000 5

MAIN HAZOP FOLLOW UP - UTILITIES PLANT SPC. N.
: 00-ZA-E-85101
Action Response Sheet Rev.: 5
Company: ENGRO
Facility: Utilities Plants
Session: 1 Date: 04/02/2008

Node: (1) Condensate Recovery Vessel 12-V-1203 equipped with Condensate Cooler 12-E-1201 and relevant Recovery Condensate Pumps 12-P-1203 A/B.
Drawings: 12-GD-B-86540 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
13-GD-B-86550 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-PD-A-87658 Sh 1 of 1 Rev. 1
Ref. N. Parameter GW Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations By Comments Project Response Signature Closure Date
W.1 Flow 1.10. More flow in 1.10.1. 1.10.1.1. Possible 1.10.1.1.1. W1. Verify the size of SP-AUS. 6 inch is adequate for 25/07/2008
the line 8'-1203 Malfunction of V-1203 overfilling Automatic start of the overflow line for overflow considering the
pressure control and showering of stand-by pump P- this scenario. maximum flow rate (6 t/h) of
loop PIC-6201 hot condensate to 1203A/B on HHLL condensate entering into 12-V-
with valve fully ground through by logic I-1201 1203. The velocity is 0.083
open. the vent line with activation on LXT- m/s with negligible head
potential for 6202; 1.10.1.1.2. losses
operators injuries.LAH-6201.;
1.10.1.1.3. 6' over
flow line.
W.2 Flow 1.10. More flow in 1.10.1. 1.10.1.2. Possible 1.10.1.2.1. Vent line W2. Consider to SP-AUS. Implemented in P&ID 12-GD- 06/05/2008
the line 8'-1203 Malfunction of V-1203 design sized to release the provide a high flow B-86540 (U10) rev. 3
pressure control pressure maximum steam alarm on existing FI-
loop PIC-6201 exceeding due to flow coming from 6202.
with valve fully higher amount of PV-6201 fully open.
open. steam generated.
W.3 Flow 1.10. More flow in 1.10.1. 1.10.1.2. Possible 1.10.1.2.1. Vent line W3. Provide in the SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
the line 8'-1203 Malfunction of V-1203 design sized to release the operating manual ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 9.
pressure control pressure maximum steam guideline to verify the Para 2.5.1
loop PIC-6201 exceeding due to flow coming from pressure and
with valve fully higher amount of PV-6201 fully open. temperature inside the
open. steam generated. equipment in case of
high flow alarm.
W.4 Flow Reverse 1.11. Reverse 1.11.1. Flow 1.11.1.1. Possible 1.11.1.1.1. FO- W4. To be confirmed SP-MAC / The purpose of FO is only for 06/05/2008
Flow in the stand- orifice FO- pump damage due 6302A/B are 3mm by machine Vendor warm-up. No reverse rotation
by pump 6302A/B on to reverse rotation. size with no impact department and pump is expected through 3 mm
discharge line check valve by- on the pumps. vendor. hole.
pass.
Node 1 - Page 1 of 59
MAIN HAZOP FOLLOW UP - UTILITIES PLANT SPC. N.: 00-ZA-E-85101
Company: ENGRO

13-GD-B-86550 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-PD-A-87658 Sh 1 of 1 Rev. 1
W.5 Temperature More 1.13. Higher 1.13.1. Possible 1.13.1.1. Possible 1.13.1.1.1. TAH- W5. Verify the SP-AUS Even if the condensates 06/05/2008
Temperature in upsets in the V-1203 and 6304.; 1.13.1.1.2. maximum temperature temperatures could be higher
the line 6'-1208. upstream units connected lines The of the than the design temperature
(steam trap design condensate/steam condensate/steam of 12-V-1203, the vessel is
failure). temperature equilibrium coming from the atmospheric and the
exceeding. temperature at the ammonia plant condensates have a flash
V-1203 design entering the vessel that leads
pressure is lower in any case to a temperature
than vessel design not exceeding 148°C that is
temperature (refer the equilibrium temperature of
to doc. Nr. 00-ZA-E- 3.5 kg/cm2g (design pressure
86010). of 12-V-1203)
W.6 Temperature 1.14. Higher 1.14.1. Possible 1.14.1.1. Possible 1.14.1.1.1. TAH- W6. Verify the SP-AUS Even if the condensates 06/05/2008
the line 3'-1300 upstream units connected lines The of the than the design temperature
exceeding. temperature at the utilities plant condensates have a flash
86010). of 12-V-1203)
W.7 Temperature 1.15. Higher 1.15.1. Possible 1.15.1.1. Possible 1.15.1.1.1. TAH- W7. Verify the SP-AUS Even if the condensates 06/05/2008
the line 8'-1203 upstream units connected lines The of the than the design temperature
exceeding. temperature at the ammonia plant. condensates have a flash
86010). of 12-V-1203)
Company: ENGRO

13-GD-B-86550 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-PD-A-87658 Sh 1 of 1 Rev. 1
W.8 Temperature 1.16. Higher 1.16.1. 1.16.1.1. Possible 1.16.1.1.1. TAH- W8. Specify in the SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Temperaure in V- Overheated vessel design 6304.; 1.16.1.1.2. operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
1203 steam from the temperature The proper monitoring and Para 2.2.1
upstream units exceeding and condensate/steam maintenance
due to possible damage. equilibrium procedure for the
upsets (steam temperature at the steam traps.
trap failure) V-1203 design
pressure is lower
than vessel design
temperature (refer
to doc. Nr. 00-ZA-E-
86010).
W.9 Pressure More 1.17. Higher 1.17.1. Failure of 1.17.1.1. 1.17.1.1.1. None. W9. Specify in the SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Pressure in the 6'- one steam trap in Increasing of operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
1208. the upstream unit. back pressure in proper monitoring and Para 2.2.1
the header with maintenance
possible difficult procedure for the
discharge of the steam traps.
other steam traps.
W.10 Pressure 1.18. Higher 1.18.1. Failure of 1.18.1.1. 1.18.1.1.1. None. W10. Specify in the SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Pressure in the 3'- one steam trap in Increasing of operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
1300. the upstream unit. back pressure in proper monitoring and Para 2.2.1
the header with maintenance
possible difficult procedure for the
discharge of the steam traps.
other steam traps.
W.11 Level More 1.28. Higher Level 1.28.1. 1.28.1.1. Possible 1.28.1.1.1. 6' over W11. Verify the SP-TUB. In order to avoid potential 25/07/2008
in V-1203. Malfunction of V-1203 overfilling flow line.; location of the vent showering on operators, vent
level control loop and showering of 1.28.1.1.2. LXAHH- with respect to the outlet has been rotated in the
LIC-6201 with hot condensate to 6202.; 1.28.1.1.3. possible showering of opposite direction of the
valve closure . ground through Vent discharge to condensate. operator platform and 200
the vent line with safe location as mm of horizontal pipe has
potential for steam/condensate been added at the vent outlet.
operators injuries. release. Refer to 60% 3D model
Company: ENGRO

13-GD-B-86550 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-PD-A-87658 Sh 1 of 1 Rev. 1
W.12 Level More 1.28. Higher Level 1.28.5. Tube 1.28.5.2. Higher 1.28.5.2.1. AIH- W12. Verify the SP-AUS. There is no impact in a short 06/05/2008
in V-1203. rupture in E-1201 conductivity of 6201 (conductivity) potential for impact of time due to dilution of 9 m3/h
with release of make up water to at pump discharge the higher conductivity versus 400 m3/h, but the
CW in the vessel. deaerator and line to the in regards of the polishing unit is able to accept
boilers. deaerator. downstream systems. a higher conductivity for a
short period increasing the
number of regeneration
cycles
Company: ENGRO

Node: (2) Turbine condensate through Turbine Condensate Cooler 12-E-1202 to Intermediate Water Storage Tank 12-T-1201. Water to Polishing Unit by Intermediate Water Pumps 12-P-1201 A/B.
12-GD-B-86543 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.13 Flow No 2.1. No Flow in the 2.1.1. Malfunction 2.1.1.1. Possible 2.1.1.1.1. None. W13. Verify the design SP-AUS / OSBL upstream line will be 12/02/2009
8'-6000 line (demi of level control design pressure pressure of the ENGRO protected by PSV. Pump
water from B.L.). loop LIC-6221 exceeding in the upstream unit and if shutoff pressure is less than
with valve upstream line and necessary provide maximum pressure
closure. damage. protection. communicated by Contractor
as part of LEDD
W.14 Temperature More 2.12. Higher 2.12.1. Possible 2.12.1.1. Possible 2.12.1.1.1. TAH- W14. Verify the pump SP-AUS 2.12.1.1.1. The value of NPSH @ 60°C 06/05/2008
Temperature in upset in the condensate 6261 at polishing P-1201A/B NPSH The has been verified and it is in
the line 8'-1201 or upstream unit. heating in the tank feed line.; available at 60°C. maximum compliance with the value
in the line 8'-1202 during long period 2.12.1.1.2. TAH- condensate required by pump Vendor
from urea plant. and possible T- 6222.; 2.12.1.1.3. temperature (see pump Vendor
1201 design Polishing unit coming from documentation 12-MA-E-
temperature (85 designed for the urea unit in 31050)
°C) exceeding and maximum case of upset
damage in case of temperature of the is about 100
tank empty. turbine condensate °C from the
(60°C). line 8'-1201
and about
120 °C from
the line 8'-
1202
W.15 Temperature More 2.12. Higher 2.12.1. Possible 2.12.1.1. Possible 2.12.1.1.1. TAH- W15. Verify the SP-AUS / 2.12.1.1.1. The max condensate 25/07/2008
Temperature in upset in the condensate 6261 at polishing scenario and provide SP-PRC The temperatures coming from
the line 8'-1201 or upstream unit. heating in the tank feed line.; protection if necessary maximum urea plant is about 100°C and
in the line 8'-1202 during long period 2.12.1.1.2. TAH- condensate 120°C, but each condensate
from urea plant. and possible T- 6222.; 2.12.1.1.3. temperature line has a temperature alarm
1201 design Polishing unit coming from downstream the exchanger
temperature (85 designed for the urea unit in (TAH-1073 and TAH-1173
°C) exceeding and maximum case of upset unit 10). The time needed to
damage in case of temperature of the is about 100 have an increase in
tank empty. turbine condensate °C from the condensate temperature to
(60°C). line 8'-1201 the polishing unit is very long.
and about
120 °C from
the line 8'-
1202
Company: ENGRO

Node: (2) Turbine condensate through Turbine Condensate Cooler 12-E-1202 to Intermediate Water Storage Tank 12-T-1201. Water to Polishing Unit by Intermediate Water Pumps 12-P-1201 A/B.
12-GD-B-86543 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.16 Composition As Well As 2.15. 2.15.1. Failure on 2.15.1.1. Possible

2.15.1.1.1. High W16. Consider to SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Contamination in demand of logic I- conductivity conductivity alarm provide a procedure in ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
the line 8'-1201. 1203. increase duringat the polishing unit the operating manual Para 2.1
long time of the
outlet.; 2.15.1.1.2. to check daily the
condensate sentDilution effect in the conductivity of the
tank due to
to the polish unit. condensate sent to
presence of other the polishing unit
condensate and through the existing
demi water make- sample connection.
up.
W.17 Level Less 2.19. Lower Level 2.19.2. Both the 2.19.2.1. Possible 2.19.2.1.1. LAL- W17. Verify the SP-AUS / 2.19.2.1.1. This procedure is present in 25/07/2008
in T-1201. pumps P- tank emptying 6221.; 2.19.2.1.2. possibility to inhibit the SP-MAC The minimum the C&E matrix (see doc. 12-
1201A/B running. during long Logic I-1202 trips starting of stand-by flow ZA-D-86180 ). Please refer to
periods with pump the both pumps P- pump while the main arrangement note 8 included in the logic I-
cavitation and 1201A/B on LAXLL- pump is running. is designed 1202
damage. 6222.; 2.19.2.1.3. for only one
PAXH-6221 at pump
pump discharge.; running.
2.19.2.1.4. Alarm to
DCS for
contemporary
pumps running.
Company: ENGRO
Facility: Utilities
Plants

Node: (3) Sulphuric Acid Storage Vessel 12-V-1201 with relevant Sulphuric Acid Unloading Pump 12-P-1204, Sulphuric Acid transfer Pumps 12-P-1205 A/B and Sulphuric Acid Dosing Unit 12-PK-1220. Caustic Soda
Storage Vessel 12-V-1202 with relevant Caustic Soda Unloading Pump 12-P-1206 and Caustic Soda Dosing Unit 12-PK-1230.
Drawings: 12-GD-B-86542 Sh 1of 1 Rev. 1
W.18 Flow Other Than 3.1. Loss of 3.1.1. Leakages 3.1.1.1. 3.1.1.1.1. None. W18. Provide a double SP-AUS Implemented in P&ID 12-GD- 06/05/2008
containment in V- through drain Impossibility to isolation mean on the B-86542 (U12) rev. 3
1201/ V-1202. valves. isolate the system. drain lines.
W.19 Temperature Less 3.3. Lower 3.3.1. Low 3.3.1.1. Possible 3.3.1.1.1. None. W19. Verify the SP-AUS A new system configuration 25/07/2008
Temperature in ambient check valve possibility of check has been implemented in
the V-1201 vent temperature. blockage due valve blockage due to P&ID 12-GD-B-86542 (U12)
line. condensed vapour condensed vapour rev. 3. The check valve has
crystallization. crystallization during been removed and a
winter season, if yes dedicated overflow line has
modify the design been provided with a
accordingly. hydraulic seal. The operator
will check any possible leak in
the catch basin.
W.20 Pressure More 3.5. Higher 3.5.1. 3.5.1.1. Possible 3.5.1.1.1. None. W20. Provide SP-AUS A new system configuration 25/07/2008
Pressure in V- Impossibility of vessel design protection against the has been implemented in
1201. vessel out- pressure blocked outlet. P&ID 12-GD-B-86542 (U12)
breathing due to exceeding and rev. 3. The check valve has
check valve stuck damage. been removed and a
closed in the dedicated overflow line has
overflow line . been provided with a
hydraulic seal. A dedicated
line for outbreathing has been
provided
W.21 Pressure Less 3.6. Lower 3.6.1. 3.6.1.1. Possible 3.6.1.1.1. None. W21. Provide SP-AUS A new system configuration 25/07/2008
Pressure in V- Impossibility of vessel vacuum protection against has been implemented in
1201. vessel in- design condition vessel vacuum P&ID 12-GD-B-86542 (U12)
breathing due to exceeding and condition . rev. 3. In the new
check valve stuck damage. configuration the inbreathing
closed in the vent and outbreathing line are
line . separated
W.22 Composition As Well As 3.7. 3.7.1. Operator 3.7.1.1. Possible 3.7.1.1.1. None. W22. Provide proper SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Contamination in error during equipment loading procedure in ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
V-1201/1202. loading operation damage due to the operating manual. Para 2.2.2 and Cap.5, para
: acid loading in exothermic 3.3
place of caustic reaction.
soda and
viceversa.
Company: ENGRO
Facility: Utilities
Plants

W.23 Composition As Well As 3.7. 3.7.1. Operator 3.7.1.1. Possible 3.7.1.1.1. None. W23. Verify the SP-TUB. Two different colours have 25/07/2008
Contamination in error during equipment possibility to make been foreseen. Refer to
V-1201/1202. loading operation damage due to distinguishable the SPC.00-GA-E-60701
: acid loading in exothermic acid and caustic "Specification for external
place of caustic reaction. loading line with painting" rev.1
soda and different colours.
viceversa.
W.24 Composition As Well As 3.8. 3.8.1. Acid (or 3.8.1.1. Possible 3.8.1.1.1. None. W24. Verify the SP-AUS / Nitrogen connection is 25/07/2008
Contamination in caustic) in the pipe damage. purpose of the SP- present only for instrument
the Nitrogen nitrogen line in Nitrogen connection to SMAUT purge. Normal position of
system by acid or case of vessel level instruments and isolation valves is open. A
caustic overfilling. the normal position of check valve has been added
the isolation valves in the P&ID 12-GD-B-86542
and evaluate if rev. 4
necessary to provide
additional protection.
W.25 Level More 3.9. Higher Level 3.9.1. Operator 3.9.1.1. Vessel 3.9.1.1.1. Catch W25. Verify that the SP-AUS / 3.9.1.1.1. For net The design of catch basin is 19/09/2008
in V-1201. mistake (i.e. overfilling basin designed to catch basin is acid SP-TUB. capacity is meant tiled with antiacid ceramic
operator misses collect the spillage resistant painted and the total capacity instead of anti-acid paint.
to stop the pump up to 30 m3 (vessel then verify the life of of the basin minus
P-1204 during net capacity).; the paint. the volume of the
vessel filling 3.9.1.1.2. LAH- vessel / other
operation). 6241. equipment inside
the same basin .;
3.9.1.1.2. The
drain valves of
vessel and pump
isolation valve
should be
accessible form
outside the basin.
Company: ENGRO
Facility: Utilities
Plants

W.26 Level More 3.9. Higher Level 3.9.1. Operator 3.9.1.1. Vessel 3.9.1.1.1. Catch W26. Verify the net SP-HSE 3.9.1.1.1. For net 1) The catch basin has been 19/09/2008
in V-1201. mistake (i.e. overfilling basin designed to catch basin capacity capacity is meant design to take into account
operator misses collect the spillage with respect to the the total capacity every possible spillages from
to stop the pump up to 30 m3 (vessel applicable standard. of the basin minus the vessel. As written in the
P-1204 during net capacity).; the volume of the P&I, the basin has the same
vessel filling 3.9.1.1.2. LAH- vessel / other capacity of the vessel
operation). 6241. equipment inside 2) The drain valves
the same basin .; accessibility were checked
3.9.1.1.2. The during the 3D model review.
drain valves of
vessel and pump
isolation valve
should be
accessible form
outside the basin.
W.27 Level More 3.9. Higher Level 3.9.1. Operator 3.9.1.1. Vessel 3.9.1.1.1. Catch W27. Verify during 3D SP 3.9.1.1.1. For net The lay-out of the system has 25/07/2008
in V-1201. mistake (i.e. overfilling basin designed to model review the lay- capacity is meant been checked and verified
operator misses collect the spillage out of the system. the total capacity during the 60% 3D model
to stop the pump up to 30 m3 (vessel of the basin minus review
P-1204 during net capacity).; the volume of the
the same basin .;
3.9.1.1.2. The
drain valves of
vessel and pump
isolation valve
should be
accessible form
outside the basin.
Company: ENGRO
Facility: Utilities
Plants

W.28 Level 3.10. Higher Level 3.10.1. Operator 3.10.1.1. Vessel 3.10.1.1.1. Catch W28. Verify that the SP-AUS / 3.10.1.1.1. For net The design of catch basin is 19/09/2008
in V-1202. mistake (i.e. overfilling basin designed to catch basin is caustic SP-TUB. capacity is meant tiled with antiacid ceramic
operator misses collect the spillage resistant painted and the total capacity instead of anti-acid paint.
to stop the pump up to 30 m3 (vessel then verify the life of of the basin minus
P-1206 during net capacity).; the paint. the volume of the
the same basin .;
3.10.1.1.2. The
drain valves of
vessel and pump
isolation valve
should be
accessible form
outside the basin.
W.29 Level 3.10. Higher Level 3.10.1. Operator 3.10.1.1. Vessel 3.10.1.1.1. Catch W29. Verify the net SP-HSE 3.10.1.1.1. For net 1) The catch basin has been 19/09/2008
in V-1202. mistake (i.e. overfilling basin designed to catch basin capacity capacity is meant design to take into account
operator misses collect the spillage with respect to the the total capacity every possible spillages from
to stop the pump up to 30 m3 (vessel applicable standard. of the basin minus the vessel. As written in the
P-1206 during net capacity).; the volume of the P&I, the bas has the same
vessel filling 3.10.1.1.2. LAH- vessel / other capacity of the vessel
operation). 6243. equipment inside 2) The drain valves
the same basin .; accessibility were checked
3.10.1.1.2. The during the 3D model review.
drain valves of
vessel and pump
isolation valve
should be
accessible form
outside the basin.
Company: ENGRO
Facility: Utilities
Plants

W.30 Level 3.10. Higher Level 3.10.1. Operator 3.10.1.1. Vessel 3.10.1.1.1. Catch W30. Verify during 3D SP 3.10.1.1.1. For net The lay-out of the system has 25/07/2008
in V-1202. mistake (i.e. overfilling basin designed to model review the lay- capacity is meant been checked and verified
operator misses collect the spillage out of the system. the total capacity during the 60% 3D model
to stop the pump up to 30 m3 (vessel of the basin minus review
P-1206 during net capacity).; the volume of the
the same basin .;
3.10.1.1.2. The
drain valves of
vessel and pump
isolation valve
should be
accessible form
outside the basin.
W.31 Maintenance Other Than 3.13. Difficult 3.13.1. Lack of 3.13.1.1. 3.13.1.1.1. None. W31. Revise the SP-AUS Drainage points have been ok 06/05/2008
Maintenance on drain valves in Impossibility to drainage points revised and shown in P&ID 12-
the system different points of drain the pipe. accordingly. GD-B-86542 (U12) rev. 3
the system.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (4) Sulphuric Acid from Sulphuric Acid Dosing Unit, Caustic Soda from Caustic Soda and Dosing Unit, Exhaust Hydrochloric Acid from Electrochlorination Unit and Backwash Water from Demineralised water
storage tank to Polishing Unit 12-PK-1210.
Drawings: 12-GD-B-86542 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1; 12-GD-B-86543 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
12-GD-B-86544 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1; 12-PD-A-87004 Sh 1of 2 Rev. 1;
12-PD-A-87004 Sh 2 of 2 Rev. 1
W.32 Flow No 4.1. No Flow in 8'- 4.1.1. XV-6401 C 4.1.1.1. Increase 4.1.1.1.1. FAL-6401 W32. Provide a proper SP-PACK This information is included in 16/01/2009
1224 (C-1210 C) fails closed of flowrate in the C; 4.1.1.1.2. FAH- time delay for the the revision 3 of document
during absorption other mixed bad 6401 B; 4.1.1.1.3. closure of the XV-6402 SPC.N. 00-PA-E-87016
phase (C-1210 B) in AAH-6401 B; B and XV-6401 B in "Control Narratives & Process
operation with 4.1.1.1.4. Large order to allow the description for condensate
possible demi hold up time in the operator a proper polishing package 12-PK-
water out of spec upstream (8 h) and action (start the 3rd 1210"
at the outlet and down stream (12 h) mixed bed if not in
stop also of the tank; 4.1.1.1.5. Trip regeneration, reopen
second mixed bed alarm XXA-6401 C the closed valve, or put
(C-1210 B) in for valve the unit in shut down)
operation due to discrepancy
high conductivity position
W.33 Flow Reverse 4.5. Reverse Flow 4.5.1. XV-6403 C 4.5.1.1. Water in 4.5.1.1.1. Trip alarm W33. Consider to Vendor Check valve has been 31/07/2008
in the line 3'-1224 fails open the caustic circuit XXA-6403 C for provide a check valve provided. Refer to P&ID 12-
during absorption with possible valve discrepancy in the line PD-A-87004 rev.2
phase unproper position
regeneration in the
other mixed bed
W.34 Flow Reverse 4.11. Reverse 4.11.1. XV-6406 4.11.1.1. Acid and 4.11.1.1.1. Trip W34. Consider to Vendor Done. Refer to P&ID 12-PD-A- 31/07/2008
Flow in the line 4'- C fails open caustic diluted alarm XXA-6406 C move the spec break 87004 rev.2
1205 during solution to the for valve 11A/H2 before the
regeneration blower and discrepancy check valve provided
phase possible damage position; 4.11.1.1.2. on the line in order to
Check valve make the check valve
provided in the line; suitable for diluted
4.11.1.1.3. acid and caustic
Additional check service
valve provided at
blower discharge
Company: ENGRO

12-PD-A-87004 Sh 2 of 2 Rev. 1
W.35 Temperature More 4.12. Higher 4.12.1. 4.12.1.1. Possible 4.12.1.1.1. FAL- W35. Provide in the Vendor This procedure will be 03/02/2009
Temperature in Exothermic damage in the 6403; 4.12.1.1.2. operating manual a included in the operating
the acid feed line reaction of soda acid feed line and FAL-6402; procedure to foreseen manual. Refer to SPC 87022
and in the C-1210 and acid due to of the resin inside 4.12.1.1.3. AAH- periodically rev.1
C during the failure of the vessel 6403 to stop the maintenance and
regeneration regeneration regeneration acid calibration for the
phase water pump metering pump (not analyzer AE-6403, AE-
the neutralization 6404. Vendor to advice
pump) by the according to his
activation of the experience about the
logic P-4; frequency of the
4.12.1.1.4. AAH- calibration
6404 to stop the
regeneration
caustic metering
pump (not the
neutralization
pump) by the
activation of the
logic P-4;
4.12.1.1.5.
Regeneration water
pumps failure signal
stops the acid and
caustic
regeneration
metering pumps
(not the
neutralization
pump) by activation
of the logic P-4
Company: ENGRO

12-PD-A-87004 Sh 2 of 2 Rev. 1
W.36 Pressure More 4.15. Higher 4.15.1. Thermal 4.15.1.1. Design 4.15.1.1.1. PSV- W36. The isolation Vendor 4.15.1.1.1. Contractor contirms that 19/09/2008
Pressure in C- expansion of pressure 6401 C provided valves upstream PSV- Extend this isolation valves are lockable.
1210 C liquid trapped in exceeding and against thermal 6401 C must be locked recommendat Refer to P&ID 12-PD-A-87004
equipment relief open ion to all the
damage isolation
valves
located
upstream all
the PSV of
this system
W.37 Pressure More 4.16. Higher 4.16.1. Blocked 4.16.1.1. Possible 4.16.1.1.1. None W37. Provide a PSV to Vendor Valve already existing on 31/07/2008
Pressure in blower outlet blower damage protect the blower standard supplier equipment
discharge line due to design against the blocked
pressure outlet
exceeding
W.38 Composition As Well As 4.17. 4.17.1. Exhausted 4.17.1.1. Demi 4.17.1.1.1. AAH- W38. In case of other Vendor It is implemented in the 16/01/2009
Contamination: resin inside mixed water out of spec 6401 C and mixed bed in revision 3 of doc. "Control
high conductivity bed in downstream activation of logic P- regeneration consider Narratives & Process
in the line 8'-1230 tank and turbine 4 to put the C-1210 to shut down Description for Condensate
during absorption fouling and C in regeneration if automatically (through Polishing Package 12-PK-
phase corrosion of the no other mixed bed logic P-4) the C-1210 1210".
boiler is in regeneration C for high conductivity
at outlet line
W.39 Composition As Well As 4.18. 4.18.1. Exhausted 4.18.1.1. Demi 4.18.1.1.1. AAH- W39. In case of other Vendor It is implemented in the 16/01/2009
Contamination: resin inside mixed water out of spec 6402 C and mixed bed in revision 3 of doc. "Control
high silica content bed in downstream activation of logic P- regeneration consider Narratives & Process
in the line 8'-1230 tank and turbine 4 to put the C-1210 to shut down Description for Condensate
during absorption fouling and C in regeneration if automatically (through Polishing Package 12-PK-
phase in silica corrosion of the no other mixed bed logic P-4) the C-1210 1210".
mode boiler is in regeneration C for high silica
content at outlet line
Company: ENGRO

12-PD-A-87004 Sh 2 of 2 Rev. 1
W.40 Composition Other Than 4.20. Incorrect 4.20.1. Presence 4.20.1.1. Possible 4.20.1.1.1. None W40. Provide basin / Vendor / 4.20.1.1.1. This point has been cheched 25/07/2008
Material for the CB-of acid or caustic basin damage due connected trench acid SP Internal and verified during the 60%
1210 water to corrosion and caustic resistant clarification 3D model review. The
leaching to the lining according to about the material used is caustic
ground with vendor advice line material resistant
possible scope of
environment supply
pollution
W.41 Level More 4.21. Higher Level 4.21.1. Prolonged 4.21.1.1. Possible 4.21.1.1.1. LAH- W41. Verify the SP-AUS 4.21.1.1.1. In Based on document 00-ZA-E- 06/05/2008
in CB-1210 regeneration on basin overfilling 6401 and LAHH- suitability of the WY case of high 86500 and Conceptual
the washing with release of 6401. The operator and relevant pipe liquid level in Effluent Scheme the chemical
phase in the potentially warned by the high material to receive the basin the overfilling has been routed to
upstream mixed contaminated level alarm can shut possible contaminated P-1211 is UY network and shown in
bed water down the upstream water from the automatically P&ID 12-GD-B-86543 (U13)
mixed bed; neutralisation basin started but rev. 3
4.21.1.1.2. 10' and provide the water is
overflow line to alternative if necessary recirculated
discharge the water in the basin
to WY (P&ID U-13) until the
correct pH is
reached
W.42 Maintenance Other Than 4.23. Unsafe 4.23.1. Possible 4.23.1.1. Possible 4.23.1.1.1. None W42. Provide a Vendor Implemented in P&ID 12-GD- 06/05/2008
Maintenance in C- caustic and/or operator injury second isolation valve B-86542 (U12) rev. 3
1210 C acid leakage in the lines
through the valve
XV-6403 C and
XV-6405 C
W.43 Maintenance Other Than 4.24. Difficult 4.24.1. Missing of 4.24.1.1. 4.24.1.1.1. None W43. Provide draining Vendor Implemented in P&ID 12-GD- 06/05/2008
maintenance in draining valves impossibility to valve on pump B-86542 (U12) rev. 3
the caustic and perform a safe suction/discharge
acid metering maintenance
pumps
Company: ENGRO

Node: (5) Demineralized Water Storage Tank 12-TK-1202 and relevant Demineralized Water Pumps 12-P-1202 A/B. Water Pump 12-P-1202 A operated by Steam Turbine 12-TP-1202 A.
Drawings: 12-GD-B-86544 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.44 Flow Reverse 5.4. Reverse Flow 5.4.1. Pump P- 5.4.1.1. Possible 5.4.1.1.1. None. W44. Verify the demi ENGRO Company confirm that Water 10/02/2009
in the 6'-1209 1202 stops demi water water inlet nozzle inlet nozzle is at tank top
(demi water from storage tank at location, in the
B.L. 2) B.L.2 emptying for downstream tank
long period . OSBL2, to care this
scenario.
W.45 Pressure More 5.5. Higher 5.5.1. Line 5.5.1.1. Possible 5.5.1.1.1. PSV- W45. Verify with the SP-MAC Protections are already 19/09/2008
Pressure in the blocked outlet. line /turbine 6395. selected turbine provided. Refer to Vendor
line 4'-1202 design pressure vendor the presence drawing (12-MB-D-36138)
(steam from exceeding and of turbine protection where dedicated valves are
turbine TP- damage. against the blocked provided. Refers also to
1202A). outlet. Control Narrative (12-MB-E-
36576)
W.46 Pressure More 5.6. Higher 5.6.1. Upstream 5.6.1.1. Turbine 5.6.1.1.1. None. W46. Verify with SP-MAC Overspeed protection is 06/05/2008
Pressure in the pressure overspeed and turbine vendor the based by governor. See SPC.
line 3'-1201 (LHS controller failure. possible damage. presence of 12-MA-E-31055
to turbine TP- overspeed protection.
1202A).
W.47 Pressure More 5.7. Higher 5.7.1. Turbine 5.7.1.1. Possible 5.7.1.1.1. All the W47. Verify that the ENGRO. Line design pressure is 10/02/2009
Pressure in the overspeed. line and down- lines/equipment line design pressure equivalent to Contractor line
line 12'-1208 stream equipment located downstream OSBL2 is in design pressure
(pump P-1202A/B design pressure the pump discharge accordance with the
discharge line). exceeding and are designed design pressure of the
damage. accordingly. pump discharge up to
the last isolating valve
before the tank, or that
there is no possibility
of blocked outlet
OSBL.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (5) Demineralized Water Storage Tank 12-TK-1202 and relevant Demineralized Water Pumps 12-P-1202 A/B. Water Pump 12-P-1202 A operated by Steam Turbine 12-TP-1202 A.
W.48 Phase More 5.9. Presence of 5.9.1. Low 5.9.1.1. Possible 5.9.1.1.1. Line is W48. Specify in the SP-AUS. 5.9.1.1.1. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
condensate in the ambient turbine damage. isolated.; 5.9.1.1.2. operating manual a During ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
line 3'-1201 (LHS temperature Presence of steam proper monitoring and normal Para 2.1
to turbine TP- (especially during traps located at line maintenance operation
1202A). start-up). low points upstream procedure for the condensation
of the automatic steam traps. is not
on/off valve XV- expected and
6281. there is no de-
superheater
in the
upstream
line.
W.49 Level Less 5.11. Lower Level 5.11.1. 5.11.1.1. Possible 5.11.1.1.1. LSXLL- W49. Provide proper SP-AUS 5.11.1.1.1. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
in the tank T- Malfunction of tank emptying 6282A/B/C (2oo3 operating procedure in Tank sized ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
1202. level control loop during long period voting system) the operating manual for 12 hours Para 2.2.3
LIC-6281 with with potential for alarm and pump trip to check periodically of hold up.
valve closure. pump cavitation by logic I-1206 the level in the T-1202
and damage. activation. from local level field
indication
W.50 Safety Other Than 5.12. Less Safety 5.12.1. Possibility 5.12.1.1. Possible 5.12.1.1.1. None. W50. Provide to lock SP-AUS The FO present in the old 19/09/2008
on TP-1202A. to by-pass the turbine damage. close the valves configuration to keep hot the
turbine shut-down located in the XV-6281 turbine has been removed
action (XV-6281 by-pass line. after a check with the turbine
closure) by Vendor. In the P&ID 12-GD-B-
means of by pass 86544 rev. 4 only one valve is
valve opening. present on the by-pass line
and it is LC
W.51 Safety Other Than 5.12. Less Safety 5.12.1. Possibility 5.12.1.1. Possible 5.12.1.1.1. None. W51. Provide in the SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
on TP-1202A. to by-pass the turbine damage. operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 5.
turbine shut-down proper procedure to Para 3.3
action (XV-6281 operate the by-pass
closure) by during start-up.
means of by pass
valve opening.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (6) Demineralized Water from Deaerator 13-V-1301 to KP/HP BFW Pumps 13-P-1301 A/B/C. BFW Injection facilities constituted by BFW Oxygen Scavenger Dosing Unit 13-PK-1310 and BFW Corrosion
Inhibitor Dosing Unit 13-PK-1320.
13-GD-B-86550 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1; 13-GD-B-86551 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.52 Temperature More 6.1. Higher 6.1.1. LV-6602B 6.1.1.1. 6.1.1.1.1. None. W52. Provide in the SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Temperature in fails closed during Undesirable hot operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 5.
CB-1301 overflow deaerator water to the white procedure to keep the Para 4.3 and Cap. 9, para
line to WY. overflow through sewer and then to basin full of cold 3.5.1
LV-6602A. the effluent water. In case of
collection pit. overflow in the
deaerator the operator
, warned by alarm for
LV-6602A not closed,
shall verify the opening
of the LV-6602B and
in case of valve
malfunction operates
the by-pass valve.
W.53 Temperature More 6.1. Higher 6.1.1. LV-6602B 6.1.1.1. 6.1.1.1.1. None. W53. Consider to ENGRO ENGRO confirms the line is 19/09/2008
Temperature in fails closed during Undesirable hot provide temperature presence of TI designed for
CB-1301 overflow deaerator water to the white indication on the 50 °C
line to WY. overflow through sewer and then to effluent , flowing
LV-6602A. the effluent outside the plant ,
collection pit. downstream the
collection pit.
W.54 Pressure More 6.3. Higher 6.3.1. Malfunction 6.3.1.2. Possible 6.3.1.2.1. None. W54. Vent and PSVs SP-TUB Vent and PSVs discharge 25/07/2008
Pressure in V- of pressure hot condensate discharge lines to be lines have a 45° elbow to
1301. control loop PIC- carry over and located at safe location avoid showering on operators.
6601 with valve showering through considering the Refer to 3D model
fully open. the vent line. possibility of hot
condensate showering.
W.55 Pressure Less 6.4. Lower 6.4.1. Malfunction 6.4.1.1. Possible 6.4.1.1.1. FAL-6602 W55. Verify with pump SP-AUS The NPSH required by pump 06/05/2008
Pressure in V- of pressure BFW pump in the steam line.; vendor if the pumps Vendor is 5.4 m, the NPSH
1301 control loop PIC- damage due to 6.4.1.1.2. TAL-6702 can run with upstream calculated is 13.3 m. The
6601 with valve decreasing of the atmospheric pressure difference of 7.9 m is an
closure available NPSH . without damage. adequate margin shown in
NPSH curve supplied by
pump Vendor
Company: ENGRO

W.56 Composition As Well As 6.5. 6.5.2. Oxygen 6.5.2.1. Increasing 6.5.2.1.1. None. W56. Provide SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Contamination: scavenger dosing of corrosion in the procedure in the ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
more Oxygen system failure. downstream operating manual for Para 3.2.1
content in the system during routine monitoring of
BFW . long period. dosing unit.
W.57 Composition As Well As 6.6. 6.6.1. High high 6.6.1.1. Possible 6.6.1.1.1. None W57. Verify with SP-AUS. Based on Nalco Eliminox 15/01/2009
Contamination: level in the V- environment vendor the (chemicals used in this
Oxygen scavenger 1301. contamination. acceptability of the contest) there is not possibility
in the white sewer release of water to contaminate surface water
through the V- containing oxygen and than environmental
1301 overflow line. scavenger (at the
deaerator
concentration) to the
environment .
W.58 Composition Part Of 6.7. Missing 6.7.1. Corrosion 6.7.1.1. Increasing 6.7.1.1.1. None. W58. Provide SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Component: Loss inhibitor dosing of corrosion in the procedure in the ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
of corrosion system failure. downstream operating manual for Para 3.2.1
inhibitor in the system during routine monitoring of
BFW. long period. dosing unit.
W.59 Level More 6.8. Higher Level 6.8.1. Malfunction 6.8.1.1. Vessel 6.8.1.1.1. LAH- W59. Verify with the SP- The safety valves are not 19/09/2008
in V-1301. of level control overfilling and 6602; 6.8.1.1.2. de-aerator vendor the AUS/Ven verified against this scenario,
loop LIC-6601 possible damage LAHH-6602 to open PSV-6781 and PSV- dor but the protection of the
with valve fully due to design the overflow valve 6782 against this vessel (independent LAH,
open. pressure LV-6602A. scenario. LAH & LHCO, PAH) is
exceeding. ensured by the overflow line
that has been calculated for
the maximum incoming flow
rate. TAH-6601 is also
provided for this scenario
W.60 Level More 6.8. Higher Level 6.8.1. Malfunction 6.8.1.2. Vessel 6.8.1.2.1. LAH- W60. Vent to be SP-TUB This point has been verified 25/07/2008
in V-1301. of level control overfilling and hot 6602; 6.8.1.2.2. located at safe location during the 60% 3D model
loop LIC-6601 condensate LAHH-6602 to open considering the review. No possibility of
with valve fully showering through the overflow valve possibility of hot showering
open. the vent line. LV-6602A. condensate showering.
Company: ENGRO

W.61 Level More 6.8. Higher Level 6.8.2. BFW 6.8.2.1. Vessel 6.8.2.1.1. LAH- W61. Verify with the SP- The safety valves are not 19/09/2008
in V-1301. pumps fail overfilling due to 6602; 6.8.2.1.2. de-aerator vendor the AUS/Ven verified against this scenario,
stopped. the continuous LAHH-6602 to open PSV-6781 and PSV- dor but the protection of the
flow of recovered the overflow valve 6782 against this vessel (indipendent LAH, LAH
condensate in the LV-6602A. scenario. & LHCO, PAH) is ensured by
3'-1201 line and the overflow line that has
condensing steam been calculated for the
in the 18'-1307 maximum incoming flow rate,
line with possible moreover the alarms LAXH-
damage due to 6602 and LAXHH-6602 in
design pressure control room will advise the
exceeding. operator of the possible
overflow from the deaerator to
the overflow pit
W.62 Level More 6.8. Higher Level 6.8.2. BFW 6.8.2.2. Vessel 6.8.2.2.1. LAH- W62. Vent to be SP-TUB This point has been verified 25/07/2008
in V-1301. pumps fail overfilling due to 6602; 6.8.2.2.2. located at safe location during the 60% 3D model
stopped. the continuous LAHH-6602 to open considering the review. No possibility of
flow of recovered the overflow valve possibility of hot showering
condensate in the LV-6602A. condensate showering.
3'-1201 line and
condensing steam
in the 18'-1307
line with hot
condensate
showering through
the vent line.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (7) Demineralized Water from Deaerator to HP BFW Header for Desuperheaters and to Ammonia Plant pumped by KP/HP BFW Pumps 13-P-1301 A/B/C. 13-P-1301 A operated by Steam Turbine 13-TP-
1301 A.
13-GD-B-86551 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.63 Flow Reverse 7.2. Reverse Flow 7.2.1. Flow orifice 7.2.1.1. Possible 7.2.1.1.1. FO- W63. To be confirmed SP-MAC/ The purpose of FO is only for 06/05/2008
in the stand-by FO-6721A/B/C on pump damage due 6721A/B/C are by machine Vendor warm-up. No reverse rotation
BFW pump MOV and check to reverse rotation. 3mm size with no department and pump is expected through 3 mm
discharge line valve by-pass impact on the vendor. hole.
line. pumps.
W.64 Pressure More 7.3. Higher 7.3.1. Check 7.3.1.1. Possible 7.3.1.1.1. None. W64. Provide SP-AUS. Check valve removed in P&ID 06/05/2008
Pressure in the valve stuck line damage due adequate protection. 13-GD-B-86550 (U15) rev. 3
line 8'-1315. closed. to design pressure due to the location of the
exceeding nozzle over the high high
level and to the machine
protections against the
reverse flow
W.65 Pressure More 7.4. Higher 7.4.1. Outlet 7.4.1.1. Line 7.4.1.1.1. None. W65. Verify with SP-AUS / Design pressure modified and 19/09/2008
Pressure in the blocked. damage due to vendor the shut-off SP-MAC. PSV added to accomodate
line 4'-1316. design pressure condition of the HP the shut off conditions of the
exceeding. BFW extraction and pump in P&ID 13-GD-B-
make the line design 86551 (U16) rev. 3
pressure consistent or
provide alternative
protection.
W.66 Pressure More 7.5. Higher 7.5.1. Blocked 7.5.1.1. Possible 7.5.1.1.1. None. W66. Verify with pump SP-AUS / Contractor confirms that for 19/09/2008
Pressure in the outlet. downstream vendor the maximum SP-MAC. this scenario the design
pumps header equipment pump shut-off pressure is according to
discharge 14'- damage due to pressure, considering maximum shut-off pressure
1311 line. design pressure the turbine overspeed,
exceeding. and if necessary
provide adequate
protection.
W.67 Pressure More 7.6. Higher 7.6.1. Line 7.6.1.1. Possible 7.6.1.1.1. PSV- W67. Verify with the SP-MAC PSV-6788 on dicharge line is 19/09/2008
Pressure in the blocked outlet. line /turbine 6788. selected turbine added in the rev. 4 of P&ID to
line 14'-1300 design pressure vendor the presence take into account of the shut
(steam from exceeding and of turbine protection off condition
turbine TP- damage. against the blocked
1301A). outlet.
Company: ENGRO

1301 A.
13-GD-B-86551 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.68 Pressure More 7.7. Higher 7.7.1. Upstream 7.7.1.1. Turbine 7.7.1.1.1. None. W68. Verify with SP-MAC Contractor confirms that 19/09/2008
Pressure in the pressure overspeed and turbine vendor the overspeed protection on the
line 8'-1300 (LHS controller failure. possible damage. presence of turbine is provided (P&I 13-
to turbine TP- overspeed protection. MB-B-36904)
1301A).
W.69 Phase More 7.9. Presence of 7.9.1. Low 7.9.1.1. Possible 7.9.1.1.1. Line is W69. Provide steam SP-AUS 7.9.1.1.1. Steam trap has been added 06/05/2008
condensate in the ambient turbine damage. isolated. traps located at line During and shown in P&ID 13-GD-B-
line 8-1300 (LHS temperature low points upstream of normal 86551 rev. 3
to turbine TP- (especially during the automatic on/off operation
1301A) start-up). valve XV-6631. condensation
is not
expected and
there is no de-
superheater
in the
upstream
line.
W.70 Phase More 7.9. Presence of 7.9.1. Low 7.9.1.1. Possible 7.9.1.1.1. Line is W70. Specify in the SP-AUS 7.9.1.1.1. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
condensate in the ambient turbine damage. isolated. operating manual a During ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
line 8-1300 (LHS temperature proper monitoring and normal Para 3.2.2
to turbine TP- (especially during maintenance operation
1301A) start-up). procedure for the condensation
steam traps. is not
expected and
there is no de-
superheater
in the
upstream
line.
W.71 Safety Other Than 7.10. Less Safety 7.10.1. Possibility 7.10.1.1. Possible 7.10.1.1.1. None. W71. Provide to lock SP-AUS The FO present in the old 25/07/2008
on TP-1301A. to by-pass the turbine damage. close the valves configuration to keep hot the
turbine shut-down located in the XV-6631 turbine has been removed
action (XV-6631 by-pass line. after a check with the turbine
closure) by Vendor. In the P&ID 13-GD-B-
means of by pass 86551 rev. 4 only one valve is
valve opening. present on the by-pass line
and it is CSC
Company: ENGRO

1301 A.
13-GD-B-86551 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.72 Safety Other Than 7.10. Less Safety 7.10.1. Possibility 7.10.1.1. Possible 7.10.1.1.1. None. W72. Provide in the SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
on TP-1301A. to by-pass the turbine damage. operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 5.
turbine shut-down proper procedure to Para 4.3
action (XV-6631 operate the by-pass
closure) by during start-up.
means of by pass
valve opening.
ENGRO

Node: (8) LHS to LS through LHS/LS Letdown Desuperheater 13-E-1301. LHS Steam Vent Silencer 13-L-1301 on LHS vent line and LS Steam Vent Silencers 13-L-1302 A/B on LS vent lines.
W.73 Flow No 8.1. No Flow in the 8.1.1. Malfunction 8.1.1.1. Loss of 8.1.1.1.1. None. W73. Verify the SP / Line will be blinded at BL-2. In 10/02/2009
10'-1304 (LS to of flow control steam export . potential for hazard ENGRO. case of future utilization of
OSBL1). loop FIC-6663 issues in case of no this line, hazard protection will
with valve flow to the downstream be provided
closure. system and if
necessary provide
protection.
W.74 Flow More 8.2. More Flow in 8.2.1. Malfunction 8.2.1.1. Increasing 8.2.1.1.1. None. W74. Verify the SP / Line will be blinded at BL-2. In 10/02/2009
the 10'-1304 (LS of flow control of steam export potential for hazard ENGRO. case of future utilization of
to OSBL1). loop FIC-6663 with possible issues in case of more this line, hazard protection will
with valve fully downstream flow to the downstream be provided
open. upset. system and if
necessary provide
protection.
W.75 Temperature More 8.3. Higher 8.3.1. Malfunction 8.3.1.1. Loss of 8.3.1.1.1. TAXH- W75. Verify that the SP-AUS. A simulation has been carried 25/07/2008
Temperature in of temperature steam 662A/B/C (2oo3 downstream out and the temperature
the 24'-1301 control loop TIC- desuperheating voting system) to piping/equipment are increase has been evaluated
(downstream the 6661 with valve with possible activate the logic I- designed to withstand in 10°C over the design only
desuperheater) closure. design 1303 to close the this scenario. for the particular contingency
temperature PV-6661A/B. indicated (malfunction) and
exceeding and with an alarm of high
damage in the temperature raised in control
downstream room. ASME B31.3 par.
piping/equipment . 302.2.4 "Allowances for
pressure and temperature
variations" says that
occasional variations of
pressures and/or temperature
may occur in a piping system
for no more of 20% per 50 hr
for any one time and no more
than 500 hr/yr
ENGRO

Node: (8) LHS to LS through LHS/LS Letdown Desuperheater 13-E-1301. LHS Steam Vent Silencer 13-L-1301 on LHS vent line and LS Steam Vent Silencers 13-L-1302 A/B on LS vent lines.
W.76 Pressure More 8.5. Higher 8.5.1. Malfunction 8.5.1.1. Possible 8.5.1.1.1. PSV- W76. Consider to SP-AUS. 8.5.1.1.1. PV- Implemented in P&ID 13-GD- ok 06/05/2008
Pressure in the LS of pressure line design 6795A/B (2 x 50%) provide a PAH on the 6661A/B are B-86552 (U17) rev. 3
line 24'-1302. control loop PIC- pressure designed for this existing PT-6663. mechanically
6661 (or PIC- exceeding and scenario (one interlocked
6662) with valve damage with control valve open, upstream
open . release of steam up to mechanical (only one
to the atmosphere stop, and no valve can be
with possible consumption by considered in
operator injuries. downstream users). service)
W.77 Phase More 8.8. Presence of 8.8.1. Malfunction 8.8.1.1. Possible 8.8.1.1.1. Line is W77. Provide steam SP-AUS 8.8.1.1.1. According to PRG-TP-PIP- 06/05/2008
condensate in the of temperature upset in the isolated. trap to be located at / SP- These two 1002 (cap. 4.6.2) every 30-40
line 24'-1301. control loop TIC- downstream line low points . TUB. recommendat meters steam traps are
6661 with valve users. ions shall be provided.
fully open. extended to
all the steam
network
W.78 Phase More 8.8. Presence of 8.8.1. Malfunction 8.8.1.1. Possible 8.8.1.1.1. Line is W78. Specify in the SP-AUS. 8.8.1.1.1. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
condensate in the of temperature upset in the isolated. operating manual a These two ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
line 24'-1301. control loop TIC- downstream proper monitoring and recommendat Para 3.2.
6661 with valve users. maintenance ions shall be
fully open. procedure for the extended to
steam traps. all the steam
network
Company: ENGRO

Node: (9) Raw water from B.L.3 to Make-up Water Break Tank 14-T-1401 through Make-up Water Filtration Unit 14-PK-1410.
Drawings: 14-GD-B-86560 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;14-GD-B-86561 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.79 Flow No 9.1. No Flow in the 9.1.1. 9.1.1.1. Pump 9.1.1.1.1. None W79. Verify that the ENGRO Confirmed - PSV / pressure 10/02/2009
line 20'-1400 Malfunction of located outside design of upstream protection has been provided
level control loop B.L. running shut system is such that to cover for this scenario
LIC-8011 with off with possible piping equipment and
valve closure line and instrumentation design
equipment inside pressure of the
B.L. design downstream system is
pressure not exceeded
exceeding and otherwise provide
damage protection
W.80 Pressure More 9.7. Higher 9.7.1. Thermal 9.7.1.1. Design 9.7.1.1.1. PSV- W80. The isolation Vendor 9.7.1.1.1. Isolation valves are lockable. 19/09/2008
Pressure in S- expansion of pressure 8701 A provided valves upstream PSV- Extend this Refer to P&ID 12-PD-A-87004
1410 A liquid trapped in exceeding and against thermal 8701 A must be locked recommendat rev.4 Note 6
equipment relief open ion to all the
damage isolation
valves
located
upstream all
the PSV of
this system
W.81 Pressure More 9.7. Higher 9.7.1. Thermal 9.7.1.1. Design 9.7.1.1.1. PSV- W81. Consider to Vendor 9.7.1.1.1. PSV discharge destination is 25/07/2008
Pressure in S- expansion of pressure 8701 A provided change the PSV Extend this now to an open drain.Refer to
1410 A liquid trapped in exceeding and against thermal discharge destination recommendat P&ID 12-PD-A-87004 rev.2
equipment relief to an open drain in ion to all the
damage order to allow the isolation
operator to be advised valves
of PSV lifting located
upstream all
the PSV of
this system
W.82 Pressure More 9.8. Higher 9.8.1. Blocked 9.8.1.1. Possible 9.8.1.1.1. None W82. Provide a PSV to Vendor Valve already existing on 19/09/2008
Pressure in blower outlet blower damage protect the blower standard supplier equipment.
discharge line due to design against the blocked P&I 12-PD-A-87004 rev.4
pressure outlet
exceeding
Company: ENGRO

Node: (10) Make-up Water from Make-up Water Break Tank 14-T-1401 pumped to Cooling Tower Basin by Make-up Water Pump 14-P-1401 A/B and pumped to Electrochlorination Unit by Electrochlorination
Drawings: 14-GD-B-86561 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;14-GD-B-86562 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.83 Composition As Well As 10.4. 10.4.1. Failure on 10.4.1.1. Possible 10.4.1.1.1. None W83. Provide sample SP-AUS. Sample point implemented in 15/01/2009
Contamination of demand of the fouling in the connection in the water P&ID 14-GD-B-86561 (U19)
the make up water chlorine analyzer make up water make up system and rev. 3. For the procedure:
AI-8011 . system during proper procedure in see SPC. 00-ZA-E-86250
long period. the operating manual rev.0, Cap. 6. Para 3.2.
to verify periodically
the water quality.
W.84 Level Less 10.6. Lower Level 10.6.1. 10.6.1.1. Possible 10.6.1.1.1. LSXLL- W84. Consider to SP-AUS. Implemented in P&ID 14-GD- 06/05/2008
in the Make-up Malfunction of tank emptying with 8012 alarm and provide a FAL on the B-86560 (U18) rev. 3
Water Break Tank level control loop potential for pumps (P- existing FIC-8001A
14-T-1401 LIC-8011 with pumps (P- 1401/1402/1410) located upstream the
valve closure. 1401/1402/1410) trip by logic I-1401 make up water filtering
cavitation and activation. unit.
damage.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (11) Hot CW from Ammonia Urea Plants Off Site Users to Cooling Tower Cells 14-E-1401 A¸N. Make-up from Transfer Pumps 14-P-1401 A/B, Sulphuric Acid from 14-PK-1440, Steam Condensate from
Urea Unit, Filtered CW from Side Stream Filtration Unit 14-PK-1460 and Cooling Water Return from B.L.7 to Cooling Tower Basin 14-CB-1401.
W.85 Flow No 11.1. No Flow in 11.1.1. 11.1.1.1. Possible 11.1.1.1.1. None. W85. Provide, in the SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
the line 24'-1450 Malfunction of the suspended solids operating manual, ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
(CW side-stream flow control loop accumulation in procedure to check Para 4.2.3
filtration). located at pump the CW with periodically the
discharge. consequent suspended solids
fouling in the CW content in the CW in
system. the basin.
W.86 Flow No 11.1. No Flow in 11.1.1. 11.1.1.2. Possible 11.1.1.2.1. None. W86. Provide, in the SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
the line 24'-1450 Malfunction of the exceeding of the operating manual, ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
(CW side-stream flow control loop allowed limit of procedure to check Para 4.2.3
filtration). located at pump suspended solids periodically the
discharge. discharged to the suspended solids
white sewer content in the CW in
through the blow- the basin. In case of
down line. TSS limit exceeding
provide corrective
action.
W.87 Temperature More 11.2. Higher 11.2.1. Motor fan 11.2.1.1. Cooling 11.2.1.1.1. TAH- W87. Verify the SP-AUS / There is the run status signal 06/05/2008
Temperature in shut -down due to water system 8055 at CW pump presence of fan motor SP- of the fans in control room.
the cooling water local electric temperature rise discharge header. fault alarm to DCS SMAUT
basin CB-1401. power failure. up with possible
upset in the CW
users.
W.88 Temperature Less 11.3. Lower 11.3.1. Low 11.3.1.1. Possible 11.3.1.1.1. The W88. Verify the SP-MAC 11.3.1.1.1. Also at lower ambient 06/05/2008
Temperature in ambient Ammonia/Urea operator can adjust minimum acceptable Urea and temperature, the circuit could
the cooling water temperature. users upset. the CW CW supply ammonia reach a value with no impact
basin CB-1401. temperature by temperature to the plant do not on the machine packages
adjusting the fan machine packages expect any
pitch or stopping upset due to
fans motor. low
temperature
of the cooling
water
Company: ENGRO

W.89 Composition As Well As 11.4. 11.4.1. Leakages/ 11.4.1.1. Possible 11.4.1.1.1. W89. Verify the SP-HSE Due to the large area of the 06/05/2008
Contamination : Tube rupture from explosion in the Hydrogen trap possibility to provide CW tower is difficult to detect
presence of the Ammonia CW tower. installed in the CW Hydrogen detectors in traces of Hydrogen by H2
Hydrogen in the plant exchangers. return from 11-E- the CW Tower area. detectors (see HSE Review
CW system. 504 in the Ammonia N° 17)
plant.; 11.4.1.1.2.
CW Tower area
classified for
hydrogen
presence..
W.90 Composition As Well As 11.5. 11.5.1. Leakages/ 11.5.1.1. Possible 11.5.1.1.1. AAH W90. Provide, in the SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Contamination : Tube rupture from environment (conductivity) in the operating manual, ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
presence of the Ammonia contamination blow down line. procedure to check Para 4.2.3
Ammonia in the /Urea plant from blow down to daily the quality of the
CW system. exchangers. white sewer. CW in the basin.
W.91 Composition As Well As 11.5. 11.5.1. Leakages/ 11.5.1.1. Possible 11.5.1.1.1. AAH W91. Verify the SP-AUS. The maximum ammonia 06/05/2008
Contamination : Tube rupture from environment (conductivity) in the maximum Ammonia content in case of tube
presence of the Ammonia contamination blow down line. concentration in the rupture in the process area
Ammonia in the /Urea plant from blow down to CW basin in the worst leads to an ammonia content
CW system. exchangers. white sewer. case of tube rupture in of about 40 ppm within the
the upstream limitations indicated in the
ammonia/urea plant. Contract
W.92 Composition As Well As 11.6. 11.6.1. 11.6.1.1. Possible 11.6.1.1.1. None. W92. Provide in the SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Contamination : Malfunction in the exceeding of the operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
high sulphate flow control allowed limit of procedure to check Para 4.2.3 and 4.2.4
content in the CW system in the sulphate periodically the
basin. chemical dosing discharged to the sulphate content in the
system. white sewer CW and the correct
through the blow- functioning of the
down line. sulphate dosing
system. In case of
sulphate content limit
exceeding provide
corrective action.
Company: ENGRO

W.93 Composition Part Of 11.7. Missing 11.7.1. 11.7.1.1. 11.7.1.1.1. AAH W93. Consider to set SP-AUS The alarm will be set at 15/01/2009
Component: loss Malfunction in the
Increasing of the (pH)-8056 at CW properly the pH alarm ph=8.5. Furthermore a daily
of sulphate in the flow control pH of the CW pump discharge. threshold in order to sampling to check the pH has
CW basin system in the during long term, anticipate the been provided by sample
chemical dosing with possible carbonate salts SC1403 (for more detail
system. carbonate salts formation. referred to Utilities -
formation in the Laboratory Analytical Manual
system. SPC 00-ZA-E-86602
W.94 Level More 11.8. Higher Level 11.8.1. 11.8.1.1. Basin 11.8.1.1.1. W94. In case high ENGRO This recommendation is OPEN
in the cooling Malfunction of overfilling with Presence of 24' chlorine content (more related to post
water basin CB- level control loop water spillage to overflow line to than allowed limit) in commissioning/start-up phase
1401. LIC-8021 with the ground and discharge the the effluent going to
valve fully open. possible exceeding water to the white sewer, the
environmental white sewer.; last shall be diverted to
contamination due 11.8.1.1.2. LAH- the pond inside
to the presence of 8022 in the basin. ENGRO B.L.
chemicals (free
Chlorine).
Company: ENGRO

Node: (12) Cooling Water to B.L.7, to Distribution and to Side Stream Filtration Unit pumped by Cooling Water Pumps 14-P-1403 A/B/C/D. Pumps 14-P-1403 A/B activated by Steam Turbine 14-TP-1403 A/B. Turbine
Condensate to Turbine Condensate Cooler through 14-E-1403 and 14-P-1473 A/B. 14-P-1473 A activated by 14-TP-1473 A.
14-GD-B-86565 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.95 Pressure Less 12.1. Lower 12.1.1. Local 12.1.1.1. Electric 12.1.1.1.1. None. W95. Verify the SP-AUS / 12.1.1.1.1. In case The scenario has been 25/07/2008
Pressure in the electrical power motor driven scenario in the 'surge SP-PRC. of local electric included in the surge relief
CW supply failure. pump stopped analysis' considering power failure two study and the results have
header. with reduced duty also the logic delay CW turbine driven been summarized in the
to the downstream activation, the low low pumps are still document 14-ZA-E-86160. No
Ammonia plant pressure set point running, two fans in impact has been foreseen
users with activation and the the CW cell basin
possible Ammonia MOV-8100 stroking are under
plant shut-down. time in order to allow a emergency diesel
Urea plant shut- safe Ammonia plant generator and the
down due to the shut-down. Consider CW to the Urea
cut-off of the CW this type of emergency plant is cut-off by
supply by means in the operating means of dedicated
of dedicated MOV- manual shut -down MOV-8100 (under
8100 procedure. emergency diesel
generator) on low
low pressure at
main CW
distribution header
(logic I-1403
activation, see
DWG nr.12-GD-E-
68401).
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86565 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.96 Pressure Less 12.1. Lower 12.1.1. Local 12.1.1.1. Electric 12.1.1.1.1. None. W96. Verify the SP-ELE. 12.1.1.1.1. In case Electrical motor of CW are on 26/09/2008
Pressure in the electrical power motor driven possibility to provide of local electric the different bars: motor C on
CW supply failure. pump stopped the electric power to power failure two the bar A of MS-2, motor D on
header. with reduced duty the motor fans and CW CW turbine driven the bar B of MS-2. (Reference
to the downstream pumps from different pumps are still in 00-EB-B-42400 rev.3)
Ammonia plant source as far as running, two fans in
users with possible. the CW cell basin
possible Ammonia are under
plant shut-down. emergency diesel
Urea plant shut- generator and the
down due to the CW to the Urea
cut-off of the CW plant is cut-off by
supply by means means of dedicated
of dedicated MOV- MOV-8100 (under
8100 emergency diesel
generator) on low
low pressure at
main CW
distribution header
(logic I-1403
activation, see
DWG nr.12-GD-E-
68401).
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86565 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.97 Pressure Less 12.1. Lower 12.1.2. Stop of 12.1.2.1. Reduced 12.1.2.1.1. PAL- W97. Verify the SP-AUS / The scenario has been 25/07/2008
Pressure in the one running CW duty to the 8055.; 12.1.2.1.2. scenario in the 'surge SP-PRC. included in the surge relief
CW supply pump due to downstream Automatic start up analysis' considering study and the results have
header. closure of the Ammonia/Urea of the stand-by also the logic delay been summarized in the
automatic valve at plant users with pump through logic activation, the low low document 14-ZA-E-86160. No
pump discharge possible shut- I-1440 activated by pressure set point impact has been foreseen
or due to closure down. PXT-8056A/B/C on activation and the
of automatic valve low low pressure at MOV-8100 stroking
on steam line in CW distribution time in order to avoid
case of steam header.; 12.1.2.1.3. the unwanted shut-
turbine . In case of failure of down of the Urea plant.
stand-by pump to
start , the Urea
plant will be shut-
down by the cut-off
of the CW supply to
the Urea plant
through dedicated
MOV-8100,
avoiding in this way
the shut-down of
the Ammonia plant.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86565 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.98 Pressure Less 12.1. Lower 12.1.2. Stop of 12.1.2.1. Reduced 12.1.2.1.1. PAL- W98. Verify with the SP-AUS / The pump Vendor (that 06/05/2008
Pressure in the one running CW duty to the 8055.; 12.1.2.1.2. valve (located at Vendor. supplies also the stop/check
CW supply pump due to downstream Automatic start up pump discharge) valves) say that the valves are
header. closure of the Ammonia/Urea of the stand-by vendor and provide not pneumatically actuated
automatic valve at plant users with pump through logic the fail safe indication but throgh an oleodynamic
pump discharge possible shut- I-1440 activated by on P&ID. system. There could be a
or due to closure down. PXT-8056A/B/C on power failure that can stop the
of automatic valve low low pressure at electrical motors of the
on steam line in CW distribution system, but the system has
case of steam header.; 12.1.2.1.3. been designed to avoid the
turbine . In case of failure of immediate closure of the
stand-by pump to valve for a minimum time to
start , the Urea allow the activation of the
plant will be shut- emergency diesel generator
down by the cut-off
of the CW supply to
the Urea plant
through dedicated
MOV-8100,
the shut-down of
the Ammonia plant.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86565 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.99 Pressure Less 12.1. Lower 12.1.2. Stop of 12.1.2.1. Reduced 12.1.2.1.1. PAL- W99. Verify with SP-AUS / The action of the valve is F.C. 19/09/2008
Pressure in the one running CW duty to the 8055.; 12.1.2.1.2. turbine vendor the fail Vendor. (see P&I 86564 rev.4)
CW supply pump due to downstream Automatic start up safe action of the
header. closure of the Ammonia/Urea of the stand-by automatic valves in the
automatic valve at plant users with pump through logic steam line.
pump discharge possible shut- I-1440 activated by
or due to closure down. PXT-8056A/B/C on
of automatic valve low low pressure at
on steam line in CW distribution
case of steam header.; 12.1.2.1.3.
turbine . In case of failure of
stand-by pump to
start , the Urea
plant will be shut-
down by the cut-off
of the CW supply to
the Urea plant
through dedicated
MOV-8100,
the shut-down of
the Ammonia plant.
W.100 Pressure More 12.2. Higher 12.2.2. Steam 12.2.2.2. Possible 12.2.2.2.1. None. W100. Verify with SP-MAC Overspeed protection is 06/05/2008
Pressure in the Turbine 14-TP- turbine damage turbine vendor the based on Governor. See
discharge header 1403 A/B due to overspeed. presence of SPC 14-MA-E-31055
overspeed. overspeed protection.
W.101 Pressure No 12.4. Vacuum in 12.4.1. Transient 12.4.1.1. Possible 12.4.1.1.1. CW W101. Verify in the SP-AUS. Surge analysis to be issued 06/05/2008
the CW supply related to surge line damage. supply /return 'surge analysis' the with the final definition and
/return header. conditions. header designed for possibility for vacuum location of the vacuum
full vacuum. condition or breaker valves to protect the
hammering in the CW system against the vacuum
header and provide conditions. Refer to SPC 14-
adequate protection if ZA-E-86160
required.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86565 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.102 Composition As Well As 12.5. 12.5.1. 12.5.1.1. Possible 12.5.1.1.1. None. W102. Provide in the SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Contamination : Malfunction in the exceeding of the operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
high hypochlorite flow control allowed limit of procedure to check Para 4.2.3 and 4.2.4
content in the CW system in the free chlorine periodically the free
basin. chemical dosing discharged to the chlorine content in the
system. white sewer CW and the correct
through the blow- functioning of the
down line. hypochlorite dosing
system. In case of free
chlorine content limit
exceeding provide
corrective action.
W.103 Composition Part Of 12.6. Missing 12.6.1. 12.6.1.1. 12.6.1.1.1. None. W103. Provide in the SP-AUS. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Component: loss Malfunction in the Increasing of operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
of corrosion flow control corrosion in the procedure to check Para 4.2.3 and 4.2.4
inhibitor in the CW system in the downstream periodically the correct
basin. chemical dosing system during functioning of the
system. long term. corrosion inhibitor
dosing system.
Component: loss Malfunction in the Increasing operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
of hypochlorite in flow control biological growth procedure to check Para 4.2.3 and 4.2.4
the CW basin system in the in the CW system periodically the correct
chemical dosing during long term. functioning of the
system. hypochlorite dosing
system
Component: loss Malfunction in the Increasing operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
of dispersant in flow control suspended solids procedure to check Para 4.2.3 and 4.2.4
the CW basin system in the in the CW system periodically the correct
chemical dosing during long term. functioning of the
system. dispersant dosing
system
W.106 Maintenance Other Than 12.9. Unsafe 12.9.1. Leakage 12.9.1.1. Possible 12.9.1.1.1. None. W106. Verify with the SP-AUS / The leakage class has been 25/07/2008
Maintenance in from the isolating operator injuries. valve vendor the Vendor defined by pump Vendor as
the CW pump. valve located at leakage class of the Class VI
the pump isolating valve to
discharge line . ensure a safe
handover.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86565 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.107 Safety Other Than 12.10. Less Safety 12.10.1. 12.10.1.1. 12.10.1.1.1. None. W107. Provide to lock SP-AUS The FO present in the old 19/09/2008
on TP-1403A/B. Possibility to by- Possible turbine close the valves configuration to keep hot the
pass the turbine damage. located in the XV- turbine has been removed
shut-down action 8045/8046 by-pass after a check with the turbine
(XV-8045/8046 line. Vendor. In the P&ID 14-GD-B-
closure) by 86564 rev. 4 only one valve is
means of by pass present on each by-pass line
valve opening. and they are L.C.
W.108 Safety Other Than 12.10. Less Safety 12.10.1. 12.10.1.1. 12.10.1.1.1. None. W108. Provide in the SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
on TP-1403A/B. Possibility to by- Possible turbine operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 5.
pass the turbine damage. proper procedure to Para 5.3
shut-down action operate the by-pass
(XV-8045/8046 during start-up.
closure) by
means of by pass
valve opening.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (13) CW from CW Pumps 14-P-1403 A/B/C/D to CW Basin 14-CB-1401 through Side Stream Filtration Unit 14-PK-1460.
14-GD-B-86566 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1; 14-PD-A-87604 Sh 1 of 1 Rev. 1
W.109 Flow No 13.1. No Flow in 13.1.1. 13.1.1.1. Loss of 13.1.1.1.1. None W109. Provide SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
the line 12'-1450 Malfunction of side stream procedure/frequency ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
(water to side flow control loop filtration and in the operating Para 4.2.3
stream filtration FIC-8056 with possible high manual to perform
unit) valve closure suspended solid TSS analysis by
content in the means on existing
water basin during sample connection
long time
W.110 Flow More 13.2. More Flow in 13.2.1. 13.2.1.1. Possible 13.2.1.1.1. None W110. In order to SP-AUS Implemented in P&ID 14-GD- 06/05/2008
the line 12'-1450 Malfunction of overfilling in the reduce effluent B-86566 (U24) rev. 3
(water to side flow control loop collecting basin generation in the plant
stream filtration FIC-8056 with with high effluent verify the possibility to
unit) valve fully open generation in the discharge the overflow
WY water to the cooling
water basin instead of
WY
W.111 Flow Less 13.3. Less Flow of 13.3.1. Not 13.3.1.1. Less 13.3.1.1.1. None W111. Verify the SP-CIV / This point has been verified 25/07/2008
filtered water to enough hydraulic water filtration and hydraulic head SP-TUB during the 60% 3D model
the cooling water head to allow the possible high between the filters and review. The hydraulic head is
basin gravity flow to the suspended solid cooling water basin in sufficient
cooling water content in the order to allow the
basin water basin during gravity flow
long time
Company: ENGRO

Node: (14) Hydrochloride to CW Basin, Raw Water Import Line from Electrochlorination Unit 14-PK-1450. Exhaust Hypocloric Acid to 12-PK-1210 from Electrochlorination Unit 14-PK-1450.
Drawings: 14-GD-B-86560 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1; 14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1; 14-GD-B-86567 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
00-PB-B-87404 Sh 1 of 2 Rev. 1; 00-PB-B-87404 Sh 2 of 2 Rev. 1
W.112 Flow Other Than 14.1. Misdirected 14.1.1. The 14.1.1.1. 14.1.1.1.1. None W112. Review the Vendor The set of the PSV is 6 06/05/2008
Flow in in the line normal operating Continuous flow design pressure of kg/cm2g. At the inlet a PCV
4'-0001 pressure at unit through the PSV- PSV and the has been added to be
inlet is 6.5 kg/cm2 8821 to WY during downstream system to consistent for the operating
g while the PSV- normal operation make it consistent with pressure inlet (1)
8821 set pressure with higher water the upstream system
is 5 kg/cm2 g effluent generation
W.113 Flow Other Than 14.2. Loss of 14.2.1. Possible 14.2.1.1. Possible 14.2.1.1.1. None W113. Verify the Vendor This scenario has been again 06/05/2008
containment in the leakage of water explosive mixture scenario and if evaluated. No possibility to
sight glass flange and hypochlorite formation in case necessary provide have explosive mixture (See
located at containing H2 of overcoming of different design relevant study), so no
hypochlorite LEL in the air additional safeguards are
generator outlet needed (1)
W.114 Flow No 14.4. No Flow in 14.4.1. 14.4.1.1. Loss of 14.4.1.1.1. TAHH- W114. Provide LC the Vendor 14.4.1.1.1. All Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
the line 2'-0004 Malfunction of dilution/chilling 8801 to shut down manual by pass valves the local P&DI rev. 2 (1)
flow control loop water to the the unit on FV-8801 and LV- alarm are
to close the FV- hypochlorite (deenergizing all 8801 in order to avoid replicated to
8801 generators with the transformers, the possible by pass of DCS
increasing of stopping salt pit a safety action
temperature pumps, closing FV-
downstream the 8801 and LV-8801
generator and through a solenoid
hypochlorite valves) by means of
decomposition activation of the
and possible logic P-XX;
generators 14.4.1.1.2. FALL-
damage 8802 to shut down
the unit
(deenergizing all
the transformers,
stopping salt pit
pumps, closing FV-
8801 and LV-8801
through a solenoid
valves) by means of
activation of the
logic P-XX
Company: ENGRO

W.115 Flow No 14.4. No Flow in 14.4.1. 14.4.1.1. Loss of 14.4.1.1.1. TAHH- W115. The total unit Vendor / 14.4.1.1.1. All Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
the line 2'-0004 Malfunction of dilution/chilling 8801 to shut down shut down can cause a SP- the local P&DI rev. 2 (1)
flow control loop water to the the unit loss of hypochlorite to PACK alarm are
to close the FV- hypochlorite (deenergizing all downstream unit. Even replicated to
8801 generators with the transformers, if not consequences of DCS
increasing of stopping salt pit concern are expected
temperature pumps, closing FV- for short time (several
downstream the 8801 and LV-8801 hours) verify the
generator and through a solenoid possibility to increase
hypochlorite valves) by means of availability of the
decomposition activation of the hypochlorite system. In
and possible logic P-XX; case of problem to a
generators 14.4.1.1.2. FALL- single generator
damage 8802 to shut down consider to provide the
the unit shut down only for the
(deenergizing all single generator and
the transformers, not for all the unit
stopping salt pit
pumps, closing FV-
8801 and LV-8801
through a solenoid
valves) by means of
activation of the
logic P-XX
W.116 Flow No 14.5. No Flow in 14.5.1. Failure of 14.5.1.1. Possible 14.5.1.1.1. FALL- W116. Verify the SP / This scenario has been again 25/07/2008
line 12'-0001 at the blower explosive mixture 8806 with activation scenario and if Vendor evaluated. No possibility to
blower discharge formation inside of logic P-XX to necessary consider to have explosive mixture (See
the tank shut down the unit provide additional relevant study), so no
protection in order to additional safeguards are
increase the reliability needed (1)
of the protection
system
W.117 Flow No 14.5. No Flow in 14.5.2. Check 14.5.2.1. Possible 14.5.2.1.1. FALL- W117. Verify the SP / This scenario has been again 06/05/2008
line 12'-0001 at valve stuck explosive mixture 8806 with activation scenario and if Vendor evaluated. No possibility to
blower discharge closed formation inside of logic P-XX to necessary consider to have explosive mixture (See
the tank shut down the unit provide additional relevant study), so no
protection in order to additional safeguards are
increase the reliability needed (1)
of the protection
system
Company: ENGRO

W.118 Flow Less 14.6. Less Flow in 14.6.1. Plugging 14.6.1.1. Possible 14.6.1.1.1. None W118. Provide in the Vendor OPERATING MANUAL (1) OPEN
1/2'-0002 (brine to of S-1451 A hypochlorite out of operating manual a
static mixer) spec to down procedure to the
stream tank T- operator to check
1551 periodically the
pressure and flowrate
downstream the filter
by means of local
instrument
W.119 Flow Less 14.6. Less Flow in 14.6.1. Plugging 14.6.1.1. Possible 14.6.1.1.1. None W119. Provide a local Vendor Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
1/2'-0002 (brine to of S-1451 A hypochlorite out of PDI and by pass line P&DI rev. 2 (1)
static mixer) spec to down across the filter
stream tank T-
1551
W.120 Flow Less 14.6. Less Flow in 14.6.1. Plugging 14.6.1.1. Possible 14.6.1.1.1. None W120. Provide a flow Vendor Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
1/2'-0002 (brine to of S-1451 A hypochlorite out of transmitter with low P&DI rev. 2 (1)
static mixer) spec to down flow alarm in the brine
stream tank T- line to static mixer
1551
W.121 Pressure More 14.7. Higher 14.7.1. Blocked 14.7.1.1. Possible 14.7.1.1.1. The W121. In case of Vendor The tube rupture in the 06/05/2008
Pressure in outlet equipment design equipment is water release of the present configuration is
hypochlorite pressure protected with rupture disk free H2 routed the the tank. See P&I
generator EL-01-A- exceeding and rupture disk can be released to rev. 2 (1)
1/2 damage (the atmosphere with
generator design possible explosive
pressure is 4 mixture formation.
kg/cm2 g while the Provide different
design pressure of discharge destination
the system is 7 from the rupture disk or
kg/cm2 g) alternative design
Company: ENGRO

W.122 Pressure More 14.7. Higher 14.7.1. Blocked 14.7.1.1. Possible 14.7.1.1.1. The W122. The hazardous Vendor The vent of the tank, the tank 06/05/2008
Pressure in outlet equipment design equipment is area classification are in the HAC. See 00-ZB-A-
hypochlorite pressure protected with must be in accordance 85922 rev.1 (1)
generator EL-01-A- exceeding and rupture disk with possible presence
1/2 damage (the of H2
generator design
pressure is 4
kg/cm2 g while the
design pressure of
the system is 7
kg/cm2 g)
W.123 Pressure More 14.7. Higher 14.7.1. Blocked 14.7.1.1. Possible 14.7.1.1.1. The W123. Consider to Vendor The set of the PSV is 6 06/05/2008
Pressure in outlet equipment design equipment is review the design kg/cm2g. At the inlet a PCV
hypochlorite pressure protected with pressure in the system: has been added to be
generator EL-01-A- exceeding and rupture disk the upstream system is consistet for the operating
1/2 damage (the designed for 8 kg/cm2 pressure inlet (1)
generator design g, PSV set at the unit
pressure is 4 inlet is 5 kg/cm2 g, the
kg/cm2 g while the water chiller system is
design pressure of designed for 7 kg/cm2
the system is 7 g and the hypochlorite
kg/cm2 g) generators are
designed for 4 kg/cm2
g. The protection
against overpressure
in all the system must
be reviewed
W.124 Composition As Well As 14.8. 14.8.1. Failure on 14.8.1.1. Possible 14.8.1.1.1. None W124. Verify the SP / An additional FSL has been 06/05/2008
Contamination: H2 demand of FT- explosive mixture scenario and if Vendor added on the flow inlet to shut-
in the T-1551 8806 formation in the necessary provide down the plant (increasing the
tank additional protection in reliability) (1)
order to increase the
reliability of the
protection system
Company: ENGRO

W.125 Composition As Well As 14.9. 14.9.1. Brine pit 14.9.1.1. 14.9.1.1.1. None W125. Brine pit Vendor Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
Contamination: overfilling Environmental pollution must be route P&DI rev. 2 (1)
high chloride pollution to CY
content (300000
ppm) to the WY
W.126 Composition As Well As 14.10. 14.10.1. 14.10.1.1. 14.10.1.1.1. None W126. Verify the SP- It has been verified that there 25/07/2008
Contamination: Discharge of Possible pump P- possibility to damage PACK / is no risk of damage for the
hydrochloric acid exhaust acid from 1211 A/B damage the pump and if Polishin pumps because the discharge
to neutralization T-1452 due to incorrect necessary provide g unit of the exhaust hypochlorite
pit 12-CB-1210 material (316 SS) protection Vendor acid has a pH within pH range
(polishing unit- for which the pumps are
P&ID: 12-PD-A- designed (1)
87004)
W.127 Composition As Well As 14.11. 14.11.1. No flow 14.11.1.1. 14.11.1.1.1. None W127. Consider to Vendor Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
Contamination: of water in seal Possible discharge the flushing P&DI rev. 2 (1)
hypochlorite in flushing line hypochlorite to water to CY
seal flushing line WY through pump
of P-1452 A/B seal
W.128 Documentation Other Than 14.12. 14.12.1. Cooling W128. Verify and Vendor Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
Inconsistent water from update as necessary P&DI rev. 2 (1)
Documentation on transformers
cooling water from inside vendor
transformers P&ID is routed to
WY instead of
cooling water
basin as indicated
on SP P&ID
W.129 Documentation Other Than 14.12. 14.12.1. Cooling W129. In case of Vendor Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
Inconsistent water from discharge in the P&DI rev. 3 (1)
Documentation on transformers cooling water basin by
cooling water from inside vendor means of a common
transformers P&ID is routed to header consider to
WY instead of provide isolation
cooling water valves at each
basin as indicated transformer outlet in
on SP P&ID order to allow a safe
maintenance
Company: ENGRO

W.130 Maintenance Other Than 14.13. Unsafe 14.13.1. Leakage 14.13.1.1. 14.13.1.1.1. None W130. Consider to Vendor Already implemented in the 06/05/2008
Maintenance in from the isolation Possible operator provide a second P&DI rev. 2 (1)
the hypochlorite valve located in injury isolation means or
generator the acid line alternative protection
during the acid
washing phase for
the other
generator
NOTE (1): Electrochlorination Unit HAZOP done again as part of Package HAZOP (see node 42 of Package HAZOP); in that session, points W112 to W.130 were also analyzed again and closed
Company: ENGRO

Node: (15) Chemicals from CW Corrosion Inhibitor Dosing Unit 14-PK-1420, from CW- Dispersant Dosing Unit 14-PK-1430 and from pH Conditioner Unit 14-PK-1440 to CW Basin.
14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.131 Temperature Less 15.2. Lower 15.2.1. Low 15.2.1.1. Possible 15.2.1.1.1. None W131. Verify after SP-AUS Based on Nalco 73202 the 26/09/2008
Temperature in ambient chemical vendor selection freezing point is -10°C and
the dispersant temperature crystallization / possible low the product is stable under
dosing system PK- solidification / temperature impact on normal conditions.
1430 increasing of the system and provide
viscosity protection if necessary
W.132 Temperature Less 15.3. Lower 15.3.1. Low 15.3.1.1. Possible 15.3.1.1.1. None W132. Verify after SP-AUS Based on Nalco 73401 the 26/09/2008
Temperature in ambient chemical vendor selection freezing point is -20°C and
the corrosion temperature crystallization / possible low the product is stable under
inhibitor dosing solidification / temperature impact on normal conditions.
system PK-1420 increasing of the system and provide
viscosity protection if necessary
W.133 Pressure More 15.4. Higher 15.4.1. Blocked 15.4.1.1. Possible 15.4.1.1.1. None W133. Provide a PSV SP- PSV-8761 and PSV-8762 are 25/07/2008
Pressure in the outlet pump / line design at pump discharge to PACK provided for pumps A and B.
sulphuric acid pressure be located before the Refer to P&ID 00-PB-D-87204
injection line at exceeding check valve sh.7 of 7 rev.2.
pump discharge
dispersant pressure be located before the Refer to P&ID 00-PB-D-87204
pump discharge
corrosion inhibitor pressure be located before the Refer to P&ID 00-PB-D-87204
pump discharge
W.136 Composition As Well As 15.7. 15.7.1. Operator 15.7.1.1. Possible 15.7.1.1.1. None W136. Provide in the SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Contamination: mistake to sulphuric acid operating manual a ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
humidity in the replace the dilution during procedure to check Para 4.2.7
sulphuric acid to exhaust silica gel long term and periodically the silica
the cooling water in the service tank increasing gel status in the tank
basin vent line corrosion in the vent line
system
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.137 Composition As Well As 15.8. 15.8.1. Operator 15.8.1.1. Possible 15.8.1.1.1. None. W137. Provide proper SP-AUS Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
Contamination in error during equipment loading procedure in ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 5 and
service tank inside loading operation damage due to the operating manual. Cap. 6
the PK-1420 / PK- : dispersant exothermic
1430 loading in place of reaction.
corrosion inhibitor
and viceversa.
W.138 Composition As Well As 15.8. 15.8.1. Operator 15.8.1.1. Possible 15.8.1.1.1. None. W138. Verify the SP According to similar 26/09/2008
Contamination in error during equipment possibility of experience (also from
service tank inside loading operation damage due to exothermic reaction Vendors) exothermic reaction
the PK-1420 / PK- : dispersant exothermic and if necessary has not expected
1430 loading in place of reaction. consider to make
corrosion inhibitor distinguishable the
and viceversa. dispersant / corrosion
inhibitor loading line
with different colours.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.139 Level More 15.9. Higher Level 15.9.1. Operator 15.9.1.1. Service 15.9.1.1.1. Overflow W139. Provide SP-AUS 15.9.1.1.1. Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
in the sulphuric mistake (i.e. tank overfilling line to release operating manual For net ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
acid service tank operator misses with release of sulphuric acid in a procedure to open the capacity is Para 4.2.8
inside the PK- to stop the pump sulphuric acid to dedicated bounded valve in the line to WY meant the
1440 P-1205 (P&ID U- the ground and area than sloped to in case of storm only total capacity
12) during vessel possible injury of chemical sewer; after check the pH of the basin
filling operation). operator and 15.9.1.1.2. LSXHH- minus the
environmental 8088 and alarm to volume of the
pollution stop the upstream P- vessel / other
1205 equipment
inside the
same basin .;
15.9.1.1.2.
The drain
valves of
vessel and
pump
isolation
valve should
be accessible
form outside
the basin.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.140 Level More 15.9. Higher Level 15.9.1. Operator 15.9.1.1. Service 15.9.1.1.1. Overflow W140. The pipe SP-TUB 15.9.1.1.1. Spec. Line 41A is suitable for 06/05/2008
in the sulphuric mistake (i.e. tank overfilling line to release material for the line For net sulphuric acid. The indication
acid service tank operator misses with release of sulphuric acid in a routing sulphuring acid capacity is has been added in the P&DI
inside the PK- to stop the pump sulphuric acid to dedicated bounded to UY should be meant the rev. 3
1440 P-1205 (P&ID U- the ground and area than sloped to suitable for the service total capacity
12) during vessel possible injury of chemical sewer; and must be indicated of the basin
filling operation). operator and 15.9.1.1.2. LSXHH- in P&ID minus the
1205 equipment
inside the
same basin .;
15.9.1.1.2.
The drain
valves of
vessel and
pump
isolation
valve should
be accessible
form outside
the basin.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.141 Level More 15.9. Higher Level 15.9.1. Operator 15.9.1.1. Service 15.9.1.1.1. Overflow W141. Verify the catch SP-AUS / 15.9.1.1.1. The design of catch basin is 19/09/2008
in the sulphuric mistake (i.e. tank overfilling line to release basin anti acid coating SP-TUB. For net tiled with antiacid ceramic
acid service tank operator misses with release of sulphuric acid in a life capacity is instead of anti-acid paint.
inside the PK- to stop the pump sulphuric acid to dedicated bounded meant the
1440 P-1205 (P&ID U- the ground and area than sloped to total capacity
12) during vessel possible injury of chemical sewer; of the basin
1205 equipment
inside the
same basin .;
15.9.1.1.2.
The drain
valves of
vessel and
pump
isolation
valve should
be accessible
form outside
the basin.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.142 Level More 15.9. Higher Level 15.9.1. Operator 15.9.1.1. Service 15.9.1.1.1. Overflow W142. Verify the net SP-HSE 15.9.1.1.1. The catch basin has been 19/09/2008
in the sulphuric mistake (i.e. tank overfilling line to release catch basin capacity For net design wit net capacity equal
acid service tank operator misses with release of sulphuric acid in a with respect to the capacity is to vessel capacity to take into
inside the PK- to stop the pump sulphuric acid to dedicated bounded applicable standard. meant the account every possible
1440 P-1205 (P&ID U- the ground and area than sloped to total capacity spillages from the vessel
1205 equipment
inside the
same basin .;
15.9.1.1.2.
The drain
valves of
vessel and
pump
isolation
valve should
be accessible
form outside
the basin.
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.143 Level More 15.9. Higher Level 15.9.1. Operator 15.9.1.1. Service 15.9.1.1.1. Overflow W143. Verify during SP 15.9.1.1.1. This point has been verified 25/07/2008
in the sulphuric mistake (i.e. tank overfilling line to release 3D model review the For net and checked during 60% 3D
acid service tank operator misses with release of sulphuric acid in a lay-out of the system. capacity is model review.
inside the PK- to stop the pump sulphuric acid to dedicated bounded meant the
1440 P-1205 (P&ID U- the ground and area than sloped to total capacity
1205 equipment
inside the
same basin .;
15.9.1.1.2.
The drain
valves of
vessel and
pump
isolation
valve should
be accessible
form outside
the basin.
W.144 Level More 15.10. Higher 15.10.1. Operator 15.10.1.1. Service 15.10.1.1.1. W144. Provide high SP- High level alarm (LAH-8741) 19/09/2008
Level in the mistake (i.e. tank overfilling Overflow line to level alarm on PACK has been provided. Refer to
Dispersant service operator misses with release of release dispersant dispersant service tank P&ID 00-PB-D-87204 sh.6 of
tank inside the PK- to stop the dispersant to the in a dedicated 7
1430 unloading pump ground and bounded area than
during filling possible injury of sloped to chemical
operation) operator and sewer
environmental
pollution
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.145 Level More 15.10. Higher 15.10.1. Operator 15.10.1.1. Service 15.10.1.1.1. W145. Verify the SP-AUS / Based on Nalco 73202 no 26/09/2008
Level in the mistake (i.e. tank overfilling Overflow line to toxicity and the SP-HSE toxicity studies have been
Dispersant service operator misses with release of release dispersant possible impact of conducted on this product.
tank inside the PK- to stop the dispersant to the in a dedicated dispersant to the The following results are for a
1430 unloading pump ground and bounded area than environment / human similar product.
during filling possible injury of sloped to chemical body ACUTE ORAL TOXICITY :
operation) operator and sewer Species LD50 Test Descriptor
environmental Rat 5,000 mg/kg
pollution PRIMARY SKIN IRRITATION:
Draize Score Test Descriptor
0.0 / 8.0
PRIMARY EYE IRRITATION:
Draize Score Test Descriptor
4.7 / 110.0
SENSITIZATION:
This product is not expected
to be a sensitizer.
Based on similar expecience
no concerns are expected to
toxicity (and sewer) if, during
loading and unloading, PPE
are used (as normal practice).
W.146 Level More 15.11. Higher 15.11.1. Operator 15.11.1.1. Service 15.11.1.1.1. W146. Provide high SP- High level alarm (LAH-8781) 19/09/2008
Level in the mistake (i.e. tank overfilling Overflow line to level alarm on PACK has been provided. Refer to n
corrosion inhibitor operator misses with release of release corrosion corrosion inhibitor P&ID 00-PB-D-87204 sh.5 of
service tank inside to stop the corrosion inhibitor inhibitor in a service tank 7
the PK-1420 unloading pump to the ground and dedicated bounded
during filling possible injury of area than sloped to
operation) operator and chemical sewer
environmental
pollution
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.147 Level More 15.11. Higher 15.11.1. Operator 15.11.1.1. Service 15.11.1.1.1. W147. Verify the SP-AUS / Based on Nalco 73401 the 26/09/2008
Level in the mistake (i.e. tank overfilling Overflow line to toxicity and the SP-HSE following results are for the
corrosion inhibitor operator misses with release of release corrosion possible impact of active components.
service tank inside to stop the corrosion inhibitor inhibitor in a corrosion inhibitor to ACUTE ORAL TOXICITY :
the PK-1420 unloading pump to the ground and dedicated bounded the environment / Species LD50 Test Descriptor
during filling possible injury of area than sloped to human body Rat 350 mg/kg Active
operation) operator and chemical sewer Substance Zinc Chloride
environmental Rat 1,472 mg/kg Active
pollution Substance 2,2-(((5-Methyl-1H-
Benzotriazol-1-
yl)Methyl)Imino)Bisethanol2,2-
(((4-Methyl-1H-Benzotriazol-1-
yl)Methyl)Imino)Bisethanol
SENSITIZATION:
May cause sensitization by
skin contact.
Based on similar expecience
no concerns are expected to
toxicity (and sewer) if, during
loading and unloading, PPE
are used (as normal practice).
W.148 Level Less 15.12. Lower 15.12.1. The level 15.12.1.1. 15.12.1.1.1. None W148. Suitable SP- Two independent level alarms 25/07/2008
Level in the decrease due to Possible pump safeguard should be PACK LAL-8761 and LAL-8762 have
sulphuric acid the normal damage provided against the been provided. Refer to P&ID
service tank inside operation low level in the service 00-PB-D-87204 sh.7 of 7
the PK-1440 tank rev.2
W.149 Level Less 15.13. Lower 15.13.1. The level 15.13.1.1. 15.13.1.1.1. None W149. Suitable SP- Low level alarm LAL-8741 25/07/2008
Level in the decrease due to Possible pump safeguard should be PACK has been provided. Refer to
dispersant service the normal damage provided against the P&ID 00-PB-D-87204 sh.6 of
tank inside the operation low level in the service 7 rev.2
PK-1430 tank
Company: ENGRO

14-GD-B-86564 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1;
14-GD-B-86568 Sh 1of1 Rev. 1
W.150 Level Less 15.14. Lower 15.14.1. The level 15.14.1.1. 15.14.1.1.1. None W150. Suitable SP- Low level alarm LAL-8721 25/07/2008
Level in the decrease due to Possible pump safeguard should be PACK has been provided. Refer to
corrosion inhibitor the normal damage provided against the P&ID 00-PB-D-87204 sh.5 of
service tank inside operation low level in the service 7 rev.2
the PK-1420 tank
Company: ENGRO

Node: (16) Fuel Gas from B.L.6 and Natural Gas from B.L.1 through Fuel Gas K.O. Drum 19-V-1901 to LP Fuel Gas Network, to Ammonia Plant Flare 19-PK-1901 to Process Flare 19-PK-1902 and to Ignition Panel
of 19-PK-1902. Fuel Gas/Air Mix and Fuel Gas from Ignition Panel 19-PK-1902 to Ammonia Plant Flare Pilot Burners.
Intention:
W.151 Flow No 16.1. No Flow of 16.1.1. 16.1.1.1. Flame 16.1.1.1.1. PXAL- W151. Verify the ENGRO Indipendent QRA for 27/01/2009
fuel gas to all the Malfunction of out in the all plant 9002; 16.1.1.1.2. possibility of delayed ammonia storage by Vendor
flare systems pressure control flares with release According to the cloud connection due
(ammonia plant, loop PIC-9001 of flammable gas flame out study (00- to the flame out in the
ammonia storage with closure of and possible ZA-E-85021) no ammonia storage plant
and urea plant) both valves PV- delayed cloud explosion expected
9001 A/B ignition and due to the delayed
consequent ignition of
operators injury flammable cloud as
and equipment critical mass, 100
damages kg, will not be
reached and in
case of flash fire no
damage to the
equipment and
injury to operators
are foreseen
W.152 Flow No 16.1. No Flow of 16.1.1. 16.1.1.2. Flame 16.1.1.2.1. PXAL- W152. Perform SP-HSE / Dispersion analysis from 19/09/2008
fuel gas to all the Malfunction of out in the all plant 9002 dispersion analysis (for ENGRO ammonia flares has been
flare systems pressure control flares with release all the flares) in order (for performed. Results are
(ammonia plant, loop PIC-9001 of toxic gases to to assess the toxicity ammonia reported in SPC. 00-ZA-E-
ammonia storage with closure of the atmosphere for people in case of storage 85023. Toxic cloud could
and urea plant) both valves PV- with possible flame out system) impact on the upper part of
9001 A/B people injury and prilling tower.
environmental
pollution
Company: ENGRO

Intention:
W.153 Flow No 16.1. No Flow of 16.1.1. 16.1.1.3. Possible 16.1.1.3.1. PXAL- W153. Verify with the SP-PRC Already analized during the 19/09/2008
fuel gas to all the Malfunction of explosive mixture 9002; 16.1.1.3.2. urea flare system Flares Hazop (node 1, 2)
flare systems pressure control formation due to Activation of logic I- vendor the need of
(ammonia plant, loop PIC-9001 air reverse flow in 1902 to open the nitrogen purging
ammonia storage with closure of the flare stack XV-9002 on system in case of
and urea plant) both valves PV- nitrogen line with flame out
9001 A/B header purging (PK-
1901, PK-1902 and
for ammonia
storage plant);
16.1.1.3.3. Flame
arrestor provided on
the main fuel gas
line to the flare
stack (PK-1901, PK-
1902); 16.1.1.3.4.
Flare headers
continuously purged
at each initial point
W.154 Flow No 16.2. No Flow of 16.2.1. 16.2.1.2. Possible 16.2.1.2.1. None W154. Perform SP-HSE Dispersion analysis from 25/07/2008
fuel gas to PK- Malfunction of flame out in the dispersion analysis (for ammonia flares has been
1901 during a flare flow control loop PK-1901 flare with PK-1901 flare) in order performed. Results are
emergency FIC-9002 with FV- release of toxic to assess the toxicity reported in SPC. 00-ZA-E-
9002 completely gases to the for people in case of 85023. Toxic cloud could
closed atmosphere with flame out impact on the upper part of
possible people prilling tower.
injury and
environmental
pollution
Company: ENGRO

Intention:
W.155 Flow More 16.3. More Flow of 16.3.1. 16.3.1.1. Possible 16.3.1.1.1. I-1903 to W155. Verify with SP The scenario valve has been 19/09/2008
fuel gas in the line Malfunction of pilot flame off with cut off the valve FV- vendor the possibility verified with the tip vendor: in
8'-1901 flow control loop release of 9002 in case of loss of flame off according caso of the valve fully open
FIC-9002 with FV- flammable gas of pilot flame and to CV of the valve and (with the real CV) there no
9002 completely and possible with valve position if necessary provide possibility of the flame off
open delayed cloud discrepancy alarm protection
ignition and
consequent
operators injury
and equipment
damages
W.156 Flow More 16.3. More Flow of 16.3.1. 16.3.1.1. Possible 16.3.1.1.1. I-1903 to W156. Verify with SP- The logic has been verified 19/09/2008
fuel gas in the line Malfunction of pilot flame off with cut off the valve FV- vendor the action of FORNI / with the vendor. No concern
8'-1901 flow control loop release of 9002 in case of loss the logic I-1903 SP-AUS considering also that loss of
FIC-9002 with FV- flammable gas of pilot flame and Pilot Flame will cut
9002 completely and possible with valve position combustion fuel. See 19-ZA-D-
open delayed cloud discrepancy alarm 86183.
ignition and
consequent
operators injury
and equipment
damages
W.157 Flow Other Than 16.4. Loss of 16.4.1. Leakage 16.4.1.1. 16.4.1.1.1. None W157. Consider to SP-AUS Implemented in P&ID 19-GD- 06/05/2008
containment from from the draining Impossibility to provide an additional B-86570 (U27) rev. 3
V-1901 valve isolate the vessel isolation mean in the
drainage line
W.158 Pressure More 16.5. Higher 16.5.2. 16.5.2.1. Possible 16.5.2.1.1. PSV- W158. Provide an high SP-AUS Implemented in P&ID 19-GD- 06/05/2008
Pressure in V- Malfunction of vessel design 9181 A/B pressure alarm on the B-86570 (U27) rev. 3
1901 pressure control pressure existing PXT-9002
loop PIC-9001 exceeding and
with PV-9001 A/B damage
fully open
Company: ENGRO

Intention:
W.159 Phase More 16.6. Carbamate 16.6.1. Mixing of 16.6.1.1. Possible 16.6.1.1.1. None W159. Evaluate this SP-AUS / A PDT with alarm has been 25/07/2008
formation and CO2 from fuel gas flame arrestor scenario and if SP-PRC implemented in P&ID 19-GD-
solidification in the and ammonia plugging and necessary provide a B-86570 (U27) rev. 4
line entering the from process reduced flowrate protection
flare stack discharge of support gas to
the flare
W.160 Level More 16.7. Higher Level 16.7.1. Possible 16.7.1.1. Liquid 16.7.1.1.1. None W160. Evaluate the SP-AUS / The new configuration of the 19/09/2008
in the V-1901 slug from carry-over to the possibility of the ENGRO ammonia, avoid this scenario,
upstream system flare with possible scenario and if already analized in the Flare
due to upset combustion necessary consider to Hazop (node 3, 4). On V-
problem provide a level 1901 is already present HLA
transmitter with high at DCS.
level alarm to DCS
W.161 Level Less 16.8. Lower Level 16.8.1. Operator 16.8.1.1. Possible 16.8.1.1.1. None W161. Consider to SP-AUS Implemented in P&ID 19-GD- 06/05/2008
in the V-1901 mistake missing vessel emptying provide a dead man B-86570 (U27) rev. 3
to close the with fuel gas to the type draining valve or
draining valve atmosphere and alternative protection
during vessel possible device
emptying flammable gas
operation ignition and
operator injury
W.162 Level Less 16.8. Lower Level 16.8.1. Operator 16.8.1.1. Possible 16.8.1.1.1. None W162. Verify the SP-TUB This point has been evaluated 19/09/2008
in the V-1901 mistake missing vessel emptying possibility to locate the and checked during 60% 3D
to close the with fuel gas to the drainage away from model review. Contractor
draining valve atmosphere and the roads confirm that drains are
during vessel possible located away from roads
emptying flammable gas
operator injury
Company: ENGRO

Intention:
W.163 Level Less 16.8. Lower Level 16.8.1. Operator 16.8.1.1. Possible 16.8.1.1.1. None W163. Evaluate the SP-AUS / Implemented. See SPC. 00- 15/01/2009
in the V-1901 mistake missing vessel emptying possibility to discharge SP-TUB ZA-E-86250 rev.0, Cap. 6.
to close the with fuel gas to the the drainage to the Para 5.2.1. There is no
draining valve atmosphere and blow down system possibility of routing the
during vessel possible instead of disposal drainage to the blow down
emptying flammable gas drum system
operator injury
W.164 Safety Other Than 16.9. Less Safety 16.9.1. Loss of 16.9.1.1. Flame 16.9.1.1.1. None W164. Consider to SP As agreed during the Flares 19/09/2008
on the fuel gas plant instrument out in all the flares provide an Hazop Session (node 3, 4),
supply to the air independent fuel gas the valve now is F.L. (FC) with
flares pilots source for flare pilots a air reservoir of 30 minutes
to be derived before
the XV-9003
MAIN HAZOP FOLLOW UP - UREA PLANT SPC. N.: 00-ZA-E-85101
Company: ENGRO
Facility: Urea Plant

Node: (1) Ammonia from Carbamate Ejector 10-L-01 and CO2 from CO2 Compressor 10-K-01 to Urea Reactor 10-R-01. Reactor effluent to Urea Stripper 10-E-01.
Drawings: 10-GD-4C-06413;
10-GD-3C-06414
U.1 Flow Reverse 1.1. Reverse Flow 1.1.1. Trip of the 1.1.1.2. Plugging 1.1.1.2.1. 2 check U-1. Provide minimum SP-PRC Minimum distance has been 06/05/2008
in the line 10'- CO2 compressor of CO2 line due to valves in series distance between HV- considered and indicated in
1038 K-01 carbamate reverse (downstream and 1005 and reactor inlet P&ID rev.3
flow upstream HV-1055. nozzle
One of this check
valve is hoerbiger
type with high seal
class); 1.1.1.2.2.
Closure of HV-1005
through the
activation of logic I-
1 (compressor trip);
1.1.1.2.3. Provision
of KW (HP water)
for flushing the line
U.2 Flow Reverse 1.1. Reverse Flow 1.1.1. Trip of the 1.1.1.2. Plugging 1.1.1.2.1. 2 check U-2. Provide procedure SP-PRC Procedure is included in the 15/01/2009
in the line 10'- CO2 compressor of CO2 line due to valves in series in the operating operating manual: SPC 00-ZA-
1038 K-01 carbamate reverse (downstream and manual in order to E-06010 page 163/192 (Shut-
flow upstream HV-1055. wash the line when the down sequence operation &
One of this check plant is in shut down condition of H.P
valve is hoerbiger EQUIPMENT)
type with high seal
class); 1.1.1.2.2.
Closure of HV-1005
through the
activation of logic I-
1 (compressor trip);
1.1.1.2.3. Provision
of KW (HP water)
for flushing the line
U.3 Flow Other Than 1.3. Loss of 1.3.1. Possible 1.3.1.1. Release 1.3.1.1.1. U-3. Provide procedure SP-PRC Procedure is included in the 15/01/2009
containment in the leakage from of CO2/ammonia Wheephole in the operating operating manual: SPC 00-ZA-
reactor internal lining with possible detection system manual to check E-06010 page 163/192
operator injury provide to detect periodically the status (Inspection procedure for
traces of of wheephole detection weep holes)
ammonia/carbamat system
e solution
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06414
U.4 Temperature More 1.4. Higher 1.4.1. Higher 1.4.1.1. Less 1.4.1.1.1. None U-4. Consider to SP-PRC Logic for high temperature 06/05/2008
Temperature in R- temperature of conversion in the provide an high (TXA-1810 A/B/C) is provided
01 the CO2 feeding reactor to urea temperature alarm on in the compressor package
the reactor due to with more existing TI-1012 on the
upset in the CO2 carbamate CO2 line to reactor
compression formation
system
U.5 Temperature More 1.4. Higher 1.4.2. More flow 1.4.2.1. Less 1.4.2.1.1. High U-5. Consider to SP-PRC TAH- 1015 has been 25/07/2008
Temperature in R- of CO2 and conversion in the pressure alarm provide an high provided. Refer to P&ID P-43
01 consequent reactor to urea PAH-1058 temperature alarm on rev.4
increasing of existing TI-1015 on the
reaction rate with CO2 on the reactor
ammonia outlet line
(carbamate
formation)
U.6 Temperature Less 1.5. Lower 1.5.1. Less or no 1.5.1.1. Less 1.5.1.1.1. None U-6. Verify during the SP FAL-1801 is provided at CO2 25/07/2008
Temperature in R- flow of CO2 to the conversion in the hazop of the package compressor 3rd stage suction.
01 reactor reactor to urea if the system is Refer to P&ID P-65 rev.0
protected against less
or no flow of CO2 in
the upstream
compression unit
otherwise provide
adequate protection
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06414
U.7 Pressure More 1.6. Higher 1.6.1. Closure of 1.6.1.1. Possible 1.6.1.1.1. PAXHH- U-7. Verify the SP-PRC 1.6.1.1.1. The HV-1006 is a drilled valve 25/07/2008
Pressure in R-01 HV-1006 (on R-10 reactor and lines 1018 A/B/C with scenario (verify that design allowing the passage of 350
outlet line) due to design pressure activation of logic I- the open path through pressure of t/h (with a ΔP = 22 kg/cm2)
HIC-1006 exceeding and 2 (2oo3 voting the HV-1006 can upstream flow thus preventing the
malfunction damage with system) to: close release the required CO2 pressure to rise above the
release of hot HV-1008 (V-01 flowrate without compressor design pressure.
ammonia and urea bottom line), close overcome the reactor is 174 kg/cm2 Moreover consequences of
and operators the HV-1010 design pressure) and g, the design overpressure of R-01 due to
injury (ammonia to the L- provide additional pressure of other causes have been
01), trip the protection if necessary the upstream evaluated and reported in
ammonia pumps P- ammonia QRA. Risk is tolerable such
01 and close HV- pump is 283 that additional protection are
1005 (CO2 to kg/cm2 g not required. Refer to event
reactor), trip air while the top TOP TU-4 in SPC 00-ZA-E-
compressor K-002 design 85400.
A/B; 1.6.1.1.2. HV- pressure of
1006 is a drilled the reactor is
valve (with always 170 kg/cm2 g
an open path)
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06414
U.8 Pressure More 1.6. Higher 1.6.2. Plugging of 1.6.2.1. Possible 1.6.2.1.1. PAXHH- U-8. Provide in the SP-PRC Procedure is included in the 15/01/2009
Pressure in R-01 HV-1006 due to reactor and lines 1018 A/B/C with operating manual a operating manual: SPC 00-ZA-
carbamate design pressure activation of logic I- procedure to perform E-06010 page 163/192 (Shut-
formation (during exceeding and 2 (2oo3 voting periodically the down sequence operation &
start up) damage with system) to: close flushing of the valve condition of H.P
release of hot HV-1008 (V-01 especially during start EQUIPMENT)
ammonia and urea bottom line), close up and shut down
and operators the HV-1010
injury (ammonia to the L-
01), trip the
ammonia pumps P-
01 and close HV-
1005 (CO2 to
reactor), trip air
compressor K-002
A/B; 1.6.2.1.2. The
line is sloped to
downstream
equipment in order
to avoid carbamate
accumulation in the
valve; 1.6.2.1.3.
Flushing water
facilities provided to
remove possible
carbamate
solidification
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06414
U.9 Pressure More 1.6. Higher 1.6.3. Increasing 1.6.3.1.1. PAXHH-

1.6.3.1. Operating U-9. Consider to SP-PRC 1.6.3.1.1. TAL-1015 and TAH-1015 25/07/2008
Pressure in R-01 of molar ratio of upset in the 1018 A/B/C with provide a low and high Refer To have been provided. Refer to
ammonia and system due to activation of logic I- temperature alarm on recommendat P&ID P-43 rev.4
CO2 due to FIC- increasing of 2 (2oo3 voting existing TI-1015 at ion U-
1003 malfunction pressure system) to: close reactor outlet in order 10\nThis
with valve partial HV-1008 (V-01 to detect the up set recommendat
closure bottom line), close condition ion can be
the HV-1010 applied to all
(ammonia to the L- the scenarios
01), trip the leading to a
ammonia pumps P- different
01 and close HV- ammonia/CO
1005 (CO2 to 2 ratio
reactor), trip air
compressor K-002
A/B
U.10 Pressure More 1.6. Higher 1.6.3. Increasing 1.6.3.1. Operating 1.6.3.1.1. PAXHH- U-10. Consider to SP-PRC 1.6.3.1.1. In the SP technology there 06/05/2008
Pressure in R-01 of molar ratio of upset in the 1018 A/B/C with provide a system (i.e. Refer To are no requirements for a
ammonia and system due to activation of logic I- software calculator in recommendat constant N/C ratio which can
CO2 due to FIC- increasing of 2 (2oo3 voting DCS or hardware) to ion U- be considered in a range 3.3 -
1003 malfunction pressure system) to: close detect the 10\nThis 3.6. The best methodology to
with valve partial HV-1008 (V-01 ammonia/CO2 ratio recommendat detect this value is the
closure bottom line), close feeding the reactor ion can be sample at reactor discharge.
the HV-1010 applied to all
(ammonia to the L- the scenarios
01), trip the leading to a
ammonia pumps P- different
01 and close HV- ammonia/CO
1005 (CO2 to 2 ratio
reactor), trip air
compressor K-002
A/B
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06414
U.11 Pressure Less 1.7. Lower 1.7.1. Less flow of 1.7.1.1. Less 1.7.1.1.1. PAL-1022 U-11. Consider to SP-PRC TAH-1015 has been provided. 25/07/2008
Pressure in R-01 ammonia from the efficiency in the provide a high Refer to P&ID P-43 rev.4
upstream pumps reactor leading to temperature alarm on
overloading the existing TI-1015 at
downstream reactor outlet in order
section (more to detect the up set
carbamate) and to condition
high temperature
in the reactor
Company: ENGRO

Node: (2) Atmospheric Air to Urea Stripper 10-E-01 through Stripper Passivation Air Compressor 10-K-02 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06414
U.12 Pressure More 2.3. Higher 2.3.4. Malfunction 2.3.4.1. Possible 2.3.4.1.1. PAXHH- U-12. Verify PSV-1013 SP-PRC The design pressure for 06/05/2008
Pressure in E-01 of pressure stripper design 1018 A/B/C (at A/B also for this stripper Shell Side is the
control loop PIC- pressure reactor inlet) with scenario same of the extraction of the
1020 (locate at E- exceeding and activation of logic I- steam turbine; the exceeding
01 SS) with PV- damage 2 (2oo3 voting of the design pressure on
1020 fully open system) to: close process side is not possible.
HV-1008 (V-01
bottom line), close
the HV-1010
(ammonia to the L-
01), trip the
ammonia pumps P-
01 and close HV-
1005 (CO2 to
reactor), trip air
compressor K-002
A/B; 2.3.4.1.2. PAH-
1021
U.13 Pressure More 2.3. Higher 2.3.5. More 2.3.5.1. Possible 2.3.5.1.1. PAXHH- U-13. Verify PSV-1013 SP-PRC This scenario is covered by 06/05/2008
Pressure in E-01 carbamate in the stripper design 1018 A/B/C (at A/B also for this PSV 1013 A/B and PSV 1014
stripper due to pressure reactor inlet) with scenario A/B
upset of upstream exceeding and activation of logic I-
equipment damage 2 (2oo3 voting
system) to: close
HV-1008 (V-01
bottom line), close
the HV-1010
(ammonia to the L-
01), trip the
ammonia pumps P-
01 and close HV-
1005 (CO2 to
reactor), trip air
compressor K-002
A/B; 2.3.5.1.2. PAH-
1021
Company: ENGRO

Node: (2) Atmospheric Air to Urea Stripper 10-E-01 through Stripper Passivation Air Compressor 10-K-02 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06414
U.14 Pressure Less 2.4. Lower 2.4.1. Malfunction 2.4.1.1. 2.4.1.1.1. LAH-1011 U-14. Consider to SP-PRC Low flow allarm FAL-1013 is 06/05/2008
Pressure in E-01 of pressure Overloading of provide a low flow provided
control loop PIC- downstream MP alarm on existing FI-
1020 (locate at E- unit due to loss of 1013 on steam line
01 SS) with PV- carbamate
1020 closure decomposition
and possible
stripper overfilling
U.15 Level Less 2.6. Lower Level 2.6.1. Malfunction 2.6.1.2. Low 2.6.1.2.1. U-15. Verify this SP In case of low suction 25/07/2008
in E-01 tube side of level control pressure in the Compressor shut scenario in the CO2 pressure, PXT-101A/B/C
loop LIC-1011 stripper and in the down for low compressor package activates logic I-101 to trip
with LV-1011 fully upstream reactor pressure at hazop session the compressor. Moreover
open with possible CO2 compressor suction radial and axial vibration
compressor is provided sensors with alarms and trip
damage due to are provided. For more details
high vibration refer to Package Hazop node
(high flowrate) n.1, deviation "less pressure"
SPC. 00-ZA-E-85100
Company: ENGRO

Node: (3) MP Steam from Turbine to Urea Stripper 10-E-01 through Stripper Steam Saturator 10-V-09. Condensate from Stripper Steam Saturator 10-V-09 to 1st Carbamate Condenser 10-E-05 A through M.P.
Decomposer 10-E-02 B.
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06416
U.16 Flow Other Than 3.1. Loss of 3.1.1. Leakage 3.1.1.1. Potential 3.1.1.1.1. AIH-1005 U-16. Consider to SP-PRC The conductivity meters are 06/05/2008
containment in the from the tube for tube rupture (conductivity) review the position and provided near the carbamate
E-01 sheet and equipment located at E-05 A the number of condensers, which are the
damage if not shell side overhead conductivity analysers steam generator, and at any
quickly detected line; 3.1.1.1.2. PSV- in the condensate / discharges to B.L. These are
1012 for tube steam circuit in order according to SP experience.
rupture to have a quick Additional analyser are not
response in case of required.
tube leakage and also
to identify the source of
leakage
U.17 Level No 3.5. No Level in 3.5.1. Malfunction 3.5.1.1. Design 3.5.1.1.1. LAXLL- U-17. Provide LC on SP-PRC LC on PV-1020 by-pass is 06/05/2008
the V-09 of level control temperature 1010 to close the PV-1020 by pass valve provided
loop LIC-1009 to exceeding in the E- PV-1020 through in order to avoid to by
open LV-1009 B 01 / V-09 and the solenoid valve pass the shut down
and not open LV- damage by the activation of action
1009A or P-10 the logic I-7A;
A/B stop (P&ID 3.5.1.1.2. TAXHH-
P56) 1011 A/B/C (2oo3)
to close the HV-
1120 for high high
temperature in the
stripper by the
activation of the
logic I-7B
U.18 Level No 3.5. No Level in 3.5.1. Malfunction 3.5.1.1. Design 3.5.1.1.1. LAXLL- U-18. The high high SP-PRC Contractor that the high high 06/05/2008
the V-09 of level control temperature 1010 to close the temperature trip set temperature trip is setted
loop LIC-1009 to exceeding in the E- PV-1020 through point shall be below below the design temperature
open LV-1009 B 01 / V-09 and the solenoid valve the design temperature of the equipment. Contractor
and not open LV- damage by the activation of of the equipment confirm that all the alarm set
1009A or P-10 the logic I-7A; are shown in the O.M.
A/B stop (P&ID 3.5.1.1.2. TAXHH-
P56) 1011 A/B/C (2oo3)
to close the HV-
1120 for high high
temperature in the
stripper by the
activation of the
logic I-7B
Company: ENGRO

Node: (3) MP Steam from Turbine to Urea Stripper 10-E-01 through Stripper Steam Saturator 10-V-09. Condensate from Stripper Steam Saturator 10-V-09 to 1st Carbamate Condenser 10-E-05 A through M.P.
Decomposer 10-E-02 B.
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06416
U.19 Level No 3.5. No Level in 3.5.1. Malfunction 3.5.1.3. Possible 3.5.1.3.1. LAXLL- U-19. Verify the PSV- SP-PRC The two logic I-7A and I-7B 06/05/2008
the V-09 of level control V-09 emptying 1010 to close the 1015 A/B located at E- are sufficient to protect
loop LIC-1009 to and steam break PV-1020 through 05 A SS (P&ID P44) against this scenario.
open LV-1009 B through to the E- the solenoids valve for the steam break In addition to the PSV 1015
and not open LV- 02 B SS (P&ID by the activation of through from the V-09 A/B, on the same steam
1009A or P-10 P45) and then to E-the logic I-7A; header PV-1059B and PSV
A/B stop (P&ID 05 A (P&ID P44) 3.5.1.3.2. TAXHH- 1046 are provided.
P56) and possible 1011 A/B/C (2oo3)
design pressure to close the HV-
exceeding and 1120 for high high
damage temperature in the
stripper by the
activation of the
logic I-7B
U.20 Level More 3.6. Higher Level 3.6.1. Malfunction 3.6.1.1. Overfilling 3.6.1.1.1. TAL-1017 U-20. Provide a low SP-PRC Low flow alarm FAL-1013 is 06/05/2008
in the V-09 of level control of V-09 and E-01 flow alarm on existing provided
loop LIC-1009 to SS with up set due FI-1013 located on
close LV-1009 B to loss of heating steam line to E-01 SS
and overloading of
the downstream
MP section
Company: ENGRO

Node: (4) Carbonate Solution from H.P. Carbamate Solution Pumps 10-P-02 A/B and Overhead from Urea Stripper 10-E-01 to Carbamate Separator 10-V-01 through Carbamate Mixer 10-L-21, 1st and 2nd
Carbamate Condenser 10-E-05 A/B (T.S.).
Drawings: 10-GD-3C-06414
U.21 Temperature More 4.1. Higher 4.1.1. Loss of 4.1.1.1. Possible 4.1.1.1.1. LAL- U-21. Provide high SP-PRC High temperature alarms TAL- 06/05/2008
Temperature in condensate in up set in the 1012; 4.1.1.1.2. temperature alarm on 1105 and TAL-1002 has been
the V-01 one of the E-05 downstream V-01 PAH-1021 existing TI-1105 and TI- provided
A/B due to the and possible low 1002 located
failure of level level and high downstream E-05 A/B
control loop LIC- pressure in the V-
1013 or LIC-1113 01
and relevant
valve fully open
U.22 Temperature More 4.2. Higher 4.2.1. Less flow of 4.2.1.1. Possible 4.2.1.1.1. None U-22. Verify the SP-PRC 4.2.1.1.1. As The tube bundle is designed 25/07/2008
Temperature at E- carbamate with E-05 A tube possibility to overcome for for the maximum temperature
05 A bundle inlet more heat due to bundle design the E-05 A bundle Snamprogetti without carbamate (fresh
(downstream L- exothermic mixing temperature design temperature knowhow this fluid) thus avoiding design
21) exceeding and and if necessary consequence temperature exceeding in
damage provide protection is not case of less flow of
foreseen carbamate.
U.23 Temperature Less 4.3. Lower 4.3.1. Low 4.3.1.1. Possible 4.3.1.1.1. PAH- U-23. Provide low SP-PRC High temperature alarms TAL- 06/05/2008
Temperature in pressure in the plugging of E-05 1021 temperature alarm on 1105 and TAL-1002 has been
the E-05 A/B tube steam network A/B tube bundle existing TI-1105 and TI- provided
side and V-01 due to due to carbamate 1002 located
malfunction of solidification downstream E-05 A/B
pressure control
valve to release
the steam to the
atmosphere
(P&ID P57)
U.24 Pressure No 4.5. Vacuum in 4.5.1. 4.5.1.1. Possible 4.5.1.1.1. None U-24. Provide a SP-PRC 4.5.1.1.1. Procedure is included in the 15/01/2009
the V-01 during Condensation of equipment procedure in the Extend this operating manual: SPC 00-ZA-
steam out trapped in steam damage due to operating manual to recommendat E-06010 page 121/192 (Plant
operation vacuum design leave an open path to ion to all the heating before the start-up)
pressure the atmosphere equipment
exceeding through vent line or subjected to
drain line steam out
operation
Company: ENGRO

Node: (4) Carbonate Solution from H.P. Carbamate Solution Pumps 10-P-02 A/B and Overhead from Urea Stripper 10-E-01 to Carbamate Separator 10-V-01 through Carbamate Mixer 10-L-21, 1st and 2nd
Carbamate Condenser 10-E-05 A/B (T.S.).
U.25 Level More 4.7. Higher Level 4.7.1. Less flow of 4.7.1.2. Possible 4.7.1.2.1. LAH- U-25. Verify the SP-PRC According to SP experience 06/05/2008
in the V-01 ammonia from P- up set in the 1012; 4.7.1.2.2. possibility of erosion in there are not erosion
01 A/B due to the downstream MP PAH-1021 the PV-1021 A/B and if problems for the two valves
malfunction FIC- section / erosion necessary provide PV-1021 A/B. The material
1003 with valve of the PV-1021 protection has been specified as "Urea
partial closure A/B service" (see 10-SA-E-50129
sh. 33, note 2)
Company: ENGRO

Node: (5) Condensate from M.P. Decomposer 10-E-02 A/B to 10-V-10 through 1st and 2nd Carbamate Condenser (S.S.).
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06417
U.26 Pressure No 5.4. Vacuum in 5.4.1. Possible 5.4.1.1. Possible 5.4.1.1.1. None U-26. Provide LO on SP-PRC LO for the isolation valves are 06/05/2008
the E-05 A/B shell condensation of vacuum design the isolation valve provided
side steam trapped in pressure located on the E-05
exceeding and A/B overhead line
damage
U.27 Level More 5.5. Higher Level 5.5.1. Malfunction 5.5.1.1. E-05 A 5.5.1.1.1. None U-27. Provide an SP-PRC An indipendent level 06/05/2008
in the E-05 A shell of level control possible overfilling independent level trasmitter is provided
side loop LIC-1013 to with release of transmitter with high
close LV-1013 B condensate to the high level alarm or
steam header and alternative protection
hammering and
upset in the steam
distribution system
U.28 Level More 5.6. Higher Level 5.6.1. Malfunction 5.6.1.1. E-05 B 5.6.1.1.1. None U-28. Provide an SP-PRC An indipendent level 06/05/2008
in the E-05 B shell of level control possible overfilling independent level trasmitter is provided
side loop LIC-1113 to with release of transmitter with high
close LV-1113 B condensate to the high level alarm or
steam header and alternative protection
hammering and
upset in the steam
distribution system
U.29 Level Less 5.7. Lower Level 5.7.1. Malfunction 5.7.1.1. Possible 5.7.1.1.1. None U-29. Provide an SP-PRC An indipendent level 06/05/2008
in the E-05 A shell of level control E-05 A shell side independent level trasmitter is provided
side loop LIC-1013 emptying and transmitter with low
with LV-1013 B sudden level alarm or
fully open evaporation and alternative protection
hammering in the
exchanger in case
of water coming
from make up line
directly to the hot
tube bundle
Company: ENGRO

Node: (5) Condensate from M.P. Decomposer 10-E-02 A/B to 10-V-10 through 1st and 2nd Carbamate Condenser (S.S.).
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06417
U.30 Level Less 5.8. Lower Level 5.8.1. Malfunction 5.8.1.1. Possible 5.8.1.1.1. None U-30. Provide an SP-PRC An indipendent level 06/05/2008
in the E-05 B shell of level control E-05 B shell side independent level trasmitter is provided
side loop LIC-1113 emptying and transmitter with low
with LV-1113 B sudden level alarm or
fully open evaporation and alternative protection
hammering in the
exchanger in case
of water coming
from make up line
directly to the hot
tube bundle
Company: ENGRO

Node: (6) Off Gas from Carbamate Separator 10-V-01 to M.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-02 through M.P. Decomposer 10-E-02 A/B (relevant Steam Condensate Separator). Urea Solution from Urea Stripper 10-E-
01 to L.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-03 through M.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-02, M.P. Decomposer 10-E-02 A/B and M.P. Decomposer Holder 10-L-03.
10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415
U.31 Flow Other Than 6.1. Loss of 6.1.1. Leakage 6.1.1.1. Potential 6.1.1.1.1. AIH-1005, U-31. Verify the PSV- SP-PRC In addition to the PSV 1015 06/05/2008
containment in the from the tube for tube rupture AIH-1006 1015 A/B and PSV- A/B, on the same steam
E-02 A/B sheet and equipment (conductivity) 1016 A/B against the header PV-1059B and PSV
damage if not located at E-05 A/B tube rupture in the E- 1046 are provided.
quickly detected shell side overhead 02 A/B The system is designed in
and possible line order to have the same
design pressure design pressure up to the two
exceeding on the isolation valves TV-1021 and
downstream E-05 LV-1018
A/B
U.32 Pressure More 6.4. Higher 6.4.3. Loss of 6.4.3.1. Possible 6.4.3.1.1. PAH- U-32. Verify the PSV- SP-PRC This scenario is covered by 06/05/2008
Pressure in the V- condensation in equipment design 1024 on V-02 1018 A/B for this the PSV
02 the E-06 (located pressure overhead line scenario
on V-02 overhead exceeding and
line) due to TIC- damage
1026 malfunction
with TV-1026
closure
U.33 Pressure More 6.4. Higher 6.4.4. Blocked 6.4.4.1. Possible 6.4.4.1.1. PAH- U-33. Verify the PSV- SP-PRC This scenario is covered by 06/05/2008
Pressure in the V- outlet in the V-02 equipment design 1024 on V-02 1018 A/B for this the PSV
02 overhead line due pressure overhead line; scenario
to carbamate exceeding and 6.4.4.1.2. The line
solidification and damage provided with
plugging (E-06 flushing facilities
outlet)
U.34 Level Less 6.9. Lower Level 6.9.1. Malfunction 6.9.1.1. Gas break 6.9.1.1.1. PAH- U-34. Provide a low SP-PRC low pressure alarm PAL-1024 06/05/2008
in the MP of LIC-1014 with through to the LP 1031 on LP pressure alarm on the is provided
decomposer (tube valve LV-1014 decomposer and decomposer V-03 existing PI-1024
side) fully open possible design (P&ID P47); located at V-02
pressure 6.9.1.1.2. PSV- overhead line
exceeding and 1027 A/B on LP
overloading of the decomposer V-03
downstream LP (P&ID P47);
decomposer 6.9.1.1.3. TAL-1021
on the L-02
Company: ENGRO

Node: (6) Off Gas from Carbamate Separator 10-V-01 to M.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-02 through M.P. Decomposer 10-E-02 A/B (relevant Steam Condensate Separator). Urea Solution from Urea Stripper 10-E-
01 to L.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-03 through M.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-02, M.P. Decomposer 10-E-02 A/B and M.P. Decomposer Holder 10-L-03.
10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415
U.35 Level Less 6.10. Lower Level 6.10.1. 6.10.1.1. LM 6.10.1.1.1. Valve U-35. Verify the SP-PRC This line has been verified in 25/07/2008
in the V-23 steam Malfunction of LIC- steam and material suitable for possibility of mixed flow to take account of
condensate 1018 with valve condensate to the erosion service hammering in the line the possibility of hammering
separator LV-1018 fully E-05 B with and if yes provide
open possible protection (i.e. design
hammering in the the line for mixed flow)
line 6'-LC1022-
11D and erosion
in the LV-1018
Company: ENGRO

Node: (7) Off Gas from M.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-02 to M.P. Absorber 10-C-01 through Vacuum Preconcentrator 10-E-04.
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06417;
10-GD-3C-06418
U.36 Temperature More 7.6. Higher 7.6.1. Malfunction 7.6.1.1. CO2 carry 7.6.1.1.1. TAH-1034 U-36. Provide the SP-PRC 7.6.1.1.1. The Procedure is reported in the 15/01/2009
Temperature in of TIC-1026 with over with on C-01 bottom; procedure indicated in operator warned operating manual. SPC 00-ZA-
the E-06 shell side valve TV-1026 ammonia from C- 7.6.1.1.2. TAH-1394 the comment in the upfrontely by the E-06010; page 150/192
closure 01 top with on C-01 bottom; operating manual increasing (Change of operating
carbamate 7.6.1.1.3. TAH-1035 temperature in the variables of M.P. absorber)
formation and / TAH-1059 / TAH- C-01 shall increase and page 152/192 (Change of
solidification 1030 on C-01 top; first the ammonia operating variables of medium
downstream the E- 7.6.1.1.4. TAH-1028 reflux through the and low pressure condensers)
06, in the C-01, in on C-01 overhead FIC-1010 than the
the piping, in V-05 line; 7.6.1.1.5. water flowrate
and P-05 A/B Provision of flushing through the FIC-
damage facilities in C-01 and 1009 in order to
C-01 overhead line wash possible
plugging in the
trays and to absorb
the CO2. In case
this action should
not be sufficient
the operator shall
put the unit in
shutdown in order
to avoid to damage
the downstream P-
05 A/B.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (8) M.P. Absorber 10-C-01 and relevant H.P. Carbamate Solution Pumps. 10-P-02 A/B
10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415
U.37 Flow More 8.3. More Flow in 8.3.1. Malfunction 8.3.1.1. More 8.3.1.1.1. TAL- U-37. Verify the high SP Vibration transmitters are 25/07/2008
the 3'-1057 (reflux of flow control ammonia in the C- 1395; 8.3.1.1.2. vibration protections provided to automatically trip
from ammonia loop FIC-1010 01 bottom with TAL-1034; of the pump during the P-02. Refer to package hazop
booster pump) with FV-1010 fully possible cavitation 8.3.1.1.3. Low hazop of package node 32 SPC. 00-ZA-E-85105
open of P-02 A/B due to ampere load alarm
less NPSH on the pump IAXLL-
available MP02 A/B to
activate the logic I-4
A/B to shut down
the pump
U.38 Flow More 8.6. More Flow in 8.6.1. HV-1009 8.6.1.1. Refer To U-38. Provide high SP-PRC High ampere alarm is 06/05/2008
8'-1023 ( P-02 fully open due to 8.11.2.1 ampere alarm on P-02 provided
discharge line to operator mistake A/B
carbamate
condenser)
U.39 Level More 8.10. Higher Level 8.10.2. Pump P- 8.10.2.1. Flooding 8.10.2.1.1. LAH- U-39. Provide the SP-PRC 8.10.2.1.1. Procedure is reported in the 15/01/2009
in the C-01 02 A/B stop due of the C-01 and 1015; 8.10.2.1.2. procedure indicated in The operator operating manual. SPC 00-ZA-
to failure possible CO2 FAL-1005 A/B at the comments in the warned by E-06010; page 150/192
carry over pump suction (P&ID operating manual the high level (Change of operating
P42); 8.10.2.1.3. alarm in the variables of M.P. absorber)
Alarm in control C-01 shall and page 151/192 (Medium
room for pump trip open the HV- Pressure absorber upsets)
1012 to
release liquid
in the V-06 to
avoid the C-
01 flooding.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (8) M.P. Absorber 10-C-01 and relevant H.P. Carbamate Solution Pumps. 10-P-02 A/B
10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415
U.40 Level Less 8.11. Lower Level 8.11.1. 8.11.1.1. Possible 8.11.1.1.1. FAL- U-40. Verify the SP LV-1015 mechanical stop at 25/07/2008
in the C-01 Malfunction of C-01 emptying 1005 A/B; protections of the 10% is provided ensuring a
level control loop with pump P-02 8.11.1.1.2. Low pump during the hazop minimum flow to P-02.
LIC-1015 with LV- A/B running dry ampere load alarm of package In addition refer protections
1015 closed and damage for on the pump IAXLL- listed in package hazop
cavitation. In case MP02 A/B to nodes 32 and 33 SPC. 00-ZA-
of pump seal activate the logic I-4 E-85105.
damage possible A/B to shut down
release of the pump
ammonia solution
to the atmosphere
with possible
operator injury
Company: ENGRO

Node: (9) Ammonia from M.P. Absorber 10-C-01 to Ammonia Receiver 10-V-05 through Ammonia Condenser 10-E-09 (S.S.). CW through Ammonia Condenser 10-E-09 (T.S.) and through M.P. Condenser 10-E-06
10-GD-3C-06416
U.41 Pressure More 9.6. Higher 9.6.1. Tube 9.6.1.1. Possible 9.6.1.1.1. PSV- U-41. Provide a SP-HSE Dispersion study has been 19/09/2008
Pressure in the E- rupture CW piping design 1024 designed for dispersion study from issued (see HSE-review N°
09 tube side (CW) pressure this scenario to V-11 vent stack 19, SPC 00-ZA-E-85700)
exceeding and release the content
damage with (ammonia, water) to
ammonia release the V-11
to atmosphere and
operator injury
Company: ENGRO

Node: (10) Ammonia from B.L. to M.P. Absorber 10-C-01 through B.L. NH3 Filters, M.P. Ammonia Recovery Tower 10-C-05, Ammonia Receiver 10-V-05 and relevant Ammonia Booster Pumps 10-P-05 A/B.
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06416
U.42 Flow Less 10.2. Less Flow in 10.2.1. Plugging 10.2.1.1. Refer To 10.2.1.1.1. PDAH- U-42. Provide in the SP-PRC Procedure is reported in the 15/01/2009
8'-1067 (ammonia of S-04 A/B due 10.13.1.1 Possible 1027; 10.2.1.1.2. operating manual the operating manual. SPC 00-ZA-
from B.L.) to possible V-05 emptying. Spare filter is frequency of the E-06010; page 118/192 No 3
catalyst dust in provided; change over / (Charging of ammonia in
the ammonia 10.2.1.1.3. FAL- maintenance of the M.P. section)
(especially at start 1011 filter for normal
up) operation and start up
operation
U.43 Flow No 10.5. No Flow in P- 10.5.1. Pump P- 10.5.1.1. Possible 10.5.1.1.1. Low U-43. During the hazop SP Automatic trip of P-01 due to 25/07/2008
05 A/B discharge 05 A/B fails stop P-01 A/B ampere load alarm of the package verify P-05 trip has been
line 12'-1005 or cavitation cavitation and on the pump IAXLL- with P-01 A/B vendor if implemented (refer to logic I-
damage MP01 A/B to the low ampere load 103) on the basis of QRA
activate the logic I-3 alarm / trip can be results (see event TU-1 in
A/B to shut down considered a QRA SPC. 00-ZA-E-85400).
the pump safeguard to prevent Refer also to package hazop
the cavitation of the node 30 parameter "other"
pumps, and anyway SPC.00-ZA-E-85105
provide two
independent protection
U.44 Temperature Less 10.6. Lower 10.6.1. Ammonia 10.6.1.1. Possible 10.6.1.1.1. None U-44. Verify the SP During normal operation the 06/05/2008
Temperature in from ammonia equipment / piping scenario and if NH3 coming form BL is mixed
the V-05 storage at -33 °C damage due to necessary provide with the NH3 coming from the
and at 30 kg/cm2 embrittlement adequate protection ammonia condenser at 38°C.
g at ammonia caused by The mixed solution in this
storage pump simultaneous high scenario is at 10°C without
discharge pressure and low any problems for the
temperature equipment.
U.45 Pressure More 10.8. Higher 10.8.1. Thermal 10.8.1.1. Possible 10.8.1.1.1. PSV- U-45. Verify the set SP-PRC the line is NNF and designed 25/07/2008
Pressure in the expansion of line design 1126 pressure of this PSV at the shut-off of the pump.
line 3'-1056 liquid ammonia pressure PSV is verified
trapped in exceeding and
damage
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06416
U.46 Pressure More 10.9. Higher 10.9.1. Check 10.9.1.1. Possible 10.9.1.1.1. None U-46. Move the spec SP-PRC This line is used only during 19/09/2008
Pressure in the valve stuck line design break 78A/53A/33D the start-up phase. After that,
line 8'-1009 closed pressure after the check valve according a proper procedure
exceeding and or provide alternative in the O.M. , the valve is
damage protection closed and line up to the
ckeck valve, is washed
through the dedicated line
(1/2"-HW1041). A PI at DCS
has been added. A PSV has
been added in the in the line
8"-P1009, designed for 10%
of the flow in case of the
leakage of the VD04 valve
U.47 Composition As Well As 10.11. 10.11.1. Leakage 10.11.1.1. Fouling 10.11.1.1.1. None U-47. Verify the SP-PRC The maximum content of oil 19/09/2008
Contamination: from pump seal in in the urea plant maximum expected has been verified: 5 ppm.
traces of oil in the the ammonia and possible content of oil from This value is in accordance
ammonia from plant / storage product off spec ammonia storage / with the garantied value at the
B.L. to V-05 plant and if necessary inlet and at the outlet.
provide protection
U.48 Level More 10.12. Higher 10.12.1. 10.12.1.1. 10.12.1.1.1. LAHH- U-48. Verify during the SP Already verified in the Flare 19/09/2008
Level in the V-05 Malfunction of Possible V-05 and 1114 on V-05; hazop of the package Hazop (node 1)
level control loop C-03 overfilling 10.12.1.1.2. PAH- the scenario and the
LIC-1016 with and release of 1026 on V-05; suitability of the
valve LV-1016 ammonia to 10.12.1.1.3. LAH- downstream
fully open continuous flare 1017 on C-03; continuous flare
system through 10.12.1.1.4. FAXH- system to receive in
the PV-1026 1113 on C-03 safety way the liquid
(normal opening ammonia otherwise
position). provide adequate
protection
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06416
U.49 Level More 10.12. Higher 10.12.1. 10.12.1.2. In case 10.12.1.2.1. LAHH- U-49. Verify the SP-PRC PSV-1022 cover this scenario 06/05/2008
Level in the V-05 Malfunction of the PV-1026 can 1114 on V-05; scenario and if credible
level control loop not release the 10.12.1.2.2. PAH- design the PSV-1022
LIC-1016 with increasing 1026 on V-05; against the overfilling
valve LV-1016 pressure possible 10.12.1.2.3. LAH-
fully open equipment design 1017 on C-03;
pressure 10.12.1.2.4. FAXH-
exceeding and 1113 on C-03
damage with
release of
ammonia to the
atmosphere and
operatorsinjury
U.50 Level More 10.12. Higher 10.12.1. 10.12.1.2. In case 10.12.1.2.1. LAHH- U-50. According to SP-PRC / This scenario has been 25/07/2008
Level in the V-05 Malfunction of the PV-1026 can 1114 on V-05; QRA results evaluate SP-HSE analysed in QRA. Refer to
level control loop not release the 10.12.1.2.2. PAH- to automatically close event TU-17 in SPC. 00-ZA-E-
LIC-1016 with increasing 1026 on V-05; the ammonia inlet from 85400. Considering all
valve LV-1016 pressure possible 10.12.1.2.3. LAH- B.L. to V-05 in case of causes leading to potential V-
fully open equipment design 1017 on C-03; high high level in the V- 05 overpressure in addition to
pressure 10.12.1.2.4. FAXH- 05 this LIC-1016 failure, the risk
exceeding and 1113 on C-03 of this scenario is assessed
damage with as tolerable such that
release of additional protections are not
ammonia to the required. A trip to
atmosphere and close the ammonia inlet has
operatorsinjury been added: LAHH-1114 will
close LV-1016, through a
soledonid. The LV-1016 will
be L.C., while the valve will be
class V
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06416
U.51 Level Less 10.13. Lower 10.13.1. 10.13.1.1. 10.13.1.1.1. LALL- U-51. Verify with P-05 SP-MAC 10.13.1.1.1. On the basis of QRA results 19/09/2008
Level in the V-05 Malfunction of Possible V-05 1115 on V-05; A/B vendor if the low Refer To (see event TU-14 and TU-1
level control loop emptying and 10.13.1.1.2. FAL- ampere load alarm can recommendat for P-01 in QRA SPC. 00-ZA-
LIC-1016 with pump P-05 A/B 1011 on ammonia be considered a ion U-53 E-85400) the following trips
valve LV-1016 and than P-01 A/B
line from B.L.; safeguard to prevent .\nExtend the have been added:
closed damage with 10.13.1.1.3. Low the cavitation of the recommendat - Automatic trip of P-05 in
release of ampere load alarm pumps, otherwise ion to all the case of low low level (refer to
ammonia to the on the pump AIIL- provide adequate pumps in the logic I-126);
atmosphere and MP05 A/B; protection urea unit - Automatic trip of P-01 due to
operator injury 10.13.1.1.4. Low handling P-05 trip (refer to logic I-103)
ampere load alarm hazardous or
on the pump IAXLL- non
MP01 A/B to hazardous
activate the logic I-3 material
A/B to shut down
the pump
U.52 Level Less 10.13. Lower 10.13.1. 10.13.1.1. 10.13.1.1.1. LALL- U-52. During the hazop SP 10.13.1.1.1. See previuos response for 25/07/2008
Level in the V-05 Malfunction of Possible V-05 1115 on V-05; of the package verify Refer To recommendation U.51. In
level control loop emptying and 10.13.1.1.2. FAL- with P-01 A/B vendor if recommendat addition refer to package
LIC-1016 with pump P-05 A/B 1011 on ammonia the low ampere load ion U-53 hazop SPC. 00-ZA-85105
valve LV-1016 and than P-01 A/B line from B.L.; alarm / trip can be .\nExtend the
closed damage with 10.13.1.1.3. Low considered a recommendat
release of ampere load alarm safeguard to prevent ion to all the
ammonia to the on the pump AIIL- the cavitation of the pumps in the
atmosphere and MP05 A/B; pumps, otherwise urea unit
operator injury 10.13.1.1.4. Low provide adequate handling
ampere load alarm protection hazardous or
A/B to shut down
the pump
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06416
U.53 Level Less 10.13. Lower 10.13.1. 10.13.1.1. 10.13.1.1.1. LALL- U-53. Verify if the SP-MAC / 10.13.1.1.1. Refer to response for 25/07/2008
Level in the V-05 Malfunction of Possible V-05 1115 on V-05; project applicable SP-PRC Refer To recommendation U.51.
level control loop emptying and 10.13.1.1.2. FAL- standard for pumps P- recommendat
LIC-1016 with pump P-05 A/B 1011 on ammonia 01 A/B and P-05 A/B ion U-53
valve LV-1016 and than P-01 A/B line from B.L.; require pump trip to .\nExtend the
closed damage with 10.13.1.1.3. Low avoid cavitation (low recommendat
release of ampere load alarm level or no flow in the ion to all the
ammonia to the on the pump AIIL- suction) if yes provide pumps in the
atmosphere and MP05 A/B; urea unit
operator injury 10.13.1.1.4. Low handling
ampere load alarm hazardous or
A/B to shut down
the pump
U.54 Maintenance Other Than 10.14. Unsafe 10.14.1. Quick 10.14.1.1. 10.14.1.1.1. None U-54. Provide a SP-PRC 10.14.1.1.1. Scenario has been evaluated 25/07/2008
Maintenance on S- opening of ball Release of high protection against this Extend this and there are no issues due
04 A/B isolation valve pressure ammonia scenario recommendat to the minimum volume. No
due to operator (about 25 kg/cm2 ion to all special precautions are
mistake g) to the equipment required. Procedure
atmosphere with handling according to Mantenance
operator injury hazardous standard (pag 118/192 of
material and O.M.)
subjected to
maintenance
with the plant
in operation.;
10.14.1.1.2.
The seal
class of the
ball isolation
valve is VI
Company: ENGRO

Node: (11) Ammonia from M.P. Ammonia Recovery Tower 10-C-05 and Condensate from Flushing Condensate Cooler 10-E-10 to M.P. Absorber 10-C-01 through M.P. Ammonia Absorber 10-E-11, M.P. Inerts
Washing Tower and relevant Ammonia Solution Pumps 10-P-07 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06416
U.55 Temperature More 11.1. Higher 11.1.1. Loss of 11.1.1.1. Possible 11.1.1.1.1. FAXH- U-55. Provide an high SP-PRC TAH-1041 has been provided 25/07/2008
Temperature in cooling water in E- increasing of 1113 on c-03 vent temperature alarm on in P&ID P-46 rev.4
the C-03 11 shell side ammonia to the line to activate the the existing TI-1041 on
flare due to the logic I-18 to C-03 bottom line
less absorption in increase the natural
C-03 with possible gas to the flare
incombusted ensuing the gas
ammonia to combustion
atmosphere due to
low LHV
U.56 Composition More 11.5. High 11.5.1. High 11.5.1.1. Possible 11.5.1.1.1. AAH- U-56. Provide SP-PRC Analytical manual for the urea 15/01/2009
Concentration of passivation air to explosive mixture 1007 explosive procedure in the unit has been provided (SPC.
O2 in C-03 top the stripper E-01 formation in the mixture alarm (gas operating manual to 10-ZA-E-86601)
vessel and chromatograph to calibrate the gas
possible ignition in detect O2, H2, CH4 chromatograph
the downstream and inerts and to periodically
PV-1026 with calculate the
vessel damage explosive mixture
composition) on
the C-03 overhead
line; 11.5.1.1.2. PV-
1026 internals
coated with teflon in
order to avoid
sparks; 11.5.1.1.3.
Grounding provided
between the valve
flanges; 11.5.1.1.4.
Provision of MP
dilution steam on
the top of the C-03
through the HV-
1103
Company: ENGRO

Node: (11) Ammonia from M.P. Ammonia Recovery Tower 10-C-05 and Condensate from Flushing Condensate Cooler 10-E-10 to M.P. Absorber 10-C-01 through M.P. Ammonia Absorber 10-E-11, M.P. Inerts
Washing Tower and relevant Ammonia Solution Pumps 10-P-07 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06416
U.57 Level More 11.8. Higher Level 11.8.1. 11.8.1.1. Possible 11.8.1.1.1. PAH- U-57. Provide high SP-PRC High temperature alarm TAL- 06/05/2008
in the C-03 Malfunction of overfilling of the C- 1026 in V-05; temperature alarm on 1037 is provided
level control loop 03 and water 11.8.1.1.2. PSV- existing TI-1037 at V-
LIC-1017 with LV- reverse flow in the 1022 verified for 05 bottom
1017 closed V-05 with this scenario;
increasing of the 11.8.1.1.3. FAL-
temperature and 1011 on ammonia
possible design line from B.L.
pressure
exceeding in the V-
05 due to vapour
line blocked outlet
U.58 Level Less 11.9. Lower Level 11.9.1. 11.9.1.1. Possible 11.9.1.1.1. Low U-58. Verify with P-07 SP-PRC On the basis of QRA results 25/07/2008
in C-03 Malfunction of C-03 emptying ampere load alarm A/B vendor if the low (see event TU-21 for P-07 in
level control loop and pump P-07 on the pump AIIL- ampere load alarm can QRA SPC. 00-ZA-E-85400),
LIC-1017 with LV- A/B damage with MP07 A/B; be considered a automatic trip of P-07 for low
1017 fully open release of 11.9.1.1.2. Double safeguard to prevent amperage has been added
ammonia solution mechanical seal the cavitation of the (refer to logic I-127).
to atmosphere provided for the pumps and provide
with possible pump P-07 A/B two independent
operator injury protection
U.59 Level Less 11.9. Lower Level 11.9.2. Two pump 11.9.2.1. Possible 11.9.2.1.1. LAL- U-59. Consider to SP-PRC 11.9.2.1.1. Refer to above response to 25/07/2008
in C-03 P-07 A/B in C-03 emptying 1017 on C-03; provide a level The possible recommendation U.58
operation due to and pump P-07 11.9.2.1.2. Low indication on field cavitation can
operator mistake A/B damage with ampere load alarm readable from pump P- occur quickly
or pump P-07 A/B release of on the pump AIIL- 07 A/B due to the
change over ammonia solution MP07 A/B; low hold up in
to atmosphere 11.9.2.1.3. Double the C-03
with possible mechanical seal
operator injury provided for the
pump P-07 A/B
Company: ENGRO

Node: (12) Ammonia from Ammonia Booster Pumps 10-P-05 A/B to Carbamate Ejector 10-L-01 through H.P. Ammonia Pumps Suction Filters 10-S-03 A/B, H.P. Ammonia Pumps 10-P-01 A/B and Ammonia
Preheater 10-E-07 (T.S.).
10-GD-4C-06413;
10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-3C-06416;
10-GD-3C-06418
U.60 Flow No 12.1. No Flow in 12.1.1. 12.1.1.2. Possible 12.1.1.2.1. None U-60. Provide an high SP-PRC 12.1.1.2.1. High temperature alarm is 06/05/2008
the line 10'-1001 P- Malfunction of E-07 design temperature alarm on The operating provided TAL-1058
01 A/B discharge flow control loop temperature existing TI-1058 temperature
line FIC-1003 with exceeding and of E-07 shell
valve FV-1003 damage side is 130 °C
closed while the
design
temperature
of E-07 tube
side is 125 °C
U.61 Flow No 12.1. No Flow in 12.1.1. 12.1.1.2. Possible 12.1.1.2.1. None U-61. Evaluated the SP-PRC 12.1.1.2.1. TAH-1058 on E-07 outlet 25/07/2008
the line 10'-1001 P- Malfunction of E-07 design scenario and if The operating (shell side) has been added
01 A/B discharge flow control loop temperature necessary provide an temperature (refer to P&ID P-48 rev.3) and
line FIC-1003 with exceeding and additional and of E-07 shell TAH-1020 on ammonia side
valve FV-1003 damage independent protection side is 130 °C is provided (refer to P&ID P-
closed against the design while the 44 rev.3)
temperature exceeding design
temperature
of E-07 tube
side is 125 °C
U.62 Flow No 12.1. No Flow in 12.1.1. 12.1.1.3. Possible 12.1.1.3.1. Vertical U-62. Provide in the SP-PRC Procedure is reported in the 15/01/2009
the line 10'-1001 P- Malfunction of reverse flow of check valve along operating manual a operating manual. SPC 00-ZA-
01 A/B discharge flow control loop carbamate from the line; 12.1.1.3.2. procedure to manage E-06010; page 145/192 no 4
line FIC-1003 with reactor R-01 in the FZAL-1003 for this type of scenario (H.P. ammonia pumps and
valve FV-1003 line 10'-1001 valve closed; H.P. carbonate solution
closed 12.1.1.3.3. pumps A/B upsets)
Provision for
flushing facilities
Company: ENGRO

Node: (12) Ammonia from Ammonia Booster Pumps 10-P-05 A/B to Carbamate Ejector 10-L-01 through H.P. Ammonia Pumps Suction Filters 10-S-03 A/B, H.P. Ammonia Pumps 10-P-01 A/B and Ammonia
Preheater 10-E-07 (T.S.).
10-GD-4C-06413;
10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-3C-06416;
10-GD-3C-06418
U.63 Flow No 12.1. No Flow in 12.1.1. 12.1.1.3. Possible 12.1.1.3.1. Vertical U-63. Verify if check SP-PRC This line has been verified in 25/07/2008
the line 10'-1001 P- Malfunction of reverse flow of check valve along valve is tight shutoff mixed flow to take account of
01 A/B discharge flow control loop carbamate from the line; 12.1.1.3.2. type the possibility of hammering.
line FIC-1003 with reactor R-01 in the FZAL-1003 for The check valve for this
valve FV-1003 line 10'-1001 valve closed; service is "spring check
closed 12.1.1.3.3. valve", a type of valve to
Provision for avoid this scenario
flushing facilities
Company: ENGRO

Node: (13) Urea Solution from M.P. Decomposer 10-E-02 A/B to L.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-03. L.P. Decomposer 10-E-03, L.P. Decomposer Holder 10-L-03 and relevant Steam Condensate Separator 10-V-24.
Carbonate solution from L.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-03 to Carbonate Solution Accumulator 10-V-06 through Ammonia Preheater 10-E-07 (S.S.) and L.P. Condenser 10-E-08.
10-GD-3C-06417;
10-GD-3C-06418
U.64 Flow Reverse 13.1. Reverse 13.1.1. P-03 A/B 13.1.1.1. E-08 13.1.1.1.1. None U-64. Verify the SP-PRC this recycle line is NNF and 06/05/2008
Flow in the line 1 ' stop partial by pass scenario and evaluate the design pressure of E-08 is
1/2 -1092 (from P- with no the necessity of a the same of V-06 without any
03 discharge line consequence of check valve consequence for the
to E-08 inlet line) concern equipment
U.65 Temperature More 13.2. Higher 13.2.1. 13.2.1.1. 13.2.1.1.1. PAH- U-65. Provide an high SP-PRC High temperature alarm TAL- 06/05/2008
Temperature in Malfunction of Overloading of the 1031 on the V-03 temperature alarm on 1042 is provided
the LP temperature downstream overhead line the existing TI-1042
decomposer E-03 control loop TIC- vacuum system on the V-03 overhead
(shell side) 1043 with TV- and possible off line
1043 fully open spec product
U.66 Temperature Less 13.4. Lower 13.4.1. Colder 13.4.1.1. Possible 13.4.1.1.1. TAL- U-66. Provide a low SP-PRC High temperature alarm TAL- 06/05/2008
Temperature in ammonia in the E- plugging in the 1048 downstream E- temperature alarm on 1058 is provided
the E-07 shell side 07 tube side due downstream E-08 08 the existing TI-1058
to possible upset shell side due to
carbamate
solidification
U.67 Temperature Less 13.5. Lower 13.5.1. 13.5.1.1. Possible 13.5.1.1.1. PAH- U-67. Verify the SP-PRC PAL-1033 is already provided 06/05/2008
temperature in the Malfunction of plugging in the 1031 on V-03 scenario and if the
E-08 shell side temperature downstream E-08 overhead line; solidification of
control loop TIC- shell side due to 13.5.1.1.2. The line carbamate can occur
1048 with TV- carbamate provided with provide an
1048 fully open solidification flushing facilities independent
temperature
transmitter with low
temperature alarm
Company: ENGRO

Node: (13) Urea Solution from M.P. Decomposer 10-E-02 A/B to L.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-03. L.P. Decomposer 10-E-03, L.P. Decomposer Holder 10-L-03 and relevant Steam Condensate Separator 10-V-24.
Carbonate solution from L.P. Decomposer Separator 10-V-03 to Carbonate Solution Accumulator 10-V-06 through Ammonia Preheater 10-E-07 (S.S.) and L.P. Condenser 10-E-08.
10-GD-3C-06417;
10-GD-3C-06418
U.68 Pressure More 13.8. Higher 13.8.1. Tube 13.8.1.1. Possible 13.8.1.1.1. PSE- U-68. Verify the set SP-PRC 13.8.1.1.1. The new set pressure of PSE 19/09/2008
Pressure in the E- rupture equipment design 1059 A/B (rupture pressure of PSE-1059 The design is 12.5 kg/cm2g. The line
07 shell side pressure disc) A/B and if necessary pressure of E- class pressure design is 9.7
exceeding and update 07 shell side kg/cm2g at the operating
damage with and the set temperature. Hydraulic
release of pressure of Pressure test is higher than
ammonia to the PSE-1059 12.5. ASME allows that.
atmosphere and A/B are 14
operator injury kg/cm2 g
while the
design
pressure of
the upstream
and
downstream
equipment
and relevant
PSV are 7
kg/cm2 g
U.69 Level Less 13.14. Lower 13.14.1. 13.14.1.1. LM 13.14.1.1.1. None U-69. Verify the SP-PRC This line has been verified in 25/07/2008
Level in the V-24 Malfunction of LIC- steam and possibility of mixed flow to take account of
steam condensate 1019 with valve condensate to the hammering in the line the possibility of hammering
separator LV-1019 fully E-05 B with and if yes provide
open possible protection (i.e. design
hammering in the the line for mixed flow)
line 6'-LC1021-
11D and erosion
in the LV-1019
U.70 Level Less 13.14. Lower 13.14.1. 13.14.1.1. LM 13.14.1.1.1. None U-70. Verify that valve SP-PRC the possibility of a flash into 06/05/2008
Level in the V-24 Malfunction of LIC- steam and material is suitable for the valve has been
steam condensate 1019 with valve condensate to the erosion service and if considered in the data sheet
separator LV-1019 fully E-05 B with not provide
open possible
hammering in the
line 6'-LC1021-
11D and erosion
in the LV-1019
Company: ENGRO

Node: (14) Carbonate Solution from Carbonate Solution Accumulator 10-V-06 with relevant L.P. Inert Washing Tower 10-C-04 to Distillation Tower 10-C02 through M.P. Carbonate Solution Pumps 10-P-03 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06417;
10-GD-3C-06418;
10-GD-3C-06423
U.71 Flow Reverse 14.2. Reverse 14.2.1. Pump P- 14.2.1.1. Possible 14.2.1.1.1. None U-71. Verify the SP-PRC this line is NNF and the 19/09/2008
Flow in the line 2'- 03 A/B fails stop reverse flow of scenario and if design pressure is the same
1097 gas from C-02 top necessary provide a of V-06 (P=6 kg/cm2g)
to V-06 through P- check valve in the line without any consequence for
03 A/B minimum the equipment.
flow line with The vent of 6" is able to
possible up set in remove the excess of
the V-06 pressure anso in case of 2"
reverse flow. PAH-1033 is
already present to detect this
event. Reverse
flow in this line has no safety
concern and will not result in
process upset
U.72 Level More 14.5. Higher Level 14.5.1. 14.5.1.1. Possible 14.5.1.1.1. LAH- U-72. Verify if the SP-PRC The flares are provided with a 06/05/2008
in the V-06 Malfunction of V-06 overfilling 1024; 14.5.1.1.2. downstream liquid seal which works as
level control loop with release of PAH-1033; discontinuous flare K.O. drum.
LIC-1015 with LV- carbamate to 14.5.1.1.3. PSV- system is able to
1015 closure discontinuous 1032 on V-06 receive carbamate
(P&ID P47) flare F-13 and solution in a safe way
possible design
pressure
exceeding and
damage
U.73 Level More 14.5. Higher Level 14.5.4. Operator 14.5.4.2. Possible 14.5.4.2.1. PAH- U-73. Verify the PSV- SP-PRC PSV-1032 cover this scenario 06/05/2008
in the V-06 mistake to open gas breakthrough 1033 1032 for this scenario
the HV-1012 to V-06 with
possible design
pressure
exceeding and
equipment
damage
Company: ENGRO

Node: (14) Carbonate Solution from Carbonate Solution Accumulator 10-V-06 with relevant L.P. Inert Washing Tower 10-C-04 to Distillation Tower 10-C02 through M.P. Carbonate Solution Pumps 10-P-03 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06417;
10-GD-3C-06418;
10-GD-3C-06423
U.74 Level More 14.5. Higher Level 14.5.4. Operator 14.5.4.2. Possible 14.5.4.2.1. PAH- U-74. Consider to SP-PRC The system is under pressure 25/07/2008
in the V-06 mistake to open gas breakthrough 1033 provide an alarm of HV- control (PIC-1033). In case of
the HV-1012 to V-06 with 1012 fully open HV-1012 fully open, PSV-
possible design 1032 is provided to cover this
pressure scenario.
exceeding and
equipment
damage
Company: ENGRO

Node: (15) Urea Solution from L.P. Decomposer Holder 10-L-03 to 1st Vacuum Concentrator 10-E-014 through Vacuum Preconcentrator Separator 10-V-04, Vacuum Preconcentrator 10-E-04, Vacuum
Preconcentrator Holder 10-L-04 and Urea Solution Pumps 10-P-06 A/B. Off Gas from Vacuum Preconcentrator Separator 10-V-04 to 1st Vacuum System.
10-GD-3C-06419
U.75 Temperature Less 15.2. Lower 15.2.1. Less 15.2.1.1. Possible 15.2.1.1.1. TAL- U-75. Provide low SP-PRC low temperature alarm TAL- 06/05/2008
Temperature in E- temperature in the crystallization in 1047 on L-04; temperature alarm on 1081 is provided
04 tube side E-04 shell side the L-04 bottom 15.2.1.1.2. existing TI-1081
due to LV-1015 line Provision for
fully open flushing facilities
U.76 Pressure More 15.3. Higher 15.3.1. Gas break 15.3.1.1. Loss of 15.3.1.1.1. PAH- U-76. Verify the SP-PRC This scenario has been 25/07/2008
Pressure in the through from L-03 vacuum and 1032 on V-04; scenario in order to evaluated during the design
vacuum due to possible loss of 15.3.1.1.2. PAH- ensure that in case of phase of the flare system.
preconcentrator malfunction of LIC- seal water in T-02 1034 on the V-14; gas break through from The system is designed to
1022 with valve and more 15.3.1.1.3. PAH- L-03 is not possible to cover the gas break through
LV-1022 fully ammonia release 1036 on the V-15 overcome the design
open on L-03 to flare and pressure of the
bottom line possible vacuum vacuum section taking
system design in to account the back
pressure pressure from the T-02
exceeding due to due to the pressure
high back losses: if not provide
pressure from T- protection
02
U.77 Pressure More 15.3. Higher 15.3.2. Tube 15.3.2.1. Loss of 15.3.2.1.1. PAH- U-77. Verify the SP-PRC The system has been 25/07/2008
Pressure in the rupture in the E- vacuum and 1032 on V-04; scenario in order to designed considering the tube
vacuum 04 possible loss of 15.3.2.1.2. PAH- ensure that in case of rupture
preconcentrator seal water in T-02 1034 on the V-14; tube rupture from E-04
and more 15.3.2.1.3. PAH- is not possible to
ammonia release 1036 on the V-15 overcome the design
to flare and pressure of the
possible vacuum vacuum section taking
system design in to account the back
pressure pressure from the T-02
exceeding due to due to the pressure
high back losses and also
pressure from T- considering the
02 increase of pressure in
the E-04 due to the
transient; if not provide
protection
Company: ENGRO

Node: (15) Urea Solution from L.P. Decomposer Holder 10-L-03 to 1st Vacuum Concentrator 10-E-014 through Vacuum Preconcentrator Separator 10-V-04, Vacuum Preconcentrator 10-E-04, Vacuum
Preconcentrator Holder 10-L-04 and Urea Solution Pumps 10-P-06 A/B. Off Gas from Vacuum Preconcentrator Separator 10-V-04 to 1st Vacuum System.
10-GD-3C-06419
U.78 Level More 15.5. Higher Level 15.5.1. 15.5.1.2. Pump P- 15.5.1.2.1. IIAL- U-78. Verify with P-06 SP-MAC Internal minimum flow without 15/01/2009
in the vacuum Malfunction of 06 A/B running MP06 A/B A/B vendor if the low recycle line has been
preconcentrator (L- level control loop below minimum ampere load alarm can considered (refer to SPC. N.
04) LIC-1023 with acceptable flow be considered a 10-MA-E-06306 note 6). In
valve LV-1023 and possible safeguard to prevent the O.M. a procedure is
closure damage the damage of the written how to proceed in this
pumps, otherwise scenario (00-ZA-E-06010).
provide adequate Contractor confirms that this
protection scenario has been checked
with the Vendor and low
ampere is considered a
proper protection
U.79 Level Less 15.6. Lower Level 15.6.1. 15.6.1.1. Possible 15.6.1.1.1. IIAL- U-79. Verify with P-06 SP-MAC Pressure indicators (PI-1047 25/07/2008
in the vacuum Malfunction of L-04 emptying and MP06 A/B A/B vendor if the low and PI-1049) with low alarm
preconcentrator (L- level control loop pump P-06 A/B ampere load alarm can at discharge have been
04) LIC-1023 with cavitation and be considered a provided. Refer to P&ID rev.4.
valve LV-1023 damage safeguard to prevent In the O.M. a procedure is
fully open the damage of the written how to proceed in this
pumps, otherwise scenario (00-ZA-E-06010).
provide adequate Contractor confirms that this
protection scenario has been checked
with the Vendor and low
proper protection
U.80 Level Less 15.6. Lower Level 15.6.1. 15.6.1.1. Possible 15.6.1.1.1. IIAL- U-80. Verify the SP-PRC See above response to 25/07/2008
in the vacuum Malfunction of L-04 emptying and MP06 A/B presence of other recommendation U.79 In the
preconcentrator (L- level control loop pump P-06 A/B safeguard against this O.M. a procedure is written
04) LIC-1023 with cavitation and scenario and if how to proceed in this
valve LV-1023 damage necessary provide scenario (00-ZA-E-06010).
fully open additional protection in Contractor confirms that this
order to have two scenario has been checked
independent protection with the Vendor and low
proper protection
Company: ENGRO

Node: (16) Urea Solution from Urea Solution Pumps 10-P-06 A/B to 2nd Vacuum Concentrator through 1st Vacuum Concentrator (and relevant Steam Condensate Separator 10-V-25) and 1st Vacuum Separator 10-V-1
10-GD-3C-06420
U.81 Flow No 16.1. No Flow in 16.1.1. P-06 A/B 16.1.1.1. 16.1.1.1.1. PAH- U-81. Provide high SP-PRC 16.1.1.1.1. High DP alarm is provided 06/05/2008
the line 12'-1102 fails stop with Solidification and 1037 on P-08 differential pressure LIC-1025
vacuum system plugging of the discharge line; alarm on existing PDI- close the LV-
still run line 16.1.1.1.2. PAH- 1035 1025 to
1034 on V-14; maintain the
16.1.1.1.3. level in the V-
Provision for 15 causing
flushing water in the high pressure
line in the pump
discharge line
U.82 Pressure More 16.4. Higher 16.4.5. Tube 16.4.5.1. Loss of 16.4.5.1.1. PAH- U-82. Verify the SP-PRC In case of tube rupture more 25/07/2008
Pressure in the V- rupture in the E- vacuum and 1032 on V-04; scenario in order to water gas (steam) to vacuum
14 14 possible loss of 16.4.5.1.2. PAH- ensure that in case of system is foreseen without
seal water in T-02 1034 on the V-14 tube rupture in E-04 is consequences.
and possible not possible to
vacuum system overcome the design
design pressure pressure of the
exceeding due to vacuum section taking
high back in to account the back
pressure from T- pressure from the T-02
02 due to the pressure
losses: if not provide
protection
Company: ENGRO

Node: (16) Urea Solution from Urea Solution Pumps 10-P-06 A/B to 2nd Vacuum Concentrator through 1st Vacuum Concentrator (and relevant Steam Condensate Separator 10-V-25) and 1st Vacuum Separator 10-V-1
10-GD-3C-06420
U.83 Level More 16.6. Higher Level 16.6.1. Plugging 16.6.1.1. Possible 16.6.1.1.1. PAH- U-83. Provide high SP-PRC High DP alarm is provided 25/07/2008
in the V-14 of the line 12'- V-14 overfilling 1032 on the V-04; differential pressure
1102 due to up and release of 16.6.1.1.2. PAH- alarm on existing PDI-
set of one of the liquid urea in the 1034 on the V-14 1035
steam tracing vacuum top; 16.6.1.1.3.
(steam trap condenser and Provision of double
malfunction) than in the T-02 steam tracing in the
with loss of line with two
vacuum in the different source of
vacuum section steam, two
and loss of independent steam
production coils and two
independent steam
trap; 16.6.1.1.4.
Line provided with
maximum slope to
the downstream E-
15
U.84 Level Less 16.8. Lower Level 16.8.1. 16.8.1.1. LS 16.8.1.1.1. None U-84. Verify the SP-PRC This line has been verified in 25/07/2008
in the V-25 steam Malfunction of LIC- steam and possibility of mixed flow to take account of
condensate 1111 with valve condensate to the hammering in the line the possibility of hammering
separator LV-1111 fully condensate and if yes provide
open network (V-10) protection (i.e. design
with possible the line for mixed flow)
hammering in the
line 8'-LC1037-
11D and erosion
in the LV-1111
U.85 Level Less 16.8. Lower Level 16.8.1. 16.8.1.1. LS 16.8.1.1.1. None U-85. Verify that valve SP-PRC the possibility of a flash into 06/05/2008
in the V-25 steam Malfunction of LIC- steam and material is suitable for the valve has been
condensate 1111 with valve condensate to the erosion service and if considered in the data sheet
separator LV-1111 fully condensate not provide
open network (V-10)
with possible
hammering in the
line 8'-LC1037-
11D and erosion
in the LV-1111
Company: ENGRO

Node: (17) Urea Solution from 1st Vacuum Separator 10-V-14 to Prilling Tower 10-L-08 through 2nd Vacuum Concentrator (and relevant Steam Condensate Separator 10-V-26), 2nd Vacuum Separator 10-V-15 and
Urea Melt Pumps 10-P-08 A/B
10-GD-3C-06420
U.86 Pressure More 17.3. Higher 17.3.4. Tube 17.3.4.1. Loss of 17.3.4.1.1. PAH- U-86. Verify the SP-PRC 17.3.4.1.1. See response to 25/07/2008
Pressure in the V- rupture in the E- vacuum and 1036 on V-15; scenario in order to Refer To recommendation U.82
15 15 possible loss of 17.3.4.1.2. PDAL- ensure that in case of recommendat
seal water in T-02 1035 tube rupture in E-04 is ion U-
and possible not possible to 87.\nExtend
vacuum system overcome the design this
design pressure pressure of the recommendat
exceeding due to vacuum section taking ion to PDT-
high back in to account the back 1035 and PT-
pressure from T- pressure from the T-02 1034 (on V-
02 due to the pressure 14)
losses: if not provide
protection
U.87 Pressure More 17.3. Higher 17.3.4. Tube 17.3.4.1. Loss of 17.3.4.1.1. PAH- U-87. PT-1036 and SP- 17.3.4.1.1. Instrument air is provided to 25/07/2008
Pressure in the V- rupture in the E- vacuum and 1036 on V-15; PDT-1035 have a SMAUT Refer To avoid plugging. Each
15 15 possible loss of 17.3.4.1.2. PDAL- common isolation recommendat instrument has a dedicated
seal water in T-02 1035 valve and common ion U- isolation valve as per sketch
and possible tapping. In case of 87.\nExtend sh.75 of 232 of PSC. 00-SC-E-
vacuum system single failure this 57035
design pressure (plugging) is possible recommendat
exceeding due to to lose both the ion to PDT-
high back safeguard. Verify in 1035 and PT-
pressure from T- instrument spec and 1034 (on V-
02 update if necessary. 14)
(The tubing is provided
with instrument air
purging to avoid the
plugging)
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06420
U.88 Level More 17.4. Higher Level 17.4.2. 17.4.2.2. Pump P- 17.4.2.2.1. PAH- U-88. Verify with P-08 SP-MAC Low pressure alarm on PI- 25/07/2008
in the V-15 Malfunction of 08 A/B running 1037 on pump P-08 A/B vendor if the low 1037 at P-08 discharge has
level control loop under acceptable A/B discharge line; ampere load alarm can been provided. Refer to rev. 4
LIC-1025 with LV- minimum flow and 17.4.2.2.2. IIAL- be considered a of P&ID. In the O.M. a
1025 closure damage MP08 A/B; safeguard to prevent procedure is written how to
17.4.2.2.3. the damage of the proceed in this scenario (00-
Possibility for the pumps, otherwise ZA-E-06010). Contractor
operator to divert provide adequate confirms that this scenario
the urea entering protection in order to has been checked with the
the V-14 in the T-01 have two independent Vendor and low ampere is
by means of 3 way protection considered a proper
valve through the protection
line 8'-1081
U.89 Level Less 17.6. Lower Level 17.6.1. 17.6.1.1. LS 17.6.1.1.1. None U-89. Verify the SP-PRC This line has been verified in 25/07/2008
in the V-26 steam Malfunction of LIC- steam and possibility of mixed flow to take account of
condensate 1112 with valve condensate to the hammering in the line the possibility of hammering
separator LV-1112 fully condensate and if yes provide
open network (V-10) protection (i.e. design
with possible the line for mixed flow)
hammering in the
line 6'-LC1040-
11D and erosion
in the LV-1112
U.90 Level Less 17.6. Lower Level 17.6.1. 17.6.1.1. LS 17.6.1.1.1. None U-90. Verify that valve SP-PRC the possibility of a flash into 25/07/2008
in the V-26 steam Malfunction of LIC- steam and material is suitable for the valve has been
condensate 1112 with valve condensate to the erosion service and if considered in the data sheet
separator LV-1112 fully condensate not provide of the valve (see SPC. 10-ZA-
open network (V-10) E-06254, sheet 12)
with possible
hammering in the
line 6'-LC1040-
11D and erosion
in the LV-1112
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06420
U.91 Level Less 17.7. Lower Level 17.7.1. 17.7.1.1. Possible 17.7.1.1.1. IIAL- U-91. Verify with P-08 SP-MAC Refer to response of 15/12/2008
in the V-15 Malfunction of V-15 emptying MP08 A/B A/B vendor if the low recommendation U.88.
level control loop and pump P-08 ampere load alarm can Pump vendor confirmed. In
LIC-1025 with LV- A/B running dry be considered a the O.M. a procedure is
1025 fully open with cavitation and safeguard to prevent written how to proceed in this
damage the damage of the scenario (00-ZA-E-06010)
pumps, and provide Contractor confirms that this
adequate protection in scenario has been checked
order to have two with the Vendor and low
independent protection ampere is considered a
proper protection
Company: ENGRO

Node: (18) 1st Vacuum System 10-PK-01, 2nd Vacuum System 10-PK-02 and relevant Vent Scrubber 10-C-35.
U.92 Flow No 18.3. No Flow in 18.3.1. Loss of 18.3.1.1. Loss of 18.3.1.1.1. PAH- U-92. Verify the SP-PRC It is not possible to overcome 25/07/2008
the common cooling water vacuum and 1032 on V-04; scenario in order to the design pressure in this
cooling water line possible loss of 18.3.1.1.2. PAH- ensure that in case of scenario.
seal water in T-02 1034 on the V-14; loss of cooling water in In addition in case of loss of
and more 18.3.1.1.3. PAH- PK-01 / PK-02 is not cooling water logic I-106 trips
ammonia release 1036 on the V-15 possible to overcome Urea plant
to flare and the design pressure of
possible vacuum the vacuum section
system design taking in to account the
pressure back pressure from the
exceeding due to T-02 due to the
high back pressure losses: if not
pressure from T- provide protection
02
U.93 Temperature More 18.7. Higher 18.7.1. Loss of 18.7.1.1. Possible 18.7.1.1.1. None U-93. Verify with PK- SP-PACK / Shell side: Design 10/09/2008
Temperature in cooling water high temperature 01 / PK-02 vendor the SP-PRC temperature 185°, Op.
the PK-01 / PK-02 while steam in the PK-01 / PK- scenario and if Temperature 135°C, CS;
shell side continuous flow in 02 exchangers necessary provide Tube side: Design
the shell side shell side and protection temperature 70°C, CS.
possible design In case of CW failure no
temperature mechanical impact (for a time
exceeding due to less then 30-60 minutes). The
the steam first effect of the CW failre is
the loss of vacuum. In the
Urea plant, CW failure means
Urea Plant shut-down
U.94 Pressure More 18.9. Higher 18.9.1. Tube 18.9.1.1. Possible 18.9.1.1.1. None U-94. Verify the SP-PRC This scenario has been 10/09/2008
Pressure in the E- rupture design pressure scenario with Pk-01 / SP-PACK evaluated and overprssure is
52 or E-54 or E-55 exceeding and PK-02 vendor and if not possible. Higher pressure
or E-56 shell side damage necessary provide side is water and there are no
protection valves
Company: ENGRO

Node: (18) 1st Vacuum System 10-PK-01, 2nd Vacuum System 10-PK-02 and relevant Vent Scrubber 10-C-35.
U.95 Pressure Less 18.10. Lower 18.10.1. Up set in 18.10.1.1. Loss of 18.10.1.1.1. PAH- U-95. Verify if the SP-PRC The design pressure in this 10/09/2008
Pressure of LS in LS distribution vacuum and 1032 on V-04; scenario is credible SP-PACK scenario, will remain below
the vacuum header possible loss of 18.10.1.1.2. PAH- and if yes verify, in the atm pressure plus back
system ejectors seal water in T-02 1034 on the V-14; order to ensure that in pressure on the tank (less
and more 18.10.1.1.3. PAH- case of decrease of than design). Back pressure
ammonia release 1036 on the V-15 pressure of LP steam inside the tank is limited by
to flare and to PK-01 / PK-02 is not the internat settle.
possible vacuum possible to overcome
system design the design pressure of
pressure the vacuum section
exceeding due to taking in to account the
high back back pressure from the
pressure from T- T-02 due to the
02 pressure losses, if
necessary provide
protection
U.96 Documentation Other Than 18.11. Incorrect U-96. The isolation SP-PRC LO is indicated in P&ID rev.3 06/05/2008
Documentation on valve upstream the
PSV isolation PSV must be LO
valve in the
vacuum system
condenser
Company: ENGRO

Node: (19) Carbonate Solution from Carbonate Close Drain Tank 10-T-04 and Condensate from 1st Vacuum System 10-PK-01 and 2nd Vacuum System 10-PK-02 to Distillation Tower Preheater 10-E-16 through
Process Condensate Tank 10-T-02 and relevant Distillation Tower Feed Pumps 10-P-14 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06420;
10-GD-3C-06423;
10-GD-3C-06424;
10-GD-3C-06430
U.97 Flow No 19.1. No Flow in 19.1.1. 19.1.1.1. Pump P- 19.1.1.1.1. Pump P- U-97. Verify the SP-PRC 19.1.1.1.1. LO is indicated in P&ID rev.3 06/05/2008
the line 6'-1106 Malfunction of 14 A/B running 14 A/B provided necessity to provide Extend this
flow control loop under acceptable with minimum flow LO on isolation valve recommendat
FIC-1030 with FV- minimum flow with line through on minimum flow line ion to all the
1030 closure damage automatic minimum and make it consistent pump in the
flow valve to the same urea plant
arrangement in the
urea plant
U.98 Pressure More 19.2. Higher 19.2.1. Refer To 19.2.1.1. Possible 19.2.1.1.1. Tank U-98. Verify the SP-PRC The system is designed in 25/07/2008
Pressure in the T- 15.3.1 \nGas tank T-02 design provided with 18' scenario in order to order to not allow the
02 breakthrough pressure vent line connected ensure that is not exceeding of the tank design
from L-03 (P&ID exceeding and to discontinuous possible to overcome pressure with a dedicated
P47) damage flare the design pressure of seal drum at the bottom of the
the T-02 taking in to flare.
account the back
pressure from the
discontinuous flare due
to the pressure losses:
if not provide
protection
U.99 Pressure More 19.2. Higher 19.2.1. Refer To 19.2.1.2. Possible 19.2.1.2.1. Overflow U-99. Verify that in SP-PRC the idraulic seal, provided, 06/05/2008
Pressure in the T- 15.3.1 \nGas release of line 8'-1069 to CD case of high pressure avoid releases to
02 breakthrough ammonia (solution in the T-02 the atmopsphere
from L-03 (P&ID of 5% and gases) ammonia can not be
P47) to the atmosphere released to the
through the line atmosphere through
1/2'-1006 (see the 1/2'-1006 line,
detail A) otherwise provide
protection
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06420;
10-GD-3C-06423;
10-GD-3C-06424;
10-GD-3C-06430
U.100 Pressure Less 19.3. Lower 19.3.1. P-14 A/B 19.3.1.2. Possible 19.3.1.2.1. PAXLL- U-100. Verify the SP-PRC Vacuum breaker are installed 19/09/2008
Pressure in the T- still running reverse flow of 1093 on T-02 vent scenario in order to in the tank (open to flares).
02 during vacuum gas from the flare line with activation avoid the possibility of No explosive mixture
system shutdown system to T-02 of the logic I-21 to explosive mixture
with possible open the HV-1013 formation in the tank T-
explosive mixture (N2 to tank); 02 and in the flare vent
formation 19.3.1.2.2. line and if necessary
Hydraulic seal in V- provide additional
13 (discontinuous independent protection
flare KO drum)
U.101 Level More 19.4. Higher Level 19.4.2. Overfilling 19.4.2.1. Possible 19.4.2.1.1. High U-101. Verify the SP-PRC Based on the available 25/07/2008
in the T-02 of urea in the T-02 overfilling level alarm LAH- scenario in order to protections and in particular
upstream vacuum and release of 1026; 19.4.2.1.2. 8' ensure that in case of on the presence of an
section urea in the flare over flow line to CD overfilling in the overflow line without any
system, and with siphon breaker; upstream vacuum intercept, this scenario is
possible vacuum 19.4.2.1.3. PAH- section is not possible considered not credible.
system (V-04, V- 1032 on V-04; to overcome the Additional protections are not
14, V-15) design 19.4.2.1.4. PAH- design pressure of the required.
pressure 1034 on the V-14; vacuum section taking
exceeding due to 19.4.2.1.5. PAH- in to account the back
high back 1036 on the V-15 pressure from the T-02
pressure from T- due to the pressure
02 losses considering the
maximum level that
can be reached in the
T-02 : if not provide
protection
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06420;
10-GD-3C-06423;
10-GD-3C-06424;
10-GD-3C-06430
U.102 Level Less 19.5. Lower Level 19.5.1. Less flow 19.5.1.1. Possible 19.5.1.1.1. LAL- U-102. Verify with P-14 SP-MAC 19.5.1.1.1. In Present protections are 25/07/2008
in the T-02 pump of condensate to pump P-14 A/B 1026; 19.5.1.1.2. A/B vendor if the low case of LT- considered adequate for this
side the tank T-02 running dry and IIAL-MP14 A/B ampere load alarm can 1026 scenario.
(process upset / damage due to be considered a malfunction
unit operator at cavitation with safeguard to prevent the operator
turn down) release of the damage of the can check the
ammonia solution pumps, considering level in the T-
(5%) to the also the possible 02 by means
atmosphere with environmental of local level
possible pollution, otherwise indication LI-
environmental provide adequate 1516
pollution protection
Company: ENGRO

Node: (20) Urea Melt from Urea Melt Pumps 10-P-08 A/B to Prilled Urea Storage through Prilling Tower 10-L-08 and relevant: Prilling Buckets 10-L-09 A/B, Prilling Buckets Supports 10-L-10, Prilling Tower Lift 10-
H-06, Rotary Scraper 10-H-01, Urea Recycle Belt Conveyor 10-H-03, Prilling Tower Belt Conveyor 10-H-02 and Urea Lumps Separator 10-S-02.
10-GD-3C-06421
U.103 Flow No 20.2. No Flow in 20.2.1. 20.2.1.1. Possible 20.2.1.1.1. Line 5'- U-103. Provide SP- 20.2.1.1.1. Procedure is reported in the 15/01/2009
the line 5'-1104 Malfunction of plugging of the 1104 provided of procedure in the PRC No operating manual SPC 00-ZA-
(concentrated control loop LIC- line due to urea jacketing line with operating manual for solidification E-06010, page156/192 No1
urea to prilling 1026 with LV- solidification LS (143 °C) operator (sequence of is expected (Melt urea pumps upsets)
tower) 1026 closure or events and time with steam
pump P-08 A/B motion) for safe jacket
fails stop operation to avoid
blockage of the line. If
sufficient time is not
available for operator
action provide
adequate solution
U.104 Flow No 20.4. No Flow to S- 20.4.2. Belt 20.4.2.1. Urea 20.4.2.1.1. None U-104. Provide motor SP- Now the motor is at fixed 19/09/2008
02 (urea lumps rupture falling out the belt high speed alarm PRC speed. High speed alarm is
separator) with motor not required
overspeed
U.105 Flow No 20.5. No Flow of 20.5.1. Trip of the 20.5.1.1. 20.5.1.1.1. Motor U-105. Clarify the B.L. SP- refer to P&ID rev.3 06/05/2008
urea to storage motor of belt Accumulation of fault alarm MA- indication on the P&ID PRC
scale the urea on the MH994; 20.5.1.1.2. with respect to the belt
belt scale with SAXL-MH99 scale
urea falling out the
belt
U.106 Temperature More 20.7. Higher 20.7.1. High 20.7.1.1. More 20.7.1.1.1. TDAH- U-106. Verify the SP- 20.7.1.1.1. high temperature alarm (TAH- 06/05/2008
Temperature in pressure in LS biuret formation 1067 between urea scenario and if PRC The operator 1055) in the product belt
the line 5'-1104 due to and product off to prilling tower and necessary consider to must use conveyor is provided
(concentrated malfunction of spec and possible L-15 (P&ID P49) provide a temperature PPE and according to the P&ID review
urea to prilling pressure control operator injury due indication with high follow the (to add in the P&I rev. 5)
tower) loop PIC-1039 to product high temperature alarm to operating
with PV-1039 fully temperature (up to DCS procedure to
open maximum about manage urea
80 °C) product
U.107 Level Less 20.10. Lower 20.10.1. High 20.10.1.1. Lumps 20.10.1.1.1. None U-107. Provide high SP- high speed alarm is provided 06/05/2008
Level in the RPM of the deposition on speed alarm for bucket PRC
bucket L-09 bucket prilling tower walls motor
A/B/C/D
Company: ENGRO

Node: (20) Urea Melt from Urea Melt Pumps 10-P-08 A/B to Prilled Urea Storage through Prilling Tower 10-L-08 and relevant: Prilling Buckets 10-L-09 A/B, Prilling Buckets Supports 10-L-10, Prilling Tower Lift 10-
H-06, Rotary Scraper 10-H-01, Urea Recycle Belt Conveyor 10-H-03, Prilling Tower Belt Conveyor 10-H-02 and Urea Lumps Separator 10-S-02.
10-GD-3C-06421
U.108 Level Less 20.10. Lower 20.10.1. High 20.10.1.1. Lumps 20.10.1.1.1. None U-108. Provide SP The removal of the lumps 19/09/2008
Level in the RPM of the deposition on provision for lumps from the prilling tower should
bucket L-09 bucket prilling tower walls removal from the wall be done during the
A/B/C/D of the prilling tower maintenance. No dedicated
devices are foreseen for this
matter. According the SPC.
00-ZA-E-60714, the internal
walls are painted with a lining
to reduce the possibility of
packing on the wall. Visual
inspection is done though the
windows, located to do that
and to allow the cleaning
through fire water.
U.109 Level Less 20.10. Lower 20.10.2. Operator 20.10.2.1. Up set 20.10.2.1.1. None U-109. Verify with SP- Graphs showing RPM at 25/07/2008
Level in the mistake to reduce of the prilling vendor the optimum PRC varoius load are repoted in
bucket L-09 the RPM during RPM at various load vendor documentation. Refer
A/B/C/D the plant running to SPC. N. 10-MG-E-34327
at turn down less rev.1
than required
Company: ENGRO

Node: (21) Urea Solution Tank 10-T-01 (and relevant Urea Solution Recovery Pumps 10-P-09 A/B) connected to 1st Vacuum Concentrator 10-E-14, Urea Solution Pumps 10-P-06 A/B, Urea Melt Pumps 10-P-08
A/B and Urea Close Drain Tank 10-T-03.
Drawings: 10-GD-3C-06417; 10-GD-3C-06419;
10-GD-3C-06421; 10-GD-B-06422;
10-GD-B-06431
U.110 Flow No 21.1. No Flow in 21.1.1. 21.1.1.1. Possible 21.1.1.1.1. Pump U-110. Verify the need SP-PRC minimum flow is provided (3"- 19/09/2008
the pump P-09 Malfunction of pump damage due provided with of a minimum flow 10-P1131-31C-T). Valve is
A/B discharge line flow control loop to pump running at internal recirculation protection for the pump indicated as L.O. (P&I rev. 5)
FIC-1037 with FV- shut off with process fluid and if necessary
1037 closed from discharge provide
U.111 Pressure More 21.4. Higher 21.4.2. High 21.4.2.1. Possible 21.4.2.1.1. PAXLL- U-111. Verify during SP-PRC Verified during the Flare 19/09/2008
Pressure in the T- backpressure in reverse flow of 1051 on T-01 vent the hazop of the hazop (node 2)
01 the tank vent line gas from the flare line with activation package the scenario
due to high flow system to T-01 of the logic I-20 to with flare vendor and if
rate in the HP with possible open the HV-1016 necessary provide
vent line to the F- explosive mixture (N2 to tank); additional protection
13 (tank vent line formation 21.4.2.1.2.
and HP vent line Hydraulic seal in V-
has a common 13 (discontinuous
flare KO drum) flare KO drum)
U.112 Pressure Less 21.5. Lower 21.5.1. Pump P- 21.5.1.2. Possible 21.5.1.2.1. PAXLL- U-112. Verify the SP-PRC Flare is provided with 19/09/2008
Pressure in the T- 09 A/B start due reverse flow of 1051 on T-01 vent scenario in order to hydraulic seal. For other
01 to operator gas from the flare line with activation avoid the possibility of details refer to Flare Hazop
mistake without system to T-01 of the logic I-20 to explosive mixture (node 2)
any liquid feed in with possible open the HV-1016 formation in the tank T-
the tank explosive mixture (N2 to tank); 01 and in the flare vent
flare KO drum);
21.5.1.2.3.
Hydraulic seal in T-
01 to avoid air inlet
U.113 Level More 21.6. Higher Level 21.6.1. Activation 21.6.1.1. Possible 21.6.1.1.1. LAH- U-113. Verify the size SP-PRC The size has been verified 06/05/2008
in the T-01 of HV-1032 A to T-01 overfilling 1027; 21.6.1.1.2. of the over flow line with the maximum inlet flow
divert the urea to with release of Tank provided with with respect to the
T-01 due to urea to 8' overflow line (with maximum inlet flowrate
spurious signal discontinuous siphon breaker) to
(P&ID P51) flare CB-01 and than to
CY
Company: ENGRO

Node: (21) Urea Solution Tank 10-T-01 (and relevant Urea Solution Recovery Pumps 10-P-09 A/B) connected to 1st Vacuum Concentrator 10-E-14, Urea Solution Pumps 10-P-06 A/B, Urea Melt Pumps 10-P-08
A/B and Urea Close Drain Tank 10-T-03.
Drawings: 10-GD-3C-06417; 10-GD-3C-06419;
10-GD-3C-06421; 10-GD-B-06422;
10-GD-B-06431
U.114 Level Less 21.8. Lower Level 21.8.1. 21.8.1.2. Possible 21.8.1.2.1. PAXLL- U-114. Verify the SP-PRC LAL-1027 and local LI-1522 19/09/2008
in the T-01 Inadvertent tank reverse flow of 1051 on T-01 vent scenario in order to are provided on tank T-01.
draining valve gas from the flare line with activation avoid the possibility of Flare is provided with
opening system to T-01 of the logic I-20 to explosive mixture hydraulic seal. For other
with possible open the HV-1016 formation in the tank T- details refer to Flare Hazop
explosive mixture (N2 to tank) 01 and in the flare vent (node 2)
formation line and if necessary
provide additional
U.115 Level Less 21.8. Lower Level 21.8.2. Operator 21.8.2.1. Possible 21.8.2.1.1. LAL- U-115. Verify with P-09 SP-MAC Pump is in discontinous 19/09/2008
in the T-01 mistake to not tank emptying and 1027; 21.8.2.1.2. A/B vendor if the low service. Present protections
stop the pump P- pump running dry IIAL-MP09 A/B ampere load alarm can are considered adequate for
09 A/B and damage due be considered a this scenario.
to cavitation safeguard to prevent
the damage of the
pumps, considering
also the possible
environmental
pollution, otherwise
provide adequate
protection
Company: ENGRO

Node: (22) Distillation Tower 10-C-02 and relevant Distillation Tower Preheater 10-E-16, Final Process Condensate Cooler 10-E-23 and Purified Process Condensate Pumps 10-P-20 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06423
U.116 Temperature More 22.1. Higher 22.1.2. 22.1.2.1. Possible 22.1.2.1.1. None U-116. Provide an high SP-PRC high temperature alarm TAL- 06/05/2008
Temperature in Malfunction of design temperature alarm on 1069 is provided
the C-02 level control loop temperature existing TI-1069
LIC-1031 with LV- exceeding and
1031 closure damage during
short time (the
fluid on exchanger
shell side is the
same of
exchanger tube
side)
U.117 Temperature More 22.1. Higher 22.1.2. 22.1.2.1. Possible 22.1.2.1.1. None U-117. Verify the SP-PRC high temperature alarm TAL- 06/05/2008
Temperature in Malfunction of design scenario and if 1069 is provided; the material
the C-02 level control loop temperature necessary provide of the piping cover this
LIC-1031 with LV- exceeding and protection temperature
1031 closure damage during
short time (the
fluid on exchanger
shell side is the
same of
exchanger tube
side)
U.118 Temperature More 22.2. Higher 22.2.2. 22.2.2.2. Possible 22.2.2.2.1. TAH- U-118. Verify the SP-PRC in case of loss of feed to the 06/05/2008
Temperature in Malfunction of design 1073 on E-23 tube scenario and if column other protection are
the 6'-1000 flow control loop temperature side outlet necessary provide already provided: TAL-1062,
(condensate to 12- FIC-1030 with FV- exceeding in the E- protection LAL-1031 and LAL-1030
T-01) 1030 closure 16 / E-23 and
damage during
short time
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06423
U.119 Pressure More 22.4. Higher 22.4.2. 22.4.2.1. Possible 22.4.2.1.1. PAH- U-119. Verify that the SP 22.4.2.1.1. see HSE review N°18 06/05/2008
Pressure in the C- Malfunction of C-02 design 1052 on C-02 PSV-1034 on C-02 Company and
02 level control loop pressure overhead line; overhead line has Snamprogetti
LIC-1032 with LV- exceeding and 22.4.2.1.2. PAH- been sized for gas have a
1032 fully open damage with 1038 on C-02 breakthrough different
with possible gas release of steam, overhead line down according to applicable interpretation
breakthrough ammonia and stream PV-1038; standard (API 520 / of API 521
form R-02 CO2 vapours 22.4.2.1.3. PSV- API 521) standard
1034 on C-02 application.
overhead line Company
interpretation
of API 521
application is
to consider in
case of
failure of
automatic
control the
PSV should
be sized
considering
the control
valve fully
open and the
by pass valve
fully open
simultaneousl
y for system
with
upstream
pressure
higher than
U.120 Pressure More 22.4. Higher 22.4.3. 22.4.3.1. Possible 22.4.3.1.1. PAH- U-120. Verify the PSV- SP-PRC the PSV cover this scenario 06/05/2008
Pressure in the C- Malfunction of C-02 design 1052 on C-02 1034 for this scenario
02 pressure control pressure overhead line; (the PV-1038 is
loop PIC-1040 exceeding and 22.4.3.1.2. PAH- normally closed)
with PV-1040 fully damage with 1038 on C-02
open release of steam, overhead line down
ammonia and stream PV-1038
CO2 vapours
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06423
U.121 Level More 22.7. Higher Level 22.7.1. 22.7.1.1. C-02 22.7.1.1.1. FAL- U-121. Consider to SP-PRC Existing safefuards are 25/07/2008
in the C-02 Malfunction of flooding with 1017; 22.7.1.1.2. provide an adequate for this scenario.
(bottom) level control loop possible trays LAH-1031 on independent level Additional protections are not
LIC-1030 with LV- damage and chimney tray transmitter with high required.
1030 closure possible overfilling high level alarm
with release of
urea / ammonia
solution upstream
to E-07 shell side
U.122 Level Less 22.8. Lower Level 22.8.1. 22.8.1.1. Possible 22.8.1.1.1. IIAL- U-122. Verify with P-20 SP-MAC 22.8.1.1.1. This safeguard is adequate 25/07/2008
in the C-02 Malfunction of C-02 emptying MP20 A/B A/B vendor if the low Company for this scenario. In addition
(bottom) level control loop with pump P-20 ampere load alarm can consider this FAL-1017 (see
LIC-1030 with LV- A/B running dry be considered a scenario as recommendation U-123) has
1030 fully open and damage safeguard to prevent an hazard been provided
the damage of the (possible
pumps, otherwise release of hot
provide adequate water and
protection steam
through pump
seal) and
according to
his procedure
require a
second
independent
safeguard
Company: ENGRO

10-GD-3C-06423
U.123 Level Less 22.8. Lower Level 22.8.1. 22.8.1.1. Possible 22.8.1.1.1. IIAL- U-123. Provide high SP-PRC 22.8.1.1.1. high flow alarm FAL 1017 is 06/05/2008
in the C-02 Malfunction of C-02 emptying MP20 A/B flow alarm on existing Company provided
(bottom) level control loop with pump P-20 FI-1017 consider this
LIC-1030 with LV- A/B running dry scenario as
1030 fully open and damage an hazard
(possible
release of hot
water and
steam
through pump
seal) and
according to
his procedure
require a
second
independent
safeguard
Company: ENGRO

Node: (23) Urea Hydrolizer 10-R-02 and relevant Hydrolizer Preheater 10-E-18 A/B and Hydrolizer Feed Pumps 10-P-15 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06424
U.124 Pressure More 23.2. Higher 23.2.3. 23.2.3.1. Possible 23.2.3.1.1. TAH- U-124. Verify the PSV- SP-PRC the PSV covers this scenario 06/05/2008
Pressure in the R- Malfunction of R-02 design 1071 on R-02; 1035 for this scenario
02 flow control loop pressure 23.2.3.1.2. TXAH-
FIC-1016 with FV- exceeding and 1072 on steam line;
1016 fully open damage 23.2.3.1.3. TXAHH-
1072 on steam line;
23.2.3.1.4. PAH-
1040 on R-02
overhead line
U.125 Level More 23.4. Higher Level 23.4.1. 23.4.1.2. Possible 23.4.1.2.1. None U-125. Verify the SP-PRC Independent level indicator 25/07/2008
in the R-02 Malfunction of hammering in the scenario and if LXI-1050 with high level alarm
level control loop R-02 overhead necessary provide has been provided
LIC-1032 with LV- line and possible protection
1032 closed damage
U.126 Level Less 23.6. Lower Level 23.6.1. 23.6.1.2. Possible 23.6.1.2.1. TAH- U-126. Verify if is SP-PRC 23.6.1.2.1. New logic I-125 with 25/07/2008
in the R-02 Malfunction of emptying of last 1071 on R-02 outlet possible to overcome According to independent level transmitter
level control loop chamber of the design temperature described LXT-1050 to close LV-1032
LIC-1032 with LV- hydrolyzer with of downstream E-18 scenario SP has been provided according
1032 fully open steam A/B/C/D and C-02 and confirm that to result of quantified risk
breakthrough to C- if yes provide is not assessment (refer to HSE
02 and possible protection possible to review N° 18)
design overcome the
temperature design
exceeding temperature
of E-18
A/B/C/D and
C-02
Company: ENGRO

Node: (24) Carbonate Solution from Drain Network to Process Condensate Tank 10-T-02 through Carbonate Close Drain Tank 10-T-04 and Carbonate Close Drain Recovery Pumps 10-P-16 A/B.
U.127 Flow No 24.1. No Flow in 24.1.1. Operator 24.1.1.1. Possible 24.1.1.1.1. LAH- U-127. Verify the need SP-PRC minimum flow is not required 19/09/2008
the pump P-16 mistake to close pump P-16 A/B 1033 on T-04; of a minimum flow for this vertical pumps due to:
A/B discharge line the HV-1017 running at shut off 24.1.1.1.2. LAXHH- protection for the pump small size and load and for
during pump and damage 1034 on T-04 and if necessary the presence of the automatic
running provide starting of the spare pump
start-up
U.128 Pressure Less 24.3. Lower 24.3.1. Pump P- 24.3.1.2. Possible 24.3.1.2.1. PAXLL- U-128. Verify the SP-PRC Already verified during the 19/09/2008
Pressure in the T- 16 A or B fail to reverse flow of 1039 on T-04 vent scenario in order to Flares Hazop (node 2)
04 stop on LSXLL- gas from the flare line with activation avoid the possibility of
1034 system to T-04 of the logic I-22 to explosive mixture
with possible open the HV-1118 formation in the tank T-
explosive mixture (N2 to tank); 04 and in the flare vent
flare KO drum);
24.3.1.2.3.
U.129 Pressure Less 24.3. Lower 24.3.1. Pump P- 24.3.1.2. Possible 24.3.1.2.1. PAXLL- U-129. Provide SP-PRC Procedure is reported in the 15/01/2009
Pressure in the T- 16 A or B fail to reverse flow of 1039 on T-04 vent procedure in the operating manual SPC 00-ZA-
04 stop on LSXLL- gas from the flare line with activation operating manual to E-06010, page 25/192
1034 system to T-04 of the logic I-22 to check periodically the
with possible open the HV-1118 level in the hydraulic
explosive mixture (N2 to tank); seal of T-04 in order
formation 24.3.1.2.2. to refill the evaporation
Hydraulic seal in V- loss
13 (discontinuous
flare KO drum);
24.3.1.2.3.
Company: ENGRO

Node: (24) Carbonate Solution from Drain Network to Process Condensate Tank 10-T-02 through Carbonate Close Drain Tank 10-T-04 and Carbonate Close Drain Recovery Pumps 10-P-16 A/B.
U.130 Pressure More 24.4. Higher 24.4.1. High 24.4.1.1. Possible 24.4.1.1.1. PAXLL- U-130. Verify during SP-PRC Already verified during the 19/09/2008
Pressure in the T- backpressure in reverse flow of 1039 on T-04 vent the hazop of the Flares Hazop (node 2)
04 the tank vent line gas from the flare line with activation package the scenario
due to high flow system to T-04 of the logic I-22 to with flare vendor and if
rate in the HP with possible open the HV-1118 necessary provide
vent line to the F- explosive mixture (N2 to tank); additional protection
13 (tank vent line formation 24.4.1.1.2.
and HP vent line Hydraulic seal in V-
has a common 13 (discontinuous
flare KO drum) flare KO drum)
U.131 Level Less 24.6. Lower Level 24.6.1. Pump P- 24.6.1.1. Possible 24.6.1.1.1. LAL- U-131. Verify with P-16 SP-MAC Actual safeguards are 19/09/2008
in the T-04 16 A or B fail to T-04 emptying 1033 on T-04; A/B vendor if the low adequate for this scenario
stop on LSXLL- with pump P-16 24.6.1.1.2. IIAL- ampere load alarm can (also LAL-1033)
1034 A/B cavitation and MP16 A/B be considered a
damage safeguard to prevent
the damage of the
pumps, otherwise
provide adequate
protection
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

Node: (25) Condensate from Steam Condensate Accumulator 10-V-10 (and relevant Steam Recovery Tower 10-C-06) to 10-E-05 A/B through Steam Condensate Pumps 10-P-13 A/B and to 12-T-1201 through Steam
Condensate Pumps 10-P-13 A/B and Steam Condensate Cooler 10-E-22,
10-GD-3C-06425;
10-GD-3C-06426
U.132 Flow More 25.1. More Flow in 25.1.1. 25.1.1.1. Loss of 25.1.1.1.1. None U-132. Provide an high SP-PRC high flow alarm FAL-1127 is 06/05/2008
the line 3'-1000 Malfunction of demi water flow alarm on existing provided
(demi water to V- level control loop FI-1127
10) LIC-1035 with LV-
1035 A fully open
U.133 Temperature More 25.2. Higher 25.2.1. Loss of 25.2.1.1. Hot 25.2.1.1.1. None U-133. Provide high SP-PRC 25.2.1.1.1. Refer high temperature alarm TAL- 06/05/2008
Temperature in CW in the E-22 water to the temperature alarm on to utilities main 1173 is provided
the E-22 shell side tube side storage (12-T- existing TI-1173 hazop: node 2;
1201) deviation: more
temperature in
the line 8'-1202
U.134 Temperature More 25.3. Higher 25.3.1. Operator 25.3.1.1. Possible 25.3.1.1.1. None U-134. Provide SP-PRC Procedure is reported in the 15/01/2009
Temperature in mistake to close wrong analysis operating guideline for operating manual SPC 00-ZA-
the AT-1003 manual valve on routine monitoring on E-06010, page 29/192
conductivity meter cooling water line analyzer
or fouling in the
coil of sample
cooler
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-GD-3C-06425;
10-GD-3C-06426
U.135 Pressure More 25.4. Higher 25.4.1. Steam 25.4.1.1. Possible 25.4.1.1.1. PAH- U-135. Verify that the SP 25.4.1.1.1. see HSE review N° 18 06/05/2008
Pressure in the V- breakthrough V-10 design 1041 on V-10; PSV-1036 on V-10 has Company and
10 from E-05 B due pressure 25.4.1.1.2. PSV- been sized for steam Snamprogetti
to the malfunction exceeding and 1036 on V-10 breakthrough have a different
of level control damage with verified for this according to applicable interpretation of
loop LIC-1113 release of steam scenario standard (API 520 / API 521
with LV-1113 B condensate and API 521) standard
fully open steam to the application.
atmosphere Company
interpretation of
API 521
application is to
consider in case
of failure of
automatic
control the PSV
should be sized
considering the
control valve
fully open and
the by pass
valve fully open
simultaneously
for system with
upstream
pressure higher
than
downstream
hydrotest
pressure
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-GD-3C-06425;
10-GD-3C-06426
U.136 Pressure More 25.4. Higher 25.4.1. Steam 25.4.1.1. Possible 25.4.1.1.1. PAH- U-136. Verify the safe SP-TUB 25.4.1.1.1. This point has been checked 25/07/2008
Pressure in the V- breakthrough V-10 design 1041 on V-10; location of PSV-1036 Company and during the 60% 3D model
10 from E-05 B due pressure 25.4.1.1.2. PSV- and PV-1041 with Snamprogetti review. The PSV and PV are
to the malfunction exceeding and 1036 on V-10 respect of hot have a different in safe location without
of level control damage with verified for this showering interpretation of possibility of hot showering
loop LIC-1113 release of steam scenario API 521
with LV-1113 B condensate and standard
fully open steam to the application.
atmosphere Company
interpretation of
API 521
application is to
consider in case
of failure of
automatic
control the PSV
should be sized
considering the
control valve
fully open and
the by pass
valve fully open
simultaneously
for system with
upstream
pressure higher
than
downstream
hydrotest
pressure
U.137 Pressure More 25.4. Higher 25.4.2. Possible 25.4.2.1. Possible 25.4.2.1.1. PAH- U-137. Verify the SP This scenario has been 25/07/2008
Pressure in the V- high pressure V-10 design 1041 on V-10 scenario during the analyzed and checked during
10 from 10-TK-01 (2' pressure package hazop and if the Package Hazop (node 3-
line MC-1021 to exceeding and necessary provide 6)
main MC damage with protection
condensate release of steam
header, P&ID condensate and
D40) steam to the
atmosphere
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-GD-3C-06425;
10-GD-3C-06426
U.138 Pressure More 25.4. Higher 25.4.3. 25.4.3.1. Possible 25.4.3.1.1. PSV- U-138. Verify the SP-PRC since the system is in 06/05/2008
Pressure in the V- Malfunction of V-10 design 1036 on V-10 possibility to provide equilibrium, high pressure is
10 pressure control pressure verified for this an additional detected by the high
loop PIC-1041 exceeding and scenario independent safeguard temperature alarm TAH-1172
with PV-1041 damage with already provided
closed (blocked release of steam
outlet) condensate and
steam to the
atmosphere
U.139 Pressure More 25.4. Higher 25.4.7. 25.4.7.1. Possible 25.4.7.1.1. PAH- U-139. Verify the PSV- SP-PRC Already verified. The PSV 25/07/2008
Pressure in the V- Malfunction of V-10 overfilling 1041 on V-10; 1036 on V-10 for this cover this scenario. Additional
10 level control loop with design 25.4.7.1.2. FAL- scenario level indicator LI-1051 with
LIC-1035 with LV- pressure 1021 condensate high alarm has been provided
1035 B closed exceeding and line to 12-T-1201 (refer to P&ID P-55 rev. 4)
and LV-1035 A damage and
fully open release of steam
condensate to the
atmosphere
U.140 Pressure Less 25.5. Lower 25.5.2. Trapped- 25.5.2.1. Possible 25.5.2.1.1. The V- U-140. Provide a low SP-PRC low pressure alarma PAL- 06/05/2008
Pressure in the V- in steam V-10 vacuum 10 designed for full pressure alarm on 1041 is provided
10 condensation design pressure e vacuum existing PIC-1041
exceeding and
damage and
possible P-13 A/B
and P-10 A/B
damage due to
low NPSH
U.141 Level More 25.7. Higher Level 25.7.2. Refer To 25.7.2.1. P-13 A/B 25.7.2.1.1. FAL- U-141. Verify if the 2'- SP-PRC The line is the minimum flow 25/07/2008
in the V-10 25.4.6\nMalfuncti running at shut off 1021 1069 at pump P-13 for the line. In addition refer to
on of level control and possible A/B discharge is a U.139 response
loop LIC-1035 damage minimum flow line for
with LV-1035 B the P-13 A/B, if not
closed and LV- verify the necessity of
1035 A fully open a minimum flow
protection for the pump
and provide if required
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-GD-3C-06425;
10-GD-3C-06426
U.142 Level Less 25.8. Lower Level 25.8.1. 25.8.1.1. Possible 25.8.1.1.1. IIAL- U-142. Verify with P-13 SP-MAC 25.8.1.1.1. Additional level indicator LI- 25/07/2008
in the V-10 Malfunction of V-10 emptying MP13 A/B low A/B vendor if the low Company 1051 with low alarm has been
level control loop and P-13 A/B and ampere load alarm ampere load alarm can consider this provided (refer to P&ID P-55
LIC-1035 with LV- P-10 A/B running on P-13 A/B be considered a scenario as an rev. 4). The protections are
1035 B fully open dry and possible safeguard to prevent hazard (possible sufficient
damage due to the damage of the release of hot
cavitation pumps, otherwise water and steam
provide adequate through pumps
protection seal) and
according to his
procedure
require a second
independent
safeguard for
each pump (P-
10 A/B and P-13
A/B)
U.143 Level Less 25.8. Lower Level 25.8.1. 25.8.1.1. Possible 25.8.1.1.1. IIAL- U-143. Provide low SP-PRC / 25.8.1.1.1. low amperage alarm IAL is 19/09/2008
in the V-10 Malfunction of V-10 emptying MP13 A/B low ampere load alarm on SP-MAC Company provided. Also LAL-1051 is
level control loop and P-13 A/B and ampere load alarm P-10 A/B and verify consider this provided. In the O.M. a
LIC-1035 with LV- P-10 A/B running on P-13 A/B with vendor if this can scenario as an procedure is written how to
1035 B fully open dry and possible be considered a hazard (possible proceed in this scenario (00-
damage due to safeguard to prevent release of hot ZA-E-06010). Contractor
cavitation the damage of the water and steam confirms that this scenario
pumps, otherwise through pumps has been checked with the
provide adequate seal) and Vendor and low ampere is
protection according to his considered a proper
procedure protection
require a second
independent
safeguard for
each pump (P-
10 A/B and P-13
A/B)
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

Node: (26) Condensate from Steam Condensate Accumulator 10-V-10 to users through H.P. Flushing Pumps 10-P-11 A/B, Steam Condensate Flushing Pumps 10-P-10 A/B and relevant Flashing Condensate Cooler
10-E-10.
Drawings: 10-GD-3C-06411; 10-GD-3C-06412;
10-GD-4C-06413; 10-GD-3C-06416;
10-GD-3C-06418; 10-GD-3C-06420;
10-GD-3C-06425; 10-GD-3C-06426; 10-GD-3C-06427
U.144 Flow No 26.1. No Flow in 26.1.1. Pump P- 26.1.1.5. Loss of 26.1.1.5.1. PXAL- U-144. Verify during SP-MAC Refer to nodes 31 and 33 of 25/07/2008
the line 4'-1038 (P- 10 A/B stop flushing water to P- 1057 with activation the hazop of the / SP- package hazop.
10 A/B discharge 02 A/B and to P- of the logic I-XX to package with P-01 A/B PRC Logic I-XX to start stand by
line) 01 A/B start the stand by and P-02 A/B vendor pump is I-124
pump the consequence and
protection against this
scenario
U.145 Flow No 26.1. No Flow in 26.1.1. Pump P- 26.1.1.11. 26.1.1.11.1. PXAL- U-145. Provide low SP-PRC low ampere alarm IAL is 19/09/2008
the line 4'-1038 (P- 10 A/B stop Possible P-11 A/B 1057 with activation ampere load alarm on / SP- provided.
10 A/B discharge damage (if of the logic I-XX to P-11 A/B and verify MAC PAL-144 is provided. The
line) running) start the stand by with vendor if this can booster pump is stopped by
pump be considered a the main pump stopping.
safeguard to prevent Protections are suffcient
the damage of the
pumps, otherwise
provide adequate
protection
U.146 Flow Reverse 26.3. Reverse 26.3.1. Pump P- 26.3.1.1. 26.3.1.1.1. PXAL- U-146. Verify the SP-PRC This line has been verified in 25/07/2008
Flow of steam in 10 A or B stop Hammering in the 1057 with activation scenario and if mixed flow to take account of
the line 2'-1015 condensate of the logic I-XX to necessary provide the possibility of hammering
(condensate to V- distribution system start the stand by check valve on the line
09) pump
U.147 Temperature More 26.4. Higher 26.4.1. Loss of 26.4.1.1. Possible 26.4.1.1.1. TAH- U-147. Verify the SP-PRC The column has been verified 06/05/2008
Temperature in cooling water design 1061 in E-10 outlet possibility of damage for this scenario, so also at
the line 3'-1026 temperature line to the C-04 and if higher temperature no
downstream E-10 exceeding in the C- necessary provide damage in the column
shell side 04 and possible protection
damage and more
ammonia release
to the
discontinuous
flare
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-E-10.
Drawings: 10-GD-3C-06411; 10-GD-3C-06412;
10-GD-4C-06413; 10-GD-3C-06416;
10-GD-3C-06418; 10-GD-3C-06420;
10-GD-3C-06425; 10-GD-3C-06426; 10-GD-3C-06427
U.148 Temperature More 26.4. Higher 26.4.1. Loss of 26.4.1.3. Possible 26.4.1.3.1. TAH- U-148. Verify the SP-PRC The design temperature of the 06/05/2008
Temperature in cooling water design 1061 in E-10 outlet possibility of damage column is 185°C, higher than
the line 3'-1026 temperature line to the C-35 and if scenario considered
downstream E-10 exceeding in the C- necessary provide
shell side 35 and possible protection
damage and more
ammonia release
to the
discontinuous
flare
U.149 Temperature More 26.4. Higher 26.4.1. Loss of 26.4.1.4. Hot 26.4.1.4.1. TAH- U-149. Verify during SP-MAC Refer to nodes 31 and 33 of 25/07/2008
Temperature in cooling water flushing water to P- 1061 in E-10 outlet the hazop of the / SP- package hazop.
the line 3'-1026 02 A/B and to P- line package with P-01 A/B PRC
downstream E-10 01 A/B and and P-02 A/B vendor
shell side possible seal the consequence and
damage protection against this
scenario
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-E-10.
Drawings: 10-GD-3C-06411; 10-GD-3C-06412;
10-GD-4C-06413; 10-GD-3C-06416;
10-GD-3C-06418; 10-GD-3C-06420;
10-GD-3C-06425; 10-GD-3C-06426; 10-GD-3C-06427
U.150 Pressure More 26.5. Higher 26.5.1. 26.5.1.1. Line 26.5.1.1.1. PSV- U-150. Verify that the SP 26.5.1.1.1. see HSE review N° 18 06/05/2008
Pressure in the Malfunction of design pressure 1040 on the line PSV-1040 on the line Company and
line 2'-1000 (LW pressure control exceeding and downstream the PV- has been sized for PV- Snamprogetti
header) loop PIC-1042 damage with 1042 1042 fully open have a different
with PV-1042 fully release of steam according to applicable interpretation of
open with no condensate and standard (API 520 / API 521
consumption in steam to the API 521) standard
the downstream atmosphere application.
users Company
interpretation of
API 521
application is to
consider in case
of failure of
automatic
control the PSV
should be sized
considering the
control valve
fully open and
the by pass
valve fully open
simultaneously
for system with
upstream
pressure higher
than
downstream
hydrotest
pressure
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-E-10.
Drawings: 10-GD-3C-06411; 10-GD-3C-06412;
10-GD-4C-06413; 10-GD-3C-06416;
10-GD-3C-06418; 10-GD-3C-06420;
10-GD-3C-06425; 10-GD-3C-06426; 10-GD-3C-06427
U.151 Pressure More 26.5. Higher 26.5.1. 26.5.1.1. Line 26.5.1.1.1. PSV- U-151. Consider to SP-PRC 26.5.1.1.1. PSV-1040 has been designed 25/07/2008
Pressure in the Malfunction of design pressure 1040 on the line provide independent Company and for control valve fully open
line 2'-1000 (LW pressure control exceeding and downstream the PV- pressure transmitter Snamprogetti amd the by-pass valve fully
header) loop PIC-1042 damage with 1042 with high pressure have a different open simultaneously.
with PV-1042 fully release of steam alarm downstream the interpretation of
open with no condensate and PV-1042 or alternative API 521
consumption in steam to the protection standard
the downstream atmosphere application.
users Company
interpretation of
API 521
application is to
consider in case
of failure of
automatic
control the PSV
should be sized
considering the
control valve
fully open and
the by pass
valve fully open
simultaneously
for system with
upstream
pressure higher
than
downstream
hydrotest
pressure
U.152 Pressure More 26.6. Higher 26.6.1. Tube 26.6.1.1. Possible 26.6.1.1.1. PSV- U-152. Provide PSV- SP-TUB This point has been verified 25/07/2008
Pressure in the rupture in the E- line and 1042 1042 discharge at safe during the 60% 3D model
cooling water line 10 equipment design location review
8'-1034 (E-10 tube pressure
side) exceeding and
damage
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-E-10.
Drawings: 10-GD-3C-06411; 10-GD-3C-06412;
10-GD-4C-06413; 10-GD-3C-06416;
10-GD-3C-06418; 10-GD-3C-06420;
10-GD-3C-06425; 10-GD-3C-06426; 10-GD-3C-06427
U.153 Safety Less 26.7. Less Safety 26.7.1. Release 26.7.1.1. Possible 26.7.1.1.1. None U-153. Provide PSV SP-TUB The PSV is in safe location. 25/07/2008
at PSV-1039, PSV- of hot flashing operator injury discharge at safe Verified during the 60% 3D
1040, PSV-1041 water (120 °C) at location model review
grade
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

Node: (27) L.P. Steam Silencer 10-L-16 on LS Header. Desuperheater 10-E-24 on MP Steam Line and L.M.P. Steam Silencer 10-L-18 on LMS Steam Line. Desuperheater 10-E-25 on HP Steam Line.
10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06423;
10-GD-3C-06427
U.154 Temperature More 27.1. Higher 27.1.1. 27.1.1.1. Loss of 27.1.1.1.1. None U-154. Verify the SP-PRC 27.1.1.1.1. The the design temperature for 06/05/2008
Temperature in Malfunction of HP steam design temperature of operating the material is in accordance
MPS steam temperature desuperheating the line (piping class temperature during with the maximum
header 18'-1000 control loop TIC- with possible 13A) and provide normal condition temperature coming from the
1074 with TV- MPS line design protection if (327 °C) seems to steam turbine. A verification
1074 closure temperature necessary. If the be higher then line with the spec class has been
exceeding and design temperature design temperature done.
damage can be overcome then (250 °C)
provide two
U.155 Temperature More 27.2. Higher 27.2.1. 27.2.1.1. Loss of 27.2.1.1.1. TAH- U-155. Verify the SP-PRC A TI on DCS (with alarm) has 19/09/2008
Temperature in Malfunction of MP steam 1078 on LMS steam scenario with respect been added (see P&I P57)
LMS steam temperature desuperheating header to the design
header 26'-1018 control loop TIC- with possible temperature of the
1076 with TV- downstream equipment and
1076 closure equipment (fed by provide protection if
LMS) design necessary
temperature
exceeding and
damage
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06423;
10-GD-3C-06427
U.156 Pressure More 27.3. Higher 27.3.1. 27.3.1.1. Possible 27.3.1.1.1. PSV- U-156. Provide an high SP-PRC 27.3.1.1.1. Company high pressure alarm PAL- 06/05/2008
Pressure in MP Malfunction of MPS steam 1043 designed for pressure alarm on and Snamprogetti 1007 is provided
steam header 18'- pressure control system design this scenario existing PIC-1007 have a different
1000 loop PIC-1048 pressure (P&ID P43) interpretation of API
with PV-1048 fully exceeding and 521 standard
open damage with application.
release of steam Company
to the atmosphere interpretation of API
and possible 521 application is to
operator injury consider in case of
failure of automatic
control the PSV
should be sized
considering the
control valve fully
open and the by
pass valve fully open
simultaneously for
system with
upstream pressure
higher than
downstream
hydrotest pressure
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06423;
10-GD-3C-06427
U.157 Pressure More 27.3. Higher 27.3.1. 27.3.1.1. Possible 27.3.1.1.1. PSV- U-157. Verify that the SP 27.3.1.1.1. Company see HSE review N°18 06/05/2008
Pressure in MP Malfunction of MPS steam 1043 designed for PSV-1043 on the line and Snamprogetti
steam header 18'- pressure control system design this scenario has been sized for PV- have a different
1000 loop PIC-1048 pressure 1048 fully open interpretation of API
with PV-1048 fully exceeding and according to applicable 521 standard
open damage with standard (API 520 / application.
release of steam API 521) Company
control the PSV
should be sized
considering the
control valve fully
open and the by
simultaneously for
system with
upstream pressure
higher than
downstream
hydrotest pressure
U.158 Pressure More 27.3. Higher 27.3.2. HV-1120 27.3.2.1. Possible 27.3.2.1.1. PAH- U-158. Verify the SP-PRC 27.3.2.1.1. When the maximum pressure from 25/07/2008
Pressure in MP fail closed due to MPS steam 1048 scenario considering the MPS header is the steam turbine is 28
steam header 18'- spurious signal system design the maximum pressure feed by steam kg/cm2 (g), the same of the
1000 pressure coming from 10-TK-01 turbine the PV-1048 line design
exceeding and and if necessary is closed. The HP
damage with provide protection steam is used only
release of steam during start up / shut
to the atmosphere down of the plant.
and possible PSV-1043 is
operator injury designed for PV-
1048 fully open only
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06423;
10-GD-3C-06427
U.159 Pressure More 27.4. Higher 27.4.1. 27.4.1.1. Possible 27.4.1.1.1. PSV- U-159. Verify that the SP 27.4.1.1.1. Company see HSE review N°18 06/05/2008
Pressure in LMP Malfunction of LMS steam 1046 designed for PSV-1046 on the line and Snamprogetti
steam header 26'- pressure control system design this scenario; has been sized for PV- have a different
1018 loop PIC-1059 pressure 27.4.1.1.2. TAH- 1059 A fully open interpretation of API
with PV-1059 A exceeding and 1078 on LMS according to applicable 521 standard
fully open damage with header standard (API 520 / application.
release of steam API 521) Company
control the PSV
should be sized
considering the
control valve fully
open and the by
simultaneously for
system with
upstream pressure
higher than
downstream
hydrotest pressure
U.160 Pressure More 27.5. Higher 27.5.1. 27.5.1.1. Possible 27.5.1.1.1. PSV- U-160. Consider to SP-PRC Additional PI at DCS (with low 19/09/2008
Pressure in LS Malfunction of LS steam system 1047 designed for provide an and high alarm) has been
steam header 20'- pressure control design pressure this scenario independent pressure added on 18"-LMS1014 (see
1132 loop PIC-1060 exceeding and transmitter on LS P&I P57)
with PV-1060 A damage with steam header with
fully open release of steam high pressure alarm
to the atmosphere
and possible
operator injury
Company: ENGRO
Session: 10 Date: 27/02/2008

10-GD-3C-06414;
10-GD-4C-06415;
10-GD-3C-06423;
10-GD-3C-06427
U.161 Pressure Less 27.6. Lower 27.6.1. 27.6.1.1. Up set 27.6.1.1.1. TAL- U-161. Consider to SP-PRC Additional PI at DCS (with low 19/09/2008
Pressure in LS Malfunction of condition in the 1044 on V-14 provide an and high alarm) has been
steam header 20'- pressure control downstream users (P&ID P49); independent pressure added on 20"-LS1132 (see
1132 loop PIC-1060 27.6.1.1.2. TAL- transmitter on LS P&I P57)
with PV-1060 B 1052 on V-15 steam header with low
fully open PV- (P&ID P49) pressure alarm
1060 A closed
U.162 Pressure Less 27.7. Lower 27.7.1. 27.7.1.1. Up set 27.7.1.1.1. TAL- U-162. Provide low SP-PRC TAL-1078 has been provided 25/07/2008
Pressure in LMP Malfunction of condition in the 1021 on L-02 (P&ID temperature alarm on (see P&ID P-57 rev.4)
steam header 26'- pressure control downstream users P45); 27.7.1.1.2. existing TI-1078
1018 loop PIC-1059 TAL-1043 on L-03
with PV-1059 B (P&ID P47)
fully open and PV-
1059 A closed
U.163 Pressure Less 27.8. Lower 27.8.1. 27.8.1.2. Low 27.8.1.2.1. None U-163. Verify the SP-PRC PAL-1055 at turbine 25/07/2008
Pressure in MP Malfunction of pressure at 10-TK- scenario and if discharge is implemented
steam header 18'- pressure control 01 discharge and necessary provide (refer to P&ID P-66)
1000 loop PIC-1007 possible turbine adequate protection
with PV-1007 fully damage
open
U.164 Phase More 27.10. Presence 27.10.1. 27.10.1.1. 27.10.1.1.1. PAL- U-164. Provide a low SP-PRC TAL-1078 has been provided 25/07/2008
of condensate in Malfunction of Hammering in the 1059 on LMS steam temperature alarm on (see P&ID P-57 rev.4)
LMS steam temperature line and possible header existing TI-1078 on
header control loop TIC- low temperature / LMS steam header
1076 with TV- pressure in the
1076 fully open LMS steam
header
Company: ENGRO
Session: 11 Date: 28/02/2008

Node: (28) Off Spec. Condensate Tank 10-T-05 and relevant Off Spec. Condensate Recovery Pumps 10-P-25 A/B.
10-GD-3C-06424;
10-GD-3C-06430
U.165 Temperature More 28.2. Higher 28.2.1. Loss of 28.2.1.1. Possible 28.2.1.1.1. TAH- U-165. Provide an high SP-PRC 28.2.1.1.1. TAH-1125 has been 25/07/2008
Temperature in cooling water in E- pump P-25 A/B 1073 on E-23 (P&ID
temperature alarm on The implemented
the T-05 23 tube side damage due to P53); 28.2.1.1.2.existing TI-1125 on the maximum
(P&ID P53) with C-less NPSHa and IIAL-MP25 A/B T-05 temperature
02 aligned with T- possible seal of the water
05 damage for high in the tank
temperature can be 100
°C if the tank
is emptying
U.166 Temperature More 28.2. Higher 28.2.1. Loss of 28.2.1.1. Possible 28.2.1.1.1. TAH- U-166. Verify with P-25 SP-MAC 28.2.1.1.1. Since the pump is in 19/09/2008
Temperature in cooling water in E- pump P-25 A/B 1073 on E-23 (P&ID A/B vendor the The discontinuous operation,
the T-05 23 tube side damage due to P53); 28.2.1.1.2. maximum temperature maximum temperature higher than
(P&ID P53) with C-less NPSHa and IIAL-MP25 A/B for pump seal temperature maximum seal temperature
02 aligned with T- possible seal of the water should be present in very long
05 damage for high in the tank time.
temperature can be 100
°C if the tank
is emptying
U.167 Level Less 28.5. Lower Level 28.5.1. Operator 28.5.1.1. Possible 28.5.1.1.1. LAL- U-167. Verify with P-25 SP-MAC 28.5.1.1.1. The pump is in discontinuous 19/09/2008
in the T-05 mistake to miss to pump P-25 A/B 1125 on T-05; A/B vendor if the low Local level operation and present
stop the pump P- running dry with 28.5.1.1.2. IIAL- ampere load alarm can indication scenario is adequately
25 A/B on tank cavitation and MP25 A/B be considered a (the tank protected
low level damage safeguard to prevent emptying is
the damage of the on field
pumps operation)
Company: ENGRO
Session: 11 Date: 28/02/2008

Node: (29) Urea from Prilling Tower 10-L-08 to Urea Solution Tank 10-T-01 through Urea Close Drain Tank 10-T-03 (and relevant Urea Close Drain Tank Stirrer 10-L-21) Urea Close Drain Recovery Pumps 10-P-19
A/B and Urea Solution Filters 10-S-01 A/B.
10-GD-B-06431
U.168 Flow Less 29.1. Less Flow 29.1.1. Partial 29.1.1.1. Pump 29.1.1.1.1. PDAH- U-168. Verify with the SP-MAC P-19 is a summerged pump 25/07/2008
on the line 2'-1133 plugging of S-01 running under 1019 / PDAH-1023 vendor if the existing and in discontinuous service.
(to T-01) A/B acceptable safeguard can avoid Actual protections are
minimum flow and the damage of the adequate.
possible damage pump P-19 A/B for no /
less flow on pump
discharge and if not
provide protection
U.169 Temperature More 29.2. Higher 29.2.1. Less / no 29.2.1.1. Possible 29.2.1.1.1. None U-169. Verify the SP-MAC No CW is required after the 19/09/2008
Temperature in flow of flushing pump P-19 A/B scenario with vendor design pump changed
the P-19 A/B /cooling water in damage due to and if necessary
bushing the line 1/2'-1038 loss of cooling provide protection (i.e.
due to operator local flow indication in
mistake to the line)
manage the
manual valve
U.170 Temperature Less 29.3. Lower 29.3.1. Operator 29.3.1.1. Possible 29.3.1.1.1. None U-170. Provide a low SP-PRC TAL-1080 has been provided 25/07/2008
Temperature in mistake to close lumps melting temperature alarm on (refer to P&ID P-61 rev.4)
the T-03 the manual valve missing with grid existing TI-1080
on steam inlet line plugging
U.171 Temperature Less 29.3. Lower 29.3.1. Operator 29.3.1.1. Possible 29.3.1.1.1. None U-171. Provide SP-PRC Procedure is reported in the 15/01/2009
Temperature in mistake to close lumps melting procedure in the operating manual SPC 00-ZA-
the T-03 the manual valve missing with grid operating manual in E-06010, page 26/192
on steam inlet line plugging order to check (auxiliary installation)
periodically possible
lumps accumulation on
the grid
U.172 Composition As Well As 29.4. 29.4.1. Motor 29.4.1.1. Possible 29.4.1.1.1. IIAL- U-172. Consider to SP-PRC Typical arrangment has 25/07/2008
Contamination: stirrer failure grid plugging MP19 A/B; provide an alarm on shown in P&I rev. 4 where are
lumps on pump P- inside the T-03 29.4.1.1.2. Pump DCS for stirrer motor present the status of the
19 A/B suction with overflow of suction provided failure stirren motor (Run / Fault)
lumps in pump P- with screen
19 A/B suction protection
and possible
pump damage
Company: ENGRO
Session: 11 Date: 28/02/2008

Node: (29) Urea from Prilling Tower 10-L-08 to Urea Solution Tank 10-T-01 through Urea Close Drain Tank 10-T-03 (and relevant Urea Close Drain Tank Stirrer 10-L-21) Urea Close Drain Recovery Pumps 10-P-19
A/B and Urea Solution Filters 10-S-01 A/B.
10-GD-B-06431
U.173 Level More 29.5. Higher Level 29.5.1. Pump P- 29.5.1.1. Possible 29.5.1.1.1. Start of U-173. Provide LO on SP-PRC LO on isolation valve of LXT- 19/09/2008
in the T-03 19 A or B fail to T-03 overfilling second pump for the isolation valve 1037 and LT-1028 have been
start on LSXL- with release of high high LAXHH- along the instrument provided. Refer to P&ID P-61
1037 urea solution to 1037 level in the T- air to LXT-1037 and LT- rev. 4
the atmosphere 03; 29.5.1.1.2. LAH- 1028 to avoid spurious
and possible T-03 1037 on T-03; signal due to the
damage 29.5.1.1.3. LAH- plugging
1028 on
independent level
transmitter;
29.5.1.1.4. 6'
overflow line to CY
U.174 Level Less 29.6. Lower Level 29.6.1. Pump P- 29.6.1.1. Possible 29.6.1.1.1. LAL- U-174. Verify with P-19 SP-MAC P-19 is a summerged pump 19/09/2008
in the T-03 19 A or B fail to T-03 emptying 1028 on A/B vendor if the low and in discontinuous service.
stop on LSXLL- with pump P-19 independent level ampere load alarm can Actual protections are
1037 A/B cavitation and transmitter; be considered a adequate.
damage 29.6.1.1.2. IIAL- safeguard to prevent
MP19 A/B the damage of the
pumps

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MAIN HAZOP FOLLOW UP - UTILITIES PLANT SPC. N.

Session: 1 Date: 04/02/2008

Session: 1 Date: 04/02/2008

Session: 1 Date: 04/02/2008

Session: 1 Date: 04/02/2008

Session: 1 Date: 04/02/2008

Session: 1 Date: 04/02/2008

W.16 Composition As Well As 2.15. 2.15.1. Failure on 2.15.1.1. Possible

Session: 2 Date: 05/02/2008

Session: 2 Date: 05/02/2008

Session: 2 Date: 05/02/2008

Session: 2 Date: 05/02/2008

Session: 2 Date: 05/02/2008

Session: 7 Date: 12/02/2008

Session: 7 Date: 12/02/2008

Session: 7 Date: 12/02/2008

Session: 7 Date: 12/02/2008

Session: 3 Date: 06/02/2008

Session: 3 Date: 06/02/2008

Session: 3 Date: 06/02/2008

Session: 3 Date: 06/02/2008

Session: 3 Date: 06/02/2008

Session: 3 Date: 06/02/2008

Session: 3 Date: 06/02/2008

Session: 3 Date: 06/02/2008

Session: 4 Date: 07/02/2008

Session: 4 Date: 07/02/2008

Session: 7 Date: 12/02/2008

Session: 4 Date: 07/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 5 Date: 08/02/2008

Session: 8 Date: 13/02/2008

Session: 8 Date: 13/02/2008

Session: 8 Date: 13/02/2008

Session: 8 Date: 13/02/2008

Session: 8 Date: 13/02/2008

Session: 8 Date: 13/02/2008

Session: 8 Date: 13/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008

Session: 6 Date: 11/02/2008