High Court Madras
High Court Madras
High Court Madras
before expiry of period of limitation specified for filing the Petition and even after the
expiry of the time specified in the order made in the Waiver Application. In view of
the mandatory requirement prescribed under Section 19 of MSMED Act, the
Arbitration Petition cannot be treated as maintainable either on 29.3.2010 or on
13.5.2010 without 15% of pre-deposit. If at all the same shall be treated as in order. it
was only on 4.6.2012, the date on which pre-deposit of 75% of Award amount stands
complied with. TIle Petition is, as 011 4.6.2012, hopelessly barred by limitation and as
there is no provision under Arbitration Act to condone the delay beyond 30 days the
Arbitration Petition is hit by limitation as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
and our High Court in the judgments cited below: IPara 16J
Thus, the principles laid down in the authorities cited above, are to the effect that
under Section 19 of MSMED Act, the constitutional validity of which is already
upheld pre-deposit of 75% of the award amount is mandatory for entertaining any
AppeallPetition against the award passed by Conciliation Council. Though the
present Arbitration Petition was filed within the time, the mandatory requirement
has not been complied with either within the period of limitation or extended period
and the Petition is hence barred by limitation. On this score alone, this Original
Petition is liable to be dismissed. [Para 22J
Even otherwise, whatever the grounds available to the Petitioner on factual and
legal aspects and also against the validity and enforceability of the award, the same
can be canvassed only by way of proper Petition under Section 34 of the Act and
when thcrelevant provision of law provides that the Petition shall be entertained
only along with pre-deposit of 75% of thc amount awarded, the Petition ought to
have been filed, after complying with mandatory requirement and on the failure of
the Petitioner to do so, the Petition shall be treated as incomplete and improperly
filed and shall not be entertained and shall be rejected. In view of the same, there is
no challenge against the Arbitral award and the same entitled the awardee to enforce
the same and to withdraw the amount deposited by the Petitioner herein. [Para 25J
Arbitration· and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 34(3) -
Micro. Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (27 of
. 2006), Section 19 - Petition challenging Award of Facilitation Council
- Limitation and Pre-deposit - Petition under Section 34 to be .IUed
within 90 days or within further 30 days, from date of Award or date of
receipt of same - Said Petition to be mandatorily accompanied with
75 % of amount as stipulated in Impugned Award.
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act prescribes time limit for
filing the Petition to set aside the award as three months from the date of receipt of
the Arbitral Award and the Proviso to Section 34(3) prescribes further grace period
of thirty days for entertaining an Application under Section 34 provided the
Applicant satisfy the Court with sufficient cause for not making an Application
within a period of three months. As rightly argued hy the learned Counsel for the
First Respondent, the combined appreciation of Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act and Section 19 of the MSMED would undoubtedly go the show
that the Petition \1nder Section 34 shall bF filed within 90 days Of within 30 days
thereafter i.e.• within 120 days either from the date of the award or from the date of
receipt of copy of the award by the Applicant and not thereafter and the Appeal or
Petition shall not be entertained, unless the Petitioner deposits 75~ of the amount in
J
28 Current Tamil Nadu Cases 2013 (5) ere
S. Silambanan, Senior Counsel for S. Rajenf Ramndass, Advocate for Petitioner.
Sa.thish Parasaran, Advocate for Respondent NQ.l.
O.P. DISMISSED
Prayer : Petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside the
purported award dated 31 .12.2009 passed by the Second I~espondcnt.
IJUDGMENT I
1. This Original Petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act against the award dated 31.10.2010 passed in favour of the
First Respondent MIs. Nortan Intec Rubber (P) Ltd. by Second Respondent
MSR Facilitation Council and Industries Commissioner and Director of
Industries and Commerce (hereinafter shortly referred to as ~'MSMED").
2. The facts, which are relevant for consideration herein are as follows:
The Petitioner-Company MIs. Goodyear India Ltd and the First
Respondent Mis. Nortan Intec Rubber (P) Ltd. entered into Agreements on
14.05.1997 and 01.04.1999 thereby the Petitioner-Company agreed to supply
to the First Respondent required quantity of butyl rubber, carbon black,
valve components, chemicals for the manufacture and packing of butyl tubes
by using the Plant and Machinery belonging to the First Respondent. The
First Respondent was entitled to get conversion charges and Excise duty
payable thereon against invoices. The Petitioner in terms of the Agreement
supplied the materials, but the First Respondent, according to the Petitioner
defaulted in supply of finished goods, as such, dispute arose between the
parties, which was followed hy Memorandum of Understanding dated
04.11.2000. There was renewal of supply of raw materials. Again, according
to the Petitioner, there was default in supply of finished goods and the same
was again followed by further dispute and misunderstanding and exchange
of notices between the two. In the meanwhile Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (Act 27 of2006 came into force) (herein
after. shortly referred to as ~~MSMEDAct". The First Respondent by
invoking the relevant provisions of law under Act 27 of 2006 filed a claim
for ~80~3I,9561- against the Petitioner herein before the Second Respondent-
Council.
3. The Petitioner-Company filed a detailed Counter thereby seriously
questioning the applicability of the provisions of Act 27 of 2006 for the
claim relating to the period between 1997 to 1999 and by denying the
liability and the quantum of liability and prayed for rejection of the claim
made by the First Respondent. The parties are permitted to tile their Written
Objections and also to advance hearings and oral arguments on the hearing
dates and last of such hearing date was on 23.1 1.2009. The Petitioner-
Company herein and the First Respondent made the claim before the Second
Respondent herein and seriously opposed the niaintainability of the claim '
before the Second Respondent on the ground of non-applicability of
l ~ __"'______~_
Current Tamil Nadu Cases 2013 (5) ere
"19. Applicationfor setting aside Decree,Award or Order.- No Application for
setting aside any Decree, Award or other Order made either by the Council itself
or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to
which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any Court
unless the Appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five
percent. of the amount in terms of the decree, award or. as the case may he, the
other order in the manner directed by such Court:'
Provided that pending disposal of the Application to set aside the Decree, Award
or Order, the Court shall order that sucbpercentage of the amount deposited
shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances
of the case. subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose." .
8. Our High Court in a batch of Writ Petitions in W.P. 16908 of 2010,
etc. reported in Eden Exports Company, rep. by its Partner, Mrs. Faiqua
Shameei J'. Union of India, 2010 (2) CWC 886, referred to the Division
Bench Judgement of Kerala High Court reported in K.S.R. T.C 1'. Union of
India, 2010 (1) KLT 65 which upheld the validity of Constitutionality of
Section 19 of MSMED Act.
9. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act prescribes time
limit for fi1ing the Petition to set aside the award as three months from the
date of receipt of the Arbitral Award and the Proviso to Section 34(3)
prescribes further grace period of thirty days for entertaining an Application
under Section 34 provided the Applicant satisfy the Court with sufficient
cause for not making an application within a period of three months. As
rightly argued by the learned Counsel for the First Respondent, the
combined appreciation of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
and Section 19 of the MSMED would undoubtedly go the show that the
Petition under Section 34 shall be filed within 90 days or within 30 days
thereafter i.e.• within 120 days either from the datc ofthc award or from the
date of receipt of copy of the award by the Applicant and not thereafter and
the Appeal or Petition shall not be entertained, unless the Petitioner deposits
75% of the amount in terms of the impugned award and the Petition under
Section 34 shall be entertained with deposit of 75% of the amount in terms
of the award. The Apex Court in Lalla Prasad Khinni Lal Case referred to
the Full Bench decision reported in Lakshmi Rattan Engineering Works
Ltd. Jr. Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, AIR 1968 SC 488, wherein the
Supreme Court has observed that the word "entertain" means "admitting to
consideration" and the Court shall not proceed to admit to consideration an
Appeal, which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of
the admitted tax, which is the statutory requirement as laid down under law.
10. In the instant case, admittedly, the Petitioner has not deposited 75%
of the award amount within 120 days .which is the statutory period
prescribed for filing an Appeal including this Petition under Section 34 of
the Ar~itJ:;ati~n Act. yh,?VSh the ~ppeal is ~led w~thin 30 days. from the ?ate
of receipt of copy of this award, the same is not filed along With 750/0 of the
Appeal was filed within the time, there was delay in making the necessary
deposit of the admitted tax and the delay could not be condoned. When the
same was challenged before the Hon 'ble Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
has, in view of applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act to such Appeals,
observed that the Appeal became entertainablc on 27.5.1966, the date on
which, the necessary document showing deposit of the full amount was
made, but it only suffered from the defect that it was barred by time on that
date and in view of Section 9(6), the assessee could file an Application for
extension of time and the rejection of the Application is on the erroneous
ground that the Courts below have no jurisdiction to entertain such
Application. The Hon 'ble Supreme Court has set aside the order of the High
Court and remitted the matter for fresh disposal. While doing so, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Para 5 of the Judgement categorically observed that the
Appeal is deemed to have been properly tiled on the date on which the
amount of admitted tax is paid and if it is beyond the period of 30 days, the
Appeal will be barred by time.
18. The important factor to be noted in the case decided by the Supreme
Court is that there is no outer limit prescribed for condoning the delay as in
the present case. Therefore, Section 9(6) entertains the Application filed
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act without any outer limit. Whereas, in
the present case, the outer limit 'fixed beyond the limitation period is only 30
days and not. beyond that. If the observation of the Supreme Court is viewed,
in the light of specific provisions of law, the present Arbitration Petition
should be treated as having been preferred only on 4.6.2012 and in the
absence of any Application for condoning the delay and in the absence of
any provision for condoning the delay beyond 30 days, the Arbitration
Petition shall be treated as barred by limitation as on 4.6.2012, the date on
which condition of pre-deposit of 750/0 stands complied with.
19. It lTIUY be true that this Court and the Supreme Court have periodically
extended the time, with an observation that in the event of the order for deposit
of statutory requirement being corn plied with, the Arbitration Petition will be
entertained. But the Apex Court has in the same order granted liberty to the
Respondent to contest all grounds available to them, including that of question
of limitation, as such, this Court is, for the discussion held above, compelled to
hold that the Petition is barred by limitation.
20. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Union of India v.
Popular Constructions Co., 2001 (4) CTC 213 (SC) : 2001 (8) see 470,
observed in Para 16 that " ...an Application filed beyond the period mentioned in
Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an Application in accordance with that
sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34( 1). rcq~urseto the COUIt
agai nst an Arbitral Award cannot be made beyond the periodprescribed", It is
further observed in the same Para 16 that now the cons~taence of the tUn¢
U
expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the Award becomes
immediataJy enforceable without Any further act of the Court", '
I was 30 days and the Appeal should have been filed on or before 3.3.1989,
after paying the admitted tax. The Appeal was filed on 1.3.1989 and the
admitted tax was paid only on 30.3.1989. Under tlie First Proviso to Section
31 of the Act, the, Appellate Authority has power to excuse the delay for
sufficient reasons only upto 15 days beyond the last date for tiling' the
AppeaL Whereas: there was delay of 28 days in payment of admitted tax.
The Appellate Authority refused to condone the delay and dismissed the
~etition seeking such condonation. The same was challenged before th~
Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, The Tribunal allowed the Appeal and
remanded the case before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner holding that
there was no delay in filing the Appeal and the payment of the admitted tax
beyond the period of limitation was of no consequence. Against which,
T.C.509/1995 was tiled by the Revenue. The Full Bench of our High Court,
after referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court, our High Court.
and other High Courts arising out of the same issue, arrived at a finding in
Para 24 of the judgment that "we were therefore firmly-of the opinion that if
there was no payment of the admitted tax within the period allowed for
condonation of delay in preferring an Appeal, no Appeal could be said to
have been filed. It was only when the payment of admitted tax was-made that
the Appeal couldbe said to have been filed. We also made it clear that the
words Uno Appealshould be entertained under this sub-section unless it was
accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax admitted by the
Appellant to be due .....~' as already stated in Para 14 supra were interpreted
to mean that the payment of the admitted tax should be made within the time
or the extended time prescribed tor filing an Appeal, even though the
satisfactory proof might be produced later before HIe Appeal was taken up
for the first time for consideration. Consequently it followed that if the
payment of admitted tax was. made beyond the period of 30 days prescribed
for filing of an Appeal and beyond the period of 15 days in respect of which
a1one, the Appellate Authority has power to condone the delay then the
Appellate Authority has to necessarily reject the Appeal as barred by
limitation". The Full Bench of our High Court has accordingly set aside the
order of the Tribunal, thereby restoring the order of the Assistant
Cornmissioner. holding the respecti ve Appeals as barred by Iimitation.
22. Thus, the principles laid down in the authorities cited above. are to
the effect that under Section ] 9 of MSMED Act, the Constitutional validity·
of which is already upheld pre-deposit of 75% of the award amounr ..~
mandatory for entertaining any Appeal/Petition against the award pasScd.§l'r
Conciliation Council. Though the present Arbitration=Petition was fi~ "".".\,,~. ,
I
within the time, the mandatory requirement has not been complied with
either within the period of limitation or extended period and the Petition is
hence barred by limitation. On this score alone, this Original Petition is
liable to be dismissed.
23. However, for the purpose of complete adjudication. other grounds
raised on the side of the Petitioner to be looked into are that the irnpugned
Award was passed without requisite quorum. It is contended by the learned
Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that the copy of the award was signed by
Chairman and not by other members of the Council Chennai Region and
hence is without jurisdiction and is invalid and unenforceable. Whereas, the
original minutes and Award was signed by the Chairman and other Members
constituting the Committee. It is also sought to be argued on the side of the
Petitioner that the issue was permitted to be argued by the Council not on
merits, but only on legal groundsvWhereas, the Council passed the award on
merits, thereby holding the Petitioner herein liable to make payment with
interest without affording any opportunity to the Respondent to argue on
merits, the issue relating to quantum 'of liability of the Petitioner to make any
payment to the Respondent,
24. In this regard, the attention of this Court is drawn to the issues (a) to
(d) framed for determination of the council i.e. in the Award impugned
herein (a) jurisdiction (b) limitation (c) Applicability of MSMED Act 2006
to the instant case, and' (d) to what effect. The learned Counsel for the
Respondent contended that the parties were directed to raise grievance and
counter-claim and advanced oral and written arguments on all aspects and
the council decided to proceed all the issues under the Award impugned
herein and there was no room for raising any grievance as raised herein. In
support of such contention, the Respondent also produced the copy of
Minutes of Council Meeting held on 23.11.2009. The perusal of the same
reveals that as many as 46 cases were taken up on 23.11.2009 in the
presence of requisite quoram and orders were passed in 1 I cases and amount
was fully settled and case was closed in 4 cases and part amount was
received in two cases and the minutes was signed by all members attended
the Council meeting. The perusal of the minutes revel that the claim arising
out of which is the Arbitration Petition was taken up as Sl. No.18 and both
the Petitioner and Respondent-Company appeared for the hearing before the
Council and both the parties orally reiterated their written submissions and
the hearing was closed and orders were reserved. Further the perusal of the
typed set filed on the side of the Petitioner on 26.11.20 I 0 would reveal that
the Petitioner herein filed detailed Counter on merits and also filed Written
Submissions. but reiterated the arguments only on issues on legal grounds.
25. Even orherwise, whatever the grounds available ttt'tbe Petitioner on
factual and legal aspects.and also against the validity and enforceability of
the Award, the same can be canvassed only by Way of proper Petition'under
[: ,2013
(5[STC.~.2_J
IN THE HIGH COIJRT OF MADRAS
S.Nagalnuthu, J.
C.R.P.(PD) No.3415 of2012 and M.P. No.1 of2012
30.4.2013
V.I. Yocoob ....• Petitioner
Vs.
Big Mosque, rep. by its Secretary, Mettupalayam-ri-t l 30 I, Coimbatore
District ....• Respondent
1908 ~._Q(J,2_Q,8.},.J)~ctiQn_I_S.l -
{;J~d~_._~f._!;jyjJ..~ror.edure, Petition to
reopen case - Whetber necessary - When Suit was posted for
judgment, Application filed to reopen case for purpose of tiUng
Application to impfead Wakf Hoard -- Application allowed - Ot·del"
challenged in Revision - There is no need to file Application to reopen
case - At any stage, Application can be filed to implead any pnrty -
Application tiled to implead party already numbered - Direction
issued for disposal of Application to implead - C.R.P. dismissed.
Facts : Revision was filed against the Order allowing Application seeking to
reopen the case. when. the Suit was posted for judgment, Applicatigll was flledto
reopen so as to enable the Plaintiff to file Application to implead • .I+{'igb
Court held
that there is no necessity to tile Application In reopen and that the Application tv
implead can be filed at any stage.
,