History of Logic From Aristotl - Corazzon, Raul - 5777 PDF

Table of Contents
General Informations to Readers on This Site

History of Logic
The History of Logic and Its Relationship with Ontology
Bibliography of General Studies on the History of Logic
Index of the Section: Aristotle's Logic
Aristotle's Logic: General Survey and Introductory Readings
Bibliography on the Logic of Aristotle
Aristotle's De Interpretatione: Philosophy of Language
Bibliography on Aristotle's De Interpretatione
Aristotle: the Theory of Categorical Syllogism
Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Categorical Syllogism
Index of the Section Ancient Logic after Aristotle
History of Ancient Logic in the Hellenistic Period
Bibliography of Ancient Logic in the Hellenistic Period
Peripatetic Logic: Eudemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus
Bibliography on the Logic of Eudemus and Theophrastus
The Dialectical School of Logic: a Selected Bibliography
Bibliography on the Master Argument, Diodorus Cronus, Philo
Stoic Logic: The Dialectic from Zeno to Chrysippus
The Stoic Doctrine of Lekta (Sayables)
Ancient Stoicism: Critical Editions and Translations
Annotated Bibliography on Ancient Stoic Dialectic: A - E
Selected Bibliography on Stoic Logic. Second part: F - Z
Bibliography on Stoic Philosophy of Language
Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus. A Bibliography
Cicero: Logic and Rhetoric in His Philosophical Works
Editions of the Philosophical Works of Cicero
The Philosophical Works of Cicero. A Selected Bibliography
Boethius: Editions and English Translations
Boethius' Logic as a Discourse on Being
Boethius' Logic and Metaphysics. An Annotated Bibliography
Index of the Section History of Medieval Logic
History of Medieval Logic: A General Overview
Bibliography on Medieval Logic: General Works A - K
Bibliography on Medieval Logic: General Works L - Z
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Medieval theories of Supposition and Mental Language
Bibliography on the medieval theories of supposition (A - F)
Bibliography of Medieval theories of mental language (M - Z)
Abelard: Logic, Semantics and Ontology
Theories of the Copula in the Logical Works of Abelard
Abelard's Logical Works: Editions, Translations
Abelard's Logic and Ontology. Bibliography: A - L
Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Peter Abelard: M - Z
Buridan's Logical Works: Summulae de dialectica
Buridan's Treatise on Consequences and Other Writings
Buridan Logical and Metaphysical Works: A Bibliography
Buridan's Logic and Metaphysics. A Bibliography (First Part)
Bibliography on Buridan's Logic and Metaphysics (L-Z)
Index of the Section History of Modern Logic
History of Renaissance and Modern Logic from 1400 to 1850
Bibliography on the History of Renaissance and Modern Logic
Leibniz on Logic, Language and Signs: a Bibliography (A- K)
Leibniz on Logic, Language and Signs: a Bibliography (L- Z)
Index of the Section History of Contemporary Logic
History of Contemporary Logic from Boole to Godel
Bibliography on the History of Contemporary Logic
Prominent Logicians from Aristotle to Godel (1931)
Index of the Bibliographies of Historians of Logic
E. Jennifer Ashworth on the History of Logic
E. J. Ashworth on the History of Logic (1977-1988)
Bibliography of L. M. de Rijk from 1950 to 1974
Mauro Nasti de Vincentis. Bibliography 1981-2010
Wilhelm Risse's writings on the History of Logic
General Informations to Readers on This Site
TList of the Indexesy
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History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel
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About This Ebook (last update: March
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This ebook and the web site "History of Logic from
Aristotle to Godel"
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Aristotle to Godel" (www.historyoflogic.com), can be read in sequence,
starting from the beginning or end of the website, or by consulting the table
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Differences with the on-line version

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HISTORY OF LOGIC FROM

ARISTOTLE TO GÖDEL
N.B. For the most important logicians separated pages are in preparation.
History of Logic
General Introduction
Logic and Ontology from an Historical Perspective
General Works and Bibliographies on the History of Logic
The Logical Works of Aristotle
Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Aristotle: General and

Introductory Readings
Aristotle's Earlier Dialectic: the Topics and Sophistical Refutations
Aristotle's De Interpretatione: Semantics and Philosophy of Language
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Annotated bibliography on Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Peri
Hermeneias)
Aristotle's Prior Analytics: the Theory of Categorical Syllogism
Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Categorical

Syllogism
Aristotle's Prior Analytics: the Theory of Modal Syllogism
Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Modal Syllogism
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics: The Theory of Demonstration
Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics
Ancient Logic after Aristotle
Peripatetic Logic: Eudemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus of Eresus
Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Eudemus and

Theophrastus
The Dialectical School and the Origins of Propositional Logic
Selected Bibliography on the Dialectical School and the Origins

of Propositional Logic
The Master Argument: The Sea Battle in De Intepretatione 9,

Diodorus Cronus, Philo the Dialectician
Logic in Ancient Stoicism
Critical Editions and Translations of the Fragments and Testimonia
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Ancient Stoic Rhetoric (under construction)
Stoic Philosophy of Language and Grammar (under construction)
Selected Bibliography on Stoic Logic: A - E
Selected Bibliography on Stoic Logic: F - Z
Bibliography on Stoic Philosophy of Language, Grammar,

Rhetoric
Early Stoic Logicians: Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus
Other Aspects of Ancient Logic
Critical Editions and Translations of the Philosophical Works of

Cicero
Logic and Rhetoric in the Philosophical Works of Cicero
Sextus Empiricus and the Skeptical Criticism of Logic and Truth
Porphyry's Isagoge and his Commentary to Aristotle's

Categories
Boethius' Contribution to the Development of Medieval Logic
The Philosophical Works of Boethius. Editions and Translations
Selected Bibliography on the Logical Works of Boethius
The Development of Medieval Logic
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Medieval Logic: A General Overview
General Bibliography on Medieval Logic:
General Studies A - K
General Studies L - Z
Latin Logic until the Eleventh Century
Selected Bibliography on Latin Logic until the Eleventh Century
The Birth of the Liberal Arts: the Trivium (Grammar, Dialectic,

Rhetoric)
Logic and Grammar in the Twelfth Century
Selected Bibliography on the Twelfth Century
The Development of Logic in the Thirteenth Century
The Development of Logic in the Fourteenth Century
Selected Bibliography on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental Language
Bibliography on the Medieval Theories of Supposition and Mental

Language:
Supposition A - L
Supposition M - Z
Abelard: Logic, Semantics, Ontology and His Theories of the Copula
Abelard's Logical Works: Editions, Translations, Selected Texts
I. Logic, Semantics and Ontology in the Work of Abelard
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II. Theories of the Copula in the Logical Works of Abelard
Bibliography on the Logic and Metaphysics of Peter Abelard:
Abelard A - L
Abelard M - Z
An Overview of Buridan's Logical Works:
Editions, Translations and Studies on the Manuscript Tradition
I. An Overview of the Summulae de Dialectica
II. The Treatise on Consequences and Other Writings
Selected Bibliography on the Logic and Metaphysics of Buridan:
Buridan A - L
Buridan M - Z
The Development of Modern Logic
Selected Bibliography on the History of Renaissance and

Modern Logic
Leibniz on Logic and Semiotics: the Project of a Universal Language
Bibliography of Leibniz on Logic and Semiotics:
Leibniz A - K
Leibniz L - Z
The Rise of Contemporary Logic
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The Period from Boole to Gödel
Selected Bibliography on the Contemporary Symbolic Logic

from Boole to Gödel
Appendix: The Great Logicians
A Selection of Prominent Logicians from Aristotle to Gödel (1931)
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and Its Relation to Ontology
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
"In short, we can gain access to philosophy through the concrete problems of
logic."
Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Summer
semester 1928), Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 7
"Preliminary definition of the subject matter of the history of logic is hard to

come by. For apart from 'philosophy' there is perhaps no name of a branch of
knowledge that has been given so many meanings as 'logic'. Sometimes the
whole of philosophy, and even knowledge in general, has been thus named,
from metaphysics on the one hand, cf. Hegel, to aesthetics ('logic of beauty')
on the other, with psychology, epistemology, mathematics etc. in between.
With such a wide choice it is quite impossible to include in a history of
logical problems all that has been termed 'logic' in the course of western
thought. To do so would practically involve writing a general history of
philosophy. But it does not follow that the use of the name 'logic' must be
quite arbitrary, for history provides several clues to guide a choice between
its many meanings.
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This choice can be arrived at by the following stages.
1. First let us discard whatever most authors either expressly ascribe to some
other discipline, or call 'logic' with the addition of an adjective, as for
example epistemology, transcendental logic, ontology etc.
2. When we examine what remains, we find that there is one thinker who so
distinctly marked out the basic problems of this residual domain that all later
western inquirers trace their descent from him: Aristotle. Admittedly, in the
course of centuries very many of these inquirers -- among them even his
principal pupil and successor Theophrastus -- have altered Aristotelian
positions and replaced them with others. But the essential problematic of
their work was, so far as we know, in constant dependence in one way or
another on that of Aristotle Organon. Consequently we shall denote as 'logic'
primarily those problems which have developed from that problematic. 3.
When we come to the post-Aristotelian history of logic, we can easily see
that one part of the Organon has exercised the most decisive influence,
namely the Prior Analytics. At some periods other parts too, such as the
Topics or the Posterior Analytics, have indeed been keenly investigated and
developed. But it is generally true of all periods marked by an active interest
in the Organon that the problems mainly discussed are of the kind already to
hand in the Prior Analytics. So the third step brings us to the point of
describing as 'logic' in the stricter sense that kind of problematic presented in
the Prior Analytics. 4. The Prior Analytics treats of the so-called syllogism,
this being defined as logos in which if something is posited, something else
necessarily follows. Moreover such logoi are there treated as formulas which
exhibit variables in place of words with constant meaning; an example is 'B
belongs to all A'. The problem evidently, though not explicitly, presented by
Aristotle in this epoch-making work, could be formulated as follows. What
formulas of the prescribed type, when their variables are replaced by
constants, yield conditional statements such that when the antecedent is
accepted, the consequent must be admitted? Such formulas are called 'logical
sentences'. We shall accordingly treat sentences of this kind as a principal
subject of logic."
From: Joseph Bochenski - A History of Formal Logic - New York: Chelsea
Publishing Co. 1961 pp. 2-3.
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LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY
The question "how are logic and ontology interrelated?" is an ambiguous

question, that is, it can refer either to logic and ontology themselves or to the
metatheories of logic and ontology (that is, to the views about them).
Furthermore, in the first case, both logic and ontology may be considered
either objectively or subjectively.
(1) If the question refers to logic and ontology themselves considered
objectively (that is, in their content), the disciplines are seen as sets of laws
and/or rules, and so the problem is purely logical. It will be clear that its
solution depends largely on the content of logic and of ontology as they were
constructed at a given time.
(2) If the question refers to the same, but as seen subjectively (that is, in as
far as they were conceived by some thinkers or groups of thinkers), then it is
about empirical facts and is then a historical question: how did the fact that x
held the ontology O influence the fact that he also held the logic L or
inversely?
(3) Finally, if the question is concerned not with the two systems as they are
but rather with the metatheoretical views about them (that is, with the
corresponding philosophies of logic), the question is a quite different one.
That this is so is indicated by the fact that often the same type of logic was
philosophically interpreted in a different manner by two different schools.
This question, in turn, can be considered either logically or historically. It
should be clear that the first question is fundamental. Therefore, the principal
focus of this presentation will be upon it. The philosophy of logic and
ontology will be treated only secondarily, while the historical question of the
mutual factual influences of doctrines about them will be only marginally
noted.
Now to state at once one of the principal conclusions of the present
investigation, it must be confessed that there is considerable confusion about
that basic question. Almost any imaginable answer has been proposed by one
or another philosopher. To mention only two of the extreme views,
respectable logicians have maintained that there is a complete identity of both
disciplines (thus, Scholz) and that there is no relation whatsoever between
them (thus, Nagel). The very fact that this is so requires an explanation. As is
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always so in such cases, this explanation must be historical.
One reason for the unfortunate state prevailing in investigations of this
problem can readily be identified: ignorance. Most ontologists do not know
even the ABC's of logic. But the inverse is also true: most logicians do not
have the least idea what ontology might be. These deficiencies are often
combined, on both sides, with value judgments of an unkind sort. Thus, to
most ontologists, logic does not seem to be a serious discipline, although they
concede that it provides (hélas!) some practical results for computer science.
On the other hand, ontology is merely nonsense in the estimation of many
logicians. It is little wonder that such scholars produce few worthwhile
contributions regarding the relations of the two disciplines.
But this is not the whole answer. The present bifurcation did not always
prevail. There have been ontologists who were well instructed in logic and
who were even creative logicians in their own right ; Thomas Aquinas and
Uddyotakâra (seventh century) are examples. There were also logicians who
knew a good deal about ontology; one need think only of Leibniz and of
Whitehead. Nevertheless, confusion about our problem is widespread across
the ages. Some explanation must be offered for this fact, and once again it
has to explained historically. (pp. 274-275)
(...)
The history begins with Aristotle, as so many philosophical questions do. Nor
is it a question of that history merely beginning with him. For in many cases
one gets the impression that where "the Master of those who know" (Dante)
failed to perceive or to formulate a problem, his successors had a difficult
time at formulating or solving it. Among these problems is that of the
relations between logic and ontology.
The following is a brief description of both disciplines as they appear to the
unbiased reader in the Aristotelian corpus. There is a book, or rather a
collection of writings, called "Metaphysics" by Andronikos Rhodes. There is
also a collection of works which received the name "Organon" from the
commentators. None of these names derive from Aristotle himself. There can
be no doubt, however, that we find in his writings a considerable number of
doctrines belonging to what will subsequently be called 'logic" and
"ontology" respectively.
As regards ontology, Aristotle talks about a "first philosophy" and a "divine
science." He says that they are about being as being; what we see here is an
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attempt to define this discipline. But as far as logic is concerned, we find no
name for it in his writings. (...) Still less is there any attempt to define the
subject matter of logic.
If, however, we turn from his philosophy of logic and of ontology to the
theories themselves (that is, to the systems Aristotle developed), it is
relatively easy to describe what he would have meant by "ontology" and
"logic" respectively, if he had such terms.
Regarding ontology, we should first note that Aristotle, unlike many later
thinkers, did not believe that there is an entity or even a meaning
unambiguously associated with the term "being." In one of those passages
which can certainly be esteemed as a stroke of genius, Aristotle explicitly
states that "being" is an ambiguous term; he justifies this assertion by a sort
of embryonic theory of types. And yet, we find extensive discussions of the
characteristics of entities in general in the Metaphysics and elsewhere. On
closer inspection, we discover that his ontological doctrines can be divided
into two classes.
First of all, in the fourth book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle undertakes to
state and discuss the "principles" -- namely, non-contradiction and the
excluded middle. (Aristotle made explicit use of the principle of identity in
his logic, but never made it the object of a similar study.) Next we have a
number of analyses of concrete entities. Of these the most conspicuous are
the doctrine of act and potency and the table of the categories (also studied in
the Organon, but obviously belonging to the "first philosophy"). The last
named could be and has often been viewed as a classification of entities. But
it seems more consistent with Aristotle's thought to consider it as a sort of
analysis of a concrete entity into its various aspects. (...)
In summary, the Aristotelian ontology appears to be a study (1) of
(isomorphically, we would say) common properties of all entities and (2) of
the aspects into which they can be analyzed. Both sorts of studies are about
real objects. One distinctive characteristic of this ontology is its conspicuous
lack of existential statements, which is contrary to what we find in what is
now commonly called "metaphysics". (pp. 279-281)
(...)
In summary, then, Aristotle left: (1) an ontology conceived as a theory of real
entities in general and of their most general aspects; this discipline is defined;
(2) two quite different systems of logic: a technology of discussion and an
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object-linguistic formal logic; (3) a considerable overlapping of both
disciplines (for example, the "principles," the categories, etc.) ; (4) not even a
hint, direct or indirect, as to what formal logic might be about ; in other
words, no philosophy of logic at all.
It should be clear that in that frame of reference, the question of the relations
between logic and ontology cannot even be clearly stated. For we do not
know what logic is nor which of the two logics has to be considered nor
where are the boundaries between it and ontology.
And yet that is the frame of reference within which most of the Western
discussions of our problem will develop. That is, so it seems, the explanation
of the confusion reigning in our field.
With the Stoics, we find a clear choice between the alternative conceptions of
logic: they opt for "dialectics," the art of arguing. This does not mean that
they remained at the level of the Topics. On the contrary, their logic of
propositions, magnificently developed, is formal logic. But it is conceived as
being a set of rules of arguing.
Moreover, the Stoics were the first to formulate a consistent theory of the
object of logic. Logic is, according to them, radically different from ontology
of the Aristotelian type. There is, it is true, no ontology in their philosophy;
and what corresponds to the Aristotelian table of categories is considered to
be a part of logic. But the subject matter of logic, the meanings, is sharply
distinguished from what is real. For, whereas everything which is real,
including mental entities, is a body in the Stoics' view, the meanings are not
bodies. They are ideal entities.
Thus the first known philosophy of logic emphasizes the radical difference
and independence of logic as regards ontology.
The Scholastics make no use of the term "ontology" and discuss subjects
which will subsequently be called "ontological" in the context of their
commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics. As compared with the latter, there
are some important developments. For example, much consideration is given
to the semantic status of "being." We are aware of several positions adopted
regarding this problem: while the Thomists considered "being" as analogous
(that is, basically a systematically ambiguous term), others, such as the
Ockhamists, held that it was purely ambiguous; Scotists, on the other hand,
claimed that it is a "genus" (that is, not an ambiguous expression). Depending
on the position assumed, some philosophers will develop a general theory of
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being, while others will not. In addition, we find a few new chapters in
ontology: above all, the doctrine of the distinction between essence and
existence, the theory of the "transcendental" properties of all entities, and, of
course, a rich technical elaboration of every doctrine. With these exceptions,
the subject matter of ontology is the same as that found in Aristotle.
When we turn to logic, the situation is quite different. While incorporating
and developing a number of Aristotelian doctrines, Scholastic logic is very
much un-Aristotelian insofar as its method and approach are concerned, but
also, to a large extent, as regards the content. It is completely metalinguistic
and consists of rules. But it is unlike Stoic logic as well, for its explicit
concern is not with mere meanings but rather with what were called
propositions (meaningful sentences). Semantics undergoes tremendous
development during this period.
This being so, several important facts which are relevant to our problem
emerge. First of all, a sharp distinction between logic and ontology is
explicitly established: the former is metalinguistic, the latter, object-
linguistic; logic formulates rules, ontology, laws. Secondly, given this
distinction and the nature of the Aristotelian corpus, a curious duplication of
doctrines appears: problems are treated twice, once in logic and then again in
ontology. As Ockham noted, there are two principles of noncontradiction:
one ontological, stated in object-language, and another logical, formulated in
metalinguistic terms.
The Scholastics also formulated various philosophies of logic. They had
several common views. For one, logic, while being primarily a methodology
of reasoning and arguing, is said to be also a theory of certain entities.
Second, they all shared the assumption that logic is not about "first
intentions," which are dealt with in ontology, but rather about "second
intentions." However, these terms assumed very different meanings in the
context of different schools. (pp. 282-283)
(...)
The modern era, prior to the rise of mathematical logic, is an alogical and a
largely unontological period. It opens with the Humanists ; in their view, if
logic has any usefulness at all, it is only as a set of rules for everyday
arguments: it is an inferior sort of rhetoric, as Valla put it. Later on, when the
scientific spirit began to rise, even the most rationalistic thinkers, such as
Descartes, would not dare to reconsider the Humanists' total condemnation of
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"scholastic subtleties," including formal logic. Gradually, the so-called
conventional logic was formulated.
The latter consists of extracts from Scholastic logic which omit almost every
logical matter not connected with the theory of the assertoric syllogism (thus,
the logic of propositions among others) and with the addition of a number of
methodological doctrines. Logic is quite clearly conceived of as "dialectics,"
"the art of thinking," as the authors of the influential Logique de Port-Royal
titled it. Philosophically, there is a novelty: widespread psychologism,
according to which logic has as its object mental entities and activities
(concepts, judgments, reasonings).
There is, of course, one great exception--Leibniz, a logician of genius and an
important thinker in the field of ontology. His ontology has been popularized
by Wolff; in the latter's work the term "ontology" is clearly defined as
designating the most general part of metaphysics, dealing with "being in
general" (quite in the Aristotelian spirit). Leibnizian logic is mathematical
and should rather be considered together with more recent logics, for its
influence on the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries was almost
negligible. Leibniz also established his own philosophy of logic, which can
only be understood in light of his logic. Our discussion of this will be
deferred as well.
But, apart from Leibniz, the situation of our problem is not much different
from that found in the Stoics and Scholastics: as logic is concerned with the
mental behavior of men and ontology with being in general, the separation of
the two is just as sharp as in the older schools. Indeed, this separation is
reinforced by the fact that logic is now thought of as being a purely practical
discipline and not as a theoretical one.
The whole course of the evolution between Aristotle and Boole may be
summarized as follows. Ontology, whenever present, is on the whole of the
Aristotelian type: a general theory of real entities. Regarding logic, the great
majority of thinkers opt for the first Aristotelian logic, that of the Topics; they
cultivate this discipline as a methodology of thought. While it is true that
some Scholastics admitted a theory founding such a methodology, their logic
nevertheless belongs to the type outlined in the Topics, not to that of the Prior
Analytics. With such an assumption as a basis, whatever philosophy of logic
they developed--whether conceived as a theory of meanings, of second
intentions, of syntax or of mental entities, it was always radically different
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from ontology." (pp. 284-285).
From: Joseph Bochenski - Logic and Ontology - Philosophy East and West,
24, 1974 pp. 275-292.
"Aristotle was the founder not only of logic in western philosophy, but
of ontology as well, which he described in his Metaphysics and the
Categories as a study of the common properties of all entities, and of the
categorial aspects into which they can be analyzed. The principal
method of ontology has been one or another form of categorial analysis,
depending on whether the analysis was directed upon the structure of
reality, as in Aristotle's case, or upon the structure of thought and reason,
as, e.g., in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Viewed in this way, the two
subjects of logic and ontology could hardly be more different, and many
schools in the history of philosophy, such as the Stoics, saw no common
ground between them. Logic was only a system of rules for how to
argue successfully, and ontology, as a categorial analysis and general
theory of what there is (in the physical universe), was a system of
categories and laws about being.
Scholastic logicians also drew a sharp distinction between logic and
ontology, taking the latter to be about ‘first intentions’ (concepts abstracted
directly from physical reality), and the former about ‘second intentions’
(concepts abstracted wholly from the ‘material’ content of first intentions, as
well as about such categorial concepts as individual, proposition, universal,
genus, species, property, etc., and so-called syncategorematic concepts such
as negation). According to Aquinas, second intentions have a foundation in
real entities, but 'exist' only in knowledge; i.e., they do not exist in the real
world but depend on the mind for their existence – which is not say that they
are subjective mental entities." p. 117.
From: Nino Cocchiarella: Logic and Ontology - Axiomathes vol. 12, (2001)
pp. 117-150.
A SURVEY OF RESEARCH ON THE HISTORY OF

LOGIC UNTIL 1950
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"Ancient and medieval history of ancient logic.
One meets sometimes with the assertion that history of philosophy is an
invention of the XVIIIth century. This is in so far correct, that in older times -
- in spite of Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas' explicit teaching -- scholars
neglected completely the genetic point of view in history of logic; on the
other hand, thorn is no doubt that another aspect of historiography, namely
the understanding of doctrines, was much cultivated by ancient and medieval
thinkers. A complete account of ancient logic would have to take their results
into consideration. Unfortunately, we know practically nothing of all the
huge work which was accomplished, especially on Aristotle, by Greek,
Syrian, Arabian, Jewish, or, above all, by Latin medieval logicians: as was
already stated, the Greek commentators have not yet been studied, while the
others are little more than a field for future research. And yet, we know that
there were important discoveries during that time. This has been proved at
least in one particularly striking instance: Albertus Magnus had a perfect
understanding (superior to that of Alexander, not to mention Prantl) of the
highly difficult Aristotelian modal logic. This understanding has been nearly
completely lost, however, during the modern ages.
State of the history of formal logic during the XIXth century.
Modern history of Logic had been started during the XIXth century, but its
state was very bad at that time -- indeed until 1930 approximately -- because
of two phenomena. On one hand, most of the historians of logic took for
granted what Kant said on it; namely that "formal logic was not able to
advance a single step (since Aristotle) and is thus to all appearance a closed
and complete body of doctrine" (*); consequently, there was, according to
them, no history of logic at all, or at the most, a history of the decay of
Aristotelian doctrines. On the other hand, authors writing during that period
were not formal logicians and by "logic" they mostly understood
methodology, epistemology and ontology. That is why e.g. Robert Adamson
could devote 10 pages to such a "logician" as Kant -- but only five to the
whole period from the death of Aristotle to Bacon, i.e. to Theophrastus, the
Stoic-Megaric School and the Scholastics. In order to realize what this
means, it will be enough to remember that from the point of view we assume
here, Kant is not a logician at all, while the leading Megaricians and Stoics
are among the greatest thinkers in Logic.
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The worst mischief was done during that period by the work of Carl Prantl
(1855). This is based on an extensive knowledge of sources and constitutes
the only all-embracing History of Ancient Logic we have until now.
Unfortunately, Prantl suffered most acutely from the two above-mentioned
phenomena: he believed firmly in the verdict of Kant and had little
understanding of formal logic. Moreover, he had the curious moralizing
attitude in history of logic, and, as he disliked both the Stoics and the
Scholastics, he joined to incredible misinterpretations of their doctrines,
injurious words, treating them as complete fools and morally bad men
precisely because of logical doctrines which we believe to be very interesting
and original. It is now known that his work -- excepting as a collection of
texts (and even this far from being complete) -- is valueless. But it exercised
a great influence on practically all writers on our subject until J. Lukasiewicz
and H. Scholz drew attention to the enormous number of errors it contains.
Recent research.
We may place the beginning of recent research in our domain in 1896 when
Peirce made the discovery that the Megaricians had the truth-value definition
of implication. The first important studies belonging to the new period are
those of G. Vailati on a theorem of Plato and Euclid (1904), A. Rüstow on
the Liar (1908) and J. Lukasiewicz (1927); the Polish logician proposed in it
his re-discovery of the logical structure of the Aristotelian syllogism and of
Stoic arguments. Four years later appeared the highly suggestive, indeed
revolutionary, History of Logic by H. Scholz, followed in 1935 by the paper
of Lukasiewicz on history of logic of propositions; this is considered until
now as the most important recent contribution to our subject. Both scholars --
Lukasiewicz and Scholz -- formed small schools. J. Salamucha, the pupil of
the former, wrote on Aristotle's theory of deduction (1930) and the present
author on the logic of Theophrastus (1939). Fr. J. W. Stakelum, who studied
with the latter, wrote a book on Galen and the logic of propositions. On the
other hand, A. Becker, a student of H. Scholz, published an important book
on Aristotle's contingent syllogisms (1934). Professor K. Dürr was also
influenced by Lukasiewicz in his study on Boethius (1938); his results were
somewhat improved by R. van den Driessche (1950). In the English speaking
world we may mention the paper of Miss Martha Hurst (1935) on implication
23
during the IVth century (1935) -- but above all the already quoted work of
Dr. B. Mates on Stoic Logic (in the press [published in 1953]), which, being
inspired by Lukasiewicz and his school may be considered as one of the best
achievements of recent research.
Such is, in outline, the work done by logicians. On the other hand philologists
had considerable merits in the study of ancient logic. We cannot quote here
all their contributions, but at least the important book of Fr. Solmsen (1929)
on the evolution of Aristotle's logic and rhetoric must be mentioned, and,
above all, the masterly commentary on the Analytics by Sir W. D. Ross
(1949). It does not always give full satisfaction to a logician trained on
modern methods, but it is, nevertheless, a scholarly work of a philologist who
made a considerable effort to grasp the results of logicians."
(*) Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2d ed. p, VIII (English by N. Kemp Smith)
From: Joseph Bochenski - Ancient Logic - Amsterdam: North-Holland 1951
pp. 4-7 (some notes omitted).
24
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Contents
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General Works and Bibliographies on the

History of Logic in Western Thought
SOME WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF LOGIC [UP
TO 1977]
There is a paucity of works which treat the complete history of logic.
Investigation of some of the problems in this field has increased in the last
decades, mostly due to symbolic logic, which has established that many of
the results obtained were familiar to the Stoics and particularly to the
Scholastics. But these have not been overall studies of the science. The
authors of the studies we possess usually aimed at rediscovering the results
reached in symbolic logic by earlier logical schools, and so many problems of
historical interest have in the past been only little explored or not at all. We
shall quote below only those studies published in volumes, and which have a
more general aim, even when treating special problems, or limited periods of
time.
The first history of logic seems to be the work of Petrus Ramus, entitled
Scholae in liberales artes -- "Schools of Liberal Arts" (Basle, 1569). The first
eight chapters of this book deal with history of logic and are called Scholae
dialecticae -- "Dialectic Schools". Unfortunately, the author naively believes
all historical or legendary personages to have been logicians and in the
25
chapter Logica Patrum ("Logic of our Ancestors") he lists among them Noah
and Prometheus.
After this, studies of the history of logic become more scientific. Here we
quote:
Bartholomäus Keckermann: Praecognitorum Logicorum Tractatus III -
- "Three Treatises on the most well-known Logicians" (Hanover,
1598). It is rather a useful list of authors and titles, with some
indication of contents.
Jacob Friedrich Reimmann: Critisirender Geschichts-Calender von der
Logica -- "Critical and Historical Calendar of Logic" (Frankfort-on-
Main, 1699). Written in defective German, this work nevertheless
contains valuable information.
Pierre Gassendi: De origine et varietate logicae -- "On the Origin and
Diversity of Logic" (Lyons, 1658), a very valuable work.
Johann Albert Fabricius: Specimen elencticum historiae logicae --
"Index of Subjects of the History of Logic" (Hamburg, 1699). This
"Index" is actually a catalogue of the treatises of logic known by this
scholar.
Johannes Georgius Walchius [Johann Georg Walch]: Historia Logicae
-- "History of Logic" (Leipzig, 1721). This book differs from the
preceding ones in the correctness of its information.
Heinrich Christoph Wilhelm Sigwart: De historia logicae inter Graecos
usque ad Socratem commentatio -- "On the History of Logic among
Greeks as far as Socrates" (Tübingen, 1832).
Frederich Auguste de Reiffenberg: Principes de la Logique suivis de
l'Histoire et de la bibliographie de cette Science --" The Principles of
Logic followed by the History and Bibliography of this Science"
(Brussels, 1833).
Adolphe Frank: Esquisse d'une histoire de la logique precedée d'une
Analyse etendue de l'Organum d'Aristote -- "Sketch of a History of
Logic Preceded by an Extensive Analysis of Aristotle's Organon"
(Paris, 1838).
Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg: Geschichte der Kategorienlehre --
26
"History of the Theory of Categories" (Berlin, 1845).
Robert Blakey: Historical Sketch of Logic, from the Earliest Times to
the Present Day (Edinburgh, 1851).
We have reached now the monumental work in four volumes, Carl
Prantl's Geschichte der Logic im Abendlande -- "History of logic in
Western Europe" (Leipzig, 1855-1870). This writing offers an
inexhaustible source of information, of original Greek and Latin texts,
some of them copied down from inaccessible books and manuscripts
(which the present, work has also used). Yet this work has at least two
shortcomings: it expounds the history of logic only down to the
sixteenth century, and it is blemished by opinions that are inadmissible
because of their violence and by a lack of understanding of ideas
different from his own. Although Prantl was convinced he had written a
work "so that it would not be necessary, at least for some time, to write
another history of logic" (op. cit., IV, Vorwort), the material he
collected can be only a source of information for other histories of
logic. Prantl's method is exclusively chronological and therefore entails
repetitions.
Paul Janet and Gabriel Séailles: Histoire de la Philosophie (Paris
1887). In this "History of Philosophy", a large part deals with history of
logic in a very original manner, dividing it into its main problems:
history of the problem of concept, of judgement, of syllogism, of
induction. It is a didactic handbook, supplying an important amount of
information, sometimes following closely the treatise of Prantl.
Friederich Harms: Die Philosophie in ihrer Geschichte "Philosophy in
its History".
The second volume of this work is entitled Geschichte der Logik -
“History of Logic”. (Berlin, 1881), and deals in a very general way
with the history of this discipline.
Robert Adamson: A Short History of Logic (Edinburgh, 1911;
reprinted, Dubuque, Iowa, 1962).
Clarence Irving Lewis: A Survey of Symbolic Logic (Berkeley, 1918).
This book contains numerous historical indications about mathematical
logic.
27
Theodor Ziehen: Lehrbuch der Logik auf positivistischer Grundlage
mit Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Logik, - "Treatise on Logic,
on Positivist Ground, Considering also the History of Logic" (Bonn,
1920).
Oswald Külpe: Vorlesungen über Logik - "Lessons on Logic" (Leipzig,
1923). The first part of this book is a short history of logic, containing
competent opinions, and a very judicious division of the history of this
science.
Federigo Enriques: Per la storia della logica - "For the History of
Logic" (Bologna, 1922). This study contains some interesting remarks,
gives the logic a larger framework, (including the methodologic and
philosophical logic), but aims to show the connections between
mathematics and logic.
Henrich Scholz: Geschichte der Logik - "History of Logic" (Berlin,
1931). This is a short, but very erudite study, which underlines only
those data which confirm or prefigure the results of mathematical logic.
Jörgen Jörgensen: A Treatise of Formal Logic (3 vols., Copenhagen -
London, 1931). The first volume bears the title Historical
Developments, and offers precious information.
Evert Willem Beth: De Wijsbegeerte der Wiskunde van Parmenides tot
Bolzano - "The Theory of Science from Parmenides to Bolzano" (in
Dutch, Antwerp-Nijmegen, 1944);
Evert Willem Beth: Geschiedenis der Logica - "History of Logic" (in
Dutch, the Hague, 1944).
Francesco Albergamo: Storia della logica delle scienze esatte -
"History of the Logic of Exact Sciences" (Bari, 1947).
Antoinette Virieux-Reymond: La logique et l'épistémologie des
Stoïciens - "Logic aad Epistemology of the Stoics" (Lausanne, 1949).
Philotheus Boehner: Medieval Logic, an outline of its development
from 1350 to c. 1400 (Manchester, 1952).
Robert Feys: De ontwikkelung van het logisch denken - "Development
of Logic Thought" (in Dutch, Antwerp - Nijmegen, 1949).
28
Alonzo Church: Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton, 1956).
This masterly treatise on mathematical logic contains numerous and
important historical references. Church has also published regularly in
"Journal of Symbolic Logic" the bibliography of this science
(beginning from 1936).
Józef Maria Bochenski: Formale Logik - "Formal Logic" (Freiburg -
Munchen, 1956). This is, in our opinion, an important work in this
field. It contains an anthology of texts, taken from the original writings
of the logicians, beginning with Greeks until now, translated into
German, and is chronological. The principle of this work is to give the
texts which prefigure or present the results obtained in our time by
mathematical logic. Formale Logik also gives short information about
Indian logic. [Translated in English as A history of formal logic (1961)
Francesco Barone: Logica formale e Logica transcendentale - "Formal
and Transcendental Logic" (2 vols., Turin, 1957-1965). The first
volume is entitled Da Leibniz aKant - "From Leibniz to Kant", and the
second one L'algebra della logica - “The algebra of logic”. Barone's
work, although limited to a certain determined period, is rich in
personal comment and contains much information.
Ettore Carruccio: Matematica e logica nella storia e nel pensiero
contemporaneo "Mathematics and Logic In the History and In the
Contemporary Thought" (Turin, 1958).
Benson Mates: Stoic Logic (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961).
William and Martha Kneale: The Development of Logic (Oxford,
1962): We think this is the third important work in this field
(chronologically, after those of Prantl and of Bochenski), very
important as a work of references. The aim of this book is, as the
authors say in the "Preface", "an account of the growth of logic, rather
than an attempt to chronicle all that past scholars, good or bad, have
said about their science". Kneale's method is not that used by
Bochenski (anthology of texts), but their aim coincides with
Bochenski's, being "to record the first appearances of those ideas which
seem to us most important in the logic of our own day".
Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Leçons sur l'histoire de la logique - "Lessons in
29
the History of Logic" (Paris, 1964). The book is the translation of the
lessons given by the author at the University of Warsaw, and though
short offers a larger framework for the history of this discipline, also
discussing other logic problems, for instance methodological ones,
which were not considered by Bochenski or Kneale. Notwithstanding,
this work aims to show the historical filiation of mathematical logic.
Nicolai Ivanovici Stiazhkin: Stanovlenie idei matematiceskoi logiki -
"The Genesis of the Idea of Mathematical Logic" (Moscow, 1964).
This book has been translated into English under the title History of
Mathematical Logic from Leibniz to Peano (Cambridge, Mass.,
London, 1969).
Ernst Kapp: Der Ursprung der Logik bei den Griechen - "The Origin of
Logic with Greeks" (Gottingen, 1965) [Originally published in English
as Greek foundations of traditional logic, 1942)
Wilhelm Risse : Bibliographia Logica. The author intends to continue
the work of Prantl, in his studies bearing this general title, but in an
objective manner, beginning from where the last has left it, i. e. end of
the sixteenth century. This bibliography is planned to appear in four
volumes, the first being already published: Bibliographia Logica.
Verzeichnis der Druckschriften zur Logik mit Angabe ihrer Fundorte.
Band I, 1172 -1800 - "Logic Bibliography. List of printed writings with
indication where they are to be found. Vol. I, 1472-1800" (Hildesheim -
New York, 1965). Beside this vast bibliography, (which will also list
the manuscripts of logic), Risse has published another work in two
volumes (which will be continued too): Die Logik der Neuzeit Band I,
1600-1640 - "Logic of Recent Times, vol. I, 1500-1640" (Stuttgart -
Bad Cannstatt, 1964); Die Logik der Neuzeit Band II, 1640-1780
(Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt, 1970). These two volumes expound, in
Prantl's manner, but more systematically, the treatises on logic from the
mentioned periods. The studies of Risse, as well as those of Prantl, are
indispensable to all researches in the field of history of logic.
Peter Harold Nidditch: The Development of Mathematical Logic
(London, New York, 1960).
Guido Calogero: Storia della logica antica - "History of the ancient
logic" (Bari, 1967). The author, mentions that this is the first of a series
30
of volumes - "The Archaic Epoch", dealing with logic from Heraclitus
to Leucippus and Democritus [other volumes were never published].
Calogero also published the important work I fondamenti della logica
aristotelica - The Bases of Aristotle's Logic" (2nd ed., Florence, 1968)
[First edition: Rome, 1932]
Alexandr Osipovich Makovelski: Istoria Logiki - "History of Logic"
(Moscow, 1967), short general and didactic handbook of this discipline
[translated in French by Geneviève Dupond as: Histoire de la logique,
Moscou, Éditions du Progrés, 1978].
James C. Colbert: La evolucion de la logica simbolica y sus
implicaciones - "Evolution of Symbolic Logic and its Philosophical
Implications" (Pamplona, 1968). This writing studies mathematical
logic and some important authors.
Anton Dumitriu: Istoria Logicii - "History of Logic" (Bucharest, 1969).
The work highlights all the historical aspects of logic. It contains a
chapter on logic in China and another on logic in India. An ample
compendium of the whole book, in two parts, was published by
“Scientia”, and appeared simultaneously in French and English
versions (Nos. VII-X, 1971). [Translated in English as History of logic
(1977)]
Robert Blanché: La logique et son histoire. D'Aristote à Russell -
"Logic and its History. From Aristotle to Russell" (Paris, 1970), The
book is full of interesting remarks, but it neglects, as many other works
do, methodology, Renaissance logic, and other important problems.
Reuben Louis Goodstein: Development of Mathematical Logic
(NewYork, London 1971).
Vicente Muñoz Delgado: Logica Hispano-Portuguesa hasta 1600 -
"The Spanish- Portuguese Logic till 1600" (Salamanca, 1972). This is
an important study of logic in the Iberian Peninsula, containing
information ignored till now.
Stanislaw Surma (editor): Studies in the History of Mathematical Logic
(Wroclaw - Warszawa - Krakow - Gdansk, 1973).
We can see from the above list, that very few of the works quoted are really
31
"histories of logic". The importance of all these contributions cannot be
diminished but -- and this is a curious fact -- they generally defend or
emphasize some particular results and thus neglect others.
We realize, in this way, that, indisputably, one veritable historical work, in
the above list, is nevertheless, in spite of its weak side, Prantl's Geschichte
der Logik im Abendlande, because the author does not select the logicians nor
the theories he is treating of. He is judging them severely when they
contradict his conception, and that is his error. But his work is
unquestionably historical in character, and Prantl is really a historian,
although his judgements are often too subjective and rudely expressed.”
From: Anton Dumitriu - History of logic - Tunbridge Wells, Abacus Press,
1977 - Vol. I, pp. XIII-XVI.
The most important recent works are the Handbook of the History of
Logic, edited by Dov Gabbay and John Woods (11 volumes) and The
Development of Modern Logic edited by Leila Haaparanta; see the
following section for the bibliographic details.
GENERAL WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF LOGIC

"Logic, History Of." In. 2006. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second
Edition, edited by Borchert, Donald M., 397-484. New York: Thomson
Gale.
The first edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul
Edwards, was published in 1967.
The editor of the article Logic, history of in the first edition was Arthur
Norman Prior.
"The mainstream of the history of logic begins in ancient Greece and
comes down through the Arabian and European logic of the Middle
Ages and through a number of post-Renaissance thinkers to the more or
less mathematical developments in logic in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. In the period after the fall of Rome many of the ancient
achievements were forgotten and had to be relearned; the same thing
happened at the end of the Middle Ages. Otherwise this Western
tradition has been fairly continuous. Indian and Chinese logic
32
developed separately. Today logic, like other sciences, is studied
internationally, and the same problems are treated in the Americas,
western and eastern Europe, and Asia and Australasia. The story of the
development of logic will be told here under the following headings:
Susanne Bobzien: Ancient logic; Brendan S. Gillon: Logic and
inference in Indian philosophy; A. C. Graham (1967): Chinese logic
(Bibliography updated by Huichieh Loy); Nicholas Rescher (1967):
Logic in the Islamic world (with an Addendum by Tony Street);
Christopher J. Martin: Medieval (European) logic; Ivo Thomas (1967):
The Interregnum (between medieval and modern logic); Precursors of
modern logic: Ivo Thomas (1967): Leibniz; Ivo Thomas (1967): Euler;
Ivo Thomas (1967): Lambert and Ploucquet; Yehoshua Bar-Hillel
(1967): Bolzano; Modern logic: the Boolean period; P. L. Heath
(1967): Hamilton; P. L. Heath (1967): De Morgan; John Corcoran:
Boole; P. L. Heath (1967): Jevons; P. L. Heath (1967): Venn; Francine
F. Abeles: Carroll; A. N. Prior (1967): Peirce; A. N. Prior (1967): A. N.
Prior (1967): Keynes; A. N. Prior (1967): Johnson; The heritage of
Kant and Mill; A. N. Prior (1967): From Frege to Gödel; Ivo Thomas
(1967): Nineteenth century mathematics; Bede Rundle (1967): Frege;
Bede Rundle (1967): Whitehead and Russell; Bede Rundle (1967):
Ramsey; Bede Rundle (1967): Brouwer and Intuitionism; Bede Rundle
(1967): Hilbert and Formalism; Bede Rundle (1967): Löwenheim;
Bede Rundle (1967): Skolem; Bede Rundle (1967): Herbrand; Bede
Rundle (1967):Gödel; John P. Burgess: Since Gödel: Bede Rundle
(1967): Gentzen; Bede Rundle (1967): Church; Herbert B. Enderton:
Turing and computability theory; Wilfrid Hodges: Decidable and
undecidable theories; Wilfrid Hodges: Model theory; Grahan Priest:
The proliferation of nonclassical logics; Peter Cholak and Red
Solomon: Friedman and revers mathematics." (from the Second
Edition)
Gabbay, Dov, and Woods, John, eds. 2004. Handbook of the History of
Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Plan of the work: 1. Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic (2004); 2.
Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic (2008); 3. The Rise of Modern
Logic: from Leibniz to Frege (2004); 4. British Logic in the Nineteenth
Century (2008); 5. Logic from Russell to Church (2009); 6. Sets and
Extensions in the Twentieth Century (co-editor Akihiro Kanamori,
33
2012); 7. Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century (2006); 8.
The Many Valued and Non-monotonic Turn in Logic (2007); 9.
Computational Logic (2015); 10. Inductive Logic (co-editor Stephan
Hartmann; 2011); 11. Logic: A History of its Central Concepts (2012).
———, eds. 2004. Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Handbook of the History of Logic: Vol. 1
———, eds. 2008. Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Handbook of the History of Logic: Vol. 2.
———, eds. 2004. The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege.
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
———, eds. 2008. British Logic in the Nineteenth Century.
———, eds. 2009. Logic from Russell to Church. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
———, eds. 2012. Sets and Extensions in the Twentieth Century.
Co-editor Akihiro Kanamori.
———, eds. 2006. Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century.
———, eds. 2007. The Many-Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in
———, eds. 2015. Computational Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
———, eds. 2011. Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Co-Editor Stephan Hartmann.
Gabbay, Dov, Pelletier, Francis Jeffrey, and Woods, John, eds. 2012.
Logic: A History of Its Central Concepts. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
34
Haaparanta, Leila, ed. 2009. The Development of Modern Logic. New
York: Oxford University Press.
"This volume is the result of a long project. My work started sometime
in the 1990s, when Professor Simo Knuuttila urged me to edit, together
with a few colleagues, a volume on the history of logic from ancient
times to the end of the twentieth century. Even if the project was not
realized in that form, I continued with the plan and started to gather
together scholars for a book project titled The Development of Modern
Logic, thus making a reference to the famous book by William and
Martha Kneale. Unlike that work, the new volume was meant to be
written by a number of scholars almost as if it had been written by one
scholar only. I decided to start with thirteenth-century logic and come
up with quite recent themes up to 2000, hence, to continue the history
written in The Development of Logic. My intention was to find a
balance between the chronological exposition and thematic
considerations. The philosophy of modern logic was also planned to be
included; indeed, at the beginning the book had the subtitle "A
Philosophical Perspective," which was deleted at the end, as the volume
reached far beyond that perspective. The collection of articles is
directed to philosophers, even if some chapters include a number of
technical details. Therefore, when it is used as a textbook in advanced
courses, for which it is also planned, those details are recommended
reading to students who wish to develop their skills in mathematical
logic." (From the Preface by Leila Haaparanta)
Contents: Preface V-VI; 1. Leila Haaparanta: Introduction 3; 2. Tuomo
Aho and Mikko Yrjönsuuri: Late medieval logic 11; 3. Mirella
Capozzi, Gino Roncaglia: Logic and philosophy of logic from
Humanism to Kant 78; 4. Volker Peckhaus: The mathematical origins
of Nineteenth century algebra of logic 159; 5. Christian Thiel: Gottlob
Frege and the interplay between logic and mathematics 196; 6. Risto
Vilkko: The logic question during the first half of the Nineteenth
century 203; 7. Leila Haaparanta: The relations between logic and
philosophy, 1874-1931 222; 8. Göran Sundholm: A century of
judgement and inference, 1837-1936: Some strands in the development
of logic; 9. Paolo Mancosu, Richard Zach, Calixto Badesa: The
development of mathematical logic from Russell to Tarski 1900-1935
35
318; 10. Wilfrid Hodges: Set theory, model theory, and computability
theory 471; 11. Jan von Plato: Proof theory of Classical and
Intuitionistic logic 499; 12. Tapio Korte, Ari Maunu, Tuomo Aho:
Modal logic from Kant to possible worlds semantics 516; Appendix to
Chapter 12: Risto Hilpinen: Conditionals and possible worlds: On C. S.
Peirce's conception of conditionals and modalities 551; 13. Gabriel
Sandu, Tuomo Aho: Logic and semantics in the Twentieth century 562;
14. Andrew Aberdein and Stephen Read: The philosophy of alternative
logics 613; 15. Sandy Zabell: Philosophy of inductive logic: the
Bayesian perspective 724; 16. Alessandro Lenci, Gabriel Sandu: Logic
and linguistics in the Twentieth century 775; 17. Richmond Thomason:
Logic and artificial intelligence 848; 18. J. N. Mohanty, S. R. Saha,
Amita Chatterjee, Tushar Kanti Sarkar, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya:
Indian logic 903; Index 963-994.
"I Simposio De Historia De La Lógica, 14-15 De Mayo De 1981."
1983. Anuario Filosofico de la Universidad de Navarra Pamplona no.
16.
Contents: I. Angelelli: Presentación del Simposio 7; Mario Mignucci:
La teoria della quantificazione del predicato nell'antichità classica 11;
Claude Imbert: Histoire et formalisation de la logique 43; Klaus Jacobi:
Aussagen über Ereignisse. Modal- und Zeitlogische Analysen in der
Mittelalterlichen Logik 89; Vicente Muñoz Delgado: Pedro de
Espinosa (+ 1536) y la lógica en Salamanca hasta 1550 119; Angel
d'Ors: Las Summulae de Domingo de Soto. Los límites de la regla
'tollendo tollens' 209; José Luis Fuertes Herreros: Sebastián Izquierdo
(1601-1681): un intento precursor de la lógica moderna en el siglo
XVII 219; Larry Hickman: The Logica Magna of Juan Sanchez Sedeño
(1600). A Sixteenth century addition to the Aristotelian Categories
265; Hans Burkhardt: Modaltheorie und Modallogik in der Scholastik
und bei Leibniz 273; Christian Thiel: Die Revisionssbedürftigkeit der
logischen Semantik Freges 293; Ignacio Angelelli: Sobre una clase
especial de proposiciones reduplicativas 303; Alfonso García Suárez:
Fatalismo, trivalencia y verdad: una análisis del problema de los futuros
contingentes 307; Georges Kalinowski: La logique juridique et son
histoire 331-350.
Angelelli, Ignacio, and D'Ors, Angel, eds. 1990. Estudios De Historia
De La Lógica. Actas Del Ii Simposio De Historia De La Lógica,
36
Universidad De Navarra, Pamplona, 25-27 De Mayo De 1987.
Pamplona: Ediciones Eunate.
Indice: I. Angelelli: Presentación; E. J. Ashworth: The doctrine of signs
in some early sixteenth-century Spanish logicians 13; I. Boh: On
medieval rules of obligation and rules of consequence 39; Alexander
Broadie: Act and object in Late-Scholastic logic 103; Hans Burkhardt:
Contingency and probability: a contribution to the Aristotelian theory
of science 125; Jeffrey S. Coombs: John Mair and Domingo de Soto on
the reduction of iterated modalities 161; Donald Felipe: Johannes
Felwinger (1659) and Johannes Schneider (1718) on syllogistic
disputation 183; Norbert Hinske: Kant by computer. Applications of
electronic data processing in the humanities 193; Herbert Hochberg:
Predication, relations, classes and judgment in Russell's philosophical
logic 213; Joachim Hruschka: The hexagonal system of deontic
concepts according to Achenwall and Kant 277; Simo Knuuttila:
Varieties of natural necessity in medieval thought 295; Wolfgang
Lenzen: Precis of the history of logic from the point of view of the
leibnizian calculus 321; Juan Carlos Leon, Alfredo Burrieza: Identity
and necessity from the fregean perspective 341; Albert C. Lewis: An
introduction to the Bertrand Russell editorial project: axiomatics in
Russell 353; Christopher Martin: Significatio nominis in Aquinas 363;
Mario Mignucci: Alexander of Aphrodisias on inference and syllogism
381; Vicente Muñoz Delgado: El análisis de los enunciados 'de incipit
et desinit' en la logica de Juan de Oria (1518) y en la de otros españoles
hasta 1540 413; Niels Offenberger: Die Oppositionstheorie strikt
partikulärer Urteilsarten aus der Sicht der Vierwertigkeit 489; Angel
d'Ors: La doctrina de las proposiciones insolubles en las Dialecticae
introductiones de Agustin de Sbarroya 499; Juana Sánchez Sánchez:
Quine y Kripke sobre el análisis objetual de los enunciados de
identidad 553; Christian Thiel: Must Frege's role in the history of
philosophy of logic be rewritten? 571; Lista de participantes 585;
Indice 589-591.
Angelelli, Ignacio, and Cerezo, María, eds. 1996. Studies on the
History of Logic. Proceedings of the Iii. Symposium on the History of
Logic. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Contents: Preface V; List of Contributors XI; Mario Mignucci:
Aristotle's theory of predication 1; Robin Smith: Aristotle's regress
37
argument 21, Hermann Weidemann: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Cicero
and Aristotle's definition of possibility 33; Donald Felipe: Fonseca on
topics 43; Alan Perreiah: Modes of scepticism in medieval philosophy
65; Mikko Yrjönsuuri: Obligations as thoughts experiments 79; Angel
d'Ors: Utrum propositio de futuro sit determinate vera vel falsa
(Antonio Andrés and John Duns Scotus) 97; Earline Jennifer Ashworth:
Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) on analogy and equivocation 117; Allan
Bäck: The Triplex Status Naturae and its justification 133; William E.
McMahon: The semantics of Ramon Llull 155; Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe:
The doctrine of descent in Jerónimo Pardo: meaning, inference, truth
173; Jeffrey Coombs: What's the matter with matter: Materia
propositionum in the post-medieval period 187; Rafael Jiménez
Cataño: Copulatio in Peter of capua (12th century) and the nature of the
proposition 197; Lynn Cates: Wyclif on sensus compositus et divisus
209; Mauricio Beuchot: Some examples of logic in New Spain
(Sixteenth-Eighteenth century) 215; Adrian Dufour: necessity and the
Galilean revolution 229; Guy Debrock: Peirce's concept of truth within
the context of his conception of logic 241; Pierre Thibaud: Peirce's
concept of proposition 257; Jaime Nubiola: Scholarship on the relations
between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce 281; José Miguel
Gambra: Arithmetical abstraction in Aristotle and Frege 295; Herbert
Hochberg: The role of subsistent propositions and logical forms in
Russell's 1913 Philosophical logic and in the Russell-Wittgenstein
dispute 317; Alfonso García Suárez: Are the objects of the Tractatus
phenomenological objects? 343; María Cerezo: Does a proposition
affirm every proposition that follows from it? 357; Javier Legris:
Carnap's reconstruction of intuitionistic logic in the Logical syntax of
language 369; Albert C. Lewis: Some influences of Hermann
Grassmann's program on modern logic 377; Juan Carlos León:
Indeterminism and future contingency in non-classical logics 383;
Christian Thiel: Research on the history of logic at Erlangen 397; Index
403.
Knuuttila, Simo, ed. 1988. Modern Modalities. Studies of the History of
Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Contents: Simo Knuuttila: Introduction VII-XIV; Lilli Alanen and
Simo Knuuttila: The foundations of modality and conceivability in
38
Descartes and his predecessors 1; Ilkka Patoluoto: Hobbes's system of
modalities 71; Jaakko Hintikka: Was Leibniz Deity an Akrates? 85;
Martin Kusch and Juha Manninen: Hegel on modalities and
monadology 109; Pascal Engel: Plenitude and contingency: modal
concepts in Nineteenth century French philosophy 179; Leila
Haaparanta: Frege and his German contemporaries on alethic
modalities 239; Ilkka Niiniluoto: From possibility to probability:
British discussions on modality in the Nineteenth century 275; Hans
Poser: The failure of Logical Positivism to cope with problems of
modal theory 311; Index of names 329; Index of subjects 341.
"The word "modern" in the title of this book refers primarily to post-
medieval discussions, but it also hints at those medieval modal theories
which were considered modern in contradistinction to ancient
conceptions and which in different ways influenced philosophical
discussions during the early modern period. The medieval
developments are investigated in the opening paper, 'The Foundations
of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and His Predecessors', by
Lilli Alanen and Simo Knuuttila.
Boethius's works from the early sixth century belonged to the sources
from which early medieval thinkers obtained their knowledge of
ancient thought. They offered extensive discussions of traditional
modal conceptions the basic forms of which were: (1) the paradigm of
possibility as a potency striving to realize itself; (2) the "statistical"
interpretation of modal notions where necessity means actuality in all
relevant cases or omnitemporal actuality, possibility means actuality in
some relevant cases or sometimes, and impossibility means
omnitemporal non-actuality; and (3) the "logical" definition of
possibility as something which, being assumed, results in nothing
contradictory. Boethius accepted the Aristotelian view according to
which total possibilities in the first sense must prove their mettle
through actualization and possibilities in the third sense are assumed to
be realized in our actual history. On these presumptions, all of the
above-mentioned ancient paradigms imply the Principle of Plenitude
according to which no genuine possibility remains unrealized. (For the
many-faceted role of the Principle of Western thought, see A.O.
Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1936, and S. Knuuttila
39
(ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being. Studies of the History of
Modal Theories (Synthese Historical Library 20), Dordrecht, Reidel
1981.)
Boethius sometimes says that there can be opposite diachronic
possibilities vis-à-vis future moments of time, but even in these cases
unrealized alternatives cease to be possibilities when one of them is
actualized. The idea of spelling out the meaning of modal notions with
the help of synchronic alternative states of affairs hardly played any
role in ancient thought; after having been suggested by some Patristic
thinkers, it became a systematic part of modal thinking only in the
twelfth century. It was realized that even if the traditional philosophical
conceptions might be applicable to the phenomenal reality, possibilities
of God, acting by choice, refer to alternative providential plans or
histories. Although there were not many twelfth or thirteenth century
figures who, like Gilbert of Poitiers or Robert Grosseteste, would have
understood the theoretical significance of the idea of modality as
referential multiplicity, the doctrine of special theological modalities
motivated new kinds of discussions of the nature of natural necessities
and the relations between the notions of possibility, conceivability, and
knowability.
In ancient metaphysics, modality and intelligibility were considered
real moments of being. A Christian variant of this doctrine can be
found in such thirteenth century Parisian scholars as Thomas Aquinas,
Bonaventura, and Henry of Ghent. They thought that God's infinite act
of understanding contains the ideas of all conceivable kinds of beings.
Ideas as possibilities have an ontological foundation, however, because
God's act of thinking consists of understanding the infinite ways in
which his essence could be imitated by finite beings. Because the
ontological foundation of possibilities remains as such unknown to
men, it is claimed that we usually cannot decide whether an alleged
unrealized possibility really is a possibility or not.
In Duns Scotus's modal theory, the ontological foundation of
thinkability is given up. The area of logical possibility is characterized
as an infinite domain of thinkability which, without having any kind of
existence, is objective in the sense that it would be identical in any
omniscient intellect thinking about all thinkable things. This theory of
the domain of possibility as an absolute precondition of all being and
40
thinking was accepted by Ockham and many other medievals, and
through Suárez's works it was commonly known in the seventeenth
century, too. Another historically important feature of Scotus's modal
theory is that it systematically developed the conception of modality as
referential multiplicity. The domain of possibility as an a priori area of
conceptual consistency is partitioned into equivalence classes on the
basis of relations of compossibility. One of them is the actual world."
pp. VII-IX.
Drucker, Thomas, ed. 2008. Perspectives on the History of
Mathematical Logic. Boston: Birkhäuser.
Atti Del Convegno Di Storia Della Logica (Parma, 8-10 Ottobre 1972).
1974. Padova: Liviana editrice.
Indice: RELAZIONI. Evandro Agazzi: Attuali prospettive sulla storia
della logica 3; Carlo Augusto Viano: Problemi e interpretazioni nella
storia della logica antica 25; Franco Alessio: Prospettive e problemi
della storia della logica medievale 37; Cesare Vasoli: La logica europea
nell'età dell'Umanesimo e del Rinascimento 61; Francesco Barone:
Sviluppi della logica nell'età moderna 95; Corrado Mangione:
Indicazioni per una storia della logica matematica 113;
COMUNICAZIONI. 1) STORIA DELLA LOGICA CLASSICA.
Vittorio Sainati: La matematica della scuola eudossiana e le origini
dell'apodittica aristotelica 131; Mario Mignucci: Universalità e
necessità nella logica di Aristotele 151; Walter Leszl: Conoscenza
dell'universale e conoscenza del particolare in Aristotele 169; Lorenzo
Pozzi: Il nesso di implicazione nella logica stoica 177; Enzo
Maccagnolo: La "proprietas veritatis" in Anselmo d'Aosta 189;
Giovanni Versace: La teoria della "suppositio simplex" in Occam e in
Burley 195; Giulio Cesare Giacobbe: La "quaestio de certitudine
mathematicarum" all'interno della scuola padovana 203; 2) STORIA
DELLA LOGICA MATEMATICA. Ettore Carruccio: Teorema della
pseudo-Scoto e sue applicazioni matematiche 215; Gabriele Lolli: Il
concetto di definibilità nella discussione sui fondamenti dell'inizio del
secolo 227; Domenico Costantini: Il postulato della permutazione di W
.E. Johnson e gli assiomi carnapiani dell'invarianza 237; Giulio
Giorello: Osservazioni sulle strutture non-standard della aritmetica e
dell'analisi 243; Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara Scabia: Ampliamenti della
logica classica: logica quantistica e logiche temporali non-standard
41
261; Silvio Bozzi: Alcune osservazioni storiche sui rapporti tra
semantica e teoria dei modelli 269; Ugo Volli: Sviluppi recenti nei
rapporti fra logica e linguistica 285-292.
Abrusci, Michele, Casari, Ettore, and Mugnai, Massimo. 1983. Atti Del
Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica. Bologna: CLUEB.
Organizzato dalla Società italiana di logica e filosofia delle scienze
(SILFS), San Gimignano, 4-8 dicembre 1982
Indice: Presentazione di Ettore Casari V; Elenco degli autori VIII;
Indice IX;
Relazioni.
C.A. Viano: La proposizione in Aristotele 3; J. Berg: Aristotle's theory
of definition 19; V. Sainati: Per una nuova Iettura della sillogistica
modale aristotelica 31; M. Mignucci: Alessandro di Afrodisia e la
logica modale di Crisippo 47; D.P. Henry: New aspects of medieval
logic 59; G. Nuchelmans: Medieval problems concerning substitutivity
(Paul of Venice, Logica Magna, II, 11, 7-8) 69; K. Jacobi: Abelard and
Frege: the semantics of words and propositions 81; C.E. Vasoli: Logica
ed 'enciclopedia' nella cultura tedesca del tardo Cinquecento e del
primo Seicento: Bartholomaeus Keckermann 97; M. Mugnai: Alle
origini dell'algebra della logica 117; G. Lolli: Quasi alphabetum. Logic
and encyclopedia in G. Peano 133; C. Mangione, S. Bozzi: About some
problems in the history of mathematical logic 157; Ch. Thiel: Some
difficulties in the historiography of modem logic 175; A.S. Troelstra:
Logic in the writings of Brouwer and Heyting 193; E. Borger: From
decision problems to complexity theory. A survey 211;
Comunicazioni.
N. Öffenberger: Sulla 'equivalenza' degli enunciati 'strettamente'
particolari in prospettiva tetravalente 219; P. Cosenza: Procedimenti di
trasformazione nella sillogistica di Aristotele 223; W. Cavini: La teoria
stoica della negazione 229; M. Nasti de Vincentis: Chrysippean
implication as strict equivalence 235; E. Galanti: True arguments and
valid arguments. Apropos of Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoneiae
Hypotyposeos II, 188-92 241; A.D. Conti: La teoria degli ad aliquid di
Boezio: osservazioni sulla terminologia 247; R. Pinzani: Le
'propositiones coniuncte temporales' nel De Ypoteticis di Abelardo 253;
R. Cordeschi: I sillogismi di Lullo 259; G.C. Giacobbe: La Logica
demonstrativa di Gerolamo Saccheri 265; M. Capozzi: Sillogismi e 'ars
42
inveniendi' in J.H. Lambert 271; R. Pozzo: Logica e 'Realphilosophie'
negli scritti jenensi di Hegel 277; D. Buzzetti: Benjamin Humphrey
Smart and John Stuart Mill: logic and parts of speech 283; P. Freguglia:
Influenze algebriche sull'opera di Boole: W.R. Hamilton e G. Peacock
289; N. Guicciardini: Cambridge mathematics and algebra of logic:
pure analytics, Cauchy's methodology and divergent series 295; M.
Ferriani: Boole, Frege e la distinzione leibniziana 'Lingua-Calculus'
301; E. Picardi: On Frege's notion of Inhalt 307; P. Casalegno: Lo
strano caso del dr. Gustav Lauben 313; G.A. Corsi: A note of
indexicals and Frege's notion of sense 319; F. Gana: Una questione di
priorità nella definizione di insieme finito 325; U. Bottazzini: Sul
Calcolo geometrico di Peano 331; M. Borga, P. Freguglia, D.
Palladino: Su alcuni contributi di Peano e della sua scuola alla logica
matematica 337; P.A. Giustini: Geometria ed assiomatica 343; R.
Simili: W.E. Johnson e il concetto di proposizione 347; C. Pizzi: Il
problema dei determinabili nella logica del '900 353; G. Pretto, G.
Sambin: Mistica come etica della filosofia della matematica di L.E.J.
Brouwer 359; F. Arzarello: Classical mathematics in Brouwer
intuitionism and intuitionism in Brouwer classical mathematics 363;
V.M. Abrusci: Paul Hertz's logical works. Contents and relevance 369;
T. Tonietti: Le due tappe del formalismo di Hilbert e la controversia
con Brouwer 375; E. Moriconi: Sul tentativo hilbertiano di dimostrare
l'ipotesi del continuo di Cantor 381; S. Quaranta: Il teorema di
Herbrand: semantica 'costruttiva' e completezza 387; D. Costantini,
M.C. Galavotti: Osservazioni sullo sviluppo storico della nozione di
casualità 393-401.
Corsi, Giovanni, Mangione, Corrado, and Mugnai, Massimo, eds. 1989.
Le Teorie Delle Modalità. Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia
Della Logica. Bologna: CLUEB.
Organizzato dalla Società italiana di logica e filosofia delle scienze
(SILFS), San Gimignano, 5-8 dicembre 1987.
Indice: Presentazione di Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara 5; Ringraziamenti 7;
Elenco dei partecipanti 9; Elenco degli Autori 11;
Relazioni
W. Cavini, Modalità dialettiche nei Topici di Aristotele 15; M.
Mignucci, Truth and modality in late antiquity: Boethius on future
contingent propositions 47; S. Knuuttila, Modalities in obligational
43
disputations 79; G. Hughes, The modal logic of John Buridan 93; V.
Sainati, Verità e modalità in Leibniz 113; H. Poser, Kants absolute
Modalitäten 121; E. Picardi, Assertion and assertion sign 139; H.
Burkhardt, Das Vorurteil zugunsten des Aktualen: die philosophischen
Systeme von Leibniz and Meinong 155; S. Bozzi, Implicazione stretta e
metodo assiomatico nella logica di Lewis e Langford 183; C. Pizzi,
Propositional quantifiers in Lewis and Langford's "Symbolic Logic"
205; K. Segerberg, Getting started: beginnings in the logic of action
221;
Comunicazioni
M. Mariani, Le dimostrazioni indirette in An. Pr. A,15 253; M. Nasti,
Stoic implication and stoic modalities 259; R. Pinzani, Un approccio
semantico alla dialettica di Abelardo 265; G. Roncaglia, Alcune note
sull'uso di composslbilitas e incompossibilitas in Alberto Magno e
Tommaso d'Aquino 271; A. Tabarroni, Predicazione essenziale ed
intentiones secondo Gentile da Cingoli 277; R. Lambertini, Utrum
genus possit salvari in unica specie. Problemi di semantica dei termini
universali tra Gentile da Cingoli e Radulphus Brito 283; L. Pozzi,
Heytesbury e l'autoriferimento 289; P. Freguglia, Sullo scholium alla
prima proposizione dell'Euclidis Elementorum libri XV di Cristoforo
Clavio 295; C. Cellucci, De conversione demonstrationis in
definitionem 301; M. Capozzi, La sillogistica di Signer 307; A. Drago,
Dalla geometria alla formalizzazione logica: Lazare Carnot 313; E.
Casari, Remarks on Bolzano's modalities 319; M. Ferriani, Gil Interessi
logici del giovane Peirce: spunti per una rilettura 323; U. Garibaldi - M.
A. Penco, A measure-theoretical approach to pre-Bayesian intensional
probability 329; V. M. Abrusci, David Hilbert's Vorlesungen on logic
and foundations of mathemathics 333; E. Moriconi, Una nota sul
secondo e-teorema di D. Hilbert 339; A. Rainone, Belief-contexts and
synonymity in Carnap's semantics 345; G. Hughes, "Every world can
see a reflexive world" 351; G. Corsi, Sulla logica temporale dei
programmi 359; G. Tamburrini, Mechanical procedures and
epistemology 365; G. Colonna, Sulla sfortuna di certe modalità nella
storia della logica 371; Indice 377-378.
Guetti, Carla, and Puja, Roberto, eds. 1996. Momenti Di Storia Della
Logica E Di Storia Della Filosofia. Roma: Aracne.
Atti del Convegno tenuto a Roma, 9-11 November, 1994.
44
Büttgen, Philippe, Dieble, Stéphane, and Rashed, Marwan, eds. 1999.
Théories De La Phrase Et De La Proposition De Platon À Averroés.
Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.
Sommaire: Philippe Büttgen, Stéphane Diebler et Marwan Rashed:
Avant-propos VII-IX; I. Aux origines ontologiques du langage
rationnel; Claude Imbert: Le dialogue platonicien en quête de son
identité 3; Denis O'Brien: Théories de la proposition dans le Sophiste
de Platon 21; Francis Wolff: Proposition, être et vérité: Aristote ou
Antisthène? 43; II. Entre logique et sémantique: l'autonomie
problématique de la théorie aristotélicienne; Barbara Gernez: La théorie
de la lexis chez Aristote 67; Jacques Brunschwig: Homonymie et
contradiction dans la dialectique aristotélicienne 81; Pierre Chiron: La
période chez Aristote 103; III. La théorie stoïcienne et ses enjeux; Jean-
Baptiste Gourinat: La définition et les propriétés de la proposition dans
le stoïcisme ancien 133; Frédérique Ildefonse: La théorie stoïcienne de
la phrase (énoncé, proposition) et son influence chez les grammairiens
151; Marc Baratin: La conception de l'énoncé dans les textes
grammaticaux latins 171; IV - D'Aristote à l'aristotélisme; Henri
Hugonnard-Roche: La théorie de la proposition selon Proba, un témoin
syriaque de la tradition grecque (VIe siècle) 191; Philippe Hoffmann:
Les analyses de l'énoncé: catégories et parties du discours selon les
commentateurs néoplatoniciens 209; Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal: La
proposition assertorique (de inesse) selon Averroès 249; Ali
Benmakhlouf: Averroès et les propositions indéfinies 269; Maroun
Aouad: Les prémisses rhétoriques selon les Isarat d'Avicenne 281;
Épilogue; Jean Jolivet: Sens des propositions et ontologie chez Pierre
Abélard et Grégoire de Rimini 307; Index des auteurs anciens 325;
Index des auteurs modernes 333-336.
Barth, Else M. 1974. The Logic of the Articles in Traditional
Philosophy. A Contribution to the Study of Conceptual Structures.
Dordrecht: Reidel.
Revised translation from the original Dutch (1971) by E. M. Barth and
T. C. Potts.
Table of Contents: Preface XIX; Preface to the original edition XXI;
On the use of symbols and graphical types XXIII-XXV; Part 1. The
problem. I. Introduction: problems and sources 3; II. Naming what is
34; III. The semantics of the logical constants 50; Part 2. Historical
45
survey. IV. From the history of the logic of indefinite propositions 75;
V. From the history of the logic of individual propositions 141; VI.
Singular - General - Indefinite 180; VII. The identity theories of the
copula 204; Part 3. Descent. VIII. Argument by analogy 291; IX: The
problem of the logic of relations and its connection with the logic of the
articles 337; Part 4. X: Introduction of indefinite propostions by
ekthesis 381; XI. Conjunction, potentiality, and disjunction 417; XII.
Summary and conclusion 457; Bibliography 482; Index of proper
names 502; Index of subjects 509.
Biard, Joël, and Mariani, Zini Fosca, eds. 2009. Les Lieux De
L'argumentation. Histoire Du Syllogisme Topique D'Aristote À Leibniz.
Turnhout: Brepols.
Blanché, Robert. 1970. La Logique Et Son Histoire D'Aristote À
Russell. Paris: Armand Colin.
Deuxième edition revue par Jacques Dubucs, Paris, Colin, 1996.
Bochenski, Joseph. 1961. A History of Formal Logic. Notre Dame:
Indiana University Press.
Translated from the German edition "Formale Logik" (1956) by Ivo
Thomas.
Reprinted New York, Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970.
———. 1974. "Logic and Ontology." Philosophy East and West no.
24:275-292.
"The scope of this article is to present a broad survey of the relations
between logic and ontology as they have been conceived of in the
history of Western thought. While it is true that Hindu philosophy
offers a similar field of research, the impression is that we are not yet
prepared to handle it in any synthetic way. We simply do not know
enough about the details of the Hindu doctrines."
———. 1981. "The General Sense and Character of Modern Logic." In
Modern Logic - a Survey. Historical, Philosophical, and Mathematical
Aspects of Modern Logic and Its Applications, edited by Agazzi,
Evandro, 3-14. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Buzzetti, Dino. 1976. "Cronaca, Preistoria E Storia Della Logica."
Rivista di Filosofia:484-496.
"The author surveys recent contributions to the history of logic and
develops methodological reflections aiming to show that a proper
treatment of the discipline requires a wide-scope investigation taking
46
into account not only formal theories acceptable by present-day
standards of adequacy, but also the relationship between formalization
and ordinary language, the philosophical, and the material heuristic
motivations."
Carruccio, Ettore. 1964. Mathematics and Logic in History and in
Contemporary Thought. Chicago: Aldine.
Original Italian edition: Matematica e logica nella storia e nel pensiero
contemporaneo - Torino, Gheroni, 1958.
Church, Alonzo. 1956. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Third reprint 1996.See in particular the Historical notes: Chapter II.
The propositional calculus (continued) § 29 pp. 155-166; Chapter IV.
The pure functional calculus of First Order 49 pp. 288-294.
———. 1965. "The History of the Question of Existential Import of
Categorical Propositions." In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science. Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress, edited by
Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua, 417-424. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Dumitriu, Anton. 1977. History of Logic. Tunbridge Wells: Abacus
Press.
Revised, updated, and enlarged translation from the Roumanian of the
second edition of "Istoria logicii" (4 volumes).
Filkorn, Vojtech. 1963. Pre-Dialectical Logic. Bratislava: Publishing
House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences.
Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1989. "La Definition De L'identité D'Aristote a
Zermelo." Theoria.Revista de Teoria, Historia y Fundamentos de la
Ciencia no. 4:55-79.
"This paper sketches a history of definition of identity from Aristotle's
"Tpics" down to the modern set theory. The author tries to explain
particularly, first, how the transformation of the concept of predicate at
the end of the Nineteenth century made it necessary to revise the
Leibnizian definition of the identity of individuals; secondly, why
Dedekind, Peano, Schroder, etc., made, between two possible
definitions of identity of predicates or of sets, a choice which later
made it necessary to postulate in set theory the axiom of
extensionality."
Gensler, Harry. 2006. Historical Dictionary of Logic. Lanham:
Scarecrow Press.
47
Contents: Editor's Foreword by Jon Woronoff IX; Preface XI; Notation
XIII; Chronology XV; Introduction XXIX-XLIV; The Dictionary 1;
Bibliography 255; About the author 307.
This book is an encyclopedia of logic. It introduces the central concepts
of the field in a series of brief, nontechnical "dictionary entry" articles.
These deal with topics like logic's history, its various branches, its
specialized vocabulary, its controversies, and its relationships to other
disciplines. While the book emphasizes deductive logic, it also has
entries on areas like inductive logic, fallacies, and definitions -- and on
key concepts from epistemology, mathematics, and set theory that are
apt to arise in discussions about logic. Following the series guidelines,
Historical Dictionary of Logic tries to be useful for specialists
(especially logicians in areas outside their subspecialties) but
understandable to students and other beginners; so I avoid topics or
explanations that are so technical that only math majors would
understand.
The major part of this book is the dictionary section, with 352 entries.
While these are arranged alphabetically, there is also an organization
based on content. Four very general entries start with "logic:" and serve
mainly to point to more specific entries (like "propositional logic");
these in turn often point to related topics (like "negation,"
"conditionals," "truth tables," and "proofs"). So we have here a
hierarchy of topics. Here are the four "logic:" entries:
logic: deductive systems points to entries like propositional logic,
modal logic, deontic logic, temporal logic, set theory, many-valued
logic, mereology, and paraconsistent logic.
logic: history of is about historical periods and figures and includes
entries like medieval logic, Buddhist logic, twentieth-century logic,
Aristotle, Ockham, Boole, Frege, and Quine.
logic: and other areas relates logic in an interdisciplinary way to other
areas and includes entries like biology, computers, ethics, gender, God,
and psychology.
logic: miscellaneous is about everything else (including technical
terms) and includes entries like abstract entities, algorithm, ad
hominem, inductive logic, informal/formal logic, liar paradox,
metalogic, philosophy of logic, and software for learning logic.
The entries vary in length from a sentence or two to several pages. The
48
front of the book has three important parts:
A short notation section gives the main logical symbols that I use in the
book, along with alternative symbols that others sometimes use.
A chronology lists some of the main events in the history of logic.
An introduction tries to give an overall view of logic, the big picture, in
order to give a broader context for the dictionary entries.
The back of the book has a substantial bibliography on related
readings." (from the Preface).
Imbert, Claude. 1999. Pour Une Histoire De La Logique. Un Héritage
Platonicien. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Jennings, Raymond Earl. 1994. The Genealogy of Disjunction. New
Kneale, William, and Kneale, Martha. 1962. The Development of
Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reprinted 1975 with corrections.
Kotarbinski, Tadeusz. 1964. Leçons Sur L'histoire De La Logique.
Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
Traduit de l'édition original polonaise (1957) par Anna Posner.
Lejewski, Czeslaw. 1981. "Logic and Ontology." In Modern Logic - a
Survey. Historical, Philosophical, and Mathematical Aspects of
Modern Logic and Its Applications, edited by Agazzi, Evandro, 379-
398. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"My discussion of the topic prescribed by the title of the paper will
consist of two parts. In Part I, I propose to discuss, in very general and
informal terms, the nature of logic and ontology, and the relationship
that seems to connect these two disciplines. In Part II, I intend to
examine, in some detail, a certain specific problem, which concerns
logicians as well as ontologists, a problem which has been with us for
about forty years, and which lacks a generally acceptable solution." p.
379.
Lewis, Clarence Irving. 1918. A Survey of Symbolic Logic. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Reprinted New York, Dover Publishing 1960, with the omission of
chapter V and VI.
Mangione, Corrado, and Bozzi, Silvio. 1993. Storia Della Logica. Da
Boole Ai Nostri Giorni. Milano: Garzanti.
49
Mates, Benson. 1965. "A Brief Outline of the History of Logic." In
Elementary Logic, 205-230. New York: Oxford University Press.
Second revised edition 1972.
Nidditch, Peter H. 1962. The Development of Mathematical Logic.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Contents: 1. Purpose and language of the Book 1; 2. Aristotle's
syllogistic 3; 3. The idea of a complete, automatic language for
reasoning 14; 4. Changes in algebra and geometry, 1825-1900 23;
5. Consistency and metamathematics 30; 6. Boole's algebra of logic 33;
7. The algebra of logic after Boole: Jevons, Peirce and Schroeder 44; 8.
Frege's logic 59; 9. Cantor's arithmetic of classes 66; 10. Peano's logic
73; 11. Whitehead and Russell's 'Principia Mathematica' 77; 12.
Mathematical logic after 'Principia Mathematica': Hilbert's
metamathematics 79; Further reading 86; Index 87.
Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1973. Theories of Proposition. Ancient and
Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Contents: Preface V; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Plato 13; 3. Aristotle 23; 4.
The Stoic lekton 45; 5. The Stoic axioma 75; 6. Later developments in
Greek antiquity 89; 7. The transition to the Latin West 105; 8. Boethius
and the beginning of the Middle Ages 123; 9. Abelard 139; 10. The
doctrine of the dictum in the century after Abelard 165; 11.
Preliminaries to the fourteenth century debate 177; 12. The complexum
theory of Ockham and Holkot 195; 13. Some reist opponents of
Ockham and Holkot 209; 14. The theory of the complexe significabile
227; 15. The oppositions against the theory of the complexe
significabile 243; 16. The significate of a true propositio 273; Selective
bibliography 281; Indices 289-309.
"This book is intended as the first part of a history of those problems
and theories in the domain of philosophical semantics which nowadays
are commonly referred to as problems and theories about the nature and
the status of propositions. Although the conceptual apparatus and the
terminology by means of which questions concerning propositions
were asked and answered have considerably varied from period to
period, the main types of disputes and solutions have remained
remarkably constant. One of the aims of this study is precisely to trace
the vicissitudes of the vocabulary in which this refractory topic was
50
treated in the remote past. As is evident from the Bibliography, many
parts of the field have been explored by predecessors. Guided by their
results, I have tried to fill in more details and to design a provisional
map of the area as a whole." (From the Preface).
———. 1980. Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of Proposition.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Contents: Part One: Late-Scholastic theories of the proposition. 1.
Introduction 3; 2. Different kinds of propositions and their ways of
signifying 9; 3. The tie between the principal parts of a proposition 27;
4. The adequate signification and the adequate significate of a
proposition 45; 5. Disguised propositions 74; 6. Judgment 90; 7. The
object of judgment 103; 8. Propositions as bearer of truth-values 114;
Part Two: Humanist theories of proposition. 9. Introduction 143; 10.
The first attempt at reorientation 146; 11. The Melanchtonian treatment
of a theme 159; 12. Peter Ramus 168; 13. The diffusion of Ramist
terminology 180; 14. Eclectics 189; Epilogue 204; Bibliography 209;
Indices 224-237.
"After publishing, more than six years ago, my Theories of the
Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth
and Falsity, I initially intended to cover the remaining phases of the
history of the semantics of declarative sentences in one volume. As the
material proved more abundant and unwieldy than I had anticipated, I
decided to limit the next instalment to the period between 1450 and
1650. Accordingly, the present book treats the theories of the
proposition put forward by late-scholastic and humanist philosophers. It
will be followed, in the not too distant future, I hope, by a third volume
which will continue the account until the first decades of the nineteenth
century.
In making my way through the intricate mass of sources, which are
often works that are completely forgotten and extremely hard to obtain,
I was greatly assisted by Professor Ashworth's pioneering book on
Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period. Moreover, when I
had practically finished my manuscript, she was kind enough to send
me the draft of an article entitled 'Theories of the Proposition: Some
Early Sixteenth Century Discussions'. As this article is based on a
corpus of texts which is slightly different from mine, it enabled me to
check some of my results against the findings of a very competent
51
collaborator in this lonely field of research. I can only advise the reader
to do the same when the article will have been published (in Franciscan
Studies [38, 1978 pp. 81-121])."
———. 1983. Judgment and Proposition. From Descartes to Kant.
Contents: 1. The legacy of scholasticism and humanism 9; 2. Idea and
judgment in Descartes 36; 3. Repercussions of Descartes' theory of
judgment 55; 4. Arnauld and the Port-Royal Logic 70; 5. Some
eighteenth-century critics of the Port-Royal view 88; 6. Geulincx's
contribution to Cartesian philosophy of logic 99; 7. Ideas and Images.
Gassendi and Hobbes 121; 8. The heyday of British empiricism 139; 9.
Sensationalism and its critics in France 174; 10. Common sense
philosophy and nominalism in Great Britain 194; 11. Leibniz's logical
realism 214; 12. The German enlightenment 233; 13. Some problems in
Kant and his contemporaries 246; Epilogue 257; Bibliography 262;
Indices 280-295.
"This volume completes -- for the time being -- a series of
investigations that were undertaken with the purpose of tracing in some
detail the development of that field of logico-semantic research for
which the foundations were laid in the first chapters of Aristotle's De
interpretatione and which, in honour of that pioneer, might perhaps be
called apophantics. The first part -- Theories of the Proposition.
Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity -
was published in 1973, followed by a second part -- Late-Scholastic
and Humanist Theories of the Proposition -- in 1980. The last
instalment takes the account from the beginning of the modern period
to roughly that point in the nineteenth century from which on
discussions of the subject in the recent past and contemporary
systematic treatment tend to coalesce. " (From the Preface).
Prantl, Carl. 1997. Geschichte Der Logik Im Abendlande. Hildesheim:
Georg Olms.
Anastatic reprint of the original edition printed in four volumes
Leipzig, S. Hirzl, 1855-1867.
" It is a remarkable fact, unique perhaps in the writing of history, that
Carl Prantl, the first to write a comprehensive history of western logic,
on which task he spent a lifetime, did it precisely to prove that Kant
was right, i.e. that formal logic has no history at all.
52
His great work contains a collection of texts, often arranged from a
wrong standpoint, and no longer sufficient but still indispensable. He is
the first to take and discuss seriously all the ancient and scholastic
logicians to whom he had access, though mostly in a polemical and
mistaken spirit. Hence one can say that he founded the history of logic
and bequeathed to us a work of the highest utility.
Yet at the same time nearly all his comments on these logicians are so
conditioned by the prejudices we have enumerated, are written too with
such ignorance of the problems of logic, that he cannot be credited with
any scientific value. Prantl starts from Kant's assertion, believing as he
does that whatever came after Aristotle was only a corruption of
Aristotle's thought. To be formal in logic, is in his view to be
unscientific. Further, his interpretations, even of Aristotle, instead of
being based on the texts, rely only on the standpoint of the decadent
'modern' logic. Accordingly, for example, Aristotelian syllogisms are
misinterpreted in the sense of Ockham, every formula of propositional
logic is explained in the logic of terms, investigation of objects other
than syllogistic characterized as 'rank luxuriance', and so of course not
one genuine problem of formal logic is mentioned.
While this attitude by itself makes the work wholly unscientific and,
except as a collection of texts, worthless, these characteristics are
aggravated by a real hatred of all that Prantl, owing to his logical bias,
considers incorrect. And this hatred is extended from the teachings to
the teachers. Conspicuous among its victims are the thinkers of the
Megarian, Stoic and Scholastic traditions. Ridicule, and even common
abuse, is heaped on them by reason of just those passages where they
develop manifestly important and fruitful doctrines of formal logic."
(From: I. M. Bochenski - A history of formal logic - Notre Dame,
University of Notre Dame Press, 1961, pp. 6-8).
Prior, Arthur Norman. 1962. Formal Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Second edition (First edition 1955).
"This book is designed primarily as a textbook; though like most
writers of textbooks I hope it will prove to be of interest to others
beside Logic students. Part I covers what I would regard as the
'fundamentals' of the subject-the propositional calculus and the theory
of quantification. Part II deals with the traditional formal logic, and
with developments which have taken that as their starting-point. I do
53
not regard this as covering different ground from that covered in Part I
under quantification theory, but rather as covering the same ground in a
different way. Both ways seem to me to have their merits, and to throw
light on one another and the subject. I would say the same of the logic
of classes and relations in extension, discussed in Part III, Ch. III ; but
the other chapters of this last Part deal with what I take to be genuine
extensions of the subject-matter opened up in Part I, in two different
directions -modal logic, and `non-classical' systems of propositional
calculus. Negatively, I have attempted to keep within the range
indicated by my title: I have touched hardly at all upon `scientific
method', and have indulged in a minimum of metaphysical reflection
(avoiding, for example, such topics as the relations between
'propositions' and sentences).In the greater part of the book the
symbolic notation used is that of Lukasiewicz, with minor
modifications. This seems to me unquestionably the best logical
symbolism for most purposes, and I should like to have helped to show
that it is. In Part III, Ch. III, however, I have used the notation of
Principia Mathematic a (referred to throughout this work as PM) ; in
the particular field there covered, there is no other as fully developed or
as deservedly well known. It does students no harm to learn to use two
different notations, and to employ the one that is best for whatever they
may have in hand at the time.Other innovations beside the symbolism
are these: (i) throughout the book, a fairly frequent setting out of formal
proofs (something to which the Polish notation particularly lends itself)
; (ii), in Part I, the devotion of particular attention to completeness
proofs, and to forms of the propositional calculus not yet widely
studied, especially to varieties of it which use the 'standard false
proposition' o, and variable operators as well as propositional variables;
(iii), in Part II, considerable use of scholastic material and of material
from the writings of de Morgan. I have included these items from a
sense of their importance rather than of their novelty, and have placed
them where their appearance seems to me most rational and
economical; but if any teacher wishes to use this book for a more
orthodox type of logic course, there are various ways in which he may
do so. If, for example, he wishes to introduce the traditional logic at an
early stage, he could pass to Part II immediately from Part I, Ch. I, Ch.
II, § 1, and Ch. IV, §§ and 2. (This procedure would have in any case
54
the advantage of giving the student an interval of rest from pure
symbolism before passing to the more interesting but more difficult
aspects of the propositional calculus.) If he wishes to give the more
usual sort of 'modern' course, he could pass immediately on from the
same portions of Part I to Part III, Ch. I, § 2 and Ch. III." (from the
Preface to the first edition).
"Apart from one or two very small corrections, I have in this edition
left the body of the work just as it was, but have completely revised the
two original appendixes and placed a wholly new appendix (the present
Appendix II) between them. These alterations and additions will, I
hope, make the appendixes much more valuable both for general
reference and for pedagogical use. In the latter connexion I would
particularly recommend that what I have said in the body of the book
on quantification theory - which has met with some just criticisms - be
read in conjunction with § 4 of Appendix I. There is also abundant
material for exercises in simply verifying some of the relations asserted
to hold between postulate-sets in this Appendix, using to this end the
techniques sketched in the one that follows it." (from the Preface to the
Second edition).
Scholz, Heinrich. 1961. Concise History of Logic. New York:
Philosophical Library.
Translated from the German edition "Abriss der Geschichte der Logik"
(1931) by Kurt F. Leidecker.
Translated in Italian as: "Breve storia della logica" Milano, Silva
Editore 1967.
Contents: Preface to the first edition (1931) V; Introduction by Kurt F.
Leidecker IX; Abbreviations XIII-XIV; Types of logic 1; The Classical
type fof formal logic 24; The Modern type of formal logic 50;
Bibliographic appendix 76; Supplementary observation 86; Notes 89;
Index of names 137-140.
"The reader of this Concise History of Logic is entitled to know what
the objections to this book are and why it was nevertheless published.
Carl Prantl (1820-1888) produced between 1855 and 1870 a standard
work and source book for the history of logic from Aristotle to the end
of the 15th century in which it is possible even now to appreciate an
admirable mastery of the material, an exemplary punctiliousness in
presenting the sources, and a nearly equally perfect intuitive certainty
55
with which the material has been selected. For the history of modern
logic there simply does not exist any work which could remotely be
compared with Prantl's. Indeed, such a work will be written only when
more shelf footage of monographs is available and each monograph can
be considered on a par with the one Louis Couturat (1868-1914) wrote
on the logic of Leibniz. (1)
It is, therefore, incumbent on us to state boldly that the present concise
history is a hazardous enterprise. For, it is impossible to summarize
knowledge which does not even exist as yet, and which cannot since his
time. However, in our endeavor we must never lose sight of the fact
that the logic of antiquity, and to a considerable degree the logic of the
middle ages, have come down to us in heaps of fragments.
A third and very great flaw is the multiplicity of forms in which logic
manifested itself, particularly in three stages; when it was raised to the
first power in the days after the Logic of Port Royal (1662); when it
was raised to the second power after Kant; and finally when it was
raised to the third power after Hegel, a stage in which we have
witnessed a plethora of forms right down to the present where we are
no longer able to survey them.
I have risked writing this brief history nevertheless, supported by my
belief in the new logic, a belief that has aided me in conquering my
inhibitions. This belief has encouraged me again and again in the
difficult task of condensing the vast material into the limited space
available. I owe thanks to my publisher for the understanding which
prompted him to acknowledge the necessity of my going beyond the
limits which. I had agreed to at the outset. This made it possible to
produce a little volume in which not merely beliefs could be stated, but
knowledge could be spread out; knowledge, I might add, which I can
back up completely by my own researches. Nothing has been referred
to or touched upon in this concise history which has not passed through
my fingers or which has not been thoroughly studied by me. All dates,
likewise, were checked so that I have been able to correct, and that
without much ado, not a few of the errors in Eisler's indispensable
Philosophen Lexikon as well as other, older, reference works.
I am sending this little volume into the world in
be created by a tour de force in mere sampling of, what can only be
actually gotten hold of by most thorough and painstaking research, and
56
even at that not so without reliance on one's intuition and an eye
sharpened by long experience.
Another and still greater flaw in the enterprise is this. When Prantl
wrote his history of logic the type of modern formal logic which is now
available in the shape of symbolic logic had not yet been called into
being. There was, therefore, no dependable position by which such a
history could be oriented and from which it could be surveyed. For,
what formal logic really is we know only because symbolic logic
provided the 'conceptual equipment needed to answer this problem. In
general, too, the extant gains registered by the modern symbolic
treatment of logic have become such an essential factor in making
pronouncements regarding the history of logic that we are constrained
to say that an essential knowledge and mastery of the results of
symbolic logic have become an indispensable condition for any and all
fruitful study of the history of logic. Prantl had to rely completely on
himself in sifting the material, in highlighting and playing down certain
aspects. He worked under a serious handicap by virtue of the
nonexistence of exact formal logic in his day. This resulted in the
formation of value judgments which, measured by the standards of
rigorous critical thinking now in demand, are shot through with very
bad blunders. These value judgments, thus, should first be corrected.
Then the entire magnificent material which Prantl spread out before us
must be subjected to a fresh and thorough reinterpretation, making use
of all the material contributions that have been made the hope that I
might thereby kindle in the reader a confidence, which he might not
have had before, in the new logic upon which I have based my history,
hoping of course that he may overcome all obstacles with which we
have to reckon. Furthermore, I possess faith that the history of logic,
with the new light which can be thrown on it today, will become a
beautiful and fascinating chapter of western civilization, so that at long
last it may be studied with pleasure and sympathy. This accomplished,
there will follow the labors of scholars as a matter of course which will
close the gaps in the history of logic which we still, regretfully, have to
admit today." (Preface).
Ueberweg, Friedrich. 2001. System of Logic and History of Logical
Doctrines. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Reprint of the 1871 edition translated from the German, with notes and
57
appendices by Thomas M. Lindsay.
Velarde Lombraña, Julián. 1989. Historia De La Lógica. Oviedo:
Universidad de Oviedo.
Indice de materias: Prologo de Gustavo Bueno Martínez V-XV;
Introducción 17; I. Los origines 19; II. Aristoteles 31; III: Megarico-
Estoicos 84; IV. Epicureos 97; V. El fin de la Antigüedad clásica 100;
VI. La Edad Media 109; VII: Ramón Llull 153; VIII. Humanistas y
Cartesianos 154; IX. Leibniz 166; X. La lógica simbólica en el siglo
XVIII 207; XI. Lógica filósofica en los siglos XVIII y XIX 218; XII:
El algebra de la lógica 244; XIII. La logística hasta a Russell 300; XIV.
Russell 365; XV. El programa Hilbertiano 397; Apéndice: lógica
polivalente 409; BibliografÍa de carácter general 419; Indice de autores
421-431.
Weinberg, Julius R. 1965. Abstraction, Relation, and Induction. Three
Essays in the History of Thought. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON THE HISTORY OF LOGIC

Rabus, Leonhard. 1868. "Logische Literatur." In Logik Und
Metaphysik. I. Erkenntnislehre, Geschichte Der Logik, System Der
Logik, 453-518. Erlangen: Andreas Deichert.
"... the best bibliography of logic (Neuzeit) has been, before Risse's
work, the impressive list printed in the year 1868 by Verlag von
Andreas Deichert (Druck der Universitäts-Buchdruckerei von E. Th.
Jacob in Erlangen) as appendix to Rabus' Logik und Metaphysik. And
even with respect to Risse's Bibliographia Logica one may assert that
Rabus has not been completely defeated; there are in fact some authors
(such as N. Wallerius and S. Hasenmüller) mentioned by Rabus but not
by Risse.
(...)
It is curious to observe how the Logische Literatur of G.L. Rabus has
been so much overlooked. (...) It occupies pages 443 to 518 and
provides more than 1200 authors. This enormous list is distributed in
six chronological sections. Rabus' bibliography is a remarkable and
original contribution: almost 1000 authors are recorded from the
58
Aufkommen des Protestantismus until the year 1865. In this sense it is
a necessary complement to Prantl's unfinished work. But, in contrast
with Prantl, Rabus offers to the XXth century reader a pure masterpiece
of historical research, free from subjective interfering commentaries.
The seventh section of the bibliography: Hülfsmittel zum Studium der
Geschichte der Logik shows the very wide frame in which Rabus
conducted his work although it is not clear whether the quoted sources
were exhaustively investigated.
Rabus' bibliography from the Renaissance onwards is also a remarkable
supplement to I. M. Bochenski's bibliography (Formale Logik, first ed.
1956) and offers to contemporary logicians interested in the history of
logic, the possibility of exploring a wide terra incognita. In fact, until
now historical research from the point of view of contemporary logic
has concentrated on centuries previous to the Renaissance (see I. M.
Bochenski, Formale Logik, p. 297 and W. and M. Kneale, The
development of logic, p. 298)."
From: Ignacio Angelelli - The "Logische Literatur" of L. Rabus - in: W.
Arnold, H. Zeltner (Eds.) - Tradition und Kritik. Festschrift für Rudolf
Zocher zum 80. Geburtstag - Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart,1967, pp. 39-
42.
Church, Alonzo. 1936. "A Bibliography of Symbolic Logic (First
Part)." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 1:121-218.
Current bibliographies regularly thereafter.
"There is presented herewith what is intended to be a complete
bibliography of symbolic logic for the period 1666-1935 inclusive.
In the compilation use has been made of existing bibliographies,
including those in Venn's Symbolic logic, Schröder's Vorlesungen Über
die Algebra der Logik (vol. 1 and vol. 2 part 2), Lewis's A survey of
symbolic logic, the Royal Society index, the International catalogue of
scientific literature, and the bibliographical journals, Jahrbuch Über die
Fortschritte der Mathematik and Zentralblatt für Mathematik und ihre
Grenzgebiete, as well as many bibliographies of special authors or
special subjects. In addition many titles have been included as a result
of search through bound volumes of journals, or from references found
in the literature, or from information supplied by authors themselves or
others. So far as possible the original work (or a reprint of it) has been
consulted in each case before its inclusion in the bibliography. In a
59
number of cases where it has proved to be very difficult to obtain a
copy of the original work, titles have been included on the basis of
what was believed to be good authority as to existence and content,
checking, however, one source of information against another in order
to avoid the reproduction of typographical and other errors.
It has been the intention to confine the bibliography to symbolic logic
proper as distinguished from pure mathematics on the one hand and
pure philosophy on the other. The line is, of course, difficult to draw on
both sides, and perhaps has not herein always been drawn consistently,
but the attempt has been necessary in order to keel) within reasonable
limits of length.
By symbolic logic is understood the formal structure of propositions
and of deductive reasoning investigated by the symbolic method."
———. 1938. "A Bibliography of Symbolic Logic (Second Part)."
Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 3:178-212.
Risse, Wilhelm. 1965. Bibliographia Logica. Verzeichnis Der
Druckschriften Zur Logik Mit Angabe Ihrer Fundorte (1472-1800).
Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Volume I.
"No other branch of philosophy presently possesses a bibliography
quite so extensive and comprehensive as this one for logic, which is a
by-product, as the Vorwort explains, of Risse's systematic history of the
development of logic, Die Logilc der Neuzeit.
Volume 1 (1965, 293p.) lists in chronological arrangement monographs
published from 1472 to 1800. Volume 2 (1973, 494p.) does the same
for the period 1801-1969. Both volumes cite holding libraries (mainly
European but also some American) for most of the works listed.
Volume 3 (1979, 412p.) lists articles published both in periodicals and
in anthologies, arranged according to a detailed classification system
outlined in the front. Volume 4 (1979, 390p.) is a catalogue of 3,006
manuscripts, arranged by author if known and by title if anonymous,
with separate sections for medieval and more recent manuscripts.
Holding libraries or archives are indicated.
All volumes are thoroughly indexed."
From: Hans E. Bynagle - Philosophy. A guide to the reference
literature. Third edition - Westport, Libraries Unlimited, 2006, pp. 724-
725.
60
———. 1973. Bibliographia Logica. Verzeichnis Der Druckschriften
Zur Logik Mit Angabe Ihrer Fundorte (1801-1969). Hildesheim: Georg
Olms.
Volume II
———. 1979. Bibliographia Logica. Verzeichnis Der
Zeitschriftenartikel Zur Logik. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Volume III.
"Preface: The third volume of the "Bibliographia Logica" lists papers
on logic and the history of logic which have appeared in periodicals
and anthologies. The list is incomplete for two reasons: (1) Numerous
works were inaccessible to me, particularly earlier periodicals and
those published outside Germany; (2) applications of logic in other
disciplines are included only if logical themes are mentioned in the
titles.
The variety of themes and conceptions of logic led to an arrangement
of titles in three categories:
A: Logic ("traditional logic", "classical logic"), starting with Aristotle;
B: Logistics ("symbolic logic", "mathematical logic"), representations
of logic in the mathematical tradition and using mathematical means;
C: History of logic.
The criterion used in categorizing the individual titles is the theme dealt
with, not the point of view of the author.
The three categories are indicated by letters; sub - categories by
numbers. The arrangement of material is given in the table of contents
in German, English, and French (p. 9*). Titles of frequently quoted
periodicals are abbreviated (Table of symbols p. 401)."
———. 1979. Bibliographia Logica. Verzeichnis Der Handschriften
Zur Logik. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Volume IV
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1974. "Some Additions to Risse's
Bibliographia Logica." Journal of the History of Philosophy no.
12:361-365.
"One of the greatest contributions to the history of logic in recent years
was the publication in 1965 of Wilhelm Risse's Bibliographia Logica,
Vol. I, which covers the years from 1472 to 1800. However, despite the
fact that Risse's monumental work lists an estimated 8,000 logical
61
works, it is still far from comprehensive, as Mr. Hickman pointed out in
an earlier article in this journal. Why this should be the ease
immediately becomes apparent when one starts to work in a library
such as the Bodleian at Oxford with its handwritten catalogue of books
printed before 1920 and its lack of any specialized bibliographies such
as the British Museum has provided for early printed books. Even in
well catalogued libraries such as the University Library at Cambridge it
can be difficult to locate texts, and one often stumbles across a new
logical work through the accident of its being bound in the same
volume as better known works. As a result of my researches over the
last few years, I have put together a list of works which do not appear
in Risse in the hope that other historians of logic may benefit from my
discoveries. I cannot, however, claim that I have exhausted the
resources of the libraries which I have visited. Doubtless there are still
not only new editions but new authors left to be discovered.
(...)
This paper concerns logic texts published between 1472 and 1800. I list
20 items whose authors do not appear in Risse, 12 items whose authors
appear in Risse in connection with another title or other titles, and 58
items which appear in Risse in another edition or in other editions. I
indicate the libraries in which all these items are to be found, and I also
list some useful bibliographical works."
———. 1978. The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative
Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century. A
Bibliography from 1836 Onwards. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Medieval Studies.
From the Preface: "My main interest in drawing up this bibliography
was to list all the books and articles which have to do with formal logic
and semantics from the time of Anselm to the end of the seventeenth
century. I see this area as including such topics as consequences,
syllogistic, supposition theory, and speculative grammar, but as
excluding such topics as the categories, the struggle between
nominalism and realism, and pure grammar. It is not, of course, always
easy to draw a line between works which are concerned with formal
logic and semantics and works which are not so concerned, and
inevitably my choice of borderline cases will seem too restrictive to
some and too liberal to others. However, my hope is that I have not
62
excluded any book or article which obviously falls into the area I have
delimited. I have used the phrase 'the tradition of medieval logic' in the
title in order to indicate that although I include the seventeenth century,
I am not concerned with the contributions of modern philosophy. The
work of men such as Pascal, Descartes, Arnauld, Leibniz and Locke
carries us far indeed from medieval discussions of logic and semantics.
Moreover, there is already such an extensive literature on these figures
that to include them in my bibliography would completely change its
character. On the other hand, I do include humanist logic and
renaissance Aristotelianism, since they involve a reaction to the
medieval tradition which can only properly be understood in the light
of that tradition. (...) The earliest book I list is Victor Cousin's 1836
edition of Abelard, since this can properly be viewed as the starting
point of modern scholarly work on medieval logicians." p. VII.
Pironet, Fabienne. 1997. The Tradition of Medieval Logic and
Speculative Grammar. A Bibliography (1977-1994). Turnhout: Brepols.
From the Preface: "This book is a continuation of Earline Jennifer
Ashworth's bibliography, The Tradition of Medieval Logic and
Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth
Century: A Bibliography from 1836 Onwards, that is the reason why
the title is partly adopted from it. The aim and the general principles are
the same as Ashworth's ones, but I have broadened the field: this
bibliography itemizes books and articles written between 1977 and
1994 on logic and grammar from Boethius to the end of the seventeenth
century, not excluding topics as the categories and, in some extension,
the struggle between nominalism and realism nor works of or on men
such as Pascal, Descartes, Arnauld, Leibniz and Locke. Of course, main
topics are still consequences, syllogistic, supposition theory, insolubles,
obligations, semantics, speculative grammar, etc., but I think that the
extension to subjects and authors mentioned above corresponds to the
way researches in that field evoluted last years. First, we note that the
number of editions, translations and studies on medieval logic and
grammar has considerably increased: about 1000 items from 1836 to
1976, about 2000 from 1977 to 1994. Second, we see that it is difficult
to make a clear distinction between different branches of knowledge,
this is why many people work on the relations between logic or
grammar and related matters, such as metaphysics, physics, theology,
63
etc. Third, always more people working on modern philosophy tend to
go back to medieval philosophy to search for the roots of the texts they
study, while medievalists are interested to know which influence
medieval philosophers have had on their successors. With a very few
exceptions, book reviews and articles from general works are not
included." p. VII.
Müller, Gert Heinz, and Lenski, Wolfgang, eds. 1987. [Omega] -
Bibliography of Mathematical Logic. Berlin: Springer.
Six volumes: 1. Classical logic edited by Wolfgang Rautenberg; 2.
Non-classical logics edited by Wolfgang Rautenberg; 3. Model theory
edited by Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus; 4. Recursion theory edited by Peter
G. Hinman; 5. Set theory edited by Andreas R. Blass; 6. Proof theory;
Constructive mathematics edited by Jane E. Kister, Dirk van Dalen,
Anne S. Troelstra.
"This collection of six hefty, orange volumes is a dream come true for
anyone interested in mathematical logic and its history. It contains a
remarkably complete bibliography of the field, from 1879, the year of
Frege's Begriffsschrift, through 1985.
(...)
Each volume has a number of introductory sections, including a general
survey of work in the volume, and useful appendices of various sorts.
However, the core of each volume consists of three indices: Subject
Index, Author Index, and Source Index." p. 524
Jon Barwise - Review - in: Bulletin of the American Mathematical
Society, Vol. 19, 1988, pp. 524-528.
Anellis, Irving A. 1995. "Studies in the Nineteenth-Century History of
Algebraic Logic and Universal Algebra. A Secondary Bibliography."
Modern Logic no. 5:1-120.
Redmond, Walter Bernard. 1972. Bibliography of the Philosophy in the
Iberian Colonies of America. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations XIII-XIV; Catalogue of
manuscripts and printed works on Philosophy from the Colonial Period
in Latin America; Philosophical works from Colonial Latin America 1;
Anonymous works 111; Appendix of some Colonial philosophical
works which have become lost 134; Bibliography of the secondary
literature concerning the philosophy of the Colonial Period of Latin
America 139-174.
64
"The first part of this bibliography is a catalogue of philosophical
writings from colonial Latin America which, on the basis of the
secondary literature, are presumed to be extant. It is followed by a short
appendix listing some colonial authors whose philosophical works are
lost, but which perhaps still exist. The second part of the bibliography
contains the secondary literature: studies on the philosophy of colonial
Latin America as well as subsequently published texts and translations
of the works of the colonial authors. It also contains non-philosophical
works to which reference is made in the first section. A brief digest of
the content of each philosophical work follows the entry." p. VIII.
RELATED PAGES
Annotated Bibliographies of:
E. J. Ashworth
L. M. de Rijk
Wilhelm Risse
65
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INDEX OF THE SECTION:

ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC
The Organon
General Introduction
General Works and Bibliographies on the History of Logic
The Logical Works of Aristotle
Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Aristotle: General and

Annotated bibliography on Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Peri

Hermeneias)
66
Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Categorical
Syllogism
Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Modal Syllogism
Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics
67
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Aristotle's Logic: General Survey and

A SUMMARY OF ARISTOTLE' SYLLOGISTIC
"We have identified five aspects of Aristotle’s syllogistic to highlight the
remarkable modernity of his logical investigations: (1) Aristotle took logic to
be a formal part of epistemology. A logic is an instrument for establishing
knowledge of logical consequence; this is a principal concern of the science
of logic. (2) Prior Analytics is a metalogical treatise on the syllogistic
deduction system. Aristotle exhaustively treated all possible combinations of
elemental “syllogistic” argument patterns to determine which have only valid
argument instances. (3) Aristotle recognised the epistemic efficacy of certain
elemental argument patterns having only valid instances, and he explicitly
formulated them as rules of natural deduction in corresponding sentences. (4)
Prior Analytics is a proof-theoretic treatise in which Aristotle described a
natural deduction system and demonstrated certain of the logical relationships
among syllogistic rules. In fact, Aristotle modelled his syllogistic in a
rudimentary way for this purpose. One important metasystematic result is to
have established the independence of a set of deduction rules. Finally, (5)
Aristotle worked with a notion of substitution sufficient for distinguishing
logical syntax and semantics. In this connection he also distinguished validity
from deducibility sufficiently well to note the completeness of his logic. Our
68
reading of Prior Analytics takes Aristotle to have treated the process of
deduction much as modern mathematical logicians do and not to have been
confused about some fundamental matters of logic. Least of all was he
confused, as some commentators believe, about a distinction between
“following necessarily” and “being necessary,” both in respect of the
distinction between a συλλογισμός or a deduction and a demonstration and of
the distinction between assertoric logic and modal logic. Aristotle clearly
distinguished between (1) a given sentence’s following necessarily from
other given sentences and (2) a given sentence denoting a state of affairs to
be necessary (or possible). Seeing that he was concerned with the deduction
process helps us to avoid such an error. In any case, Aristotle recognised that,
while the conclusion of a given argument follows necessarily from its
premises, this necessity might not be evident to a participant. He knew that
the epistemic process of deduction produces knowledge, or makes evident,
that a given sentence follows necessarily from other given sentences. He
considered the product of this epistemic process to be an argumentation that
includes a deductive chain of reasoning in addition to the premises and
conclusion. He recognised using deduction rules in the epistemic process for
establishing validity, and that this process can be applied in a purely
mechanical and computational way. Furthermore, Aristotle distinguished (1)
the subject matter of a given argument from (2) the use to which a given
argument might be put from (3) the varying expertise of a participant. All
these matters are distinct from (4) the formal matters underlying any of them.
And precisely to examine these formal matters was his project in Prior
Analytics. In this connection, then, we understand Aristotle to have
distinguished two kinds of knowledge that cannot be otherwise: (1)
knowledge of what L is true or false, which pertains to sentences, and (2)
knowledge of what is valid or invalid, which pertains to arguments." (pp.
110-111)
Gorge Boger, The Modernity of Aristotle's Logic in Demetra Sfendoni-
Mentzou et al. (eds.), Aristotle and Contemporary science. Vol. II, Bern:
Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 97-112.
THE MODERNITY OF ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC
69
"Only recently have we been able to recover something of Aristotle’s
promethean accomplishments relating to logic. Indeed, we are recognising
more and more that part of the history of modern mathematical logic is to
have re-invented the wheel that Aristotle turned many years ago. It is
astonishing that for .hundreds of years, perhaps dating to before the Port
Royal Logic, Aristotelian logic, or traditional logic, has been taught without a
single reference to the process of deduction. This was the practice of R.
Whately, W. S. Jevons, H. W. B. Joseph, J. N. Keynes, R. M. Eaton, and
many others. It is still the practice in untold numbers of introductory
textbooks on categorical logic to test a syllogism according to rules of
quality, quantity, and distribution, and entirely to overlook the deduction
process of chaining syllogisms, not to mention the glaring traditionalist error
of taking a syllogism to be either a valid or invalid argument. Jan
Lukasiewicz can be credited with being the first to shed light on the
syllogistic by examining it with the theoretical apparatus of mathematical
logic. But Lukasiewicz and his followers really only “improved” the
traditionalist interpretation with a sophistication afforded by mathematical
logic. Both lines of interpretation took Aristotle’s presentation in Prior
Analytics to be his own axiomatization of the syllogistic. While traditionalists
awkwardly drew lines between sentences (or sentence patterns) in different
syllogisms to indicate their logical relationships (their so-called reductions or
analyses), axiomaticists such as Lukasiewicz cleverly turned a συλλογισμός
into a logically true conditional proposition that could be processed by a
propositional logic. In this way the axiomaticists aimed to elucidate the
logical relationships among the syllogisms. Again, the epistemic process of
deduction explicitly treated in Prior Analytics was overlooked. It was not
until the early 1970s with the independent works of John Corcoran and
Timothy Smiley that the case for Aristotle’s reputation as a logician of
consummate intelligence and originality was well argued. They established
Aristotle to have been concerned with the deduction process just as many
modern logicians are. Corcoran and Smiley also used mathematical logic to
model Aristotle’s syllogistic. However, instead of finding an axiomatization
of a logic, they discovered a natural deduction system. But they remained
puzzled by reduction, in part, we believe, because they did not think that
Aristotle modelled his own system of deduction rules nor that he could
envisage distinguishing syntax and semantics. Our interpretation builds on
70
the work of Corcoran and Smiley, and now on that of Robin Smith whose
1989 translation of Prior Analytics has incorporated their findings. We
believe, however, that Aristotle did model his own system. In particular, we
see him as treating a συλλογισμός as a rule of deduction in Prior Analytics
A.4-7, and that he himself was able proof-theoretically to determine certain
mathematical properties of his deduction system. He was able to refine the
system by eliminating redundant rules, and he affirmed his system’s
completeness. These are Aristotle’s own accomplishments, not merely those
of modem logicians who, using mathematical logic, believe themselves to
have discovered features of the syllogistic unknown to Aristotle. Indeed,
modern logicians might wonder at their “having spoken” Aristotelian logic
their whole lives, without any idea of it." (pp. 111-112)
Gorge Boger, The Modernity of Aristotle's Logic in Demetra Sfendoni-
Mentzou et al. (eds.), Aristotle and Contemporary science. Vol. II, Bern:
Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 97-112.
LOGIC AS FORMAL ONTOLOGY

"There are several different conceptions of the nature of logic. Here I want to
contrast an ontic conception with an epistemic conception. On one ontic
conception logic investigates certain general aspects of 'reality', of 'being as
such', in itself and without regard to how (or even whether) it may be known
by thinking agents: in this connection logic has been called formal ontology.
On one epistemic conception, logic amounts to an investigation of deductive
reasoning per se without regard to what it is reasoning about; it investigates
what has been called formal reasoning. On this view, logic is part of
epistemology, viz. the part that studies the operational knowledge known as
deduction. It has been said that one of the main goals of epistemically-
oriented logic is to explicate the expression 'by logical reasoning' as it occurs
in sentences such as: a deduction shows how its conclusion can be obtained
by logical reasoning from its premise-set.
Relevant to the axiomatic method there would be two branches of
epistemology: one to account for knowledge of the axioms and one to
account for how knowledge of the theorems is obtained from knowledge of
71
the axioms, in other words, one investigating induction and one investigating
deduction. The latter is logic according to the epistemic conception.
On the ontic view of logic, on the other hand, logic is an attempt to gain
knowledge of the truth of propositions expressible using only generic nouns
(individual, property, relation, etc.) and other 'logical' expressions. In the
framework of Principia Mathematica those are propositions expressible
using only variables and logical constants. Principia Mathematica is an
excellent example of an axiomatic presentation of logic as formal ontology.
Below are some typical laws of formal ontology.
Excluded middle: Given any individual and any property either the
property belongs to the individual or the property does not belong tothe
individual.
Noncontradiction: Given any individual and any property it is not the case
that the property both belongs to the individual and does not belong to the
individual.
Identity: Given any individual and any property, if the property belongs to the
individual then the individual has the property.
Dictum de omni: Every property A belonging to everything having a given
property B which in turn belongs to everything having another property C
likewise belongs to everything having that other property C.
Dictum de nullo: Every property A belonging to nothing having a given
property B which in turn belongs to everything having another property C
likewise belongs to nothing having that other property C.
Commutation of Complementation with Conversion: Given any relation R the
complement of the converse of R is the converse of the complement of R.
From this sample of logic as ontic science we can see how the focus is
on ontology, or, as has been said by others, on the most general features
of reality itself and not on methods of gaining knowledge. According to
Russell Introduction to mathematical philosophy, 1919, 169, 'logic is
concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its
more abstract and general features.' These six laws are purely ontic in
that they involve no concepts concerning a knowing agent or concerning
an epistemic faculty such as perception, judgement, or deduction. This is
not to deny that there is an epistemic dimension to logic as ontic science
72
but only to affirm that the focus if ontic. Every science in so far as it is
science has an epistemic dimension. The epistemic differs from the ontic
more as size differs from shape than as, say, animal differs from plant.
Logic as ontic science was referred to above as formal ontology. Logic as
epistemic metascience may in like manner be called formal epistemology. It
is important and interesting to note that both are called formal logic but for
very different reasons. Some formal onticists justify the adjective formal by
reference to the fact that its propositions are expressed exclusively in general
logical terms without the use of names denoting particular objects, particular
properties, etc. cf. Russell 1919, 197. Some formal epistemicists justify the
adjective formal by reference to the fact that the cogency of an argumentation
is subject to a principle of form and in particular to the following principles:
(l) every two argumentations in the same form are either both cogent or both
non-cogent, (2) every argumentation in the same form as a deduction is itself
a deduction. In fact, some formal epistemicists such as Boole claimed, with
some justification, that they were dealing with the forms of thought, i.e. with
the forms of cogent argumentations. For more on cogency of argumentations
and the principles of form see Corcoran 1989.
Formal onticists are often easy to recognize because of their tendency to
emphasize the fact that formal ontology does not study reasoning per se. In
fact, the formal onticists often think that the study of reasoning belongs to
psychology and not to logic. For example, Lukasiewicz in his famous book
on Aristotle's syllogistic makes the following two revealing remarks.
Lukasiewicz 1957 pages 12 and 73, respectively. 'Logic has no more to do
with thinking than mathematics. "[Aristotle's] system is not a theory of the
forms of thought nor is it dependent on psychology; it is similar to a
mathematical theory...'
There are significant differences among formal onticists. For example, even
among those that emphasize the truth-preserving character of deduction some
accept the view that it is consequences-conservative as well and some reject
this view. For example, Lukasiewicz 1929, 16 explicitly rejects the view that
deduction is a process of information extraction. He says that in deductive
inference '...we may obtain quite new results, not contained in the premises'."
pp. 17-19
From: John Corcoran: The Founding of Logic. Modern Interpretations of
73
Aristotle's Logic, Ancient Philosophy, 14, 1994 pp. 9-24.
(to be continued...)
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Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Aristotle: General and Introductory

Readings
74
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Selected Bibliography on the Logic of

Aristotle: General and Introductory
Readings
INTRODUCTORY READINGS ON ARISTOTLE'S
LOGIC
"Logic, Dialectic and Science in Aristotle." 1994. Ancient Philosophy
no. 14.
Special issue edited by Robert Bolton and Robin Smith.
Contents: Introduction by the Editors 1; John Corcoran: The founding
of logic 9; Timothy Smiley: Aristotle's completeness proof 25; Gisela
Striker: Modal vs. assertoric syllogistic 39; James G. Lennox:
Aristotelian problems 53; Michael Ferejohn: The immediate premises
of Aristotelian demostration 79; Robert Bolton: The problem of
dialectical reasoning in Aristotle 99; Robin Smith: Dialectic and the
syllogism 133-151.
Allen, James. 1995. "The Development of Aristotle's Logic: Part of an
Account in Outline." Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy
no. 11:177-205.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1959. "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration."
Phronesis no. 14:123-152.
75
Reprinted in: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds.) - Articles on
Aristotle Vol 1 - London, Duckworth, 1975, pp. 65-87
———. 1996. "Grammar on Aristotle's Terms." In Rationality in Greek
Thought, edited by Frede, Michael and Striker, Gisela, 175-202. New
"However that may be, Aristotelian syllogistic concerned itself
exclusively with monadic predicates. Hence it could not begin to
investigate multiple quantification. And that is why it never got very
far. None the less, the underlying grammar of Aristotle's logic did not
in itself block the path to polyadicity. The later Peripatetics were
conservative creatures and they lacked logical imagination. Moreover,
Aristotle himself had assured them that his syllogistic was adequate for
all serious scientific needs. As for Aristotle, his service to logic is
nonpareil, and it would be grotesque to chide him for lack of
inventiveness. It is true that, in logical grammar, he did not climb above
the level which he attained in the de Interpretatione. But the Analytics
does not represent a fatal, or even a new, grammatical excursion. And
the story of Aristotle's fall, like the story of the fall of Adam, is a
myth." pp. 201-202
Bastit, Michel, and Follon, Jacques, eds. 2001. Logique Et
Métaphysique Dans L'organon D'Aristote. Louvain: Peeters.
Actes du colloque de Dijon
Berg, Jan. 1983. "Aristotle's Theory of Definition." In Atti Del
Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica, edited by Michele,
Abrusci, Casari, Ettore and Mugnai, Massimo, 19-30. Bologna:
CLUEB.
Bochenski, Joseph. 1951. "Non-Analytical Laws and Rules in
Aristotle." Methodos no. 3:77-79.
Bolton, Robert. 1990. "The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian
Dialectic." In Biologie, Logique Et Métaphysique Chez Aristote, edited
by Devereux, Daniel and Pellegrin, Pierre, 185-236. Paris: Éditions du
CNRS.
———. 1994. "The Problem of Dialectical Reasoning in Aristotle."
Ancient Philosophy no. 14:99-132.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1990. "Rémarques Sur La Communication De
Robert Bolton." In Biologie, Logique Et Métaphysique Chez Aristote,
edited by Devereux, Daniel and Pellegrin, Pierre, 237-262. Paris:
76
Éditions du CNRS.
———. 1991. "Sur Quelques Malentendus Concernant La Logique
D'Aristote." In Penser Avec Aristote, edited by Sinaceur, Mohammed
Allal, 423-428. Paris: Éditions érès.
Calogero, Guido. 1927. I Fondamenti Della Logica Aristotelica.
Firenze: Le Monnier.
Second edition with appendixes by Gabriele Giannantoni and Giovanna
Sillitti - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1968.
Charles, David. 2000. Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Dancy, Russell M. 1975. Sense and Contradiction: A Study on
Aristotle. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Deslauriers, Marguerite. 2007. Aristotle on Definition. Leiden: Brill.
Detel, Wolfgang. 2006. "Aristotle's Logic and Theory of Science." In A
Companion to Ancient Philosophy, edited by Gill, Mary Louise and
Pellegrin, Pierre, 245-269. Malden: Blackwell.
Devereux, Daniel. 1990. "Comments on Robert Bolton's the
Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic." In Biologie, Logique
Et Métaphysique Chez Aristote, edited by Devereux, Daniel and
Pellegrin, Pierre, 263-286. Paris: Éditions du CNRS.
Ebert, Theodor. 1977. "Zur Formulierung Prädikativer Aussagen in
Den Logischen Schriften Des Aristoteles." Phronesis no. 22:123-145.
Gohlke, Paul. 1936. Die Entstehung Der Aristotelischen Logik. Berlin:
Junker und Dünnhaupt.
"In this monograph Dr. Wilke attempts to distinguish within the text of
the Organon the different strata which mark the stages of development
in Aristotle's logic. This development, he believes, is essentially the
history of Aristotle's discovery of the quantity of judgments and the
ever increasing role of the particular proposition, which means the
gradual emancipation of logic from its metaphysical (i. e. Platonic)
background. In the development of the doctrine of modality Dr. Gohlke
finds a second means of distinguishing different chronological strata
and a third in the changing theory of method, particularly in the
supposed alteration of Aristotle's attitude toward the object of
demonstration."
From: Harold Cherniss - Review in The American Journal of Philology,
1938, 59, pp. 120-122
77
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 2001. "Principe De Contradiction, Principe Du
Tiers-Exclu Et Principe De Bivalence: Philosophie Première Ou
Organon?" In Logique Et Métaphysique Dans L'organon D'Aristote,
edited by Bastit, Michel and Follon, Jacques, 63-91. Louvain: Peeters.
Hintikka, Jaakko. 1993. "Commentary on Smith." Proceedings of the
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 9.
Commentary on: R. Smith - What use is Aristotle's Organon? (1999)
Reprinted in: Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.) - Aristotle. Critical assessments -
Vol. I: Logic and metaphysics - New York, Routldge, 1999, pp. 20-27
———. 1995. "Commentary on James Allen the Development of
Aristotle's Logic: Part of an Account in Outline." Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 11:206-215.
Lear, Jonathan. 1980. Aristotle and Logical Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Leszl, Walter. 1970. Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle. Aristotle's
Treatment of Types of Equivocity and Its Relevance to His
Metaphysical Theories. Padova: Antenore.
———. 2004. "Aristotle's Logical Works and His Conception of
Logic." Topoi.An Internationale Review of Philosophy no. 23:71-100.
"I provide a survey of the contents of the works belonging to Aristotle's
Organon in order to define their nature, in the light of his declared
intentions and of other indications (mainly internal ones) about his
purposes. No unifying conception of logic can be found in them, such
as the traditional one, suggested by the very title Organon, of logic as a
methodology of demonstration. Logic for him can also be formal logic
(represented in the main by the De Interpretatione), axiomatized
syllogistic (represented in the main by the Prior Analytics) and a
methodology of dialectical and rhetorical discussion. The consequent
lack of unity presented by those works does not exclude that both the
set of works called Analytics and the set of works concerning dialectic
(Topics and Sophistici Elenchi) form a unity, and that a certain priority
is attributed to the analytics with respect to dialectic."
Lukasiewicz, Jan. 1929. Elements of Mathematical Logic. Warsaw:
Warsaw University.
English translation by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz edited with footnotes by
Jerzy Slupecki, New York, Macmillan, 1963.
———. 1979. "Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction." In Articles on
78
Aristotle. Vol. 3: Metaphysics, edited by Barnes, Jonathan, Schofield,
Malcolm and Sorabji, Richard, 50-62. London: Duckworth.
Translated by Jonathan Barnes.
Originally published as Über den Satz des Widespruchs bei Aristoteles
- in: Bulletin International de l'Académie des Sciences de Cracovie, Cl.
d'histoire et de philosophie, 1910. Already ranslated into English by V.
Wedin as On the principle of contradiction in Aristotle in The Review
of Metaphysics 24, 1970/71 pp. 485-509.
———. 1993. Über Den Satz Des Widerspruchs Bei Aristoteles.
Zur Modernen Deutung der aristotelischen Logik (Band 5).
Translated from the Polish O zasadzie sprzecznosci u Arystotelesa
(1910) by Jacek Barski; with a preface by Joseph Bochenski-
Translated in Italian as: Del principio di contraddizione in Aristotele -
A cura di Gabriele Franci e Claudio Antonio Testi; presentazione di
Maurizio Matteuzzi - Macerata, Quodlibet, 2003.
Translated in French as: Du principe de contradiction chez Aristote -
Paris, Édition Éclat, 2000
Mariani, Mauro. 2000. "Numerical Identity and Accidental Predication
in Aristotle." Topoi.An Internationale Review of Philosophy no. 19:99-
110.
Menne, Albert, ed. 1962. Logico-Philosophical Studies. Dordrecht:
Reidel.
Menne, Albert, and Öffenberger, Niels, eds. 1982. Über Den
Folgerungsbegriff in Der Aristotelischen Logik. Hildesheim: Georg
Olms.
Zur Modernen Deutung der aristotelischen Logik (Band 1)
———, eds. 1985. Formale Und Nicht-Formale Logik Bei Aristoteles.
———, eds. 1988. Modallogik Und Mehrwertigkeit. Hildesheim:
Georg Olms.
Mignucci, Mario. 1985. "Puzzles About Identity. Aristotle and His
Greek Commentators." In Aristoteles. Werk Und Wirkung: Paul
Moraux Gewidmet. Erster Band: Aristoteles Und Seine Schule, edited
79
by Wiesner, Jürgen, 57-97. Berlin: de Gruyter.
"Aristotle's conception of identity is too large a subject to be analyzed
in a single article. I will try to discuss here just one of the many
problems raised by his views on sameness. It is not, perhaps, the most
stimulating question one could wish to see treated, but it is a question
about logic, where I feel a little more at ease than among the
complicated and obscure riddles of metaphysics. My subject will be
Aristotle's references to what is nowadays called 'Leibniz' Law'(LL):if
two objects x and y are the same, they both share all the same
properties.
(...)
First, I will consider Aristotle's statements about (LL) and the analyses
he gives of some supposed counterexamples to this principle. Secondly,
the interpretations of his view among his Greek commentators will be
taken into account and their distance from the position of the master
evaluated. As Professor Moraux has taught us, the study of the
Aristotelian tradition often gives us the opportunity of understanding
Aristotle's own meaning better." pp. 57-58
———. 1996. "Aristotle's Theory of Predication." In Studies on the
History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the History
of Logic, edited by Ignacio, Angelelli and Cerezo, Maria, 1-20. Berlin,
New York: de Gruyter.
Öffenberger, Niels, and G., Vigo Alejandro. 1997. Südamerikanische
Beiträge Zur Modernen Deutung Der Aristotelischen Logik.
Öffenberger, Niels, and Skarica, Mirko, eds. 2000. Beiträge Zum Satz
Vom Widerspruch Und Zur Aristotelischen Prädikationstheorie.
Öffenberger, Niels, and Surdu, Alexandru, eds. 2004. Rumänische
Beiträge Zur Modernen Deutung Der Aristotelischen Logik.
"In keeping with the fundamental aims of the series Zur modernen
Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik -- i.e. to make available articles
otherwise difficult to trace -- the editors of this IXth volume present
80
essays from Romania, together with a brief overview of the history of
logic in Romania. Although the essays were published in two major
international languages -- mainly in French, with some in German --
they appeared in Romanian journals which have a limited circulation in
the West. Studies have been selected for their focus on major areas of
Aristotelian logic: the theory of categories, syllogistics, logical
principles and the theory of knowledge; an additional theme is the
historical significance of Theophil Corydaleu's work. All these combine
to give a comprehensive view of contemporary Aristotle scholarship in
Romania."
Parry, William, and Hacker, Edward. 1991. Aristotelian Logic. New
York: State University of New York Press.
Pasquale, Gianluigi. 2006. Aristotle and the Principle of Non-
Contradiction. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Traduzione italiana: Il principio di non-contraddizione in Aristotele -
Torino, Bollati-Boringhieri, 2008.
Index: Introduction 9; I. The PNC as a law of reality and thought 17; II.
The PNC as indemonstrable principle 69; Conclusion 111;
Bibliography 119; Index of names 127-128.
"The aim of this study is to discuss the formulation of the principle of
non-contradiction (PNC) based on the text of Aristotle. It does not deal
with the whole Aristotle's Metaphysics. We take certain passages
selectively from chapter 3 and chapter 4 of the Metaphysics, with a
view to interpreting the PNC as a law of being.
Our discussion focuses mainly on how Aristotle regards the PNC as a
law of reality and a law of thought. Then we shall see the possibility of
knowing the PNC by way of intuitive understanding. This leads us to
affirm that the PNC is a supreme principle that we cannot demonstrate.
The only way Aristotle thinks it possible to speak about the principle in
question is by way of confutation, using a dialectical argument: in order
to proceed with the confutational proof, the opponent must say
something which is meaningful for himself and for others. Aristotle
distinguishes proper demonstration from a dialectical argument. We
shall also try to specify the dialectical method that Aristotle uses to
prove the PNC.
This study has two chapters. The first chapter deals with the PNC as a
law of reality and thought. This has two parts: the first part deals with
81
Metaph. IV, 3, 1005b 19-20; IV, 3, 1005b 26-27; IV, 6, 1011b 15-20
and the secand part analyses Metaph. IV, 3, 1005b 24-26; IV, 3, 1005b
28-31. These passages treat the PNC as a law of reality and thought
respectively.
We shall interpret the PNC as a law of being from two points of view:
first, based on the different types of opposition that Aristotle explains
in the Categories, we shall see the meaning of «contradiction» that
Aristotle understands in the formulation of PNC. Our conclusion will
be that the greatest opposition that Aristotle has conceived in his whole
work is the contradiction between being and non-being. The other
oppositions such as contraries, privation and relatives, are oppositions
that do not produce contradiction. As we shall see, the opposition
between the relatives father and son, between privations vision and
blindness, and between the contraries white and black, could not be
predicated at the same time of the same subject in the same respect. But
they are different from the sense of contradiction that Aristotle
conceived in the formulation of the PNC -- because they do not
distinguish absolutely the two extreme existences being and non-
being." pp. 9-10
Perreiah, Alan R. 1993. "Aristotle's Axiomatic Science: Peripatetic
Notation or Pedagogical Plan?" History and Philosophy of Logic no.
14:87-99.
"To meet a dilemma between the axiomatic theory of demonstrative
science in "Posterior analytics" and the non-axiomatic practice of
demonstrative science in the physical treatises, Jonathan Barnes has
proposed that the theory of demonstration was not meant to guide
scientific research but rather scientific pedagogy. The present paper
argues that far from contributing directly to oral instruction, the
axiomatic account of demonstrative science is a model for the written
expression of science. The paper shows how this interpretation accords
with related theories in the "Organon", including the theories of
dialectic in "Topics" and of deduction in "Prior analytics"."
Rijk, Lambertud Marie de. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology.
Volume I: General Introduction. The Works on Logic. Leiden: Brill.
From the Preface: "In this book I intend to show that the ascription of
many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle resulted from persistent
misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this
82
study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic
perceptions of `predication', and statement-making in general to
Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics
underlying Aristotle's expositions of his philosophy are culled from the
Organon. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's
semantics are is extremely important for our understanding of his view
of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.
In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when
analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does
not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic
function of `be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical
investigations shows that in his analysis statement-making is copula-
less. Following traditional linguistics I take the èxistential' or hyparctic
use of `be' to be the central one in Greek (pace Kahn), on the
understanding that in Aristotle hyparxis is found not only in the
stronger form of àctual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I
term `connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's
`semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse
semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a
well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this
void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).
In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's
statement-making, in which the opposition between àssertible' and
àssertion' is predominant and in which ìs' functions as an assertoric
operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that
Aristotle's doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of
copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are
àppellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring
in an `S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in
the wider context of Aristotle's general strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).
In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more
evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's `semantic
behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find
them in the several tracts of the Organon, in particular the Categories
De interpretatione and Posterior Analytics. These tracts are dealt with
in extenso, in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively to suit
my purposes."
83
———. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume Ii: The
Metaphysics, Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument. Leiden:
Brill.
From the Preface to the first volume: "The lion's part of volume two
(chapters 7-11) is taken up by a discussion of the introductory books of
the Metaphysics (A-E) and a thorough analysis of its central books (Z-
H-O). I emphasize the significance of Aristotle's semantic views for his
metaphysical investigations, particularly for his search for the true
ousia. By focusing on Aristotle's semantic strategy I hope to offer a
clearer and more coherent view of his philosophical position, in
particular in those passages which are often deemed obscure or
downright ambiguous.
In chapter 12 1 show that a keen awareness of Aristotle's semantic
modus operandi is not merely useful for the interpretation of his
metaphysics, but is equally helpful in gaining a clearer insight into
many other areas of the Stagirite's sublunar ontology (such as his
teaching about Time and Prime matter in Physics).
In the Epilogue (chapter 13), the balance is drawn up. The unity of
Aristotelian thought is argued for and the basic semantic tools of
localization and categorization are pinpointed as the backbone of
Aristotle's strategy of philosophic argument.
My working method is to expound Aristotle's semantic views by
presenting a running commentary on the main lines found in the
Organon with the aid of quotation and paraphrase. My findings are first
tested (mainly in Volume II) by looking at the way these views are
applied in Aristotle's presentation of his ontology of the sublunar world
as set out in the Metaphysics, particularly in the central books (ZHO).
As for the remaining works, I have dealt with them in a rather selective
manner, only to illustrate that they display a similar way of
philosophizing and a similar strategy of argument. In the second
volume, too, the exposition is in the form of quotation and paraphrase
modelled of Aristotle's own comprehensive manner of treating
doctrinally related subjects: he seldom discussed isolated problems in
the way modern philosophers in their academic papers, like to deal with
special issues tailored to their own contemporary philosophic interest."
Sainati, Vittorio. 1968. Storia Dell' "Organon" Aristotelico. I: Dai
"Topici" Al "De Interpretatione". Firenze: Le Monnier.
84
———. 1973. Storia Dell' "Organon" Aristotelico. Ii: L'analitica.
Parte Prima. La Crisi Epistemologica Della Topica. Firenze: Le
Monnier.
Ristampato con il titolo: Dalla Topica all'Analitica in Teoria, 2, 1993
pp. 1-117
———. 1993. "Aristotele. Dalla Topica All'analitica." Teoria.Rivista di
Filosofia no. 2:1-117.
Scritto nel 1973.
Sisson, Edward. 1939. "The Copula in Aristotle and Afterwards."
Philosophical Review no. 48:57-64.
Smith, Robin. 1993. "What Use Is Aristotle's Organon?" Proceedings
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 9:261-285.
Reprinted in: Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.) - Aristotle. Critical assessments -
Vol. I: Logic and metaphysics - New York, Routldge, 1999, pp. 1-19
Solmsen, Friedrich. 1929. Die Entwicklung Der Aristotelischen Logik
Und Rhetorik. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.
Reprinted Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 2001
Sorbi, Luca. 1999. Aristotele: La Logica Comparativa. Firenze:
Olschki.
Due volumi: I (1999); II (2002).
Striker, Gisela. 1998. "Aristotle and the Uses of Logic." In Method in
Ancient Philosophy, edited by Genttzler, Jyl, 209-226. New York:
"Aristotle, as we all know, invented formal logic. Over the last fifty
years or so, scholars have learned to recognize that what he presented
in the first few chapters of the Prior Analytics (An. pr.) is the real thing
-- a system of formal logic, whether or not the inspiration for the
discovery of the syllogism had anything to do with Platonic division.
We no longer hear about the magical force of the middle term or the
alleged demonstrative power of first figure syllogisms as opposed to,
say, the superficial subtleties of Stoic logic. Although Aristotle's
syllogistic covers only a small part of' the field of modern mathematical
logic, what he offered contained all the elements of a formal deductive
system. He introduces the system of syllogistic moods by defining its
technical terms, stating and justifying the primitive rules, and then
providing formally correct proofs of the derivative rules. In other
words, he developed a complete system of natural deduction, limited
85
indeed by the assumption that all propositions must be simple subject-
predicate sentences, but otherwise flawless. (1)
(...)
Aristotle was interested both in logic as a theory and in its more
humdrum uses in philosophical, or indeed everyday, argument, and
more than half of the text of the Prior Analytics is concerned with the
uses of logic in argument, rather than with either the exposition of a
formal system or what we would calf logical theory. This is what one
should expect, since Aristotle invented formal logic for the purposes of
his general theory of argument, not just as a formal theory of deductive
proof or an 'underlying logic' for demonstrative science. (5) In order to
show how the perspective of a general theory of argument differs from
that of logical theory, I will argue that although syllogistic can be
shown to be complete in the modern logician's sense, it was not
considered by its author to be complete in the sense relevant to his
project. A deduction system is complete in the modern sense if it allows
one to deduce all (and only) the valid formulae.
What Aristotle has in mind when he set out to show that 'every
deductive argument (sullogismos) is one of the (syllogistic) figures'
(A23 40b20-22) was the claim that every valid deductive argument can
be formulated as one or more syllogisms in the narrow sense. This, as
Aristotle recognized, is not the case (A 44. 50b2-3). However, I will
also argue that he thought syllogistic captured at least a necessary
component of every valid deductive argument, and perhaps that it was
indeed sufficient as an account of the logical form of scientific
demonstration. Finally, I will illustrate the role of formal syllogistic in
the theory of argument by a few examples from the second half of book
A and from book B." pp. 210-211
(1) This summarizes the conclusion of J. Corcoran, 'Aristotle's Natural
Deduction System', in idem (ed.), Ancient Logic and its Modern
Interpretations (Dordrecht: Reidel. 1974), 122-3.
(5) Corcoran 'Aristotle's Natural Deduction System'. 98.
Surdu, Alexandru. 2006. Aristotelian Theory of Prejudicative Forms.
Zur Modernen Deutung der aristotelischen Logik (Band 10).
"Alexandru Surdu is an outstanding representative of the Romanian
school of Aristotle research. The special characteristic of this school is
86
that its members have not based their research solely on the An. pr. and
the De int. but have also paid particular attention to the Categories.
This volume contains a thorough modern interpretation of the
Categories in which the author takes into account commentators in the
Greek, Latin and modern traditions, for example Adolf Trendelenburg.
The symbolic-logical-mathematical presentation of the first chapter of
the Categories with reference to the difference between the predicative
types 'dicitur de' and 'inesse', especially in the case of the ante-
predicative 'universal accidence' allows the author to elaborate the
'prejudicative forms' which carry no values of truth and do not come
into being through assent or denial. Using an original interpretation of
these 'prejudicative forms' the author is able to reveal forms and modes
similar to those of syllogistics which have hitherto been unknown to
either traditional or symbolic logic."
Theron, Stephen. 2002. "The Interdependence of Semantics, Logic, and
Metaphysics as Exemplified in the Aristotelian Tradition."
International Philosophical Quarterly no. 42:63-91.
"We need to recognize, or to remember, the priority of being to truth
and not to conflate them. We need to explicate the origin of thinking
(abstraction) as at one remove from immediate sense-experience.
Syllogistic logic then emerges as a true causal account of reasoning in
general; it is not some primitive attempt to outline a formal logical
system. An account of suppositio as controlling the analogous uses of
our finite store of words in reference to an infinite reality itself shaped
by crisscross patterns of likenesses, governs the general picture
supplied here."
Thompson, Manley. 1953. "On Aristotle' Square of Opposition."
Viano, Carlo Augusto. 1955. La Logica Di Aristotele. Torino: Taylor.
———. 1983. "La Proposizione in Aristotele." In Atti Del Convegno
Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica, edited by Michele, Abrusci,
Casari, Ettore and Mugnai, Massimo, 3-18. Bologna: CLUEB.
Vuillemin, Jules. 1967. De La Logique À La Théologie. Cinq Études
Sur Aristote. Paris: Flammarion.
Nouvelle version remaniée et augmentée par l'auteur editée et prefacée
par Thomas Benatouil - Louvain-La-Neuve, Peeters, 2008.
Wedin, Michael. 1978. "Aristotle on the Existential Import of Singular
87
Sentences." Phronesis no. 23:179-196.
———. 1990. "Negation and Quantification in Aristotle." History and
Philosophy of Logic no. 19:131-150.
"Two main claims are defended. The first is that negative categorical
statements are not to be accorded existential import insofar as they
figure in the square of opposition. Against Kneale and others, it is
argued that Aristotle formulates his O statements, for example,
precisely to avoid existential commitment. This frees Aristotle's square
from a recent charge of inconsistency. The second claim is that the
logic proper provides much thinner evidence than has been supposed
for what appears to be the received view, that is, for the view that
insofar as they occur in syllogistic negative categoricals have
existential import. At most there is a single piece of evidence in favor
of the view -- a special case of echthesis or the setting out of a case in
proof."
Weidemann, Hermann. 1980. "In Defence of Aristotle's Theory of
Predication." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 25:76-87.
———. 1989. "Aristotle on Inferences from Signs (Rhetoric I 2, 1357
B 1-25)." Phronesis no. 34:343-351.
Wieland, Wolfgang. 1967. "Zur Deutung Der Aristotelischen Logik."
Philosophische Rundschau no. 14:1-27.
Williams, C.J.F. 1985. "Aristotle's Theory of Descriptions."
RELATED PAGES
The Logical Works of Aristotle:
Aristotle's Earlier Dialectic: the Topics and Sophistical Refutations(in

preaparation)
88
Aristotle's Prior Analytics: the Theory of Modal Syllogism (in
preaparation)
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics: The Theory of Demonstration (in

preaparation)
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Semantics and Philosophy of Language in

Aristotle's De Interpretatione
INTRODUCTION
"The central theme of the De interpretatione is the nature of contradiction
between assertions. This is a crucially important theme for dialectic, whose
regular tasks include that of establishing the contradictory of a proposed
thesis, and that of replying to a dilemmatic question by choosing between the
affirmation and the negation of a given thesis.(4) The inquiry into language
as such, which occupies the first four chapters, is subordinated to this goal.
One apparent obstacle to such a view of the treatise is the (highly suspect)
transmitted title, Περί ερμηνείας, which should probably be understood in the
sense "On language" (cf. De anima II 8, 420b19-21, where ερμηνεία
functions as a synonym of δίάληκτος). A second obstacle is the opening
announcement: "First we must determine what a name is, and what a verb is,
then what are a negation, an affirmation, an assertion, and a sentence
(λόγος)". This programme attaches no special importance to contradiction:
affirmation and negation merely appear in the middle of the agenda.(5) In
fact though, these two obstacles may helpfully cancel each other out. All we
need is the simple hypothesis that the original, lost title of the work (or
lecture course) already specified contradiction as the principal theme. There
is in fact good reason to think that the authentic title was On affirmation and
90
negation.(6) In that case the opening sentence was unambiguously
understood as specifying the series of definitions required as a preliminary to
that central theme. Later, when the authentic title was lost, we need only
suppose that an early editor was misled by the programmatic opening
sentence into identifying language itself as the work's main theme, and
inventing its current title, "On language".
As regards the progression in the opening chapters from "name" (δνομα) and
"verb" (ρήμα) to "sentence" (λόγος), even this should not really be seen as an
investigation of language as such. In ignoring all components of statements
other than "names", "verbs", and the negation sign, Aristotle continues and
reflects the project in Plato's Sophist 260-264 of investigating statements qua
bearers of truth and falsity. (Even the treatment of negation represents the
legacy of the Sophist: Aristotle follows Plato (257b-c) in regarding "not" as
negating only the word which follows, (7) in contrast with Stoic logic, which
uses it to negate an entire proposition). This is a further sign that the
dominant theme is a specific one, the relation between certain kinds of
assertion, rather than language in general." pp. 88-89
(4) My understanding of this and many other aspects of the De int. has
been transformed by a recently completed Cambridge doctoral thesis,
soon to be published: C.W.A. Whitaker, An analysis of Aristotle's De
interpretatione [published in 1996 as: Aristotle's De interpretatione.
Contradiction and dialectic. Oxford: Clarendon Press]. He shows that
the treatise is to be read in conjunction with the Topics much more than
with the Analytics.
(5) The agenda itself does not observe a strictly linear sequence. The first
pair, δνoμα/ρήμα, does correspond to chapters 2 and 3 respectively. But
άπόφασις καί κατάφασις καί άπόφανσις καί λόγος precisely reverses the
order followed in chapters 4-6, starting with the two species, then moving to
their genus and finally to the genus of their genus. On this, see Montanari
(1984, I: 25-31).
(6) I suggest this because (a) the ancient commentators knew a work by
Theophrastus entitled Περί καταφάσεως καί άπoφάσεως, which they said
covered the same themes as Int. (Theophrastus frr. 71G, 72A, 79, 8 lB FHSG;
cf. schol. in Ar. De int. 94b14-17 Brandis, in Bekker (1961, vol.4), and (b)
Theophrastus' other works corresponding to the Organon all had identical
91
titles to the matching Aristotelian texts: he wrote a Categories, a Topics, a
Prior Analytics and a Posterior Analytics (frr. 1, 2, 71F, 100B, 104, 112B,
113B, 117, 124A, 127A, 127B FHSG). (Despite frr.frr. 71A and 71E
(FHSG), it seems most unlikely that Theophrastus wrote a work actually
entitled Περί έρμηνε'ας). An alternative but less plausible hypothesis is that
of Maier (1900: 70-1) that it was Theophrastus himself who, finding the
Aristotelian treatise already untitled, invented the title Περίκαταφάσεως καί
άπoφάσεως. But it is hard to believe that Aristotle's long-term close
collaborator on logic and dialectic was ignorant of its authentic title. The
likelier story is that it was only after Theophrastus' death that the inauthentic
title was invented to fill a gap in the MSS.
(7) This is well demonstrated by Whitaker [1996]
"The results so far are as follows. The semantic theory of the De
interpretatione places itself at the service of Aristotle's study of
contradiction between assertions, and reflects a Platonic debate on the
question how beliefs and assertions come to be true or false. It is from
this perspective, and not for their own sake, that the theory also
addresses itself to the minimum semantic components of assertions,
names and verbs. Therefore the semantic passage in chapter 1 is to be
thought of as prefixed to the entire work, especially the final chapter,
and not specially to chapters 1-4" p. 100
From: David Sedley, Aristotle's De interpretatione and Ancient Semantics,
in: Giovanni Manetti (ed.), Knowledge Through Signs. Ancient
SemioticTtheories and Practices, Turnhout: Brepols, 1996, pp. 87-108
Abbreviation: FHSG = Fortenbaugh, Huby, Sharples and Gutas (eds.),

Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings Thought and
Influence, Leiden: Brill 1992 (two volumes).
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DE INTERPRETATIONE

(PERI HERMENEIAS)
"ORDER OF THE PERI HERMENEIAS.
92
Since the enunciation is the principal subject of the Peri Hermeneias the
treatise is divided according to the consideration of the enunciation and
its parts.(1) After a preliminary chapter on signification and different
ways of signifying, (2)Aristotle treats first the principles of the subject
i.e., the principles of the enunciation. These are of two kinds: material
and formal. The material (or, as St. Thomas refers to them, "quasi
material" (3) principles or integral parts of the enunciation are the nom
and the verb, the former signifying the substance of a thing and the latter
signifying an action or a passion proceeding from a thing. (4) Aristotle
defines the noun as a vocal sound which signifies by convention,
without time, no part of which signifies separately. (5) "Vocal sound" is
the matter or subject on which the signification of the noun is imposed;
it distinguishes the noun from sounds not emitted by animals. "Which
signifies" distinguishes the noun from nonsense words. "By convention"
manifests that this signification of a noun proceeds arbitrarily from the
human will; the noun is distinct from sounds which are naturally
significant, such as groans and cries. "Without time" distinguishes the
noun from the verb, and this last phrase, "no part of which signifies
separately," distinguishes the noun from speech (oratio) of which it is a
part. The verb is defined in the same way, except that it signifies with
time, since it signifies action. It is moreover, distinguished from the
participle in that it is always a sign that something is predicated of
another. The formal principle of the enunciation is speech, which is its
genus.(6) The genus of the enunciation is then called its formal
principle, because the more universal in praedicando since it is not of
itself contracted to this or that species, is as a form including the species.
A genus is logically superior to the species contained under it; since the
species are as subjects of which the genus is predicated, the genus is
their formal principle.
Having treated the principles of the subject, Aristotle now takes up the
subject, i.e., the enunciation, in the rest of the book. This falls into two
sections, the first is on the enunciation absolutely considered, (7) the second
is on the different kinds of enunciations.(8) The absolute consideration of the
enunciation comprises three parts: its definition, (9) its division, (10) and its
property of opposition.(11)
The enunciation is defined as speech in which the true or false is found.(12)
93
This definition distinguishes the enunciation from incomplete speech
(orationes imperfectae) as well as from questions, commands, prayers, and
salutations which do not absolutely signify concepts in which the true or false
is found.(13) The first division is into the enunciation which is simply one
because what it signifies is one and the enunciation which is one only by
conjunction because it signifies many. The latter, called a composite
enunciation, is one only secundum quid; simpliciter it is many.(14) The
second division is into the species of the enunciation: the affirmation and the
negation. This division is primarily of the simple enunciation, but can also be
applied ex consequenti to the composite enunciation.(15)
These divisions are followed by a treatment of opposition between the
subjective parts of the enunciation, i.e., between affirmation and negation.
First, Aristotle shows how enunciations are opposed to each other,(16) and,
secondly, he answers a difficulty about whether in future singular
enunciations in contingent matter one of the opposed enunciations must be
true or false.(17) To show how enunciations are opposed to each other he
takes up, first of all, the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely
considered, i.e., without reference to differences arising from the subject.
This opposition of affirmation and negation is called contradiction.(18) In
this connection, St. Thomas points out that affirmation and negation divide
the enunciation on the part of its very form or mode of enunciating, whereas
the true and the false divide it in comparison to things, e.g., "The crow is
white" is affirmative in its mode of enunciating, but false; "The crow is not
white" is negative and true.
...Philosophus assumit duplicem diversitatem enunciationis: quarum
prima est ex ipsa forma vel modo enunciandi, secundum quod dictum
est quod enunciatio vel est affirmativa, per quam scilicet enunciatur
aliquid esse, vel est negative per quam significatur aliquid non esse;
secunda diversitas est per comparationem ad rem, ex qua dependet
veritas et falsitas intellectus et enunciationis. Cum enim enunciatur
aliquid esse vel non esse secundum congruentiam rei, est oratio vera;
alioquin est oratio falsa.(19)
Next, Aristotle shows how enunciations are furthermore opposed by
reason of their subjects.(20) This involves a new division of
94
enunciations according to the quantity of the subject, i.e., according as
something is predicated of many or of one only. Since a subject is either
singular or universal, and since a predicate is said of a universal either
universally, particularly, or indefinitely, there are four kinds of
enunciations: singular, universal, particular, and indefinite.(21) Then,
combining the qualities of affirmation and negation with the quantity of
the subject, Aristotle shows that an affirmative universal and a negative
universal are opposed as contraries, e.g., "Every man is white" and "No
man is white."(22) However, when nothing is predicated universally of a
universal subject, there cannot be an opposition of contrariety; therefore
indefinite enunciations cannot be opposed as contraries.(23) A particular
affirmative cannot properly be said to be opposed to a particular
negative, because opposition demands the same subject in both
enunciations, but a particular enunciation is opposed as a contradictory
to the universal of the opposite quality, e.g., "Some man is white" is the
contradictory of "No man is white."(24) Next, the author considers how
these opposed affirmations and negations are related to truth and falsity:
contraries cannot be simultaneously true, etc.(25)
After distinguishing the different modes of opposition, Aristotle shows that
there is only one negation opposed to every affirmation, e.g., "Some man is
not white" is the only negation of "Every man is white," because it alone
removes the very universality of the universal enunciation.(26) Finally,
Aristotle takes up the problem of whether one of the opposites must be
determinately true .or false in all kinds of enunciations or not.(27) To treat
this question it is necessary to observe that enunciations can be divided
according to time into present, past, and future and according to their matter
into necessary, impossible, and possible or contingent.(28) For enunciations
in present or past time, either a universal or its contradictory particular is
necessarily true and its opposite is false, in any kind of matter, e.g., "Some
man is not white" is necessarily true, if "Every man is white" is false. This is
also true for singular enunciations which are opposed as contradictories, e.g.,
if "This man is white" is true, "This man is not white" is necessarily false.
From the truth of a particular affirmation, however, the falsity of its negative
cannot be inferred, e.g., "Some man is white" and "Some man is not white"
can both be true. But for enunciations in future time a distinction must be
made according to the matter of the enunciation. Future enunciations in
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necessary and impossible matter are determinately true or false in the same
way as enunciations in present and past time. Likewise, in contingent matter,
universals are false and particulars are true, as for present and past
enunciations. It is for singular enunciations in future time that a problem
arises, for, although a future singular enunciation in necessary matter is
determinately true or false, it does not seem to be so in contingent matter.(29)
The answer to this problem and the reasons for the answer take up the rest of
this chapter in Aristotle and the rest of the first book of St. Thomas's
commentary.
The remainder of the Peri Hermeneias (30) is devoted to the enunciation as it
is diversified by the addition of something. First of all, something can be
added to a part of the enunciation, i.e., to the subject or to the predicate.
Sometimes such an addition does not take away the unity of the enunciation,
as when the subject or predicate is rendered infinite by the addition of a
negative.(31) Aristotle first takes up the simplest kind of enunciation which
consists only of a noun and the verb "is," e.g., "Socrates is." (32) Since only
the subject can be made infinite in this kind of enunciation, only two
affirmations can be formed from it: "Socrates is" and "Non-Socrates is."
There are also the two corresponding negations: "Socrates is not" and "Non-
Socrates is not." These enunciations are said to be de secundo adjacente, (33)
because "is" is the second diction in the enunciation; "is" signifies that
"Socrates" really exists. There are also enunciations de tertio adjacente (34)
in which "is" is not the principal predicate but serves to connect the principal
predicate with the subject, e.g., "Socrates is white." In such enunciations, the
predicate as well as the subject can be made infinite. If an enunciation is
constructed from a finite noun, the verb "is," and a predicate which can be
either finite or infinite, four enunciations are possible: "Man is just" with its
negation, "Man is not just," and "Man is non-just" with its negation, "Man is
not non-just." (35) If, on the other hand, the subject is an infinite noun, four
enunciations are also possible: "Non-man is just" with its negation, "Non-
man is not just" and "Non-man is non-just" with its negation, "Non-man is
not non-just." (36) No more than these twelve enunciations are possible.
Since the subject of each can be singular, universal, particular, or indefinite, a
total of forty-eight enunciations is possible from the point of view taken here.
(37) Enunciations whose verbs are adjectival, (38) such as "Socrates runs,"
are affected by an addition to a part of the enunciation in the same way as
96
simple enunciations, i.e., de secundo adjacente. This is true, despite the fact
that from the point of view of what is signified such enunciations are the
equivalent of enunciations de tertio adjacente: "Socrates runs" is equivalent
to "Socrates is running."
Sometimes an addition takes away the unity of the enunciation. (39) An
enunciation is multiple, if what is signified is multiple, even though the
enunciation may appear to be simple. An enunciation can be multiple in four
ways: (a) when the subject or predicate is one noun which is imposed on
several things, which combine into one, but not insofar as they are one (b)
when the several which combine into one are the subject or predicate insofar
as they are distinct actualities; (c) when one noun is imposed of several things
which do not combine into one; and (d) when the several which do not
combine into one are the subject or predicate.(40) After distinguishing the
multiple enunciations, Aristotle takes up their consequences.(41) He proposes
first the problem of why some predicates are true of a subject both when the
predicates are taken separately and whey they are joined, while others are
true only separately, e.g., from the fact that Socrates is a man and is white it
follows that Socrates is a white man but from the fact that he is good and is a
musician it does not follow that Socrates is a good musician.(42) The second
problem is whether from ay enunciation whose predicate includes several
notions it is legitimate to infer several enunciations each having one of the
notions for its predicate e.g., from "Socrates is a white man" it follows that he
is white and that he is a man, but from "Socrates is a good musician" it does
not follow that he is good. (43)
Secondly, an addition can be made, not merely to a part of the enunciation,
but to its very composition. Such an addition is a mode, and it distinguishes
the modal enunciation from the de inesse enunciation. There are four of these
modes: possible, contingent, impossible, and necessary.(44) The introductory
paragraphs of Cajetan's commentary explain the distinction between the
modal and the de inesse enunciations, which mode make an enunciation
modal, the parts of the modal enunciation, and it definition.(45) The text of
Aristotle covers the opposition of modals by reason of affirmation and
negation(46) as well as their consequences. Thus, to the affirmation, "That
man is white is possible," is opposed the negation, "That man is white is not
possible."(47) A modal is negative only by addition of a negative to the
mode, regardless of whether or not the dictum is negative.(48) The following
97
is an example of the consequence of equipollent modals: that which is
necessary to be is, consequently, no possible not to be, not contingent not to
be, and impossible not to be.(49) Cajetan concludes this section with some
paragraphs on the quantity peculiar to modals and their opposition by virtue
of their quantity.(50)
Lastly, Aristotle treats the opposition of enunciations deriving from an
addition made to a simple enunciation.(51) In this section, he asks whether
the contrary of an affirmative enunciation is the negation of the same
predicate or the affirmation of the contrary predicate, e.g., is the contrary of
"Every man is just" "No man is just" or "Every man is unjust" ?
DIVISIONS OF THE ENUNCIATION
Six ways of dividing the enunciation can be gathered from the Peri
Hermeneias: by reason of unity, quality, quantity, time, matter, and
expression or non-expression of the mode of composition.
The first division is into the enunciation that is one (una simpliciter) and that
which is composite (una conjunctione). The former is sometimes called
categorical, and the latter hypothetical.(52) This is an essential division of the
enunciation, because it is a division on the part of the copula.
The second is into affirmation and negation, which St. Thomas frequently
asserts is the division of the enunciation into its species.
Quae quidem est divisio generis in species, quia sumitur secundum
differentiam praedicati ad quod fertur negatio; praedicatum autem est
pars formalis enunciationis; et ideo hujusmodi divisio dicitur pertinere
ad qualitatem enunciationis, qualitatem, inquam, essentialem, secundum
quod differentia significat quale quid.(53)
The third division is by reason of a difference found in the subject of the
enunciation, according as it is said of many or only of one. St. Thomas
says this division pertains to the quantity of the enunciation, for quantity
follows matter, and the subject is as matter in the enunciation.(54) But
when the subject is a universal (i.e., it can be said of many) something
can be predicated of it in three ways: universally, if the predicate
belongs to the entire multitude in which the universal is found, e.g.,
"Every man is an animal" ; particularly, if the predicate is said to belong
98
to an indeterminate individual that falls under the universal, e.g., "Some
man is white"; or indefinitely, when something is predicated of a
universal without any sign of universality or particularity. Thus from the
point of view of quantity, the enunciation is divided into singular,
universal, particular, and indefinite.(55)
The fourth division of the enunciation is according to time, i.e., into past,
present, and future. As the third division was on the part of the subject, this is
on the part of the verb, because every enunciation must have a verb or a form
of a verb and must, therefore, consignify present past, or future time.(56)
Both the third and fourth divisions are accidental because they are according
to a part of the enunciation.
The fifth division of the enunciation is according to matter, i.e., according to
the relationship of predicate to subject. If the predicate is in the, subject per
se, the enunciation is said to be in necessary matter, e.g. "Man is an animal,"
or "Man is capable of laughter." If it is per s repugnant that the predicate be
in the subject, the enunciation is said to be in impossible or remote matter,
e.g., "Man is a horse." If the predicate is neither per se repugnant to the
subject nor per se contained it, the enunciation is said to be in possible or
contingent matter.(57)
The sixth and last division of the enunciation is into the de inesse and the
modal enunciation, the former merely stating that the predicate, is or is not in
the subject, the latter stating the mode in which the predicate does or does not
belong to the subject, i.e., necessarily, impossibly, possibly or contingently.
(58)The extremes of this division are the expression o the non-expression of
the mode of composition of predicate with subject."
(1) "Principaliter tamen modum scientiae considerantis subjectum et
partes subjecti, de quibus per principia propria probat passiones." St.
Thomas, In Peri Hermenias, p.377a.
(2) Aristotle, Peri Herm., chap.1; St. Thomas, In Peri Herm., lect.1-3.
(3) Lect.4, n.1.
(4) Ibid.; the noun and the verb are treated in Aristotle, chaps. 2, 3; St.
Thomas lect. 4, 5.
(5) It is important to note that nomen or noun includes both the noun
substantive and the noun adjective. This is not only true in logic, but is also in
accordance with the usage of the older grammarians. Thus, in "Man is white"
99
both "man" am "white" are nouns.
(6) Aristotle, chap. 4, 16b27-35; St. Thomas, lect. 6.
(7) Chap. 4, 17a1-chap. 9.
(8) Chaps. 10-14; in the commentary of St. Thomas, the first is treated in
lessons seven to fifteen of what he calls the first book; all the rest in the
commentaries of St. Thomas and Cajetan is called the second book.
(9) Chap. 4, 17a1-8.
(10) Chaps. 5-6, 17a26.
(11) Chap. 6, 17a27-chap. 9.6
(12) "Enunciatio est oratio, in qua verum vel falsum est." St. Thomas, lect.7,
n.2.
(13) Ibid., n.4.
(14) Ibid., lect.8, n.13.
(15) Ibid., n.19.
(16) Chap. 6, 17a27-chap. 8; St. Thomas, lect.9-12.
(17) Chap. 9; St. Thomas, l lect.13-15.
(18) St. Thomas, lect.9, n.8.
(19) Ibid., n.2.
(20) Aristotle, chap.7, 17a37-17b22; St. Thomas, lect.10, 11, nn.1-5.
(21) St. Thomas, lect.10, nn.10, 14, 15, 16.
(22) Ibid., n.18.22
(23) Ibid., n.19.
(24) Ibid., lect.11, nn.2, 3.
(25) Aristotle, chap.7, 17b23-37; St. Thomas, lect.11, nn.6-11.
(26) Chap.7, 17b38-chap.8; St. Thomas, lect.12.
(27) Chap.9; St. Thomas, lect.13-15.
(28) St. Thomas, lect.13, n.3.
(29) Ibid., nn.4, 5, 6.
(30) Aristotle, chaps.10-14; the second book of the commentaries.
(31) Chap.10; St. Thomas and Cajetan, II, lect.1-4.
(32) St. Thomas, lead.
(33) Ibid., lect.2, n.2.
(34) Ibid.
(35) Cajetan, lect.3, nn.1-8.
(36) Ibid., n.9.
(37) Ibid., n.10.
100
(38) Ibid., nn.12-16.
(39) Aristotle, chap.11; Cajetan, lect.5-7.
(40) Cajetan, lect.5, n.4.
(41) 20b32-21a33; Cajetan, lect.6, 7.
(42) Cajetan, lect.6.
(43) Ibid., lect.7.
(44) Aristotle, chaps.12, 13; Cajetan, lect.8-12.
(45) Lect.8, nn.1-6.
(46) Chap.12; Cajetan, lect.8, n.7-lect.9.
(47) Chap.13; Cajetan, lect.10-12, n.9.
(48) Cajetan lect.9, n.5.
(49) Ibid., lect.12, n.7.
(50) Ibid., nn.10-13.
(51) Chap.14; Cajetan, lect.13, 14.
(52) John of Saint Thomas, Cursus philosophicus (ed. Reiser, 3 vols.; Rome:
Marietti, 1930), T.I, p.25.
(53) In I Peri Herm., lect.10, n.10.
(54) Ibid.
(55) Ibid., n.13-16.
(56) Ibid., lect.13,
(57) Ibid.
(58) Cajetan, In II Peri Herm., lect.8, n.2.
From: Henri DuLac, The 'Peri Hermenias'. Its Place in Logic and Its Order,
Laval Théologique et Philosophique 5: 161-169 (1949)
ONOMA AND RHEMA IN THE DE

INTERPRETATIONE
"3.2. The expression of thought in speech
3.2.1. As we saw in 2.4.3, one of the words that Plato uses for giving verbal
expression to what one holds true in one's mind is the verb apophainesthai.
This verb, with gnomon or doxan as the expressed or unexpressed object, was
familiar to every Greek and had the quite ordinary meaning of making known
one's opinion. It is this word that plays a central role in Aristotle's treatment
101
of the expression of thought in speech, at least in De interpretatione.
Together with the noun apophansis, it becomes a more or less technical term
for the speech act of making known to others what one holds true in one's
mind, of asserting that something is the case. This speech act is either an
affirmation or a denial: a kataphasis is an apophansis in which it is asserted
that one thing belongs to another, an apophasis is an apophansis in which
one thing is separated from another (De int. 17 a 25). Both kataphasis and
apophasis are species of the genus phasis: they are forms of saying (phanai)
that something is or is not the case.
All these nouns suffer from a process-product ambiguity. Sometimes they
indicate the activity of making known one's opinion by means of affirming or
denying that something is the case. But they may also designate the utterance
which is produced in the course of that activity. So an apophansis is defined
as a significant spoken sound about whether something does or does not hold
(De int. 17 a 23). The two species of the genus phasis, kataphasis and
apophasis, are defined as logos kataphatikos and logos apophatikos, as an
affirmative or negative utterance (Cat. 12 b 8). Each is a logos apophantikos,
an utterance used in the activity of revealing one's thought (De int. 17 a 8).
It is this utterance, as used for a special purpose, that is the typical unit of the
legein-level, the Platonic logos. In contrast with other sorts of expressions
which do not yet admit of truth or falsity, a kataphasis or apophasis and a
logos apophantikos are the kind of units that are rightly called true or false
(Cat. 2 a 7; De int. 17 a 3, 20 a 35).
3.2.2. The other sorts of expressions, which do not yet admit of truth or
falsity and are for that reason incomplete and defective, are the units of
Plato's onomazein-level, the onomata and rhemata. By uttering an onoma or
a rhema one cannot reveal anything by one's utterance in such a way as to be
making a statement (De int. 17 a 17). This 'not yet'-character of onomata and
rhemata is a point to which Aristotle remarkably often returns.
In Cat. 1 a 16 he distinguishes between expressions whose utterance involves
a combination (symploke) and expressions that are uttered without
combination. As examples are given: 'Man runs', 'Man wins'; 'Man', 'Ox',
'Runs', 'Wins'. The expressions formed without any combination designate
something belonging to one of the categories, and none of them is either true
or false (Cat. 2 a 8, 13 b 10).
In De int. 16 a 9 a parallel is drawn between the mental sphere and the verbal
102
sphere. In the mental sphere two kinds of thoughts are found, those
unaccompanied by truth or by falsity and those that necessarily have one or
the other. In the verbal sphere onomata and rhemata which are pronounced
without any addition -- for instance, 'Man', 'White' -- are like thoughts that are
formed without any combination; they are not yet true or false. Even a word
such as 'Goat-stag' does not yet signify anything true or false. It does so only
when 'is' or 'is not' is added.
That the symploke must be of a special kind is shown by De int 16 b 1. When
'is' or 'is not' is added to a genitive or dative case (Philo's' or 'to-Philo), the
combination does not yet yield a truth or falsehood. The oblique cases cannot
play the role of naming the subject in a statement-making utterance.
Further examples of the 'not yet'-terminology are De int. 16 b 19 and 17 a 9.
Verbs uttered by themselves signify something but they do not yet signify
whether something is the case or not (Compare De int. 16 b 28: a word like
'Man' signifies something but not that something is the case or is not the
case). The definition (logos) of man, without 'is' or 'was' or 'will be' or
something of that kind, is not yet a statement-making utterance.
These passages are sufficient proof that Aristotle, probably inspired by Plato,
is fully aware of the incomplete and defective character of onomata and
rhemata. Measured against the relative independence of utterances by means
of which expression is given to a belief that something is the case, and which
therefore admit of truth or falsity, the meaning of onomata and rhemata is
imperfect. A composite unit of the legein-level, which has the complete sense
of a true or a false thought, is formed only when the open place
accompanying each separate onoma or rhema is occupied by a proper
complement.
Aristotle defines onomata and rhemata as spoken sounds significant by
convention none of whose parts is significant in separation (De int. 16 a 20,
16 b 6; Poetics 1457 a 10, 14). The difference between the two is that an
onoma signifies without any reference to time, whereas a rhema additionally
signifies time. Moreover, the rhema is a sign of something said of something
else, the subject. The verb legein which Aristotle uses in this connection
indicates both the predicative and the assertive function of the rhema; if
someone says 'Callias runs', the component 'runs' is a sign that the speaker
connects the activity of running with Callias, but also that he holds that this
predicate actually belongs to Callias, at the time indicated. As for cases like
103
'Callias is running' or 'Man is just', where the word 'is' occurs as a third
element, there the verb 'is' by itself is nothing, but it additionally signifies
some combination (synthesis) which cannot be thought without the
components (De int 16 b 25). This synthesis, of which the spoken sounds 'is'
or 'is not' are the appropriate sign, is the mental activity of bringing together
or separating two concepts which, at the same time, is an act of assenting to
the combination, or of dissenting from it. Aristotle does not seem to
distinguish between merely conceiving of a certain combination, in a neutral
state of mind, and actually accepting or rejecting it; for him a synthesis is
always a mental assertion. That the copula 'is' has this assertive force is
confirmed by Met. 1017 a 31; although Aristotle speaks there of an emphatic
use of Is' and 'is not', in the sense of 'Socrates is educated, he really is so',
there is reason to believe that this emphatic use is only a strengthening of
what is normally present in all cases. For in De int. 21 b 31 it is said that in
utterances of the form 'Man is white', 'Man is not white' the parts 'is' and 'is
not' determine the true; this presumably means that they lend assertive force
to these utterances (The passage is, however, far from clear).
De int. 16 b 20 is also interesting because it is in these lines that we find the
first trace of a distinction that later came to be known as the distinction
between categorematic and syncategorematic words. Although verbs by
themselves do not yet signify whether something is the case or not and
therefore do not possess the degree of completeness and independence which
is characteristic of the units of the legein-level, it is still true that most of
them have a meaning of their own in the sense that both the speaker and the
hearer, in pronouncing or hearing the word, will have a definite thought in
their minds, a thought that has some kind of self-sufficiency. The copula 'is',
on the contrary, is not accompanied by any such distinct and relatively self-
sufficient thought; it only adds a certain nuance to the meaning of the words
to which it is joined. For this additional way of signifying Aristotle uses the
word prossemainein. This verb also occurs in De int 20 a 13, in connection
with 'every' and 'no'; these words additionally signify nothing other than that
the affirmation or negation is about the name taken universally. Thus we have
here the beginning of a trichotomy: expressions signifying that something is
the case; verbs and nouns, which do not yet signify that something is the case
but have some meaning of their own; and words like 'is', 'every', 'no', which
do not signify (semainein) in either of those ways but only contribute to the
104
meaning of other words." pp. 26-29
(...)
"3.6. Summary
This chapter clearly shows that the treatment of problems concerning acts and
attitudes of holding something true and their objects with which Plato had
made a modest but hopeful beginning in Sophist 261-264 was considerably
extended and refined by Aristotle's efforts. By way of conclusion I shall give
a synopsis of what we have found out about his conception of the bearers of
truth and falsity.
In the first place that is true or false which is thought or believed to be the
case. This bearer of truth or falsity may be designated by such expressions as
doxa, hypolepsis, doxazomenon (doxaston), hypolambanomenon (hypo-
lepton), or by a hoti-clause or an accusative and infinitive phrase. In so far as
a thought or belief is expressed in words it is perhaps also referred to as the
pragma that underlies an affirmation or negation; but Aristotle does not seem
to make a clear terminological distinction between the thing believed or
asserted and that which is actually the case in reality.
Although it is not denied that logos sometimes stands for that which is
asserted, in the contexts that are most relevant to our subject the word usually
has the sense of utterance. Utterances that are used to make statements are the
second category of bearers of truth and falsity, designated by such
expressions as logos apophantikos, logos kataphatikos, logos apophatikos,
apophansis, kataphasis, apophasis, and protasis. It is probable that Aristotle
in speaking of utterances commonly has in mind what would nowadays be
called utterance-tokens. There are, however, some passages in which the
bearer of truth or falsity must be taken to be an utterance-type of a certain
kind. (*)
As some of the terms for that which is thought or believed and for the
utterances used to express it are also employed for the acts or attitudes of
judging and believing and for the acts of uttering words with a special
intention, the qualifications 'true' and 'false' can easily come to be applied to
those acts and attitudes as well. Such cases are, however, exceptional and at
any rate derivative." pp. 43-44
(*) For the problem of the so-called future contingencies see Dorothea
Frede, Aristoteles and die 'Seeschlacht. Das Problem der Contingentia
105
Futura in De interpretatione 9, Gottingen, 1970.
From: Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of Proposition. Ancient and Medieval
Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Amsterdam: North-Holland
1973.
RELATED PAGES
Selected Bibliography on the de Interpretatione
106
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Annotated bibliography on Aristotle's De

Interpretatione (Peri Hermeneias)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For the studies on the Chapter 9 ("The Problem of Future Contingents") see:
The Master Argument: The Sea Battle in De Intepretatione 9, Diodorus
Cronus, Philo the Dialectician
Arens, Hans, ed. 1984. Aristotle's Theory of Language and Its
Tradition. Texts from 500 to 1750. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Selection, translation and commentary by Hans Arens.
Contents: Preface 1; 1. The extraordinary fate of Peri hermeneias 6; 2.
Aristotle's text (Peri hermeneias 16a1 - 17a7) 16; 3. Commentary to
Aristotle 24; 4. Ammonius Hermeiu: Commentary to Aristotle's Peri
hermeneias 58; 5. Commentary to Ammonius 124; 6. Anicius Manlius
Severinus Boethius: Commentaries to Aristotle's Peri hermeneias.
Second edition. 159; 7. Commentary to Boethius 205; 8. Peter
Abaelard: Glosses on Peri hermeneias 231; 9. Commentary to
Abaelard 303; 10. Albertus Magnus: Perihermeneias. Paraphrase 339;
11. Commentary to Albert 376; 12. Thomas Aquinas: Exposition of
Aristotle's Perihermeneias 397; 13. Commentary to Thomas 434; 14.
Martinus de Dacia: Quaestions concerning Peri hermeneias 458; 15.
Commentary to Martin 471; 16. Johannes a S.Thoma: Artis logicae
107
prima pars 484; 17. Commentary to John of St.Thomas 507; 18. James
Harris, an Aristotelian of the 18th century 514; References 523;
Concordance 527; Index of Persons 530-532.
"It is a very small particle of the philosophic and scientific cosmos that
bears Aristotle's name, in fact, it is little more than one page of the
whole corpus that I am going to consider, that one page out of 1500
where, in the frame of his logic, he formulates his general views on
language. Yet, here, in the first four chapters of Peri hermeneias, he is
not primarily interested in language, which is a natural - and therefore
self-evident - instrument of expression and communication: he
considers it only as the indispensable means of forming a proposition,
which is part of a syllogism. The linguistic theory sketched here
without any pretence to originality would not claim our serious
attention and careful examination if those 48 Greek words in ch. 1 had
not proved of such incredibly far-reaching influence in the development
of linguistic thought. This influence was rendered possible by the
steady tradition of the text, and this book is intended as its
documentation. As far as I know there exist no modern translations of
all the old commentaries I present, and so I hope to do some pioneer
work in the field. As the list in ch. 1 shows, I offer only a selection: the
works of eminent authors available in modern editions.
Up to Martinus de Dacia the material consists of explanations of the
Philosopher's words, and it is obvious that the same words must often
lead to the same explanations, the more so as the explainers did not
want to criticize him, but to prove him right. This attitude was bound to
lead to many parallelisms between the different texts. I could not omit
all those repetitions if I did not want to present mere fragments to the
reader. Fortunately the writers are different personalities with different
styles and ways of handling the matter so that the reader does not only
get acquainted with the medieval ways of thinking and argumentation,
but also with the different forms of that sort of literature: the
commentary, the exposition, the glosses,the paraphrase, and the
questions. At the same time he can follow the development of the
scholastic method. And with all the burden of formalism,
traditionalism, and dependence on authority which the authors carry
along, they have ideas of their own - more or less, of course - and all
these chapters add up to a book on linguistic logic or the logic of
108
language, which makes an interesting section in the history of
linguistics, being a museum of past views on language. And my serious
advice is to wander through it and see what is there, so as to avoid
presenting thoughts as new and progressive which are in fact very old -
it is always a poor sight and a little ridiculous too.
I had to content myself with presenting the Greek and Latin material in
English and adding my comment where I thought it necessary or at
least desirable. I am not giving a philosophical exegesis, but an
interpretation from the linguistic point of view. The grammatica
speculativa and the grammaire générale or universal grammar could
not be included, though I end with the latter (James Harris). From
Aristotle on, the translation is always more or less an interpretation,
sometimes not really possible, because there is no exact equivalent, for
instance, of onoma and rhema. And the interpretation is a hazardous
enterprise because of the distance of time (1500 years between us and
our first commentator) and the lack of an elaborate terminology, which
manifests itself in the polysemy of the essential terms, especially in the
Latin commentaries, for instance: forma, vox, intellectus, ratio. And,
also from Aristotle on, one often cannot be sure that the text is correct
or whether by an error of the author, of the scribe, of the editor or,
lastly, of the printer, there is something wrong with it - sometimes the
only thing one knows (or thinks one knows). For all these reasons, and
because I am neither an expert medievalist nor a logician, I can, despite
several revisions of my text, not guarantee that my translation is always
correct." (From the Preface)
Aubenque, Pierre. 1991. "Herméneutique Et Ontologie. Remarques Sur
Le Peri Hermeneias D'Aristote." In Penser Avec Aristote, edited by
Sinaceur, Mohammed Allal, 93-105. Toulouse: Éditions Érès.
Reprinted in: P. Aubenque - Problèmes aristotéliciens. Philosophie
théorique - Paris, Vrin 2009 pp. 101-116
———. 1992. "Das Verhältnis Von Hermeneutik Und Ontologie Am
Beispiel Des 'Peri Hermeneias' Von Aristoteles." Perspektiven der
Philosophie no. 18:27-46.
Ax, Wolfram. 1979. "Zum Isolierten Rhéma in 'Aristoteles' De
Interpretatione 16b19-25." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no.
61:271-279.
———. 2007. "Psophos, Phoné Und Dialektos Als Grundbegriffe
109
Aristotelischer Sprachreflexion." Glotta no. 56:245-271.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1991. "Ammonius and Adverbs." Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy.Supplementary volume:145-163.
———. 1993. "Meaning, Saying and Thinking." In Dialektiker Und
Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring,
Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 47-62. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Belardi, Walter. 1975. Il Linguaggio Nella Filosofia Di Aristotele.
Roma: Kappa Libreria Editrice.
———. 1981. "Riconsiderando La Seconda Frase Del De
Interpretatione." Studi e Saggi Linguistici no. 21:79-83.
Black, Deborah. 1992. "Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in Medieval Latin
and Arabic Philosophy: Logic and the Linguistic Arts." In Aristotle and
His Medieval Interpreters, edited by Bosley, Richard and Tweedale,
Martin, 25-83. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
Supplementary volume 17 to Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
"This paper compares the views of a number of Arabic and thirteenth-
century Latin commentators on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias on the
status of logic as a linguistic art and its relation to grammar. The
discussion considers the commentators' general positions on the
logician's treatment of linguistic topics, and their attempts to reconcile
the dual claim of logic to be both a linguistic and a rational art. These
general principles are then traced through the treatment of a number of
particular themes in the Peri Hermeneias's linguistic sections: The
definition of the noun,the cases of the noun, and the indefinite or
infinite noun (i.e., of the form non-X). The article concludes that,
although there are basic differences between the Latin and Arabic
traditions stemming from the presence in the Latin world of a
philosophical theory of grammar, authors in both traditions are adamant
that a balance must be maintained between the linguistic and rational
characterizations of logic."
Bluck, Richard. 1963. "On the Interpretation of Aristotle, De
Interpretatione 12-13." Classical Quarterly no. 13:214-222.
Bobzien, Susanne. 2007. "Aristotle's De Interpretatione 8 Is About
Ambiguity." In Maieusis. Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of
Myles Burnyeat, edited by Scott, Dominic, 301-321. New York: Oxford
University Press.
"My goal in this paper is to shows that contrary to the prevalent view,
110
in his De Interpretatione 8, Aristotle is concerned with homonymy;
more precisely, with homonymy of linguistic expressions as it may
occur in dialectical argument. The paper has two parts. In the first I part
argue that in Soph. el. 175 b 39 - 176 a 5, Aristotle indubitably deals
with homonymy in dialectical argument; that De Interpretatione 8 is a
parallel to Soph. el. 175 b 39 - 176 a 5; that De Interpretatione 8 is
concerned with dialectical argument; that, hence, De Interpretatione 8,
too, deals with homonymy in dialectical argument. In the second part I
discusse objections that have been put forward against the view that De
Interpretatione 8 is about homonymy and shows that they do not
succeed." p. 301
Braakhuis, Henk Antonius, and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, eds. 2003.
Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the
Commentary Tradition. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
Table of Contents V; Preface VII; Introduction IX-XLI; Yukio
wakuma: William of Champeaux and the Introductiones 1; Sten
Ebbesen: Questions and Sophismata: tracking Peter of Auvergne 31;
Alan Perreiah: Orality and literacy in the De interpretatione tradition
51; Robert Andrews: The Modistae and John Duns Scotus's
Quaestiones super Perihermeneias 67; Claude Panaccio: Debates on
mental language in the early Fourteenth century 85; Joël Biard: Le
statut des énoncés dans les commentaires du Peri hermeneias de
Gautier Burley 103; M. Kaufmann: The discussion on the nature of the
concept in Ockham's Perihermeneias Commentary 119; Mieczyslaw H.
Markowski: Der Kommentar des Peter Wysz von Polen zu De
interpretatione des Aristoteles 135; Gino Roncaglia: Mesino de
Codronchi's discussion on Syncategoremata and mental language in his
Quaestiones on De interpretatione 149; Irène Rosier: Variations
médiévales sur l'opposition entre signification "ad placitum" et
signification naturelle 165; L. M. de Rijk: The logic of indefinite names
in Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito 207; Judith
Dijs: Radulphus Brito's use of Intentio in Quaestio 9 of his In Peri
hermeneias 235; Christian Strub: Propositio una / multiplex in Abelard:
a note on the relationship of dialectic and grammar 257; Joke Spruyt,
The semantics of complex expressions in John Duns Scotus, Peter
Abelard and John Buridan 275; F. Beets: Theories of prediction from
Boethius to Thomas Aquinas 305; Allan Bäck: Aquinas on predication
111
321; Andrea Tabarroni, The 10th Thesis in Logic condemned at Oxford
in 1277 339; C. H. Kneepkens, Aristotle's transposition and the
Twelfth-century commentaries on De interpretatione, 20b1-12: an
exploratory study 363; Simo Knuuttila: Truth and falsity as modal
notions: some medieval comments on De interpretatione, 12, 22a13
413; Elizabeth Karger: John Buridan's theory of the logical relations
between general modal formulae 429; Indices 445; Index locorum 447;
Index nominum 462; Index rerum 468; Manuscripts mentioned 483;
Bibliography 485-509.
"The majority of the twenty essays of the present volume were
originally delivered at the Xth European Symposium on Medieval
Logic and Semantics held at Nijmegen, 22 - 26 June, 1992, that was
devoted to the tradition of Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin
Middle Ages. Circumstances made it impossible to publish the
proceedings immediately after the symposium. Since the editors were,
nevertheless, aware that the material presented was extremely
important for further studies on the history of medieval logic, semantics
and philosophy of language, they decided, some time ago, to ask the
contributors to update, revise or rewrite their essays in preparation for
the publication of this collection. Although some authors have partially
drawn on material found in this collection for publications elsewhere,
most of the information contained in these essays remains new,
including the many detailed descriptions and editions of unedited works
that will constitute a greatly appreciated resource in the study of
medieval philosophy." (From the Preface)
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1969. "La Proposition Particulière Et Les
Preuves De Non-Concluance Chez Aristote." Cahiers pour l'Analyse
no. 10:3-26.
Repris dans: Albert Menne, Niels Öffenberger (eds.) - Über den
Folgerungsbegriff in der aristotelischen Logik - Hildesheim, Georg
Olms, 1982, pp. 182-205.
"Je me propose ici d' étudier une incidence particulière avec quelque
détail: le problème que posent le sens et l'usage de la proposition
particulière, notamment en rapport avec le rôle qu'elle joue dans les
procédures par lesquelles est démontrée la non-concluance des couples
de prémisses autres que ceux des modes syllogistiques valides. J'espère
en effet montrer que les textes relatifs à ces questions manifestent une
112
modification significative de l'attitude d'Aristote, et qu'ils permettent de
saisir sur le vif le travail du logicien, d'abord victime des équivoques du
langage naturel, prenant ensuite de ces équivoques une conscience
progressive, sous la poussée interne des problèmes eux-mêmes, et
parvenant enfin à les maîtriser. Au terme de cette évolution, la
proposition particulière abandonne celles de ses connotations usuelles
qui perturbent son maniement logique, et n'est plus définie que par sa
place dans un système d'oppositions, avec toutes les conséquences que
cela comporte."
———. 2008. "Le Chapitre 1 Du De Interpretatione. Aristote,
Ammonius Et Nous." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 64:35-
87.
"As for this long paper itself, it would be difficult to summarize it: it is,
or tries to be, exactly what it looks like, namely a detailed reading of
Ammonius' commentary to the famous Chapter One of the De
Interpretatione. If this reading has any dose of originality, it will be due
not so much to the lights the ancient commentary may shed (or not
shed) on the letter and the interpretation of the Aristotelician text as to
what it may teach concerning the methods, selections, and intellectual
behaviour of its author himself, as well as with regard to his own
philosophical and pedagogical reactions before such a text as Aristotle's
own."
Cauquelin, Anne. 1990. Aristote: Le Langage. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France.
Cavini, Walter. 1985. "La Negazione Di Frase Nella Logica Greca." In
Studi Su Papiri Greci Di Logic E Medicina, edited by Cavini, Walter,
Donnini-Macciò, Maria Cristina, Funghi, Maria Serena and Manetti,
Daniela, 7-126. Firenze: Olschki.
Celluprica, Vincenza. 1987. "Logica E Semantica Nella Teoria
Aristotelica Della Predicazione." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy no. 32:166-187.
Charles, David. 1994. "Aristotle on Names and Their Signification." In
Language, edited by Everson, Stephen, 37-73. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Revised and reprinted as Chapter 4: The signification of names - in: D.
Charles - Aristotle on meaning and essence - New York, Oxford
University Press, 2000, pp. 78-109.
113
Chiesa, Curzio. 1986. "Symbole Et Signe Dans Le De Interpretatione."
In Philosophie Du Langage Et Grammaire Dans L'antiquité, edited by
Joly, Henri, 203-218. Bruxelles: Ousia.
Actes du Colloque International sur philosophie du langage et thérories
liguistiques dans l'Antiquité. Grenoble 3-6 septembre 1985.
Crivelli, Paolo. 2004. Aristotle on Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Notes on the text X; List of
abbreviations of titles of Aristotle's works XI; Introduction 1; Part I.
Bearers of truth or falsehood 45; 1. States of affairs. thoughts. and
sentences 45; 2. Truth conditions for predicative assertions 77; 3. Truth
conditions for existential assertions 99; Part II. 'Empty' terms 129; 4.
Truth as correspondence129; 5. 'Vacuous' terms and 'empty' terms 152;
Par III. Truth and time 183; 6. Truth and change 183; 7. Truth and
determinism in De Interpretatione 9 198; Appendix I. Metaph. Theta
10 1051b 1: the text 234; Appendix 2. Metaph. Theta 10 1051b 2-3: the
text 238; Appendix 3. Int. 7, 17b 16-18: the text 239; Appendix 4. The
two place relations in Aristotle's definition of truth 254; Appendix 5.
Aristotle's theory of truth for predicative assertions: formal presentation
258; Appendix 6. The failure of Bivalence for future-tense assertions
formal presentation 266; References 284; Index of names 313; Index of
subjects 319; Index of passages 321.
———. 2009. "Aristotle on Signification and Truth." In A Companion
to Aristotle, edited by Anagnostopoulos, Georgios, 81-100. Malden:
Wiley-Blackwell.
"Aristotle discusses signification and truth in passages from several
works, mainly the Categories, de Interpretatione, Sophistici Elenchi, de
Anima, the Metaphysics, and the Poetics. Signification and truth are not
the main topic of these works: their discussions of these subjects are
asides. This study reconstructs some views on signification and truth to
which Aristotle can be plausibly taken to be committed by his scattered
remarks." p. 81
Cuypere, Ludovic de, and Willems, Klaas. 2008. "Meaning and
Reference in Aristotle's Concept of the Linguistic Sign." Foundations
of Science no. 13:307-324.
"To Aristotle, spoken words are symbols, not of objects in the world,
but of our mental experiences related to these objects. Presently there
114
are two major strands of interpretation of Aristotle's concept of the
linguistic sign. First, there is the structuralist account offered by
Coseriu (Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie. Von den Anfängen bis
Rousseau, 2003 [1969], pp. 65-108) whose interpretation is reminiscent
of the Saussurean sign concept.
A second interpretation, offered by Lieb (in: Geckeler (Ed.) Logos
Semantikos: Studia Linguistica in Honorem Eugenio Coseriu 1921-
1981, 1981) and Weidemann (in: Schmitter (Ed.) Geschichte der
Sprachtheorie 2. Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike, 1991),
says that Aristotle's concept of the linguistic sign is similar to the one
presented in Ogden and Richards's (The meaning of meaning: A study
of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of
symbolism, 1970 [1923]) semiotic triangle. This paper starts off with an
introductory outline of the so-called phýsei-thései discussion which
started during presocratic times and culminated in Plato's Cratylus.
Aristotle's concept of the linguistic sign is to be regarded as a solution
to the stalemate position reached in the Cratylus. Next, a discussion is
offered of both Coseriu's and Lieb's analysis. We submit that Aristotle's
concept of the linguistic sign shows features of both Saussure's and
Ogden and Richards's sign concept but that it does not exclusively
predict one of the two. We argue that Aristotle's concept of the
linguistic sign is based on three different relations which together
evince his teleological as well empiricist point of view: one internal
(symbolic) relation and two external relations, i.e. a likeness relation
and a relation katà synthéken."
d'Avino, Rita. 1988. "Un Proemio Esemplare: Aristotele, Peri
Hermeneias, 16a 1-16." Studi e Saggi Linguistici no. 28:127-146.
Denooz, Joseph. 1996. "L'étendue Du Lexique Chez Aristote." In
Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges Offerts a Christian Rutten, edited by
Motte, André and Denooz, Joseph, 81-90. Liège: Université de Liège.
Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres.
Di Cesare, Donatella. 1980. La Semantica Nella Filosofia Greca.
Roma: Bulzoni.
———. 1981. "Die Semantik Bei Aristoteles." Sprachwissenschaft no.
6:1-30.
Diebler, Stéphane. 2002. "Les Canons De Proclus: Problèmes Et
Conséquences De L'interprétation Syriano-Proclienne Du De
115
Interpretatione." Dionysius no. 20:71-94.
"Ammonius' commentary on the third section of Aristotle's De
interpretatione offers insight into the hermeneutical and logical debates
of the 5th-cent. Neoplatonic school in Athens. These debates reveal one
of the rare cases of a theory that was developed by Proclus in
contradiction to that of his teacher Syrianus, and in the course of which
the authoritative status of De interpretatione as a carefully composed,
syntagmatic work was itself put into question. Ammonius was
concerned to establish the coherence of Int. 19 B 19-20 B 12.
According to his interpretation, this section falls into two further
sections, arranged around two types of logical sequences : the first
section (19 B 19-20 A 6) is explained according to an interpretation
that derives from Syrianus ; the second (20 A 20-20 B 13) recalls the
canons of Proclus."
DuLac, Henri. 1949. "The 'Peri Hermenias'. Its Place in Logic and Its
Order." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 5:161-169.
"Aristotle and St. Thomas commonly divide logic according to the
three operations of the human intellect, because logic is the art which
directs man in the very act of reasoning that he might proceed in good
order, with ease, and without error. (1) The first two acts of the mind
are properly called acts of intellect rather than of reason, because they
are not acts of discourse. The first act is the understanding of what is
indivisible or incomplex, and is therefore called simple apprehension.
By this act the intellect grasps the essence of a thing. The Predicaments
of Aristotle treats the part of logic pertaining to this operation. The
second act of the intellect is that of composition or division, in which
truth or falsity is found. Aristotle treated what pertains to this act in the
Peri Hermeneias. The third operation of the mind is properly called an
act of reason, because in it the mind moves from a knowledge of a
known truth to a knowledge of a truth previously unknown. This is the
act of discourse, that is, of going from one to another. The remaining
books of the Organon treat of what pertains to this act - the Prior
Analytics, the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistic
Refutations. Just as the first of these acts is ordered to the second, and
the second to the third, so the Predicaments is ordered to the Peri
Hermeneias and the latter to the Prior Analytics and the books that
follow."
116
(1) At. Thomas, Expositio in Libros Posteriorum Analytitcorum, I, lect.
1 (ed. Leonina), nn. 1, 4.
Fédier, François. 1985. "Interprétations." In. Paris: Press Universitaires
de France.
Fine, Gail. 1984. "Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione." History
of Philosophy Quarterly no. 1:23-47.
"Aristotle's rebuttal at De int. IX of two arguments for fatalism do not,
as is commonly believed, reflect the conviction that the fatalist's
arguments are valid but unsound. Rather it can be shown that Aristotle
judges the fatalist's arguments to be invalid."
Garrido Fernández, Regla María. 1991. "La Categoría De Onoma
Según Ammonio De Alejandría." Habis.Arqueología, filología clásica
no. 22:313-327.
———. 1994. "Los Adverbios En Ammonio De Alejandría."
Habis.Arqueología, filología clásica no. 25:297-307.
———. 1996. "Los Comentarios Griegos Y Latinos Al De
Interpretatione Aristotélico Hasta Tomás De Aquino." Emerita.Boletín
de Lingüística y Filología Clásica no. 64:307-323.
"The authoress retraces the history of the Greek and Latin
commentaries to Aristotle's De Interpretatione up to Thomas of
Aquinas. For this purpose she analyses the mentions of other
commentaries in those of Ammonius, of Alexander and Boethius, being
that of Arnmonius the first extant one in Greek. From these two sources
dependences and influences among the different
cornmentaries are described."
———. 1998. La Reflexión Lingüística En El Último Neoplatonismo.
Huelva: Universidad de Huelva.
Introducción, traducción y notas del Comentario de Ammonio al
tratado "Sobre la interpretación" de Aristóteles (Ammon. In int. 1-77,25
Busse)
Graffi, Giorgio. 1986. "Una Nota Sui Concetti Di Rhema E Logos in
Aristotele." Athenaeum no. 74:91-101.
Gyekye, Kwame. 1974. "Aristotle on Language and Meaning."
International Philosophical Quarterly no. 14:71-77.
Hankinson, R.J. 1987. "Improper Names. On Intentional Double
Ententes in Aristotle's De Interpretatione." Apeiron no. 20:219-225.
117
Hintikka, Jaakko. 1962. "On the Interpretation of Aristotle, De
Interpretatione 12-13." Acta Philosophica Fennica no. 14:5-22.
Reprinted as Chapter III in: J. Hintikka - Time and necessity. Studies in
Aristotle's theory of modality - New York, Oxford University Press,
1973, pp. 41-61
Hoffmann, Philippe. 1999. "Les Analyses De L'énoncé: Catégories Et
Parties Du Discours Selon Les Commentateurs Néoplatoniciens." In
Théories De La Phrase Et De La Proposition. De Platon À Averroès,
edited by Buttgen, Philippe, Diebler, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan,
209-248. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.
Hugonnard-Roche, Henri. 2005. "Scolies Syriaques Au Peri
Hermeneias D'Aristote." In Scientia in Margine. Études Sur Les
Marginalia Dans Les Manuscrits Scientifiques Du Moyen Âge À La
Renaissance, edited by Jacquart, Danielle and Burnett, Charles F., 27-
55. Genève: Droz.
Husson, Suzanne, ed. 2009. Interpréter Le De Interpretatione. Paris:
Vrin.
Table des matières: Jonathan Barnes: Avant-propos 7; Suzanne
Husson: Introduction 11; Pierre Aubenque: Sens et unité du traité
aristotélicien De l'interprétation 37; Maddalena Bonelli: Alexandre
d'Aphrodise et le De interpretatione 51; Cristina Viano: Aristote contre
les astrologues. Olympiodore sur le De interpretatione, chap. 9 69; Ali
Benmakhlouf: La similitude entre les verbes et les noms dérivés 89;
Irène Rosier-Catach: Sur le verbe substantif, la prédication et la
consignification - Peri hermeneias 16 b 20-25 dans les traductions et
les commentaires en latin 97; Jonathan Barnes: Le De interpretatione
dans la philosophie moderne 141; Jean Baptiste Gourinat: Le traité De
l'interprétation entre logique classique et logique non-classique 163;
Bibliographie 193; Index des sources 205; Index des noms 211; Index
des notions 215-222.
"Pendant les années 2003-2005 les membres du Centre Léon Robin ont
décidé de consacrer leurs heures de travail commun à une étude du De
interpretatione. Chaque mois, un samedi matin a été consacré à une
séance close où nous avons lu ensemble le texte d'Aristote; chaque
mois, un vendredi après-midi s'est tenue une conférence publique sur le
thème: "Le De interpretatione et sa réception". Le présent livre en
rassemble, sous une forme revue, une sélection.
118
Inutile de dire que le livre ne donne pas une histoire de la fortune du De
interpretatione: une telle histoire remplirait deux volumes chacun de
cinq cents pages. Inutile de dire que le livre n'offre pas de récit continu:
les recueils de conférences ne sont pas comme cela. Mais il vaut la
peine de dire que le livre possède une certaine cohérence, qu'il possède
une unité thématique.
Après une introduction générale de la main de Suzanne Husson qui a
édité le recueil, le premier chapitre, écrit par Pierre Aubenque, ancien
directeur du Centre Léon Robin, discute de la nature et de la spécificité
du traité aristotélicien; ensuite, six chapitres présentent six échantillons,
les résultats de six sondages pris dans l'histoire du De interpretatione.
Deux des sondages ont été faits sur l'Antiquité, deux sur le Moyen Âge,
deux sur l'époque moderne. Les échantillons font ressortir l'influence
du traité sur l'histoire des sujets qu'il a abordés: sur la théorie des
parties du discours, par exemple, ou sur la conception de la
signification. Ils font également ressortir l'influence du traité sur des
sujets apparemment éloignés de ses propres intérêts: sur les attaques
contre l'astrologie, par exemple, ou sur le développement d'une logique
qui reconnaît plus de deux valeurs de vérité. Ils démontrent comment
ce ne furent pas seulement les doctrines professées dans le traité qui
déterminèrent la pensée de ses lecteurs mais aussi les détails-parfois
même des variantes textuelles ..." p. 9
Irwin, Terence. 1982. "Aristotle' Concept of Signification." In
Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented
to G. E. L. Owen, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum,
Martha, 241-266. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Isaac, Jean. 1953. Le Peri Hermeneias En Occident De Boèce À Saint
Thomas. Histoire Littéraire D'un Traité D'Aristote. Paris: Vrin.
Jacobi, Klaus. 1985. "Diskussionen Über Unpersönliche Aussagen in
Peter Abaelards Kommentar Zu Peri Hermeneias." In Mediaeval
Semantics and Metaphysics, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 1-63.
Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Jacobs, William. 1979. "Aristotle and Nonreferring Subjects."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:282-300.
Joja, Athanase. 1969. "La Théorie De La Modalité Dans Le De
Interpretatione." Revue Roumaine des Sciences Sociales.Série de
Philosophie et Logique no. 13:323-342.
119
Kirwan, Christopher. 1986. "Aristotle on the Necessity of the Present."
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 4:167-187.
Kneepkens, Corneille Henri. 1994. "From Eternal to Perpetual Truths:
A Note on the Mediaeval History of Aristotle, De Interpretatione, Ch.
1 16a18." Vivarium.An International Journal for the Philosophy and
Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages and Renaissance no. 32:161-185.
Knuuttila, Simo. 2003. "Truth and Falsity as Modal Notions: Some
Medieval Comments on De Interpretatione 12, 22a13." In Aristotle's
Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary
Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk Antonius and Kneepkens,
Corneille Henri, 413-427. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
Kretzmann, Norman. 1974. "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by
Convention." In Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, edited
by Corcoran, John, 3-21. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"A few sentences near the beginning of De interpretatione (16a3-8)
constitute the most influential text in the history of semantics. The text
is highly compressed, and many translations, including the Latin
translation in which it had its greatest influence, have obscured at least
one interesting feature of it. In this paper I develop an interpretation
that depends on taking seriously some details that have been neglected
in the countless discussions of this text.
The sentence with which De interpretatione begins, and which
immediately precedes the text I want to examine, provides (as Ackrill
remarks 1) the program for Chapters 2-6.
... we must settle what a name is [Chapter 2] and what a verb is
[Chapter 3], and then what a negation [Chapters 5 and 6], an
affirmation [Chapters 5 and 6], a statement [Chapters 4 and 5] and a
sentence [Chapters 4 and 5] are. (16a1-2) (2)
But Aristotle says "First we must settle what a name is ...", and that is
what he does in Chapter 2. The remainder of Chapter 1, then, may be
thought of as preparatory to the main business of those chapters. And
since their main business is to establish definitions, it is only natural to
preface them with a discussion of the defining terms. At the beginning
of Chapter 2, for instance, Aristotle defines 'name' in these terms:
'spoken sound', 'significant by convention', 'time', and 'parts significant
in separation'. These terms continue to serve as defining terms beyond
Chapter 2, and the remainder of Chapter 1 (16a3-18) is devoted to
120
clarifying them. The special task of the text I am primarily concerned
with is the clarification of the proximate genus for the definitions in
Chapters 2-6: "spoken sound significant by convention" (3)." p. 3
(1) In the notes to his translation (J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories
and De Interpretatione, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963; reprinted with
corrections, 1966), p. 113.
(2) I am using Ackrill's translation, the only one in English that shows
an understanding of the text.
(3) Cf. Ackrill, op. cit., Notes, p. 115: "'A spoken sound significant by
convention' gives the genus under which fall not only names but also
verbs (Chapter 3) and phrases and sentences (Chapter 4)".
———. 1987. "Boethius and the Truth About Tomorrow's Sea Battle."
In Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in
Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, edited by Rijk, Lambertus
Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk Antonius. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
Reprinted in: D. Blank, N. Kretzmann (eds.) - Ammonius on Aristotle
On Interpretation 9 with Boethius on Aristotle On Interpretation 9 -
London, Duckworth, 1998, pp. 24-52
Larkin, Miriam Therese. 1971. Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle.
The Hague: Mouton.
Manetti, Giovanni. 1993. Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity.
Bloomngton: Indiana University Press.
Original Italian edition: Le teorie del segno nell'antichità classica -
Milano, Gruppo Editoriale Fabbri, 1987.
Translated by Christine Richardson.
See Chapter Five: Language and signs in Aristotle - pp. 70-91
Modrak, Deborah. 2001. Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Montanari, Elio. 1984. La Sezione Linguistica Del Peri Hermeneias Di
Aristotele. Firenze: Università degli Studi.
Vol. 1: Il Testo (1984); Vol. 2: Il Commento (1988).
Monteil, Jean-François. 1996. "De La Traduction En Arabe Et En
Français D'un Texte D'Aristote: Le Chapitre Vii Du Peri Hermeneias."
Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales no. 48:57-76.
"Les propositions indéterminées du chapitre VII de Peri Hermeneias
121
sont des particulières traduites par des universelles fausses. La cause de
cette bizarrerie est dans le maître, et non dans les traducteurs. Aristote
mutile un système naturel de propositions dont l'intégrité est restaurée
par l'hexagone de Robert Blanché. Celui-ci ajoute deux postes au carré:
Y (quantité partielle) et U (exclusion de la quantité partielle). Le carré
représente A (totalité) et E (quantité zéro), mais pas avec la tierce
quantité Y. Or, la quantité partielle (Y) est essentielle: c'est celle des
particulières naturelles contenant notoirement plus d'information que
les particulières logiques. U (exclusion de la quantité partielle) est le
signifié commun aux deux phrases qu'Aristote élimine du système
naturel."
———. 2001. "Une Exception Allemande: La Traduction Du De
Interpretatione Par Le Professeur Gohlke: La Note 10 Sur Les
Indéterminées D'Aristote." Revues de Études Anciennes no. 103:409-
427.
"Professor Paul Gohlke (*) is the only translator to fully respect
Aristotle's own conception of indeterminates. He was the first to
perceive the linguistic problem raised by the indeterminate negative.
All the other translators of De Interpretatione mistakenly render
Aristotle's indeterminates, which are particulars, as universals. The
origin of this mistake lies in one of the two Arabic translations."
(*) Kategorien und Hermeneutik, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh,
1951
———. 2004. "La Transmission D'Aristote Par Les Arabes À La
Chrétienté Occidentale: Une Trouvaille Relative Au De
Interpretatione." Revista Española de Filosofia Medieval no. 11:181-
195.
"Some men are not white and Some men are white versus No man is
white are illegitimately identified to the two pairs of logical
contradictories constituting the logical square: A versus O and I versus
E, respectively. Thus, the level of natural language and that of logic are
confused. The unfortunate Aristotelian alteration is concealed by the
translation of propositions known as indeterminates. To translate these,
which, semantically, are particulars, all scholars, except for Paul
Gohlke, employ the two natural universals excluded by the Master! The
work of Isador Pollak, published in Leipzig in 1913, [Die Hermeneutik
des. Aristoteles in der Arabischen übersetzung des Ishiik Ibn Honain]
122
reveals the origin of this nearly universal translation mistake: the
Arabic version upon which Al-Farabi unfortunately bases his comment.
In adding the vertices Y and U to the four ones of the square, the logical
hexagon of Robert Blanché (*) allows for the understanding of the
manner in which the logical system and the natural system are linked."
(*) Structures Intellectuelles. Essai sur l'organisation systématique des
concepts - Paris, Vrin, 1966; Raison et Discours. Défense de la logique
réflexive - Paris, Vrin, 1967
———. 2005. "Isidor Pollak Et Les Deux Traductions Arabes
Différentes Du De Interpretatione D'Aristote." Revue d'Études
Anciennes no. 107:29-46.
"Dans le chapitre VII du De interpretatione, Aristote mutile un système
naturel de trois couples de contradictions naturelles. Il évince le couple
où deux universelles naturelles "Les hommes sont blancs", "Les
hommes ne sont pas blancs" s'opposent contradictoirement.
Conséquence grave: les deux couples de contradictoires naturelles,
qu'Aristote considère exclusivement, sont identifiés illégitimement aux
deux couples de contradictoires logiques constituant le carré logique.
Cette mutilation est dissimulée par la traduction des propositions dites
"indéterminées". L'ouvrage d'Isidor Pollak, publié à Leipzig en 1913
(Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung des
Ishak Ibn Honain, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes,
13,1), révèle l'origine de cette faute de traduction quasi universelle: la
version arabe sur laquelle al-Farabi fonde son commentaire."
Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro. 1981. "L'affermazione Da Trasposizione in
De Int. 10 E A. Pr. A 46." In Atti Del Congresso Nazionale Di Logica.
Montecatini Terme, 1-5 Ottobre 1979, edited by Bernini, Sergio, 617-
645. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Pépin, Jean. 1985. "Sumbola, Sèmeia, Homoiomata. A Propos De De
Interpretatione 1, 16a3-8 Et Politique Viii 5, 1340a6-39." In Aristoteles
Werk Und Wirkung. Paul Moraux Gewidmet. Band I: Aristoteles Und
Seine Schule, edited by Wiesner, Jürgen, 22-44. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Perreiah, Alan. 2003. "Orality and Literacy in the De Interpretatione
Tradition." In Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages.
Essays on the Commentary Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk
Antonius and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 51-66. Groningen: Ingenium
Publishers.
123
Polansky, Ronald, and Kuczewski, Mark. 1990. "Speech and Thought,
Symbol and Likeness: Aristotle's De Interpretatione 16a 3-9."
Apeiron:51-63.
Purnelle, Gérald. 1996. "La Proportion Des Conjonctions De
Subordination Dans Six Oeuvres D'aristotle." In Aristotelica Secunda.
Mélanges Offerts a Christian Rutten, edited by Motte, André and
Denooz, Joseph, 91-102. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de
Philosophie et Lettres.
Rapp, Christoph. 1991. "Esti Triton. Aristoteles, De Interpretatione 10,
19b 21-22." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 73:125-128.
Rehn, Rudolf. 1986. "Zur Theorie Des Onoma in Der Griechischen
Philosophie." In Sprachphilosophie in Antike Und Mittelalter, edited by
Mojsisch, Burkhard, 63-119. Amsterdam: Grüner.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1987. "The Anatomy of the Proposition.
Logos and Pragma in Plato and Aristotle." In Logos and Pragma.
Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel
Nuchelmans, edited by Rijk, Lambertus Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk
Antonius, 27-61. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
"Introductory
This study is written in honour of a scholar who, among many other
things, has laid the solid basis for the study of what may be considered
the kernel of the semantics of the statement-making utterance, viz. the
definition of the bearers of truth and falsity.
In the first section I present a survey of Plato's semantics of the
statement-making expression and a number of key notions involved.
Next, I explore Aristotle's views of the matter, starting with a
discussion of Aristotle's notion of pragma including that of being qua
truth and not-being qua falsehood. In search for the nature of Aristotle's
logos, I discuss this notion as it occurs on the onomazein level as well
as the way in which it acts on the legein level. Next, I investigate the
important notions of synthesis and dihaeresis and the role of einai as a
monadic functor and qua syncategorematic container of categorial
being. Finally, I attempt to present a characterization of Aristotle's
statement-making utterance.
(...) p. 27
"Epilogue
We may summarize what we have found as follows:
124
1 For Plato,
1.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of a name (onoma) and
an attribute (rhêma) which as such is not yet a statement-making
utterance
1.2 a logos represents a state of affairs (pragma), i.e. an actual
combination of some participata (dynameis) in the outside world
1.3 a logos eirêmenos is a statement-making utterance; it asserts that
the pragma represented by the logos is actually the case.
2 For Aristotle,
2.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of an onoma and a
rhêma which represents both a notional and an ontological state of
affairs. It may be characterized as a 'statable complex'
2.2 a pragma is a state of affairs either ontologically: state of affairs
being part of the outside world or semantically: state of affairs
conceived of and expressed by a logos
2.3 a logos apophantikos ('statement-making utterance') is a logos
actually stated (either asserted or denied)
2.4 a logos may as such be used either on the onomazein level or on the
legein level (qua logos apophantikos). Similarly, phasis (kataphasis,
apophasis) may be used on either of these levels
2.5 synthesis is either synthesis1, = the act of uniting an onoma and a
rhêma into a logos (on the onomazein level) or synthesis2 = the
assertion of such a union accomplished in a logos apophantikos, (on
the legein level), while dihairesis is always the denial of such a union
(on the legein level)
2.6 the esti forming part of a logos apophantikos is not a copula,
properly speaking. Rather, it is a sign of (it consignifies, to speak with
De interp. 3,16b24-5) synthesis2. The onoma and rhêma are already
united to make up a logos ('statable complex') by synthesis, and, then,
the esti rather than acting as a dyadic copulative functor, is merely a
monadic sign of the 'statable complex' being actually stated
2.7 The propositional structure found in the logos apophantikos may be
described as follows:
linguistically: a logos expressing categorial being (i.e.
syncategorematic being implemented by one or more of the ten
categories of being) is stated (either affirmatively or negatively) by
means of the monadic functor 'be' or 'not be'
125
semantically: the pragma represented by the logos is said to be (or not
to be, respectively) part of the outside world (or: 'be (not) the case')."
pp. 53-54 (notes omitted).
———. 1996. "On Aristotle's Semantics in De Interpretatione 1-4." In
Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient
Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on His Sixtieth Birthday, edited
by Algra, Keimpe, Horst, Pieter van der and Runia, David, 115-134.
Leiden: Brill.
"By and large, in De interpretatione Aristotle is concerned with our
capability to speak about all that presents itself to our mind. From
chapter 4 onwards, he deals with the statement-making expressions
(affirmation and negation), which are the main tools for conveying our
thoughts about things. This discussion is prepared (chapters 1-3) by
some important observations concerning the basic elements of such
expressions, viz. onoma and rhema. The present contribution contains
some comments on Aristotle's view of the proper nature of statement-
making as put forward in De interpretatione. First, I would like to
highlight Aristotle's, what Sir David Ross has called 'frankly
'representative' view of knowledge' by discussing the terms omoioma
and pragma. Next, I will discuss what is meant by a term's 'time-
connotation', and finally I will examine the semantics of onoma, rhema
and logos." p. 115
———. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General
Introduction. The Works on Logic. Leiden: Brill.
perceptions of 'predication', and statement-making in general to
126
function of 'be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical
less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic
use of 'be' to be the central one in Greek (pace Kahn), on the
stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I
term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's
'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse
statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and
'assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric
'appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring
in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in
evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic
my purposes."
Riondato, Ezio. 1957. La Teoria Aristotelica Dell'enunciazione.
Padova: Antenore.
Rosier, Irène. 2003. "Variations Médiévales Sur L'opposition Entre
Signification "Ad Placitum" Et Signification Naturelle." In Aristotle's
Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk Antonius and Kneepkens,
Corneille Henri, 165-205. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
Sadun Bordoni, Gianluca. 1994. Linguaggio E Realtà in Aristotele.
Bari: Laterza.
Sainati, Vittorio. 1968. Storia Dell' "Organon" Aristotelico. I: Dai
127
"Topici" Al "De Interpretatione". Firenze: Le Monnier.
Scarpat, Giuseppe. 1950. Il Discorso E Le Sue Parti in Aristotele.
Arona: Paideia.
Sedley, David. 1996. "Aristotle's De Interpretatione and Ancient
Semantics." In Knowledge through Signs. Ancient Semiotic Theories
and Practices, edited by Manetti, Giovanni, 87-108. Turnhout: Brepols.
Revised version: Aristote et la signification, in: Philosophie Antique, 4,
2004, pp. 5-25.
"Studies of ancient semantics are inclined to concentrate on the
significations of individual words. But most ancient thinkers are likely
to be misrepresented by such an approach. In Aristotle's classic
treatment of the subject, I shall argue, the primary signifier is the
sentence, and individual words are considered only secondarily, in so
far as they contribute to the sentence's function. Moreover, this
emphasis is to be found elsewhere in the Platonic tradition of which, in
this respect, Aristotle is a part - not just in Plato himself, but also in the
Stoics. In fact only the Epicureans, among ancient thinkers, can be seen
to make individual word-meaning primary.
This difference, if it can be established, should not cause surprise, since
it merely reflects the general metaphysical outlook of the thinkers in
question. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics are teleologists, who regard the
whole as ontologically prior to the part: the part can only be fully
understood by reference to its function within the whole. (1) Epicurus
by contrast is an atomist. He standardly treats parts as discrete items
which, in coming together, generate larger complexes - be they atoms
forming phenomenal bodies, or humans forming societies - but which
in no sense have that as their pre-existing nature or function. Even
bodily parts like hands and tongues came into being before any
functions - including their communicative functions - were found for
them. (2) On this same anti-teleological model, Epicurus regards the
central core of language as an original set of naturally uttered "names"
(probably nouns, adjectives and verbs), correlated to individual objects
or contents of experience, and only at a later stage supplemented and
inflected into a full-scale language. (3)
In developing this contrast, I shall concentrate primarily on Aristotle's
De interpretatione, whose opening chapters became in antiquity a locus
classicus on signification. This is not because I believe that the De
128
interpretatione must have directly influenced any of the other thinkers
in the story. While we cannot positively exclude the possibility of its
influence in the fourth and third centuries, perhaps even on Plato
himself, I see no clear signs of it. The reason for my choice is that the
De interpretatione is, if I am right, the most seriously misunderstood
text in ancient semantics. If I can make out my case with regard to it, it
will provide a valuable perspective on the other philosophers in
question." pp. 87-88
(1) See e.g. Plato, Laws X 903b-d, Aristotle, Pol. 1253a19ff., and, for
the Stoics, Plutarch, St. Rep. 1054E-F.
(2) Lucretius 4.823-57.
(3) See Long and Sedley (The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987, section
19).
Sluiter, Inneke. 1997. "The Greek Tradition." In The Emergence of
Semantics in Four Linguistic Traditions: Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek,
Arabic, edited by Koerner, Ernst Frideryk Konrad, 149-224.
Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Sorabji, Richard. 1980. Necessity, Cause, and Blame. Perspectives on
Aristotle's Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Teixidor, Javier. 1996. "L'introduction Au De Interpretatione Chez
Proba Et Paul Le Perse." In Symposium Syriacum Vii. Uppsala
University, Department of Asian and African Languages, 11-14 August
1996, edited by Lavenant, René, 293-301. Roma: Pontificio Istituto
Orientale.
Verbeke, Gérard. 1956. "Ammonius Et Saint Thomas. Deux
Commentaires Sur Le Peri Hermeneias D'Aristote." Revue
Philosophique de Louvain no. 54:228-253.
"La comparaison entre le commentaire d'Ammonius, dans la traduction
latine de Guillaume de Moerbeke, et celui de saint Thomas, permet de
préciser dans quelle mesure saint Thomas s'inspire d'Ammonius.
Édition critique du texte latin du Peri hermeneias d'Aristote, dans la
traduction de Moerbeke du commentaire d'Ammonius, avec références
au texte des manuscrits grecs."
———. 1991. "Interprétation Et Langage Dans La Tradition
Aristotélicienne." In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur
Geschichte Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters, edited by Mojsisch,
Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf, 1029-1045. Amsterdam: R. Grüner.
129
"A la lumière des analyses qui précèdent, qu'en est-il maintenant du
titre peri hermeneias? Ce titre correspond-il au contenu de l'ouvrage?
La question posée ne vise pas directement l'authenticité
Aristotélicienne de la formule: il est vrai cependant, qu'un titre qui ne
traduirait pas bien le contenu du traité, aurait peu de chances d'avoir été
rédigé par le Stagirite. Par contre, il est probable que l'ouvrage ait reçu
un certain titre de la part de son auteur et si le titre traditionnel
correspond au contenu de l'écrit, il peut très bien remonter à l'auteur
lui-même. Quoi qu'il en soit de la question d'authenticité, nous croyons
pouvoir conclure que le titre donné recouvre bien le contenu du traité,
dont le sujet principal est l'énonciation catégorique et ses composants.
En se basant sur les analyses de Boèce et d'Ammonius, on peut dire que
tous ces éléments correspondent à l'idée d'interprétation telle qu'elle est
expliquée dans le traité:
1. L'énonciation y est conçue comme l'interprétation d'un contenu de
pensée. Toutefois si le langage se rapporte directement à un objet
pensé, il se réfère indirectement au réel: il en résulte que le discours
énonciatif est aussi une interprétation de la réalité. Il l'est à un double
niveau: le contenu particulier de chaque énonciation se rapporte à un
sujet déterminé du monde et en exprime certaines caractéristiques; on
peut donc le considérer comme un acte d'interprétation. Par ailleurs, il y
a la structure même du jugement, qui, elle aussi, est une interprétation à
un niveau plus fondamental de la physionomie du réel.
2. Les noms et les verbes constituent à leur tour un acte d'interprétation.
Selon Aristote, la signification des mots est conventionnelle: elle est le
résultat de la vie en communauté, où les hommes sont amenés à se
mettre d'accord sur des notions fondamentales de la vie morale et
sociale. Ammonius croit que le sens des mots n'est pas purement
artificiel, mais qu'il est adapté à la nature des choses. Quoi qu'il en soit,
le fait d'appliquer au réel des noms et des verbes est un acte
d'interprétation. Exprimer le réel dans les catégories du langage
implique toujours un acte interprétatif.
La doctrine aristotélicienne sur la nature du langage justifie donc le titre
de peri hermeneias.".
Visentin, Mauro. 1999. "La Sospensione Del Linguaggio Fra Verità E
Realtà in Aristotele. Breve Commento Filosofico Del De
Interpretatione." Annali dell'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici no.
130
16:125-200.
Wagner, Hans. 1971. "Aristoteles, De Interpretatione 3, 16 B 19-25."
In Philomathes. Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of
Philip Merlan, edited by Palmer, Robert B. and Hamerton-Kelly,
Robert, 95-115. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Waterlow, Sarah. 1982. Passage and Possibility. A Study of Aristotle's
Modal Concepts. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Weidemann, Hermann. 1982. "Ansätze Zu Einer Semantischen Theorie
Bei Aristoteles." Zeitschrift für Semiotik no. 4:241-257.
———. 1982. "Aristoteles Über Das Isolierte Aussagewort: De Int. 3,
16b 19-25." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 64:239-256.
———. 1991. "Grundzüge Der Aristotelischen Sprachtheorie." In
Geschichte Der Sprachtheorie: 2. Sprachtheorien Der
Abendländischen Antike, edited by Schmitter, Peter, 170-192.
Tübingen: Narr.
———. 1995. "Aristoteles Über Attributive Und Prädikative
Adjektive: (Peri Hermeneias 11)." Incontri Linguistici no. 18:61-67.
———. 2005. "Le Proposizioni Modali in Aristotele, De
Interpretatione 12 E 13." Dianoia no. 10:27-41.
Traduzione italiana di Luca Castagnoli
Whitaker, C.W.A. 1996. Aristotle's De Interpretatione. Contradiction
and Dialectic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
White, Michael J. 1979. "Aristotle and Temporally Relative
Modalities." Analysis no. 39:88-93.
Wolanin, Hubert. 1995. "Aristotle on the Word as a Vehicle of
Semantic Function." Eos.Commentarii Societatis philologae
Polonorum no. 83:251-263.
"In order to understand Aristotle's perception and description of
language at its most basic level, i.e. the semantics of the single word,
some aspects of the Aristotelian conception of the word as unit of
linguistic communication are analyzed. The Poetics and De
interpretatione are particularly meaningful in this context."
Zadro, Attilio. 1974. Interpretazione E Rappresentazione (Una Aporia
Formale Classica E La Critica Della Tradizione). Padova: Liviana.
———. 1979. Tempo Ed Enunciati Nel De Interpretatione Di
Aristotele. Padova: Liviana.
131
RELATED PAGES
Bibliography on the Logic of Aristotle: Introductory Readings
Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Categorical Syllogism
132
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Aristotle's Prior Analytics: the Theory of

Categorical Syllogism
INTRODUCTION: MODERN INTERPRETATIONS
OF ARISTOTLE'S SYLLOGISTIC
N.B.: For the references, please see Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's
Theory of Categorical Syllogism
"When modem logicians in the 1920s and 1930s first turned their attention to
the problem of understanding Aristotle’s contribution to logic in modern
terms, they were guided both by the Frege-Russell conception of logic as
formal ontology and at the same time by a desire to protect Aristotle from
possible charges of psychologism. They thought they saw Aristotle applying
the informal axiomatic method to formal ontology, not as making the first
steps into formal epistemology. They did not notice Aristotle’s description of
deductive reasoning. Ironically, the formal axiomatic method (in which one
explicitly presents not merely the substantive axioms but also the deductive
processes used to derive theorems from the axioms) is incipient in Aristotle’s
presentation. Partly in opposition to the axiomatic, ontically-oriented
approach to Aristotle’s logic and partly as a result of attempting to increase
the degree of fit between interpretation and text, logicians in the 1970s
working independently came to remarkably similar conclusions to the effect
133
that Aristotle indeed had produced the first system of formal deductions.
They concluded that Aristotle had analyzed the process of deduction and that
his achievement included a system of natural deductions including both direct
and indirect deductions which, though simple and rudimentary, was
semantically complete. Where the interpretations of the 1920s and 1930s
attribute to Aristotle a system of propositions organized deductively, the
interpretations of the 1970s attribute to Aristotle a system of deductions,
extended deductive discourses, concatenations of propositions, organized
epistemically. The logicians of the 1920s and 1930s take Aristotle to be
deducing laws of logic from axiomatic origins; the logicians of the 1970s
take Aristotle to be describing the process of deduction and in particular to be
describing deductions themselves, both those deductions that are proofs
based on axiomatic premises and those deductions that, though deductively
cogent, do not establish the truth of the conclusion but only that the
conclusion is implied by the premise-set. Thus, two very different and
opposed interpretations had emerged, interestingly both products of modern
logicians equipped with the theoretical apparatus of mathematical logic. The
issue at stake between these two interpretations is the historical question of
Aristotle’s place in the history of logic and of his orientation in philosophy of
logic. This paper affirms Aristotle’s place as the founder of logic taken as
formal epistemology, including the study of deductive reasoning. A by-
product of this study of Aristotle’s accomplishments in logic is a clarification
of a distinction implicit in discourses among logicians—that between logic as
formal ontology and logic as formal epistemology. Aristotle’s Logic: New
Goals, New Results Our understanding of Aristotle’s logic has increased
enormously in the last sixty years. It is gratifying to review the cascade of
progress beginning with the independently achieved but remarkably similar
advances reported in 1929 by Jan Lukasiewicz and in 1938 by James
Wilkinson Miller. Penetrating examination and critical evaluation of the
Lukasiewicz-Miller viewpoint in the 1950s and 1960s set the stage for work
in the early 1970s by Timothy Smiley and myself. Subsequent work in the
late 1970s and early 1980s by various people including Timothy Smiley,
Robin Smith, Michael Scanlan and myself can be seen as culminating, at
least for the moment, in the 1989 translation and commentary on Prior
Analytics by Robin Smith." (pp. 9-10)
134
From: John Corcoran, The Founding of Logic. Modern Interpretations of
Aristotle's Logic, Ancient Philosophy, 14, 1994, pp. 9-24.
"Jan Lukasiewicz, by his own account, entered the lists in 1923 as an

interpreter of ancient logic from the standpoint of modern formal logic. In
that year he began defending his view of the contrast of Stoic logic with
Aristotelian logic; this view appeared in print for the first time in 1930.(1)
This was followed by the Polish version in 1934, and the German in 1935, of
his landmark paper, 'On the History of the Logic of Propositions' [1967].
During the same period Lukasiewicz was lecturing on Aristotle's syllogistic.
An authorized version of his lectures on this and other logical topics was
published by students at the University of Warsaw in 1929, republished in
Warsaw in 1958, and finally translated into English in 1963 under the title
Elements of Mathematical Logic [1963]. Lukasiewicz elaborated his
researches until he issued in 1951 his now famous monograph Aristotle's
Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic [1951]. A second
edition, enlarged but not revised, appeared in 1957, its author's death having
occurred in the previous year.
Lukasiewicz thus has held the field for nearly half a century. Questions have
been raised about some details of his interpretation, and corrections have
been made of some of his mistakes in matters of fact, but, so far as I know,
no one had brought a direct challenge against the main lines of Lukasiewicz's
interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic and its place in ancient logic until John
Corcoran did so in 'A Mathematical Model of Aristotle's Syllogistic' [1973].
Indeed, so spectacular a tour de force was Lukasiewicz's book that, despite
his own protestations that he was setting out the system merely "in close
connexion with the ideas set forth by Aristotle himself" ([1951], p. 77) and
"on the lines laid down by Aristotle himself" ([1951], p. VIII), his account
has gained wide acceptance as the definitive presentation of Aristotle's
syllogistic, and some writers lead one to believe that Aristotle's system is no
more and no less than what Lukasiewicz proposes.
Lukasiewicz's view, very briefly put, is this: The logic of Aristotle is a theory
of the relations A, E, I, and O (in their mediaeval senses) in the field of
universal terms ([1951], p. 14). It is a theory of special relations, like a
mathematical theory ([1951], p. 15). As a logic of terms, it presupposes a
more fundamental logic of propositions, which, however, was unknown to
135
Aristotle and was discovered by the Stoics in the century after him ([1951], p.
49). Aristotle's theory is an axiomatized deductive system, in which the
reduction of the other syllogistic moods to those of the first figure is to be
understood as the proof of these moods as theorems by means of the axioms
of the system ([1951], p. 44).
Corcoran has proposed, on the other hand, that Aristotle's syllogistic is not an
axiomatic science but rather a natural deduction system, and that the theory is
itself fundamental, presupposing neither the logic of propositions nor any
other underlying logic.
Corcoran's proposals have a good deal to recommend them. First, Corcoran
provides a faithful reconstruction of Aristotle's method. Although
Lukasiewicz gives a system that does arrive at Aristotle's results, obtaining
and rejecting laws corresponding to the moods which Aristotle obtains and
rejects, his derivations, by substitution and detachment from axioms, have
nothing in common with Aristotle's own method. Indeed, Lukasiewicz must
say that Aristotle's proposals about method are wrong, and that Aristotle did
not and could not use the technique of perfecting syllogisms, which Aristotle
claims over and over again that he is using.(2) Corcoran, on the other hand,
not only makes perfect sense of the doctrine of perfecting syllogisms, but he
is willing to take Aristotle at his word instead of being content to elaborate a
system allegedly in close connexion with Aristotle's ideas. The upshot is that
Corcoran succeeds, as Lukasiewicz did, in reproducing Aristotle's results, and
he succeeds, as Lukasiewicz did not, in reproducing Aristotle's method step
by step, so that the annotated deductions of his system D are faithful
translations of Aristotle's exposition. Corcoran's concern for method is
prompted by his belief that Aristotle shared this concern. I think there can be
no doubt that he is correct. Aristotle sets out his method in detail which if
concise is yet minute, and when, at the beginning of Chapter XXX of the first
book of the Priora (46a4), he summarizes his work so far, he speaks not of
the same results in philosophy and every kind of art and study whatsoever,
but of the same method (686g) in all these branches of inquiry.
Corcoran's interpretation also has the virtue of making sense of Aristotle's
views concerning the place of syllogistic in his doctrine as a whole. While
Lukasiewicz apparently held that syllogistic was a science which must take
its place beside the other sciences in the Aristotelian scheme, Corcoran
proposes to take syllogistic as the underlying logic of the demonstrative
136
sciences. Lukasiewicz held further that syllogistic itself presupposes
propositional logic as an underlying logic -- of which Aristotle, however, was
ignorant. Corcoran, by contrast, suggests that syllogistic is a fundamental
logical system, presupposing no other." pp. 133-135
(1) Lukasiewicz [8]. See Storrs McCall Polish Logic 1920-1939, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1967, p. 69, n. 1, for Lukasiewicz's remark
concerning the date of hist first proposals.
(2) Lukasiewicz [1951], p. 44. For texts in An. Pr. and An. Post. see Corcoran
[3].
From: Mary Mulhern, Corcoran on Aristotle's Logical Theory. In Ancient
Logic and Its Modern Interpretations. Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium
on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972. Edited
by John Corcoran, Dordrecht: Reidel 1974, pp. 133-148
CONTEMPORARY EVALUTATIONS OF
ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC
"As a kind of summary of our research we present a review of what we take
to be the fundamental achievements of Aristotle's logical theory. In the first
place, he clearly distinguished the role of deduction from the role of
experience (or intuition) in the development of scientific theories. This is
revealed by his distinction between the axioms of a science and the logical
apparatus used in deducing the theorems. Today this would imply a
distinction between logical and nonlogical axioms; but Aristotle had no idea
of logical axioms (but cf. 77a22-25). Indeed, he gave no systematic
discussion of logical truth (Axx is not even mentioned once). In the second
place, Aristotle developed a natural deduction system which he exemplified
and discussed at great length. Moreover, he formulated fairly intricate
metamathematical results relating his central system to a simpler one. It is
also important to notice that Aristotle's system is sound and strongly
complete. In the third place, Aristotle was clear enough about logical
consequence so that he was able to discover the method of counter instances
for establishing invalidity. This method is the cornerstone of all independence
(or invalidity) results, though it probably had to be rediscovered in modern
times (cf. Cohen and Hersh). In the fourth place, his distinction between
137
perfect and imperfect syllogisms suggests a clear understanding of the
difference between deducibility and implication -- a distinction which
modern logicians believe to be their own (cf. Church, p. 323, fn. 529). In the
fifth place, Aristotle used principles concerning form repeatedly and
accurately, although it is not possible to establish that he was able to state
them nor is even clear that he was consciously aware of them as logical
principles. The above are all highly theoretical points -- but Aristotle did not
merely theorize; he carried out his ideas and programs in amazing detail
despite the handicap of inadequate notation. In the course of pursuing details
Aristotle originated many important discoveries and devices. He described
indirect proof. He used syntactical variables (alpha, beta, etc.) to stand for
content words -- a device whose importance in modern logic has not been
underestimated. He formulated several rules of inference and discussed their
interrelations. Philosophers sometimes say that Aristotle is the best
introduction to philosophy. This is perhaps an exaggeration. One of the
Polish logicians once said that the Analytics is the best introduction to logic.
My own reaction to this remark was unambiguously negative -- the severe
difficulties in reading the Analytics form one obstacle and I felt then that the
meager results did not warrant so much study. After carrying out the above
research I can compromise to the following extent. I now believe that
Aristotle's logic is rich enough, detailed enough, and sufficiently
representative of modern logics that a useful set of introductory lectures on
mathematical logic could be organized around what I have called the main
Aristotelian system. From a modern point of view, there is only one mistake
which can sensibly be charged to Aristotle: his theory of propositional forms
is very seriously inadequate. It is remarkable that he did not come to discover
this for himself, especially since he mentions specific proofs from arithmetic
and geometry. If he had tried to reduce these to his system he may have seen
the problem (cf. Mueller, pp. 174-177). But, once the theory of propositional
forms is taken for granted, there are no important inadequacies attributable to
Aristotle, given the historical context. Indeed, his work is comparable in
completeness and accuracy to that of Boole and seems incomparably more
comprehensive than the Stoic or medieval efforts. It is tempting to speculate
that it was the oversimplified theory of propositional forms that made
possible the otherwise comprehensive system. A more adequate theory of
propositional forms would have required a much more complicated theory of
138
deduction -- indeed, one which was not developed until the present era." p.
130-131
Cohen, P. J. and Hersch, R. "Non-Cantorian Set Theory", Scientific
American, December 1967, pp. 104-116.
Church A., Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton 1956.
Mueller, Ian, 'Stoic and Peripatetic Logic' Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 51 (1969), 173-187.
From: John Corcoran, Aristotle's Natural Deduction System. In Ancient Logic
and Its Modern Interpretations. Edited by Corcoran John, Dordrecht: Reidel
1974, pp. 85-131
RELATED PAGES
Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Categorical Syllogism
139
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Theory of Categorical Syllogism
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Angelelli, Ignacio. 1978. "Analytica Priora, I, 38 and Reduplication."
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 19:295-296.
"Although many commentators have summarized chapter 38 of
Analytica Priora I as if it was perfectly clear to them, I have not found
their explanations satisfactory enough. In fact, I think Aristotle's text
needs badly some sort of clarification that makes it meaningful to
modern logicians. In this note I wish to propose one such
reconstruction."
Bäck, Allan. 1982. "Syllogisms with Reduplication in Aristotle." Notre

Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 23:453-458.
"Prior Analytics 1.38 is a difficult text that offers a way of handling
qua propositions in formal syllogistic. By 'qua proposition' I mean a
proposition that contains a qualifying term, phrase, or clause. Many
such propositions have a qua connector like 'qua', 'insofar as', 'in virtue
of the fact that', 'with respect to', although in some cases a construction
like an accusative of respect occurs
140
instead of an explicit connective.(1) Still, all qua propositions may be
paraphrased by explicit qua connectives. So the class of qua
propositions is a grammatical class of propositions of the form 'S is P
qua M' The Prior Analytics chapter deals with a specific logical type of
qua propositions, and its syllogistic properties.(2)"
(1) Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum
Librum I Commentaria, ed., Wallies, Berlin, 1883.
(2) Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Quae Fertur In
Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Paraphrasis, ed., Wallies, Berlin,
1883.
———. 1996. On Reduplication. Logical Theories of Qualification.

Leiden: Brill.
"This work deals with the logical properties of the 'qua' connective,
"that treacherous little word 'as'."' This connective is represented by
many expressions in ordinary language, such as 'insofar as', 'in virtue
of, and 'in the sense that'. Traditionally, a use of this connective was
called a reduplication. I shall trace the development of the theory of
reduplication. As I shall show, this theory has its roots in various
passages where Aristotle discusses 'qua' propositions. Islamic and Latin
medieval philosophers then contributed to the topic. From all this there
arose a theory of 'qua' propositions, or a theory of reduplication, in the
high medieval period (1250-1350). Although there are of course
different philosophers with different views on reduplication in that
period, it will become clear that their views are extremely similar, and
that it makes sense to talk of the rise of a single theory' of reduplication.
Indeed, the similarity of their views is due to their using Aristotle's
works as a common reference point: They all heed what Aristotle says
about 'qua' propositions, and attempt to offer analyses that demonstrate
the truth of those 'qua' propositions that Aristotle (as well as others in
the Aristotelian tradition) asserts and the validity of inferences
involving 'qua' propositions that he maintains.
So I shall be dealing with propositions of form 'S is P qua M', which,
dropping the italics and the single quotes, I shall henceforth call 'qua
propositions'. 'Qua' will represent the type of the connective, which has
different grammatical forms. When 'qua' appears in italics, it is meant
141
to be the particular connective, 'qua'.
The program that I shall follow is this: First, I shall consider those
passages in which Aristotle discusses the use of qua phrases and
propositions. Next, I shall discuss Islamic philosophers, who wrote
about qua propositions while commenting on those passages in
Aristotle. Then I shall consider Latin medieval philosophers of the
period of the old logic, when the Analytics and the Sophistical
Refutations, which contain important passages on qua propositions,
were at best not well known. Next, I shall discuss various versions of
what may be loosely called the theory of reduplication. I shall consider
various philosophers of the High Middle Ages on the following topics:
determination, or the qualification of a sentence by a modifier; the
fallacy of secundum quid es simpliciter; the exposition of reduplicative
propositions; the conversion of reduplicative propositions; the
reduplicative syllogistic; the supposition of terms in qua propositions. I
shall also discuss certain uses to which the theory of reduplication was
put: notably, the Incarnation, the nominalist reduction of abstract terms,
and supposition theory. Next, I shall discuss the post-medieval period,
where the medieval theory of reduplication was codified and developed
further. I shall consider there the classifications and analysis of qua
propositions, the formal features of the logical types distinguished, and
applications, including Leibniz's extensive use of qua propositions in
his writings. I shall conclude with a survey of current work on qua
propositions. Finally, I shall summarize the historical development of
the theory of reduplication, offer what I consider to be the best version
of that theory, and note some applications of it." (pp. XV-XVI)
Barker, Evelyn M. 1984. "Unneeded Surgery on Aristotle's "Prior

Analytics"." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 25:323-331.
"The article takes issue with Ross's bracketing of lines 45a9-16 of
Aristotle's "Prior Analytics" I 28 because they involve Aristotle in an
"elementary logical error." Describing Aristotle's "method of identities"
for finding syllogistic premises, I point out the lines contain an
essential leg of Aristotle's argument that this method handles all cases
in which the incompatibility between the attributes of a subject e and a
predicate a generates a syllogistic conclusion that A does not belong to
some E. Also, Aristotle's claim that incompatibility of attributes in such
142
cases always resolves into identity of attributes is valid."
Barnes, Jonathan. 1981. "Proof and the Syllogism." In Aristotle on

Science. The "Posterior Analytics". Proceedings of the Eighth
Symposium Aristotelicum Held in Padua from September 7 to 15, 1978,
edited by Berti, Enrico, 17-59. Padova: Antenore.
———. 1999. "Grammar on Aristotle's Terms." In Rationality in Greek

Thought, edited by Frede, Michael and Striker, Gisela, 175-202.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
"However that may be, Aristotelian syllogistic concerned itself
exclusively with monadic predicates. Hence it could not begin to
investigate multiple quantification. And that is why it never got
very far. None the less, the underlying grammar of Aristotle's logic did
not in itself block the path to polyadicity. The later Peripatetics were
conservative creatures and they lacked logical imagination.
Moreover, Aristotle himself had assured them that his syllogistic was
adequate for all serious scientific needs. As for Aristotle, his service to
logic is nonpareil, and it would be grotesque to hide him for lack of
inventiveness. It is true that, in logical grammar, he did not climb above
the level which he attained in the de Interpretatione. But the Analytics
does not represent a fatal, or
even a new, grammatical excursion. And the story of Aristotle's fall,
like the story of the fall of Adam, is a myth."
Berka, Karel. 1991. "La Syllogistique Aristotélicienne, Reconstruction

Historico-Logique." In Penser Avec Aristote, edited by Sinaceur,
Mohammed Allal, 429-432. Paris: Éditions érès.
Boger, George. 2001. "The Modernity of Aristotle's Logic." In Aristotle

and Contemporary Science. Vol. Ii, edited by Sfendoni-Mentzou,
Demetra, Hattiangadi, Jagdish and Johnson, David M., 97-112. Bern:
Peter Lang.
"Summary.
We have identified five aspects of Aristotle's syllogistic to highlight the
remarkable modernity of his logical investigations: (1) Aristotle took
143
logic to be a formal part of epistemology. A logic is an instrument for
establishing knowledge of logical consequence; this is a principal
concern of the science of logic. (2) Prior Analytics is a metalogical
treatise on the syllogistic deduction system. Aristotle exhaustively
treated all possible combinations of elemental "syllogistic" argument
patterns to determine which have only valid argument instances. (3)
Aristotle recognised the epistemic efficacy of certain elemental
argument patterns having only valid instances, and he explicitly
formulated them as rules of natural deduction in corresponding
sentences. (4) Prior Analytics is a proof-theoretic treatise in which
Aristotle described a natural deduction system and demonstrated
certain of the logical relationships among syllogistic rules. In fact,
Aristotle modelled his syllogistic in a rudimentary way for this purpose.
One important metasystematic result is to have established the
independence of a set of deduction rules. Finally, (5) Aristotle worked
with a notion of substitution sufficient for distinguishing logical syntax
and semantics. In this connection he also distinguished validity from
deducibility sufficiently well to note the completeness of his logic.
Our reading of Prior Analytics takes Aristotle to have treated the
process of deduction much as modern mathematical logicians do and
not to have been confused about some fundamental matters of logic.
Least of all was he confused, as some commentators believe, about a
distinction between "following necessarily" and "being necessary,"
both in respect of the distinction between a syllogismos or a deduction
and a demonstration and of the distinction between assertoric logic and
modal logic. Aristotle clearly distinguished between (1) a given
sentence's following necessarily from other given sentences and (2) a
given sentence denoting a state of affairs to be necessary (or possible).
Seeing that he was concerned with the deduction process helps us to
avoid such an error. In any case, Aristotle recognised that, while the
conclusion of a given argument follows necessarily from its premises,
this necessity might not be evident to a participant. He knew that the
epistemic process of deduction produces knowledge, or makes evident,
that a given sentence follows necessarily from other given sentences.
He considered the product of this epistemic process to be an
argumentation that includes a deductive chain of reasoning in addition
to the premises and conclusion. He recognised using deduction rules in
144
the epistemic process for establishing validity, and that this process can
be applied in a purely mechanical and computational way. Furthermore,
Aristotle distinguished (1) the subject matter of a given argument from
(2) the use to which a given argument might be put from (3) the
varying expertise of a participant. All these matters are distinct from (4)
the formal matters underlying any of them. And precisely to examine
these formal matters was his project in Prior Analytics. In this
connection, then, we understand Aristotle to have distinguished two
kinds of knowledge that cannot be otherwise: (1) knowledge of what is
true or false, which pertains to sentences, and (2) knowledge of what
valid or invalid, which pertains to arguments." pp. 110-111
Clark, Michael. 1980. The Place of Syllogistic in Logical Theory.

Nottingham: University of Nottingham Press.
Corcoran, John. 1972. "Completeness of an Ancient Logic." Journal of

Symbolic Logic no. 37:696-702.
———. 1973. "A Mathematical Model of Aristotle's Syllogistic."

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 55:191-219.
"Our purpose in the present article is to present a mathematical model
designed to reflect certain structural aspects of Aristotle's logic.
Accompanying the presentation of the model is an interpretation of
certain scattered parts of the Prior and Posterior Analytics. Although
our interpretation does not agree in all respects with those previously
put forth, the present work would have been impossible without the
enormous ground work of previous scholars - especially Jenkinson,
Lukasiewicz and W. D. Ross - to whom we are deeply grateful.
Our interpretation restores Aristotle's reputation as a logician of
consumate imagination and skill. Several attributions of shortcomings
and logical errors to Aristotle are seen to be without merit. Aristotle's
logic is found to be self-sufficient in several senses. In the first place,
his theory of deduction is logically sound in every detail. (His indirect
deductions' have been criticized, but incorrectly on our account.) In the
second place, Aristotle's logic presupposes no other logical concepts,
not even those of propositional logic. In the third place, the Aristotelian
system is seen to be complete in the sense that every valid argument
145
statable in his system admits of a deduction within his deductive
system, I. e. every semantically valid argument is deducible.
In the present paper we consider only Aristotle's theory of non-modal
logic which has been called "the theory of the assertoric syllogism" and
"Aristotle's syllogistic." Aristotle presents the theory almost completely
in Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the first book of Prior Analytics,
although it presupposes certain developments in previous works -
especially the following two : first, a theory of form and meaning of
propositions having an essential component in Categories (Ch. 5, esp.
2a 34- 2b 7) ; second, a doctrine of opposition (contradiction) more
fully explained in De Interpretatione (Ch. 7, and cf. Ross, p. 3)." p. 191
———. 1974. "Aristotelian Syllogisms: Valid Arguments or True

Universalized Conditionals?" Mind no. 83:278-281.
———. 1974. "Aristotle's Natural Deduction System." In Ancient

Logic and Its Modern Interpretations. Proceedings of the Buffalo
Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22
April, 1972, edited by Corcoran, John, 85-131. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"In the present article we attempt to show that Aristotle's syllogistic is
an underlying logic which includes a natural deductive system and that
it is not an axiomatic theory as had previously been thought. We
construct a mathematical model which reflects certain structural aspects
of Aristotle's logic and we examine both the mathematical properties of
the model and the relation of the model to the system of logic
envisaged in certain scattered parts of Prior and Posterior Analytics.
Our interpretation restores Aristotle's reputation as a logician of
consummate imagination and skill. Several attributions of shortcomings
and logical errors to Aristotle are shown to be without merit. Aristotle's
logic is found to be self-sufficient in several senses. In the first place,
his theory of deduction is logically sound in every detail. (His indirect
deductions have been criticized, but incorrectly on our account.) In the
second place, Aristotle's logic presupposes no other logical concepts,
not even those of propositional logic. In the third place, the Aristotelian
system is seen to be complete in the sense that every valid argument
expressible in his system admits of a deduction within his deductive
system; i.e., every semantically valid argument is deducible.
146
There are six sections in this article. The first section includes
methodological remarks, a preliminary survey of the present
interpretation and a discussion of the differences between our
interpretation and that of Lukasiewicz. The next three sections develop
the three parts of the mathematical model. The fifth section deals with
general properties of the model and its relation to the Aristotelian
system. The final section contains conclusions." p. 85
"As a kind of summary of our research we present a review of what we
take to be the fundamental achievements of Aristotle's logical theory. In
the first place, he clearly distinguished the role of deduction from the
role of experience (or intuition) in the development of scientific
theories. This is revealed by his distinction between the axioms of a
science and the logical apparatus used in deducing the theorems. Today
this would imply a distinction between logical and nonlogical axioms;
but Aristotle had no idea of logical axioms (but cf. 77a22-25). Indeed,
he gave no systematic discussion of logical truth (Axx is not even
mentioned once). In the second place, Aristotle developed a natural
deduction system which he exemplified and discussed at great length.
Moreover, he formulated fairly intricate metamathematical results
relating his central system to a simpler one. It is also important to
notice that Aristotle's system is sound and strongly complete. In the
third place, Aristotle was clear enough about logical consequence so
that he was able to discover the method of counter instances for
establishing invalidity. This method is the cornerstone of all
independence (or invalidity) results, though it probably had to be
rediscovered in modern times (cf. Cohen and Hersh). In the fourth
place, his distinction between perfect and imperfect syllogisms suggests
a clear understanding of the difference between deducibility and
implication -- a distinction which modern logicians believe to be their
own (cf. Church, p. 323, fn. 529). In the fifth place, Aristotle used
principles concerning form repeatedly and accurately, although it is not
possible to establish that he was able to state them nor is even clear that
he was consciously aware of them as logical principles.
The above are all highly theoretical points -- but Aristotle did not
merely theorize; he carried out his ideas and programs in amazing
detail despite the handicap of inadequate notation. In the course of
pursuing details Aristotle originated many important discoveries and
147
devices. He described indirect proof. He used syntactical variables
(alpha, beta, etc.) to stand for content words -- a device whose
importance in modern logic has not been underestimated. He
formulated several rules of inference and discussed their interrelations.
Philosophers sometimes say that Aristotle is the best introduction to
philosophy. This is perhaps an exaggeration. One of the Polish
logicians once said that the Analytics is the best introduction to logic.
My own reaction to this remark was unambiguously negative -- the
severe difficulties in reading the Analytics form one obstacle and I felt
then that the meager results did not warrant so much study. After
carrying out the above research I can compromise to the following
extent. I now believe that Aristotle's logic is rich enough, detailed
enough, and sufficiently representative of modern logics that a useful
set of introductory lectures on mathematical logic could be organized
around what I have called the main Aristotelian system.
From a modern point of view, there is only one mistake which can
sensibly be charged to Aristotle: his theory of propositional forms is
very seriously inadequate. It is remarkable that he did not come to
discover this for himself, especially since he mentions specific proofs
from arithmetic and geometry. If he had tried to reduce these to his
system he may have seen the problem (cf. Mueller, pp. 174-177). But,
once the theory of propositional forms is taken for granted, there are no
important inadequacies attributable to Aristotle, given the historical
context. Indeed, his work is comparable in completeness and accuracy
to that of Boole and seems incomparably more comprehensive than the
Stoic or medieval efforts. It is tempting to speculate that it was the
oversimplified theory of propositional forms that made possible the
otherwise comprehensive system. A more adequate theory of
propositional forms would have required a much more complicated
theory of deduction -- indeed, one which was not developed until the
present era." p. 130-131
———. 1989. "Argumentations and Logic." Argumentation no. 3:17-

43.
———. 1994. "The Founding of Logic. Modern Interpretations of

Aristotle's Logic." Ancient Philosophy no. 14:9-24.
148
"Conclusion.
The tendency of interpreters to find an epistemically-oriented theory in
Aristotle has been overwhelming. With the exception of James
Wilkinson Miller’s 1938 book and the writings of Jan Lukasiewicz and
those directly influenced by these two, few interpreters have found a
theory of formal ontology in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Down through
the ages, with these exceptions, interpreters have agreed that Prior
Analytics is about methods of determining validity and invalidity of
arguments. People studied Prior Analytics in order to learn more about
deductive reasoning and in order to improve their own reasoning skills.
Despite the overwhelming tendency to interpret the syllogistic
epistemically it wasn’t until the early 1970s that it occurred to anyone
to wonder whether Aristotle had a developed theory of deductive
reasoning with a well worked-out system of deductions comparable in
rigor and precision with the systems then familiar from mathematical
logic. Of the logicians that studied Prior Analytics from this point of
view, two of them published articles in same twelve-month period with
remarkably similar systems affirming in clear and unequivocal terms
the epistemic nature of Prior Analytics: Corcoran 1972 and Smiley
1973.
The simpler of the two articles holds that Aristotle’s theory of
deductions recognizes two kinds of extended deductions of conclusions
from arbitrarily large premise sets: direct deductions and indirect
deductions. A direct deduction of a conclusion from given premises
begins with the premises and proceeds by chaining together simple
one-premise and two-premise inferences until the conclusion is
reached. An indirect deduction of a given conclusion from given
premises is in effect a direct deduction of a pair of contradictory
opposites from the premises augmented by the contradictory opposite
of the conclusion. This view is spelled out in more detail in the
introduction to Smith’s 1989 translation of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics.
According to the ontic interpretation the syllogistic is a system of true
propositions about inclusional relations among classes. It is a system
which is organized deductively, axioms followed by deduced theorems,
by employment of an underlying logic never explicitly mentioned by
Aristotle. It is a system whose place in the Organon, in Greek
philosophy, and in the history of philosophy raises many problems.
149
When we turn to the epistemic interpretation the changes are dramatic.
From the epistemic perspective the syllogistic is a system of deductions
or chains-of-reasoning. It is organized according to an initial-versus-
derivative structure with the derivative components as chainings of
initial components. It is a system which can be seen to explain
epistemic processes of deduction presupposed by the Socratic
hypothetical method, by the so-called method of analysis, by the
axiomatic method and even by dialectic itself. According to the
epistemic interpretation, the focus of the syllogistic is on methods as
opposed to results; it concerns the process of deduction rather than
conclusions per se. One might say that it concerns how to think rather
than what to think. And it is a step toward understanding the nature of
proof as opposed to persuasion and toward fulfilling the demand made
by Socrates in the Phaedo for a techné logiké. This step made by
Aristotle was so firm, so detailed, and so well-developed that it
warrants the title of THE FOUNDING OF LOGIC." (pp. 19-20)
———. 2003. "Aristotle's Prior Analytics and Boole's Laws of

Thought." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 24:261-288.
"Prior Analytics by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 - 322 BCE)
and Laws of Thought by the English mathematician George Boole
(1815 - 1864) are the two most important surviving original logical
works from before the advent of modern logic. This article has a single
goal: to compare Aristotle's system with the system that Boole
constructed over twenty-two centuries later intending to extend and
perfect what Aristotle had started. This comparison merits an article
itself. Accordingly, this article does not discuss many other historically
and philosophically important aspects of Boole's book, e.g. his
confused attempt to apply differential calculus to logic, his misguided
effort to make his system of 'class logic' serve as a kind of 'truth-
functional logic', his now almost forgotten foray into probability
theory, or his blindness to the fact that a truth-functional combination
of equations that follows from a given truth-functional combination of
equations need not follow truth-functionally. One of the main
conclusions is that Boole's contribution widened logic and changed its
nature to such an extent that he fully deserves to share with Aristotle
the status of being a founding figure in logic. By setting forth in clear
150
and systematic fashion the basic methods for establishing validity and
for establishing invalidity, Aristotle became the founder of logic as
formal epistemology. By making the first unmistakable steps toward
opening logic to the study of 'laws of thought' -- tautologies and laws
such as excluded middle and non-contradiction -- Boole became the
founder of logic as formal ontology."
———. 2009. "Aristotle's Demonstrative Logic." History and

"Demonstrative logic, the study of demonstration as opposed to
persuasion, is the subject of Aristotle's two volume Analytics. Many
examples are geometrical. Demonstration produces knowledge (of the
truth of propositions). Persuasion merely produces opinion. Aristotle
presented a general truth-and-consequence conception of
demonstration meant to apply to all demonstrations. According to him,
a demonstration, which normally proves a conclusion not previously
known to be true, is an extended argumentation beginning with
premises known to be truths and containing a chain of reasoning
showing by deductively evident steps that its conclusion is a
consequence of its premises. In particular, a demonstration is a
deduction whose premises are known to be true. Aristotle's general
theory of demonstration required a prior general theory of deduction
presented in the Prior Analytics. His general immediate-deduction
chaining
conception of deduction was meant to apply to all deductions.
According to him, any deduction that is not immediately evident is an
extended argumentation that involves a chaining of intermediate
immediately evident steps that shows its final conclusion to follow
logically from its premises. To illustrate his general theory of
deduction, he presented an ingeniously simple and mathematically
precise special case traditionally known as the categorical syllogistic."
Crivelli, Paolo. 2001. "Empty Terms in Aristotle's Logic." Boston Area

Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 17:237-269.
"Aristotle's logic can accommodate non-referring terms. Genuine
affirmations must contain both a referring subject and a referring
151
predicate; sentences that contain non-referring subjects or non-referring
predicates are not genuine assertions. In appendix : The translation of
De interpretatione 8. 18A23."
Cutler, Darcy Allen. 2005. "Aristotle and Modern Logic." In Mistakes

of Reason. Essays in Honour of John Woods, edited by Peacock, Kent
A. and Irvine, Andrew D., 207-223. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Ebbinghaus, Kurt. 1964. Ein Formales Modell Der Syllogistik Des

Aristoteles. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Frede, Michael. 1974. "Stoic Vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic." Archiv für

Geschichte der Philosophie no. 56:1-32.
Reprinted in: M. Frede - Essays in Ancient Philosophy - Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota Press, 1987 pp. 99-124.
Galvan, Sergio. 1995. "A Formalization of Elenctic Argumentation."

Erkenntnis no. 43:111-126.
"In the Aristotelean philosophical tradition, elenctic argumentation
(Elenchos) is conceived as a form of dialectical foundation of a thesis.
It takes place in the context of discussion for and against a given thesis
and consists in showing that, as the denier of this thesis argues against
the opponent, he is unable to maintain his position unless he
presupposes the thesis itself, which thus prevails and is consequently
proven. As is well known, Aristotle used this form of argumentation in
many areas of his inquiry, since he regarded it as an extremely effective
technique not only in the speculative sciences but in the physical and
practical sciences as well. Particularly fortunate - because of its
subsequent widespread use and because of the broad reflection that it
stimulated - was Aristotle's application of this form of dialectical
argumentation in Book Four of the Metaphysics in order to justify the
principle of non-contradiction. Apart from its historical influence, this
application is of especial importance because it evidences Aristotle's
intention to prove, not any thesis whatsoever, but a logical principle,
and this expresses his claim for an epistemically absolute proof - in the
152
form of self-proof - of the principle itself.
It does not appear, however, that elenctic proof of the non-contradiction
principle can be accomplished successfully. In fact, demonstration that
this proof is impossible is the purpose of the present essay, in which I
propose a formalization of the argument - i.e. a formal reconstruction of
the argument intended to give it a sufficiently precise specification -
which highlights
the conceptual difficulties that lie at its root." p. 111
Glashoff, Klaus. 2005. "Aristotelian Syntax from a Computational-

Combinatorial Point of View." Journal of Logic and Computation no.
15:949-973.
Goddard, Len. 2000. "The Inconsistency of Aristotelian Logic?"

Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 78:434-437.
Granger, Gilles Gaston. 1970. "Le Syllogisme Catégorique D'aristote."

L'Age de la Science no. 3:281-310.
Hintikka, Jaakko. 1988. "Le Logicien Incontinent D'aristote." In

Aristote Aujourd'hui, edited by Sinaceur, Mohammed Allal, 94-112.
Paris: Éditions érès.
Ierodiakonou, Katerina. 2002. "Aristotle's Use of Examples in the Prior

Analytics." Phronesis no. 47:127-152.
Jacobs, William. 1979. "Aristotle and Nonreferring Subjects."

"It is a widely accepted view amongst scholars that Aristotle believed
that the subject of an assertion might fail to refer. Two texts, De
Interpretatione XI 21 a 25-28 and Categories X 13 b 12-35, are
generally cited as evidence for this belief. In this paper I will argue that
both passages have previously been misunderstood and that Aristotle
did not accept the possible referential failure of the subject of an
assertion. In Section I, after first discussing the standard interpretations
of both texts, I note the difficulties which result from these accounts. In
Section II I offer a brief general argument showing that Aristotle's own
153
account of what an assertion is implies that it is impossible for the
subject of an assertion to fail to refer. In Section III I present my own
analysis of each passage and show that when properly understood
neither is in .any way concerned with the problem of referential
failure."
———. 1979. "The Existential Presuppositions of Aristotle's Logic."

Philosophical Studies no. 37:419-428.
Johnson, Fred. 1991. "Three-Membered Domains for Aristotle's

Syllogistic." Studia Logica no. 50:181-187.
"The paper shows that for any invalid polysyllogism there is a
procedure for constructing a model with a domain with exactly three
members and an interpretation that assigns non-empty, non-universal
subsets of the domain to terms such that the model invalidates the
polysyllogism."
———. 1994. "Syllogisms with Fractional Quantifiers." Journal of

Philosophical Logic no. 23:401-422.
"Aristotle's syllogistic is extended to include denumerably many
quantifiers such as more than 2/3' and exactly 2/3.' Syntactic and
semantic decision procedures determine the validity, or invalidity, of
syllogisms with any finite number of premises. One of the syntactic
procedures uses a natural deduction account of deducibility, which is
sound and complete. The semantics for the system is non-classical
since sentences may be assigned a value other than true or false.
Results about symmetric systems are given. And reasons are given for
claiming that syllogistic validity is relevant validity."
———. 1994. "Apodictic Syllogisms: Deductions and Decision

Procedures." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 16:1-18.
Kapp, Ernest. 1975. "Syllogistic." In Articles on Aristotle. Vol. 1

Science, edited by Barnes, Jonathan, Schofield, Malcolm and Sorabji,
Richard, 35-49. London: Duckworth.
Originally published as 'Syllogistik' in: Pauly-Wissowa's Real-
154
Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumwissenschaft, IV A, 1931 cols.
1046-1067. Reprinted in E. Kapp - Ausgewählte Schriften - Hrsg. von
Hans und Inez Diller, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1968, pp. 254-277.
Kelly, Charles J. 1991. "The Logic of the Liar from the Standpoint of
the Aristotelian Syllogistic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no.
32:129-146.
Keyt, David. 2009. "Deductive Logic." In A Companion to Aristotle,

edited by Anagnostopoulos, Georgios, 31-50. Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell.
Lukasiewicz, Jan. 1951. Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of

Modern Formal Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Second edition 1957 with a new chapter on Aristotle's modal logic.
———. 1963. Elements of Mathematical Logic. Oxford: Pergamon

Press.
Translated from Polish by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz.
Original edition: Elementy logiki matematycznej, Warszawa, 1929.
———. 1967. "On the History of the Logic of Propositions." In Polish

Logic 1920-1939, edited by Storrs, McCall, 66-87. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Originally published in Polish as: Z historii logiki zdan, Przeglad
Filozoficzny, 37, 1934; translated by the author in German as: Zur
Geschichte der Aussagenlogik, Erkenntnis, 5, 1935, pp. 111-131.
Translated in English in: Storrs McCall (ed.), Polish Logic 1920-1939,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967 pp. 66-87 and also in: J. Lukasiewicz,
Selected Works - Edited by Ludwik Borowski, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1970 pp. 197-217.
———. 1967. "Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of

Propositional Logic." In Polish Logic 1920-1939, edited by Storrs,
McCall. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
155
Originally published in German as: Philosophische Bemerkungen zu
mehrwertighen Systemen des Aussagenkalküls, Comptes rendus des
séances de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie 23, 1930.
Translated in English in: Storrs McCall (ed.) Polish Logic 1920-1939,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, pp. 40-65 and also in: J. Lukasiewicz,
Selected Works, Edited by Ludwik Borowski, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1970, pp. 153-178.
Marshall Jr., David. 1977. "Lukasiewicz, Leibniz and the

Arithmetization of the Syllogism." Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic no. 18:235-242.
"Lukasiewicz' second axiomatization of the assertoric syllogism
("Aristotle's syllogistic", 1957) consists of four axioms of assertion and
one of rejection. n arithmetic interpretation is presented proving the
independence of the latter. Lukasiewicz himself demonstrated all five
consistent by means of an arithmetization due to Leibniz. This
arithmetization, we are told by Louis Couturat ("La logique de
Leibniz", 1901) was thought by Leibniz himself to have been invalid.
Whether and why Leibniz in fact took this (mistaken) view, is
discussed briefly."
Martin, John N. 1997. "Aristotle's Natural Deduction Reconsidered."

History and Philosophy of Logic no. 18:1-15.
"John Corcoran's natural deduction system for Aristotle's syllogistic is
reconsidered. Though Corcoran is no doubt right in interpreting
Aristotle as viewing syllogisms as arguments and in rejecting
Lukasiecwicz's treatment in terms of conditional sentences, it is argued
that Corcoran is wrong in thinking that the only alternative is to
construe Barbara and Celarent as deduction rules in a natural deduction
system. An alternative is presented that is technically more elegant and
equally compatible with the texts. The abstract role assigned by
tradition and Lukasiewicz to Barbara and Celarent is retained. The two
'perfect syllogisms' serve as ` basic elements' in the construction of an
inductively defined set of valid syllogisms. The proposal departs from
Lukasiewicz, and follows Corcoran, however, in construing the
construction as one in natural deduction. The result is a sequent system
156
with fewer rules and in which Barbara and Celarent serve as basic
deductions. To compare the theory to Corcoran's, his original is
reformulated in current terms and generalized. It is shown to be
equivalent to the proposed sequent system, and several variations are
discussed. For all systems mentioned, a method of Henkin-style
completeness proofs is given that is more direct and intuitive than
Corcoran's original."
Mignucci, Mario. 1991. "Expository Proof in Aristotle's Syllogistic." In

Aristotle and the Later Tradition, edited by Blumenthal, Henry and
Robinson, Howard, 9-28. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Oxford studies in ancient philosophy. Supplementary volume
———. 1996. "Aristotle's Theory of Predication." In Studies on the

History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the History
of Logic, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo, Maria, 1-20. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter.
———. 1996. "Che Cos'è Un Sillogismo Aristotelico?" In Momenti Di

Storia Della Logica E Di Storia Della Filosofia, edited by Guetti, Carla
and Puja, Roberto, 39-58. Roma: Aracne Editrice.
Atti del Convengno della Società Italiana di Logica e filosofia delle
scienze - Roma 9-11 novembre 1994
Miller, James W. 1938. The Structure of Aristotelian Logic. London:

Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.
Morgenstern, Amy S. 2001. "Commentary to Paolo Crivelli: Empty

Terms in Aristotle's Logic." Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
Morrison, John J. 1955. "The Existential Import of a Proposition in

Aristotelian Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no.
15:386-393.
Mulhern, Mary. 1974. "Corcoran on Aristotle's Logical Theory." In

Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations. Proceedings of the
157
Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21
and 22 April, 1972, edited by Corcoran, John, 133-148. Dordrecht:
Reidel.
"Corcoran, it seems to me, has made a very important contribution to
our understanding of Aristotle's logic, and the suggestions offered in
what follows should not be construed as impugning in any substantive
way the value of that contribution.
Of the many points Corcoran raises, I intend to take up four: (1)
whether syllogistic is a science; (2) whether the theory of propositional
forms presupposed by syllogistic is adequate; (3) whether Aristotle had
a doctrine of logical truth; and (4) whether Aristotle considered
reasoning natural or conventional." p. 136
Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro. 1981. "L'affermazione Da Trasposizione in

De Int. 10 E A. Pr. A 46." In Atti Del Congresso Nazionale Di Logica.
Montecatini Terme, 1-5 Ottobre 1979, edited by Bernini, Sergio, 617-
———. 2010. "Forme Della Contraddizione E Sillogistica

Aristotelica." In La Contradizion Che Nol Consente, edited by Puppo,
Federico, 67-84. Milano: Angeli.
Negro, Camillo. 1967. "La Sillogistica Di Aristotele Come Metodo

Della Conoscenza Scientifica." In. Bologna: Patron.
Novak, Joseph A. 1980. "Some Recent Work on the Assertoric

Syllogistic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 21:229-242.
"Over the last few decades there have been many attempts to approach
the Aristotelian syllogistic by utilizing the techniques of contemporary
formal logic. The aim of this paper is to examine the most significant of
these attempts and evaluate their fidelity to and consistency with
Aristotle's own basic exposition of the syllogistic as expressed in the
Prior Analytics (Book I, 1-2; 4-6).
Two major approaches to the formalization of the assertoric syllogistic
can be distinguished in the literature. The first and older approach
construes the syllogistic as an axiomatic system, while the second and
158
more recent approach considers the syllogistic as a natural deduction
system. Since many of the attempts of the first sort fail to be mentioned
in current discussion, this paper will try to summarize them and only
make a concluding reference to the second approach which is readily
accessible in the more recent publications.
There are two main issues which must be confronted in the case of each
attempt to present Aristotle's assertoric syllogistic as an axiomatic
system: first, whether the method of representation, i.e., the logical
alphabet and the well-formed formulas of the system, conforms to
Aristotle's own approach; second, whether the specific formulas chosen
as axioms and definitions, the rules of inference, and the manner of
proof, etc., are faithful to or at least consistent with Aristotle's writings.
Although it might appear that the first issue, a discussion of the logical
symbols employed, is
not of any real value, one must remember that Aristotle's logic seems
tied to some basic philosophical or, better, metaphysical
presuppositions. That there can be a close link between certain
symbolical representations and some ontological positions is clear in
the case of some other philosophers.
One instance in the twentieth century is Gustav Bergmann whose
espousal of a bare particularist theory of individuation is linked to his
employment of a type of Russelian formal language (Bergmann, G.,
Meaning and Existence, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison,
1960).
Attempts at presenting the syllogistic in a formal way have proceeded
along four lines: first, the attempt to present the syllogistic by means of
the first-order predicate calculus; second, the classic attempt of
Lukasiewicz to develop the syllogistic; third, the attempt to present the
syllogistic as a theory of classes; fourth, Lejewski's attempt to relate the
syllogistic to Lesniewski's ontology. Each of these attempts will be
treated below in light of the two issues raised above."
Parry, William T., and Hacker, Edward A. 1991. Aristotelian Logic.

Albany: State University of New York Press.
Patterson, Richard. 1989. "The Case of the Two Barbaras: Basic

Approaches to Aristotle's Modal Logic." Oxford Studies in Ancient
159
" Aristotle's modal propositions use modal copulae rather than modal
predicates or modally qualified dicta; the familiar contrast between
predication of dicta and of things is inappropriate to the Aristotelian
modalities. Despite what may appear to be vacillation on Aristotle's
part between de re and de dicto modality, the copulae interpretation can
serve to unify the two types."
———. 1990. "Conversione Principles and the Basis of Aristotle's

Modal Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 11:151-172.
"Aristotle founds his modal syllogistic, like his plain syllogistic, on a
small set of 'perfect' or obviously valid syllogisms. The rest he reduces
to those, usually by means of modal conversion principles. These
principles are open to more than one reading, however, and they are in
fact invalid on one traditional reading (de re), valid on the other (de
dicto). It is argued here that this way of framing the contrast is not
Aristotelian, and that an interpretation involving modal copulae allows
us to see how these principles, and the modal system as a whole, are to
be understood in light of close and precise connections to Aristotle's
essentialist metaphysics."
———. 1993. "Aristotle's Perfect Syllogisms, Predication, and the

Dictum De Omni." Synthese no. 96:359-378.
Patzig, Günther. 1959. "Aristotle and Syllogisms from False

Premisses." Mind no. 68:186-192.
———. 1968. "Aristotle's Theory of Syllogism. A Logico-Philological

Study of Book a of the Prior Analytics." In. Dordrecht: Reidel.
English translation by Jonathan Barnes of G. Patzig - Die aristotelische
Syllogistik. Llogisch-philologische Untersuchungen über das Buch A
der Ersten Analytiken - Göttingen. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959.
———. 1988. "Problèmes Actuels De L'interprétation De La

Syllogistique D'aristote." In Aristote Aujourd'hui, edited by Sinaceur,
160
Rose, Lynn. 1956. "Premise Order in Aristotle's Syllogistic." Phronesis
no. 11:154-158.
"Upon examination of all of the syllogisms in the "Prior Analytics," it
is found that Aristotle has relatively strong tendencies to write the
major premise before the minor premise in the first figure and in the
second figure and a considerably weaker tendency to write the major
premise first in the third figure. These tendencies are explained in terms
of 'left-right' and 'adjacency' factors that are connected with Aristotle's
treatment of the syllogism as a rectilinear array of the three terms."
———. 1965. "Aristotle's Syllogistic and the Fourth Figure." Mind no.
74:382-389.
———. 1968. Aristotle's Syllogistic. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.

Contents: I. Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's syllogistic 3; II. The
varieties of predication 13; III: The three figures 16; IV. The non-use of
rules 27; V. Validation by reduction 34; VI. Invalidation by
counterexample 37; VII. The syllogistic system 53; VIII. The Fourth
Figure and the indirect proof 57; IX. Subalternation 80; X. Premise
order 81; Appendix. I. The square of opposition 99; II. The mnemonic
lines 102; III: The perfection of Aristotle' First Figure 104; IV.
Theophrastus and the indirect moods 109; V. The diagrams of the three
figures 133; VI. John Locke's criticisms of Aristotle and the syllogism
137; Bibliography 144; Index 147-149.
"Aristotle's work in formal logic has received a great deal of scholarly
attention; nevertheless, it remains largely misunderstood. Aristotle's
logic has often been equated with traditional "Aristotelian" logic (a
usage as unhistorical as "Platonic" love or "Epicurean" tastes), or,
which is even worse, judged and evaluated in accordance with how
closely it follows or "fails" to follow that traditional logic. Even when
efforts have been made to understand Aristotle's logic in its own right,
Aristotle has usually been very shabbily treated. He has commonly
been accused of errors that he never made at all, such as neglecting or
overlooking the fourth figure. Even his way of conceiving the
syllogism as a linear array of three terms has been lost on minds
handicapped by later, but not thereby better, ways of thinking.
161
Although I hope that this book will contribute towards a better
understanding of what Aristotle did and did not accomplish in his
syllogistic, I have by no means attempted to treat Aristotle's syllogistic
in its entirety. (For one thing, I have confined myself to the assertoric
syllogistic and not gone into the modal logic at all.) The principal task
of this book has been to explore the consequences of accepting the
Aristotelian syllogism as a linear array of three terms. This approach to
Aristotle sheds light on many hitherto mysterious aspects of Aristotle's
logic; it provides new insights into what Aristotle was doing in the
Prior Analytics and enables us to correct numerous misconceptions
about his logic.
My treatment of the Prior Analytics has been quite sympathetic, and
my conclusions are generally favorable; indeed, one of the aims of this
book is to exonerate Aristotle's work in formal deductive logic." p. V
Ross, William D. 1939. "The Discovery of Syllogism." Philosophical

Review no. 48:251-271.
Shepherdson, John C. 1956. "On the Interpretation of Aristotelian

Syllogistic." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 21:137-147.
Simons, Peter. 1989. "Tree Proofs for Syllogistic." Studia Logica no.
48:540-554.
"This paper presents a tree method for testing the validity of inferences,
including syllogisms, in a simple term logic. The method is given in the
form of an algorithm and is shown to be sound and complete with
respect to the obvious denotational semantics. The primitive logical
constants of the system, which is indebted to the logical works of
Jevons, Brentano and Lewis Carroll, are term negation, polyadic term
conjunction, and functors affirming and denying existence, and use is
also made of a metalinguistic concept of formal synonymy. It is
indicated briefly how the method may be extended to other systems."
Smiley, Timothy. 1962. "Syllogism and Quantification." Journal of

Symbolic Logic no. 27:58-72.
———. 1973. "What Is a Syllogism?" Journal of Philosophical Logic
162
no. 2:136-154.
———. 1994. "Aristotle's Completeness Proof." Ancient Philosophy

no. 14:25-38.
"In Prior Analytics I 23 Aristotle presents a completeness proof for
syllogistic logic, or so I maintain. I reconstruct the crucial step, which I
take to be his highly condensed argument that every syllogistic-style
deduction with more than two premises can be reduced to a series of
syllogisms proper. I detect two big holes in the argument, but show that
they can be filled without recourse to anachronistically modern
methods. I end with a principle about the ordering of terms, and discuss
the connections between it, Platonic division and Aristotle's exclusion
of the fourth figure."
Smith, Robin. 1978. "The Mathematical Origins of Aristotle's

Syllogistic." Archive for History of Exact Sciences no. 19:201-210.
"Interpretation of the syllogistic theory presented in Prior Analytics I.4-
7. This syllogistic theory is more properly regarded as mathematics
than as logic as understood by most contemporary logicians."
———. 1982. "What Is Aristotelian Ecthesis?" History and Philosophy

of Logic no. 3:113-127.
"I consider the proper interpretation of the process of ecthesis which
Aristotle uses several times in the "Prior analytics" for completing a
syllogistic mood, i.e., showing how to produce a deduction of a
conclusion of a certain form from premisses of certain forms. I consider
two interpretations of the process which have been advocated by recent
scholars and show that one seems better suited to most passages while
the other best fits a single remaining passage. I also argue that
"ecthesis" for Aristotle means 'setting out' the case to be proved using
letters. Aristotle's remarks about the use of letters in mathematical
proofs suggest that he had some understanding of rules equivalent to
universal generalization and existential instantiation; the 'proofs
through ecthesis' are so-called because they rest on the latter rule, with
which use of letters is involved in a special way."
163
———. 1982. "The Axiomatic Method and Aristotle's Logical
Methodology." Southwest Philosophical Studies no. 8:49-59.
"I argue that Aristotle developed the syllogistic in the "Prior Analytics"
in order to use it in resolving the question, presented in "Posterior
Analytics" A 3, whether proof of every proposition is either necessary
or possible. His method, which rests on an analysis of the possible
structure of proofs derived from the study of syllogisms in the "Prior
Analytics", resemble modern proof theory in both style and purpose."
———. 1983. "Completeness of an Ecthetic Syllogistic." Notre Dame

Journal of Formal Logic no. 24:224-232.
"In this paper I study a formal model for Aristotelian syllogistic which
includes deductive procedures designed to model the "proof by
ecthesis" that Aristotle sometimes uses and in which all deductions are
direct. The resulting system is shown to be contained within another
formal model for the syllogistic known to be both sound and complete,
and in addition the system is proved to have a certain limited form of
completeness."
———. 1986. "Immediate Propositions and Aristotle's Proof Theory."

" I argue that Aristotle's main reason for developing the theory of
deductions (syllogisms) in the "Prior Analytics" was its use as a proof-
theoretic instrument to solve problems about demonstrative sciences.
thus, concerning the old problem of the relation of the two "Prior" and
"Posterior Analytics", I hold that the "Prior" is "propter", and therefore
"post", the "Posterior". This is shown in greater detail through an
analysis of the role of 'immediate' propositions in his theory."
———. 1994. "Dialectic and the Syllogism." Ancient Philosophy no.

14:133-151.
Striker, Gisela. 1985. "Notwendigkeit Mit Lücken." Neue Hefter für

Philosophie no. 24/25:146-164.
Thom, Paul. 1976. "Ecthesis." Logique et Analyse no. 74-76:299-310.
164
———. 1979. "Aristotle's Syllogistic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic no. 20:751-759.
———. 1981. The Syllogism. München: Philosophia Verlag.

Contents: Preface 11; Part One. Aristotle's syllogistic. I. Elementary
syntax 19; II. Basis of the system 32; III. Theses 45; IV. Non-theses 56;
V. Interpretation an application 69; Part Tow. Syllogistic and its
extensions. Introduction 89; VI. System A 91; VII: Subsystems 109;
VIII. Extensions 119; IX: Rejection 147; X: Echtesis 164; Part Three.
The theory of the syllogism. Introduction 179; XI. Syntactic theory
181; XII. Aristotle's syntactic theory 193; XIII. Semantic theory 216;
XIV: Epistemological theory 227; Appendix 1. The Gergonne relations
253; Appendix 2. Termini obliqui and the logic of relations 255;
Appendix 3. Medieval echtetic systems 257; Notes 261; Bibliography
289; Indices. Index 1. Aristotelian passages 299; Index 2. Definitions
306; Index 3. Names 409-312.
"The three Parts of this book deal respectively with the formal analysis
of Aristotle's non-modal syllogistic; with the inter-relations between
various syllogistic systems, their subsystems and extensions; and with
the most fundamental question about the syllogism, viz. What is it?
Part One aims to effect a synthesis of recent work (both logical and
philological) on the non-modal sections of the Prior Analytics, within
the framework of a new formal system which combines features of
Lukasiewicz's àxiomatic' approach with features of the 'natural
deduction' approach of Corcoran and Smiley.
This system is identified, in Part Two, as one of a family which also
includes the semantically complete systems of Lukasiewicz and
Corcoran. Extended systems are also considered, in which rejected
formulae are axiomatised, and negative or singular terms added. In
particular, formal analyses are given of Aristotle's own logics of
negative and singular terms, and it is shown that the whole system of
categorical syllogisms can be based on a system of singular syllogisms
with the Aristotelian rules of ecthesis.
The multiplicity of syllogistic systems discussed in Part Two gives rise
to the search (carried out in the third Part) for properties essential to the
syllogism, which would recur in any genuinely syllogistic system. A
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complex syntactic property of the categorical syllogism is first
described, then a semantic one, and finally one which I will term
epistemological (without wanting to sink into psychologism). The
principal standpoint in this Part is a purely theoretical one - the
semantic discussion being within the context of the contemporary
debate on entailment, and the epistemological one belonging to the
theory of fallacies. But the historical approach of the first two Parts is
not wholly abandoned, and a detailed account is given of those parts of
the Prior Analytics (not often read) which include Aristotle's own
attempts at metatheory.
With some reluctance, and in the interests of brevity, I have adopted a
style of exposition which is generally dogmatic rather than dialectical,
in that it seeks merely to state the truth rather than to allow the true
view to emerge in stages from partial truths or mistaken opinions. Also,
interpretations or theories which seemed to me wholly wrong have in
general not been mentioned: there are just too many of them. On the
other hand, I have tried to include reference to what seemed to me the
most important contributions of the ancient and medieval
commentators.
I have proceeded (as Aristotle would have said) from what is best
known in itself, to what is best known for us, beginning with the basis
of an uninterpreted formal system, and ending with a statement of the
function of the syllogism and the use of the system. So, in a sense, the
reader will not know why the beginning is as it is, until he has come to
the end. For the benefit of readers who can't stand the suspense, I have
tried to make the end independently intelligible, so that they can begin
there, and then go to the beginning, ending in the middle with a kind of
syllogismus interruptus." pp. 11-12
———. 1991. "The Two Barbaras." History and Philosophy of Logic

no. 12:135-149.
"This paper examines three recent discussions of Aristotle's system of
syllogisms with apodeictic and assertoric premisses. Though they
contain no cross-references, and though they arrive at disparate
interpretations, all three pieces share a common aid. That aim is to
construct an intuitively graspable interpretation of Aristotle's modal
syllogistic which is based on metaphysical considerations. I argue that
166
none of these authors has succeeded in this; nevertheless, I share their
broad aim, and attempt to show that a more satisfactory interpretation
can be formulated by combining and developing elements drawn from
all three."
———. 1993. "Apodeictic Ecthesis." Notre Dame Journal of Formal

Logic no. 34:193-208.
Thompson, Marley. 1959. "On the Elimination of Singular Terms."

Mind no. 68:361-376.
Weidemann, Hermann. 2004. "Aristotle on the Reduciblity of All Vald

Syllogistic Moods to the Two Universal Moods of the First Figure (Apr
A7, 29b1-25)." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 25:73-78.
Westerstähl, Dag. 1989. "Aristotelian Syllogisms and Generalized

Quantifiers." Studia Logica no. 48:577-585.
Williams, Mark F. 1984. Studies in the Manuscript Tradition of

Aristotle's Analytica. Königstein: A. Hain.
Williamson, Colwyn. 1972. "Squares of Opposition: Comparisons

between Syllogistic and Propositional Logic." Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic no. 13:497-500.
"It has been pointed out, for example by Bochenski, (1) that the
principles of propositional logic now known as DeMorgan's Laws bear
a certain resemblance to the laws depicted in the traditional Square of
Opposition.
The analogy, however, is not as perfect as it could be. The aim of this
paper is to explore some of the consequences of seeking a more exact
comparison between syllogistic and propositional logic."
(1) J. M. Bochenski, A Précis of Mathematical Logic, Holland (1959),
p. 14
———. 1988. "How Many Syllogisms Are There?" History and

"The incompleteness and artificiality of the 'Traditional logic' of the
167
textbooks is reflected in the way that syllogisms are commonly
enumerated. The number said to be valid varies, but all the numbers
given are of a kind that logicians should find irritating. Even the
apparent harmony of what is almost invariably said to be the total
number of syllogisms, 256, turns out to be illusory. In the following, it
is shown that the concept of a "distribution-value", which is related to
the traditional theory of distribution, and the familiar concept of
"quantity" together suffice to produce a far better way of enumerating
syllogisms and a more complete understanding of the systematic
features of syllogistic logic."
RELATED PAGES
Bibliography on the Logic of Aristotle: Introductory Readings
Selected Bibliography on the de Interpretatione
Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Categorical Syllogism
168
Home
Contents
Last Page
INDEX OF THE SECTION: ANCIENT

LOGIC AFTER ARISTOTLE
N.B. For the most important logicians separated pages are in preparation.
From Theophrastus to Boethius

Peripatetic Logic: Eudemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus of Eresus
Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Eudemus and

Theophrastus
The Dialectical School and the Origins of Propositional Logic
Selected Bibliography on the Dialectical School and the Origins

of Propositional Logic
The Master Argument: The Sea Battle in De Intepretatione 9,

Diodorus Cronus, Philo the Dialectician
169
Logic in Ancient Stoicism
Ancient Stoic Rhetoric (under construction)
Selected Bibliography on Stoic Logic: A - E
Selected Bibliography on Stoic Logic: F - Z
Bibliography on Stoic Philosophy of Language, Grammar,

Rhetoric
Other Aspects of Ancient Logic
Editions and Translations of the Philosophical Works of Cicero
Sextus Empiricus and the Skeptical Criticism of Logic and Truth
Porphyry's Isagoge and his Commentary to Aristotle's Categories
Boethius' Contribution to the Development of Medieval Logic
170
Selected Bibliography on the Logical Works of Boethius
171
Home
Contents
Last Page
History of Ancient Logic in the

Hellenistic Period
THE SUCCESSSION OF THINKERS AND
SCHOOLS
The history of ancient philosophy covers about eleven centuries, from Thales
who lived during the sixth century B.C. to Boethius and Simplicius who
flourished at the beginning of the sixth A.D. From the point of view of the
history of formal logic this long epoch may be divided into three periods.
(1) The pre-Aristotelian period, from the beginnings to the time at which
Aristotle started writing his Topics (about 340 B.C.). There is no formal logic
during this period, i.e. no study of logical rules or laws; but some of them are
used consciously since Zeno of Elea, and Plato tries, if unsuccessfully, to
build up a logic.
(2) The creative period, from the time of Aristotle's Topics to the death of
Chrysippus of Soloi (205/8 B.C.). During this period Logic was founded and
considerably developed.
(3) The period of schoolmasters and commentators, from the death of
Chrysippus until the end of Antiquity. In that period no more creative work is
done, as far as we know; moreover, a continuous decline of formal logic
seems to take place. Boethius and Simplicius who are considered as the last
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ancient philosophers are also the last ancient logicians.
It appears, consequently, that out of the eleven centuries mentioned above
only about 150 years are of real importance; but those years are of enormous
importance -- they are, indeed, among the best years of logic in the whole
history of humanity until now.
The succession of different trends of logical thought -- for there were several
such trends -- can be briefly stated in the following terms. If Zeno is,
according to Aristotle, "the inventor of dialectics", Socrates seems to have
been the real father of formal logic ; at least both Plato and Euclides, the head
of the Megaric School, claim to be his disciples. Plato was the teacher of
Aristotle, the founder of formal Logic; Aristotle was succeeded by
Theophrastus, Eudemus and some others, who, if far less important than he,
are nevertheless productive logicians. This is one line of development of
logic, the peripatetic. The other line starts with Euclid of Megara and in the
second generation after him bifurcates into the properly Megaric School, with
Diodorus Cronus, and Philo of Megara his pupil, as most important logicians
on one hand -- the Stoic School founded by Zeno of Chition and having as
chief thinker Chrysippus of Soloi on the other. After Chrysippus' death one
hears no more of the Megaricians, and, later on, a syncretism of the
Peripatetic and Stoic-Megaric Schools appears.
Here is a scheme which may help in comparing the respective dates and
mutual influences; it contains only the most important names:
173
From: I. M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland
1951, pp. 9-10.
FIRST PHILOSOPHY AND ONTOLOGY

"Let us begin then -- according to our program -- with the question: What, in
the Greek philosophy, is the relation between First Philosophy and reflexion
on language?
Why -- to put the question directly -- did ontology become the First
Philosophy at that time rather than philosophy of language? From our
historical distance and level of reflexion one could consider the last question
as somewhat curious, and one might answer it by calling attention to the fact
that language as a condition of knowledge is much more difficult to grasp and
to analyze than the realm of things given by the senses. At first -- one might
say -- attention focuses on what can be shown in unreflective experience, in
the so called intentio recta or prima; later one comes to reflect -- within the
so called intentio obliqua or secunda -- on cognition itself as function of
consciousness and, finally, one may reflect on the function of language as a
condition of the possibility and intersubjective validity of knowledge.
Certainly, this answer is not false; we will even accept it as a guideline for
understanding the sequence of periods in the history of philosophy. However,
it must be stressed, that Greek philosophy itself went through this cycle of
stages in a way. In the age of Socrates and the Sophists it already turns away
from ontological questions about the nature (φύσις) and origin (άρχή) of
things, and raises questions as to the correctness of names (ορθοτες
ονομάτων), the function of speech (λόγος) and the meaning of words as
concepts or definitions (ὁροί, δρισμοί). Plato, through whom we know about
these discussions, already achieves the insight, that the truth is not to be
sought in the quality of single names but that it is a function of their
connection into a statement (λόγος) (5). And Aristotle especially in his "De
Interpretatione" laid the foundations of a philosophy of grammar, which was
further elaborated by the Stoics and thus decisively influenced the grammar
of the schools in the western world up to the present day.
But why did not Plato already, as Wittgenstein suggests, look for the rule of
the use of words in order to find an answer to the famous questions of
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Socrates into what courage or justice is? And why did he not see in his own
definition of thinking as a voiceless dialogue of the soul with itself a clue to
the fact that thinking is to be considered as a function of communication by
language? And Aristotle, who so often opens his questions about the essence
(σύσία) of being (óν) by an inquiry into the use of the words -- why did he
not consider the possibility that his ontological categories are relative to the
Greek language?
The answer to these questions, in my opinion, has to be a twofold one: On the
one hand Plato and Aristotle would have had good reasons for being
dissatisfied by doctrines which claim to "reduce" their question as to the
essence of things to mere question about the use of words. (...) On the other
hand, however, we must not overlook that Plato and Aristotle did not have a
concept of language adequate to enable them to see that their very questions,
not to speak of the answer, were dependent on the learned use of a certain
language.
The classical philosophy of the Greeks had at its disposal essentially four
concepts for comprehending the essence of human speech or communication:
όνομα (name), σύμβολον, σημεϊον (symbol or sign), δρος; (concept) and
λόγος; (speech, oratio, ratio, statement, etc.) (It is worth mentioning that it
had no concept of a special language. Only the Romans had the word "lingua
latina".) (7) By means of these four concepts it was impossible to grasp that
meaning is essentially a function of a language. For these four concepts form
two clusters between which the problem of linguistic meaning slips through:
λόγος (ratio) and δρος (concept) were a priori directed to something universal
which was thought to be independent of the use of language; όνομα (name)
and σύμβολον or σημείον (sign), on the other hand, did in fact mean
something which differs according to the use of different languages, but for
Aristotle, at least, it had nothing to do with the meaning of thoughts; it was
only a conventional means of designating, in the service of the "logos".
(Perhaps it was precisely this progressive step of no longer asking for the
correctness of single names but rather for the truth of statements that caused
the Greek philosophers to overlook the cognitive function which languages
have by virtue of the determinate meanings of their words and phrases.) (8)"
pp. 34-36
(5) Cf. Plato, Sophist 261c - 262e
175
(6) Cf. Plato, Sophist 263d
(7) See J. Lohmann, "Über den paradigmatischen Charakter der griechischen
Kultur", in: Festschrift für H. G. Gadamer, Tübingen 1960, pp. 171-89; see
further J. Lohmann's papers in Lexis, I, 1948, pp.49-106, Lexis, III, 1, pp. 5-
49, Lexis, III, 2, p. 169-217, and in: Festschrift fur L. Weisgerber, Düsseldοrf
1958.
(8) So it is not quite surprising that the Neoplatonist tradition which
interpreted Plato's "Cratylus" as defending the theory of the correctness of
names had some beneficial influence by preserving the notion that words are
not simply sounds arbitrarily used as signs. Finally, the strongest argument of
the θέσει-theory of names was answered in the Neoplatonist tradition by the
fruitful idea that the variety of words standing for the same things must not
necessarily be explained by different conventions but could also be explained
by a variety of experienced aspects of things. This view may be traced in, for
instance, Nicolaus Cusanus, Leibniz and still in W. von Humboldt. Cf. Κ. O.
Apel, "Die Idee der Sprache bei Nicolaus von Cues", in Archiv für
Begriffsgeschichte, Bd. 1, Bonn 1955, pp. 200-221.
From: Karl-Otto Apel, "The Transcendental Conception of Language-
Communication and the Idea of a First Philosophy" in: Herman Parrett (ed.),
History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter 1975, pp. 32-61.
LOGICAL FORM AND LOGICAL MATTER

"The mediaeval distinction between material and formal consequence derives
ultimately, both in name and in substance, from ancient texts. (60)
Form and matter, eidos and hyle, are Peripatetic twins, and the mediaeval
distinction -- and hence the modern notion of 'formal' logic -- comes in the
end from Aristotle.
These claims are indisputable -- but they are vague. If we inquire more
closely into the business, dispute and controversy appear. For some historians
of logic have claimed that the later Peripatetics, at least, had a clear
understanding of the notion of logical form and hence of the essential nature
of formal logic; (61) whereas others have maintained, to the contrary, that the
176
modern ideas of formal validity and of the logical form of an argument have
no genuine counterparts in the ancient texts. (62) In fact -- and predictably --,
the truth lies dully between these two exciting extremes; and if we are to see
just how and where it lies, we must proceed by a plodding examination of the
relevant texts.
Aristotle himself only once applies the concepts of matter and form to the
syllogism: at Phys 195a18-19 he observes laconically that "the hypotheses
are matter for the conclusion". (By "hypotheses" he here means "premisses".)
The later commentators pick up the point. Alexander, it is true, was not
happy with it, (63) and he does not make use of it in his own logical writings.
But Philoponus had no such qualms: he repeats the idea that the premisses of
a syllogism are, as it were, the stuff out of which the conclusion is made (64)
Yet whatever we make ofPhys 195a18-19, the text has nothing to do with the
distinction between formal and material validity.
Several other logical applications of the twin concepts are found in the later
commentators: thus the modal status or skesis of a proposition is called its
'matter'; (65) or the subject of a proposition stand to the predicate as matter to
form; (66) or an unquantified proposition is matter, the quantifier form; (67)
and so on. (68) None of these applications of the Aristotelian distinction is
illuminating; and none is relevant here.
Alexander preferred to invoke matter and form in a different logical context;
and it is his preferred distinction between logical matter and logical form
which is to the present point. (69) The idea first appears early in Alexander's
commentary on the Prior Analytics:
The figures of the syllogism are like a sort of common matrix. You may
fit matter into them and mould the same form for different matters. Just
as, in the case of matrixes, the matters fitted into them differ not in
respect of form or figure but in respect of matter, so too is it with the
syllogistic figures. (in APr (6.16-21).
Alexander says no more than this to explain what distinguishes the form
from the matter of an argument. Similarly, the distinction enters his
commentary on the Topics in its first pages (in Top 2.1-3.4) -- and again,
there is no serious explanation. After their introduction, the concepts are
used with frequency and without apology throughout the commentaries.
177
The twins reappear in the later Peripatetic commentators. Ammonius presents
them in a cautious manner near the beginning of his commentary on the Prior
Analytics:
In every syllogism there is something analogous to [analogon] matter
and something analogous to form. Analogous to matter are the objects
[pragmata] themselves by way of which the syllogism is combined, and
analogous to form are the figures. (in APr 4.9-11).
As this passage suggests, Ammonius does not greatly like the term hyle;
and to convey the Alexandrian distinction he will in fact more often
employ the word pragma. (70) But his pupil Philoponus was content
with the term hyle and he simply equates pragmata and hyle as though
nothing turned on the point (in APr9.6.)
(...)
Thus the later authors used a variety of linguistic turns. But it would be rash
to look for any substantial difference behind the linguistic facade. Boethius
and the later Greeks adopted and deployed an established and apparently
uncontroversial distinction. How the distinction was referred to and by what
names it was called were questions of taste and style.
Alexander too had taken the thing for granted; and we must infer from his
commentaries that earlier Peripatetics had applied the concepts of matter and
form to logic. On independent grounds we may believe that Alexander's
teacher, Herminus, (75) had probably spoken of the form and matter of
arguments. (76) As far as I know, there is no other evidence for the use of
matter and form in logical theory before Alexander: it is not found in
Aristotle's own works; nor is there any text ascribing it to Theophrastus or
Eudemus, or to Boethus or Aristo. But the silence proves little, and
Alexander's attitude shows that by his time it was already thoroughly
familiar. (77)
If we ask why some Peripatetic scholar thought to apply matter and form to
logic, we can give no worthwhile answer. Was the idea part of a general
attempt to systematise Aristotle, so that his customary analytical concepts
should be applied in every part of his philosophy? Was it rather reflexion on
the Analytics themselves (perhaps on the sense and function of Aristotle's
dummy letters (78) which encouraged the invocation of matter and form?
178
Was it the influence of the Stoics, whose own distinction between a logos and
a tropos might have put a Peripatetic in mind of matter and form? (79) There
is no evidence from which to answer these questions." pp. 39-43
(60) For the links between the ancient and the mediaeval accounts see
esp. Ebbesen pp. 95-101; cfr. Pinborg pp. 74-80. For the importance of
the distinction in Arabic texts see Zimmermann pp. XXXVIII-XLI. (But
Zimmemann claims too much for Al-Farabi. "Striking an individual note
in the very first sentence of his Commentary al-Farabi says that the De
Int. is about the "composition" [ta'lif], not the "matter" [madda], of
propositions. I do not find this opposition of terms, which recurs as a
kind of leitmotiv throughout the work, in the Greek commentaries; and
the fact that it is usually in criticizing his predecessors that he invokes it
confirms that here we have a new departure in the exegesis of the De
Interpretatione" (pp. XXXVIII-XXXIX). Not entirely new, I think --
and in any case, the opposition of terms which al-Farabi deploys was
thoroughly familiar to the Greek commentators on the Analytics.)
(61) Thus the Peripatetic commentators "show us that they had an excellent
conceptual grasp of the essence of what is today called 'formal' logic" (Lee, p.
38); and Alexander had "a clear insight into the essence of formal logical
laws" (Bochenski, p. 157).
(62) Thus "it seems that neither the Stoics nor the Peripatetics ever say that
an argument is valid because of its logical form, which would be strange if
they actually had thought that the validity had to be explained as being due to
the form. And even when it is said that a certain form of argument is valid for
every matter (i.e. for every suitable substitution of the letters), this does not
seem to be the same as saying that the validity is due to the form" (Frede, p.
103). (In a note, Frede admits that there are apparent counterexamples to his
thesis -- he cites Boethius, Hyp syll II ii 4-5, iii 6, iv 2 [see below, p. 42] --,
and says that these passages "would have to be dealt with individually" (p.
368 n. 3).) -- I am not sure exactly what Frede concedes and what he denies.
But the main point appears to be this: the ancient logicians do not ever say of
an argument that it is valid because of its form. Now, taken absolutely
literally, this may well be true; at least, I have not come across a text in which
a conclusion is saidsunaghestai dia to eidos. But there are, as Frede allows, a
few passages which say something very close to this (e.g. that a conclusion is
179
drawn dia ten plochen); and there are numerous passages which imply
something like it (e.g. passages which contrast syllogisms with arguments
which conclude dia ten hylen). -- My own reasons for qualifying the
enthusiastic view exemplified in the last footnote are not Frede's. Rather,
first, I hold that the use of the matter/form distinction by Alexander (and the
later commentators) is not always coherent [see below, pp. 58-65]. And
secondly, I doubt if the ancients had any dear or coherent notion of form.
They had (contra Frede) a rough and ready notion of formal validity; but
(contra Lee) they had no precise and rigorous notion. (Of course, if the
reflections in the previous Part of this paper are correct, then the ancients
were in this respect no worse off than most moderns.);
(63) See the passage quoted by Simplicius, in Phys 320.1-10.
(64) See e.g. in APr 6.10-14; 32.31-33.2. The idea survived to become a
commonplace of traditional logic: see e.g. 59 of Kant's Logik
(65) See below, pp. 44 and 48.
(66) E.g. Philoponus, in APr 65.11-13; [Ammonius], in APr 71.14-16.
(67) E.g. Ammonius, in Int 111.19-23.
(68) For yet other uses of matter and form see e.g. [Ammonius], in APr
68.33-69.11; Philoponus, in APr 6.2-3 (cfr. 10.18); 44.24-26; 66.7-26
(69) On Alexander's use of matter and form in logic see esp. Lee, pp. 38-44.
(70) Alexander too occasionally uses pragma (e.g. in APr 295.1; 301.12-13);
and he takes this usage from Aristotle (APr 43b3-4).
(75) On whom see P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, vol. II,
Berlin, de Gruyter 1984 ("Peripatoi", 6), pp. 361-363.
(76) See [Ammonius], in APr 39.32: I say "probably" because [Ammonius] is
paraphrasing rather than quoting, and because we cannot be sure of the
reliability or the accuracy of his paraphrases. (See below, p. 80).
(77) Bochenski is therefore wrong when he says (p. 157) that "Alexander
seems to have been the first to give an explicit account of the difference
between form and matter in logic".
(78) See below, p. 51.
(79) See below, pp. 65-66.
Bibliographical note
This list is not a bibliography: it merely gives details of those works which
the text refers to more than once.
180
J. M. Bochenski, Formate Logik, Freiburg/Munich, Verlag Karl Alber 1956
("Orbis Academicus" III, 2).
S. Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici
Elenchi, Leiden, E. J. Brill 1981 ("Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in
Aristotelem Graecorum", VII).
Michael Frede, Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic, Archiv fur Geschichte der
Philosophie, LVI, 1974, pp. 1-32, reprinted in Michael Frede, Essays in
Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1987 (I cite from the
reprint).
Tae-Soo Lee, Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der
Spätantike, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1984 ("Hypomnemata",
79).
J. Pinborg, Logica e Semantica nel Medioevo, Turin, Boringhieri 1984.
F. W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on
Aristotle's De Interpretatione, London, Oxford University Press 1981
("Classical and Mediaeval Logic Texts", III).
From: Jonathan Barnes, "Logical Form and Logical Matter", in Logica, mente
e persona. Studi sulla filosofia antica., edited by Alberti Antonina. Firenze:
Leo S. Olschki Editore 1990, pp. 7-119.
LATER ANTIQUITY
"The last period of ancient logic is characterized by the following traits, some
of which have already been touched upon (chapter 2 C). First of all, as far as
we know, it is no longer a creative period: we cannot quote a single logician
comparable -- not only with Aristotle, Diodorus or Chrysippus, but even with
Theophrastus. Logic seems to have still been much studied, however, and its
knowledge must have been widely spread. At the same time there was the
unfortunate phenomenon of the struggle between the Peripatetic and the Stoic
Schools. Slowly a mixture of both trends formed. Thus, we hear that Boethus
of Sidon, pupil of Andronicus Rhodos, who lived at the time of Augustus and
was the head of the Peripatetic School, asserted the priority of the Stoic
undemonstrated in regard to the categorical syllogism; syncretism is often
met with later on, e.g. in the Dialectical Introduction of Galenus. On the
181
other hand there are still some rigid peripateticians who deny any merit to the
Stoic-Megaric School; Alexander of Aphrodisias is an instance. In the long
run, however, a kind of commonly received doctrine, composed of rather
poor remains of both Aristotelian and Stoic-Megaric doctrines was formed.
Yet the work of the commentators and authors of textbooks has not been, as it
seems, completely irrelevant to logic -- here and there they probably were
able to bring some complements and perfections of the old doctrines.
Unfortunately, we know nearly nothing about their work.
The Logicians.
There follows here a (incomplete) list of important logicians who lived
during that long period. Ariston of Alexandria is reported to have stated the
"subaltern modes" of the syllogism (1); he lived during the II century A.D.
Another important logician of the same period is the famous physician
Galenus (129 - c. 199 A.D.); his "Dialectical Introduction" is the only ancient
Greek textbook of logic preserved; it has been studied by Fr. Stakelum. His
contemporary Apuleius of Madaura (125 A.D.) wrote among others a Latin
book Peri hermenias which seems to be of great interest. Alexander of
Aphrodisias, who lived during the third century, is probably one of the most
penetrating logicians of the peripatetic School and one of the best
commentators of the Organon in history. Porphyrius of Thyrus (232/3 -
beginning of the IV century) is another important commentator of Aristotle,
if inferior to Alexander: his Introduction was destined to have a brilliant
career during the Middle Ages. Sextus Empiricus (3rd century) our main
source for the Stoic-Megaric School can hardly be called a logician, yet he
knew logic well and some of his criticisms might be of interest. Later authors
- such as Iamblichus of Chalkis c. 330), Themistius (330-390), Ammonius
Hermeiou, the disciple of Proclus, David Ioannes Philoponus (died after 640),
are of far lesser importance. But at the end of our period we have again some
men of interest: Martianus Capella, who wrote between 410 and 439 his
celebrated "De nuptiis Philosophiae et Mercurii" with a book devoted to
logic; Simplicius, pupil of Ammonius, and the last important Athenian
Philosopher (he was driven from Athens by a decree of Justinian in 529) is
also an intelligent logician; finally Boethius, himself a not very good thinker,
is highly important because of his influence on the Middle Ages, but also
because of the mass of information his logical works contain."
182
(1) Apul. 193, 16ff.; there is much confusion in this text.
From: I. M. Bochenski - Ancient formal logic - Amsterdam, North-Holland,
1951, pp. 103-104
"Very little is known about the development of logic from c. 100 BCE to
c. 250 CE. It is unclear when Peripatetics and the Stoics began taking
notice of the logical achievements of each other. Sometime during that
period, the terminological distinction between categorical syllogisms,
used for Aristotelian syllogisms, and hypothetical syllogisms, used not
only for those by Theophrastus and Eudemus but also for the Stoic
propositional-logical syllogisms, gained a foothold. In the first century
BCE, the Peripatetics Ariston of Alexandria and Boethus of Sidon wrote
about syllogistic. Ariston is said to have introduced the so-called
subaltern syllogisms (Barbari, Celaront, Cesaro, Camestrop and
Camenop) into Aristotelian syllogistic (Apul.Int. 213.5–10), that is, the
syllogisms one gains by applying the subalternation rules (that were
acknowledged by Aristotle in his Topics): From “A holds of every B”
infer “A holds of some B” From “A holds of no B” infer “A does not
hold of some B” to the conclusions of the relevant syllogisms. Boethus
suggested substantial modifications to Aristotle’s theories: He claimed
that all categorical syllogisms are complete and that hypothetical
syllogistic is prior to categorical (Gal.Inst.Log. 7.2), although we are not
told prior in which way. The Stoic Posidonius (c.135–c.51 BCE)
defended the possibility of logical or mathematical deduction against the
Epicureans and discussed some syllogisms he called conclusive by the
force of an axiom, which apparently included arguments of the type “As
the 1st is to the 2nd, so the 3rd is to the 4th; the ratio of the 1st to the
2nd is double; therefore the ratio of the 3rd to the 4th is double,” which
was considered conclusive by the force of the axiom “things which are
in general of the same ratio, are also of the same particular ratio” (Gal.
Inst. Log.18.8). At least two Stoics in this period wrote a work on
Aristotle’s Categories. From his writings we know that Cicero was
knowledgeable about both Peripatetic and Stoic logic; and Epictetus’s
discourses prove that he was acquainted with some of the more taxing
parts of Chrysippus’s logic. In all likelihood there existed at least a few
183
creative logicians in this period, but we do not know who they were and
what they created. The next logician of rank, if of lower rank, of whom
we have sufficient evidence is Galen (129–199 or 216 CE), whose
greater fame was as a physician. He studied logic with both Peripatetic
and Stoic teachers and recommended to avail oneself of parts of either
doctrine, as long as it could be used for scientific demonstration. He
composed commentaries on logical works by Aristotle, Theophrastus,
Eudemus, and Chrysippus, as well as treatises on various logical
problems and a major work titled On Demonstration. All these are lost
except for some information in later texts, but his Introduction to Logic
has come down to us almost in full. In On Demonstration, Galen
developed, among other things, a theory of compound categorical
syllogisms with four terms, which fall into four figures, but we do not
know the details. He also introduced the so-called relational syllogisms,
examples of which are “A is equal to B, B is equal to C; therefore A is
equal to C” and “Dio owns half as much as Theo; Theo owns half as
much as Philo. Therefore Dio owns a quarter of what Philo owns.” (Gal.
Inst. Log. 17–18). All relational syllogisms Galen mentions have in
common that they are not reducible in either Aristotle’s or Stoic
syllogistic, but it is difficult to find further formal characteristics that
unite them all. In general, in hisIntroduction to Logic, he merges
Aristotelian Syllogistic with a strongly Peripatetic reinterpretation of
Stoic propositional logic. The second ancient introduction to logic that
has survived is Apuleius’s (second century CE) De Interpretatione. This
Latin text, too, displays knowledge of Stoic and Peripatetic logic; it
contains the first full presentation of the square of opposition, which
illustrates the logical relations between categorical sentences by
diagram. Alcinous, in his Handbook of Platonism 5, is witness to the
emergence of a specifically Platonist logic, constructed on the Platonic
notions and procedures of division, definition, analysis, and hypothesis,
but there is little that would make a logicians heart beat faster. Sometime
between the third and sixth century CE, Stoic logic faded into oblivion
to be resurrected only in the twentieth century in the wake of the
(re)discovery of propositional logic. The surviving, often voluminous,
Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works by Alexander of
Aphrodisias (fl. c.200 CE), Porphyry (234–c.305), Ammonius Hermeiou
184
(fifth century), John Philoponus (c. 500), and Simplicius (sixth century),
and the Latin ones by Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c.480–524)
have their main importance as sources for lost Peripatetic and Stoic
works. Still, two of the commentators deserve special mention:
Porphyry, for writing the Isagoge or Introduction (that is, to Aristotle’s
Categories), in which he discusses the five notions of genus, species,
differentia, property, and accident as basic notions one needs to know to
understand the Categories. For centuries, the Isagoge was the first logic
text a student would tackle, and Porphyry’s five predicables (which
differ from Aristotle’s four) formed the basis for the medieval doctrine
of the quinque voces. The second is Boethius. In addition to
commentaries, he wrote a number of logical treatises, mostly simple
explications of Aristotelian logic, but also two very interesting ones: (1)
His On Topical Differentiae bears witness of the elaborated system of
topical arguments that logicians of later antiquity had developed from
Aristotle’s Topics under the influence of the needs of Roman lawyers.
(2) His On Hypothetical Syllogisms systematically presents wholly
hypothetical and mixed hypothetical syllogisms as they are known from
the early Peripatetics; it may be derived from Porphyry. Boethius’s
insistence that the negation of “If it is A, it is B” is “If it is A, it is not B”
suggests a suppositional understanding of the conditional, a view for
which there is also some evidence in Ammonius, but that is not attested
for earlier logicians. Historically, Boethius is most important because he
translated all of Aristotle’s Organon into Latin, and thus these texts
(except thePosterior Analytics) became available to philosophers of the
medieval period."
From: Susanne Bobzien, "Logic, History of: Ancient Logic: Later Antiquity",
in: Donald M. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second Edition,
New York: Macmillan 2006, Vol. 5, pp. 407-409.
Aristotle (384 BC - 322 BC)

Aristotle's Logic: Introductory Readings and the Syllogistic
185
Aristotle's Theory of Categorical Syllogism in the Prior Analytics
Disciples of Aristotle
Eudemus of Rhodes (c. 350 BC - 290 BC)
Theophrastus of Eresus (371 BC - c. 287 BC)
The Dialectical School and the Origins of Propositional

Logic
Philo the Dialectician (4th century BC)
Diodorus Cronus (second-half of the 4th century BC)
Bibliography on the The Dialectical School
Early Stoic Logicians: Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes,

Chrysippus
Zeno of Citium (c. 334 BC - 262 BC)
Cleanthes of Assos (c. 331 BC - c. 232 BC)
Chrysippus (c. 280 - c. 207 BC)
Bibliography on the Early Stoic Logic
Epicureans
Philodemus of Gadara (c. 110 - c. 40 BC)
Other Greek Logicians
186
Claudius Galenus (129 - 200)
Sextus Empiricus (160 - 210)
Diogenes Laërtius (3rd century)
Greek Commentators of Aristotle's Logical Works

Alexander of Aphrodisias (end of 2nd century)
Porphyry (234? - 305?)
Ammonius Hermeiou (c. 435/445 - 517/526)
Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 490 - c. 560)
John Philoponus (c. 490 - c. 570)
RELATED PAGES
Great Logicians
187
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Contents
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Bibliography of Ancient Logic in the

Hellenistic Period
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON HELLENISTIC
LOGIC
Alessandrelli, Michele, and Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro, eds. 2009. La
Logica Nel Pensiero Antico. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Atti del Colloquio, Roma, 28-29 novembre 2000.
Indice: Mauro Nasti de Vincentis: Premessa 9; Francesco Ademollo:
Un'interpretazione del Cratilo di Platone 15; Fabio Acerbi:
Osservazioni sulle origini aritmetiche della teoria aristotelica del
sillogismo 75; Luca Castagnoli: Sunártesis crisippea e tesi di Aristotele
105; Mauro Nasti de Vincentis: Dalla tesi di Aristotele alla tesi di
Boezio: una tesi per l'implicazione crisippea? 165; Anna Maria
Schiaparelli: La fallacia della composizione e della divisione in
Aristotele e in Galeno 249; Indice delle fonti 281; Indice dei nomi
antichi 291; Indice degli autori moderni 293-295.
Algra, Keimpe, Barnes, Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap, and Schofield,
Malcolm, eds. 1999. The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy.
Part II. Logic and language. Chapter 4: Introduction by Jonathan
Barnes 65; Chapter 5: Logic by Jonathan Barnes, Susanne Bobzien and
188
Mario Mignucci; 5.I The Peripatetics 77; 5.II The 'Megarics' 83; 5.II
The Stoics; Chapter 6: Language by Dirk M. Schenkeveld; 6.I
Linguistics 177; 6.II Rhetoric 216; 6.III Poetics 221-225.
Allen, James. 2001. Inference Form Signs. Ancient Debates About the
Nature of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baldassarri, Mariano. 1990. "La Logica Filodemea." In Studi Di
Filosofia Antica. Vol. I, 7-54. Como: Librria Noseda.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1981. "Proof and the Syllogism." In Aristotle on
Science. The "Posterior Analytics", edited by Berti, Enrico, 17-59.
Padova: Editrice Antenore.
Proceedings of the Eight Symposium Aristotelicum held in Padua from
September 7 to 15, 1978
———. 1986. "Peripatetic Negations." Oxford Studies in Ancient
———. 1988. "Epicureans Signs." Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy.Supplementary volume no. 6:91-134.
———. 1990. "Logical Form and Logical Matter." In Logica, Mente E
Persona. Studi Sulla Filosofia Antica, edited by Alberti, Antonina, 7-
119. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore.
———. 2007. Truth, Etc. Six Lectures on Ancient Logic. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
———. 2007. "Peripatetic Logic: 100 Bc - Ad 200." In Greek and
Roman Philosophy 100 Bc - 200 Ad. Vol. Ii, edited by Sharples, Robert
W. and Sorabji, Richard, 531-546. London: Institute of Classical
Studies.
Barnes, Jonathan, Bobzien, Susanne, Mignucci, Mario, and
Schenkeveld, Dirk. 1999. "Part Ii. Logic and Language." In The
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra, Keimpe,
Barnes, Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield, Malcolm, 65-225.
Chapter 4: Introduction (pp. 65-76) by J. Barnes; Chapter 5: Logic: I.
The Peripatetics (pp. 77-83) by J. Barnes; II. The 'Megarics' (pp. 83-92)
by S. Bobzien, III. The Stoics §§ 1-7 (pp. 92-157) by S. Bobzien; § 8
(pp. 157-176) by M. Mignucci; Chapter 6: Language (pp. 177-225) by
D. Schenkeveld, J. Barnes (pp. 193-213).
Barnouw, Jeffrey. 2002. Propositional Perception. Phantasia,
Predication, and Sign in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Lanham:
189
University Press of America.
Berti, Enrico. 1989. Analitica E Dialettica Nel Pensiero Antico. Napoli:
Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa.
Bobzien, Susanne. 2000. "Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy:87-137.
"In antiquity we encounter a distinction of two types of hypothetical
syllogisms. One type are the 'mixed hypothetical syllogisms'. The other
type is the one to which the present paper is devoted. These arguments
went by the name of 'wholly hypothetical syllogisms'. They were
thought to make up a self-contained system of valid arguments. Their
paradigm case consists of two conditionals as premisses, and a third as
conclusion. Their presentation, either schematically or by example,
varies in different authors. For instance, we find 'If (it is) A, (it is) B; if
(it is) B, (it is) C; therefore, if (it is) A, (it is) C'. The main contentious
point about these arguments is what the ancients thought their logical
form was. Are A, B, C schematic letters for terms or propositions? Is
'is', where it occurs, predicative, existential, or veridical? That is,
should 'A esti' be translated as 'it is an A', 'A exists', 'As exist' or 'It is
true/the case that A'? If A, B, C are term letters, and 'is' is predicative,
are the conditionals quanti ed propositions or do they contain
designators? If one cannot answer these questions, one can hardly claim
to know what sort of arguments the wholly hypothetical syllogisms
were. In fact, all the above-mentioned possibilities have been taken to
describe them correctly. In this paper I argue that it would be mistaken
to assume that in antiquity there was one prevalent understanding of the
logical form of these arguments even if the ancients thought they were
all talking about the same kind of argument. Rather, there was a
complex development in their understanding, starting from a term-
logical conception and leading to a propositional-logical one. I trace
this development from Aristotle to Philoponus and set out the deductive
system on which the logic of the wholly hypothetical syllogisms was
grounded."
———. 2000. "Why the Order of the Figures of the Hypothetical
Syllogisms Was Changed." Classical Quarterly no. 50:247-251.
———. 2002. "The Development of Modus Ponens in Antiquity: From
Aristotle to the 2nd Century Ad." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient
190
"Aristotelian logic, as it was taught from late antiquity until the 20th
century, commonly included a short presentation of the argument forms
modus (ponendo) ponens, modus (tollendo) tollens, modus ponendo
tollens, and modus tollendo ponens. In late antiquity, arguments of
these forms were generally classified as 'hypothetical syllogisms'.
However, Aristotle did not discuss such arguments, nor did he call any
arguments 'hypothetical syllogisms'. The Stoic indemonstrables
resemble the modus ponens/tollens arguments. But the Stoics never
called them 'hypothetical syllogisms'; nor did they describe them as
ponendo ponens, etc. The tradition of the four argument forms and the
classification of the arguments as hypothetical syllogisms hence need
some explaining. In this paper, I offer some explanations by tracing the
development of certain elements of Aristotle's logic via the early
Peripatetics to the logic of later antiquity. I consider the questions: How
did the four argument forms arise? Why were there four of them? Why
were arguments of these forms called 'hypothetical syllogisms'? On
what grounds were they considered valid? I argue that such arguments
were neither part of Aristotle's dialectic, nor simply the result of an
adoption of elements of Stoic logic, but the outcome of a long, gradual
development that begins with Aristotle's logic as preserved in his
Topics and Prior Analytics; and that, as a result, we have a Peripatetic
logic of hypothetical inferences which is a far cry both from Stoic logic
and from classical propositional logic, but which sports a number of
interesting characteristics, some of which bear a cunning resemblance
to some 20th century theories."
———. 2002. "Some Elements of Propositional Logic in Ammonius."
In Interpretation Und Argument, 103-119. Würzburg: Königshausen &
Neumann.
———. 2002. "Pre-Stoics Hypothetical Syllogistic in Galen's Institutio
Logica." In The Unknown Galen, edited by Nutton, Vivian. London:
Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.
"The text of the Institutio logica is not found in Kühn (*) because its
sole surviving MS was first published, not long after its discovery, in
1844, and thus too late for inclusion. The reasons for once considering
it spurious are unconvincing. Galen's Institutio is one of our main
witnesses for a hypothetical syllogistic which predates Stoic
propositional logic. Galen draws from a number of different sources
191
and theories including the "ancient philosophers" (hoi palaioi ton
philosophon), including Chrysippus; and the "more recent" (hoi
neoteroi), post-Chrysippean Stoics or logicians of other schools who
adopted Stoic terminology and theory."
[* Karl Gottlob Kühn, Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia. Leipzig: C.
Cnobloch, 1821-1833, 19 volumes, reprinted Hildesheim, Georg
Olms,1964-1997].
Bochenski, Joseph. 1937. "Notes Historiques Sur Les Propositions
Modales." Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques no.
26:673-692.
———. 1951. Ancient Formal Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Contents: I. Prolegomena 1; II. The Forerunners 14; III. Aristotle 19;
IV. The Old Peripateticians 72; V. The Stoic-Megaric School 77; VI.
The last period 103; Bibliography 110; Index of Greek terms 118;
Index of names 121.
"The present book is intended to supply mathematical logicians with a
synthetic outline of the main aspects of ancient formal logic which are
known in the present state of research. In order to avoid
misunderstandings, each of the above terms has to be explained.
The reader is supposed to be a mathematical logician, i.e., to know both
the symbolisms and the (English) language of contemporary
mathematical logic; those who are not acquainted with it must be
warned that several terms used in that language have a particular
meaning, different from the meaning attributed to the terms of the same
form in other contexts.
The subject of the book is formal Logic; by this we understand a
science such as was developed by Aristotle in his Prior Analytics, i.e.,
essentially the theory of syllogisms as defined in An. Pr. A 1, 24b 18-
20. Along with the syllogisms proper, the structure of the sentences and
semiotics will be studied; contrariwise, not only all ontological,
psychological and epistemological problems, but even methodological
topics will be omitted in so far as possible. This is perhaps regrettable;
but there are several good books on those subjects while there is none
on ancient formal logic as a whole - and the limitation of space forced
us to omit everything which was not strictly formal.
By ancient formal logic, Greek logic from the beginning of Greek
Philosophy until the end of Antiquity is meant. We have, it is true,
192
some Latin textbooks of formal logic - but they all seem based on, or
even copied from, Greek sources. It is perhaps worthwhile mentioning
that there is also an ancient Indian Logic; this lies, however, outside
our present scope.
What is offered here is an outline, moreover a very fragmentary one. A
complete account of ancient formal logic cannot be written at the
present date because of the lack of scientific monographs on individual
logicians and topics. The initial aim of the author was to limit himself
to a reassumption of monographs already published; in the course of
the work he was compelled, however, to use some of his own
unpublished researches on Aristotle and had the exceptional fortune of
reading the manuscript of Dr Benson Mates' book on Stoic logic. He
also collected some new data on other topics. In spite of this,
considerable parts of ancient logic have hardly been touched upon - e.g.
the logic of the Commentators - while others, Aristotle included, have
been treated in a way which is far from being complete. On the whole,
what the book contains may be considered as a kind of starting point
for future research. Yet, it is hoped that even this will supply logicians
with some information difficult to be found elsewhere and give a
general idea of what the ancient logic was and how it developed." pp.
1-2
Burnyeat, Myles. 2005. "The Origins of Non-Deductive Inference." In
Science and Speculation. Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice,
edited by Barnes, Jonathan, Brunschwig, Jacques, Burnyeat, Myles and
Schofield, Malcolm, 193-238. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Calogero, Guido. 1967. Storia Della Logica Antica. Bari: Laterza.
Castagnoli, Luca. 2010. Ancient Self-Refutation. The Logic and History
of the Self-Refutation Argument from Democritus to Augustine.
Cavini, Walter. 1985. "La Negazione Di Frase Nella Logica Greca." In
Studi Su Papiri Greci Di Logic E Medicina, edited by Cavini, Walter,
Indice dei Contenuti: Nota liminare 9;
LA NEGAZIONE ARISTOTELICA
1. La sintesi dichiarativa: supplemento di frase e contenuto descrittivo
11; 2. Negazione semplice e affermazione trasposta 17; 3. Le asserzioni
193
indeterminate: trasformazione predicativa ed equivocità composta 26;
4. Portata esistenziale dell'affermazione 36; 5. Negative categoriche 41;
LA NEGAZIONE STOICA
1. Frammenti e testimonianze 47; 2. La teoria stoica degli axiomata 48;
3. Negazione semplice e composta 51; 4. Opposti contraddittòri 57; 5.
Ambiguità della negazione ordinaria 67;
APPENDICE - IL PAPIRO PARIGINO 2
Testo e traduzione 86; Commento 107; Bibliografia 122-126
Celluprica, Vincenza. 1978. La Logica Antica. Torino: Loescher.
Antologia di testi con ampia introduzione
Chiaradonna, Riccardo. 2004. "La Constitution De La Logique Tardo-
Antique Et L'élaboration D'une Logique "Matérielle" En Syriaque." In
Aristotele E I Suoi Esegeti Neoplatonici. Logica E Ontologia Nelle
Interpretazioni Greche E Arabe.
Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Roma 19-20 Ottobre 2001, edited by
Celluprica, Vincenza and D'Ancona Costa, Cristina, 55-83. Napoli:
Bibliopolis.
Conso, Daniele. 2001. "Remarques Sur La Terminologie Du "Liber
Peri Hermeneias" Et De La Tradition Logique De Langue Latine
Antérieure À Boèce." Latomus.Revue d'Études Latines no. 60:944-961.
"Après avoir rappelé les principales concordances et divergences entre
la terminologie logique latine avant et après Boèce, on examine deux
choix propres soit à l'auteur du Peri hermeneias (PH) transmis sous le
nom d'Apulée, soit à la première tradition logique de langue latine:
celui de "pars" ("particula") et celui de "formula" ("forma" chez
Martianus Capella), choix auquels Boèce substituera "terminus" et
"figura", pour rendre le notion de "terme" (horos chez Aristote) et celle
de "figure (du syllogisme)" (skhema chez Aristote). Dans chaque cas,
on passe en revue la distribution des emplois dans le PH et chez
Martianus, en signalant les attestations antérieures ou postérieures à ces
traités. On s'interroge enfin sur les raisons possibles du choix effectué
par l'auteur du PH et maintenu ou modifié par Martianus Capella.
Corcoran, John. 1972. "Conceptual Structure of Classical Logic."
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 33:25-47.
———, ed. 1974. Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations.
Dordrecht: Reidel.
Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on modernist interpretations of
194
ancient logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972.
Contents: Preface IX; Part One: Ancient semantics; Norman
Kretzmann: Aristotle on spoken sound significant by convention 3;
Ronald Zirin: Inarticulate noises 23; Newton Garver: Notes for a
linguistic reading of the Categories 27; Part Two: Modern research in
ancient logic; Ian Mueller: Greek mathematics and Greek logic 35;
John Mulhern: Modern notations and ancient logic 71; Part Three:
Aristotle's logic; John Corcoran: Aristotle's natural deduction system
85; Mary Mulhern: Corcoran on Aristotle's logical theory 133; Part
Four: Stoic logic; Josiah Gould: Deduction in Stoic logic 151; John
Corcoran: Remarks on Stoic deduction 169; Part Five: Final session of
the Symposium; John Corcoran: Future research on ancient theories of
communication and reasoning 185; A panel discussion on future
research in ancient logical theory 189; Index of names 209-211.
"During the last half century there has been revolutionary progress in
logic and in logic-related areas such as linguistics. Historical
knowledge of the origins of these subjects has also increased
significantly. Thus, it would seem that the problem of determining the
extent to which ancient logical and linguistic theories admit of accurate
interpretation in modern terms is now ripe for investigation.
The purpose of the symposium was to gather logicians, philosophers,
linguists, mathematicians and philologists to present research results
bearing on the above problem with emphasis on logic. Presentations
and discussions at the symposium focused themselves into five areas :
ancient semantics, modern research in ancient logic, Aristotle's logic,
Stoic logic, and directions for future research in ancient logic and logic-
related areas.
Seven of the papers which appear below were originally presented at
the symposium. In every case, discussion at the symposium led to
revisions, in some cases to extensive revisions. The editor suggested
still further revisions, but in every case the author was the final judge of
the work that appears under his name.
In addition to the seven presented papers, there are four other items
included here. Two of them are papers which originated in discussions
following presentations. Zirin's contribution is based on comments he
made following Kretzmann's presentation. My 'Remarks on Stoic
Deduction' is based on the discussion which followed Gould's paper. A
195
third item contains remarks that I prepared in advance and read at the
opening of the panel discussion which was held at the end of the
symposium. The panel discussion was tape-recorded and the transcript
proved of sufficient quality to merit inclusion in these proceedings with
a minimum of editing." (From the Preface)
———. 2006. "Schemata: The Concept of Schema in the History of
Logic." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic no. 12:219-240.
"Schemata have played important roles in logic since Aristotle's Prior
Analytics. The syllogistic figures and moods can be taken to be
argument schemata as can the rules of the Stoic propositional logic.
Sentence schemata have been used in axiomatizations of logic only
since the landmark 1927 von Neumann paper [31]. Modern
philosophers know the role of schemata in explications of the semantic
conception of truth through Tarski's 1933 Convention T [42].
Mathematical logicians recognize the role of schemata in first-order
number theory where Peano's second-order Induction Axiom is
approximated by Herbrand's Induction-Axiom Schema [23]. Similarly,
in first-order set theory, Zermelo's second-order Separation Axiom is
approximated by Fraenkel's first-order Separation Schema [17]. In
some of several closely related senses, a schema is a complex system
having multiple components one of which is a template-text or scheme-
template, a syntactic string composed of one or more "blanks" and also
possibly significant words and/or symbols. In accordance with a side
condition the template-text of a schema is used as a "template" to
specify a multitude, often infinite, of linguistic expressions such as
phrases, sentences, or argument-texts, called instances of the schema.
The side condition is a second component. The collection of instances
may but need not be regarded as a third component. The instances are
almost always considered to come from a previously identified
language (whether formal or natural), which is often considered to be
another component. This article reviews the often-conflicting uses of
the expressions 'schema' and 'scheme' in the literature of logic. It
discusses the different definitions presupposed by those uses. And it
examines the ontological and epistemic presuppositions circumvented
or mooted by the use of schemata, as well as the ontological and
epistemic presuppositions engendered by their use. In short, this paper
is an introduction to the history and philosophy of schemata."
196
[17] Abraham Fraenkel - Part I. Historical introduction - to Paul
Bernays - Axiomatic set theory (1958) - Reprint Dover 1991 pp. 3-35.
[23] Jacques Herbrand, Logical Writings, (W. Goldfarb, Tr. Goldfarb,
and van J. Heijenoort, editors), Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1971
[31] Johann von Neumann, Zur Hilbertschen Beweistheorie,
Mathematische Zeitschrift, vol. 26 (1927), pp. 1-46.
[42] Adam Tarski, The concept of truth in the languages of the
deductive sciences, Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego,
Wydzial III Nauk Matematyczno-Fizycznych, vol. 34 (1933), reprinted
in [50], pp. 13-172; expanded English translation in [48], pp. 152-278.
[48] Adam Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, papers from
1923 to 1938, 2nd ed., Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983, edited with
introduction and analytic index by J. Corcoran (first editiion 1956)
[50] Jan Zygmunt (editor), Alfred Tarski, Pisma Logiczno-Filozoficzne,
1 Prawda, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw, 1995
De Lacy, Phillip H. 1937. "Contributions of the Herculanean Papyri to
Our Knowledge of Epicurean Logic." Transactions and Proceedings of
the American Philological Association no. 68:318-325.
Di Cesare, Donatella. 1980. La Semantica Nella Filosofia Greca.
Roma: Bulzoni.
Dumont, Jean-Paul. 2005. "Confirmation Et Disconfirmation." In
Science and Speculation. Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice,
edited by Barnes, Jonathan, Brunschwig, Jacques, Burnyeat, Myles and
Ebbesen, Sten. 2005. "Theories of Language in the Hellenistic Age and
in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries." In Language and Learning.
Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the
Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Frede, Dorothea and
Inwood, Brad, 299-319. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"It is a generally accepted view that 'philosophy of language' as well as
`grammar' as a philosophical discipline were invented in antiquity by
the Stoics or by grammarians inspired by them. It is also the accepted
view that these achievements were passed on to the Latin West in the
Middle Ages through authors like Priscian and Boethius, to be
augmented and refined by the schoolmen from the beginning of the
twelfth century on. But though the general route of the tradition that
197
indirectly relates to the beginning of linguistic philosophy in Hellenistic
times is uncontested, there is little knowledge about any direct
influence of the Hellenistic philosophers on that period. Sten Ebbesen
takes his readers into the relatively uncharted waters of the influence of
Hellenistic philosophy on the Middle Ages by tracing Stoic influence
on certain issues. Ebbesen focuses on three points. First he points out
how the question of 'imposition', i.e. the assignment of phonemes to
natural things was taken up by the members of the Porretan school in
order to show how moral and rational vocabulary arose through a
transformation of the natural vocabulary, so as to allow discussion of
non-natural phenomena in the sphere of culture, reason, and even
theology. Second he shows that Boethius of Dacia and other members
of the `modist school' in the late thirteenth century developed a theory
of formal grammar and logic, a theory that showed how the 'modes' of
signifying, supplemented by a theory of representing logical
relationships, is based on modes of understanding and ultimately
related to the modes of being. Though among the modists the
conviction prevailed that language is based on convention they did not
hold that expressions are introduced at random; hence etymology, as
first adumbrated in Plato's Cratylus, has its role to play in linguistic
theory. Finally Ebbesen shows that the static conception of the modists
that assumed invariable rules of language was changed into a dynamic
theory of language by Roger Bacon, whose theory allowed for
changing rules of language without loss of intelligibility.
Thus we find in the Middle Ages ghost-like replicas of the
controversies among the ancient philosophers of language, whether it
concerns the ìmposition of words' inspired by Plato's Cratylus, the
quest to account for the relation between language and the objects in
the world that was a main
concern of the Stoics, and the controversy between analogist and
anomalist accounts of language. Ebbesen does not claim that those
medieval discussions were based on any direct knowledge of the
Hellenistic philosophers or on that of Plato's Cratylus. He holds,
however, that these medieval positions could not have been developed
had there not been the rich tradition of the Hellenistic age, passed on to
them in the reflections of Boethius and Priscian." From the
Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 12-13
198
Everson, Stephen, ed. 1994. Language. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Gabbay, Dov, and Woods, John, eds. 2004. Greek, Indian and Arabic
Handbook of the History of Logic: vol. 1.
Contents: Preface by Dov Gabbay and John Woods VII; List of
contributors IX; Logic before Aristotle: development or birth? by Julius
Moravcsik 1; Aristotle' early logic by John Woods and Andrew Irvine
27; Aristotle's underlying logic by George Boger 101; Aristotle's modal
syllogism by Fred Johnson 247; Indian logic by Jonardon Ganeri 309;
The Megarians and the Stoics by Robert R. O'Toole and Raymond E.
Jennings 397; Arabic logic by Tony Street 523; The translation of
Arabic works on logic into Latin in the Middle Ages and Renaissance
by Charles Burnett 597; Index 607-628
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 2001. "Comment Peut-on Faire L'histoire De
La Logique De L'antiquité?" In Comment Écrire L'histoire De La
Philosophie?, edited by Zarka, Yves Charles, 253-257. Paris: Presses
Graeser, Andreas. 1977. "On Language, Thought, and Reality in
Ancient Greek Philosophy." Dialectica no. 31:359-388.
Reprinted in: A. Graeser - Issues in the philosophy of language past
and present - Bern, Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 9-41
Henle, Paul. 1949. "On the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism."
Philosophy of Science no. 16:94-104.
Huby, Pamela M. 2004. "Elementary Logic in the Ancient World."
Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies no. 47:119-128.
"Formal education in elementary logic began in Plato's Academy and
can be traced into the Middle Ages. Evidence from Aristotle, Prior
analytics, Apuleius, De interpretatione, Galen, Institutio logica, and
anonymous sources suggests that many works may have been written to
be memorized by students. The views of the Peripatetics and Stoics,
originally different, coalesced, and later handbooks covered both at an
elementary level. The origin of a concept of a syllogistic mood is
obscure; it may have existed for some time before appearing first in
Apuleius."
Hurst, Martha. 1935. "Implication in the Fourth Century B.C." Mind
no. 44:484-495.
199
"Modern analyses of the nature of necessary connection have given rise
to more paradoxes than they have solved. A familiarity with the
controversy between Diodorus and Philo which took place in the
Fourth Century B.C. might perhaps have made unnecessary the anguish
which modern logicians have suffered. (1)
The dispute is mentioned in passing by Cicero (2) and is discussed in
two places by Sextus Empiricus (3). The persons concerned in the
dispute are named Diodorus and Philo, and are, I think, to be identified
as the Megarians, Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo."
(1) My attention was first called to this dispute by a notice in C. S.
Peirce, Collected Papers 3, 441. In being aware of this dispute Peirce is
an exception among modern logicians. But he failed to grasp its full
significance; so that his knowledge did not save him from the mistakes
which they have made.
(2) Academica Priora, II, 143.
(3) Pyrrhoneion Hypotyposeon II, 110, Adversus Mathematicos VIII,
113 ff.
Ildefonse, Frédérique. 1997. La Naissance De La Grammaire Dans
L'antiquité Grecque. Paris: Vrin.
Jedan, Christoph, and Strobach, Niko. 2002. Modalities by Perspective.
Aristotle, the Stoics and a Modern Reconstruction. Sankt Augustin:
Academia Verlag.
Kapp, Ernst. 1942. Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Contents: Preface V-VIII; I. The origin of logic as a science 5; II.
Concepts, terms, definitions, ideas, categories 20; III. Judgments,
subject and predicate 43; IV. Syllogisms 60; V. Induction: ancient and
modern logic 75; Books cited 89; Index 91-95.
"The five chapter of this little book represent the manuscript of a series
of five special lectures which I gave at Columbia University by
invitation of the Department of Philosophy and the Department of
Greek and Latin." (Preface, V).
Klein, Jacob. 1968. Greek Mathematics Thought and the Origin of
Algebra. Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press.
Translated from the original German Die griechische Logistik und die
Entstehung der Algebra (1934-1936) by Eva Brann.
With an appendix containing Vieta's Introduction to the analytical art
200
translated by J. Winfree Smith.
Kneale, William, and Kneale, Martha. 1935. "Implication in the 4th
Century." Mind no. 44:484-495.
———. 1972. "Prosleptic Propositions and Arguments." In Islamic
Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays Presented by His
Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on His Seventieth Birthday,
edited by Stern, S.M., Hourani, Albert and Brown, Vivian, 189-207.
London: Bruno Cassirer.
Lee, Tae-Soo. 1984. Die Griechische Tradition Der Aristotelischen
Syllogistik in Der Spätantike. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Lloyd, Antony C. 1956. "Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic
(First Part)." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy:58-72.
———. 1956. "Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic (Second
Part)." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy:146-160.
———. 1971. "Neoplatonists's Account of Predication and Mediaeval
Logic." In Le Néo-Platonisme. Actes Du Colloque De Royaumont, 9-13
Juin 1969, 357-364. Paris: Éditions du CNRS.
Long, Anthony A. 1988. "Reply To: J. Barnes Epicureans Signs."
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.Supplementary volume no. 6:135-
144.
Longo, Angela. 2009. "The Principle of Contradiction. An Ancient
Interpretation (Syrianus, Ad Vth Cet.) and a Modern Interpretation (J.
Lukasiewicz, 1878-1956): A Comparison." In Syrianus Et La
Métaphysique De L'antiquité Tardive, edited by Longo, Angela, 383-
Luhtala, Anneli. 2003. "Syntanx and Dialectic in Late Antiquity." In
Syntax in Antiquity, edited by Swiggers, Pierre and Wouters, Alfons,
205-225. Louvain: Peeters.
———. 2005. Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. A Study of
Priscian's Sources. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Lukasiewicz, Jan. 1967. "On the History of the Logic of Propositions."
In Polish Logic 1920-1939, edited by McCall, Storrs, 66-87. Oxford:
Originally published in Polish as Z historii logiki zdan, Przeglad
Translated in English in: Storrs McCall (ed.) - Polish logic 1920-1939 -
201
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967 pp. 66-87 and also in: J. Lukasiewicz -
Selected works - Ludwik Borowski (ed.) - Amsterdam, North-Holland,
1970 pp. 197-217.
Propositional Logic." In Polish Logic 1920-1939, edited by McCall,
Storrs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Translated in English in: Storrs McCall (ed.) - Polish logic 1920-1939 -
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967 pp. 40-65 and also in: J. Lukasiewicz -
Selected works - Ludwik Borowski (ed.) - Amsterdam, North-Holland,
1970 pp. 153-178.
Malatesta, Michele. 1989. "An Extension of Gentzen's Natural
Deduction." Metalogicon no. 2:1-32.
"Roots of Gentzen's system can be found in the mediaeval logic and in
the logic of the Graeco-Roman age. This logic has the distinguishing
characteristic of using n-adic connectives (n<2) instead of dyadic ones,
and this at the object language level. The texts which exhibit the
precious logic are Aulus Gellius' Noctes Atticae XVI,8, for the logical
product or conjunction, and Galen's Institutio logica for the logical sum
or alternation."
Manchester, Peter. 2005. The Syntax of Time. The Phenomenology of
Time in Greek Physics and Speculative Logic from Iamblichus to
Anaximander. Leiden: Brill.
Marquand, Allan. 1983. "The Logic of the Epicureans." In Studies in
Logic by Members of the John Hopkins University (1883), edited by
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 1-11. Amsterdam: John Benjamin.
Reprint of the original edition of 1883.
Martin, John N. 1995. "Existence, Negation, and Abstraction in the
Neoplatonic Hierarchy." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 16:169-
196.
"The paper is a study of the logic of existence, negation, and order in
the Neoplatonic tradition. The central idea is that Neoplatonists assume
a logic in which the existence predicate is a comparative adjective and
in which monadic predicates function as scalar adjectives that nest the
background order. Various scalar predicate negations are then
202
identifiable with various Neoplatonic negations. including a privative
negation appropriate for the lower orders of reality and a hyper-
negation appropriate for the higher. Reversion to the One can then be
explained as the logical inference of hyper-negations from mundane
knowledge. Part I develops the relevant linguistic and logical theory.
and Part II defends Wolfson and the scalar interpretation against the
more traditional Aristotelian understanding of Whittaker and others of
reversion as intensional abstraction."
———. 2004. Themes in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Logic. Order,
Negation and Abstraction. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Contents: Preface VII; Introduction XI; 1. Aristotle's Natural Deduction
Reconsidered 1; 2. Ecthesis and Existence in the Syllogistic 19; 3.
Existence, Negation, and Abstraction in the Neoplatonic Hierarchy 25;
4. A Tense Logic for Boethius 53; 5. Proclus on the Logic of the
Ineffable 65; 6. Proclus and the Neoplatonic Syllogistic 79; 7.
Ammonius on the Canons of Proclus 125; 8. All Brutes are Subhuman:
Aristotle and Ockham on Privative Negation 139; 9. Lukasiewicz's
Many-valued Logic and Neoplatonic Scalar Modality 167;
Bibliography 195; Index of Names 201; Index of Topics 203-204.
Mignucci, Mario. 1983. "La Teoria Della Quantificazione Del
Predicato Nell'antichità Classica." Anuario Filosófico no. 16:11-42.
Morison, Ben. 2008. "Logic." In The Cambridge Companion to Galen,
edited by Hankinson, Robert James, 66-115. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
———. 2008. "Language." In The Cambridge Companion to Galen,
edited by Hankinson, Robert James, 116-156. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Mueller, Ian. 1974. "Greek Mathematics and Greek Logic." In Ancient
Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, edited by Corcoran, John, 35-70.
Dordrecht: Reidel.
"By 'logic' I mean 'the analysis of argument or proof in terms of form'.
The two main examples of Greek logic are, then, Aristotle's syllogistic
developed in the first twenty-two chapters of the Prior Analytics and
Stoic propositional logic as reconstructed in the twentieth century. The
topic I shall consider in this paper is the relation between Greek logic in
this sense and Greek mathematics. I have resolved the topic into two
questions: (1) To what extent do the principles of Greek logic derive
203
from the forms of proof characteristic of Greek mathematics? and (2)
To what extent do the Greek mathematicians show an awareness of
Greek logic?
Before answering these questions it is necessary to clear up two
preliminaries. The first is chronological. The Prior Analytics probably
predates any surviving Greek mathematical text. There is, therefore, no
possibility of checking Aristotle's syllogistic against the actual
mathematics which he knew. On the other hand, there is no reason to
suppose that the mathematics which he knew differs in any essential
way, at least with respect to proof techniques, from the mathematics
which has come down to us." p. 35
"The paper which follows has three main sections. In the first I discuss
the character of Euclidean reasoning and its relation to Aristotle's
syllogistic. In the second I consider the passages in the Prior Analytics
in which Aristotle refers to mathematics; my purpose here is to
determine whether reflection on mathematics influenced his
formulation of syllogistic. In both sections my conclusions are mainly
negative. Euclid shows no awareness of syllogistic or even of the basic
idea of logic, that validity of an argument depends on its form. And
Aristotle's references to mathematics seem to be either supportive of
general points about deductive reasoning or, when they relate
specifically to syllogistic, false because based on syllogistic itself rather
than on an independent analysis of mathematical proof.
In the third main section of the paper I consider the influence of
mathematics on Stoic logic. As far as Chrysippean propositional logic
is concerned, my conclusions are again negative. However, it is clear
that at some time logicians, probably Stoic, began to consider
mathematical proof on its own terms. Although they never developed
what I would call a logic to cover mathematical proof, they at least
realized the difference between it and the logical rules formulated in
antiquity. Much of the third section is devoted to an attempt to
reconstruct in outline the history of logical reflections on mathematics
in the last two centuries B.C. In conclusion I recapitulate briefly my
conclusions about the relation between Greek mathematics and logic."
p. 37
Mulhern, John. 1974. "Modern Notations and Ancient Logic." In
Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, edited by Corcoran,
204
John, 71-82. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"To what extent does ancient logic admit of accurate interpretation in
modern terms? Blanché [3] and Dürr [14] published general surveys of
research on ancient logic in the mid-1950's. My aim in the present
paper is to identify studies made available during the quarter-century
1945-1970 that illustrate the influence modern notations have had on
our understanding of ancient logical texts. Accepting Bochenski's
division of ancient logic into four temporally distinct stages, I mention
research on the Prearistotelian, Aristotelian, Stoic and Commentatorial
logics in Sections 1-4. In Section 5, I offer some generalizations on the
utility of modern notations in writing the history of ancient logic." p. 71
"At the beginning of this paper, I asked to what extent ancient logic
admits of accurate interpretation in modern terms. While no final
answer to this question will be available until research in the field has
gone a good deal further than it has so far, still the progress since 1945
has been remarkable, and it is not too early to consider its causes. In his
history of the history of logic, Bochenski wrote as follows:
The rise of modern history of logic concerning all periods save the
mathematical was made possible by the work of historians of
philosophy and philologists in the 19th century. These published for the
first time a series of correct texts edited with reference to their context
in the history of literature. But the majority of ancient philologists,
medievalists and Sanskrit scholars had only slight understanding of and
little interest in formal logic. History of logic could not be established
on the sole basis of their great and laborious work.
For its appearance we have to thank the fact that formal logic took on a
new lease of life and was reborn as mathematical. Nearly all the more
recent researches in this history were carried out by mathematical
logicians or by historians trained in mathematical logic. ([5e], pp. 9-
10.)
The trained researchers who have worked on the ancient materials have
had to do much more than merely transcribe into modern notations
logical treatises originally written in ancient natural languages. Just
finding suitable transcriptions has had to wait on considerable analysis
of the ancient texts. Transcription into modern notations presupposes
some community of understanding and purpose with the ancient
logicians, and this community is something that needs to be argued for.
205
In general, a department of ancient logic lends itself to being dealt with
in notation if and only if its corresponding department of modern logic
lends itself to being dealt with in notation. Logistic systems and their
interpretations lend themselves to this to a great extent, theoretical
syntax and especially semantics to a much lesser extent. Where a
modern notation follows or reproduces or elucidates the logical form of
a sentence or inference or schema that interests an ancient logician,
then its use is in order. The studies discussed in Sections 1-4 of this
paper point to the conclusion that the judicious use of modern notations
has been one cause of progress -- over the last two decades and a half --
in our understanding of ancient logic." (pp. 81-82)
[3] Blanché, R., Vues nouvelles sur l'ancienne logique', Les Etudes
Philosophiques 11, 1956, 183-208
[4] Bochenski, I. M., Ancient Fomal Logic, Amsterdam 1951
[5e] Bochesnki, I. M., A History of Formal Logic (trans. by I. Thomas),
Notre Dame 1961
Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro. 2006. "Conflict and Connectedness:
Between Modern Logic and History of Ancient Logic." In Logic and
Philosophy in Italy. Some Trends and Perspectives, edited by Ballo,
Edoardo and Franchella, Miriam, 229-251. Monza: Polimetrica.
North-Holland.
Contents: Preface V; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Plato 13; 3. Aristotle 23; 4.
The Stoic lekton 45; 5. The Stoic axioma 75; 6. Later developments in
Greek antiquity 89; 7. The transition to the Latin West 105; 8. Boethius
and the beginning of the Middle Ages 123; 9. Abelard 139; 10. The
doctrine of the dictum in the century after Abelard 165; 11.
Preliminaries to the fourteenth century debate 177; 12. The complexum
theory of Ockham and Holkot 195; 13. Some reist opponents of
Ockham and Holkot 209; 14. The theory of the complexe significabile
227; 15. The oppositions against the theory of the complexe
significabile 243; 16. The significate of a true propositio 273; Selective
bibliography 281; Indices 289-309.
"This book is intended as the first part of a history of those problems
and theories in the domain of philosophical semantics which nowadays
are commonly referred to as problems and theories about the nature and
206
the status of propositions. Although the conceptual apparatus and the
terminology by means of which questions concerning propositions
were asked and answered have considerably varied from period to
period, the main types of disputes and solutions have remained
remarkably constant. One of the aims of this study is precisely to trace
the vicissitudes of the vocabulary in which this refractory topic was
treated in the remote past. As is evident from the Bibliography, many
parts of the field have been explored by predecessors. Guided by their
results, I have tried to fill in more details and to design a provisional
map of the area as a whole." (from the Preface)
The two other volumes are: Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of
the Proposition (1980) and Judgment and Proposition. From Descartes
to Kant (1983).
Plochmann, George Kimball. 1952. "Professor Henle on the Four
Figures of Syllogism." Philosophy of Science no. 19:333-341.
Pozzi, Lorenzo. 1974. Studi Di Logica Antica E Medievale. Padova:
Liviana.
Indice: Prefazione di Domenci Pesce VII-VIII; I. Il metodo della
divisione nella logica antica 1; II. Il quadrato delle proposizioni opposte
nella storia della logica 39; III. La dottrina dell'inventio medii in
Aristotele e nei suoi commentatori 63; IV: Il silogismo ipotetico nella
dottrina di Boezio 75; Indice dei nomi degli autori moderni 103-104.
Rescher, Nicholas. 1969. "Three Post-Aristotelian Concepts of
Syllogistic Logic." In Essays in Philosophical Analysis, 61-71.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Sainati, Vittorio. 2000. Logica E Filosofia. Pisa: ETS.
Salvaneschi, Enrica. 1974. "Le Nozioni Di Segno Linguistico E Di
Struttura Nei Filosofi Greci." Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di
Pisa no. 4:1-55.
Sedley, David. 2005. "On Signs." In Science and Speculation. Studies
in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, edited by Barnes, Jonathan,
Brunschwig, Jacques, Burnyeat, Myles and Schofield, Malcolm, 239-
272. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smiley, Timothy. 1973. "What Is a Syllogism?" Journal of
Smith, Robin. 1983. "Completeness of an Echtetic Syllogistic." Notre
207
Sullivan, Mark. 1970. "What Was True or False in the Old Logic?"
Journal of Philosophy no. 67 (22):788-800.
Tracy, Kevin. 2006. The Development of Dialectic from Aristotle to
Chrysippus.
Dissertation presented to the University of Pennsylvania (available on
ProQuest).
"From Aristotle onward, formal logic was an element of ancient Greek
dialectic (dialektiké). Aristotle's Prior Analytics (4th century BCE) is
the earliest evidence of a formal logic in antiquity. The evidence for the
formal logic of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (3rd century BCE) is
fragmentary; nonetheless it makes clear that not more than a century or
so after Prior Analytics, Chrysippus revolutionized formal logic. The
scholarship on Stoic logic has not yet presented the history of dialectic
from Aristotle to Chrysippus as an intelligible narrative. Without such a
narrative, one cannot explain what, in general, motivated the
innovations of Chrysippus, what made Stoic logic coherent as a unified
project, or what relationship that project had to earlier work in logic.
This dissertation approaches the problem through the presentation and
interpretation of the ancient source material. First it describes the
logical doctrines of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the 'Megarics' in such
a way as to make clear what questions these predecessors left for
Chrysippus. It then describes how Chrysippus addressed these
questions. Finally, it uses the resulting narrative to give a detailed
account of Stoic formal logic. The dissertation yields five principal
conclusions. First, neither the Peripatetics or the 'Megarics' described
logical forms of propositional logic; Chrysippus was the first to do so.
Second, the guiding aim of Chrysippus' logic was to avoid adopting a
semantic stance in describing logical forms and explaining logical
relationships. Third, the Stoics distinguished 'valid' (hugies) from 'true'
(aléthes), so that sunartésis is a standard for the validity rather than the
truth of the Stoic conditional (sunhémmenon). Fourth, the Stoics
produced derivations for categorical arguments in their deduction
system. Fifth, the Stoic deduction system is roughly analogous to the
first-order fragment of Frege's system, except on two points: it most
likely was not designed to accommodate the use of polyadic predicates
with multiple quantifiers, although the possibility for doing so inheres
in its approach to the analysis of propositions, and it uses the 'natural'
208
approach rather than the 'axiomatic' approach of Frege."
White, Michael J. 1983. "Time and Determinism in the Hellenistic
Philosophical Schools." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no.
65:40-62.
Wolenski, Jan. 1998. "Scepticism and Logic." Logical Analysis and
History of Philosophy no. 1:187-194.
"This paper offers a logical analysis of Scepticism. It is shown that
Dogmatism, Academism and Scepticism as characterized by Sextus
Empiricus in Outlines of Pyrronism form a variety of views which can
be ordered by an interpretation of the classical logical square. In
particular, Scepticism appears as a conjunction of the negations of
Dogmatism and Academism. The next problem concerns the logic
proper for Scepticism. Logic based on a dual of the consequence
operation is proposed as satisfying intuitive requirements associated
with doubting. Finally, the attitude of the sceptic toward logic is
discussed. In particular, it is argued that the principle of isosteny
trivializes scepticism if it is applied to logic."
RELATED PAGES
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Peripatetic Logic: Eudemus of Rhodes

and Theophrastus of Eresus
EUDEMUS OF RHODES AND THEOPHRASTUS
OF ERESUS CONTRIBUTIONS ON LOGIC
This page use the font Lucida Sans Unicode for logical symbols.
“Aristotle's successor as director of the Lyceum was Theophrastus, his friend
and disciple; Eudemus, another of the Stagirite's important disciples should
also be mentioned. Other philosophers belonging to the Peripatetic school
were: Aristoxenus, Dikaiarchos, Phanias, Straton, Duris, Chamaeleon, Lycon,
Hieronymus, Ariston, Critolaus, Phormio, Sotion, Hermippus, Satyrus and
others. Straton even succeeded Theophrastus as director of the Lyceum but
his name and those of the other Peripatetics of Aristotle's old school should
not be considered in a history of logic as they were mainly concerned with
history and the natural sciences.
Theophrastus rejoiced in an enormous prestige at this time and for long
afterwards. Diogenes Laertius attributes a tremendous number of works to
him. Of them a significant proportion are writings on logic: Analytica Priora
(3 books); Analytica Posteriora (7 books); Analysis of Syllogisms (1 book);
Summary of the Analytics (1 book); Polemic on the Theory of Euristic
Arguments. On Definition (1 book); The First Premises (18 books); The
210
Sophisms (2 books); On the Solution of Syllogisms (1 book); Topics (2
books); On Artless Demonstrations (1 book); On Negation (1 book); On
Intellect (1 book); Classifications (2 books); On Entymemes (1 book); On the
Appreciation of Syllogism (1 book); On Lies and Truth (1 book);
Argumentations (2 books); Theses (3 books); On Definition (2 books); On the
Data of Problems (1 book); On the Liar (3 books); Preface to the Topics (1
book); On Arguments proper (1 book); Specifications on The Texts of
Syllogisms (1 book).
Eudemus also wrote some treatises on logic, concerning which some
information has come down to us; Ammonius, in his Commentary On
Aristotle's Categories attributes to him a writing on The Analytics --
'Analitika', and another On Expressions -- Peri lexeos, in which he deals with
the grammatical and logical functions of the sentence. The commentator
David in Prolegomena to Isagoge by Porphiry also mentions these works.
The latter work is also known to us from the commentaries of Galen.
Theophrastus and Eudemus were concerned with the relationship
between judgements in the mechanism of the syllogism, rather than the
relationship of the concepts they are made of. In other words, as Prantl
remarks (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I, p. 351), the logical
function of the proposition is gradually replaced by the grammatical
function.
To Theophrastus we owe the distinction made between significant judgement
-- apophansis -- and premise protasis. Aristotle had used the term protasis --
premise -- but by it he had meant apophantic judgement. Theophrastus
retained the term apophantic for the true and false judgements; the same
judgement becomes a premise if affirmative or negative. Theophrastus'
interest turned, therefore, to the grammatical form and construction of the
judgement whose function in the syllogism was, in his opinion, more
important than the truth or falsity of a judgement.
This and many other examples illustrate that Aristotle's disciples were no
longer in quest of truth but of the syllogistic mechanism independent of truth,
and therefore independent of ontology.
These were also Eudemus' concerns. He made an interesting contribution to
the theory of existential sentences. Aristotle had replaced all the verbs that
could occur in judgements by the copula "is" -- esti -- or "is not" ouk esti.
211
Eudemus studied the existential sentences and demonstrated that the copula
'is" is a real term that can itself have a predicative determination. This
conception, centered mainly, as we see from the examples above, on the
structure of the grammatical form of judgements, explains why their logical
investigations focused on another aspect of logic in which the expression of
thinking was of prime importance.”
From: Anton Dumitriu, History of Logic, - Tunbridge Wells: Abacus Press
1977, Vol. I, pp. 207-208
EUDEMUS OF RHODES (c. 350 BC - 290 BC)

"Eudemus (2nd half of 4th cent. B.C.E.), of Rhodes. A student of Aristotle,
often mentioned in conjunction with Theophrastus. In a charm story in Aulus
Gellius (13.5), when Aristotle was dying, he chose Theophrastus over
Eudemus as his successor in the Lyceum. Eudemus apparently returned to
Rhodes on Aristotle's death and founded his own school; Simplicius (In Phys
. 923.9-15) mentions an exchange of letters between him and Theophrastus
on a textual question in Aristotle Physics. Simplicius also (924.13) mentions
a biography of Eudemus by one Damas, of whom nothing else is known.
There are ascribed to Eudemus in various places (see Wehrli) two books
of Analytics, a Categories, On Expression (Peri Lexeôs), On the Angle,
Physics, and histories of geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy.
Simplicius refers to Eudemus as "the most genuine of Aristotle's
comrades" ( In Phys. 411.15-16) and says that he "follows Aristotle in
all things" (133.22). Though not entirely true, this appears not far off.
In logic, Eudemus and Theophrastus (who are always mentioned together in
this connection) made various modifications to Aristotle's s logistic;
Alexander, in his commentary on the Prior Analytics, cites the following
(Alexander is echoed by the other commentators on most of these points): (i)
Theophrastus and Eudemus devised a direct proof the convertibility of
universal negative propositions (Alexander 31.4-10; contrast Ar. APri. 1.2,
25a14-17). (ii) They adopted the peiorem rule in modal logic: "that the
conclusion is always assimilated to the lesser and weaker of the premises"
(Alexander 124.13-14; by contrast Aristotle allowed certain combinations of
212
necessary and assertoric premises to yield necessary conclusions, as in APri.
1.9). (iii) They defended the convertibility of universal negative problematic
propositions (Alexander 220.9-16, against Ar. APri. 1.17, 36b35-37a31). (iv)
They also did extensive work on hypothetical syllogisms (Alexander 389.31-
390.3; Philoponus In APri. 242.18-19, speaks of "treatises of many lines" on
the subject).
Eudemus is said to have claimed in On Expression (Alexander In APri.
16.15-17, scholium in APri. ed. Brandis [in Aristotelis Opera 4] 146a24-27)
that "is" in "Socrates is" is a predicate term; he may thus have been the first
to have contradicted Kant's claim that existence is not a predicate.
Alexander's notice of this is phrased in a way that make it appear to
contradict Aristotle (at least under Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle:
15.14-22)."
From: Eudemus of Rhodes by Russell M. Dancy - in: Donald J. Zeyl (ed.) -
Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy - London, Fitzroy Dearborn
Publishers, 1997, p. 234
"Those works of Eudemus of which we have any real knowledge fall

into two groups: systematic and historical. The second group, containing
the histories of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and perhaps theology,
is generally assumed to have been conceived as part of a greater project,
initiated by Aristotle himself: a series of surveys covering all the
philosophically interesting fields of knowledge, which included
Theophrastus' Physikai Doxai and Menon's Iatrika, as well as those of
Eudemus. They will have been compiled during Aristotle's lifetime at
Athens, the only place where Eudemus could easily have got hold of the
necessary research materials. This raises the question whether, or to
what extent, his reading of his sources was affected by Aristotelian
preconceptions, a question which has long bedevilled our understanding
of Theophrastus' historical works. But it looms less large in connection
with the history of mathematics, since in most respects Aristotle's
teaching was in accord with the assumptions of mainstream
mathematicians, e.g., in accepting the "Euclidean" notion of space, if
you will allow the anachronism. The only point on which there was a
fundamental disagreement between him and any major group of
213
mathematicians was the existence of indivisible lines, and here Eudemus
adopted the Peripatetic position. Thus he agreed with Aristotle in
rejecting Antiphon's attempt to square the circle as contravening a basic
principle of geometry, the infinite divisibility of magnitudes.(8) In
general, however, these works seem to have contained more straight
reporting, and less criticism, than the Physikai Doxai. In particular,
many of the extant fragments make a point of determining who first
discovered a phenomenon or theorem, but then such observations are
easier to make and more illuminating in connection with the special
sciences than the history of philosophy. When we turn to Eudemus'
systematic writings, the situation is more complicated. We have fairly
extensive fragments of three: the Analytika (frr. 9-24W), the Peri lexeos
(frr. 25-9) and the Physika (frr. 31-123). Like the corresponding works
of Aristotle and Theophrastus, they reflect Eudemus' lectures closely
(see in particular fr. 88), even if they were more than lecture notes in the
ordinary sense. Yet there are differences between them which are not
only due to the differences of their subject-matter. The Physika, of
which we have by far the fullest reports, was based on a course of
lectures covering the same subjects as Aristotle's Physics in the same
order (see especially fr. 98), except that it contained nothing
corresponding to Book 7 of our version. The extant fragments contain
no doctrinal innovations and Eudemus' contribution seems to have been
limited to changes of presentation and emphasis (more on this later).
Our reports of his Analytika are more sporadic, but this work brought
some important modifications of Aristotle's doctrine: a new method of
proving the convertibility of certain kinds of proposition; the recognition
of five kinds of syllogism, which Aristotle treated as variants of other
moods, as independent moods of the first figure; the introduction of the
in peiorem rule in modal syllogistic; and some advances in the theory of
"hypothetical" syllogisms. If this were all we knew about the work,
Eudemus would count as a considerable logician in his own right, but
now comes the rub: all of these doctrines are attributed to him and
Theophrastus jointly. The only major fragment ascribed to Eudemus
alone (fr. 23W) contains a detailed discussion of the meanings of
"hypothetical" which might have been useful for elementary students,
but makes no advance in logical theory. (9)
214
The Peri lexeos shows rather more independence. Unlike the books with the
same title written by Aristotle and Theophrastus (Diogenes Laërtius 5.24 =
Aristoteles Rhet. 3; 5.47), it was not concerned with the stylistic, but the
logical aspects of language. Of the four certain surviving fragments (frr. 25-
8),(10) one asks in what circumstances questions count as "propositions"
(protasis), two show Eudemus differing from Aristotle as to whether the "is,"
in sentences of the form "A is B," is part of the predicate or only a link
between the subject-term and the predicate-term, while the fourth informs us
that Eudemus gave an account of the "third man" argument similar in all
essentials to the one found in Aristotle's Peri ideon.(11) One wonders how
this came to be included in a treatise on language; perhaps the theory of
Forms was brought into a discussion of meaning. While these fragments do
not allow us to reconstruct the Peri lexeos even in outline, they are enough to
indicate its subject matter. An almost pedantic concern with verbal
expression and verbal distinctions can also be observed in some of the
fragments of Eudemus' Physika, e,g., frr. 61, 83, 92, 94-6, 102.
Finally there is one series of fragments which is entirely different from all the
others: half a dozen stories about animal behaviour preserved by Aelian (frr.
127-32)." pp. 29-31 (some notes omitted)
(8) Fr. 140W. But the sentence near the beginning of the extract printed
by Wehrli (1969, 57.271.) which contains a verbal echo of Aristotle
(Phys. 185a18), is the work of Simplicius; he only refers to Eudemus
later, at 59.11.
(9) The last fragment printed under this head by Wehrli (fr. 24) is also
attributed to Eudemus alone, but consists of a historical note about
Speusippus' views on definition which may have come from a different work.
(10) 29W, from Galen's De captionibus in dictione, refers to a certain source
of examples of fallacies; in the older editions, its name is given as (the book
of) Eudemus, but the unique MS may read eudumou rather than eudemou and
Ebbesen has printed Euthudemou in his edition [Commentators and
commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici elenchi,] (1981, 2:18; cf. 1:14-16). He
cites Alcinoos Didasc. p. 159.39 H in support of his conjecture and further
confirmation is offered by Simplicius In Cat. 22.11ff. This passage can no
longer be safely attributed to Eudemus, and it is now doubtful whether his
Peri lexeos included a treatment of fallacies. See Fortenbaugh in this volume.
215
(11) Alexander of Aphrodisias In Metaph. 83.34ff. = Aristotelis Fragmenta
pp. 125-6 Ross; 380a36 - 381a32 Gigon. Wehrli (1969) only prints a very
short extract as Eudemus fr. 28.
From: Hans B. Gottschalk, "Eudemus and the Peripatos". In Eudemus of
Rhodes. Edited by Bodnár István and Fortenbaugh William W., New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2002. pp. 25-37
THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS (371 BC - c. 287 BC)

"Theophrastus continued Aristotle's work on logic, making improvements,
but also important modifications. Regarding statements, he distinguished
between those that are singular and those that are particular, maintaining that
the former are definite and the latter indefinite. Affirmations with a privative
predicate he called ek metatheseô. In regard to the categorical syllogism,
Theophrastus added five moods to the canonical four of the first figure. The
five are those of the indirect first figure, which is equivalent to the later
fourth figure. They are neither perfect nor undemonstrated and are mentioned
by Aristotle only in passing. Theophrastus also held that the first mood of the
third figure has two different forms. In the same figure he proposed another
order of the moods based on the directness of their proofs. In modal logic,
Theophrastus maintained against Aristotle that the universal negative
problematic premise (that of one-sided possibility) converts just as do the
assertoric universal negative and the necessary. In the case of syllogisms
constructed from premises of different modalities, he held that the conclusion
in every case follows the weaker premise (peiorem-rule), while according to
Aristotle it follows the major premise. In connection with the Academic
search for eide, Theophrastus developed a special logical form, the prosleptic
syllogism, which cannot be reduced to a categorical syllogism. One
proposition contains potentially a third term, which is made explicit in a
second proposition; and the two propositions together yield a conclusion.
Theophrastus also did more systematic research in hypothetical syllogistic
than Aristotle, and almost certainly influenced the Stoics. But he remained an
Aristotelian, concerning himself mainly with the logic of terms and not that
of propositions."
216
From: William W. Fortenbaugh and Josip Talanga, Theophrastus, in: Donald
J. Zeyl (ed.), Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy, London: Fitzroy
Dearborn Publishers 1997, pp. 552-553.
THEOPHRASTUS ON QUANTIFICATION
Boethius reports concerning Theophrastus (floruit 322-388 BC), student,
friend, and first successor to Aristotle as Director of the Lyceum, that "those
points which Aristotle expounded in this book on the proposition, he
recapitulated lightly, but those items which him teacher failed to publish, he
added as a supplement, and executed indeed with a rather sharp type of
analysis."(29) And on other and independent grounds there is no doubt that
Theophrastus prolonged the lines of Aristotle's own later development and
thus stands forth as his most authentic interpreter. It is of crucial importance
for the history of traditional logic to disengage the elements of this
development from the fragments of Theophrastus. Many significant advances
emerge. Of them the following three seem most relevant to our present
purposes.
Among the disjointed references to Theophrastus one finds for example the
very significant remark that:
On the other hand Theophrastus maintains that there are certain cases of
statements in which, if there is no quantitative determination of the
predicate also, their respective contradictories will be true. This is the
example that he gives: if we say 'Phanias possesses knowledge'; Phanias
does not possess knowledge,' it is possible for both statements to be true
simultaneously. (30)
For Phanias could indeed be an expert in musical theory, but know
nothing, for example, of astronomy. If one is to avoid the possibility of
simultaneously valid contradictories that such unresolved ambiguity
grounds, then it is necessary to add to the term: 'knowledge,' some
quantitative specification. For one does quantify differently, for
example, the following statements: (1) All men are mortal, and (2) Some
men are married. In such quantification revision of the present case there
would result : (1) Phanias possesses all knowledge, and (2) Phanias does
217
not possess all knowledge. Both of these latter formulations preclude the
possibility of simultaneous truth.
The instance of Theophrastus is profoundly interesting. But its true
significance is not cleanly and clearly disengaged from his vague but correct
feeling for the problem. The focus would have been sharpened by two
alterations in its formulation: (1) quantify the subject of the pertinent and
illustrative sentences and (2) distinguish and divide the separate elements in
the complex predicate: 'possess.' For in the present case 'knowledge' is not
really the predicate. The true predicate is 'possesses' and 'knowledge' belongs
in one of its two places, as one of its arguments or relata. For 'someone
possesses something' comes far closer to the genuine analysis than 'someone
is something-that-possesses-something'. Theophrastus is not clear. But his
instinct is sound. Like most pioneers in theoretical advances, his grasp on the
discovery is clumsy and heavy, even if sure and firm.
And the point is of paramount importance. For the main character of
difference between the conventional logic of analysis of propositions and that
of modern logic is precisely this: conventional logic arbitrarily restricts its
analysis to functions involving a single generalization (of 'S' in the 'S is P'
formula), whereas the modern analysis of statements concerns itself with the
further analysis of functions involving many coordinate generalizations,
wherever possible and wherever logically important or relevant. The
conventional expression : 'All a's are b's', is no more nor less than a function
constructed on the matrix pattern: 'if anything is an a, then it is a b,' by means
of the single generalization of the subject to the level of 'anything.' And this
level is the actual upper limit and maximum ceiling of conventional analysis.
Consider however such a statement as: 'Every man has a father,' which even
in its grammatical formulation is doubly generalized ('every' and 'a'). Such a
sentence can undergo partial analysis and resolution by conventional
procedures. One may let 'a' stand for the class of men, and 'b' represent the
class of 'beings-that-have-fathers,' and write accordingly: Everything that is
an a, is also a b.' But this technique achieves an analysis of the statement only
with regard to its first generalization to the level of 'any man whatever.' If one
is to secure an equally valid and necessary analysis of the doubly general
statement, there is no alternative but to proceed as follows: 'For every entity x
there exists at least some one y or other, such that if x is a man, then y is the
father of x' (31) This is in fact that technique of double generalization or
218
quantification which Theophrastus glimpsed, but darkly.
Alexander (32) furthermore informs us that Theophrastus labeled
'propositions kata prolepson' statements which were formed by appropriate
substitution in the generalized matrix formula: 'to that whatsoever to which B
universally belongs, A belongs universally also.' And Alexander proceeds to
explain that the label is etymologically derived from the fact that over and
beyond the two determinate terms: 'A' and 'B,' one also employs [ a third
most generalized and indeterminate element, i. e. that object whatsoever it be
to which both A and B jointly apply. The sense of the passage is clear and the
meaning it suggests may be expressed in the following formulation of a
universal affirmative statement: 'no matter what entity one may care to
mention, if it is a B, then it is also an A.' Alexander further reports that in the
opinion of Theophrastus himself such statements kata prolepsin and those
which are called categorical and are formed by appropriate substitutions in
the generalized schema : 'A is B,' are logically equivalent. It would thus
appear that the primitive notions of a quantification theory and of resolution
of categorical assertions into formal implications are not altogether foreign to
the traditional development of Aristotle's logic.
From: Joseph T. Clark, Conventional Logic and Modern Logic: A Prelude to
Transition, Woodstock, Maryland: Woodstock College Press, 1952, pp. 19-
20.
THEOPHRASTUS AND HYPOTHETICAL

SYLLOGISMS
Boethius furthermore gives this reply to a persistent inquirer whose
logical interests appear to have coincided with our own present ones:
... You frequently ask me about hypothetical syllogisms. Aristotle composed
no treatise on them. Theophrastus, however, although gifted with a most
versatile competence, only touches on their high points. Eudemus undertakes
to impart a broader view of the subject, but goes about the execution of the
project in such a way that to all appearances he reaped no harvest from the
germinal ideas that he scattered about. (33)
What then were these high points to which Boethius alludes? Alexander (34)
219
reports for the record a set of rules which seem to pertain to the type of
hypothetical syllogisms in question. These are the syllogisms kata
analoghian also called 'completely hypothetical syllogisms', or again 'triply
hypothetical syllogisms'. And we are instructed that Theophrastus reduced
these formulae to three figures:
1. If the A proposition [to A], then the B; if the B, then the C; hence if the A,
then the C.
2. If the A, then the B; if not the A, then the C; hence if not the B, then the C.
3. If the A, then the C; if the B, then not the C; hence if the A, then not the B.
Theme formulations are of profound logical interest. A1, first blush they may
be hastily identified with comparable laws of the modern sentential calculus
in which the alphabet symbols represent unanalyzed statements, regarded as
unit block wholes. But it is more than likely that Theophrastus construes what
ho Imparts in the familiar context of an Aristotelian logic of terms. The
paradox is characteristic of pioneers. While laying the groundwork in point of
fart for a primitive calculus of statements, Theophrastus apparently interprets
his own advances as a prolongation into unexplored areas of the Aristotelian
syllogism. But they are without doubt genuine advances.”
(29) Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina 64; Boethius, De
Interpretatione 12.16: ". . . quae Aristoteles Imo libro de enuntiatione
tractavit, leviter ab co transcursa sunt; quae vero magister eius tacuit, ipse
subtiliore modo considerationis adiecit.” I take it that one does not 'keep
silent' on matters of which one is completely ignorant.
(30) Theodorus Waitz, Aristotelis Organon Graece (Lipsiae: 1844-1846) I.
40 ad 17b16.
(31) And in symbolic formulation:
(x) (Ey) (Mx ⊃ Fyx).

And on this important point see C. H. Langford in Clarence I. Lewis and C.
H. Langford, Symbolic Logic (New York: The Century Co., 1932), pp. 286-
287.
(32) Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum Primum
Commentarium (ed. M. Wallies, Berolini: 1883) 378. 12-20 ad 49b27
220
(33) "J. P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina 64; Boethius,
De Syllogismo Hypothetico 831C: ". . . de hypotheticis syllogismis saepe
quaerebas, in quibus ab Aristotele nihil est conscriptum. Theophrastus vero,
vir omnis doctrinae capax, rerum tantum summas exsequitur. Eudemus
latiorem docendi graditur viam, sed ita, ut veluti quaedam seminaria
sparsisse, nullum tamen frugis videatur extulisse proventum."
(34)Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum Primum
Commentarium (ed. M. Wallies, Berolini: 1883) 326.8-327.18
From: Joseph T. Clark, Conventional Logic and Modern Logic. A Prelude to
Transition, Woodstock: Woodstock College Press 1952, pp. 22-23.
RELATED PAGES
Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Eudemus and Theophrastus
221
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Selected Bibliography on the Logic of

Eudemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus of
Eresus
CRITICAL EDITION OF THE FRAGMENTS OF
EUDEMUS OF RHODES (c. 350 BC - 290 BC)
Wehrli, Fritz, ed. 1955. Eudemos Von Rhodos. Basel: B. Schwabe & C.
The standard collection of Fragments, abbreviated W. in the citations;
second edition 1969.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE LOGIC OF

EUDEMUS
Alexander, of Aphrodisias. 1999. On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.8-13
(with 1.1736b35 - 37a31), Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. London:
Duckworth.
Translated by Ian Mueller with Josiah Gould.
On the modal logic of Eudemus of Rhodes see pp. 59ff. with notes on
Alexander 124.11 ff.
Bodnár, István, and Fortenbaugh, William W., eds. 2002. Eudemus of
222
Rhodes. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Contents: Preface VII; Contributors IX; 1. Dimitri Gutas: Eudemus in
the Arabic tradition 1; 2. Hans B. Gottschalk: Eudemus and the
Peripatos 25; 3. Tiziano Dorandi: Qualche aspetto controverso della
biografia di Eudemo di Rodi 39; 4. William W. Fortenbaugh: Eudemus'
work On Expression 59; 5. Pamela M. Huby: Did Aristotle reply to
Eudemus and Theophrastus on some logical Issues? 85; 6. Robert W.
Sharples: Eudemus' physics: change, place and time 107; 7. Han
Baltussen: Wehrli's edition of Eudemus of Rhodes: the physical
fragments from Simplicius' commentary On Aristotle's Physics 127; 8.
Sylvia Berryman: Continuity and coherence in early Peripatetic texts
157; 9. István Bodnár: Eudemus' Unmoved Movers: fragments 121-
123b Wehrli 171; 10.Deborah K. W. Modrak: Phantasia, thought and
science in Eudemus 191; 11. Stephen A. White: Eudemus the naturalist
207; 12. Jørgen Mejer: Eudemus and the history of science 243; 13:
Leonid Zhmud: Eudemus' history of mathematics 263; 14. Alan C.
Bowen: Eudemus' history of early Greek astronomy: two hypotheses
307; 15. Dmitri Panchenko: Eudemus fr. 145 Wehrli and the ancient
theories of lunar light 323; 16. Gábor Betegh: On Eudemus fr. 150
(Wehrli) 337; Index of ancients sources 359-383.
"This volume of Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities,
no. XI in the series, is the third devoted to Theophrastus' colleagues,
pupils and successors, i.e., those Peripatetic philosophers, whom Fritz
Wehrli brought together under the label die Schule des Aristoteles.
Volume IX focuses on Demetrius of Phalerum, who was Theophrastus'
pupil and for ten years the ruler of Athens. Volume X has Dicaearchus
of Messana, Theophrastus' fellow-pupil within the Aristotelian
Peripatos, as its subject. The present Volume, no. XI, concentrates on
Eudemus of Rhodes, who, like Dicaearchus, studied under Aristotle
and alongside Theophrastus. This concern with die Schule des
Aristoteles will continue with the next two volumes: Lyco of Troas and
I lieronymus of Rhodes will be the subjects of Volume XII, and Aristo
of Ceos will be featured in Volume XIII. All three belong to the post-
Theophrastean Peripatos. Like Volumes IX and X, so Volumes XII and
XIII will present the ancient sources with translation as well as
discussion by various scholars. Volume XI is different in that it is
entirely composed of articles which discuss Eudemus from differing
223
points of view." (from the Preface by the Editors)
Fortenbaugh, William W. 2002. "Eudemus' Work on Expression." In
Eudemus of Rhodes, edited by Bodnár, István and Fortenbaugh,
William W., 59-83. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
"Eudemus of Rhodes wrote a work entitled On Expression, Peri lexeos.
It was at least two books or rolls long and was the subject of a lost
treatise by Galen. Apparently the work was not only substantial but
also full of interesting material. It is therefore regrettable that we have
only a few fragments from which to judge the content of the work. Five
fragments, nos. 25-9, are assigned to the work by Wehrli, but that may
be too generous. In what follows, I intend first to consider Wehrli's five
fragments and then to ask what we can conclude concerning the content
of On Expression." p. 59
Gottschalk, Hans B. 2002. "Eudemus and the Peripatos." In Eudemus of
Rhodes, edited by Bodnár, István and Fortenbaugh, William W., 25-37.
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Gutas, Dimitri. 2002. "Eudemus in the Arabic Tradition." In Eudemus
of Rhodes, edited by Bodnár, István and Fortenbaugh, William W., 1-
23. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Reprinted as Chapter VIII in D. Gutas - Greek philosophers in the
Arabic tradition - Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000. see IV. Logic pp. 9-11.
"The information on Eudemus of Rhodes that can be recovered in
Arabic sources falls into three categories: there is a full collection of
sayings (Section II below and Appendix), some incidental biographical
notices that mainly state his relation to Aristotle and Theophrastus
(Section III), and a number of references to his views on logic which lie
held in common with Theophrastus (Section IV). No work of his is
reported to have been translated into Arabic or is known to be extant.
Apart from the sayings, therefore, Eudemus has no independent
persona or presence in Arabic but rides on the coattails primarily of
Theophrastus. This is hardly surprising, given the little information on
Eudemus that was available even in Greek at the time of the rise of
Islam." p. 1
Huby, Pamela M. 2002. "Did Aristotle Reply to Eudemus and
Theophrastus on Some Logical Issues?" In Eudemus of Rhodes, edited
by Bodnár, István and Fortenbaugh, William W., 85-106. New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
224
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE LOGIC OF
THEOPHRASTUS
Barnes, Jonathan. 1983. "Terms and Sentences: Theophrastus on

Hypothetical Syllogisms." Proceedings of the British Academy no.
69:279-326.
———. 1985. "Theophrastus and Hypothetical Syllogistic." In
Aristoteles. Werk Und Wirkung, Paul Moraux Gewidmet, I: Aristoteles
Und Seine Schule, edited by Wiesner, Jürgen, 557-576. Berlin: de
Gruyter.
Reprinted in: W. W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, A. A. Long (eds.) -
Theophrastus of Eresus. On his life and work - New Brunswick,
Transaction Books, 1985, pp. 125-141.
"In APr 1.44 Aristotle considers "arguments on the basis of a
hypothesis." He deals first with arguments that are "agreed to by way of
a compact," and then with those that "reach their conclusion by way of
the impossible." The chapter ends with a promise: "Many other
arguments reach their conclusion on the basis of a hypothesis. We
should consider them and mark them out clearly. We shall say later
what varieties of them there are and in how many ways arguments can
rest on a hypothesis" (APr 50 a 39-b2).
Alexander of Aphrodisias (In APr 389, 31-390.9) (1) comments on that
passage as follows:
Having talked about arguments on the basis of an agreement and
arguments by reductio ad impossible, he says that "many others reach
their conclusion on the basis of a hypothesis." He postpones discussion
of them, as though intending to deal with them more carefully; but no
book of his on the subject is in circulation. Theophrastus, however,
refers to them in his own Analytics -- and so do Eudemus and some
others of Aristotle's associates.
Aristotle presumably has in mind those arguments which proceed by
way of a continuous proposition (or a connected proposition, as it is
also called) together with the additional assumption, and those which
proceed by way of a separative or disjunctive proposition -- and
perhaps also those which proceed by way of a negated conjunction, if
they are indeed different from the ones already mentioned. (2)
225
In addition to those we have mentioned, there will also be arguments on
the basis of proportion and those which they call "qualitative" (i.e.,
arguments from what is more so or less so or equally so) and whatever
other varieties of arguments based on a hypothesis (3) there are (they
have been discussed elsewhere).
In addition to those we have mentioned, there will also be arguments on
the basis of proportion and those which they call "qualitative" (i.e.,
arguments from what is more so or less so or equally so) and whatever
other varieties of arguments basal on a hypothesis' there are (they have
been discussed elsewhere).
Those paragraphs are of some importance for the history of logic: the
present paper is a commentary on them."
1. The passage is F 29 in A. Graeser, Die logischen Fragmente des
Theophrast (Berlin / New York 1973), and frag. 33c in L. Repici, La
logica di Teofrasto (Bologna 1977).
2. Wallies, in the CIAG edition, punctuates so as to begin a new
sentence with the clause "if they-already mentioned." The result is
ungainly and obscure. In my translation I gratefully adopt a suggestion
made by David Sedley: his punctuation gives perfect sense and makes
better Greek. (It leaves an unpleasant asyndeton. Perhaps we should
insert a particle and begin the new sentence at 390.6 with para de tous.)
3. I excise protaseon (390.9): the phrase "propositions based on a
hypothesis" is strange, and even if it may be allowed as a variant on
"hypothetical proposition," it is out of place; Alexander is enumerating
types of hypothetical arguments, not types of hypothetical propositions.
Bobzien, Susanne. 2000. "Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy:87-137.
Traces the history in Aristotelian commentators of the type of
syllogisms called "wholly hypothetical" -- that is, those consisting in
two conditionals as premisses, with a third as the conclusion -- and sets
forth the deductive system on which the logic of this syllogism was
grounded. There was no unique prevalent understanding of the logical
form of these arguments, but rather a complex development in their
understanding, starting from a term-logical conception and leading to a
propositional-logical one. The roles of Theophrastus, Alexander of
Aphrodisias, and Porphyry (via Boethius) in the transmission and
transformation of this problematic are investigated."
226
Bochenski, Joseph. 1947. La Logique De Théophraste. Fribourg:
Librairie de l'Université.
Reprinted New York, Garland, 1987.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1982. ""Indeterminé" Et "Indefini" Dans La
Logique De Théophraste." Revue Philosophique de la France et de
l'Étranger no. 172:359-370.
Fortenbaugh, William W. 1991. "Theoprastus, Fr. 65 Wimmer: Is It
Important for Understanding Peripatetic Rhetoric?" American Journal
of Philology no. 111:152-156.
Revised reprint in: W. W. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastean Studies,
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 2003, I Section: Logic: pp. 15-21.
———. 1995. "Theophrastus, No. 84 Fhs&G: Nothing New Here!" In
The Passionate Intellect: Essays on the Transformation of Classical
Traditions, edited by Lewis, Ayres, 161-176. New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers.
Revised reprint in: W. W. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastean Studies, I
Section: Logic: pp. 22-34, with the subtitle: Did Theophrastus oppose
Aristotle and accept quantification of the predicate?.
———. 1998. "Cicero: On Invention 1.51-77; Hypothetical Syllogistic
and the Early Peripatetics." Rhetoric no. 16:25-46.
Revised reprint in: W. W. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastean Studies, I
Section: Logic: 51-67.
———. 2000. "Teofrasto Di Ereso: Argomentazione Retorica E
Sillogistica Ipotetica." Aevum no. 74:89-103.
Revised English version in: W. W. Fortenbaugh, Theophrastean
Studies, I Section: Logic: pp. 89-103 with the title: Theophrastus of
Eresus: Rhetorical Argument and Hypothetical Syllogistic.
"To appreciate Theophrastus' contributions to the study of rhetorical
argument, we should consider his accomplishments in the field of logic,
for it is Theophrastus and other members of the second generation of
the Peripatos who developed hypothetical syllogistic. Many of the
illustrative arguments in Aristotle's Rhetoric (esp. in chapters on the
enthymeme, the koiné and topics) take the form of a mixed hypothetical
syllogism. Aristotle promised to discuss such syllogisms, but he never
did. That task fell to his successors, among Theophrastus will have
made the connection with rhetoric."
Gottschalk, Hans B. 1987. "Did Theophrastus Write a Categories?"
227
Philologus no. 131:245-253.
Huby, Pamela M. 1977. "Apuleius and Theophrastus' Fifth
"Indemonstrable" Mood." Liverpool Classical Monthly no. 2:147-148.
An interpretation of Apuleius Peri hermeneias chapter 13.
———. 1979. "A Neglected Fragment of Peripatetic Logic." Liverpool
Classical Monthly no. 4:207-210.
Discussion of an account of hypothetical syllogisms appended in an
11th cent. ms. (Laurentianus 72.5) to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
The account may represent the views of Theophrastus."
———. 1989. "Theophrastus and the Criterion." In The Criterion of
Truth. Essays Written in Honour of George Kerferd, Together with a
Text and Translation (with Annotations) of Ptolemy's on the Kriterion
and Hegemonikon, edited by Huby, Pamela M. and Neal, Gordon, 107-
122. Liverpool: Liverpool Univrsity Press.
———. 2002. "Did Aristotle Reply to Eudemus and Theophrastus on
Some Logical Issues?" In Eudemus of Rhodes, edited by Bodnár, István
and Fortenbaugh, William W., 85-106. New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers.
Lejewski, Czeslaw. 1961. "On Prosleptic Syllogisms." Notre Dame
As a rule modern textbooks of traditional logic distinguish only two
kinds of syllogism: the categorical syllogism, which has originated with
Aristotle, and the hypothetical syllogism, which goes back to the early
Peripatetics and to the Stoics. Rarely, if ever, is mention made of the
third kind of syllogism namely the prosleptic syllogism. Yet, the
prosleptic syllogism, for which we seem to be indebted to
Theophrastus, appears to have been regarded at least by some logicians
in later ages of antiquity as a legitimate part of logical theory.
Like the expressions 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' the expression
'prosleptic' is a technical term and its full significance can only emerge
at a later stage of our enquiry. At this stage suffice it to say that
'prosleptic' is meant to render the Greek expression kata proslepsin in
its adjectival use.
Although the prosleptic syllogism has not played as important a role in
the development of logic as the other two kinds of syllogism, it
deserves our attention particularly for the following two reasons. First,
the validity of prosleptic syllogisms is based, as we shall see, on certain
228
logical notions which in modern logic find their expression in the use
of the universal quantifier. Secondly, the theory of prosleptic syllogism
bears witness to the resourcefulness of Theophrastus as a logician.
In what follows I propose to reconstruct the theory of prosleptic
syllogisms to the extent to which the scarcity of textual evidence
permits, and to examine it from the point of view of modern logic."
———. 1976. "On Prosleptic Premisses." Notre Dame Journal of
Galen claimed that prosleptic premisses, used for the first time by
Aristotle and treated systematically by Theophrastus, were equivalent
to appropriate categorical premises. This claim can only be sustained
with substantial qualifications. The paper carries out a detailed
examination of equivalence relationship between the two kinds of
premisses within the framework of axiomatized Aristotelian syllogistic,
which had to be suitably extended for the purpose by additional
assumptions. The results of the enquiry differ from those obtained by
William and Martha kneale in their paper on "Prosleptic propositions
and arguments" in "Islamic philosophy and the Classical tradition",
edited by S. M. Stern and others, Cassirer 1972."
Lorenzen, Paul. 1969. "Theophrastische Modallogik." Archiv für
mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung no. 12:72-75.
Maróth, Miklos. 1979. "Die Hypothetischen Syllogismen." Acta
Antiqua Academiae Scientiae Hungaricae no. 27:407-436.
Étude des syllogismes chez Aristote, dans l'école péripatéticienne
(Théophraste) et dans le stoïcisme. Malgré de nombreux éléments
individuels, Galien s'insère plutôt dans le courant péripatéticien. C'est
également de ce dernier, et non de la théorie stoïcienne, que s'inspire la
logique arabe."
Mignucci, Mario. 1965. "Per Una Interpretazione Della Logica Modale
Di Teofrasto." Vichiana:227-277.
Les innovations de Théophraste correspondent à une conception de la
nature et de la fonction de la logique, qui n'a plus dignité de science
autonome et indépendante, visant à l'analyse des connexions formelles
du réel, mais qui devient de plus en plus instrument de la recherche
scientifique."
———. 1998. "Theophrastus' Logic." In Theophrastus. Reappraising
the Souces, edited by Ophuijsen, Johannes Van and Raalte, Marlein
229
Van, 39-66. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
———. 1999. "La Critica Di Teofrasto Alla Logica Aristotelica." In
Antiaristotelismo, edited by Natali, Carlo and Maso, Stefano, 21-39.
Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert.
Repici, Luciana. 1977. La Logica Di Teofrasto. Studio Critico E
Raccolta Dei Frammenti E Delle Testimonianze. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Indice: Parte prima. Gli studi moderni sulla logica di Teofrasto 9; Parte
seconda. Le opere logiche di Teofrasto. I. I problemi della ricostruzione
della logica di Teofrasto 33; II. Dell'affermazione e della negazione 45;
III. Analitici Priori 81; IV. Analitici Secondi 159; V. Topici 167; Vi. Le
altre opere logiche 179; Parte terza. Testimonianze e frammenti 193;
Bibliografia 227; Indici delle fonti 235; Tavola di raffronto dei
Frammenti [con l'edizione di Andreas Graeser - Die logischen
Fragmente des Theophrast - Berlin, 1973] 241-243; Indice dei nomi
245-247.
"This is the second collection of Theophrastus' logical fragments to
appear within four years and it is very similar to that of Andreas
Graeser, published with a German commentary in 5973. The similarity
is not surprising, for the majority of passages which can be attributed to
Theophrastus with confidence can also be assigned with confidence to
one of his commentaries, if we may so call them, on Aristotle's works,
the On Affirmation and Denial, which, according to Boethius, followed
the lines of Aristotle's De Interpretatione, the Prior and the Posterior
Analytics, and the Topics. Since, further, most of these passages occur
in later commentaries on Aristotle, and are linked with particular
sections of his work, there is not even much doubt their order, and with
only three exceptions, of minor importance, the order given here is the
same as that of Graeser.
Since so much is well established, these two editions are likely to
remain the only ones for many years. Graeser's is marred by many
inaccuracies, and this one is much better on that score. Miss Repici has
also taken the trouble to translate every passage into Italian, which is
sometimes very helpful, and she gives a survey of much earlier work on
Theophrastus' logic." (Pamela M. Huby - Review of the book - Mind,
1979, pp. 448-450)
Rose, Lynn. 1968. Aristotle's Syllogistic. Springfield: Charles C.
Thomas.
230
Contents: I. Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's syllogistic 3; II. The
varieties of predication 13; III: The three figures 16; IV. The non-use of
rules 27; V. Validation by reduction 34; VI. Invalidation by
counterexample 37; VII. The syllogistic system 53; VIII. The Fourth
Figure and the indirect proof 57; IX. Subalternation 80; X. Premise
order 81; Appendix. I. The square of opposition 99; II. The mnemonic
lines 102; III: The perfection of Aristotle' First Figure 104; IV.
Theophrastus and the indirect moods 109; V. The diagrams of the three
figures 133; VI. John Locke's criticisms of Aristotle and the syllogism
137; Bibliography 144; Index 147-149.
"Traditional "Aristotelian" logic recognizes four figures of the
syllogism, including five "indirect" moods of the first figure.
The usual account of the origin of these is that Aristotle himself
developed the first, second, and third figures, that Theophrastus added
the indirect moods of the first figure, (2) and that the fourth figure was
added later on by someone else, probably Galen. (3)
I shall attempt to show that the five argument forms added to the first
figure by Theophrastus were in fact not the indirect moods of the first
figure that became part of the traditional "Aristotelian" logic. They
were, rather, argument forms corresponding both to the later indirect
first and to the later fourth figure moods, but not recognizing any
distinction between the two. From the modern (i.e., traditional) point of
view, it is just as accurate, and just as wrong, to say that Theophrastus
added the fourth figure as to say that he added the indirect first. In a
sense he did both; in a sense he did neither. For in the later logic the
indirect first moods are carefully distinguished from the fourth figure
moods. But Aristotle and Theophrastus had no formal basis for
distinguishing the indirect first form the fourth. They attached no
significance to premise order. (4)" pp. 109-110
(2) The main evidence for this is the statement of Alexander, Alexandri
in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Commentarium, CAG,
edited by Maximilian Wallies. Berlin, 1883, vol. II, part I, pp. 69.26-
70.21 and 109.29-110.21. See also Boetii De Syllogismo categorico
libri duo. In Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, edited by J.-
P. Migne. Paris, Bibliothecae Cleri universae, 1891, vol. LXIV, 814C-
816C.
(3) The best known source for this is Averroes. Two recent and full
231
treatments of the history of the fourth figure and of reports about it are
in A. I. Sabra: A twelfth-century defence of the fourth figure of the
syllogism. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes. XXVIII:
14-28, 1965, and Nicholas Rescher: New light from Arabic sources on
Galen and the fourth figure of the syllogism. Journal of the History of
Philosophy, III: 27-41, 1965.
(4) For Aristotle on premise order, see Chapter X above. We shall see
in this Appendix that there seems to be no reason to suppose that
Theophrastus had nay conventions regarding premise order either.
RELATED PAGES
232
Home
Contents
Last Page
Selected Bibliography on the Dialectical

School (Later 4th to the Mid 3rd
Centuries BC)
EDITIONS OF THE FRAGMENTS OF THE
DIALECTICAL SCHOOL
Döring, Klaus. 1972. Die Megariker. Kommentierte Sammlung Der
Testimonien. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.
Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorbemerkungen IX-XII; (T = Testimonien; K =
Kommentar).
I. Euklid und sein Kreis.
1. Euklid T = 3; K = 73; 2. Diokleides T = 4; K = --; 3. Dionysios aus
Chalkedon T = 14; K = 99; 4. Ichthyas T = 15; K = 100; 5.
Kleinomachos T = 15; K = 101;
II. Eubulides und sein Krei
1. Eubulides T = 16; K = 102; 2. Euphantos von olynth T = 20; K =
114; 3. Memnon (?) T = 21; K = --;4. Alexinos T = 21; K = 115;
III. Diodor und sein Kreis.
1. Apollonios Kronos T = 28; K = --; 2. Diodor T = 28; K = 124; 3.
Philon T = 45; K = 138; 4. Panthoides T = 45; K = 139; 5. Die Töchter
Diodoros T = 45; K = --;
233
IV. Stilpon und sein Kreis.
1. Pasikles von Theben T = 46; K = --; 2. Thrasymachos von Korinth T
= 46; K = --; 3. Stilpon T = 46; K = 140; 4. Philippos der Megariker T
= 61; K = --; 5. Simmias von Syrakus T = 61; K = --; 6. Alkimos,
Aristeides, Diphilos, Kleitarch, Metrodor, Myrmex, Paioneios,
Phrasidemos, Timagoras T = 61; K = --;
Anhang: Bryson und sein Schüler Polyxenos.
Bryson T = 62; K = 157;
Polyxeons T = 67; K = 166;
Stemma der Lehrer-Schüler-Verhältnisse 171; Verzeichnis der
wichtigen Literatur 172; Stellenregister 175.
Giannantoni, Gabriele, ed. 1990. Socratis Et Socraticorum Reliquiae.
Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Second revised and expanded edition (4 volumes).
The first edition, titled Socraticorum reliquiae, was published at Roma,
Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1983-1985.
Vol. I gives the testimonies for Socrates and testimonies and fragments
of Euclides and the Megarians, Phaedo and Menedemus; vol. II for the
Cyrenaeans, Cynics, Aeschines and other Socratics; vol. III contains
the bibliography and indices; vol. IV notes on various subjects.
The testimonia on Philo the Dialectician and Diodorus Cronos are in
vol. I, p. 414-435; that on Diodorus can also be found in Klaus Döring,
Die Megariker, Amsterdam: Grüner, 1972.
For a possibly Philonian theory of signs see: Hermann Diels,
Doxographi Graeci. Berlin: Reimer, 1879, p. 605 (Pseudo-Galen,
Historia philosophica c. 9).
Montoneri, Luciano. 1984. I Megarici. Studio Storico-Critico E
Traduzione Delle Testimonianze Antiche. Catania: Università di
Catania.
Indice generale: Premessa 7; Parte prima I Megarici. Studio storico-
critico 13; Introduzione: I discepoli di Socrate e le loro scuole 15; I.
Euclide e la sua scuola 39; II. Eubulide e seguaci 93; III. Diodoro
Crono e seguaci 123; IV. Stilpone e seguaci 207; Stemma della
diadoche megarica 226; Parte Seconda: I Megarici. Le testimonianze
227; Indice dei nomi antichi 323; Indice degli autori moderni 329;
Indice delle fonti 333-345.
234
La presente ricerca "vuole essere un primo tentativo unitario e globale
di ricostruzione e interpretazione delle fondamentali problematiche
speculative dei pensatori megarici, condotto sulla scorta di un'attenta
ricognizione critica del lavoro storiografico degli ultimi due secoli." p.
8
"Veniamo ora a illustrare la struttura dell'opera, che è bipartita.
Abbiamo articolato la prima parte -- che ha carattere monografico -- in
quattro capitoli, dedicati rispettivamente alle grandi figure dei
"capiscuola" del Megarismo: Euclide, Eubulide, Diodoro Crono e
Stilpone.
La seconda parte comprende invece la traduzione delle testimonianze
sui Megarici, ed è anch'essa strutturata in quattro sezioni (I. Euclide e la
sua scuola; II. Eubulide e seguaci; III. Diodoro Crono e seguaci; IV.
Stilpone e seguaci), corrispondenti ai quattro capitoli della prima parte.
Diversamente da Döring che le raccoglie a parte (cf. Anhang: Bryson
und sein Schüler Polyxenos, pp. 62-70), noi abbiamo incorporato nella
sezione I le testimonianze su Brisone e Polisseno, conformemente al
nostro punto di vista espresso nel capitolo I.
In ciascuna sezione abbiamo raggruppato le fonti -- secondo la
partizione adottata da Döring -- in: Testimonianze sulla vita (A), sugli
scritti e la dottrina (B) e (soltanto per Euclide) sulla scuola (C).
Abbiamo inoltre inserito -- quando ci è parso utile a una maggiore
perspicuità di lettura -- titoli supplementari (in corsivo), con intento
classificatorio e, insieme, chiarificatore del contenuto delle
testimonianze.
Per quanto riguarda la traduzione italiana, valgano le seguenti
avvertenze:
1. Sono state tradotte tutte le testimonianze comprese nella raccolta di
Döring, a eccezione di alcune poche (precisamente quelle
corrispondenti ai frr. 21, 22, 23, 58, 69, 72, 200, 201), che sono state
omesse o perché prive di senso compiuto (frr. 21, 22, 23), o perché non
interpretabili, trattandosi di testi papiracei assai lacunosi dai quali si
ricavano non più che nomi e termini isolati. In ogni caso, Si tratta -- a
nostro avviso -- di testimonianze praticamente irrilevanti dal punto di
vista del loro contenuto storico-filosofico.
Viceversa, abbiamo ritenuto utile inserire la traduzione di alcune
testimonianze non comprese nella raccolta di Döring, e che sono quelle
235
contrassegnate dai nn. 44, 48, 166, 174L del nostro ordinamento.
2. Nella traduzione abbiamo di norma seguito il testo critico riprodotto
da. Döring, esplicitamente dichiarando i pochi casi nei quali abbiamo
preferito una diversa lezione.
Nella traduzione abbiamo disposto le testimonianze secondo un ordine
di lettura che ci è parso coerente con le caratteristiche e le conclusioni
della trattazione monografica. Per facilitare i riscontri col testo greco,
abbiamo fatto seguire, al nostro numero d'ordine della testimonianza,
quello corrispondente nella numerazione Döring, riportato in parentesi.
Al fine di renderne più perspicuo al lettore il senso complessivo,
abbiamo tradotto alcune testimonianze in una citazione più ampia
rispetto a quella riportata da Döring. Esse sono state contrassegnate da
un asterisco (*) posto accanto al nostro numero d'ordine della
testimonianza." pp. 10-11.
Muller, Robert. 1982. Les Mégariques. Fragments Et Témoignages.
Paris: Vrin.
Traduction et commentaire.
Table des matières: Introduction 7; Les fragments et témoignages (I.
Euclide, II. Eubulide, III. Diodore, IV. Stilpon, V. Appendice: Bryson
et son élève Polyxène) 19; Annexe I 75; Annexe II 91; Commentaire
95; Notes 183; Bibliographie 229; Index des sources 237; Index
locorum 247-253.
"Introduction. I. Les textes Mégariques.
On s'accorde volontiers à reconnaître que les Mégariques sont parmi les
plus mal connus des philosophes de l'Antiquité, assurément les plus
insaisissables, alors même que les éléments de leur doctrine
ressurgissent régulièrement dans les travaux des interprètes de Platon et
d'Aristote ou dans ceux des historiens de la logique, et après que
plusieurs d'entre eux eurent joui auprès des Anciens d'une célébrité
égale à celle des plus grands. A cela il y a d'abord une raison simple, la
quasi-absence de textes: des originaux il ne subsiste en effet que
quelques courts fragments difficiles à exploiter, et les témoignages des
Anciens sont dans l'ensemble peu nombreux, souvent brefs, dispersés,
et donc d'un accès malaisé. Cette situation défavorable n'est certes pas
réservée aux seuls Mégariques, puisque bon nombre de Présocratiques,
les Cyniques ou les Cyrénaïques, pour ne citer qu'eux, ne sont
apparemment pas mieux lotis. Pour tous ceux-là, cependant, le lecteur
236
moderne a à sa disposition, parfois depuis longtemps, des recueils
regroupant l'essentiel ou la totalité des textes subsistants (1), alors que
pour les Mégariques il lui aura fallu attendre le dernier tiers du XXe
siècle: ce n'est qu'en 1972, en effet, qu'est paru le livre de K. Döring qui
réunit pour la première fois l'ensemble des fragments et témoignages
qui les concernent (2). Les qualités de ce travail, jointes à la commodité
que constitue le fait d'avoir enfin regroupés et ordonnés la quasi-totalité
des textes intéressant les Mégariques font qu'il est en passe de devenir
classique, les historiens de la philosophie et de la logique s'y référant de
plus en plus volontiers. On ne pouvait donc mieux faire, quand il s'est
agi de proposer au lecteur français la documentation la plus complète et
la plus sûre sur la pensée mégarique, que de prendre le livre de Dôring
comme base de travail, et de traduire la totalité des fragments et
témoignages rassemblés par lui en respectant sa numérotation et la
disposition générale de son ouvrage.
Il est bien connu cependant que les difficultés du genre empêchent
presque fatalement un recueil de ce type d'être réellement exhaustif et
de se suffire à lui-même. Il faut d'abord sélectionner et découper les
textes pertinents, ce qui exige qu'on se donne des critères à la fois
rigoureux et maniables, mais qui ne seront jamais totalement à l'abri de
la contestation. Il faut ensuite tenir compte du fait qu'un extrait isolé de
son contexte peut être inintelligible, ou interprété à contresens; de
même la juxtaposition de fragments d'auteurs et de siècles différents,
parfois très éloignés les uns des autres, peut avoir des conséquences
malheureuses.
Il faut reconnaître que sur le premier point le travail de Dôring ne
suscite que peu de réserves: ayant adopté le principe de ne retenir que
les textes où apparaît formellement le nom des Mégariques en général
ou de l'un au moins des membres présumés du groupe, l'auteur ne fait
donc pas figurer dans son recueil les divers passages où la critique
moderne a cru déceler des allusions aux Mégariques. Si cette prudence
peut sembler excessive à certains, elle a du moins le mérite de la clarté
et de la rigueur en proposant un minimum de textes incontestables:
dans la mesure où il est difficile de trancher sur la base de simples
critères externes dans les querelles opposant à ce sujet les spécialistes,
elle laisse aux interprètes la responsabilité de leurs choix. Tout au plus
pourrait-on remarquer que Döring est infidèle à son principe à une ou
237
deux reprises -- en omettant telle phrase où figure pourtant le nom d'un
Mégarique(3), ou en incluant un fragment dans lequel aucun nom n'est
cité (4) -- et que parfois le mauvais découpage d'un extrait interdit d'en
saisir clairement la signification.
La deuxième difficulté, quant à elle, ne peut guère être tournée qu'en
joignant aux fragments et témoignages une introduction ou un
commentaire, dont l'objet serait de restituer aussi souvent que
nécessaire les divers contextes, et de mettre en lumière la cohérence
conceptuelle des principaux éléments de la doctrine, ou, à défaut, de
faire apparaître au moins l'unité d'inspiration de l'ensemble. Bien que
l'auteur ait complété son travail par un commentaire assez fourni (une
centaine de pages), il ne paraît pas que cette reconstruction de la pensée
mégarique ait été pour lui un objectif prioritaire: tous ses soins sont
allés à la réunion et à l'établissement des textes, les éclaircissements qui
les accompagnent étant plutôt de nature historique et philologique.
C'est en tenant compte de ces difficultés et de cet état de fait que nous
avons conçu notre propre travail. Les mérites du livre de Döring étant
reconnus, on devait seulement chercher à le compléter pour pallier les
inconvénients qu'on vient de relever. Pour combler les rares lacunes de
sa collection, mais surtout pour éclairer par les sources anciennes elles-
mêmes le contenu de quelques fragments elliptiques ou allusifs, un
certain nombre de textes complémentaires ont été ajoutés en Annexes,
ainsi qu'une brève liste des allusions probables ou possibles proposées
par divers spécialistes; d'autre part, pour corriger dans la mesure du
possible les effets négatifs de l'extrême dispersion de nos sources et de
la brièveté de la majorité d'entre elles, on s'est efforcé d'éclairer par un
Commentaire la signification littérale et la portée philosophique des
divers fragments, la place occupée par ce commentaire se justifiant par
la rareté, dans notre langue, des travaux consacrés aux Mégariques:
hormis deux ou trois études déjà anciennes (6), on ne dispose en effet à
ce jour que de quelques courts chapitres inclus dans les histoires
générales do la philosophie et d'articles spécialisés sur telle ou telle
question particulière de logique (7), ce qui est manifestement
insuffisant quand on cherche à acquérir une vue cohérente sur la nature
exacte et l'étonnant destin de la doctrine mégarique.
Étrange destin, en effet, que celui des philosophes de Mégare. Les
caractères particuliers de la documentation, que l'on vient de rappeler
238
(sources indirectes, fragmentaires, longtemps difficiles à consulter),
n'expliquent sans doute pas à eux seuls la méconnaissance dont ils sont
encore partiellement victimes. Car il faut savoir qu'une certaine
ambiguïté a marqué leur réputation dès l'origine: si on leur
reconnaissait volontiers des talents hors pair, principalement dans le
domaine de la dialectique, si on saluait la personnalité exceptionnelle à
tous égards d'un Stilpon, on ne manquait pas de dénoncer d'autre part
les dangers que présentait l'usage de ces mêmes talents, ou de souligner
la vanité de leurs prétendus tours de force. Pour comprendre ces
jugements contrastés -- auxquels font curieusement écho les
appréciations contradictoires des historiens de la logique des XIXe et
XXe siècles (8) -- et pour éviter les risques de méprise, il est
indispensable de donner d'abord, à qui voudrait entreprendre la lecture
des textes, une vue plus précise sur la situation historique de l'École de
Mégare; on tentera ensuite, pour les mêmes raisons, de restituer
quelque chose de l'unité d'une pensée souvent réduite à quelques thèses
disparates et paradoxales." pp. 7-9
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allen, James. 2001. Inference from Signs. Ancient Debates About the
Nature of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Study III: The Stoics on Sign-Inference and Demonstration pp. 147-
193, Appendix: The Evidence for a Dialectical Origin of the Stic
Theory of Signs (pp. 188-193).
Bochenski, Joseph. 1951. Ancient Formal Logic. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Chapter V. The Stoic-Megaric School 77-102.
Ebert, Theodor. 1991. Dialektiker Und Frühe Stoiker Bei Sextus
Empiricus. Untersuchungen Zur Entstehung Der Aussagenlogik.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
See Chapter 3 The Megarians and the Stoics Sections 1, 2 and 3 pp.
113-138
Muller, Robert. 1988. Introduction À La Pensèe Des Mégariques. Paris:
239
Vrin.
Table des matières: Première partie: Préliminaires méthodologiques et
historiques. 1. Problèmes généraux de la connaissance et de
l'interprétation de l'École de Mègare 11; I. Historique 33; Deuxième
partie: La philosophie mégarique: essai d'Interprétation. I. La visée
éthique 71; II. Un rationalisme abstrait 83; III. La dialectique 111;
Troisième partie et Conclusion. I. Le rôle de Dodore et de Stilpon 185;
II. Le Destin de l'École de Mègare 198; Appendice: L'édition de Döring
et l'édition de Giannantoni 205; Index des fragments 221; Note
bibliographique 223; Index nominum 227-232.
"Avant-propops. Longtemps délaissés, les Mégariques sont depuis peu
l'objet d'études de plus en plus nombreuses. Venant après quelques
articles remarquables mais trop discrets, le travail le plus décisif de ces
dernières années a sans doute été la publication par K. Döring de la
quasi-totalité des fragments et témoignages concernant cette école, dans
une édition fiable et commode: Die Megariker. Kommentierte
Sammlung der Testimonien, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1972. L'importance
de cet ouvrage nous a incité à proposer une traduction française,
assortie d'un commentaire, des textes de Döring: Les Mégariques.
Fragments et témoignages, Paris, Vrin, 1985. A peu près en même
temps paraissaient deux autres publications comparables, l'une de L.
Montoneri (I Megarici. Studio storico-critico e traduzione delle
testimonianze antiche, Università di Catania, 1984), et l'autre de G.
Giannantoni (Socraticorum reliquiae, Roma, Ed. dell'Ateneo, 4 vol.,
1983-85 - mais disponibles en 1985 seulement) (1). On ne peut que se
féliciter de cette soudaine richesse, en dépit des inconvénients qui
résulteront des numérotations différentes dont les textes mégariques
sont désormais affectés.
Il nous a semblé qu'il convenait de contribuer à cette renaissance en
offrant au lecteur non-spécialiste un aperçu systématique -- quoique
moins ambitieux -- de l' état de nos connaissances sur le sujet. Tel est
donc l'objet du présent ouvrage, qui s'efforce de ne pas faire double
emploi avec notre publication précédente. Ce livre se distingue du
précédent sur deux points: 1. le commentaire fragment par fragment ne
permettant guère les vues d'ensemble, nous avons au contraire cherché
ici à présenter une vision plus synthétique de la philosophie mégarique,
voire -- pour autant que la documentation l'autorise, et justement parce
240
que cette documentation fragmentaire a trop souvent servi de prétexte à
des recherches ponctuelles -- une tentative de reconstruction de la
doctrine, dans son unité et sa cohérence; 2. les mêmes raisons font que
certains développements particuliers intéressant des fragments éloignés
les uns des autres (le problème des Amis des Idées du Sophiste, le
contexte et la nature exacte de la dialectique mégarique), ou impliquant
une mise en perspective des auteurs les uns par rapport aux autres
(l'évolution de l'école), ne pouvaient trouver leur place et leur portée
que dans ce cadre-ci.
Enfin, nous avons jugé utile d'ajouter en appendice une courte
comparaison des deux éditions de fragments disponibles et auxquelles
on devra désormais se référer, suivie de deux tables de concordance
destinées à faciliter la confrontation."
(1) Comme l'indique son titre, ce dernier recueil est beaucoup plus
large puisqu'il concerne tous les (Petits) Socratiques. Le vol. I contient
les textes relatifs aux Socratiques en général (section I), aux
Mégariques (sect. II); aux philosophes d'Elis et d'Erétrie (sect. III), et
aux Cyrénaïques (sect. IV); le vol. II est entièrement consacré à
Antisthène et aux TE T
ET
ECyniques. Le vol. III comprend les "notes" (en fait, une série de
chapitres sur les principaux auteurs et les problèmes concernant leurs
écoles, dont l'ensemble constitue un commentaire très substantiel des
deux premiers vol.); le vol. IV enfin, la bibliographie et deux index (les
sources; les noms propres).
Rüstow, Alexander. 1910. Der Lügner. Theorie, Geschichte Und
Auflösung. Leipzig: Teubner.
Reprint: New York, Garland, 1987.
Bobzien, Susanne. 1999. "Logic. Ii. The 'Megarics'." In The Cambridge
History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra, Kempe, Barnes,
Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield, Malcolm, 83-91. Cambridge:
Cambiano, Giuseppe. 1977. "Il Problema Dell'esistenza Di Una Scuola
Megarica." In Scuole Socratiche Minori E Filosofia Ellenistica, edited
by Giannantoni, Gabriele, 25-53. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Ebert, Theodor. 1993. "Dialecticians and Stoics on the Classification of
Propositions." In Dialektiker Und Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und
241
Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 111-127.
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
———. 2008. "In Defence of the Dialectical School." In Anthropine
Sophia. Studi Di Filologia E Storiografia Filosofica in Memortia Di
Gabriele Giannantoni, edited by Alesse, Francesca, Aronadio,
Francesco, Dalfino, Maria Cristina, Simeoni, Luca and Spinelli,
Emidio, 275-293. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Fritz, Kurt von. 1931. "Megariker." In Paulys Realencyclopädie Der
Classischen Altertumswisseschaft. Supp. V, 707-724. Stuttgart: J. B.
Metzler.
Abbreviated version in: H. von Fritz, Schriften zur griechischen Logik,
Band 2: Logik, Ontologie und Mathematik, Stuttgart - Bad Cannstat,
Frommann-Holzboog, 1978, pp. 75-92
O'Toole, Robert R., and Jennings, Raymond E. 2004. "The Megarians
and the Stoics." In Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic, edited by Gabbay,
Dov and Woods, John, 397-522. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Weidemann, Hermann. 1993. "Zeit Und Wahrheit Bei Diodor." In
Dialektiker Und Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer,
edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 319-329. Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner.
Cambiano, Giuseppe. 1971. "La Scuola Megarica Nelle Interpretazioni
Moderne." Rivista di Filosofia no. 62:227-253.
"Rassegna delle interpretazioni della Scuola Megarica a partire dagli
inizi dell'Ottocento: dalle ricostruzioni tendenziose di Tennemann e
Hegel alle ricerche di Schleiermacher, Deycks, Henne e altri, dalla
presentazione negativa della logica megarica dovuta a Prantl e Zeller e
combattuta da Grote e Gomperz sino alla storiografia del Novecento,
che ha insistito soprattutto negli ultimi decenni sull'importanza della
logica Megarica (Lukasiewicz, Mates, Kneale). ma la filosofia
Megarica, benchè sia un campo ampiamente esplorato, sembra
costituire ancor oggi uno dei problemi piu difficili per la ricerca storica,
filologica e filosofica."
Celluprica, Vincenza. 1982. "Necessità Megarica E Fatalità Stoica."
Elenchos no. 3:361-385.
Crivelli, Paolo. 1994. "The Stoic Analysis of Tense and of Plural
Propositions in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos X 99."
242
Classical Quarterly no. 44:490-499.
Adversus Mathematicos (M.) X is the second book dedicated by Sextus
to the discussion of the physical doctrines put forward by dogmatic
philosophers. An extensive section (M. X 85-120) deals with Diodorus
Cronus' arguments concerning movement.
Denyer, Nicholas. 1981. "Time and Modality in Diodorus Cronus."
Theoria no. 47:31-53.
———. 2002. "Neglected Evidence for Diodorus Cronus." Classical
Quarterly:597-600.
Döring, Klaus. 1989. "Gab Es Eine Dialektische Schule?" Phronesis
no. 34:293-310.
"Until recently, students of ancient philosophy have generally believed
that Diodorus Cronus was a member of the Megarian school founded
by Socrates' pupil Euclides of Megara. In 1977, however, David Sedley
claimed that Diodorus should be associated with the so-called
Dialectical school. The article argues against this view. The main
results are (1) There are no testimonies which suggest that we should
distinguish between Megarians and Dialecticians. (2) The so-called
Dialectical school never existed; it is a construct of ancient historians of
philosophy."
Ebert, Theodor. 1987. "The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs in
Sextus Empiricus." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 5:83-126.
Hartmann, Nicolai. 1993. "Le Concept Mégarique Et Aristotélicien De
Possibilité. Contribution À L'histoire Du Problème Ontologique De La
Modalité." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 49:131-146.
Traduit par Jean-Pierre Narbonne.
Mates, Benson. 1949. "Diodorean Implication." Philosophical Review
no. 58:234-242.
Prior, Arthur Norman. 1955. "Diodorean Modalities." Philosophical
Quarterly no. 5:205-213.
———. 1958. "Diodorus and Modal Logic. A Correction."
Philosophical Quarterly no. 8:226-230.
Rosen, Stanley. 1980. "Dynamis, Energeia, and the Megarians."
Philosophical Inquiry no. 1:105-119.
———. 1983. "La Critique Aristotélicienne Des Mégariques in
Philosophie Grecque." Études Philosophiques:309-330.
243
Sedley, David. 1977. "Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy."
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society no. 23:74-120.
Reprinted in: Terence Irwin (ed.) - Hellenistic Philosophy (Classical
Philosophy Collected Papers vol. 8) - New York, Routledge, 1995, pp.
270-315.
"During the last four decades historians of ancient logic have become
increasingly aware of the importance of Diodorus Cronus and his pupil
Philo as pioneers of the propositional logic which came to flourish in
the Stoa. Their direct influence has so far been recognised in two main
areas of Hellenistic controversy -- the validity-criteria for conditional
propositions, and the definition of the modal terms 'possible' and
'necessary'. But some broader questions have not been satisfactorily
answered. What wee Diodorus' own philosophical allegiances and
antecedents? What is his place in the history of Greek philosophy?
How far-reaching was his influence on the post-Aristotelian
philosophers?
There was little chance of tackling these questions confidently until
1972, when Klaus Döring published for the first time the collected
fragments of Diodorus, in his important volume Die Megariker.
Meagre though they are, these fragments confirm my suspicion that
Diodorus' philosophical background has not been fully explored, and
also that his influence on the three emerging Hellenistic schools -- the
Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics -- was far wider than has hitherto been
recognised. There has been much discussion as to which earlier
philosophers played the most decisive part in shaping Hellenistic
philosophy, and the respective claims of the Platonists and of Aristotle
have never lacked expert advocacy. In all this, the claims of so obscure
a figure as Diodorus have been underrated." p. 74
Weidemann, Hermann. 2008. "Aristotle, the Megarics, and Diodorus
Cronus on the Notion of Possibilty." American Philosophical Quarterly
no. 45:131-148.
White, Michael J. 1979. "An S5 Diodorean Modal System." Logique et
Analyse no. 88:477-487.
"This note points out that the fatalism or logical determinism associated
with the name of the ancient logician Diodorus Cronus is not captured
"within" the contemporary modal-tense logic developed for the
representation of the "Diodorean" modalities, i.e., the interpretation of
244
necessity as present-and-always-future truth, possibility as present-or-
sometime-future truth. With additional postulates for "eternal
recurrence" or cyclical time (tense-logically equivalent), a form of
fatalism (FP entails LFP, PP entails LPP) is captured that does not
"collapse" the system into propositional logic (P does not entail LP).
The result is the Lewis S5 system. While there is no evidence that
Diodorus subscribed to the doctrine of eternal recurrence, most of the
Stoics, "logical successors" of the Megarian logicians, did adopt such a
conception of time."
———. 1980. "Facets of Megarian Fatalism: Aristotelian Criticisms
and the Stoic Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence." Canadian Journal of
RELATED PAGES
The Dialectical (Megarian) School:
The Dialectical School and the Origins of Propositional Logic (under

construction)
Bibliography on the "Master Argument", Diodorus Cronus, Philo the

Dialectician
Ancient Stoicism. Editions of the Texts:
Stoic Logic:
The Dialectic from Zeno to Chrysippus
Stoic Philosophy of Language, Grammar and Rhetoric (under

construction)
245
Home
Contents
Last Page
Selected Bibliography on the Master

Argument, Diodorus Chronus, Philo the
Dialectician
BIBLIOGRAPHY (in progress)
Anscombe, G.Elizabeth M. 1956. "Aristotle and the Sea Battle. De
Interpretatione Chapter Ix." Mind no. 65:1-15.
Appendix: A note on Diodorus Cronus.
Revised reprint in: J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.) - Aristotle: A Collection of
Critical Essays - London, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 15-33 and in: The
Collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe - Vol. I, Oxford,
Blackwell, 1981, pp. 44-56
Bäck, Allan. 1992. "Sailing through the Sea Battle." Ancient
Barreau, Hervé. 1975. "Le Maître Argument De Diodore: Son
Interprétation Traditionnelle, Sa Signification Historique, Sa
Reconstitution Contemporaine." Cahiers Fundamenta Scientiae no.
46:1-51.
———. 2006. "Cléanthe Et Chrysippe Face Au Maître-Argument De
Diodore." In Les Stoiciens Et Leur Logique, edited by Brunschwig,
Jacques, 283-301. Paris: Vrin.
246
Deuxième édition revue, augmentée et mise a jour (Première edition
1978, pp. 21-40).
Barreau, Hervé, and Picolet, Françoise. 1978. "Suite Et Fin Sur Le
Maître Argument De Diodore." Cahiers Fundamenta Scientiae no.
88:1-53.
1) Françoise Picolet: Nouvelles remarques à propos de Diodore, pp. 7-
11; Hervé Barreau: Conception diodoréenne et conception stoicienne
du Maître Argument, pp. 15-53.
Becker, Oskar. 1956. "Über Den "Kurieuon Logos" Des Diodoros
Kronos." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie no. 99:289-304.
Blanché, Robert. 1965. "Sur L'interpretation Du Kurieon Logos." Revue
Philosophique no. 155:133-149.
Bosley, Richard. 1978. "In Support of an Interpretation of on Int. 9."
Ajatus no. 37:29-40.
Boudot, Maurice. 1983. "L'argument Dominateur Et Le Temps
Cyclique." Études Philosophiques:271-298.
Celluprica, Vincenza. 1977. Il Capitolo 9 Del De Interpretatione Di
Aristotele. Rassegna Di Studi 1930-1973. Bologna: Il Mulino.
———. 1977. "L'argomento Dominatore Di Diodoro Crono E Il
Concetto Di Possibile in Crisippo." In Scuole Socratiche Minori E
Filosofia Ellenistica, edited by Giannantoni, Gabriele, 55-73. Bologna:
Il Mulino.
———. 1984. "Necessità Megarica E Fatalità Stoica." Elenchos no.
3:361-385.
Eck, Job van. 1988. "Another Interpretation of Aristotle's De
Interpretatione Ix. A Support for the So-Called Second Oldest or
"Mediaeval" Interpretation." Vivarium.An International Journal for the
Philosophy and Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages and Renaissance
no. 26:19-38.
Frede, Dorothea. 1970. Aristoteles Und Die Seeschlacht. Das Problem
Der Contingentia Futura in De Interpretatione 9. Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
———. 1972. "Omne Quod Est Quando Est Necesse Est Esse." Archiv
für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 54:153-167.
———. 1985. "The Sea-Battle Reconsidered. A Defence of the
Traditional Interpretation." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no.
247
3:31-87.
"In De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle treats the relationship between the
truth and necessity of future contingents differently from those of the
past or present, as exemplified by his consideration of the statement "A
sea battle will take place tomorrow". While Aristotle clearly believes in
the application of the "principle of bivalence" to the present and past,
he does limit its application to the future, despite recent claims to the
contrary."
———. 1990. "Fatalism and Future Truth." Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 6:195-227.
Gaskin, Richard. 1993. "Alexander's Sea Battle: A Discussion of
Alexander of Aphrodisias De Fato 10." Phronesis.A Journal for
———. 1995. The Sea-Battle and the Master Argument. Aristotle and
Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future. Berlin: de Gruyter.
———. 1996. "Sea Battles, Worn-out Cloaks, and Other Matters of
Interpretation: Weidemann on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias." Archiv für
Giannantoni, Gabriele. 1981. "Il Kyrieuon Logos Di Diodoro Crono."
Elenchos no. 2:239-272.
Goodman, Lenn E. 1999. "The Diodorean Modalities and the Master
Argument." In From Puzzles to Principles? Essays on Aristotle's
Dialectic, edited by Sim, May, 15-37. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Hintikka, Jaakko. 1964. "The Once and Future Sea Fight: Aristotle's
Discussion of Future Contingents in De Interpretatione Ix."
Revised and reprinted as Chapter VIII in: J. Hintikka - Time and
necessity. Studies in Aristotle's theory of modality - New York, Oxford
University Press, 1973, pp. 147-178
Hintikka, Jaakko, Knuuttila, Simo, and Remes, Unto. 1977. "Aristotle
on Modality and Determinism." Acta Philosophica Fennica no. 29.
Judson, Lindsay. 1988. "La Bataille Navale D'aujourd'hui. De
Interpretatione Ix." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 6:5-37.
"Réexamen, mené dans la perspective de la philosophie analytique, des
arguments discutés par Aristote à propos des futurs contigents et
illustrés par l'exemple de la bataille navale. Aristote ne nie pas la
"vérité-par-avance", mais il explique plutôt ce qui est erroné dans
248
l'argument nécessitariste. En outre, il ne répond pas dans le De int. IX à
l'argument de la vérité future, mais à un argument subtilement
apparenté à celui-ci. Enfin il propose une solution qui vaut non
seulement pour le problème qu'il discute, mais aussi pour d'autres
problèmes posés par l'idée de "vérité-par-avance".
Kneale, William, and Kneale, Martha. 1935. "Implication in the 4th
Century." Mind no. 44:484-495.
Michael, Frederick S. 1976. "What Is the Master Argument of
Diodorus Cronos?" American Philosophical Quarterly no. 13:229-235.
Mignucci, Mario. 1966. "L'argomento Dominatore E La Teoria
Del'implicazione in Diodoro Crono." Vichiana no. 3:3-28.
———. 1996. "Ammonius on Future Contingent Propositions." In
Rationality in Greek Thought, edited by Frede, Michael and Striker,
Gisela, 279-310. xford: Clarendon Press.
Muller, Robert. 1984. "Signification Historique Et Philosophique De
L'argument Souverain De Diodore." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne
no. 2:3-37.
Picolet, Françoise. 1977. "A Propos D'une Reconstitution Recente Du
Maître Argument De Diodore Cronus." Cahiers Fundamenta Scientiae
no. 72:1-12.
Sur Barreau (1975).
Purtill, Richard L. 1973. "The Master Argument." Apeiron no. 7:31-36.
Rescher, Nicholas. 1966. "A Version of the 'Master Argument' of
Diodorus." Journal of Philosophy no. 63:438-445.
Revised version as a Section of : Truth and Necessity in Temporal
Perspective, in: N. Rescher, Essays in Philosophical Analysis,
Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburg Press, 1969, pp. 271-302 (see note
36, p. 296).
Schuhl, Pierre-Maxime. 1960. Le Dominateur Et Les Possibles. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
Seel, Gerhard. 1982. "Diodore Domine-T-Il Aristote?" Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale no. 87:293-313.
Seel, Gerhard, Schneider, Jean-Pierre, and Schulthess, Daniel, eds.
2000. Ammonius and the Seabattle. Texts, Commentary, and Essays.
Berlin: de Gruyter.
Ammonius on Aristotle: De Interpretatione 9 (and 7,1-17).
249
Greek text established by A. Busse, reprinted from CAG IV/v. English
translation by David Blamk, revised by J.-P. Schneider and G. Seel.
Philosophical commentary by Gerhard Seel. Essays by Mario Mignucci
and Gerhard Seel.
Contents: Part I. Preliminaries 1; Part II. Gerahrd Seel: Introduction.
Future contingencies: the problem and its possible solutions 13; Part
III. Ammonius on Aristotle: De Interpretatione 9 (and 7, 1-17). Greek
text with an English translation 39; Part IV: Gerhard Seel:
Philosophical commentary 131; Part V: Essays. Gerhard Seel:
Ammonius' semantics of the assertoric sentence 213; Gerhard Seel: 'In
a definite way true'; truth values and their modalisation in Ammonius
234; Mario Mignucci: Ammonius on future contingent propositions
247; Part VI: Bibliography 285; Part VII: Index of names 307; Index of
passages cited 310-312.
Spellman, Lynne. 1980. "Di 9. An Exegetical Stalemate." Apeiron no.
14:115-124.
Sutula, John. 1976. "Diodorus and the "Master Argument"." Southern
Journal of Philosophy no. 14:323-344.
"Diodorus Cronus was a Megaric logician who was reputed to have
derived from uncontroversial premises the surprising conclusion that
the possible is that which either is or will be the case. Versions of his
lost argument have been reconstructed recently by Prior, Hintikka, and
Rescher. I analyze and compare these versions and argue that none of
them forms a sound argument."
Talanga, Josip. 1986. Zukunftsurteile Und Fatum. Eine Untersuchung
Über Aristoteles' De Interpretatione 9 Und Ciceros De Fato, Mit
Einem Uberblick Über Die Spätantiken Heimarmene-Lehren. Bonn:
Habelt.
See in particular pp. 169-185.
Vuillemin, Jules. 1979. "L'argument Dominateur." Revue de
———. 1983. "Le Chapitre Ix Du De Interpretatione D'Aristote. Vers
Une Réhabilitation De L'opinion Comme Connaissance Probable Des
Choses Contingentes." Philosophiques no. 10:15-52.
———. 1984. Nécessité Ou Contingence: L'aporie De Diodore Et Les
Systèmes Philosophiques. Paris: Éditions du Minuit.
———. 1984. "Un Système De Fatalisme Logique: Diodore Kronos."
250
Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 3:39-72.
Repris comme Chapitre III dans: J. Vuillemin, Nécessité ou
contingence. L'aporie de Diodore et les systèmes philosophiques, Paris,
Èditions de Minuit, 1984.
———. 1988. "Le Chapitre Ix Du De Interpretatione Et La
Connaissance Probable." In Aristote Aujourd'hui, edited by Sinaceur,
———. 1996. Necessity or Contingency. The Master Argument.
Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
———. 1997. "Nouvelles Réflexions Sur L'argument Dominateur: Une
Double Référence Au Temps Dans La Seconde Prémisse." Philosophie
no. 55:14-30.
"Révision de l'interprétation modale de la seconde prémisse de
l'argument dominateur d'Epictète, selon laquelle l'impossible ne suit pas
logiquement du possible, développée par l'Auteur dans son ouvrage
intitulé Nécessité ou contingence: l'aporie de Diodore et les systèmes
philosophiques (1984). L'Auteur reconstruit son analyse de l'argument
aristotélicien du De Coelo et aménage le système chrysippéen à la
lumière des principes aristotéliciens de la nécessité conditionnelle et de
la contraction synchronique de la possibilité."
Weidemann, Hermann. 1987. "Das Sogenannte Meisterargument Des
Diodoros Kronos Und Der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff." Archiv
für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 69:18-53.
———. 2008. "Aristotle. The Megarics, and Diodorus Cronus on the
Notion of Possibility." American Philosophical Quarterly no. 45:131-
148.
Wheeler, Samuel C.III. 1983. "Megarian Paradoxes as Eleatic
Arguments." American Philosophical Quarterly no. 20:287-295.
White, Michael J. 1980. "Necessity and Unactualized Possibilities in
Aristotle." Philosophical Studies no. 31:298-298.
Zeller, Eduard. 1882. "Über Den Kupieuwv Des Megarikers Diodorus."
Sitzungberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften:151-
159.
Reprinted in E. Zeller, Kleine Schriften, Band I, ed. Otto Leuze, Berlin,
Reimer, 1910, pp. 252-262.
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251
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Stoic Logic: The Dialectic from Zeno to

Chrysippus
THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
"The nature of the Stoics' philosophy of language is the most tantalizing
problem in the history of semantics. We know enough of it to say that it was
by far the most intricate and probably the most insightful theory of its kind in
antiquity and for centuries afterward; but we cannot be certain what its details
were, and even its leading principles are sometimes obscured by vague or
conflicting testimony. Those Stoics who had most to say about language
were, naturally, the logicians, and the difficulty of determining the exact
character of what they had to say stems from the fact that none of the many
works of the Stoic logicians is extant. The best surviving sources (which date
from almost five hundred years after the period of greatest development in
Stoic logic and semantics) are Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism,
Book II, and Adversus Mathematicos, Book VIII; and Diogenes Laërtius,
Book VII. Under these circumstances it is seldom possible to assign a
particular doctrine to a particular Stoic, but much of the best of their logic
and semantics is very likely to be the work of Chrysippus (c. 280–206 BCE).
Under the Stoic division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, logic
was divided into rhetoric and dialectic, and dialectic further divided into an
account of language (περί της φωςης) and an account of things signified (περί
253
των σημαινόμενων). Both these subdivisions contain material relevant to
semantics. In their account of language the Stoics distinguished vocal sound
generally, "which may include mere noise," from the sort that is articulate
(ἔςαρθρος), that is, capable of being embodied in written symbols
(ἐγγάμματος). Articulate sound, in turn, may be non-significant—for
instance, “blityri”— or significant (σημαντηή); but for any articulate sound to
be considered a sentence (λόγος) it must be significant and a product of
someone’s reason (Diogenes Laërtius 7.55–57).
Within that same branch of their dialectic the Stoics recognized five kinds of
words and distinguished their semantic or syntactic functions. They were the
first who clearly separated (1) names, such as “Socrates,” from (2)
appellatives (προσηγορίαι), such as “man.” (Cf. Aristotle’s similar but
significantly different distinction in De Interpretatione, Ch. 7.) A name
“points out a kind proper to an individual,” while an appellative “signifies a
common kind.” (3) A verb “signifies a predicate”; (4) a conjunction “binds
together the parts of a sentence”; (5) an article (possibly also what would
now be called a relative pronoun) serves to “distinguish the gender and
number of nouns” (Diogenes Laërtius 7.58). Thus the function of
conjunctions and articles is purely syntactic, the semantic function of (proper)
names is different from that of appellatives (or common names), and the
appellative and the verb—the standard ingredients of the simplest kind of
logicians’ sentence—have one and the same kind of semantic function. The
appellative occurring in a sentence signifies a subject and the verb a predicate
or “something attachable (συςτακτόν) to the one or more subjects.”
Obviously the division between the accounts of language and of things

signified was not exclusive, but the transition from the one account to the
other as the Stoics conceived of them may be seen in the claim that all we
utter (προφέρειν) is sounds, while what we express (λέγειν) is matters of
discourse (πράγματα), or lekta—“expressibles” (Diogenes Laërtius 7.57). It is
the doctrine of the lekton around which the Stoics organized their account of
things signified. In its novelty, importance, and difficulty that doctrine
overshadows all the considerable remainder of their philosophy of language."
(p. 757).
254
From: Norman Kretzmann, Semantics, History of in: Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Second edition. Edited by Borchert Donald M. New York:
Thomson Gale 2006. pp. 750-807.
THE REDISCOVERY OF STOIC LOGIC

"The first reactions to the negative appraisal of Stoic philosophy have come
not from historians or philosophers specializing in antiquity, but from
logicians being interested in the development of ancient logic.
(...)
Now in addition to what has been said in connection with the nineteenth-
century misinterpretations and misconceptions, let me quote another view
about the specific reasons for the disappreciation as well as for the
rehabilitation of Stoic logic; it is found in I. M. Bochenski's Ancient Formal
Logic (Amsterdam, 1951), and it clearly portrays the difference in attitude of
the logicians of the twentieth century towards the Stoic logical system:
Modern history of Logic had been started during the XIXth century, but
its state was very bad at that time -- indeed until 1930 approximately --
because of two phenomena. On one hand, most of the historians of logic
took for granted what Kant said on it; namely that 'formal logic was not
able to advance a single step (since Aristotle) and is thus to all
appearance a closed and complete body of doctrine'; consequently, there
was, according to them, no history of logic at all, or at the most, a
history of the decay of Aristotelian doctrines. On the other hand, authors
writing during that period were not formal logicians and by 'logic' they
mostly understood methodology, epistemology and ontology. . . . We
may place the beginning of recent research in our domain in 1896 when
Peirce made the discovery that the Megarians had the truth-value
definition of implication. (pp. 4-5)
Now whether it is Peirce to whom we owe the revival of interest in Stoic
logic or not, what certainly is the case is that, from the early decades of
the twentieth century on, given the important developments in the field
of symbolic logic, it has finally become obvious that Stoic logic differed
essentially from Aristotelian logic and should be studied on its own
255
merits. The articles and books on Stoic logic which since then have been
published, have examined in detail the Stoic contribution to the
development of a logical calculus:
J. Lukasiewicz, 'Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik', Erkenntnis, 5
(1935).
B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley, 1953).
O. Becker, Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik (Wiesbaden, 1957).
W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962).
M. Mignucci, Il significato della logica stoica (Bologna, 19672).
I. Mueller, 'Stoic and Peripatetic Logic', Archiv fur Geschichte der
Philosophie, 51 (1969), 173-87.
M. Frede, Die stoische Logik (Gottingen, 1974).
M. Frede, 'Stoic vs. Aristotelian syllogistic', Archiv fur Geschichte der
Philosophie, 56 (1974), 1-32."
From: Katerina Ierodoakonou, Introduction. The Study of Stoicism: Its
Decline and its Revival, in: K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy
- Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999 pp. 15-17
"Modern mathematical logic has taught us to distinguish within formal

logic two basic disciplines, no less different from one another than
arithmetic and geometry. These are, the logic of propositions and the
logic of terms. The difference between the two consists in the fact that in
the logic of propositions there appear, besides logical constants, only
propositional variables, while in the logic of terms term variables occur.
The simplest way of making this difference clear is to examine the Stoic and
the Peripatetic versions of the law of identity. To avoid misunderstanding let
me at once say that, so far as our sources indicate, the two laws of identity
were only incidentally formulated by the ancients, and in no way belong to
the basic principles of either logic. The Stoic law of identity reads "if the
first, then the first", and is to be found as a premiss in one of the inference-
schemata cited by Sextus Empiricus. (1) The Peripatetic law of identity is "a
belongs to all a", and is not mentioned by Aristotle, but can be inferred from
a passage in Alexander's commentary on the Prior Analytics. (2) Using
variable letters we can write the Stoic law of identity in the form "if p then
256
p"; the Peripatetic law can be recast in the form "all a is a". In the first law the
expression "if ... then" is a logical constant, and "p" a propositional variable;
only propositions such as "it is day" can be meaningfully substituted for "p".
This substitution yields a special case of the Stoic law of identity: "if it is day,
it is day". In the second law the expression "all ... is" is a logical constant, and
"a" a term variable; "a" can be meaningfully replaced only by a term, and, in
accordance with a tacit assumption of Aristotelian logic, only by a general
term at that, such as "man" Upon substitution we get a special case of the
Peripatetic law of identity: "all man is man". The Stoic law of identity is a
thesis of the logic of propositions, whereas the Peripatetic law is a thesis of
the logic of terms.
This fundamental difference between the logic of propositions and the logic
of terms was unknown to any of the older historians of logic. It explains why
there has been, up to the present day, no history of the logic of propositions,
and, consequently, no correct picture of the history of formal logic as a
whole. Indispensable as Prantl's 3) work is, even today, as a collection of
sources and material, it has scarcely any value as an historical presentation of
logical problems and theories. The history of logic must be written anew, and
by an historian who has fully mastered mathematical logic. I shall in this
short paper touch upon only three main points in the history of propositional
logic. Firstly I wish to show that the Stoic dialectic, in contrast to the
Aristotelian syllogistic, is the ancient form of propositional logic; and,
accordingly, that the hitherto wholly misunderstood and wrongly judged
accomplishments of the Stoics should be restored their due honour. Secondly
I shall try to show, by means of several examples, that the Stoic propositional
logic lived on and was further developed in medieval times, particularly in
the theory of "consequences". Thirdly I think it important to establish
something that does not seem to be commonly known even in Germany,
namely that the founder of modern propositional logic is Gottlob Frege.
(...)
The fundamental difference between Stoic and Aristotelian logic does not lie
in the fact that hypothetical and disjunctive propositions occur in Stoic
dialectic, while in Aristotelian syllogistic only categorical propositions
appear. Strictly speaking, hypothetical propositions can be found in
Aristotle's syllogistic also, for each proper Aristotelian syllogism is an
implication, and hence a hypothetical proposition. For example, "If a belongs
257
to all b and c belongs to all a, then c belongs to all b". (7) The main
difference between the two ancient systems of logic lies rather in the fact that
in the Stoic syllogisms the variables are propositional variables, while in
Aristotle's they are term variables. This crucial difference is completely
obliterated, however, if we translate the above-mentioned Stoic syllogism as
Prantl does (I, p. 473):
If the first is, the second is
But the first is
Therefore the second is.
By adding to each variable the little word "is", which occurs nowhere in the
ancient texts, Prantl, without knowing or wishing it, falsely converts Stoic
propositional logic into a logic of terms. For in Prantl's schema only terms,
not propositions, can be meaningfully substituted for "the first" and "the
second". As far as we can judge from the fragmentary state of the Stoic
dialectic that has come down to us, all Stoic inference-schemata contain,
besides logical constants, only propositional variables. Stoic logic is therefore
a logic of propositions. (8)" pp. 197-200
(1) Sextus, Adv. Math. VIII 292 (missing in Arnim): ei to poton, to
poton. Good as H. von Arnim's collection is (Stoicorum veterum
fragmenta [SVF], vol. II, Leipzig 1903), it does not begin to serve as
source material for Stoic dialectic.
(2) Alexander, In anal. pr. comm., ed. Wallies, p. 34, 1. 19.
(7) Aristotle, An. pr. II. 11. 61b34
(8) I have defended this interpretation of the Stoic dialectic since 1923; see J.
Lukasiewicz, "Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des
Aussagen-kalkuls", Comptes rendus des séances de la Société des Sciences et
des Lettres de Varsovie 23 (1930), cl. III, pp. 51-77. ["Philosophical Remarks
on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional. Logic", pp. 153-178 of this
volume.] I rejoice in having found in H. Scholz, Geschichte der Logik
(Berlin, 1931), p. 31, a supporter of this point of view.
From: Jan Lukasiewicz - On the history of the logic of proposition (1934) -
Translated in: Selected Works - Edited by Ludwik Borkowski - Amsterdam,
North-Holland, 1970 pp. 197-217 (Greek omitted)
258
"I have compiled thus many quotations on purpose, for, although they
illuminate one of the most important problems of logic, it nevertheless
appears that many of them were either unknown to the historians of
logic, or at least not sufficiently appreciated. The reason for this is in my
opinion that the history of logic has thus far been treated by
philosophers with insufficient training in logic. The older authors cannot
be blamed for this, as a scientific logic has existed only for a few
decades. The history of logic must be written anew, and by an historian
who has a thorough command of modern mathematical logic. Valuable
as Prantl's work is as a compilation of sources and materials, from a
logical point of view it is practically worthless. To give only one
illustration of this, Prantl, as well as all the later authors who have
written about the logic of the Stoa, such as Zeller and Brochard, have
entirely misunderstood this logic. For anybody familiar with
mathematical logic it is self-evident that the Stoic dialectic is the ancient
form of modern propositional logic. (26)
Propositional logic, which contains only propositional variables, is as distinct
from the Aristotelian syllogistic, which operates only with name variables, as
arithmetic is from geometry. The Stoic dialectic is not a development or
supplementation of Aristotelian logic, but an achievement of equal rank with
that of Aristotle. In view of this it seems only fair to demand of an historian
of logic that he know something about logic. Nowadays it does not suffice to
be merely a philosopher in order to voice one's opinion on logic.
(26) I have already expressed this idea, in 1923, in a paper read to the
first congress of Polish philosophers in Lwow. A short summary of it
appeared in Przeglqd Filozoficzny 30 (1927), p. 278. [Lukasiewicz
develops his historical analysis of Stoic logic in his article "On the
History of the Logic of Propositions" (pp. 197-217 of this book).]" p.
178
From: Jan Lukasiewicz, Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of
Propositional Calculus (1930) - Translated in: Selected Works - Edited by
Ludwik Borkowski, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1970 pp. 153-178
"In the first comprehensive history of western logic Prantl (1) described
259
Stoic logic as "dull," "trivial," and "pedantic." Prantl's dismissal of Stoic
logic was accepted by most interpreters of Stoicism for three quarters of
a century. However, since the publication of Lukasiewicz's article, "On
the History of the Logic of Propositions" in 1934, (2) Prantl's evaluation
has been largely abandoned. Bochenski's remark, "The development of
formal logic in antiquity reached its peak in the works of the thinkers
belonging to the Megaric and Stoic Schools," exemplifies well the
radical rehabilitation of the Stoics as logicians. (3) The cause of this
rehabilitation is not the discovery of new texts, but rather the twentieth-
century revolution in the subject of logic itself. Lukasiewicz and others,
working with a full understanding of modern logic, have succeeded in
retrieving from the ancient texts a Stoic logical theory of startling
originality which rivals the achievement of Aristotle, the founder of
logic. The failure of Prantl and his successors to accomplish this
retrieval stems not from their obtuseness or stupidity but from the fact
that the background scientific knowledge needed to understand the Stoic
achievement was not available to them.
A factor contributing to Prantl's low opinion of Stoic logic was the character
of the ancient texts themselves. There are no primary sources for Stoic logic
analogous to Aristotle's Prior Analytics, and the ancient secondary sources
are brief and usually hostile in their treatment of the subject. In many cases
Prantl's evaluations simply repeat or develop remarks in the sources
themselves. The unsatisfactoriness of the sources (on this see Mates, Stoic
Logic 8-10) makes any but a tentative reconstruction of Stoic logic
impossible. Unless an indication is given to the contrary, what I describe will
be the most certain features of the theory.
One of the uncertain features is chronology. The history of Stoicism proper
covers five centuries during which the logical theory, like other doctrines of
the school, underwent modification and development. In the case of logic we
know of some disagreements within the school and some ideas that can be
ascribed to individuals, but most of our sources refer simply to "the Stoics,"
as if there were a single, unambiguous Stoic logical theory. Commentators
have tended to assign the major Stoic achievements in logic to Chrysippus (c.
280 B.C .- c. 206 B.C.), the third leader of the Stoa, of whom it was said, "If
there were a dialectic among the gods, it would be none other than the
Chrysippean one." (Diogenes Laertius 7.180. At 7.198 Diogenes mentions
260
that Chrysippus wrote 311 books on logical matters.) In general I shall not
attempt to assign logical doctrines to specific persons, but simply speak of
"Stoic logic." Occasionally, however, it will be necessary to refer to possible
disagreements within the school." pp. 1-2
(1) C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leizig, 1855) 408. I
have generally given at most one ancient source for a doctrine. More
information about sources can be found by consulting B. Mates, Stoic
Logic (2nd ed.) or M. Frede, Die Stoische Logik.
(2) Reprinted in J. Lukasiewicz, Selected Works, ed. L. Borkowski
(3) I. M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic (Amsterdam, 1951) 77.
From: Ian Mueller, An Introduction to Stoic Logic. In The Stoics. Edited by
John M. Rist, Berkeley: University of California Press 1978. pp. 1-26
"Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school of philosophy, is said to have

been influenced primarily by two of the Socratic schools, the Cynics and
the Megarians. (*) From the Cynics, according to the usual account, he
took his moral teaching; from the Megarians, his logic. In view of our
present subject, we shall omit all discussion of the Cynics and devote
our attention to the Megarians.
The Megarian school was founded by Euclid, a follower of Socrates and a
somewhat older contemporary of Plato. (See fig. 1.)
Among the pupils of Euclid were: Eubulides, a famous logician to whom the
antinomy of The Liar is sometimes ascribed; Ichthyas, the successor of
Euclid as head of the school; and Thrasymachus of Corinth, who is known
primarily as the teacher of Stilpo. Stilpo, a contemporary of Aristotle,
enjoyed a great reputation as a lecturer. He is supposed to have been
somewhat influenced by the Cynics. His most famous pupil was Zeno,
261
founder of Stoicism. Another important branch of the Megarian school
consisted of Eubulides, Apollonius Cronus, Diodorus Cronus, and Philo, in
that order. The latter two are very important in connection with Stoic logic,
mainly for their views on the truth-conditions of conditionals.
Diodorus, a native of lasus in Caria, lived at the court of Alexandria in the
reign of Ptolemy Soter. His surname or nickname "Cronus" ("old fool") is
variously explained. According to one story, it was given to him by Ptolemy
on account of his inability to solve a problem of logic put forth by Stilpo at a
royal banquet. In fact, Diodorus is said to have taken his defeat so much to
heart that he went home, wrote a treatise on the subject, and died in despair.
According to another account, Diodorus took the surname from his teacher,
Apollonius Cronus. At any rate, Diodorus was certainly not regarded as an
old fool in antiquity. On the contrary, he was so celebrated for his dialectical
skill that he was called "the logician" and "most logical one". This epithet
gradually became a surname, and was even applied to his five daughters, who
were also distinguished as logicians.
Little is known of the philosophy of Diodorus save two important definitions
(and examples illustrating these): (1) a proposition is possible if and only if it
either is true or will be true; (2) a conditional proposition is true if and only if
it neither is nor was possible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent
false. It is known that he constructed the famous "Master" argument
(kurieuon logos) to justify his definition of "possible." It is also known that
he entered into a controversy with his pupil Philo over the truth-conditions
for hypothetical propositions; this controversy was perpetuated and enlarged
within the Stoic school.(**)
Philo of Megara, the pupil of Diodorus, was also very famous as a logician.
Almost nothing is reported of his life except that he was a friend of Zeno.
Chrysippus later wrote treatises against both him and his master. Philo
disagreed with Diodorus concerning the nature of possibility and especially
concerning the criterion for the truth of conditional propositions. Regarding
the first, he thought (as against Diodorus) that a piece of wood at the bottom
of the sea should be considered combustible even if it will never be burned.
In regard to conditionals, he gave exactly the modern truth-table definition: a
conditional is false if it has a true antecedent and a false consequent; in the
other three cases it is true.
Zeno himself apparently lived ca. 350-260 B.C., but the dates are very
262
uncertain. Like all the other major Stoic philosophers before the Christian
era, he was not a native of Greece proper. (His birthplace was at Citium, in
Rhodes.) Few facts are known about him, but where the facts leave off,
legend begins. It is said that he was greatly respected for his personal
characteristics dignity, modesty, sincerity, affability. Presumably because of a
life of moderation, he lived to the ripe old age of ninety-eight, and, as the
story has it, he died in the following way. As he was leaving the school one
day, he stumbled and broke his toe. Beating his hand upon the ground, he
addressed himself to the gods: "I'm coming of my own accord. Why then do
you bother to call me?" Then he perished by holding his breath.
Also according to the legends, Zeno devoted much thought and energy to
proposed reforms in language. This aroused ire in certain quarters, and it was
pointed out that he was proposing to reform a language which he himself
could hardly speak. As he was fond of coining new words, much of the
technical vocabulary of Stoic logic may well be attributed to him. It was said
that he used new terms in order to conceal his plagiarism of the views of his
predecessors; Cicero repeats this charge at least fourteen times. His writings,
which were not numerous and were written in a very poor style, have been
lost (excepting, of course, a few fragments).
The second head of the Stoic school was Cleanthes, known throughout
antiquity as a man of strong character, great energy, and weak intellect.
According to one story, he was a prize fighter who came to Athens with four
drachmas in his pocket and entered the school of Zeno. He accepted Zeno's
teaching in every detail and passed it on unchanged. At the age of ninety-nine
or so, he died by starving himself to death.
Cleanthes was succeeded by Chrysippus, often said to have been the greatest
logician of ancient times. Chrysippus was regarded as the second founder of
Stoicism; according to an old saying, "If there had been no Chrysippus, there
would have been no Stoa." He was born in 280 B.C. in Cilicia; the date of his
death may be conjectured as 205 B.C. Without doubt, he was the best student
his Stoic professors ever had. While in training, he thought of so many
skeptical arguments against Stoicism that he was accused by the later Stoics
of supplying Carneades with ammunition for attacking them. Chrysippus
wrote 750 books, if the list given by Diogenes can be trusted. Of these we
possess only the titles and a small number of fragments. But the titles alone
show that he wrote on almost every important aspect of propositional logic.
263
There are many ancient complaints that Chrysippus' books were dry and
repetitious, and written in a very poor style. Yet they were widely read. He
did not, like Cleanthes, merely repeat the words of his predecessors; there is a
story that when he was a student of logic he wrote to Cleanthes, "Just send
me the theorems. I'll find the proofs for myself."
It seems likely that Chrysippus was responsible for the final organization of
Stoic logic into a calculus. When the five basic undemonstrated argument-
types are cited, the name of Chrysippus is usually mentioned; in one place it
is expressly stated that Chrysippus restricted the number of these types to
five."
(*) For the following account I am indebted to Zeller, Die Philosophie
der Griechen, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 244 ff., and vol. 3, part 1, pp. 27-49;
William Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and
Mythology (Boston, Little, Brown, 1849), 3 vols.
(**) The views of Diodorus will be discussed fully in the sequel, pp. 36-40,
44-51. Cf. my article, "Diodorean Implication."
From: Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, Berkeley, University of California Press
1953, pp. 5-7
SUMMARY OF BENSON MATES, STOIC LOGIC

(1953)
Chapter I. Introduction: "The aim of this study is to present a true description

of the logic of the Old Stoa. It repeats most of Lukasiewicz's published
conclusions on the subject and offers additional evidence for them. It also (1)
describes the Stoic semantical theory and compares it with certain similar
modern theories, (2) attempts to give a better account of the heretofore
misunderstood Diodorean implication, (3) points out the Stoic version of the
conditionalization principle, and (4) discusses the contention of the Stoics
that their propositional logic was complete. In appendices it offers and
justifies new translations of some important fragments pertaining to Stoic
logic. The Stoic authors in whose work we shall be interested primarily are
Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. Closely associated with them were
Diodorus Cronus and Philo, of the Megarian school. Since the writings of
264
these men have been lost, and since our sources usually do not distinguish
between the views of the various Stoics, we are forced to treat the entire Old
Stoa as a unit. This, of course, creates many difficulties. The best of our
sources are Sextus Empiricus and Diocles Magnes (apud Diogenes Laertius).
We also derive bits of information from Cicero, Gellius, Galen, Boethius,
Apuleius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius, Philoponus, Origen,
Proclus, Stobaeus, Epictetus, Seneca, and a few others. Of these, only
Epictetus and Seneca were favorably inclined toward Stoicism, and they,
unfortunately, restricted their attention almost entirely to ethics. It is thus
remarkable that the fragments of Stoic logic, transmitted by unsympathetic
hands, are as clear and consistent as they are." p. 1
Chapter II. Signs, sense, and denotation: "The Chapter is divided into two
sections. The first contains an account of the Stoic distinction between the
sign, the significate (called the "Lekton"), and the physical object to which
the sign refers. Various types of signs and their corresponding Lekta are
described in detail. In the second section the Stoic theory is compared with
the modern theories of Frege and Carnap and is shown to bear marked
resemblance to them, particularly in regard to what Carnap calls the
"intension" of linguistic expressions. Numerous dissimilarities are also
indicated, the most important of which are: (1) the Stoics restricted the
denotation of expressions to bodies; (2) the Stoics did not take truth-values as
the denotations of sentences." p. 11
Chapter III. Propositions, truth, and necessity: "This Chapter is divided into
three sections. The first defines and classifies propositions and discusses their
fundamental properties. A proposition is said to be "a complete Lekton
assertoric in itself." Its most basic property is that of being true or false and
not both. Propositions are classified as atomic and molecular; each of these
classes in turn is divided into several subclasses. The absence from Stoic
logic of examples beginning with "all" is noted. In the second section, the
many Stoic usages of the words "truth" and "true" are taken up seriatim. All
these usages are definable in terms of the usage referring to propositions. The
third section deals with Stoic notions of necessity and possibility, as found in
the fragments of certain (Megarian) philosophers to whom the notions were
originally due. It is shown that a reference to time plays a very important role
in Diodorus' view of possibility. (This is closely connected with his position
in the controversy over implication, to be discussed in chap. IV.) A brief
265
account of what is known of the famous "Master" argument of Diodorus is
included, together with a few remarks on the views of Philo and Chrysippus
regarding possibility." p. 27
Chapter IV. Propositional connectives: "The Stoics gave truth-functional
definitions of all the more important propositional connectives, and defined
also some non-truth-functional connectives. These definitions, and the
various controversies over them, form the subject matter of the present
chapter. The first section, on implication, contains an account of the four-
sided argument over the truth-conditions for hypothetical propositions. It is
shown that Philo's type of implication was exactly the same as the modern
"material implication." Diodorean implication is defined and distinguished
from Chrysippean implication, which is the ancient equivalent of what is now
called "strict implication." The connection between Diodorus' views on
implication and on necessity is shown. In. the second section we are
concerned with disjunction. The Stoics distinguished between inclusive and
exclusive disjunction, gave truth-functional definitions of both types and also
a non-truth-functional definition of the latter type. The third section considers
conjunction, along with several other connectives. In the fourth section, we
see how implication was defined in terms of conjunction and negation; also,
how exclusive disjunction was defined in terms of negation and equivalence.
Certain. difficulties in the evidence for these definitions are pointed out." p.
42
Chapter V. Arguments: "This Chapter consists of five sections. In the first,
"argument" is defined as "a system of propositions composed of premises and
a conclusion." A valid argument, according to the Stoics, is an argument such
that the negation of its conclusion is incompatible with the conjunction of its
premises. A true argument is a valid argument which has true premises, and a
demonstration is a special kind of true argument. Another subclass of the
valid arguments contains the so-called "undemonstrated" arguments; of these,
five types were called "simple" and the innumerable others were called "non-
simple," or "derived." To achieve generality in their discussions of
propositional logic the Stoics made use of inference-schemas containing the
numerals "first," "second," and so on as propositional variables. The second
section contains an exposition of the five basic undemonstrated argument-
types, as they are described in some twelve sources. The third section
discusses an important Stoic principle which is closely related to the so-called
266
"deduction theorem." In the fourth section is an account of the Stoic method
of deriving non-simple undemonstrated arguments from simple ones;
examples are considered in detail. Note is taken of the assertion of the Stoics
that their propositional logic was complete. The fifth section describes the
Stoic classification of invalid arguments and also considers briefly the
famous paradox of The Liar, which was the subject of much Stoic writing.
The classification is found to be poor, but the Stoic version of The Liar is
stronger than the usual Epimenides paradox." p. 58
Chapter VI. Evaluations of Stoic logic: "In this concluding chapter we
consider the traditional evaluations of Stoic logic, together with some of the
confusions upon which they are based. The first section concerns some
typical adverse criticisms by Prantl and Zeller. Unfortunately, these cannot be
challenged by attacking the relevance or accuracy of the evidence for them,
since there is no evidence for them. But it is apparent that Prantl and Zeller
did not understand Stoic logic. The second section discusses the great
confusion which exists in regard to the meaning of the technical term
sunemménon. Third, there is a short conclusion." p. 86
Appendix A. Translations: "This Appendix consists of translations of some
of the fragments which comprise our sources for Stoic logic. I have included
only the fragments upon which relatively important sections of this study
rest, and, of these, only passages which have not already been adequately
translated into English." p. 95
Appendix B. Glossary: "This Glossary is not intended to be a complete
list of the technical terms in Stoic logic. It includes only terms that
appear in a sufficient number of contexts to establish their technical
usage. Further, only a few of the more important occurrences of each
term are cited. Usually these will include a definition or at least a
passage of relatively clear meaning. Other glossaries of Stoic
terminology are as follows:
R. G. Bury, Sextus Empiricus, volume 3. This glossary is almost worthless in
regard to logical terminology.
I. M. Bochefiski, Elementa Logicae Graecae, pp. 99 ff. (Greek-Latin). Good.
J. W. Stakelum, Galen and the Logic of Propositions, pp. 92-93 (Greek-
English). Good.
See also the Index Verborum in volume 4 of Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta.
267
Most of the Aristotelian commentators are well indexed, but unfortunately
the indices for Sextus are very incomplete, and there are none for Diogenes
Laertius." 132
SOURCES FOR STOIC LOGIC

"Except for a few fragments, all the writings of the earlier Stoics have been
lost. We must therefore depend on secondary sources. But that is only half of
the difficulty. Since none of the later Stoics had much to say about logic, we
are in the very unsatisfactory position of having to depend on the accounts of
men who were without exception opponents of the Stoics. In view of this, it
is all the more remarkable that Stoic logic makes as excellent a showing as it
does. Perhaps the saving circumstance was that the essentials of Stoic logic
were brought together in handbooks not long after the time of Chrysippus.
Such handbooks were commonly entitled "Introduction to Logic" (eisagogé
dialektiké), and evidently had a very wide circulation. Whatever accuracy and
sense remain in the bits of Stoic logic which have filtered down to us
probably derive from the fact that our sources made use of the handbooks.
The difficulties created by the loss of the Stoic writings are even greater than
might at first appear. Since our sources do not distinguish between the views
of the various Stoics but rather tend to ascribe the sayings of any of them to
all of them, we must treat the school as a whole, even though we know that
this procedure will lead to apparent inconsistencies. Also, it is obvious that
technical writings such as those on logic suffer from being reported at second
hand; of all our sources, Sextus is the only one who seems to have had some
understanding of the theory he was reporting. Another serious difficulty
arises from the fact that our best sources are at least four hundred years later
than Chrysippus. By this time the mixture and confusion of Stoic logic with
that of Aristotle were well under way, producing strange conglomerates like
that found in Galen's Institutio Logica. Since we do not possess the
information necessary for disentangling the two doctrines, we can only make
the best of it.
Far and away our most important source for Stoic logic is Sextus Empiricus,
a Greek physician and Skeptic, who lived in the first half of the third century
of the Christian era. Almost nothing is known of his life. Two of his works
268
are extant, the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in three books, and Against the
Mathematicians, in eleven books. Most of his discussion of Stoic logic is to
be found in Book II of the Outlines and Book VIII of Against the
Mathematicians; the accounts given in these two places are often identical.
Sextus is our only intelligent source. But even with him there is a fly in the
ointment: he quotes the Stoics only to refute them. We may expect, therefore,
that any parts of Stoic logic which he found either too difficult or too good to
refute will be absent from his account. Also, he emphasized those matters on
which Stoic opinions differed, with the result that we get no clear statement
of the logical doctrine of any one man.
The next best picture of Stoic logic is that given by Diogenes Laertius, author
of Lives of Eminent Philosophers. There is no information whatever on his
own life, but since Sextus and Saturninus are the latest writers he quotes, it is
sometimes guessed that he lived in the third century of the Christian era. As
is well known, Diogenes is wholly unreliable on many subjects. It is therefore
fortunate for us that in writing his life of Zeno (Book VII) Diogenes had
recourse to a book written by Diodes Magnes, a scholar of the first century
B.C., who seems to have had a fair knowledge of Stoic logic. The most
serious deficiency of Diogenes' account is its extreme brevity; what there is
of it is as excellent as anything to be found in Sextus.
All our other sources for Stoic logic are relatively unsatisfactory. Scattered
references to the Stoa will be found throughout the twenty volumes of
Galen's works,(8) but discussions of any extent are rare. The little treatise
called Historia Philosopha contains the remains of a good account of the five
basic undemonstrated argument-types. However, it has been necessary for
editors to reconstruct the text on the analogy of corresponding passages in
Sextus; consequently it has little independent value. There is also the
handbook, Institutio Logica, ascribed to Galen by the manuscripts. Prantl has
vehemently challenged its authenticity; Kalbfleisch has "proved" it genuine
with equal vigor.(9) In any case, the treatise is of considerable interest to
historians of logic. Although it is a mixture of Aristotelian and Stoic logic, its
account of the five basic types of argument is clear and agrees exactly with
our other information. Its criticism of these, however, is typically Peripatetic
and typically confused. The treatise contains a few further hints about the
views of the Stoics, but nothing else of value for our purpose.
Other scraps of information are to be found in the writings of Cicero, Gellius,
269
and the many Aristotelian commentators.(10) Most of these scraps fit
consistently into the picture, but they are too brief to be of much help.
The work of the later Aristotelian commentators reveals extreme confusion
between Stoic and Aristotelian logic, and hence is of very little use as a
source.
All our sources have one characteristic in common: the more interesting the
logic becomes, the more corrupt the text becomes. Because of the technical
terminology and the very unusual sentences with which the Stoics sometimes
illustrated their points, the origin of these textual difficulties is
understandable -- but the difficulties remain. Especially is this noticeable in
Galen's Institutio Logica, where occasionally the whole thread of argument is
lost.
In view of all these difficulties, the reader may well wonder whether there is
enough evidence to justify the attempt to give a complete account of Stoic
logic. He may answer this question for himself by reading the following
chapters and, if he is interested, by checking the exposition against the Stoic
passages which are cited. He will find that no effort has been made to conceal
or minimize evidence contrary to the various theses proposed; the price
exacted by this procedure is that the account is not always as simple and clear
as one might desire."
(8) The best exegetical study of the logic of Galen is by Stakelum,
Galen and the Logic of Propositions [1940]. See especially the
summary, pp. 90-91. [cited below]
(9) Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, [1855] pp. 591-610;
Kalbfieisch, "Ueber Galens Einleitung in die Logik," [1897] pp. 681-708.
(10) The relevant writings of these authors are listed in the Bibliography. An
excellent critical discussion of Apuleius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Sextus,
Diogenes Laertius, Themistius, Boethius, Ammonius, Simplicius, and
Philoponus as sources of information about ancient logic may be found in
Bochenski, La Logique de Théophraste, [1947] chap. I.
From: Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, Berkeley, University of California Press
1953, pp. 8/10
"Conclusion.
270
It is evident from the Introduction to Dialectic that Galen was perfectly
familiar with Stoic formal logic. It is equally evident that he was not a Stoic.
Because he began his studies in the Stoic school, his terminology was Stoic,
and the powerful Stoic influence of his period confirmed him in Stoic usage.
His strong formalistic tendency also manifests his Stoic training. His later
profession of Aristotelianism, however, becomes certain in his Peripatetic
interpretation of Stoic propositions.
Galen presents exactly the forms of Stoic compound propositions, which he
calls "hypothetical"; but his explanation are not Stoical, because he follows
the Peripatetic practice of examining the matter of the propositions; instead of
the Stoic custom of considering only the conjunctions. To the traditional
Chrysippian propositions he adds the disjunctive and the not-excluding
alternative propositions. His Introduction is also one of the earliest sources
for the doctrine on equivalence and conversion of compound propositions.
Although his interpretation of Stoic propositions is not strictly formal,
Galen's presentation of the hypothetical syllogisms is in accord with the most
rigid Stoic formalism. He clearly explains the unfamiliar Stoic terminology
pertinent to syllogisms, and he accepts four of the five traditional
indemonstrable formulae. These he supplements with the disjunctive and the
not-excIuding alternative syllogisms. He completes the treatment of the Stoic
syllogism with his extraordinary doctrine on the conversion of hypothetical
syllogisms.
Galen's teaching on the logic of propositions is a complete record of the state
of Stoic logic in the second century. He not only summarizes the doctrine of
the centuries immediately preceding but indicates the direction actually
followed by subsequent logicians. His tendency to interpret Stoic Logic
according to Peripatetic principles finds its culmination in classical logic. As
this tendency so to interpret Stoic logic became more and more pronounced,
the logic of the Stoa declined more and more until, having eventually lost its
distinctiveness as a branch of dialectics, it was completely absorbed into
Peripatetic logic. He proves himself beyond all doubt an independent thinker
and not a mere compiler, for the logic of propositions comes from his hands
colored by the touch of his originality. The study of this elementary logical
treatise makes us strongly desire to know some of more extensive works of
Galen, the great logician, who has given us The Introduction to Dialectic."
271
From: James W. Stakelum, Galen and the Logic of Propositions, Romae,
Angelicum, 1940, pp. 90-91
ANCIENT THEORIES OF MEANING

"There were three ancient theories of meaning:
(1) According to the Peripatetics, words mean thoughts, and thoughts stand
for things.
(2) According to the Epicureans, words directly mean things.
(3) According to the Stoics, words mean sayables, (1) and sayables stand for
things.
The Stoics agree with the Peripatetics and disagree with the Epicureans in
maintaining that a semantic theory must be three-tiered. The Stoics disagree
with the Peripatetics insofar as the intermediate items in their three-tiered
theory are sayables and not thoughts.
Thus far, mere caricature: each of the theories I have sketched requires
further elucidation; and each of the sketches would be regarded as wildly
inaccurate by some scholars. I shall not attempt to replace the caricatures by
professional portraits; rather, I want to address one particular problem which
the caricatures raise. If the Peripatetic and Stoic theories differ insofar as
thoughts differ from sayables, then -- we may well wonder -- what exactly is
the difference between sayables and thoughts, and how is Stoic saying related
to Stoic thinking?
Several scholars, both ancient and modern, have denied that there is any
substantive difference between the Peripatetic and the Stoic theories of
meaning on the grounds that sayables are simply thoughts under a different
name. Thus according to Simplicius, some people held that
the argument in the Categories is about thoughts (peri noematon); for
Aristotle plainly says that it is about things which are said (peri ton
legomenon), and things which are said, or sayables, are thoughts, as the
Stoics too held. (in Cat. 10.2-4 = FDS 703) (2)
More recently it has been maintained that a sayable is "that which is
merely an expressed thought"; for sayables "exist only insofar as they
are thought and expressed in words. As ideas in the mind ... the lekta ...
272
should be interpreted ... as something ... akin to the ideas of, for
instance, classical British empiricism -- as a kind of mental images
which precede and accompany our words and give them meaning" (3)
A weaker thesis has also found favour: sayables are not to be identified with
thoughts, but they are logically dependent upon the activity of thinking. For
"every species of lekton requires the utterance of some expressible object
present to the mind. Does this entail thatlekta only persist as long as the
sentences which express them? ... there is no evidence to show that lekta, as
distinct from the speaker and his reference, persist outside acts of thought and
communication". (4)
These theses about sayables and thoughts are not mere conjectures. For there
are several ancient texts which associate sayables with thoughts, and these
texts have been taken to support either the strong view that sayables actually
are thoughts or the weaker view that sayables are parasitic upon thoughts.
The issues are complicated, both from a philosophical and from an exegetical
point of view. I shall first make a few abstract remarks; then look at the
Peripatetic theory of meaning; and finally turn to the texts which associate
thoughts with sayables." pp. 47-48
(1) I use the unlovely word "sayable" for the Greek lekton. I take it that
lekta stand to saying as thoughts stand to thinking; but no decent English
word stands to "say" as "thought" stands to "think".
(2) Note that Simplicius does not subscribe to this view of lekta (pace Long
[1971] 80): he ascribes it to unnamed interpreters of Aristotle's Categories,
and at e.g. in Cat. 397.10-12 he implicitly distinguisheslekta from
dianoemata.
(3) Nuchelmans (1973) 52, 55.
(4) Long (1971) 97,98.
From: Jonathan Barnes, Meaning, saying and thinking. In Dialektiker und
Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer. Edited by Klaus Döring and
Theodor Ebert, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner 1993 pp. 47-61
THE STOIC CLASSIFICATIONS OF ARGUMENTS

"In Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism (6) one finds the following
273
Stoic definitions of the expressions 'premises', 'conclusion', and 'argument'
(i) 'premises': the propositions assumed for the establishment of the
conclusion,
(ii) 'conclusion': the proposition which is established by the premises (7),
(iii) 'argument': a whole composed of premises and a conclusion.
In terms of these definitions the questions I shall be attempting to answer are:
for the Stoics what are the conditions under which the premises in an
argument logically imply its conclusion? And, if the premises of an argument
in fact imply its conclusion but not evidently so, how according to the Stoics
may this relation of logical consequence be made evident? Before dealing
with these questions, however, I present several classifications of Stoic
arguments (see the outline of these classifications below).
The first division of the first classification of arguments is into valid and
invalid arguments. An argument is valid "when the conditional having as its
antecedent the conjunction formed from the premises of the argument and as
its consequent the conclusion of the argument is true" (P.H. ii.137). An
example of a valid argument is
(1) If it is day, it is light. It is day.
Therefore it is light.
Arguments which do not satisfy this condition are invalid.
Next valid arguments are divided into those which are true and those which
are not true. A true valid argument is one of which both the conclusion and
the premises are true (P.H. ii.138). An example of a true valid argument is (1)
above when set forth during the day. Arguments which do not satisfy this
condition are not true. An example of a not-true argument is the following
when made during the day:
(2) If it is night, it is dark.
It is night.
Therefore it is dark.
Of true valid arguments some are demonstrative and some are not
demonstrative. Demonstrative arguments are "those which conclude
something non-evident through pre-evident premises".(8) An example of a
demonstrative true valid argument, preserved by Sextus (P.H. ii.140), is
(3) If sweat flows through the surface of the skin, there exist imperceptible
pores.
Sweat flows through the surface of the skin.
274
Therefore there exist imperceptible pores.
An argument not satisfying this condition is not demonstrative. Argument (1)
is an example of an argument which is valid, true when set forth during the
day, and not demonstrative. It will be shown subsequently that there was
another kind of argument called undemonstrated, which provides an
additional important category of arguments. It is not to be confused with a
not-demonstrative argument.
Of demonstrative true valid arguments "some lead us through the premises to
the conclusion ephodeutikos only" (P.H. ii.141). I am not sure precisely what
'ephodeutikos' means. Etymologically the word suggests 'advancing over a
path towards something' and when the expression attaches to the word
'argument' a reasonable candidate for the 'something' would be the conclusion
of the argument. But 'advancing over a path towards a conclusion' is a
metaphorical description of arguments generally and it fails to bring out what
is peculiar to the type of argument to which the label is here attached. I
simply transliterate the expression. A kind of this type argument is said to be
one which "depends upon belief and memory". One might well ask, 'What
kind of argument doesn't?' An example of an argument which depends on
belief and memory is
(4) If someone said to you that this man would be wealthy, this man will be
wealthy.
This god said to you that this man would be wealthy. Therefore this man will
be wealthy.
Sextus' comment on this argument is that we "assent to the conclusion not so
much on account of the necessity of the premises as because we believe the
assertion of the god" (P.H. ii.141-142).
275
Contrasted with this type argument are those which "lead us to the
conclusion not only ephodeutikeis but also by way of discovery" (P.H.
ii.142). An example of such an argument is (3). The element of
discovery in this argument is the disclosure of the existence of pores
through the fact that sweat flows through the surface of the skin. The
element of belief in the argument, apparently sufficient to provide the
ephodeutikeis component, is the "prior assumption that moisture cannot
flow through a solid body" (P.H. ii.142).
The components of a 'demonstration' may be derived from one component of
each division in this first classification, for a demonstration is a valid and true
argument having a non-evident conclusion and disclosing that conclusion by
the power of the premises (P.H. ii.143). I am uncertain as to the point of the
last clause in Sextus' report. It appears to imply that the conclusion is
obtained without the aid of assumptions external to the premises of the
argument, although this would involve the existence of a class of
demonstrative arguments different from those which are ephodeutikeis.
A second Stoic classification of arguments is also reported by Sextus, and it,
276
too, ought to be kept in mind when thinking about deduction in Stoic logic.
This classification begins from a division of arguments into demonstrated and
undemonstrated. I take a demonstrated argument in this context to be one
whose validity has been made evident. I say more subsequently about how
the validity of arguments is made evident. An argument is undemonstrated in
one of two senses. The first sense is the contradictory of that of
'demonstrated'. In this sense, then, an argument is undemonstrated if it has
not been demonstrated (Adv. Math. viii.223), i.e., on my interpretation, if it
has not been shown to be valid. In a second sense an argument is
undemonstrated if it is immediately evident that it is valid (ibid.). This
distinction may be brought out by noticing that the first sense is temporal
inasmuch as an argument which is undemonstrated in that sense in 100 B.C.
may be demonstrated in 50 B.C., while the second sense is non-temporal.(9)
An argument is undemonstrated in this second sense if it exhibits one of five
forms of argument which are referred to respectively as the first
undemonstrated, the second undemonstrated, etc. These forms are also called
inference schemata, and I have more to say about them below. For now I
merely give the forms with illustrative examples (Gould The Philosophy of
Chrysippus, pp. 83-85):
The first undemonstrated
(5) If the first, the second.
The first.
Therefore the second.
If it is day, there is light.
It is day.
Therefore there is light.
The second undemonstrated
(6) If the first, the second.
Not the second.
Therefore not the first.
If it is day, there is light.
There is not light.
Therefore it is not day.
The third undemonstrated
277
(7) Not both the first and the second.
The first.
Therefore not the second.
Not both it is day and it is night.
It is day.
Therefore it is not night.
The fourth undemonstrated
(8) Either the first or the second.
The first.
Therefore not the second.
Either it is day or it is night.
It is day.
Therefore it is not night.
The fifth undemonstrated
(9) Either the first or the second.
Not the first.
Therefore the second.
Either it is day or it is night.
It is not day.
Therefore it is night.
A third classification divides valid arguments first into simple and non-
simple (Adv. Math. viii.228). A simple valid argument is one having the
form of one of the five undemonstrated argument forms. A non-simple
valid argument is one 'woven together' out of simple valid arguments in
order that it may be known to be 'valid' (Adv. Math. viii.229). There are
two kinds of non-simple arguments, one formed from two or more
simple arguments all of the same form, and the other composed from
two or more simple arguments not of the same form. The former is a
homogeneous non-simple and the latter, a heterogeneous non-simple
argument (ibid.). An example of a homogeneous non-simple argument is
(10) If it is day, then if it is day it is light.
It is day.
278
Therefore it is light.
For upon analysis it may be seen to have been compounded from two simple
arguments having the form of the first undemonstrated. Analysis of this
argument is carried out in accordance with the following 'dialectical theorem'
:
(11) Whenever we have premises from which a certain conclusion can be
validly deduced, potentially we have also that conclusion among the
premises, even if it is not stated explicitly.(10)
One analyzes (10) by drawing the conclusion from the first two premises in
accordance with the first undemonstrated inference schema, thus getting
It is day.
Therefore if it is day, it is light.
Then by the theorem stated in (11) one gets as premises
It is day.
If it is day, it is light.
And by another application of the first inference schema one gets the
conclusion in (10)." pp. 152-157
(6) ii.135-136. This work will be referred to in the remainder of the
paper as P.H.
(7) Thomas has rightly pointed out that the intent here must have been
something like "the proposition which is allegedly established by the
premises". Otherwise every conclusion would be the conclusion of a valid
argument.
(8) P.H. ii.140. Sextus reports (P.H. ii.97-98) that the 'dogmatists'
distinguished three kinds of non-evident objects. Some are absolutely non-
evident; these are those which are not of the sort to fall under our
apprehension, e.g., that the stars are even in number. Some are on occasion
non-evident; these are of a sort to be evident but are made non-evident on
occasion by external circumstances, e.g., as a city in which I am not present
now is to me. Finally, some are naturally non-evident; these are naturally
incapable of falling under our clear apprehension, e.g., that there are
imperceptible pores.
(9) I am indebted to John Corcoran for having suggested to me this feature of
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the distinction.
(10) Adv. Math. viii.231. I discuss this theorem below (p. 18) in conjunction
with other Stoic rules of inference.
From: Joseph Gould, Deduction in Stoic Logic, in: Ancient logic and its
modern interpretations. Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist
Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972. Edited by Corcoran
John. Dordrecht: Reidel 1974. pp. 151-168
280
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THE PLACE OF THE DOCTRINE OF LEKTA IN
THE STOIC DIALECTIC
SVF = Hans von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Lipsia 1903-1905
(the standard collection of the Fragments of ancient Stoics).
"In moving from the theory of knowledge to the other topics which the Stoics
include within the third branch of their philosophy, it must be noted that they
draw a sharp distinction between logic and language. All the remaining topics
can be grouped either on one side of this distinction or the other. The Stoics
define language as utterance. Language is sound. It is corporeal, material, and
sensible. (135) Hence, language is part of the world of real being. Words, real
beings themselves, are natural signs of natural objects. Logic, on the other
hand, falls within the category of the incorporeals. Logical statements are
lekta. (136) They have meaning, but since they are not corporeal, they do not
have full being. They exist only intramentally. The lekta include predicates,
arguments, syllogisms, and fallacies. They are not natural signs of natural
objects.
This classification of logical statements as lekta has important implications
for the way in which the Stoics handle dialectic, or logic as a formal branch
of philosophical investigation.(137) Their logic is propositional. The
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variables in Stoic syllogisms are propositions, in contrast to the variables in
Aristotelian syllogisms, which tend to be terms and classes. The Stoics are
sensitive to the grammatical precision of their logical propositions; they
elaborate a more precise way of expressing negation than had been used
hitherto, prefixing a negative word to the entire proposition and not just to the
verb. Thus, instead of saying "It is not day," they say "Not: it is day." While
less idiomatic, this is a more unambiguous way of specifying what is being
negated, similar to the usage "Not-p" in modern symbolic logic. Indeed, the
technical ingenuity of Stoic logic is considerable, resulting in a number of
ideas which had been neglected in Aristotle's logic.
Since lekta are not natural signs of natural objects, the Stoic preference in
logic is for hypothetical syllogisms.(138) Unlike the categorical, deductive,
or inductive syllogisms used by Aristotle, the hypothetical syllogism does not
begin with an axiomatic statement about a general class of beings, nor does it
conclude with a statement about the fixed, essential nature of things. For the
Stoics, such a procedure would have been in conflict with a propositional
logic whose aim is to demonstrate the logical tenability of the conclusions of
one's premises, not their empirical or ontological verifiability. At the same
time, and although they are lekta, the Stoics' hypothetical syllogisms are
compatible with the physics which they espoused, for their syllogisms deal
with the changing relations between concrete individual events rather than
with a changeless structure of fixed essences.(139) The five main types of
syllogisms used by the Stoics may be schematized as follows:
Conditional: "If it is light, it is day."
Conjunctive: "It is light and it is day."
Disjunctive: "Either it is light or it is day."
Causal: "It is light because it is day."
Likely: "It is more likely that it is day than that it is night."
In all cases both the initial premises and whatever conclusions may
follow from them refer to transient events. Having demonstrated a
proposition by means of these syllogisms, one has still not claimed to
have said anything about an enduring natural phenomenon. This is a
perfectly reasonable choice for the Stoics given both their physics of
dynamic events and their conception of the lekta."
282
(135) SVF, 1, 74; 2, 140-41, 144a.
(136) See the references cited in note 35 above; Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.
63-81.
(137) The traditional view of Stoic logic, treating it as beneath consideration
because of its departures from Aristotelian logic, is stated clearly by Carl
Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leipzig, 1927), 1, 401-96. It
has been superseded by a positive reinterpretation of Stoic logic, marked by
two trends. One understands Stoic logic and its differences from Aristotelian
logic in the light of its connections with the rest of the Stoic system. The
most important studies in this area are Urs Egli, Zur stoischen Dialektik
(Basel, 1967), pp. 93-104; Michael Frede, Die stoische Logik, Abhandlungen
der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, philosophisch-historische
Klasse, 3:88 (Göttingen, 1974); and Virieux-Reymond, La logique et
l'épistimologie des Stoïciens. See also Bréhier, Hellenistic and Roman Age,
pp. 41 fr.; V. Brochard, Études de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie
moderne, nouv. ed. I Paris, 1926), pp. 220-51; Carlo Diano, Forma ed
evento: Principii per una interpretatione del mondo greco (Venezia, 1952),
pp. 9-20; Edelstein, Meaning of Stoicism,pp. 27-29; Goldschmidt. I.e système
stoïcien, pp. 82 83; Josiah 13. Gould, "Chrysippus: On the Criteria for the
Truth of a Conditional Proposition," Phronesis, 12 (1967), 152-61;
Chrysippus, pp. 66-88; Charles H. Kahn, "Stoic Logic and Stoic Logos,"
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 51 (1969), 158-72; Lorenzo Pozzi, "Il
nesso di implicazione nella logica stoica," Atti del convegno di storia della
logica, Parma, 8-10 ottobre 1972 (Padova, 1974), pp. 177-87; Giulio Preti,
"Sulla dottrina del semeion nella logica stoica," Rivista critica di storia della
filosofia, 2 (1956), 5-14; Reymond, "La logique stoïcienne," Revue de
Théologie et de Philosophie, n.s. 17 (1929), 161-71; Carlo Augusto Viano,
"La dialettica stoica," Rivista di filosofia, 49 (1958), 179-227; Antoinette
Virieux-Reymond, "Le 'sunemménon' stoïcien et la notion de la loi
scientifique," Studia Philosophica, 9 (1949), 162-69.
The second group consists of scholars primarily interested in modern logic,
who have rediscovered Stoic logic because of the affinities they perceive
between it and the school of Carnap and Frege. The essay which began this
movement is Jan Lukasiewicz, "Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik,"
Erkenntnis, 5 (1935), 111-31. The most important technical treatment of
Stoic logic within this or any other perspective is Benson Mates, Stoic Logic
283
(Berkeley, 1953). See also Nimio de Anquin, "Sobre la logica de los
Estoicos," Sapientia, 11 (1956), 166-72; Oskar Becker, Zwei Untersuchungen
zur antiken Logik (Wiesbaden, 1957); I. M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal
Logic (Amsterdam, 1951), pp. 77-102; William Kneale and Martha Kneale,
The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962), pp. 11376; Leo Lugarini,
"L'orizzonte linguistico del sapere in Aristotele e la sua trasformazione
stoica," Il Pensiero, 8 (1963), 327-51; Jürgen Mau, "Stoische Logik. Ihre
Stellung gegenüber der aristotelische Syllogistik und dem modernen
Aussagekalkül," Hermes, 85 (1957), 147-58; Mario Mignucci, Il significato
della logica stoica, 2a ed. (Bologna, 1967); Jan Mueller, "An Introduction to
Stoic Logic," in The Stoics, ed. Rist, pp. 1-26.
(138) SVF, 2, 182, 207-08, 213, 215, 241-42, 245.
(139) For the parallels in physics see SVF, 2, 13, 114, 395-97. Good analyses
of this point can be found in Jacques Brunschwig, "Le modèle conjonctif,"
Les Stoiciens et leur logique, Actes du Colloque de Chantilly, 18-22
septembre 1976 (Paris, 1978), pp. 61-65; Edelstein, Meaning of Stoicism, pp.
27-29; Michael Frede, "Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic," Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie, 56 (1974), 1-32; Goldschmidt, Le système
stoïcien, pp. 82-83; Gould, "Chrysippus," Phronesis, 12 (1967), 152-61;
Chrysippus, pp. 66-88; A. A. Long, "Dialectic and the Stoic Sage," in The
Stoics, ed. Rist, pp. 101-24; Virieux-Reymond, "Le 'sunemménon' stoicien,"
Studia Philosophica, 9 (1949), 162-69. William H. Hay, "Stoic Use of
Logic," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 51 (1969), 145-57 argues
unconvincingly that the Stoic syllogisms also reflect an interest in abstract
subjects and universal conclusions.
(140) SVF, 2, 368-75. On the other hand, Andreas Graeser, "The Stoic
Categories," Les stoiciens et leur logique, pp. 199-221; "The Stoic Theory of
Meaning," in The Stoics, ed. Rist, p. 78 sees the categories as linguistic
expressions signifying syntactical classifications.
(141) SVF, I, 91.
From: Marcia L. Colish - The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early
Middle Ages. I. Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature, Leiden, Brill 1985, pp.
53-55
THE LEKTON AS WHAT IS SAID OR

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PREDICATED OF SOMETHING
"4.1.1 According to SVF 1, 89, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic
school, made a distinction between a cause, which is a body or soma, and that
of which it is the cause, which is called symbebekos, consequence, or
kategorerna, predicate. Stobaeus, who gives this information, cites as
examples of causes or bodies practical wisdom(phronesis), the principle of
life (psyche), and self-control (sophrosyne); and as examples of what is
caused by these bodies being wise (phronein), living (zen), and being
temperate (sophronein). For the Stoics a body or soma is everything that acts
or undergoes action (SVF II, 336, 340). What is done or undergone by such
agents or patients, the action or passion, is a kategorema, which in contrast
with the somatic agents or patients is characterized as asomatic (asomaton)
Sextus M IX, 211) gives the following examples. The lancet and the flesh are
bodies; the lancet is the cause of an asomatic kategorema, namely being cut,
with respect to the flesh. Fire and wood are bodies; the fire is the cause of an
asomatic kategorema, namely being burnt, with respect to the wood. Further
examples can be found in SVF II, 349, where it is also added that the flesh is
the cause of the cutting with respect to the lancet.
The verbal character of that which is caused was stressed by the Stoics
against those who maintained that it could be indicated by nominal
expressions (SE, PH III, 14). If the sun or the sun's heat makes the wax melt,
we have to say that the sun is the cause, not of the melting of the wax (tes
chyseos), but of the wax being melted, of a kategorema which is indicated by
an infinitive (tou cheisthai). Clement of Alexandria (SVF III, 8, p. 263) even
makes an explicit distinction, in a somewhat similar context, between 'is cut'
(temnetai), which is the actual kategorema, and the infinitive 'to be cut',
which is the name (ptiptosis) of the katkategorema." pp. 45-46
(...)
"The strongest proof that the term lekton was used to designate that which is
said or predicated of something, as a synonym of kategorema and in the
typical frame of the Stoic theory of predication, is the fact that it is so often
qualified by the attribute asomaton. In many contexts one can make sense of
this characterization only by taking lek ton as standing for the action or
passion, the pragma which is signified by the verb, in contrast with the
285
somata which perform or undergo the action. It is therefore time to try to
throw more light upon the ontological and psychological aspects of that
which the Stoics called asomaton.
4.1.5. As for the ontological aspects, I shall confine myself to a rough outline;
for details and controversial points I refer to Bréhier (1962), Goldschmidt
(1969), Hadot (1968 and 1969), and Rist (1969). At the top of the Stoics'
ontological hierarchy we find the ti. These somethings are divided into the on
and the me on, the sphere of the existent and the sphere of the non-existent.
To the on belong the somata, the things that can perform or undergo actions.
In terms of the Stoic categories a soma is composed of hyle, matter, and
poiotes, determining quality. To the me on belong the void, place, time, and
the lekta. These four asomata do not have an independent existence of their
own; they are only thought and said. A lekton, as we have seen, belongs to a
soma (hyparchein) when the soma actually performs or undergoes the action
concerned, but in itself it does not have the same kind of existence as a soma
has. What is predicated of a soma is an event that occurs at the periphery of
the domain in which bodies act and are acted upon; the actuality of the event
entirely derives from the body by which it is caused. In terms of the Stoic
categories the lekton has to be associated with the pos echon, the ways of
behaving of a body, and the pros ti pa's echon, its ways of behaving in
relation to something else.
4.1.6. Turning now to the psychological side of the aromatic lekton, I first
call attention to a passage (DL VII, 51) in which two divisions of
presentations (phantasiai) are mentioned. One is into those of living beings
possessed of reason and speech (logikai) and those of living beings that are
deprived of these faculties(alogoi). The presentations of the first group are
also called noeseis, in a broad sense of that word (Cf. SVF II, 89). The second
division divides presentations into those of sense-perception (aisthetikai) and
those of thought in the narrower sense (dia tes dianoias). To the latter group
belong the presentations of asomata and of the other things that are
apprehended only by means of the logos. Parallel to this second division into
presentations of sense-perception and presentations of thought we often find
a distinction between periptosis and metabasis: between direct acquaintance
by means of the senses (for instance, with something white or black, sweet or
bitter) and the formation of ideas, which consists in a kind of transition from
sense-perception to something else. The metabasis is characteristic of man
286
(SE, AM VIII, 276, 288; Epictetus, Dissertationes I, 6, 10). This creative
power of the human mind amounts, however, to no more than the faculty of
compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials
afforded us by the senses; it is impossible to find in thought anything which
one does not possess as known by experience (SE, AM VIII, 58, 60). Sextus
gives the following examples of metabasis (AM I, 25, III, 40, VIII, 59, IX,
393, XI, 250). Because of a likeness of Socrates, which has been seen, we
conceive of Socrates, who has not been seen. Starting from the common man
we move on to a conception of a giant. By decreasing the size of the common
man we grasp a conception of a pygmy. By way of composition we derive
from man and horse the conception of a thing we have never perceived, a
centaur. DL VII, 52-53, gives a more extensive list of possibilities. The queer
thing is that he contrasts periptosis not with metabasis generally, but with
such species of metabasis(in Sextus's sense) as resemblance, analogy,
transposition, composition, and opposition. Metabasis occurs as one of the
species: some ideas are formed by transition, for instance lekta and place,
both asomata. This may be just a mistake; or the word metabasis may have
been used by some in a generic sense and by others in a more special sense,
without much further difference of meaning.
Now the lekton was defined as that which exists kata logiken phantasian, by
way of a presentation which is typical of a living being possessed of reason
and speech (DL VII, 63; SE, AM VIII, 70). Sextus adds that a logike
phantasia is a presentation in which it is possible to set the thing presented
before the mind by means of speech(logos). This can be connected with what
DL, VII, 49, says: first comes the presentation and then follows thought
(dianoia), which is capable of expressing things in speech (eklaletike) and
expresses that which it undergoes by the influence of the presentation, by
means of an utterance. From elsewhere (SVF II, 236) we know that the Stoics
called the noemata by the name of ekphorika, things capable of being
expressed in words.
The view that the thinking faculty is capable of forming, on the basis of the
materials offered by sense-perception, new presentations which are arrived at
by a process of metabasis and exist only in so far as they are thought and
expressed in words, was illustrated by means of the following simile (SE, AM
VII, 409). A trainer or drill-sergeant who is teaching a boy rhythm and how
to make certain motions sometimes takes hold of the boy's hands and at other
287
times stands at a distance and offers himself as a model for the boy's
imitations, by making certain rhythmical motions. In the same way some of
the objects presented produce the impression in the soul as it were by
touching and contact with it (such as white and black and somata generally),
whereas others are not of this nature, since in their case the principal part of
the soul has presentations which are not caused by them but are formed on
the occasion of their occurrence (tou hegemonikou ep'autois
phantasioumenou kai ouch hyp'auton), as is the case with asomatic lekta.
Sextus cites this simile in connection with the question of how presentations
of asomatic lekta are possible. Since an asomaton neither effects nor suffers
anything, it cannot produce presentations in the soul. The Stoics apparently
solved this problem by pointing out that just as the boy makes both
movements which are caused by the trainer and spontaneous movements, so
the soul has both presentations that are caused by somata and spontaneous
presentations -- for instance, of lekta. The lekta do not cause their
presentations, but those presentations are produced by the soul itself,
although this spontaneous production is limited to certain operations on the
impressions of sense-perception.
That lekta are merely thought and that nothing directly corresponds to them
in the world of existing somata is confirmed by SVF II, 521. The Stoics
considered time and asomata generally as existing only in thought, without
the reality of bodies which consists in causal activity. It looks as if this were
contradicted by a passage in Plutarch (De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos
1084 c), where such activities as walking and dancing (ton peripaton, ten
orchesin) are counted among the somata. This can be connected with what
Seneca (Epistula 113, 23; SVF II, 836) tells us about a controversy between
Cleanthes and Chrysippus concerning the nature of walking
(ambulatio).Cleanthes contended that it is pneuma which has been sent down
from the principal part of the soul into the feet; Chrysippus maintained that it
is the principal part of the soul itself (a soma). To solve the apparent
contradiction we probably have to distinguish between the Om as far as it is
in a certain state or is disposed in a certain way (pos echon) and that state
itself, considered on its own. If the action or passion is regarded as realized in
a soma, it is, as it were, an aspect of that soma. This point of view was
strongly emphasized by Chrysippus, here and elsewhere. But if the action or
passion is contrasted with the soma, as that which is caused or undergone by
288
it, it is seen to have a status of its own; from this point of view it is something
asomatic and a mere product of thought.
4.1.7. It may be concluded, I think, that at least one of the ways in which the
word lekton was used by Stoic philosophers was to designate that which is
said or predicated of something. The lekton or kategorema is an asomatic
pragma, an action or passion which is performed or undergone by a soma.
From an ontological point of view the lekton-kategorema-pragma is totally
different from the soma. Somata are the real things which are characterized
by their capacity of acting and being acted upon. The actions or passions
themselves are merely thought and expressed in words; they are presentations
which are spontaneously formed by a transition from sense-experience and
made known by spoken sounds, without having a direct counterpart in
somatic reality. Given this ontological and psychological peculiarity of the
lekton, it is not unlikely that almost from the beginning the word lekton could
also be taken as referring to that which is only (thought and) said. If the
lekton as such does not really exist and is nothing but a spontaneous product
of thought, it is quite natural to see it not only as that which is said of a soma,
but also as that which is merely an expressed thought, only something said."
pp. 51-55
From: Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of Proposition. Ancient and Medieval
Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Amsterdam, North-Holland
1973.
289
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Ancient Stoicism: The Editions of

Fragments and Testimonia
EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS
Arnim, Hans Friedrich August von, ed. 1903. Stoicorum Veterum
Fragmenta. Stuttgart: Teubner.
Reprint: München, Leipzig: K.G. Sauri, 2004.
Vol. I: Zeno et Zenonis discipuli (1905); Vol. II: Chrysippi Fragmenta
logica et physica (1903); Vol. III: Chrysippi Fragmenta moralia --
Fragmenta successorum Chrysippi (1903); Vol. IV: Indices conscripsit
Maximilianus Adler (1924).
Hülser, Karlheinz, ed. 1987. Die Fragmente Zur Dialektik Der Stoiker.
Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
Neue Sammlung der Texte mit deutscher Übersetzung und
Kommentaren (4 Bande).
I: Fragmente 1-368 (1987) ; II: Fragmente 369-772 (1987) ; III:
Fragmente 773-1074 (1987) ; IV: Fragmente 1075-1257 (1988).
[ My translation of the] Overview of Contents: Preface XIX;
Introduction by the Editor XXIII; Annexes I-II LXXVIII; 1.
Introduction: The dialectic in the context of the Stoic philosophy
(Fragments No. 1-254) 2; 1.1 Philosophy and its division in Logic,
Ethics, Physics (No. 1-32a) 2; 1.2 Exclusion and further determination
290
of Dialectic (Nos. 33-98). 40; 1.3 On the origin, development and
reception of Stoic dialectic (No. 99-254) 102; 2. Theory of Knowledge
(Epistemology) (No. 255-473) 248; 2.1 Unity and diversity of
representations (ideas) (No. 259-281) 260; 2.2 On sensory perception
and on the Concept (No. 282-321). 296; 2.3 The criteria of truth (No.
322-362) 332; 2.4 Assent, knowledge and science (No. 363-419) 392;
2.5 Digression: On the Soul (No. 420-456) 454; 2.6 Theoretical
Sciences (No. 457-473) 486; 3. About the linguistic sign (No. 474-680)
516; 3.1 Successive determination of the speech according to the sound
(No. 476-535) 520; 3.2 The parts of speech (word classes) (No. 536-
593) 592; 3.3 Advantages and faults of speech. Poetics (No. 594-620)
672; 3.4 Linguistic characters in relation to their meaning (No. 621-
680) 714; 4. About the meanings (No. 681-1257) 790; 4.1 Terminology
(No. 681-694) 790; 4.2 The Lekta (sayable) in general. The incomplete
Lekta and the categories (No. 695-873) 806; 4.3 The full Lekta (no.
874-913) 1086; 4.4 The classifications of the statement (No. 914-1035)
1140; 4.5 The theory of argument (No. 1036-1198a) 1364; 4.6 The
fallacies (no. 1199-1257) 1690; Indexes I-VIII 1787.
Schmidt, Rudolf Traugott. 1839. Stoicorum Grammatica. Halle.
Dissertation presented at the University of Halle.
Reprint: Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1967.
———. 1979. Die Grammatik Der Stoiker. Brauschweig / Wiesbaden:
Vieweg.
German translation of R. T. Schmidt's Grammatica stoicorum edited
and introduced by Karlheinz Hülser; with an annotated bibliography on
Stoic dialectic by Urs Egli.
Baldassarri, Mariano. 1984. La Logica Stoica. Testimonianze E
Frammenti. Como: Litotipografia Malinverno.
Testi originali con introduzione e traduzione commentata. (Otto volumi
in dieci tomi. Il nono volume: a) Indice terminologico; b; Bibliografia
sui testi e sugli studi; Conclusione critica sulle interpretazioni della
logica stoica, non è mai stato pubblicato).
I. Introduzione alla logica stoica (1984); II. Crisippo: il catalogo degli
scritti e i frammenti dai papiri (1985); III. Diogene Laerzio (Dalle Vite
dei filosofi VII) (1986); IV. Sesto Empirico (Dai Lineamenti pirroniani
II, Dal Contro i matematici VIII) (1986); Va. Alessandro di Afrodisia
(Dal Commento agli Analitici primi, Dal Commento ai Topici) (1986);
291
Vb. Plotino, i Commentatori aristotelici tardi, Boezio (1987); VI.
Cicerone (Testi dal Lucullus, dal De Fato, dai Topica) (1986); VIIa.
Galeno (Dalla Introduzione alla dialettica) (1986); VIIb. Le
Testimonianze minori del sec. II. d.C.: Epitteto, Plutarco, Gellio,
Apuleio (1987); VIII. Testimonianze sparse ordinate sistematicamente
(1987).
"Il presente lavoro tenta una ricostruzione sintetica della logica stoica
considerata nei suoi rapporti storici e nella sua cornice sistematica: non
è pertanto una interpretazione della logica stoica nella prospettiva della
logica moderna né propriamente una esposizione di un momento della
storia della logica, bensì intenderebbe presentare un momento della
storia della filosofia.
In particolare, esso nasce da un decennale contatto con tutte le fonti
antiche relative alla logica stoica e vuole introdurre alla lettura di tali
fonti. I testi di Crisippo, di Diogene Laerzio, di Sesto Empirico, dei
commentatori di Aristotele (innanzitutto di Alessandro di Afrodisia), di
Cicerone, degli scrittori del sec. Il d.C. che ci informano sulla logica
stoica (innanzitutto di Galeno) sono stati raccolti, ordinati per autore e
vagliati, nonché tradotti e commentati; sono state anche raccolte e
ordinate secondo il contenuto secondo il quale si sviluppa l'esposizione
nel presente lavoro le testimonianze che si trovano sparse nei più vari
autori (anche negli autori che si potrebbero ritenere scarsamente
significativi), e sono state anch'esse tradotte e commentate." (Dalla
Prefazione al primo volume).
Isnardi Parente, Margherita, ed. 1989. Stoici Antichi. Torino: Utet.
Radice, Roberto, ed. 1998. Stoici Antichi. Tutti I Frammenti. Milano:
Bompiani.
Testo greco degli Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta di Hans von Armin e
traduzione italiana di Roberto Radice.
Schuhl, Pierre-Maxime, ed. 1962. Les Stoiciens. Paris: Gallimard.
Textes choisis et traduits pat Émile Bréhier et édités sous la direction
de Pierre-Maxime Schuhl.
Mates, Benson. 1953. Stoic Logic. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Second edition 1961.
Appendix A. Translations 95-131.
Long, Arthur A., and Sedley, David N., eds. 1987. The Hellenistic
292
Philosophers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vol. I: Translations of the principal sources, with philosophical
commentary; Vol. II: Greek and Latin texts with notes and
bibliography.
On Stoic logic see: Vol. I: Logic and Semantics. 31. Dialectic and
rhetoric p. 183; 32. Definition and division 190; 33. Sayables ( lekta)
195; 34. Simple propositions 202; 35. Non-simple propositions 208; 36.
Arguments 212; 37. Fallacy 220; 38. Modality 230-236.
Inwood, Brad, and Gerson, Lloyd P., eds. 1997. Hellenistic Philosophy.
Introductory Readings. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Second expanded edition (first edition 1988).
Chapter II. Stoicism pp. 103-260; see in particular the section Logic and
Theory of Knowledge pp. 111-131.
———, eds. 2008. The Stoics Reader. Selected Writings and
Testimonia. Indianapolis: Hackett.
See Logic and Theory of Knowledge pp. 11-24.
A SELECTION OF THE MAIN SOURCES ON

STOIC DIALECTIC
Diogenes, Laertii. 1964. Vitae Philosophorum. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Critical edition of the Greek text by Herbert Strainge Long.
See the Book VII: Zeno, Ariston, Herillus, Dionysius, Cleanthes,
Sphaerus, Chrysippus.
Diogenes, Laërtius. 1925. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Translated by R. D. Hicks with the Greek text facing.
Reprint with an introduction by Herbert Strainge Long, 1972.
Diogène, Laërce. 2006. Vies Et Doctrines Des Stoïciens. Paris: LGF.
Traduction, introduction, notes de commentaire, bibliographie, index de
Richard Goulet.
Filodemo. 1994. Storia Dei Filosofi: La Stoà Da Zenone a Panezio
(Pherc. 1018). Leiden: Brill.
Edizione, traduzione e commento a cura di Tiziano Dorandi.
293
Mutschmann, Hermann, and Mau, Jürgen, eds. 1912. Sexti Empirici
Opera. Leripzig: Teubner.
Vol. I: Pyrroneion hypotyposeon libri tres (1912); Vol. II: Adversus
dogmaticos libri quinque ( Adv. mathem. VII-XI) (1914); Vol. III:
Adversus mathematicos libri I-VI (1954) ed. J. Mau.
Vol. IV: Indices ad vol. I-III adiecit Karel Janácek (1962).
Sextus, Empiricus. 2005. Against the Logicians. Cambridge:
Edited and translated by Richard Bett.
Contents: Acknowledgments VI; Abbreviations VII; Introduction IX;
Chronological table XXXI; Further reading XXXII; Note on the text
and translation XXXV; Outline of argument XXXVIII; Against the
Logicians 1. Book 1 3; Book 2 90; Glossary 184; Parallels between
Against the Logicians and other works of Sextus 193; Names referred
to in Against the Logicians 196; Subject index 205.
Galenus. 1896. Galeni Institutio Logica. Leipzig: Teubner.
———. 1964. Galen's Institutio Logica. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press.
English translation, introduction and commentary by John Spangler
Kieffer.
Galien. 1998. Traités Philosophiques Et Logiques. Paris: Flammarion.
Le volume contient cinq traités de Claude Galien:1. Des textes pour les
débutants; 2. Esquisse empirique; 3. De l'expérience médicale; 4. Des
sophismes verbaux; 5. Institution logique.
Traduction de Jean-Pierre Levet.
Edlow, Robert Blair. 1977. Galen on Language and Ambiguity. Leiden:
Brill.
An English Translation of Galen's ' De Captionibus (On Fallacies)'
with Introduction, Text and Commentary.
see in particular Chapter VII: The Stoics on Fallacy and Ambiguity, pp.
56-68.
Londey, David, and Johanson, Carmen, eds. 1987. The Logic of
Apuleius. Leiden: Brill.
Including a complete Latin text and English translation of the Peri
Hermeneias of Apuleius of Madara.
Pearson, Alfred Chilton. 1891. The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes.
294
London: C. J. Clay & Sons.
Arnim, Hans Friedrich August von, ed. 1905. Zeno Et Zenonis
Discipuli. Stuttgart: Teubner.
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: Vol. I.
Watanabe, Albert Tohru. 1988. Cleanthes Fragments: Text and
Commentary.
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation available at ProQuest Dissertation
Express n. AAT 8908885.
Thom, Johan Carl. 2005. Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus. Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck.
Text, translation, and commentary.
Arnim, Hans Friedrich August von, ed. 1903. Chrysippi Fragmenta
Logica Et Physica. Stuttgart: Teubner.
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: Vol. II.
Crönert, Wilhelm. 1901. "Die Logika Zetemata Des Chrysippus Und
Die Übrigen Papyri Logischen Inhalts Aus Der Herculanensischen
Bibliothek." Hermes no. 36:548-579.
Traduzione italiana di Enrico Livrea in: W. Croenert, Studi Ercolanesi,
Napoli, Morano, 1975 pp. 63-101.
Del Mastro, Gianluca. 2005. "Il Pherc. 1380: Crisippo, Opera Logica."
Cronache Ercolanesi no. 35:61-70.
"Analisi paleografica di PHerc. 1380 e ricostruzione della subscriptio:
si tratta dell'opera "Degli elementi del discorso e della frase" di
Crisippo, di argomento logico-dialettico, affine per tema al trattato sulle
ambiguità del linguaggio tramandato in PHerc. 307."
Marrone, Livia. 1997. "Le Questioni Logiche Di Crisippo ( Pherc.
307)." Cronache Ercolanesi no. 27:83-100.
Critical edition and Italian translation of Chrysippus' work Logika
zetemata (Investigations in logic) found in the Herculaneum Papyrus
307.
———. 1982. "Nuove Letture Nel Pherc. 307 ( Questioni Logiche Di
Crisippo)." Cronache Ercolanesi no. 12:13-18.
Chrysippe. 2004. œuvre Philosophique. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Édition bilingue (textes grecs et latins, traduction française). Textes
traduits et commentés par Richard Dufour.
Table des matières.
295
Tome I: Remerciements IX; Avant-propos XI; Introduction XV;
Avertissement LIII; Sur la vie de Chrysippe et témoignages sur ses
écrits, n. 1-31 p. 1; Prolégomènes à la philosophie, n. 32-42 p. 43;
PREMIÈRE PARTIE. LA LOGIQUE (n. 43-51) p. 57.
Chapitre I. La doctrine de la connaissance (n. 52-112) p. 69; Chapitre
II. La dialectique (n. 113-295) p. 141; Chapitre III. La Rhétorique (n.
296-306) p. 391;
DEUXIÈME PARTIE: LA PHYSIQUE p. 401.
Chapitre I. Les doctrines fondamentales de la physique (n. 307-535) p.
403;
Liste des ouvrages de Chrysippe 661; Glossaire 665; Chronologie des
écoles philosophiques 673; Bibliographie 675-685.
Tome II: Chapitre II. sur le monde (n. 536-647) p. 9; Chapitre III. Des
corps célestes et des phénomènes atmosphériques (n. 648-707) p. 109;
Chapitre IV: Des animaux et des plantes (n. 708-772) p. 157; Chapitre
V. De l'âme humaine (n. 773-913) p. 206; Chapitre VI. Sur le destin (n.
914-1014) p. 355; Chapitre VII. Sur la nature des dieux (n. 1015-1110)
p. 485; Chapitre VIII. Sur la providence et la nature artiste (n. 1111-
1166) p. 567; Chapitre IX. Sur la divination (n. 1167-1195) p. 621;
Repères chronologiques des citateurs 649; Bibliographie des citateurs
651; Index des notions 671; Index des passages cités 679; Index des
personnages 705; Concordances: ce recueil-Long & Sedley 717;
Concordances: ce recueil-SVF 719; Concordances: Long & Sedley-ce
recueil 729; Concordances: SVF-ce recueil 733-743.
Posidonius. 1972. The Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Vol. I.
See Fragments 42. On Criterion; 43. On General Enquiry Against
Hermagora; 44. Introduction to Style; 45. On Conjunctions; and 188.
Dialectic: definition; 189. Rhetoric, Classication of status; 190. Cause;
191. Relationa syllogisms; 192. Grammar: etimology; 193. Etymology
of Sight; 194. Sight.
———. 1988. The Commentary. Fragments 1-149. Cambridge:
Vo. II.1.
See Commentary to Fragments 42-45 (pp. 189-204).
296
———. 1988. The Commentary. Fragments 150-293. Cambridge:
Vol. II.2.
See Commentary to Fragments 188-194 (pp. 684-698).
———. 1999. The Translation of the Fragments. Cambridge:
Vol. III.
STOIC LEXICON
Lexicon IV: Stoics, Edited by Roberto Radice in collaboration with Lucia

Palpacelli, Chiara Pisoni, Ilaria Ramelli, Laura Stochino, Francesca Scrivani
and Emmanuele Vimercati. Electronic edition by Roberto Bombacigno,
Milano: Biblia 2007, 4 vols. (4040 p.) 1 CD-ROM + License.
Complete edition in the original language, index lemmatized, (also available
on CD-ROM) of the works of the Stoic philosophers, Greek and Latin.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON STOICISM
Egli, Urs. 1979. "Bibliographie Zur Stoischen Sprachwissenschaft
(Dialektik)." In Die Grammatik Der Stoiker, 182-216. Braunschweig:
Vierweg & Sohn.
Appendix to the German translation by Karlheinz Hülser of: Rudolf
Traugott Schmidt, Stoicorum grammatica, Halle, 1839.
Epp, Ronald H. 1985. Stoicism Bibliography. In Southern Journal of
Philosophy
Recovering the Stoics. Spindel Conference 1984.
1169 titles.
"This bibliography cites the most important secondary literature on
Stoic philosophy. It is not exhaustive in part because the term Stoic has
such a bastardized legacy.
What has been selected are important contributions to the Stoic
tradition as theory and practice. This literature is concentrated in a half
dozen modern European languages accessible to English language
scholars, and is largely confined to the twentieth century.
297
A generous sense of what is philosophical has been employed; works
that are exclusively historical, philological, or literary have been
excluded. The following forms of scholarship were generally ignored:
(a) primary sources, translations, and commentaries, (b) encyclopedia
and dictionary entries, (c) dissertations, (d) book reviews, and (e)
standard histories.
Several oddities should be noted. All serials titled by a single term (e.g.
Phronesis) will be fully cited, whereas multi-term serials (e.g. Classical
Quarterly) are abbreviated according to L'Annee Philologique, and
listed here with other serials on pages 126-13 1. Since rules of
capitalization are varied, I have favored a minimalist approach, and
when the work of a single author is collected (e.g. Max Pohlenz's
Kleine Schriften), a single citation replaces the separate citations
contained therein. Indexes of key English and selected Greek subjects
complete user access to this bibliography, and regrettably indexes to
Latin terms and the primary literature could not be included." (From the
Preface by R. H. Epp).
Baldassarri, Mariano. 1993. "Logica Stoica: Bibliografia." In Studi Di
Filosofia Antica Ii, 139-172. Como: Libreria Noseda.
Steinmetz, Peter. 1994. "Die Stoa." In Die Philosophie Der Antike.
Band 4: Die Hellenistiche Philosophie, edited by Flashar, Hellmut,
491-716. Basel: Schwabe & Co.
Inhalt: Vorbemerkung 491; 33. Die Stoa bis zum Begin der römischen
Kaiserzeit im allgemeinen 495; 34. Zenon aus Kition 518; 35. Die
Schüler Zenons (I). Persaios aus Kition, Philonides aus Theben,
Dionysios aus Herakleia, Ariston aus Chios, Hérillos aus Kalchedon
555; 36. Die Schüler Zenons (II). Kleanthes und Sphairon 566; 37.
Chrysippus Soloi 584; 38. Schüler und Nachfolger Chrysipps 626; 39.
Panaitios aus Rhodos und seine Schüler 646; 40. Poseidonios aus
Apameia 670; 41. Die Stoa in derr Mitte und zweiten Hälfte des 1.
Jahrunderts von Christus 706-716.
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 2000. La Dialectique Des Stoiciens. Paris:
Vrin.
Bibliographie: Textes antiques 335-341; Textes modernes 341-357.
———. 2005. "Bibliographie D'orientation." In Les Stoiciens, edited
by Romeyer Dherbey, Gilbert and Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, 545-572.
Paris: Vrin.
298
"Bibliographie Complémentaire." In. 2006. Les Stoïciens Et Leur
Logique, edited by Brunschwig, Jacques, 475-484. Paris: Vrin.
Actes du Colloque de Chantilly 18-22 septembre 1976.
Première édition 1978; deuxième édition, revue, augmentée et mise à
jour (reproduit la pagination de l'édition originale).
"Nous n'avons pas reproduit dans ce volume la bibliographie de la
première édition, qui aurait rendu celle-ci pléthorique; nous avons donc
laissé à leur place, et sous leur forme initiale, toutes les références
antérieures à 1976, telles qu'elles se trouvent dans le texte et dans les
notes des articles eux-mêmes. En revanche, nous regroupons ici, par
ordre alphabétique des noms des auteurs, les références complètes des
études qui ont été mentionnées, sous forme abrégée, dans les
compléments apportés aux textes et aux notes par les auteurs et
réviseurs de la présente deuxième édition; nous y ajoutons quelques
publications récentes particulièrement marquantes. On ne trouvera donc
dans ce qui suit, sauf exceptions justifiées par leur importance, que des
titres publiés depuis 1976."
RELATED PAGES
Stoic Philosophy of Language, Grammar and Rhetoric (under construction)
Stoic Logic. The Dialectic: First Part: A - E
Stoic Logic. The Dialectic: Second Part: F - Z
299
construction)

Dialectician
300
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Annotated Bibliography on the Ancient

Stoic Dialectic (First Part: A - E)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Achard, Martin. 2001. "Logos Endiathetos Et Théorie Des Lekta Chez
Les Stoiciens." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 57:225-233.
This paper is a discussion of Claude Panaccio's (*) interpretation of the
Stoic view of logos endiathetos [internal discourse]. Two questions are
more specifically addressed : 1) what is the relation between logos
endiathetos and lekta? and 2) is logos endiathetos tied to language or
not?"
(*) Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham (1999).
Alessandrelli, Michele. 2013. Il Problema Del Lekton Nello Stoicismo
Antico. Origine E Statuto Di Una Nozione Controversa. Firenze:
Olschki.
"According to Michael Frede’s interpretation, the notion of lekton was
developed in the context of the Stoic theory of causality, and conceived
as a metaphysical entity. The author of the book challenges this
developmental explanation, upholding the linguistic origin of the notion
of lekton, that would have been always conceived by the Stoics as a
purely semantic entity – that is, as the incorporeal meaning of a
corporeal linguistic voice."
301
Annas, Julia. 1980. "Truth and Knowledge." In Doubt and Dogmatism.
Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, edited by Barnes, Jonathan,
Burnyeat, Myles and Schofield, Malcolm, 84-104. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Baldassarri, Mariano. 1993. "Un Trattatello Plutarcheo Di Dialettica
Stoica: De E Delphico Cap. Vi." In Studi Di Filosofia Antica Ii, 43-65.
Como: Libreria Noseda.
Pubblicato in tedesco in: Klaus Döring, Theodr Ebert (hers.) -
Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer - pp.
33-46
———. 1993. "Il Simposio Di Bamberg Sulla Logica Degli Stoici E
Dei Suoi Precursori." In Studi Di Filosofia Antica Ii, 67-107. Como:
Libreria Noseda.
Note sul Symposion zur Logik der Stoiker und ihrer Vorläufer
(Bamberg, 2-6 September 1991)
———. 1993. "Una Rilevante Disciplina Antica Documentata in Modo
Nuovo (Discussione)." In Studi Di Filosofia Antica Ii, 109-123. Como:
Libreria Noseda.
A proposito del libro di Karlheinz Hülser - Die Fragmente zur
Dialektik der Stoiker - Stuttgart, Frommann Holzboorg 1986-1987.
———. 1993. "Osservazioni Sull'interpretazione Prantliana Della
Logica Stoica." In Studi Di Filosofia Antica Ii, 125-138. Como:
Libreria Noseda.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1980. "Proof Destroyed." In Doubt and Dogmatism.
Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, edited by Barnes, Jonathan,
Burnyeat, Myles and Schofield, Malcolm, 161-181. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
———. 1982. "Medicine, Experience and Logic." In Science and
Speculation. Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, edited by
Barnes, Jonathan, Brunschwig, Jacques, Burnyeat, Myles and
Translated in French as: Médecine, expérience et logique, in: Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale, 1989, 94, pp. 437-481.
———. 1985. "Theophrastus and Stoic Logic." In Aristoteles. Werk
Und Wirkung, Paul Moraux Gewidmet, I: Aristoteles Und Seine Schule,
edited by Wiesner, Jürgen, 557-576. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Reprinted in: Reprinted in: J. Barnes, Logical Matters: Essays in
302
Ancient Philosophy II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012. pp. 413-432.
———. 1993. "Meaning. Saying and Thinking." In Dialektiker Und
Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring,
Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 47-61. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
———. 1997. Logic and Imperial Stoa. Leiden: Brill.
———. 1999. "Aristotle and Stoic Logic." In Topics in Stoic
Philosophy, edited by Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 23-53. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Reprinted in: J. Barnes, Logical Matters: Essays in Ancient Philosophy
II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012. pp. 382-412.
"Were Aristotle's logical writings known to the early Stoic logicians,
and did Aristotle's logical ideas have any influence on the development
of Stoic logic? The evidence which bears on this question is perplexing:
there are numerous pertinent texts which favour an affirmative answer;
yet as we approach them they seem, like so many will-o'-the-wisps, to
retreat -- and we are stumbling in a treacherous marsh.
But the question is not without its fascination, in as much as it concerns
the historical relations between two magnificent monuments to Greek
philosophical acumen; and it may stand some discussion. Section I
presents some general ruminations. Section II deals with the
preliminary question of whether the Stoics could in principle have read
Aristotle. Section III assembles a sample of the evidence which
suggests that the Stoics did in fact read and study their Aristotle. And
the remaining sections try to assess the value of this evidence.
The question is a historical one, and it invites consideration of a certain
type of historical explanation. It is not merely a matter of whether the
Stoics were aware of the Peripatetic achievement in logic: it is a matter
of whether this awareness influenced their own logical thoughts and
caused them to think in this way rather than in that." p. 23
———. 2005. "What Is a Disjunction?" In Language and Learning.
That the Stoics were the instigators of the emphasis put on linguistic
observations in ancient philosophy is uncontested. To what degree they
are rightly accused of paying more attention to expressions rather than
to things is quite another matter, despite the fact that this reproach was
303
voiced repeatedly in antiquity by authorities such as Galen and
Alexander of Aphrodisias and has lasted through the nineteenth century
AD. If the Stoics have enjoyed a better press since the twentieth
century it is because they were taken to be logicians for logic's sake,
committed formalists who stopped just short of inventing the
appropriate type of artificial language. That this picture needs revision
is argued by Jonathan Barnes (What is a disjunction?') in a painstaking
investigation of the treatment of connectives in Apollonius Dyscolus'
essay with that title and Galen's Institutio logica. Barnes shows that
Apollonius' text is coherent and thereby undermines a long-standing
prejudice about the Stoic impact on the development of traditional
grammar: contrary to what has been assumed (via an unwarranted
textual emendation in a crucial passage of Apollonius Dyscolus)
Apollonius does not criticise the Stoics' meddling with grammar, but
rather their insufficient interest in some of its finer points. Far from
adopting a purely formalistic stance, the Stoics distinguished between
natural and non-natural disjunctions and colligations. They used these
considerations not only to distinguish between natural and occasional
disjunctions, but also between grammatical and semantical nonsense.
Since no other text besides Apollonius' attributes the conception of
'natural disjunctions' to the Stoics it is a question whether it actually is
of Stoic origin rather than derived from the Peripatetics or an invention
by certain grammarians. As Barnes shows, the interconnections and
boundaries between natural language and formal logic did not only play
a crucial role in the treatment of disjunctions by Apollonius Dyscolus.
They are also the basis of Galen's criticism of Stoic logic on the
differentiation between complete and incomplete conflict and
implication, whose intent was to show what is and what is not a
legitimate use of conjunctions. If that distinction is at stake, then
Galen's view on disjunctions and conjunctions turns out to be coherent,
despite initial appearances to the contrary. The differing parties accused
each other of not having paid sufficient attention to the pragmata;
however, their complaint is not that the facts in the world have been
ignored, but rather that the meaning of the terms has not received
sufficient attention." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and
Brad Inwood, pp. 11-12
———. 2009. "Grammaire, Rhétorique, Épistémologie, Et
304
Dialectique." In Lire Les Stoïciens, edited by Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste
and Barnes, Jonathan, 135-149. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Becker, Oskar. 1957. "Über Die Vier "Themata" Der Stoischen Logik."
In Zwei Untersuchungen Zur Antiken Logik, 27-49. Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz.
Berrettoni, Pierangiolo. 1997. "L'aksioma Diasaphoun to Mallon Nella
Logica Stoica." In Grammatica E Ideologia Nella Storia Della
Linguistica, edited by Berrettoni, Pierangiolo and Lorenzi, Franco, 1-
34. Perugia: Margiacchi - Galeno.
Bobzien, Susanne. 1986. Die Stoische Modallogik. Würzburg:
Kõnighausen-Neumann.
Inhalverzeichnis: Einleitung 4;
I. Der Axioma-Begriff der Stoiker 11;
1. Die stoische Definition des Axioma-Begriffes 11; 2. Vorläufige
Bestimmung der Wahrheitskriterien des stoischen Axioms 14; 3. Der
gleiche Satz bezeichnet verschiedene Axiomata: das definite Axioma
17; 4. Axiomata vergehen 18; 5. Axiomata, die ihren Wahrheitswert
wechseln: meta - piptonta 21; 6. Das Bestehen des dem Axioma
korrespondierenden Sachverhalts wird durch das Axiome je nur für den
Zeitpunkt der Behauptung dieses Axioma behauptet 23; 7.
Zeitbezogene Axiomata 26; 8. Wahrheitsbedingungen der
zeitbezogenen Axiomata 28; 9. Wahrheitswertwechsel der
zeitbezogenen Axiomata 26; 9. Axiomata mit Pseudodaten 31; 11.
Nichtzeitbezogene Axiomata 34; 12. Zusammenfassung 36;
II. Die stoische Modallogik 40;
1.Die Definitionen der stoischen Modalbegriffe 40; a) Interpretation
und Rekonstruktionsversuche vor Frede 40; b) Fredes Rekonstruktion
der stoischen Modalbegriffe 45; 2.Korrelation der stoischen Axioma-
und Sachverhaltsmodi 50; 3. Die Sachverhaltsmodi und ihre
überlieferten Bestimmungen 51;
4. Kontingente Axiomata und Sachverhalte 56; 5. Der Ausdruck
'epidektikon aletés / pseudos einai 60; 6. Die Modalitäten der
nichtzeitbezogenen Axiomata 63; 7. Der Ausdruck 'äussere Umstände
hindern...' 67; 8. Die Modalitäten der zeitbezogenen Axiomata 72; a)
Die Modalitäten der Axiomata über die Gegenwart 73; b) Die
Modalitäten der Axiomata über die Vergangenheit 76; c) Die
Modalitäten der Axiomata über die Zukunft 91; 9. Zusammenfassung
305
und Schlussfolgerung bzgl. der Art der Modalitäten der zeitbezogenen
Axiomata 98; 10. Modalitätenwechsel 103; 11. Aus Möglichem folgt
Unmögliches 105; 12. Die Rekonstruktion des stoischen Modalsystems
von Mignucci und Vuillemin 113; 13. Zusammenfassung 118;
Anmerkungen 121; Symbol- und Abkürzungsverzeichnis 142;
Literaturverzeichnis 143-147.
"ABSTRACT: Part I discusses the Stoic notion of propositions
(assertibles, axiomata): their definition; their truth-criteria; the relation
between sentence and proposition; propositions that perish;
propositions that change their truth-value; the temporal dependency of
propositions; the temporal dependency of the Stoic notion of truth;
pseudo-dates in propositions. Part II discusses Stoic modal logic: the
Stoic definitions of their modal notions (possibility, impossibility,
necessity, non-necessity); the logical relations between the modalities;
modalities as properties of propositions; contingent propositions; the
relation between the Stoic modal notions and those of Diodorus Cronus
and Philo of Megara; the role of 'external hindrances' for the
modalities; the temporal dependency of the modalities; propositions
that change their modalities; the principle that something possible can
follow from something impossible; the interpretations of the Stoic
modal system by B. Mates, M. Kneale, M. Frede, J. Vuillemin and M.
Mignucci are evaluated.
For a shorter, updated, English version of Part I of the book see my
'Stoic Logic', in K. Algra et al. (eds), The Cambridge History of
Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge 1999, 92-157. For a shorter,
updated, English version of Part II of the book see my 'Chrysippus'
Modal Logic and its Relation to Philo and Diodorus', in K. Doering,
Th. Ebert (eds.), Dialektiker und Stoiker (Stuttgart 1993) 63-84."
———. 1996. "Stoic Syllogistic." Oxford Studies in Ancient
"For the Stoics, a syllogism is a formally valid argument, and the
primary function of their syllogistic is to establish the formal validity of
arguments. Stoic syllogistic can be understood as a system of formal
logic that relies on two types of argumental rules:' first, five rules (the
accounts of the indemonstrables) which were used to determine
whether any given argument is an indemonstrable argument
(anapodeiktos logos), i.e. an elementary syllogism the validity of which
306
is not in need of further demonstration (D.L. 7.79), since its validity is
evident in itself (Sextus, M. 2. 223);2 second, one unary and three
presumably binary argumental rules, called themata, which allow one
to establish the formal validity of non-indemonstrable arguments by
analysing them in one or more steps into one or more indemonstrable
arguments (D.L. 7. 78). The function of these rules is not to generate
non indemonstrable syllogisms from indemonstrable ones, but rather to
reduce given non-indemonstrable arguments to indemonstrable
syllogisms. Moreover, the Stoic method of deduction differs from
standard modern ones in that the direction is reversed. The Stoic system
may hence be called an 'argumental reductive system of deduction'.
In the following I present a reconstruction of this system of logic. The
rules or accounts used for establishing that an argument is
indemonstrable have all survived, and the indemonstrables are among
the best-known elements of Stoic logic. However, their exact role and
logical status in Stoic syllogistic are usually neglected. I expound how
they are integrated in the system of deduction. The state of evidence for
the themata is dismal -- although perhaps not hopeless. I suggest a
reconstruction of the themata, based on a fresh look at some of the
sources, and then offer a reconstruction of the general method of
reduction of arguments and some general remarks on Stoic syllogistic
as a whole and on the question of its completeness (much of which will
not depend on the particular formulation of the themata I propose, but
on more general considerations for a reconstruction).
Stoic logic is a propositional logic, and Stoic negation and conjunction
are truth-functional. This has, naturally, led to comparisons with the
'classical' propositional calculus (as e.g. presented in Principia
Mathematica), including repeated examinations of Stoic syllogistic on
completeness in the modern sense. The Stoic theory of deduction
invariably comes out as deficient, inferior, or simply outlandish in such
comparisons, which has evoked adjusting additions and modifications -
- tacit or explicit -- in previous reconstructions of the system. I suggest
that this is the wrong approach; that the classical propositional calculus
is the wrong paradigm; that Stoic logic has to be considered first of all
in its own light; and that, if one looks for comparisons with
contemporary logic, one can find some rather more interesting parallels
when turning one's attention to non-truth-functional propositional
307
logics."
(1) By an argumental rule I mean a rule that produces arguments from
(zero or more) arguments, as opposed to a rule that produces
propositions from (zero or more) propositions.
(2) The accounts of the indemonstrables, when interpreted as rules, are
nullary argumental rules.
———. 1997. "The Stoics on Hypotheses and Hypothetical
Arguments." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 42:299-
312.
The article argues (i) that the hypothetical arguments about which the
Stoic Chrysippus wrote numerous books (DL VII 196) are the same as
those mentioned five times in "Epictetus" (e.g., Diss. I 25.11-12), and
(ii) that these hypothetical arguments are formed by replacing in a non-
hypothetical argument one (or more) of the premisses by a Stoic
"hypothesis" or supposition. Such "hypotheses" differ from
propositions in that they have a specific logical form and no truth-
value. The reason for the introduction of a distinct class of hypothetical
arguments can be found in the context of dialectical argumentation.
Some evidence for the use of Stoic hypothetical arguments in ancient
texts is discussed."
———. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. New
See Chapter 3 Modality, determinism, and freedom pp. 97-143.
"A considerable number of our testimonies about the Stoic doctrine of
determinism are concerned with modality. In particular the concepts of
possibility and necessity were central to some parts of its discussion. It
seems that Hellenistic philosophers generally agreed that an action or,
in general, activity does not depend on us and is not in our power, if it
(or a corresponding proposition) is necessary or impossible; or, put
differently, that a prerequisite for something's depending on us is that it
is both possible and non-necessary. This fact is invoked both by the
Stoics in defence of their theory and in the criticism of their opponents.
But in the debate over fate and determinism, modalities played a role in
a number of different contexts. They are dealt with separately in the
following sections:
- Chrysippus rejected Diodorus' modal theory, because of its built-in
necessitarian consequences (3.1.2).
308
- Chrysippus developed his own set of modal notions, which, in
themselves, do not lead to necessitarianism and which secure a
necessary con
dition for that which depends on us (3.1.3-5).
- Some critics of Chrysippus and the Stoics developed arguments to
show that there is a conflict between Chrysippus' modal notions and the
Stoic theory of fate (3.2).-
- Some later Stoics replied to this type of objection by giving an
epistemic interpretation of Chrysippus' modal notions (3.3).
- Critics of the Stoics objected that fate, qua Necessity, renders all
events necessary; but this objection is not justified in Chrysippus'
philosophy (3.4)." p. 97
———. 2002. "Pre-Stoics Hypothetical Syllogistic in Galen's Institutio
Logica." In The Unknown Galen, edited by Nutton, Vivian. London:
Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.
The text of the Institutio logica is not found in Kühn (*) because its
sole surviving MS was first published, not long after its discovery, in
1844, and thus too late for inclusion. The reasons for once considering
it spurious are unconvincing. Galen's Institutio is one of our main
witnesses for a hypothetical syllogistic which predates Stoic
propositional logic. Galen draws from a number of different sources
and theories including the "ancient philosophers" (hoi palaioi ton
philosophon), including Chrysippus; and the "more recent" (hoi
neoteroi), post-Chrysippean Stoics or logicians of other schools who
adopted Stoic terminology and theory."
[* Karl Gottlob Kühn, Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia. Leipzig: C.
Cnobloch, 1821-1833, 19 volumes, reprinted Hildesheim, Georg
Olms,1964-1997].
———. 2003. "Logic." In The Cambridge Companion to Stoics, edited
by Inwood, Brad, 85-123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2005. "The Stoics on Fallacies of Equivocation." In Language
and Learning. Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age.
Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Frede,
Dorothea and Inwood, Brad, 239-273. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
As Susanne Bobzien shows, the Stoics had philosophical reasons for
the development of strategies to handle `lexical' ambiguities, because
309
they regarded fallacies of ambiguity as complexes of propositions and
sentences that straddle the realm of linguistic expression (the domain of
language) and the realm of meaning (the domain of logic); moreover,
there is also a pragmatic component because being deceived is a
psychological disposition that can be reduced neither to language nor to
meaning. Not all arguments are, after all, as transparently fallacious as
is the example that exploits the ambiguity of 'for men/manly' and
concludes that a 'garment for men' must be courageous because
manliness is courage. Bobzien provides a detailed analysis of the
relevant passages, lays bare textual and interpretative difficulties, and
explores what the Stoic view on the matter implies for their theory of
language. She points up that the Stoics believe that the premisses of the
fallacies, when uttered, have only one meaning and are true, and thus
should be conceded; hence no mental process of disambiguation is
needed, while Aristotle, by contrast, assumes that the premisses contain
several meanings, and recommends that the listeners explicitly
disambiguate them. Bobzien proffers two readings of the Stoic advice
that we 'be silent' when confronted with fallacies of ambiguity, and
explicates how each leads to an overall consistent interpretation of the
textual evidence. Finally, she demonstrates that the method advocated
by the Stoics works for all fallacies of lexical ambiguity." From the
Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 10-11
———. 2011. "The Combinatorics of Stoic Conjunction: Hipparchus
Refuted, Chrysippus Vindicated." Oxford Studies in Ancient
Bobzien, Susanne, and Mignucci, Mario. 1999. "Logic. Iii. The Stoics."
In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra,
Keimpe, Barnes, Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield, Malcolm, 92-
§§ 1-7 (pp. 92-157) by S. Bobzien; § 8 (pp. 157-176) by M. Mignucci.
Bochenski, Joseph. 1961. A History of Formal Logic. Notre Dame:
Indiana University Press.
Translated from the German edition "Formale Logik" (1956) by Ivo
Thomas.
Reprinted New York, Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970.
On the Stoics see Part III. The Megarian-Stoic School pp. 105-251.
Brancacci, Aldo. 2005. "Antisthène Et Le Stoïcisme: La Logique." In
310
Les Stoïciens, edited by Romeyer, Dherbey Gilbert and Gourinat, Jean-
Baptiste, 55-73. Paris: Vrin.
Brittain, Charles. 2005. "Common Sense: Concepts, Definition and
Meaning in and out of the Stoa." In Language and Learning.
Charles Brittain also focuses on an important aspect of the
philosophical analysis of language: its relation to reality and to the
conceptual apparatus in the human mind, which on most theories
connects reality to language. To the naive mind, a concept like
'common sense' would not seem to be in need of development since it
must have been in place since the dawn of human reasoning. Nor is that
the issue of Brittain's paper. Instead, he focuses on the development of
a theory of common sense that is based on the connection between a
stock of rational conceptions that is the common possession of all
humans and the words which map naturally onto those conceptions and
so give expression to them. The Stoics themselves did not maintain that
everyone can acquire conceptions that successfully capture the essence
of things; such success presupposes the uncorrupted mind of the wise;
so these normative concepts do not seem to be an obvious source for a
theory of common conceptions that are open to all. As Brittain
contends, it would nevertheless be wrong to attribute such a theory to
the later Platonists despite the fact that they advocated the existence of
universally acceptable word-meanings that are open to every human
being's grasp. For Platonists regarded these meanings as mere
accidental features of the thing in question. What was needed to
establish a theory of common sense was a combination of the two
theories: the 'preliminary definition' of a term with universal acceptance
that lays claim to at least a partial grasp of the thing's essence. En route
to this solution Brittain offers, inter alia, a reconstruction of the
mechanism at work in the formation of common concepts with abstract
and general contents and seeks to solve the conundrum of how
definitions of the words corresponding to the concepts are formed. He
does so by carefully sifting through different sources that employ Stoic
vocabulary (such as 'preconceptions' or 'common conceptions') but that
differ significantly from the Stoic view that all humans have at least a
311
partial grasp of a thing's essential properties, rather than mere
accidental properties. This assumption paves the way towards a theory
of 'common sense' that establishes a direct connection between the
concepts and the objects of the world and explains how ordinary
language-speakers have at least an outline understanding of the world.
Such a theory, so Brittain argues, is the upshot of Cicero's treatment of
preconceptions, in the basis of definitions. The rendering of
'preconception' (prolepsis) as shared by all - by communis mens and
finally by communis sensus - justifies the attribution to Cicero of at
least 'a fragment of a theory of common sense' in civic and political
matters that everyone in principle can understand. This was a theory
that deeply influenced the later rhetorical tradition and thereby became
a lasting asset in cultural history." From the Introduction by Dorothea
Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 8-9
Brochard, Victor. 1892. "La Logique Des Stoïciens." Archiv für
Repris dans: V. Brochard, Études de philosophie antique et de
philosophie moderne: XI. La logique des Stoïciens (Première étude
220-238); XII. La logique des Stoïciens (Deuxième étude 239-251),
Paris, Vrin, 1954.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1980. "Proof Defined." In Doubt and
Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, edited by Barnes,
Jonathan, Burnyeat, Myles and Schofield, Malcolm, 125-160. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
———. 1986. "Remarques Sur La Classification Des Propositions
Simples Dans Les Logiques Hellénistiques." In Philosophie Du
Langage Et Grammaire Dans L'antiquité, 287-310. Bruxelles: Ousia.
Rèimpimé dans: J. Brunschwig, Études sur les philosophies
hellénistiques. Epicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1995.
Translated as: Remarks on the classification of simple propositions in
Hellenistic logics, in: J. Brunschwig, Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy,
translated by Janet Lloyd, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994, pp. 57-71.
———, ed. 2006. Les Stoïciens Et Leur Logique. Paris: Vrin.
312
Table des matières: Avant propos de la deuxième édition 7; Avant
propos de la première édition 11; John M. Rist: Zeno and the Origins of
Stoic Logic (non revu par l'auteur) 13; Ian G. Kidd: Posidonius and
Logic (revu par l'auteur) 29; Victor Goldschmidt: Remarques sur
l'origine épicurienne de la "prénotion" (revu par Pierre-Marie Morel)
41; Anthony A. Long: The Stoic Distinction Between Truth (me
alétheia) and the True (to alethés) (revu par l'auteur) 61; Claude
Imbert: Théorie de la représentation et doctrine logique dans le
stoïcisme ancien (revu par l'auteur) 79; George Kerferd: The Problem
of syntakatathesis and katalepsis in Stoic Doctrine (revu par Thomas
Bénatouïl) 109; Urs Egli: Stoic Syntax and Semantics (revu par
l'auteur) 131; Pierre Pachet: l'imperatif stoïcien (revu par l'auteur) 149;
Françoise Caujolle-Zaslawsky: Le style stoïcien et la paremphasis
(revu par l'auteur) 165; Richard Goulet: La classification stoïcienne des
propositions simples selon Diogène Laërce, VII 69-70 (revu par
l'auteur) 191; Anthony C. Lloyd: Definite Propositions and the Concept
of Reference (revu par Jean-Baptiste Gourinat) 223; Jacques
Brunschwig: Le modèle conjonctif (revu par l'auteur) 235; Gérard
Verbeke: La philosophie du signe chez les stoïciens (revu par Danielle
Lories) 261; Hervé Barreau: Cléanthe et Chrysippe face au maître-
argument de Diodore (revu par l'auteur) 283; Mario Mignucci: Sur la
logique modale des stoïciens (revu par Paolo Crivelli) 303; Pasquale
Pasquino: Le statut ontologique des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme
(revu par l'auteur) 333; Andreas Graeser: The Stoic Categories (revu
par l'auteur) 347; Janine Bertier: Une hénadologie liée au stoïcisme
tardif dans le commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise à la Métaphysique
d'Aristote (990 b 9) (non revu par l'auteur) 369; Jean-Paul Dumont:
Mos geometricus, mos physicus (revu par Pierre-Marie Michel) 389;
Joseph Moreau: Immutabilité du vrai, nécessité logique et lien causal
(revu par Valéry Laurand) 405; Jonathan Barnes: La doctrine du retour
éternel (revu par l'auteur) 421; Maria Daraki: Les fonctions
psychologiques du logos dans le stoïcisme ancien (non revu par
l'auteur) 441; Bibliographie complémentaire 475; Index locorum 485-
509.
Burnyeat, Myles. 1982. "Gods and Heaps." In Language and Logos.
Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen,
313
edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha, 315-338.
On the Stoic Sorite paradox.
———. 2011. "The Origins of Non-Deductive Inference." In Science
and Speculation. Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, edited by
Barnes, Jonathan, Brunschwig, Jacques, Burnyeat, Myles and
Casari, Ettore. 1958. "Sulla Disgiunzione Nella Logica Megarico-
Stoica." In Actes Du Viii Congrès Internationale D'histoire Des
Sciences. Florence-Milan, 3-9 Septembre 1956. Vol. Iii, 1217-1224.
Paris: Hermann et C.ie.
Castagnoli, Luca. 2010. "How Dialectical Was Stoic Dialectic?" In
Ancient Models of Mind: Studies in Human and Divine Rationality,
edited by Nightingale, Andrea Wilson and Sedley, David, 153-179.
Cavini, Walter. 1983. "La Teoria Stoica Della Negazione." In Atti Del
Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica, edited by Abrusci,
Michele, Casari, Ettore and Mugnai, Massimo, 229-234. Bologna:
CLUEB.
———. 1985. "Il Papiro Parigino 2. Testo, Traduzione E Commento."
In Studi Su Papiri Greci Di Logica E Medicina, 85-126. Firenze:
Olschki.
———. 1985. "La Negazione Di Frase Nella Logica Greca." In Studi
Su Papiri Greci Di Logica E Medicina, edited by Cavini, Walter,
Indice dei Contenuti: Nota liminare 9;
LA NEGAZIONE ARISTOTELICA
1. La sintesi dichiarativa: supplemento di frase e contenuto descrittivo
11; 2. Negazione semplice e affermazione trasposta 17; 3. Le asserzioni
indeterminate: trasformazione predicativa ed equivocità composta 26;
4. Portata esistenziale dell'affermazione 36; 5. Negative categoriche 41;
LA NEGAZIONE STOICA
1. Frammenti e testimonianze 47; 2. La teoria stoica degli axiomata 48;
3. Negazione semplice e composta 51; 4. Opposti contraddittòri 57; 5.
Ambiguità della negazione ordinaria 67;
APPENDICE - IL PAPIRO PARIGINO 2
314
Testo e traduzione 86; Commento 107; Bibliografia 122-126
———. 1996. "Essere Ed Essere Vero. Sull'uso Assoluto Di Hyparcho
Nella Logica Stoica." In Odoi Dizesios = Le Vie Della Ricerca. Studi in
Onore Di Francesco Adorno, edited by Funghi, Maria Serena, 141-145.
Firenze: Olschki.
Celluprica, Vincenza. 1980. "La Logica Stoica in Alcune Recenti
Interpretazioni." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico:123-150.
———. 1989. "Diocle Di Magnesia Come Fonte Della Dossografia
Stoica in Diogene Laerzio." Orpheus.Rivista di Umanità Classica e
Cristiana no. 10:58-79.
Colish, Marcia L. 1979. "The Stoic Hypothetical Syllogisms and Their
Transmission in the Latin West through the Early Middle Ages." Res
Publica Litterarum no. 2:19-26.
———. 1985. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle
Ages. Leiden: Brill.
Vol. I: Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature (1985); Vol. II: Stoicism
in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century (1990).
See Vol. I, Chapter One: Stoicism in Antiquity § C) Logic pp. 50-60.
"Logic in the Stoic philosophy deals broadly with the way men think
and speak about the world. The Stoics' theory of knowledge, their
formal dialectic, and their theories of language, grammar, rhetoric, and
poetics show an intimate relationship to their physics and ethics. The
logos of thought and speech is a cognate of the logos as the rational
principle of the universe and of the human logos which enables man to
make the correct judgments on which his ethical life depends." pp. 50-
51
Corcoran, John. 1974. "Remarks on Stoic Deduction." In Ancient Logic
and Its Modern Interpretations. Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium
on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972,
edited by Corcoran, John, 169-181. Dordrecht: Reidel.
The purpose of this note is to raise and clarify certain questions
concerning deduction in Stoic logic. Despite the fact that the extant
corpus of relevant texts is limited, it may nevertheless be possible to
answer some of these questions with a considerable degree of certainty.
Moreover, with the answers obtained one might be able to narrow the
range of possible solutions to other problems concerning Stoic theories
of meaning and inference.
315
The content of this note goes somewhat beyond the comments I made
during the discussion of Professor Gould's paper 'Deduction in Stoic
Logic', in the symposium. I am grateful to Professors Gould and
Kretzmann for pointing out the implications of those comments as well
as for encouraging me to prepare them for this volume.
One of the obstacles to a careful discussion of Stoic logic is obscurity
of terminology. Clarification of terminology may catalyze recognition
of important historical facts. For example, in 1956 a modern logician
suggested (incorrectly) in a historical note [A. Church, Introduction to
mathematical logic, Princeton. 1956, fn. 529] that the distinction
between implication and deduction could not have been made before
the work of Tarski and Carnap. But once historians had clarified their
own terminology it became obvious that this distinction played an
important role in logic from the very beginning. Aristotle's distinction
between imperfect and perfect syllogisms is a variant of the
implication-deduction distinction and Gould 'Deduction in Stoic Logic'
suggests the existence of a parallel distinction in Stoic logic." p. 169
Crivelli, Paolo. 1994. "Indefinite Propositions and Anaphora in Stoic
Logic." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 39:187-206.
The verb hupotattein belongs to the jargon of Stoic logic and expresses
the operation of subordination, which yields the definite propositions
that are relevant to the truth or falsity of a given indefinite proposition.
The standard ("sentential") truth conditions of conditionals and
conjunctions yield the expected ("quantificational") truth conditions of
indefinite conditionals and conjunctions, i.e. truth conditions suitable
for "universal" and "particular" propositions."
———. 1994. "The Stoic Analysis of Tense and of Plural Propositions
in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos X 99." Classical
———. 2009. "La Dialectique." In Lire Les Stoïciens, edited by
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste and Barnes, Jonathan, 41-61. Paris: Presses
———. 2010. "The Stoics on Definitions." In Definition in Greek
Philosophy, edited by Charles, David, 359-423. New York: Oxford
University Press.
The present study is a reconstruction of the Stoic theory of definition.
The topic is vast and the sources are scarce. My focus is on the
316
epistemological and semantic aspects of the Stoic theory of definition.
The study's first section explains how important definitions were for the
Stoics. The second section expounds the different locations of the study
of definitions within the Stoic system of philosophical disciplines. The
third section discusses the epistemological side of the theory of
definitions on which one of these locations relies. In particular, it
addresses two roles played by definitions: sharpening our conceptions
in such a way that they are more successfully applied to or withheld
from entities, and endowing our conceptions with a systematic structure
that makes them suitable for instruction. The fourth section discusses
the link between definition and essence: it argues that the Stoics do not
think that definitions reveal the essence of what is defined. The fifth
section discusses the position of definitions within Stoic philosophy of
language: definitions are not linguistic expressions, but sayables of a
special kind (distinct from statables)." (p. 359).
Croissant, Jeanne. 1984. "Autour De La Quatrième Formule
D'implication Dans Sextus Empiricus, Hyp. Pyrrh. Ii, 112. Essai De
Mise Au Point." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 2:73-120.
Repris dans: J. Croissant, Études de philosophie ancienne, Bruxelles,
Ousia, 1986, pp. 297-345.
Detel, Wolfgang, Hülsen, Reinhard, Krüger, Gerhard, and Lorenz,
Wolfgang. 1980. "Lekta Elliphé in Der Stoischen Sprachphilosophie."
Dorandi, Tiziano. 2005. "La Tradition Papyrologique Des Stoïciens." In
Les Stoiciens, edited by Romeyer, Dherbey Gilbert and Gourinat, Jean-
J'ai organisé ma contribution en cinq sections: I. Noms de philosophes
stoïciens et de leurs oeuvres dans les papyrus (d'Égypte et
d'Herculanum). 2. Histoire de la Stoa de Philodème de Gadara. 3.
Textes stoïciens en tradition directe (livres ou fragments de philosophes
stoïciens transmis par les papyrus d'Égypte ou d'Herculanum). Je
considère d'abord les textes dont l'attribution à un philosophe défini est
certaine ou présumée telle: Chrysippe, Hiéroclès, Musonius Rufus;
ensuite, je m'arrête sur le papyrus Parisinus 2 dont l'attribution à
Chrysippe a été contestée; enfin, j'examine des cas de fausses
attributions. 4. Textes stoïciens en tradition indirecte (les extraits de la
Politeia de Zénon de Citium cités par Philodème; ceux tirés des œuvres
317
d'Ariston de Chios, d'Antipatros de Tarse et de Diogène de Séleucie). 5.
Pour terminer, je dresserai une liste de papyrus où se trouve une
référence à la Stoa, aux stoïciens, ou des allusions à des doctrines
stoïciennes." p. 30.
Les pp. 35-37 sont sur les Recherches logiques (Logika zêtêmata)
(fragmenta, P. Herc. 307) de Chrysippe.
Döring, Klaus, and Ebert, Theodor, eds. 1993. Dialektiker Und Stoiker.
Zur Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort 7; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 8;
Teilnehmerverzeichnis 9; Wolfram Ax: Der Einfluss des Peripatos auf
die Sprachtheorie der Stoa 11; Mariano Baldassarri: Ein kleiner Traktat
Plutarchs über stoische Logik 33; Jonathan Barnes: Meaning, Saying
and Thinking 47; Susanne Bobzien: Chrysippus' Modal Logic and Its
Relation to Philo and Diodorus 63; Walter Cavini: Chrysippus on
Speaking Truly and the Liar 85; Theodor Ebert: Dialecticians and
Stoics on the Classification of Propositions 111; Urs Egli: Neue
Elemente im Bild der stoischen Logik 129; Michael Frede: The Stoic
Doctrine of the Tenses of the Verb 141; Gabriele Giannantoni: Die
Philosophenschule der Megariker und Aristoteles 155; Karheinz
Hülser: Zur dialektischen und stoischen Einteilung der Fehlschlüsse
167; Katerina Ieorodiakonou: The Stoic Indemonstrables in the Later
Tradition 187; Fritz Jürss: Zum Semiotik Modell der Stoiker und ihrer
Vorläufer 201; Mario Mignucci: The Stoic Themata 217; Luciano
Montoneri: Platon, die Ältere Akademie und die stoische Dialektik
239; Luciana Repici: The Stoics and the Elenchos 253; Andreas
Schubert: Die stoischen Vorstellungen 271; Gerhard Seel: Zur
Geschichte und Logik des therizön logos 291; Hermann Weeidemann:
Zeit und Wahrheit bei Diodor 319; Literaturverzeichnis 331; Register
343-361
Drozdek, Adam. 2002. "Lekton. Stoic Logic and Ontology." Acta
Antiqua.Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae no. 42:93-104.
For the Stoics, the lekton is as an intermediary between the thought and
the object. They do not exist independently of the mind, but, at the
same time, the mind does not create them. Due to this status, they
guarantee intersubjectivity of the rational discourse. They are
incorporeals that do not exist, but subsist and the Stoic Logos-God
guarantees their permanent subsistence. The lekta are semantico-
318
syntactic entities. Their role is analogous to the role of an interlingua
used as a tool for automated translation of languages."
Dumitriu, Anton. 1977. History of Logic. Tunbridge Wells: Abacus
Press.
Revised, updated, and enlarged translation from the Roumanian of the
second edition of "Istoria logicii" (4 volumes).
On the Stoics see: Vol. I, pp. 216-253.
Dyson, Henry. 2009. Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa. Berlin: de
Gruyter.
Ebert, Theodor. 1987. "The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs in
Sextus Empiricus." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 5:83-126.
In his critical discussion of the dogmatic philosophers Sextus
Empiricus expounds a Stoic doctrine which has conveniently been
labelled 'the theory of signs'. This chapter of Stoic philosophy offers a
blend of logic and epistemology, a mixture bound to attract the interest
of present-day 'ancient philosophers'. Hence, with the growing
discussion focusing on the philosophy of the Hellenistic period, this
part of Stoicism was to get a fair share of attention. (1) Controversy has
been flourishing over the merits and weaknesses of this theory; it has
been compared with tenets about the topic of signs held by earlier and
later philosophers, yet in these discussions it has almost universally
been taken for granted that there is a single theory of signs and that it
can be attributed unqualifiedly to the Stoics. (2)
Part of what I want to do in this paper is to challenge this assumption. I
shall argue that the material relating to the theory of signs which is
preserved in Sextus does not reflect Chrysippan teaching, but goes back
to Stoics antedating Chrysippus. To have a convenient term, I shall
refer to the pre-Chrysippan Stoics as 'early Stoics'. (3) I shall further
argue that the theory of signs of the early Stoics was a harvest not
grown in the fields of Stoic philosophy, but that it originated from the
'Dialecticians', a group of philosophers confused for a long time with
the Megarians and rediscovered as a group in its own right by David
Sedley. (4) I shall further try to point out some modifications which this
theory underwent as it was integrated into the epistemology of the early
Stoics. I shall not discuss the doctrine of signs advocated by the
opponents of the Epicureans in Philodemus' de Signis -- almost
certainly Stoic philosophers -- a doctrine which has been ably discussed
319
by David Sedley in a recent paper. (5)" pp. 83-84
(1) Cf. G. Verbeke, 'La philosophie du signe chez les Stoiciens', in Les
Stoiciens et leur logique, ed. J. Brunschwig (Paris, 1978), 401-24; J. M.
Rist, 'Zeno and the origins of stoic logic', ibid. 387-400; M. Baratin,
'Les origines stoiciennes de la théorie augustinienne du signe', Revue
des Etudes Latines, LIX (1981), 260-8; M. F. Bumyeat, 'The Origins of
Non-deductive Inference', in Science and Speculation: Studies in
Hellenistic Theory and Practice, ed J. Barnes et al. (Cambridge/Paris,
1982), 193-238; D. Sedley, 'On Signs', ibid. 239-72; D. Glidden,
'Skeptic Semiotics', Phronesis, XX (1983), 213-55. For discussions in
the older literature cf. R. Philippson, De Philodemi Libro qui est peri
semeion kai semeioseon et Epicureorum doctrina logica (Berlin, 1881);
P. Natorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im
Altertum (Berlin, 1884), 127 ff; W. Heintz, Studien zu Sextus Empiricus
(Halle, 1932), 42-51; G. Preti, 'Sulla dottrina del semeion nella logica
stoica', Rivista Cntica di Storia della Filosofia, XI (1956), 5-14.
(2) The only exception known to me is D. Sedley who wants to 'put
into abeyance the widespread belief that Stoic doctrine is under
discussion by Sextus Empiricus throughout M VIII. 141-298 and PH II.
97-133' (Sedley, above n. 1, 241).
(3) The traditional division of Stoicism puts Chrysippus' Stoic
predecessors together with his own school into the Old Stoa, separating
it from middle Stoicism inaugurated by Panaetius. This classification
seems to be based on Stoic ethics, and understandably so. After all, it
was their moral philosophy which, beginning with Cicero, made the
Stoics so immensely influential, and here the affinity between Zeno and
Chrysippus is clearly stronger than the one between Chrysippus and
Panaetius. Yet in logic and epistemology, there is no similar
relationship between Chrysippus and his predecessors. Here the great
break comes about with Chrysippus, and we should group Stoic
philosophers in this field accordingly.
(4) Cf. D. Sedley, 'Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy',
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, CCIII, N S 23
(1977), 74- 120.
(5) Cf. D. Sedley, above n 1.
———. 1991. Dialektiker Und Frühe Stoiker Bei Sextus Empiricus.
Untersuchungen Zur Entstehung Der Aussagenlogik. Göttingen:
320
Inhalt: Einleitung 13; I. Teil: Der Ursprung der stoischen Theorie des
Zeichens. Erstes Kapitel: Die stoische Theorie des Zeichens bei Sextus
Empiricus 29; Zweites Kapitel: Die stoische Theorie des Zeichens vor
dem Hintergrund der Berichte bei Diogenes Laertius 54; Drittes
Kapitel: Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker zur Theorie des Zeichens 66; II.
Teil: Die Dialektiker bei Sextus Empiricus. Viertes Kapitel: Die
Dialektische Klassifikation der Aussagen bei Sextus Empiricus 83;
Fünftes Kapitel: Die Dialektische Klassifikation der Aussagen als
Vorstufe der stoischen 108; Sechstes Kapitel: Die Dialektische und die
stoische Klassifikation der Fehlschlüsse bei Sextus Empiricus 131;
Siebtes Kapitel: Die Dialektiker über Trugschlüsse und ihre Auflösung
176; Anhang I zum II. Teil: Diodor und die 'Dialektiker' in AM 10.111
209; Anhang II zum II. Teil: Dialektiker und Stoiker bei Apuleius 213;
III. Teil: Der Ursprung der stoischen Theorie des Beweis. Achtes
Kapitel: Der frühstoische Charakter der Theorie des Beweises bei
Sextus Empiricus 219; Neuntes Kapitel: Ubereinstimmungen und
Unterschiede in den Referaten des Sextus zur stoischen Beweistheorie
und das genetische Verhältnis ihrer Quellen 232; Zehntes Kapitel: Von
den Dialektikern zu Chrysipp -- der Weg einer Theorie in der Alten
Stoa 287; Schlussbemerkung 303; Anhang: Texte aus Sextus Empiricus
zu den Dialektikern und den Stoikern 311; Literaturverzeichnis 326;
Register 337-346.
English translation of the first part in: The origin of the Stoic theory of
signs in Sextus Empiricus (1987)
———. 1993. "Dialecticians and Stoics on the Classification of
Propositions." In Dialektiker Und Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und
Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 111-127.
Egli, Urs. 1967. Zur Stoischen Dialektik.
Inauguraldissertation (Universität Bern).
Inhaltsverzeichnis: 1. Allgemeines zur Rekonstruktion der stoischen
Dialektik 2; 2. Diokles bei Diogenes Laertios 7.49-82 8; 3.
Quellengeschichtliche Nebenergebnisse zu Diogenes und Sextos 59; 4.
Nebenergebnisse zu Galens Einführung in die Logik 74;
Zusammenfassung und Ausblick 87; Erklärung der wichstigsten
Abkürzungen 106; Bibliographie 107-113.
321
———. 1983. "The Stoic Theory of Arguments." In Meaning, Use, and
Interpretation of Language, edited by Bäuerle, Rainer, Schwarze,
Christoph and Stechow, Arnim von, 79-96. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Contents: 1. Relevance of the topic; 2. Concepts involved; 2.1
Arguments; 2.2 Simple and logical concepts; 2.3 A hypothesis on Stoic
deduction theory; 3. A commentary on Sextus' passage on invalidity
[Adv. Math. 8, 292-294]; 3.1 The context; 3.2 The passage; 4.
Deductions; 5. Completeness; 6. Conclusion; Appendix: Possible
existence of cut free systems; Bibliography.
"1. Relevance of the Topic
The Stoíc theory of arguments to my mind illustrates one point: If
certain ancient doctrines had been properly understood, the
corresponding modern theories would have been developed sooner. We
would have had a propositional logic by 1800, we would have had a
serious syntax long before transformational grammar. Stoics, in
addition, had already something like a speech act theory. In one or two
cases modern theories have directly been elaborations of Stoico-
Megarian developments: First, Prior's tense logic was influenced by
reflections on Diodorus. Second, Kripke's semantics for modal logic
was directly influenced by Prior's exposition of the theory of modality
of Diodorus Kronos. Compare his truth definition of modal statements
with that of Kripke:
p is possible now iff p is true now or will be true later (Diodorus).
p is possible in our world iff p is true in a world accessìble from ours
(Kripke).
Kripke replaced points of time by possible worlds and the relation "to
be now or later" by the accessibility relation. It is not impossible that
further study of Stoic theories will contribute in a similar way to
modern discussions.
It has been proved by Lukasìewìcz and Mates that the Stoic theory of
what they called syllogisms contained something we might call
propositional logic in modern terms. Mates also brought up the problem
of deciding whether
1) Stoics contended that their propositional logic was complete; and
whether
2) Stoic logic actually was complete according to modern criteria
(Mates 1961, 81-82).
322
As to the first question, the evidence that Mates adduces is not wholly
conclusive, for the passages are little more than consequences of the
definition of syllogisms (= valid arguments): According to this
definition a syllogism is either a basic syllogism (anapodeiktos) or
derived from basic syllogisms by the deductive rules (themata) (DL
7.78). From this definition follows that every syllogism (which is not
basic) is derived from the basic ones -- the passages adduced by Mates
say just that. If it is not clear whether the Stoics actually held that their
propositional logic was complete, Becker's attempt to prove the
completeness of Stoic logic by reconstructing the missing pieces of the
deductive apparatus may seem futile. He has also been severely
criticised by Mueller, Frede and others because it is not clear
(a) whether the Stoic conditional sign ei is to be taken as a truth-
functional connective or not,
(b) how the Chrysippean exclusion of arguments with but one premise
can be reconciled with Becker's full use of such arguments in his proofs
of semantic completeness,
(c) whether the completeness extended from the part of the system
involving only conjunction and negation to other connectives.
I now want to reopen the question by arguing that a kind of
completeness is indeed to be found in Stoic passages (though not in
those Mates adduced) and that an examination of the sources renders
some plausibility to the thesis that the Stoics had a system of deduction
rules which can be proved adequate according to modern criteria.
(Some material on the same matter is already contained in Egli 1967,
54 and Egli 1977 [Review of Frede 1974. Gnomon 49, 1977, 784-
790].)" pp. 789-80.
———. 1993. "Neue Elemente Im Bild Der Stoischen Logik." In
Steiner.
Evans, John David Gemmill. 2011. "The Old Stoa and the Truth-Value
of Oaths." Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society no.
20:44-47.
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Stoic Dialectic (Second Part: F - Z)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Frede, Michael. 1974. Die Stoische Logik. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht.
Inhaltverzeichnis: (I) Einleitung 9; A.Der Gegenstand dieser Arbeit 9;
Die äussere Geschichte der stoischen Logik 12; (II) Die Aussage 32; A.
Der stoische Begriff der Aussage 32; 1. Die stoischen Bestimmungen
der Aussage 32; 2. Aussagen ändern ihren Wahrheitswert 44; 3. Die
Vergänglichkeit von Aussagen 48; B. Die Arten von Aussagen 49; 1.
Die Unterscheidung von einfachen und nichteinfachen Aussagen 49; 2.
Dier Arten von einfachen Aussagen 51; 3. Die Arten von nicht-
einfachen Aussagen 73; 4. Logisch wahre Aussagen 105; C. Die
Modalität von Aussagen 107; (III) Der Schluss 118; A. Die gültigen
Schlüsse 118; 1. Die stoische Definition des Schlusses 118; B. Die
Syllogistik 124; 1. Der stoische Begriff des Syllogismus 124; 2. Die
elementaren Syllogismen 127; 3. Die nicht-elementaren Syllogismen
167; (iv) Arten von Schlüssen, welche mit Hilfe des 2. Themas
analysiert werden 181; 4. Die Vollständigkeit der stoischen Syllogistik
196; 5. Der Formalismus der stoischen Syllogistik 198; Indices 202; (I)
Literaturverzeichnis 202; Sachregister 208; Verzeichnis griechischer
325
Termini 209; Verzeichnis lateinischer Termini 210; Bemerkungen zum
Text 210; Stellenregister 211-224.
Review by A. C. LLoyd in: Mind, 86, pp. 286-289.
———. 1974. "Stoic Vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic." Archiv für
Reprinted in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota Press, 1987 pp. 99-124.
———. 2009. "The Stoic Notion of a Lekton." In Language, edited by
Everson, Stephen, 109-128. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Companions to Ancient Thought. Vol. 3.
Gabriel, Gottfried, Hulser, Karlheinz, and Schlotter, Sven. 2009. "Zur
Miete Bei Frege - Rudolf Hirzel Und Die Rezeption Der Stoischen
Logik Und Semantik in Jena." History and Philosophy of Logic no.
30:369-388.
t has been noted before in the history of logic that some of Frege's
logical and semantic views were anticipated in Stoicism. In particular,
there seems to be a parallel between Frege's Gedanke (thought) and
Stoic lekton; and the distinction between complete and incomplete lekta
has an equivalent in Frege's logic. However, nobody has so far claimed
that Frege was actually influenced by Stoic logic; and there has until
now been no indication of such a causal connection. In this essay, we
attempt, for the first time, to provide detailed evidence for the existence
of this connection. In the course of our argumentation, further analogies
between the positions of Frege and the Stoics will be revealed. The
classical philologist Rudolf Hirzel will be brought into play as the one
who links Frege with Stoicism. The renowned expert on Stoic
philosophy was Frege's tenant and lived in the same house as the
logician for many years."
Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1985. "Sur Le Diexengménon De La Logique
Stoïcienne." Logique et Analyse no. 28:385-394.
Gaskin, Richard. 1997. "The Stoics on Cases, Predicates and the Unity
of the Proposition." In Aristotle and After, edited by Sorabji, Richard,
91-108. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.
Gould, Josiah. 1974. "Deduction in Stoic Logic." In Ancient Logic and
Its Modern Interpretations. Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on
Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972,
edited by Corcoran, John, 151-168. Dordrecht: Reidel.
326
In their logical theory Stoic philosophers made use of a simple but
important distinction alleged to hold among valid arguments, a
distinction to which Aristotle had first called attention.(1) They
distinguished those arguments whose validity is evident from those
whose validity is not evident and so needs to be demonstrated. The
Stoics, having supposed that the distinction obtains, raise and answer
the question, how does one demonstrate the validity of those arguments
whose validity is not plain? The Stoics appear to have set forth both a
discursive method of demonstration and a test for validity. In this paper
I examine these two facets of Stoic logic.(2)
The paper is in three parts. The first is essentially terminological and
taxonomic. There I record Stoic definitions of logical terms and I give
three Stoic classifications of arguments, appending samples from the
writings of Sextus Empiricus.(3) This provides and puts on exhibit an
array of typically Stoic arguments to which I refer in the second part of
the paper. There I examine Sextus' contention that the disagreement
among the Stoics over the criterion of truth for a conditional
proposition renders inefficacious the test that had been set forth as
sufficient for judging the validity of an argument, and I argue that
Sextus' charge has to be qualified. Even if an unqualified form of
Sextus' accusation could be established, its importance, I maintain,
would be diminished by the fact that the Stoics didn't make extensive
use of this test anyhow. As I show in the third part of the paper, the
Stoics ordinarily claim to prove the validity of all valid arguments(4)
not by means of a test but by means of a calculus of propositions(5)
having its base in a theory of deduction, which includes a language
consisting of connectives and variables, axiomatic inference schemata,
and rules of derivability. I conclude with a statement about the Stoic
theory of deduction in relation to systems of logic developed in the
19th and 20th centuries and to Aristotelian syllogistic." p. 151
(1) Prior Analytics I.24b22-26, 27a16-18. The distinction between
plainly valid syllogisms and non-evidently valid syllogisms is for
Aristotle the distinction between 'perfect' syllogisms, on the one hand,
and 'imperfect' syllogisms, on the other. A perfect syllogism is one in
which, as Aristotle frequently puts it, the necessity (of the conclusion if
the premises be assumed) is evident. That the Stoics presupposed this
distinction is made clear in Part III of this paper.
327
(2) I wish to thank my colleagues, James A. Thomas and Harold
Morick, for helpful critical remarks on an earlier draft of this paper. I
am also enormously indebted to John Corcoran for many incisive
remarks and helpful suggestions on two later versions of the paper.
(3) Sextus is the richest source we have for a knowledge of Stoic logic.
Being a Sceptic he is extremely critical of the Stoics. He also tends to
be tediously repetitious. He appears to have quoted and paraphrased
with care, though there aren't always non-circular ways of checking
this. As Mates has observed (Stoic logic (1961), p. 9), "any parts of
Stoic logic which he found either too difficult or too good to refute will
be absent from his account", but even so there is enough material in
Sextus to extract a fairly good account of the elements of Stoic logic.
(4) Mates refers in several places (pp. 4, 58, 82) to and gives evidence
for the Stoics' claim that their propositional logic was complete.
(5) The Stoics didn't call their logic a calculus of propositions
(Diogenes Laertius groups Chrysippus' books dealing with the subject
under the heading 'Logic in Relation to Arguments and Moods', Vitae
vii. 193); but Stoic logic shares so many similarities with modern
propositional logic, calling their logic 'a calculus of propositions' while
anachronistic is at least not baneful, and it is, in fact, in my view
illuminating to use this expression to refer to Stoic logic.
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 1999. "La Définition Et Les Propriétés De La
Proposition Dans Le Stoïcisme Ancien." In Théories De La Phrase Et
De La Proposition De Platon À Averroès, edited by Büttgen, Philippe,
Dieble, Stéphane and Marwan, Rashed, 133-150. Paris: Éditions rue
d'Ulm.
———. 2000. La Dialectique Des Stoiciens. Paris: Vrin.
Graeser, Andreas. 1978. "The Stoic Theory of Meaning." In The Stoics,
edited by Rist, John M., 77-100. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Reprinted in: A. Graeser - Issues in the philosophy of language past
and present - Bern, Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 121-144.
"Whether or not the Stoics conceived of any "science" corresponding in
scope and methods to formal semantics in the sense described, for
example, by J. Moravcsik (1) seems hard to determine. Evidence
regarding this issue is scanty, particularly in view of the fact that some
of the isolated testimonies relating to the Stoic theory of meaning are
328
extremely difficult to assess and still require good deal of extensive
analysis. From the meager reports concerning the bare essentials of this
theory as incorporated into later manuals and elsewhere, it would
appear, however, that in the course of their school's history the Stoics
developed a fairly detailed semantic theory. It is a theory of meaning
that has invited comparison with modern theories and obviously stood
it well. In fact, it is generally agreed that the Stoic account of semantics
is superior to and more sophisticated than the more influential one
offered by Aristotle in the De Interpretatione (16a3-18).(2) It is also
considered to figure among the very few definitely modern-minded
contributions to the systematic study of philosophical problems carried
out by ancient Greek thinkers.
Semantics in general, according to Stoic philosophers, seems to be an
integral part of what they called "Logic" or "Dialectic" respectively,
that is, the study of the utterance and the study of the utterance as
meaningful. It is integral inasmuch as the Stoic conception of logic is
one that depends again on their theory of meaning. In the analysis of
meaning three components seem to been distinguished. The
components or aspects under consideration are: first, the sign
(sèmainon, i.e., that which signifies) which is a phoneme or grapheme;
second, the significate (sémainomenon, i.e., that which is signified)
which is expressed by the sound which we apprehend as it arises in our
mind; and third, the external object referred to." pp. 77-78
(1) Understanding Language (The Hague, 1975) 21.
(2) On this most influential text in the history of semantics, see N.
Kretzman, "Aristotle on Spoken Sound," in J. Corcoran, ed., Ancient
Logic and its Modern Interpretations (Dordrecht and Boston, 1974) 3-
21.
Hájek, Alan. 2009. "Two Interpretations of Two Stoic Conditionals."
Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy no. 12:206-221.
Controversy has surrounded the interpretation of the so-called
'Diodorean' and 'Chrysippean' conditionals of the Stoics. I critically
evaluate and reject two interpretations of each of them: as expressing
natural laws, and as strict conditionals. In doing so I engage with the
work of authors such as Frede, Gould, Hurst, the Kneales, Mates, and
Prior. I conclude by offering my own proposal for where these Stoic
conditionals should be located on a 'ladder' of logical strength."
329
Hamelin, Octave. 1902. "Sur La Logique Des Stoïciens." Année
philosophique no. 12:13-26.
Hay, William. 1969. "Stoic Use of Logic." Archiv für Geschichte der
To sum up. I began by reporting briefly the present widely held opinion
that Stoic logic was a logic of propositions. I reminded us that in
twentieth-century logic, the logic of propositions, consists of rules
governing inferences according to their sentence-connectives and that it
by no means exhausts the rules of logic. Rather propositional functions
or predicates are added to that, and in turn many-place predicates are
added. Some investigators have supposed that Stoic logic was confined
to a logic of propositions. That restriction may be suggested by the
concentration of the Stoics on singular propositions as those which
express what exists most clearly and by their claim that all inferences
depend on their logic. If, however, the Stoics had no more logic than
the logic of propositions, they had no way of accounting for believing
(much less for knowing) non-simple propositions in conditional or
disjunctive forms, so that such non-simple propositions would be useful
in inference.
Evidence was introduced that the Stoics had and used a rule of
instantiation in conditional propositions. This led us to see a use for
their rules about the three kinds of simple propositions, those with
indefinite subjects, tis, ti, 'someone,' 'something;' those with definite
subjects, demonstrative articles such as outos, touto, 'this one', 'that
thing' and those with intermediate subjects, 'Socrates', 'Dion',
anthropos, 'a man'.
There is further evidence that the Stoics claimed to be able to rephrase
universal propositions of the Peripatetic form as conditional
propositions with indefinite subjects. Some philosophers from other
schools acknowledged that the conditionals followed from the standard
universal. There was disagreement about the converse. The charge was
made that the Stoics failed to acknowledge eternal forms and that they
replace them by things which existed in the mind only, or rather since
they were corporealists in the body of the knower only. Another paper
would be required to discuss the place of these grasps in the Stoic
account of knowledge and of ethics, for action involves how I take
things." pp. 155-156
330
Hirzel, Rudolf. 1879. "De Logica Stoicorum." In Satura Philologa.
Hermanno Sauppio Obtulit Amicorum Conlegarum Decas, 61-78.
Berlin: Weidemann.
Hitchcock, David. 2005. "The Peculiarities of Stoic Propositional
Logic." In Mistakes of Reason. Essays in Honour of John Woods,
edited by Peacock, Kent A. and Irvine, Andrew D., 224-242. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Hossenfelder, Malte. 1967. "Zur Stoischen Definition Von Axioma."
Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte no. 11:238-241.
Hülser, Karlheinz. 1983. "The Fragments on Stoic Dialectic: A New
Collection." In Meaning, Use, and Interpretation of Language, edited
by Bäuerle, Rainer, Schwarze, Christoph and Stechow, Arnim von,
235-249. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
For the Stoics dialectic was the discipline where they developed their
theory of cognition and of language as well as some kind of grammar
und formal logic. All those topics were formed into a system and a lot
of remarkable statements made about them. Hence, Stoic dialectic had
much influence, and founded the western tradition of systematic
linguistic theory. But the original writings of the Stoics are,
nevertheless, lost. Thus, in order to study the origins of systematic
linguistic thought, we have to collect the testimonies and fragments on
Stoic dialectic from many scattered sources, i.e. from later authors who
mentioned, reported or criticized Stoic ideas. In the last centuries this
task was performed by different scholars. I only mention Rudolf T.
Schmidt (1) and -- above all -- Hans v. Arnim whose 'Stoicorum
veterum fragmenta' is the famous standard collection of fragments on
all the three parts of Stoic philosophy up to now (2). With regard to
Stoic dialectic Prof. U. Egli came up with the idea that it would be
worth the trouble to collect the fragments once again. Ile applied for a
research program, sponsored by the 'Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(DFG)', and asked me to realize what he had in mind, the result of
which is a new collection of fragments on Stoic dialectic, the subject of
this paper.
The formal data of this new collection are the following ones: The
collection which amounts to 1257 fragment-numbers (plus ca. 70
additional a-numbers) embraces about 1800 texts, the greatest part of
which is quoted in Greek or Latin as well as translated into German;
331
various commentaries are inserted. All this comes to 978 crowded
typewritten pages. Superadded are some indices and an introduction by
the editor. The book is entitled Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker
- zusammengestellt, ins Deutsche übersetzt und teilweise kommentiert -
von K. Hülser (the abbreviation of which will be FDS), and is
forthcoming: In 1982 it is published in 8 volumes within the
publications of the 'Sonderforschungsbereich 99' at the University of
Konstanz (Fed. Rep. of Germany). This edition, though it has a small
number of copies and no ISBN-number, serves its purpose as a citable
on for the time being (available in the library of the University of
Konstanz), but will be replaced by a more 'genuine' one as soon as
possible.
As for the kind and the content of the new collection, three approaches
will be offered in the following. The first one starts from the function
of collections of fragments in general; it will explain why v. Arnim's
collection is insufficient and a new one necessary, and consequently it
leads to certain requirements concerning FDS. The second approach,
then, starts from the arrangement of fragments in FDS and will show
some systematic aspects of Stoic dialectic connected with it. The third
one eventually is centered on the problem of intended completeness; in
some cases this aim, being unterstood systematically, leads to
interesting results though it widens the concept of fragments." pp. 235-
236
(1) R. T. Schmidt, Stoicorum grammatica, Halle 1839; repr.
Amsterdam 1967. A German translation with an introduction and some
additional notes by K. Hülser was published in Braunschweig /
Wiesbaden 1979, completed by a bibliography on Stoic dialectic by U.
Egli.
(2) H. v. Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta Vol. IV (Indices, by M.
Adler), Leipzig 1903-1905, 1924; repr. Stuttgart 1964.
———. 1992. "Sextus Empiricus Und Die Stoiker." Elenchos.Rivista
di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 13:233-276.
Ierodiakonou, Katerina. 1990. Analysis in Stoic Logic, University of
London.
Unpublished dissertation (can be download from British Library
Document Supply Service).
Abstract: "This thesis focusses on the notion of analysis in Stoic logic,
332
that is to say on the procedure which the Stoic logicians followed in
order to reduce all valid arguments to five basic patterns. By
reconsidering the uses of its Aristotelian homonym and by examining
the evidence on the classification of Stoic arguments, I distinguish two
methods of Stoic analysis and I discuss their rules: (i) the analysis of
non-simple indemonstrables, which constitutes a process of breaking up
an argument by means of general logical principles ; and (ii) the
analysis of (yllogistic) arguments, which replaces demonstration and is
effected by employing standard well-determined rules. The ancient
sources provide us with concrete examples illustrating the first type of
analysis; however, there is no single text that reports the exact
procedure of analysing (syllogistic) arguments. Modern scholars have
reconstructed in different ways this type of Stoic analysis; I deal with
all of them separately and show that the proposed reconstructions are
insightful but historically implausible. Based on the textual materiel
concerning the notion of analysis not only in its Stoic context but also
in some other of its uses, and especially in mathematical practice, I
suggest an alternative reconstruction of the Stoic method of reducing
valid arguments to the basic indemonstrables."
———. 1990. "Rediscovering Some Stoic Arguments." In Greek
Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, edited by
Nicolacopoulos, Pantelis, 133-148. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1993. "The Stoic Indemonstrables in the Later Tradition." In
Steiner.
———. 2006. "Stoic Logic." In A Companion to Ancient Philosophy,
edited by Gill, Mary Louise and Pellegrin, Pierre, 505-529. Malden:
Blackwell.
Conclusion. As I indicated at the beginning of the chapter, it was only
towards the middle of the twentieth century that Stoic logic began to be
studied on its own merits and not as an appendix to Aristotle's
syllogistic. To a great extent it was the revival of interest in the logical
contributions of the Stoics that convinced scholars to investigate more
carefully the other parts of Stoic philosophy, namely ethics and
physics. The literature on Stoic logic that has since been published has
managed to reconstruct a logical calculus, which still surprises us with
333
its sophistication and its similarities to modern systems of logic. At the
same time, though, it also has become clear that we should not fail to
take seriously into account what differentiates Stoic logic from its
modern counterparts. For only in this way can we get a better
understanding of how the history of logic has evolved in close
connection to the other parts of philosophy, and more importantly, only
in this way do we have a chance to appreciate the peculiar features and
insights of ancient logic." p. 527
Ildefonse, Frédérique. 2000. Les Stoiciens I. Zénon, Cléanthe,
Chrysippe. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Sommaire: Repères chronologiques 9; Introduction 11; I. Physique 31;
II. Logique, 1: Théorie de la représentation 75; III. Logique, 2: La
syntaxe des lekta 111; IV. Éthique 143; V: La théorie du destin 183;
Conclusion 211; Bibliographie 219-224.
Imbert, Claude. 1980. "Stoic Logic and Alexandrian Poetics." In Doubt
and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, edited by
Schofield, Malcolm, Burnyeat, Myles and Barnes, Jonathan, 183-216.
Jedan, Christoph, and Strobach, Nico. 2002. Modalities by Perspective.
Aristotle, the Stoics and a Modern Reconstruction. Sankt Augustin:
Academia Verlag.
Jennings, Raymond Earl. 1994. The Genealogy of Disjunction. New
See Chapter 10 Stoic Disjunction pp. 252-275.
Kahn, Charles H. 1969. "Stoic Logic and Stoic Logos." Archiv für
'"I turn now to the principal claim of Professor Hay's paper: that the
logic of the Stoics was not exclusively a logic of propositions but that it
included arguments whose major premiss was, in effect, a universally
quantified conditional, "(x) (If Ax, then Bx)," instead of the ordinary
conditional composed of two self-contained sentences "If A, then B."
Hay brings evidence of three sorts to bear in favor of this thesis. (1)
First of all, there are the logical and historical considerations already
alluded to: how could the Stoics have claimed to reduce all valid
arguments, including the Aristotelian syllogism, to their five
undemonstrated schemata, if they did not have some device equivalent
to quantification"? (2) Secondly, there is the question of the epistemic
334
function of logic: where the major premiss is a conditional such as If
Plato lives, then Plato breathes interpreted truth-functionally, and I am
able to draw the conclusion Plato breathes, how could I be in a position
to know or believe the conditional premiss without already knowing or
believing the conclusion? (For the truth of the conditional depends
upon the truth of the consequent in this case,
since the antecedent is taken as true.) But the epistemic problem will
not arise in this form if the major premiss may be universally
quantified. I do not need to know that Socrates breathes - I do not need
to know anything about Socrates at all - in order to agree that if
anything is alive, that same thing (or animal) breathes. (3) Furthermore,
Hay calls our attention (and apparently for the first time) to several
decisive texts in which the Stoics make theoretical use of generalized
conditionals of the form 'If anyone is born under the Dog Star, he will
not die at sea.' Finally (4)
Hay suggests that the Stoic motive for the alleged reformulation of
universal propositions as conditionals was their desire to avoid positing
essences or classes or universals of any sort.
I am inclined to believe that Hay's principal thesis is correct, at least in
principle; but it raises new problems almost as serious as those it
solves. First of all, did the Stoics realize that they were introducing
quantification when they offered a conditional compounded in this way
of two indefinite propositions? If so, this seems to defeat their claim
that all valid arguments could be reduced to their five undemonstrated
forms. But if they did not see this, they were poorer logicians than
Aristotle at a crucial point they will have set up a propositional calculus
only at the cost of distorting the facts concerning quantification. We
seem to be faced with a dilemma. Either Stoic logic is based solely on
the propositional connectives, and then it is epistemically sterile. (This
appears to be Mueller's view.) Or else it involves generalized
conditionals and a rule of instantiation, but then it is defective as logic
since we are left without any account of the quantified conditional. (1) I
suspect that the latter is likely to be true, and that by formulating
indefinite conditionals to achieve generality, and then instantiating for a
definite, ostensibly indicated subject, the Stoics believed that they
could in fact do without quantification, i. e. without any theory
involving 'all' and 'none.' " pp. 163-164.
335
(1) I have oversimplified in order to put the problem sharply. It is worth
noting that the decisive text from De Fato is explicitly meta-linguistic:
"If G (a generalized conditional) is true, then C (an ordinary
conditional) is also true" (see Hay, note 15). Therefore arguments
making use of such a rule of instantiation will be valid but not
necessarily reducible to one of the five undemonstrated schemata
(compare the examples in Mates, p. 64 and p. 65 n. 32). In the
Symposium discussion in St. Louis several suggestions were made for
reconstructing the Stoic generalized conditional without quantification
theory, as the meta-linguistic representation for a "bundle of individual
conditionals" (Quine, Methods of Logic, p. 13), much as an axiom
schema may represent an infinite set of individual axioms. I leave it to
others to decide how far such a suggestion can be worked out
systematically.
Kidd, Ian G. 1989. "Orthos Logos as a Criterion of Truth in the Stoa."
In The Criterion of Truth. Essays Written in Honour of George Kerferd,
edited by Huby, Pamela and Neal, Gordon, 137-149. Liverpool:
Liverpool University Press.
See Chapter III: The Megarian and the Stoics pp. 113-176.
Labarge, Scott. 2002. "Stoic Conditionals of Necessity and
Explanation." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 23:241-252.
An examination of a particular passage in Cicero's De fato (Fat. 13-17)
is crucial to our understanding of the Stoic theory of the truth-
conditions of conditional propositions, for it has been uniquely
important in the debate concerning the kind of connection the
antecedent and consequent of a Stoic conditional should have to one
another. Frede has argued that the passage proves that the connection is
one of logical necessity, while Sorabji has argued that positive Stoic
attitudes toward empirical inferences elsewhere suggest that that cannot
be the right interpretation of the passage. I argue that both parties to the
debate have missed a position somewhere between them which both
renders a connection between antecedent and consequent that is not
merely empirical and makes sense of the actual uses to which the Stoics
put the conditional. This will be an account which grounds the
336
connection between antecedent and consequent in a prolêpsis, a special
kind of concept which plays a special epistemological role for the
Stoics, especially in grounding scientific explanations. My contention
will be that Stoic conditionals are true when there is a conceptually
necessary connection between antecedent and consequent such that the
former explains the latter via a prolêpsis."
Leeman, Anton Daniël. 1954. "Posidonius the Dialectician in Seneca's
Letters." Mnemosyne no. 7:233-240.
Löbl, Rudolf. 1986. Die Relation in Der Philosophie Der Stoiker.
Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Inhaltsübersicht: Literaturangaben 7; Einleitung 13; Teil 1 17; A.
Physis 19; B. Logos 62; Teil II 111; A. Die äusseren Relationen 113; B.
Die inneren Relationen 129; C. Die transcendentale Relationen 134;
Excursus: Zu Physik 141-150.
On Logic see pp. 77-102.
Long, Anthony Arthur. 1974. Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics,
Epicureans, Sceptics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Second edition 1986 with a Bibliographical Postscript 1985 pp. 257-
268.
See Chapter 4: Stoicism § III: Stoic logic pp. 121-146.
———. 1978. "Dialectic and the Stoic Sage." In The Stoics, edited by
Rist, John M., 101-124. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Reprinted in: A. A. Long, Stoic Studies, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1996, pp. 85-106.
Lukasiewicz, Jan. 1967. "On the History of the Logic of Propositions."
In Polish Logic 1920-1939, edited by McCall, Storrs, 66-87. Oxford:
Oxford University press.
Originally published in Polish as: Z historii logiki zdan, Przeglad
Translated in English in: Storrs McCall (ed.), Polish Logic 1920-1939,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967 pp. 66-87 and also in: J. Lukasiewicz,
Selected Works - Edited by Ludwik Borowski, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1970 pp. 197-217.
Propositional Logic." In Polish Logic 1920-1939, edited by McCall,
Storrs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
337
Translated in English in: Storrs McCall (ed.) Polish Logic 1920-1939,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, pp. 40-65 and also in: J. Lukasiewicz,
Selected Works, Edited by Ludwik Borowski, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1970, pp. 153-178.
Manuli, Paola. 1993. "Galen and Stoicism." In Galen Und Das
Hellenistische Erbe, edited by Kollesch, Jutta and Nickel, Diethard, 53-
61. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Mates, Benson. 1949. "Stoic Logic and the Text of Sextus Empiricus."
American Journal of Philology no. 70:290-298.
The text of Sextus Empiricus contains a number of corrupt places
which can easily be corrected by reference to a few technical terms and
elementary concepts of Stoic logic. It is the aim of the present paper to
prove this assertion with respect to a certain class of cases and, in so
doing. to show that any future editor of Sextus ought to have a clear
understanding of Stoic logic." p. 290
———. 1953. Stoic Logic. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Second edition 1961.
Contents: I. Introduction 1; Chapter I. § 1: The problem § 2: Stoic
authors to be considered §3: Sources for Stoic logic; Chapter II. Signs,
sense, and denotation 11; § 1: Exposition of the Stoic theory § 2:
Comparison with modern theories; Chapter III. Propositions, truth, and
necessity 27; § 1: Propositions § 2: Truth § 3: Necessity and
Possibility; Chapter IV. Propositional connectives 42; § 1: Implication
§ 2: Disjunction § 3: Conjunction and the other logical connectives § 4:
The interdefinability of the connectives; Chapter V. Arguments 58 § 1:
Definition and Classification § 2: The five basic types of
Undemonstrated Argument § 3: The Principle of Conditionalization §
4: The analysis of non-simple arguments § 5: Invalid arguments;
Paradoxes; Chapter VI. Evaluations of Stoic logic 86; § 1: The
judgments of Prantl and Zeller § 2: The confusion about sunemménon -
§ 3: Conclusion; Appendix A. Translations 95; Appendix B. Glossary
132; Bibliography 137; Indices -141-148.
Mau, Jürgen. 1957. "Stoische Logik. Ihre Stellung Gegenüber Der
Aristotelischen Syllogistik Un Des Modernen Aussagenkalkül."
338
Hermes no. 85:147-158.
Mignucci, Mario. 1965. Il Significato Della Logica Stoica. Bologna:
Patron.
———. 1967. "Il Problema Del Criterio Di Verità Negli Stoici
Antichi." In Posizione E Criterio Del Discorso Filosofico, edited by
Giacon, Carlo, 145-169. Bologna: Patron.
———. 1988. "The Stoic Notion of Relatives." In Matter and
Metaphysics. Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (Pontignano, August
21-28, 1986), edited by Barnes, Jonathan and Mignucci, Mario, 129-
The fragments of the Stoics which are explicitly concerned with a
theory of relations are few, scattered and difficult to interpret. The
largest of them is preserved in Simplicius' commentary on the
Categories (165.32 ff.; SVF ii 403) and it expounds an important
distinction which the Stoics made between two kinds of relatives. This
doctrine is attributed to the Stoics, but no representative of the school is
mentioned. Echoes of it are reflected in some sceptical arguments
reported by Sextus Empiricus (M viii 455-456) and Diogenes Laertius
(IX 87-88) (1). Besides, there are some related passages in the scholia
on Dionysius Thrax's Ars grammatica which are supposed to go back
to Apollonius Dyscolus (II century A.D.), where, although the Stoics
are not explicitly named, Stoic material is believed to be used and
referred to (2). There is also a text of Sextus (M VIII 453-454; SVF II
404) in which a general definition of relatives is attributed by him to
the Dogmatists and reasons can be given for saying that his Dogmatists
must be identified with the Stoics. Finally, some passages in which the
name of Chrysippus is tied to questions which are supposed to concern
our problems are difficult to interpret and on closer inspection they
reveal themselves not to pertain to the theory of relatives (3).
In the face of this complicated situation in our sources, I will examine
first Simplicius' passage, trying to disentangle it from spurious
connections with other parts of the Stoic doctrine which have generated
more than one misunderstanding of it. Secondly, I will inquire to what
extent a possibly general definition of relatives implied in Simplicius'
distinction is consistent with the statements reported by other sources,
in order to determine whether Simplicius' report can be inserted in a
coherent framework.
339
This sketch of the plan of our inquiry shows that we confer a central
role on Simplicius' passage, and this assumption might be disputed,
since Simplicius is a late authority and no Stoic master of the first
generation is mentioned in it. We will discuss these problems later.
Whatever their solution might be, it must be pointed out that
Simplicius' text is almost the only one in which a relevant aspect of the
Stoic doctrine of relatives is expounded and discussed. The other
sources are much vaguer and mostly concerned with a general
characterization of the notion of relative. Therefore, it is difficult in this
situation not to confer a special position on Simplicius passage." pp.
129-130
1) These texts are not found in von Arnim's collection. They will be
discussed in section VIII.
(2) These passages too are not in von Arnim. We will examine them
later (cf. sections XI-XII).
(3) I am thinking especially of three passages we will consider later,
namely Varro De lingua latina X 59 (SVF a 155); Plutarch, De
Stoicorum repugnantibus 1054 EF (SVF II 550); Aulus Gellius Noctes
atticae VII 1, 1-6 (SVF II 1169): cf. sections XIV and XV.
———. 1993. "The Stoic Themata." In Dialektiker Und Stoiker. Zur
Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and
Ebert, Theodor, 217-238. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
———. 1999. "The Liar Paradox and the Stoics." In Topics in Stoic
Philosophy, edited by Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 54-70. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Milne, Peter. 1995. "On the Completeness of Non-Philonian Stoic
Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 16:39-64.
The majority of formal accounts attribute to Stoic logicians the
classical truth-functional understanding of the material conditional and
exclusive disjunction.These interpretations were disputed, some Stoic
logicians favouring modal and/or temporal analyses; moreover, what
comes down to us of Stoic logic fails to secure the classical
interpretations on purely formal grounds.It is therefore of some interest
to see how the non-classical interpretations fare. I argue that the
strongest logic we have good grounds to attribute to Stoic logicians is
not complete with respect to the non-classical interpretations of
disjunction and the conditional."
340
Mueller, Ian. 1969. "Stoic and Peripatetic Logic." Archiv für
We know that one of the issues dividing the Stoics and the Peripatetics
concerned the use of logic. Alexander [of Aphrodisias] (1) insists that
only Peripatetic logic is an organon for philosophy, an instrument for
making unknown things known through known premisses. Since the
Stoics called logic a part of philosophy, they may well have considered
their propositional logic a theoretical discipline for which
epistemological considerations were irrelevant. This modern attitude
seems quite commensurate with the Stoics' presentation of logic. They
seem to have been interested in technical devices and formalization for
its own sake.
I suggest, then, that an important disagreement between the Peripatetic
and Stoic logicians concerned the power of their respective logics to
represent arguments. The Peripatetic claims were that all scientific
proofs are categorical syllogisms and that the inference schemata of the
Stoics represented techniques of argument having no place in science.
The Stoic reply was that the first claim is false since there are very
elementary relational arguments in mathematics which are not
syllogisms. Moreover, they pointed out that all conclusive arguments,
including categorical syllogisms, could be represented as propositional
arguments by a (trivial) technical device. Formally the Stoics held an
unassailable position, but they were vulnerable to attack on
methodological grounds, since establishing the truth of the premisses of
the newly formulated argument seemed to involve making an inference
in terms of the old logic. The Peripatetics therefore insisted on the
claim, believed for many centuries after them, that their logic was the
instrument of science. We do not know the Stoic response to this claim,
but it is reasonable to suppose that they retreated to the view that the
theory of deductive inference was a technical discipline studied for
some ethical end perhaps, but not as the method of scientific
discovery." p. 184
(1) In Analyticorum Priorum 1 ff.
———. 1978. "An Introduction to Stoic Logic." In The Stoics, edited
by Rist, John M., 1-26. Berkeley: University of California Press.
The charge of uselessness permeates the ancient literature on Stoic
logic. Alexander [of Aphrodisias] is very concerned to defend
341
Aristotelian logic as the tool (organon) of philosophy and science, a
means for making unknown things known through known premises.
For Sextus no logic is capable of serving these functions. The gist of
both men's attack on Stoic logic is that with its arguments there is no
way to establish the premises without first establishing the conclusion.
The attack is usually made in terms of the first undemonstrable
argument and depends upon the truth-functional interpretation of the
conditional. Suppose one wishes to prove 'the second' by establishing
'the first' and 'If the first the second.' Then if 'the first' is established, the
only way to establish 'if the first the second' is to establish 'the second,'
i.e., to establish the conclusion one is trying to prove. Similar
objections could be raised against the other undemonstrable arguments.
In each case, when the second premise is taken as true, then the obvious
truth-functional argument for the first premise requires establishing the
truth of the conclusion. There is no way out of this situation, a fact that
strongly suggests that Sextus's insistence on applying the truth-
functional interpretation to the conditional represents an argumentative
device rather than an accurate reflection of standard Stoic doctrine. If
the first premise of an undemonstrable argument expresses a stronger
than truth-functional connection between its component propositions,
there is no reason why the first premise cannot be established
independently of the conclusion.
Of course, the position I have just ascribed to the Stoics means that
philosophically a great deal of weight must be placed on the knowledge
of necessary connections between propositions. Many of Sextus's
arguments are directed against the possibility of such knowledge. To
consider these arguments would take us outside the domain of logic and
into epistemology. The point I wish to make is that the Stoics could
have claimed universality for their propositional logic without
subjecting themselves to attacks on grounds of uselessness. But to what
use did the Stoics put their logic? It is tempting to suppose that the
Stoics might have treated logic as a technical discipline developed for
its own sake. The picture of Chrysippus analyzing innumerable
arguments into the undemonstrable points makes it seem certain that to
some extent logic was pursued for its own sake. But at least some
Stoics thought of logic as more than a self-sufficient technical
discipline.
342
(…)
The most important inferences from signs would be those based on he
first undemonstrable syllogism. Questions about the viability of
inferences from sign to thing indicated or commemorated would almost
certainly end up as questions about the connection asserted to hold in
the first premise, i.e., as questions of metaphysics or epistemology. One
cannot expect logic to settle such questions, nor is there any reason to
think the Stoics expected it to. The thrust of their logic was to provide a
framework in which questions of inferential validity could be settled
and questions that fell outside of logic, e.g., whether sweat implies the
existence of pores, made precise. It seems fair to say that Stoic
achievement in this area remained unparalleled until the time of
Leibniz." pp. 22-25
———. 1979. "The Completeness of Stoic Propositional Logic." Notre
In this paper I wish to pursue in more detail the question of the
completeness of Stoic propositional logic. I shall bring out certain
anomalies in Becker's [1957] argument which obscure the precise sense
in which his system is complete. The Kneales' system (*) will be shown
to be complete in a stronger sense than Becker's but not to be as
historically plausible a reconstruction of the Stoic theory. In conclusion
I shall suggest a modification of both systems which is historically
more plausible than either and also complete in the stronger sense. In
the course of the paper I will also discuss other logical and historical
points about the systems.
I shall take for granted the truth-functionality of the Stoic propositional
connectives but disregard interdefinability relationships. I will also
formulate the systems of Becker and the Kneales in ways which
diverge slightly but unproblematically from their own presentations." p.
202
(*) William and Marta Kneale - The development of logic, Oxford,
1962
Mühl, Max. 1962. ""Der Logos Endiathetos Und Prophorikos" Von
Der Älteren Stoa Bis Zur Synode Von Sirmium 351." Archiv für
Begriffsgeschichte no. 7:7-56.
On the history of the distinction between "internal discourse" and
"uttered discourse".
343
Muller, Robert. 2006. Les Stoïciens. Paris: Vrin.
Table des matières: Avertissement 7; Introduction 11; Chapitre I:
L'école stoicienne 17; Chapitre II: La physique 61; Chapitre III: La
logique 127; Chapitre IV: L'éthique 187; Conclusion: La liberté et
l'ordre du monde 255; Annexe 272; Bibliographie 275; Index nominum
284; Table des matières 288-290.
Nasieniewski, Marek. 1998. "Is Stoic Logic Classical?" Logic and
Logical Philosophy no. 6:55-61.
In this paper I would like to argue that Stoic logic is a kind of relevant
logic rather than the classical logic. To realize this purpose I will try to
keep as close as possible to Stoic calculus as expressed with the help of
their arguments."
Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro. 1981. "Logica Scettica E Implicazione
Stoica. A Proposito Di Adv. Math. Viii 462-481." In Lo Scetticismo
Antico. Vol. Ii, edited by Giannantoni, Gabriele, 501-532. Napoli:
Bibliopolis.
———. 1984. "Stopper on Nasti's Contention and Stoic Logic."
Reply to M. R. Stopper (1983).
———. 1988. "The Third and Fourth Account of Conditionals in
Sextus Empiricus." In Temi E Prospettive Della Logica E Della
Filosofia Della Scienza Contemporanee. Vol. I: Logica, edited by
Cellucci, Carlo and Sambin, Giovanni, 219-226. Bologna: Clueb.
———. 1989. "Stoic Implication and Stoic Modalities." In Le Teorie
Delle Modalità. Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della
Logica, edited by Corsi, Giovanni, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai,
Massimo, 258-263. Bologna: CLUEB.
A new account of Stoic connexive conditional is given, according to
which (in order to agree with textual evidence) the truth-conditions for
the so-called Chrysippean implication are a function of the modality of
the clauses."
———. 2004. "From Aristotle's Syllogistic to Stoic Conditionals:
Holzwege or Detectable Paths?" Topoi.An International Review of
This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet
almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the
Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's
344
metasyllogistic equimodality condition (as stated at Prior Analytics I
24, 41b27-31) and truth-conditions for third type (Chrysippean)
conditionals (as they can be inferred from, say, Sextus Empiricus
Outlines of Pyrrhonism II 111 and 189). In fact, as is shown in §1,
Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his (propositional)
metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-
conditions of which turn out to be logically equivalent to truth-
conditions of third type conditionals, according to which only the
impossible (and not the possible) follows from the impossible.
Moreover, Aristotle is given precisely this non-Scotian conditional
logic in two so far overlooked passages of (Latin and Hebraic
translations of) Themistius' Paraphrasis of De Caelo (CAG V 4, 71.8-13
and 47.8-10 Landauer). Some further consequences of Aristotle's
equimodality condition on his logic, and notably on his syllogistic (no
matter whether modal or not), are pointed out and discussed at length.
A (possibly Chrysippean) extension of Aristotle's condition is also
discussed, along with a full characterization of truth-conditions of
fourth type conditionals."
———. 2006. ""Boethiana". La Logica Stoica Nelle Testimonianze Di
Boezio: Nuovi Strumenti Di Ricerca." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul
Pensiero Antico:377-408.
In view of the importance of Boethius' In Ciceronis Topica as a source
for Stoic logic, argues for the constitution of an index of divergent
readings between the editions of Orelli (Zurich 1833) and Migne,
including those omitted by Stangl (1882). Such an index would show
that while Orelli's edition is better, sometimes the reading of Migne is
to be preferred. Includes considerations on the gradual Stoicization of
Aristotelian syllogistics, on Boethius' reliability as a source for Stoic
logic, and on the genuine editio princeps of Boethius' De topicis
differentiis (Rome 1484, rather than Venice 1492)."
———. 2006. "Conflict and Connectedness: Between Modern Logic
and History of Ancient Logic." In Logic and Philosophy in Italy. Some
Trends and Perspectives.Essays in Honor of Corrado Mangione, edited
by Ballo, Edoardo and Franchella, Miriam, 229-251. Milano:
Polimetrica.
Normore, Calvin G. 1991. "Medieval Connectives, Hellenistic
Connections; the Strange Case of Propositional Logic." In Atoms,
345
Pneuma, and Tranquillity. Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European
Thought, edited by Osler, Margaret J., 25-38. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
North-Holland.
Chapter 4. The Stoic lekton 45; 5. The Stoic axioma 75-88.
"The Stoic conception of the bearers of truth and falsity centres around
the notion of axioma. As an axioma is a species of the genus lekton, I
shall first discuss the nature of the lekton. It will be maintained that the
word lekton must have had several shades of meaning, although the
deplorable state of our sources makes it impossible to reach a high
degree of certainty about the exact borderlines between these different
nuances and their ascription to definite authors or periods." p. 45
"As we saw in the foregoing chapter, an axioma is a complete and
independent pragma which is expressed in a speech act of asserting.
The complete and independent pragma is the thought of an action or
passion and its indispensable complements. In so far as this pragma is
put into words it is a Iekton; in so far as it is expressed in a speech act
of asserting it is an apophanton or axioma, an asserted thought-content.
A pragma such as 'Plato liking Dion' can be expressed in different
speech acts: for instance, in a yes-or-no question, 'Does Plato like
Dion?', in a wish, 'May Plato like Dion', or in an assertion, 'Plato likes
Dion'. On the other hand, the same type of speech act, say asserting,
may be related to different pragmata; for I may assert many different
things. Reflections of this kind must have led the Stoics to a distinction
between the generic element of the pragma or Iekton and the specific
element of the speech act in which a certain thought is expressed.
As a rule, then, an axioma is a thought-content which is in fact asserted.
Nevertheless, the Stoics used the name axioma also for the antecedent
and consequent of a conditional, although as parts of the composite
whole these are not actually asserted. This may be accounted for by the
fact that axioma originally meant that which is assumed or taken to be
true. Or, as I suggested at the end of 4.2.5, the Stoics may have
regarded the antecedent and consequent as potential axiomata, just as
they held that a privative assertion of the form 'Un(kind he is)' contains
the potential axioma 'Kind he is'. Such an assertable would lie
346
somewhere between the neutral pragma or Iekton and the factually
asserted axioma." p. 75
Orth, Emil. 1959. "Lekton = Dicibile." Helmantica no. 32:221-226.
L'article est en latin. L'A. y explique le sens de lekton, terme stoïcien,
en analysant la gnoseologie stoïcienne, sans faire appel aux textes. Il
ajoute un bref aperçu de l'histoire du terme où il signale, entre autres
choses, qu'Apulée, Peri hermeneias, emploie pronuntiabile pour lekton
et Augustin, Principia Dialecticae, 5, P.L., 32, 1411, dicibile; Isidore
de Seville, Etymol. 2, 22, 2, dictio. L'article n'est pas conçu comme une
recherche philologique, mais comme un exposé théorique." Bulletin
Augustinien pour 1959.
———. 1962. "Stoicorum Lekton = Iudicium, Dicibile." Emerita no.
30:59-61.
O'Toole, Robert R., and Jennings, Raymond Earl. 2004. "The
Megarians and the Stoics." In Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic, edited
by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 397-522. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Pozzi, Lorenzo. 1974. "Il Nesso Di Implicazione Nella Logica Stoica."
In Atti Del Convegno Di Storia Della Logica (Parma, 8-10 Ottobre
1972), 177-187. Padova: Liviana.
Preti, Giulio. 1956. "Sulla Dottrina Del Semieion Nella Logica Stoica."
Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia no. 10:5-14.
Ristampato in: G. Preti - Saggi filosofici. Storia della logica e
storiografia filosofica - Vol. II - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, pp. 3-16 (col
titolo: La dottrina del segno nella logica Stoica)
Reed, Baron. 2002. "The Stoics' Account of the Cognitive Impression."
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 23:147-180.
Repici, Luciana. 1993. "The Stoics and the Elenchos." In Dialektiker
Und Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by
Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 253-270. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Rist, John M. 1981. "The Importance of Stoic Logic in the Contra
Celsum." In Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought. Essays in
Honour of A. H. Armstrong, edited by Blumenthal, Henry Jacob and
Markus, Robert Austin, 64-78. London: Variorum.
Rüstow, Alexander. 1910. Der Lugner. Theorie, Geschichte, Und
Auflösung. Leipzig: Teubner.
Reprint: New York, Garland, 1987.
347
Schubert, Andreas. 1993. "Die Stoischen Vorstellungen." In Dialektiker
Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 271-290. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Sedley, David. 1982. "On Signs." In Science and Speculation. Studies
in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, edited by Barnes, Jonathan,
Brunschwig, Jacques, Burnyeat, Myles and Schofield, Malcolm, 239-
———. 1984. "The Negated Conjunction in Stoicism."
Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 5:311-316.
———. 1989. "Le Critère D'identité Chez Les Stoïciens." Revue de
French translation of: The Stoic criterion of identity.
Sellars, John. 2006. Stoicism. Berkeley: University of Cafifornia Press.
Chapter 3: Stoic logic pp. 55-79.
Speca, Anthony. 2001. Hypothetical Syllogistic and Stoic Logic.
Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Abstract IX; Preface XI-XIII; 1. The
Aristotelian background 1; 2. The Greek Commentators on Aristotle
35; 3. Boethius: On hypothetical syllogisms 67; 4. Boethius: On
Cicero's Topics 101; References 135; General index 139; Index
locorum 141
Stakelum, James W. 1940. Galen and the Logic of Propositions.
Romae: Angelicum.
These pages, restrictedly entitled Galen and the Logic of Propositions,
originally formed part of an academic dissertation, Galen's Introduction
to Dialectic. The threefold purpose of the larger study was to present
Galen's Dialectic in a clear light, to examine his doctrine and weigh its
importance as to originality or historical precedent, and from these
considerations to draw conclusions as to its influence on succeeding
generations. The doctrine, scattered throughout the Galenic text, was
gathered under five headings: I. Galen's Introductory Remarks; II.
Logic of Propositions; III. Aristotelian Term Logic; IV. Other Classes
of Syllogisms; V. Applied Logic. Owing to the limited size of the
volumes of this series, published under the sponsorship of Father I. M.
Bochenski, O. P., it is impossible to publish here the whole result of the
inquiry. Accordingly, we have selected for presentation our
Introduction -- rearranged as Part One in several short chapters -- and
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the most important portion of our examination of Galen's Dialectic,
dealing with the logic of propositions. The latter section is divided into
three parts. A brief conclusion completes the essay,
It is traditional to attribute to Galen an eminent position in the field of
logic, but rarely do we find specific reasons assigned for this eminence.
The composition of this dissertation has, for me, definitely determined
Galen's position in the history of logic. It is hoped that it will serve a
similar purpose for others."
Stopper, M.R. 1983. "Schizzi Pirroniani." Phronesis no. 28:265-297.
Critical notice of: Gabriele Giannantoni (ed.), Lo scetticismo antico.
Atti del convegno organizzato dal Centro di studio del pensiero antico
del C.N.R., Roma 5-8 novembre 1980, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1981.
M. R. Stopper is a pseudonym of Jonathan Barnes.
Tracy, Kevin. 2006. The Development of Dialectic from Aristotle to
Chrysippus.
Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.
"From Aristotle onward, formal logic was an element of ancient Greek
dialectic (dialektiké). Aristotle's Prior Analytics (4th century BCE) is
the earliest evidence of a formal logic in antiquity. The evidence for the
formal logic of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (3rd century BCE) is
fragmentary; nonetheless it makes clear that not more than a century or
so after Prior Analytics, Chrysippus revolutionized formal logic. The
scholarship on Stoic logic has not yet presented the history of dialectic
from Aristotle to Chrysippus as an intelligible narrative. Without such a
narrative, one cannot explain what, in general, motivated the
innovations of Chrysippus, what made Stoic logic coherent as a unified
project, or what relationship that project had to earlier work in logic.
This dissertation approaches the problem through the presentation and
interpretation of the ancient source material. First it describes the
logical doctrines of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the 'Megarics' in such
a way as to make clear what questions these predecessors left for
Chrysippus. It then describes how Chrysippus addressed these
questions. Finally, it uses the resulting narrative to give a detailed
account of Stoic formal logic. The dissertation yields five principal
conclusions. First, neither the Peripatetics or the 'Megarics' described
logical forms of propositional logic; Chrysippus was the first to do so.
Second, the guiding aim of Chrysippus' logic was to avoid adopting a
349
semantic stance in describing logical forms and explaining logical
relationships. Third, the Stoics distinguished 'valid' (hugies) from 'true'
(aléthes), so that sunartésis is a standard for the validity rather than the
truth of the Stoic conditional (sunhémmenon). Fourth, the Stoics
produced derivations for categorical arguments in their deduction
system. Fifth, the Stoic deduction system is roughly analogous to the
first-order fragment of Frege's system, except on two points: it most
likely was not designed to accommodate the use of polyadic predicates
with multiple quantifiers, although the possibility for doing so inheres
in its approach to the analysis of propositions, and it uses the 'natural'
approach rather than the 'axiomatic' approach of Frege."
Verbeke, Gérard. 1977. "Der Nominalismus Der Stoischen Logik."
Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie no. 3:36-55.
———. 1991. "Ethics and Logic in Stoicism." In Atoms, Pneuma, and
Tranquillity. Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, edited
by Osler, Margaret J., 11-24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1996. "Meaning and Role of the Expressible (Lekton) in Stoic
Logic." In Knowledge through Signs. Ancient Semiotic Theories and
Practices, edited by Manetti, Giovanni, 133-154. Turnhout: Brepols.
In his critical survey of Stoic dialectic Sextus states that the doctrine of
the expressible, which plays an important part in the theory of
knowledge, has been repeatedly put into question:(1) the lekton is an
incorporeal, together with time, place and empty space, it belongs to
the group of incorporeal objects generally accepted by the Stoics. In
their opinion incorporeals are not active, they are unable to effect or
produce something: yet they are indispensable in view of a coherent
understanding of the universe.(2) Within this framework it was agreed
that each argument is composed of incorporeal expressibles, since it is
a combination of sentences which are considered to be complete lekta.
(3) The question however was asked whether expressibles are really
necessary, if they are totally ineffective. Even the meaning of the
notion is questionable: it is obviously related to language, but it is not a
component neither of spoken nor of written language. In other words it
is not a verbal utterance and yet it is referred to by linguistic terms.(4)
So it seems to have a definite function in the Stoic theory of
knowledge." p. 133
(1) Sextus, M 8. 336. The author states that the existence of
350
expressibles has been heavily discussed: there was no agreement about
this issue. In some other passage Sextus even speaks of an unending
debate (8. 262). Sextus lived in the second half of the second century
and in the beginning of the third A.D.: at that time Stoicism was still
very influential. No other philosophical school ever accepted this
doctrine, but it was not disregarded: philosophers had to cope with it
especially in their dialectic.
(2) Sextus, M 8. 262. An incorporeal object could not affect anything,
nor could it be affected. For it could only be affected by something
corporeal, and that is excluded, since corporeal and incorporeal are not
on the same level.
(3) Sextus, M 8. 260-261; 8. 404: every proof is composed of
incorporeal expressibles. In Sextus' opinion a vicious circle is
unavoidable.
(4) Sextus, M 8. 264: according to Sextus lekta are signified and among
them are also propositions, which are regarded as complete
expressibles.
Viano, Carlo Augusto. 1958. "La Dialettica Stoica." Rivista di Filosofia
no. 49:179-227.
Ristampato in: Autori Vari - Studi sulla dialettica - Torino, Taylor,
1969 pp. 63-111
Virieux-Reymond, Antoinette. 1949. La Logique Et L'épistémologie
Des Stoïciens. Leurs Rapports Avec La Logique D'aristote, La
Logistique Et La Pensée Contemporaine. Lausanne: Librairie de
l'Université.
———. 1984. "L'originalité De La Logique Mégaro-Stoïcienne Par
Rapport À La Logique D'aristote." Diotima no. 12:172-174.
Watson, Gerald. 1966. The Stoic Theory of Knowledge. Belfast:
Queens' University.
Contents: Introducyion 1; Chapter I. Physical Theory 9; Chapter II. The
Knowing Process 22; Chapter III. Theory and Practice 35; Chapter IV.
Criticisms 65; Chapter V. Panaetius and Posidonius 74; Conclusion 82;
Appendix: The Lekton and Russell 92; Selected Bibliography 97; Index
100-106.
White, Michael J. 1986. "The Fourth Account of Conditionals in Sextus
Empiricus." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 7:1-14.
This paper develops an interpretation of the fourth account of
351
conditionals in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism that
conceptually links it with contemporary 'relevance' interpretations of
entailment. It is argued that the third account of conditionals, which
analyzes the truth of a conditional in terms of the joint impossibility of
antecedent and denial of consequent, should not be interpreted in terms
of a "relative" incompatibility of antecedent and denial of consequent
because of stoic acceptance of the truth of some conditionals of the
form "p"(-"p" and its converse. Rather, It is suggested, ancient attempts
to avoid the so-called paradoxes of implication involve the fourth
account of conditionals. I hypothesize that this account is related to
stoic attempts to define truth conditions for conditionals in terms of a
theory of the concludency (validity) of arguments in opposition to the
more common procedure (represented by the first three accounts of
conditionals) of specifying truth conditions for conditionals
'semantically' and using those truth conditions in the development of a
theory of argument validity."
Zarnecka-Bialy, Ewa. 1979. "Stoic Logic as Investigated by Jan
Lukasiewicz." Reports on Philosophy no. 3:27-40.
Zoecklein, Walter O. 1969. The Ontological Commitments in Stoic
Logic, University of California, San Diego.
Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 6919703.
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Selected Bibliography on Stoic

Philosophy of Language, Grammar and
Rhetoric
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON STOIC PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE AND SEMIOTIC
Allen James. Inference from Signs. Ancient Debates About the Nature
of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
See Study III: The Stoics on Sign-Inference and Demonstration pp.
147-193.
Ax Wolfram. Laut, Stimme Und Sprache. Studien Zu Drei
Grundbegriffen Der Antiken Sprachtheorie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1986.
———. "Der Einfluss Des Peripatos Auf Die Sprachtheorie Der Stoa."
In Dialektiker Und Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer,
edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor. 11-32. Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner, 1993.
Reprinted in: W. Ax, Lexis und Logos. Studien zur antiken Grammatik
und Rhetorik, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 2000, pp. 73-94.
Barnouw Jeffrey. Propositional Perception. Phantasia, Predication,
and Sign in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Lanham: University Press of
354
America, 2002.
Contents: Preface IX; Introduction 1; 1. Phantasia, Judgment and
Statement in Plato 9; 2. Phantasia in Aristotle 49; 3. Predication and
Sign in Aristotle 97; 4. Phantasia and Sign in Stoic Philosophy 149; 5.
Recalling Sign and Revealing Sign. Part I. Sceptics and Stoics 21; Part
II. The Debates of the Hellenistic Medical Sects 245; 6. Predication,
Proposition, Sign and Proof in Stoic Logic 275; Appendix 1.
Declarative Predication vs. Kahn's Veridical Be 327; Appendix 2.
Peirce, the Epicureans and the Stoics 341; Bibliography 369; Indices
379-383.
"There has been considerable growth in the understanding and
estimation of Stoic logic in the last thirty years, yet an important
dimension of this Stoic achievement has not been grasped. Stoic logic
was broadly conceived to include their theories of knowledge and
perception, and the theory of perception provides the starting point and
foundation of their logic. It is essential to the structure and unity of that
logic that the Stoics take perception to be propositional. Starting from a
new interpretation of the Stoic conception of phantasia as propositional
perception, this study offers a view of Stoic logic that brings out the
continuity linking perception, predication, inferential signs and proof.
For Plato and Aristotle the basic objects of perception are qualities. In
effect they develop a phenomenological analysis, underpinned by a
physiological conception of sensation. The Stoics take this over as an
account of sensation, but they establish the theory of perception at a
higher level of complexity. For the Stoics the objects of perception are
not qualities nor discrete things or bodies but rather have the form of
fact, event or situation, relating qualities to things and things to each
other. In perceiving we are trying to make sense of things. This means
that both inference (drawing on past perception) and judgment (i.e.
judging that something holds in reality) are involved in perception from
the start. Conversely, the logical capacities of the mind, extending
through logical signs to proof, carry forward a revelatory power
inherent in perception.
The propositional character of perceptions does not derive from
language. In the Stoic analysis perceiving picks out a focus or subject
and links a predicate to it, and these are logical entities, strictly
distinguished, terminologically and in their discrete treatment, from
355
what are linguistic elements, the grammatical subject and predicate.
What is predicated of the subject is generally doing or undergoing some
action. This linking of elements within perception is at the same time
propositional in the sense that it pro-poses something, that is, makes a
truth- or reality-claim. What is perceived is by that very act taken to be
the case, to be real.
To translate 'phantasia' as 'perception' is unusual but justified, even
required, in Stoic contexts. The term undergoes striking changes in
meaning from Plato through Aristotle to the Epicureans, Sceptics and
Stoics, which must be reflected in differing translations. For Plato it is
misleading 'appearance', sensation wrongly taken as revealing reality.
In some of the applications of the term in Aristotle the translation
'imagination' seems appropriate, while in others something like
'representation' or 'impression' is called for, either in a neutral sense or
with a problematic cast akin to the Platonic and Sceptic versions.
In the Hellenistic schools 'phantasia' (often in the plural) designates not
a faculty but particular mental events. It is usually taken to mean
'impression' or 'mental presentation'. This is apt for the Sceptics, for
whom a further act would be needed to add belief to what is present to
the mind and affirm it as real. But 'perception' is the translation called
for by Stoic usage. To translate it as 'presentation' in Stoic arguments
would be to concede a damaging point of contention to their Sceptic
critics by eliding its intrinsic reality claim, its propositional character.
To understand what the Stoics are doing to and with the idea of
phantasia, we must see it in relation to the different purpose and
character given the term first in Plato, then in Aristotle, and in those
contemporary antagonists of the Stoics, the Sceptics and Epicureans.
The starting point is Plato's origination of the notion phantasia, taken
together with his analysis of predication or what constitutes 'statement',
in the Theaetetus and Sophist. Building on the connection of phantasia
and statement, the Stoics reverse the tendency which Plato embodies in
his coinage in that they try to establish confidence in what phantasia
reveals, whereas Plato took such confidence to be necessarily
misplaced.
Indeed, the purpose of his coinage (derived from 'phainesthai', 'to
appear', meaning appearance in contrast to reality or being) was to
embody the confusion of 'it seems to me' and 'it is' and so to show up
356
the fundamental error of those who rely on the senses as revealing
reality. To trust the senses as a basis of knowledge opens one to
distortion from perspective and the illusory character of objects that
never are the same." pp. 1-2.
Bundy Murray Wright. The Theory of Imagination in Classical and
Medieval Thought. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1927.
Contents: Preface 7; I. Pre-Socratic Philosophy 11; II. Plato 19; III.
Aristotle 60; IV. Post-Aristotelian Philosophy 83; V. The Theory of
Art: Quintilian, Longinus, and Philostratus 105; VI. Plotinus 117; VII.
The Lesser Neoplatonists 131; VIII. Neoplatonic Views of Three Early
Christians [Synesius, Augustine, Boethius] 146; IX. Mediaval
Descriptive Psychology 177; X. The Psychology of the Mystics 199;
Xi. Dante's Theory of Vision 225; XII. Conclusion 257; Index 281-289.
On the Stoics see. pp. 87-96.
Chiesa Curzio. "Le Problème Du Langage Intérieur Chez Les
Stoiciens." Revue Internationale de Philosophie 45 (1991): 301-321.
Colish Marcia. "The Stoic Theory of Verbal Signification and the
Problem of Lies and False Statement from Antiquity to St. Anselm." In
Archéologie Du Signe, edited by Brind'Amour, Lucie and Vance,
Eugène. 17-43. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983.
Cortassa Guido. "Pensiero E Linguaggio Nella Teoria Stoica Del
Lekton." Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica 106 (1978): 385-
394.
Detel Wolfgang, Hülsen Reinhard, Krüger Gerhard, and Lorenz
Wolfgang. "Lekta Ellipé in Der Stoischen Sprach-Philosophie." Archiv
für Geschichte der Philosophie 62 (1980): 276-288.
Ebert Theodor. "La Théorie Du Signe Entre La Médecine Et La
Philosophie." In Signe Et Prédiction Dans L'antiquité, edited by Kany-
Turpin, José. 51-64. Saint-Etienne: Publications de l'Université de
Saint-Etienne, 2005.
Actes du colloque international interdisciplinaire de Créteil et de Paris,
22-23-24 mai 2003.
Edlow Robert Blair. Galen on Language and Ambiguity. Leiden: Brill,
1977.
An English translation of Galen's De Captionibus (On Fallacies), with
introduction, text and commentary.
Se the Chapter Seven: The Stoics on Fallacy and Ambiguity, pp. 56-68.
357
Egli Urs. Zwei Aufsätze Zum Vergleich Der Stoischen Sprachtheorie
Mit Modernen Theorien. Bern: Institut für Sprachwissenschaft, 1970.
———. "Sprachwissenschaft in Hellenistischer Zeit." In Neuere
Forschungen Zur Wortbildung Und Historiographie Der
Sprachwissenschaft, edited by Asbach, -Schnitker Brigitte, Brekle,
Herbert Ernst and Roggenhofer, Johannes. 261-269. Tübingen: Gunter
Narr, 2011.
Frede Michael. "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct
Impressions." In The Skeptical Tradition, edited by Burnyeat, Myles.
65-93. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
Reprinted in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 151-176.
Gentinetta Peter M. Zur Sprachbetrachtung Bei Den Sophisten Und in
Der Stoisch-Hellenistischen Zeit. Winterthur: P.G. Keller, 1961.
On the Stoics see pp. 93-118.
Hülser Karlheinz. "Expression and Content in Stoic Linguistic Theory."
In Semantics from Different Points of View, edited by Bäuerle, Rainer,
Egli, Urs and Stechow, Arnim von. 284-303. New York: Springer,
1979.
Ildefonse Frédérique. "Perception Et Discours Dans L'ancien
Stoicisme." Histoire Épistemologie Langage 14 (1992): 3-34.
"As the Stoics (particularly through the status they grant to
apprehensive representation) work out the relationship between
perception and discourse, their definition of representation as alteration
rather than impression may be understood as an effort to uphold
perceptive multiplicity. I endeavour to find out how the multiplicity
which perception implies is to be transcribed into discourse, and why
such a transcription requires us to distinguish between two ways of
partitioning discursive language, which are hinted at by the two
expressions mérè tou logou and stoicheia tou logou."
———. "La Théorie Stoïcienne De La Phrase (Énoncé, Proposition) Et
Son Influence Chez Les Grammairiens." In Théories De La Phrase Et
De La Proposition De Platon À Averroés, edited by Büttgen, Philippe,
Dieble, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan. 151-170. Paris: Éditions Rue
d'Ulm, 1999.
Jackson Darrell B. "The Stoic Theory of Signs in St. Augustine's "De
Doctrina Christiana"." Revue des Études Augustiniennes 15 (1969): 9-
358
49.
Reprinted in: Robert Austin Markus (ed.) - Augustine: a collection of
critical essays - Garden City, Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 92-147
Long Anthony Arthur. "Language and Thought in Stoicism." In
Problems in Stoicism, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur. 75-113.
London: Athlone Press, 1971.
———. "Stoic Psychology and the Elucidation of Language." In
Knowledge through Signs. Ancient Semiotic Theories and Practices,
edited by Manetti, Giovanni. 109-131. Turnhout: Brepols, 1996.
"(1) During the creative period of Stoicism grammar was still in its
infancy as a determinate field of study. I mention this fact because, as is
well known, the Stoics were enormously influential on the Graeco-
Roman grammatical tradition, which extends from the later Hellenistic
epoch into the Christian period of the Roman Empire. Recourse to the
Stoic influence on that tradition, excellently facilitated now by
Karlheinz Hülser's collection (1987), can give the impression that these
philosophers were merely pioneers in starting what the grammarians
carried forward more fully and systematically. I want to suggest that
such an impression may be seriously misleading in two respects.(2)
First, it implies, incorrectly I believe, that the Stoics approached
language as a phenomenon calling primarily for the kind of
grammatical and syntactical description later grammarians developed.
Secondly, it fails to identify the philosophical considerations that
underpin the Stoics' principal interests in language. The Stoics had
some splendid intuitions about the phonetic, grammatical and semantic
levels of linguistic structure. Although these bear directly on the
development of traditional grammar, they also seem to have clear
affinities with what contemporary experts in linguistics call universal
grammar.
The material I have chosen in order to make this point will be drawn
primarily from sections of Diogenes Laertius' doxography of Stoicism
(7.41-83). This is our only comprehensive account of "the logical part"
of Stoic philosophy. I shall be dealing mainly with Diogenes' section
"on utterance" (peri phonés) or "on signifiers" (peri semainonton),
which forms the first part of the subdivision of "dialectic" (D.L. 7.55-
62). The second part of that subdivision (D.L. 7.63-82) is "on
significations" (peri semainomenon). This division of dialectic into
359
signifiers and significations has a clear rationale, as we shall see, but it
too can yield misleading impressions, especially if it is taken to imply
that the subdivisions are independent of one another or that there are no
superordinate concepts that unite them. I shall argue that there are two
such concepts, (phantaisia and logos, and that these together provide
the foundations of the Stoic theory of language and logic.(3)
There is a third general point that I want to address. Scholars have
become accustomed to making a sharp distinction between the Stoic
concept of linguistic signs (words and sentences) and their concept of
semeion.(4) They applied the latter term (as distinct from the term
semainon) to a pattern of sign-inference from a fact or proposition that
is evident to a fact or proposition that is non-evident. It so happens that
nothing is said about sign-inference in Diogenes Laertius' doxography
of Stoic logic.(5)
Whatever the explanation for this omission may be, it cannot be
doubted that the Stoics classified sign-inferences under the
"significations" heading of the division of dialectic. As such, they are
not linguistic signs but a class of propositions signified by linguistic
signs. The antecedent or "if' clause of a sign inference is a meaning or
sayable (lekton), not the sentence by which this meaning is expressed,
and what the "if' clause is the sign for is the truth value of its
consequent and the connexion of that truth value to itself. However,
what we should conclude from this is not that sign-inference is a
function of logic as distinct from language, but that it is a normative
function of language, i.e., language in its epistemic and truth-signifying
capacity. Not only do sign-inferences require language for their
expression; they are also tied to language as lekta, or sentence content.
Correspondingly, language is tied to lekton (including sign inferences)
for its semantic content. The Stoics appl,ÁÿÖ5òied the term logos both
to significant utterances (linguistic signifiers) and to sign-inferences of
the form: if p, then q. The presence of logos on both sides of the
division of dialectic is hardly inadvertent. I take it as an indication that
what the Stoics were seeking to elucidate was a unitary science of
discourse, which would comprehend both linguistic signs and sign-
inferences without reducing one to the other." pp. 109-110
(1) (...) I have deliberately focused upon a limited range of texts, and I
say virtually nothing about the antecedents of Stoic doctrines or their
360
reception by later philosophers and grammarians. That is due in part to
reasons of time and space, and also to the excellent studies covering
these matters by Ax (1986), Frede (1977, 1978) and others. However,
given the extremely fragmentary nature of our evidence, it also seemed
to me important to focus rather narrowly on texts which have at least
the appearance of being systematically Stoic and uncontaminated by
other material. Hence my concentration on the "logical" doxography of
Diogenes Laertius 7.
(2) The three studies from which I have learned most about the
complex relation between Stoicism and the work of grammarians are
Lloyd (1971) and Frede (1977, 1978).
(3) There is no novelty about this claim. Its implications are explored
by Imbert (1978) and Manetti (1988), and I dealt with them at some
length in Long (1971b). My main point here is to elucidate the primacy
attached to phantasia in Stoic logic.
(4) See for instance Long (1971b: 84-88).
(5) This is noted and explored by Ebert (1991: 54 ff.).
Manetti Giovanni. "Perception, Encyclopaedia, and Language among
the Stoics." Versus.Quaderni di Studi Semiotici 50%1 (1988): 123-144.
———. Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity. Bloomngton:
Indiana University Press, 1993.
Original Italian edition: Le teorie del segno nell'antichità classica -
Milano, Gruppo Editoriale Fabbri, 1987.
Translated by Christine Richardson.
See Chapter Six: Theory of language and semiotics in Stoic
philosophers - pp. 92-106
Melazzo Lucio. "La Teoria Del Segno Linguistico Negli Stoici."
Lingua e Stile 10 (1975): 199-230.
Panaccio Claude. Le Discours Intérieur. De Platon À Guillaume
D'ockham. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1999.
Sur ce livre voir: Laval Théologique et Philosophique, vol. 57 n. 2
(June 2001).
Sur les Stoiciens, voir le Chapitre 2. Logos endiathetos 53-93.
Pinborg Jan. "Das Sprachdenken Der Stoa Und Augustins Dialektik."
Classica et Medievalia 23 (1962): 148-177.
Pohlenz Max. "Die Begründung Der Abendländischen Sprachlehre
361
Durch Die Stoa." Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu
Göttingen, philosophische-historische Klasse 1, 3.6 (1939): 151-198.
Reprinted in: M. Pohlenz, Kleine Schriften, edited by Heinrich Dörrie,
Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1965, vol. I, pp. 39-86.
Sandbach Francis Henry. "Phantasia Kataleptike." In Problems in
Stoicism. 9-21. London: Athlone Press, 1971.
Schubert Andreas. Untersuchungen Zur Stoischen Bedeutungslehre.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994.
Inhalt: Vorwort 7; Einleitung 9; I. Kapitel: Die Identität des Lektons
15; II. Die Identität der unvollständingen Lekta und die stoischen
"Fälle" 57; III. Die Unkörperlichkeit der Lekta 110; IV. Das Konzept
des Lektons in seiner Genese und in der philosophischen Diskussion
131; V. "hyparchein" und "hyphistasthai" bei den Stoikern 149; VI.
"Bedeutungslehre" bei Aristoteles und Augustinus und ihr Verhältnis
zur stoischen Semantik 175; VII. Die stoische "Kategorienlehre" 199;
Appendix: Bemerkungen zu "hyparchein" und "hyphistasthai" im
philosophischen Schriftttum und im Corpus Hippocraticum 246;
Abkürzungsverzeichnis 261; Bibliographie 263; Index nominum 275;
Index locorum 278-284.
Shields Christopher. "The Truth Evaluability of Stoic Phantasiai:
Adversus Mathematicos Vii 242-46." Journal of the History of
Phiosophy 31 (1993): 325-347.
Sluiter Ineke. "Language and Thought in Stoic Philosophy." In History
of Language Sciences / Geschichte Der Sprachwissenschaften /
Histoire Des Sciences Du Langage I.1, edited by Auroux, Sylvain,
Koerner, Konrad, Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Cornelis
H.M., 375-384. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011.
Steinthal Heymann. Geschichte Der Sprachwissenschaft Bei Den
Griechen Und Römern Mit Besonderer Rücksicht Auf Die Logik.
Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1890.
Two volumes: I (1890); II (1891).
Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1961.
Verbeke Gérard. "Philosophie Et Séméiologie Chez Les Stoiciens." In
Études Philosophiques Présentees Au Dr. Ibrahim Madkour. 15-38.
Paris: Gebo, 1974.
Repris dans: G. Verbeke, D'Aristote à Thomas d'Aquin. Antécédents de
la pensée moderne, Louvain, Presses de l'Université de Louvain, 1990,
362
pp. 341-364.
Watson Gerard. "Discovering the Imagination. Platonists and Stoics on
Phantasia." In The Question of "Eclecticism". Studies in Later Greek
Philosophy, edited by Dillon, John M. and Long, Anthony Arthur. 208-
233. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
———. Phantasia in Classical Thought. Galway: Galway University
Press, 1988.
Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Preface IX-XIII; 1. Phantasia in
Plato 1; 2 Phantasia in Aristotle and Theophrastus 14; 3. The
Epicureans and Stoics 38; 4. The transformation of phantasia 59; 5. The
Neoplatonists 96; 6. The transition to imaginatio 134; Bibliography
163; General Index 170; Index of Names 174-176.
On the Stoics see pp. 44-59.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON STOIC GRAMMAR

Allen James. "The Stoics on the Origin of Language and the
Foundation of Etymology." In Language and Learning. Philosophy of
Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium
Hellenisticum, edited by Frede, Dorothea and Inwood, Brad. 14-35.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
"James Allen shows that this assumption explains the Stoics'
preoccupation with etymology as part of their concern with a time
'when language was still young' and the product of a primordial
wisdom. Since they held a naturalist rather than a conventionalist view
the Stoics assumed that there had been a primary stock of words that
somehow 'imitate' the nature of the objects in question and could
therefore be used as a natural standard of correctness. Since they
assumed that there had been a high level of rationality among humans
at a primordial stage, the Stoics saw nothing unnatural in proposing the
notion of an original 'name-giver' as a hypothetical construct. Such a
construct escapes the sceptic's ridicule because it merely assumes that
the human need and the ability to converse rationally with each other,
which manifests itself in every individual at a certain age, must also
have been part of the nature of the (assumed) first generation of human
beings. The 'naturalness' of names consists, then, in their suitability for
363
communication with others; though it presupposes a mimetic relation
between words and certain kinds of objects, it is not confined to
onomatopoetics; instead it makes use of other means to augment
language by associations and rational derivations of further expressions
that are gradually added to the original stock of words. This
explanation, as Allen points out, may make the etymologies less
interesting and relevant in our eyes; but though the Stoics did not
assume mechanical laws of derivation that would allow them to recover
the 'cradle of words', attempts at rational reconstruction of the relation
between different expressions provided them with a means to discover
and to correct later corruptions of thought and so to play a crucial role
in philosophical progress. Despite certain similarities of concern with
the naturalist position in the Cratylus, the Stoic position therefore
differs in more significant ways from the Platonic position than is
usually acknowledged." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and
Brad Inwood, pp. 4-5
Amsler Mark. Etymology and Grammatical Discourse in Late Antiquity
and the Early Middle Ages. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1989.
See Chapter 1. Etymology and Discourse in Late Antiquity, pp. 15-56.
Atherton Catherine. The Stoics on Ambiguity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993.
"The subject of this book is some of the most impressive and original
work on ambiguity to survive the wreck of western antiquity: that of
the Stoa.
At some point in the long history of their school Stoics constructed at
least one definition of ambiguity, the earliest to survive in the western
philosophical tradition, and remarkable in any case for its complexity,
subtlety, and precision. It shows that its authors saw themselves as
defining a linguistic phenomenon, amphibolia, which can easily be
recognised today as familiar to users of most, if not all, natural
languages: that one and the same linguistic item can mean or signify
two or more different things. (This rough-and-ready characterisation
will serve for the moment.) Two Stoic classifications of types of
ambiguity, neither explicitly associated with the definition, are also
extant; as these seem to differ from each other in small but important
ways, they make it probable that at least one other definition was also
arrived at, and this too may have survived, albeit in a mutilated form,
364
and not explicitly attributed to the Stoa.
Three chapters of this book will be devoted to close analysis of these
three main pieces of evidence. They will reveal that Stoic philosophers
had identified a range of linguistic and semantic concepts and
categories with which ambiguity is intimately connected, and which
serve to delimit or define it. Brief as they are, the texts to be examined
will repay detailed study not only by students of ancient philosophy, at
whom this book is primarily aimed, but also by workers in a variety of
modern disciplines, above all by philosophers of language, theoretical
and comparative linguists, and philosophical logicians: although they
may all need to be convinced of the fact.
What these texts do not reveal, in a general, explicit way, is what
originally prompted Stoic interest in ambiguity. No ancient authority
says in so many words why Stoics, as self- professed philosophers,
found it worth while to define and classify ambiguity. If their
motivations and anxieties are to be comprehensible, their conceptions
of the purpose, structure, and contents of philosophy, of its internal and
external boundaries, of the goal of human existence, and of the right
way to achieve that goal, must all be determined. Stoic interest in
ambiguity was the inevitable consequence of the basic doctrines about
human nature, language, and rationality on which the whole Stoic
system was based. Once ambiguity's place in the Stoic scheme of things
is clear, it will be possible to trace the ways in which the form and
content of Stoic work on ambiguity were shaped and constrained by its
origins; and judgement by the school's own lights can be passed on its
success in the projects it set itself.
This interpretative and evaluative task is one of the two chief purposes
of this book. It prepares the way for its companion, which is to assess,
as far as possible, the merits and defects of Stoic work from other
appropriate perspectives, including those of relevant modern concerns
and interests, both inside and outside philosophy. To do so it will be
necessary to abandon the special viewpoints of both the Stoics' own
philosophical teachings and their philosophical and intellectual milieu.
One result of this shift will be a questioning of the lines of division
which moderns (philosophers, logicians, linguists, and others) and
ancients (Stoics and rival philosophers, as well as non-philosophical
professionals such as grammarians and rhetoricians) alike draw
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between what they conceive of as different disciplines or sciences,
including philosophy itself.
Given that part of the purpose of this book will be to try to analyse and
explain some of the differences, in conception and method, between a
range of modern and ancient perspectives on ambiguity, then restricting
our inquiry to the particular contributions, however rich, which Stoics
made to what are now called grammar, semantics, and epistemology,
and to the other ancient disciplines or theories comparable with modern
endeavours, would be a false economy even were the details of the
Stoic enterprise not hopelessly distorted or understanding of them
severely curtailed in the process. For the exegetical need for these
larger contexts also reflects the fact that Stoic ideas of what philosophy
was like, and what it was for, are vastly different from those which
dominate the field today. The Stoic motivation for studying ambiguity
might be called pragmatic, but not in the sense that it contributed to
some narrowly practical goal, whether writing good Greek or
understanding the classics, arguing in court or doing grammar -- or
even doing logic, if that is conceived of as just another intellectual
discipline, or as a tool of philosophy or of the sciences. The point was
that seeing or missing an ambiguity could make a difference to one's
general success as a human being." pp. 1-3
Auroux Sylvain, ed. La Naissance Des Metalangages En Orient Et En
Occident. Liège: Mardaga, 1989.
Histoire des idéèes linguistiques, Vol. 1.
Chapitre III. La naissance de la réflexion linguistique occidentale:
Marc Baratin: Section 3. La constitution de la grammaire et de la
dialectique 186; Section 4: La maturation des analyses grammaticaes
et dialectiques p. 207; Section 45. Les difficultés de l'analyse
syntaxique pp. 228-242.
Ax Wolfram. Laut, Stimme Und Sprache. Studien Zu Drei
Grundbegriffen Der Antiken Sprachtheorie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1986.
Zweiter Teil: Die philosophischen Grundlagen, 3. Stoa pp. 138-211.
Baratin Marc. "Les Origines Stoiciennes De La Théorie Augustinienne
Du Signe." Revue des Études Latines 59 (1981): 260-268.
———. "L'identité De La Pensée Et De La Parole Dans L'ancien
Stoïcisme." Langages 16 (1982): 9-21.
366
———. "La Constitution De La Grammaire Et De La Dialectique." In
Histoire Des Idées Linguistiques. I. La Naissance Des Métalangages
En Orient Et En Occident, edited by Auroux, Sylvain. 186-206. Liège:
Mardaga, 1989.
———. "Aperçu De La Linguistique Stoïcienne." In Sprachtheorien
Der Abendländischen Antike, edited by Schmitter, Peter. 193-217.
Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1991.
Geschichte der Sprachtheorie. Band II.
Baratin Marc, and Desbordes Fraçoise. L'analyse Linguistique Dans
L'antiquité Classique. 1. Les Théories. Paris: Klincksieck, 1981.
Avec la participation de Philippe Hoffman et Alain Pierrot.
Berrettoni Pierangiolo. "An Idol of the School: The Aspectual Theory
of the Stoics." Rivista di Linguistica 1 (1989): 33-68.
———. "Further Remarks on the Stoic Theory of Tenses." Rivista di
Linguistica 1 (1989): 251-275.
———. "La Formazione Di Un Paradigma Stoico-Alessandrino Nella
Teoria Dei Tempi Verbali." Quaderni dell'Istituto di Glottologia
dell'Università di Chieti 8 (1997): 5-28.
"The article seeks to identify the philosophical premises of the theory
of tense developed by the Stoics in the formation of a propositional
logic and a temporal logic. It also indicates the presence of a number of
suggestions derived from mathematical theories."
Blank David Leslie. Ancient Philosophy and Grammar. The Syntax of
Apollonius Dyscolus. Chico: Scholars Press, 1982.
———. "Remarks on Nicator, the Stoics and the Ancient Theory of
Punctuation." Glotta 61 (1983): 48-67.
Blank David Leslie, and Atherton Catherine. "The Stoic Contribution
to Traditional Grammar." In The Cambridge Companion to Stoics,
edited by Inwood, Brad. 310-327. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
Brunschwig Jacques. "Remarques Sur La Théorie Stoïcienne Du Nom
Propre." Histoire Épistemologie Langage 6 (1984): 3-19.
Répris dans: J. Brunschwig, Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques:
Epicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme, Paris, Presses Universitaires de
France, 1995.
Caujolle-Zaslawsky Françoise. "La Scholie De Stéphanos. Quelques
367
Remarques Sur La Théorie Des Temps Du Verbe Attribuée Aux
Stoiciens." Histoire Épistemologie Langage 7 (1985): 3-19.
"Although this testimony is isolated, the historians of ancient grammar,
who are aware of the part played by the Stoics in the formation of an
independent grammatical field, unreluctantly take for granted the
indications of a scholium by Stephanos -- the commentator on
Dionysios Thrax -- which imply the existence of stoic theory of verbal
tenses; yet none of the reconstructions of this theory as the basis of the
scholium can be taken as conclusive, for want of complementary
documents. This paper offers neither a new reconstruction nor a critical
survey of former ones, but tries to follow another path; it investigates
whether elements which, in the scholium, are undoubtedly of stoic
origin, did not stand up to the scholiast's skill in his attempt to integrate
them within a framework which may be foreign to them."
Dinneen Francis P. "On Stoic Grammatical Theory." Historiographia
Linguistica 12 (1985): 149-164.
Egli Urs. "The Stoic Concept of Anaphora." In Semantics from
Different Points of View, edited by Bäuerle, Rainer, Egli, Urs and
Stechow, Arnim von. 266-283. New York: Springer, 1979.
———. "Stoic Syntax and Semantics." In The History of Linguistics in
the Classical Period, edited by Taylor, Daniel J., 281-306, 1986.
Also published in: Historiographia Linguistica, 13, 1986 and in J.
Brunschwig (ed.), Les Stoiciens et leur logique, Paris, Vrin, 1986, pp.
135-147 (2nd edition 2006, pp. 131-148).
"Let me now summarize the main points of my exposition of Stoic
syntax:
1. Stoic loquia (lekta) are designated by expressions of a normalized
Greek. They have the same structure as these Greek expressions. Thus
in most technical uses they serve approximately the same purpose as
"semantic structures" or "semantic representations" in modem
linguistics and philosophy of language.
2. There is an infinity of loquia derived by a finite number of recursive
rules of four types, lexical, inclusion, combination and transformation
rules. Semantic categories like statement, predicate and subject are used
in the formulation of these rules which enable us to build complex
loquia of the various categories from atomar ones (asuntheta). The
structure of a compound loquium may be revealed by using Chomsky
368
or Montague analysis trees.
3. This infinity of loquia is related with real things by an analogue of
modern model theory. General terms are said to denote individuals
according to a variant of multiple denotation theory. Deictic subjects
are assigned values, like their modern analogues: individual variables
by an assignment (deixis). Statements are either true or false. Complex
expressions are valuated in function of their syntactic composition and
the values of their parts.
4. Denotations of Greek expressions are determined indirectly. E.g.
appellatives signify appellative subjects, which refer to individuals.
Thus appellatives indirectly denote these individuals too.
5. All this would have to be refined by taking into account tense.
6. By neglecting tense, plural and subjectivization, Stoic loquium
theory becomes an analogue of modern first order predicate logic by
a) the introduction of n place predicates with arbitrary n,
b) the introduction of a means to handle relative clauses
Stoic syntax and related model theory thus proves interesting and
comparable to modern treatments." Les Stoiciens et leur logique, 2nd
edition 2006, pp. 144-145.
———. "Anaphora from Athens to Amsterdam." In Reference and
Anaphoric Relations, edited by Heusinger, Klaus von and Egli, Urs. 17-
29. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000.
"Excavating the prehistory of dynamic predicate logic in the Stoic
theory of methodical arguments makes us aware of an interrupted
tradition, in a way that is possible only by philological reconstruction
and the use of similar facts independently invented in modern times.
That such interrupted traditions can become important has been shown
by the use of ancient temporal logic and its resurrection in Kripke's
(1963) semantics of modal logic. Kripke combined Prior's
reconstruction of the Diodorean system of time-logical modality with
ideas from Carnap on modal logic in order to get his semantic
characterization of the Lewis systems of modal logic. Modern
developments offer scholars of classical logic a modern foil that can
help them to understand ancient texts and to see interesting
developments in them which otherwise would be incomprehensible.
The modern representatives of this tradition also gain an advantage
from such research, in that they can build on a tradition which helps to
369
strengthen confidence in the new methods.
The adherents of Stoicism gave their logic high priority, saying that if
the Greek gods had a logic, then it must be that of Chrysippus. As we
have seen, this logic was a form of dynamic predicate logic. It is
equivalent to classical predicate logic and contains it as the static part.
Classical predicate logic is according to Hilbert's thesis a privileged
form of logic, and according to Quine it is the right regimentation of
language. Perhaps the Stoic saying was not so false after all. But we
can also learn something about our own form of predicate logic,
classical and dynamic, because the Stoic developments can be
considered as a finalized whole. Even if the Stoic version of dynamic
predicate logic is no logic of the gods, it still is an important logic for
human beings." p. 28
Frede Michael. "Some Remarks on the Origin of Traditional
Grammar." In Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, edited by Butts, Robert E.
and Hintikka, Jaakko. 51-79. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977.
Reprinted with the title: The Origins of Traditional Grammar in: M.
Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987,
pp. 338-359.
———. "Principles of Stoic Grammar." In The Stoics, edited by Rist,
John M., 27-75. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
Reprinted in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford,
"Historians of grammar have usually proceeded as if their subject had a
continuous history starting in the fifth century B.C., with the Sophists.
But even if one is willing to credit Sophists like Protagoras and
Prodicus, and later philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, with a theory
of language, It is obvious that their theories were not grammatical
theories: they were not interested in finding out how a particular
language, Greek, actually works in such detail as to be in a position
even to attempt to start formulating the canons for correct Greek.
Hence to treat them as part of one continuous tradition along with the
later grammarians is to invite neglect of important questions. We may,
for example, assume that those who actually started grammar had
certain notions concerning the nature of language, and that these and
other philosophical views influenced the way they set up their subject
370
and thus also its later development. We may also assume that they had
certain reasons for starting this enterprise and that these reasons
influenced the way they went about it and hence, indirectly, the outlines
of later grammar. For reasons of this sort it is important that we should
have a better notion of the actual origins of the grammatical tradition.
Now our question concerning the Stoics is important, since it has been
claimed that it was the Stoics themselves who first formulated
traditional grammar, To substantiate this claim it will not be sufficient
to show that traditional grammar is Influenced in many respects by
Stoic notions. For such a state of affairs would be completely
compatible with the assumption that the Stoics still formed part of the
earlier philosophical tradition, though they contributed more to this
tradition than their predecessors, but that grammar itself only began
among the classical scholars of Alexandria, who exploited the available
philosophical tradition and the Stoic contributions to it. To substantiate
the claim that grammar originated with the philosophers we have to
show that it formed a definite part of Stoic philosophy (the evidence
seems to rule out the other schools of philosophy as plausible
candidates). But the origin of traditional grammar is not the concern of
this paper. Even if grammar originated with the Alexandrians, it would
be important to know whether in matters of language the Stoics still
formed part of the earlier philosophical tradition or whether they were
already engaged in doing grammar. For the evidence on the Stoic
theory of language is so fragmentary that the context of the fragments
and testimonies makes an enormous difference to their interpretation
and evaluation."
———. "The Stoic Doctrine of the Tenses of the Verb." In Dialektiker
Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor. 141-154. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner,
1993.
———. "The Stoic Notion of a Grammatical Case." Bulletin of the
Institute of Classical Studies 39 (1994): 13-24.
Gourinat Jean-Baptiste. " La Théorie Stoïcienne Et Ses Enjeux." In
Théories De La Phrase Et De La Proposition De Platon À Averroés,
edited by Buttgen, Philippe, Dieble, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan.
133-150. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm, 1999.
———. "Épistémologie, Rhétorique Et Grammaire." In Lire Les
371
Stoïciens, edited by Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste and Barnes, Jonathan. 23-
39. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009.
Hadot Pierre. "La Notion De "Cas" Dans La Logique Stoïcienne." In Le
Langage. Actes Du Xiii Congrés Des Sociétés De Philosophie De
Langue Française. Genève, 2-6 Août 1966. 109-112. Neuchâtel: La
Baconnière, 1966.
Hagius Hugh. "The Stoic Theory of the Parts of Speech." 1979.
Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University available at: ProQuest
Dissertation Express n. 8008733.
Contents: Preliminary remarks IV--IX; Chapter I. Chrysippus 1;
Chapter II. The Techne concerning sounds of Diogenes of Babylon
101; Chapter III. Aristarchus and the Aristarcheans 171; Chapter IV.
The Dialectica of Augustine 249; Concluding remarks 260; Appendix I
265; Appendix II 280; Bibliography 283-290.
Abstract: "This dissertation relates the history of the theory of the parts
of speech from its origin in the Stoic school of dialectics through its
passage into the Alexandrian school of literary criticism in the second
century B.C.
It pays especial attention to the way in which the theory was
transformed in that passage. The Stoics had used it as part of their
general system of dialectics, intended to give an account of the truth of
true sentences and the validity of valid deductions. The Alexandrians,
whose main activity was textual criticism, used the parts of speech as a
system of naming and classifying the forms of Greek. The dissertation
argues that for each of these purposes a different theory is required, and
that in the Alexandrian grammarians' application of the theory two
different ways of analyzing language were confused.
The chief figures in this history are the Stoics, Chrysippus of Soloi (c.
281 to 208 B.C.) and his student, Diogenes of Babylon (c. 238 to 150
B.C.), and the Alexandrian, Aristarchus of Samothrace (c. 216 to 144
B.C.). One chapter is devoted to each of them.
The first chapter is a reconstruction of Chrysippus's version of the
theory of the parts of speech. It discusses the terminology which he
inherited, such as "element of logos," the forerunner of our phrase "part
of speech," as well as the notions of noun, verb, conjunction and article.
It examines Chrysippus's theory of the significate (alternatively called
the lekton), which was described as being what "the barbarians,
372
although hearing the sound, do not understand," and also as being "just
what is true or false." The several parts of speech were distinguished
according
to their association with significates.
The second chapter is a reconstruction of a lost work of Diogenes of
Babylon, his Techne Concerning Sound. This was a handbook which
treated language as a single topic, beginning with acoustics and
proceeding to the parts of speech. Diogenes's Techne probably was the
vehicle by which the theory of the parts of speech reached Alexandria.
The third chapter discusses Aristarchus's adaptation of the parts of
speech to the purposes of textual criticism, and some of the ways in
which he used it in his own edition of the Iliad. It also considers the
difficulty which the confusion within the theory caused for
Aristarchus's successors. Finally it compares the grammatical theory of
the Alexandrians with that of the great Indian grammarian Panini and
his commentators.
The fourth and final chapter is devoted to a post-classical Latin text
which has come down to us as the De Dialectica of Augustine. Its
sources are obscure, but it appears to represent a development of Stoic
theory later than Diogenes. It considers questions of metalanguage, and
draws a distinction between use and mention very like the one made by
Panini. This stage of Stoic theory did not pass into the grammatical
tradition, but the De Dialectica was read during the medieval and
Renaissance periods in Europe.
The dissertation contains two appendices. The first is a collection of
fragments upon which the reconstruction of Diogenes's Techne
Concerning Sound was based. The second discusses Aristarchus's pupil
Dionysius Thrax, and the grammar attributed to him."
Hennigfeld Jochem. Geschichte Der Sprachphilosophie. Antike Und
Mittelalter. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994.
Chapter V. Die Stoa. Laut und Bedeutung pp. 104-124.
Householder Fred Walter. The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1981.
Translated and with Commentary.
Ildefonse Frédérique. La Naissance De La Grammaire Dans L'antiquité
Grecque. Paris: Vrin, 1997.
Chapitre II: Les Stoïciens - pp. 119-251.
373
———. "Petite Histoire De La Metabasis." Histoire Épistemologie
Langage 20 (1998): 63-80.
"I will try to illustrate the dynamics of the passage as described by
metabasis in a few stoic texts and several grammatical analysis of
Apollonius Dyscolus. I believe the concept of « décrochement », which
I borrow from Claude Lévi-Strauss, helps to clarify it. The adjective
metabatikos qualifies the type of human representation, logical
representation, which, in as much as it is « transitive », allows an
information to open into another, as well as their mutual articulation,
therefore founding the conception of the sign « if this, then this » and
the possibility of the conditional « if it is day, there is light ».
According to the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, metabasis
intervenes in the analysis of the transitive diathesis and in the definition
of the person. I will procède to show the part played by metabasis in the
grammatical treatment of conjunction and how it allows to throw some
light upon the obscure part of the definition of conjunction in the
Technè Grammatikè attributed to Dionysus the Trhax."
Lallot Jean. "Origines Et Développement De La Théorie Des Parties
Du Discours En Grèce." Langages 23 (1988): 11-23.
Lohmann Johannes. "Über Die Stoische Sprachphilosophie." Studium
Generale 21 (1968): 250-257.
Summarizes in particular the important unpublished Dissertation by
Hans-Erich Müller (1943).
Long Anthony Arthur. "Stoic Linguistics, Plato' Cratylus, and
Augustine's De Dialectica." In Language and Learning. Philosophy of
Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium
Hellenisticum, edited by Frede, Dorothea and Inwood, Brad. 36-55.
"Anthony Long also elaborates on the influence of Plato's Cratylus on
Stoic theory. But he goes much further than Allen with his hypothesis
that the Stoics not only made use of Plato's dialogue, but did so in a
way that justifies he presentation of many central features of their
linguistic theory as being he result of a revisionary reading of the
Cratylus. It is a reading that makes Socrates' suggestions about the
'natural' relation of names to things much more coherent than they are
in the dialogue itself. This also applies to their etymological
explanation of the names of the gods that they suggested as a revision
374
of a corrupted tradition and a return to the original name-givers'
comprehension of the true nature of the universe. Given their
`synaesthetic' reconstruction of the relation between phonetics and
semantics, the Stoics could avoid the Cratylus' more absurd features of
onomatopoetics, as Long shows by analysing different forms of
'naturalism', including 'formal and phonetic naturalism', and their
application by the Stoics that not only ins hides names but also the
famous lekta or 'sayables'. Long contends that the Stoics not only found
a better balance between the phonetic and the formal constituents of
meaningful discourse than emerges from Plato's dialogue itself, but
restricted their use of etymology as a back-up to their theology, i.e. the
naturalistic reconstruction of the names of the gods. As an additional
witness to the sophistication of the Stoic linguistic theory Long adds an
appendix on the four-fold semantic distinction (between dicibile, res,
verbum, and dictio) in St Augustine's De dialectica, which he takes to
be largely of Stoic origin.
The Epicureans also held that language is part of the natural emergence
of human culture. But here the similarity between the Stoic and the
Epicurean theory of language ends. For instead of an early stage of
rationality and inspired `name-givers', the Epicureans proposed a quite
different account of the evolution of language as part of their
mechanical reconstruction of the order in nature, which includes an
animal-like primitive stage of human beings. Unfortunately the
information on this early stage in the development of humans as
cultural beings in Epicurean theory is extremely meagre; attempts to
reconstruct it have to rely on a few lines in Epicurus' Letter to
Herodotus and in Lucretius' poem." From the Introduction by Dorothea
Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 5-6
Luhtala Anneli. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic
Logic. Münster: Nodus Publikationen, 2000.
"This study examines the dialectical origin of syntactical description in
our traditional grammar. Two famous texts take pride of place in
containing the first descriptions of a 'clause' in Greek literature, namely
Plato's Sophist and Aristotle's Peri hermeneias. These descriptions
arose in the context of a more general inquiry into the nature of truth
and language which gave rise to the first speculations on the form of
the logical proposition in Greek Antiquity. By establishing as the unit
375
of propositional analysis a combination of two linguistic items, Onoma
(`name', 'noun') and rhema (`verb', 'predicate') these philosophers laid
the foundation for the doctrine of the parts of speech which later
constituted the core of ancient grammar. Their concern was to establish
the two functional constituents of the proposition, roughly the subject
and the predicate, by means of which true and false statements could be
made. The object of their concern -- the minimal statement consisting
of a noun and a verb -- came to figure as the point of departure for
syntactical analysis when it began to be pursued in independent
grammatical treatises. In the grammar of Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd
century A.D.), which is our first extant grammatical treatise on syntax,
syntactical description proceeds from the minimal self-sufficiency
(autoteleia) of the linguistic expression. But the description of the
minimal sentence by Apollonius bears witness to the distinctly Stoic
origin of the notion of self-sufficiency." p. 11
Müller Hans-Erich. "Die Prinzipien Der Stoischen Grammatik." 1943.
Unpublished dissertation (University of Rostock).
Ophuijsen Johannes M.Van. "Parts of What Speech? Stoic Notions of
Statement and Sentence; or, How the Dialectician Knew Voice and
Began Syntax." In Syntax in Antiquity, edited by Swiggers, Pierre and
Wouters, Alfons. 77-94. Louvain: Peeters, 2003.
Pinborg Jan. "Classical Antiquity: Greece." In Current Trends in
Linguistics. Vol 13: Historiography of Linguistics, edited by Sebeok,
Thomas A., 69-126. La Haye: Mouton, 1975.
Schenkeveld Dirk Marie. "Stoic and Peripatetic Kinds of Speech Act
and the Distinction of Grammatical Moods." Mnemosyne 37 (1984):
291-353.
Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics II.
———. "The Stoic Techne Peri Phones." Mnemosyne 43 (1990): 86-
108.
Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics III.
———. "Developments in the Study of Ancient Linguistics."
Mnemosyne 43 (1990): 289-306.
Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics IV.
———. "Scholarship and Grammar." In La Philologie Grecque À
L'époque Hellénistique Et Romaine. Sept Exposés Suivis De
Discussions (Vandoeuvres - Genève, 16-21 Août 1993), edited by
376
Montanari, Franco. 263-301. Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1993.
———. "Philosophical Prose." In Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in
the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. - A.D. 400, edited by Porter, Stanley E.,
195-264. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
———. "The Invention of the Whole-and-Part Figure and the Stoics on
Solecism: Ancient Interpretations of Il. 24.58." Mnemosyne 55 (2002):
513-537.
Schenkeveld Dirk Marie, and Barnes Jonathan. "Language." In The
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra, Keimpe,
Barnes, Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield, Malcolm. 177-225.
Schmidt Rudolf T. Die Grammatik Der Stoiker.
Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn, 1979.
Introduction, translation and editing from the Latin edition (1839) by
Karlheinz Hülser. With an annotated bibliography of the Stoic
linguistics (dialectic) by Urs Egli (pp. 182-216).
Sluiter Ineke. Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study
of Ancient Linguistic Thought. Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1990.
Contents: VII-X; Preface XI-XII; General Introduction 1; I. The Stoa 5;
II.Apollonius Dyscolous 39; III. Causal ina 143; IV. The Interjection
173; Abbreviations 247; Bibliography 248; Selective Index Locorum
263; Selective Indices: I. Greek 266; II. Latin 268; III. Subject 268-270.
Telegdi Zsigmond. "On the Formation of the Concept of 'Linguistic
Sign' and on Stoic Language Doctrine." In Hungarian Linguistics,
edited by Kiefer, Ferenc. 537-588. Philadelphia: J. Benjamins, 1982.
Versteegh Cornelis H.M. "The Stoic Verbal System." Hermes 108
(1980): 338-357.
"The difficulties one meets in studying Stoic grammatical theory may
well be illustrated by the verbal system, whose reconstruction has been
undertaken in various ways. It is our aim in this paper to study first the
data provided by the Greek grammarians, and to determine the
influence of Stoic theories on this corpus with the help of the direct
quotation in the scholia (scholia Dyonisios Thrax 250, 26 - 251, 25).
Then we will analyse the data from Varro (De Lingua Latina VIII - X)
and from the Latin Corpus Grammaticorum, in connection with the
direct quotation by Priscianus (Inst. 414, 21 sqq.). Finally, we will
compare the various reconstructions which have been proposed, and
377
give our own proposal." p. 338
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON STOIC RHETORIC
"Rhetorics of Reason and Restraint: Stoic Rhetoric from Antiquity to

the Present." Advances in the History of Rhetoric 14 (2011).
Atherton Catherine. "Hand over Fist: The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric."
Classical Quarterly 38 (1988): 392-427.
"Students of Stoic philosophy, especially of Stoic ethics, have a lot to
swallow. Virtues and emotions are bodies; virtue is the only good, and
constitutes happiness, while vice is the only evil; emotions are
judgements (in Chrysippus' Stoa); all sins are equal; and everyone bar
the sage is mad, bad and dangerous to know. Non-Stoics in antiquity
seem for the most part to find these doctrines as bizarre as we do. Their
own philosophical or ideological perspectives, and the criticisms of the
Stoa to which these gave rise, are no less open to criticism than are the
paradoxes and puzzles under attack -- but they may be, often are, better
documented, less provocatively attention-begging, or simply more
familiar. Even disputes within the Stoa can be obscured or distorted by
modern prejudices. Posidonius rejected Chrysippus' theory of a unitary
soul, one rational through and through, on the grounds that such a
theory could not satisfactorily account for the genesis of bad --
excessive and irrational- - emotions, the páthe (Galen, PHP [De
placitis Hippocratis et Platonis] 2.246.36ff., 314. 15ff. De Lacy).
Posidonius' own Platonising, tripartite soul feels more familiar to us
because the Republic tends to be a set text rather more often than do the
fragments of Chrysippus' de anima; and the balance in Plato's favour is
unlikely to change. When Posidonius wrote, on the other hand, the
Chrysippean soul was school orthodoxy, and Platonism the latest thing
in radical chic." (p. 392).
Barré Véronique, and Laks André. "Le Sens De Lektixos Dans La
Définition Stoïcienne De L'ambiguïté (Diogène Laërce Vii, 62 = Svf
Iii, 23)." Revue des Etudes Grecques 107 (1994): 708-712.
Barwick Karl. Probleme Der Stoischen Sprachlehre Und Rhetorik.
Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1957.
Inhalt: Abkürzungen 4; Vorwort 5; Einleitung 7; I. Augustins Dialektik
378
und ihr Verhältnis zu Varros Schriften De dialectica und De lingua
latina 8; II. Die Sprachschöpfungslehre der Stoa 29; III. Die
Deklinationslehre der Stoa 34; IV. Die Etymologie der Stoa 58; V.
Platons Kratylos und die stoische Sprachschöpfungslehre und
Etymologie 70; VI. Die Stellung der Stoa zu dem Problem der
sprachlichen Neuschöpfung 80; 1. Die stoische Auffassung von der
sprachlichen Neuschöpfung bei Varro und Quintilian 80; 2. Das
Problem der sprachlichen Neuschöpfung bei Cicero, Quintilian und
anderen Rhetoren 83; 3. Horaz und das Problem der sprachlichen
Neuschöpfung 85; VII. Die stoische Tropen- und Figurenlehre und ihr
Verhältnis zu der der zünftigen Rhetorik 88; 1. Die stoische
Tropenlehre 88; 2. Die stoische Figurenlehre 97; 3. Entstehungszeit der
stoischen Tropen- und Figurenlehre 110-111.
Vorwort: "Die vorstehenden Untersuchungen verfolgen das Ziel, einige
Gebiete der stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik aufzuhellen. Bei dem
Stand unserer Überlieferung ist das eine schwierige und
entsagungsvolle Aufgabe: aber, wie ich glaube, eine Aufgabe, die sich
lohnt; denn nur auf dem Weg über die Stoa läßt sich ein tieferer
Einblick gewinnen in die Geschichte der antiken Sprachtheorien und,
bis zu einem gewissen Grad, auch der antiken Rhetorik. Leider ist auch
die Arbeit des nachprüfenden Lesers nicht immer bequem. Ich war
daher bemüht, sie ihm nach Möglichkeit zu erleichtern und weitgehend
die Quellen selber sprechen zu lassen.
Der Stoff ist in sieben Kapitel gegliedert. Sie behandeln Themen
verschiedener Art, die aber innerlich eng zusammenhängen. Kapitel I
will durch seine Analysen eine stoische Quelle erschließen, die von
Wichtigkeit ist für die folgenden Untersuchungen. Kapitel II und III
versuchen die stoische Auffassung von der Entstehung der Sprache
klarzulegen, wobei das erstere mehr die verschiedene Bedeutung der
Worte, das letztere ihre verschiedenen Formen ins Auge faßt. Mit
Kapitel II und III steht Kapitel IV in engem Zusammenhang: Über die
in ihm behandelte Etymologie der Stoa läßt sich nur von ihrer Ansicht
über die Entstehung der Sprache her ein tieferes Verständnis gewinnen.
Da die stoischen Lehren über die Sprachentstehung und Etymologie
sich nahe berühren mit denen des platonischen Kratylos, waren in
Kapitel V die beiderseitigen Beziehungen zu untersuchen und
festzustellen, wie weit etwa die Stoiker von Platon abhängig sind und
379
wie weit sie ihre eigenen Wege gehen. Kapitel VI und VII untersuchen
die stoischen Anschauungen über das sprachschöpferische Verfahren
der Gegenwart; beide gehören mehr in das Gebiet der Rhetorik.
Während Kapitel VI die verschiedenen Arten der Neubildung von
Worten behandelt, beschäftigt sich Kapitel VII mit den Tropen und
Figuren; sie können ebenfalls, wenn auch in anderem Sinn als die
Bildung neuer Worte, als ein Akt sprachlicher Neuschöpfung
bezeichnet werden. Die Formen moderner Sprachschöpfung gehen,
jedenfalls zum Teil, parallel mit dem sprachschöpferischen Verfahren,
wie es von den Stoikern für die Urzeit angenommen und in Kapitel II
und III beschrieben wurde. Kapitel VI und VII setzen also zu ihrem
tieferen Verständnis Kapitel II und III voraus.
Es sei noch bemerkt, daß Kapitel VII ursprünglich als selbständige
Abhandlung geplant und bereits 1922 geschrieben war, als mein Buch
über "Remmius Palaemon und die römische ars grammatica" gedruckt
wurde, wo S. 99, 1 auf sie verwiesen wird. Die Veröffentlichung ist
damals aus verschiedenen Gründen unterblieben und erfolgt jetzt im
Rahmen dieser Untersuchungen in erweiterter und z. T. veränderter
Form."
Edlow Robert Blair. "The Stoics on Ambiguity." Journal of the History
of Philosophy 13 (1975): 423-445.
Flory Dan. "Stoic Psychology, Classical Rhetoric, and Theories of
Imagination in Western Philosophy." Philosophy and Rhetoric 29
(1996): 147-167.
"The roots of a major theory of imagination arising out of classical
thought lay in descriptions of phantasia (or its equivalent) in fragments
of Stoicism and accounts of philosophical rhetoric."
Goldschmidt Victor. "Logique Et Rhétorique Chez Les Stoiciens."
Logique et Analyse 16 (1963): 450-456.
Repris dans: V. Goldschmidt, Écrits. Tome 1: Études de philosophie
ancienne, Paris, Vrin, 1984, pp. 179-186.
Hadot Pierre. "Philosophie, Dialectique, Rhétorique Dans L'antiquité."
Studia Philosophica 39 (1980): 139-166.
Répris dans P. Hadot, Études de philosophie ancienne, Paris, Belles
Lettres, 1998, pp. 159-193.
Le Bouellec Alain. "L'allégorie Chez Les Stoiciens." Poétique 23
(1975): 301-322.
380
Moretti Gabriella. Acutum Dicendi Genus. Brevità, Oscurità,
Sottigliezze E Paradossi Nelle Tradizioni Retoriche Degli Stoici.
Trento: Università di Trento, 1990.
O'Gorman Ned. "Stoic Rhetoric: Prospects of a Problematic." Advances
in the History of Rhetoric 14 (2011): 1-13.
Pachet Pierre. "Les Métaphores De La Connaissance Chez Les Anciens
Stoiciens." Revue des Etudes Grecques 81 (1968): 374-377.
Pearcy Lee T. "Galen and Stoic Rhetoric." Greek, Roman, and
Byzantine Studies 24 (1983): 259-272.
Protopapas-Marnelli Maria. La Rhétorique Des Stoiciens. Paris:
L'Harmattan, 2002.
Striller Franz. De Stoicorum Studiis Rhetoricis. Breslau: W. Kebner,
1886.
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Selected Bibliography on the Early Stoic

Logicians: Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus
Zeno of Citium
Editions
Pearson Alfred Chilton. 1891. The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes.
London: C. J. Clay & Sons.
Zeno et Zenonis discipuli. Edited by Arnim Hans Friedrich August von.
Stuttgart: Teubner 1905.
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: Vol. I.
Studies
Adorno, Francesco. 1957. "Sul Significato Del Termine Hyparchon in
Zenone Stoico." Parola del Passato no. 12:362-374.
———. 1959. "Sul Significato Del Termine Mnemonichon in Zenone
Stoico." Parola del Passato no. 14.
———. 1966. "I Fondamenti Della Logica in Zenone Stoico." In Studi
Sul Pensiero Greco, 121-178. Firenze: Sansoni.
Brinkmann, Klaus. 1997. "Zénon, Matérialiste Et Nominaliste?"
Diotima no. 25:48-55.
"The article questions the standard perception of Stoic philosophy as
383
materialist and nominalist in nature. Rather than being materialistic,
Stoic ontology represents a consistent hylemorphism in which nothing
exists without matter and which is intended to circumvent and the
matter-form dualism in Aristotle's metaphysics and to avoid Aristotle's
epistemological problem of the unknowability of matter. Similarly,
Stoic semantics is not entirely nominalistic. Although Stoic universals
("ennoemata", "ennoiai") are "post rem", unlike word or sentence
meanings ("lekta") they are nonmental noematic or conceptual
structures."
Döring, August. 1902. "Zeno, Der Gründer Der Stoa." Preussische
Jahrbücher no. 107:213-242.
Fritz, Kurt von. 1972. "Zenon Von Kition." In Pauly's Real-
Encyclopädie. Band 10 A, 83-121.
Graeser, Andreas. 1975. Zenon Von Kition. Positionen Und Probleme.
Berlin: de Gruyter.
See in particular: Teil I. Zur Logik, pp. 8-81.
Review by Jaap Mansfeld: Zeno of Citium. Critical observations on a
recent study, Mnemosyne, 31, 1978, pp. 134-178.
Hunt, Harold Arthur Kinross. 1976. "A Physical Interpretation of the
Universe. The Doctrines of Zeno the Stoic." In. Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press.
Ieorodiakonou, Katerina. 2002. "Zeno's Arguments." In Zeno of Citium
and His Legacy. The Philosophy of Zeno, edited by Scaltsas, Theodore
and Mason, Andrew S., 81-112. Larnaca: The Municipality of Larnaca.
Mansfeld, Jaap. 1978. "Zeno of Citium: Critical Observations on a
Recent Study." Mnemosyne no. 31:134-178.
Critical review of: A. Graeser, Zenon von Kition. Positionen und
Probleme.
———. 2002. "Zeno on the Unity of Philosophy." In Zeno of Citium
and His Legacy. The Philosophy of Zeno, edited by Scaltsas, Theodore
and Mason, Andrew S. Larnaca: The Municipality of Larnaca.
"The formula "the elements of logos" in the Zeno quotation by
Epictetus at Arrian, Diss. 4.8.12 need not, pace e.g. von Arnim, pertain
to the parts of speech, but more probably means the elements, i.e.
primary theorems of philosophical theory, or doctrine. Theory
moreover should become internalized to the soul and "lived":
philosophy is also the so-called "art of life". These theorems are to be
384
distinguished but should reciprocally entail each other. Philosophy
according to Zeno is both tripartite and one, and tripartite especially in
that its parts (and subparts) cannot be transferred simultaneously: of
necessity these have to taught and learned one after the other."
Pachet, Pierre. 1975. "La Deixis Selon Zénon Et Chrysippe."
Pohlenz, Max. 1938. "Zenon Und Chrysipp." Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Go?ttingen.Philologisch-Historische
Klasse.Nachrichten:173-210.
Neue Folge. Fachgruppe 1. Altertumswissenschaften Bd. 2, Nr. 9.
———. 1940. "Grundfragen Der Stoischen Philosophie."
Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Go?
ttingen.Philologisch-Historische Klasse:1-122.
Folge 1, Nr. 26.
Rist, John M. 2006. "Zeno and the Origins of Stoic Logic." In Les
Stoïciens Et Leur Logique, edited by Brunschwig, Jacques, 13-28.
Paris: Vrin.
"I I have attempted to sketch what Zeno left behind for Chrysippus to
develop (63). Cleanthes has been mentionned in passing, and his
contributions are, so far as we can see, largely limited to additional
work of the same general sort as his master. He too took an interest in
the work of Diodorus Cronus, and as we have seen, is the first recorded
Stoic to have discussed the notorious Master Argument and its theory
about the possible and the necessary. Probably some form of a theory
of lekta may be ascribed to him, as Clement of Alexandria tells us. But
how much he said on the topic is beyond our ken; probably not very
much. For I am personally even Inclined to think that it is more likely
to have been Chrysippus who formally added lekta to the list of
incorporeals, though such an addition might be implicit in the thought
of anyone who postulated that there are "non-existents": subjects of
meaningful discourse which cannot be put in category One, the
category of what exists. For it is hard to see how that which does not
exist can be corporeal. Perhaps it was from some such considerations
that the notion of "meaning" itself arose, as well as the thesis that words
385
may have a sense but no reference." p. 27
"Résumé. Avant le développement systématique que Chrysippe donna
à la logique stoicienne, peut-on préciser l'eeuvre de Zénon dans ce
domaine? Souhaitant donne à l'idée de nature un contenu plus positif
que ne le faisait la morale cynique, il devait rencontrer l'hypothèque
éléatique; il fut l'élève et le condisciple de plusieurs dialecticiens
mégariques (bien qu'on ne lui attribue pas de position dans le problème
du Dominateur et des possibles). Il a dû s'intéresser aussi à la théorie
des signes et au problème du critère de validité du conditionnel, sur
lequel il adopte la position de Philon (que Chrysippe abandonnera sous
la pression des critiques de Diodore). Ce problème est lié à celui de la
nature du sage; en reconnaissant dans l'aptitude à inférer un aspect
fondamental de la nature humaine, Zénon accélérait sa rupture avec le
cynisme. Des Mégariques, Zénon a hérité certaines divergences de
vocabulaire et de fond avec la logique aristotélicienne; de Stilpon,
notamment, il peut avoir reçu l'idée du primat de l'individuel, contre les
Formes platoniciennes et peut-être aussi contre les universaux
aristotéliciens. Parmi les domaines que Zénon n'a apparemment pas
touchés, on peut compter: la théorie des signifiants et des signifiés;
peut-être, la notion même du lekton (qui aurait été rajouté, après Zénon,
aux trois incorporels primitifs, nés en terrain physique), et du même
coup la classification systématique des lekta;enfin, la théorie des
indémontrables. En matière de théorie de la connaissance, c'est en
revanche Zénon qui a jeté les bases de la doctrine stoïcienne; le
problème était urgent, après le platonisme et le pyrrhonisme, comme le
démontre l'attitude contemporaine d'Épicure.
Le Professeur Rist n'a pas souhaité rédiger de compléments pour la
deuxième édition. (Note de l' éditeur)" pp. 27-28.
(63) Ibid. p. 153-154.
Scaltsas, Theodore, and Mason, Andrew S., eds. 2002. The Philosophy
of Zeno. Zeno of Citium and His Legacy. Larnaca: The Municipality of
Larnaca.
Schofield, Malcolm. 1983. "The Syllogisms of Zeno of Citium."
———. 2002. "Cicero, Zeno of Citium, and the Vocabulary of
Philosophy." In Le Style De La Pensée. Recueil De Textes En
Hommage À Jacques Brunschwig, edited by Canto-Sperber, Monique
386
and Pierre, Pellegrin, 412-428. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Sedley, David. 2002. "Zeno's Definition of Phantasia Kataleptike." In
Zeno of Citium and His Legacy. The Philosophy of Zeno, edited by
Scaltsas, Theodore and Mason, Andrew S., 133-154. Larnaca: The
Municipality of Larnaca.
Stroux, Leonhard. 1965. Vergleich Und Metapher in Der Lehre Des
Zenon Von Kition. Berlin: Ernst-Reuter-Gesellschaft.
Cleanthes of Assos
Editions
Watanabe Albert Tohru. 1988. "Cleanthes Fragments: text and
commentary".
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation available at ProQuest Dissertation
Express n. AAT 8908885.
Thom Johan Carl. 2005.Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus. Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck.
Text, translation, and commentary.
Studies
Barreau, Hervé. 2006. "Cléanthe Et Chrysippe Face Au Maître-
Argument De Diodore." In Les Stoiciens Et Leur Logique, edited by
Brunschwig, Jacques, 283-301. Paris: Vrin.
1978, pp. 21-40).
Cambronne, Patrice. 1998. "L'universel & Le Singulier: L 'Hymne À
Zeus De Cléanthe: Notes De Lecture." Revues des études anciennes no.
100:89-114.
Goulet-Cazé, Marie-Odile. 1982. "Un Syllogisme Stoïcien Sur La Loi
Dans La Doxographie De Diogène Le Cynique À Propos De Diogène
Laërce Vi 72." Rheinisches Museum no. 215:214-240.
"Le syllogisme sur la loi était un syllogisme stoïcien attribué à Diogène
le Cynique dans la doxographie que lui consacre Diogène Laërce. Il
n'est que l'écho d'un ensemble de syllogismes sur la loi et la cité dont
l'auteur est vraisemblablement Cléanthe. La source de Diogène Laërce
387
pourrait être Apollodore de Séleucie."
Guérard, Christian. 1994. "Cléanthe D'assos." In Dictionnaire Des
Philosophes Antiques, edited by Goulet, Richard, 406-415.
Vol. II
Meijer, Pieter Ane. 2008. Stoic Theology. Proofs for the Existence of
the Cosmic God and of the Traditional Gods. Including a Commentary
on Cleanthes' Hymn on Zeus. Delft: Eburon.
Thom, Johan C. 2005. Cleanthes' Hym to Zeus. Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck.
Text, translation and commentary.
"Although the Hymn to Zeus is often cited as one of the most important
documents of early Stoic philosophy -- indeed the only text to survive
more or less intact -- it has not yet received a detailed treatment in a
monograph by itself. Besides its indubitable philosophical interest, the
poem also provides crucial evidence for the way philosophy came to
function as a form of religion from the Hellenistic period onwards. The
present study strives to pay due attention to the most relevant factors
which make this poem exceptional: the philosophical and moral ideas
conveyed in poetic form, the religious underpinning given to Stoicism,
and the intricate interaction with the preceding literary tradition.
Cleanthes offers his own philosophical answer to the human moral
dilemma in terms of the Greek cultural heritage; the Hymn to Zeus
should therefore not simply be interpreted against the background of
Stoicism in general." (From the Preface).
Verbeke, Gérard. 1949. Kleanthes Van Assos. Brussel: Paleis der
Academiën.
Written in Dutch.
Chrysippus of Soli
Editions
Chrysippi Fragmenta logica et physica. Edited by Arnim Hans
Friedrich August von. Stuttgart: Teubner 1903.
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: Vol. II.
Crönert Wilhelm, "Die Logika Zetemata des Chrysippus und die
388
übrigen Papyri logischen Inhalts aus der herculanensischen Bibliothek,"
Hermes 36: 548-579 (1901).
Traduzione italiana di Enrico Livrea in: W. Crönert - Studi Ercolanesi -
Napoli, Morano, 1975 pp. 63-101
Del Mastro Gianluca, "Il PHerc. 1380: Crisippo, Opera logica,"
Cronache Ercolanesi 35: 61-70 (2005).
"Analisi paleografica di PHerc. 1380 e ricostruzione della subscriptio:
si tratta dell'opera "Degli elementi del discorso e della frase" di
Crisippo, di argomento logico-dialettico, affine per tema al trattato sulle
ambiguità del linguaggio tramandato in PHerc. 307."
Marrone Livia, "Le Questioni logiche di Crisippo (PHerc. 307),"
Cronache Ercolanesi 27: 83-100 (1997).
Critical edition and Italian translation of Chrysippus' work Logika
zetemata (Investigations in logic) found in the Herculaneum Papyrus
307.
Marrone Livia, "Nuove letture nel PHerc. 307 (Questioni Logiche di
Crisippo)," Cronache Ercolanesi 12: 13-18 (1982).
Chrysippe. Oeuvre philosophique. Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2004.
Édition bilingue (textes grecs et latins, traduction française). Textes
traduits et commentés par Richard Dufour.
Table des matières.
Tome I: Remerciements IX; Avant-propos XI; Introduction XV;
Avertissement LIII; Sur la vie de Chrysippe et témoignages sur ses
écrits, n. 1-31 p. 1; Prolégomènes à la philosophie, n. 32-42 p. 43;
PREMIÈRE PARTIE. LA LOGIQUE (n. 43-51) p. 57.
Chapitre I. La doctrine de la connaissance (n. 52-112) p. 69; Chapitre
II. La dialectique (n. 113-295) p. 141; Chapitre III. La Rhétorique (n.
296-306) p. 391;
DEUXIÈME PARTIE: LA PHYSIQUE p. 401.
Chapitre I. Les doctrines fondamentales de la physique (n. 307-535) p.
403;
Liste des ouvrages de Chrysippe 661; Glossaire 665; Chronologie des
écoles philosophiques 673; Bibliographie 675-685.
Tome II: Chapitre II. sur le monde (n. 536-647) p. 9; Chapitre III. Des
corps célestes et des phénomènes atmosphériques (n. 648-707) p. 109;
Chapitre IV: Des animaux et des plantes (n. 708-772) p. 157; Chapitre
389
V. De l'âme humaine (n. 773-913) p. 206; Chapitre VI. Sur le destin (n.
914-1014) p. 355; Chapitre VII. Sur la nature des dieux (n. 1015-1110)
p. 485; Chapitre VIII. Sur la providence et la nature artiste (n. 1111-
1166) p. 567; Chapitre IX. Sur la divination (n. 1167-1195) p. 621;
Repères chronologiques des citateurs 649; Bibliographie des citateurs
651; Index des notions 671; Index des passages cités 679; Index des
personnages 705; Concordances: ce recueil-Long & Sedley 717;
Concordances: ce recueil-SVF 719; Concordances: Long & Sedley-ce
recueil 729; Concordances: SVF-ce recueil 733-743.
Studies
Barnes, Jonathan. 1984. "The Logical Investigations of Chrysippus."
Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin.Jahrbuch:19-29.
———. 1985. "Piqana Sunhmmena." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul
Pensiero Antico no. 6:453-467.
———. 1993. "Galen and the Utility of Logic." In Galen Und Das
Hellenistische Erbe, edited by Jutta, Kollesch and Nickel, Diethard, 33-
———. 1996. "The Catalogue of Chrysippus' Logical Works." In
by Algra, Keimpe, Horst, Pieter van der and Runia, David, 169-184.
Leiden: Brill.
The catalogue of the works of Chrysippus preserved by Diogenes
Laertius (7, 189 ff.) may derive from a handbook by Chrysippus
himself ; this makes it a fairly reliable guide to his thought.
Barreau, Hervé. 2006. "Cléanthe Et Chrysippe Face Au Maître-
Argument De Diodore." In Les Stoiciens Et Leur Logique, edited by
Jacques, Brunschwig, 283-301. Paris: Vrin.
1978, pp. 21-40).
Bobzien, Susanne. 1993. "Chrysippus' Modal Logic and Its Relation to
Philo and Diodorus." In Dialektiker Und Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa
Und Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 63-
———. 2002. "Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness."
390
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 102:217-238.
———. 2011. "The Combinatorics of Stoic Conjunction: Hipparchus
Refuted, Chrysippus Vindicated." Oxford Studies in Ancient
Bréhier, Émile. 1951. Chrysippe Et L'ancien Stoïcisme. Paris: Presses
Universitarires de France.
Première édtion: Paris, Alcan, 1910
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1991. "On a Book-Title by Chrysippus: "On the
Fact That the Ancients Admitted Dialectic Along with
Demonstrations"." In Aristotle and the Later Tradition, edited by
Blumenthal, Henry and Robinson, Howard, 81-95. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
"On what can be inferred from the title and from its place in the list of
Chrysippus' works at Diogenes Laertius 7, 201; on its relevance to
Plutarch's criticism of Stoic consistency at Stoic rep. 1035a."
Burke, Michael B. 1994. "Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to
an Ancient Puzzle." Journal of Philosophy no. 91:129-139.
"The puzzle of Dion and Theon was pondered more than 2000 years
ago by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus. Puzzles of the same type
engage identity theorists today. After surveying the many solutions
currently on offer, and noting their drawbacks, this article presents a
new solution, one that affirms the long- ignored position of Chrysippus,
although not the reasoning by which he arrived at it. The solution
employs (and assumes) the recently resurgent doctrine of Aristotelian
Essentialism, which provides a hitherto unexploited resource for
dealing with the full range of putative exceptions to the principle that
different objects cannot simultaneously occupy the same place."
Castagnoli, Luca. 2004. "Il Condizionale Crisippeo E Le Sue
Interpretazioni Moderne." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico
no. 25:353-395.
———. 2009. "Sunártesis Crisippea E Tesi Di Aristotele." In La
Logica Nel Pensiero Antico, edited by Alessandrelli, Michele and Nasti
de Vincentis, Mauro, 105-164. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"This paper aims at analysing the logic and truth-conditions of the
Chrysippean conditional. In its first part some influential interpretations
of sunártesis are examined, their shortcomings are disclosed, and two
distinct possible versions of the truth-conditions of sunártesis are
391
proposed and spelled out in outline. In the second part the question is
investigated of whether the so-called Aristotle's thesis and Boethius'
thesis can be regarded as genuine properties of the Chrysippean
conditional, as some scholars have interestingly maintained. Textual
evidence is exhibited suggesting that it is likely that such theses were
valid in Stoic logic. Finally, the problem of how to reconcile the
purported truth of these theses with some prima facie incompatible
arguments attested by our sources is explored: some possible
explanations for the alleged inconsistency are examined."
Cavini, Walter. 1972. "I Sillogismi Ipotetici Del Papiro Parigino
Attribuito a Crisippo." In Studi Classici in Onore Di Quintino
Cataudella. Vol I, 39-43. Catania: Università di Catania. Facoltà di
lettere e filosofia.
———. 1993. "Chrysippus on Speaking Truly and the Liar." In
Steiner.
Celluprica, Vincenza. 1977. "L'argomento Dominatore Di Diodoro
Crono E Il Concetto Di Possibile in Crisippo." In Scuole Socratiche
Minori E Filosofia Ellenistica, edited by Giannantoni, Gabriele, 55-73.
Bologna: Il Mulino.
Croenert, Wilhelm. 1901. "Die Logika Zetemata Des Chrysippos Und
Die Übrigen Papyri Logischen Inhalts Aus Der Herculanensischen
Bibliothek." Hermes no. 36:548-579.
Traduzione italiana: W. Crönert, Studi Ercolanesi, Introduzione e
traduzione di Enrico Livrea, Napoli, Morano, 1975, pp. 65-86.
Del Mastro, Gianluca. 2007. "Un'opera Logica Di Crisippo Nel Pherc.
1380." In Proceedings of the 24th Congress of Papyrology. Helsinki, 1-
7 August 2004, edited by Frösén, Jaakko, Purola, Tiina and Salmenkivi,
Erja, 249-258. Helsinki: Societas Scientarum Fennica.
Donini, Pierluigi. 1973. "Crisippo E La Nozione Del Possibile." Rivista
di Filologia no. 101:333-351.
Dorandi, Tiziano. 2005. "La Tradition Papyrologique Des Stoiciens." In
Les Stoiciens, edited by Romeyer-Dherbey, Gilbert and Gourinat, Jean-
Gould, Josiah. 1967. "Chrysippus: On the Criteria for the Truth of a
Conditional Proposition." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy
392
no. 12:156-161.
———. 1970. The Philosophy of Chrysippus. Leiden: Brill.
See Chapter IV. Logic pp. 45-91.
Goulet, Richard. 1994. "Chrysippe De Soles." In Dictionnaire Des
Philosophes Antiques, edited by Goulet, Richard, 329-365.
Vol. II.
Hadot, Pierre. 1994. "Liste Commentée Des Oeuvres De Chrysippe (D.
L. Vii 189-202)." In Dictionnaire Des Philosophes Antiques. Tome 2:
De Babélyca D'argos À Dyscolius, edited by Goulet, Richard, 336-356.
Paris: CNRS-Éditions.
Hershbell, Jackson P. 1993. "Epictetus and Chrysippus." Illinois
Classical Studies no. 18:139-146.
"Chrysippus' works were read and commented on in Epictetus' school,
and they influenced Epictetus' discussions of formal logic."
Hunter, Graeme. 1994. "A Ciceronian Critique of Chrysippus." Apeiron
no. 27:17-23.
Analysis of Cicero's argument at De fato 6 against Chrysippus' doctrine
about future contingency
Ide, Harry A. 1992. "Chrysippus's Response to Diodorus's Master
Argument." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 13:133-148.
"Chrysippus claims that some propositions perish, including some true
conditionals whose consequent is impossible and antecedent is
possible, to which he appeals against Diodorus's Master Argument.
Onthe standard interpretation, perished propositions lack truth
values,and these conditionals are true at the same time as their
antecedent sare possible and consequents impossible. But perished
propositions are false, and Chrysipus's conditionals are true when their
antecedent and consequent are possible, and false when their
antecedent is possible and consequent impossible. The claim of the
Master Argument that Chrysippus rejects, then, is stronger than usually
supposed."
Irigoin, Jean. 1990. "Chrysippe, Sur Les Propositions Négatives." In
Mise En Page Et Mise En Texte Du Livre Manuscrit, edited by Martin,
Henri Jean and Vezin, Jean, 34-36. Paris: Éditions du Cercle de la
Librairie-Promodis.
La disposition du texte dans le Papirus Paris 2 (= P. Louvre inv. 2326),
fragment d'un ouvrage de logique attribué traditionnellement à
393
Chrysippe.
Leib, Ethan J. 2001. "On the Sorites: Toward a Better Understanding of
Chrysippus." Ancient Philosophy no. 21:147-159.
"The paper explores the logical paradox of the sorites and its scope. By
examining the original sources in Diogenes, Sextus, and Cicero and
contemporary commentators (Barnes and Burnyeat), and elaborating
upon the context in which the paradox arose (the debate between the
Stoics and the Skeptics), I hope to illuminate what the paradox can and
cannot accomplish. By focusing on the dialogical nature of the original
presentation of the paradox, I outline a better understanding than has
been offered previously of the strategy that the Stoics deployed, under
their leader Chrysippus, in dealing with the skeptical challenge."
Malatesta, Michele. 1998. "On One Instance of the Chrysippean
Syllogism of the Dog in Plato's Sophista 252e 1-8." Metalogicon no.
11:1-16.
Marrone, Livia. 1984. "Il Problema Dei 'Singolari' E Dei 'Plurali' Nel
Pherc. 307." In Atti Del Xvii Congresso Internazionale Di Papirologia,
edited by Frösén, Jaakko, Purola, Tiina and Salmenkivi, Erja, 419-427.
Napoli: Centro internazionale per lo studio dei papiri ercolanesi.
Vol 2
———. 1984. "Proposizione E Predicato in Crisippo." Cronache
Ercolanesi no. 14:136-146.
———. 1987. "Testi Stoici Ercolanesi." Cronache Ercolanesi no.
17:181-184.
———. 1987. "Testi Stoici Ercolanesi Ii." Cronache Ercolanesi no.
18:223-225.
———. 1988. "Il Mentitore Nel Pherc. 307 (Questioni Logiche Di
Crisippo), I." In Proceedings of the Xviii International Congress of
Papyrology. Athens 25-31 May 1986, edited by Mandilaras, Basil G.,
271-276. Athens: Greek Payrological Society.
———. 1992. "L'ambiguità Verbale Nel Pherc. 307 (Questioni
Logiche Di Crisippo)." In Proceedings of the Xix International
Congress of Papyrology. Cairo 2-9 September 1989, edited by
Mosallamy, Abd Alla Hassan el, 261-267. Cairo: Ain Shams
University,.
"Un nouvel examen des col. 4-14 de ce papyrus montre que cette
oeuvre a bien, comme le veut le genre des zetemata, un caractère
394
aporétique, présentant des propositions dans lesquelles le
semainomenon n'est pas exprimé clairement. La variété et la vivacité de
ce texte important pour notre connaissance de la dialectique des
stoïciens traduit l'existence d'un milieu culturel riche en innovations et
en provocations."
———. 1993. "Gnoseologia Stoica Nel Pherc 307." In Ercolano 1738-
1988. 250 Anni Di Ricerca Archeologica., edited by Dell'Orto, Luisa
Franchi, 339-341. Roma: "L'Erma" di Bretschneider.
Atti del Convegno internazionale Ravello-Ercolano-Napoli-Pompei 30
ottobre-5 novembre 1988
———. 1999. "Logica Nei Papiri Ercolanesi." In Testimonianze
Matematiche a Napoli, edited by Carbone, Luciano and Palladino,
Franco, 153-163. Napoli: La Città del Sole.
Atti del Convegno di Napoli, 19 marzo 1991.
———. 2000. "La Logica Degli Epicurei E Degli Stoici: Filodemo E
Crisippo." Cronache Ercolanesi no. 30:111-118.
"Profilo dei trattati filodemei di epistemologia, fondati sulla
rielaborazione delle lezioni di Zenone Sidonio (PHerc. 1389, 1003,
671, 861, 1065), e di alcuni testi di logica stoica, con particolare
attenzione alle "Questioni logiche" di Crisippo di Soli (PHerc. 1022,
307)."
Mayet, Karin. 2010. Chrysipps Logik in Ciceros Philosophischen
Schriften. Tübingen: Narr Verlag.
Mignucci, Mario. 1983. "Alessandro Di Afrodisia E La Logica Modale
Di Crisippo." In Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della
Logica, edited by Abrusci, Michele, Casari, Ettore and Mugnai,
Massino. Bologna: CLUEB.
———. 1993. "The Stoic Analysis of the Sorites." Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society no. 93:231-245.
"Chrysippus' solution of the sorites argument was in keeping with his
general view of paradoxes; we must give up some of our common-
sense beliefs, such as our belief in the validity of modus ponens."
Moretti, Gabriella. 1990. Acutum Dicendi Genus. Brevità, Oscurità,
Sottigliezze E Paradossi Nelle Tradizioni Retoriche Degli Stoici.
Bologna: Pàtron.
Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro. 1983. "Chrysippean Implication as Strict
Equivalence." In Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della
395
Massino, 235-240. Bologna: CLUEB.
———. 1994. "Connexive Implication in a Chrysippean Setting." In
Logica E Filosofia Della Scienza: Problemi E Prospettive. Atti Del
Congresso Triennale Della Società Italiana Di Logica E Filosofia
Delle Scienze (Lucca, 7-10 Gennaio 1993), edited by Cellucci, Carlo,
Di Mario, Maria Concetta and Roncaglia, Gino, 595-603. Pisa: ETS.
———. 1998. "La Validità Del Condizionale Crisippeo in Sesto
Empirico E Boezio (Parte I)." Dianoia no. 3:45-75.
Empirico E Boezio (Parte Ii)." Dianoia no. 4:11-43.
———. 2002. Logiche Della Connessività. Fra Logica Moderna E
Storia Della Loica Antica. Bern: Haupt.
Indice: Premessa 7; Introduzione 11; 1. L'interpretazione classica e le
sue varianti 39; 2. La pars destruens: le difficoltà dell'interpretazione
classica 69; 3. La pars construens: verso una nuova interpretazione 95;
4. Obbiezioni, risposte e conferme 123; 5. Implicazione crisippea e
implicazione boeziana 151; 6. Considerazioni conclusive e problemi
aperti 173; Appendice: La dottina boeziana della repugnantia - Scelta
di testi 193; Riferimenti bibiografici 231-232.
———. 2009. "Dalla Tesi Di Aristotele Alla Tesi Di Boezio: Una Tesi
Per L'implicazione Crisippea?" In La Logica Nel Pensiero Antico,
edited by Alessandrelli, Michele and Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro, 165-
Pachet, Pierre. 1975. "La Deixis Selon Zénon Et Chrysippe."
Papazian, Michael B. 2001. "Chrysippus and the Destruction of
Propositions: A Defence of the Standard Interpretation." History and
"One of the most intriguing claims of Stoic logic is Chrysippus's denial
of the modal principle that the impossible does not follow from the
possible. Chrysippus's argument against this principle involves the idea
that some propositions are 'destroyed' or 'perish'. According to the
standard interpretation of Chrysippus's argument, propositions cease to
exist when they are destroyed. Ide has presented an alternative
interpretation according to which destroyed propositions persist after
destruction and are false. I argue that Ide's alternative interpretation as
396
well as some versions of the standard interpretation conflict with Stoic
doctrines about the nature of propositions. I propose another version of
the standard interpretation based on Frede's account of the Stoic theory
of the proposition. I hold that this version of the standard interpretation
both escapes Ide's objections and is consistent with Stoic logic and
philosophy of language."
Pizzi, Claudio. 1998. "Implicazione Crisippea E Dipendenza
Contestuale." Dianoia no. 3:25-44.
Sedley, David. 1984. "The Negated Conjunction in Stoicism."
Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 5:311-316.
Tieleman, Teun. 1996. Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul: Argument
and Refutation in the De Placitis, Book Ii-Iii. Leiden: Brill.
Todd, Robert B. 1973. "The Stoic Common Notions: A Reexamination
and Reinterpretation." Symbolae Osloenses:47-75.
Vuillemin, Jules. 1983. "Le Carré Chrysippéen Des Modalités."
Dialectica no. 37:235-247.
"A sentence p is necessary, according to Chrysippus if p is true and, p
being susceptible of being false, the external circumstances prevent it
from being false. This explanation is used in order to construct the
modal square or rather the two modal squares. Something is specific in
the chrysippean logic: from the necessity of p we may validly conclude
that it is impossible that not p, while the converse conclusion is not
valid."
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Logic and Rhetoric in the Philosophical

Works of Cicero
INTRODUCTION
This page is dedicated to the following aspects of the philosophy of Marcus
Tullius Cicero:
The creation of the Latin philosophical vocabulary;
His testimony on Stoic logic;
His book Topica, who in the Middle Ages become one of the texts of the
Logica Vetus.
Attention will also be given to the De Inventione and De Oratore, who

exerted a great influence on medieval thinkers.
AN OVERVIEW OF CICERO AS PHILOSOPHER

"Philosophy meant Greek. Rome had nothing to offer except a stern
traditional moralism exemplified by Cato, which found the rigid Semitic ethic
of the Stoics congenial, and a reaction away from this, which expressed itself
399
in a loose Epicureanism, such as Epicurus himself and his sincere exponents
would have utterly disowned. 'And so it is not Epicurus who has driven them
to debauchery. They have already given themselves over to immorality, and
now try to hide their debauchery in the lap of philosophy; they congregate in
the place where they hope to hear the praise of pleasure' (1). The words date
from the next century, but they are applicable to the age of Cicero. Cicero is
at some pains to explain away the apparent Roman incapacity for philosophy.
He suggests that there is no real inability : rather their energies have been
diverted into other channels.
Be that as it may, philosophy meant Greek, and Greek philosophy of the age
of Cicero was represented predominantly by four schools.
a) The oldest of these was the Academy. Under Plato this had been a training-
ground for politicians, with a course designed to lift the mind from the
relativities of our normal life to the eternal verities, and a pioneering interest
in logical analysis. For seventy years after his death the heads of the
Academy were dogmatists whose interests were predominantly ethical. Then
in the mid-third century Arcesilas transformed the whole direction of
Academic thought, by retaining the dialectic but abandoning the dogmatic, so
that every question was treated as an open question, certainty was abjured
and probability left as a guide. This was a polemic against Stoic claims of
infallibility; it was affected by the scepticism of Pyrrho and the logical
acumen of Diodorus, so that the satirist Timon described Arcesilas as a kind
of Homeric chimaera 'Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, in between
Diodorus' Arcesilas' work was taken up in the next century by Carneades,
unquestionably the greatest thinker between Aristotle and Plotinus, and
suspension of judgment remained a tenet of the school, though there may
have been some esoteric dogmatism. According to Cicero the Academics of
his day were few in number (2).
b) The Peripatetics originated with Plato's pupil Aristotle. Of all the ancient
schools the Peripatetics were the most insistent that theory should be
grounded in fact, and they specialized in amassing large quantities of fact on
which a critical judgment could be based. Their judgments were generally
free from extremism and marked by a sturdy common sense. Their special
contribution lay in scientific research.
400
c) Stoicism emerged at the beginning of the third century to meet the demand
for education occasioned by limiting the period of military training and
transferring it to Athens. The philosophy was designed to meet a mood of
despair in an age of 'the failure of nerve'. Its religion was a pantheistic
determinism; its chief virtue resignation. Its early exponents preached a rigid
moralism in which virtue was the only good, vice the only evil, and all else
matters of indifference, and which divided mankind into saints and stoners
without any No Man's Land between. Later this rigidity was modified, though
the quest for perfect virtue was never abandoned.
d) Epicureanism met the same needs, opportunities and mood as Stoicism.

Epicurus regarded the end of life as 'pleasure', not crudely interpreted but
understood as freedom from disturbance. To this end we must be rid of fear
and control desire. Fear is dispelled by understanding; hence the Epicureans
adopted Democritus' atomic theory as the most reasonable account of the
world, and this enabled them to dismiss the fear of death, death being the
painless dissolution of our atomic structure. The greatest external adjunct to
the tranquil life is friendship, and the emphasis upon friendship is one of the
most attractive features of the school. Finally, gods exist, but they are remote
and not to be feared, spending their time in philosophic conversation.
This picture must be modified by a general tendency to eclecticism. Among

the Peripatetics this is open and unashamed, and the De mundo contains
much that is Stoic, andDe virtutibus et vitiis is an attempt to reconcile the
Academy and the Peripatos. The Platonists had, at least publicly, given up
their distinctive insight in the interests of scepticism, and turned increasingly
towards the Stoics, and in the age of Cicero Antiochus of Ascalon, who had
at first opposed the Stoics, later capitulated and, in R.D. Hicks' words, 'taught
Stoic logic, Stoic physics and an ethical theory which was only not orthodox
Stoicism because it was fatally wanting in the unity, coherence and
consistency which even opponents admired in the Stoics'. But the Stoics also,
as we have seen, shifted -- the attacks of Carneades could not be ignored --
and in the first century Posidonius abandoned the orthodox psychology and
went back to Plato. Only the Epicureans never changed an atom, and the
agreement of Lucretius and even Diogenes of Oenoanda with Epicurus is a
tribute to the conservatism of the school.
401
It is not always realized how thoroughly Cicero was grounded in philosophy.
He was born in the country near Arpinum, but from the age of ten Rome was
his centre. His philosophical training began before he was sixteen when in
conjunction with his friend Titus Pomponius Atticus he attended the lectures
of the Epicurean Phaedrus, who was teaching in Rome at the time (3). Both
students were impressed. With Atticus it lasted a life-time; with Cicero the
enthusiasm for the tenets of Epicurus soon wore off, but he continued to
speak of Phaedrus with respect and to enjoy his friendship. Thereafter he had
little official contact with the Epicureans, and publicly disavows acquaintance
with their formless writings, but it is clear that he had read more than he
makes out (4). Later legend associated him with Lucretius' poem; Jerome
says that he amended it and Borgius quotes some alleged corrections. The
indefatigable Merrill assures us that there is no phrase in Cicero which is
assuredly borrowed from Lucretius. But we know from the letters that Cicero
was familiar with the poem (5), and Lucretius may have read extracts to the
distinguished littérateur.
After leaving Phaedrus, Cicero went to study dialectic with Diodotus the
Stoic. This art, which Cicero calls 'abbreviated eloquence', was at the time the
monopoly of the Stoics. Cicero absorbed, but was not attracted by, the
general philosophy. But Diodotus became an inmate of Cicero's house until
his death some thirty years later (6).
Then, in 88 Philo of Larissa, the head of the Academy came as a refugee to
Rome. He was a versatile genius, attractive to Cicero not least for his mastery
of the theory and practice of oratory. But these were troubled times
politically. It seemed that a public career was closed, though he took further
training from Molo, the Rhodian ambassador, who linked for him rhetoric
and ethics. Meantime he threw himself whole-heartedly into the study of
philosophy, and his commitment to the Academy lasted a lifetime (7). Later
he likes to recollect his early enthusiasm for philosophy (8), but, even
allowing for exaggeration, it is clear that he worked very hard. Throughout
the years 88-1 the training continued, and his translations from Greek into
Latin included Xenophon's Oeconomicus and Plato's Protagoras.
Even now he was not done. In 81 he made his first public speech; in the
following year he made a public attack upon one of the minions of the
dictator Sulla, and shortly afterwards we find him leaving Rome 'for the good
of his health'. He spent six months in Athens. There were, it seems, no
402
eminent Stoics or Peripatetics in the city at the time. The Epicureans were
under the leadership of Zeno of Sidon, a man of mordant sarcasm but an
unrivalled expositor, endowed with more clarity than charity. Cicero's old
friend Phaedrus was however there also, and Cicero accompanied Atticus to
some of his lectures (9). He also made the acquaintance of the Stoicizing
Academic Antiochus of Ascalon, for whom he conceived a great admiration,
'pre-eminent among contemporary philosophers in ability and scholarship'
(10), 'a writer of extraordinary shrewdness' (11), 'the shrewdest and most
cultured of the philosophers of my time' (12). In theory, however, he sided
with the more orthodox Philo (13).
From the mainland of Greece Cicero went on to Rhodes to continue his study
of rhetoric with Molo. Here he met Posidonius; they struck up a friendship,
and through this contact Stoicism entered his thinking for the first time as a
vital influence. Cicero calls him the greatest of the Stoics, a thorough
investigator and the most celebrated of all contemporary philosophers, and
says that he read his works more than those of any other philosophical writer.
He certainly quotes them more often (14).
From his return to Rome in 77 Cicero was fully engaged in his public career,
though he never forgot that he was a scholar and was proud, for example, that
as an administrative officer in Sicily he had rescued the tomb of Archimedes
from oblivion. But his formative period was over. It had been long and
thorough; he had been trained in three of the principal schools, and had
emerged with an Academic theory of knowledge, an immense admiration for
Plato, and some inclination to the Stoics without their dogmatism. (pp. 99-
103).
(...)
It is important to realize what Cicero was trying to do. He never claims
originality, except in the last book De officiis. He admits that his works are
derivative -- 'I merely provide words, and I've plenty of those'. He is however
no slavish translator (15); he always brings a critical and interpretative
faculty to bear, as he himself claims (16). His aim is the introduction of
philosophy to Rome. War and dictatorship alike limited the scope of public
oratory. Philosophy was to Cicero only a second-best, but it was that, and
with the decline of oratory he was prepared to give an impulse to Roman
philosophy. They needed to be able to philosophize without resort to the
Greeks, and to this end he sought to provide them with a kind of philosophic
403
encyclopaedia. He hoped to make every department of philosophy accessible
in Latin; 'what greater or better service, could I offer my country than
teaching and instructing the young' (17).
He chose as his form the dialogue, and his models Aristotle, and,
occasionally, Heraclides Ponticus (18). This is especially marked in the
Tusculans where the dialogue is a dialogue with a tendency to monologue,
though we cannot help feeling that Cicero, who never suffered from an
excess of modesty, is consciously or unconsciously casting himself for the
role of Socrates. He is himself aware of this tendency (19). In general, as in
De finibus or De natura deorum, he likes first to present and then criticize the
tenets of each of the leading schools in the field under discussion. His
presentation is generally fair, though an unconscious bias asserts itself in that
he puts the Stoic case at much greater length than the Epicurean. His
criticisms are sometimes self-contradictory, but never merely silly. The
whole is a fascinating and, we must believe, generally reliable introduction to
the climate of Greek thought in the time of Cicero.
It is not needful here to essay any summary of these expositions, since, it is
Cicero whom we are considering rather than his sources.
(...)
But we may properly ask whether we can see what Cicero regarded as the
function of philosophy. Unfortunately the work in which he must have
presented this systematically, Hortensius, is lost. However, we can recover
something of its theme. We know, for example, that it was based on
Aristotle's Protrepticus. This also is lost, but the work of Jaeger and others
has enabled us to see something of its content. The book was addressed to a
prince of Cyprus named Themison. It was written in Aristotle's Platonic
period, and there is no doubt that its ultimate aim was practical. Themison
says Jaeger 'is to help to realize the political philosophy of the Academy. He
is to be a philosopher-king. But although the aim was practical it was not
utilitarian, and Aristotle argued against the proposition that philosophy is to
be judged by its immediate expediency; this, as Jaeger has shown, is a
defence of the Academic training against Isocrates. On the contrary, we
should not be too engrossed in mortal affairs; the life of pure contemplation
offers something they can never offer; it accords with man's peculiar gifts and
function; in the isles of the blest there will be no place for the ethical virtues;
our aim must be to devote ourselves to truth as the fulfilment of our true
404
personalities.
Cicero followed this, but not slavishly. He used the dialogue form, as
Aristotle probably did not. Our knowledge of Cicero's text is principally from
Augustine, for whom it was a seminal work. A long and famous extract
contains the passage which shows that in the legendary islands after death
there will be no place for virtue where there is no room for vice nor even for
eloquence where there are no law-courts, but contemplation alone belongs to
the highest happiness. Similarly the final conclusion of Hortensius directed
the reader away from frail mortality to eternity.
Cicero was however by no means always so divorced from practicality.
The last book of the Tusculans begins with an eloquent panegyric of
philosophy, including a summary of the course of Greek thought which
omits all mention of the natural philosophers and praises Socrates for
having first brought philosophy down from the sky (that is from
astronomy and cosmology) and planted her in the town and in the home;
to compel men to give thought to ethical principles and their general
way of life (20). 'O philosophy' he cries 'life's supreme commander,
tracking virtue to its lair and banishing vice, what would have happened
to us, what could have happened to man's life at all without you? You
brought towns into being. When men were separate from one another
you summoned them to community, drew them together first in families,
then in marriage, then in the use of a common language. You devised
the rule of law; you were our schoolmistress in learning and behaviour.
You are our refuge, our source of help. In the past we have given
ourselves to you only with reservations; now we give ourselves utterly
and completely' (21). Again in the second book we read 'Philosophy has
to her credit the cure of souls, the removal of idle worries, redemption
from lust and the banishment of fear' (22). So in a letter to Varro he
speaks of his return to his books as to old friends whose advice he has
neglected in his dubious political alliances. They have forgiven him, and
with their help he hopes to face more steadfastly present and future
distress (23). Cicero in these passages is writing without a model open
before him; he is writing from the heart, and there is adequate indication
that he is really preoccupied with ethical and practical issues.
In fact when we examine the theme and contents of his surviving work this
405
assertion is amply borne out. They all deal with problems of politics (as in the
rather earlier De Republica and De legibus), religion or ethics. The
Tusculans, a collection of five miscellaneous discourses, deals successively
with the propositions 'I think death is an evil' 'I reckon pain the worst of all
evils' 'I think the wise man is liable to present distress' 'I think the wise man
cannot get rid of all mental disturbances'. 'I think that virtue is not sufficient
to produce ultimate happiness'. These themes (all the propositions are
confuted) show well enough the general tenour of his thought. In some
moods he was doubtful whether philosophy had all the answers, and
Lactantius quotes a letter he wrote to his son 'We ought to know what
philosophy teaches, but we ought to live by our national traditions' (24).
He is not interested in the physical sciences, though in De natura deorum he
followed with keen interest the beauties of the Stoic natural theology against
the Academic Carneades. He recognized the Peripatetic virtues in the field of
science, and corrected some of the extravagances of the Stoics by reference to
Aristotle. His theory of knowledge is Academic. As an orator he was trained
to see both sides of a case, as a historian of philosophy he saw the conflicts of
philosophers, as a person he was inclined to charity and saw something
unworthy in arrogant dogmatism. Opinion, he insists, is free, and each man is
free to defend his own position.(25) Disagreement is legitimate and
understandable, but not bitterness (26). After all, quot homines, tot sententiae
(27) Not for him the pernicious autocracy of Pythagoras with hipse dixit (28)
or the apron-strings of Chrysippus shackling the Stoic. The Academic,
abjuring certainty, guided by probability roams free. Cicero anticipated Mill
in his belief that freedom of discussion leads to intellectual progress.
Sometimes, it must be admitted, he uses the doctrine as an excuse for mental
laziness. He has the inconsistency which is the besetting sin of those who
borrow eclectically from their predecessors. The view of divination in De
legibus is radically different from the scepticism of De divinatione, and the
attempted explanations of this are not really satisfactory. The last book of the
Tusculans and the fourth of De finibus are in flat contradiction with one
another. Cicero is quite cheerful about such contradictions. 'At different times
different views seem more probable' he comments (29); like Dr. Johnson, he
refuses to be bound by his previous utterances. He lives, from day to day
(30). He is not, however, always free from dogmatism. Indeed there is an
amusing passage in the Tusculans. Cicero has in the very previous paragraph
406
been commending suspension of judgment. His interlocutor puts the
proposition, 'I think that virtue is not sufficient to produce ultimate
happiness', and Cicero's demur is almost violent in its emphasis. This is
generally true of his ethics which incline to the absolute and dogmatic
position of the Stoics. One of Cicero's aims was to undermine Epicurean
influence by a combination of Academci scepticism and Stoic ethics.
So far he might seem another of the hack-writers of philosophical text-books
who diligently and meticulously perpetuate the errors of past generations.
When we turn to his methodology however he appears much more modern.
In the first place he insists on definitions. So he writes to his son in De officiis
'Every systematic philosophical development of a subject must begin with a
definition to provide a clear explanation of the subject under discussion' (7).
Throughout this work his treatment is carefully analytical, as we may note in
the discussion of the cardinal virtues. In De finibus the first substantial point
which Cicero makes against Epicurus arises out of the latter's failure to
define: he does not make clear what he means by 'pleasure' (32). Again in the
fourth book of the Tusculans, where the theme is mental disturbance in
general, Cicero points out that the Stoics have spent some time in
classification and definition, a thorny subject which the Peripatetics by-pass.
He will therefore start with the Stoics, and gives Zeno's definition of mental
disturbance as an 'unnatural spiritual upheaval uncontrolled by philosophy'. It
is easy to pick holes in the definition; the point is that a definition has been
given; he himself suggests an alternative 'an excessively violent appetition'
(33). He then takes up an analysis from the previous book (34) according to
which the irrational emotions are four in number -- pleasure, which is
reaction to a present good, desire, which is an outreaching to a future good,
fear, which is an outreaching to a future evil, and distress, which is reaction
to a present evil. Finally he subdivides these four sections, differentiating in
each between apparent synonyms in a passage which should be compulsory
reading for developing the precise use of words in Latin Prose Composition.
Nowell-Smith's Ethics (*) is described in its blurb as 'A study of the words
and concepts that we use for answering practical questions, making decisions,
advising, warning, and appraising conduct '. No doubt Nowell-Smith starts
with very different presuppositions and with a superior logical equipment, but
in essence he is doing no more than Cicero, and Cicero's insistence on
definition and analysis ought to commend him to contemporary thought.
407
Secondly, Cicero insists on the method of dialectic. So in the Tusculans,
'I have always approved the Academic and Peripatetic practice of
presenting every subject in the form of a debate, partly because it is the
only way of reaching the most probable conclusion on any particular
topic, partly because it is good rhetorical practice' (35). 'The sole object
of our discussions' he says in the Academica 'is by arguing on both sides
to draw out and give shape to some conclusion which may be either true
or the nearest possible approximation to the truth' (36). It is significant
that in adopting Aristotle's Protrepticus, which seems not to have been
in dialogue form, for his Horensius he recast it as a dialogue. De finibus
is here typical of his methods. The theme is the summum bonum. Book I
presents the Epicurean view. Book II subjects this to a criticism which is
overtly Academic, though its content include, a large admixture of
Stoicism. Book III presents the Stoic case, and to Book IV this in turn is
attacked, though more sympathetically, from an Academic standpoint.
Book V presents a synthetic Academic-Peripatetic view. In De
divinatione the Epicurean view is omitted as it was a flat negation. Book
I presents the Stoic position, Book II the Academic assault upon it. The
treatment in De natura deorum is closely similar. The Epicurean view is
stated and criticized; then the Stoic view is stated and criticized. There is
some disparity of space between these treatments. To some extent this
reflects the greater importance that theology held for the Stoics; it also
reflects a bias in Cicero. Wilamowitz once made a curiously wrong-
headed remark that there were no real debates in Cicero. Cicero is not
always objective in his presentation, but the principles underlying it are
remarkably Hegelian.
Thirdly, his concept of his function as a philosopher (though not of the
function of philosophy itself) was plainly the examination and criticism
of what philosophers have actually said. This, so far as it goes, is a
modern approach. Some of the detailed criticisms have a modern ring
about them also. The Epicureans argued for the existence of gods on the
grounds of universality of belief. Cotta's question 'How do you know
what all the nations of mankind believe?' (37) might almost have been
asked by Ayer or Findlay, and the assertion is brought to the empirical
408
test of actual atheism. In fact, Cicero is always quoting actual Roman
experience to illustrate or to test his theme.
Fourthly, and most important, Cicero gave to Rome, and hence to
modern Europe, her philosophical vocabulary, and so inescapably
moulded our patterns of thought. This was his greatest achievement;
Pease called it an 'incomparable service'. Plutarch says of him (38): 'He
made it his business further to compose and translate dialogues on
philosophy, and to express in Latin the vocabulary of science and logic.
It is said that he was the original or principal person to supply the
Romans with words for phantasia, synkatathesos, epoche, catalepsis, as
well as atomon, ameres, and kenon he produced familiar and acceptable
terms by the use of transference of language and other devices'. We must
remember that Lucretius, who was ten years younger than Cicero, but
writing before him, spoke bitterly and repeatedly of the poverty of his
native language (39). He found himself continually forced to use Greek
formations, of which homoeomereiae is merely the most notorious.
Some significant Epicurean concepts, such as that which Cicero terms
the intermundia, the spaces between the universes, Lucretius does not
express at all. Cicero refuses to allow that Greek is a richer tongue than
Latin; in a long passage at the beginning of De finibus he asserts the
contrary (40), a claim repeated in the Tusculans (41). His age is to see
the birth of philosophy in Latin literature and he is to be the midwife
(42). He tells Atticus not to be alarmed about the Latin language (43). In
the Academica, one of the works in which he is forming his style, he
examines some of the difficulties of translating technical terms and
admits that he has to 'manufacture' words (44). This he does with
marked success. We in fact owe to Cicero the words quality, individual,
vacuum, moral, property, induction, element, definition, difference,
notion, comprehension, infinity, appetite, instance, science, image and
species. It is interesting that in two instances we have adopted the
original Greek as well, as a doublet with a different shade of meaning;
we use 'atom' as well as 'individual', and 'ethical' as well as 'moral'.
Some of these words were coined by Cicero. Poiotes was a curious
invention of Plato (45). Cicero puts qualitas in the mouth of the
encyclopedist Varro, who was working at the time on his treatise De
409
lingua Latina. The whole passage is worth quoting (46).
'They called the product of force and matter body and what I may call quality.
You will allow me, I am sure, to use unexampled words in dealing with
unfamiliar topics. The Greeks do it, and they 've been handling these subjects
for a good while now'. 'Of course we will' said Atticus, 'but if you want you
can use Greek too if Latin lets you down'. 'Thank you, but I 'll do my best to
talk Latin except with words like philosophy, rhetoric, physics and dialectic
which are habitually used as Latin together with many others. I 've given the
name qualities to the things the Greeks call poiotetes. That's a technical term
of Greek philosophy like many others, and not in general use. As a matter of
fact the logical analysts have their own vocabulary, quite different from that
of the man in the street. In fact almost all the sciences do it; they either have
to invent new words for new things or extend the usage of old ones. The
Greeks have been engaged in these studies for centuries, and they still do it;
we 're now trying to handle them for the first time, and may perhaps be
excused'. 'Varro', I said, 'you 've already added to our factual knowledge; if in
addition you add to our vocabulary you 'll certainly have done well by our
country'.
Cicero there speaks of inventing some words and adapting others. Examples
of such adaptation are his application of definire to words, the logical use of
differre, which has previously meant to 'put off' or 'delay' the extension of
elementa from Lucretius' atoms to Aristotle's stoicheia, the use of imago (a
statue) for the mental images of Stoic psychology, and above all the
extension of species from outward shape (in late Latin virgo speciosa means
'a pretty girl') to the Platonic form or universal (47).
There is no need to press the point further. But Cicero's linguistic
preoccupations make one wish for a reassessment of his work and influence
by one of our contemporary linguistic analysts." (pp. 104-111).
(1) Seneca, Dial. 7, 12, 4.
(2) Nat. deor. 1, 6; 1,11.
(3) Fam. 13,1.
(4) ib. 15, 16; 15, 19.
(5) Ad Q. fr. 2, 9, 4.
(6) Brut. 90, 309; Att. 2, 20, 6.
(7) Brut. 89, 306.
410
(8) rep. I, 4, 7; Tusc. 5, 2, 5; Off. 2, 1, 4; Fat. 1, 2.
(9) Fin. 1, 5, 16.
(10) Ac. 2, 2, 4.
(11) 2, 22, 69.
(12) 2, 35, 113.
(13) Brut. 91, 314 ff.
(14) Hort. fr. 18, Div. 1, 57, 130; Tusc. 2, 25, 61.
(15) Off. 2, 17, 60.
(16) Fin. 1, 2, 6.
(17) Div. 2, 2, 4.
(18) Att. 13, 19, 4; Fam. 1, 9, 23.
(19) Att. 13, 19, 4. Fat. 1.
(20) 5, 4, 11.
(21) 5, 2, 5.
(22) 2, 4, 11.
(23) Fam. 9, 1, 2.
(24) Inst. 3, 14, 17.
(25) Tusc. 4, 4, 7.
(26) Fin. 1, 8. 27.
(27) Ib. 1, 5, 15.
(28) Nat. deor. 1, 5, 10.
(29) Ac. 2, 38, 121.
(30) tusc. 3, 11, 33; cfr. 2, 2, 5.
(31) 1, 2, 7.
(32) 2, 5, 15.
(33) 4, 6, 11.
(34) 3, 11, 24.
(35) 2, 3, 9.
(36) 2, 3, 7.
(37) Nat. deor. 1, 23, 62.
(38) Cic. 881.
(39) I, 139; 1, 832; 3, 260.
(40) 1, 3, 10.
(41) 3, 5, 10.
(42) 2, 2, 5.
(43) Att. 12, 52, 3.
411
(44) 2, 6, 17.
(45) Theatet. 182 A.
(46) Ac. 1, 6, 24.
(47) Ac. 1, 8, 30.
(*) [Patrick-Horace Nowell-Smith, Ethics, London, Penguin Books, 1954]
From: John Ferguson, Cicero's Contribution to Philosophy, in: J. Ferguson
(ed.), Studies in Cicero, Roma, Centro di Studi Ciceroniani Editore, 192, pp.
99-111.
CICERO: THE CREATOR OF LATIN

PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY: GREEK
PHILOSOPHY AND LATIN LANGUAGE AT ROME
IN THE FIRST CENTURY B.C.
"Philosophy, the genre in which Greek, in Rome as elsewhere, must be
granted the position of the dominant language, poses a special problem for a
study of the language choice in that literary expression in Antiquity was not
necessarily resorted to by the philosophers. Many famous philosophers never
wrote anything themselves, although their pupils may have spread their
doctrines in written form using their names to do so. It is not always possible
to discern the original language use behind this written form, and, in general,
it may be difficult to compare the phenomenon of philosophy with such
genres as, for instance, history, with which literary expression was
indissolubly connected.
This problem already affects the very beginning of the philosophical tradition
in Rome. We find eastern philosophers in second century Rome teaching and
also writing philosophical treatises in Greek: Panaetius and Hecaton from
Rhodes, Philon from Larissa and Boethus from Sidon. Many Romans were in
contact with them, and listened to and spread their doctrines, probably in a
Greek form and in the Greek language, although they did not use literature to
do this. (p. 239)
(...)
Cicero considered himself a pioneer of Latin philosophy, and together with
M. Terentius Varro and M. Junius Brutus he represents the only significant
412
period of philosophical literature in Latin before late Antiquity. But these
writers, too, had to defend their use of Latin, and their influence on
contemporary society remained small.(1) As the works of Varro and Brutus
are lost, we know only the apologies of Cicero, but interestingly, one of these
occurs in a conversation with Varro (ac. post. 1.4-8), while another is
addressed to Brutus (de fin. 1.1-5).
The editio posterior of Cicero's Academica, written in 45 B.C., opens with a
conversation between Cicero and Varro, in which the former begs Varro to
write on philosophy in Latin. Varro's attitude is negative, and he uses two
main arguments to support this:
nam cum philosophiam viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam,
existimavi si qui de nostris eius studiis tenerentur, si essent Graecis studiis
eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos; sin a Graecorum artibus et
disciplinis abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione
Graeca intellegi non possunt; itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent (ac. post. 1.4).
[As I have seen that philosophy has been very carefully expounded in Greek,
I have come to the following view about people from our country who are
seriously interested in it. If they have had the benefit of an education in Greek
learning, they will read works in Greek rather than in our own language. But
if they have taken against Greek arts or disciplines, they won't care for Latin
works, either, since the latter can't be understood without knowledge from the
Greeks. As a result I have been unwilling to write works that would neither
be intelligible to the unlearned nor something the learned cared to read. (On
Academic Scepticism, translated, with introduction and notes, by Charles
Brittain, Indianapolis, Hackett, 2006, p. 88)]
Varro goes on to tell us that there are philosophical works in Latin by
Amafinius and Rabirius, but both their style (vulgari sermone disputant)
and the way in which the doctrines are presented are below his own
standard. (pp. 240-241)
(...)
This brings us to the best known and documented Roman translator, M.
Tullius Cicero. We shall first look at what he translated -- in addition to the
Aratea discussed above -- and then examine his opinions on the reasons for
translating from Greek. The prose translations of Cicero can be divided into
413
philosophical treatises and the speeches of Greek orators. Earliest in the
former group in Xenophon's Oeconomicus, translated when Cicero was little
more than twenty (de off. 2.87). (p. 286)
(...)
Cicero himself promises in de fin. 1.7, to translate -- sometime in the future --
passages from Plato and Aristotle.(2) We have four fragments by Roman
grammarians from a work of Cicero's called Protagoras, which seems to be a
rather accurate translation of Plato's Protagoras.(3) In addition, we have in
the manuscript tradition a large fragment from a translation of Plato's
Timaeus, which is also mentioned and identified by Hieronymus as a
translation (in Esaiam XII prol., in Amos lib. II, V, 3). But the MSS have
preserved part of a preface, which seems to indicate that the translation was
part of a dialogue; how Cicero himself indicated the translation, how it was
incorporated into the dialogue and whether the treatise of Plato was translated
completely, cannot be known. If we disregard the gaps in the manuscript
tradition, the translation seems to be rather faithful.
Of Aristotle, nothing is known except Topica. This represents a very curious
case: Cicero has promised to translate or at least explain(4) the Topics of
Aristotle to Trebatius; he finds no time to do this before embarking on a
voyage, in which, however, he has no books to refer to. But nevertheless he
completes the task and sends the work, which he calls Topica Aristotelea,
from Rhegium on July 28th, 44 B.C. to Trebatius (ad fam. 7.19). The
problem is that the work has almost nothing to do with the Topics of
Aristotle; evidently Cicero never read the work in question.(5) Thus, we can
be certain that this work of Cicero had nothing to do with translation.
I have elsewhere discussed the discrepancy between the indication in the
preface and the contents, and suggested that Cicero's doctrine as regards the
topics was based on an otherwise unknown Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, and
that in this sense the indication of the preface was true; but clearly, Cicero
was very free in his treatment of his theme and source.(6) (pp. 286-287)
If we can discern the reason why Cicero translated the speeches of
Demosthenes and Aeschines, sufficient evidence for his philosophical
translations can also be adduced, although this is mainly connected with
the treatises, whose dependence on Greek original is less clear (see also
above, pp. 240-243). In addition to the above-mentioned educational
414
aspect, the nationalistic idea seems to supply the principal motivation for
translating into Latin.(7) An extreme case is Tusc. 2.6, where Cicero
anticipates a time when all Greek philosophical literature will be
translated or transferred into Latin and Greek libraries can close down.
(8) This passage belongs to a powerful exhortation to transfer the
achievements of Greek philosophy to Rome.(9) One could maintain that
the pioneer work of Cicero in the field of Latin philosophy consisted
entirely of the adapting or translating of Greek philosophical works into
Latin. He compares in de fin. 1.4-5 his work to that of Roman
dramatists, and considers that a good Roman ought to prefer Latinized
philosophy in the same way as he prefers to read the dramas of Terence
and Ennius.
The fact that Cicero considers the Greek libraries worthless when the bulk of
Greek literature is adapted or translated into Latin, shows that, not unlike
many other Romans, he emphasized the independence of the translation or
adaptation from the original. Cicero also wished to make translations very
free. He had not translated Demosthenes or Aeschines as an interpreter, but
as an orator (opt. gen. 14; 23).(10) In de fin. 1.6, he emphasizes that only the
contents of his philosophical works are derived from the Greeks, the form is
his own; he does not want to be a mere translator.(11) Cicero distinguishes
sharply between interpretatio and imitatio, an independent transferring, with
an artistic purpose, of the ideas of the original.(12)
Consequently, it is clear that Cicero's translations are, or intend to be, creative
and ambitious with definite artistic aims and a clear nationalistic coloring.
One further question remains to be answered: does Cicero have in mind those
Roman readers who are incapable of reading the Greek originals due to a
defective knowledge of Greek, i.e. does the modern reason for translating
apply in any way? The question is discussed in ac. post. 1.3-4, where Varro
gives as one reason why he does not deal with philosophy in Latin, his
opinion that those readers with a Greek education would prefer reading in
Greek and those without such an education -- we can take this to mean,
unable to read Greek -- would not be interested in philosophy anyway (see
also above, p. 240). Cicero duly protests, but everything points to the fact that
in the sphere of which Cicero's literary activity formed a part the reader was
generally considered bilingual and that translations were therefore not
necessary. (pp. 288-289)
415
It is time to return to Cicero, whose views on Latinity and purism have
already been discussed. We have seen in the previous section that as
with Livius Andronicus and his successors, the general language choice
of Cicero, i.e. the choice of Latin for philosophical and rhetorical
literature, rested to a large extent on a nationalistic basis. Cicero's
general attitude to the Latinizing of Greek words also closely resembled
that of the early poets. Again, I would not see in this a negative attitude
towards the Greek language so much as a perception of the necessity of
creating an indigenous vocabulary for these branches of learning.
The nationalism of Cicero's attitude shows up clearly in that his discussion of
the use of Greek words is mostly connected with passages comparing the
lexical resources of Latin with those of Greek, or emphasizing the needs of
Latin philosophical literature: quare bonitate potius nostrorum verborum
utamur quam splendore Graecorum (or. 164). This is also the starting point
in de fin. 3.5: because the Latin vocabulary is richer than the Greek,
elaborandum est, ut hoc non in nostril solis artibus, red etiam in illorum
ipsorum adsequamur. When in this context Cicero accepts words like
philosophia and rhetorica, because as usu recepta they have become Roman,
he states that even these could easily be replaced by purely Latin terms.
Central to the whole passage is the fact that all special languages use verba
inusitata, either Greek or Latin, and as a branch of learning philosophy
cannot take its vocabulary from the streets (3.4). The same idea is continued
in de fin. 3.15: preferably one should translate Greek terms by Latin ones; if
one Latin word is not enough, several may be used. But: tamen puto concedi
nobis oportere, ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus occurret Latinum.
The theory of establishing new Latin terms for hitherto unknown concepts is
discussed by Cicero several times, and almost always in a defensive tone,(67)
thus anticipating criticism. The alternatives at Cicero's disposal for the
expressing of Greek terms in Latin are classified, mainly on the basis of
Cicero's own theories, by Hartung as follows:(13) (a) to use the Greek term
as such; (b) to use a Greek loan word in a Latinized form and with Latin
characters; (c) to use Latin words which were exact counterparts of the Greek
terms and well-known in this sense (verba propria et usitata); (d) to use Latin
words which are transferred from another area of meaning (verba similitudine
translata); (e) to form new Latin words. As has been noted, Cicero does not
416
entirely ignore methods (a) and (b), either in theory or, especially, in practice;
but he clearly prefers even (e) to (a) and (b). This reveals the mentality of the
pioneer of Latin literature; Cicero regards himself as the founder of the
terminological tradition in Roman philosophy and rhetoric, and his view is
that in so far as solutions have not already been made by adopting Greek
terms into Latin, the preferable solution is contained in (c), (d) or (e).
None of this can by judged against a background of purism, since from the
purist point of view, the use of verba inusitata is to be condemned
independently of the Latin or Greek origin. Neither does Cicero's view reveal
a negative attitude towards the Greek language. In addition to the
nationalistic aspect discussed above, I think that a certain language
theoretical view of Cicero is also applicable here, a view which emphasizes
the significance of the origin of the persons, both ethnic and social, for the
language which he uses. The clearest expression of this view, together with a
special reference to Greek loan words, can be found in de off. 1.111:
ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam,
Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones
omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus.
[For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who
are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule
upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our
actions or our life in general. (English translation by Walter Miller,
Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1913)]
The above-mentioned passages, in which Cicero distinguishes several special
languages within the Latin language, represent another expression of this
view. And in a sense, we can relate to this the famous passage Tusc. 1.15, in
which Cicero claims that he does not use more Greek in Latin than Latin in
Greek: scis enim me Graece loqui in Latino sermone non plus solere quam in
Graeca Latine. This occurs in a passage which is concerned with the
quotation of a verse of Epicharmus, a quotation which Cicero makes, as his
normal practice is, in Latin translation.
In the comparison of Cicero's theoretical attitude with his practice of writing,
his letters must be discussed as a special group. The Greek loan words in
these occur approximately as often as in Cicero's other work, if only
frequency and occurrence is taken into account; but the words are more often
417
such which only rarely appear elsewhere and can hardly be considered verba
usitata. The main difference, however, lies in the fact that in his letters Cicero
is fond of inserting Greek phrases and words with Greek spellings,(14) a
licence Cicero has allowed himself in his other work only in special cases.
(15) This phenomenon certainly reflects the style used in the normal
communication of the two correspondents in question; the number of Greek
phrases depends not only on the theme of the letter, but also on the person to
whom the letter is written; they are commonest by far in the letters to Atticus.
(16) The interpretation of the phenomenon for our purposes is clear and
agrees with other sources: on the one hand, the insertion of Greek phrases
and words was obviously a favourite practice in civilized conversation and
communication between Romans -- it even lent some kind of intimacy to the
letters; (17) Greek had retained its position as the cultural language, and the
attitude towards it, in this social class at least, was favourable. Sometimes
Cicero and his correspondents even boast of their knowledge of Greek --
certain words are not found in the extant Greek literature -- , but at other
times it is only deficiencies in the Latin which are rectified.(73) On the other
hand, the rare occurrence of Greek quotations and words in Cicero's treatises
and speeches was based on a deliberate avoidance of them. One could think
that this avoidance or rather the stylistic ideal to which it belongs was due
either to a negative attitude to the Greek language or to a nationalistic
emphasis on Latinized literature; the first alternative being excluded on
grounds given above, we might perhaps state a preference for the second one.
In the speeches very rare, slightly more common in the rhetorical and
philosophical treatises, in which terms with Greek spellings also occur: this is
the general picture of Greek loan words in Cicero.(74) Greek sources are
cited outside the letters in Latin translation.(75) Cicero's theoretical principles
on the avoidance and inclusion of Greek loan words accord rather well with
his practice; perhaps there are a few more Greek words than one would
expect, but this is probably due to the fact that our conception of what a
Greek loan word is and Cicero's conception may differ greatly." (pp. 309-
310)
[Notes are renumbered for clarity]
(1) See E. Norden, Die römische literatur, (6 ed.) Leipzig 1961, 55.
418
(2) locos quidem quondam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab its quos
modo nominavi (sc. Plato et Aristoteles), cum inciderit ut id apte fieri possit.
[If I think fit, I will translate certain passages, particularly from those authors
(Plato and Aristotle) I just mentioned, when it happens to be appropriate].
(3) K. Büchner, RE VII A, 1150.
(4) ut tibi illa traderem are the words used by Cicero in top. 1.2; in the
following Trebatius is urged to acquire the contents from a teacher of oratory,
and this rather refers to explaining, but then Cicero again speaks of the
charmful and rich style which ought to have attracted philosophers to the
work. Cassiodorus (de art. ac discipl. lib. art. 583 Garet) says: Topica
Aristotelis ... Cicero transtulit in Latinum.
(5) However, B. Riposati has in his long monograph Studi sui 'Topica' di
Cicerone, Ed. dell'Univ. Catt. del S. Cuore, Ser. Pubbl. 22, Milano 1947,
attempted again to show that the principal themes and ideas of Cicero can be
traced back to Aristotle.
(6) J. Kaimio, Cicero's Topica: the Preface and Sources, Ann. Univ.
Turkuensis Ser. B Tom. 141, Turku 1976.
(7) See also A. Reiff, Interpretatio, imitatio, aemulatio, Diss. Köln, 1959, 25.
(8) quodsi haec studia traducta erunt ad nostros, ne bibliothecis quidem
Graecis egebimus, in quibus multitudo infinita librorum propter eorum est
multitudinem, qui scripserunt. [Besides, if these studies are ever brought
home to us, we shall not want even Greek libraries, in which there is an
infinite number of books, by reason of the multitude of authors among them.]
(9) Tusc. 2.5: quam ob rem hortor omnis, qui facere id possunt, ut humus
quoque generic laudem iam languenti Graeciae eripiant et transferant in
hanc urbem . . . philosophia nascatur Latinis quidem litteris ex his
temporibus. [and therefore I recommend all men who have abilities to follow
my advice to snatch this art also from declining Greece, and to transport it to
this city . . . Let philosophy, then, derive its birth in Latin language from this
time.]
(10) Cf. de fin. 3.15: nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse exit, at
interpretes indiserti solent. See Reiff, 40. Cf. Hor. ars p. 133-134:nec verbo
verbum curabis reddere fidus / interpres, and Cicero de off. 1.6, 2.60.
(11) quid, si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta
tent ab iis, quos probamus, eisque nostrum indicium at nostrum scribendi
ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca anteponant iis, quae et
419
splendide dicta tint neque tint conversa de Graecis? [What of it, if I do not
perform the task of a translator, but preserve the views of those whom I
consider sound while contributing my own judgement and order of
composition? What reason does anyone have for preferring Greek to that
which is written with brilliance and is not a translation from Greek?
(Translation by Raphael Woolf, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001] See also the analysis of the passage by Reiff, 26-28.
(12) See Reiff, 22-51. For Cicero's technique in his philosophical translations,
see R. Poncelet, Cicéron, traducteur de Platon. L'expression de la pensée
complexe en latin classique, Diss. Paris 1953; Jones, 'Cicero as a Translator',
Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 6, 1959, 26-28; H. Müller,
Ciceros Prosaübersetzungen. Beiträge zur Kenntnis der ciceronischen
Sprache,Diss. Marburg 1964.
(13) H.-J. Hartung, Ciceros Methode bei der Übersetzung griechischer
philosophischer Termini, Diss. Hamburg 1970, 20-23; cf. also Poncelet's
thesis; D. M. Jones, 'Cicero as a Translator', 26.
(14) See P. Oksala, Die griechischen Lehnwörther in den Prosaschriften
Ciceros, Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, ser. B, 80.1, Helsinki
1953, 91-109, 153, especially the statistics in 104 and 153; R. B. Steele, 'The
Greek in Cicero's Epistles', American Journal of Philology, 21/1900, 387-
410.
(15) See Hartung, 20-21.
(16) Cf., however, also ad fam. 13.15, redolent with Greek quotations, and
see R. B. Steele, 'The Greek in Cicero's Epistles', 309.
(17) J. M. Pabón, 'El Griego, lengua de la intimidad entre los romanos',
Emerita 7/1939, 126-131, 127.
From: Jorma Kaimio, The Romans and the Greek Language, Helsinki,
Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1979.
CICERO'S TESTIMONY OF STOIC LOGIC

The main texts of Cicero on Stoic logic can be found in:
Lucullus 91-98;
420
De fato 11-21
Topica 26-34, 47-49, 53-59.
(under construction)
LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN ROME AT THE TIMES

OF CICERO
Rhetoric was intensely practised in ancient Greece by a series of orators
whose names are still well-known. It seems to have appeared in Sicily as a
special science with its own laws, whence it was taken over to Greece by
Gorgias. Later, rhetoric was greatly improved by the Sophists, both from the
point of view of the art of adorned speech and of the art of persuading by
argument.
The first great orator is Isocrates (born about 436 B.C.) who studied under
Prodicus and Gorgias. Aristotle (...) established rhetoric as a branch of
dialectics and codified its rules, and Demosthenes brought that art to
perfection.
The disciples of Isocrates and those of Aristotle, respectively, formed two
rhetorical schools: the first was concerned rather with polishing and
improving the oratorical form and style, the second, as one should expect,
was concerned with constructing the arsenal of the art of persuasion.
What is significant and testifies to the closer link between logic and rhetoric,
and generally, between the latter and philosophy, is the fact that those who
studied rhetoric most were the philosophers of the Peripatetic and Stoic
schools.
Starting with the second century B.C. systematized treatises on rhetoric
began to be written, such as that of Hermagoras of Temnos (about 120 B.C.).
As the general preoccupations acquired an ever growing practical character,
especially under Roman rule (the Roman spirit being pre-eminently practical
and formalistic), studies of rhetoric flourished in Greece, which explains why
later, when logic reached Rome through the Greek rhetors, it was only a
discipline to be learned in connection with rhetoric.
The conservative section of the Roman society was at first rather opposed to
421
the Greek rhetoricians who, by their pro and contra arguments of the same
thesis, shocked the Romans' commonsense. Thus, in 161 B.C. by a senatus-
consultus, all the Greek rhetors were banished from the Eternal City.
Afterwards, however, Latin rhetors appeared, who had studied in Greece, but
neither were they favourably regarded by the authorities, and therefore were
officially blamed by the Roman censors about the year 92 B. C. In Caesar's
epoch, however, rhetoric became a free art, both in respect to learning and
practising it. It came to be so highly valued, that emperor Vespasianus (7-79
A.D.) ordered public schools of rhetoric to be set up, with Greek and Latin
masters, who were to be state stipendiaries.
On the other hand, we see logic, which for centuries had ranked first among
the concerns of the Greek philosophers, come to Rome and be overshadowed
by rhetoric, groping to acclimatize its terminology and devoid of any creative
force.
We shall further examine these Latin orators and philosophers whose works
bear witness to the way logic was introduced to Rome, to the way in which
the logical terminology was established (no easy problem), and to the general
conceptions of the Roman philosophers about logic. We shall briefly survey
the most remarkable among them.
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (106-43 B.C.)
Dialectics was introduced by M. Terentius Varro (116-28 B.C.) through
his encyclopedic work De novem disciplinis ("On the nine sciences").
Varro was a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon. He wrote prolifically (he himself
declared he would have written up to the age of 84 years, 490 books).
Contemporary inquiries ascribe to him altogether 620 books (74 independent
works). His writing which interests us especially is the above mentioned, De
novem disciplinis, a synthesis of the whole science of his time. It is
undoubtedly the origin of the seven liberal arts, which will be the basis of the
Scholastic learning, and of which we will speak further. In this work, Varro,
treated the following disciplines, divided into two groups:
(1) grammar, dialectics and rhetoric;
(2) geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, medecine and architecture.
Varro enjoyed a great prestige in his time, and a long time afterwards he was
considered as an unquestionable authority in the "disciplines" he wrote about.
422
For instance, Augustine named him doctissimus Romanorum ("the most
learned Roman") in his work De civitate Dei (XIX, 22).
The fragments remaining from Varro were gathered, translated and published
by F. Brunetti (Venice, 1874)(*). An interesting study on the logic aspects of
the work of Varro was published by Lucien Gerschel: Varron logicien I.
Etude sur une séquence du De lingua latina
("Latomus", 1958, pp. 65-72).
The first one interested, however, in translating the Greek logical terminology
into Latin is Marcus Tullius Cicero, the greatest Roman orator and one of the
greatest in the world. His work is considerable. We shall only mention his
writings dealing with logic or with the manner in which the Romans
conceived it.
-- De Inventione ("On invention") is a treatise imitating Rhetorica, ad M.

Herennium, a work ascribed to Q. Cornificius (tribune of the plebs in 69
B.C.).
-- De Oratore ("On the Orator") is a work in which Cicero displays the
Ancients' concept of the value and means of the oratorical art; written in the
form of a dialogue, the main roles are granted to two of the greatest orators of
the previous generation, L. Crassus and M. Antonius.
-- Brutus, also written as a dialogue between Atticus and Brutus, represents a
real history of Roman eloquence. He quotes over two hundred older orators
but among his contemporaries, Cicero only mentions Caesar, Sulp. Rufus,
and M. Marcellus.
-- Orator is a short writing, in which the author depicts the type of the ideal
orator.
-- Partitiones Oratoriae ("The Oratorical divisions") is a manual written as
questions and answers for his son's instruction.
-- Topica comprises a kind of commentary addressed to C. Trebatius, where
Cicero reveals how the oratorical art can make use of the means offered by
logic.
-- De optime genere oratorum ("On the best style of Orators") is an
opusculum in which Cicero pleads for the Attic oratorical style (this booklet
was written as a preface to the translation of the speeches made by Aeschines
and Demosthenes in connection with the famous "Affair of the Crown").
423
Cicero's works, were published under the title Opera Omni by C. F. Miller
and G. Friedrich in 15 vols. (Leipzig, beginning from 1878). A critical Latin
edition, with Italian translation, published "Centro di Studi Ciceroniani"
(Rome, beginning from 1964).
For the philosophical terminology of Cicero we have the writings of H.
Merguet: Lexikon zu den philosophischen Schriften Ciceros (2 vols., 1905-
1906), and Lexikon zu den Reden des Ciceros (4 vols., 1877-1884). Both
were printed at Jena, and reproduced, after the original, at Hildesheim (1960-
1962).
More information, concerning Cicero's philosophical terminology, can be
found in A. Michel's Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron (Paris, 1961).
Two things in Cicero's works are relevant to the history of logic,
namely: the invention of a Latin terminology corresponding to the Greek
one, and information on Stoic logic whence we become aware that the
Romans practised those forms of logic. Cicero, like the other Roman
rhetors and thinkers, made no original contribution.
Cicero's logical terminology is rather hesitating. Even the name of that
discipline he rendered λογική, and sometimes by διαλεκτική, which he was
unable to translate into Latin and he therefore kept generally the Greek terms
in the Latin text. However, he sometimes translated those two Greek words
by ars disserendi -- "the art of discussing" (De Oratore, II, 38) or ars
disceptatrix -- "The art of deciding".
Here is an example of his use of the Greek term λογική -- logic, in a
Latin text, namely in a fragment from De finibus bonorum et malorum
("On the Purpose of the Good and Bad Things", I, 7): Jam in altera
philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi quae λογική
dicitur, iste vester plane. . . inermis ac nudus est. ("Also in the second
part of philosophy, which deals with research and discourse, and is
called λογική, that [master] of yours is unarmed and defenceless").
In De Inventione (XXVIII, 42) Cicero began to employ such Latin terms
as: adversum, contrarium, negans, for ἄποφατικόν (negative),
oppositum for ἔναντίον (opposite) and repugnans for άντπατικόν
(repelling). For the idea of sentence, Varro and Aelius mentioned in
their texts the Greek term ἄξίομα, which they would sometimes render
424
by proloquium. Cicero's translation of "sentence" varies: effatum,
pronuntiatum, enunciatum or enuntiato. (De Inventione, 1, 37). In the
texts dealing with the classification of judgements according to their
quality, Cicero started from the verb aio -- I affirm, and nego -- I deny,
and translated καταφατικόν (affirmative) by aientia, and ἄποφατικόν
(negative) by negantia.
In Topica, meant to be a rendering of the treatise bearing the same title by
Aristotle, Cicero introduced terms which definitely remained in logic such as:
definitio, genus, species (forma) etc.
He hesitated in the translation of the word τόπσς for which he used in turn the
terms, locus, sedes and nota: locum esse argumenti sedem -- locus is sedes
(the seat) of the argument.
As regards the Stoic dialectics, it dissatisfied Cicero "because it only gives
the art of argumentation, not that of inventing -- invenire, too". However, he
translated and explained at the same time, the terms of the hypothetical
reasoning (De Divinatione, II, 53). Lemma -- λεμμα -- is translated by
sumptio, πρόσληψις by assumptio, and έπιφορά by complexio. Concerning
the reasoning, Cicero introduced the term inductio for ἔπαγογή and divided
all arguments into two groups: induction; and deductive reasoning "as most
of the Greeks do [who divide them] into παραδείγματα and ἔπιχειρήματα,
interpreting παραδείγμα as oratorical induction ( Quintilianus, De Institutione
Oratoria, 11).
Although he was not too interested in the Stoics' modes of argumentation,

Cicero enumerated the five undemonstrable Stoic arguments, from, which, he
said "numerous others" can be derived (Topica, 54-57). He gives the
following examples to this effect, which may represent the sixth and seventh
arguments:
(6) Non et hoc et illud; hoc autem; non igitur illud.

Not both this and that; but this; therefore not that.
(7) Non et hoc et illud; non autem hoc; illud igitur.
Not both this and that; but not this; therefore that.
Related to Cicero's rhetorical logic, mention should be made of the
Greek Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara (first century B.C.). He came to
425
Rome, became acquainted with and then highly appreciated by Cicero,
and Lucretius himself seems to have been among his disciples.
Several epigrams by him were known, but after the diggings at Herculanum
no less than 36 philosophical books by the same writer were found.
Unfortunately, they were in rather bad state and could be only partially
deciphered.
M.E. Gros published the fragments referring the oratorical art separately,
under the title Philodemi rhetorica (Paris, 1840).
In one of these newly found treatises, significantly entitled On Signs and
Significances (**), Philodemus opposed the Stoic conception (called
"dogmatic" at the time), set up an empirical theory of knowledge and
examined the inductive methods of natural sciences."
(*) [Libri di M. Terenzio Varrone intorno alla lingua latina, edited and
translated in Italian by Pietro Canal (first edition 1846-1854), reprinted
Venice: Giuseppe Antonelli, 1874, with the addition of the fragments
with notes by Federico Brunetti. The De novem disciplinis is lost, but
Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl collected the extant fragments in: De M.
Terentii Varronis disciplinarum libris commentarius (Bonn, 1845),
reprinted in: F. Ritschl, Opuscula philologica, Vol. III, Leipzig 1877,
353-402 - Note added by R. Corazzon]
(**) Philodemus, On Methods of Inference. A Study in Ancient Empiricism,
edited, with translation and commentary, by Phillip Howard De Lacy and
Estelle Allen De Lacy, Philadelphia, Pa., The American philological
association, 1941; new revised edition: Napoli : Bibliopolis, 1978 - Note
added by R. Corazzon]
From: Anton Dumitriu - History of logic - Tunbridge Wells, Abacus Press,
1977 - Vol. I, pp.
"For some centuries after Stoic logic had been formulated by Chrysippus
we find discussion of the merits of his system and that of Aristotle, then
a gradual fusion, or perhaps we should say confusion, which was
completed at the end of classical antiquity in the work of Boethius.
When the study of logic was resumed after the Dark Ages, the writings
of Boethius were better known than those of Aristotle and his reputation
426
as high. Some part of the Stoic contribution remained, therefore, in what
we now call traditional logic, though weakened later by a revival of
interest in Aristotle, which led sometimes to a kind of Aristotelian
purism. In this section we shall try to trace the transmission from Greek
antiquity to the Middle Ages giving names and dates where these are
likely to be useful. But we shall not attempt to treat even the famous
philosophers of this long period in detail, since our purpose is only to
give perspective to our view of antiquity and the Middle Ages.
During the last two centuries B.C. and the first century A.D. the
philosophical schools in Athens existed side by side, competing for pupils
with doctrines which followed more or less closely those of their founders;
but the Stoics and the Epicureans were the most influential. Plato's Academy
became presently a home of scepticism with Carneades as its most famous
member, and Aristotle's influence was not very strong. If we may judge from
the writings of Cicero, the Stoic school was the dominant one in his day. No
doubt there were developments in that school after the time of Chrysippus,
but we cannot now separate them from his work, because the ancient tradition
is not full enough. Later writers such as Galen, Alexander, and Boethius
speak constantly of the Stoics or 'the moderns' (οἱ νεώτεροι) without
troubling to distinguish individuals.
Cicero made no original contribution to the development of logic, but his
writings preserve some scraps of information about the teaching of the Stoics,
and in this, as in other fields of philosophy, he did a useful service by
inventing Latin equivalents for Greek technical terms. Propositio, for
example, was introduced by him, but not with exactly the same sense as that
it commonly has in later Latin. In his terminology it means the leading
premiss of an argument (τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν λη + ̑μμα), and is used to make a
contrast with assumptio, which means the additional premiss (ἡ πρόσληψις).
(1) This special sense is to be found later in the logical writings attributed to
Apuleius and Martianus Capella, but already before the end of the first
century A.D. the word was used by Quintilian, the rhetorician, in the more
general sense of 'statement' or 'indicative sentence' which it retained
throughout the Middle Ages.
Cicero's word for a conclusion in the passage we have just noticed is
complexio, which means literally 'a knitting together', but it is interesting to
notice that the same word occurs elsewhere in the book with the sense of
427
'dilemma': 'Complexio est in qua, utrum concesseris, reprehenditur ad hunc
modum: Si improbus est, cur uteris? Si probus, cur accusas?' (2) No doubt
such reasoning was popular with the Hellenistic rhetoricians fro whom
Cicero took his material, and it may have been cultivated by them rather than
by the Stoic logicians, who first studied conditional and disjunctive
arguments. The 'theorem with two complex premisses' which we noticed in
our section on the system of Chrysippus is, of course, a special case of the
kind of argument called by later logicians a simple constructive dilemma (i.e.
in Stoic terminology 'If the first, then the third; if the second, then the third;
but either the first or the second; therefore in any case the third'), and the
paradox of the crocodile and the baby, which Lucian attributes to Chrysippus,
(3) involves an argument of similar pattern. So there can be no doubt that the
Stoics were familiar with this development of their logic. On the other hand,
according to Chrysippus all good arguments are διλήμματα in the original
sense of 'arguments with two premisses'; and there is no evidence of the use
of the word διλήμματον in the modern sense of 'dilemma' before the second
century A.D., when it occurs in the work of the rhetorician Hermogenes with
an explanation like that given by Cicero for complexio, namely by reference
to two questions, both equally awkward to answer. (4)
Among Cicero's philosophical works there is a small treatise called Topica
which has had considerable influence on the teaching of logic because it was
highly regarded in late antiquity, when logic was associated with rhetoric in
the way he thought proper. This book professes to be an adaptation of
Aristotle Topics for the use of a friend called Trebatius, but it shows little
trace of direct borrowing from Aristotle's work. It is conceived as a manual
for the training of Roman orators and is therefore furnished with illustrations
from Roman jurisprudence. Probably the plan, such as it is, was derived from
some Hellenistic manual; for the topics discussed here are mentioned in the
same order in the De Oratore, (5) as though they were in fact commonplaces
of that age. Some topics, it is said, are connected intrinsically with the subject
to be discussed (in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent), e.g. those concerned with
definition, genus, species (or in Cicero's terminology forma generis), while
others are brought in from without (assumuntur extrinsecus), e.g. that which
involves appeal to authority. With some elaborations this simple
classification was retained as long as men thought there was anything to be
learnt from the study of topics."
428
(1) De Inventione, I.57 ff.
(2) Ibid. 45
(3) Vitarum Auctio, 22.
(4) Hermogenes, De Inventione, IV.6.
(5) De Oratore, II.162-73.
From: William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford,
CICERO'S TOPICA
"It is a commonplace to talk, in general terms, of the dependence of all
European thought and learning on Greek philosophy, and more particularly
on Greek logic. It is a commonplace, also, to analyse the structure of
individual works of Latin literature in terms of the divisions and subdivisions
in the treatment of the subject involved, with their frequent prefatory
definitions. This is a method that may in many cases be taken from recent
Greek models of various kinds, in particular works on rhetoric or grammar,
but which for Cicero goes back to the dialectic of the philosophers, and
which Fuhrmann has traced even beyond Socrates to the sophists.(1) It is
perhaps less of a commonplace, though doubtless rash, to try to take a
comprehensive view of the Romans' attempt, over a wide spectrum of
subjects, to apply this method, to try to see how important they felt it to be,
and how far they were successful in it. The extent to which they regarded it
as the transformation of the subjects in question into τἔκναι or artes must also
be considered. I want to stress that we are not merely dealing with an
expository method used in introductory handbooks of little intellectual
originality, as Fuhrmann's useful Das Systematische Lehrbuch might suggest,
but that it came to seem to the Romans simply the best way to think and write
about a serious subject, to be applied both on a large scale, i.e. to works in a
number of books, and on a small one, i.e. inside a single book. The Roman
attempt to organize almost the whole body of their knowledge into a series of
systematic and comprehensible wholes along these lines can be seen as a
development in intellectual history of great importance for later times. This
attempt probably began before the first century BC opened, and continued to
429
make more measured progress after it closed. But the earlier and middle first
century is that of its most enthusiastic, indeed sometimes over-enthusiastic,
adoption. If we see this, it should help us also to understand certain aspects of
two of the most important figures of the time, Cicero himself and Varro,
better than is always done, and to put into some sort of context the present
lively argument as to what exactly was happening in Roman jurisprudence at
this period.
In his Topica, which are aimed at persuading the lawyer Trebatius that
rhetorico-philosophical ways of finding arguments may be useful to him,
Cicero, possibly in the wake of Stoic dialectic, carefully distinguishes
between partitio, μερισμὄς, listing the parts, or some of the parts, that go to
make up a whole, and divisio, διαἴρεσις, that operates with the concepts of
genus and subordinate species, though because he does not like the forms
specierum and speciebus he declares that he will use forma instead of species
(the Greek terms are of course γἔνος and εἴδοσς). He also states that both
partitio and divisio are forms of definition.(2) But in practice both he and
other Romans are often far from precise: genus, pars, species and forma are
used pretty indiscriminately,(3) and as we shall see definitions are actually
often thought to be better if they are unphilosophically loose. But this does
not make the adoption of the system less important, or alter the fact that it
was felt to be derived from philosophy. Cicero at least was of course aware
that there was much more to dialectic than the two procedures we have
mentioned; but it is these that were most widely grasped and applied." (pp.
324-325 of the reprint)
(1) Manfred Fuhrmann: Das systematische Lehrbuch. Ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte der Wissenschaften in der Antike Gottingen: Vandehoeck &
Ruprecht, 1960, chap. 1.
(2) Cicero, Topica 28 f.; cf. Dieter Nörr, Divisio und Partitio. Bemerkungen
zur römischen Rechtsquellenlehre und zur antiken Wissenschaftstheorie,
Berlin:Schweitzer, 1972. M. Talamanca, Lo schema ''genus-species' nelle
sistematiche dei giuristi romani' (Problemi attuali di scienza e cultura:
colloquio italo-francese: La filosofia greca e il diritto romano.), Roma 14-17
aprile 1973, Tomo II Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, (1977) 103, 145, 156
argues that this is peculiar to Cicero.
(3) As their Greek equivalents are by Plato, probably Speusippus, and often
430
Aristotle (in the biological as opposed to the logical works; also
Theophrastus): D. M. Balme, 'Τἔςος and εἴδος in Aristotle's Biology',
Classical Quarterly XII (1962) 81. Diog. Laert. VII 39 reveals that some
philosophers described as εἴδη of philosophical λὄγος what others called
γἔνη; Strabo I 2 6 seems distinctly confused about the εἴδη of discourse,
λὄγος, which is γενιχὄς.
From: Elizabeth Rawson, "The Introduction of Logical Organisation in
Roman Prose Literature," Papers of the British School at Rome 46: 12-34
(1978). Reprinted in: E. Rawson, Roman Culture and Society: Collected
Papers, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 324-351
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Critical Editions and Translations of the Philosophical Works of Cicero
431
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Editions and Translations of the

Philosophical Works of Cicero
LIST OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND
RHETORICAL WORKS OF CICERO
Cicero gives a list of his philosophical works in the preface to the second
book of his De divinatione:
"After serious and long continued reflection as to how I might do good to as
many people as possible and thereby prevent any interruption of my service
to the State, no better plan occurred to me than to conduct my fellow-citizens
in the ways of the noblest learning — and this, I believe, I have already
accomplished through my numerous books. For example, in my work entitled
Hortensius, I appealed as earnestly as I could for the study of philosophy.
And in my Academics, in four volumes, I set forth the philosophic system
which I thought least arrogant, and at the same time most consistent and
refined. And, since the foundation of philosophy rests on the distinction
between good and evil, I exhaustively treated that subject in five volumes and
in such a way that the conflicting views of the different philosophers might
be known. Next, and in the same number of volumes, came the Tusculan
Disputations, which made plain the means most essential to a happy life. For
the first volume treats of indifference to death, the second of enduring pain,
432
the third of the alleviation of sorrow, the fourth of other spiritual
disturbances; and the fifth embraces a topic which sheds the brightest light on
the entire field of philosophy since it teaches that virtue is sufficient of itself
for the attainment of happiness. After publishing the works mentioned I
finished three volumes On the Nature of the Gods, which contain a discussion
of every question under that head. With a view of simplifying and extending
the latter treatise I started to write the present volume On Divination, to
which I plan to add a work on Fate; when that is done every phase of this
particular branch of philosophy will be sufficiently discussed. To this list of
works must be added the six volumes which I wrote while holding the helm
of state, entitled On the Republic — a weighty subject, appropriate for
philosophic discussion, and one which has been most elaborately treated by
Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the entire peripatetic school. What need is
there to say anything of my treatise On Consolation? For it is the source of
very great comfort to me and will, I think, be of much help to others. I have
also recently thrown in that book On Old Age, which I sent my friend Atticus;
and, since it is by philosophy that a man is made virtuous and strong, my
Cato is especially worthy of a place among the foregoing books. Inasmuch as
Aristotle and Theophrastus, too, both of whom were celebrated for their
keenness of intellect and particularly for their copiousness of speech, have
joined rhetoric with philosophy, it seems proper also to put my rhetorical
books in the same category; hence we shall include the three volumes On
Oratory, the fourth entitled Brutus, and the fifth called The Orator."
(II, 1-4; English translation by W. A. Falconer, Loeb Classical Library,
Harvard University Press, 1923).
Complete list of the works:
A) PHILOSOPHY:
De Republica (Books: Six; Date: 54-51; only Fragments are extant).
De Legibus (Books: Three; Date: Broken off and late aside in 51, taken
up again in 46; unfinished).
Paradoxa Stoicorum (Six Paradoxes; Date: Early Spring 46).
Consolatio (Books: Two; Date: Spring 45; Only 16 Fragments are
extant).
433
Hortensius (Books: One; Date: Spring 45; Only Fragments are extant).
Academica (Book 1 ( Varro): The first quarter of the Second Edition;
Book 2 ( Lucullus): the second half of the First Edition; Date: May-July
45).
De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (Books: Five; Date: May-July 45).
Tusculanae Disputationes (Books: Five; Date: June-August 45).
De Natura Deorum (Books: Three; Date: June-August 45).
De Divinatione (Books: Two; Date: Book 1 before the Ides of March
44; Book 2 after).
De Fato (Books: One (fragmentary); Date: March (after the Ides) - June
44).
Cato Maior de Senectute (Books: One; Date: Before the Ides of March;
late 45 or early 44).
De Amicitia (Books: One; Date: Summer or early Autumn 44).
De Officiis (Books: Three; Date: Books 1 and 2 begun between 9 and
25 October 44; finished by 5 November; Book 3 finished by 9
December).
B) RHETORIC:
De Inventione (Books: Two; Date: between 87 and 81 BC).
De Oratore (Books: Three; Date: 55-52).
Brutus (Books: Two; Date: Early 46).
Orator (Books: One; Date: Summer 46).
De Optimo Genere Oratorum (Books: One; Date: 46).
Partitiones Oratoriae (Books: One; Date: 46).
Topica (Books: One; Date: July 44).(ca 88-89 BC)
The Rhetorica ad Herennium, (ca. 88-90 BC), was formerly attributed to
Cicero, but is of unknown author (Critical edition: Rhetorica ad
Herennium, Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation
by Harry Caplan, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1954).
434
Cicero translated a part of Plato's Timaeus and the Protagoras, but only the
translation of the Timaeus, with Cicero's own preface, survive (Critical
edition: De divinatione; De fato; Timaeus; edidit Remo Giomini, Leipzig:
Teubner, 1975).
CRITICAL EDITIONS, TRANSLATIONS AND

COMMENTARIES
A) PHILOSOPHY:
Cicero. 1928. De Re Publica, De Legibus. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation by Clinton
Walker Keyes.
———. 1995. De Re Publica. Selections. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Edited with Introduction and Commentary by James E.G. Zetzel.
———. 2006. De Re Publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior De Senectute,
Laelius De Amicitia. New York: Oxford University Press.
Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis. Recognovit brevique
adnotatione critica instruxit, J.G.F. Powell.
———. 2008. The Republic, the Laws. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Oxford World's Classics. Translated by Niall Rudd. With an
introduction and notes by Jonathan Powell and Niall Rudd.
———. 1980. La République. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Esther
Bréguet. (2 volumes).
———. 1984. De Re Publica. Heidelberg: Winter.
Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen
Schriftstellern. Kommentar von Karl Büchner.
———. 2010. Der Staat = De Re Publica. Düsseldorf: Artemis &
Winkler.
Lateinisch-Deutsch. Herausgegeben und übersetzt von Rainer Nickel.
Kenter, L. P. 1972. De Legibus. A Commentary on Book I. Amsterdam:
Hakkert.
435
By L. P. Kenter. Translation from the Dutch by Margie L. Leenheer-
Braid.
Cicero. 1999. On the Commonwealth; on the Laws. Cambridge:
Edited by James E.G. Zetzel.
Dyck, Andrew R. 2004. A Commentary on Cicero, De Legibus. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Caspar, Timothy W. 2010. Recovering the Ancient View of Founding. A
Commentary on Cicero's De Legibus. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Cicero. 1959. Traité Des Lois. Paris Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Georges
De Plinval.
Giraret, Klaus M. 1983. Die Ordnung Der Welt. Ein Beitrag Zur
Philosophischen Und Politischen Interpretation Von Ciceros Schrift De
Legibus. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
Sauer, Jochen. 2007. Argumentations- Und Darstellungsformen Im
Ersten Buch Von Ciceros Schrift De Legibus. Heidelberg: Winter.
Ronnick, Michele V. 1991. Paradoxa Stoicorum. A Commentary, an
Interpretation, and a Study of Its Influence. Bern: Peter Lang.
Cicero. 1971. Les Paradoxes Des Stoïciens. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Jean
Molager.
———. 1994. De Legibus = Über Die Gesetze; Paradoxa Stoicorum =
Stoische Paradoxien. Zürich: Artemis & Winkler.
Lateinisch-Deutsch. Herausgegeben, übersetzt und erläutert von Rainer
Nickel.
———. 1869. Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia. Leipzig: G. Teubner.
The volume 11 contains the Fragments of the Consolatio. This edition
is now supersed by that of Giovanna Garbarino (1984).
———. 1984. Fragmenta Ex Libris Philosophicis, Ex Aliis Libris
Deperditis, Ex Scriptis Incertis. Milano: Mondadori.
Contains the extant Fragments of the Consolatio; critical edition by
Giovanna Garbarino.
———. 1958. L' Hortensius. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Collection d'études anciennes. Histoire et reconstitution par Michel
Ruch.
436
———. 1962. Hortensius. Milano: Istituto editoriale Cisalpino.
Edidit commentario instruxit Albertus Grilli.
———. 1976. Hortensius. Bern: Peter Lang.
Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe XV, Klassische Philologie und
Literatur; 9. (Hrs.) Laila Straume-Zimmermann.
———. 1933. De Natura Deorum; Academica. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation by Harris
Rackham.
———. 1970. Academica Posteriora. Liber Primus. Paris: Presses
Érasme: collection de textes latins commentés. Édition, introduction et
commentaire de Michel Ruch.
Hunt, Terence J. 1998. A Textual History of Cicero's Academici Libri.
Leiden: Brill.
Cicero. 2006. On Academic Scepticism. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Translated, with introduction and notes, by Charles Brittain.
———. 1995. Akademische Abhandlungen. Lucullus. Hamburg: F.
Meiner.
Text und Übersetzung von Christoph Schäublin. Einleitung von
Andreas Graeser und Christoph Schäublin. Anmerkungen von Andreas
Bächli und Andreas Graeser.
Haltenhoff, Andreas. 1998. Kritik Der Akademischen Skepsis. Ein
Kommentar Zu Cicero, Lucullus 1-62. Bern: Peter Lang.
Cicero. 1914. De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation revised in
1951 by Harris Rackham.
———. 1998. De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum: Libri Quinque. New
York: Clarendon Press.
Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Leighton Durham
Reynolds.
———. 2005. De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum. Munich: K. G. Saur.
Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana.
Recensuit Claudio Moreschini.
———. 1991. On Stoic Good and Evil: De Finibus Bonorum Et
437
Malorum, Liber Iii; and Paradoxa Stoicorum. Warminster: Aris &
Phillips.
Edited with introduction, translation and commentary by M. R. Wright.
———. 2001. On Moral Ends. Cambridge: Cambridger University
Press.
Edited by Julia Annas and translated by Raphael Woolf.
———. 1928. Des Termes Extrêmes Des Biens Et Des Maux. Paris:
Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Jules
Martha (2 volumes).
———. 1988. Über Die Ziele Des Menschlichen Handelns = De
Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum. München: Artemis.
Herausgegeben, übersetzt und kommentiert von Olof Gigon und Laila
Straume-Zimmermann.
———. 1927. Tusculanae Disputationes. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation by John
Edward King.
———. 1985. Tusculan Disputations. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities
Press.
Edited with translation and notes by Alan Edward Douglas (2
volumes).
———. 2002. Cicero on the Emotions. Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Translated and with commentary by Margaret Graver.
Gildenhard, Ingo. 2007. Paideia Romana. Cicero's Tusculan
Disputations. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society.
Cicero. 1930. Tusculanes. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Tome I: Livres I et II (1930);
Tome II. Livre III-V (1931). Texte établi par G. Fohlen et traduit par J.
Humbert.
———. 1952. Gespräche in Tusculum. Zürich: Artemis.
Eingeleitet und neu Übertragen von Karl Büchner.
———. 1998. Gespräche in Tusculum = Tusculanae Disputationes.
München: Artemis und Winkler.
Lateinisch-deutsch mit ausführlichen Anmerkungen neu herausgegeben
438
von Olof Gigon.
Koch, Bernhard. 2006. Philosophie Als Medizin Für Die Seele.
Untersuchungen Zu Ciceros Tusculanae Disputationes. Stuttgart:
Steiner.
Eckhard, Lefèvre. 2008. Philosophie Unter Der Tyrannis. Ciceros
Tusculanae Disputationes. Heidelberg: Winter.
Cicero. 1955. De Natura Deorum. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Edited with a commentary by Arthur Stanley Pease. Two volumes: 1
(1955), 2 (1958).
Reprint: New York, Arno Press, 1979.
———. 1997. The Nature of the Gods. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Translated with an introduction and notes by Patrick Gerald Walsh.
———. 2003. De Natura Deorum. Liber I. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics. Latin text and English translation
by Andrew R. Dyck.
———. 2002. La Nature Des Dieux. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Traduit et commenté par Clara Auvray-Assayas.
———. 1986. " De Natura Deorum: Tables." Latomus no. 192:1-173.
———. 1996. Vom Wesen Der Götter: Lateinisch-Deutsch. Zürich:
Artemis und Winkler.
Herausgegeben, übersetzt und kommentiert von Olof Gigon und Laila
Straume-Zimmermann.
———. 1920. De Divinatione; Liber Primvs-Secvndvs. Urbana:
University of Illinois.
Edited an annotated by Arthur Stanley Pease.Two volumes: 1 (1920); 2
(1923).
———. 2006. Cicero on Divination. De Divinatione, Book 1. New
Translated with introduction and historical commentary by David
Wardle.
———. 1992. De La Divination. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Traduit et commenté par Gérard Freyburger et John Scheid; préface de
439
Amin Maalouf.
———. 2004. De La Divination = De Divinatione. Paris: Flammarion.
Text Latin, introduction, traduction et notes par José Kany-Turpin.
De François, Guillaumont. 2006. Le De Diuinatione De Cicéron Et Les
Théories Antiques De La Divination. Bruxelles: Éditions Latomus.
Cicero. 1991. Über Die Wahrsagung = De Divinatione : Lateinisch-
Deutsch. München: Artemis und Winkler.
Herausgegeben, übersetzt und erläutert von Christoph Schäublin.
———. 1991. On Fate (De Fato) / Cicero. & the Consolation of
Philosophy (Philosophiae Consolationis) : Iv.5-7, V / Boethius.
Warminster: Aris and Phillips.
Edited with an introduction, translations and commentaries by Robert
W. Sharples.
———. 1933. Traité Du Destin. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Albert
Yon.
Schallenberg, Magnus. 2008. Freiheit Und Determinismus. Ein
Philosophischer Kommentar Zu Ciceros Schrift De Fato. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter.
Cicero. 1963. De Fato. Über Das Fatum. Lateinisch-Deutsch.
München: Heimeran-Verlag.
Herausgegeben von Karl Bayer.
———. 1923. De Senectute; De Amicitia; De Divinatione. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation by William
Armistead Falconer.
———. 1988. Cato Maior De Senectute. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Edited with introduction and commentary, by J.G.F. Powell.
———. 1989. Caton L'ancien (De La Vieillesse). Paris: Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Pierre
Wuilleumier.
———. 1998. Cato Maior De Senectute = Cato Der Ältere Über Das
Alter. Lateinisch-Deutsch. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Übersetzt und herausgegeben von Harald Merklin.
———. 1972. De Senectute. Paris: Bordas.
440
Texte présenté, annoté et commenté par Michel Ruch.
———. 1990. On Friendship and the Dream of Scipio. Warminster:
Arts and Phillips.
Edited with an introduction, translations and commentaries by Jonathan
G. F. Powell.
———. 1965. Laelius; De Amicita Dialogus. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Mit einem Kommentar hrsg. von Moritz Seyffert.
2. Auflage besorgt von C.F.W. Müller: reprografischer Nachdruck der
Ausgabe Leipzig, 1876.
Steinmetz, Fritz-Arthur. 1967. Die Freundschaftslehre Des Panaitos.
Nach Einer Analyse Von Ciceros Laelius De Amicitia. Wiesbaden: F.
Steiner.
Cicero. 1913. De Officiis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation by Walter
Miller.
———. 1967. On Moral Obligation. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
A new translation of Cicero's De officiis, with introduction and notes,
by John Higginbotham.
———. 1991. On Duties. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Edited and translated by Miriam T. Griffin and E. Margaret Atkins.
———. 1994. De Officiis. New York: Oxford University Press.
Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Michael
Winterbottom.
Dyck, Andrew R. 1996. A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan.
Cicero. 2001. On Obligations. New York: Oxford Univeristy Press.
Translated with an introduction and notes by Patrick Gerald Walsh.
———. 1965. Les Devoirs. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Maurice
Testard.
2 volumes: 1 (1965); 2 (1970).
———. 1995. De Officiis. Index Verborum, Listes De Fréquence,
Relevés Grammaticaux. Liège: C.I.P.L.,.
Par Catherine Kinapenne.
———. 2008. De Officiis = Vom Pflichtgemässen Handel. Lateinisch-
441
Deutsch. Düsseldorf: Artemis und Winkler.
Herausgegeben und übersetzt von Rainer Nickel.
B) RHETORIC:
Cicero. 1949. De Inventione; De Optimo Genere Oratorum; Topica.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation by Harry
Mortimer Hubbell.
———. 1994. De L'invention. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Guy
Achard.
———. 1998. De Inventione = Über Die Auffindung Des Stoffes ; De
Optimo Genere Oratorum = Über Die Beste Gattung Von Rednern.
Düsseldorf: Artemis und Winkler.
Lateinisch-Deutsch. Herausgegeben und übersetzt von Theodor
Nüsslein.
———. 1902. Rhetorica, Tomus I: Libros De Oratore Tres Continens.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis. Recognovit brevique
adnotatione critica instrvxit A. S. Wilkins.
———. 1948. De Oratore [and De Fato; Paradoxa Stoicorum; De
Partitione Oratoria]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Contents: I. De Oratore, Books 1-2, Latin text
with an English translation by Edwad William Sutton, completed with
an introduction by Harris Rackham; II. De Oratore, Book 3. De Fato,
Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria, with an English
translation by Harris Rackham.
———. 2001. Cicero on the Ideal Orator (De Oratore). New York:
Translated, with introduction, notes, appendixes, glossary, and indexes
by James M. May, Jakob Wisse.
———. 2008. L'orateur. Du Meilleur Genre D'orateurs. Paris: Belles
Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Albert
Yon.
———. 1985. De Oratore Libri Iii. Kommentar. Heidelberg: Winter.
Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen
442
Schriftstellern. Kommentar von Anton D. Leeman, Harm Pinkster.
Band 1: Buch I, 1-65 (A. D. Leeman, H. Pinkster, Hein L. Nelson,
Edwin Rabbie, 1993); Band 2: Buch I, 166-265, Buch II, 1-98 (A. D.
Leeman, H. Pinkster, Hein L. Nelson, Edwin Rabbie, 1985); Band 3:
Buch II, 99-290 (A. D. Leeman, H. Pinkster, Hein L. Nelson, Edwin
Rabbie, 1989); Band 4: Buch II, 291-367 /Buch III, 1-95 (A. D.
Leeman, H. Pinkster, J. Wisse, H. L. Nelson, E. Rabbie, 1996).
———. 2007. De Oratore = Über Den Redner. Düsseldorf: Artemis &
Winkler.
Lateinisch-Deutsch. Herausgegeben und übersetzt von Theodor
Nüsslein.
———. 1903. Rhetorica, Tomus Ii: Brvtvs; Orator; De Optimo Genere
Oratorvm; Partitiones Oratoriae; Topica. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis. Recognovit brevique
adnotatione critica instrvxit August Samuel Wilkins.
———. 1962. Brutus; Orator. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Loeb Classical Library. Latin text and English translation by George
Lincoln Hendrickson ( Brutus) and Harry Mortimer Hubbell ( Orator).
———. 1981. Brutus. Freiburg: Ploetz.
Lateinisch-Deutsch. Textbearbeitung, Einleitung und erklärendes
Verzeichnis der Eigennamen von Karl Barwick.
———. 1885. Ad M. Brutum Orator. Cambridge: Cambridge
Unviersity Press.
A revised text with introductory essays and critical and explanatory
notes by John Edwin Sandys.
———. 1907. Ad M. Brutum Orator. Lipsia: G. Teubner.
Bibliotheca Scriptorvm Graecorvm Et Romanorvm Tevbneriana.
Recognovit Wilhelm Friedrich.
———. 2003. Topica. New York: Oxford University Press.
Edited with an introduction, translation, and commentary by Tobias
Reinhardt.
———. 1924. Divisions De L'art Oratoire, Topiques. Paris: Belles
Lettres.
Collection des universités de France. Texte établi et traduit par Henri
443
Bornecque.
———. 1983. Topik. Lateinisch-Deutsch. Hamburg: F. Meiner.
Übersetz und mit einer Einleitung herausgegeben von Hans Günter
Zekl.
LEXICA
Hugo Meguet. Lexikon zu den Philosophischen Schriften Cicero's mit
Angabe sämtlicher Stellen, Jena: G. Fischer, 1887 (3 volls.) reprint:
Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1987.
———. Lexikon zu den Reden des Cicero mit Angabe sämtlicher
Stellen, Jena: H. Duft, 1877-1884 (4 volls.) reprint: Hildesheim, Georg
Olms, 2005.
———. Handelexicon zu Cicero, Leipzig: T. Weicher, 1905, reprint:
Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 2005. 1962.
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The Philosophical Works of Cicero. A

Selected Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF STUDIES ON CICERO'S
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS
Albrecht, Michael von. 2003. Cicero's Style: A Synopsis. Leiden: Brill.
Followed by Selected Analytic Studies.
André, Jean-Marie. 1977. La Philosophie À Rome. Paris: Presses
Univeristaires de France.
Chapitre 2 Cicéron créateur de la philosophie latine, pp. 50-101.
Aubert, Sophie. 2008. "Cicéron Et La Parole Stoïcienne: Polémique
Autour De La Dialectique." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no.
57:61-91.
"In many passages, Cicero analyzes Stoic language in a precise, though
polemical, way. Since a syllogistic style coexists with a more abundant
one in the same speech, he wholly discredits Stoic rhetoric and declares
that the philosophers of the Porch only possess one way of expressing
themselves, the dialectical one, whose validity he contests both in the
practice of philosophy, which he thinks is ineffective, and in the field
of oratory, because such a style is fundamentally inappropriate to every
possible audience. In De Oratore, Crassus analyzes Stoic philosophical
expression from a rhetorical point of view, whereas he studies
445
Academic and Peripatetic philosophical eloquence without examining
if it would suit an orator. In Brutus, the eponymous character insists on
the so-called unity and homogeneity of Stoic eloquence, both in Athens
and in Rome, in philosophical conversations and in forensic,
deliberative or encomiastic speeches. The description of Diogenes of
Babylon's style by Antony confirms that Stoic language is restricted to
dialectic, and thus unable to delight, to move or even to teach. It is also
dry, obscure (because of a constant gap between res and uerba), useless
as far as invention and topics are concerned, and above all, self-
destructive. However, Stoic dialectic did have a heuristic function, and
not only a defensive or an agonistic one."
Auvray-Assayas, Clara. 2006. Cicéron. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Auvray-Assayas, Clara, and Delattre, Daniel, eds. 2001. Cicéron Et
Philodème. La Polémique En Philosophie. Paris: Rue d'Ulm.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1997. "Logic in Academica I and the Lucullus." In
Assent and Argument. Studies in Cicero Academic Books, edited by
Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 140-160. Leiden: Brill.
Benardete, Seth. 1987. "Cicero's De Legibus I. Its Plan and Intention."
Cicero adds rhetoric to the usual tripartition of philosophy into ethics,
physics, and dialectic.
Blyth, Dougal. 2010. "Cicero and Philosophy as Text." Classical
Journal no. 106:71-98.
"Philosophy for Cicero implies not only a way of life taught orally in a
school but also reading and writing. This foreshadows his influence on
the later Latin tradition, which identified philosophy with the meaning
and evaluation of texts, and ultimately replaced its conception as an
autonomous way of life. I propose four factors in Cicero's influence:
initiating the tradition of Latin philosophical prose; developing its
vocabulary; the choice of a rhetorical over a dialectical mode; and
locating discussion in the context of libraries, reading and book
production."
Boyancé, Pierre. 1971. "Cicéron Et Les Parties De La Philosophie."
Revues des Études Grecques no. 49:127-154.
Brignoli, Fernando. 1957. "Le Parole Greche Nelle Opere Di
Cicerone." In Studi Ciceroniani, 101-162. Napoli: Armanni.
Buckley, Michael J. 1970. "Philosophic Method in Cicero." Journal of
446
the History of Philosophy no. 8:143-154.
"The two moments of Cicero's methodology are invention and
judgment, the discovery of things or arguments or symbols and their
consequent testing, criticism or verification. His dialogues provide
both, not by moving dialectically from oppositions to an assimilation of
lesser truths into the greater, but by the perspectival discrimination of
scientific formulations into their diverse frames of reference and
uniting them into irreducible controversy. Controversy constitutes the
universal method, and its product is probabilities. The rhetorical is
distinguished from the philosophic as this single method is brought to
bear upon particular cases (causae) or universal questions
(quaestiones). The four aristotelian questions of inquiry transpose into
the four questions of controversy, queries about facts, symbols, kinds,
and pragmatic consequences. An example of their structural usage is
found in Cicero's treatment of the gods."
Burkert, Walter. 1965. "Cicero Als Platoniker Und Skeptiker."
Gymnasium no. 72:175-200.
Clark, Mark Edward, and Ruebel, James S. 1975. "Philosophy and
Rhetoric in Cicero's Pro Milone." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie
no. 128:57-72.
Clausen, Marion. 2008. Maxima in Sensibus Veritas? - Die
Platonischen Und Stoischen Grundlagen Der Erkenntniskritik in
Ciceros Lucullus. Bern: Peter Lang.
Cole, Thomas A. 1997. "Canonicity and Multivalence: The Case of
Cicero." In The Rhetoric Canon, edited by Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 33-
45. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Colish, Marcia. 1985. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early
Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill.
Vol. I: Stoicism in Classical Latin literature (1985); Vol. II: Stoicism in
Christian Latin thought through the Sixth century (1990).
See Vol. I, Chapter Two: Cicero pp. 61-158.
D'Onofrio, Giulio. 2002. "Il Parricidio Di Cicerone. Le Metamorfosi
Della Verità Tra Gli Academica Ciceroniani E Il Contra Academicos
Di Agostino (Lettura Di Testi),." In Enosis Kai Philia - Unione E
Amicizia. Omaggio a Francesco Romano, edited by Barbanti, Maria,
Giardina, Giovanna R. and Manganaro, Paolo, 207-236. Catania:
CUECM.
447
"Studies the evolution from Cicero's probabilism, through its rejection
by Lactantius, for whom only Christianity can supply the indubitable
truths required by philosophy; to Augustine's Academici. The ignorance
of ultimate truth which, for Cicero, is the end result of philosophy, is
for Augustine only the starting-point. Truth, being divine, is superior to
the human mind, and can be known to us only through divine self-
revelation."
Douglas, Alan Edward. 1965. "Cicero the Philosopher." In Cicero,
edited by Dorey, Thomas Alan, 135-170. London: Routledge.
———. 1968. Cicero. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1973. "The Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorica. A
Study in Method." In Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt,
Teil I: Von Den Anfängen Roms Bis Zum Ausgang Der Republik, Band
3: Sprache Und Literatur (1. Jahrunderth V. Chr.), edited by
Temporini, Hildegard, 95-138. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Dross, Juliette. 2010. Voir La Philosophie. Les Représentations De La
Philosophie À Rome. Rhétorique Et Philosophie, De Cicéron À Marc
Aurèle. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Englert, Walter. 1990. "Bringing Philosophy to the Light: Cicero's
Paradoxa Stoicorum." Apeiron no. 23:117-142.
"In the Paradoxa Stoicorum Cicero tried unsuccessfully to bridge the
gap that he saw between learned and philosophical discourse on the one
hand, and popular discourse on the other. There is a tension in the work
between this aim and the form he employed, the commonplace. Cicero
learned from this experiment, and the Paradoxa was an important step
in his philosophical and literary development."
Erskine, Andrew. 2003. "Cicero and the Shaping of Hellenistic
Philosophy." Hermathena:5-15.
"Cicero stands closest in time to the lost works of the Hellenistic
philosophers, and his are the first substantial philosophical writings to
survive since the days of Aristotle. As a result Cicero has done much to
shape the way in which we think about the Hellenistic philosophers. In
his Tusculan disputations and in De officiis Cicero confronted problems
of his own and looked to Greek philosophy for solutions. Cicero was no
doxographer putting together tidy summaries; he was a man with strong
opinions who turned Hellenistic philosophy into what he wanted it to
be."
448
Ferguson, John. 1962. "Cicero's Contribution to Philosophy." In Studies
in Cicero, edited by Ferguson, John, 99-111. Rome: Centro di Studi
Ciceroniani.
———, ed. 1962. Studies in Cicero. Rome: Centro di Studi
Ciceroniani.
Contents: John Ferguson: Preface 7; John Ferguson: Some Ancient
Judgments of Cicero 11; LLoyd A. Thompson: Cicero the Politician 37;
John Ferguson: The Religion of Cicero 83; John Ferguson: Cicero's
Contribution to Philosophy 99; Arthur R. Hands: Humour and Vanity
in Cicero 115; W.A. Ladlaw: Cicero and the Arts 129-142.
Fortenbaugh, William W. 1989. "Cicero's Knowledge of the Rhetorical
Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus." In Cicero's Knowledge of the
Peripatos, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and Steinmetz, Peter,
39-60. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
———. 1998. "Cicero, on Invention 1.51-77 Hypothetical Syllogistic
and the Early Peripatetics." Rhetorica.A Journal of the History of
Rhetoric no. 16:25-46.
"In On Invention, Cicero discusses both induction and deduction. In
regard to the latter, Cicero presents a controversy between those who
advocate a five-part analysis of deductive reasoning and those who
prefer three parts. The issue is not practical or pedagogical, but
conceptual in nature. Cicero himself prefers analysis into five parts, and
rather confusingly he presents the argument of the advocates of five
parts as if it were his own. The argument is striking in that it makes
elaborate use of mixed hypothetical syllogisms in order to argue for
five parts. Cicero claims that the five-part analysis has been preferred
by all who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus. A survey of
what Theophrastus is reported to have said concerning the hypothetical
syllogism renders Cicero's claim intelligible. That is not to say that
Theophrastus himself advocated a five-part analysis. Most likely the
association with him derives from his known interest in hypothetical
syllogistic. Later rhetoricians who identified themselves with the
Peripatos made the cormection with the founders of the school, thereby
gaining authority for a controversial analysis."
———. 2005. "Cicero as a Reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean
Rhetorical Doctrine." Rhetorica.A Journal of the History of Rhetoric
no. 13:37-64.
449
"This article is based on a general principle: the study of a fragmentary
author should begin with a study of the sources. The particular subject
is Cicero as a source for Theophrastus' rhetorical doctrine. The works
On Invention, On the Orator and Orator are considered one after the
other. The reliability of Cicero is tested by comparing what is said
about Aristotle with what we read in the existing Rhetoric. Grounds for
caution will be found. In the case of Theophrastus, we shall discover
that Cicero does have value as a source, but his value should not be
overstated. The reports are often quite general and sometimes they
involve Ciceronian additions."
Fortenbaugh, William W., and Steinmetz, Peter, eds. 1989. Cicero's
Knowledge of the Peripatos. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Contents: Note on Contributors XI; List of Cicero's Philosophical
Works XIII-XVII; J. G. F. Powell: Introduction: Cicero's Philosophical
Works and their Background 1; 1. A. A. Long: Cicero's Plato and
Aristotle 37; 2. Malcolm Schofield: Cicero's Definition of Res Publica
63; 3. Woldemar Görler: Silencing the Troublemaker: De Legibus 1.39
and the Continuity of Cicero's Scepticism 85; 4. John Glucker:
Probabile, Veri Simile, and Related Terms 115 5. Michael C. Stokes:
Cicero on Epicurean Pleasures 145; 6. M. R. Wright: Cicero on Self-
Love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 3 171; 7. A. E. Douglas:
Form and Content in the Tusculan Disputations 197; 8. Stephen A.
White: Cicero and the Therapists 219; 9. R. W. Sharples: Causes and
Necessary Conditions in the Topica and De Fato 247; 10. J. G. F.
Powell: Cicero's Translations from Greek 273; 11. Philippa R. Smith:
'A Self-indulgent misuse of leisure and writing'? How Not to Write
Philosophy: Did Cicero Get It Right? 301; 12. Miriam T. Griffin:
Philosophical Badinage in Cicero's Letters to his Friends 325; Indexes
347-360.
Fox, Matthew. 2007. Cicero's Philosophy of History. New York:
Gaines, Robert N. 2002. "Cicero's Partitiones Oratoriae and Topica:
Rhetorical Philosophy and Philosophical Rhetoric." In Brill´S
Companion to Cicero. Oratory and Rhetoric, edited by May, James M.,
445-480. Leiden: Brill.
Gantar, Kajetan. 1995. "Cicero Über Die Anfänge Der Philosophie in
Rom." Wiener Humanistische Blätter:45-58.
450
Sonderheft zur Philosophie der Antike.
Gawlick, Gunther. 1956. Untersuchungen Zu Ciceros Philosophischer
Methode.
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Kiel).
Gawlick, Gunther, and Görler, Woldemar. 1994. "Cicero." In
Grundriss Der Geschichte Der Philosophie. Die Philosophie Der
Antike Band Iv: Die Hellenistische Philosophie, edited by Flashar,
Helmut, 991-1168. Basel: Schwabe.
Begründet von Friedrich Ueberweg.
Gersh, Stephen. 1986. Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin
Tradition. Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press.
See Vol. I Chapter 1, Cicero pp. 53-154.
Gigon, Olof. 1973. "Cicero Und Die Griechische Philosophie." In
Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Teil I: Von Den
Anfängen Roms Bis Zum Ausgang Der Republik, Band 4: Philosophie
Und Wissenschaften, edited by Temporini, Hildegard, 226-261. Berlin:
de Gruyter.
———. 2011. "Cicero Und Aristoteles." Hermes no. 87:143-162.
Gildenhard, Gingo. 2011. The Construction of Reality in Cicero's
Speeches. New York: Oxford University Press.
Glucker, John. 1988. "Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations." In The
Question of "Eclecticism". Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, edited by
Dillon, John M. and Long, Anthony Arthur, 34-69. Berkeley:
———. 1992. "Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations Again." Liverpool
Classical Monthly no. 17:134-138.
Görler, Woldemar. 1974. Untersuchungen Zu Ciceros Philosophie.
Heidelberg: C. Winter.
———. 1988. "From Athens to Tusculum: Reconsidering the
Background of Cicero's De Oratore." Rhetorica no. 6:215-235.
Reprinted in: W. Görler, Kleine Schriften zur hellenistisch-römischen
Philosophie, edited by Christoph Catrein, Philosophia Antiqua, XCV,
Leiden:Brill, 2004, pp. 172-192.
———. 1989. "Cicero Und Die 'Schule Des Aristoteles'." In Cicero's
Knowledge of the Peripatos, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and
Steinmetz, Peter, 246-262. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
451
"Cicero is well acquainted with Peripatetic philosophers from
Theophrastus up to his own time. But he does not approve of their
philosophical tenets and quotes them but rarely. Some general
conclusions may be drawn as to Cicero's reliability as a "source
author": Wherever Cicero cites his authority he may be trusted. More
often, however, his statements about Greek philosophers (given in
vague and general terms) are thoroughly tinged with his own
philosophical convictions. Verbatim quotations of Greek 'sources' are
to be found only where Cicero says so, explicitly. All other passages
are of his own wording and should not be regarded as 'fragments'."
———. 1990. "Antiochos Von Askalon Über Die "Alten" Und Über
Die Stoa: Beobachtungen Zu Cicero, Academici Posteriores 1,24-43."
In Beiträge Zur Hellenistischen Literatur Und Ihrer Rezeption in Rom,
edited by Steinmetz, Peter, 123-139. Stuttgart: Steiner.
———. 1997. "Cicero's Philosophical Stance in the Lucullus." In
Assent and Argument. Studies in Cicero' Academic Books, edited by
Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 36-57. Leiden: Brill.
Gorman, Robert. 2005. The Socratic Method in the Dialogues of
Cicero. Wiesbaden: Franz steiner.
Gotter, Ulrich. 1996. "Der Platonismus Ciceros Und Die Krise Der
Republik." In Hellenismus. Beiträge Zur Erforschung Von
Akkulturation Und Politischer Ordnung in Den Staaten Des
Hellenistischen Zeitalters, edited by Funck, Bernd, 543-559. Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Gottschalk, Hans B. 1987. "Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman
World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century Ad."
In Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt. Tel Ii: Teilband:
Philosophie (Platonismus, [Forts.]; Aristotelismus) Band 36:
452
Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik, edited by Haase, Wolfgang,
1079-1174. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Revised reprint in: R. Sorabji (ed.) - Aristotle transformed. The Ancient
Commentators and their Influence (London, Duckworth, 1990), pp. 55-
81.
Guazzoni Foà, Virginia. 1958. "La Terminologia Filosofica
Ciceroniana." Giornale di Metafisica no. 13:225-242.
Guérin, Charles. 2009. Persona. L'élaboration D'une Notion
Rhétorique Au Ier Siècle Av. J.-C. Paris: Vrin.
Volume I: Antécédents grecs et première rhétorique latine (2009);
Volume II: Théorisation cicéronienne de la persona oratoire (2011).
Hartung, Hans-Joachim. 1970. Ciceros Methode Bei Der Übersetzung
Griechischer Philosophischer Termini. Hamburg.
Hirzel, Rudolf. 1877. Untersuchungen Zu Ciceros Philosophischen
Schriften. Leipzig: S. Hirzel.
Vol. 1: 1. De natura deorum (1877); Vol. 2.1/2: De finibus. De officiis
(1882); Vol. 3: Academica priora. Tusculanae disputationes (1883).
Horsley, Richard A. 1978. "The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero."
Harvard Theological Review no. 71:35-59.
" Philo is the first to use the Greek expression nomos tes phuseos
frequently, but the same idea occurs earlier in Cicero. Both Philo and
Cicero drew on a Stoic tradition, which was part of a broad movement
of social-political philosophy. Antiochus of Ascalon, head of the
Academy in the early first century B.C., was the key figure and the
thinker upon whom Cicero and, probably, Philo depend. The Christian
idea of natural law and the philosophical rationalization of Roman law
derive from the transcendent conception of the law of nature."
Huby, Pamela. 1988. "Boethius Vindicates Cicero as a Logician."
Liverpool Classical Monthly no. 13:60-61.
———. 1989. "Cicero's Topics and Its Peripatetic Sources." In Cicero's
Knowledge of the Peripatos, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and
Steinmetz, Peter, 61-76. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
"What is the origin of the list of Topics in Cicero's Topics and other
works? Aristotle's primarily dialectical topics were transferred to
rhetoric and law, and Cicero's inept treatment suggests a Greek original
designed for different purposes. The fifth-century Martianus Capella
has a similar list and, separately, some propositional logic identical
453
with that embedded in Cicero's list. Both may have a post-Chrysippean
Stoic original. Boethius claims to give a list of topics from Themistius,
but that is confused. Cicero's account of what a topic is may come from
Theophrastus, but his sources are many."
Inwood, Brad, and Mansfeld, Jaap, eds. 1997. Assent and Argument.
Studies in Cicero's Academic Books. Leiden: Brill.
Proceedings of the 7th Symposium Hellenisticum (Utrecht, August 21-
25, 1995).
Johanson, Carmen, and Londey, David. 1988. "Cicero on Propositions:
Academica Ii.95." Mnemosyne no. 41:325-342.
Jones, David Mervyn. 1959. "Cicero as a Translator." Bulletin of the
Institute of Classical Studies no. 6:22-34.
Leonhardt, Jünger. 1999. Ciceros Kritik Der Philosophenschulen.
München: C. H. Beck.
Lévy, Carlos. 1984. "La Dialectique De Cicéron Dans Les Livres Ii Et
Iv Du De Finibus." Revues des Études Latines no. 62:111-127.
———. 1985. "Cicéron Et La Quatrième Académie." Revues des
Études Latines no. 63:32-41.
———. 1989. "Le De Officiis Dans L'oeuvre Philosophique De
Cicéron." Vita latina no. 116:10-16.
———. 1992. "Cicéron Créateur Du Vocabulaire Latin De La
Connaissance: Essay De Synthèse." In La Langue Latine Langue De La
Philosophie, 91-106. Palais Farnèse: École française de Rome.
"La création par Cicéron du vocabulaire philosophique latin a été un
acte d'une grande audace intellectuelle, à l'égard duquel Atticus et
Varron ont d'abord été très réservés, pour des raisons à la fois
culturelles et philosophiques. C'est l'élaboration dans les Académiques
d'une terminologie fort complexe, destinée à rendre les concepts
gnoséologiques stoïciens et académiciens, qui a renforcé la confiance
que Cicéron a toujours eue dans les possibilités philosophiques de la
langue latine. L'étude de ce vocabulaire (epoché, katalepton,
sugkatathesis, ennoia, prolepsis) montre que, si le principal souci de
Cicéron était de concilier précision et uarietas, il a néanmoins exprimé,
par son choix ou sa création de certains termes, une vision du monde
qui ne coïncidait pas nécessairement avec celle des philosophes grecs.
La construction du concept de "probalble" à partir du pithanon et de
l'eulogon confirme à quel point cette démarche aura été féconde."
454
———. 1992. Cicero Academicus. Recherches Sur Les "Académiques"
Et Sur La Philosophie Cicéronienne. Rome: École française de Rome.
———. 1996. "Doxographie Et Philosophie Chez Cicéron." In Le
Concept De Nature À Rome. La Physique, edited by Lévy, Carlos, 109-
123. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure.
———. 1997. "Les Titres Des Oeuvres Philosophiques De Cicéron." In
Titres Et Articulations Du Texte Dans L'antiquité, edited by Fredouille,
Jean-Claude, 191-207. Paris: Études augustiniennes.
———. 2000. "Cicéron Critique De L'éloquence Stoïcienne." In
Papers on Rhetoric. Vol Iii, edited by Calboli Montefusco, Lucia, 127-
144. Bologna: CLUEB.
———. 2008. "Cicéron, Le Moyen Platonisme Et La Philosophie
Romaine: À Propos De La Naissance Du Concept Latin De Qualitas."
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 57:5-20.
"Cicero held a complex position towards Middle Platonism. His
masters, Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, each in his own
way, had used elements which were to influence the emergence of this
kind of thought. As for him, who inherited both of these teachings, he
defines himself as a rigorous New Academic, but his work includes
most of the ingredients usually considered as the theoretical core of
Middle Platonism. The invention of qualitas has much to do with this
situation. Apparently, this word is the exact equivalent of Stoic poiotés
however, it is original insofar as it does not refer any more to the Stoic
theory of principles, since the active power acting on matter is not
identified with the pneuma any more. As he identifies qualitas with the
qualified object, Cicero, through Antiochus-Varro, leaves room to the
hypothesis that the world may not have a material origin."
Liscu, Marin O. 1930. Étude Sur La Langue De La Philosophie Morale
Chez Cicéron. Paris: Belles Lettres.
———. 1937. L'éxpression Des Idées Philosophiques Chez Cicéron.
Paris: Belles Lettres.
Long, Anthony Arthur. 1995. "Cicero's Plato and Aristotle." In Cicero
the Philosopher. Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G.F., 37-
61. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reprinted in: A. A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in
Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, New York, Oxford University
Press, 2006, pp. 285-306.
455
MacKendrick, Paul. 1989. The Philosophical Books of Cicero. London:
Duckworth.
With the collaboration of Karen Lee Singh.
Mancal, Josef. 1982. Untersuchungen Zum Begriff Der Philosophie Bei
M. Tullius Cicero. München: W. Fink.
Marinone, Nino. 2004. Cronologia Ciceroniana. Bologna: Patron.
Second edition updated and corrected by Ermanno Malaspina (also
available in CD-ROM).; First edition: Roma: Centro di studi
ciceroniani, 1997.
Maso, Stefano. 2008. Capire E Dissentire. Cicerone E La Filosofia Di
Epicuro. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
May, James M., ed. 2002. Brill´S Companion to Cicero. Oratory and
Rhetoric. Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Preface IX; List of Contributors XI; 1. James M. May:
Cicero: His Life and Career 1; 2. Anthony Corbeill: Rhetorical
Education in Cicero's Youth 23; 3. James M. May: Ciceronian Oratory
in Context 49; 4. Ann Vasaly: Cicero's Early Speeches 71; 5. Robert
W. Cape, Jr.: Cicero's Consular Speeches 113; 6. Andrew M. Riggsby:
The Post Reditum Speeches 159; 7. Anthony Corbeill: Ciceronian
Invective 197; 8. Harold C. Gotoff: Cicero's Caesarian Orations 219; 9.
Jon Hall: The Philippics 273; 10. Jane W. Crawford: The Lost and
Fragmentary Orations 305; 11. Jakob Wisse: The Intellectual
Background of Cicero's Rhetorical Works 331; 12. Jakob Wissse: De
Oratore: Rhetoric, Philosophy, and the Making of the Ideal Orator 375;
13. Emanuele NarduccI: (translated by the Editor): Brutus: The History
of Roman Eloquence 401; 14. Emanuele NarduccI: (translated by the
Editor): Orator and the Definition of the Ideal Orator 427; 15. Robert
N. Gaines: Cicero's Partitiones Oratoriae and Topica: Rhetorical
Philosophy and Philosophical Rhetoric 445; 16. George A. Kennedy:
Cicero's Oratorical and Rhetorical Legacy 481; 17. Christopher P.
Craig: A Survey of Selected Recent Work on Cicero's
Rhetorica and Speeches 503; Christopher P. Craig: Bibliography 533;
General Index 601; Index Locorum 622-632.
———. 2007. "Cicero as Rhetorician." In A Companion to Roman
Rhetoric, edited by Dominik, William and Hall, Jon, 250-263.
Blackwell.
McKeon, Richard. 1950. "Introduction to the Philosophy of Cicero." In
456
Brutus. On the Nature of the Gods. On Divination. On Duties, 1-65.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1966. "The Methods of Rhetoric and Philosophy: Invention
and Judgment." In The Classical Tradition. Literary and Historical
Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan, edited by Wallach, Luitpold, 365-
373. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Reprinted as Chapter 6 in: R. McKeon, Selected Writings of Richard
McKeon. Vol. 2:: Culture, Education, and the Arts, edited by Zahava
K. MacKeon and William G. Swenson, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 2005, pp. 97-103.
Merguet, Hugo. 1961. Lexikon Zu Den Philosophischen Schriften
Cicero's. Mit Angabe Samtlicher Stellen. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Original edition in three volumes Jean, 1887-1894.
Michel, Alain. 1962. Le 'Dialogue Des Orateurs' De Tacite Et La
Philosophie De Cicéron. Paris: Klincksieck.
———. 1968. "Ciceron Et Les Paradoxes Stoiciens." Acta Antiqua
Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae no. 16:223-232.
———. 1973. "Rhétorique Et Philosophie Dans Les Traités De
Cicéron." In Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Römischen Welt, Teil I: Von
Den Anfängen Roms Bis Zum Ausgang Der Republik, Band 3: Sprache
Und Literatur (I. Jahrundert V. Chr.), edited by Temporini, Hildegard,
———. 1982. "La Théorie De La Rhétorique Chez Cicéron: Éloquence
Et Philosophie." In Éloquence Et Rhétorique Chez Cicéron. Sept
Exposés Suivis De Discussions, edited by Ludwig, Walther, 109-147.
Genève: Fondation Hardt.
———. 1992. "Cicéron Et La Langue Philosophique: Problèmes
D'éthique Et D'esthétique." In La Langue Latine Langue De La
Philosophie. Palais Farnèse: École française de Rome.
Actes du colloque organisé per l'École française de Rome avec le
concours de l'Universitém de Rome "La Sapienza" (Rome, 17-19 mai
1990).
"La philosophie morale joue un rôle dominant dans la pensée de
Cicéron. On a reproché à la langue qu'il emploie l'imprécision,
l'équivoque et le manque de personnalité; on a souligné que le latin se
prêtait mal à la transcription d'enseignements grecs. En réalité, la
démarche de l'orateur est originale, fondée sur la mise en relation de la
457
rhétorique, de la philosophie et de la romanité (dialogue et
doxographie, langage et mores, esthétique et sagesse). Ainsi
apparaissent, autour de la notion d'humanitas, un certain nombre de
termes qui resteront fondamentaux jusqu'à notre temps."
———. 2003. Les Rapports De La Rhétorique Et De La Philosophie
Dans L'oeuvre De Cicéron. Louvain: Peeters.
Deuxième édition avec une Appendice 1960-2002 (pp. 741-753).
Première édition: Paris, 1960.
Moreschini, Claudio. 1979. "Osservazioni Sul Lessico Filosofico Di
Cicerone." Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa.Classe di
Lettere e Filosofia no. 9:99-178.
"L'esame della terminologia filosofica di Cicerone non seguirà il più
comune e più noto ordine della tripartizione stoica (logica - fisica -
etica), bensì quello che Cicerone stesso si è dato nel proemio al
secondo libro del De divinatione, e su cui si è opportunamente
soffermato P. Boyancé (1), e precisamente: problema della conoscenza
(Academica), etica (De finibus e Tusculanae), fisica (De natura
deorum, De divinatione, De fato); la logica, in particolare il suo aspetto
di quaestio perÌ dunaton, si ricollega al De fato. Sarebbe, questo, un
ordine che rispecchierebbe la successione di Antioco di Ascalona,
secondo il quale l'etica precederebbe la fisica." p. 103.
(1) Cf. P. Boyancé, Cicéron et les parties de la philosophie, Revue des
Études Latines, XLIX, 1971, 127-154.
Muchnova, Dagmar. 1980. "Veritas Dans Les Traités Philosophiques
De Marcus Tullius Cicéron." Graecolatina Pragensia no. 8:41-51.
"L'examen des synonymes et antonymes et l'analyse de l'emploi de
veritas, surtout du point de vue sémantique, montrent que Cicéron a
contribué à la diffusion de ce terme, ainsi qu'à celle du mot verum, et
qu'il les a enrichis d'un sens philosophique."
Muller, Philippe. 1990. Cicéron, Un Philospphe Pour Notre Temps.
Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme.
Poncelet, Roland. 1957. Cicéron Traducteur De Platon. L'expression
De La Pensée Complexe En Latin Classique. Paris: De Boccard.
Powell, Jonathan G.F., ed. 1995. Cicero the Philosopher. Twelve
Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1995. "Cicero's Translations from Greek." In Cicero the
Philosopher. Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G.F., 273-300.
458
———. 2007. "Cicero." In Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 Bc - 200
Ad. Vol. Ii, edited by Sharples, Robert W. and Sorabji, Richard, 333-
345. London: Institute of Classical Studies.
Radford, Robert T. 2002. Cicero. A Study in the Origins of Republican
Philosophy. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Rawson, Elizabeth. 1978. "The Introduction of Logical Organisation in
Roman Prose Literature." Papers of the British School at Rome no.
46:12-34.
Reprinted in: E. Rawson, Roman Culture and Society: Collected
Papers, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 324-351.
———. 1983. Cicero. A Portrait. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Riposati, Benedetto. 1947. Studi Sui Topica Di Cicerone. Milano: Vita
e Pensiero.
———. 1985. "La Terminologia Logica Nelle Opere Retoriche Di
Cicerone." In Hommages À Henry Bardon, edited by Renard, Marcel
and Laurens, Pierre, 319-331. Bruxelles: Latomus.
Rosén, Hanna. 193. "The Mechanisms of Latin Nominalization and
Conceptualization in Historical View." In Aufstieg Und Niedergang
Der Römischen Welt, Teil Ii: Principat, Band 29.2: Sprache Und
Literatur (Sprachen Und Schriften), edited by Haase, Wolfgang, 178-
211. Berlin: de Gruyter.
See in particular: Specialized uses and names for nominal concepts:
Cicero's methods of innovation, pp. 204-209.
Rubinelli, Sara. 2009. Ars Topica. The Classical Technique of
Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero. Dordrecht: Springer.
Contents; Introduction by David S. Levene: Topoi in Their Rhetorical
Context XVII-XXII; Part I: The Creation of the Method of Topoi and
Its Characteristics. 1. Aristotle's Topics 3; 2. Dialectical and Rhetorical
Uses of Topoi 43; Part II: Topoi and Loci. 3. Cicero's Use of Locus in
De Inventione 93; 4.Cicero's List of Aristotelian Loci 111; Conclusion
145; Bibliography 149; Index of Concepts 155; Index of Passages 157-
160.
Ruch, Michel. 1995. Le Préambule Dans Les Oeuvres Philosophiques
De Cicéron. Essai Sur La Genèse Et L'art Du Dialogue. Strasbourg:
Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg.
Runia, David T. 1989. "Aristotle and Theophrastus Conjoined in the
459
Writings of Cicero." In Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos, edited by
Fortenbaugh, William W. and Steinmetz, Peter, 23-38. New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
"An analysis is given of the 16 passages in Cicero's rhetorical and
philosophical works where the names of Aristotle and Theophrastus are
mentioned together. Cicero joins them together so often (1) because of
his great interest in philosophical successions, and (2) because he
regards the encyclopedic research carried out in the early Peripatos as
an example to follow in his own attempt to present philosophy to a
Roman audience."
Schallenberg, Magnus. 2008. Freiheit Und Determinismus. Ein
Philosophischer Kommentar Zu Ciceros Schrift De Fato. Berlin: de
Gruyter.
Schenkeveld, Dirk M. 2001. "Philosophical Prose." In Handbook of
Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C.-A.D. 400, edited
by E., Porter Stanley, 195-264. Leiden: Brill.
Schmidt, Peter L. 1979. "Cicero's Place in Roman Philosophy: A Study
of His Prefaces." Classical Journal no. 74:115-127.
"Cicero's philosophical works represent two phases, the first from 56
B.C. to 51 when he wrote political philosophy as part of his active
involvement in public life, and the second from 46 to 43 when,
deprived of political influence by the course of events, he turned to
ethics. In the prefaces to the works of the second period, he presents
himself as motivated by a desire still to serve the state and by cultural
competition with his Greek models. His reluctance to endorse the views
of any one school was partly the result of his own sceptical leanings
and partly a didactic principle."
Schofield, Malcolm. 2002. "Cicero, Zeno of Citium, and the
Vocabulary of Philosophy." In Le Style De La Pensée. Recueil De
Textes En Hommage À Jacques Brunschwig, edited by Canto-Sperber,
Monique and Pierre, Pellegrin, 412-428. Paris: Belles Lettres.
Schrenk, Lawrence. 1994. "Cicero on Rhetoric and Philosophy:
Tusculan Disputations I." Ancient Philosophy no. 14:355-360.
Schütrumpf, Eckart. 1988. "Platonic Elements in the Structure of
Cicero De Oratore Book 1." Rhetorica no. 6:237-258.
Smethurst, Stanley Eric. 1957. "Cicero's Rhetorical and Philosophical
Works: A Bibliographical Survey." Classical World no. 51:1-4.
460
Second part: vol. 58 (1964), pp. 36-45; Third part: vol. 61 (1967), pp.
125-133.
Spahlinger, Lothar. 2005. Tulliana Simplicitas. Zu Form Und Funktion
Des Zitats in Den Philosophischen Dialogen Ciceros. Göttingen:
Strasburger, Hermann. 1990. Ciceros Philosophisches Spätwerk Als
Aufruf Gegen Die Herrschaft Caesars. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Striker, Gisela. 1995. "Cicero and Greek Philosophy." Harvard Studies
in Philology no. 97:53-61.
Süss, Wilhelm. 1966. Cicero: Eine Einführung in Seine
Philosophischen Schriften (Mit Ausschluss Der Staatsphilosophischen
Werke). Wiesbaden: Steiner.
Swain, Simon. 2002. "Bilingualism in Cicero? The Evidence of Code-
Switching." In Bilingualism in Ancient Society. Language Contact and
the Written Word, edited by Adams, J.N., Janse, Mark and Swain,
Simon, 128-168. New York: Oxford University Press.
"This chapter explores the problem of Roman Latin-Creek bilingualism
in the Late Republic. There is an abundance of evidence to show that
Romans at this time knew classical Greek literature well enough. Some
of them, like Cicero, knew key parts of it extremely well. Cicero
himself was able to compose Greek prose and verse and to deliver set
speeches in Greek before a Greek audience. No one would deny that he
could speak Greek well. It is a commonly held view that Cicero's peers
were fluent in Greek and regularly used it in conversation with each
other. There are, however, no grounds for the latter belief. This chapter
places Cicero's choices against the general background and function of
bilingualism in Rome."
Tarán, Leonardo. 1987. "Cicero's Attitude Towards Stoicism and
Skepticism in the De Natura Deorum." In Florilegium Colombianum.
Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, edited by Selig, Karl-Ludwig
and Somerville, Robert, 1-22. New York: Italica Press.
Reprinted in: L. Tarán, Collected Papers (1962-1999), Ledien, Brill,
2001, pp. 455-478.
Thorsrud, Harald. 2002. "Cicero on His Academic Predecessors: The
Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades." Journal of the History of
Watson, Gerald. 1971. "The Natural Law and Stoicism." In Problems in
461
Stoicism, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur. London: Athlone Press.
"The concept of natural law, although it had antecedents in Greek
philosophy, was first given general expression by the Stoics. It was
transmitted by Cicero to the Church Fathers and thence into medieval
and modern philosophy."
Wisse, Jakob. 2002. "De Oratore: Rhetoric, Philosophy, and the
Making of the Ideal Orator." In Brill´S Companion to Cicero. Oratory
and Rhetoric, edited by May, James M., 375-401. Leiden: Brill.
Wood, Neal. 1988. Cicero's Social and Political Thought. Berkeley:
RELATED PAGES
Critical Editions and Translations of the Philosophical Works of Cicero
462
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The Works of Boethius. Editions and

English Translations
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDES ABOUT THE
PHILOSOPHY OF BOETHIUS
Luca Obertello. Severino Boezio. Genova: Accademia Ligure di
Scienze e Lettere 1974. Vol. II: Bibliografia boeziana. Bibliografia
generale pp. 323
Joachim Gruber. Boethius 1925-1998 in: Lustrum. Internationale
Forschungsberichte aus deim Bereich des klassischen Altertums, 39,
1997 pp. 307-383 and 40, 1998 pp. 199-259 (see in particular the
Section C. Schriften zur Logik pp. 353-373, 117 titles).
Christophe Erismann. Originalité et latinité de la philosophie de Boèce.
Note bibliographique, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und
Theologie, 51, 2004 pp. 277–289.
John Marenbon, (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Boethius,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 311–339.
Joachim Gruber. Kommentar zu Boethius de Consolatione
Philosophiae. Berlin: de Gruyter 2006. Second fully revised and
extended edition (first edition 1978). Anhang. Systematische
Literaturverzeichnis pp. 409-444.
Phillips, Philip Edward. "Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius: A
463
Chronology and Selected Annotated Bibliography", in: A Companion
to Boethius in the Middle Ages, edited by Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr., and
Philip Edward Phillips, Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp. 551-589.
For more information see: John Magee and John Marenbon, Appendix:
Boethius' Works, in: John Marenbon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to
Boethius, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 303-310.
"This Appendix is designed as a user's guide to Boethius' works. It is divided
according to the four main spheres of his activity - (A) mathematical subjects;
(B) logic; (c) theology; (D) the Consolation - with additional sections on (E)
lost works and (F) works sometimes misattributed to him. For each work,
there is a very brief description, any questions over its authenticity and
completeness are considered and a dating given, where possible; the best
edition is cited (and any other useful ones) and details of translations and
commentaries given, where applicable."
BOETHIUS OPERA OMNIA IN THE PATROLOGIA

LATINA
Migne, Jacques Paul, ed. 1860. Manlii Severini Boethii opera omnia.
Paris: Garnier.
The editio princeps wa published at Venice in 1491-1492 and reprinted
1497-1499, 1523, 1536.
Other important editions are: Julianus Martianus Rota (only the logical
works, Venice 1543, 1547, 1559), and Henrichus Loritus Glareanus,
(Basel 1546, 1570).
The edition by Glareanus with the partial editions of Renatus Vallinus
(London 1656) and Pierre Cally (Paris 1680) were reproduced in
Jacques Paul Migne, Patrologia Latina vol. 63 and 64 (= PL).
Patrologia Latina vol. 63.
Contents:
N. of Columns:
555 - 562C Vita Operaque [Editor]
561 - 574D Vita Operaque. Testimonia Variorum De Boethio Et Ejus
Scriptis
464
579 - 870A De Consolatione Philosophiae
1079 - 1167A De Arithmetica Libri Duo
1307 - 1352C Euclidis Megarensis Geometriae Libri Duo ab A. M.
Severino Boethio Translati [opera spuria]
1352 - 1364D Liber De Geometria [opera spuria]
Patrologia Latina vol. 64.
Contents:
N. of Columns:
9A - 70D In Porphyrium Dialogi A Victorino Translati
71A - 158D Commentarii In Porphyrium A Se Translatum
159A - 294C In Categorias Aristotelis Libri Quatuor
294D - 639A In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Duo
639B - 712C Priorum Analyticorum Aristotelis Libri Duo
712D - 762B Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis Libri Duo
762C - 832A De Syllogismo Categorico
832B - 876C De Syllogismo Hypothetico Libri Duo
876D - 892A De Divisione
892B - 910C Liber De Diffinitione [the author is Marius Victorinus,
not Boethius]
910D - 1008C Topicorum Aristotelis Libri Octo Severino Boethio
Interprete
1008D - 1040C Elencorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis Libro Duo
Severino Boetio Interprete
1040D - 1173B In Topica Ciceronis Commentariorum Libri Sex
1173C - 1217C De Differentiis Topicis Libri Quatuor
1217D - 1221C Speculatio De Rhethoricae Cognatione [opera spuria]
1221D - 1224C Locorum Rhethoricorum Distinctio [opera spuria]
1223A - 1238D De Disciplina Scholarum [opera spuria]
Theological tractates:
1247A - 1256A Quomodo Trinitas Unus Deus Ac Non Tres Dii
1299A - 1302C Utrum Pater Et Filus Ac Spiritus Sanctus De Divinitate
Substantialiter Praedicentur Liber
1312A - 1314C Quomodo Substantiae In Eo Quod Sint Bonae Sint
Cum Non Sint Substantialia Bona
1334B - 1338C Brevis Fidei Christianae Complexio
1337A - 1354D Liber De Persona Et Duabus Naturis Contra Eutychen
465
Et Nestorium.
"Contains the complete Latin works of Boethius in two volumes, with
general prolegomena, notes, and commentaries in Latin and a life of
Boethius in French; because of textual corruptions and authorial
misattributions, text should be consulted only when a later, edited
critical edition is unavailable." Philip Edward Phillips, "Anicius
Manlius Severinus Boethius: A Chronology and Selected Annotated
Bibliography", in: A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages, edited
by Noel Harold Kaylor, Jr., and Philip Edward Phillips, Leiden: Brill,
2012, p. 553.
MODERN EDITIONS OF BOETHIUS'

TRANSLATIONS OF ARISTOTLE AND PORPHYRY
Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo, and Dod, Bernard G., eds. 1966.
Categoriarum supplementa. Pophyrii Isagoge translatio Boethii et
Anonymi fragmentum vulgo vocatum 'Liber sex principiorum'.
Accedunt Isagoges fragmenta M. Victorino interprete et specimina
translationum recentiorum categoriarum. Bruges: Desclée De
Brouwer.
Aristotele Latinus I. 6-7. "This volume constitutes a supplement to the
Latin versions of the Categories. It contains Porphyry's famous
Introduction to Aristotle's Categories in Boethius' translation (6) [pp. 5-
31] and an extract of an anonymous 12th century Latin writing, which
was widespread under the title Liber sex principiorum (7): it deals
mainly with the last six categories, treated more briefly in Aristotle's
work. The volume also contains the fragments quoted by Boethius from
an older Latin version of Porphyry's Introduction, done by Marius
Victorinus."
Porphyre. 1998. Isagoge. Paris: Vrin.
Texte grec et latin, traduction par Alain de Libera et Alain-Philippe
Segonds.
Introduction et notes per Alain de Libera.
Table des matières: Alain de Libera: Introduction VII; L’ Isagoge: une
introduction aux Catégories d’Aristote XIII; Sur les sources non
aristotéliciennes de Porphyre XXVII; Le paradoxe de l' Isagoge
466
XXXIII; Le questionnaire de Porphyre XXXVI; Le σκοπός de l'
Isagoge et la question des πέντε φωναι XXXVIII; Sur l’interprétation
médiévale du questionnaire de Porphyre LXII; La solution
néoplatonicienne du problème de Porphyre: la théorie des trois états de
l’universel LXXV; Les sources aristotéliciennes de Porphyre et la
théorie des prédicables XCII; Porphyre et le vocabulaire de la
prédication CVI; L’interprétation médiévale de l' Isagoge CXXVII-
CXLII.
Introduction de Poprphyre aux Catégories d'Aristote.
Texte grec, Translatio Boethii, traduction française 1; Notes de la
traduction française 31; Notes de la Translatio Boethii 71;
Bibliographie 73; Index verborum. Grec-latin 77; Latin-grec 88; Index
nominum. Anciens et médiévaux 95; Modernes 98-100.
[Contient la traduction latine de Boèce, Porphyrii Introductio in
Aristotelis Categorias a Boethio translata, en bas de page du texte
grec.]
"Soucieux d’inscrire l' Isagoge dans la longue durée de son
interprétation médiévale, nous proposons ici un texte qui s’écarte sur
plusieurs points de l’édition critique de L. Minio-Paluello et B. G. Dod.
Indépendamment de plusieurs variantes de détail, nous maintenons,
notamment, « differentibus specie » au lieu de « differentibus speciebus
» ou « differentibus » (I, § 9) et « Priami » au lieu de « Primum » (II, §
1), car, même manifestement fautives, ce sont les leçons qui ont
réellement circulé au Moyen Age (comme en témoignent, entre bien
d’autres, les commentaires embarrassés de Guillaume d’Occam
reproduits dans notre apparat critique)" P. CXLII.
Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo, ed. 1961. Categoriae vel Praedicamenta.
Translatio Boethii, Editio Composite, Translatio Guillelmi de
Moerbeka, Lemmata e Simplicii commentario decerpta, Pseudo-
Augustini Paraphrasis Themistiana. Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer.
Aristotele Latinus I. 1-5. "This volume contains five Latin versions of
Aristotle's Categories. Numbers 1 (pp. 5-41) and 2 (pp. 47-79) both
stem from Boethius, who is responsible for the Latin translations that
were most widespread. One of them is more literal, the other more
elegant. William of Moerbeke, on the other hand, was the author of a
Latin version not only of Aristotle's work (3), but also of Simplicius'
commentary, which contains the abbreviated lemmas of the Aristotelian
467
text (4). Moreover, Aristotle's work was known by means of a Roman
paraphrase attributed to Augustin and influenced by Themistius (5)."
Verbeke, Gerard, ed. 1965. De interpretatione vel periermenias.
Translatio Boethii specimina translationum recentiorum edidit
Laurentius Minio-Paluello. Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka. Bruges:
Desclée De Brouwer.
Edidit Gerardus Verbeke, revisit L. Minio-Paluello.
Aristotele Latinus II. 1-2. "This volume contains the vulgate text of the
Perihermeneias, which goes back to Boethius (1) [pp. 5-38], and the
version composed with the lemmas of the Aristotelian text in William
of Moerbeke's translation of Ammonius' commentary (2)."
Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo, ed. 1962. Analytica priora. Translatio Boethii
(recensiones duae), Translatio anonyma, Pseudo-Philoponi aliorumque
Scholia,. Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer.
Aristotele Latinus III. 1-4. "Boethius composed a double Latin version
not only of the Categories, but of the Prior Analytics [pp. 5-191] as
well (1-2). However, the two versions have not been edited separately
except for certain parts, the second version having been displayed, for
the other parts, in the critical apparatus. Apart from these widespread
texts, a good, but not quite successful anonymous 12th century
translation of Aristotle's logic has come down to us (3). Special
attention is paid to a set of Latin scholia to the Prior Analytics (4), the
origin of which is disputed. According to L. Minio-Paluello and J.
Shiel, they were translated by Boethius along with the Aristotelian text;
according to recent research, however, they might go back to a
translation by James of Venice."
Reprint with a supplement composed by James Shiel, Leiden: Brill,
1998.
———, ed. 1969. Topica. Translatio Boethii, Fragmentum Recensionis
Alterius et Translatio Anonyma. Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer.
Aristotele Latinus V. 1-3. "Boethius' rendering of the Topics [pp. 5-
185] has been carried out, once more, in two versions (1-2), one of
which has not been preserved but partly. Moreover, a 12th century
version is extant: it stems from the anonymous translator of the Prior
analytics (3)."
Dod, Bernard G., ed. 1975. De sophisticis elenchis. Translatio Boethii,
Fragmenta Translationis Iacobi et Recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeke.
468
Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer.
Aristotele Latinus VI. 1-3. "The vulgate text of the De sophisticis
elenchis [pp. 5-60] stems from Boethius (1). Fragments of another
version have been attributed to James of Venice (2), and William of
Moerbeke did a revision of Boethius' translation (3)."
MODERN EDITIONS OF THE COMMENTARIES

ON CICERO'S TOPICA
Boethius. 1833. "In Ciceronis Topica." In M. Tulli Ciceronis Opera

Omnia. Vol. V. 1, edited by Orelli, Johann Kaspar von and Baiter,
Johann Georg, 269-388. Zurich.
The text of this edition is frequently (but not always) better than Migne.
———. 1990. Boethius' De topicis differentiis und die byzantinische
Rezeption dieses Werkes. Paris: Vrin.
De topicis differentiis kaì hoi byzantinès metaphráseis ton Manouèl
Holobolou kaì Prochórou Kydóne: parartéma / Anhang: Eine
Pachymeres-Weiterbearbeitung der Holobolos-Übersetzung eisagogé
kaì kritiké ekdosé ton keimenon hypo Demetrio u Z. Niketa.
Introduction (in German) and critical edition by Dimitrios Z. Nikitas
(Corpus philosophorum medii aevi. Philosophi Byzantini, vol. 5).
MODERN EDITIONS OF OTHER WORKS
Thörnqvist, Christina Thomsen. 2008. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii

De syllogismo categorico. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg.
Critical edition with introduction, translation, notes, and indexes by
Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist.
Contents: Preface X; Editions cited XIII; Introduction. I. The author,
the work, and its sources. 1. The author XV; 2. The work and its
sources XVIII; 3. The interrelation and the titles of the two monographs
on the categorical syllogism XXIX; II. Boethius’ monographs on the
categorical syllogism in the Middle Ages XLI; III. The edition. 1. The
textual tradition LIII; 2. Editorial principles LXXIII; 3. The apparatus
fontium and notes LXXIV; De syllogismo categorico 1; Translation
469
102; Notes 158; Appendix: Selected variant readings in the younger
manuscripts 177; Bibliography 194; Word index 199; Index of passages
218; General index 226.
———. 2008. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Introductio ad
syllogismos categoricos. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg.
Critical edition with introduction, commentary, and indexes by
Contents: Editions cited XIII; Introduction. I. The work and its sources
XV; II. The edition. 1. The extant tradition XXIII; 2. The interrelation
of the manuscripts XXXIII; 3. Editorial principles XLVI; Introductio
ad syllogismos categoricos 5; Synopsis 85;
Commentary 88; Bibliography 169; Word index 173; Index of passages
Abstract: "The Roman statesman and philosopher Anicius Manlius
Seuerinus Boethius (c. 480-c. 525) translated and wrote commentaries
on most of Aristotle’s logical works. In addition, he wrote several
treatises on logic, including two monographs on the categorical
syllogism, which are commonly known as De syllogismo categorico
and Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos. The present study is the
first critical edition of the latter.
The main purpose of both De syllogismo categorico and Introductio ad
syllogismos categoricos is to serve as introductions to Aristotelian
syllogistics by providing a pedagogical transition from the theory of the
proposition to the doctrine of the categorical syllogism. In the case of
Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos, however, the final section
(supposedly the second book of the work) has either been lost or was
never written. Certain characteristics of the extant tradition seem to
indicate that the work is an improved redaction of De syllogismo
categorico, but that it never underwent final revision before
publication. As in the case of De syllogismo categorico, Boethius’
ultimate sources are Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias and Analytica priora,
but dispositional, terminological, and doctrinological features give
evidence that the influence of the Greek commentators is all-pervasive.
The reconstitution of the text rests on collation of 21 manuscripts
dating from the 10th to the 15th century. An analysis of the
interrelation of the manuscripts leads to the conclusion that all extant
manuscripts descend from a common archetype but that the tradition is
470
severely contaminated and cannot be described by means of a stemma
codicum. Hence, a formal hierarchy is established among the text
witnesses. The Latin text is presented with a critical apparatus, an
apparatus fontium, a commentary, and indexes."
Boezio, A. M. Severino. 1969. De hypotheticis syllogismis. Brescia:
Paideia.
Latin text, Italian translation, introduction and commentary by Luca
Obertello (in Italian).
Magee, John, ed. 1998. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii De divisione
liber Leiden: Brill.
Critical edition, translation, prolegomena and commentary by John
Magee.
Friedlein, Gottfried, ed. 1867. Anicii Manlii Torquati Severini Boetii:
De Institutione Arithmetica libri duo; De institutione musica libri
quinque. Accedit geometria quae fertur Boetii. Lipsiae: B.G. Teubner.
Reprint: Frankfurt, Minerva, 1966.
De institutione arithmetica pp. 3-173; De institutione musica pp. 175-
371.
The Geometria is not a work by Boethius.
Oosthout, Henri, and Schilling, Johannes, eds. 1999. Anicii Manlii
Severini Boethii De arithmetica. Turnhout: Brepols.
Corpus Christianorum. Serie Latina 94A.
Critical edition with introduction in Latin, index of mathematical
concepts, definitions, and technical terms.
Guilaumin, Jea-Yves, ed. 1995. Boèce. Institution arithmétique. Paris:
Les Belles Lettres.
Texte établi et traduit par Jean-Yves Guillaumin.
Humphrey, Illo, ed. 2007. Boethius. De institutione arithmetica libri
duo: édition proto-philologique intégrale princeps d'un manuscrit du
IXe siècle (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, latin 14064).
Ottawa: Institute of Mediaeval Music.
Texte, gloses, notes tironiennes, signes de renvoi par Illo Humphrey.
Text of De institutione arithmetica in Latin; preliminary essay in
English; introduction and concluding essay in French.
Folkerts, Menso, ed. 1970. Boethius' Geometrie II. Ein mathematisches
Lehrbuch des Mittelalters. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
471
This work, attributed to Boethius for nearly a millennium, was
compiled by an unknown author in the XI century.
Santosuosso, Alma, ed. 1999. MSS Avranches, Bibliothèque
Municipale, 236, 237. Boethius’ De institutione musica. Ottawa:
Institute of Mediaeval Music.
"Halftone of two 10th century. mss. once in the possession of the abbey
of Mont Saint-Michel. Mss 236, compiled for teaching purposes,
contains the complete text of Boethius’ treatise on music and excerpts
from Venerable Bede’s treatises on the art of poetry, the reckoning of
time and a few quotations from De natura rerum. Ms 237 comprises
Boethius’ De institutione musica, a short unpublished text on the
modes, and six diagrams of the different species."
Meyer, Christian, ed. 2004. Boèce. Traité de la Musique. Tornhout:
Brepols.
Edition (from Freidlein’s Latin edition of 1867) and French translation
by Christian Meyer.
Bieler, Ludwig, ed. 1957. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Philosophiae
consolatio. Turnhout: Brepols.
Corpus Christianorum. Serie Latina 94.
Revised edition 1984.
Moreschini, Claudio, ed. 2005. De consolatione philosophiae.
Opuscula theologica. Lipsia: K. G. Saur.
Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana. Editio
altera.
First edition 2000; the second edition includes the Opuscula theologica.
Praefatio [in Latin] V-XVIII; Conspectus siglorum XIX-XXI;
Consolatio philosophiae 3-162; Opuscola theologica: I. De Sancta
Trinitate 165-181; II. Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de
divinitate substantialiter praedicentur 182-185; III. Quomod substantiae
in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantalia bona 186-194; IV.
[De fide catholica] 195-205; V. Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 206-
241; Indices: Index fontium 242; Index nominum 243; Index rerum
245; Index metrorum 263.
N.B.: For the De consolatione philosophiae I give only the main editions and
translations.
472
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS
Boethius. 1957. "The Second Edition of the Commentaries on the

Isagoge of Porphyry, (Book I)." In Selections From Medieval
Philosophers (I): Augustine to Albert the Great, edited by McKeon,
Richard 70-99. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Translation of In Isagoge, 1.1-12.
"The selection which follows, the First Book of the second
Commentaries on the Isagoge, illustrates the temper and interest, no
less than the importance, of Boethius. The entire Book is commentary
on not more than a page of text from Porphyry, and a good two-thirds
of it is devoted to
developing and enforcing in full detail a remark of his concerning the
utility of the study of logic. The remaining part is devoted to a
penetrating
-- and startlingly cautious -- discussion of the problem of the universal.
As in the case of the defense of logic, the discussion grows out of a
remark by Porphyry -- his refusal to discuss in an introductory work
questions concerning the possible existence of genera and species
outside our mind; concerning their nature, corporeal or incorporeal; and
their relations to sensible objects. To answer such problems in any
detail would be to develop an entire philosophy. Particularly, it would
necessitate a choice between Plato and Aristotle as Boethius conceived
and stated them.
Boethius, none the less, with reservations and for reasons which he
carefully states, undertakes the discussion of the basic notions of the
problem. The later development of scholastic philosophy is based,
significantly, upon these questions. It is needless of course to say, as
has frequently been said, that Boethius introduced the question to the
middle ages and set the twelfth century to discussing the universal: the
problem is to be found in Augustine, and it would be difficult to
proceed far in philosophy without encountering it. Yet it is striking that
most usually the discussion was introduced in twelfth century writings
by a reference to Boethius and to his translation of the questions of
Porphyry."
(...)
473
"It was as a logician that the middle ages chiefly esteemed Boethius,
sometimes to the extreme of preferring him to Aristotle in translation.
Although that preference yielded to others, at least Boethius was for
centuries the principal source of aristotelianism in the
west. This contribution alone must be estimated considerable, if one
remember the despair of Cicero at the rendering of philosophy in the
latin language; in the time of Boethius latin had already become a
supple philosophic language, and for good or ill many of the
terms of later philosophical discussions in it were originated by him."
(Richard McKeon, pp. 67-69)
———. 1994. "From His Second Commentary to Porphyry's Isagoge."
In Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals. Porphyry,
Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, edited by Spade, Paul
Vincent, 20-25. Indianapolis: Hackett.
The passage from Boethius’s Second Commentary on Porphyry is from
Book I, Chs. 10-11, of the Brandt edition (159.3-167.20).
———. 1984. "Second Commentary to De interpretatione." In
Aristotle's Theory of Language and Its Tradition. Texts from 500 to
1750, edited by Arens, Hans, 159-204. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Selection, translation and commentary by Hans Arens.
Contents of the volume: Preface 1; 1. The extraordinary fate of Peri
hermeneias 6; 2. Aristotle's text 16; 3. Commentary to Aristotle 24; 4.
Ammonius: Commentary 58; 5. Commentary to Ammonius 124; 6.
Boethius: Commentary 159; 7. Commentary to Boethius 205; 8.
Abaelard: Glosses 231; 9. Commentary to Abaelard 303; 10. Albertus
Magnus: Paraphrase 339; 11. Commentary to Albert 376; 12. Thomas
Aquinas: Expositio 397; 13. Commentary to Thomas 434; 14. Martinus
de Dacia: Quaestiones 458; 15. Commentary to Martin 471; 16.
Johannes a S.Thoma: Ars logica 484; 17. Commentary to John of
St.Thomas 507; 18. James Harris, an Aristotelian of the 18th century
514; References 523; Concordance 527; Index of Persons 530.
The text translated is: Commentaries to Aristotle's Peri hermeneias
Second edition Book I (pp. 159-204); followed by a Commentary by
Hans Arens, pp. 205-230.
———. 2010. Boethius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-3. London:
Duckworth.
Translated by Andrew Smith.
474
Contents: Conventions VII; Textual Emendations VIII; Introduction 1;
Translator's Note 11; Translation. Book 1 15; Book 2 57; Book 3 115;
Notes 151; Select Bibliography 157; English-Latin Glossary 159;
Latin-English Index 160; Index of Names 162; Subject Index 164-166.
"Boethius’ second and larger commentary on Aristotle’s On
Interpretation was written in Latin in the early sixth century AD in the
style of Greek commentaries on Aristotle. Both commentaries were
part of his project to bring to the Latin-speaking world knowledge of
Plato and Aristotle. His project was for comprehensive translation of
them and for adaptation of the Greek commentaries on them. The
project was cruelly interrupted by his execution at the age of about 45
between 524 and 526 AD, leaving the Latin world under-informed
about Greek Philosophy for 700 years, although his commentary on
Aristotle’s On Interpretation remained the standard introduction
throughout the Latin Middle Ages.
Aristotle’s On Interpretation.
In the first six chapters of his On Interpretation Aristotle defines name,
verb, sentence, statement, affirmation and negation. This has standardly
been seen as a progression beyond the subject of his Categories, which
distinguishes single terms. For On Interpretation already studies the
complexity of a statement, and it can be seen as pointing forward to the
treatment in his Analytics of syllogistic arguments, which combine
three statements, two of them premisses and one a conclusion. But
C.W.A. Whitaker has argued that what turns out to interest Aristotle
from Chapter 7 onwards is contradictory or contrary pairs of
statements, and that these contradictory or contrary pairs relate rather to
the practice of dialectical refutation discussed in Aristotle’s other
logical works, the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi. (1)"
In Chapters 8 to 10, Aristotle examines exceptions to the rule that in
contradictory or contrary pairs one statement will be false and the other
true. Chapter 11 addresses some puzzles about complex assertions,
Chapters 12 to 13 consider pairs of statements involving possibility and
necessity, while the last chapter, 14, discusses beliefs that are contrary."
( Introduction by Richard Sorabji, p. 1)
(1) C.W.A. Whitaker, aristotle's De Intepretatione, Contradiction and
Dialectic, Oxford 1996.
———. 2011. Boethius: On Aristotle On Interpretation 4-6. London:
475
Bristol Classical Press.
Translated by Andrew Smith.
Contents: Conventions VII; Textual Emendations VIII; Introduction 1;
Translator's Note 11; Translation. Book 4 15; Book 5 60; Book 6 100;
Notes 141; Select Bibliography 145; English-Latin Glossary 147;
Latin-English Index 148; Index of Names 150; Subject Index 151.
———. 1998. On Determinism. Ammonius On Aristotle On
Interpretation 9 with Boethius On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 First
and Second Commentaries. London: Duckworth.
Ammonius translated by David Blank; Boethius translated by Norman
Kretzmann.
With essays by Richard Sorabji, Norman Kretzmann and Mario
Mignucci.
Contents: Richard Sorabji: Preface VII; Acknowledgements VIII; I.
Introduction. 1. Richard Sorabji: The three deterministic argumenta
opposed by Ammonius 3; 2. Richard Sorabji: Boethius, Ammonius and
their different Greek backgrounds 16; 3. Norman Kretzmann: Boethius
and the truth about tomorrow's sea battle 24; 4. Mario Mignucci:
Ammonius’ sea battle 53; Π. Translations. Textual Emendations 89;
Ammonius On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 translated by David Blank
91; Notes 118; Boethius On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 (first
commentary) 129; Boethius On Aristotle On Interpretation 9 (second
commentary) translated by Norman Kretzmann 146; Notes 187;
Bibliography 193; English-Greek Glossary 197; Greek~English Index
200; English-Latin Glossary 207;
Latin-English Index 210; Subject Index 213-216.
"This is a volume on determinism. It contains the two most important
commentaries on the determinist’s sea battle argument, and on other
deterministic arguments besides. It includes the earliest full exposition
of the Reaper argument for determinism, and a discussion of whether
there can be changeless knowledge of the passage of time. It contains
the two fullest expositions of the idea that it is not truth, but only
definite truth, that would imply determinism.
Ammonius and Boethius both wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s On
Interpretation and on its ninth chapter where Aristotle discusses the sea
battle.Their comments are crucial, for Ammonius’ commentary
influenced the Islamic Middle Ages, while that of Boethius was of
476
equal importance to medieval Latin-speaking philosophers.
It was once argued that Boethius was influenced by Ammonius, but
these translations are published together in this volume to enable the
reader to see clearly that this was not the case. Ammonius draws on the
fourth- and fifth-century Neoplatonists Iamblichus, Syrianus and
Proclus.
He arranges his argument around three major deterministic arguments
and is our main source for one of them, the Reaper argument, which
has hitherto received insufficient attention. Boethius, on the other hand,
draws on controversies from 300 years earlier between Stoics and
Aristotelians as recorded by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry.
Ammonius’ commentary on the first eight chapters of Aristotle’s On
Interpretation has appeared in a previously published volume in this
series, translated by David Blank." ( Preface by Richard Sorabji)
Thörnqvist, Christina Thomsen. 2008. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii
De syllogismo categorico. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg.
Critical edition with introduction, translation, notes, and indexes by
Contents: Preface X; Editions cited XIII; Introduction. I. The author,
the work, and its sources. 1. The author XV; 2. The work and its
sources XVIII; 3. The interrelation and the titles of the two monographs
on the categorical syllogism XXIX; II. Boethius’ monographs on the
categorical syllogism in the Middle Ages XLI; III. The edition. 1. The
textual tradition LIII; 2. Editorial principles LXXIII; 3. The apparatus
fontium and notes LXXIV; De syllogismo categorico 1; Translation
102; Notes 158; Appendix: Selected variant readings in the younger
manuscripts 177; Bibliography 194; Word index 199; Index of passages
Abstract. "The Roman statesman and philosopher Anicius Manlius
Seuerinus Boethius (c. 480-c. 525) translated and wrote commentaries
on most of Aristotle’s logical works. In addition, he wrote several
treatises on logic, including two monographs on the categorical
syllogism, which are commonly known as De syllogismo categorico
and Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos. The present study is the
first critical edition of the former.
De syllogismo categorico divides into two books of which the first is an
account of the categorical proposition and the second deals with the
477
categorical syllogism. The ultimate sources are Aristotle’s Peri
hermeneias and Analytica priora, but certain dispositional,
terminological, and doctrinological features show that the text is
heavily influenced by the tradition of the Greek commentators.
From the rediscovery of Boethius’ logical writings in the 10th century
until the mid-12th century, Aristotle’s doctrine of the categorical
syllogism was known chiefly through Boethius’ De syllogismo
categorico. The influence by as well as on the work is discussed in the
introduction to the present study.
The reconstitution of the text rests on collation of 47 manuscripts
dating from the 10th to the 15th century. An analysis of the
interrelation of the manuscripts leads to the conclusion that all extant
manuscripts descend from a common archetype but that the tradition is
severely contaminated and cannot be described by means of a stemma
codicum. The text is primarily based on the sixteen earliest text
witnesses, among which a formal hierarchy is established. The Latin
text is presented with a critical apparatus, an apparatus fontium, an
English translation, notes, and indexes. Selected variant readings in the
later manuscripts are reported in an appendix."
Boethius. 1988. In Ciceronis Topica. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Translated, with notes and an introduction by Eleonore Stump.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Abbreviations XI; Introduction 1; In
Ciceronis Topica: Book I 21; Introduction: The Purpose of Topics 22;
The Nature of Logic 25; The Nature of Topics 29; The Division of
Topics 36; Book II 49; Introduction: The Nature of Related Things 50;
The Topic from related things 55; An Extrinsic Topic 72; Book III 75;
Introduction: The Relationship of Topics to the Thing at Issue 75;
Definition 84; Book IV 105; Partition 106; Designation 108; Related
Things 110; Book V 132; Introduction: The Nature and Sorts of
Conditional Propositions 133; The Seven Stoic Modes of Hypothetical
Syllogism 135; Causes 154; Book VI 167; Introduction: Review of The
Nature of Topics 168; Causes 169; Effects and Comparison 171; The
Division of Topics 176; The Extrinsic Topic 179; Notes to the
Translation. Book I 185; Book II 194; Book III 205; Book IV 214;
Book V 224; Book VI 240; Appendix: Categories and Predicables 244;
Selected Bibliography 256; Indexes 265-277.
"Boethius's In Ciceronis Topica is one of two treatises Boethius wrote
478
on the subject of the Topics or loci. The other treatise is De top. diff.,
(11) one of the last philosophical works he composed.(12) Together
these two treatises present Boethius's theory of the art of discovering
arguments, a theory that was enormously influential in the history of
medieval logic. (13) De top. diff. is a fairly short treatise, but it is
Boethius's advanced book on the subject; it is written in a concise, even
crabbed style, and it clearly presupposes acquaintance with the subject
matter. In contrast, ICT is Boethius's elementary treatise on the Topics.
It was written shortly before De top. diff. (14) and is a commentary on
Cicero's Topica, though it is a much larger and more comprehensive
work than the Topica; it is more than twice as long as the more tightly
knit De top. diff." (p. 4)
(...)
According to Boethius, who is dependent on both the Greek and Latin
traditions, (22) two different sorts of things are Topics: a Topic is both
a maximal proposition and the Differentia (23) of a maximal
proposition. On Boethius's view, a maximal proposition is a self-
evidently true, universal generalization, such as 'Things whose
definitions are different are themselves also different.' Boethian Topics
of this sort probably have as their ancestors the Aristotelian Topics that
are principles. Their official function, on Boethius's account, is to aid in
the discovery of arguments, but in practice Boethius tends to use them
to confirm arguments. (24) Differentiae are theoretically the
differentiae dividing the genus maximal proposition into its subaltern
genera and species, and in that capacity they serve to classify maximal
propositions into groups. Some maximal propositions have to do with
definition, for example, and other with genus; so from definition and
from genus are Differentiae. Much more importent, however, is the role
Differentiae play in Boethius's method for the discovery of dialectical
arguments. For the most part, Boethius thinks of dialectical arguments
as having categorical rather than conditional conclusions, and he
conceives of the discovery of an argument as the discovery of a middle
term capable of linking the two terms of the desired conclusion.
Boethian Differentiae are, for the most part, the genera of such middle
terms. (In those cases where the arguments are hypothetical rather than
categorical, Boethius generally but not invariably thinks of Topics as
validating the conditional proposition in the argument.) To find an
479
argument using Boethius's method, one first chooses an appropriate
Differentia (criteria for appropriateness are left to the arguer's
intuition). The genus of middle terms, determined by the Differentia
chosen, and the two terms of the desired conclusion then indicate the
specific middle term of the argument and so indicate a dialectical
argument supporting the conclusion." (pp. 4-6)
(11) An edition of this text can be found in J.-P. Migne, patrologia
Latina (PL), vol. LXIV (Turnhout: Brepols: n.d.), 1174-1216. For a
translation and notes, see Stump 1978.
(12) de Rijk, "On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic. Part
II", Vivarium, 2, 1964: 159-160.
(13) See Stump 1978, and idem, "Topics: Their Development and
Absorption into Consequences," in Norman Kretmann et al. eds., The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 273-299. See also Niels J.
Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages
(Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984).
(14) de Rijk 1964: 159-161.
(22) For a summary of the controversy over Boethius's sources, see
Stump "Boethius Works on the Topics", Boethius Works on the
Topics" Vivarium, 12, 1974, 77-93.
(23) I am capitalizing 'Differentia' here to distinguish this technical use
of the word from its more ordinary use designating one of the
predicables.
(24) For a detailed analysis of Boethius's use and understanding of
Topics, see Stump 1978, especially pp. 179-204.
[For a modern edition of Cicero's Topica, see: Cicero's Topica, Edited
with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary by Tobias
Reinhardt, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.]
———. 1978. De topicis differentiis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Translated, with notes and essays on the text, by Eleonore Stump.
Contents: Abbreviations 11; Introduction 13; Part One. De topicis
differentiis. Book I 29; Book II 43; Book III 63; Book IV 79; Notes to
the Translation. Book I 97; Book II 110; Book III 128; Book IV 141;
Part Two. Dialectic in Ancient and Medieval Logic. Dialectic and
Aristotle's Topics 159; Dialectic and Boethius's De topicis differentiis
179; Between Aristotle and Boethius 205; Peter of Spain on the Topics
480
215; Differentia and the Porphyrian Tree 237; Differentia 248;
Bibliography 263; Indexes 275-287.
"This book is a philosophical study of Boethius's treatise De topicis
differentiis. It includes the first English translation of this historically
and philosophically important text, as well as copious notes designed to
make the text accessible to philosophers and scholars interested in the
medieval period. Detailed philosophical analyses of the text and of
important technical concepts, such as the concept of the predicables,
are worked out in the chapters of Part II. Chapters on Aristotle's Topics
and the treatise on dialectic in Peter of Spain's Tractatus explain the
work of these philosophers on the Topics and explore the relationship
of their views to those of Boethius. My principal aim is to make
Boethius's treatise available and comprehensible to scholars for whom
the technical Latin vocabulary and unfamiliar subject matter have made
it inaccessible." ( Preface, p. 7)
(...)
"Boethius's De topicis differentiis is concerned with the discovery of
arguments. As there is a method for judging or evaluating arguments
(what we call 'logic'), so, Boethius thinks, there is also a method for
finding arguments. The method varies somewhat, depending on
whether the arguments sought will be used in rhetoric for legal or
political speeches or in dialectic for philosophical inquiry. Most of
Boethius's attention is given to the method as used in dialectic, but the
fourth and last Book of the treatise examines the method as used in
rhetoric and compares it with that used in dialectic.
Whether the method for finding arguments is rhetorical or dialectical,
its main instrument is something called a Topic (in Latin, 'locus').
'Topic' is the standard English translation for the Greek 'τόπος' (the
Aristotelian counterpart of 'locus'), which means, literally, a place or
area. A certain sort of Topic that plays a role in the ancient methods for
memorization antedates and is probably the source for the kind of
Topic used in discovering arguments. In the art of memorizing, a Topic
is a place, in the literal sense, which the memorizer pictures in his mind
and from which he recalls what he wants to remember. He familiarizes
himself with some large edifice in which a number of places are picked
out as the τόποι to aid memory, and these places are fixed in the
memory in their actual order of occurrence in the edifice. Then the
481
speech, or whatever is being memorized, is divided into parts, and a
vivid image is associated with each of the parts. The memorizer
pictures these images put into the places of the edifice in their
appropriate order. When he is delivering his speech, he imagines
himself walking through the edifice, going from place to place, and
finding in each place the image he put there. Each image reminds him
of a certain part of his speech; and in this way he uses the τόποι to
recall the entire speech, part by part, in order. (7)" pp. 15-16)
(...)
" De top. diff. is Boethius's definitive work on the Topics. In it he
considers two different sets of dialectical Topics, one of which he finds
in Cicero's Topica and the other of which stems from the Greek
commentator Themistius (ca. 320-390); and he attempts to reconcile
the two sets of dialectical Topics. He also discusses rhetorical Topics,
and he concludes the treatise by comparing rhetorical and dialectical
Topics to make their similarities and differences clear. Because it is an
advanced work with a broad scope of material, De top. diff. does not
devote much attention to the way in which a Topic functions to find an
argument. One is likelier to find such discussion in the more
elementary In Ciceronis Topica. Instead, in De top. diff. Boethius
contents himself with describing the various Topics and giving
examples using each, with a minimum of explanation about the basic
method. In the chapter on Boethius, I have explained what I think his
technique for finding arguments is and how it works." (p. 17)
(7) Cf. Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (London, 1966); Frances
Yates, 'The Ciceronian Art of Memory," Medioevo e rinascimento
(Florence, 1955), II, 871-903; Harry Caplan, tr., Rhetorica ad
Herennium (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); and Richard Sorabji, Aristotle
on Memory (London, 1972).
———. 1988. "On Division." In Logic and Philosophy of Language,
edited by Kretzmann, Norman and Stump, Eleonore, 11-38.
The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. Vol 1.
"De divisione was probably written sometime between 505 and 509. It
is a study of different sorts of division - e.g., the division of a genus
into its species or the division of a whole into its integral parts - an
important part of the logical heritage on which the scholastic period
482
built. Boethius investigates the way in which these various divisions are
distinguished from one another and the logical relations between
whatever is being divided (or analyzed, or classified) and its dividing
elements. For example, he points out that a genus is naturally prior to
its species but a whole is naturally posterior to its integral parts; if a
genus is destroyed, so are all its species, but if a whole is destroyed,
some of its integral parts may remain. A large part of the treatise is
devoted to the division of genus into species, in connection with which
Boethius deals extensively with the predicables (genus, species,
definition, differentia, proprium, and accident), their interrelationships,
and the way they combine to form a Porphyrian tree." (pp. 11-12)
———. 1998. De Divisione Liber. Leiden: Brill.
Critical edition, translation, prolegomena and commentary by John
Magee.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations XI; Boethian Editions
Cited XIII; Prolegomena XV; Date of De divisione XVII; Boethius,
Porphyry, and Andronicus XXXIV; Textual Tradition of De divisione
LVIII; De divisione 1; Commentary 53; Appendix: Elenchus
Lectionum Singularium Selectarum 171; Bibliography 177; Word
Index 187; Index of Passages 200; General Index 222-224.
Date of composition: "All things considered, the period between 515
and 520 seems a safe surmise." (p. XXXIII)
"Like all of Boethius' writings, De divisione looks both back to
Antiquity and ahead to the Middle Ages. (1) It was copied with great
frequency for use in the medieval schools, the MSS in which it is
preserved being outnumbered only, among Boethius’ works, by those
of De differentiis topicis and the Consolatio. And in addition to the
commentaries of Peter Abelard, Albert the Great, and Antonius
Andreae, there is a wealth of glossed MSS, florilegia, and indirect
evidence to suggest that De divisione proved of enduring interest to
medieval students from the later tenth century on. This would have
pleased Boethius, who in the proem evinces particular concern for the
utilitas of the treatise in the context of the Latin-speaking world. As for
Antiquity, there is an important lost tradition underlying De divisione.
More precisely, in the proem and conclusion Boethius mentions two
works which are otherwise completely unattested: a “book” on
diaeresis by Andronicus of Rhodes (1st c. BC) (2) and a “commentary”
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on Plato’s Sophist by Porphyry (b. AD 232/3). (3) The lost ancient
tradition is the concern of the present discussion, and I begin with the
relevant passages. In the proem and conclusion Boethius indicates:
(1) that Andronicus published a book on diaeresis, in which he
(Andronicus) remarked (a) that diaeresis is a method of great utility and
(b) that the Peripatos (before Andronicus) had always held the method
in high esteem: Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia
diuidendi quamque apud Penpateticam disciplinam semper haec fient
in honore notitia, docet et Andronici diligentissimi senis De diuisione
liber editus (4,3ff.);
(2) that Plotinus approved of or recommended Andronicus’ book: et hic
idem a Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus (4,5f.);
(3) that Porphyry (consequently) adapted Andronicus’ book for his
commentary on Plato’s Sophist: et in Platonis librì qui Sophistes
inscrìbitur commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus (4,6f.);
(4) that the later Peripatos (a) distinguished between diaeresis in the
essential and incidental senses and (b) made subdivisions of each:
Posterior quidem Peripateticae secta prudentiae differentias
diuisionum diligentissima ratione perspexit et per se diuisionem ab ea
quae est secundum accidens ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distribuii
(48,26ff.);
(5) that, by contrast, the earlier Peripatetics indiscriminately employed
accidents in place of genera, species, and differentiae: antiquiores
autem indifferenter et accidente pro genere et accidentibus pro
speciebus aut differentiis utebantur (50,1 f.); and
(6) that the promiscuous “earlier” usage drove Boethius to explain how
the various kinds of division are (a) similar to and (b) different from
one another: unde nobis peropportuna utilitas uisa est et commumones
harum diuisionum prodere et eas propriis differentiis disgregare
(50,2ff.)." (pp. XXXIV-XXXV)
(1) The following is based on my “Boethius ... and Andronicus;” points
of detail are treated in the commentary.
(2) The complicated issues of Andronicus’ precise dates and
scholarchship I pass over here. One may consult, among others,
Moraux, Aristotelismus I 45fF., with Tarân’s review, esp. 73 Iff., and
Gottschalk, “Commentators” 55ff.
(3) A. Smith, (ed.) Porphyry Philosophi Fragmenta xf., and “Studies”
484
750, treats the “bulk” of Dio. as a Porphyrian fragment (169F).
Although preferable to treating it as an Andronicean one, this entails
complications of its own.
Ancient Commentaries on Boethius’ De divisione:
- Pietro Abelardo, Scritti filosofici: Editio super Porphyrium - Glossae
in Categorias - Super Aristotelem De Interpretatione - De divisionibus
- Super Topica glossae. Edited by Mario Dal Pra. Rome-Milan 1954,
pp. 155-203.
- B. Alberti Magni Ord. Praed. commentarii in librum Boethii De
divisione: Editio prìnceps. Edited by Fr. P.M. von Loë, O.P. Bonn
1913.
- Robert Kilwardby’s Writings on the Logica Vetus Studied with
Regard to Their Teaching and Method. Edited by P.O. Lewry, O.P.
(unpublished Dissertation), Oxford 1978, pp. 408-12.
- Antonij Andree super artem veterem. Scripts: seu Expositiones
Antonij Andree super artem veterem: et super Boetium de divisionibus:
cum questionibus eiusdem. Venice 1517. Fols. 89vb-103b.
———. 1983. Boethian Number Theory. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Translation, with introduction and notes, of the De institutione
arithmetica by Michael Masi.
Contents: Preface 9; Boethian Number Theory 11; The Iconography of
the Liberal Arts and the Boethian Arithmetic 13; Boethian Number
Theory and Music 23; Arithmetic Proportion and the Medieval
Cathedral 31; Medieval Literature andf the Theory of Number 39; De
Institutione Arithmetica: Commentaries and Derivative Works 49;
Manuscripts Containing the De Institutione Arithmetica 58; A View of
Bethius' Life and Works 64; Boethius, to Symmachus, his Lord, the
Patrician 66; Boethius, De Institutione Arithmetica 71; Bibliography
189-197.
"The consistency, even into the Renaissance, of the Liberal Arts
curriculum, (1) its essentially mathematical nature, its influence beyond
the quadrivium on music theory and practice, and its bearing on the
nature of aesthetics (2) are all revelant to the basic concepts outlined in
Boethius’ De Institutione Arithmetica. Not only does the name of
Boethius appear repeatedly in discussions of proportions and harmony,
but numerous manuscripts and publications of his works and
commentaries on the De Institutione Arithmetica continued with
485
undiminished, even increased, vigor into the sixteenth century.
Before I present an outline of this scope of influence, the distinction
between practical and theoretical mathematics should be clarified in
order to help avoid a common misunderstanding. The modem meaning
of arithmetic conveys nothing of what it meant for Boethius. The
difference between arithemetic (Αριθμητική ) and logistics ( Λογιστική
) was the same for Boethius as it was for the Greeks who originally
defined it. (3) Both disciplines deal with numbers, but arithmetic
designates the theory or philosophy of number, only after the Middle
Ages did the term designate an elementary discipline of counting and
calculation. The process whereby one undertook the solution of
practical problems of computation was known to the Greeks and to
Boethius as logistics and to the Middle
Ages as algorism. (4)
The nature and scope of number theory is adequately explained in the
first chapter of the De Institutione Arithmetica -- it is essentially a
preparatory study for philosophy. As such, among the Neo-
Pythagoreans, it had a fundamentally moral character and bespoke the
order of the world in its most basic terms. The expression of this order
was eventually, in the other disciplines of the quadrivium, expanded
into musical terminology where it acquired the dimension of harmony;
in the study of geometry, it was extended to plane surfaces and solid
figures. In astronomy, the geometric measurements and the metaphor of
harmony found their widest applications in the definition of the order of
the universe and in the supreme model of concord, the music of the
spheres.
To demonstrate within the limits of this introduction the pervasiveness
of Boethius’ treatise on the study of number theory, its importance as a
preparatory study for music, and the bearing of number theory on
architecture, literature, and moral philosophy, I have organized my
discussion under five headings. With each I have provided adequate
bibliography so that those interested in particular applications of this
number theory may pursue and test the application of principles in the
De Institutione Arithmetica to other disciplines. The five headings are:
(I) The Iconography of the Liberal Arts; (II) the De Institutione
Arithmetica and the De Institutione Musica in the theoretical writings
of later musicologists; (III) Arithmetic proportion and architecture; (IV)
486
Literary extensions of the Theory of Number; (V) Commentaries,
derivative studies, and extant manuscripts." (pp. 11-12)
(1) Trivium: grammar, rhetoric, logic; Quadrivium: arithmetic, music,
geometry, astronomy.
(2) See various chapters in E. de Bruyne Études d'esthetique médiévale
(Bruges, De Tempel, 1946).
(3) See Sir Thomas Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1921), Vol. I, pp. 13-16.
(4) See Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic, trans.
Martin Luther D'ooge, intro. Frank E. Robbins and L.C. Karpinski
(New York), Macmillan,1926, pp. 3-4; Plato, Gorgias Sec. 451C;
Theatetus, Sec. 145A, 198A. For the Middle Ages, see A.C. Crombie,
Medieval and Early Modem Science (New York, Anchor Books, 1959),
Vol. I, pp. 50-51.
Palisca, Claude, ed. 1989. Boethius. Fundamentals of Music. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Translated, with introduction and notes by Calvin M. Bower.
Contents: Preface by Series Editor Claude V. Palisca XIII; Translator's
Preface XVII; Introductio XIX-XLIV; Book 1 1; Book 2 52; Book 3
88; Book 4 115; Book 5 162; Appendix 1: Chapters 20-30 of Book 5
181; Appendix 2: Notes on the Text of the Spartan Decree 185;
Appendix 3: Notes on the Diagrams and their Sources 189; Index 197-
205.
"Shortly after the turn of the sixth century a young Roman patrician
began to record in Latin the sources and background of his exceptional
Greek education. Although it is uncertain that he ever studied in Athens
or Alexandria, those fifth-century centers of liberal learning and
philosophy fundamentally shaped his thinking, even to the extent of
determining his literary and pedagogical objectives. He would lay a
scientific foundation by writing on four mathematical disciplines—the
quadrivium as he collectively called them. Thereafter he would
translate and comment on the Organon of Aristotle and, building on the
mathematical disciplines and Aristotelian logic, would finally approach
the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle and the world of
metaphysics. (1)
In this context, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (480-524) wrote
the treatise entitled De institutione musica, one of his earliest works,
487
probably around the middle of the first decade of the sixth century. It
was intended to be read along with the De institutione arithmetica and
may have been one of four works setting out the foundations of
Platonic scientific education: arithmetic, music, geometry, and
astronomy. None of the mathematical works—or even the logical
works—was considered original by Boethius or his contemporaries.
Boethius’s early works record in Latin what he was reading in Greek.
Reading, translating, writing, and commenting formed an integrated
process through which Boethius appropriated for his culture works that
not only were unknown but that in most cases surpassed the superficial
dabblings in science and logic from the golden and silver ages of
Roman civilization. Scholars such as Marius Victorinus und Apuleius
of Madaura had produced scientific translations for Latin readers of the
fourth and fifth centuries, but Boethius carried the genre to new levels
of rigor and thoroughness. Written for a cultural elite already initiated
into philosophical literature, Boethius's mathematical and logical works
represent one of the most notable projects in intellectual history of
preserving and transmitting a corpus of knowledge from one culture to
another. (2)
No evidence has been found that Boethius’s mathematical works were
read between his short lifetime and the ninth century. But when liberal
learning saw a rebirth in the Carolingian era, Boethius’s treatises on
arithmetic and music reappeared as authoritative works on these
disciplines, rivaled only by Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae
et Mercurii. (3) When a tradition of independent musical treatises
began in the ninth century, Boethius’s treatise became the unique
source for the thorough mathematical underpinning of Western musical
theory. It is ironic that this work intended as an approach to logic and
philosophy would essentially shape the most illiberal of the liberal arts.
(4)" (pp. XIX-XX)
(...)
"An overview of the structure of the five extant books should assist the
reader in placing the musical details of the treatise in perspective. Book
1 forms a self-contained introduction to the discipline, whereas books 2
and 3 present mathematical demonstrations of propositions introduced
in book 1. Book 4 applies the mathematical principles developed in
books 2 and 3 to the monochord and presents the theory of modes.
488
Finally, book 5 introduces the reader to the mathematical and musical
subtleties of Ptolemy." (p. XXIX)
(1) For a thorough study of Boethius’s life, see Henry Chadwick,
Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy
(Oxford, 1981), pp. 1-68. Also informative is John Matthews, “Anicius
Manlius Severinus Boethius,” in Boethius: His Life, Thought and
Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 15-43.
(2) Concerning the complex question of Boethius’s literary precursors
and his audience, see Helen Kirkby, “The Scholar and his Public,” in
Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, pp. 44-69.
(3) See Martianus Capella, ed. Adolf Dick, with addenda by Jean
Préaux (Stuttgart, 1969); also Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal
Arts, vol. 1, William Harris Stahl, The Quadrivium of Martianus
Capella, Latin Translations in the Mathematical Sciences, 50 B.C.-A.D.
1250, and Richard Johnson with E. L. Burge, A Study of the Allegory
and the Verbal Disciplines (New York and London, 1971); vol. 2, The
Marriage of Philology and Mercury, trans. W. H. Stahl and R. Johnson
with E. L. Burge (New York, 1977).
(4) For the tradition of Boethius’s treatise in the early Middle Ages, see
Calvin M. Bower, “The Role of Boethius’ De institutione musica in the
Speculative Tradition of Western Musical Thought,” in Boethius and
the Liberal Arts: A Collection of Essays, ed. Michael Masi, Utah
Studies in Literature and Linguistics 18 (Bern, Frankfurt, and Las
Vegas, 1981), pp. 157-74; and Alison White, “Boethius in the Medieval
Quadrivium,” in Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, pp. 162-
205.
Boethius. 1973. The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of
Philosophy: Text and Translations. London: Heinemann.
The Loeb Classical Library; new edition; Latin text and English
translation.
The Theological Tractates translated by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand and
S. J. Tester; The Consolation of Philosophy translated by S. J. Tester.
Contents: Note on the Text VII; Introduction IX; Bibliography XV; The
Theological Tractates 2; The Consolation of Philosophy 128;
Symmachi versus 412; Index 415-420.
"A seventeenth-century translation of the Consolatio philosophiae is
here presented with such alterations as are demanded by a better text,
489
and the requirements of modem scholarship. There was, indeed, not
much to do, for the rendering is most exact. This in a translation of that
date is not a little remarkable. We look for fine English and poetry in an
Elizabethan; but we do not often get from him such loyalty to the
original as is here displayed.
Of the author “ I. T.” nothing is known. He may have been John
Thorie, a Fleming born in London in 1568, and a B.A. of Christ
Church, 1586. Thorie “ was a person well skilled in certain tongues,
and a noted poet of his times ” (Wood, Athenae Oxon. ed. Bliss, I. 624),
but his known translations are apparently all from the Spanish. (a)
Our translator dedicates his “ Five books of Philosophical Comfort” to
the Dowager Countess of Dorset, widow of Thomas Sackville, who
was part author of A Mirror for Magistrates and Gorboduc, and who,
we learn from I. T's preface, meditated a similar work. I. T. does not
unduly flatter his patroness, and he tells her plainly that she will not
understand the philosophy of the book, though the theological and
practical parts may be within her scope.
The Opuscula Sacra have never before, to our knowledge, been
translated. In reading and rendering them we have been greatly helped
by two mediaeval commentaries: one by John the Scot (edited by E. K.
Rand in Traube’s Quellen und Untersuchungen, vol. I. pt. 2, Munich,
1906); the other by Gilbert de la Porrée (printed in Migne, P.L.
LXIV.)."
(a) Mr. G. Bayley Poison suggests with greater probability that I. T.
was John Thorpe (fl. 1570-1610), architect to Thomas Sackville, Karl
of Dorset. Cf. American Journal of Philology, vol. XIII. (1921), p. 266.
———. 1991. "De hebdomadibus." In Being and Goodness. The
Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology,
edited by MacDonald, Scott, 299-304. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Translation by Scott MacDonald.
"The Latin texts are Boethius 1978a and Peiper 1871. The line numbers
from Rand’s text are given in angle brackets in the text of the
translation. In preparing this translation, I have consulted the
translations of Stewart, Rand, and Tester in Boethius 1978a, Boethius
1981, and de Rijk’s suggestions for translating the axioms in de Rijk
1987." (p. 299)
References
490
Boethius 1978a. The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of
Philosophy: Text and Translations. Ed. and trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K.
Rand, and S. J. Tester. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Boethius 1981. “How Are Substances Good Insofar as They Exist,
Since They Are Not Substantial Goods? ( De hebdomadibus)
(Preliminary draft). Trans. Paul Vincent Spade. Translation Clearing
House, Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University.
Boethius 1871. Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii Philosophiae
Consolationis Atque Opuscula Sacra. Ed. Rudolph Peiper. Leipzig:
Teubner.
Rijk, L. M. de. 1987. “On Boethius’ Notion of Being: A Chapter in
Boethian Semantics.” In Meaning and Inference in Medieval
Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. Norman
Kretzmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1999. The Consolation of Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Translated with introduction and explanatory notes by Patrick Gerard
Walsh.
"This is an appropriate time to launch a new translation of The
Consolation of Philosophy. In the past few years there has been a
significant revival of interest in Boethius; this has been marked by
several studies which have partially restored him to the prominence
which he enjoyed for over a millennium from the Carolingian age
onwards. My rendering, with its accompanying Introduction and
annotation, has sought to exploit these important researches.
The translation is based on Ludwig Bieler’s admirable edition in the
Corpus Christianorum series. The annotations have benefited
conspicuously from the notable commentary of J. Gruber. Henry
Chadwick’s general study of Boethius, and the volume of essays edited
by the late-lamented Margaret Gibson entitled Boethius, his Life,
Thought, and Influence, have furnished much of the information on
which the Introduction is based. My debts to Gerard O’Daly’s The
Poetry of Boethius for interpretation of the verses, and to R. W.
Sharpies’ edition of the taxing philosophical content of Books 4-5, will
be obvious from the frequent citations in the notes. Details of these
works are presented in the Select Bibliography." (from the Preface)
"Summary of the Treatise.
491
Book 1. As the prisoner grieves over his downfall and impending fate,
Lady Philosophy appears before him. Initially he fails to recognize her,
but once recognition dawns he pours out to her his resentment at the
iniquity of Fortune. His devoted public service has ended in his
condemnation; the order evident in the world of nature does not extend
to the just treatment of humankind. Philosophy diagnoses his ailment;
blinded by vicious emotions, he has forgotten how the world is ordered.
She promises initially a gentler cure.
Book 2. Lady Philosophy denounces the prisoner’s bitter indictment of
Fortune, against whom he has no real complaint. Fortune herself is
invoked to justify her ways with men. Hitherto she has favoured him,
and the inconstancy she now shows is at one with the similar pattern in
nature. Philosophy insists that his present life has its material
consolations, but true happiness is not to be sought in them. She
reviews the worldly goods to which men aspire, and successively
rejects wealth, ambition for high position, and the pursuit of fame as
avenues to happiness. Fortune benefits man more when adverse than
when favourable.
Book 3. Before explaining where true happiness is to be found, Lady
Philosophy reiterates that the quests for riches, high position, and fame,
and additionally physical pleasure, are defective ways of seeking the
true good. The true avenue is reversion to our beginnings. The
prisoner’s former wealth, the tenure of public office, the kingship under
which he has served, the desire for fame, the pursuit of bodily pleasure,
the reliance on physical strength and beauty are all false goods which
fail to attain sensation, imagination, reason, and understanding; these
correspond with the four levels of existence, namely immobile life, that
of the lower animals, the human, and the divine. The reconciliation
between Providence and free will is achieved at the fourth level of
divine understanding. God’s knowledge is always in the present, not in
the future or past. Though from the divine aspect all future events will
be necessary, in their own nature some will be necessary but others
freely chosen. In this sense the freedom of the will remains intact."
———. 2001. The Consolation of Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Translated, with introduction and notes, by Joel C. Relihan.
"Principles of translation.
Latin poetry does not rhyme; its rhythms, far more complex than those
492
of English, are not related to the accents of the words themselves but to
the succession of long and short syllables; that is to say, they depend
upon the length of time that it takes to pronounce each syllable. The
music of Latin poetry is accordingly quite polyphonic; sometimes word
accent agrees with verse accent, and sometimes conflicts with it.
Within this rhythmic environment is found a highly artificial poetic
language: The great Latin poets (Vergil, Horace, Ovid) did not just
write memorable works in verse but, for each writer who came after
them, offered new solutions to the old problem of how to fit the Latin
language into the shapes of Greek verse. Consequently, every Latin
poem is a mosaic of phrases learned from earlier poems; the reading of
any Latin poem is a complicated intertextual game, as even a lone word
in a given place in a line of a certain rhythm may evoke associations
with an earlier poem that then becomes part of the context in which the
new poem is meant to be read.
There are thirty-nine poems in Consolation, written in a wide range of
meters and combinations of meters. The poetic nature of the text cannot
be ignored; only Satyricon and Martianus Capella’s Marriage come
close to the richness of its mixture of prose and verse. No English
translation of a Latin poem can hope to mirror the music of these Latin
originals, or the complexities of their associations with the whole of
Latin literature. That is for specialists; students curious to see Boethius
the poet in his workshop, adapting the themes and language of his
originals, may be referred to the study of O’Daly, [ Poetry of Boethius,
Chapel Hill and London, The University of North Carolian Press] 1991.
What I have done here, and what has not been done before in the long
history of translation of
Consolation into English, is reproduce through English accents the
rhythms and meters of the original poems. I have thought it important
to do so in order to make the reader stop and take the poems seriously;
there is a tendency to take the poems as mere metrical restatements of
the arguments of the preceding prose sections. I would claim that in
fact the poems often shift the focus of arguments, or redirect them in
surprising ways; the reader needs to linger on them. The rhythms of the
Latin will for the most part not be familiar; I have included accent
marks to show where the stresses should fall, and have added in the
notes to each poem a brief discussion of the meter and its associations.
493
The reader needs to know only that the stress marks are intended to
have their Latin force: That is, they show where the syllables should be
dragged out a bit, pronounced more slowly, given more time. (1) It is
possible for other English accents to be heard against this background,
and I flatter myself in thinking that the resulting synthesis of these two
competing rhythms, while not the equivalent of the Latin complexity,
makes a worthy music of its own.
The language of poetry is not the language of prose. I have tried to
represent the prose speeches of the participants in this dialogue with
full respect for what may be called their pedanticisms and niceties: And
so it is for this very reason that . . . ; it cannot in any way be doubted . .
. ; I see that that is indeed the logical consequence. . . . Consolation
tells of the worlds of God and of mortals, of timeless reality and
physical things, and I have not tried to substitute, as would be the
standard translation practice, more elegant English abstract nouns for
these crucial “things". " (pp. XXVIII-XXIX)
(1) Stress marks fall on the second element of a diphthong (e.g., eách).
When on the first element, they help suggest a polysyllabic
pronunciation (e.g., concéaled is trisyllabic at IV.m.5.9.).
(2) For example, IV.6.9: “Should one look at the force of these two
terms in one’s own mind, it will appear quite easily that they are
different; for Providence is the divine reason itself, established in the
highest ruler of all things, which arranges all things; Fate is the
arrangement that inheres in the things that have motion, the
arrangement through which Providence weaves all things together in
their proper orders.” In the verse sections, necessities of meter at times
force me to exploit a fuller range of translation options.
Sharples, Robert W., ed. 1991. Cicero: On Fate (De fato): & Boethius:
The Consolation of Philosophy (Philosophiae consolationis) IV. 5-7, V.
Warminster, England: Aris & Phillips.
Contents: Preface VI; Note on abbreviations IX; Introduction. 1. Cicero
and the Latin reception of Greek philosophy 1; 2. The place of On fate
among Cicero’s philosophical works 3; 3. The freewill problem before
Cicero; 3.1 Causation 6; 3.2 Future truth and possibility 11; 4. Cicero’s
treatise On Fate: plan and sources; 4.1 The plan of the work 16; 4.2
Cicero’s sources 20; 5. An evaluation of Cicero’s treatise 23; 6. The
influence of Cicero’s treatise 24; 7. Divine foreknowledge from Cicero
494
to Boethius 25; 8. Fate and providence 29; 9. The problem of evil 31;
10. Boethius’ life and works 34; 11. The Consolation of Philosophy 37;
12. The sources and arguments of IV.5-7) and V 41; 13. The
Consolation and Christianity 46; 14. The influence of the Consolation
of Philosophy 48;
14. On the texts 49; Sigla 51; Text and translation: Cicero, On fate 52;
Appendix: Parallel texts 92; Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy IV.5-
7 and V 102; Commentary: Cicero, On fate 159; Appendix: Parallel
texts 196; Excursus: Terminology for Causes 198; Boethius,
Consolation of Philosophy IV.5-7 and V 202; Select Bibliography 233;
Index 241-244.
"The two texts considered here are linked by more than one common
feature. They are examples of the writings of the two men who did
more to communicate Greek philosophy to the Latin-speaking West
than anyone else in antiquity, with the possible exceptions of Augustine
and (in one particular field) Lucretius. They are works which reflect
two very different branches of the tradition that goes back to Plato, or
to Plato’s Socrates. Cicero writes as a follower of the sceptical New
Academy, which derived its readiness to challenge dogmatic positions
from Socrates even if its belief that certainty is impossible was not one
he would have shared; Boethius’ Consolation is in the tradition of the
revived dogmatic Platonism of the Imperial period, a Platonism that
welcomed, and made use of, ideas from Aristotle as well as from Plato.
They are works of philosophy written by two men each of whom
played a part in the public life of their times - and paid with their own
lives for doing so; though there is the difference that Boethius’
Consolation of Philosophy was written when its author was already
under sentence of death, while Cicero’s On Fate was written in haste as
its author was planning the return to the political arena that was
ultimately to be his downfall. Above all, however - and this is the
justification for uniting the two texts, or rather one fragmentary text
and one partial extract, in this single volume - they represent two stages
in a story, the story of man’s attempt to understand whether he is or is
not in control of his own destiny; this story in one guise or another
pervades the literature of antiquity, and is not finished yet.
That said, there are also great differences between the two texts.
Cicero’s treatise On Fate survives in fragmentary form only; we may
495
have about two-thirds of the whole text, but it lacks its beginning and
its end, and there are major gaps which seriously affect our
interpretation of the whole. Questions concerning the literary form and
structure of the treatise as originally composed, of Cicero’s sources and
of philosophical interpretation are here all closely intertwined with one
another, giving this work a particular fascination over and above that of
the subject-matter itself; but, while it has been extensively quarried for
technical discussions, and extensive extracts have been included in
source-books, English readers have been poorly served until now as far
as the availability in a single volume of a reliable continuous text and
translation is concerned.
The situation with Boethius’ Consolation could hardly be more
different. It is one of the major works of world literature; the work that
- along perhaps with Augustine’s City of God - marks the boundary
between ancient and medieval thought; a work which profoundly
influenced the thought of the Middle Ages; a work translated into
English by, among others, Alfred the Great, Chaucer, and Elizabeth the
First. It is a daunting prospect to write about such a work, a work
moreover that can be approached from many different perspectives: its
relation to earlier Latin literature both in prose and in poetry, its
relation to Boethius’ philosophical interests on the one hand and his
Christian beliefs on the other, its influence on later thought and
literature. In a book of the present size it would scarcely be possible to
do justice to all these perspectives; given the reason for including
Cicero and Boethius together in this book in the first place, I hope that
my comments may at least be helpful for those who wish to consider
the part of the Consolation here included as a stage in a particular
philosophical debate.
That, too, must be the justification for violating Boethius’ design by
including only a part of the whole, even though it is the final part and
culmination. I can only hope that those who read the end of the work
here will want to go on and read what precedes. Boethius does mark a
new stage in the discussion by Philosophy’s observation that “You
summon me to a matter which involves the greatest enquiry of all"; the
reason for including the end of book 4 as well as book 5 is that it
introduces the question of how fortune and freedom are to be
reconciled with the divine providence which has formed the topic of the
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discussion since 3.12." ( Preface, VI-VII).
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Introduction: An Overview of the Logical Works of
Boethius
"According to Minio-Paluello, the editor of most of the translations, the
medieval manuscript tradition shows traces of both a first and a second
version of the Latin Categories, Peri hermeneias, Prior Analytics and Topics.
(5) Boethius did not take his task as a translator lightly!
Only one commentary on the Categories is extant, but in it Boethius
announces a plan to write a second one, and it seems likely that an
anonymously transmitted text may be a small fragment of the second
commentary (whether it was ever completed or not). (6) Of the two
commentaries on Peri hermeneias, the second is considerably longer and
generally more interesting than the first. There is no dedicated companion
monograph, but parts of the lore of the Peri hermeneias are presented in the
works on categorical syllogisms and the one about topical differences.
It seems possible that Boethius composed or prepared a commentary on the
Prior Analytics. While preparing an edition of Boethius’ translation of this
Aristotelian text, Minio-Paluello discovered that a twelfth-century manuscript
contains marginal scholia on that work which must be translations from the
Greek or adaptations of a Greek source, and the translator’s habits seemed to
indicate that he was no one other than Boethius. (7) Possibly, then, these
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scholia were raw materials intended for use in a commentary. Later I
discovered traces of more translated Greek scholia in a twelfth-century
commentary on the Prior Analytics. (8) This suggests that either (1) Boethius
had left more extensive raw materials than the ones discovered by Minio-
Paluello, or (2) he had actually left a whole commentary, of which we have
only discovered little fragments, or (3) in spite of the agreement with
Boethius’ habits as a translator, what Minio-Paluello and myself discovered
were in fact traces of a twelfth-century translation – complete or partial – of a
Greek commentary. The matter is in need of further research. The monograph
on categorical syllogisms may reasonably be seen as a handy summary of the
subject treated at length and in depth in the Prior Analytics, while the one on
hypothetical syllogisms is only linked to the Aristotelian work in the sense
that it was customary in late antiquity to think that, by laying the foundations
of categorical syllogistic in Prior Analytics, Aristotle had also laid the
foundations of hypothetical syllogistic, and commentators seem routinely to
have said something about the latter in connection with Prior Analytics I.23.
Boethius’ treatment of hypothetical syllogisms is (to put it mildly) very
strange; recently a Greek parallel to a little part of it was discovered, (9) but
for the most part it is unparallelled in ancient literature, though, admittedly,
we do not have much by which to gauge what may have been the standard
approach to the matter in late antiquity. Boethius probably never translated or
commented on the Posterior Analytics, though he obviously had some
acquaintance with the work, and must be assumed to have intended to include
it in his program. (10) He himself mentions that there was a book by Vettius
Praetextatus (c.320–84) which claimed to be a Latin translation of both of
Aristotle’s Analytics, while in fact it contained translations of Themistius’
fourth-century paraphrases, “as is obvious to anyone who knows both.” (11)
Nor does Boethius seem to have commented on the Sophistical Refutations,
although he did translate it. About Boethius’ lost commentary on the Topics
not much can be said except that it probably depended on a paraphrase-
commentary by Themistius, which he also used in his De topicis differentiis,
and from which he seems to have derived the idea that a topic (Greek topos,
Latin locus) is not only a highly general notion such as “genus” or “form,”
but also an associated axiom (Greek axioma, Latin maxima), such as “A thing
is capable of exactly as much as its natural form permits” and “Things that
have different genera are also different from one another.” (12)
499
In a way, De topicis differentiis might more properly be classified as a
companion to Cicero’s Topics, which was taught in Roman rhetoric schools,
it seems, and on which first Marius Victorinus and then Boethius had
composed commentaries. Boethius, however, in On Topical Differences,
inserts so much material with a background in Aristotelian exegesis that the
result is something that might well be taken to contain the essentials of the
lore of Aristotle’s Topics – and, indeed, that was how medieval schoolmen
were to read the work." (pp. 37-38)
References:
Bobzien, S. 2002. ‘A Greek Parallel to Boethius’ De hypotheticis

syllogismis’, Mnemosyne 55: 285–300.
Dod, B. G. 1982. ‘Aristoteles Latinus’, in The Cambridge History of Later

Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 46–79.
Ebbesen, S. 1981a. Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s

Sophistici Elenchi: A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval
Writings on Fallacies (Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem
Graecorum 7.1–3), Leiden: Brill.
Ebbesen, S. 1981b. ‘Analyzing Syllogisms or Anonymus Aurelianensis III –

the (presumably) Earliest Extant Latin Commentary on the Prior Analytics,
and its Greek Model’, CIMAGL 37: 1–20
Hadot, P. 1959. ‘Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boèce sur les

Catégories d’Aristote dans le Codex Bernensis 363’, Archives d’histoire
doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 26, 11–27, reprinted in id., Plotin,
Porphyre: études néoplatoniciennes, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1999, 382–
410.
Minio-Paluello, L. 1957. ‘A Latin Commentary (? Translated by Boethius) on

the Prior Analytics and its Greek sources’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 77,
93–102, (reprinted in Minio-Paluello 1972, 347–56
500
Minio-Paluello, L. 1972. Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle, Amsterdam:
Hakkert.
Shiel, J. 1982. ‘A Recent Discovery: Boethius’ Notes on the Prior Analytics’,

Vivarium 20, 128–41.
Shiel, J. 1984. ‘Aristoteles Latinus III: Scholiorum in Analytica Priora

supplementa’, Bulletin de philosophie médievale édité par la S.I.E.P.M. 26,
119–26.
Sten Ebbesen, "The Aristotelian Commentator", in John Marenbon (ed.), The

Cambridge Companion to Boethius, Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press,
2009, pp. 34-55.
(5) See Minio-Paluello’s introductions to volumes I, II, III and V of
Aristoteles Latinus [= AL]. His arguments seem very strong, but I cannot
quite suppress a fear that his similar results for each work may be due to
some flaw in his methodology. Dod 1982: 54 cautiously says that “[t]he
revisions may be Boethius’ own, or they may be the work of an unknown
editor, possibly working in Constantinople where Boethius’ works are known
to have been transcribed (and perhaps edited) already in the sixth century.”
(6) See Hadot 1959.
(7) See Minio-Paluello 1957. Cf. Shiel 1982. Edition in AL III.4, supplements
in Shiel 1984.
(8) See Ebbesen 1981b.
(9) See Bobzien 2002.
(10) A reference to a Boethian commentary on Posterior Analytics I is found
in a thirteenth-century MS (Munich, clm 14246), but this is surely an error.
The work referred to was really the translation of Philoponus’ commentary
that most schoolmen attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias. I regret having
called attention to the Munich MS in a small article of 1973 (CIMAGL 9:
68–73), and I beg my readers not to waste their time on looking up that
article.
(11) Boethius 2IN [Second Commentary on On Interpretation] 3.
(12) For the history of the Boethian theory of topics see Ebbesen 1981a: 1.
106ff. The maxims cited occur at TD [De topicis differentiis] 2.7.26: p. 36
(1190A) (page references to TD are to Boethius 1990, with references to
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Boethius 1847 added in brackets) and 3.3.11: p. 52 (1197C).
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Boethius' Logic. An Annotated

Bibliography
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON BOETHIUS'
LOGICAL WORKS AND COMMENTARIES
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1989. "Boethius on Topics, Conditionals
and Argument-Forms." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 10:213-
225.
"Eleonore Stump’s splendid translation of Boethius's In Ciceronis
Topica (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988) is a very
welcome companion to her earlier translation of Boethius's De topicis
differentiis (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978).
Together the iwo volumes provide us with a hitherto unequalled
opportunity to come to grips with the logical work of an author whose
influence on medieval and Renaissance developments in this field was
surpassed only by Aristotle himself. Indeed, it was only because of
Boethius, his translations and commentaries, that Aristotle was first
transmitted to the Latin speaking West. The importance of Boethius's
work on the Topics is not purely historical, for it offers us a valuable
insight into a type of logic which is aimed not at the production of
formal languages or the examination of valid inference forms, but at
ways to produce belief in the context of debate and against a
503
background of straightforwardly metaphysical doctrines.
In this essay review I shall first make some general remarks about the
nature of Topics-logic, with particular reference to In Ciceronis Topica
. I shall then explore just one Topic, that of incompatibles, which is a
particularly interesting Topic for several reasons. First. Boethius's
attempt to define incompatibles shows the limitations of any formal
approach to the material in hand. Second, Boethius's use of the Topic
casts considerable light on his view of conditionals and their basis in
metaphysical features of the world. Third, the examination of these
issues helps explain Boethius's interpretation of certain key argument
forms and their relation to Stoic logic. Finally, I shall make some
remarks about Stump’s translation and notes." (p. 213)
Asztalos, Monika. 1993. "Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to
the Latin West: the Categories ." Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology no. 95:367-407.
"...my purpose in this paper is to bring out what these commentaries,
and especially the ones on the Isagoge and the Categories , reveal
about Boethius’ working methods in his earliest works on Greek logic.
I intend to deal less with the end product than with the road to it, and to
point to the stages of development and improvement exhibited within
these early works." (p. 367)
(...)
"Boethius devoted his first effort in Greek philosophy to Porphyry’s
Isagoge , and later, in the year of his consulate (510), when he was in
all likelihood in his late twenties, he spent all his spare time
commenting for the first time on a work by Aristotle, the Categories .
Ever since Samuel Brandt attempted a chronology of Boethius’ works
on the basis of their internal references, it has been commonly held that
when Boethius began commenting on the Categories , he had already
written both his expositions of Porphyry’s Isagoge (hereafter Isag. 1
and Isag. 2 ), the first one a dialogue in two books based on Marius
Victorinus’ apparently incomplete Latin version, the second a five book
commentary on his own, complete translation. (2) This is certainly not
the place for a full discussion of the chronology of Boethius’ works, but
for the arguments of this paper it is necessary to establish the order
between Isag. 2 and the commentary on the Categories (CC)." (p. 368)
(..)
504
"... I am not in a position to judge whether or not Boethius displays real
originality in his later, more mature works. But I think that it would be
unfair to expect novel interpretations in commentaries like the Isag. 1
and CC, which, if my assumptions in the first sections of this paper are
correct, are not only the earliest of Boethius’ works on Greek
philosophy but also the context in which he first encountered Aristotle.
He seems to have come quite unprepared to both the Isagoge and the
Categories , unarmed with proper translations and unfamiliar with the
work he was commenting on. Boethius is indeed an epitome of the
expression docendo discimus ." (p. 407)
(2) 2 S. Brandt, “Entstehungszeit und zeitliche Folge der Werke von
Boethius,” Philologus 62 (1903), 141-154 and 234-275. See also pp.
XXVI-XXIX of the Prolegomena to Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii In
Isagogen Porphyrii commenta , rec. S. Brandt, Corpus
Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 48, Wien/Leipzig, 1906. In his
“ Stylistic Tests and the Chronology of the Works of Boethius,”
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 18 (1907), 123-156, A. P.
McKinley’s conclusions concerning the chronology of Isag. 7 ,
Isag. 2, and the commentary on the Categories (hereafter CC) are the
same as Brandt’s.
McKinley studied the frequency of certain particles in these
commentaries as well as in Boethius’ translations of the Isagoge and
Categories , assuming that Boethius’ language was influenced by his
translations of Porphyry and Aristotle. Now, some of McKinley’s data
corroborate Brandt’s chronology whereas others support the one I will
suggest below. Furthermore, McKinley’s tests were made before the
appearance of L. MinioPaluello’s critical editions of Boethius’
translations in the Aristoteles Latinus and would therefore have to be
remade. I also believe that a necessary preliminary stage in examining
whether Boethius’ translating activities influenced his choice of
particles is to compare his Latin commentaries with the extant Greek
sources. Since there is no adequate source apparatus in any of the
editions of Boethius’ commentaries, this would mean a great deal of
work. Concerning the question whether Boethius wrote Isag. 2 before
or after CC, L. M. De Rijk follows Brandt’s view on pp. 125-127 of
“On the chronology of Boethius’ works on logic,” Vivarium 2 (1964),
1-9 and 125-162, on exactly the same grounds as the ones on which
505
Brandt based his conclusions and without corroborating them further.
———. 2003. "Boethius on the Categories ." In Boèce ou la chaîne des
savoirs , edited by Galonnier, Alain, 195-205. Louvain-Paris: Éditions
Peeters.
"Among Boethius’ commentaries on Greek works on logic (that is to
say, on Porphyry’s Eisagoge and on Aristotle’s Categories and Peri
hermeneias ), only the one on the Categories has so far not been
critically edited. At present I am editing the text and at the same time
preparing an English translation of it to appear in Ancient
Commentators on Aristotle . (1) So far only translations of Greek
commentaries have appeared in this series, and consequently the fact
that Boethius’ work on the Categories will be included is a statement
about his heavy dependence on Greek sources. It is of course a well-
known fact that all Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’s works are
heavily dependent on Greek Neoplatonic interpretations. However, the
extent to which this is true has so far not been revealed in the form of a
source apparatus accompanying the texts edited. In the case of the
commentaries on the Peri hermeneias , the two volumes of which
appeared in 1877 and 1880 respectively, the editor did not have access
to a modern edition of the extensive commentary by Ammonius which
has since appeared in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. (2) But for
an editor of Boethius’ commentary on the Categories the work is
easier: first of all, there are a number of Greek commentaries on this
work that have been edited in CAG. In addition, those by Porphyry,
Dexippus, and Ammonius have appeared in commented translations in
Ancient Commentators on Aristotle .
So, while in the process of editing Boethius’ work on the Categories , I
have provided the text with an apparatus indicating parallels in the
Greek commentaries. A great deal of work has already been done in
order to map out the nature and extent of Boethius’ dependence on the
Greeks in this particular work of his. There is Bidez’ groundbreaking
article “Boèce et Porphyre”, where Porphyry’s little commentary on the
Categories in the form of questions and answers (3) is described as “la
source unique, ou a peu près unique, du commentaire de Boèce” (p.
195); James Shier's provocative papers presenting Boethius as a
translator of scholia that he allegedly found in the margins of his copy
of Aristotle, some of them originating from the school of Proclus but
506
the majority taken from Q&A ; Sten Ebbesen’s article on Boethius as
an Aristotelian scholar, in which Q&A is described as Boethius’ main
source, a source from which he deviated when he wished to avoid
introducing Neoplatonic entities such as the Eternal Mind into his own
elementary work; a contribution of my own in which I claim that
Boethius used Q&A but also a commentary on the Categories written
by a follower and occasional critic of Iamblichus; and the valuable
footnotes to Steven Strange’s English translation of Q&A with their
references to Boethius’ commentary. (4) What all these different
studies have in common is that they consider Porphyry’s Q&A to be
Boethius’ main source.
So, one may justifyibly ask, is there anything really new to be said
about Boethius’ use of the Greek sources in his commentary on the
Categories ? The purpose of this paper is to show that while putting
together a source apparatus for Boethius’ text I have come to the
conclusion that our view of Boethius’ dependence on Porphyry needs
to be modified. (5)" (pp. 195-196)
(...)
"To conclude: Boethius naturally used Porphyry’s extant little dialogue
on the Categories . But his main source is a later Greek commentary
that makes use of Iamblichus’ commentary but whose author takes an
uncompromisingly Aristotelian stance. Since Iamblichus made ample
use of Porphyry’s no longer extant Ad Gedalium , the influence of
Porphyry is quite heavy on Boethius’ commentary. When the two
sources (Q&A and the later commentary) expressed different views, for
example on the scope of the Categories , Boethius did not bother to try
to harmonize between the two. In that respect, he is not a full-fledged
scholastic in his commentary on the Categories , which is an early
work of his, at least not as full-fledged as he was to become later, when
he wrote the Consolation of philosophy ." (pp. 204-205)
(1) General editor: Richard Sorabji.
(2) Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii commentarii in librum Aristotelis
PEPI EPMHNEIAS , rec. Carolus Meiser, I-II, Leipzig, 1877, 1880.
Ammonius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione commentarius , ed. A.
Busse, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (=CAG) IV:5, Berlin,
1897.
(3) Porphyrii in Aristotelis Categorias expositio per interrogationem et
507
responsionem , ed. A. Busse, CAG IV: 1, Berlin, 1887. This work is
henceforth referred to as Q&A .
(4) J. Bidez, “Boèce et Porphyre”, Revue belge de philologie et
d’histoire , 2, [1923] ρ. 189-201. J. Shiel, “Boethius’ commentaries on
Aristotle”, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies , 4, 1958, p. 217-244;
Boethius . Ed. by M. Fuhrmann and J. Gruber. Darmstadt, 1984, p. 155-
183; Aristotle transformed. The ancient commentators and their
influence . Ed. by R. Sorabji. London, 1990, p. 349-372. S. Ebbesen,
“Boethius as an Aristotelian Scholar” in Aristoteles, Werk und
Wirkung, Ραμί Moraux gewidmet . Bd II. Ed. J. Wiesner. Berlin-New
York, 1987, p. 286-311. M. Asztalos, “Boethius as a Transmitter of
Greek Logic to the Latin West: the Categories”, Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology , 95, 1993, p. 367-407. Porphyry, On Aristotle
Categories . Translated by S. K. Strange. London, 1992.
(5) I wish to thank Börje Bydén, Göteborg University, for his valuable
comments on this paper.
———. 2014. "Nomen and Vocabulum in Boethius’s Theory of
Predication." In Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought ,
edited by Kirchner, Andreas, Jürgasch, Thomas and Böhm, Thomas,
31-52. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Anyone who tries to make sense of Boethius’s commentary on
Aristotle’s Categories will be intrigued by his use of the terms nomen
and uocabulum . Sometimes it is clear that he cannot be using the terms
to refer to names (in our sense of the word) and words, but then how
does he use them? They may appear to be interchangeable, (1) but there
is a difference in how Boethius uses these terms, and it is important to
establish what the difference is, given that they are essential in
Boethius’s theory of predication. Then there is a cluster of verbs —
uocare, nominare, nuncupare —which are clearly connected with
uocabulum and nomen , but how? The purpose of this paper is to
present Boethius’s thoughts on predication by exploring the way he
uses these key terms.
I will be quoting extensively from my own forthcoming edition of
Boethius’s commentary on the Categories . I have not given references
to the text printed in Migne’s Patrologia Latina vol. 64 but have
specified which lines in Aristotle’s text the passages quoted comment
on. This will make it fairly easy for readers to find the appropriate
508
places in the Migne edition. All translations are my own.
In Boethius’s commentary on Aristotle’s Categories , nomina and
uocabula are couched in a theory involving also res, uox, significare,
significatio, and designare .
These are main protagonists in Boethius’s commentaries on the De
interpretatione , a work in which nomina and uocabula take the back
seat." (p. 31)
(...)
"Does Boethius’s use of uocabulum and nomen make him a paradigm
of Late Ancient thought? In the case of nomen as a term for a mental
collection of things he could to a certain extent lean on tradition, given
that the word is commonly used for a collection like a family or a
people in classical Latin. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that
Aristotle uses ὄνομα in the same way. But what about uocabulum and
its connection with uox and uocare ? Only a study of earlier Latin texts
can confirm that Boethius has introduced a new tool in the theory of
predication. And it remains to be investigated whether or not medieval
philosophers appreciated the value of the tool and employed it in their
own discussions of predication." (p. 50)
(1) In her recent book Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic. A Study
of Boethius’ Commentaries on Peri hermeneias, (= Philosophia antiqua;
127), Leiden/Boston 2012, Taki Suto holds: “Even though there may be
some difference in Boethius’ usage of these two expressions, the
difference is slight, and he may not differentiate between them.” (p. 68,
note 109).
Barnes, Jonathan. 1981. "Boethius and the Study of Logic." In
Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence , edited by Gibson,
Margaret, 73-89. Oxford: Blackwell.
Reprinted in J. Barnes, Logical Matters. Essays in Ancient Philosophy
II , New York: Oxford University Press, Chapter 26, pp. 666-682.
"Boethius’ logical oeuvre contains works of three types. First, and at
the centre, there are the Latin translations of the Greek texts: Boethius
put into Latin the Categories , the de Interpretatione , the Prior and
Posterior Analytics , (5) the Topics , the Sophistici Elenchi; and he
prefaced his Latin Organon with a version of Porphyry’s Isagoge , the
standard Greek introduction to Peripatetic philosophy. (6) Secondly,
there are the commentaries: Boethius planned commentaries on the
509
Isagoge and on each book of the Organon , and he added, as a
supplement, a commentary on Cicero's Topics. (7) The commentaries
on Aristotle's Topics and Analytics have not survived; and some
scholars doubt if Boethius lived to complete his commentatorial task.
(8) Thirdly, there are the treatises: On Division covered much of the
ground tilled in the Categories ; On Categorical Syllogisms and the
unfinished Introduction to Categorical Syllogisms correspond in part to
the de Interpretatione and the Prior Analytics ; On Hypothetical
Syllogisms has no counterpart in Aristotle’s works, but answers to a
fixed feature of later Peripatetic logic; On Topical Differences matches
Aristotle’s Topics . (9)
Thus on three distinct levels Boethius translated Peripatetic logic from
Greece to Rome. His achievement is remarkable by any reckoning; and
his work in logic stands as a paradigm of sustained and systematic
scholarship. The next three sections will discuss separately the
translations, the commentaries, and the treatises; but it should not be
forgotten that, for Boethius, those three types of scholarly production
were complementary parts of a unitary whole." (pp. 74-75)
(...)
"What, then, was Boethius’ contribution to the study of logic?
First, Boethius was not an original logician: he did not pretend to be.
He saw himself as a translator, conveying Greek wisdom to a Greekless
world; the insights which his works contain are not his own, his
knowledge is tralaticious. From time to time we can, I believe, hear
Boethius’ own voice; and some at least of the disposition and
organisation of his material originated in his own head. But those
touches of personality are relatively rare and relatively unimportant: the
summa logicae which Boethius determined to present was traditional
Peripatetic logic; and it is an error to speak of a Boethian logic.
Secondly, it must be admitted that today we owe little to Boethius’
immense labours. He strove to transmit Aristotle to the West; but our
present knowledge of Aristotle depends hardly at all on his strivings.
Aristotle’s texts, and the texts of his Greek commentators, have
survived in their original Greek: we can study Peripatetic logic, as
Boethius himself did, in the original sources. Had all Boethius’ logical
writings been lost, ihr modern student of logic would have little to
bewail, apart perhaps from the treatment of hypothetical syllogistic.
510
It is rather within the context of his own dark times that Boethius’
service to logic must be sought. Greek learning was increasingly
inaccessible, and the Latin world was rude. By his sole efforts Boethius
ensured that the study of Aristotle’s Organon , and with it the discipline
of logic, was not altogether eclipsed in the West. Boethius’ labours
gave logic half a millenium of life: what logician could say as much as
that for his work? what logician could desire to say more?" (pp. 84-85)
(5) The translation of the Posterior Analytics has not survived; but see
AL [Aristoteles Latinus ], IV. 1-4, pp. XII-XV.
(6) For the status of the Isagoge see in Isag ed 1. 14-5. Boethius
regarded the Organon , prefaced by the Isagoge , as a unitary — but
not a fully comprehensive — treatment of logic.
(7) At first blush, the commentary on Cicero seems anomalous; but in
fact Cicero presents his Topics as a version indeed, a translation — of
Aristotle’s Topics , and Boethius regarded Cicero’s work as forming an
integral part of Peripatetic logic (in Cic Top 271-3).
(8) (i) Topics : Boethius states categorically that he has written a
commentary (Top diff 1191 A, 1209 C, 1216 D). Nothing is known to
have survived.
(ii) Prior Analytics : we possess only preliminary notes (published in
AL , III. 1-4) ; at Syll cat 829D Boethius says that he will comment on
the Analytics , but he nowhere asserts that he has composed such a
commentary.
(iii) Posterior Analytics : a note to a thirteenth-century commentary on
the Sophistici Elenchi quotes from ‘Boethius’ commentary on Book I
of the Posterior Analytics ': see S. Ebbesen, ‘Manlius Boethius on
Aristotle’s Analytica Posteriora , CIMAGL IX (1973), 68-9. If we
believe the note, then — contrary to orthodox opinion — Boethius did
write such a commentary.
(9) The dating of Boethius’ logical works is to some extent conjectural:
see the long discussion of L. M. de Rijk, 'On the chronology of
Boethius’ works on logic’, Vivarium II (1964), 1-49, 125-62. His first
opus was in Isag ed 1, composed in 504/5; he was probably working on
Intr syll cat and in An Pr in 523; in Cat is dated to 510. There is not
much awry with the following ordering: in Isag ed 1; Syll cat ; Div ;
trans Isag ; in Isag ed 2; trans Cat ; in Cat ; trans de Int ; in Int ed ι; in
Int ed 2; trans Top ; trans Soph El , Syll hyp , in Top ; in Cic Top ; trans
511
An ; Top diff ; Intr syll cat ; in An Pr .
Belli, Margherita. 2014. "Boethius, disciple of Aristotle and master of
theological method: The term indemonstrabilis ." In Boethius as a
Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought , edited by Kirchner, Andreas,
Jürgasch, Thomas and Böhm, Thomas, 53-82. Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter.
"Indemonstrabilis . This term belongs to the Late Latin language and is
a legacy of Aristotle’s logic, especially of the Analytica posteriora . It
can be considered, therefore, a useful tool to focus on three aspects of
the deep and wide knowledge of the Aristotelian logic, which
contributes to making Boethius a unique figure among the Late Ancient
authors of the Latin West and the leading guide of the so-called
boethiana aetas . The three aspects entail:
a) the relationship between Boethius and the Author of the Peri
hermeneias , as both committed themselves to transmitting the
Aristotelian logic to the Latin West and to developing a suitable
terminology;
b) the methodological meanings that Boethius conveyed to
indemonstrabilis , in order to open it to rational theology, through the
convergence between maxima propositio and comunis animi conceptio
;
c) the way in which some 12th-century authors transformed the
previous convergence into an identity, making it the starting point of a
method that distinguishes theological knowledge from the other arts
and places it above them all.
From a research conducted by using the Library of Latin Texts A–B,
Aristoteles Latinus Data-base, Patrologia Latina Data-base, and
Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters , (1) it results that
indemonstrabilis was rarely employed until the first half of the 12th
century, when the Analytica Posteriora came back to the Latin West,
along with Aristotle’s other treatises. During the Late Antiquity
indemonstrabilis was used only by the Author of the Peri hermeneias
and by Boethius. It does not matter if the Author of the Peri
hermeneias cannot be identified as Apuleius of Madaura, because in the
worst hypothesis the Peri hermeneias must be dated no later than the
4th century, having been quoted by Martianus Capella in De nuptiis
Philologiae et Mecurii . (2) Among the pages of the Peri hermeneias
512
and Boethius’s De syllogismo categorico (505–506), In librum
Aristotelis De interpretatione secunda editio (513–516), and De topicis
differentiis (522–523),3 there are 16 occurrences of indemonstrabilis ,
which signify (for the related passages see the appendix):
1.1.a. the first four moods in the first figure of categorical syllogism
1.2. the Stoic hypothetical indemonstrables
1.3.a. the maximal propositions of dialectic." (pp. 53-54)
(1) Brepolis Latin , www.brepolis.net (accessed 30/05/2014);
Patrologia Latina Database , Alexandria/Cambridge 1995–2008;
Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters aus dem Bereich der
Philosophie und angrenzender Gebiete , ed. by Rolf Schönberger et
alii, Berlin 2011.
(2) The authorship of the Peri hermeneias is still questioned. Some
scholars maintain Apuleius’s paternity of the treatise and others reject
it. Among the scholars in favour are Sandy, Sullivan, Londey,
Johanson, and Sallmann, whilst Beaujeu, Lumpe, Moreschini, and
Harrison are contrary. See Stephen J. Harrison: Apuleius. A Latin
Sophist , Oxford/New York 2000, 11; Gerard Sandy: The Greek World
of Apuleius. Apuleius and the Second Sophistic , (= Mnemosyne.
Supplementum; 174), Leiden/New York/ öln 1997, 38–41; Die
Literatur des Umbruchs. Von der römischen zur christlichen Literatur,
117 bis 284 n. Chr., ed. by Klaus Sallmann, (= Handbuch der
Altertumswissenschaft; 8,4), Munich 1997, 301; Claudio Moreschini:
“Ricerche sulla tradizione manoscritta del De interpretatione
pseudoapuleiano”, in: Pan 10 (1990), 61–73; David Londey/Carmen
Johanson: The Logic of Apuleius. Including a Complete Latin Text and
English Translation of the Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius of Madaura , (=
Philosophia antiqua; 47), Leiden/New York 1987, 8–15; Adolf Lumpe:
Die Logik des Pseudo-Apuleius: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der
Philosophie, Augsburg 1982, 44–46; Apulée: Opuscules
philosophiques et fragments, ed. J. Beaujeu, Paris 1973, vii–viii; Mark
W. Sullivan: Apuleian Logic. The Nature, Sources, and Influence of
Apuleius’s Peri Hermeneias, (= Studies in logic and the foundations of
mathematics; 37), Amsterdam 1967, 235–242.
(3) Apuleius: Peri hermeneias , in: Apuleius: De Philosophia libri , ed.
C. Moreschini, (= Bibliotheca Teubneriana), Stuttgart/Leipzig 1991;
Boethius: De syllogismo categorico , ed. C. Thomsen Thörnqvist, (=
513
Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia; 68), Gothenburg 2008;
Boethius: Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, ed. C.
Meiser, II, (= Bibliotheca Teubneriana), Leipzig 1880; Boethius: De
topicis differentiis und die Byzantinische Rezeption dieses Werkes , ed.
D.Z. Nikitas, (= Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Byzantinoi
philosophoi; 5), Athens/Paris/Bruxelles 1990.
Bird, Otto. 1960. "The Formalizing of the Topics in Mediaeval Logic."
"The Topical Difference, or more literally the Difference of the
Maximal Proposition, is that by which one Topic differs from another
(BDT. 1186A).
Thus the Topic of Definition, for instance, differs from that of Whole
and Part in that the Maxim of the one warrants an inference among
terms in which a Definition occurs, while the other warrants an
inference among terms in which Whole and Part occur.
Topical Differences, according to Boethius, "are drawn forth from the
terms constituting the question and then discoursed about" (BDT.
1186A).
Thus in our example, it is the question, whether trees are animals, that
makes it possible to appeal to the Topic of Definition, since, knowing
the definition of "animal" and that trees do not satisfy it, we are
warranted by the Topical Maxim to conclude that trees are not animals.
The De Differentiis Topicis is little more than a listing of such Topical
Differences with representative Maxims for each. Book II gives the
compilation of Topics made by Themistius from Aristotle; Book III
that of Cicero, followed by a comparison of the two. Book I is a general
introduction dealing with the terms used for analysing an argument, and
Book IV, the final book, considers the Topics used by rhetoricians.
This work became the source for mediaeval Topical doctrine. It seems
to be the only work Abelard used for his extensive treatise on the
Topics.
Peter of Spain made a precis of it (primarily of the second book) and
provided additional Maxims in the fifth tract of his Summulae. Since
this became a standard elementary text in logic from the late 13th
through the 15th centuries, Boethius thus remained indirectly the
auctoritas for the Topics, and this seems to have remained true even
after the recovery of the Aristotelian Topic a in the late 12th century."
514
(pp. 140-141)
References
BDT = Boethius, De Differentiis Topicis , in Migne, Patrologia Latina
, T. 64.
Bobzien, Susanne. 2002. "A Greek Parallel to Boethius De hypotheticis
syllogismis ." Mnemosyne no. 55:285-300.
"In this paper I discuss a longish anonymous scholium to Aristotle's
Analytics which is a Greek parallel to Boethius' De Hypotheticis
Syllogismis .
The scholium is available in print only in Theodor Waitz's edition of
Aristotle's Organon (Leipzig 1844). It is Codex Laur. 72.5, ff. 210-2,
appended at the end of a manuscript of the Prior and Posterior
Analytics . Dieter Harlfinger has dated this part of the codex to the
second half of the 10th century (7) this gives us a terminus ante quem .
The scholium has, I believe, so far not been recognized as a parallel to
Boethius, nor has it been discussed in the literature on hypothetical
syllogisms. (8) I am also not aware of any translation. The scholium is
important for the history of hypothetical syllogistic, because it is the
only extant Greek text that provides a close parallel to the particular
theory Boethius presents in Latin. We can assume that the scholium
was composed no later than the 10th century (see above). But it
preserves elements of a theory that was most probably developed
before the 6th century. There are a number of idiosyncrasies in the
terminology, a fact that sets the text apart from all other Greek sources
on hypothetical syllogistic, and thus adds to its interest.
In the following I present the text of the scholium, a translation, and a
commentary, including some general remarks about the theory the
scholium preserves." (p. 286)
(...)
"In the commentary section it should have become increasingly
apparent that the anonymous scholium on hypothetical syllogisms in
Waitz is Peripatetic, and not Stoic, in its theoretical approach as well as
its terminology. There are several elements of early Peripatetic
hypothetical syllogistic preserved in it, although section (10) is likely to
be witness to a later development of Peripatetic or Platonist
hypothetical syllogisms. The most striking feature in the scholium is
the large number of close parallels to Boethius' De Hypotheticis
515
Syllogismis . Since it is rather unlikely that the scholium is based on a
Latin source, we can assume that there must have been a Greek source
from which both the scholium and large parts of Boethius' De
Hypotheticis Syllogismis are ultimately derived." (p. 300)
(7) D. Harlfinger, in: Paul Moraux (ed.), Aristoteles Graecus ,vol. 1
(Berlin 1976), Nachtrâge, 475-80, discusses Laur. 72.5.
(8) Except that Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande , vol. I
(Leipzig 1855), 656, quotes part of the scholium in footnote 167.
Cameron, Margaret. 2009. "Boethius on Utterances, Understanding and
Reality." In The Cambridge Companion to Boethius , edited by
Marenbon, John, 85-104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"In this chapter, we will look at the three elements that form the basis
of the theory of signification for Boethius, namely expressions,
understanding and reality, and their relation to one another. Boethius
did not write separate treatises on the philosophy of language, cognition
or metaphysics. Instead, he wrote commentaries on Aristotelian logic.
By the time he began to work on them around the start of the sixth
century, the texts of Aristotelian logic were read in a fixed sequence:
the first three were the Isagoge , Categories and On Interpretation , and
Boethius treated topics as and when they are discussed in these texts by
Porphyry and Aristotle. To grasp Boethius’ theory of signification, we
must therefore gather his views on utterances, understanding and reality
from a variety of places in his commentaries and put them together. As
evidenced by the sheer length of the treatment of Aristotle’s brief
comments on signification in his commentaries on On Interpretation ,
there is no question but that Boethius was aware of the importance of a
theory of signification in explaining how the words we use are able to
make sense to others and to refer to reality. We might expect, therefore,
that Boethius’ views on language broadly cohere with his theory of
cognition and metaphysics given elsewhere in the commentaries on the
Isagoge and Categories. (1)
The following sections aim to give a general overview of Boethius’
theory of signification by considering in turn what he says about
expressions, understanding and reality in his logical commentaries.
In the final section, we will consider the ways in which Boethius’ views
have been variously interpreted from medieval and contemporary
perspectives." (p. 85)
516
(1) This is not to suggest that Boethius’ views did not change over the
course of writing his several commentaries. With the exception of
Aristotle’s Categories , Boethius wrote two commentaries per treatise.
Here we are concerned to acquire a general overview of Boethius’
theory of signification, and we will concentrate mainly on two
commentaries by Boethius, 2IS [Second Commentary on Isagoge ] and
2IN [Second Commentary on On Interpretation ], as well as CAT
[Commentary on Categories ].
Casey, John Patrick. 2012. "Boethius’s Works on Logic in the Middle
Ages." In A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages , edited by
Kaylor Jr., Noel Harold and Phillips, Philip Edward, 193-219. Leiden:
Brill.
"This chapter discusses important Boethian contributions to medieval
logic, in particular his definition of the problem of universals and his
translation of Aristotelian logical works. It provides a brief introduction
to the basic features of ancient logic relevant to Boethius's most
noteworthy contributions to medieval logic. The chapter also discusses
the three primary avenues of Boethius's influence upon medieval logic:
his translations, commentaries, and original logical treatises. In the late
ancient world, the Aristotelian and the Stoic systems of logic were
considered to be incompatible rivals. The form of Aristotelian logic
survived and was translated into the Middle Ages in the work of
Boethius. This meant that medieval logicians learned about categorical
propositions, syllogisms, and the problem of universals, rather than
propositions, disjunctions, and conditionals." (p. 193)
Chadwick, Henry. 1981. Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic,
Theology, and Philosophy . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Chapter III. Logic Part of Philosophy or a Tool of all Philosohy? 108;
Logic and Rhetoric 111; Porphyry 120; Neoplatonists after Porphyry:
Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Ammonius 127; Boethius' commentaries
on the Isagoge 131; Translator of Aristotle 133; The Ten Categories
141; On Interpretation 152; Future Contingents 157; The Monographs
on Logic 163; Propositional Logic and the Hypothetical Syllogism 166.
"The place of logic in the hierarchy of knowledge was one of the many
matters long in dispute between the Aristotelians and the Stoics. To the
Stoics 'logic' meant something wide, an independent branch of
philosophy, the other two contrasted branches being ethics and 'physics'
517
(the scientific study of nature). The Stoics could point out that this
threefold classification had a basis in the Topics (A, 14) of Aristotle
himself. The Aristotelians, on the other hand, treated logic almost in
our modern sense as a practical instrument for the discovery of fallacies
in argument on any subject, an indispensable tool for every department
of human inquiry. This Peripatetic attitude, from which the title
Organon derives, presupposes a narrow understanding of the discipline
as concerned with propositions and syllogisms and terms.
The Platonic tradition originally preferred to speak of 'dialectic',
according to Boethius because it is a power of dividing (In Cic. Top . I,
1045B following Plato, Sophist 253d). Through its distinctions we learn
to divide genera into species, and classify different things under their
proper genus. But neither the Neoplatonists of Athens and Alexandria
nor Boethius mark a significant difference in force between 'logical'
and 'dialectical' reasoning. (1) Until the twelfth century, when an
attempt was made to classify dialectic with grammar as two branches of
Logica , the terms were to be used more or less interchangeably.
The Peripatetic case for their estimate of logic is most eloquently put
by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on the Prior Analytics
(CAG II, 1) in a way that makes minor concessions to the Platonic
tradition. We have a number of late Platonist accounts of this dispute,
e.g. the commentaries on the Prior Analytics by Ammonius (CAG IV,
6 pp. 811) and Philoponus (CAG XIII, 2 pp. 69). It is incautious to
assume with Courcelle that Boethius had Ammonius before him when
writing his second commentary on Porphyry in which the dispute is
discussed. (2) One major element in Boethius' argument there, that
logic is not confined by the limits and aims of other parts of
philosophy, and is not restricted to a particular set of questions, stands
without parallel in Ammonius. It is difficult to affirm a literary relation
when one is dealing with a convention of the schools which every
Neoplatonic teacher will think it his duty to expound." (pp. 108-109)
(1) The contrary is asserted, on a waferthin basis, by G. Pfligersdorffer,
['Zu Boethius, De Interpr . ed sec. I p. 4, 4 sq. Meiser nebst
Beobachtungen zur Geschichte der Dialektik bei den Römern'], Wiener
Studien 66, 1953, 131-154.] p. 152.
(2) P. Courcelle, Les Lettres grecques en occident (1948), p. 272 = Late
Latin Writers (1969), p. 288.
518
Clark, Joseph T. 1952. "Boethius and Analytical Techniques."
Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical
Association no. 3:35-37.
———. 1952. "Boethius and Material Implication." Philosophical
Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association no. 3:37-
38.
Correia, Manuel Antonio. 2001. "Boethius on Syllogisms with
Negative Premises." Ancient Philosophy no. 21:161-174.
"According to Aristotle, no syllogism is conclusive with two negative
premisses (Prior Analytics i 4.41 b7-9). The observation is a central
rule of his Theory of Syllogism and recognized so by ancient,
medieval, and modern logicians. In ancient scholastic discussions,
however, there is a case made in support of thepossibility of conclusion
from two negative premisses. It takes, as an authoritative proof, a
syllogism made by Plato in the Theaetetus and affirms that syllogisms
with two negative premisses are more frequent in philosophical
literature than one might suppose.
The problem, recovered especially by Boethius' second commentary on
Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Meiser 1877-1880), arises from
considerations of the logical properties of indefinite names in
categorical or simple propositions." (p. 161)
(...)
"The question of whether Plato was conscious of the syllogistic
technicality that Boethius indicates is surely controversial. We can
instead try to resolve the question of whether this syllogism can be
reasonably derived from Plato.
Meiser's edition gives a valuable notice: the syllogism in question can
be found at Theaetetus 186. In fact, the exact passage seems to be
Theaet. 186c5-e10." (p. 168)
(...)
"I have argued that the case of a syllogism in Plato's Theaetetus , where
two apparent negative premisses draw a conclusion, is simply a
confirmation of the rule that there are no syllogisms with negative
premisses and not, as Boethius suggests, a proof that a universal
negation like 'Every man is not just' is equivalent to another one like
'Every man is not-just'. I have discussed this equivalence and similar
ones arising from singular, particular, and unquantified propositions.
519
but the result is that if the equivalence in question does work, it cannot
be a characteristic of every categorical proposition. Indeed, even
though formal proofs can be provided for some cases of categoricals,
unquantified ones are explicitly stated as consequences by Aristotle (,A
man is not just' follows from' A man is not-just', but not vice versa).
Moreover, equivalences are indeed inconsistent with the principle that
there is only one negation for a single affirmation, which Aristotle
emphasizes in De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics . In the end, the
question of which was Aristotle's idea of logic arises: whether a formal
idea or a dialectical one (i.e., one compatible with the principle that an
affirmation can have only one negation)." (p. 174)
———. 2009. "The Syllogistic Theory of Boethius." Ancient
"Boethius played an important role in transmitting logic to the Latin
West. His translations, commentaries, and treatises deal amply with the
most important thesis of Aristotelian logic, a theory whose influence is
perceptible even in the last century (cf. Corcoran 2009 [‘Aristotle’s
Demonstrative Logic’ History and Philosophy of Logic , 30: 1-20]).
Two of his surviving logical treatises have traditionally received the
title of ‘syllogistic’, the Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos (=ISC)
and De syllogismis categoricis (=DSC), but DSC is the only one
explaining syllogistic, for ISC does little more than mention, belatedly
in the course of the text, its being an introduction to syllogistic." (p.
391)
(...)
"Since there has been much discussion concerning the literary unity of
DSC’s two books and its relation to ISC—including attempts to take
book 2 of DSC as book 2 of ISC (which would be the actual
Introductio Boethius wrote), it is my purpose to argue that DSC
proposes a unitary view of Aristotelian logic, in which syllogistic
comes to be the third of the three branches organizing the main logical
inferences of the theory: opposition, conversion, and syllogism.
Accordingly, DSC is indivisible from a doctrinal point of view and no
book of DSC can be the part of the other treatise. This discussion is
long overdue and it should contribute to understanding the scope of the
respective treatises and their relation to each other." (p. 393)
———. 2012. "Boethius on the Square of Opposition." In Around and
520
Beyond the Square of Opposition , edited by Béziau, Jean-Yves and
Jacquette, Dale, 41-52. Basel: Birkhäuser.
Abstract: "This article intends to reconstruct the textual tradition of the
square of oppositions from the earliest textual sources just as treated in
Boethius’ commentaries on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione and his
treatises on syllogistic, De syllogismo categorico and Introductio ad
syllogismos categoricos . The research discovers two different tracks.
One way comes from Plato’s Sophist and Aristotle’s De Interpretatione
, and the aim is to distinguish contrariety from contradiction. The
second influence also starts from Aristotle, but now in connection with
his Prior Analytics and its commentaries and treatises on categorical
syllogistic, where the aim is to show the square as one of the three main
chapters of the complete theory of categorical logic. I suggest that this
double ingredient has accompanied the development of the square from
the very original beginning of logic."
Cranz, Edward F. 2006. "Boethius and Abelard." In Reorientations of
Western Thought from Antiquity to the Renaissance , edited by
Struever, Nancy, 1-20. Aldershot: Ashgate.
"Let me conclude with two brief general addenda. First, I have tried to
outline the main development of Abelard's logic and the one most
dependent upon Boethius. What we have seen may be summarized by
saying that, where Boethius closely connects, sometimes even
identifies, intellections, universals and propositions with 'res ' or
beings, Abelard shifts all these relationships to a new context and then
denies them all: intellections, universals and propositions are not 'res ''
as physical things. To repeat a phrase; he desubstantializes them all.
But Abelard never stops thinking. Sometimes his conclusions are more
new questions than new answers, and his second treatment of a
problem is sometimes very different from his first. Some scholars have
described the last stage of his thought as a 'return to Platonism': but I
think he is more creative and original. He has changed Boethius' res
into 'physical things,' and he has denied that intellections or meanings
were 'physical things' and turned them into 'nothings.' But there are
hints, and there is no time to analyze them here, that at the end he
began to move to another new solution in which meanings from having
been nothings turn into the ultimate realities. If I had to suggest
parallels to his last stage, Petrarch, Lorenzo Valla and Nicholas of Cusa
521
come to mind. So if I have tried to describe Abelard's transformation of
Boethius, what was left, and I don't believe it was ever completed,
might be called Abelard's transformation of Abelard.
Second, while Abelard's writings had no wide dispersion and while he
was not followed by any school or even by very many pupils, I believe
his diffuse influence was greater than one might expect. The
reorientations of thought one finds in his logic and elsewhere often
spread more widely in his own time than did his specific ideas; they
were not destroyed by the reception of Aristotle and in some ways
provided a context within which Aristotle was received. So in
concluding I cannot resist noting that, while I have characterized what
happened as a transformation of Boethius, let us not in this group forget
that it was a transformation of Boethius." (p. 20)
De Rijk, Lambertus Marie. 1964. "On the Chronology of Boethius'
Works on Logic. Part I." Vivarium no. 2:1-49.
"The chronological order of Boethius' works appears to be a rather
difficult problem. Hence, it is not surprising that the numerous attempts
to establish it led the scholars to results which are neither all conclusive
nor uniform. In this article I confine myself to Boethius' works on
logic. Before giving my own contribution it would seem to be useful to
summarize the results of preceding studies and to make some general
remarks of a methodological nature.
(...)
My conclusion from this survey is that the best we can do in order to
establish approximately the chronological order of Boethius' works on
logic is to start a careful and detailed examination of all our data on this
matter. In doing so an analysis of their contents seems to be quite
indispensable, no less than a thorough examination of doctrinal and
terminological differences." (pp. 1 and 4).
———. 1964. "On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic. Part
II." Vivarium no. 2:125-162.
"We shall now sum up the results of our investigations. First some
previous remarks. Our first table gives of nine of the works discussed
the chronological interrelation, which can be established with a fair
degree of certainty. The figures put after the works give the
approximative date of their composition (the second one that of their
edition); when printed in heavy types they are based on external data;
522
the other ones are based on calculation.
Table 1
Boethius' birth about 480 A.D.
In Porphyrii Isagogen, editio prima about 504-505
In Syllogismis categoricis libri duo (= ? Institutio categorica) about
505-506
In Porphyrii Isagogen, editio secunda about 507-509
In Aristotelis Categorias (? editio prima) about 509-511
In Aristotelis Perhemeneias, editio prima not before 513
In Aristotelis Perhemeneias, editio secunda about 515-516
De syllogismis hypotheticis libri tres between 516 and 522
In Ciceronis Topica Commentaria before 522
De topicis differentiis libri quattuor before 523
Boethius' death 524
The rest of the works discussed cannot be inserted in this table without
some qualification. (...)
We may establish the following table for the works not contained in out
first table:
Table 2
Liber de divisione between 505 and 509
possible second edition of the In Categorias after 515-516
Translations of the Topica (and Sophistici Elenchi ) and of the
Analytica Priora and Analytica Posteriora not after 520
Commentary on Aristotle's Topica before 523
the so-called Introductio (? = In Priora Analytica Praedicanda )
certainly after 513; probably c. 523
Scholia on Aristotle's Analytica Priora first months of 523 at the latest"
———. 2003. "The Logic of Indefinite Names in Boethius, Abelard,
Duns Scotus, and Radulphus Brito." In Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in
the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition , edited by
Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneli Henri, 207-233.
Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
"Aristotle's doctrine of indefinite names (nouns) was handed down to
the Middle Ages together with Boethius' comments and explanations.
Boethius' view of the matter has two characteristic features. For one
523
thing, there is a certain ambiguity on his part concerning the precise
semantic value of such terms; for another, Boethius deviates
considerably from Aristotle in that he explicitly assigns the property of
'holding indifferently of existents and non-existents' not only to the
indefinite rhéma (as it is found in Aristotle, De interpr. 3, 16b15) but to
the indefinite name (onoma ) as well.
Until the end of the 12th century the logic and grammar (1) of
indefinite terms (nouns and verbs) was a much debated issue. Although
assiduously echoing the well-known auctoritates Medieval thinkers did
not always go the whole way with their predecessors. For example,
Abelard and Scotus, starting from their own philosophical tenets, more
or less inconspicuously corrected some dubious elements in Boethius'
interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the indefinite name. Peter
Abelard, especially, took great pains to precisely define the meaning of
indefinite terms. He focussed his attention on the proper meaning of
indefinite terms rather than on the question whether they are 'holding
indifferently of existents and non-existens'. In contrast, 13th-century
scholars like Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito based their discussion
of the proper meaning of the indefinite name upon the question 'Utrum
nomen infinitum aliquid ponat ' ("Whether an infinite name posits
something"), which calls to mind Boethius' claim that indefinite names
'hold indifferently of existent and non-existents'.
Abelard's discussion of the proper meaning of the indefinite name is
also interesting in that it helps us to gain a good understandiiip of what
Boethius had in mind in claiming that the indefinite name 'siginifes an
infinite number of things' ('significat infinita '). For, thanks to Äbelard's
expositions, it becomes clear that the phrase 'significare infinita ',
which, on the face of it, may be taken as referring to the extensional of
the indefinite name, on closer inspection proves to concern its
intension, because the controversy between Abelard and Boethius turns
out to be about two different views of the indefinite name's intension
rather that about any opposition of intension as against extension." pp.
207-208.
(1) For the grammatical approaches to the problem of the indefinite
term in the 12th century, see C.H. Kneepkens, "Orléans 266 and the
Sophismata Collection: Master Joscelin of Soissons and the infinite
words in the early twelfth century", in St. Read (ed.) Sophisms in
524
Medieval Logic and Grammar. Acts of the Ninth European Symposium
for Medieval Logic and Semantics, held at St Andrews, June 1990
(Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, 48; Dordrectt/Boston/London
1993), 64-85.
Dürr, Karl. 1951. The Propositional Logic of Boethius . Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Contents: Preface VIII; Abbreviations IX-X; Introduction 1; I. The
sources of "De Syllogismo Hypothetico" 4; II. The effects of Boethius'
propositional logic in the early scholastic period 16; III. Choice of
metascience and metalanguage 19; IV. Analysis of "De Syllogismo
Hypothetico" 30; V. Analysis of a section of Boethius' Commentary on
Cicero's Topics 66; Appendix by Norman M. Martin 74-79.
Boe. = Anitii Manlii Severini Boethi . . . opera, quae extant, omnia .
Basileae (1570).
"The text of the treatise "The Propositional Logic of Boethius" was
finished in 1939. Prof. Jan Lukasiewicz wished at that time to issue it in
the second volume of "Collectanea Logica"; as a result of political
events, he was not able to carry out his plan.
In 1938, I published an article in "Erkenntnis" entitled "Aussagenlogik
im Mittelalter"; this article included the contents of a paper which I
read to the International Congress for the Unity of Science in
Cambridge, England, in 1938 (Cf. Erkenntnis, vol. 7, pp. 160-168). The
subject matter of this paper touched upon that of the above-mentioned
treatise. Recently an article of Mr. René van den Driessche, "Sur le 'de
syllogismo hypothetico' de Boèce", was published in the journal
"Methodos" (vol. I, no. 3, [1949]). Mr. van den Driessche referred in
this article to the article on propositional logic in the Middle Ages,
which had appeared in "Erkenntnis". This reminded me of my yet-
unpublished treatise on the propositional logic of Boethius." (From the
Preface )
"§ 1. The Two Books of Boethius on the Theory of the Proposition.
It is the unique property of propositional logic that the variables which
are used are propositional variables, i.e. variables whose values are
propositions.
Among the logical writings of the man whom, for short, is called
“Boethius’’ and whose full name is “Anicius Manlius Severinus
Boethius”, we find two which can be characterized as presentations of
525
propositional logic.
The first of these is entitled “de syllogismo hypothetico” (on the
hypothetical syllogism).
Incidentally, it should be noted that this title, as Samuel Brandt has
shown, does not originate with Boethius, and it would be more correct
to give the book the title “de hypotheticis syllogismis” (on hypothetical
syllogisms) (Cf. Samuel Brandt: 'Entstehungszeit und zeitliche Folge
der Werke des Boethius'. Philologus , Bd. LXII (1903) p. 238).
Nevertheless, one does well to quote the work under its incorrect title
“de syllogismo hypothetico” as long as the old editions are in use.
The second book is a commentary on the Topics of Cicero. Here we do
not consider the entire commentary, but only certain sections; we will
indicate later which sections come into consideration (Cf. infra § 38)."
(p. 1)
(...)
"§ 4. More Precise Charactrization of Boethius' Propositional Logic.
At the beginning of this treatise, we declared that the logic which is
represented in the two works of Boethius, may be characterized as
propositional logic. We add the remark that all of the sentences that
have an independent value (i.e. that do not occur only as auxillary
sentences) in this logic were deductive rules, or, which comes to the
same thing, inference schemes.
In this connection we recall the explanation of Clarence Irving Lewis in
the book “Symbolic Logic”: “Exact logic can be taken in two ways: (1)
as a vehicle and canon of deductive interference, or ( 2 ) as that subject
which comprises all principles the statement of which is tautological”
(Cf. ClarenceIrving Lewis and Cooper Harald Langford: Symbolic
Logic (1932 p. 235). We can now say that the logic of Boethius belongs
to the first of these two forms of exact logic. Boethius’ aim is not to set
up sentences which are tautological, but rather to present all of the
deductive rules." (p. 3)
(...)
§ 38. The Three Enumerations of the Seven Conditional Syllogisms.
We now turn to the consideration of the form of propositional logic to
be found in Boethius’ commentary on Cicero’s Topics .
At the beginning of the fifth book of this commentary, Boethius notes
that he has treated all the hypothetical syllogisms in another book; he
526
obviously has “de syllogismo hypothetico” in mind (Cf. Boe., p. 823).
The exposition which follows this remark covers more than the first
half of the fifth book of the commentary; it constitutes that part of the
commentary that is of interest to us here (Cf. supra , § 1).
In order to determine this section more precisely one can best indicate
its beginning and its end. It begins with the words “de omnibus quidem
hypotheticis syllogismis” (Cf. Boe., p. 823) and continues to the place
immediately preceding the following words of Cicero, “proximus est
locus” (Cf. Boe., p. 934).
Boethius notes that Cicero mentioned some modi (inference types).
From the exposition that follows, it is to be assumed, that Boethius
identifies the modi that Cicero mentioned with the system of the seven
conditional syllogisms (Cf. Boe., p. 823). By conditional syllogisms we
understand inference schemes.
At the place which Boethius has in mind, Cicero enumerates seven
inference schemes. Boethius quotes this place in the fifth book of his
commentary (Cf. Boe., p. 817). We will call the quotation of this place
from Cicero’s Topics in Boethius’ commentary “the quotation”.
In the text of the commentary as given by the editions we find the
seven conditional syllogisms enumerated three times. The first and the
second enumerations precede the quotation, while the third follows it
(Cf. Boe., p. 831-833). It may be mentioned that the second
enumeration agrees so closely with the first, that it may be called a
duplication of the first.
Propositional variables are used only in the third enumeration of the
seven conditional syllogisms; the system of propositional variables
which we called the simple system is used (Cf. supra, § 17). In all three
enumerations each of the conditional syllogisms is illustrated by an
example. These examples are expressions related to the inference
schemes; like the inference schemes, they contain functors and always
contain a sign which can be identified with the functor “igitur ”; they
contain however no propositional variables, instead having simple, i.e.
atomic, sentences.
The examples of conditional syllogisms which Boethius gives with the
first and second enumerations, are extremely simple and the two
sequences agree almost completely member for member.
We will quote these examples in English; in this translation the English
527
word “therefore” occurs instead of the functor “igitur” It seems
desirable to divide the seven conditional syllogisms into four groups;
we will divide them in such a way that the first and second modi
constitute the first group, the third modus constituhs the second group,
the fourth and fifth modi the third group and finally the sixth and
seventh modi form the fourth group." (pp. 66-67)
Ebbesen, Sten. 1973. "Manlius Boethius on Aristotle's Analytica
Posteriora ." Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin no.
9:68-73.
"A reference to a Boethian commentary on Posterior Analytics I is
found in a thirteen th-century MS (Munich, clm 14246), but this is
surely an error. The work referred to was really the translation of
Philoponus’ commentary that most schoolmen attributed to Alexander
of Aphrodisias. I regret having called attention to the Munich MS in a
small article of 1973 (CIMAGL 9: 68–73), and I beg my readers not to
waste their time on looking up that article." S. Ebbesen, "The
Aristotelian Commentator" in John Marenbon (ed.). The Cambridge
Companion to Boethius, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009, p. 52.
———. 1987. "Boethius as an Aristotelian Scholar." In Aristoteles.
Werk und Wirkung. Paul Moraux zum 65 Geburtstag gewidmet - Band
2: Kommentierung, Uberlieferung, Nachleben , edited by Wiesner,
Jürgen, 286-311. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Reprinted as Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator in: Richard
Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and
Their Influence , London: Duckworth, 1990, pp. 373-392.
Citations are from the reprint in Sorabji 1990.
"It has been suggested that the only material at Boethius' disposal was a
copy of the Organon with marginal scholia, and that this collection of
scholia is no longer extant. (14) We may often be able to ascertain the
remoter origin of one of the scholia Boethius knew, but we shall never
know whether he deviated from his direct source in any way and the
standard answer to the question 'Why does Boethius say this?' can only
be, 'Because it was in his only source.'
The 'one source - no thinking' theory has the support of eminent
scholars and it cannot be refuted by any means that I can think of. But
neither can it be proved by any conceivable means short of finding the
528
supposed manuscript of the Organon with the marginal scholia. To my
mind, the circumstantial evidence in favour of this theory, though not
negligible, is less than convincing. (15) The observable facts are quite
as easily explained on the assumption that Boethius had access to
several Greek monographs and commentaries and that he followed the
common practice of using for each work one main source while also
exploiting secondary sources. It is an old discovery that this hypothesis
works well in the case of the extant short commentary on the
Categories, the only case in which we still have what may be the main
source. Boethius acknowledges a debt to Porphyry (16) and actually
keeps so close to the latter's extant minor commentary on the
Categories (CAG 4, 1) that it is simpler to assume that he had direct
access to a complete copy of it than to assume second-hand
acquaintance by way of a book which also contained the post-
Porphyrian material detectable in Boethius' commentary.
Granted that Boethius' main source was Porphyry's extant work, we can
begin to examine the way he used it. As it turns out, he follows his
predecessor to the extent of reproducing most of the questions he raised
and the answers he gave, but not to the extent of reproducing long
segments of his text in direct translation. Boethius expanded arguments
which he found too compressed while curtailing or suppressing other
passages. (17) In fact, he followed the procedure which his own
remarks in this and other works indicate (18) -- and that procedure
involved making choices. It looks as if it might be worth while to
speculate about his possible motives for choosing as he did." (pp. 376-
377; note 15, 17 and 18 omitted)
(14) J. Shiel, 'Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle': Medieval and
Renaissance Studies 4, 1958, 217-44, extensively revised in Chapter
15; id, 'Boethius and Eudemus', Vivarium 12, 1974, 14-17; id, 'A recent
discovery: Boethius' notes on the Prior Analytics', Vivarium 20,
1982,128-41.
(16) Boeth. in Cat. 160A; see n. 20 below.
———. 2008. "Boethius on Aristotle." In Greek-Latin Philosophical
Interaction. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen Volume 1 , 107-114.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
This chapter was written for the present volume, but to a considerable
extent it recapitulates Ebbesen (1987).
529
"Anicius Manlius Boethius (d. c.525) was the great mediator between
ancient Greek and medieval Latin philosophy. He completed a
tremendous piece of work by translating all of the Organon (except, it
seems, the Posterior Analytics ) into Latin and writing commentaries as
well as other companion volumes. It is remarkable that there are two
commentaries of his on Porphyry and two on Perihermeneias , but only
one on the Categories . Actually, there may have existed a second one
on that work too, but at least it did not survive for the medievals to use.
(2) As for the Ars nova , Boethius himself refers to a commentary on
the Topics (3) of which there is no trace in later times. It is uncertain
whether he accompanied his translation of the Prior Analytics with a
commentary (the question is discussed in Chapter 13 [Analysing
Syllogisms or Anonymus Aurelianensis 111 - the (presumably) Earliest
Extant Latin Commentary on the Prior Analytics and its Greek Model ,
pp. 171-186] Boethius’ monographs on categorical and hypothetical
syllogistic, on divisions and on topical argumentation were intensely
studied from the late eleventh to the early thirteenth century, and they
left their mark on Latin logic long after they ceased to be standard
reading. A commentary on Cicero's Topics was less influential.
Finally, it must be mentioned that Boethius composed treatises on the
quadrivial arts: arithmetic, music, geometry (uncertain, not extant), and
just possibly astronomy •as well. In one famous passage he himself
reveals a grandiose plan to translate the whole of Aristotle and Plato.
(4)
Remarkable as the list of Boethius’ accomplishments is, two lacunas
stand out. There is no grammar at all and no proper treatise on rhetoric,
only the somewhat related commentary on Cicero's Topics and the
fourth book of De topicis Differentiis , which was actually used as a
textbook of rhetoric in medieval Paris. We can only guess at the
reasons, but quite possibly Boethius thought of grammar and rhetoric as
sub-philosophic disciplines. After all, as opposed to logic and the
quadrivial arts, grammar and rhetoric had traditionally been taught by
their own professional teachers, not by philosophers. (5) Moreover, he
may have felt that such existing handbooks as Donatus’ Ars were
sufficient for the grammatical needs of the Latin world, and there
surely was no dearth of rhetorical treatises in the tongue of Cicero." (p.
108)
530
(...)
"So. the way 1 read Porphyry and Boethius, they shared the view that
becoming a good Aristotelian is a necessary step on the way to
becoming a good Platonist, and what you have learned in the first step
of your intellectual career does not become false when you ascend to a
higher level -- you are just able to put it into a much wider context.
The medieval West inherited from late antiquity numerous texts that
could help send people off on fanciful Neoplatonic stratospheric flights.
The fact that Boethius provided them with a proper set of down-to-
earth, but still interesting, logic books ensured that quite a few
preferred safer and saner flights closer to the surface of mother earth, or
at least tried to secure proper ground support before lifting off." (p.
114)
(2) See P. Hadot, "Un fragment du commentaire perdu de Boèce sur les
Catégories d'Aristote dans le codex Bernensis 363", Archives d'histoire
doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge , 26, 1959, pp. 11-27.
(3) Boethius. Top. Diff. 2.8.8 (PL 64 1191A) and 4.13.2 (PL 64:
1216D).
(4) Boethius. Comm. Int. ed. 2a. Weiser, pp. 79-80.
(5) For the quadrivium as the philosophers' domain, see I. Hadot, Arts
libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique. Contribution à
l'histoire de l'éducation et de la culture dans l'antiquité . Seconde
édition revue et considérablement augmentée. Paris: Vrin, 2005.
———. 2009. "The Aristotelian Commentator." In The Cambridge
Companion to Boethius , edited by Marenbon, John, 34-55. Cambridge:
"The point, then, is that we have to start from the lowest level to work
our way toward the higher. We have to learn our grammar before we
can get a deeper understanding of language-related matters by studying
logic.
We have to achieve a simplified understanding of logic before we can
undertake an in-depth study. We have to know our logic properly
before we can ascend to higher matters, such as Neoplatonic
metaphysics, in the light of which our initial understanding of logic will
appear primitive.
This way of looking upon thingswas not Boethius’ invention. In its
essentials it was already Porphyry’s, it was what allowed Porphyry to
531
include the study of Aristotle in a curriculum aimed at producing good
Platonists ready to take leave of their bodily frame. As Aristotle’s logic
was supposed not to have trespassed on Plato’s metaphysical territory,
teachers of Aristotle need not and ought not Platonize him. Boethius’
extant commentaries evince a decision to follow Porphyry, though he
was clearly sympathetic to some of the more extravagant Neoplatonists
– people of the stripe of Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus – and it
makes one shudder to imagine what the “Pythagorean” exposition of
the Categories that his extant commentary says he was contemplating
was or would be like." (p. 51)
———. 2011. "Boethius as a Translator and Aristotelian
Commentator." In Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late
Antiquity. The Alexandrian Commentary Tradition between Rome and
Baghdad , edited by Lössl, Josef and Watt, John W., 121-133. Farham:
Ashgate.
"Virtually the whole of Boethius’ literary output – including his final
Consolation of Philosophy – may be viewed as a Herculean effort to
transfer Greek philosophical thought to Latin, but only his Latinizations
of the works of the Organon were strictly speaking translations. The
commentaries and companion volumes are free adaptations of Greek
prototypes. Exactly how free is difficult to gauge because in all cases
but one we are sure that we no longer possess any of the Greek texts he
used. The exception is Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories .
There is some scholarly disagreement about whether he used that text
directly or only indirectly, but if he did have direct access to it, as I
believe, he did not at all follow it slavishly. In any event, even if he
made a very free use of his Greek sources, producing the commentaries
and companion volumes involved a considerable amount of translation,
because he had to find out how to render all the technical terminology
of his sources in Latin.
Boethius did not have to start from scratch. Already in the first century
B.C., Cicero and Varro had coined Latin equivalents of many
philosophical terms, and more had been added over the centuries. In
fact, for most of the technical terms of logic Boethius could depend on
his predecessors. He was probably the first to use subalternus and
subcontrarius when dealing with the square of opposition, and he was
almost certainly the first to translate ἀξίωμα ‘axiom’ as maxima
532
propositio , which is the origin of the English – and pan-European –
maxim . But more often than not he would use an existing translation.
His problem was rather one of choice, because in several cases Latin
usage was not uniform. (pp. 123-124)
(...)
"In the short run, Boethius’ translations, commentaries and monographs
met with no success, due to the collapse of the political structure and of
higher schooling in the western part of the Roman empire shortly after
his death. In the long run, he was immensely successful.
Use of his works began slowly in early Carolingian times, but by 1100
his translations of Porphyry, Categories and Perihermeneias were in
common use in several schools, and so were his commentaries on those
works and his handbook-like works. By about 1120 people were
beginning to also use his translations of the Prior Analytics , the Topics
and the Sophistical Refutations .
This laid the foundation for the Aristotelian scholasticism that was to
dominate the study of philosophy in the West for some four centuries.
It also meant that it was Boethius’ choices that decided what was to
become the technical vocabulary of Latin Aristotelian logic." (p. 124)
Eco, Umberto. 1984. "Signification and Denotation from Boethius to
Ockham." Franciscan Studies no. 44:1-29.
"Boethius translates "semaînein" with "significare" but he follows the
Augustinian line of thought according to which "significatio" is the
power that a word has to arouse in the mind of the hearer a thought,
through the mediation of which one can implement an act of reference
to things. He says that single terms signify the corresponding concept
or the universal idea and takes "significare"— as well as, less
frequently, "designare"— in an intensional sense. Words are
conventional instruments used to make known one's thoughts (sensa or
sententias ) (In Per. Herm. I).
Words do not designate res subiectas but passiones animae. The
designated thing is at most called "underlying the concept of it
(significationi supposita or suppositum )", see de Rijk 1967:180-181.
(3)
As for "denotatio ," Boethius uses extensively "nota ," but we know
how vague was the meaning of this term in the Latin Lexicon — at
least as vague as the meaning of the equivalent Greek "symbolon ." It
533
must be remembered that Boethius, in the translation of De
lnterpretatione used "nota " for both "symbolon " and "semeîon ," thus
creating a first "sad tale of confusion"." (pp. 5-6)
(3) in Peri herm . II, pp. 26-27, ed. Meiser, debating the question
whether words refer immediately to concepts or to things, Boethius
uses in both cases the expression 'designare .' In II, p. 20 he says in the
same context, "vox vero conceptiones animi intellectusque significat"
and "voces vero quae intellectus désignant." In II, pp. 23-24, speaking
of "litterae, voces, intellectus, res," he says that "litterae verba
nominaque significant" and that "haec vero (nomina) principaliter
quidem intellectus secundo vero loco res quoque designant. Intellectus
vero ipsi nihil aliud nisi rerum significativi sunt." In Arist. Categ . col.
159 B4-C8, says that "prima igitur ilia fuit nominum positio per quam
vel intellectui subiecta vel sensibus designaret." It seems to me that
"designare" and "significare" are taken as more or less equivalent. The
real point is that first words signify concepts and, because of that, and
mediately, can be referred to things. Cf. on the whole question de Rijk
(1967, II, I, p. 178 ff.) Nuchelmans (1973:134) remarks that even
though Boethius also uses "significare," along with "designare,
denuntiare, demonstrare, enuntiare, dicere" with an object-expression to
indicate what is true or false, however when he uses the same terms
with a person as a subject he means that someone makes known his
opinion that something is or is not the case: "the definition of the
enuntiatio or propositio as an utterance which signifies something true
or false reflects the fact that in Aristotle's view it is the thought or belief
that something is the case which is true or false in the primary sense.
As Boethius puts it, truth and falsity are not in things but in thoughts
and opinions and secondarily (post haec ) in words and utterances— in
Cat. 181b. Cf. also such a passage as in In Per . I, p. 42, 1"
(Nuchelmans 1973:134).
References
De Rijk, L. M., ed., 1967. Logica modemorum , II, 1. Assen: Van
Gorcum.
Nuchelmans, G., 1973. Theories of the Proposition . [Vol. I: Ancient
and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity ].
Gili, Luca. 2015. "A neglected source of Boethius's De syllogismo
534
categorico ." Mnemosyne no. 68:304-307.
Abstract: "This paper shows that Boethius's De syllogismo categorico
had among its sources Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentaries on the
Topics and on the Prior Analytics . The first of these sources has been
neglected by scholars until now. Boethius's usage of these sources
shows the originality of his logical treatise."
Green-Pedersen, Niels Jørgen. 1984. The Tradition of the Topics in the
Middle Ages. The Commentaries on Aristotle's and Boethius' 'Topics' .
Münich: Philosophia Verlag.
Contents: Preface 9; Part I. The Sources of the Medieval Doctrine of
the Topics 11; A. Aristotle's Works on the Topics 11; B. Boethius'
Works on the Topics 39; Part II. The Medieval Approach to the
Sources 83; A. Aristotle's Topics 85; B. Boethius' De Differentiis
Topicis 123; C. The University Teaching 127; Part II. The Doctrine of
the Topics in the Middle Ages 135; A. Introductory 135; B. The earliest
Texts 139; C. The 12th Century 163; D. The 13th Century 223; E. The
Topics and the Theory of Consequences 265; F. The 14th Century 301;
G. The 15th Century 321; Part IV. General Conclusion 345; Appendix
1: Selection of Unprinted Texts 347; Appendix 2. List of Commentaries
381; A. Commentaries on Aristotle's Topics 383; B. Commentaries on
Boethius' De Differentiis Topicis 418; References 433; Index 449;
Summary in Danish 455-459.
"B. Boethius’ Works on the Topics
1. Introductory
In chronological order the next work to discuss would be Cicero’s
Topica , which is the first work on the topics after Aristotle that has
come down to us. I shall, however, proceed directly to Boethius’s
works, partly because an acquaintance with Boethius’ doctrines
contributes to a better understanding of Cicero. Partly also because
there are no medieval commentaries on Cicero’s Topica . Apparently
this work was only influential on the teaching in the very early period,
probably not much after c. A. D. 1050. The teachers of those days did
not write commentaries, as far as we know, but only compendia or
summaries of the texts they based their teaching on; or they added
glosses to these texts. Ina later chapter we shall see how Cicero’s
Topica - directly or indirectly - is the basis of the earliest medieval
teaching about the topics which we know of. Yet even in these early
535
years the medievale use not only Cicero’s book, but also Boethius’
commentary on it. All these facts suggest that at least in a medieval
context it is better to consider Boethius before Cicero. The things
which we need to know about Cicero can be set out in connection with
Boethius or with the discussion of the works which base their teaching
upon Cicero.
Boethius wrote about the topics primarily in two works, the
Commentary on Cicero’s Topica (In Ciceronis Topica , ICT) and the
monograph De differentiis topicis (DDT). The commentary on Cicero
is the earlier of the two, as we can infer from references in the DDT
back to the ICT and from remarks in the ICT about plans for the DDT.
But the distance in time between the two is small, both were written in
the last years of Boethius’ life, i. e. after c. 520. (1) Boethius also refers
to a commentary which he claims to have written on Aristotle’s Topics
, (2) but such a work has not come down to us. As the references to it
are found in the DDT and no references are found in the ICT, we may
conjecture that the commentary on Aristotle’s Topics was written in the
period between the ICT and the DDT. On the other hand Boethius
refers to his translation of Aristotle’s Topics in the ICT, 3 and it is
natural to assume that he wrote the commentary while working on the
translation.
Boethius’ commentary on Cicero’s Topica (ICT) follows the text in
Cicero’s work continuously, but it is either preserved incompletely or it
was never finished by Boethius, since it ends in the comments on
Cicero’s § 76. Cicero’s work contains a prologue (§§ 1-5), an
introduction (§§ 6-8), a summary statement of his list of loci (§§ 9-24),
a detailed exposition of the same list (§§ 25-78), and finally a section of
a more rhetorical character (§§ 79-100). The most interesting parts of
the ICT are the rather long discussions about the nature and the division
of the loci which Boethius has inserted before both Cicero’s first and
second enumeration of the loci. Further Boethius utilizes Cicero’s
second exposition of the locus ‘from antecedents’ etc. for a long
discussion of conditionals and hypothetical syllogisms. We shall have
occasion to look at these discussions more closely.
We need not know more about the contents of the ICT, but we shall
instead turn to the DDT with which we must be well-acquainted in
order to understand the medieval doctrine of the topics." (pp. 39-40)
536
(1) De Rijk (1964) pp. 151-154.
(2) Boethius, DDT II.1191 A; IV, 1216 D. - Cf. De Rijk 1964, p. 156.
(3) Boethius, ICT I, p. 280,40-41 (1052 A-B).
References
L. M. De Rijk 'On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic. I-II",
Vivarium , 2, 1964, pp. 1-49 and 125-162.
Huby, Pamela M. 1988. "Boethius vindicates Cicero as a logician."
Liverpool Classical Monthly no. 13:60-61.
"Boethius' reading of Cicero's Topics 54 shows that he had a better text
than we do, and thus makes more sense of Cicero's argument."
Lewry, Osmond. 1981. "Boethian Logic in the Medieval West." In
Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence , edited by Gibson,
Margaret, 90-134. Oxford: Blackwell.
"Almost three centuries after his death, Boethius entered the school-
room. With Alcuin of York as master and Charlemagne as pupil, a
halting dialogue ensued. This Dialectica is a tenuous link between the
learning of a member of the old Roman nobility, from the early sixth
century, and the studious aspirations of the Frankish kingdom, at the
end of the eighth. But the title is an ambitious one for these exiguous
remains of classical culture, and even the presence of Boethius here is
faint. In sixteen chapters, Alcuin rehearses the rudiments of the old
logic. (1) He begins with Porphyry’s Isagoge , for his account of the
five universals, and ends with Aristotle’s Perihermeneias , for the
statement and its parts but, as his dedicatory verses to Charlemagne
show, the categories are the core of his work, and for these, lacking the
Praedicamenta of Aristotle himself, he had to turn to the Themistian
paraphrase, the De Decem Categoriis , which he ascribes to Augustine.
The Pseudo-Augustine only omits matters of minor importance, but
Alcuin received an account of the categories affected by transpositions
and mixed with many non-Aristotelian elements. (2) The solid
contribution of Boethius himself is in his translations of the Isagoge
and Perihermeneias if there are borrowings from his commentaries and
treatises, they are meagre. (3) Of the nineteen valid moods of the
categorical syllogism, only four appear in the treatment of
argumentation, and these, the moods of the first figure with their
premisses interchanged, in a form derived from the Perihermeneias of
Apuleius and not from the De Syllogismis Catégoricis of Boethius. (4)
537
The fifteen kinds of definition derive from a treatise which the Middle
Ages attributed to Boethius, but this Liber de Definìtionibus was in fact
by Marius Victorinus, (5) as Boethius recognised in summarising its
teaching. (6) They came to Alcuin through the Institutiones of
Cassiodorus , (7) and it was sixth-century interpolations in the same
source that gave Alcuin some second-hand knowledge of Boethius’ De
Differentiis Topicis . (8)" (pp. 90-91)
(...)
"In the first half of the fifteenth century, however, a reaction against the
influence of Boethius can be seen in Lorenzo Valla’s preface to his
Dialecticae Disputationes. His reference to ‘eruditorum ultimus
Boetius’ and his question, ‘How many were there after Boethius whom
one would consider worthy to be called a Latin and not a Barbarian?’,
(150) may suggest more than a grudging recognition for his authority,
but elsewhere Boethius is sharply criticised for his doctrine. (151) Valla
also thinks that he was overrated by Albertus Magnus among the
scholastics and Poggio among the humanists. (152) Despising Aristotle
as a man who contributed nothing to civic life and lacked practical
skills, Valla’s endeavour was to bring logic back from a realm of
abstractions to what he regarded as its proper concern, natural
expression : in effect dialectic was to be reduced to rhetoric. (153) This
enterprise of reduction could not be carried through without a reform of
terminology, and this led him, at the beginning of his work, to attack
the teaching of the categories as it had been mediated by Boethius
(154) and the Porphyrian hierarchy of substance. (155) His second
book extended the reduction to propositional logic; his third to
reasoning. Here he poured scorn on Boethius and those who praise him,
for their failure to see that the fourth figure syllogisms are but indirect
forms of the first. (...) In this humanist reaction the authority of Cicero
and Quintilian is preferred to that of Boethius." (pp. 120-121)
(...)
"The preface to the Basel edition of 1570 [of the works of Boethius ]
tempers the criticism of Valla, but passes quickly over the logic to
celebrate the achievements of Boethius in mathematics and music. The
dedicatory letter recalls the aims of Boethius himself as a translator and
commentator and praises him for opening to the Latin world what
Aristotle had hidden from many, and judiciously weighing the opinions
538
of antiquity. Regret is voiced that nothing survives of his commentaries
on the Analytica and Topica of Aristotle. Of the logical works, it is the
double commentary on the Perihermeneias which is particularly
valued, and the 'four beautiful books De Differentiis Topicis , by which
he distinguished dialectical from rhetorical topics’. Mention is still
made, though, of the works on the syllogistic and division, (159) so that
even if rhetoric had made its inroads here too, the legacy of the
Boethian logic was still prized for its own sake." (p. 122)
(1) PL CI. 949B-80B.
(2) See L. Minio-Paluello, ‘Note sull’Aristotele Latino Medievale: XV.
Dalle Categoriae Decem pseudo-Agostiniane (Temistiane) al Testo
Vulgato Aristotelico Boeziano’, in Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle
(Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 448-58, and the same author’s edition of the
text, Pseudo-Augustini Paraphrasis Themistiana (AL i. 1-5, pp. lxxvii-
xcvi, 129-75)·
(3) See A. van de Vyver, ‘Les Etapes du Développement Philosophique
du Haut Moyen-Age’, Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire VIII
(1929), 425-52, and the account of Alcuin’s work there, pp. 430-2.
(4) See M. W. Sullivan, Apuleian Logic (Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 178-
82.
(5) Ed. T. Stangl (Munich, 1882); reprinted in P. Hadot, Marius
Victorinus (Paris, 1971), pp. 329-65.
(6) In Cic Top III (PL LXIV, 1098A).
(7) Cassiodori Senatoris Institutiones II. 14, ed. R. A. B. Mynors
(Oxford, 1937), pp. 119-24.
(8) PL LXX. 1175D12 1190C4.
(150) Quotus enim quisque post Boëtium fuit qui Latinus dici mereatur
et non Barbarus: Laurentius Valla, Opera Omnia (Basel, 1540),
reprinted Turin, 1962, i. 644.
(151) See Elegantiae VI, xxxiv (ed. cit., i. 215-16); De Voluptate III. xi
(ed. cit., I. 973); Ep. ad Ioannem Aretinum (Venice, 1503, reprinted
Turin, 1962, II. 122).
(152) See In Pogium Antidoti II (ed. cit., I. 292-3).
(153) See G. di Napoli, Lorenzo Valla: Filosofia e Religione
nell'Umanesimo Italiano (Rome, 1971 Uomini e Dottrine XVII), pp.
57-99.
(154) Dialectica I. i (ed. cit., i. 645-6).
539
(155) Ibid ., I. vii (i. 646-7).
Magee, John. 1989. Boethius on Signification and Mind . Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Sigla X; Abbreviations and Editions
XI; Introduction 1; I. Aristotle: Peri Hermeneias I, 16a3-9; 7; II.
Boethius’ Translation 49; III. Orandi Ordo 64; IV. Cogitabilis Oratio
93; Afterword 142; Bibliography 150; Index Locorum 155; Index
Nominum et Rerum 162-165.
"The following is a study of Boethius' thought on signification which
attempts to situate that thought historically and to evaluate it
philosophically. Its justification is found in the present lack of any
systematic examination of the subject, (1) and in the intrinsic
importance of that subject for the history of later ancient and especially
of medieval thought. It is frequently the case that medievalists will
have read Boethius' philosophical works with an eye only to subsequent
developments; those classicists who bother with him at all will
probably have done so out of an interest (one which shows signs of
increasing) in investigating the very last stages in the history of ancient
learning. That Boethius has sometimes run afoul of misunderstandings
originating on both sides of the academic fence can, I believe, be
explained in part by the fact that his work as both commentator and
translator sets him somewhat apart in the history of ancient
commentary on Aristotle. As a commentator, he has tended to be
ignored by those classical scholars who are accustomed to the massive
and weighty Greek commentaries from the likes of Alexander (late
2nd-early 3rd c. AD) and Simplicius (6th c. AD). As a translator, he has
sometimes obscured, for the medievalists not working in the Greek
tradition of commentary (as indeed for the many medieval writers who
depended upon his translations), the prehistory of certain ideas
expressed during the course of his commentaries on the texts of what in
the Middle Ages came to be known as the logica vetus. "
(...)
"The present work is divided into four chapters, taking as its starting
point the lines of Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias around which Boethius’
theory of signification turns. The first chapter of the study plunges in
medias res , and for that the reader’s patience is requested. The Greek
text is both difficult and compressed, and necessarily brings into
consideration questions of the history of transmission and commentary,
540
as well as numerous aspects of Aristotle’s thought both in this and in
other works. But since Boethius translated either all or part of the Peri
Hermeneias before commenting upon it, and then revised the
translation for the second commentary; and since in his translation, as
in all translations, there is an element of “commentary” upon the
meaning of the original, it has been thought necessary to come to a
clear understanding of what Aristotle wrote before proceeding to the
translation and commentaries. After careful examination of the Greek
passage and of the questions it poses, there follows in the second
chapter an analysis of Boethius’ Latin translation of the same, and of
the interpretation implicitly contained therein. The third and fourth
chapters treat of Boethius’ commentaries on the passage, as seen from
two points of view: (a) from the way in which Boethius thinks Aristotle
to have disposed or ordered the four things (res, intellects, vox, litterae
) laid down in the context of the doctrine of Peri Hermeneias 16a3-9;
(b) from the point of view of the theory of cognition Boethius develops
in support of the above. The question Boethius ultimately poses for our
consideration is: How are the operations of the passive mind converted
into words and statements that can be spoken aloud? If his
commentaries allow no certain answer to this question, important
ground will nevertheless have been gained in studying carefully the
way in which Boethius introduces the problem, and then in suggesting
the solution which seems most consistent with what is said in his
commentaries." (pp. 1-2)
(1) There are two valuable studies by L.M. De Rijk, as well as a short
article by K. Berka. Beyond this, however, very little has come to my
attention. [De Rijk 1981 and 1988, Berka 1968]
———. 1994. "The text of Boethius' De divisione ." Vivarium no. 32:1-
50.
"The De divisione of Boethius ( = B.) has come down to us in nearly
200 MSS dating from the 10th c. onward. The treatise maintained a
position of some importance in the medieval schools and as a result the
textual tradition is highly complex, although it remains unstudied for
the most part. L. Minio-Paluello investigated and compared some of the
early MSS in the course of editing a fragment of B. ’s revised Topics
translation that sometimes circulated as part of De divisione , and he
put forward tentative conclusions as to the bearing of his findings on
541
the history of the transmission of De divisione itself. In what follows I
undertake to examine the earliest extant MSS of De divisione known to
me, and to reconsider Minio-Paluello’s hypothesis concerning the early
period of transmission. The study is in three parts: (a) analysis of the
evidence indicating a lost ancient “edition” of De divisione , (b) the text
of the treatise as transmitted to us by the oldest MSS; (c) a handlist of
MSS containing De divisione ." (p. 1)
———. 1997. "Boethius, De divisione 875–76, 891–92, and
Andronicus Rhodius." In A Distinct Voice. Medieval Studies in honor
of Leonard E. Boyle, O.P. , edited by Brown, Jacqueline and Stoneman,
William P., 525-560. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
———. 2010. "On the Composition and Sources of Boethius' Second
Peri hermeneias Commentary." Vivarium no. 48:7-54.
Abstract: "The paper is in three parts, prefaced by general remarks
concerning Boethius’ logical translations and commentaries: the text of
the Peri Hermeneias as known to and commented on by Boethius (and
Ammonius); the organizational principles behind Boethius’ second
commentary on the Peri Hermeneias ; its source(s). One of the main
purposes of the last section is to demonstrate that the Peri Hermeneias
commentaries of Boethius and Ammonius are, although part of a
common tradition, quite independent of one another, and special
consideration is given to the question of how Boethius interpreted and
shaped the doxographical material concerning Aspasius, Herminus, and
Alexander that had been handed down to him by Porphyry."
"Sifting through the interpretations of earlier commentators was
painstaking and laborious, Porphyry’s interpretation of 19b22-24 alone
requiring, as we have seen, seventeen pages of commentary. By about
the year 515 Boethius’ attention must have been turning toward other
projects, to new translations and commentaries, the theological
tractates, logico-rhetorical monographs, and so on. If the Peri
Hermeneias were allowed to consume so much time and energy, what
would become of the rest of the Organon and Aristotle, not to mention
Plato? Even for a treatise as rich and complex as the Peri Hermeneias
Boethius may have had finally to calculate his “point of diminishing
returns.” He may have grown impatient with the project, his copy of
Porphyry may have failed, or both. Had he known of the premature end
that awaited him, he might have thought differently about how to
542
weight the commentary, might have sought compensation in other
projects for problems left unsolved in connection with the Peri
Hermeneias ; but as it is, he left a work which, despite its
imperfections, has proved to be one of his most fascinating and
influential." (p. 54)
———. 2011. "Preliminary Observations on the Textual Tradition of
Boethius' First Peri Hermeneias Commentary." In Logic and Language
in the Middle Ages: A Volume in Honour of Sten Ebbesen , edited by
Fink, Jakob Leth, Hansen, Heine and Mora-Márquez, Ana María 13-26.
Leiden: Brill.
"In editing the first of Boethius’ two commentaries on Aristotle’s Peri
Hermeneias Carl Meiser essentially worked from a single witness, F
(below), which he ranked both antiquissimus and optimus . (1)
Readings from three other munich manuscripts, e (MS Bayer.
Staatsbibl. clm 14401, s. XI), M (below), and T (MS Bayer. Staatsbibl.
clm 18479, s.XI), he reported perpetuo more but with varying degrees
of accuracy. (2) He further consulted two st. Gall manuscripts, G
(below) and S (MS Stiftsbibl. 817, s. XI-XII) omnibus locis paulo
difficilioribus — citing them only infrequently, however, in his critical
apparatus. from Peri Hermeneias 17b20 on, F preserves excerpted
lemmata, and Meiser correctly recognized that the supplemented
versions found in other witnesses violate Boethius’ intention. (3)
But F is in fact neither antiquissimus nor optimus , and Meiser’s edition
suffers from a particular failure to distinguish between the three
versions of Boethius’ Peri Hermeneias translation, two of which form
his commentary lemmata. Hence a full assessment of the evidence
seems called for. In what follows, I hope to shed some light on certain
salient characteristics of the textual tradition." (p. 13)
(1) Boethius, Commentarii in librum aristotelis περι ερμηνειασ, pars
prior versionem continuam et primam editionem continens , ed. C.
Meiser (Leipzig: Teubner, 1877), pp. VIII-X.
(2) Cf. J. Magee, ‘On the Composition and sources of Boethius’ second
Peri Hermeneias Commentary’, Vivarium 48 (2010), 15, n. 32.
(3) Above, n. 1; cf. Aristotle, De interpretatione vel Periermenias:
Translatio Boethii , ed. L. Minio-Paluello, AL 2.1 (Bruges: Desclée de
Brouwer, 1965), pp. XI; LIII.
[MS F = Munich Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm 6374, s. IX
543
MS M = Munich Bayer. Staatsbibl. clm 14377, s. X-XI]
Magnano, Fiorella. 2013. "Boethius: the Division of Logic between
Greek and Latin Traditions." In Ad notitiam ignoti. L'Organon dans la
translatio studiorum à l'époque d'Albert le Grand , edited by
Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie, 141-171. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Basically Boethius’s division of logic is the foundation of a large
number divisions of logic belonging to other medieval philosophers as
Peter Abaelard and Albert the Great; for this reason it is extremely
important to understand first of all how Boethius developed and
understood his own division, and in this paper I will explore just these
aspects of Boethius’s logical works. Thus, first I will describe
Boethius’s two divisions of logic presented in his Isagoge
commentaries. I will then look at his mature attempt to merge the
Greek heritage of Aristotle with the Latin heritage of Cicero. Finally, I
will focus on Boethius’s own division of logic, in order to observe
where the art of the topics is exactly placed. To better achieve my
goals, it will be necessary to use several diagrams through which the
reader can better visualize these complex aspects of Boethius’s logical
thought." (pp. 142-143, note omitted)
(...)
"Conclusion.
In short, in Boethius’s view the Topics is the foundational discipline for
the dialectician, the rhetorician, and the philosopher, precisely because
it is the only way to discover the starting points of all types of
argumentation. Boethius arrives at this view through combining in a
particularly ingenious and 0riginal way the division of logic and the
sciences more generally descended from the Aristotelian and
Ciceronian, the Greek and the Latin traditions. It is necessary to think
of this endeavor as a mosaic composed of many pieces, because
combination of the two divisions of logic is only one stage of a much
large project, and the instruments used to carry out this plan are
numerous. In his second commentary on the Isagoge , Boethius began
to stress that this book is also indispensable in order to understand
Cicero’s ratio disserendi . As regards the art of the topics, he translated
and commented on Aristotle's Topics and, after having commented also
on Cicero’s Topics he stressed the original axiomatic nature of
Ciceronian loci , in order to bring out their dialectical value — a
544
process completed in the third book of the De topicis differentiis where
the Ciceronian loci are presented as dialectical loci . Finally, after
having shown the substantial agreement of Cicero’s division of logic
(ratio disserendi ) lwith that directly attributed to Aristotle and called
λογική, he also tried to show the agreement between Themistius’s and
Cicero’s divisions of the topics, i.e. the Greek and the Latin traditions
on the topics.
All these considerations allow us to conclude that in the fundamental
reorganization of the entire logical material of antiquity made by
Boethius, it is possible to discern his intention not only to rehabilitate
the dialectical value of the topics, but also to return them to the
centrality that they had in the authentic Aristotelian system. In this
respect, Boethius does not simply repeat a neo-platonic thesis, because
no neo-platonic philosopher gave, as far as know, real attention to
Aristotle’s Topics . On the contrary, Boethius re-established their use,
and this is one of the most important aspects of Boethius's own
contribution to the development of logic. The importance of this
cultural phenomenon was really enormous, since this division of logic,
like this role of the topics, were the specific ways in which
philosophers received and used them in the Middle Ages." (pp. 170-
171, note omitted)
Maloney, Thomas S. 2003. "Boethius on Aristotle on the Division of
Statements into Single/Multiple and Simple/Composed." Carmina
Philosophiae no. 12:49-74.
Marenbon, John. 2003. Boethius . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Abbreviations of Boethius’s Works XV; 1 Introduction 3; 2
Life, Intellectual Milieu, and Works 7; 3 Boethius’s Project: The
Logical Translations and Commentaries 17; 4 The Logical Textbooks
and Topical Reasoning: Types of Argument 43; 5 The Opuscula Sacra
: Metaphysics, Theology, and Logical Method 66; 6 The Consolation :
The Argument of Books I-V.2 96; 7 The Consolation , V.3-6: Divine
Prescience, Contingency, Eternity 125; 8 Interpreting the Consolation
146; 9 Boethius’s Influence in the Middle Ages 164; Notes 183;
Bibliography 219; Index Locorum 237; General Index 243-252.
"As a translator, Boethius was extremely literal, sacrificing Latin style,
of which the Consolation shows his mastery, to precision. So far as
possible, he follows the word order of the Greek and tries to render
545
each word, even the particles. The result, though grammatical, is often
awkward and heavy, but it is accurate — although there are some cases
where his choice of word and phrasing does betray his own, particular
interpretation of the text. (6) He seems to have revised each of his
translations, and there is evidence of two forms for all of them except
the Sophistical Refutations . (7)
As a commentator, again Boethius concentrated on logic, although he
did apparently write some sort of glosses or commentary to Aristotle’s
Physics . (8)
His work as an exegete stretched less widely over Aristotelian logic
than his translations: he provided, as already mentioned, two
commentaries each for the Isagoge and On Interpretation , one (or
perhaps two) for the Categories , a commentary on Cicero’s Topics , 9)
very probably a commentary on (Aristotle’s) Topics and some glosses,
at least, for the Prior Analytics . (10) He also wrote a set of logical
monographs, mainly on different sorts of argument (see chapter 4).
Since Boethius’s working life was unexpectedly and violently curtailed,
his failure to complete his original plan cannot be taken as proof that he
did not propose it in earnest. Still, he seems to have given logic the
priority and was willing in this area to go beyond the project he had set
out, writing double commentaries and logical monographs, rather than
hurrying on to Aristotle’s nonlogical works and to Plato."
(7) In the case of the Categories , the two versions that survive are
Boethius’s final version and a ‘composite’ version, which is probably
an earlier draft by Boethius, improved by using the lemmata of his
commentary (close to his final version of the translation); see Asztalos
(1993) 371-72. There is a very clear summary of scholarship on
Boethius’s translations in Chadwick (1981) 131–41; the fundamental
work was done by Minio-Paluello — see Minio-Paluello (1972) and the
introductions to the Aristoteles Latinus editions (Aristoteles Latinus ,
1961–).
(8) See Chadwick (1981) 139, who cites 2InDI 190:13, 458:27 and TC
1152B.
(9) I discuss this commentary in chapter 4 below, because it is closely
related to Boethius’s treatise on topical reasoning.
(10) As Obertello (1974) 229 has noted, Boethius refers to a
commentary by him on Aristotle’s Topics in his On Topical
546
Differentiae , 1191A, 1216D. But none has survived. He also clearly
refers to having expounded ‘the Analytics ’ (cf. Obertello (1974) 229–
30); Minio-Paluello has discovered marginal annotations in a medieval
manuscript of the Prior Analytics which, he argues, are Boethius’s: see
Aristoteles Latinus (1961–) III.1–4, lxxix–lxxxviii and (for edition of
the scholia) 295–372.
References
Asztalos, M. (1993) ‘Boethius as a Transmitter of Greek Logic to the
Latin West: The Categories’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
95, 367–407.
Chadwick, H. (1981) Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic,
Theology, and Philosophy (Oxford; Oxford University Press).
Minio-Paluello, L. (1972) Opuscula: the Latin Aristotle (Amsterdam;
Hakkert).
Obertello, L. (1974) Severino Boezio (Genoa; Accademia Ligure di
Scienze e Lettere).
———. 2008. "Logic before 1100: The Latin Tradition." In Mediaeval
and Renaissance Logic , edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 1-
63. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
See pp. 6-21: 2.2 Boethius 6; Boethius the Translator 7; The
Neoplatonic Aristotelian Tradition 8; Boethius and the Commentary
Tradition 9; Boethius’s Logical Treatises 14; Boethius and Topical
Argument 18; Boethian Logic and its Survival 20-21.
"Boethius is by far the most important figure in the ancient tradition of
Latin logic, but it is important to realize that the Boethian Tradition was
not the only ancient Latin one. The logic of the earlier Latin authors,
along with, or transmitted by, later encyclopaedic accounts, provided a
separate tradition, which would be the one on which, more than
Boethius, medieval logic depended in the period up to the late tenth
century. It is in the eleventh century that the Boethian Tradition begins
to dominate (See §4 below). The twelfth century was the Golden Age
of Boethian Logic: the six works that formed the core of the logical
curriculum were Boethius’s monographs and his translations of the
Isagoge , Categories and On Interpretation , which were taught making
extensive use of his commentaries. And the Prior Analytics and
Sophistical Refutations , also in his translation, began to be known.
As a result of the introduction of the whole range of Aristotle’s writing
547
and its adoption, by the mid-thirteenth century, as the Arts course in the
universities, and with the development of the logica modernorum ,
branches of logic newly devised by the medieval logicians themselves,
Boethian Logic became less important in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, although his translations continued to be used by all students
of logic, and some outstanding theologians, such as Albert the Great,
Aquinas and William of Ockham, made some use of his commentaries.
Moreover, On Division and TD [De Topicis differentiis ] remained part
of the standard university logical collections — and commentaries were
even written on TD in the thirteenth century.
The monographs on categorical syllogisms were no longer useful now
that the Prior Analytics itself was known, and the treatise on
hypothetical syllogisms too was forgotten [see C. J. Martin. Denying
Conditionals: "Abaelard and the Failure of Boethius’ Account of the
Hypothetical Syllogism", Vivarium , 45, 153-68, 2007.].
Martin, Christopher J. 1991. "The Logic of Negation in Boethius."
"Boethius' de Hypotheticis Syllogismis is by far the most extensive
account of the conditional and its logic to have survived from antiquity.
A rather obscure and tedious work, it has puzzled commentators from
Peter Abaelard to Jonathan Barnes. Most of the difficulties that they
have had in extracting the principles of Boethian logic seem to me to
follow from the assumption that what he offers is an account of the
application of propositional operators to propositional contents. Though
generally not made explicit by modern historians, the concepts of
propositional content and propositional operation are nevertheless
presupposed by the symbolic apparatus which they typically use to
represent the claims of ancient and mediaeval logics. I will try to show
that an examination of Boethius' theory of language forces us to give up
the assumption that his logic is propositional and that when we do so
his remarks on compound propositions turn out to be rather less
mysterious than they have seemed." (p. 277)
———. 1999. "Non–reductive Arguments from Impossible Hypotheses
in Boethius and Philoponus." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no.
17:279-302.
"While there seems to be no record of an ancient debate over the
paradoxes of strict implication anticipating those of the twelfth and
548
twentieth centuries, we can, I think, advance our understanding of
ancient attitudes to conditionals with antecedents acknowledged to be
impossible by considering some hitherto neglected remarks made by
Boethius. I shall try to show in the present paper that at least in late
antiquity some philosophers were happy to introduce acknowledged
impossibilities as hypotheses and to draw inferences from them without
any suggestion that there might be indefinitely inflationary
consequences. By these philosophers at least, the conditional was
understood relevantistically." (p. 281)
———. 2009. "The Logical Textbooks and their Influence." In The
Cambridge Companion to Boethius , edited by Marenbon, John, 56-84.
"The time at which Boethius wrote was not a great one in the history of
logic and he himself was certainly not a great logician. His importance
lies rather in acting as an intermediary between the logicians of
antiquity and the those of the Middle Ages. With his translations (1),
commentaries (2) and independent logical works (3) Boethius provided
mediaeval philosophers with most of what they knew about ancient
logic and so with the foundations upon which mediaeval logic was
built. The most important parts of those foundations were the
metaphysics of substance and semantics of common names which
could be extracted from Boethius’ commentaries on the Isagoge ,
Categories , and De interpretatione , his account of conditional
propositions in De hypotheticis syllogismis , and his treatment of
topical argumentation in De topicis differentiis . Boethius’ own peculiar
contribution to the history of logic was an exposition of the
hypothetical syllogism which, for the reasons we will consider here,
would play no role in the development of logic after the middle of the
twelfth century." (p. 56)
(1) Boethius’ translations of Porphyry’s Isagoge , and Aristotle’s
Categories and De interpretatione , were known throughout the Middle
Ages. His translations of the Sophistical Refutations , Topics and Prior
Analytics were rediscovered during the first half of the twelfth century.
Boethius’ translation of the Posterior Analytics (if he made one)
apparently did not survive into the Middle Ages.
(2) On the Isagoge (1IS, 2IS), on the Categories (CAT), on De
interpretatione (1IN, 2IN), on Cicero’s Topica (TC).
549
(3) On the categorical syllogism covering the material dealt with in
Prior Analytics I.1–7 (ISC and SC), on topical inference (TD), on the
hypothetical syllogism (SH), on division (D).
———. 2011. "De Interpretatione 5-8: Aristotle, Boethius, and
Abelard on Propositionality." In Methods and Methodologies.
Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500 , edited by Cameron,
Margaret and Marenbon, John, 207-228. Leiden: Brill.
"Boethius’ commentaries on de Interpretatione provided the Middle
Ages with their introduction to the theory of meaning. Boethian
semantics is developed on the basis of the distinction made by Aristotle
in De Interpretatione 1, between the signification of terms and that of
affirmations and negations – defined, remember, as the species of
simple assertions. On this account of them affirmations signify mental
states in which the mental items signified by their component
significant terms are combined and negations signify mental states in
which they are separated. Missing in the theory is an account of
compound propositions showing how their meanings are obtained from
the meanings of their components. Such an account requires a notion of
unasserted propositional content. With it we may also locate what is
common to different speech acts and explain how it is that they differ.
The relevant differences are the differences in what we now call their
force." (p. 211)
Martin, John N. 1989. "A Tense Logic for Boethius." History and
Reprinted as Chapter 5 in: J. N. Martin, Themes in Neoplatonic and
Aristotelian Logic. Order, Negation and Abstraction, Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2004, pp. 53-63.
Abstract: "An interpretation in modal and tense logic is proposed for
Boethius' reconciliation of God's foreknowledge with human freedom
from The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V. The interpretation
incorporates a suggestion by Paul Spade that God's special status in
time be explained as a restriction of God's knowledge to eternal
sentences. The argument proves valid, and the seeming restriction on
omnipotence is mitigated by the very strong expressive power of
eternal sentences."
McKinlay, Arthur Patch. 1938. "The De syllogismis categoricis and
Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos of Boethius." In Classical and
550
Mediaeval Studies in Honor of Edward Kennard Rand: Presented
Upon the Completion of His Fortieth Year of Teaching. , edited by
Rand, Edward Kennard and Leslie, Webber Jones, 209-219. Freeport,
N.Y: Books for Libraries Press.
Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo. 1942. "The Genuine Text of Boethius’
Translation of Aristotle’s Categories ." Medieval and Renaissance
Studies no. 1:151-177.
Reprinted in L. Minio-Paluello, Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle ,
Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972, pp. 1-27.
"It is known that Boethius wished to make translations of all the works
of Aristotle and to comment on them, (1) but fate brought him to
imprisonment and death before he was able to carry out his plan. That
he translated the works on logic is certain. True, some scholars have
doubted whether he translated the Analytics, Topics and Sophistici
Elenchi, (2) but no one disputes that he both translated and commented
on the Categories and the two books De interpretatione . This can be
established with certainty by the references he makes elsewhere to
these works of his, (3) by the tradition which begins with Cassiodorus
(4) and is thus contemporary, and by the unanimity of the manuscripts
of the Commentaries . (5) All scholars agree, and rightly so, on this
point.
On another point, however, scholars have been entirely mistaken. They
have held that the translation of the Categories , which from the tenth
century onwards appears in innumerable manuscripts, now scattered
over European and even American libraries, is by Boethius. This is the
text, often printed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and also
reproduced in the Patrologia Latina of Migne and in the editions of
Notker’s works. (6)
It is the objet of the present study to prove that this is a mistake and to
make known the genuine translation of Boethius, which until a short
time ago remained buried in a small number of manuscripts. It is hoped
also to correct certain errors arising out of this mistaken attribution and
thus to throw fresh light on the history of the study of the Categories
and of the translations from the Greek in the tenth century." (pp. 151-
152)
(...)
"To conclude, I hope I have made clear the following points:
551
(1) That a version of the Categories , whose author has hitherto not
been recognized, is the work of Boethius;
(2) that the version, which up till now has been ascribed to Boethius
partly belongs to the tenth century; and therefore
(3) that there is a mediaeval translation of Aristotle into Latin at a date
much earlier than is commonly supposed." (p. 26)
I wish to thank Dr. Decima Douie for her help in translating this article,
and the Editors of this Journal for their criticism and advice.
(1) ‘Ego omne Aristotelis opus, quodcumque in manus venerit, in
Romanum stilum vertens eorum omnium commenta latina oratione
perscribam . . .' (Comment. Second, in Arist. De interpret. 79, 16 ff.
Meiser). P. Mandonnet (Siger de Brabant , Fribourg 1899, xxiv f.)
alone believes that Boethius had really translated all Aristotle, and
quoting Migne (!) Sstates that ‘on possède les commentaires de Boèce
sur tous les livres de la logique’.
(2) E.g. M. Grabmann, Gesch. d. schol. Meth . II, 71. Even he,
however, recognised the value of the references of Boethius to his
translations (In top. Cic . PL 64 col. 1051; 1052; De diff. top . 1173;
1184; 1193; 1216). On the question of the authorship of the translations
of these works preserved under the name of Boethius, see B. Geyer,
Die alten lat. Uebersetz. d. arist. Analytik, Topik und Elenchik (Philos.
Jahrb. d. Görres-Gesellsch. 30 [1917] 25 ff.); C. H. Haskins, Studies in
the histiory of mediaeval science , Cambridge Mass. 1927, p. 228 ff.;
M. Grabmann, Forsch, üb. d. lat. Arist.-Uebersetz. d. XIII. Jahrb .
(BGPM XVII, 5-6, p. 130); id., Bearbeitungen u. Ausleg. d. arist. Logik
aus d. Zeit v. Abaelard bis Petrus Hisp . (Abh. Preuss. Akad. 1937), p.
10; E. Franceschini, Aristotele nel Medio Evo latino (Atti del IX Congr.
naz. di filos., Padova 1934-35, p. 5 ff.).
(3) See S. Brandt, Entstsehungsz. u. zeitl. Folge d. Werke von Boethius
(Philologus, N. F. 16 [1903] 141-154 and 234-275).
(4) Variae I 45, cap. 4 f. Institut. II 18 (p. 128 ed. Mynors, see
Introduction xxviii); Anecdoton Holderi (ed. Usener), p. 4. On the
question of Cassiodorus’ testimony see below, Appendix.
(5) The incipit of the Commentary to the Categories in almost every
manuscript is : ‘Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii, viri clarissimi ex
consulum ordinibus editio prima super Categorias a se verbum de verbo
translatas e graeco in latinum'; and the incipits of the two
552
Commentaries on the De interpretatione are nearly the same.
(6) At least 350 manuscripts of the Categories are till preserved. Not
less than 24 editions were published in the 15th century (see
Gesamtkatal. d. Wiegendr . nos. 2335-2342; 2390-2393; 2396-2400;
2406-2410; 4511-4512). In the Patrologia of Migne the translation is
only printed as lemmata to the Commentary (voi. 64 col. 159-294).
After editions by Graff and Hattemer, a critical edition of Notker’s
works was given by P. Piper (Die Schriften Notkers und seiner Schule ,
Freiburg 1882); the commented and translated text of the Categories is
in vol. I, 367-495.
[Minio-Paluello published the critical editions of Boethius' translation
of Aristotle's Categories in 1961 (Translatio Boethii ). ]
———. 1945. "The Text of the Categoriae : The Latin Tradition."
Classical Quarterly no. 39:63-74.
"The Latin versions of Aristotle’s Categoriae have never received
much attention from the editors of the Greek text. J. Th. Buhle (Arist.
Op. Omn . I, Bipont. 1791) and Th. Waitz (Arist. Organ , I, Lpz., 1844)
availed themselves of Latin texts, but in a very unsatisfactory way; and
since them the Latin field has remained unexplored throughout the last
hundred years, in which both Hellenists and Orientalists have done
much to increase our knowledge of the textual tradition of the Categ . It
is the purpose of these pages to give a summary account of the Latin
tradition and to contribute to a revision of the Greek text by a collation
of Boethius’ recently discovered translation with the best printed Greek
and Oriental sources.
———. 1957. "A Latin Commentary (? translated by Boethius) on the
Prior Analytics and its Greek sources." Journal of Hellenic Studies no.
77:93-102.
"Cod. Florence Bibi. Nazion. Centn Conv. Soppr. J.VI.34—formerly in
Niccolò Niccoli’s and St. Mark’s libraries—written in a beautiful
French hand of c. a.d. 1150-1200—contains the second edition of
Boethius’s translation of Pr. An . (1) Many scholia, written on the
margins and between the lines by the same calligraphic hand which
553
wrote the Aristotelian text or by a hand very similar to and
contemporary with it, accompany the translation in this MS. They are
mainly concentrated in about one-half of the work, viz. in book I.23 -30
(400-463) and book II (52a-7ob); quite a few accompany I. 1,5-6,30-45
(24a, 27b-28a, 46a-5oa) ; almost none is to be found in I.10-14,17-22
(30b7-33b25, 37a25-40b10). Arrangement and writing suggest that the
scribe intended to give the reader Aristotle’s text together with what
was available to him of an authoritative commentary.
The scholia range, in nature and extent, from short glosses on single
words or phrases and short summaries of sections of Aristotle’s work to
detailed explanations and doctrinal developments of important or
difficult passages. Here and there carefully drawn diagrams illustrate
logical rules and geometrical examples." (p.93)
(...)
"The Florentine MS. is quite unique among all the Latin manuscripts of
Pr. An . It is the only one, out of about two hundred and seventy, that
contains—and contained—only the Pr. An. ; out of a hundred and
twenty so far examined, it is the one which seems to contain the
second, and very rare, edition of Boethius’s translation in its purest
form, and the only one which contains the ‘corpus’ of Greek scholia
translated into Latin; (21) the paleographical characteristics—big letters
throughout, even for the scholia, spaciousness, very careful
transcription—suggest that we are in the presence of a library copy of
an important text of the past.
The attribution to Boethius remains hypothetical; but the linguistic
argument in its favour, if expounded in detail, might prove very strong;
our other arguments strengthen it. No argument against this attribution
has so far suggested itself." (p. 102)
(21) Only scanty fragments from the scholia are also preserved in two
or three of the many manuscripts inspected. The only important
exception is in the figure of the 'pons asinorum', which exists in most
MSS.; but it is likely that Boethius ha included it in the text of Aristotle
itself, as it appears in Greek copies of Pr. An. independently of any
commentary or scholia.
Nikitas, Dimitrios Z. 2012. ""Exemplum logicum Boethii": reception
and renewal." In Greek into Latin from Antiquity until the Nineteenth
Century , edited by Glucker, John and Burnett, Charles, 131-144.
554
Torino: Nino Aragno Editore.
Prior, Arthur Noman. 1953. "The Logic of Negative Terms in
Boethius." Franciscan Studies no. 13:1-6.
"Historians of logic have recently been turning their attention to the De
Syllogismo Hypothetico of Boethius, and have found in it a quite highly
developed propositional calculus.(1) So far as we are aware, however,
his De Syllogismo Categorico and his Introductio ad Syllogismos
Categóricos have not yet been subjected to similar scrutiny; and in the
latter work at least there are features of considerable interest.
The Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos resembles the De
Syllogismo Hypothetico in exhibiting a special interest in the results of
attaching a negative particle to an element or to the elements of a
proposition. Just as he gives in the latter work an exhaustive account of
such varieties of the conditional proposition as ‘If p then not q’, ‘If not
p then q’, ‘If not p then not q’, ‘If p then if q then not r’, and so on, so
in the Introductio he considers the relations of opposition, entailment,
and so on which hold between categorical propositions with and
without negative (or as he calls them ‘infinite’) terms. In doing this he
does not use variables such as ‘a’ and ‘b’ , but the concrete terms which
he uses are selected on a definite principle, which we shall now
illustrate." (p. 1)
(1) See, in particular, K. Diirr, The Propositional Logic of Boethius
(NorthHolland Publishing Co., 1951); R. van den Driessche, “ Sur le
‘de syllogismo hypothetico’ de Boèce,” Methodos Vol. I, No. 3; I. M.
Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic (North-Holland Publishing Co.,
1951), pp. 106-109.
Shiel, James. 1957. "Boethius and Andronicus of Rhodes." Vigiliae
Christianae no. 11:179-185.
"G. Pfligersdorffer has recently described the attitude of the ancient
editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, towards the final notes in Aristotle's
Categories on opposites, simultaneity, priority, motion and possession-
what the medievals called the postpraedicamenta. (1)
The scholar has based his intricate arguments on a passage of Boethius'
commentary on the Categories , and as this passage in the printed
editions (2) is syntactically unintelligible he has suggested an emended
text of it." (p. 179)
(...)
555
"On the basis of the passage thus emended (...) the author argues that:
(a) Andronicus does not imply that Aristotle was not the real author of
the postpraedicamenta but only that Aristotle was not responsible for
annexing them to the Categories; ..." (p. 180)
(...)
"I believe that the text of the Boethius passage can be more
convincingly presented from a wider survey of the extant manuscripts
of the In Categorias ." (p. 181)
(...)
"The text I have proposed will still support Pfligersdorffer's argument
(a) noted above -- but none of the others." (p. 185
(1) G. Pfligersdorffer, "Andronikos von Rhodos und die
Postpradikamente bei Boethius" (Vigiliae Christianae 7 (1953), 98-
115).
(2) ed. Glareanus, Basel, 1546; reprinted (badly) in Migne PL 64
[263b].
———. 1958. "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle." Mediaeval and
Renaissance Studies no. 4:217-244.
Revised version in: R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient
Commentators and Their Influence, London: Duckworth, 1990, pp.
349-372 also reprinted in: Manfred Fuhrmann & Joachim Gruber
(eds.), Boethius, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984
pp. 155-186.
Citations are from the reprint in Sorabji 1990.
"It is recognised that Aristotelian logic, which was to become an
integral part of medieval scholasticism, was first transmitted to Latin
Christianity through the work of Boethius. But the way in which he set
about his self-imposed task has never been determined in detail. (1) We
know that he promised to translate and comment 'upon every single
work of Aristotle I can lay hands on (omne Aristotelis opus
quodcumque in manus venerit )'. (2) To form the idea was a silent
judgment on the learning of his day; to realise it was more than one
man could accomplish; but Boethius accomplished much.
(...)
The genuine texts of Boethius' versions of Aristotle (except that of the
Posterior Analytics ) have now been identified among the manuscripts
and his distinctive method of translation firmly identified.(5) The
556
present article therefore proposes to examine the other extant results of
Boethius' promise, the commentaries and treatises. Are they really
original or are they too translated from Greek?" (p. 349)
(...)
"The general impression produced by this study is that Boethius in
composing his commentaries on the Organo n translated Greek notes
which he found added to his text of Aristotle. If this is true, it gives us
new insight into the way Boethius worked.
From the beginning it is evident that he considered the works of the
Organon , including Porphyry's Isagoge (which Neoplatonic
schoolwork put on a par with Aristotle), as a united whole." (p. 368)
(...)
Cicero retired to his Tusculan study, Boethius to his 'study walls
adorned with ivory and glass (bibliothecae comptos ebore ac vitro
parietes )'. Our study of him as a translator emphasises anew his
remarkable role of transmission: through him Aristotelian logic, the
equipment of Neoplatonic paganism, is carried into the Christian
Church to be eventually part of its armour of faith. (84)" (p. 371)
(1) M. Cappuyns, 'Boèce ', in Dict. d'hist. et geog. eccles . 9, Paris
1939, 367: 'The exact role of Boethius in the transmission of Aristotle's
works is hard to disentangle at present.' This statement prompted the
present enquiry. Dom Cappuyns' article is the best introduction to the
subject. [Now however see the prefaces of Aristoteles Latinus , vols 1-
6, and the supporting essays in L. Minio-Paluello, Opuscula: the Latin
Aristotle , Amsterdam 1972.]
(2) in Int. II 79,16 Meiser.
(5) L. Minio-Paluello, 'The genuine text of Boethius' translation of
Aristotle's Categories', in Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies (MRS),
1942, 151-77 (=Opuscula , 1-27) and 'The text of the Categoriae : the
Latin tradition' in Class. Quart. 39, 1945, 63-74 (= Opuscula , 28-39).
(84) This illustrates a seasoned historian's judgment that 'ancient
philosophies, rediscovered, are found to possess a disturbing vitality,
even in modern times' (Hugh Trevor Roper, Catholics, Anglicans and
Puritans , 1987, VII).
———. 1974. "Boethius and Eudemus." Vivarium no. 12:14-17.
"In writing his explanation (1) of Porphyry's 'tree' Boethius inevitably
encountered a subdivision of 'substance' where Porphyry has divided
557
'rational animate substance' into'mortal'and 'immortal'.
An immortal animate could only be a god, and, since 'animate' had
already been classed under 'corporeal', this would be a corporeal god as
described by the ancients who identified the world and the heavens
with Zeus. Boethius does not quarrel with this doctrine. Only by
abruptly detaching the reference to the ancients can Pierre Courcelle (2)
see in it a Christian reservation voiced by Boethius himself.
Since similar philosophic reference to the ancient beliefis to be found in
Greek (3) I believe that Boethius translated it from Greek. And the
Greek he translated from was not the extant commentaryof Ammonius
(4) on Porphyry." (p. 14)
(...)
"Now one cannot help noticing that Boethius has a somewhat more
complex classification than Ammonius.
The latter includes no distinction for the two kinds of non-dialectical
question. Besides, in place of 'non-dialectical' Ammonius has a more
positive term, 'investigative' (pysmatike ),which is not translated in
Boethius. And whereAmmonius says "according to the ancients"
Boethius has the more precise "according to the Peripatetics." All this
should make one cautious of asserting that Ammonius is the exact
source of Boethius.
What is more, Eudemus turns out to be the rightman. This is perfectly
clear from a passage of Alexander's commentary on the Topics (8)
where the Boethian classification is given with an explicit ascriptiono
Eudemus. Boethius however does not seem to be translating Eudemus
directly, for the Latin scheme is slightly more elaborate, especially as
regards substantial definition. And of course it is only part of the larger
classification "according to the Peripatetics."
And so I come back to the general conviction I have written about
elsewhere, that Boethius translated his explanations from some Greek
book later than Porphyry but anterior to Ammonius, and that in
numerous cases one could visualise the exact Greek words he copied
from. In the present case, as in that previous gloss on Porphyry's 'tree',
a brief marginal scheme in Boethius' uncial Greek manuscript would
have given him all the material he needed for his Latin.
It is rather a pity, then, that this Ammonius text does not work as
evidence that Boethius received his education in the school of
558
Ammonius at Alexandria. Nor does any similar text that I have so far
been able to examine." (pp. 16-17)
(1) Boeth., in Isagogen 208.22 Brandt (PL б4.103ab).
(2) P. Courcelle, La Consolation de Boèce dans la tradition littéraire
(1967) 341.
His suggestion and footnotes are appropriated by С. J. de Vogel,
Vivarium 9 (1971) 59.
(3) Elias, in Isagogen 69.21 Busse.
As homage to Boethius I have transcribed the Greek into uncial type
designed by my friend, Timothy Holloway, of St. John's
College,Oxford. This I entrust to the elegant pages of Vivarium : ...in
bibliotheca posui.
(4) cf. Ammonius, in lib de Interp. (20 b 22 ) 361 Meiser (PL 64.572c).
(8) Alexand., in Top . (104a 8) 69.13-19,22-23 Wallies. See note 3.
———. 1982. "A Recent Discovery: Boethius' Notes on the Prior
Analytics ." Vivarium no. 20:128-141.
"As a matter of fact all the genuine texts of Boethius' Aristotelian
translations are recent discoveries. They were all out of reach thirty
years ago and they have come to light only after the long and intricate
labour involved in discerning and collecting the manuscrip tmaterial for
Aristoteles Latinus . This is an edition, planned for thirty-three
volumes, of all the Latin versions of Aristotle surviving from the
Middle Ages; each volume of the collection is devoted to a single
Aristotelian work, gathering together the various translations of it so far
identified. (1) The first six volumes cover the treatises on logic,
collectively known to the tradition as the Organon : Categories , De
Interpretatione , Prior and Posterior Analytics , Topics and Elenchi ,
together with Porphyry's Isagoge ('Introduction'). In these volumes the
pioneer translations done by Boethius have been edited for all of the
treatises except the Posterior Analytics , of which the genuine Boethian
version is still missing. (2)
The procedure by which these genuine versions were discovered may
prove to be one of the most impressive feats of scholarly achievement
in this century. (3)" (p. 128)
(...)
"But the PriorAnalytics is the most interesting in this regard.The copy
of this work (b ) which was inserted by Thierry of Chartres in his
559
famous volume of the liberal arts was one of the very few which the
Aristoteles Latinus editor found to be genuinely Boethian. (9) But he
discovered another version (B), also of French provenance, in a
manuscript at Florence, (10) and on examination this proved to have so
much in common with Thierry's copy that it had to be regarded as a
second draft by the same translator.(11) The most noticeable
differences between the two drafts, b and B, occur in thefirst sixteen
chapters of Book I and in chapters 17-20 of Book II.(12)" (p. 130)
(1) A brief description of the enterprise was given by me in Medium
Aevum, 33 (1964), 61-64; 42 (1973), 147-152.
(2) AL I. I-V. 3 ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges-Paris, 1961-1969; AL
VI. 1-3 ed. B. G. Dod, Bruges-Paris, 1975.
(3) Many of the basic studies relating to the work of identification are
collected in: L. Minio-Paluello, Opuscula: the Latin Aristotle ,
Amsterdam, 1972.
(10) AL Codices (and Supplementum ) n. n.236 1412 (Firenze, Bibi.
Naz. Centr. J. 6.34) (Nn ).
(11) AL III, p. XI.
(12) AL III, p. XI-XVI.
———. 1987. "The Greek Copy of Porphyrios' Isagoge used by
Boethius." In Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung. Paul Moraux zum 65
Geburtstag gewidmet - Band 2: Kommentierung, Uberlieferung,
Nachleben , edited by Wiesner, Jürgen, 312-340. Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter.
"In this paper I wish to ask what type of Greek book Boethius
possessed for his study of the Isagoge . He certainly did use a Greek
book of some kind because although he based his first commentary (c)
(1) on the Latin version or paraphrase already made by Marius
Victorinus, for his editio secunda (C) he made his own translation (p)
of Porphyry’s work, which is a concise introduction to five basic
Aristotelian terms: Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident.
Boethius’ first commentary, c, opens with an experiment in the
dialogue style that had been familiar to Latin authors from Cicero to
Macrobius and Augustine. That such Platonizing dialogue might
employ fictional elements is admitted by Macrobius (Sat . I 1), and it
has been noticed that Augustine felt less than happy in using this
Platonic mode. The characters here are Boethius himself and a possibly
560
fictional Fabius whose total knowledge of the Isagoge seems to be
confined to the Latin version made by Victorinus. Boethius at the
outset (c 4,6) gives Fabius a Ciceronian promise (cf. Cic.Top . 1) of
deeper instruction that he could have gathered from Victorinus alone.
Boethius also admits that he will be transmitting this information from
others, from the introductorii commentarii of learned masters, and he
seems in fact to be actually consulting some such work (c 4,4: super
eisdem rebus meditantem ). A question may occur to the modern reader
over these sources of his instruction. How is Boethius, so often praised
for his originality of thought, in fact adapting or translating some
earlier commentary, when he here undertakes in the best dialogue
manner to convert otium into intellectual negotium ? A Latin source for
his work would seem unlikely, for it appears from Cassiodorus (Inst.
2,3,18) that Victorinus had made only the Latin translation and not a
commentary as well.
The extant Greek commentaries on the Isagoge have a special character
because of the work's position at the beginning of the Organon , and
therefore at the beginning of all Neoplatonic school-work in
philosophy. They begin with lengthy sets of prolegomena, first on
philosophy in general and then on the Isagoge itself. The general set
adheres to a standard school order of topics for lectures (πράξεις):
definitions of philosophy both theoretical and practical, and the
subdivisions of these; then a further list of preliminaries (κεφάλαια,
προλεγόμενα, προτεχνολογούμενα) which must be followed before
beginning the study of any philosophic work.(2) The prolegomena
proper to the Isagoge then apply these considerations, one by one, to
the book itself." (pp. 312-313)
(1) For brevity of reference I employ these sigla, based on the usage of
the Aristoteles Latinus (AL ):
Π Porphyrii Isagoge, ed. Busse, CAG IV 1 (1887)
p Isagoge Porphyrii: translatio Boethii, ed. Minio-Paluello, AL I (1966)
c Boethii in Isagogen, editio prima, ed. Brandt, CSEL 48 (1906)
C Boethii in Isagogen, editio secunda, ed. Brandt, ibid .
(...)
Solmsen, Friedrich. 1944. "Boethius and the History of the Organon ."
Reprinted in: F. Solmsen, Kleine Schriften II , Hildesheim: Olms, 1967,
561
pp. 38-43 and in: Manfred Fuhrmann & Joachim Gruber (Hrsg.),
Boethius , Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984, pp.
127-132.
"Boethius had set himself the task of bringing into Latin the entire body
of Plato's and Aristotle's writings. (1) What he actually accomplished,
the translation of Aristotle's logical treatises, was a small part of this
huge enterprise. There is, besides, his translation of Porphyry's
Eisagoge .
The chronological order of these translations (and of the commentaries
which accompany them) has been determined with reasonable certainty
by two scholars, Samuel Brandt and Arthur P. McKinlay who, though
differing in their method and criteria, have yet arrived at fundamentally
identical results. (2) The sequence appears to have been as follows:
Porphyry's Eisagoge , Aristotle's Categories , Peri Hermeneias ,
Analytica Priora, Posteriora, Topica, Sophistici Elenchi . It could not
remain unnoticed that this sequence is identical with the order in which
the original works are integrated in the standard collection of Aristotle's
logical works commonly known as the Organon ; in fact, Brandt (3)
points out that Boethius simply followed the order which he found
established in his Greek original. This suggestion is, as we shall see,
perfectly correct; but a student of Aristotle will be aware that the
existence of the Organon (or of any fixed order of these writings) by A.
D. 500 has never been proved. (4) Shall we then say that the studies of
Brandt and McKinlay have supplied the terminus ante quem for its
existence which the students of Aristotle's own works have failed to
find?
In a sense this is true, but if we wish to have the complete picture a few
more facts must be taken into account.
Byzantine manuscripts of Aristotle's logic, which are very numerous,
invariably have the writings in the "orthodox" order, given above. Just
as invariably they include Porphyry's Eisagoge as the first item, i. e.
preceding the Categories . (5) To most scholars these facts would
indicate that there were one or more late ancient editions in which the
works were thus arranged. I do not know whether anyone would be
inclined to think of a Byzantine scholar as responsible for the
arrangement, but if anyone did he would certainly find it very difficult
to maintain this view against the witness of Boethius; for it is precisely
562
here that Boethius' testimony becomes important." (pp. 69-70)
(1) In librum peri hermeneias Comment., Secunda editio , II, 3, p. 79,
16 Meiser.
(2) S. Brandt, Philol ., LXII (1903), pp. 141-54, 234-79; A. P.
McKinlay, H. S. C. P ., XVIII (1907), pp. 123-56. See also E. K. Rand,
Jahrbücher f. class. Philol ., Supplem. XXVI (1901), pp. 428 ff.
(3) Loc. cit ., p. 260. Aristotle (A. Pr. A4, 25 b 26) had made it clear
that the Analytica Posteriora was to be considered a sequel to the
Priora . Apart from this, he has nothing to do with the order sanctioned
in the Organon . On the term organon and its application to Aristotle's
logica, see e. g. Karl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendland
(Leipzig, 1855), I, p. 532 (especially notes 4 and 5); see also W. Christ
and W. Schmid, Griechische Literaturgeschichte (6th ed., Muenchen,
1920), I, p. 729, n. 3.
(4) W. D. Ross, Aristotle (3rd ed., London, 1937), p. 20, n. 6, suggests
that the term "Organon" was in the sixth century applied to the
collection of Aristotle's logical works.
Speca, Anthony. 2001. Hypothetical Syllogistic and Stoic Logic .
Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Abstract IX; Preface XI-XIII; 1. The
Aristotelian Background 1; 2. The Greek Commentators on Aristotle
35; 3. Boethius: On Hypothetical Syllogisms 67; 4. Boethius: On
Cicero's Topics 101; References 135; General index 139; Index
locorum 141.
Abstract: "Aristotle recorded his intention to discuss hypothetical
syllogistic fully (An. pr. 50a39), but no such treatment by him has been
available since at least a.d. 200, if even it ever existed. The
contributions of his successor Theophrastus have also perished, as have
those of his followers of the subsequent few centuries. At the same
time, almost all of the surviving sources, especially the Greek
commentators and Boethius, did not report hypothetical syllogistic
accurately. Rather, they conflated it with Stoic logic, which it
resembles in some respects, but from which it is significantly different.
Modern scholars, who have not appreciated the nature or extent of this
conflation, have unintentionally perpetuated the problem. As a result,
the original form of hypothetical syllogistic has been misunderstood,
and part of the influence of Stoic logic in late antiquity has remained
563
unclear.
This book is an account of the conflation of hypothetical syllogistic and
Stoic logic. The first chapter is a study of Aristotle’s remarks on
hypothetical syllogistic, which suggest that it was not a sentential logic
such as the Stoics would develop. The second chapter details the
conflation as it appears in the Greek commentaries on Aristotle, which
consists principally in a confusion between the original Peripatetic
division of hypothetical statements and syllogisms, whose criteria are
semantic, and the Stoic division of complex propositions and inference
schemata, whose criteria are syntactic. The third and fourth chapters
focus on Boethius’s On hypothetical syllogisms and On Cicero’s Topics
, in which even further conflation demonstrates that hypothetical
syllogistic and Stoic logic had completely ceased to retain their distinct
natures by the end of antiquity."
Stump, Eleonore. 1974. "Boethius Works on the Topics." Vivarium no.
12:77-93.
"The De topicis differentiis appears to be the mature product of an
axcellent mind. It shows the same acumen, subtlety, and care as
Boethius's other logical treatises; and it seems to build on the training
and insight Boethius manifested in his earlier treatises. (1) It is a
complete study of the discipline for finding arguments, both dialectical
and rhetorical. Boethius works his diverse material, from different
traditions and from different disciplines, into one coherent and elegant
system unequaled, as far as I know, in any of the material that has come
down to us from antiquityand the early middle ages. (2)
(...)
But a thesis which runs counter to the common-sense view has been
published; James Shiel in his article Boethius' Commentaries on
Aristotle (4) has argued that Boethius's works on logic are not original
compositions but are rather his translations of Greek Neo-Platonic
scholia on Aristotle's Organon . His thesis seems to be gaining
currency; two eminent scholars in the field, Minio-Paluello (5) and De
Rijk, (6) accept or support it. In this article,after considering very
briefly some treatment of Shiel's thesis in the literature, I want to
discuss the thesis in detail as it applies to Boethius's work on the Topics
. My main concern is to examine and discuss Shiel's evidence for his
counter-intuitive theory; if it does not stand up under scrutiny, we are
564
free to return to the common-sense view and to take Boethius's works
on the Topics , at least, to be just what they appear to be -- his original
compositions." (pp. 77-78)
(1) The De top. diff. is one of the last works Boethius produced. See L.
M.De Rijk, On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic II,
Vivarium 2 (1964), 153-154 and 157-161.
(2) See the Introduction and Chapters I-III in my unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Boethius's De topicis differentiis , Cornell University,
1975 [now published : Ithaca: Cornell University, 1978].
(4) Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958), 217-244.
(5) Cf. L. Minio-Paluello, Les traductions et les commentaires
aristotéliciens de Boèce in: Studia Patristica II, fifth series, V. 9; 1957;
pp.358-365.
(6) Cf. L. M. De Rijk, On the Chronology of Boethius' Works on Logic
I and II, Vivarium 2 (1964), 1-49, 125-162.
———. 1981. "Boethius’ Theory of Topics and its Place in Early
Scholastic Logic." In Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani
(Pavia, 5-8 ottobre 1980): atti , edited by Obertello, Luca, 249-262.
Roma: Editrice Herder.
"Boethius’s De topicis differentiis is a philosophically interesting and
historically influential work having to do with the art of Topics (or loci
), a branch of philosophy which antiquity bequeathed to the Middle
Ages but which philosophers of the scholastic period transformed
almost past recognition. In this article, I want to explain briefly
Boethius’s theory of Topics and then discuss in some detail that of
Abelard, which seems superficially quite similar to Boethius’s but is in
fact very different from it. As a result, I hope to make clearer both
Boethius’s theory of Topics itself and the significant role played by
Boethian Topics in the history of twelfth-century logic." (p. 249)
———. 1981. "Boethius and Peter of Spain on the Topics." In Boethius
and the Liberal Arts. A Collection of Essays , edited by Masi, Michael,
35-50. Bern: Peter Lang.
"Boethius’s influence on later medieval philosophy is, of course,
enormous, and his treatment of the Topics is no exception to that
general rule. Later medieval philosophers had a strong interest in
dialectic. The whole technique of the disputatio , for example, and the
consequent literature on obligationes have their ultimate origin in
565
dialectic; and the study of the Topics was considered a regular part of
logic and treated in a section of its own in elementary logic texts. For a
long time, Boethius was the most important, and sometimes the sole
source for the study of the Topics, and his work remained an important
indirect source even when it was superseded by later treatments of the
subject. For example, three of the best known thirteenth-century
logicians, William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, and Lambert of
Auxerre, all have a chapter on Topics in their introductory logic texts;
and all three reproduce the Boethian list of Topics and the major
Boethian categorizations or divisions of the Topics.
For the sake of putting Boethius’s work on the Topics into medieval
perspective and of understanding the changes and developments in the
Topics, it is useful to consider the treatments of the Topics among some
of these later medieval philosophers. In particular, it is worthwhile
examining the discussion of the Topics in Peter of Spain’s Tractatus ,
(9) which was the most widely used textbook of logic on the Continent
from the late thirteenth to the end id the fifteenth century (10). Its
discussion of the Topics is very similar to discussions found in several
of the scholastics contemporary with or earlier than Peter. Besides
being a representative and influential treatment of the Topics, Peter’s
discussion is heavily dependent (directly or, more likely, indirectly)
(11) on Boethius’s account. The chapter on dialectic in the Tractatus is
like De top. diff. in organization. It begins with a series of definitions
and then lists the Topics with a description and example of each. The
definitions and the listing are those in De top. diff. , and in some places
Peter’s words are equivalent to a quotation from Boethius. (12)
Consequently, comparison of Boethius and Peter is not difficult. Some
of the recent literature has suggested that Peter’s work on the Topics is
simply a slightly varied compilation drawn from Boethius’s De top.
diff. Otto Bird, for example, who has published a number of very useful
articles on the medieval Topics, says that Peter’s discussion of the
Topics "is little more than a summary of the first half of BDT [De top.
diff. ],"13 and that "Peter of Spain made a précis of it [De top. diff ]
(primarily of the second book) and provided additional Maxims in the
fifth tract of his Summulae [Tractatus ]." (14) But such a view shows a
mistaken understanding of both Peter and Boethius. In what follows
here, I will examine Peter’s discussion of the Topics in considerable
566
detail in order to exhibit with some accuracy a method for using Topics
that, despite its apparent similarity to Boethius’s method, is in fact very
different from it; by doing so, I hope to show what Peter’s method
comes to and as a result to clarify the nature of the Boethian art of
Topics." (pp. 37-38)
(9) Ed. L. M. De Rijk (Assen, 1972).
(10) Ibid., pp. XCV-C.
(11) Cf., Tractatus , p. XCIII, n. 5.
(12) Cf., for example, Peter, Tractatus , p. 55.17 and Boethius, De top.
diff. , 1180C4-5, Peter p. 55.23 and Boethius 1183A9-10, and Peter p.
56.16-18 and Boethius 1184B13-C1.
(13) "The Tradition of the Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham",
Journal of the History of Ideas , 23 (1962), p. 313.
(14) "The Formalizing of the Topics in Mediaeval Logic", Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic , 1 (1960), 140. Jan Pinborg echoes Bird’s
view of Peter. Cf. "Topik und Syllogistik im Mittelalter", in Sapienter
Ordinare: Festgabe für Erich Kleineidam , ed. F. Hoffmann, L.
Scheffczyk, and K. Feiereis (Leipzig, 1969), p. 164; and Logik und
Semantik im Mittelalter (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1972), p. 75. De Rijk,
ed., Tractatus , p. XCIII seems to agree at least in part with Bird’s
view: "This tract [chap. V of Tractatus ] is not a compilation from
Aristotle’s Topica but from Boethius' De topicis differentiis I and II,
with some additions from Aristotle’s Topics .“ He argues in note 5 on
the same page that Peter’s treatment is not taken directly from
Boethius: rather, he says, it is "useful to point to the treatment of the
loci in the Logica Cum sit nostra , pp. 438-445 or to that in the
somewhat older work, Dialectica Monacensis , pp. 528-555." De Rijk’s
point is very likely right, but what can be inferred from the claim in the
text and the note is that Peter’s work on Topics amounts to an indirect
compilation from Boethius’s De top. diff.
———. 1987. "Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica and Stoic Logic." In
Studies in Medieval Philosophy , edited by Wippel, John F., 1-22.
Washington: Catholic University of America.
———. 1989. Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval
Logic . Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1. Dialectic and
Aristotle's Topics 11; 2. Dialectic and Boethius's De topicis differentiis
567
31; 3. Between Aristotle and Boethius 57; 4. Topics and Hypothetical
Syllogisms in Garlandus Compotista 67; 5. Abelard on the Topics 89;
6. Logic in the Early Twelfth Century 111; 7. Terminist Logicians on
the Topics 135; 8. Consequences and the Decline of Aristotelianism in
Formal Logic 157; 9. William of Sherwood's Treatise on Obligations
177; 10. Walter Burley on Obligations 195; 11. Roger Swyneshed's
Theory of Obligations 215; 12. Topics, Consequences, and Obligations
in Ockham's Summa logicae 251; Index 271-274.
"Since 1975 my work in medieval logic has concentrated on dialectic. I
have tried to trace scholastic treatments of dialectic to discussions of it
in the work of Aristotle, the Greek commentators on Aristotle, and the
Latin rhetorical tradition. But I have been especially interested in
Boethius, whose discussions of dialectic were among the most
important influences on scholastic treatments of that subject. Accounts
of dialectic based ultimately on Boethius's views continued to play a
fundamental role in philosophy through the fourteenth century. The
earliest scholastic logician whose work we know, Garlandus
Computista, devoted a great deal of attention to Boethian dialectic, and
I have tried to follow the development of scholastic dialectic from
Garlandus through various twelfth-century logicians (including
Abelard) and the thirteenth-century terminists into the fourteenth
century in the work of William Ockham." (p. 1)
Suto, Taki. 2009. "Logic and Grammar in Boethius: A Logical
Analysis of the Parts of Speech." In The Word in Medieval Logic,
Theology and Psychology. Acts of the XIIIth International Colloquium
of the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale,
Kyoto, 27 September - 1 October 2005 , edited by Shimizu, Tetsuro and
Burnett, Charles, 65-80. Turnhout: Brepols.
"There is no doubt that Boethius places Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias and
his commentaries in the field of logic. In chapter 1 (16a8-9) of the
work, Aristotle famously reserves some matters for his work on the
soul, considering them beyond the scope of the subject in discussion. In
commenting on this reservation, Boethius claims that “it is one thing to
dispute principally on thoughts (intellectibus ) of the soul, but another
to take them for disputation so far as they can pertain to logical
knowledge,” (1) thus holding the topic in discussion as that of logic.
On the other hand, Boethius’ discussions in the commentaries rely
568
heavily upon the noun (nomen ) and the verb (verbum ), which we
usually take as grammatical distinctions." (p. 65)
(...)
"Although using the terminology employed by grammarians, Boethius
sometimes contrasts his view with theirs. He claims that grammarians
regard “garalus” (which is a not a real Latin word) as a noun but
philosopher do not. (10) He also claims that a grammarian counts eight
parts of speech, i.e., noun, pronoun, verb, adverb, participle,
conjunction, preposition and interjection, but that a philosopher counts
only two, that is, noun and verb. (11) Calling the holder of the view
contrasted to that of a philosopher simply “a grammarian”
(grammaticus ), (12) Boethius never actually names any grammarians
in his discussions. (13)
In this paper, by considering the question of how Boethius
distinguishes logic from grammar, I will analyse the nature of
Boethius’ investigation of logic in his commentaries. (14) Specifically,
I will look at his division of the parts of speech and his notion of
conjunction. The result of the examination will show that Ackrill’s
criticism of Aristotle does not apply to Boethius." (p. 67)
(1) “Etenim aliud est principaliter de intellectibus animae disputare,
aliud tantum sibi ad disputationem sumere, quantum ad logicae possit
pertinere peritiam.” Boethius (A.M.T. Severinus), In Peri hermeneias,
Prima editio , ed. C. Meiser in Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii
Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias , Leipzig 1877,
41.11-14. Hereafter In PH I refers to the first commentary and In PH II
to the second commentary.
(10) Boethius, In PH II , ed. Meiser, 32.17-22.
(11) Boethius, De syll. cat. , in PL 64, 796C-D; Introd. syll. cat. , in PL
64, 766A-B (note 39).
(12) Note that a “grammarian” was a scholar engaged in the study
broader than grammar in modern sense (including poetry especially):
“Primus in eo qui scribendi legendique adeptus erit facultatem,
grammatici est locus. Nec refert de Graeco an de Latino loquar,
quanquam Graecum esse priorem placet: utrique eadem via est. Haec
igitur professio, cum brevissime in duas partes dividatur, recte loquendi
scientiam et poetarum enarrationem, plus habet in recessu quam fronte
promittit.” (Qunitilianus, Institutiones oratoriae I c. 4 [1-2] in The
569
Orator's Education , ed. and trs. D. Russell, Cambridge MA 2001. See
also the appendixes of R. Kaster, Guardians of Language: The
Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity , Berkeley, 1988.
(13) We can find the names of Aristarchus and Donatus in Boethius’
writings (Aristarchus: Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis = In Cat., in
PL 64, 171D, 182C, 189C, 260A; Donatus: In Cat ., 257D). Boethius
mentions their names as examples of a grammarian and says nothing
about their grammatical theories.
(14) There are only a few secondary writings on this topic: J. C. Magee,
“Truth, Discourse and Mind in Boethius”, Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Toronto, 1986, chapter 2 and S. Ebbesen “Boethius on
the Metaphysics of Words”, in A. Galonnier ed. Boèce ou la chaîne des
savoirs , 2003, 257-75.
———. 2011. Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic. A Study of
Boethius' Commentaries on Peri Hermeneias . Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Acknowledgements XI; Note to the Reader XV; Chart 1:
Contents of Boethius’ Two Commentaries on Peri hermeneias XVII;
Chart 2: Chronology of Boethius’ Works XIX; Chart 3: Chronology of
Major Thinkers and Writers XXI; Chart 4: Relationships among
Ancient Commentators XXIII;
Introduction 1; Part One. Boethius on Words and Minds. I. The
Significatum of Spoken Words 17; II. Words as ‘Notae’ 43; III. Three
Types of Speech 77; Part Two. Boethius on Logic and Grammar. IV.
Nouns, Verbs, and Conjunctions 117; V. The Varieties of Speech 151;
VI. The Verb 'To Be' 187; VII. General Conclusions 223; Bibliography
237; Index of Ancient and Medieval Texts 269; Index of Names
(Ancient and Medieval Authors) and Subjects 285; Index of Modern
Authors (Selective) 294-296.
"This work aims to be a study of his commentaries on Aristotle’s Peri
hermeneias (De interpretatione ). For my discussion of these
commentaries, I use Carl Meiser’s edition, which is the only critical
edition currently available. Deviations from the critical edition are
recorded in the footnotes of the quotations.
Boethius wrote two commentaries on Peri hermeneias . In Meiser’s
edition, the first commentary is only 195 pages while the second
commentary is 502 pages, more than double the length of the first.
Writing two commentaries on the same work was not unusual for him.
570
He also wrote two commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge , but the first
commentary is three-fifths the length of the second commentary.(3)
The striking difference in length between the two commentaries on
Peri hermeneias reflects his careful planning of the role of each
commentary: the first one to present basic lines of Aristotle’s thought,
the second one to provide much more detailed explanations.(4) In the
second commentary, he often introduces past discussions of Greek
commentators and notions that he does not mention in the first
commentary. The fact that he purposely wrote two commentaries
should be seriously taken into account in considering the apparent
inconsistencies and contradictions between them.
This work is primarily devoted to the second commentary. I include the
first commentary principally in the following two cases: First, I point
out where his explanation significantly differs from that of the second
commentary. His account in the second commentary can be mostly
regarded as a development of the first, but the first commentary
sometimes has explanations incompatible with those in the second
commentary.(5) Boethius seems to make contradictory statements
rather deliberately, intending to present simple interpretations in the
first commentary, knowing that they are not the best.(6) Second, I refer
to the first commentary when it illuminates or enhances his
explanations in the latter.
I sometimes look at Boethius’ other works, mainly logical ones, in
relation to the main questions surrounding the second commentary.
Where the texts contribute to our understanding, I discuss them in the
relevant sections. Otherwise, I refer to them in the footnotes. For my
interpretations of the commentaries, I have relied very little on his
treatises on theology, liberal arts, and his renowned masterpiece, The
Consolation of Philosophy . It is important to consider why the same
individual wrote all these works in different disciplines. I would not
deny that these independent treatises could illuminate his logical works.
In fact, I believe they do, and I will argue so in the concluding chapter.
I find, however, that these independent treatises have many differences
from his logical works. For an accurate interpretation of his logical
works we should be very careful in relying on these treatises.(7)" (pp.
1-2)
(3) In Brandt’s edition of Boethius’ commentaries on Isagoge, the
571
second commentary is 214 pages while the first commentary is 130
pages. Boethius does not allude to a second commentary in the first.
(4) In PH1 31.6-32.3; In PH2 186.2-9; 250.20-251.4; 294.5-8. For the
dates of composition of these commentaries, see Chart 2, p. XIX.
(5) His distinction between simple and composite propositions, which I
discuss in Chapter 5, is an example of this.
(6) Sten Ebbesen (The Aristotelian Commentator (2009): 49) points this
out with textual evidence: In PH1 132.3 sqq. and In PH2 276.8 sqq.
(7) Scholars have pointed out this danger. Antony Lloyd (The Anatomy
of Neoplatonism (1990): 2, n.2) cautions against cross-referencing
Boethius’ different works. Ebbesen says, “one should be cautious in
assuming consistency between the doctrines of the Aristotle
commentaries and that of Consolation of Philosophy ” ("Review of J.
Magee’s Boethius on Signification and Mind .” Vivarium 29, 1991, p.
153). Vincent Spade (Boethius against Universals: Arguments in the
Second Commentary on Porphyry , 1996) criticizes Peter King’s use of
Boethius’ De trinitate for understanding his second commentary on
Isagoge .
Sweeney, Eileen C. 2006. Logic, Theology, and Poetry in Boethius,
Abelard, and Alan of Lille: Words in the Absence of Things . New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Contents: Abbreviations IX Acknowledgments ; Introduction: Words in
the Absence of Things 1; 1. Boethius: Translation, Transfer, and
Transport 7; 2. Abelard: A Twelfth-Century Hermeneutics of Suspicion
63; 3. Alan of Lille: Language and its Peregrinations to and from
Divine Unity 127; Conclusion: Language and the Ascensus Mentis ad
Deum 177; Notes 185; Bibliography 213; Index 230-236.
Introduction.
"While Augustine is the source of what has aptly been called “the
semiological consciousness of the Christian West,” Boethius is the
source of its technical vocabulary and academic form. (9) For the
twelfth century as a whole, Boethius’s logical commentaries and
theological tractates are the standard works of reference and provide
the technical vocabulary for new work. As we shall see, Abelard and
Alan take up not just Boethius’s vocabulary but his questions and
issues in their accounts of language and theology. Moreover, they take
up not just the logical and theological parts of Boethius’s project but
572
also the questions and themes of the Consolation in their poetry.
Boethius’s project was to translate, comment on, and transfer the
language of philosophy into theology, to incorporate secular disciplines
and texts into his own philosophical/theological vision. Boethius’s
imaginative world is one populated largely by other texts, and is
notably different from Augustine’s appropriation of secular texts in the
more positive and autonomous place given to Aristotelian logic and
pagan literature. The voices of these texts speak themselves in the work
of Boethius." (p. 2)
(...)
(9) Eugene Vance, “Saint Augustine: Language as Temporality,” in
Mervelous Signals: Poetics and Sign Theory in the Middle Ages
(Lincoln: University 0f Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 34.
Chapter 1.
"Although I do not pretend to have found the definitive solution to I he
problem of interpreting Boethius, following the theme of language
through the main parts of the corpus has yielded a stronger sense of the
unity, autonomy, and originality of Boethius. One way to express it is
in visual terms, terms suggested, I will show below, by the Consolation
itself. (7) My contention is that Boethius’s innovation is the
construction in some detail of multiple and correct, though limited,
perspectives from which human understanding can view itself and the
nature of reality. As we will see, the method of the Boethian project is
linguistic: different perspectives are constructed by developing
different vocabularies and different senses of the same terms. Then, the
perspectives are arranged hierarchically, the lower encompassed by the
higher.
The themes to which Boethius returns again and again in the logical
commentaries are the distinction between the order of words and things
and the conventionality of language. From this fundamental distinction
between what is the case and what we say, it is only a short step to the
elaboration and amelioration of this gap in terms of multiple senses of
terms, multiple disciplines with distinct methods and terminologies,
and even multiple ontologies which either describe the same reality in
different terms and/or are true descriptions of different strata of reality.
The conviction that motivates a good portion of the tractates is the view
that disagreement and contradiction can be mediated by the creation of
573
or the distinction between different vocabularies. And while it is true
that the Consolation attempts to hierarchize the different perspectives
on Boethius’s fate, it still gives voice to those “lower” perspectives
through the voice of Boethius, the prisoner.
Boethius’s own use of language mirrors this multiplicity of meanings,
methods, and rhetorics. He goes from close, careful translation,
paraphrase, and commentary designed to provide an introduction to the
greenest of beginners, to the terse, esoteric, and technical language of
the tractates, to the complex interweaving of poetic and philosophical
language and allusions in the Consolation .
Boethius surely had important models for such multileveled and
synthetic views in his Neoplatonic masters and contemporaries, who
would have seen his stated plan to translate, comment on, and show the
agreement between Plato and Aristotle as an understandable if bold
undertaking. Boethius’s vision differs from theirs both in being
Christian and in being worked out in almost exclusively textual terms
— in the mediation of texts in the translation and commentary, in the
self-conscious production of new textual forms, and in the development
of new vocabularies. Boethius both creates his own vocabulary in his
translations and transfers it from its “proper” and original location to
theological topics where it is radically reworked in the theological
tractates. The same project continues in the Consolation 's attempt to
ascend from the prisoner’s worldly perspective to that of Lady
Philosophy by means of the language and arguments of different
philosophical schools.
I will trace the construction of this peculiarly Boethian textuality in
Boethius’s Isagoge and Peri hermeneias commentaries, theological
tractates and Consolation . In all these texts, Boethius’s most common
methods are, first, the division or distinction, and second, the
construction and relating of different perspectives. Following
Boethius’s own pedagogical plan, then, I begin with the logic
commentaries." (pp. 7-8, notes omitted)
Thomas, Ivo. 1951. "Boethius’ locus a repugnantibus." Methodos no.
3:303-307.
RELATED PAGES
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Annotated Bibliographies of L. M. de Rijk
575
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INDEX OF THE SECTION: HISTORY

OF MEDIEVAL LOGIC
Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century
Medieval Logic: A General Overview
General Bibliography on Medieval Logic:
General Studies A - K
General Studies L - Z
Latin Logic until the Eleventh Century
Selected Bibliography on Latin Logic until the Eleventh Century
The Birth of the Liberal Arts: the Trivium (Grammar, Dialectic,

Rhetoric)
Logic and Grammar in the Twelfth Century
Selected Bibliography on the Twelfth Century
576
The Development of Logic in the Thirteenth Century
The Development of Logic in the Fourteenth Century
Selected Bibliography on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
Bibliography on the Medieval Theories of Supposition and Mental

Language:
Supposition A - L
Supposition M - Z
Abelard: Logic, Semantics, Ontology and His Theories of the Copula
Abelard's Philosophical Works: Editions, Translations
Bibliography on the Logic and Metaphysics of Peter Abelard:
Abelard A - L
Abelard M - Z
An Overview of Buridan's Logical Works:
I. An Overview of the Summulae de Dialectica
II. The Treatise on Consequences and Other Writings
Selected Bibliography on the Logic and Metaphysics of Buridan:
577
Buridan A - L
Buridan M - Z
578
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History of Medieval Logic: A General

Overview
INTRODUCTION
"The role of logic in the Middle Ages.
Regarding the role of logic within the framework of arts and sciences during
the Middle Ages, we have to distinguish two related aspects, one institutional
and the other scientific. As to the first aspect, we have to remember that the
medieval educational system was based on the seven liberal arts, which were
divided into the trivium, i.e., three arts of language, and the quadrivium, i.e.,
four mathematical arts. The so-called trivial arts were grammar, rhetoric, and
logic, and during a period of several centuries virtually every educated
person, at least every university graduate, received a training in these matters,
especially in logic. Students in the medieval faculty of arts probably spent
more time studying logic than any other discipline. This first -- institutional --
aspect concerning the role of logic is explained by the second -- scientific --
aspect. The trivial disciplines provided techniques of analysis and a technical
vocabulary that permeate philosophical, scientific and theological writings.
Logic, as mentioned before, was referred to and was generally regarded as the
art of arts and the science of sciences. The increasing cultural dominance of
the universities with their obligatory disputationes and their hierarchy of
579
examinations on the one hand and the outstanding status of logic on the other
were corresponding features of the educational world of the 13th century.
The core of the logic curriculum from the 12th century onwards was provided
by the logical works of Aristotle. These represented the material for the study
of types of predication, the analysis of simple propositions or statements (2)
and their relations of inference and equivalence, the analysis of modal
propositions, of the structure and the types of the syllogism, dialectical
topics, fallacies and scientific reasoning as based on the demonstrative
syllogism. Medieval logicians, however, realized that there were other, non-
Aristotelian, approaches to logical subjects, questions and methods that could
be investigated. The new approaches primarily included works on the
signification and the supposition of terms -- a distinction showing some
similarity to the modern distinction between meaning and reference. The
theory of signification deals with the capability of descriptive terms to
function as signs, i.e., their property of being meaningful. The theory of
supposition was concerned with the types of reference that terms in their
function as subject and predicate obtain in the context of different
propositions. Another emphasis was put on consequences or valid inference
forms. These innovations were by no means regarded as an alternative to
tradition, but supplemented the Aristotelian logica antiqua under the heading
of logica moderna or logica modernorum.
The medieval logicians themselves did not classify their discipline as a
scientia formalis -- to my knowledge the expression was not used in the
Middle Ages -- but as a scientia sermocinalis, i.e., a science of argumentative
speech, which was the overarching framework of the trivial arts. The scientia
sermocinalis itself is one of three types into which science was divided, e.g.,
by Peter of Spain in his well-known [Lambertus Marie de Rijk (ed.), Petrus
Hispanus: Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales, Van Gorcum 1972,
p. 29, 14-16]. The differences (differentiae) of science, as Peter states, are
naturale, morale, and sermocinale, a division which resembles the Stoic
division into natural philosophy, ethics, and logic.(3) William of Sherwood,
another important logician of the 13th century, offers the same scientific
differences, but -- in contrast to Peter of Spain -- as the result of a twofold
division:(4) Since there are two sources (principia) of things, nature and the
soul, there will accordingly also be two kinds (genera) of things. The things
whose source or principle is nature are the concern of natural science. The
580
others, whose source or principle is the soul, are again divided into two types.
Since according to Sherwood the soul is created without virtues or
knowledge, it performs certain operations by means of which it attains to the
virtues, and these are the concern of ethics or scientia moralis. The soul
performs different operations by means of which it attains to knowledge, and
these are the concern of the science of argumentative speech or scientia
sermocinalis. At this point we meet the same threefold division of science
that occurs in Peter of Spain. It is worth mentioning that the first division
regarding the nature of things is metaphysical while the second division
regarding the different sorts of things whose source is the soul is
epistemological. The sciences whose principle is the human soul are
understood as concerning basic human activities or operations, and the
specific differences among them are obtained from the goals of these
activities, namely virtues on the one hand and science on the other.
The term "scientia sermocinalis" which stands for the subtle analysis of
ordinary language came into use in the late 12th or early 13th century. The
designation of logic as a scientia sermocinalis was commonly accepted
during the 13th century, but it was not the only one. The term "logica" as
derived from the Greek "logos" can mean both "sermo" and "ratio".
Accordingly, logic was regarded either as a scientia sermocinalis or as a
scientia rationalis. The medieval authors offer considerations supporting both
titles. While logicians like William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain stressed
the feature of logic as a linguistic science as mentioned above, other authors
in the 13th century like Robert Kilwardy and St. Bonaventure called it
linguistic and rational alike. In the 14th century the notion of logic as a
rational science became predominant. An important reason lies in the fact that
logic was about second intentions, which were higher-level concepts like
"genus", "species", "predicate", etc. We make use of second intentions to
classify our concepts or first intentions of things in the world. Second
intentions reveal both universals and logical structures and were regarded as
mental constructs or rational objects reached through abstraction, which
means reflection on general features and relations of things and on actual
pieces of discourse."
(2) In medieval logic "propositio" and "enuntiatio" both stand for a
sentence signifying something true or false and are mostly used as
581
interchangeable terms. However, using the term "propositio" we have to
avoid the modern understanding of proposition, or content, as what is
asserted or what is expressed by a sentence.
(3) The scientiae morales and naturales as the counterpart to the scientiae
sermocinales were sometimes brought together under the integrating concept
of scientiae reales; cf. [Jakob Hans Josef Schneider, Scientia sermocinalis /
realis, in: Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (eds.) Historische
Wörterbuch der Philosophie 8, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellaschaft
Darmstadt 1992, col. 1508].
(4) Cf. [William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam, in: J. Reginald
O'Donnell, The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood, Medieval Studies
3 (1941), p. 46-93, p. 2, 1-12].
From: Christoph Kann. Medieval Logic as a Formal Science. In Foundations
of the Formal Sciences IV. The History of the Concept of the Formal
Sciences. Edited by Benedikt Löwe, Volker Peckhaus, and Thomas Räsch.
London: College Publications 2006. pp. 103-123.
"The specific contribution of mediaeval logicians.

The new elements which the mediaeval logicians have added to the logical
theories which had been handed down to them via Boethius, are found
embodied in a number of treatises which mainly discourse upon the field of
semantics.(5) To define the exact place of these new elements in mediaeval
logic from the twelfth to the fifteenth century, we must recall to mind the
mediaeval terminology: logica vetus, logica nova, logica antiqua, and logica
moderna.
(a) Logica vetus. It is a matter of common knowledge, that up to and
including the first few decades of the twelfth century the Latin West knew
from Aristotle's Organon only theCategories and De Interpretatione. These
two works formed, together with the Isagoge of Porphyrius, Boethius'
commentaries on these three writings as well as his logical monographs, the
works of the ars vetus or logica vetus. From c. 1200 the work De Sex
Principiis, attributed to Gilbert de la Porrée, also belonged to this group.
(b) Logica nova. This comprised Aristotle's two Analytics, Topics and
Sophistici Elenchi.
(c) Logica antiqua (or antiquorum). This name is the generic term for the ars
582
vetus and ars nova together.
(d) Logica moderna (or modernorum). This term is the pendant of the
preceding and comprises those elements in mediaeval logic which cannot be
simply traced back to the writings of the logica antiquorum."
(5) The treatise De Consequentiis can be said to be nearer to the logic of
propositions.
From: L. M. de Rjik, Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to the History of
Early Terminist Logic, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1962, Vol. I On the Twelfth
Century Rgeories of Fallacy, pp. 14-15.
"It was argued in Trentman [5] that, in spite of the important and
obvious differences of opinion that divided them, the medieval logicians
were in general agreement on the nature of their task and the way to
carry it out. For them logic was analytic and, one might say,
reconstructionistic. This character of their discipline was well expressed
by St. Anselm in a passage Henry has used to good advantage: Non
tantum debemus inhaerere improprietati verborum veritatem tegenti
quantum inhiare proprietati veritatis sub multimodo genere locutionum
latenti (*). (De casu diaboli; cf. Henry [4, 6].) Truth lies hidden under
the surface structure of everyday speech. The job of the logician is to
bring out in a systematic way what lies thus hidden. What is hidden is
logical form; we might say that it is the form of thought, and Ockham
identifies it with the structure of mental language (Trentman [7]). But
we could also say that it is the form of the world; hence, describing it
means stating the most general truths about reality. Ockham's mental
language is also intended to satisfy this requirement in that it is
supposed to be a kind of ideal language directly picturing the world. But
logicians sceptical of "Mental" also held firmly to this point of view
(Trentman [8]) ; thus a study of logic taught men to speak truly (vere
loqui). Nor did the dispute about whether logic is scientia sermocinalis
or a scientia rationalis (cf. Kretzmann [9, 10]) really touch this point of
fundamental agreement. Medieval logic, therefore, was not formalistic
in the sense of a study of uninterpreted calculi. It studied very general
truths about reality, reflected in the form of thought and expressed in
583
language. It proceeded by systematic reconstruction, but the "system"
that emerged thereby must be viewed as an interpreted system. Of
course, contrary to what people sometimes seem to believe, by no means
all twentieth-century logicians have been formalists. Indeed, the points
of view of Frege and Russell were not unlike that of the medievals, and
such otherwise disparate recent logicians as Lesniewski and Bergmann
have maintained essentially the same view of logic as an interpreted
system.
To say that medieval logic was systematic is not, of course, to say that it was
constructed like a modern quasi-axiomatic system. There are no axioms and
theorems, no formation rules and the like. Medieval logics were generally
presented in the form of lists of rules of inference, often with little or no
apparent heed for economy. This does not mean, however, that the logicians
were unaware of logical relations between rules. Indeed, in some cases they
showed a very perceptive appreciation of the ways in which proofs are
constructed and the ways in which some rules may be derived from others
(Boh [11]). The medieval logicians, unfortunately, lacked a good notation;
indeed, they lacked any notation. Even quotation marks would have helped,
as some of the complications with material supposition show. But, although
they experimented a bit with something like indicators of quotation, and they
commonly used letters for abbreviation, on the whole, they had to make do
with ordinary or (as Henry has often reminded us) rather extraordinary Latin.
None of them, however, was an "ordinary language" philosopher. Contrary to
what John of Salisbury had urged, they did not take the idioms of any
ordinary language as an arbiter of logical rectitude. No problems are solved
simply by citing ordinary usage. Yet, as Boh [11] points out, it was the
"formal aspects of ordinary discourse", that is, the syntax of ordinary
language, that provided the material for logical analysis. To this material they
brought the tools of their trade. They aimed at reconstructions of puzzling
syntactical constructions that would perspicuously reveal the logical forms
they concealed. The logicians' business, then, was with the perplexities of
ordinary language syntax; on them he used his tools of reconstruction; and
the arbiter of his success was an ideal syntax, a syntax reflecting the general
form of reality.
The theory of supposition was one of the great preoccupations of the later
medieval logicians. It was, in fact, at the heart of the studies of proprietates
584
terminorum which so characterized their work and led to their being called
"terminists". Owing to the important work of de Rijk [12], its origins are no
longer veiled in impenetrable obscurity; but, whatever its origins, it has for
some time been a subject of much fascination for modern scholars and
logicians, although, like so many medieval theories, it seems to aim one stone
at too many birds; it has to do equally with matters that we should prefer to
distinguish as semantic and syntactic. In any case, there has been
considerable recent discussion about whether or not a part of it, in particular
the theory of personal supposition, constitutes a kind of analogue to modern
quantification theory. This debate is interesting, not only in its own right, but
also in exemplifying some of the problems involved in attempted
comparisons between modern and medieval logical theories."
(*) [We should not let ourselves be hindered by the improprieties of
words which cover up the truth; rather we should seek after the propriety
of the truth which is hidden under diverse manners of speaking.]
Bibliography:
Boh, I. [11] An Examination of Some Proofs in Burleigh's Propositional
Logic. The New Scholasticism. 38 (1964): 44-60.
Henry, D. P. [4] Medieval Logic and Metaphysics. London 1972.
Henry, D. P. [6] The Logic of St. Anselm. Oxford 1967.
Kretzmann, N. [9] William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic.
Minneapolis, MI 1966.
Kretzmann, N. [10] History of Semantics. In P. Edwards (Ed.)., Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, pp. 358-406. New York 1967.
Pinborg, J., Bezeichnung in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts. Miscellanea
Mediaevalia. 8 (1971): 238-281.
Rijk, L. M. de [12] Logica Modernorum, II, I-II; The Origin and Early
Development of the Theory of Supposition. Assen 1967.
Trentman, J. A. [5] Extraordinary Language and Medieval Logic. Dialogue. 7
(1968): 286-291.
Trentman, J. A. [7] Ockham on Mental. Mind. 72 (1970): 586-590.
Trentman, J. A. [8] Vincent Ferrer on the Logician as Artifex Intellectualis.
Franciscan Studies. 25 (1965): 322-337.
From: John A. Trentman, Logic in: Contemporary Philosophy. A New
585
Survey. Vol. 6/2. Edited by Guttorm Fløistad and Raymond Klibansky.
Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990. pp. 805-819.
Latin Logicians before Eleventh Century

Cicero (106 BC 43 BC)
Lucius Apuleius of Madaura (c. 123/125 - 180)
Marius Victorinus (4th century)
Martianus Capella (5th century)
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c. 480 - 524 or 525)
Byzantine Logicians (from 6th to 12th century)
Alcuin of York (c. 735 - 804)
John Scottus Eriugena (c. 815 - 877)
Logicians of the Eleventh Century
Abbo of Fleury (c. 945 - 1004)
Anselm of Canterbury (1033 - 1109)
Islamic Logicians
Al Kindi (c. 801 - 873)
Al-Farabi (c. 872 - 950/951)
Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (c. 980 - 1037)
586
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (1126 - 1198)
Logic and Grammar in Twelfth Century
The anonymous Glosulae super Priscianum (written between 1080 and

1150)
Roscelin (c. 1050 - c. 1125)
William of Champeaux (c. 1070 - 1122)
Garlandus Computista [Gerlandus of Besançon] (early 12th century)
Peter Abelard (1079 - 1142)
Adam Parvipontanus (or Adam of Balsham) (? - 1181)
Gilbert of Poitiers (after 1085 - 1154)
John of Salisbury (c. 1120 - 1180)
Logic and Grammar in Thirteenth Century

William of Sherwood (or Shyyreswood) (1200/5 - 1266/71)
Albert the Great (1200 - 1280)
Peter of Spain (d. 1277)
Robert Kilwardby 1215? - 1279)
Roger Bacon (1215 - 1294)
Henry of Ghent (c. 1217 - 1293)
Ramón Llull (c. 1233 - 1316)
587
Boethius of Dacia (fl. 1260-1270)
William Heytesbury (? - d. 1272/3)
Simon of Faversham (c. 1260 - 1306)
John Duns Scotus (c. 1266 - 1308)
Radulphus Brito (c. 1270 - 1320)
Logic and Grammar in Fourteenth Century

Pseudo-Scotus (14th century)
Thomas of Erfurt (first quarter of the 14th century)
Walter Burley (c. 1275 - 1344)
Peter Aureoli (c. 1280 - 1322)
Siger of Courtrai (c. 1283 - 1341)
William of Ockham (c. 1287 - 1347)
Robert Holkot (c. 1290 - 1349)
Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1290 - 1349)
John Buridan (c. 1300 - after 1358)
Gregory of Rimini (c. 1300 - 1358)
Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1300 - after 1358)
Albert of Saxony (c. 1316 - 1390)
John Wyclif (c. 1330 - 1384)
588
Marsilius of Inghen (c. 1340 - 1396)
Peter of Mantua (? - d. 1400)
Richard Billingham (fl. 1350 - 1360)
Vincent Ferrer (c. 1350 - 1420/1)
Peter of Ailly (c. 1350 - 1420)
Paul of Venice (c. 1369 - 1429)
Paul of Pergola (1380 - 1455)
RELATED PAGES
Selected Bibliography on the History of Medieval Logic: General Studies
First Part: A - K
Second Part: L - Z
E. J. Ashworth
L. M. de Rijk
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Selected Bibliography on Medieval Logic:

General Studies. (First Part: A - K)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Amerini, Fabrizio. 2000. "La Dottrina Della Significatio Di Francesco
Da Prato O.P. (Xiv Secolo). Una Critica Tomista a Guglielmo Di
Ockham." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no.
XI:375-408.
Angelelli, Ignacio. 1993. "Augustinus Triumphus' Alleged Destructio
of the Porphyrian Tree." In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische
Forschungen Zu Den Logischen Und Semantischen Regeln Korrekten
Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 483-489. Leiden: Brill.
Bertagna, Mario. 2000. "La Dottrina Delle Conseguenze Nella
"Logica" Di Pietro Da Mantova." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione
Filosofica Medievale no. 11:459-496.
Beuchot, Mauricio. 1979. "La Filosofia Del Lenguaje De Pedro
Hispano." Revista de Filosofia (Mexico) no. 12:215-230.
Boh, Ivan. 1964. "An Examination of Some Proofs in Burleigh's
Propositional Logic." New Scholasticism no. 38:44-60.
———. 1984. "Propositional Attitudes in the Logic of Walter Burley
and William Ockham." Franciscan Studies:31-59.
———. 1991. "Bradwardine's (?) Critique of Ockham's Modal Logic."
590
In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte Der
Philosophie Des Mittelalters. Festschrift Für Kurt Flasch Zu Seinem
60. Geburtstag. (Vol. I), edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf,
55-70. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner.
Braakhuis, Henk Antonius. 1977. "The Views of William of Sherwood
on Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation to Those of Roger
Bacon." Vivarium no. 15:111-142.
———. 2010. "Marsilius of Inghen's Questione Elencorum and the
Discussion of the (Non-) Distinction of Propositions." In Philosophie
Und Theologie Des Ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius Von Inghen
Und Das Denken Seiner Zeit, edited by Hoenen, Maarten J.F.M. and
Bakker, Paul J.J.M., 91-119. Leiden: Brill.
Brands, Hartmut. 1993. "Topik Und Syllogistik Bei William of
Sherwood." In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen Zu
Den Logischen Und Semantischen Regeln Korrekten Folgerns, edited
by Jacobi, Klaus, 41-58. Leiden: Brill.
Broadie, Alexander. 1983. George Lokert: Late-Scholastic Logician.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
"George Lokert, an early 16th Century Scottish philosopher logician,
published a number of logic books. After a historical introduction
"George Lokert" closely examines those books, focusing on their
treatment of supposition theory, exponible terms, valid inference, and
contradiction. It is shown that much that Lokert says bears closely and
interestingly on modern discussions on logic and the philosophy of
language."
———. 1985. The Circle of John Mair. Logic and Logicians in Pre-
Reformation Scotland. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cameron, Margaret. 2004. "What's in a Name? Students of William of
Champeaux on the Vox Significativa." Bochumer Philosophisches
Jahrbuch fur Antike und Mittelalter no. 9:93-114.
"William of Champeaux (1170-1121) is best known as Peter Abelard's
teacher and the proponent of realism of universals. In recent years,
many works on the linguistic liberal arts -- grammar, dialectic and
rhetoric -- have been attributed to him. However, at least in the case of
the dialectical commentaries, these attributions have been hastily made
and are probably incorrect. The commentaries themselves, correctly
situated in the time and place when Abelard and William worked at
591
Notre Dame, nonetheless deserve close attention. The commentaries on
Aristotle's De interpretatione are examined here: in them we find a new
theory of signification which developed as a critical response to
William of Champeaux's view of the vox significativa, as well as an
important clue to the origins of the doctrine of the proprietates
terminorum."
Cesalli, Laurent. 2001. "Le Réalisme Propositionnel De Walter
Burley." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littèraire du Moyen Âge no.
68:155-221.
———. 2003. "La Sémantique Des Syncatégorèmes Chez Walter
Burley (1275-1344) Et Richard Brinkley (Fl. 1365)." Histoire,
Épistémologie, Langage no. 25:115-144.
———. 2009. "Le Signifié Propositionnel Selon Jean Duns Scot Et
Gauthier Burley." In Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early
Fourteenth Century, edited by Brown, Stephen F., Dewender, Thomas
and Kobusch, Theo, 465-482. Leiden: Brill.
Conti, Alessandro, ed. 2013. A Companion to Walter Burley. Late
Medieval Logician and Metaphysician. Leiden: Brill.
Conti, Alessandro D. 2000. "Significato E Verità in Walter Burley."
Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 11:317-
350.
———. 2005. "Johannes Sharpe's Ontology and Semantics: Oxford
Realism Revisited." Vivarium no. 43:156-186.
"The German Johannes Sharpe is the most important and original
author of the so called "Oxford Realists": his semantic and
metaphysical theories are the end product of the two main medieval
philosophical traditions, realism and nominalism, for he contributed to
the new form of realism inaugurated by Wyclif, but was receptive to
many nominalist criticisms. Starting from the main thesis of Wyclif's
metaphysics, that the universal and individual are really identical but
formally distinct, Oxford Realists introduced a new type of predication,
based on a partial identity between the entities for which the subject
and predicate stood, called predication by essence, and then redefined
the traditional post-Aristotelian categories of essential and accidental
predication in terms of this partial identity. Sharpe substantially shares
the metaphysical view and principles of the other Oxford Realists, but
he elaborates a completely different semantics, since he accepts the
592
nominalist principle of the autonomy of thought in relation to the
world, and Ockham's explanation for the universality of concepts.
Unfortunately, this semantic approach partially undermines his defence
of realism, since it deprives Sharpe of any compelling semantic and
epistemological reasons to posit universalia in re. Therefore, Sharpe's
main ontological theses certainly are sensible and reasonable, but,
paradoxically, within his philosophical system they cannot in any way
be considered as absolutely consistent."
D'Ors, Angel. 1998. "Ex Impossibili Quodlibet Sequitur (Domingo
Banez)." Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale no.
24:177-218.
Fitzgerald, Michael Joseph. 1984. "An Interpretative Dilemma in
Burlean Semantics." Franciscan Studies no. 44:181-192.
"Burlean semantics and epistemology appears to generate a dilemma:
(1) if Burley allows simply supposing terms to indicate species, then he
accepts the abstraction theory of cognition; and if Burley allows for
direct cognition of particulars by the intellect, then his epistemological
theory does not reflect his semantics for proper supposition. (2) either
he allows simply supposing terms to indicate a species, or he allows for
the direct cognition of singulars. Therefore, either burley accepts the
abstraction theory of cognition, or his epistemological theory does not
reflect his sensitive theory for proper supposition. The dilemma is taken
by the horns, and it is argued that burley's notion of formal supposition,
properly interpreted reconciles his epistemic with his semantics for
proper supposition."
Fredborg, Karin Margareta. 1976. "The Commentaries on Cicero's De
Inventione and Rhetorica Ad Herennium by William of Champeaux."
Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin:1-39.
Gál, Gedeon. 1977. "Adam of Wodeham Question on the 'Complexe
Significabile' as the Immediate Object of Scientific Knowledge."
Franciscan Studies no. 37:66-102.
Gál, Gedeon, and Wood, Rega. 1980. "Richard Brinkley and His
'Summa Logicae'." Franciscan Studies no. 40:59-101.
Gambra, José Miguel. 1996. "El Compromiso De Existencia Y La
Teoría De La Predicación En La Obra De Gualtiero Burley." Archives
d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littèraire du Moyen Âge no. 63:139-170.
"The question about existential import of singular propositions, already
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posed by Aristotle, becomes a recurrent topic in medieval logic. Burley
solves the question by laying down a distinction between predicates
involving or not involving being. A suitable understanding of this point
of view requires investigation not only of his doctrine of predication
but also of its real basis and has, for this very reason, to survey the
Burleian ontology (forms theory and rejection of real distinction
between essence and existence)."
Giard, Lucie. 1983. "Logique Et Système Du Savoir Selon Hugues De
Saint-Victor." Revue d'Histoire des Sciences no. 36:3-32.
Green-Pedersen, Neil-Jorgen. 1981. "Walter Burley, De Consequentiis
and the Origin of the Theory of Consequence." In English Logic and
Semantics: From the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham
and Burleigh, edited by Braakhuis, Henk Antonius, Kneepkens,
Corneille Henri and Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, 279-304. Nijmegen:
Ingenium Publishers.
Hackett, Jeremiah, ed. 1997. Roger Bacon and the Sciences.
Commemorative Essays. Leiden: Brill.
Henry, Desmond Paul. 1975. "The Singular Syllogisms of Garlandus
Compotista." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 29:243-270.
Hugonnard-Roche, Henri. 1992. "Les Oeuvres De Logique Traduites
Par Gérard De Cremone." In Gerardo Da Cremona, edited by
Pizzamiglio, Pierluigi, 45-56. Cremona: Annali della Biblioteca Statale
e Libreria Civica di Cremona.
Iwakuma, Yukio. 2003. "William of Champeaux and the
Introductiones." In Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle
Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk
Antonius and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 1-30. Groningen-Haren:
Ingenium.
———. 2008. "Pseudo-Rabanus Super Porphyrium (P3)." Archives
d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littèraire du Moyen Âge no. 75.
"Pseudo-Rabanus' commentary, known since Victor Cousin first
referred to it, is the earliest commentary on Porphyry' Isagoge that was
very influential in the beginning of the scholastic logic. The four extant
manuscripts give us considerably different versions. Together with a
critical edition of each version, this article argues that it was, in its
original, a work by William of Champeaux in the late 11th century, and
revised by his students in the very early 12th century."
594
Jacobi, Klaus. 1980. Die Modalbegriffe in Den Logischen Schriften Des
Wilhelm Von Shyreswood Und in Anderen Kompendien Des 12. Und
13. Jahrhunderts. Leiden: Brill.
Funktionsbestimmung und Gebrauch in der logischen Analyse.
Jolivet, Jean. 1991. "Données Sur Guillaume De Champeaux
Dialecticien Et Théologien." In L'abbaye Parisienne De Saint-Victor
De Paris Au Moyen-Åge, edited by Longère, Jean, 235-251. Turnhout:
Brepols.
Repris dans: J. Jolivet, Perspectives médiévales et arabes, Paris, Vrin,
2006 pp. 71-83.
Kalligas, Paul. 2002. "Basil of Caesarea on the Semantics of Proper
Names." In Byzantine Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources, edited by
Ieradakonou, Katerina, 31-48. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Karger, Elizabeth. 1999. "Walter Burley's Realism." Vivarium no.
37:24-40.
Kluge, Heike Henner W. 1976. "Roscelin and the Medieval Problem of
Universals." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 14:404-414.
"This paper is an attempt to reconstruct Roscelin's nominalism on the
basis of the data available, and to show that contrary to historical
commentators like Abelard and contemporary historians like Kneale it
does form a coherent system. I also show that Roscelin's position was
influential on the development of Abelard's "status"-theory, Aquinas'
moderate realism and Ockham's conceptualism."
Kneepkens, Corneille Henri. 1998. "Some Notes on Alcuin's De
Perihermeneiis with an Edition of the Text." In Alcuin of York. Scholar
at the Carolingian Court, edited by Houwen, L.A.J.R. and MacDonald,
A.A., 81-112. Groningen: Egbert Forsten.
"In his book on the history of the De interpretatione in the Latin West,
J. Isaac mentioned Alcuin as the first medieval author who referred to
Aristotle's Peri hermeneias and who showed an unmistakable
acquaintance with both of Boethius' commentaries on it. It was Isaac's
contention that Alcuin did not have the texts of Boethius at his disposal
when writing his De dialectica.(1)He must have read these works in
England, in York, but when he was on the continent, he no longer had
direct access to them anymore.(2)
Isaac arrived at this conclusion for several reasons, which can be
summarised as follows: (I) when Alcuin quotes Boethius, he does not
595
quote him literally; (II) Alcuin borrows illustrating quotations from
both of Boethius' commentaries on the Peri hermeneias (3) instead of
just one of them, so he cites from memory; and (III) if Alcuin had had a
complete version of the Peri hermeneias on his desk, he would not
have given a truncated summary as he does.
While Isaac's conclusion may ultimately be correct, in the end,
however, his arguments are not completely convincing. The fact that an
author does not quote literally from a work does not imply that he does
not have the source text on his desk; moreover, what is a source text in
this context? Furthermore, there might be another reason for giving a
truncated summary of a text besides not having this text at one's
disposal. Consequently, a closer perusal of the chapter on the Peri
hermeneias in Alcuin's De dialectica is called for. A detailed analysis
of the way in which Alcuin used and interpreted his sources may give
us a deeper insight into his method and into the reception of his
sources, namely the translation of Aristotle's Peri hermeneias by
Boethius and Boethius' commentaries on this text. In this contribution I
shall present some of my findings." pp. 81-82
(1) Alcuin, De dialectica, PL 101:951C-976A.
(2) J. Isaac, Le Peri hermeneias en occident de Boèce a Saint Thomas
(Paris 1953), pp. 39-40.
(3) For an important study of Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle's
Peri hermeneias, see. John Magee, Boethius on Signification and Mind
(Leiden, 1989)
Krieger, Gerhard. 1999. "Studies on Walter Burley 1989-1997."
Vivarium no. 37:94-100.
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General Studies (Second Part: L - Z)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lenz, Martin. 2001. "Adam De Wodeham Und Die Entdeckung Des
Sachverhalts." In Umbrüche: Historische Wendepunkte Der
Philosophie Von Der Antike Bis Zur Neuzeit. Festschrift Für Kurt
Flasch Zu Seinem 70. Geburtstag, edited by Kahnert, Klaus and
Mojsisch, Burkhard, 99-116. Philadelphia: Grûner.
Libera, Alain de. 1981. "Roger Bacon Et Le Problème De L'appellatio
Univoca." In English Logic and Semantics: From the End of the
Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, edited by
Braakhuis, Henk Antonius, Kneepkens, Corneille Henri and Rijk,
Lambertus Marie de, 193-234. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
———. 1981. "A Propos De Quelques Théories Logiques De Maître
Eckhart: Existe-T-Il Une Tradition Médiévale De La Logique
Néoplatonicienne?" Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie no. 113:1-
24.
———. 1991. "Roger Bacon Et La Référence Vide. Sur Quelques
Antécédents Médiévaux Du Paradoxe De Meinong." In Lectionum
Varietates. Hommage À Paul Vignaux, edited by Jolivet, Jean, Kaluza,
Zénon and Libera, Alain de, 85-120. Paris: Vrin.
597
Maierù, Alfonso. 1974. "Il Problema Del Significato Nella Logica Di
Pietro Da Mantova." In Antiqui Und Moderni. Traditionbewusstsein
Und Fortschrittsbewusstsein Im Späten Mittelalter, edited by
Zimmermann, Albert, 155-170. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Maloney, Thomas. 1983. "The Semiotic of Roger Bacon." Mediaeval
Studies no. 45:120-154.
Mates, Benson. 1965. "Pseudo-Scotus on the Soundness of
Consequentiae." In Contributions to Logic and Methodology in Honor
of J. M. Bochenski, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 132-141.
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Meier-Oeser, Stephan. 2009. "Walter Burley's Propositio in Re and the
Systematization of the Ordo Significationis." In Philosophical Debates
at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, edited by Brown, Stephen F.,
Dewender, Thomas and Kobusch, Theo, 483-505. Leiden: Brill.
Mews, Constant J. 2005. "Logica in the Service of Philosophy: William
of Champeaux and His Influence." In Schrift, Schreiber, Schnker.
Studien Zur Abtei Sankt Viktor in Paris Und De Viktorinen, edited by
Berndt, Rainer, 77-117. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Normore, Calvin. 1993. "Petrus Aureoli and His Contemporaries on
Future Contingents and Excluded Middle." Synthese no. 96:83-92.
Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1983. "Medieval Problems Concerning
Substitutivity (Paul of Venice, Logica Magna, Ii, 11, 7-8)." In Atti Del
Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica, edited by Abrusci,
CLUEB.
Ottman, Jennifer, and Wood, Rega. 1999. "Walter Burley: His Life and
Works." Vivarium no. 37:1-23.
Panaccio, Claude, and Bendwell, Ivan. 2006. "Le Nominalisme
D'oresme Et La Sémantique De La Connotation Dans Les Questiones
in Aristotelis De Anima." In "Ad Ingenii Acuitionem". Studies in
Honour of Alfonso Maierù, edited by Caroti, Stefano, Imbach, Ruedi,
Kaluza, Zénon, Stabile, Giorgio and Sturlese, Loris, 281-302. Louvain-
la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales.
Perreiah, Alan. 1978. "Insolubilia in the 'Logica Parva' of Paul of
Venice." Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale no.
4:145-172.
Pinborg, Jan. 1981. "Walter Burley on Exclusives." In English Logic
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and Semantics: From the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of
Ockham and Burleigh, edited by Braakhuis, Henk Antonius,
Kneepkens, Corneille Henri and Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, 305-320.
Pinzani, Roberto. 1995. ""Categorizzazione" in Prisciano E Nei Suoi
Interpreti Del Xii Secolo." Philo-Logica no. 4:17-33.
Prior, Arhtur Norman. 1953. "On Some 'Consequentiae' in Walter
Burleigh." New Scholasticism no. 27:433-446.
Redmond, Walter. 1979. "Formal Logic in New Spain: The Work of
Fray Alonso." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 19:331-351.
Rosier-Catach, Irène. 2005. "The Glosulae in Priscianum and Its
Tradition." In Flores Grammaticae. Essays in Memory of Vivien Law,
edited by McLelland, Nicola and Linn, Andrew, 81-99. Münster:
Nodus Publikationen.
———. 2007. "Priscian on Divine Ideas and Mental Conceptions. The
Discussions in the Glosulae in Priscianum, the Notae Dunelmenses,
William of Champeaux and Abelard." Vivarium no. 45:219-237.
Saarinen, Risto. 1999. "Walter Burley on Akrasia: Second Thoughts."
Spade, Paul Vincent. 1981. "'Insolubilia' and Bradwardine's Theory of
Signfication." Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale no.
7:115-134.
———. 1984. "A Defense of a Burlean Dilemma." Franciscan Studies
no. 44:193-196.
———. 1988. "Anselm and the Background to Adam Wodeham's
Theory of Abstract and Concrete Terms." Rivista di Storia della
Stump, Eleonore. 1980. "Dialectic in the Eleventh and Twelfth
Centuries: Garlandus Compotista." History and Philosophy of Logic no.
1:1-18.
"Dialectic is a standard and important part of the "Logica vetus" (or old
logic) in medieval philosophy. It has its ultimate origins in Aristotle's
"Topics", its fundamental source in Boethius's "De topics differentiis",
and its flowering in its absorption into fourteenth-century theories of
consequences or conditional inferences. The chapter on topics in
Garlandus Compotista's logic book is the oldest scholastic work on
dialectic still extant. In this paper I show the differences between
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Boethius's theory of topics and Garlandus's in order to illustrate the role
of topics in early scholastic logic. I argue that for Garlandus topics are
warrants for the inference from the antecedent to the consequent in a
conditional proposition and that he is interested in topics because of
overriding interest in hypothetical syllogisms. I conclude by discussing
briefly the relationship between Garlandus's use of topics and Twelfth-
century accounts."
———. 1981. "Roger Swyneshed's Theory of Obligation."
Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale no. 7:135-174.
Sylla, Edith. 1984. "Walter Burley's Tractatus Primus: Evidence
Concerning the Relations of Disputations and Written Works."
Tachau, Katherine. 1980. "Adam Wodeham on First and Second
Intentions." Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin no.
51:29-55.
———. 1987. "Wodeham, Crathorn and Holcot: The Development of
the Complexe Significabile." In Logos and Pragma. Essays on the
Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans,
edited by Rijk, Lambertus Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk Antonius,
161-187. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Tavuzzi, Michael. 1992. "Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic
of the Thomism of the Renaissance." Doctor Communis no. 45:132-
152.
Thom, Paul. 1982. "Conversion of Propositions Containing Singular or
Quantified Terms in Pseudo-Scotus." History and Philosophy of Logic
no. 3:129-149.
"A formal analysis is offered of Pseudo-Scotus's theory of the
conversion of (I) propositions containing singular terms (including
propositions with a singular term as predicate): and (II) propositions
with a quantified predicate. An attempt is made to steer a middle course
between using the Aristotelian logic as a framework for the analysis,
and using a Fregean framework."
———. 2007. Logic and Ontology in the Syllogistic of Robert
Kilwardby. Leiden: Brill.
Wallace, William. 1996. "Albert the Great's Inventive Logic: His
Exposition on the 'Topics' of Aristotle." American Catholic
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Wood, Rega. 1999. "Willing Wickedly: Ockham and Burley
Compared." Vivarium no. 37:72-93.
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Medieval Theories of Supposition

(Reference) and Mental Language
INTRODUCTION
"Interest in medieval logic, and recognition of its significance as an original
development of the formal logic founded by Aristotle, has arisen only within
the past thirty-five years [written in 1966]. For more than three centuries it
had been assumed, by logicians and historians alike, that medieval logic was
no more than a scholastic trivialization of Aristotelian logic, its principal
contribution being a fixation of terminology and invention of the mnemonic
verse "Barbara", Celarent" etc., used in teaching the figures and moods of the
syllogism. [...] The rediscovery of medieval logic had to wait on the
rediscovery of formal logic itself [...] Frege's Begriffschrift appeared in 1879,
but its significance was not appreciated until the beginning of the twentieth
century when the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell gave the
major impetus to the development of modern mathematical logic. On the
contrary, the leaders of the new movement claimed that nothing had been
done to advance the subject between the time of Aristotle and that of Boole,
Peirce, Peano and Frege. Two developments which have taken place during
the past thirty years have rescued medieval logic from oblivion and have
stimulated a steadily increasing study of its content. First, the publication by
Jan Lukasiewicz, in 1934, of a study which showed that the logic of
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unanalyzed propositions, on which modern mathematical logic rests as its
most fundamental part, had been discovered in antiquity by the Stoics, led to
the further discovery that the later medieval logicians, in their theory of
Consequentiae, had independently developed this fundamental and non-
Aristotelian part of logic. In the year 1935 J. Salamucha, a pupil of
Lukasiewicz, published a detailed study of the propositional logic of William
of Ockham, and in that same year the present writer published (as his
doctoral dissertation) the first modern study of Ockham's logical writings as a
whole. A second development, which has taken place during the past thirty
years within modern logic itself, has been the extension of logical
investigations into the fields of semantics, modal logic, and philosophy of
language, which turn out to be the areas in which the medieval logicians
made their most interesting contributions. By reason of these developments,
medieval logic has received increasing study since 1935 by historically
minded logicians and by logically educated historians, and fragments of
medieval logical doctrine have become part of the stock in trade, so to speak,
of many contemporary logicians and philosophers of language.
"From "Ernest A. Moody - The Medieval contribution to logic - Studium

Generale (Jahr. 19, Heft 8, Heidelberg 1966 - pp. 443-452; reprinted in:
Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic - University of California
Press - Berkeley 1975: pp. 371-392 - notes omitted).
"As the name implies, the theory of properties of terms is intended to
provide an account of the different rôles that words can have when they
appear as terms in propositions. As a matter of fact these terms are
commonly distinguished in Mediaeval logic into such terms as have
meaning in their own right (termini significativi) and such as are only
significant when joined to terms of the first sort (termini
consignificativi).
The former are also named categorematic terms (termini categorematici), the
latter syncategorematic terms (termini syncategorematici). However, there
seems to be some confusion in so far as syncategorematic terms may be
discussed as determining to some extent the actual signification or denotation
(=supposition) of the categorematic terms to which they are joined, rather
than taken in their own right. It must be borne in mind, then, that when those
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terms were only taken in their function of determining categorematic terms,
Medieval logicians used to deal with them in the tracts on the properties of
terms (namely, in the tract De distributionibus).
Whenever they were taken as having some kind of meaning (con-significatio)
of their own, or when were determinants (functors) of phrases or of simple
propositions, there were dealt with in special tracts, such as those entitled De
syncategorematibus, and De consequentiis. Besides, there is another feature
peculiar to the Medieval view of the properties of terms: Mediaeval logic
apparently assumed that only those categorematic terms truly have
significatio which signify forms (or: universal natures), either with the
underlying substances of such forms or without. This assumption appears to
have widespread in Medieval logic to such an extent, indeed, that the
Medieval theory of the properties of terms was, in fact, reduced to a doctrine
of significatio in its proper sense. This doctrine was concerned with
significatio and its three functions: suppositio, appellatio, and copulatio."
From Lambertus Marie De Rijk, Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to the

History of Early Terminist Logic, Assen: Van Gorcum & Co., 1967, vol. II,
Part one: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition,
(Chapter XVI: The Grammatical Origin and Early Development of the
Theory of Appellation and Supposition, pp. 513-514).
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Theories of Supposition and Mental
Language: A - L
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1976. "What Does Ockham Means by
Supposition?" Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 17:5-37.
"I focus on William Ockham's general account in "Summa Logicae" I,
chapter 63, of what it is for a term to supposit for something in a
proposition, and consider two interpretations of it. I first construe
Ockham as offering the following nominal definition of 'supposition':
(I) "Z" supposits for "X" in "P", if and only if "Z" is a term of "p" and
'this is "a"' (where 'this' indicates "x") is true, where general terms are
substituted for '"a"'; names of substitutions for '"A"', for '"Z"'; names of
propositions for '"P"'; and proper names for '"X"'. I argue that (I) is
inadequate both as a definition of suppositing-in-some-way-or-other for
something or of any particular kind of supposition. An alternative
interpretation is to take Ockham as giving his general account of
supposition when he says it is being posited for something in a
proposition. On this interpretation, less problematic definitions of
material and simple supposition are available. But the notion of being
posited for, which is at least as obscure as the notion of supposition, is
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left unanalysed. On the first interpretation, this is the analysis that (I) is
taken to provide."
Amerini, Fabrizio. 1999. "Il Tractatus De Suppositionibus Terminorum
Di Francesco Da Prato O.P. Una Rilettura Della Dottrina Ockhamista
Del Linguaggio." Medioevo no. 25:441-550.
Apel, Karl-Otto. 1973. "Sprachliche Wahrheit Als Richtige
Representation Der Wirklichkeit Durch Ein Zeichensystem (Ockhams
Suppositionstheorie)." In Transformation Der Philosophie, 112-126.
Arens, Hans. 1980. "Verbum Cordis. Zur Sprachphilosophie Des
Mittelalters." Historiographia Linguistica no. 7:13-25.
Arnold, Erwin. 1952. "Zur Geschichte Der Suppositiontheorie. Die
Wurzeln Des Modernen Europäischen Subjektivismus."
Symposion.Jahrbuch für Philosophie no. 3:1-134.
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1969. "The Doctrine of Supposition in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." Archiv fur Geschichte der
"It is often assumed that the logic of terms, including supposition
theory, was despised and ignored by the logicians of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, in spite of the sophistication with which it had
been developed during the later middle ages.
(...)
It is perhaps not surprising that when I looked at some eighty textbooks
written during the period in question, I discovered that as many as
twenty authors not only referred to the doctrine of supposition
sympathetically, but usually went on to offer a detailed analysis which
is neither a slavish nor an inept echo of what the mediaeval logicians
had said." pp. 260-271
———. 1973. "Priority of Analysis and Merely Confused
Supposition." Franciscan Studies no. 33:38-41.
Discussion of: Swiniarski "A new presentation of Ockham's theory of
supposition with an evaluation of some contemporary criticism".
"In this paper I criticize the argument put forward by Swiniarski that
Ockham should have adopted the priority of analysis rule whereby the
subject is analysed before the predicate, and that had he adopted such a
rule, merely confused supposition would have become unnecessary. I
point out that in later medieval logic explicit priority of analysis rules
were adopted, whereby terms with determinate supposition were
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analysed first, whether they were subject or predicate. I also discuss the
use made of merely confused supposition, particularly in the analysis of
the relationship between "all A is B" and "only B is A"."
———. 1978. "Multiple Quantification and the Use of Special
Quantifiers in Early Sixteenth Century Logic." Notre Dame Journal of
"In this paper I discuss two interrelated topics to do with supposition
theory and the extensionalist analysis of propositions: 1) the use of 'A'
and 'B' as special signs to produce respectively merely confused and
determinate supposition in the terms following them; 2) the analysis of
such non-standard propositions as 'there are some men all of whose
donkeys are running.' In addition, I show how logicians in the medieval
tradition handled such invalid inferences as 'every man has a head,
therefore there is a head that every man has'."
———. 1981. "Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions: A
Semantic Problem Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians."
"In the 14th century Gregory of Rimini argued that (1) there is a mental
language separate from spoken language and (2) mental propositions
are unified wholes with no discernible parts. This article examines the
reactions of later logicians, showing that they accepted the doctrine of
mental language; but argued that mental propositions must have a
discernible structure, which involves parts."
———. 1982. "The Structure of Mental Language: Some Problems
Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians." Vivarium no. 20:59-
83.
Reprinted in: Studies in post-medieval semantics.
"Given their belief in mental language, late medieval logicians felt the
need to give some account of its structure. I explore their different
views on the part played by syncategorematic terms, impersonal and
other verbs, demonstratives, pronouns, case, number and gender. I
show that Ockham's views were not universally followed; and I argue
that mental language was not necessarily thought of as an ideal logical
language."
Baccin, Nadia Anna. 1977. "Supposizione Confusa Tantum E
Descensus." Medioevo no. 3:285-300.
Bazán, Bernardo Carlos. 1979. "La Signification Des Termes
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Communs Et La Doctrine De La Supposition Chez Maitre Siger De
Brabant." Revue Philosophique de Louvain no. 35:345-372.
"Having as his principle objective the study of declarative propositions,
of the predicative structure, Siger showed that the meaning of the
general term is constant because it refers to changing things signified
by the intermediary of the consignified concept. The "intelligible unity"
of the essence grasped in the concept is the basis for the unity of the
meaning relative to the "existential diversity" of things. The analysis of
meaning appears insufficient when one takes into consideration the
concrete symbolic function of the term at the centre of a given
proposition. It is here that the doctrine of the "suppositio" comes into
play. Essentially this doctrine distinguishes between the signifying
function of the term and its completing function relative to the diversity
of the predicates."
Berger, Harald. 1991. "Simple Supposition in William of Ockham,
John Buridan and Albert of Saxony." In Itinéraires D'albert De Saxe.,
edited by Biard, Joël, 31-43. Paris: Vrin.
Beuchot, Mauricio. 1988. "La Teoría Semántica Medieval De La
Suppositio." In Filosofía Y Cultura Medievales, edited by González,
Ruiz E., 42-51. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
———. 1991. "Albert De Saxe: La Supposition Sémantique Et Les
Noms Vides." In Itinéraires D'albert De Saxe, edited by Biard, Joël,
111-124. Paris: Vrin.
———. 1994. "La Suposición Semántica Y Su Actualidad. Desarrollo
Histórico Y Actualidad De La Teória Escólastica De La Suposición
Semántica." In Metafísica, Lógica Y Lenguaje En La Filosofía
Medieval, 137-143. Barcelona: Promociones y Publicaciones
Universitaria, S.A.
Biard, Joël. 1997. "Intention Et Signification Chez Guillaume
D'ockham. La Critique De L'être Intentionnel." In Langages Et
Philosophie. Hommage À Jean Jolivet, edited by Libera, Alain de,
Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and Galonnier, Alain, 201-220. Paris: Vrin.
———, ed. 2009. Le Langage Mental Du Moyen Âge À L'âge
Classique. Paris: Vrin.
"La connaissance du monde s'exprime en propositions, que celles-ci
soient considérées, selon les théories, comme objets ou comme moyens
de la science. Le problème de la relation entre ces entités linguistiques
609
et les représentations mental (intellections, intentions, concepts...) a une
longue histoire qui remonte au traité De l'interprétation d'Aristote et
aux commentaires de Boèce. Après Guillaume d'Ockham, en effet,
l'idée de langage mental est certes une hypothèse qui a acquis force et
consistance, mais tous les problèmes liés à la structuration de la pensée
et au rapport entre le langage parlé et la pensée ne sont pas résolus. Des
questions surgissent sur la structuration même de ce langage.
Le colloque organisé à Tours du 1er au 3 décembre 2005 sous les
auspices de la Fondation européenne de la science (European Science
Foundation) avait l'ambition de parcourir ces questions en repartant
d'Augustin qui est l'initiale médiévale du problème, et en suivant cette
histoire jusqu'à l'aube des Temps modernes. Ce parcours historique
donc fait une part importante au Moyen Âge tardif, à la Renaissance et
au XVIIe siècle. En même temps, notre ambition était aussi
d'approfondir certains enjeux proprement philosophiques de ce
parcours. L'horizon général est la question: est-il possible de considérer
le domaine de la pensée comme étant structuré à la manière d'un
langage, et par quels moyens conceptuels penser cela?"
Table des Matières: Joël Biard: Présentation V; Isabelle Koch: Le
verbum in corde chez Augustin 1; Bérangère Hurand: La locutio
mentis: une version anselmienne du verbe intérieur 29; Cyrille Michon:
Les représentations rendent-elles indirecte la connaissance des choses?
45; Irène Rosier-Catach: Une forme particulière de langage mental: la
locutio angelica selon Gilles de Rome et ses contemporains 61; Russell
Friedman: Mental Propositions before Mental Language 95; Claude
Panaccio: Le jugement comme acte mental selon Guillaume d' Ockham
117; Simo Knuuttila: Ockham on Fallacies and Mental Language 135;
Aurélien Robert: Les deux langages de la pensée. A propos de quelques
réflexions médiévales 145; Joël Biard: Pierre d'Ailly: langage, concept,
représentation 169; Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe: Jeronimo Pardo on the unity
of mental propositions 185; Henrik Lagerlind: John Mair on Concepts
205; Fosca Mariani Zini: Topique et argumentation dans le premier
humanisme italien 221; Marie-Luce Demonet: Que reste-t-il du langage
mental dans les textes philosophiques français à la fin de la
Renaissance? 241; Martine Pécharman: De quel langage intérieur
Hobbes est-il le théoricien? 265; Calvin Normore: The End of Mental
Language 293; Jacob Schmutz: Quand le langage a-t-il cessé d'être
610
mental? Remarques sur les sources scolastiques de Bolzano 307;
Bibliographie 339; Index Nominum 359 - 364
Boehner, Philotheus. 1946. "Ockham's Theory of Supposition and the
Notion of Truth." Franciscan Studies no. 6:261-292.
Reprinted in: Collected articles on Ockham (pp.237-267)
———. 1958. "A Medieval Theory of Supposition." Franciscan
Studies no. 18:240-289.
Boh, Ivan. 1965. "Paul of Pergola on Supposition and Consequences."
Text, translation and commentary
———. 1966. "Propositional Connectives, Supposition and
Consequence in Paul of Pergola." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
no. 7:109-128.
Boler, John. 1972. "Ockham's Mental Language (Abstract)." Journal of
Bos, Egbert Peter. 1978. "Mental Verbs in Terminist Logic (John
Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen)." Vivarium no. 16:56-
69.
———. 1987. "La Théorie De La Signification De La Vox
Significativa Ad Placitum (Nomen, Verbum, Oratio) Dans Les
Introductiones Montane Maiores." In Gilbert De Poitiers Et Ses
Contemporains Aux Origines De La Logica Modernorum., edited by
Jolivet, Jean and Libera, Alain de, 73-90. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Actes du septième symposium européen d'histoire de la logique et de la
sémantique médiévales. Centre d' études supérieures de civilisation
médiévale de Poitiers 17 22 Juin 1985.
———. 1997. "Speaking About Signs. Fourteenth-Century Views on
Suppositio Materialis." Amsterdamer Beiträge zur älteren Germanistik
no. 48:71-86.
"The principal questions in my paper are the following: How did the
medieval semanticists indicate the autonymous use of words? Does the
subject term in such a proposition express a linguistic item (itself, or its
likes) because of the determination by the predicate? Or is it dependent
on the will or intention of man, the voluntas utentium, as Ockham calls
it?
Or is it a convention that determines the use of terms? Is a signum
materialitatis (a sign, or mark, indicating material supposition)
611
necessary? To what extent do the Medievals distinguish the
autonymous use of language from other uses? Or is this kind of
language meaningless?
There is hardly any secondary literature on this subject. (*)" p. 75
(*) M. Bochenski, Formale Logik (München 1970 (1956). 188-193;
CA. Dufour, Die Lehre der Proprietates Terrrunorum. Sinn und
Referenz in mittelalterlicher Logik (München/Hamden/Vv'ien 1989).
172-188. (Dufour tries to reconstruct the medieval theory of the
properties of terms with the help of modern formal logic. This very
interesting study did not obtain the attention it deserves, I feel). E.
Karger, 'La supposition matérielle comme supposition significative:
Paul de Venise, Paul de Pergola', in English Logic in Italy in the 14th
and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval
Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 november 1980, ed. by A. Maierù
(Napoli). 331-342. In a penetrating analysis, Karger discusses the
difficulties arising from the 'mentioning' of terms in relation to the
general semantical theory of a philosopher.
———. 2000. "Die Rezeption Der Suppositiones Des Marsilius Von
Inghen in Paris (Johannes Dorp) Und Prag (Ein Anonymer
Sophistriatraktat) Um 1400." In Philosophie Und Theologie Des
Ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius Von Inghen Und Das Denken
Seiner Zeit, edited by Hoenen, Marten and Bakker, Paul J.J.M., 213-
238. Leiden: Brill.
———, ed. 2013. Medieval Supposition Theory Revisited. Studies in
Memory of L. M. De Rijk. Leiden: Brill.
Also published as Volume 51, 1-4 (2013) of Vivarium.
Acts of the XVIIth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and
Semantics, held the University of Leiden, 2nd, 7th June. 2008.
———. 2077. "Richard Billingham's Speculum Puerorum, Some
Medieval Commentaries and Aristotle." Vivarium no. 45:360-373.
"In the history of medieval semantics, supposition theory is important
especially in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In this theory the
emphasis is on the term, whose properties one tries to determine. In the
fourteenth century the focus is on the proposition, of which a term
having supposition is a part. The idea is to analyse propositions in order
to determine their truth (probare). The Speculum puerorum written by
Richard Billingham was the standard textbook for this approach. It was
612
very influential in Europe. The theory of the probatio propositionis was
meant to solve problems both in (empirically oriented) scientific
propositions such as used by the Oxford Calculators, and theological
propositions, especially those about the Trinity. The book is original,
concise, but not clear in every respect. Studying medieval
commentaries may help us to understand Richard's book. In the present
paper three commentaries are presented. The commentators discussed
problems about the status of Richard's book, and about its doctrine:
what is the relation between probatio and truth, what is the relation
between probatio and supposition, what exactly are mediate and
immediate terms (e.g.is the pronoun 'this' mediate or immediate?). The
commentators sometimes criticize Richard. For example, one of them
argues, against Billingham, that the verb 'can' ampliates its subject term
and is therefore mediate."
Bottin, Francesco. 2000. "Linguaggio Mentale E Atti Di Pensiero in
Guglielmo Di Ockham." Veritas.Revista de Filosofia no. 45:349-359.
"William Ockham developed themes of epistemology which place him
in position which can easily be compared to that of modern thinkers.
Such is notably the case of his works on mental language, for instance,
which bring him closer to certain theories elaborated by Hilary Putnam,
especially his theory of representation."
———. 2005. Filosofia Medievale Della Mente. Padova: Il Poligrafo.
Brands, H. 1990. "Die Zweifache Einleitung Der Formalen Supposition
Bei William of Sherwood." In Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval
Philosophy, edited by Knuuttila, Simo, Tyorinoja, R. and Ebbesen,
Sten, 445-454.
Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of medieval
philosophy. Helsinki 24-29 August 1987. vol. II
Brown, Deborah J. 1996. "The Puzzle of Names in Ockham's Theory of
Mental Language." Review of Metaphysics no. 50:79-99.
"In his writings on semantics and logic, William of Ockham combines
two very strong claims about mental language: that mental terms are
naturally prior to and determinative of the signification of conventional
signs and that mental language contains neither synonymous nor
equivocal terms. (1) The first claim represents the role mental language
has in explaining the origins, structure, and content of thought and
language. Ockham was, as many commentators have observed, a
613
conceptual empiricist but it would be a mistake to think that he was
primarily concerned with the psychological processes that underlie our
representational system. The second claim indicates that the theory of
mental language is primarily a theory of signification or a semantics.
The notion of a redundancy-free mental language is an idealization
crafted for its explanatory role in Ockham's semantics.
The notion of a mental language devoid of synonymous and ambiguous
terms raises puzzles which threaten the internal coherence of the
project. These puzzles concern a species of categorematic terms in
mental language, Ockham's absolute terms, and are not unlike the
puzzles about proper names in Kripkean semantics. Although I am
skeptical that Ockham's theory is adequate to the dual tasks of being a
semantics as well as a psychological thesis, I shall argue that the wrong
response to these puzzles is to forfeit the theory's status as a semantic
theory by giving up the commitment to parsimony."
(1) Ockham's most sustained development of the theory of mental
language is in Summa Logicae I, in Opera Philosophica I, ed.
Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, Stephen S. Brown (St. Bonaventure,
NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974).
Brown, Stephen F. 1972. "Walter Burleigh's Treatise De
Suppositionibus and Its Influence on William of Ockham." Franciscan
"This early work of Walter Burleigh (written circa 1302), here edited,
is one of the sources of Ockham's "Summa logicae". At times it
supplies Ockham with material he adopts; at times it shares with the
works of others the role of opposition. Also it is one of the sources
which Ockham opposes in his 'commentary on the sentences'. In
relation to earlier works of the 12th and 13th centuries it shows some
technical advances while essentially holding onto the traditional
teaching. Burleigh's later treatment of supposition in the 'de puritate' is
a restatement of this early treatise in light of Ockham's 'Summa logicae'
critique of the 'realist' position."
———. 1975. "Gerard Odon's De Suppositionibus." Franciscan
New edition by L. M. De Rijk as: Liber Secundum: De suppositionibus
(pp. 231-292) in: Giraldus Odonis O. F. M. Opera Philosophica -
volume one: Logica - Critical editions from the manuscripts - Leiden,
614
Brill, 1997
———. 1993. "Medieval Supposition Theory in Its Theological
Context." Medieval philosophy and theology (3):121-157.
In appendix: Walter Chatton: Lectura in I Sent. 4.1.1-2.
———. 2009. "Gerald Odonis' Tractatus De Suppositionibus: What Is
Suppositio Communicabilis?" Vivarium no. 47:205-220.
"The Tractatus de suppositionibus, which is cited by Gerald Odonis in
his commentary on the Sentences, probably dates from ca. 1315-25. In
the Sentences commentary he refers to his treatment of 'suppositio
communicabilis' and its species, indicating a type of supposition whose
language seems new. This article attempts to find a source for it in
contemporary authors and arrives at the conclusion that
'communicabilis' is simply a synonym for 'personalis', the most
common form of supposition according to Odonis."
Bubacz, Bruce S. 1985. "La Teoría De Lenguaje Interior En San
Augustin Y En Guillermo De Occam." Augustinus.Revista trimestral
publicada por los Agustinos recoletos no. 30:383-391.
Burton, Patricia Shelby. 1990. "Suppositio Naturalis" and the Truth
Conditions of the Propositions of Demonstrative Science, The
University of Texas at Austin.
UMI Dissertation Express reference number 9105524.
Carvalho, Mário A.de Santiago. 1986. "A Teoria Da Suppositio Na
Semântica Ockhamista." Biblos no. 62:91-149.
Chalmers, David. 1999. "Is There Synonymy in Ockham's Mental
Language?" In The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, edited by
Spade, Paul Vincent, 76-99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chiesa, Curzio. 1991. "Le Problème Du Langage Intérieur Chez Les
Stoiciens." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 178:301-321.
———. 1992. "Le Problème Du Langage Intérieur Dans La
Philosophie Antique De Platon À Porphyre." Histoire, Épistémologie,
Langage no. 14:15-30.
Cocchiarella, Nino. 2001. "A Logical Reconstruction of Medieval
Terminist Logic in Conceptual Realism." Logical Analysis and History
of Philosophy no. 4:35-72.
"The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal
language within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of
the 14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from
615
Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentional object (the fictum
theory) to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the intellectio
theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the idea of
concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures.
Intentional objects (ficta) are not rejected but are reconstructed as the
objectified intentional contents of concepts.
Their reconstruction as intentional objects is an essential part of the
theory of predication of conceptual realism. It is by means of this
theory that we are able to explain how the identity theory of the copula,
which was basic to terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions.
Reference in conceptual realism is not the same as supposition in
terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various "modes" of personal
supposition of terminist logic can be explained and justified in terms of
this conceptualist theory of reference."
Corcoran, John, and Swiniarski, John J. 1978. "Logical Structures of
Ockham's Theory of Supposition." Franciscan Studies no. 38:161-183.
"This exposition of Ockham's theory of (common, personal)
supposition involves the logical form of the four descent/ascent
conditions and the logical relations of these with the three main modes
of supposition. Central theses: each condition is a one-way entailment,
each mode is a truth-functional combination of conditions, two of the
three modes are not even coextensive with the two-way entailments
commonly taken as their definitions. Ockham's idea of "the singulars"
of a general proposition is vague and problematic and the entailment
used in the descent/ascent conditions probably cannot be taken to be
logical consequence in any strict sense."
Corti, Enrique C. 1981. "Significación, Suposición Y Verdad En La
Summa Logicae De Guillermo De Ockham." Cuadernos del Sur
(14):141-155.
Courtenay, William. 1984. "Force of Words and Figures of Speech.
The Crisis over Virtus Sermonis in the Fourteenth Century."
Coxito, Amândio. 1981. Lógica, Semântica E Conhecimento Na
Escolastica Peninsular Pré-Renascentista. Coimbra: Biblioteca Geral
da Universidade.
See Chapter VI. A teoria da "suppositio" pp. 201-241.
———. 1989. "Las Doctrinas De La Significatio Y De La Suppositio
616
En Pedro Hispano." Pensamiento no. 45:227-238.
———. 2001. "Pedro Da Fonseca. A Teoria Da Suposição E O Seu
Contexto Excolástico." Revista Filosofica de Coimbra no. 10:285-311.
Dinneen, Francis P. 1990. "Suppositio in Petrus Hispanus. Linguistic
Theories and Models." In De Ortu Grammaticae. Studies in Medieval
Grammar and Linguistics Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg, edited by
Bursill-Hall, Geoffrey L., Ebbesen, Sten and Koerner, Konrad, 69-85.
Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
D'Ors, Angel. 1991. "De Mixta Suppositione." In Meeting on Logic and
Philosophy of Science. Madrid 13-15 November 1991. Rudolf Carnap
and Hans Reichenbach in Memoriam, 73-81. Madrid: Comunicaciones.
Ducrot, Oswald. 1976. "Quelques Implications Linguistiques De La
Théorie Médiévale De La Supposition." In History of Linguistic
Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, edited by Parret, Herman, 189-
227. Berlin New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Dufour, Carlos A. 1989. Die Lehre Der Proprietates Terminorum. Sinn
Und Referenz in Mittelaterlicher Logik, Analytica. Munchen, Hamden,
Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
"The present volume is a detailed and original study of the traditional,
doctrine of terms. It can be regarded as an attempt to tackle the
question: ,How would the scholastic philosophers have conceived and
defended their doctrine bad they bad at their disposal the methods and
techniques of contemporary logic and semantics? The answer provided,
a systematic reconstruction of a number of important ideas in the
history of logic, is both formally illuminating and entirely faithful to
the relevant text.
The work begins with a general exposition of the doctrine of terns
oriented around the basic semantic opposition between significatio and
suppositio, analogues of the more familiar notions of sense and
reference.
As a means of providing a precise and coherent reconstruction of the
doctrine the author does not simply provide the predictable translation
of the more amenable passages into the language of predicate logic.
Rather he develops, on the basis of a careful systematization of the
texts themselves, a formalization of his own, incorporating an ontology
of substance and accident. The advantages of this approach are revealed
in its capacity to provide both a simple reconstruction of syllogistic
617
logic by means of a sequent-calculus and a natural extension of this
logic to a theory of supposition.
Taking into consideration the categories of substance and accident in
place of the more usual apparatus of set and element allows the author
to develop a formalized theory of objects in which the two categories
are allowed to yield composite objects of various sorts. This makes
possible an illuminating application of the theory of concreta and
abstracta (square of permutations) both to the theory of ampliatio and
appellatio and to modal syllogistics.
The work concludes with a sketch of possible further developments and
an attempted demonstration of the philosophical relevance of the theory
in the light of a critical consideration of the relevant secondary
literature."
Ebbesen, Sten. 1979. "The Dead Man Is Alive." Synthese no. 40:43-70.
"English late 13th century logicians paid greater attention to the
reference (suppositio) of terms than contemporary Parisian logicians
('modistae'), who concentrated on the unchangeable meaning
(significatio) allotted to terms by 'impositio'. Discussions of the
sophism 'this is a dead man, therefore this is a man' revealed
weaknesses in modism and contributed to the 14th century acceptance
of ockham-style suppositio semantics at Paris (Buridan & al.).
Appendix contains texts by Radulphus Brito and two anonymi."
———. 1981. "Early Supposition Theory (12th-13th Century)."
Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage no. 3/1:35-48.
Reprinted in: S. Ebbesen, Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th-
14th centuries. Collected Essays Volume 2, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009,
pp. 1-14.
"The theory of supposition with the associated theories of copulatio
(sign-capacity of adjectival terms), ampliatio (widening of referential
domain), and distributio constitute one of the most original
achievements of Western medieval logic. There is nothing really
similar in any ancient text the medievals knew -though surely some
Stoic writings once contained investigations of the problems these
theories deal with -- nor had contemporary Byzantium anything similar.
The twelfth century produced a considerable harvest of rules about the
referential range of terms in various contexts. When the 13th century
arrived, a standard terminology had prevailed with such names as
618
suppositio confusa and suppositio determinata for some particularly
important types of referential range and a chapter on supposition had
become a standard feature of Introductions to Logic (summulae). But
then the development of the theory stopped. It appears that at least on
the Continent, the chapter on supposition in the summulae became one
that young students would be taught very early in their career, perhaps
before entering university; and then forget all about through the rest of
their student career.
In this paper I shall refrain from listing treatises 'de suppositionibus'; I
shall on the whole refrain from following the developments of
terminology and systematics. The spade-work in those fields has been
done by De Rijk in his Logica Modernorum.
I >will try to point to and explain some characteristic features of 12th
and early 13th speculation about supposition without going into details
and without paying much attention to the opinions of individual
authors, not even when they protest they disagree with something I say
they thought. I am not looking for the particular, but for general
attitudes and patterns of thought underlying their investigation of
suppositio."
Enders, Heinz Werner. 1975. Sprachlogische Traktate Des Mittelalters
Und Die Semantikbegriff: Ein Historisch-Systematischer Beitrag Zur
Frage Der Semantischen Grundlegung Formaler Systeme,
Veröffentlichungen Des Grabmann-Institutes Zur Erforschung Der
Mittelarterlichen Theologie Und Philosophie. Paderborn: Verlag
Ferdinand Schöning.
Ferrer, Vincent. 1909. "De Supposicionibus Dialectices." In Oeuvres
De Saint Vincent Ferrer. (First Volume). Paris.
See now the critical edition edited by John Allen Trentam 1977 (listed
below)
———. 1977. Tractatus De Suppositionibus. Stuttgart: Frommann-
Holzborg.
Critical edition with an introduction (pp. 11-86) by John Allen
Trentman
Fitzgerald, Michael Joseph. 1982. Supposition and Signification. An
Examination of Ockham's Theory of Reference, Ph. D. Dissertation
Rutgers University, The State University of New Jersey (New
Brunswick).
619
UMI Dissertation Express reference number 8221663
Forcada, V. 1973. "Momento Historico Del Tratado De
Suppositionibus De San Vincente Ferrer." Escritos del Vedat:37-89.
Freddoso, Alfred J. 1979. "O-Propositions and Ockham's Theory of
Supposition." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 20:741-750.
Freitas, Antonio de. 1999. "La Teoria De La Suposición En Pedro
Hispano." Revista Venezolana de Filosofia (39-40).
Galonnier, Alain. 1987. "Le De Grammatico Et L'origine De La
Théorie Des Propriétés Des Termes." In Gilbert De Poitiers Et Ses
Contemporains, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Libera, Alain de, 353-375.
Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Garcia Cuadrado, José Angel. 1991. "La Teoría De La Suposición En
Los Tratados Filosóficos De San Vicente Ferrer." In Excerpta E
Dissertationibus in Philosophia, 325-349. Servicio de Publicaciones de
la Universidad de Navarra.
Abstract of the Ph.D: thesis presented at the University of Navarra
———. 1992. "La Paradojia Del Análisis Linguistico En La Lógica De
San Vicente Ferrer." In Actas Del I Congreso Nacional De Filosofía
Medieval, Saragosse, 12-14 December 1990, edited by Lomba Fuentes,
J.M., 315-323. Saragosse, Ibercaja.
———. 1993. "Aspectos Gnoseológicos De La Suppositio Naturalis
De San Vicente Ferrer." Analogía Filosófica.Revista de Filosófia no.
7:153-167.
"The comparison between "suppositio naturalis" by Pedro Hispano and
Vincent Ferrer, clearly shows us the gnoseological differences
underlining the theory of one supposition from the other. Vincent
Ferrer speaks of a "moderate realism" as seen by Thomas Aquinas;
Ferrer proposes a new notion and classification of the "suppositio
naturalis" which helps to solve some of the logical-semantic problems
raised by the theory of supposition by Pedro Hispano."
———. 1994. Hacia Una Semantica Realista. La Filosofía Del
Lenguaje De San Vicente Ferrer. Pamplona: Eunsa.
———. 1998. "Una Fuente Inédita De La Teoría De La Suposición En
Vicente Ferrer: La Polémica Burleigh-Ockham." Revista Española de
Filosofía Medieval no. 5.
"The 14th century controversy between William of Ockham and Walter
Burleigh led to the publication of autonomous treatises on the theory of
620
supposition, such as William Sutton's Textus de Suppositionibus.
Significant parallels may be found between this treatise and the
Tractatus de Suppositionibus of Vincent Ferrer; such coincidences lead
to the formulation of the hypothesis of a direct influence of Sutton on
Ferrer."
Geach, Peter Thomas. 1957. Mental Acts: Their Content and Their
Objects. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Section 23 (pp. 101-106) is on Ockham's the theory of mental
language.
———. 1962. Reference and Generality. An Examination of Some
Medieval and Modern Theories. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Second emended editon 1968; third revised and expanded edition 1980.
———. 1976. "Distribution and Suppositio." Mind no. 84:432-435.
Gelber, Hester Goodenough. 1984. "I Cannot Tell a Lie. Hugh
Lawton's Critique of Ockham on Mental Language." Franciscan
Studies no. 44:141-179.
"The article describes the evolution of Ockham's theory of mental
language and its impact on three of his dominican contemporaries at
oxford: Hugh Lawton, William Crathorn and Robert Holcot, and its
impact at Paris on the works of Gregory of Rimini and Pierre d'Ailly.
Hugh Lawton's critical response to Ockham relied on a liar-like
paradox to show that mental language would preclude the ability to lie.
Crathorn devised an alternative to Ockham's theory in reaction,
whereas Holcot defended Ockham's views. At Paris, the debate
suggested a solution to the liar paradox to Gregory of Rimini."
Giacon, Carlo. 1969. "La Suppositio in Guglielmo Di Occam E Il
Valore Reale Delle Scienze." In Arts Libéraux Et Philosophie Au
Moyen Âge, 939-947. Montréal, Paris: Vrin.
Actes du quatrième Congrés international de philosophie médiévale.
Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada. 27 Août - 2 Septembre 1967
Gibson, Joan. 1976. The Role of Mental Language in the Philosophy of
William of Ockham, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Toronto.
Henry, Desmond Paul. 1963. "The Early History of Suppositio."
———. 1964. "Ockham, Suppositio, and Modern Logic." Notre Dame
———. 1981. "Suppositio and Significatio in English Logic." In
621
English Logic and Semantics from the End of the Twelfth Century to
the Time of Ockham and Burleigh., edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G.
and Kneepkens, Corneille Henry, 361-387. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
Hülsen, Reinhard. 2000. "Understanding the Semantics of "Relativa
Grammaticalia". Some Medieval Logicians on Anaphoric Pronouns."
In Reference and Anaphoric Relations, edited by Heusinger, Klaus von
and Egli, Urs, 31-46. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Inciarte, Fernando. 1974. "Die Suppositionstheorie Und Die Anfänge
Der Extensionalen Semantik." In Antiqui Und Moderni.
Traditionbewusstsein Und Fortschrittsbewusstsein Im Späten
Mittelalter, edited by Albert, Zimmermann, 126-141. Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter.
Kann, Christoph. 1990. "Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts Von
Sachsen." In Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy,
edited by Knuuttila, Simo, Tyorinoja, R. and Ebbesen, Sten, 512-520.
Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.
Proceedings of the Eight International Congress of Medieval
Philosophy, Helsinki 24-29 August 1987. (Vol. II).
———. 1993. "Materiale Supposition Und Die Erwähnung Von
Sprachzeichen." In Neue Realitäten. Herausforderung Der Philosophie.
Xvi. Deutscher Kongress Für Philosophie 20.-24. September 1993, Tu
Berlin Sektionsbeiträge I, 231-238.
———. 1994. Die Eigenschaften Der Termini: Eine Untersuchung Zur
Perutilis Logica Alberts Von Sachsen, Studien Und Texte Zur
Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters. Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill.
With the Latin edition of Perutilis Logica. Tractatus Secundus. De
suppositionibus terminorum (pp. 167-265)
Karger, Elizabeth. 1978. "Conséquences Et Inconséquences De La
Supposition Vide Dans La Logique D'ockham." Vivarium no. 16:46-55.
———. 1981. "La Supposition Matérielle Comme Supposition
Significative: Paul De Venise, Paul De Pergola." In English Logic and
Semantics from the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham
and Burleigh, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens,
Corneille Henry, 331-341. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
———. 1984. "Modes of Personal Supposition. The Purpose and
Usefulness of the Doctrine within Ockham's Logic." Franciscan
622
———. 1991. "Une Définition De La Supposition Par Guillaume
D'ockham Et Sa Reprise Par Albert De Saxe." In Itinéraires D'albert
De Saxe, edited by Biard, Joël, 51-69. Paris: Vrin.
———. 1994. "Théories De La Pensée, De Ses Objects Et De Son
Discours Chez Guillaume D'occam." Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical
Review no. 33:437-456.
———. 1996. "Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early
Ockham." Vivarium no. 34:192-230.
Kaye, Sharon. 1997. "Later Medieval Nominalism and the Politics of
Supposition." Eidos.The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy no.
14:29-50.
"The salient dispute between realists and nominalists of the fourteenth
century concerns the metaphysics of supposition. Do general terms
stand for extra-mental universals or not? By answering in the
affirmative, Walter Burley loses his ability to provide a plausible
account of indefinite promises such as "I promise you a horse." By
answering in the negative, Ockham not only explains indefinite
promises, but also paves the way for a conception of the faith
community more revolutionary than Protestantism. In the Bible, Jesus
promises his disciples that he will be with them "always, to the end of
the age." In Ockham's view, this is an indefinite promise parallel to the
case of the horse; it means "I promise you a Christian." According to
this analysis, the universal church can survive in a single, unlikely, and
even unknown, individual. Ockham thereby undermines the doctrine of
papal infallibility as well as institutional religion itself."
Kelley, F.E. 1978. "Some Observations on the Fictum Theory in
Ockham and Its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis." Franciscan Studies no.
38:260-282.
Klima, Gyula. 1995. "Existence and Reference in Mediaeval Logic." In
New Essays in Free Logic, edited by Morscher, Edgar and Hieke,
Alexander, 197-226. Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
———. 1999. "Semantic Complexity and Syntactic Simplicity in
Ockham's Mental Language." In.
———. 2004. "Tradition and Innovation in Medieval Theories of
Mental Representation." Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic
and Metaphysics no. 4:4-11.
623
Knabenschuch de Porta, Sabine. 1989. "La Téoria De La Supósicion Y
Los Idiomas Modernos." Revista de Filosofia (Venezuela):75-99.
Kneepkens, Corneille Henry. 1987. "Suppositio and Supponere in 12th
Century Grammar." In Gilbert De Poitiers Et Ses Contemporains. Aux
Origines De La "Logica Modernorun", edited by Jolivet, Jean and
Libera, Alain de, 325-351. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Actes du septième symposium européeen d'histoire de la logique et de
la sémantique médiévales. Centre d'Etudes Supérieures de Civilisation
Médiévale de Poitiers. Poitiers 17-22 jiun 1985
———. 1990. "Erfurt, Amol Q 70a: A Questiones-Commentary on the
Second Part of Alexander De Villa Dei's Doctrinale." Vivarium:26-54.
"In this paper it is argued that the Quaestiones-Commentary on
Alexander de Villa Dei's Doctrinale in the manuscript Arfurt, Ampl.
Q.70a is part of the conceptualist grammatical tradition of the late 14th
century. A characteristic feature of this theory is the absolute primacy
of mental language to spoken or written language. An edition of the
first question has been appended."
Knudsen, Christian. 1975. "Ein Ockhamkritischer Text Zu
Signifikation Und Supposition Und Zum Verhältnis Von Erster Und
Zweiter Intention." Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin
no. 14:1-26.
Kraml, Hans. 1999. "Supposition Und Wahrheit." In
Entwicklungslinien Mittelalterlicher Philosophie, edited by Leibold,
Gerhard and Löffler, Winfried, 222-231. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-
Tempsky.
Entwicklungslinien mittelalterlicher Philosophie. Vorträge des V.
Kongresses der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Teil II.
Kunze, Peter. 1980. Satzwahrheit Und Sprachliche Verweisung. Walter
Burleighs Lehre Von Der Suppositio Termini in Auseinandersetzung
Mit Der Mittelalterlichen Tradition Und Der Logik William of Ockham.
Ph. D. University of Freiburg
Lagerlund, Henrik. 2006. "What Is Singular Thought? Ockham and
Buridan on Singular Terms in the Language of Thought." In Mind and
Modality. Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo
Knuuttila, edited by Hirvonen, Vesa, Holopainen, Toivo and Tuomine,
Miira, 217-238. Leiden: Brill.
———, ed. 2007. Representation and Object of Thought in Medieval
624
Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Lenz, Martin. 2003. Mentale Sätze. Wilhelm Von Ockhams Thesen Zur
Sprachlichkeit Des Denkens. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
———. 2004. "Oratio Mentalis Und Mentalesisch. Ein
Spätmittelalterlicher Blick Auf Die Gegenwärtige Philosophie Des
Geistes." In 'Herbst Des Mittelalters'? Fragen Zur Bewertung Des 14.
Und 15. Jahrhunderts, edited by Aertsen, Jan A. and Pickavé, Martin,
105-130. New York: De Gruyter.
Libera, Alain de. 1981. "Supposition Naturelle Et Appellation: Aspects
De La Sémantique Parisienne Au Xiii Siècle." Histoire, Épistémologie,
Langage no. 3 (1):63-77.
———. 1982. "La Logique Médiévale Et La Théorie De La
Supposition." Travaux d'Histoire des Théories Linguistiques no. 1:31-
57.
———. 1987. "Suppositio Et Inclusio Dans Les Théories Médiévales
De La Référence." In La Référence. Actes Du Colloque De Saint-
Cloud, Ecole Nomale Supérieure De Saint-Cloud, 12-13 Octobre 1984,
edited by Danon-Boileau, Laurent and Libera, Alain de, 9-62. Paris:
Ophrys.
Loux, Michael J. 1979. "Significatio and Suppositio. Reflections on
Ockham's Semantics." New Scholasticism no. 53:407-427.
"In this paper, I examine Ockham's views on "significatio" and
"suppositio" in the light of pre-ockhamistic terminist treatments of
these notions. What I try to show is that Ockham's views here are not
simply nominalistic variants on traditional terminist themes. While
conceding that Ockham's nominalism is central in his theory of terms, i
try to locate the "semantical" underpinnings of his views on
"significatio" and "suppositio". What I suggest is that Ockham's
account deviates from those of his predecessors in taking the notion of
standard reference or personal "suppositio" as conceptually prior to the
notion of meaning or "significatio", and I conclude that perhaps a
rejection of the atomistic semantics of his predecessors motivates this
revision of the traditional theory of terms."
RELATED PAGES
Second Part of the Bibliography: M - Z
625
Semantics and Ontology in the thought of Peter Abelard
E. J. Ashworth
L. M. de Rijk
626
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Annotated Bibliography of the Medieval

Theories of Supposition and Mental
Language: M - Z
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Maierù, Alfonso. 1972. Terminologia Logica Della Tarda Scolastica.
Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.
The chapter "Confusio" (pp. 217-270) has been reprinted in: Frediga
Riccardo and Puggioni Sara (eds.) "Logica e linguaggio nel Medioevo"
- LED 1993 pp. 259-294
———. 1985. "A Propos De La Doctrine De La Supposition En
Théologie Trinitaire Au Xiv Siécle." In Medieval Semantics and
Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L. M. De Rijk, edited by Bos, Egbert
Peter, 221-238. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
———. 1996. "Il Linguaggio Mentale Tra Logica E Grammatica Nel
Medioevo: Il Contesto Di Ockham." In Momenti Di Storia Della
Logica E Di Storia Della Filosofia. Atti Del Convegno Di Roma (9-11
Novembre 1994), edited by Guetti, Carla and Puja, Roberto, 69-94.
Roma: Aracne Editrice.
———. 2002. "Linguaggio Mentale E Sincategoremi Nel Secolo Xiv."
In Chemins De La Pensée Médiévale. Études Offertes À Zénon Kaluza,
627
edited by Bakker, Paul J.J.M., Faye, Emmanuel and Grellard,
Christophe, 3-25. Turnhout: Brepols.
———. 2004. "Mental Language and Italian Scholasticism in the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries." In John Buridan and Beyond:
Topics in the Language Sciences, 1300-1700, edited by Friedman,
Russell and Ebbesen, Sten, 33-67. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.
"Italian universities of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries took part in
the scholastic debate concerning mental language, which first arose at
the universities in Oxford and Paris in the early fourteenth century.
Peter of Mantua (d. 1400) and Paul of Venice (d. 1429) were the
prominent Italian masters in this respect; their opinions continued to be
cited at the European universities of the early modern period. Two
main conclusions are reached here: that there is an obvious continuity
between medieval and modern ideas concerning mental language; and
that further research is needed in order to establish the respective roles
of Paris and Oxford in the development of the debate at the beginning
of the fourteenth century."
Malcolm, John. 1977. "On the Disappearance of Copulatio as a
Property of a Term." Franciscan Studies no. 37:120-138.
Markosian, Ned. 1988. "On Ockham's Supposition Theory and Karger's
Rule of Inference." Franciscan Studies no. 48:40-52.
"Elizabeth Karger has suggested an interpretation of Ockham's theory
of the modes of common personal supposition ("TM") according to
which the purpose of TM is to provide certain distinctions that Ockham
will use in formulating a unified theory of immediate inference among
certain kinds of sentences. Karger presents a single, powerful rule of
inference that incorporates TM distinctions and that is meant to codify
Ockham's theory of immediate inference. I raise an objection to
Karger's rule, thereby calling into doubt the interpretation of Ockham
that is based on attributing that rule to him."
Matthews, Gareth. 1964. "Ockham's Supposition Theory and Modern
Logic." Philosophical Review no. 73:91-99.
Reprinted in Inquires into medieval philosophy. A collection in honor
of Francis P. Clarke. Edited by J. F. Ross, Wesport, Greenwood 1971
pp. 131-140.
"Philotheus Boehner's "Medieval logic" gives the impression that
medieval supposition theory and modern quantification theory agree on
628
their interpretation of particular propositions but differ on their
interpretation of universal propositions. Matthews shows that this
impression is mistaken: they differ on both particular and universal
propositions, and the basic reason is that the medievals quantify over
terms while modern logicians quantify over variables."
———. 1973. "Suppositio and Quantification in Ockham." Noûs no.
7:13-24.
"This paper is a discussion of the idea that the doctrine of "descent to
singulars" in the supposition theory of William of Ockham constitutes a
rudimentary theory of quantification. It is here argued that the doctrine
applies to propositions of the logical forms, 'no S is P' and 'some S is
not P', only in case each of their terms is nonempty. It is urged in
conclusion that a doctrine whose application is restricted in this way is
not a quantification theory at all, not even a rudimentary one."
———. 1984. "A Note on Ockham's Theory of Modes of Common
Personal Supposition." Franciscan Studies no. 44:81-96.
———. 1997. "Two Theories of Supposition?" Topoi no. 16 (1):35-40.
"In a recent paper Paul Vincent Spade suggests that, although the
medieval doctrine of the modes of personal supposition originally had
something to do with the rest of the theory of supposition, it became, by
the 14th century, an unrelated theory with no question to answer. By
contrast, I argue that the theory of the modes of personal supposition
was meant to provide a way of making understandable the idea that a
general term in a categorical proposition can be used to refer to the
individual things that fall under it. Once that idea had been made
acceptable, truth conditions for the various forms of categorical
proposition could be given without any specific appeal to the ideas of
descent and ascent in terms of which the modes had been defined."
Maurer, Armand. 1981. "William of Ockham on Language and
Reality." In Miscellanea Mediaevalia, edited by Beckmann, Jan P.,
795-802. New York: de Gruyter.
Translated in Italian in: Logica e linguaggio nel medieoevo - Edited by
Fedriga Riccardo and Puggioni Sara
Meier-Oeser, Stephan. 1999. "Thinking as Internal Speaking: Some
Remarks on the Conceptual Changes in the Relation between Language
and Thinking from Middle Ages to Condillac." In Signs and
Signification. Vol. I, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti,
629
Giovanni, 175-194. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.
———. 2000. "The Meaning of 'Significatio' in Scholastic Logic." In
Signs and Signification. Vol. Ii, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and
Manetti, Giovanni, 89-107. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.
"Studies in scholastic theories of signification usually focus on what
Roger Bacon (De signis: 132) has called the "difficilis dubitatio utrum
vox significet species apud animam an res" (the difficult question,
whether spoken words signify mental concepts or things), or, in Scotus'
words (Ordinatio, vol. 6: 97), the "magna altercatio... de voce, utrum sit
signum rei vel conceptus" (the great altercation, whether the spoken
word is a sign of the thing or of the concept). But as interesting and
important this question may be, it covers just one aspect of the
numerous and complex problems linked with the scholastic concept of
'significatio'. For since scholastic terminology generally made a clear
cut distinction between 'significatio' and 'significatum', the two
questions, what words signify (or what their significatum is), and what
signification itself may be, lead in different directions. By leaving aside
the former question, I shall concentrate on the latter.
The question about meaning or signification is deemed, especially since
the 'linguistic turn', to be one of the most fundamental questions,
philosophy has to account for. Of course, it is by no means a recent
question. And yet it is, in a specific sense, not as old as one might
suggest. It may be controversial, whether the problem of meaning
('Bedeutungsproblem'), as Weisbergerer (1930:17f) has stated, did not
matter in classical Greek philosophy, or, as Cassirer (1925: 86) has
claimed, already for Plato made up the "starting point of philosophy",
whether Aristotle in the first chapter of his Peri hermeneias had offered
"not even a sketch of a general theory of meaning" (Kretzmann
1974:5), or at least the "rudiments of a semantic theory" (Weidemann
1982). What has to be noticed, is, that the very term and concept of
signification had not yet become a problem in classical Greek
philosophy -- and could not even have been as such, due to the simple
fact, that a concept of meaning or signification in a terminological
sense did not exist. Indeed, the word or linguistic sign (semainon) was
said to signify or mean something (semainei ti) and speech (logos) was
characterised as significative (semantikós). But whereas in modern
translations this is usually expressed in terms of words having meaning.
630
there is, as far as I can see, at least in classical Greek no equivalent
noun for 'meaning' or 'Bedeutung'. The history of terminology shows,
that the corresponding Greek noun of the latin 'significatio' was
semasia'. But the earliest evidence for the use of 'semasia' in the sense
of meaning (of a word) seems to be a passage in the De signis, written
by the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara around the middle of the first
century. In all earlier occurrences this term means 'sign' or 'signal' or an
act of signalising (cf Ebert 1987:108sq.).
So it seems as if semantics is not necessarily in need of the concept of
signification or meaning. Because for quite a long time philosophy did
not even have a word for it. But once introduced, it could give rise to
such problems, as, referring to the concept of meaning, Charles Morris
(1971:95) has pointed out by noticing that " 'meaning' signifies any and
all phases, of sign-processes (the status of being a sign, the interpretant,
the fact of denoting, the significatum)".
By considering the meaning of 'significatio' in scholastic logic, I do not
intend to give a comprehensive outline of the various theories of
signification that have been worked out by that tradition, but rather
want to confine myself to the more modest purpose of giving an
account of the use of that term in scholastic logic. So, even if the title of
my paper seems to offend the Wittgenstein's prominent advice "don't
ask for meaning, ask for use", I will observe it insofar, as I am going to
take a look at the concrete use of 'meaning' or rather 'signification' in
scholastic logic, which however, as we shall see, not quite the same. By
so doing, I do not intend to establish something like the scholastic
meaning of signification. For if we are told by Wittgenstein and many
others, that "the meaning of a word is its use in language", we will be
confronted here with the fact, that the usage of 'significatio' -- and thus
its 'meaning' -- is highly divergent in itself."
Bibliographic references:
Cassirer, E. 1925. Die Philosophie der Griechen, in: M. Dessoir (ed.):
Lehrbuch der Philosophie (Berlin).
Ebert, Th. 1987. The origin of the Stoic theory of signs in Sextus
Empiricus, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 5, 83-126.
Kretzmann, N. 1974. Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by
Convention, in: J. Corcoran (ed.): Ancient Logic and Its Modern
Interpretation (Dordrecht, Boston) 3-21.
631
Morris C. W. 1971. Signs, Language and Behavior, in: Writings on the
general 'Theory of Signs (The Hague).
Weidemann, H. 1982. Ansatze zu einer semantischen Theorie bei
Anstoteles: Zeitschrift fur Semiotik 4, 241-257.
Weigerber, L. 1930. Sprachwissenschaft und Philosophie zum
liedeutungsproblem, in: Blatter fur Deutsche Philosophie 4.
———. 2004. "Mental Language and Mental Representation in Late
Scholastic Logic." In John Buridan and Beyond: Topics in the
Language Sciences, 1300-1700, edited by Friedman, Russell and
Ebbesen, Sten, 237-265. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.
"Traditionally the two main paradigms for describing and explaining
processes of thought and mental representation have been thought as
image and thought as language. Whereas in present-day debates these
paradigms are treated as mutually exclusive, in scholastic theories of
cognition and mental language they were often amalgamated in various
ways. By tracing pertinent discussions from the fourteenth to the
seventeenth centuries, the article points to some consequences of this
amalgamation both for the notions of image and of likeness and for
approaches to thought as language."
Miller, Barry. 1973. "Proper Names and Suppositio Personalis."
Analysis no. 33:133-137.
"The question is whether a proper name (e.g., "Tom") may be used in a
way that parallels that of "man" in "man is a species". "Tom is an
individual" is the answer proposed, with "individual" functioning as a
second order term. A number of difficulties are resolved by showing
that "Tom is an individual" may be rendered as "a man is (in English)
called 'Tom' and is so constituted that only he may without ambiguity
be called 'Tom'. This shows that "Tom" in "Tom is an individual" is
neither purely a first order nor purely a second order term."
Miralbell, Ignacio. 1989. "La Transformación Ockhamista De La
Teoría De La Suposición." Sapientia no. 44:111-136.
Reprinted in: Guillermo de Ockham y su crítica lógico-pragmática al
pensamiento realista pp. 51-88
Morujão, Carlos. 2005. "A Logica Modernorum: Lógica E Filosofia Da
Linguagem Na Escolástica Dos Séculos Xiii E Xiv." Revista Filosofica
de Coimbra no. 14:301-322.
"This essay approaches two of the main contributions of medieval logic
632
to the history of logic and the philosophy of language: the doctrine of
suppositio and that of consequentiae. The aim here is to demonstrate
that although medieval logic depended on the syntactical structure of
Latin, authors managed to reach a high level of understanding
regarding strictly logical problems, not only anticipating some theories
from modern semantics, but also predicate calculus and sentential
calculus. This research, especially after the 13th century, developed in
complete isolation from Aristotelian logic, particularly its doctrines of
syllogism and declarative sentence. It also revealed enormous
originality and creativity regardless of the contribution that stoic logic
known from the works of Cicero and Boethius may have had.
Müller, H.J. 1968. Die Lehre Vom Verbum Mentis in Der Spanischen
Scholastik. Untersuchungen Zur Historischen Entwicklung Und Zum
Verständnis Dieser Lehrer Bei Toletus, Den Conimbricensern Und
Suarez, University of Münster, Westfalia.
Muñoz Delgado, V. 1986. "La Suposición De Los Términos En Juan
De Oria Y Otros Lógicos Salmantinos (1510-1535)." In Homenaje a
Pedro Sainz Rodriguez. (Volume Iv), 335-367. Madrid: Fundación
Universitaria Española.
Muñoz Garcia, Angel. 1990. "La 'Confusa' Suposición Sólo Confusa."
Analogia no. 4 (2):113-141.
———. 1991. "A Propósito De La Suposición Habitual." In Itinéraires
D'albert De Saxe, edited by Biard, Joël, 125-136. Paris: Vrin.
———. 1991. "Es La Determinada Una Suposición Distributiva?"
Medioevo no. 17:309-346.
Normore, Calvin Gerard. 1990. "Ockham on Mental Language." In
Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by Smith, J.C., 53-
70. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"Thanks largely to the work of Noam Chomsky, we have witnessed
over the last thirty years a revival of interest in two closely related
ideas: that there is a universal grammar, a set of structural features
common to every human language, and that the exploration of this
grammar is, in part, an exploration of the structure of thought.
Fourteenth century grammarians and philosophers were also interested
in this complex of questions, and debate about them raged as
vigorously then as now. One tradition in this debate grew out of
thirteenth century terminist logic and seems to have been given a
633
distinctive shape by William Ockham This tradition posited a fully-
fledged language of thought common to all rational beings and prior to
al linguistic convention. In this essay I will attempt to outline Ockham's
account of this mental language, to consider some fourteenth century
objections which lead to the refinement of the account by others in the
fourteenth century, and finally to suggest that Ockham's approach has
something to contribute to current debate about the relationship
between the theory of meaning and any language of thought.
At the very beginning of his Summa Logicae Ockham claims that there
are three distinct types of language: written, spoken, and mental. He
insists that written and spoken language are distinct in kind and that
there is a type of language whose terms are concepts and which exists
only in the mind. (1)
Ockham's mental language plays several distinct roles within his
philosophy. On the one hand, mental language figures crucially in the
semantics of spoken and written language. On the other hand, mental
language is a fully articulated language which is suited to be spoken by
natural telepaths and is spoken by the angels. These two kinds of role
require very different features of mental language, features which, as
we shall see, sometimes pull its structure in opposite directions."
(1) Cf. W. Ockham, Summa Logicae I. C. 1 in P. Boehner, G. Gal, S.
Brown (eds.), Opera Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, NY: The
Franciscan Institute, 1974).
———. 1997. "Material Supposition and the Mental Language of
Ockham's Summa Logicae." Topoi no. 16 (1):27-33.
Novaes, Catarina Dutilh. 2000. A Study of William of Ockham's Logic -
from Suppositio to Truth Conditions, University of Amsterdam.
———. 2003. A Teoria Da Suposição De Guilherme De Ockham. Uma
Reconstrução.
Master's thesis defended at the University of São Paulo, for the
obtention of the MA degree in April 2003.
"This work is the result of my attempts to combine my Philosophy
background with the Mathematical Logic inclinations of the institution
within which this research was developed. In fact, this twofold
character is noticeable in many features thereof; I shall now outline
some of them. The project has two main purposes: the less risky one is
to provide an account of William of Ockham's logical thinking, with
634
focus on its aspects which bear a relation with the contemporary issues
of intensional logics and possible-world semantics. The more risky one
consists of investigating the possibilities of developing a purely
extensional treatment of intensional contexts, such as tense and
modalities. For the latter, some other extensional/nominalistic systems
could have played the role of èxperimental sample', but there seemed
to be something intriguing about Ockham, as one wonders whether a
philosopher from the XIVth century would have something relevant to
add to our present logical issues. Moreover, he is considered to be the
founder of nominalism, so the historical interest of such enterprise was
self-evident - therefore, the legitimacy of the first purpose. I shall try to
comply with two very distinct kinds of expectations: those which are
the desiderata for a History of Philosophy work, and those of logicians,
who are interested in the formal correcteness of the system hereby
presented. The criteria of excellence of these two lines are almost
incompatible, and one wonders if it is not a suicidal enterprise to try to
combine them. On the one hand, an Ockham scholar may be discontent
with the absence of a few important aspects of Ockham's logic, since I
deliberately priorize those related to contemporary logic. On the other
hand, a logician may be bothered by the presence of too many
àntiquities', perhaps hindering logical clarity. So, at the risk of
displeasing everybody, I nevertheless maintain that such a combination
may turn out to be fruitful and informative to both sides. Chapter 1 will
display some fundamental aspects of Ockham's logic and semantics, in
a rather historical approach. However, even this part is developed
taking into account what I later shall want to establish as my version of
an òckhamist system'. I consider it to be the flaw of many such
reconstructions that they do not undertake a serious analysis of the
underlying concepts; alternatively, some which did rely on such an
analysis have reached very interesting results. Chapter 2 relates some
apparently less central (when compared to supposition theory, for
example) issues of Ockham's theory to relevant topics of Contemporary
Philosophy, such as possible worlds, designation, demonstratives etc...
In this chapter I also introduce conceptual tools which I will make use
of for the reconstruction undertaken in chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 3 is
an attempt to provide truth conditions for quantified, modal and tense
propositions, based on the truth of singular propositions. I hereby hope
635
to reach a rather broad account of Ockham's thinking, even though my
main target is to build a coherent and correctly structured
reconstruction of his theory of propositions."
———. 2007. "Theory of Supposition Vs. Theory of Fallacies in
Ockham." Vivarium no. 45:343-359.
"I propose to examine the issue of whether the ancient tradition in logic
continued to be developed in the later medieval period from the vantage
point of the relations between two specific groups of theories, namely
the medieval theories of supposition and the (originally) ancient
theories of fallacies. More specifically, I examine whether supposition
theories absorbed and replaced theories of fallacies, or whether the
latter continued to exist, with respect to one particular author, William
of Ockham. I compare different parts of Ockham's Summa Logicae,
namely III-4 (on fallacies), and the final chapters of part I and first
chapters of part II (on supposition). I conclude that there is overlap of
conceptual apparatus and of goals (concerning propositions that must
be distinguished) in Ockham's theories of supposition and of fallacies,
but that the respective conceptual apparatuses also present substantial
dissimilarities. Hence, theories of supposition are better seen as an
addition to the general logical framework that medieval authors had
inherited from ancient times, rather than the replacement of an ancient
tradition by a medieval one. Indeed, supposition theories and fallacy
theories had different tasks to fulfil, and in this sense both had their
place in fourteenth century logic."
———. 2007. Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories. Suppositio,
Consequentiae and Obligationes. New York: Springer.
Contents: Introduction I-XII; 1. Supposition theory: algorithmic
hermeneutics 7; 2. Buridan's notion of Consequentia 79; 3.
Obligationes as logical games 145; 4. The philosophy of formalization
215; Conclusion 293; References 301; Index of names and topics 310.
"This book presents novel formalizations of three of the most important
medieval logical theories: supposition, consequence and obligations. In
an additional fourth part, an in-depth analysis of the concept of
formalization is presented - a crucial concept in the current logical
panorama, which as such receives surprisingly little attention. Although
formalizations of medieval logical theories have been proposed earlier
in the literature, the formalizations presented here are all based on
636
innovative vantage points: supposition theories as algorithmic
hermeneutics, theories of consequence analyzed with tools borrowed
from model-theory and two-dimensional semantics, and obligations as
logical games. For this reason, this is perhaps the first time that these
medieval logical theories are made fully accessible to the modern
philosopher and logician who wishes to obtain a better grasp of them,
but who has always been held back by the lack of appropriate
'translations' into modern terms. Moreover, the book offers a reflection
on the very nature of logic, a reflection that is prompted by the
comparisons between medieval and modern logic, their similarities and
dissimilarities. It is thus a contribution not only to the history of logic,
but also to the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language and
semantics. The analysis of medieval logic is also relevant for the
modern philosopher and logician in that, being the unifying
methodology used across all disciplines at that time, logic really
provided unity to science. It thus presents a unified model of scientific
investigation, where logic plays the aggregating role."
———. 2008. "An Intensional Interpretation of Ockham's Theory of
Supposition." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 46:365-394.
"According to a widespread view in medieval scholarship, theories of
supposition are the medieval counterparts of theories of reference, and
are thus essentially extensional theories. The author proposes an
alternative interpretation: theories of supposition are theories of
properties of terms, but whose aim is to allow for the interpretation of
sentences. This holds especially of Ockham's supposition theory, which
is the main object of analysis in this paper. In particular, she argues for
my intensional interpretation of his theory on the basis of two key-
phrases in his Summa Logicae: 'denotatur' and 'propositio est
distinguenda'. Finally, she offers a reconstruction of his theory as a set
of instructions to be carried out in order to generate the possible
readings of (certain) sentences."
Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1983. "Medieval Problems Concerning
Substitutivity." In Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della
Logica (San Gimignano, 4-8 December 1982), edited by Abrusci, Vito
CLUEB.
———. 1992. "Some Remarks on the Role of Mental Sentences in
637
Medieval Semantics." Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage no. 14:47-59.
"After introducing the notion of mental language as it was developed
especially by William of Ockham this article focuses on the role of
mental sentences in the logical interpretation of belief-ascriptions. First,
the divergent positions advocated by Frege and Searle are outlined.
Next, it is asked how the fourteenth-century Parisian logician Jean
Buridan might hare handled such statements as 'The sheriff believes
that Mr. Howard is an honest man'. It is concluded that in spite of many
superficial differences, at bottom Buridan's view is rather similar to
Searle's account. In particular, both authors hold that in reported speech
the words 'Mr. Howard is an honest man' keep their usual meaning as
far as reference and predication are concerned."
Panaccio, Claude. 1979. "Suppositio Naturalis Au Xiii Siècle Et
Signification Chez Guillaume D'occam." In Abstracts of the Vith
International Congress of Logic. Methodology, and Philosophy of
Science. Sections 13 and 14, 137-140. Hannover.
———. 1983. "Guillaume D'occam: Signification Et Supposition." In
Archéologie Du Signe, edited by Brind'Amour, Lucie and Vance,
Eugène, 265-286. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
———. 1990. "Supposition Naturelle Et Signification Occamiste." In
De Ortu Grammaticae. Studies in Medieval Grammar and Linguistics
Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg, edited by Bursill-Hall, Geoffrey L.,
Ebbesen, Sten and Koerner, Konrad, 255-269. Amsterdam,
Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company.
———. 1990. "Connotative Terms in Ockham's Mental Language."
Cahiers d'Épistémologie:1-22.
———. 1992. "From Mental Word to Mental Language."
Philosophical Topics no. 20 (2):125-147.
———. 1992. "Intuition, Abstraction Et Langage Mental Dans La
Théorie Occamiste De La Connaissance." Revue de Métaphysique et de
Morale no. 97 (1):61-82.
———. 1996. "Le Langage Mental En Discussion: 1320-1335." Etudes
Philosophiques:323-339.
———. 1996. "Des Signes Dans L'intellect." Cahiers
d'Épistémologie:1-30.
Reprinted in: Harjett Singh Gill and Giovanni Manetti (eds.) - Signs
and Signification - Vol. II. New Delhi, Bahri Publications, 2000, pp.
638
63-88.
———. 1997. "Angel's Talk, Mental Language, and the Transparency
of the Mind." In Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in
Medieval Theological Texts (Xiith-Xivth Century). Acts of the Xith
Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. San Marino, 24-28 May
1994, edited by Marmo, Costantino, 323-335. Brepols.
———. 1999. Le Discours Intérieur. De Platon À Guillaume
D'ockham. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Sur ce livre voir: Laval Théologique et Philosophique, vol. 57 n. 2
(June 2001).
Table: Avant-propos 13; Introduction 17; Première Partie: Les Sources;
1. Platon et Aristote 29; 2. Logos endiathetos 53; 3. Verbum in corde
94; 4. Oratio mentalis 120; Deuxième Partie: Les controverses du XIII
siècle; 5. Triple est le verbe 153; 6. L'acte contre l'idole 177; 7. Le
concept et le signe 202; 8. De quoi la logique parle-t-elle? 228;
Troisième Partie: La Via moderna; 9. L'intervention d'Ockham 253; 10.
10. Réactions 279; Conclusion 305; Bibliographie 321; Index des noms
335-342.
———. 1999. "Grammar and Mental Language in the Pseudo-
Kilwardby." In Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of
the Symposium: The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy, 10-
13 January, 1996, edited by Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell, 397-
413. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels.
"In his commentary on the Priscianus Major, the author known as the
Pseudo-Kilwardby proposed inner speech as the proper object for
scientific grammar. It is shown here that this sermo in mente is
something quite different from William of Ockham's later oratio
mentalis it is a mental representation of words and not of things in
general. The Pseudo-Kilwardby, in effect, delineates a purely
intellectual level of linguistic representation, with a universal deep
structure richly furnished. This doctrinal development is situated in its
context, against the background of the increasing popularity of
Aristotle's Posterior Analytics at the mid thirteenth-century university."
———. 1999. "Semantics and Mental Language." In The Cambridge
Companion to Ockham, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 53-75.
"At the outset of Summa Logicae, Ockham endorses Boethius's old
639
distinction between three sorts of discourse: written, spoken, and
mental. The first two, he explains, are physically perceptible, whether
by the eye or by the ear, and are made up of conventional signs. The
units of mental language, by contrast, are concepts. They are internal to
thinking minds, and their signification is natural rather than
conventional. Being mental, they are not directly perceptible - at least
not in this world - to anybody but the person who internally produces
them in the course of his or her private thinking. But being originally
acquired as the result of a natural process, they are nevertheless
strongly similar - and identically organized - from one human being to
another. Although it is not a public medium of communication, mental
language is potentially common to all. Mental language is prior to, and
underlies, every reasonable speech utterance and provides it with
meaning. Ockham's semantical theory, as presented in Summa Logicae
and elsewhere, is primarily an explication of the various ways in which
the natural conceptual signs that constitute the language of thought are
linked with their external referents; and secondarily, of the ways in
which conventional discourse is derived from this mental language."
———. 2000. "Guillaume D'ockham, Les Connotatifs Et Le Langage
Mental." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no.
XI:297-316.
Updated translation of: Connotative Terms in Ockham's Mental
Language.
———. 2001. "Réponses De L'auteur. De Quelques Variations Sur Un
Thème Séculaire." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 57:261-276.
"This paper replies to questions raised by Claude Lafleur, Martin
Achard, Paul-Hubert Poirier, David Piché and Marie-Andrée Ricard
about the author's book, Le discours intérieur (1999). The following
points are discussed: the methods of historical work in philosophy
(with reference to Alain de Libera's ideas on the subject), the treatment
of the notion of logos endiathetos in Stoic thought, in Philo of
Alexandria and in Irenaeus of Lyon, the relations between philosophy
and theology in medieval Scholasticism, and those of hermeneutics
with Augustine's understanding of the inner word."
———. 2003. "Debates on Mental Language in the Early Fourteenth
Century." In Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages
Essays on the Commentary Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G.
640
and Kneepkens, Corneille Henry, 85-101. Groningen: Ingenium
Publishers.
———. 2003. "Ockham and Locke on Mental Language." In The
Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory,
1400-1700, edited by Friedman, Russell and Nielsen, Lauge, 37-52.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"For both Ockham and Locke, the objects of knowledge and belief are
mental propositions really composed of simpler mental units called
'concepts' in Ockham and 'ideas' in Locke. These units are, for both
philosophers, natural signs of external things and the primary
repositories of generality. Despite these striking similarities, the paper
argues that these two theories belong in fact to different and
incompatible families. This is shown by focusing on two crucial
differences between them concerning (a) signification, and (b)
reference (or 'suppositio')."
———. 2003. "Connotative Concepts and Their Definitions in
Ockham's Nominalism." In La Tradition Médiévale Des Catégories
(Xiie-Xve Siècles), edited by Biard, Joël and Rosier-Catach, Irène, 141-
155. Louvain: Peeters.
———. 2004. Ockham on Concepts. Aldershot: Ashgate.
———. 2004. "Tarski Et La Suppositio Materialis." Philosophiques
no. 31:295-309.
"In his 1944 paper The Semantic Conception of Truth and the
Foundations of Semantics, Alfred Tarski refers in so many words to the
medieval idea of "suppositio materialis". The interpretation he suggests
for it, however, is historically misleading, and this historical inaccuracy
yields in this case what can be taken to be an unfortunate philosophical
mistake. In " 'snow is white' is true ", Tarski sees the phrase "snow is
white" (between quotation marks) as the name of a certain sentence,
while the medieval philosophers would have seen it rather as an
occurrence of that very sentence, but taken in a special use, the
suppositio materialis . The paper shows how these two approaches
differ exactly and argues that the medieval theory is philosophically
preferable in that (1) it is descriptively more adequate with respect to
natural languages, (2) it is more appropriate even for artificial
languages, which it renders both more effective and more intelligible,
and (3) it rests upon the identification of an important phenomenon, the
641
generality of which is missed by the Tarskian type semantics, namely
the duality of principle between the extension of a term in itself and the
extension it receives within a given propositional context."
———. 2005. "Le Paradoxe Du Menteur Et Le Langage Mental:
Réflexions Sur L'approche Restrictionniste." In Logique Et Ontologie:
Perspectives Diachroniques Et Synchroniques, edited by François,
Beets and Gavray, Marc-Antoine, 55-71. Liège: Éditions Université de
Liège.
"Restrictionism is an approach to the Liar paradox and related puzzles
that was quite popular in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century.
The idea is to resort to a rule restricting the reference of certain terms
(their 'suppositio') in certain propositional contexts. But how are such
apparently ad hoc rules supposed to govern thought itself, or mental
language? This objection was raised against restrictionism by Thomas
Bradwardine and John Buridan (around 1330), and was considered
decisive. The present paper re-examines this discussion and re-
evaluates in consequence the prospects that remain for a defensible
form of restrictionism."
———. 2007. "Guillaume D'ockham Et Les Syncatégorèmes Mentaux:
La Première Théorie." Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage no. 25:145-
160.
———. 2007. "Mental Language and Tradition Encounters in
Medieval Philosophy: Anselm, Albert and Ockham." Vivarium no.
45:269-282.
"Medieval philosophy is often presented as the outcome of a large scale
encounter between the Christian tradition and the Greek philosophical
one. This picture, however, inappropriately tends to leave out the active
role played by the medieval authors themselves and their institutional
contexts. The theme of the mental language provides us with an
interesting case study in such matters. The paper first introduces a few
technical notions-'theme', 'tradition', 'textual chain' and 'textual
borrowing'-, and then focuses on precise passages about mental
language from Anselm of Canterbury, Albert the Great and William of
Ockham. All three authors in effect identify some relevant Augustinian
idea (that of 'mental word', most saliently) with some traditional
philosophical one (such as that of 'concept' or that of 'logos
endiathetos'). But the gist of the operation widely varies along the line
642
and the tradition encounter is staged in each case with specific goals
and interests in view. The use of ancient authoritative texts with respect
to mental language is thus shown to be radically transformed from the
eleventh to the fourteenth century."
———. 2007. "Ockham and Locke on Mental Language." In The
Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory,
1400-1700, edited by Friedman, Russell and Nielsen, Lauge, 37-52.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Panaccio, Claude, and Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2004. "Guillaume
D'ockham Et La Suppositio Materialis." Vivarium no. 42:202-224.
"The paper aims at showing how William of Ockham's theory of
material supposition can cope with certain interesting difficulties
recently raised about it by various commentators. The theory is first
broken down into five main theses. We then explain how the resulting
cluster is consistent with Ockham's general approach to signification,
how it accounts for the grammaticality of the relevant sentences, and
how it determines which spoken or written expressions a given word or
phrase stands for when taken in material supposition."
Parsons, Terence. 1994. "Anaphoric Pronouns in Very Late Medieval
Supposition Theory." Linguistics and Philosophy no. 17:429-445.
"This paper arose from an attempt to determine how the very late
medieval (1) supposition theorists treated anaphoric pronouns,
pronouns whose significance is derivative from their antecedents.
Modern researches into pronouns were stimulated in part by the
problem of "donkey sentences" discussed by Geach (1962) in a section
explaining what is wrong with medieval supposition theory. So there is
some interest in seeing exactly what the medieval account comes to,
especially if it turns out, as I suspect, to work as well as contemporary
ones. Besides, finding a good analysis of pronouns has proved to be
very difficult, and so we might possibly find some insight in a
historically different kind of approach.
I discuss a version of supposition theory that aims at producing
analyses of sentences containing quantified terms, (2)' as articulated
around 1400 by Paul of Venice, and as further developed by certain
logicians such as de Soto and Celaya in the 1400's and early 1500's, (3)
Much of what I will say also applies indirectly to earlier versions of
supposition theory (before 1400)."
643
(1) I say very late medieval' because the period in question (1400-1600)
would normally be classified as Renaissance. I am individuating the
period by its themes, not solely by its dates.
(2) This was not obviously the intent of the great developers of
supposition theory from 1250 to the late 1300's: Peter of Spain,
William Sherwood. Roger flacon, William Ockham, Walter Burleigh,
John Buridan. For them suppositional "descended forms" follow
logically from the sentences under discussion, but they do not analyze
those sentences because they are not generally equivalent to those
sentences. (This is important in Geach's (1962) criticisms of
supposition theory.) A burning issue in scholarship on supposition
theory is: what was it is supposed to be for? One popular answer is that
it is supposed to yield an analysis of quantification. This answer
accords well with later accounts, but poorly with earlier ones, because
the earlier "analyses" are often obviously not equivalent in truth value
to the sentences being "analyzed." (See e.g. Matthews, 1964.) I assume
equivalence in the theories under discussion.
(3) For details of the mature theory see Ashworth (1974).
———. 1997. "Supposition as Quantification Versus Supposition as
Global Quantificational Effect." Topoi no. 16 (1):41-63.
"This paper follows up a suggestion by Paul Vincent Spade that there
were two medieval theories of the modes of personal supposition. I
suggest that early work by Sherwood and others was a study of
quantifiers: their semantics and the effects of context on inferences that
can be made from quantified terms. Later, in the hands of Burley and
others, it changed into a study of something else, a study of what I call
"global quantificational effect."
———. 1997. Missing Modes of Supposition. In Canadian Journal of
Philosophy
Meaning and reference, edited by Kazmi, Ali: University of Calgary
Press.
———. 2006. "The Doctrine of Distribution." History and Philosophy
of Logic no. 27:59-74.
"Peter Geach describes the 'doctrine of distribution' as the view that a
term is distributed if it refers to everything that it denotes, and
undistributed if it refers to only some of the things that it denotes.
He argues that the notion, so explained, is incoherent. He claims that
644
the doctrine of distribution originates from a degenerate use of the
notion of 'distributive supposition' in medieval supposition theory
sometime in the 16th century. This paper proposes instead that the
doctrine of distribution occurs at least as early as the 12th century, and
that it originates from a study of Aristotle's notion of a term's being
'taken universally', and not from the much later theory of distributive
supposition. A detailed version of the doctrine found in the Port Royal
Logic is articulated, and compared with a slightly different modern
version. Finally, Geach's arguments for the incoherence of the doctrine
are discussed and rejected."
———. 2008. "The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later
12th through 14th Centuries." In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic,
edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 157-280. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2000. "Linguagem E Interpretação: O Recurso
À Linguagem Mental Em Ockham." Veritas.Revista de Filosofia no.
45:339-348.
"According to William Ockham's semantics it is crucial to resort to
mental language. In this article, having recourse to mental language is
examined so as to show one arrives at composed sentences which
signify without any commitment to the psychic reality of the attained
acts."
———. 2005. "A Composição Real Da Proposição Mental
Ockhamiana." Analytica.Revista de Filosofia no. 9:67-92.
"Mental language explains the significative character of written and
spoken languages; its elements and structures are identified by criteria
that belong to a theory serving this purpose. It seems that these criteria
allow a certain indeterminacy, if we expect to choose among different
possible canonical presentations of mental language.
But such a choice is not necessary at all for mental language to serve its
theoretical purposes. There is a kind a indeterminacy, concerning
tokens of mental propositions, that can really be found in Ockham's
texts: a mental proposition can be a simple mental act, and have a
compositional semantics. This astonishing thesis reminds us that
although semantical analysis that identify structures of mental language
describes a psychological reality, the psychological description itself
645
must also take account of other domains of Ockham's philosophy, in
particular his theory of mental acts"
———. 2007. "La Structure De L'acte Intellectif Dans Les Théories
Ockhamiennes Du Concept." Vivarium:93-112.
"William of Ockham held in his career two different theories about the
nature of concepts. According to the first theory, concepts are forged by
the mind and "terminate" the mental acts which produce them. This so
called "fictum"-theory was abandoned, and Ockham held another
theory, according to which concepts are identified with the mental acts
themselves. While I think this is a correct description of the evolution
of his philosophy, there is one aspect that has gone so far (almost)
unnoticed : in his later theory, not only concepts do not terminate
mental acts, but nothing seems fit to play this role. Mental acts are no
longer "terminated" by anything. Therefore, as the theory of concepts
changes, there is also a change in the theory of mental acts. This last
change explains the disappearance of the vocabulary associated with
the verb "terminare" in the exposition of the mental act theory."
Perler, Dominik. 1997. "Crathorn on Mental Language." In Vestigia,
Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts
(Xiith-Xivth Century). Acts of the Xith Symposium on Medieval Logic
and Semantics. San Marino, 24-28 May 1994, edited by Marmo,
Costantino, 337-354. Brepols.
Perreiah, Alan Richard. 1967. Is There a Doctrine of Supposition in the
Logica Magna?, Indiana University.
UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 6715146
———. 1971. "Approaches to Supposition Theory." New
Scholasticism no. 45:381-408.
"The past 25 years have seen an increasing interest in later medieval
logic and in the theory of supposition. A review of literature reveals,
however, wide differences of interpretation of supposition-theory.
Taking the theory in the widest sense as a contribution to semiotic or
the theory of signs, this study shows how supposition has been
variously treated as a syntactical, semantical and even pragmatical
theory. The main views of P. Boehner, E. Moody, P. Geach, D. P.
Henry, W. C. Kneale and L. M. De Rijk are examined, compared and
appraised with respect to overall progress in the elucidation of
supposition theory."
646
———. 1986. "Supposition Theory: A New Approach." New
Piché, David. 2001. "Philosophie Médiévale. Anselme De Cantorbéry,
Thomas D'aquin Et Guillaume D'ockham Sur Le Thème Du Discours
Intérieur: Quel Est Le Problème?" Laval Théologique et Philosophique
no. 57:243-249.
"The notion of internal discourse (locutio mentis, verbum mentis or
oratio mentalis), as it was worked out in the Latin Middle Ages,
fulfilled different theoretical functions and aims, depending on the
authors who had recourse to it. The following text asks Claude
Panaccio a simple question: what problem(s) exactly do Anselm of
Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas and William Ockham attempt
respectively to solve by appealing to this notion?"
Poveda, E. 1963. "El Tratado "De Suppositionibus Dialecticis" De San
Vicente Ferrer Y Su Significación Historica En La Cuestión De Los
Universales." Anales del Seminario de Valencia no. 3:5-88.
Price, Robert. 1970. "William of Ockham and Suppositio Personalis."
Priest, Graham, and Read, Stephen. 1977. "The Formalization of
Ockham's Theory of Supposition." Mind no. 86:109-113.
"The point of the paper is to show that the medieval theory of personal
supposition can be formalised using the standard tools of modern logic.
A formal account of the modes of supposition is given and it is shown
how these can be used to obtain the descensus in standard cases. The
formalisation is used to show that Ockham's views on the supposition
of the predicate in the "o" form are mistaken, and to refute the
following claims: (a) the medievals omitted some modes of
supposition; (b) they had too many modes of supposition; and, (c) their
theory is incapable of handling multiple quantification."
———. 1980. "Merely Confused Suppposition. A Theoretical Advance
or a Mere Confusion?" Franciscan Studies no. 40:265-297.
"Our task is an extended defence of the notion of merely confused
supposition in medieval semantic theory. For the nominalist it provided
a complete apparatus for detailing truth-conditions. A formalisation of
the mature theory is given and used to relate the notion to modern
philosophy of language. The lack of need for further modes of
supposition is detailed both theoretically and historically. The extension
647
of the notion to intensional contexts is discussed briefly."
———. 1981. "Ockham's Rejection of Ampliation." Mind no. 90:274-
279.
"The standard mediaeval account of the truth-conditions of modal and
tensed sentences used a notion of "ampliation", whereby the class of
objects for which a term supposits could be extended beyond the class
of things of which it could be truly predicated. Ockham did not use the
notion in his account. We examine why this was, explain Ockham's
account, and argue that it is preferable to the ampliative one. In
particular, the authors show the ambiguities found in modal and tensed
sentences to be, contrary to popular opinion, different, and support
Ockham's contention that the ambiguity in the tensed case is not one of
sense (signification) but of reference (supposition)."
Prieto del Rey, Maurilio. 1963. "Significación Y Sentido Ultimado. La
Nociòn De "Suppositio" En La Logica De Juan De Santo Tomás (First
Part)." Convivium (Barcelona) no. 15-16:33-73.
———. 1963. "Significación Y Sentido Ultimado. La Nociòn De
"Suppositio" En La Logica De Juan De Santo Tomás (Second Part)."
Convivium (Barcelona) no. 19-20:45-72.
Read, Stephen. 1991. "Thomas of Cleves and Collective Supposition."
"In the nominalist theories of language in the first half of the fourteenth
century, it was common practice to distinguish three modes of common
personal supposition. Considerations of symmetry lead one naturally to
consider the possibility of a fourth mode, corresponding to a nominal
conjunction. Investigation of little known writings of the late fourteenth
century and later reveal that two schools of thought developed, one
originating from a Parisian logician Thomas of Cleves, who supported
the addition of a fourth mode, the other vigorously rejecting it."
———. 1999. "How Is Material Supposition Possible?" Medieval
philosophy and theology no. 8:1-20.
"In the early fourteenth century, material supposition was characterized
as nonsignificative, when a term supposits for itself or other terms
contrary to its normal signification. But this characterization is in
tension with the doctrine of signification, which picks out the concept
uniting the things for which the term supposits. This tension was
appreciated by Thomas Maulfelt and others so that by the end of the
648
century, in John Dorp for example, a further concept was associated
with each term, the concept of the term itself and its equiforms.
Material supposition can then be subsumed under the theory of
signification."
Rearden, Myles. 1982. "On Teaching Students Logic." Philosophy no.
57:130-132.
"Is Peter Geach right to dismiss the medieval theory of distribution?
Arguably, the distinction between "suppositio distributiva et confusa"
and "suppositio confusa tantum" is more durable than all the rest of
supposition theory. There is still valid point about how general terms
stand for individuals. "some man runs" and "every man runs" both
stand for everyone. The difference is that the former does so
disjunctively, the latter, conjunctively. That seems enough to salvage
the essence of distribution theory. Geach's rejection of distribution
stems from his view that it involves assimilating nouns to proper names
as regards their manner of signification. Quite the contrary, medieval
distribution theory accepted the difference between a name-like
referring and a more general standing-for. Distribution theory continues
to make sense, and so consequently does much of the logic of
categorical propositions."
———. 1984. "The Distribution of Terms." Modern Schoolman no.
61:187-195.
"The traditional doctrine of distribution retains some validity, contrary
to the view of Geach in reference and generality. The history of the
doctrine is outlined. The medieval distinction between descensus
copulativus and descensus disiunctivus is the core of distribution. The
class interpretation of categoricals obscures the doctrine. Contemporary
quantifier theory reveals it again. Geach's arguments against it are
analysed and criticised."
Richards, T.J. 1971. "The Two Doctrines of Distribution." Australasian
Journal of Philosophy no. 49:290-302.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1967. Logica Modernorum. Vol 1. A
Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic. Assen: Van
Gorcum.
"This book deals with some doctrines in the work of mediaeval
logicians which cannot be traced back to Aristotle. This 'modern logic'
deals with the "proprietates terminorum". De Rijk studies its origination
649
in the period between Abailard and Petrus Hispanus. In this first
volume he concentrates upon the theory of fallacy as preserved in
Abailard, the School of Parvipontani, commentaries and glosses on
"Sophistici Elenchi" and "Perihermeneias" and several anonymous
Twelfth Century treatises. A separate chapter is devoted to applications
of this doctrine in Twelfth Century theology. In most theories, fallacies
enumerated by Aristotle and Boethius are reconciled, original cases are
classed under traditional headings or original interpretations are
inserted."
———. 1967. Logica Modernorum. Vol 2. Part One: The Origin and
Early Development of the Theory of Supposition. Assen: Van Gorcum.
———. 1967. Logica Modernorum. Vol 2. Part Two: The Origin and
Early Development of the Theory of Supposition. Texts and Indices.
Assen: Van Gorcum.
"This book deals with some doctrines in the work of mediaeval
logicians which cannot be traced back to Aristotle. This 'modern logic'
deals with the "proprietates terminorum". De Rijk studies its origination
in the period between Abailard and Petrus Hispanus. In this first
volume he concentrates upon the theory of fallacy as preserved in
Abailard, the School of Parvipontani, commentaries and glosses on
"Sophistici Elenchi" and "Perihermeneias" and several anonymous
Twelfth Century treatises. A separate chapter is devoted to applications
of this doctrine in Twelfth Century theology. In most theories, fallacies
enumerated by Aristotle and Boethius are reconciled, original cases are
classed under traditional headings or original interpretations are
inserted."
———. 1969. "Significatio Y Suppositio En Pedro Hispano."
Pensamiento no. 25:225-234.
———. 1971. "The Development of Suppositio Naturalis in Medieval
Logic (First Part)." Vivarium no. 9:71-107.
Logic (Second Part)." Vivarium no. 11:43-79.
———. 1982. "The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms."
In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by
Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony Patrick and Pinborg, Jan, 161-
———. 1985. "La Supposition Naturelle: Une Pierre De Touche Pour
650
Les Points De Vue Philosophiques." In La Philosophie Au Moyen Âge,
Translated in Italian in: Logica e linguaggio nel medieoevo - Edited by
Fedriga Riccardo and Puggioni Sara
Roberts, Louise Nisbet. 1956. "Classification of Suppositions in
Medieval Logic." Tulane Studies in Philosophy no. 5:79-86.
"Classifications of supposition are a characteristic portion of the
terminist logic of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth centuries. The article
contains a brief explanation of classifications to be found in the texts of
such logicians as Peter of Spain, Albert of Saxony, and John Buridan."
———. 1960. "Supposition: A Modern Application." Journal of
"A few Twentieth Century issues found in the analysis of ordinary
language are explored in terms of Fourteenth Century logic. The late
medieval theory of supposition is applied to problems appearing in the
work of such recent thinkers as W. V. O. Quine and P. F. Strawson."
Roncaglia, Gino. 2000. "Mesino De Codronchi's Discussion on
Syncategoremata and Mental Language in His Quaestiones on De
Interpretatione." In Ob Rogatum Meorum Sociorum. Studi in Memoria
Di Lorenzo Pozzi, edited by Caroti, Steano and Pinzani, Roberto.
Milano: Franco Angeli.
Ross, James, ed. 1971. Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy. A
Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke. Westport: Greenwood.
Sagal, Paul Thomas. 1967. The Concept of Supposition and Its Place in
the Development of Medieval Semantology, Ph. D. University of
Pennsylvania.
UMI Dissertaion Express reference number 6809232
———. 1973. "On Refuting and Defending Supposition Theory." New
"P. T. Geach's critique of medieval supposition theory has generated
much controversy. Supposition theory is neither as guilty as Geach
claims, nor as innocent as Scott, one of Geach's critics, claims. Geach
takes a medieval account of supposition, the "Ockham-Buridan"
account, and attempts to show that it provides us with unacceptable
semantic analyses of certain propositions. According to him,
supposition theory treats applicatives as associating with common
nouns to form referring expressions. However, there is no way to
651
render intelligible the referents of expressions like 'some dancers' and
'all dancers'. Geach sees this semantic foul-up as a consequence of
supposition theory's failure to assign applicatival expressions to the
proper grammatical category. T. K. Scott counters that the medieval
treatment of applicatives parallels modern logic's treatment of
quantifiers."
Schaeffer, F. 1987. "Syntax and Semantics in Supposition Theory." In
Ockham and Ockhamists., edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, H.A.,
63-69. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Acts of the Ockham-Symposium at the occasion of the 10th
anniversary of the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium
Aevum (10-12 September 1986)
Schoot, Henk J.M. 1993. "Aquinas and Supposition. The Possibilities
and Limitations of Logic in Divinis." Vivarium no. 31 (2):193-225.
"A study of "(modes of) signification" and "supposition", key terms in
13th century semantics, in the work of Thomas Aquinas, with special
focus on "suppositio naturalis". It is argued that in Aquinas the
distinction between signification (connotation) and supposition
(denotation) is maintained, even though the terms "supponere pro" and
"suppositio naturalis" are used to indicate sometimes the one and
sometimes the other semantical function. This feature is explained from
the theological purposes that semantics serves. The study forms part of
an investigation of Aquinas' use of semantics in theology, published in
"Christ the Name' of God. Thomas Aquinas on Naming Christ,"
Louvain 1993"
Scott, Theodore Kermit. 1966. "Geach on Supposition Theory." Mind
no. 75:586-588.
Seung-Chan, Park. 1999. Die Rezeption Der Mittelalterlichen
Sprachphilosophie in Der Theologie Des Thomas Von Aquin. Mit
Besonderer Berücksichtigung Der Analogie. Leiden: Brill.
"One of Thomas Aquinas's central ideas is his attempt to show how it is
possible to speak about the incomprehensible God. To reach a better
understanding of this project, it is necessary to gain some insight into
how he used the theories he acquired during his time in the faculty of
arts in his philosophical-theological works.
Park's book deals with the question which, despite the current
flourishing of the studies of the medieval philosophy of language, has
652
not received much attention. The application of the theories of
signification and supposition as well as the doctrine of the modi
significandi is reconstructed systematically. Consequently, the
traditional doctrine of analogy appears in a new light.
The interpretations of the texts in question are exemplary for the work
of philosophical interpretations. The reader is guided by overviews,
schematical drawings and references."
Smithka, Paula J. 1991. "Ampliation and Natural Supposition in Albert
of Saxony's Quaestiones Super Logicam." In Itinéraires D'albert De
Saxe, Paris-Vienne Au Xiv Siécle, edited by Biard, Joël, 137-148. Paris:
Vrin.
Spade, Paul Vincent. 1974. "Ockham's Rule of Supposition: Two
Conflicts in His Theory." Vivarium no. 12:63-67.
Reprinted in Lies, language and logic in the late Middle Ages - chapter
IX
———. 1974. "Five Logical Tracts by Richard Lavenham." In Essays
in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis, edited by O'Donnell, Reginald, 70-
124. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
"This article is an edition of Richard Lavenham's Suppositiones,
Consequentiae, Tractatus exclusivarum, Exceptivae, and Tractatus qui
Differt et Aliud Nuncupatur, based on the British Museum Sloane ms.
3899."
———. 1975. "Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-
Ockham Dispute." Franciscan Studies no. 35:212-222.
XIII
"The Fourteenth century debate between Walter Burley and William of
Ockham is usually viewed as a metaphysical dispute between a realist
and a nominalist. But there are epistemological questions at stake too. I
argue that Burley's and Ockham's answers to the question "what kind of
supposition is it in which a term supposits for what it signifies" are
independent of their metaphysical views, and have epistemological
consequences. I explore some of these consequences, and argue that
Ockham's position allows us in principle to have knowledge of
anything in his ontology, whereas Burley's does not."
———. 1975. "Ockham's Distinctions between Absolute and
Connotative Terms." Vivarium no. 13:55-76.
653
Reprinted in Spade Lies, language and logic - chapter XI
"A philosophical analysis of the distinction between absolute and
connotative terms, drawn mainly from Ockham's "summa logicae". The
article explores the implications of this distinction on Ockham's theory
of mental language."
———. 1976. "Priority of Analysis and the Predicates of O-Form
Sentences." Franciscan Studies no. 36:263-270.
XII
"Ockham claims that the predicates of particular negative (0-form)
sentences have confused and distributive supposition. This view
conflicts with the view that the modes of personal supposition are
meant to provide analyses. I argue that the same problem emerges
whenever a term in merely confused term is put within the scope of a
negation, and that a "priority of analysis" rule (Swiniarski) will not
avoid this general problem."
———. 1980. "Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockham's Mental
Language." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 18:9-22.
XIII
"A textual and philosophical study of the claim that according to
Ockham there is no synonymy or equivocation in mental language. It is
argued that Ockham is committed to both claims, either explicitly or in
virtue of other features of his doctrine. Nevertheless, both claims lead
to difficulties for Ockham's theory."
———. 1982. "The Semantic of Terms." In The Cambridge History of
Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny,
Anthony Patrick and Pinborg, Jan, 188-196. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
———. 1988. "The Logic of the Categorical: The Medieval Theory of
Descent and Ascent." In Meaning and Inference in Medieval
Philosophy, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 187-224. Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
———. 1990. "Ockham, Adams and Connotation: A Critical Notice of
Marilyn Adams William Ockham." Philosophical Review no. 99:593-
612.
———. 1997. "Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular
654
Terms." Topoi no. 16 (1):7-13.
"This paper argues that Burley's theory of simple supposition is not as it
has usually been presented. The prevailing view is that Burley and
other authors agreed that simple supposition was in every case
supposition for a universal, and that the disagreement over simple
supposition between, say, Ockham and Burley was merely a
disagreement over what a universal was (a piece of the ontology? a
concept?), combined with a separate disagreement over what terms
signify (the speaker's thoughts? the objects the thoughts are about?).
In fact, however, Burley explicitly allows that some instances of simple
supposition are for an individual, and that in certain cases personal
supposition and simple supposition coincide. The present paper
explores Burley's theory on this topic, and proposes a way of thinking
about the metaphysics and the semantics that makes sense of what he
says."
———. 1997. "Walter Burley, from the Beginning of His Treatise on
the Kinds of Supposition (De Suppositionibus)." Topoi no. 16 (1):95-
102.
"An annotated translation from the beginning of the fourteenth century
logician Walter Burley's (or Burleigh's) early treatise on supposition or
reference (dated 1302). The Translation is from Stephen Brown, ed.,
"Walter Burleigh's Treatise "De Suppositionibus" and Its Influence on
William of Ockham," "Franciscan Studies" 32 (1972), 15-64. The
translation is from pp. 31-43 (paragraph 1.1-2.425) of the edition,
concerning the supposition of "absolute" terms. The remainder of
Burley's treatise concerns the supposition of "respective" or "relative"
terms and is not translated here."
———. 1999. "Walter Burley on the Kinds of Simple Supposition."
Vivarium no. 37 (1):41-59.
Sweeney, Eileen C. 1995. "Supposition, Signification, and Universals:
Metaphysical and Linguistic Complexity in Aquinas." Freiburger
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie no. 42 (3):267-290.
"This essay places Aquinas's use of supposition theory in its
metaphysical and linguistic contexts, showing, first, how Aquinas's use
of supposition in the problems surrounding terms said of God illustrates
Aquinas's theological and metaphysical commitments. Second, I argue
that Aquinas's supposition theory organizes but does not dissolve the
655
ambiguities and complexities of language, taking the multiplicity of
meanings and references as intrinsic rather than curable aspects of
language. These complexities are, for Aquinas, reflections of our
imperfect imitation of the immediate and complete understanding of the
divine intellect, and the composite and fragmented metaphysics of
created being."
Swiniarski, John J. 1970. "A New Presentation of Ockham's Theory of
Supposition with an Evaluation of Some Contemporary Criticisms."
"This is a critical evaluation of Ockham's theories of meaning and
reference based on extensive primary source materials and especially
concerned with Ockham's procedures for the extensional analysis of
general propositions. The Kneales' contention that absurd conclusions
follow from the application of Ockham's procedures is shown to be ill-
founded. Geach's claim, that Ockham's notion of purely confused
supposition is unnecessary, is supported. Some of Moody's views on
supposition are upheld."
———. 1971. Theories of Supposition in Medieval Logic: Their Origin
and Their Development from Abelard to Ockham.
Ph. D. Dissertation, State University of New york at Buffalo.
Synan, Edward A. 1955. "The Universal and Supposition in a Logica
Attributed to Richard of Campsall." In Nine Medieval Thinkers: A
Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts, edited by O'Donnell, J.R., 183-
232. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
Tabarroni, Andrea. 1989. "Mental Signs and the Theory of
Representation in Ockham." In On the Medieval Theory of Signs, edited
by Eco, Umberto and Marmo, Costantino, 195-224. Amsterdam,
Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.
English translation of: Segno mentale e teoria della rappresentazione in
Ockham - VS Versus.Quaderni di Studi Semiotici, 38-39, 1984, pp. 63-
90.
Tachau, Katherine. 1988. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham.
Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345.
Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill.
Theron, Stephen. 1999. "The Supposition of the Predicate." Modern
Schoolman no. 77:73-78.
"Supposition theory (chiefly that of Aquinas) is contrasted with
656
theories of reference. It is argued that the predicate "stands for"
(supponit pro) what the subject stands for. It has the same supposition,
that is, but according to its predicative mode. Supposition can be varied
"ad placitum." The role of the copula is crucial, as is the principle that
"only wholes can be predicated of wholes" (Aquinas: De ente et
essentia). The context is a discussion of writings by Peter Geach."
Thomas, Ivo. 1952. "St. Vincent Ferrer's De Suppositionibus."
Dominican Studies no. 5:88-102.
Trentman, John Allen. 1964. Simple Supposition and Ontology: A
Study in Fourtenth-Century Logical Theory, Ph. D. Dissertation.
University of Minnesota.
UMI Dissertation Express reference number: 6500162
———. 1970. "Ockham on Mental." Mind no. 79:586-590.
"Mental language, according to Ockham, consists of mental acts or
capacities for performing mental acts. Its structure is analogous to that
of spoken or written language and is the structure of a logically ideal
language. Hence its study is useful for philosophy. Ockham's concern
about the apparent closeness of the analogy is also considered with
reference to his discussion of the possibility of angelic (and hence
nonphysical) language."
———. 1986. "Mental Language and Lying." In L'homme Et Son
Univers Au Moyen Age. Actes Du Septième Congrés International De
Philosophie Médiévale (30 Aout - 4 Septembre 1982 (Volume Ii), edited
by Wenin, Christian, 544-553. Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions de l'Institut
Supérieur de Philosophie.
Valdivia, Benjamin. 1987. "La Suposición Semántica En Vicente
Ferrer." Analogia no. 1 (2):85-91.
———. 1993. "Ockham: Suposición Y Ontologia." Analogía
Filosófica.Revista de Filosófia:141-151.
"Based on Ockham's "Summa Logicae", this article is intended to
present the terms classification related to individual entities and
inserted in propositions. Essence of signs is discussed, the same as
reference to the world. Ockham states that sign is that which supposes a
thing making it comprehensible. Supposition is made clear only in a
sentence as a whole, for it is the smallest signification unit (and not the
separated terms). It presents, too, conceptions of significativity and
truth as qualities of sentences, composed by terms which suppose for
657
an individualized reality."
Vera Cruz, Alonso de la. 1982. "Sobre La Suposición." Revista de
Filosofia (Mexico) no. 15:349-393.
Versace, Giovanni. 1974. "La Teoria Della Suppositio Simplex in
Ockham E in Burley." In Atti Del Convegno Di Storia Della Logica
(Parma 8-10 Ottobre 1972), 195-202. Padova: Liviana Editrice.
Wagner, Michael F. 1981. "Supposition Theory and the Problem of
Universals." Franciscan Studies no. 41:385-414.
"I examine Burleigh's and Ockham's positions on universals through
explaining their theories of signification and supposition. I argue for a
representational analysis of these theories, which i distinguish from
prevailing interpretations of these theories; and i argue, in particular,
that when Burleigh's theory of the signification and supposition of
general terms is properly understood, he is not an extreme realist (at
least as this view is normally understood) and his disagreement with
Ockham over universals is much more subtle than it is normally
conceived by historians of philosophy."
Weidemann, Hermann. 1979. "Wilhelm Von Ockhams
Suppositionstheorie Und Die Moderne Quantorenlogik." Vivarium no.
117:43-60.
"This article is the enlarged German version of William of Ockham on
particular negative propositions, published in "Mind", volume 88,
April, 1979, pages 270-275. The views of the following authors are
discussed: P. T. Geach, G. B. Matthews, A. R. Perreiah, R. Price, G.
Priest, S. Read, N. Rescher, J. Swiniarski, R. G. Turnbull."
———. 1991. "Scholasticorum Taediosa Circa Suppositiones
Praecepta: Leibniz Und Die Problematik Der Suppositionstheorie."
Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie no. 73 (3):243-260.
Yrjönsuuri, Mikko. 1997. "Supposition and Truth in Ockham's Mental
Language." Topoi no. 16 (1):15-25.
"In this paper, Ockham's theory of an ideal language of thought is used
to illuminate problems of interpretation of his theory of truth. The
twentieth century idea of logical form is used for finding out what
kinds of atomic sentences there are in Ockham's mental language. It
turns out that not only the theory of modes of supposition, but also the
theory of supposition in general is insufficient as a full theory of truth.
Rather, the theory of supposition is a theory of reference, which can
658
help in the determination of truth values within the scope of simple
predications. Outside this area, there are interesting types of sentences,
whose truth does not depend on whether the terms supposit for the
same things or not for the same things."
Zarka, Yves Charles. 1988. "Signe, Supposition Et Dénomination.
Figure Du Nominalisme Au Xvii Siècle." Revue des Sciences
Philosophiques et Théologiques no. 72 (2):263-272.
Zheng, Yiwei. 1998. "Metaphysical Simplicity and Semantical
Complexity of Connotative Terms in Ockham's Mental Language."
Modern Schoolman no. 75:253-264.
"In this paper I offer a formal presentation of Ockham's connotation
theory, based upon a distinction between metaphysical simplicity and
semantical complexity of connotative terms, that I argue render
consistent Paul Spade's claim (1975) that Ockham needs and adopted a
recursive semantics for his ontological elimination and Claude
Panaccio's observation (1990) that there is no simple connotative term
in Ockham's mental language."
RELATED PAGES
First Part of the Bibliography: A - L
Semantics and Ontology in the thought of Peter Abelard
E. J. Ashworth
L. M. de Rijk
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Logic, Semantics and Ontology in the

Philosophical Works of Abelard
INTRODUCTION
"Abelard composed four works on logic:
(1) Introductiones Parvulorum, which consists of short glosses on Porphyry
Eisagoge and Aristotle Categories and De Interpretatione;
(2) Logica Ingredientibus (so called because ingredientibus is the first word
of its text), which consists of longer glosses on the texts covered by the
previous work together with Boethius' De Differentiis Topicis and was
probably written while Abelard was teaching in Paris before 1120;
(3) Logica Nostrorum Petitioni (so called because nostrorum petitioni are the
first words of its text), which consists of longer glosses on the Eisagoge and
may date from the time of his teaching at the hermitage of the Paraclete;
(4) Dialectica, which has the form of an independent work about the subjects
covered by Boethius' logical writings and Victorinus' treatise De
Definitionibus and seems to contain materials from different periods of
Abelard's life but probably did not reach its final form until a late date,
perhaps the time of his stay at Cluny shortly before his death. Of these the
second and the fourth are the most valuable.
The Dialectica indeed, though based, like that of Garland, chiefly on the
works of Boethius and written with the prolixity which was all too common
660
among medieval authors, is an original composition of great importance for
the development of logic. Abelard's mind was the keenest (though not in all
respects the most admirable) that had been devoted to the subject for more
than a thousand years, and he approached his task with the belief that it was
still possible to make discoveries: 'Non enim tanta fuit antiquorum
scriptorum perfectio ut non et nostro doctrina indigeat studio, nec tantum in
nobis mortalibus scientia potest crescere ut non ultra possit augmentum
recipere.' (1) The Dialectica survives in a single manuscript which lacks the
opening sections. Excerpts from it were published by Victor Cousin in 1836
in his Ouvrages inédits d' Abelard. But unfortunately the text was not printed
in full until 1956, and before that date it was therefore not possible to
appreciate the magnitude of Abelard's contribution to the doctrines we regard
as characteristically medieval. (...).
The text is divided into five tractatus which correspond to groups of
Boethius' writings and are called respectively: I Liber Partium, II De
Categoricis, III Topica, IV De Hypotheticis, and V De Divisionibus et
Definitionibus. Of these the first is subdivided into three volumina dealing
with the antepraedicamenta (or quinque voces of Porphyry), the
praedicamenta (or categories of Aristotle), and the postpraedicamenta (or
questions about meaning raised in the De Interpretatione). (2) But our sole
surviving manuscript lacks the whole of the first volume and the opening of
the second. This is unfortunate, since the missing part probably contained
Abelard's last thoughts about universals. We can be reasonably sure also that
it contained an account of the distinction between words of first and words of
second imposition, since this was mentioned by Boethius in his commentary
on the Categories and is taken for granted later by Abelard."
(1) Dialectica p. 535
(2) In later times the name antepraedicamenta was used (more naturally) for
the subjects treated by Aristotle in his Categories, 1-3 (i.e. equivocal and
univocal naming, simple and complex expressions, etc.), and the name
postpraedicamenta for the subjects treated by Aristotle in his Categories, 10-
15 i.e. kinds of opposites, kinds of priority, etc.).
(3) Dialectica p. 122
From: William & Marta Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford:
661
Clarendon Press 1962, pp. 203-204. (some notes omitted)
THE MODERN REDISCOVERY OF ABELARDIAN

LOGIC
See the page Editions and Translations of the Logical Works for the
bibliographical details.
"Geyer's editions [...] gave the first decisive stimulus to the study of the
Palatine Master's philosophical writings.
Up to 1919 (the year of Geyer's first edition) the known Abelardian writings
were limited to those edited by Cousin (7): this French scholar attached the
most importance to the comments on Porphyrius, the Categorie and the
Topici of Boetius and the passages of the Dialectica. On the whole the
material was fragmentary, uncritically sifted and confused with fragments of
non-Abelardian comments, which Cousin nonetheless considered were his.
De Rémusat's incomplete paraphrase in French of a comment on the Isagoge
was then added to these texts.
In 1919 Geyer began publishing Ingredientibus (8): under this name he has
edited a comment on the Isagoge, a second on the Categorie, and a third on
De Interpretatione. A prologue (from the beginning of which Geyer took the
name Ingredientibus) presents these comments as a unit which has a certain
compactness; this is confirmed by other observations which are intrinsic to
the work, such as the internal cross-references from comment to comment,
the persistence of a similar attitude and of an identical -- terminologically as
well -- solution when confronted by the problem of universals in all the
comments (9), the 'dictum' theory present in the three comments. (10) From
internal cross-references that Abelard makes to an essay De Hypotheticis
(11), Geyer concludes that the work must have included other comments as
well as these. From hints dropped by Abelard in De Interpretatione, it seems
highly likely to me that a comment on De Categoricis also belonged to
Ingredientibus. (12) Dal Pra has shown that the comment on De differentiis
topicis, edited by him, is clearly distinct from the literal comments, and
concluded that this is a comment that comes within the framework of
Ingredientibus. (13) We thus have four of the seven comments on the usual
662
'septem codices' (14) that Abelard considered fundamental.
Also part of the Philosophische Schriften edited by Geyer is a comment on
the Isagoge of which Rémusat had edited an incomplete paraphrase in
French. In the prologue Geyer singled it out as part of an organic work, called
Nostrorum (15) by him from the words at the beginning: here too Abelard
proposed an entire treatment of the logical corpus usually used by him. Today
we still have only the comment on the Porphyrian quinque voces.
In 1954 Geyer's edition was joined by the edition of the literal comments
edited by M. Dal Pra. In this edition the comments are arranged in the order
which Abelard himself indicates at the end of the logical treatise and to which
he also holds in Dialectica. The comments on the Categorie and on De
Interpretatione thus come after the comment on the Isagoge. The presence of
a comment on the Boetian De Divisionibus indicates that Abelard used the
'seven codes' from the outset and leads one reasonably to suppose that he had
worked on other comments of the same type as De Syllogismis categoricis,
De Syllogismis Hypotheticis, and De Differentiis topicis which we do not
have now. This seems to me to be confirmed by certain references of
Dialectica, which are remade in the comments on De Differentiis topicis and
De hypotheticis in the Introductiones parvulorum (16), identified by Geyer
with the literal notes. We have already seen how the comment on De
Differentiis topicis edited by Dal Pra in the Scritti Filosofici must be
assimilated, on the contrary, to the corpus of notes in Ingredientibus.
In 1956 De Rijk published an edition of Dialectica which enhances the
picture of the Palatine Master's logical work. Dialectica is not a comment but
an organic treatise based nonetheless on the 'septem codices'. The most
serious gap, by extension and importance, is that which deprives us of the
treatise on the Porphyrian quinque voces which was certainly included in the
work, because Abelard hints at it. Two passages in this work show us
Abelard's concept of it (17): the Palatine Master here presented himself as an
auctor in line with Aristotle, Porphyrius and Boetius, whose works he would
perfect, as he proudly declares.
In Abaelardiana inedita edited by Minio Paluello (18), two texts are edited,
the first contained in a manuscript now in Berlin, and the second belonging to
a manuscript in the monastery of Fleury, both from the 12th century. The
existence of these two manuscripts was not unknown to us. (19) The text of
the Berlin manuscript, a commentary on De Interpretatione, is three-quarters
663
identical to the Ambrosian manuscript edited by Geyer as a section of
Ingredientibus and the part that differs is without any doubt more coherent
with the preceding part than the Ambrosian manuscript which contained a
noteworthy break. The contribution of this new edition consists in a rigour
and a greater accuracy in the reading of the Abelardian text: it does not,
however, appear that in this last part of the commentary there are motives that
complete or at least modify the weight and the general meaning of the
commentary itself.
The text of the Fleury manuscript is more interesting, even if, with regard to
the attribution, it is more uncertain. This concerns the analysis of a
paralogism and of five sophisms that emerge from a nominalistic
interpretation of the concept of totum."
(7) Cousin, op. cit., and Petri Abaelardi opera hactenus seorsim edita ...,
Paris 1859.
(8) Philosophische Schriften, Münster 1919, 1921, 1927. Abbreviated to G.G.
(9) See G.G., pp. 16, 127, 403, and G.L., p. 235; G.G., pp. 38, 246, 334-5,
and [Scritti filosofici, Milan 1954, abbreviated] G.L., p. 221.
(10) See p. 79, note 39.
(11) G.G., pp. 291 (25) and 389 (7).
(12) G.G., p. 394 (10-26).
(12) Dal Pra, 'Introduzione', in G.L., pp. XXIX-XXXII.
(14) Dialectica, p. 146 (10-7).
(15) G.G., p. 505 (3-5).
(16) Dialectica, pp. 269 (1-3), 329 (4), 482 (4-6).
(17) Dialectica, pp. 146 (10-20), 496 (18-26).
(18) Abaelardiana inedita, Rome 1958.
(19) Id., pp. XIIff., XLI.
From: Maria Teresa Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli, The Logic of
Abelard, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970, pp. 2-4.
THE ANCIENT LOGICAL WORKS KNOWN AT THE

TIME OF ABELARD
"...of whose seven books everyone in this art with an education in Latin
664
should be armed. Only two of Aristotle's books are still known to the use of
the Latins, namely the Categories and the De Interpretatione. One book is
Porphyry's: that is the one written about the five 'predicables' (genus, species,
difference, property and accident) [the Isagoge]; this is an introduction
preparatory to the Categories. We usually treat Boethius as four books: that is
the De Divisione, the De Topicis, the De Syllogismo Categorico and the De
Syllogismo Hypothetico. The text of my Dialectica will include a very full
summary of all of these, and it will see the light -- so that readers can use it --
provided the Creator of our life grants us a little time and Envy relaxes her
grip on our works."
From: Petrus Abaelardus, Dialectica. First complete edition of the
Parisian manuscript with an introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1970 (second edition), p. 146, lines 10-20 (cited from M. T.
Clanchy, Abelard. A Medieval Life, Malden: Blackwell, 1997, p. 98).
"The Aristotelian texts available to Abaelard.
The Introductiones parvulorum contain short glosses on Porphyry's Isagoge;
Aristotle's Categories and the Peri Heraineias; and Boethius' De topicis
differentiis and the De divisionisbus et definitionibus. The Ingredientibus
contains longer glosses on the texts of Porphry and Aristotle. The Nostrorum
petitione sociorum elaborates on Prophyry alone. Additional texts available
to Abaelard were Boethius's Introductio ad categoricos syllogismos, the De
syllogismis categoricis, the De syllogismis hypotheticis and Cicero's Topics.
Abelard was surely using the extended, newer Boethian translation of the
Isagoge (secunda editio) rather than the older translation based on Marius
Victorinus. The glosses of the Categories relied on a copy of the editio
composita of Minio-Palüello (Aristóteles Latinus I) — probably the close
redaction, Ms. Chartres 497. Both Minio-Paluello and de Rijk find
similarities between Abaelard's and Thierry of Chartres' use of Ms. Chartres
297 , in part, a Boethian translation of the Peri Hermeneias.(1) With respect
to the nova-texts available to Abaelard, it is certain that he had some
acquaintance with both the Prior Analytics, cited in the Dialectica, and the
De sophistici elenchi, cited in the Ingredientibus. As his acquaintance with
the Prior Analytics is certainly not from indirect sources, he most likely used
the recensio Carnutensis Boethian translation found in Ms. Chartres 497
which also contained the Categories. A translation of Aristotle's Topics is
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also found in the same codex. While the text is not quoted in any of Abelard's
extant writings, it seems probable that he reviewed the text. The De sophistici
elenchi is found in Ms. Chartres 498. While Abaelard states that he did not
always have access to the work (Ingred. 400,33-4), it is evident that he knew
the text-- probably from this manuscript. While there was an anonymous
translation of the Posterior Analytics circulating in Abaelard's day, it is
highly unlikely that he had ever seen the work. It is not quoted in any of the
extant writings. He was certainly unacquainted with the nova translations of
James of Venice which started to circulate sometime after 1130.
Unfortunately, James' translations of the De anima and the Metaphysics first
appeared a few years after Abaelard's death (and, in fact, they had few
readers at the time). Aristotle's Ethics was not translated until early in the
thirteenth century.
From: Daniel F. Blackwell, Non-Ontological Constructs Bern: Peter Lang,
1988, pp. 309-310.
DIALECTICS AT THE TIME OF ABELARD

"When the medievals dealt with dialectics, they meant logic as such, and
dialectic in the historic Greek sense of the term that was at issue from the
Sophists through Aristotle largely fell by the wayside. For the medievals,
then, dialectics was logic at large, the science of demonstration through
which rational inquiry sought veritatis seu falsitatis discretio.(16) And as
such dialectic constituted a key part of the institutional trivium of grammar,
rhetoric and dialectic (i.e., logic). Thus while the medieval treatment of
"dialectic" forms an important chapter in the history of logic, it can be left
aside in the context of the history of dialectic as traditionally understood in its
relation to philosophical methodology.(17) However, insofar as dialectic is a
feature of the actual practice of academic disputation, it continued to play an
important role in higher education throughout the middle ages.(18)"
(16) Abelard, Dialectica, p. 435. For an English translation of a typical
medieval treatise on dialectic see John Buridan, Summulae de dialectica
tr. by Gyula Klima (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2001). A
look at the elaborate table of its Contents shows that with regard to
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topics that the treatise remains well within the boundaries of Aristotle's
logical organon. Not until the Renaissance did Petrus Remus
reconstitute the idea of dialectic as the art of disputation (doctrina
dispusandi. See his Dialecticae Constitutiones (1543).
(17) Over and above the standard histories of logic, the following treatments
of medieval dialectic are highly instructive: T. J. Holopainen, Dialectic and
Theology in the Eleventh Century (London: Brill, 1996); J. A. Endres, "Die
Dialektik and ihre Gegner im 11. Jahrhundcrt," Philosophisches Jahrbuch,
vol. 19 (1906), pp. 20-33; N. J. Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics
in the Middle Ages (Munich, Philosophia Verlag, I984); and above all,
Eleanore Stump, Dialectic and its Place in the Development of Medieval
Logic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
(18) On medieval academic disputation see A. G. Little and F. Pelster, Word
Theology and Theologians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), pp. 29-56. A
vivid account of scholastic disputation is given in Thomas Gilby, O. P.,
Barbara, Celarent. A Description of Scholastic Dialectics (London, New
York: Longmans, Green, 1949), see especially Chapter XXXII on "Found
Dialectic," pp. 282-93; and see also Bromley Smith, "Extracurricular
Disputation: 1400-1650," Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 34 (1948), pp.
473-96. On medieval and renaissance discussions of Platonic dialectic see
Raymond Klibansky, "Plato's Parmenhks in the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance" in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vol. I (1941/43), pp.
288ff.
From: Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Idealism (Collected Papers, volume III),
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2005, p. 137
THE SEMIOTICS OF ABELARD

"3. The linguistic theory of Abelard is centred around the correlaion or
correspondence between the "word" and the "thing" or the signifiant and the
signifié as we would have them today. According to Abelard, if a word or a
sound signifies, it is because something is added to its physical being,
essentia; this something is the significative function,officium significandi.
The sound, just like the thing that it represents in a give language, remains
the same from one community of speakers to another, it belongs to the sphere
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of things, which is natural; the significance, on the other hand, changes due to
the diversity of languages, it depends upon institution, upon a human
convention, positio hominum, voluntas hominum.(1) We have already the
distinction between the sphere of significance and the sphere of things. The
sound or the physically pronounced utterance is of the order of nature while
significance is created when "something" is added to its being, and, this
"something" is due to human intervention in a human, social institution. For
Abelard, words give birth to or "generate" intellection which then correspond
to things. Thus, argues Abelard, threre is a double series of correspondence
between words and intellections, and between intellections and things, and
consequently, between words and things. These are three distinct but related
spheres.(2)
In Peri Hermeneias, Abelard insists that first of all the words signify
"intellections" and only by implication and consequently, the things,
otherwise there would be no logic. At the level of utterance, we deal with
ideas which are "abstracted" from things but which are not found in any one
thing. The reference to things is always indirect, intellective.(3)
Words are imposed upon things by human convention and they do not carry
the same significance from one language to another, hence they are
"arbitrary", but as they signify "intellection" of a given thing, they operate
within the sphere of logic. Words constitute intellections, or what are called
"analyses" in the eighteenth century by Condillac and his followers, they
represent logical propositions on the object under study. They do not
correspond to the physical, empirical reality of the thing (object) but to its
intellective reality. Hence, the move from one word (utterance) to another is
in fact a move from one intellection to another. This is why, for Abelard, to
say that a word signifies is to say that it manifests an intellection of the one
who pronounces it, and that it generates a similar intellection for the one who
hears it. To signify is to constitute intellection but the act of communication
requires a speaker and a hearer where there must be a similarity of
intellection.(4) Abelard continues the argument in Super Peri [Hermeneias]
and explains that linguistic communication is an affair between two thinking
beings. (5)
Language thus is not only a matter of forming logical propositions on the
perceived reality of things, it is an institution where two thinking beings,
beings who reflect upon the nature of things, exchange their intellections or
668
analyses. But the so-called perfect exchange can take place if the same
intellection is generated between two persons.
There are three degrees of knowledge, argues Abelard in Peri Hermeneias:
sensation, sensus, imagination, imaginatio, intellection, intellectus. One can
feel without imagination, imagine without thinking but imagination
presupposes sensation and, there can be no intellection without image.
Our words turn our attention towards the resemblance of a thing so that it
may be applied, not to this resemblance, but to the thing that it represents.
This is the role of the image. One may compare it with a statue of Socrates.
We apprehend it not as a thing but as a resemblance. Our intellection is not
concerned with it, it only represents Socrates. When our sensation perceives
it, it orients it towards the real Socrates. Image is thus situated within the
mental operation which leads to knowledge. It serves as a substitute for the
thing that is absent. An image alone can also be the object of thought, but in
that case, it is not really an image, it has to be considered as an object in itself
without another image serving as an intermediate. In any case, we see that
feeling or sensation, in itself or across an image, serves as the basis of our
intellection. But neither sensation nor image is sufficient for our knowledge;
in the first case, we remain at the surface, manifest level, in the second, there
is confusion. It is through the application of our esprit that we pass on to
intellection. It leads us to the knowledge of the nature and the properties of
things which are imperceptible to senses or to imagination.
Our reason leads our esprit to intellection, without it we remain in the domain
of confusion which is the characteristic of imagination.
To think is not to subject a given thing (object) to our intellection, but a
nature or a property of that thing.
In its simplest form, an image presents only a resemblance of a thing
perceived, it is confused, and like sensation, it does not allow us to
distinguish the various properties of the thing. It is only a material to work
on, to apply our intellection. Moreoever, the validity or invalidity of an
intellection has nothing to do with the specific characteristics of an image.
These images serve only as signs. Two persons may think of a non-sensible
object, like rationality, across two different images, and both of them may
formulate valid propositions. What matters is what is aimed at across these
images, attentio rerum per imagines, and not the arrangement or the aspects
of these images, dispositio imaginum vel forma.
669
Intellections may be simple or complex. A simple intellection corresponds to
a noun (name), its object is composed of matter and form but it is
apprehended in one unique perception, it is thus without any parts. A
complex intellection corresponds to oratio as animal, rational, mortal; it
groups several intellectual acts. The second division refers to an intellection
of related or divided things, intellectio conjunctorum vel divisorum, on the
one hand, and on the other, the intellection that relates or divides, intellectus
conjungens vel dividens. The former refers to a reunion or a separation
already made within the language. It is thus a simple idea, it corresponds to a
definite or an indefinite noun as the things are related or divided. The
intellection that relates or divides is, on the other hand, a composed or
complex intellection; to a term already thought (analysed), it relates another.
Such an intellection corresponds to animal + rational + mortal. Furthermore,
there is the intellection that divides and the other that abstracts. The former
separates one characteristics from the other but considers both in conjunction
or disjunction. The latter considers only one term at a time, neglecting the
other.
As the primary interest of Abelard is the interpretation of old sacred texts, he
argues that as the ancient texts represent specific intellections of the authors,
their true understanding would lead us to the understanding of the texts or the
intellections, which are different from those of ours, but they would not shed
light on the real nature of things, of the objects they refer to, of the mysteries
of the Church. Before Abelard, Isidore had taught in the seventh century that
once you know the etymology of a word, you know the "reality" of the thing.
For Abelard, etymology informs us only of the intellection of the previous
author. That intellection is no more related to the reality of the thing than our
intellections are today. The etymological analysis gives only a "partial" view
of what is really the thing. The etymology, says Abelard, sheds light more on
the composition of the word than on the substance of the thing.(6) No
wonder, he was excommunicated. For the logician Abelard, there is
absolutely no confusion. For him, the science of logic is concerned only with
the enunciative propositions and hence finds its precise object at the level of
language, and not, at the level of the impression of things. The sphere of
ideas is clearly distinct from the sphere of things.(7) It is interesting to note
that following this reasoning, Abelard comments upon the ten categories of
Aristotle and states that they are due to "human initiative", and hence due to
670
the nature of language, otherwise such a homogeneity between the categories
of language and that of the things of the world could not be envisaged.(8)
Eight hundred years later, in a now celebrated article, Emile Benveniste
makes the same point with the help of the modem Saussurian linguistics.(9)
Abelard insists that the formation of words must be understood as a resultant
of a certain mental activity and not as a perfectly adequate translation of the
nature of things.(10) Furthermore, as the logical proposition is not a
transposition of the natural rapports between things, we cannot talk simply of
the differentiation between language and logic. Language regulated by simple
grammar at the complex but spontaneous level of the construction of words
does neither correspond to the logical structures, nor to the nature of things.
(11) This three-way interrelation becomes even more complex when we
realise that at times, the reference to a thing may be composed of several
intellections and as such the utterance that describes this grouping may have
a multiple signification. This multiplicity of reference is the crux of the
problem of signification, not sufficiently emphasized in modem semiotics.
A proposition is both simple and multiple. It should therefore lead us, across
several terms, to something that is unique, that is numerically one. It
expresses something with the help of several words, but this something is not
a thing. A proposition is materially composed of a noun and a verb; similarly,
the corresponding intellection is constituted with the relations of the
intellections of its parts. But what corresponds, in reality, with a proposition,
not having any thing as its basis, is not composed of what corresponds, in
reality, with the words, res autem propositionis, cum nullam habeat rem
subjectam, ex rebus vocabulorum non constat. (12) In the sphere of
intellection (analysis) of a thing, Abelard insists that it is "nothing", nil
omnino, "absolutely nothing", nullam omnino rem, it is not an existing thing.
(13) But what does not exist intellectively is the corporality of the thing.
Intellection deals with what is called, the state of things, something like the
sachverhalt [state of affairs] of phenomenology which corresponds well with
the proposition of Abelard: quidam rerum modus habendi se.(16)
All experimentation in modem art in the sphere of the
correspondence,between form and content point to what Abelard emphasized
that there is no such thing as absolute reality, every thing, every object, is
under some impact, physical or psychological, whether it is the impact of
light for the impressionists or the impact of psychic turbulations for the
671
cubists or surrealists, or economic or social impact for the Marxists. Abelard
had realised in the early years of the twelfth century that the object of study is
not already given, it has to be defined, it has to be constituted within a
specific universe of discourse, and, all intellection and comprehension of this
object has to be in the sphere of ideas, in the sphere of the logical
propositions of reality. This is what he tried to do with Holy Trinity and he
got into trouble with the Church. For Abelard, at the level of things, Father,
Son and the Holy Spirit are three different things because there is no such
thing as a universal thing. It is only at the level of intellection, at the
abstractive level where a certain unity is envisaged in terms of certain
definitions of a perceived characteristics that the Trinity becomes
metaphorically one. It is only in the enunciative field of the Christian
discourse that the metonymic sequence of Father and Son is obliterated. The
move from individuality to universality is a move in the realm of intellection
and not in the realm of empirical realism which the Church wanted to impose
purely on the basis of Faith. For Abelard it is a problem of language, which is
a problem of intellection par excellence. In fact, it is only in the realm of
semiotics that the Unity of the Holy Trinity could be established as indeed
did Abelard, but unfortunately he was too advanced for his times.
4. In his Logica, Abelard discusses the intellection of the universals and
individuals.(15) When intellection acquires a universal term, argues Abelard,
we have a common and confused image formed from several realities. On the
other hand, when there is an individual term, we have before us a form of one
and unique being, a form that has a rapport with only one individual; when
we hear the word, man, a certain representation emerges whose rapport with
each of the men is such that it is common to all but specific to none. When
we hear the word, Socrates, a certain form emerges which expresses a
similitude with a given being. This vocable, Socrates, gives birth to a form of
a being who is unique, it is a real thing which is certified and determined. For
the vocable, man, on the contrary, the implied community leads us to
confusion and we do not know which man is in question. In fact, the word,
man, signifies neither Socrates nor any other man, it does not refer to any
man even though it denominates all.
A real thing abstracted by intellection may signify either a veritable substance
of a thing, when for example intellection is based on a sensible perception, or
a mental conception of form corresponding a given thing, which, in the
672
absence of such a thing, may correspond to a common or a specific form. By
common form is meant a form which has the common similitude of a
multiplicity of beings, but which, in itself, is considered as a unique thing.
As for the mental or conceptual forms, Abelard makes a distinction between
the divine forms and human forms. He compares God with artisan who
conceive mentally the form of the work that they are going to realise later in a
specific body. But there is a difference, says Abelard, it is God who creates
man, soul or stone, while man creates a house, a statue or a sword. Neither
statue nor sword are natural works, the names which designate them are not
based on substance but on accidents, they do not correspond to genres or
species. Thus one can say that the Divine thought conceives by abstraction,
the natural realities of universal character, while men know things only
through senses. Abelard thus rules out the innate faculty of man in the realm
of conceptualisation as proposed later by Descartes and further developed in
the Port Royal School.(16) In this respect he is the precursor of the empirical
school of Condillac in the eighteenth century(17), and consequently, of the
basic hypothesis of modem social sciences where all creation is due to
bricolage or due to establishing new relationships within the material culture
which is already present. Apart from the works of Claude Levi-Strauss, we
see this most clearly in the writings of A.G. Haudricourt where he
demonstrates a relationship between the methods of plantation and
cosmological conceptualisation in New Caledonia.(18)
Our intellection is based on two distinct operations: attraction and synthesis.
Form and matter, argues Abelard, do not exist in isolation from each other
but our "esprit" has the faculty to consider one or the other at a time or even
together in a certain relationship. We abstract a certain element of a synthesis
and examine it in its proper nature. When we re-establish a certain specific
relation, we operate a synthesis. For example, we may consider the substance
of a man, it may be body, animal, man, rationality etc. When we pay attention
to any one of these in its material essence excluding all other forms, this
operation is abstractive. Inversely, if we pay attention to only the corporality
which we relate with the substance, the operation is synthetic.
These abstractive operations could be considered false, for here we perceive
things not as they exist in reality; no abstracted element can exist in isolation.
However, it is not so, for it is a question of intellection, of paying attention at
a time to a specific element. The isolation of an element, substance or form is
673
only intellective and not in its subsistence. It is a matter of considering a
certain quality or characteristics separately and not as separated. For example,
if we have a statue made of half gold and half silver, we can consider
separately either gold or silver even though within this statue they do not
have separate existence. The same is true of all complex realities whose
comprehension is possible only if at times, we consider their constituents in
their abstracted forms, and at others, by operating certain specific syntheses.
The same principle operates in the prevision of the artisan who conceives
forms in advance of their realisation. This prevision is of the order of senses
as it is based on establishing intellective relationships within the elements of
things already present. These so-called pre-conceived forms of the artist are
thus not based on nothing. It is simply an affair of the mental application of
the operations of abstraction and synthesis. The creative process or the
prevision of the artist involves the establishment of metaphoric relations, the
relations which bypass the sequential relations of time and space in a
metonymic, sequential or syntactic realisation within a given enunciative
field." (pp. 4-12)
Note: This study in Abelardian Semiotics was conducted during my stay
at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris as a Visiting Professor of
Semiotics in 1987.
(1) Glossae super Peri Hermenias, 320, 12,27, ed. B. Geyer, Munster i.w.
1919-23.
(2) Glossae super Prophyrium III, 524, 3-10, ed. B. Geyer, Munster, i.w.
1919-23.
(3) Peri Hermeneias, 309, 1-13, V. Cousin, Ouvrages inedits d'Abélard,
Paris, 1836.
(4) Glossae super Peri Hermenias, 307, 31 ed. B. Geyer, Munster, i.w. 1923.
(5) ibid; 374, 21.
(6) Dialectica, 128, 29-32, ed. L.M. De Rijk, Assen, 1956.
(7) Sup. Per. 3674, 21.
(8) Sup. Porph. 11, 24.
(9) E. Benveniste: Problèmes de linguistique générale I, Gallimard, Paris,
1966, pp. 63-74. [the essay is: Catégories de pensée et catégories de langue,
first published in Les Etudes Philosophiques. 13: 1958 pp. 419-429 and
translated in: E. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, Coral Gables:
674
University of Miami Press, 1971]
(10) Sup. Per, 72-74.
(11) Sup. Porph. 11, 54, 34.
(12) Sup. Per. 308, 36.
(13) Dial. 157, 15
(14) Dial, 160, 35.
(15) Oeuvers choisies d'Abélard, M. De Gandillac, Paris, 1945, pp. 110-26.
(16) A. Arnauld and P. Nicole: La logique, 1644 edition, reprinted by Vrin,
Paris, 1981.
(17) Condillac: Traité de 1'art de penser, 1796 edition, reprinted by Vrin,
Paris, 1981.
(18) Nature et culture dans la civilisation de l'Islam, L'Homme, 4, 1964: 93-
104.
From: Harjeet Singh Gill, The Abelardian Semiotics. In Abelardian Semiotics
and Other Essays. New Dehli: Bahri Publications 1989. pp. 1-29.
ABELARD'S MODES OF SIGNIFICATION

"For Abelard there are primarily six modes of signification.
By imposition. The word, man, signifies mortal rational animal, for this
signification is imposed on the word, man. The signification is thus due
to human or cultural fact.
By determination. Rational or man referring to the substances whose
predicates they are, also determine the characteristics of rationality.
This is why Aristotle states in his Categories that the genre and species
determine a quality with reference to a substance, a substance on which
their names are imposed because of a given quality.
By generation. The intellection constituted in the word pronounced
generates a similar intellection for the one who hears it.
By negation. A thing designated by a definite noun is in a way signified
by an indefinite word. The word, non-man, attributed to an object
because it is not a man, signifies in a way also the notion of man. It
may signify many other things not covered by the word, man.
By adjunction. The name Socrates, signifies also a number of his
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accidental characteristics. The barking of a dog refers to its anger.
By consecution. When I say that I am his father, it is understood that he
is my son. The signification is created within a relational space of
reciprocity and simultaneity (*)
It is in the discussion of the nature of universals that we follow the
development of Abelardian theory of signification. The problematic revolves
around the relation between the signifier and the signified, the word and the
thing, and its numerous implications for the general theory of semiotics (9).
To signify or to designate is the function of words, to be signified is that of
the things. A universal is that which by nature can serve as a predicate of
several subjects, a singular, which cannot. It seems that both words and
things can be considered as universals, one has to see how the definition of
universal can be applied to things. Abelard states that some thinkers attribute
universality to things by arguing that there is essentially the same substance
in things which are different on in form. If we take away the forms, there
would be no difference in things. The difference lies in form or accidents and
not in essence. There is the same substance of man which becomes here
Plato, there, Socrates, due to their respective accidents.
Abelard argues that this theory does not stand the test of "physics". Suppose
that there is in fact a being essentially the same, even though it appears in
different forms, exists in different subjects. It must follow that the thing that
is within this form be the same in another form. For example, an animal
inhabited by rationality be also the animal inhabited by irrationality, thus the
rational animal is at the same time, the irrational animal; is such the two
contraries exist in the same subject. Moreover, they will not really be
contrary as they would co-exist in the same absolutely identical essence. In
fact, the contraries cannot be together in the same subject, even under
different rapports, as it is the case with relational and other attributes.
These contraries are presented by some thinkers under different perspective
by stating that one should not formulate the proposition as "rational animal is
irrational animal". A being can be rational from a certain point of view and
irrational from another, the forms which correspond to he same subject are no
more opposing forms. And, one does criticize propositions such as "rational
and mortal animal" or "white animal and animal that walks", for man is not
mortal inasmuch as he is rational or he is white inasmuch as he walks. The
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one and the same animal can have two properties under different rapports.
Then we come to the Aristotelian theory of ten essences or ten most general
genres, for in each case we find the same essence diversified only due to
different forms. Thus substances are absolutely the same beings, he same is
true of all qualities and all quantities. The realities signified by Socrates and
Plato are absolutely the same for essentially they are no more different than
the substances to which they are attached as the quality of Socrates and the
quality of Plato, for both are qualities. They do not differ from each other in
the nature of their qualities or the nature of their substances as the essence of
their substance is the same.
Abelard refutes this theory. First of all, why should one restrict only to ten
essences. There can be more or less. And, how can we perceive a numerical
multiplicity in substances if only the forms are different? We do not consider
Socrates as numerically multiple just because he may have multiple forms.
Another affirmation that does not stand the test of verity is he statement that
the individuals are made by their proper accidents. If the individuals derive
their being from their accidents, the accidents should precede them. If man
differs from other species because of the difference n form, the individual
named, Socrates, is distinguished by his accidents. Socrates thus cannot exist
without his accidents nor man without his differences. Socrates is not the
substratum of his accidents. If the accidents are not in the individual
substances, they are not in the universal substances also. The theory that
states that an absolutely identical essence is found simultaneously in different
beings is illogical, asserts Abelard.
There are others who have a slightly better theory of universality when they
state that the individuals do not differ from each other only due to their
forms, they are also individually distinct in their very essence. Matter and
form are both different in every individual. Even if the forms are suppressed,
their individual distinctions stay because of the diversity of essences. But
there is an impasse, for the theory of universality is not abandoned in this
case. It is argued that the distinct beings are the same thing, not by essence
but by non-difference. Thus the individual men are distinct from each other
but they have the same being in man. They do not differ in the nature of
humanity. This universality is due to this non-difference.
Abelard continues to present the divergent views within this doctrine of non-
difference. There are some thinkers, he says, who perceive this universal
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element in the collection constituted of several elements. For them, Socrates
and Plato by themselves do not represent a species, but all men taken together
constitute the species, man, and all animals together form a genre. A certain
unity is attributed to this collectivity, for without this one cannot have a
predicate of several individuals. A universal thing will not have multiple
subjects and the universals will not be as numerous as the singulars. As such,
Socrates inasmuch as he is a man is dissociated from himself as Socrates. He
cannot be his own genre or his own species if he is not in one way or the
other different from himself, for the relative terms must oppose each other.
Abelard thus refutes this theory of collection. How can a collection of men
taken together as one species be a predicate of several subjects and thus be
universal while taken in its totality we do not attribute it to subjects taken one
by one. If we accept that there is a predicate of different subjects according to
its parts, it has nothing to do with the community of the universals, which
according to Boethius, should entirely be in each subject. It is this that
distinguishes it from the common base, which following its parts, is like a
field whose different parts belong to different masters. We could then
attribute the predicate, Socrates, to several subjects which would be his
different parts, and he would himself be universal. Moreover, we will have to
consider a universal any plurality of men put together. Similarly, we will
make a unique universal substance from any collection of bodies and souls,
and in that case the entire collection of substances will be one of the most
general genres. In fact, argues Abelard, if one of the substances is subtracted,
the remaining collection is not the most general genre while it is a universal
substance. It must be a species of the genre of substance and should have a
species which corresponds to it under the 1 same genre. A part is not identical
with the whole but the species is always identical with the genre. How can
then the entire collection of men be equivalent to an ensemble of animals?
Finally, Abelard presents the theory of those who consider individuals as
universals inasmuch as they correspond with others, and accept that they are
predicates of several subjects not because they are essentially multiple but
because these multiple subjects correspond with them. But argues Abelard, if
to be predicated of multiple subjects is equivalent to corresponding with these
multiple, how can we say that the predicate individual is accorded to another
that is isolated? How the fact of being predicate of several subjects
distinguishes the universal from the singular? For, man, inasmuch as he is a
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man, corresponds with several subjects, but neither man, inasmuch as he is
Socrates, nor Socrates inasmuch as he is Socrates, corresponds with others.
Man in Socrates and Socrates himself do not differ from each other. Nothing
can be different from itself. This is why Socrates as white and Socrates as
grammarian, even though with two different characteristics, is not different
from himself, for he is not a grammarian in a way that he is not himself, nor
when he is considered white. When they say that Socrates and Plato
correspond with each other in "man", how can we believe this, for it is certain
that all men are different from each other in matter and in form.
It is obvious that the things, whether they are taken one be one or together,
cannot be considered universals, i.e., predicates of several subjects. Thus we
must attribute this universality, argues Abelard, to words alone. The
grammarians consider some nouns as "appelative", others, "proper".
Similarly, for the dialecticians, some simple terms are "universals", others,
"particulars", or "singulars". The universal is a vocable that is instituted to
serve as a predicate of several subjects taken separately, as the noun, man,
that one can join with specific men due to the nature of the real subjects to
whom it is attributed. The singular is that which can be a predicate of any one
subject, like Socrates." (pp. 38-41)
(...)
"Abelard's theory of signification is further crystallized in Logica Nostrorum
where he makes a distinction between vox and sermo. The universals are
neither things nor sounds, votes, they are due to sermones which may be
singular or universal. A noun or a term is due to human institution but a thing
or a sound is due to nature. The signifying act is thus a human fact, a cultural
fact, as opposed to the physical aspect of the word that is purely natural.
Abelard compares this phenomenon with the creative act. A stone and a
statue are one and the same "thing" but they are derived from different
sources. The stone is the work of God (nature) while the statue is the work of
man (culture). The sermones are universal because they are created by man,
they are predicates of several subjects. The sounds and things are not at all
universal even if in physical reality votes and sermones are not different.
Abelard's theory of signification is presented in an important article by L. M.
De Rijk (**) where he distinguishes between Abelard's views on the
signification of words and propositions. To signify, significare, with words,
dictiones, is to generate an intellection in the soul of the hearer. The same is
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applicable to the denotation of external things, and in this case, the verb is
synonymous with appellare, nominare, demonstare, designare. To signify
with complete sentences, propositiones, is to generate an intellection which is
constituted with the liaison of the intellections with its parts, dictiones. For
Abelard the words first signify intellections, then the things which correspond
them. The words generate intellections and with these we arrive at the
knowledge of things. Intellections thus play an intermediary role. We have
now to enquire about the exact status of things. For Abelard, the race, cursus,
and he runs, currit, refer to the same things as it is considered in essentia, the
race, and in adiacentia, he runs. Jean Jolivet believes that this linguistic
approach is more concerned with the mental activity than with the exact
nature of things. This is true if we think only of the external aspect of things.
In this case, Abelardian theory is different from that of Aristotle. Aristotle's
emphasis is on the external things and Abelard is primarily interested in the
domain of the spirit or the domain of intellections. As such, we can say that
the things signified by words are things as thought of or as produced by
intellection. This difference with Aristotle is manifest most clearly in
Abelardian theory of the proposition, propositio. Even though for Abelard the
signification of a proposition is definite, its signified, significatum, is not a
thing, it is a sort of a half-thing, quasi-res. It depends upon three aspects of
the proposition. One may consider it as a verbal phrase, as an intellection
expressed by words, or as a thing that is the object of the verbal phrase or the
intellection. Abelard states that our expressions have a consignificatum rather
than a signification so-called, and the task of the proposition is to present a
mode of conception, modus concipiendi. It does not have a specific content,
in istis nulla imagine nititur intellectus, but it is derived from it.
The signification of a proposition is further explained by means of the logic
of implication, si rosa est, flos est. The logic of this necessity lies in the fact
that what is stated by the antecedent, rosa est, cannot be stated without what
is stated by the consequent, flos est. If the antecedent is taken either as a
grammatical construct or as an act of intellection, it can be without the
consequent which can be taken separately as a grammatical or an intellective
construct. On the contrary, the antecedent taken as a fact of logic implies the
logical existence of the consequent. This necessity is purely relational,
quidam rerum modus habendi se and it does not concern the relation between
the external aspect of things, nor between intellections taken as psychological
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or rational acts. It is a relation between the contents of intellections. In other
words, these relations are purely logical or formal. The dictum of Abelard is
neither an external thing, res, nor a mental act as such, but the objectivated
content of this act, which being neither a thing nor an act, is called half-thing,
quasi-res." (pp. 43-44)
(*) CF. Petrus Abaelardus, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk.
(**) L. M. de Rijk, La signification de la proposition (dictum propositionis)
chez Abélard. In Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants
philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII siècle.
Edited by Jolivet Jean and Louis René. Paris: Editions du Centre national de
la recherche scientifique 1975. pp. 547-555.
From: Harjeet Singh Gill, The Abelardian Tradition of Semiotics - in:
Signs and Signification. Vol. I. Edited by Harjeet Singh Gill and
Giovanni Manetti. New Delhi: Bahri Publications 1999, pp. 35-67.
THE SIGNIFICATION OF THOUGHTS AND THE

SIGNIFICATION OF THINGS
"Although Abelard draws the material for his studies on logic from such
traditional sources as Boethius in the field of dialectic and Priscian in the
field of grammar, many of his reflections are so fresh and original that in the
history of the problems concerning the bearers of truth and falsity he belongs
among the few pioneers who really broke new ground and contributed
insights which were a lasting source of inspiration for later generations. The
following survey is based upon his glosses on Porphyry's introduction to the
Categories and Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione, which are
found in the so-called Logica ingredientibus (1) , and upon his systematic
treatise Dialectica (2).
Abelard defines a word (dictio) as a sound significant by convention none of
whose parts is significant in separation (D 147, 21). Some words, namely
nouns and verbs, have a definite signification by themselves; other words,
namely conjunctions and prepositions, have an indefinite signification by
themselves (D 117, 26). The definite signification of nouns and verbs, which
for certain purposes include also pronouns, adverbs, conventional
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interjections, and participles (D 121, 8, 18; G 334, 23), is twofold: they
signify thoughts (intellectus) and they signify things (res). Thoughts are the
affections of the soul or the noemata of which Aristotle speaks in the first
chapter of De interpretatione; Abelard interprets an intellectus as an act of
attending to the nature or a property of a thing which is either present to the
senses or put before the mind by means of a mental image (G 20, 30; G 312,
36; G 328, 18). In connection with a thought the verb significare either has
the same meaning as exprimere ormanifestare intellectum -- the speaker or
the word he uses expresses the speaker's act of thinking -- or, more often, it
has the same meaning as constituere3 or generare intellectum: the speaker or
the word he uses produces a certain act of thinking in the hearer's mind (G
307, 30). For this meaning of significare I shall commonly use the phrase 'to
produce a thought'. Further, nouns and verbs signify things; for this kind of
signifying Abelard uses, apart from significare, such verbs as appellare,
demon-ware, denotare, designare, and nominare. For this meaning of
significare I shall employ the phrase 'to denote a thing'. Although for several
reasons Abelard regards the signification of thoughts as more important, in
the context of his reflections on De interpretatione, than the signification of
things (G 308, 19), there is some difference between his conception of the
signification of nouns and verbs and Aristotle's. For the latter nouns and
verbs primarily signify thoughts; they can only be said to signify things
because of the fact that the thoughts which they signify are the likenesses of
things. In Abelard, on the other hand, this difference between the directness
of the signification of thoughts and the indirect character of the signification
of things is less prominent; both significations are treated, so to speak, on the
same level.
That conjunctions and prepositions have an indefinite signification is the
view defended by Abelard in his Dialectica (118-120). When, for instance,
the preposition de and the conjunction et are uttered in isolation, they have a
signification which is vague and undetermined: the hearer's mind is kept in
suspense about that to which they are to be attached. Only when the open
places by which they are accompanied have been filled is their imperfect and
indefinite signification rendered precise and definite. In the me of homo et
lapis, for example, the general signification of et, namely that things are
conjoined, has been made specific by the meanings of the two nouns: we now
know that we are dealing with the conjunction of a man and a stone. In the
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glosses on De interpretatione, however, Abelard objects that this view makes
it impossible to draw a clear distinction between, on the one hand,
conjunctions and prepositions and, on the other hand, nouns and verbs; for
the latter, too, can be said to have a signification which is not precise until
they are combined with other words(G 337, 41). He therefore prefers to say
that conjunctions and prepositions when uttered by themselves have no
signification at all; they signify only in combination with other words
(consignificant), but in that case they contribute a clearly distinguishable part
to the meaning of the whole. It is necessary to hold that they have a
signification of their own when they are used in combination with other
words, since otherwise they cannot be differentiated from letters and
syllables.
Whichever of the two views one adopts, there is a problem about the
intellectus and the res which are produced and denoted by conjunctions and
prepositions. If those words have a signification, either in isolation or only in
combination with other words, they must produce some thought; and they can
produce a thought only if there is a thing or a mental image of a thing to
which the thought is directed (G 338, 41). According to Abelard some
authors held that words with an indefinite signification produce a thought but
do not denote a thing, in the same way as propositiones (D 119, 3). But it is
hard to see how they could produce a thought if there is nothing to which the
thought is related. Some grammarians tried to solve this difficulty by
suggesting that prepositions denote the thing which is denoted by the noun to
which the preposition is attached; but in that case the denotation of the noun
would be superfluous. Abelard's own view is that conjunctions and
prepositions denote a certain characteristic (proprietas) with regard to the
thing that is denoted by the adjoining nouns or verbs. In the combination in
domo, for instance, the preposition in denotes the characteristic of the house
that consists in its containing something; and the conjunction ergo, placed
between statements, denotes the characteristic that consists in the
circumstance that the premisses prove the conclusion and the conclusion is
proved by the pre-misses. Abelard finds it difficult, however, to state clearly
the thought which belongs to each preposition and conjunction; it is as hard,
he says, as stating explicitly the thought that belongs to utterances that are not
used for the purpose of making a statement, such as 'Come to me' (D 118,
29).
683
The copulas est and non est get a separate treatment. They neither produce a
thought nor denote anything, but they contribute to the affirmative or
negative import of a propositio (ad vim affirmationis or ad vim negationis
proficit) by causing the mind to combine or separate the things thought of
(the intellecta or intellectae res; cf. D 154, 25-27). In understanding a
propositio the mind performs three acts: it thinks of each of the two parts, the
subject and the predicate, and it combines or separates the things thought of.
Although the act of combining or separating the things thought of is not itself
an intellectus, it nevertheless is part of the thought produced by the
wholepropositio (G 339, 20). Similarly, the conjunctions si and non si have
no signification, but they unite or separate significant sounds by inclining the
mind to a certain mode of conceiving (animum inclinant ad quendam
concipiendi modum; cf. also G 329, 29).
The same expression modus concipiendi is used in connection with the
difference between a finite verb such as currit and a noun such as cursus. The
verb and the noun denote the same thing, running, but the different mode of
conceiving it causes a difference in the thought produced (diversus modus
concipiendi variat intellectum). The distinction between parts of speech
pertains to a difference in thought produced rather than to a difference of
denotation (G 308, 25).
In D 124, 11, a distinction is made between the principal signification of a
noun and its accidental significations, which have to do with the modes of
signifying. The difference between singular and plural is said to be a
difference of accidental signification. Differences in case and gender, on the
other hand, are not related to any difference in signification, but only to the
position which nouns can occupy in constructions (Cf. G 364, 2). Similarly,
such pairs as comedere/vesci ('to eat') and carere/non habere ('to lack') have
the same signification but they play different roles in constructions (D 125,
.33; G 369, 27). The same is true of such forms as curro, curris, currit,
curritur. They all have the same signification but the ways in which they are
completed into a full propositio by the addition of such pronouns as ego, tu,
tile, a me, a te, ab illo are different. In other words, differences in person are
not connected with any difference in signification, whereas differences in
number, tense, and mood are differences in (accidental) signification (G 138,
31)." pp. 139-142
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(1)1 Edited by B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften,
Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie and Theologie des Mittelalters
XXI, 1-3, Münster, 1919-1927; I shall refer to this work by means of the
letter G, followed by page and line.
(2) Edited by L.M. De Rijk, Assen, 1956 (revised edition 1970); I shall refer
to this work by means of the letter D, followed by page and line.
I Abelard (D 112, 6; G 308, 11; G 357, 29) and others connect the phrase
continuere intellectum with Aristotle, De int. 16 b 21:histesi -- ten dianoian
had been translated by Boethius as constituit intellectum. They apparently
took intellectum as referring to the hearer's thought.
From: Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of Proposition. Ancient and
North-Holland 1973.
RELATED PAGES
Pages on Abelard's Metaphysics:
Editions and Translations of Abelard's Logical Works
Selected Bibliography on His Logic and Metaphysics:
First Part: A - L
Second Part: M - Z
Medieval Latin Logic from Boethius to 1400 ca.
Annotated bibliography of L. M. de Rijk
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Theories of the Copula in the Logical

Works of Abelard
THE USE OF THE COPULA IN ABELARD'S LOGIC
"With Abelard, the term 'copula' enters into western thought. In fact, although
widely attested, the use of the term 'copula' in reference to Aristotle's work is
totally anachronistic. (1)
What led to this term? In his Dialectica, Abelard was mainly concerned with
the way syllogisms can be construed. The interest of the copula was in fact
derivative from this main concern. As Kneale and Kneale (The development
of logic, 1962: 206) put it, 'it is clear that for his [Aristotle's] theory of
syllogism he assumes in every general proposition two terms of the same
kind, that is to say, each capable of being a subject and each capable of being
a predicate'. Thus, since the only linguistic entities that can play these two
roles are nouns (in modern terms, noun phrases), it is easy to understand why
the copula became central. Abelard pursued the Aristotelian theory by
emphasizing the role of be as the element that can turn a noun into a predicate
in a syllogism rather than as the element that provides the sentence with a
time specification (see Dialectica: 161).
It is this conceptual shift that underlies the invention of the term 'copula',
which is cast on the Latin copulare meaning 'to link'. For example, in
sentences like a man is a mammal and Socrates is a man the copula allows
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the noun phrase a man to play the role of the subject, in the first, and that of
the predicate, in the second.
Clearly, in such a framework the assumption that the copula can be
interpreted as a predicate meaning 'existence' cannot be maintained (...). We
have an explicit argument by Abelard to overcome this problem. Let us
reproduce it synthetically as follows. A sentence like Socrates est (Socrates
is), where est (is) just occurs with a subject, potentially undermines the
theory of the 'copula' as link between a predicate and a subject like in
Socrates est homo (Socrates is man). To avoid this inconsistency, Abelard
appeals to a typical reductio ad absurdum (Dialectica) (1).
(1) See for example J. L. Ackrill's comment on De Interpretatione
(Ackrill 1963). Aristotle always avoids employment of a special name
for the copula: rather he refers to actual instances of 137, 162). We
interpret Socrates est as meaning Socrates est ens (Socrates is existing,
where ens is (the Nominative, singular form of) the present participle of
esse, be). Suppose that est means est ens, that is, est is a predicate
meaning existence. Then nothing would prevent a sentence like Socrates
est ens from being interpreted as Socrates est ens ens, and that from
being interpreted as Socrates est ens ens ens, etc., ad infinitum without
reaching a stable meaning. (2) Thus, Abelard concludes, in the sentence
Socrates est, the predicate of existence is just not expressed. (3) εἰναι
(be). Not all translators seem to be aware of this fact. In the De
Interpretatione (De Int. 3, 16b, 25), for example, Aristotle says that εἰναι
προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσίν τινα. Ackrill's translation says "but it
additionally signifies some combination" (Ackrill 1963: 45). Cooke,
instead, renders it as "but imply a copulation [sic] or synthesis" (Cooke
1938: 121).
Apart from the question related to the invention of the term 'copula', the term
σύνθεσις (synthesis) employed here seems to imply that Aristotle already
conceivedεἰναι as a copula in the Abelardian sense. This possibility is
excluded here, following Ackrill's hypothesis that in this passage Aristotle is
not talking about "the copulative but about the existential is" (Ackrill 1963:
123).
(2) For a discussion on this matter see Kneale and Kneale (The development
of logic, 1962) and Pinborg (Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter, 1972).
687
(3) Correspondingly, the common use of to be (or being) as a shortened form
of to be (or being) existent is to be treated in the same way. The following
passage pointed out to me by Giulio Lepschy illustrates the point: Dixit Deus
ad Moysen: ego sum qui sum. Ait: sic dices filiis Israel: qui est, misit me ad
vos (Exodus, III 14). From a linguistic point of view, however, this should
not be surprising. A similar case is that of to do (or doing) as a shortened
form of to do (or doing) something. Interestingly, the term 'existence' is not
etymologically related to the copula essere / εἰναι but to a locative predicate
sisto and a locative particle ek-.
From: Andrea Moro, The Raising of Predicates. Predicative Noun Phrases
and the Theory of Clause Structure, (Appendix: A Brief History of the
Copula, pp. 248-261), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.
251-252.
"Before embarking on a discussion of Abelard's views on sentential

predication and the role of the copula, it seems useful to summarize our
author's basic views on the noun and verb.
(1) 'Nomen' (noun, name) is defined (in the Aristotelian-Boethian tradition)
as 'a spoken sound having a signification by convention, without the notion of
time, of which no parts are meaningful in separation' (Dialectica 121,28-9;
cf. 129,4-5 and Glosses in Peri hermeneias 334,18ff.). It should be borne in
mind that like the Ancients the Medievals too, were in the constant habit of
not sharply distinguishing between a noun's (or verb's or any other
significative expression's) significate and the 'thing' (whether substantial or
accidental) signified in the outside world. (1)
(2) Verbum ('verb') is defined (Dialectica 129,11-3) as: 'a spoken sound,
having a signification by convention, which, in its finite forms, is designative
of the present time, of which no part have meaning in separation'.
(3) As a logician Abelard is quite explicit throughout his works about the
semantic difference between categorematic words (nouns and verbs) and
syncategorematic ones (prepositions, conjunctions etc.). As to the differences
between the noun and verb his opinions are less stable, it seems. So much
seems to be certain, on the semantic level Abelard recognizes a close affinity
between the noun and verb as, in his opinion, they are just various tools to
convey identical sememes [so e.g. 'cursus' ('course') and 'currere' ('to run')],
688
whereas they only differ by the different ways in which they convey the
common sememe ('modus significandi').
(4) Both nouns and verbs have the job of naming and determining, whereby
the difference between 'naming' and 'determining' is only of a syntactic
nature, it seems. On the level of naming and determining (onomazein-level),
the noun and verb convey, each in their own ways (nominally or verbally,
respectively), some semantic content ('sememe'). By this, they constitute
some 'idea' ('conceptio', 'conceptus', 'intellectus') in somebody's mind (the
speaker's or the hearer's that is), but still without conveying any complete
thought or sense.
(5) Contrariwise, on the level of 'statement-making' (legein level) the (finite)
verb when actually used (2) comes to be really 'statement making', to the
extent indeed that it performs this job together with some noun(s) but
nonetheless being itself the statement-maker, properly speaking."
(1) For this phenomenon, see e.g. De Rijk, Plato's Sophist. A
Philosophical Commentary, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1986, Index,
s.v. Name. For Peter Abelard, see e.g. Glosses in Peri hermeneias
126,35-127,13; Dialectica 564,6-9 and all the passages in which he
explains the significatio rerum (vs. intellectuum). The distinction always
concerns the opposition of res significata to intellectus significans res,
rather than the intellectus as such.
(2) For this condition, see N. Kretzmann, The Culmination of the Old Logic
in Peter Abelard, p. 495, n. 33, cf. De Rijk Plato's Sophist. A Philosophical
Commentary, 15.23. 15.32 and 16.4 and below p. 101
From: L. M. de Rijk, "Peter Abelard's Semantics and His Doctrine of Being"
Vivarium 24: 85-127 (1986). pp. 98-99
"The distinction of nouns or names (a category that includes adjectives)

from verbs was as much argued over in Abelard's day as in ancient
times, and it provided Abelard with an entry to matters that lie at the
heart of his philosophy. He rejects Aristotle's view that verbs differ from
nouns in having a consignification of time, for he sees no reason not to
ascribe a similar consignification to nouns:
For just as 'run' or 'running' indicate running in connection with a person as
689
presently inhering in him. so 'white' determines whiteness in connection with
a substance as presently inhering, for it is called white only because of
present whiteness. (1)
Abelard is equally unhappy with the idea that verbs, as distinct from other
parts of speech, signify only actions and passions, or what might better be
called 'receptions' (passiones, i.e. the passive correlates of actions). This view
runs afoul of the copula which although accepted as a verb can he used to
'join' (copulare) to its subject any sort of entity whatsoever.'(2)What
distinguishes verbs, in Abelard's view, is that they provide the 'completeness
of sense' (sensus perfectio) characteristic of whole sentences (orationes
perfectae) as distinct from mere phrases (orationes imperfectae). What is the
difference, he asks, between 'A man runs' and 'a running man'? Of
constructions such as the latter he remarks:
But a completeness of sense has not yet been brought about in them; for
when this expression has been uttered the mind of the hearer is suspended
and desires to hear more in order to arrive at completeness of sense, for
example. 'is' or some other acceptable verb. For without a verb there is no
completeness of sense.' (3)
Verbs can perform this function because they propose the inherence of what
they signify in the subject.
Thus we see that this completeness of sense depends mainly on verbs, since
only by them is inherence of something in something indicated in a manner
expressive of different mental states; without this inherence there is no
completeness of sense. When I say 'Come to me' or 'If only you would come
to me', in a way I propound the inherence of coming to me in a manner
expressive of my order or my desire; in the one case I order that coming
should belong to him, in the other I have a desire, namely, that he come.' (4)
The talk of 'inherence', however, must be treated delicately, for it is not
Abelard's view that any verb, even the copula, signifies some relational
property of inherence. Rather verbs generally signify that which 'inheres',
while the copula, according to one of Abelard's accounts of it, signifies
nothing at all. If any verb were to signify 'inherence', then it would be unable
to perform the 'linking' function, i.e., the function of the copula, which is to
'link' what the predicate signifies to the subject. 'Runs' signifies running and
'links' it as well. The copula 'is' really expresses just this linking function
implicit in all verbs; if it were to signify anything on its own it could no more
690
take a predicate noun or adjective and link its significate to a subject than can
'runs'. (5)
This view is taken still further when Abelard separates 'to be' used as a copula
from 'to be' used to mean 'to exist'. If the separation is not made we have
problems with sentences such as 'Homer is a poet' and 'A chimera is
conceivable', where the subjects are non-existent or even impossible.
Abelard's solution is to treat the whole phrase consisting of copula plus
predicate noun or adjective as a single verb-phrase and in this way eliminate
any idea that 'to be' on its own is predicated of the subject.
Thus it seems to me if I may dare to speak freely, that it would be more
rational and satisfying to reason that ... we understand as a single verb 'to be a
man' or 'to be white' or 'to be conceivable'. Aristotle indeed says that in
'Homer is a poet-to be' is predicated per accidens, i.e., 'to be' is predicated
accidentally of Homer in that the poem belongs to him, but it is not
predicated per se of Homer that he is. But since 'to be', as was said, is not a
verbal unit, to be predicated per accidens is not to be predicated; rather 'to be'
is part of the predicate."
Abelard in effect wants us to treat the copula as what a modem grammarian
would call an auxiliary, and indeed Abelard draws support for his view from
the implausibility of dividing up 'erit sedens' (will be sitting) into two parts,
because of the conflict of tenses between auxiliary and participle."
The copula, then, turns out to be a verb-phrase-maker, taking as complements
nouns, participles, and whole clauses and turning them into verb phrases. But
the process should not be thought to leave the complement with the same
meaning it has in isolation, for this leads to logical absurdities. As we have
seen, the noun following the copula has in isolation a tense of its own
(generally the present), and this can conflict with the tense of the copula. For
example, 'This old man was a boy' will be necessarily false if we treat 'boy' as
retaining its signification of present time, for then the sentence is equivalent
to 'This old man was one of those who is presently a boy." What we must do,
Abelard says, is treat the whole copula plus predicate noun as a single verb
having the tense of the copula. He shows how only in this way can the rules
of conversion and syllogistic inference be made to apply to sentences with
verbs in tenses other than the present.' (6)
(1) Abelard, Dialectica p. 122.22-5
691
(2) Ibi Dialectica, 130.32 - 131.7
(3) Ibi Dialectica, 148.26-30
(4) Ibi Dialectica, 149.20-6
(5) See Abelard Philosophische Schriften. I. Die Logica 'Ingredientibus',
1919-1927 p. 362.25-9
(6) Abelard, Dialectica p. 138.11-22
From: Martin Tweedale, Abelard and the Culmination of the Old Logic. In
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery
of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600. Edited by
Kretzmann Norman, Kenny Anthony, and Pinborg Jan. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 144-146 (Latin text in the notes
omitted).
THE DIFFUSION OF ABELARDIAN WRITINGS

"The surviving manuscript books containing works by Abelard and by his
students and disciples have a history and reveal much about the activities of
the anonymous students of Abelard's thought. They were produced, exported,
copied and read at great labour and for particular reasons. In their character,
in the markings which they bear, in the frequency with which they are
encountered in libraries, in the relationship of the copies to each other, can be
found indications of the kinds of interests which were aroused by Abelard's
teachings and of the uses to which they were put. This is as true of copies of
Abelard's own works as of those of his disciples. The study of the diffusion of
these manuscripts is complex but it is also the study of the geography of
twelfth-century thought and learning; it assists our appreciation of the
widespread interest in Abelard's writings and by implication in those of other
masters. Our main concern is with manuscripts produced before 1500 and
containing the major doctrinal works of Abelard and of his disciples. The
poems, the personal correspondence with Héloise, the smaller occasional
letters and pieces are less instructive in this respect than the logical writings,
the biblical commentaries, the Theologia and Sic et Non in their many
versions, the Ethica and the Dialogus. Manuscripts produced after the twelfth
century are less relevant, but are none the less valuable because they
692
presuppose earlier exemplars and because they witness to the history of the
copying of particular works.
Several of Abelard's writings are wholly lost. The glosses on Ezechiel which
Abelard delivered at Laon and then finished at Paris were transcribed and
circulated but do not now survive.(1) The letter in which Abelard attacked
Roscelin of Compiegne is only known through Roscelin's reply(2) and from a
reference in a letter which Abelard wrote to the bishop of Paris. His
Grammatica is lost,(3) as is the Exhortatio which he delivered to the monks
of St Denis.(4) Heloise received from him a Psalterium which consisted
perhaps of a series of collects to follow the recitation of the Psalms.(5) It is
even possible that Abelard wrote both an Anthropologia (the counterpart in
his teaching about man of the Theologia which concerns God and the Trinity)
(6) and a Rhetorica.(7) He may also have written glosses on the De
syllogismo categorico and De syllogismo hypothetico in his Introductiones
parvulorum,(8) a commentary on the De syllogismo hypothetico in his Logica
Ingredientibus (9) and further commentaries in the Logica Nostrorum. Even
of Abelard's surviving works the varying versions and revisions are not fully
available. Analysts of Abelard's texts have posited the existence of two
versions preceding the surviving version of the Dialectica (10) as well as of
other versions of his Logica.(11) Fr Buytaert believes that the earliest version
of the Sic et Non is lost. (12) Moreover, among the extant versions
completeness is all too infrequently found. Losses have occurred too among
the writings of Abelard's followers. The authors of the Sententie
Hermanni(13) and of the Sententie Parisienses I (14) may have composed
commentaries on St Paul's Epistle to the Romans, while a Liber Sententiarum,
containing opinions which appeared to be derived from Abelard's teaching,
crossed the path of Bernard of Clairvaux in the period before the council of
Sens.(15)
The surviving copies of Abelardian works are, however, numerous enough to
permit a consideration of the extent and the manner of their diffusion and
appeal. Of Abelard's own major works the Theologia is found in eighteen
manuscripts, the Sic et Non in ten, the Ethica in five, the Dialogus in three,
the commentary on the Hexaemeron in four and that on Romans in three. A
single manuscript contains a fragment of the Apologia and there are single
copies of Abelard's logical works.(16)" (pp. 60-62; notes renumbered)
693
(1) Hist. Calam., 11. 196-248.
(2) Ed. Josef Reiners, Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik, Münster
1910, pp. 63-80; an earlier edition is in PL. 178, 357-72, and see Abelard,
Epist. ad G. episcopum Parisiensem, (PL. 178, 355-358). Also D. Van den
Eynde, 'Les Ecrits perdus d'Abelard', (Antonianum, 37, 1962, pp. 467-480),
p. 469 and H. Ostlender, PeterAbaelards Theologia 'Summi Boni', BGPTMA
[Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters],
XXXV, 2/3, 1939 pp. XVIII-XX.
(3) References from the Theologia Christiana and Theologia 'Scholarium' are
analysed by Van den Eynde, Ecrits perdus, pp. 473-6. See also M. Dal Pra,
Pietro Abelardo. Scritti filosofici, Roma-Milano, Bocca, 1954, p. XXXIII, n.
20.
(4) Van den Eynde, Ecrits perdus, pp. 469-73.
(5) Ibid., pp. 476-80.
(6) Cf. Abelard, Expositio in 'ad Romanos' (PL. 178, 901A); also Buytaert,
'Critical Observations on the "Theologia Christiana" of Abelard',
(Antonianum, vol. 38, 1963, pp. 384-433) p. 402, n. 4.
(7) References in Abelard's Super Topica Glossae, ed. Dal Pra [Scritti
filosofici], p. 263, 1. 25, p. 267, 1. 16; also ibid., pp. XXII-XXIII.
(8) Pietro Abelard. Scritti filosofici, ed. Dal pra, pp. XXV and XXVI.
(9) References, as to a work yet to be written, are in the Logica
'Ingredientibus' ed. Geyer, p. 291, l. 25 and p. 389, l. 7 and in the super
Topica Glossae, ed. Dal Pra, p. 325, l. 10. Further evidence in M. Grabmann,
'Kommentare zur aristotelischen Logik aus dem 12. und 13. Jahrhundert in
MS. lat. fol. 624 der Preussischen Staatsbibliothek in Berlin'.
(Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1938, pp.
185-210), p. 200.
(10) N. d'Olwer, 'Sur la date de la Dialectica d'Abélard', Revue du moyen âge
latin, 1, 1945, pp. 375-90 and L. M. De Rijk, Petrus Abaelardus. Dialectica,
Assen, 1956, pp. XXII-XXIII.
(11) Geyer, Untersuchungen. Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, II,
(BGPTMA, vol. 21, 4, 1933, pp. 589-633), pp. 611-12.
(12) 'The Greek Fathers in Abelard's Sic et Non', (Antonianum, vol. 12, 1966,
pp. 413-453) p. 414.
(13) Cf. Ostlender, 'Die Sentenzenbucher der Schule Abaelards',
(Theologische Quartalschrift, vol. 117, 1936, pp. 208-252) pp. 214-I5.
694
(14) Sent. Paris., ed. Landgraf, p. 29; also Ostlender in Bulletin Thomiste,
VIII (1931), p. 229.
(15) See above, p. 14.
(16) The commentary on the De interpretatione in the Logica 'Ingredientibus'
is an exception; two copies are known, see below, p. 89.
"The very important cod. Milan, Ambrosiana M. 63 sup. which contains
on ff. 1r-72r a large part of the Logica 'Ingredientibus' in a copy of the
late twelfth or early thirteenth century has been in the Ambrosian
Library since its foundation in the early seventeenth century; (1) it was
received by Cardinal Federigo Borromeo as a gift from Camillo Bossi of
Modena in 1605, but its earlier history is not known.(...) The last part of
the commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione contained in this
manuscript has been shown by Dr Minio-Paluello(3) to have issued from
a circle in which were debated problems similar to those discussed by
Abelard, and the same manuscript also contains on ff. 72v-81v a
commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge composed by a disciple of Abelard.
(4) Dr. Minio-Paluello believes that the authentic and complete version
of Abelard's commentary on the De interpretatione in the corpus of his
Logica 'Ingredientibus' is found in a copy made by an Italian scribe of
the late twelfth century in cod. Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek lat. fol.
624, ff. 97r-146r. This manuscript belonged to St Victor in Paris in the
later middle ages.(5)” (pp. 88-89)
(1) Ed. from this manuscript by B. Geyer; for descriptions see Geyer,
Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, 1, X, and L. Minio-Paluello,
Abaelardiana Inedita, p. XVI. The manuscript was noted by B.
Montfaucon, Bibliotheca Bibliothecarum, I, 521n and in the Histoire
littéraire de la France, XII (1763), 130.
(3) Abaelardiana inedita, pp. XVI-XXI.
(4) Glossae super librum Porphyrii secundum vocales, ed. C. Ottaviano
[Testi medioevali inediti. Fontes Ambrosiani, III. Edited by Carnelo
Ottaviano. Firenze, Olschki, 1933]; incomplete ed. by B. Geyer. See also
Geyer, Untersuchungen, pp. 601-12.
(5) The commentary was discovered by M. Grabmann, 'Kommentare', pp.
203-5, and the latter part of it is ed. by Minio-Paluello, op. cit., pp. 1-108. For
695
descriptions of the manuscript see Grabmann, 'Kommentare', especially pp.
185-6, and Minio-Paluello, op. cit., pp. XII-XVI.
“The evidence of all these manuscripts contributes to an understanding
of the nature of the appeal of Abelard's writings and of those of his
followers to twelfth-century scholars. Manuscripts containing Abelard's
logical writings are relatively few in number. Although, as John of
Salisbury shows in his Metalogicon and Abelard in his Historia
Calamitatum, logic was the subject of passionate disputes arousing
widespread interest, documents presenting these debates are not
abundant.(2)
Of Abelard's logical writings some are lost and only one (the commentary on
the De interpretatione in the Logica Ingredientibus) survives in more than a
single copy. Yet in comparison with the works of contemporaries, those of
Abelard survive extremely well for the logical writings of Roscelin, William
of Champeaux, Master Alberic, Jocelyn of Soissons, Bernard of Chartres and
Robert of Melun are entirely lacking while from Adam of the Petit Pont we
have only two copies of the Ars disserendi.(3) The habit of publishing one's
logical teaching may have been under-developed among the logicians and
quite possibly manuscripts of logic have had a poorer chance of surviving
through the centuries. Those of Abelard are for the most part exceptional in
bearing clear, contemporary indications of their author. The evidence
collected suggests that the logical teaching of Abelard and of other masters
was discussed not only in Paris but also in several other centres, at Fleury on
the Loire, in the circle of Robert of Torigny, in some of the religious houses
of Germany and possibly too in Italy. Copying, however, appears to have
ceased in the thirteenth century and it is then that a new period begins in the
history of logic characterized by the work of such masters as Lambert of
Auxerre, William of Shyreswood and Peter of Spain and by the absorption of
further translations of Aristotle's logical writings.” (pp. 93-94)
(2) To say this is not to ignore the series of discoveries made by the late
M. Grabmann in several of his more recent articles.
(3) Ed. L. Minio-Paluello.
From: David E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard. The Influence of
Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period, Cambridge,: Cambridge
696
RELATED PAGES
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Second Part: M - Z
697
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Abelard's Philosophical Works: Editions,

Translations, Selected Texts
ABELARD'S MAIN LOGICAL WORKS
The Philosophical works of Abelard are composed from several parts, only
partly extant (for the detail see the next list):
Peter, Abelard. 1969. "Editio Super Porphyrium." In Scritti Di Logica,
edited by Dal Pra, Mario, 3-42. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.
Introductiones dialecticae (Introductiones parvulorum): I.
———. 1992. "Super Porphyrium." Traditio no. 47:74-100.
Second Appendix to Yukio Iwakuma essay: Vocales, or Early
Nominalists (pp. 37-111).
———. 1933. "Glossae Super Porphyrium Secundum Vocales." In
Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften. Ii. Die Logica "Nostrorum
Petitioni Sociorum". Die Glossen Zu Porphyrius, edited by Geyer,
Bernhard, 583-588. Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen
Verlagsbuchhandlung.
———. 1933. "Glosae Super Librum Porphyrii Secundo Vocalem." In
Testi Medioevali Inediti. Fontes Ambrosiani, Iii, edited by Ottaviano,
Carmelo, 107-207. Firenze: Olschki.
698
DETAILED LIST OF THE LATIN LOGICAL
WORKS
Peter, Abelard. 1919. "Glossae Super Porphyrium." In Peter Abaelards

Philosophische Schriften. I. Die Logica 'Ingredientibus'. 1. Die Glossen
Zu Porphyrius, edited by Geyer, Bernhard, 1-109. Münster: Verlag der
Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Logica 'ingredientibus' I.
The commentary from Logica Ingredientibus on Porphyry's Isagoge.
———. 1933. "Glossulae Super Porphyrium." In Peter Abaelards
Philosophische Schriften. Ii. Die Logica "Nostrorum Petitioni
Sociorum". Die Glossen Zu Porphyrius, edited by Geyer, Bernhard,
505-588. Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.
The Logic that begins with the words: At the request of our friends or
Little Glosses on Porphyry Isagoge.
———. 1969. "Glossae in Categorias." In Scritti Di Logica, edited by
Dal Pra, Mario, 43-68. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.
Introductiones dialecticae (Introductiones parvulorum): II.
———. 1921. "Glossae Super Predicamenta Aristotelis." In Peter
Abaelards Philosophische Schriften. I. Die Logica "Ingredientibus". 2.
Die Glossen Zu Den Kategorien, edited by Geyer, Bernhard, 111-305.
Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Logica 'ingredientibus' II.
The commentary from Logica Ingredientibus on Aristotle's Categories.
———. 1969. "Editio Super Aristotelem De Interpretatione." In Scritti
Di Logica, edited by Dal Pra, Mario, 69-154. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.
Introductiones dialecticae (Introductiones parvulorum): III.
———. 1927. "Glossae Super Periermenias Aristotelis." In Peter
Abaelards Philosophische Schriften. I. Die Logica "Ingredientibus". 3.
Die Glossen Zu Peri Ermhneias, edited by Geyer, Bernhard, 306-504.
Logica 'ingredientibus' III.
Glosses on Aristotle's De Interpretatione.
———. 2010. Glossae Super Peri Hermeneias. Turnhout: Brepols.
Logica 'ingredientibus' III.
699
New critical edition of the text edited by Geyer in 1927 with
introduction and notes; Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis
Vol. 206.
———. 1958. "Glosse Super Periermenias Xii-Xiv." In Twelfth
Century Logic: Texts and Studies. Vol Ii: Abelardiana Inedita, edited
by Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo, 1-108. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura.
———. 1969. "Super Topica Glossae." In Scritti Di Logica, edited by
Dal Pra, Mario, 205-330. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.
Logica 'ingredientibus' VII.
The commentary from Logica Ingredientibus on Boethius De topicis
differentiis.
———. 2003. "Super Topica Glossae." In Rhetoric and Renewal in the
Latin West 1100-1540. Essays in Honour of John O. Ward, edited by
Mews, Constant J., Nederman, Cary J. and Thomson, Rodney M., 62-
80. Turnhout: Brepols.
Appendix to Karin M. Fredborg essay: Abelard on Rhetoric (pp. 55-
61).
———. 1969. "De Divisionibus." In Scritti Di Logica, edited by Dal
Pra, Mario, 155-204. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.
Introductiones dialecticae (Introductiones parvulorum): IV.
Gloss on Boethius De divisione.
———. 1956. Dialectica. Assen: Van Gorcum.
———. 1994. "Tractatus De Intellectibus." In Des Intellections, edited
by Morin, Patrick, 24-96. Paris: Vrin.
First edition in: Victor Cousin (ed.), Fragaments philosophiques, II.
Philosophie scholastique. Paris, Ladrage, 1840, deuxième edition, pp.
461-496, reprinted in appendix to: Lucia Urbani Ulivi, La psicologia di
Abelardo e il "Tractatus de Intellectibus". Roma, Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura, 1976, pp. 103-127.
———. 1992. "Positio Vocum Sententiae." Traditio no. 47:66-73.
Appendix to Yukio Iwakuma: Vocales, or Early Nominalists (pp. 37-
111).
———. 1958. "Secundum Magistrum Petrum Sententie." In Twelfth
Century Logic: Texts and Studies. Vol Ii: Abelardiana Inedita, edited
by Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo, 109-122. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e
700
Letteratura.
MODERN EDITIONS OF THE LATIN WORKS
Peter, Abelard. 1836. Ouvrages Inédits D'Abélard Pour Servir À

L'histoire De La Philosophie Publiés Par M. Victor Cousin. Paris:
Imprimerie Royale.
Contains the first edition of: Dialectica (pp. 173-497); Glosse in
Porphyrium (pp. 551-576); Glosse in Categoriam (pp. 577-594);
Glosse in Librum De Interpretatione (pp. 595-602); Glosse in Topica
Boethii (pp. 603-610).
This work is supersed by the editions of Geyer and De Rijk.
———. 1919. Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften. I. Die Logica
'Ingredientibus'. 1. Die Glossen Zu Porphyrius. Münster: Verlag der
Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des
Mittelalters. n° 21 (Part 1).
Contents: Einleitung V-XII; Logica Ingredientibus. [The Logic that
begins with the words: For beginners] First Part: Glossae super
Porphyrium [The commentary from Logica Ingredientibus on
Porphyry's Isagoge] pp. 1-109.
"Ingredientibus". 2. Die Glossen Zu Den Kategorien. Münster: Verlag
der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Mittelalters. n° 21 (Part 2).
Contents: Logica Ingredientibus. [The Logic that begins with the
words: For beginners] Second Part: Glossae super Predicamenta [The
commentary from Logica Ingredientibus on Aristotle's Categories] pp.
111-305.
"Ingredientibus". 3. Die Glossen Zu Peri Ermhneias. Münster: Verlag
der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Mittelalters. n° 21 (n° 3).
Contents: Glossae super Periermeneias [Glosses on Aristotle's De
701
Interpretatione] pp. 307-503.
———. 1933. Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften. Ii. Die
Logica "Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum". Die Glossen Zu Porphyrius.
Mittelalters. n° 21 (n° 4).
Contents: Logica nostrorum petitioni sociorum: Glossulae super
Porphyrium. [The Logic that begins with the words: At the request of
our friends or Little Glosses on Porphyry Isagoge] pp. 505-580.
Glossae super Porphyrium secundum vocales 583-588.
Untersuchungen 591-633; Sachindex zu den Texten 634-648.
———. 2010. Glossae Super Peri Hermeneias. Turnhout: Brepols.
Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis Vol. 206.
Critical edition with introduction and notes.
"The commentary on Aristotle's Peri hermeneias is certainly one of the
most important texts in the corpus of Peter Abaelard's works on logic.
The author discusses the Aristotelian text in an unbiased and thorough
manner without avoiding any difficulties, and thereby addresses all
basic issues of classical logic and semantics. The text forms part of the
so-called "mixed commentaries" and is characterised by short self-
contained systematic discussions within an explication of the
Aristotelian text. Of particular significance are the discussions of
predication (chapter 3), future contingentia (chapter 9) and modal logic
(chapters 12-14).
In 1927, this substantial commentary was edited by Bernhard Geyer.
The edition was based on the only manuscript of the text then known to
scholarship (Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana M 63 sup., fols. 45r-72r). In
1938, M. Grabmann discovered a second manuscript of the work
(Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol 624, fols.
97r-146r). As L. Minio-Paluello has shown, the final part of Abaelard's
text, which includes the long excursus on modal logic and the
commentary on chapters 12-14, is accurately preserved only in this
second manuscript. He edited this final part in 1958.
A detailed comparison of the two manuscripts showed that the
differences between them are so numerous and noteworthy that a new
critical edition was necessary. Geyer's and Minio-Paluello's editions
could be improved upon in several places. Aristotle's text in the version
702
known by Abaelard is also included."
———. 1958. Twelfth Century Logic: Texts and Studies. Vol Ii:
Abelardiana Inedita. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.
"The present volume contains an edition of two logical texts -- one
certainly and the other probably by Abailard -- which have not been
published in print before now.(1) The first -- a section of Abailard's
longer commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione, now usually
known as the third part of the Logica 'Ingredientibus' -- was discovered
about twenty years ago by the late Martin Grabmann.(2) The second,
consisting of two sections apparently extracted from one or two
otherwise lost works by Abailard (?), was seen and mentioned, though
not ascribed to this author, by Bernhard Geyer.(3)
ABAILARD'S COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S DE
INTERPRETATIONE CHAPTERS XII-XIV.
Abailard's more extensive commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione
( Perierrnenias) is preserved complete in one manuscript, now in
Berlin, and incomplete in another manuscript, now in Milan. Geyer
published the text of the latter; (4) a short passage of the seciton
missing from it was included by Grabmann in his description of the
former. (5) " (pp. XII-XII).
(1) No other unpublished logical works ascribed to Abailard are known
to exist. There are, however, a number of references to and quotations
from logical writings of Abailard in unpublished texts; see, e.g., below,
p. XLI, and Grabmann's paper mentioned in the next note. It is possible
that one or more works in cod. Orleans 266 (see below, pp. XLII-
XLVI) belong to him.
(2) M. Grabmann, Kommentare zur aristotelischen Logik aus dem 12.
and 13. Jahrhundert in MS lat. fol. 624 der Preussischen
Staatsbibliothek in Berlin (" Sitzungsb. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissensch."
1938, pp. 185-210).
(3) B. Geyer, Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, IV, Münster
1933 (" Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philos. u. Theol. d. Mittelalt." XXI. 4), p.
595 n. 3.
(4) Op. cit., III, Münster1927, pp. 307, 1-497.20.
(5) Op. cit., p. 204.
"The short text which appears under the title of "Secundum M. Petrum
sententie" in a collection of logical writings originally belonging to the
703
library of the monastery at Fleury (cod. Orleans 266, pp. 278-281) is
fragmentary. (...)
The text clearly consists of two sections, in no way distinguished from
each other in the manuscript. The first contains the analysis of a
paralogism; the second, four problems arising from the use of 'totum',
and their solutions. It is conceivable that the second section originated
in the study of -- or might even be extracted from a commentary on --
Boethius's De divisione, which is partly concerned with 'totum' and
includes more than once examples referring to the parts of a house. But
their is nothing in the first section of the Sententie to suggest that it
may belong to such a work, or indeed that it is part of the same work as
the second section. There is, however, much in common between the
two sections: the concepts used and the methods applied for the
solution of logical difficulties are the same: much turns, in both
sections, on the distinction between the " personal " and the " ad
sensum" reference of words, or, roughly speaking, between the
reference to individual things and the reference to concepts. Again,
much use is made of logical " regule " in both sections. These common
characteristics do not necessarily point to unity of work, but rather to
the interest which caused the compiler to connect these two sections in
one text.
This text can be tentatively ascribed to Abailard. It is found in the midst
of writings by Jocelyn (Goslenus) and other, anonymous, masters of the
first half and middle of the twelfth century." (pp. XXXIX-XLI).
———. 1969. Scritti Di Logica. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.
Indice: Introduzione XI-XXXIX; Avvertenze XL; Introductiones
dialecticae: Editio super Porphyrium 3; Glossae in Categorias 43;
Editio super Aristotelem De interpretatione 69; De divisionibus [Gloss
on Boethius De divisione] 155; Logica "Ingredientibus": Super topica
glossae [The commentary from Logica Ingredientibus on Boethius De
topicis differentiis] 205-330.
Seconda edizione; prima edizione col titolo: Scritti filosofici, Milano,
Bocca, 1954.
———. 1956. Dialectica. Assen: Van Gorcum.
First complete edition of the Parisian manuscript; with an introduction
by L.M. De Rijk (Introduction CVI pages; Text pages 51-637); second
revised edition 1970 (Introduction CXII; Text pages 51-669).
704
The Dialectica was edited incompletely for the first time by Victor
Cousin in Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard, Paris 1836, pp. 173-497.
The beginning (and the end?) of the text is missing: "Nevertheless I
commence the text on p. 51, in the case someone should be fortunate
enough to find it [the beginning]" (De Rijk, note 3, p XIII).
First complete edition of the Parisian manuscript; with an introduction
by L.M. De Rijk (Introduction: IX-XCVII; Text: 51-598; Indices: 601-
637; the beginning is lost); second revised edition 1970.
Contents of the Introduction: 1. Peter Abailard. Life. Works on logic
IX; 2. Abailard's Dialectica. The manuscript. Sources. 3. Masters
mentioned in the Dialectica. Date of the Dialectica XII; 4. The content
of the Dialectica XXV; 5. Inference. Consequence. Syllogism XXXI;
6. Categorical proposition. Terms. Copula. Identity theory. Inherence
theory XXXVI; 7. Hypothetical proposition. Implication. Conjunction.
Disjunction XLIII; 8. Supposition XLIX; 9. Truth and falsity LI; 10.
Affirmation. Negation. Signum quantitatis LV; 11. Modal propositions
LIX; 12. Categorical syllogism LXIII; 13. Hypothetical syllogism
LXVIII; 14. Argumentation. Kinds. Locus differentia. Maxima
propositio LXXV; 15. Division. Kinds. Definition. Kinds LXXXV; 16
Abailard's position in twelfth century logic. Dialecticians and Anti-
dialecticians. Nominalism and Realism. The question of the universals
LXXXIX; Books and Articles referred to XCV-XCVII.
"Aristotle deals with the use of speech, Abailard says (Log. Nostr.
petit., 508, 32--509, 8), in his Categories, De Interpretatione and
Topics, and with argumentations in his Prior and Posterior Analytics
(1): Porphyry wrote an introduction to the first-mentioned treatise.
Thus, the scheme of his own Dialectica is obvious: he first treats of the
parts of speech (partes orationis): tractatus I; next the categorical
propositions and syllogisms are dealt with: tractatus II; the treatment of
the hypothetical propositions and syllogisms (tractatus IV) is preceded
by that of the topics ( tractatus III); the author ends his work with a
treatise on division and definition: tractatus V." p. XXV.
(1) Abailard's description of the Aristotelian treatises is not wholly
correct.
———. 1994. Des Intellections. Paris: Vrin.
Édition, traduction et commentaire par Patrick Morin.
Table des matières: Introduction 7; P. Abelardi Tractatus de
705
intellectibus 24-96; Pierre Abélard. Le traité Des Intellections 25-97;
La psychologie d'Abélard. Commentaire du De Intellectibus 99;
Annexe A: Les affections d l'âme 128; Annexe B: Vie et œuvres
d'Abélard 129; Orientation bibliographique 155; Index 161; Table de
matières 169-170.
———. 1933. "Un Opusculo Inedito Di Abelardo: Glosae Super
Librum Porphyrii Secundo Vocalem." In Testi Medioevali Inediti.
Fontes Ambrosiani, Iii, edited by Ottaviano, Carmelo, 107-207.
Firenze: Olschki.
Glossae secundum vocales.
———. 2003. "Super Topica Glossae." In Rhetoric and Renewal in the
Latin West 1100-1540. Essays in Honour of John O. Ward, edited by
Mews, Constant J., Nederman, Cary J. and Thomson, Rodney M., 62-
80. Turnhout: Brepols.
Appendix to Karin M. Fredborg, Abelard on Rhetoric (pp. 55-61).
———. 1992. "Positio Vocum Sententiae." Traditio no. 47:66-73.
Appendix toYukio Iwakuma, Vocales, or Early Nominalists (pp. 37-
111).
———. 1992. "Super Porphyrium." Traditio no. 47:74-100.
Second Appendix to Yukio Iwakuma, Vocales, or Early Nominalists
(pp. 37-111).
Burnett, Charles, Luscombe, David E., and Barrow, Julia. 1984. "A
Checklist of the Manuscripts Containing the Writings of Peter Abelard
and Heloise and Other Works Closely Associated with Abelard and His
School." Revue d'Histoire des Textes no. 14-15:183-302.
"This checklist has been compiled to take stock of what is presently
known about the manuscripts of the works of Peter Abelard and to aid
and stimulate further work in Abelardian studies. It also includes
information about the writings of Heloise and about the manuscript
sources for the study of her life. The manuscripts of the writings of
some contemporaries who were closely concerned with Abelard, e. g.
as correspondents, are added, together with manuscripts of writings by
Abelard's closest disciples and followers.
The material is arranged as follows:
Part 1. The manuscripts p. 188
Appendix : Lost, unidentified or destroyed manuscripts p. 229
706
Part 2. The writings of Peter Abelard p. 240
Appendix : Lost or unidentified writings of Peter Abelard p. 256
Part 3. Unauthenticated or anonymous writings giving the teaching of
Peter Abelard p. 259
Part 4. Writings which have from time to time been attributed to Peter
Abelard, either in the manuscripts in which they occur or by later
scholars p. 262
Part 5. Writings bearing directly on the doctrines of Peter Abelard, the
lives of Abelard and Heloise and the Council of Sens p. 273
Part 6 a. Writings attributed to Heloise, or bearing on the early history
of the Paraclete p. 283
Part 6 b . List of charters issued for the Abbey of the Paraclete be fore
the death of Abbess Heloise p. 287
Part 7. Epitaphs of Abelard and Heloise p. 293
Index of works included in the checklist p. 298
The list is designed to provide guidance on the manuscripts for those
engaged in editing writings by Abelard and by his associates and
followers, as well as for those who wish to know how, when, where
and by whom these manuscripts were copied and read. Several
manuscripts are listed here which have not hitherto been used in
editions or which have only recently come to light."
TRANSLATIONS OF THE LOGICAL WORKS

ENGLISH
Peter, Abelard. 1973. "The Glosses of Peter Abailard on Porphyry." In
Philosophy in the Middle Ages. The Christian, Islamic and Jewish
Traditions, edited by Hyman, Arthur and Walsh, James.J., 169-188.
Indianapolis: Hackett.
Second revised edition (first edition 1967).
Reprinted from Richard McKeon (ed.), Selections from Medieval
Philosophers, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, Vol. I.
———. 1994. "From the "Glosses on Porphyry" in His Logica
'Ingredientibus'." In Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of
Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, edited
707
by Spade, Paul Vincent, 26-56. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Translation from the edition of Geyer 1919, 7.25-32.12.
———. 1996. "Glosses on Porphyry from Logica Ingredientibus, "on
Universals"." In Readings in Medieval Philosophy, edited by
Schoedinger, Andrew, 529-538. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 1984. "Glosses in Peri Hermeneias." In Aristotle's Theory of
Language and Its Tradition. Texts from 500 to 1750, edited by Arens,
Hans, 231-302. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Translation of pp. 307-371 of the edition Geyer 1927 (pp. 307-503): the
Glosses on chapters 1-4 of the Peri hermeneias; with a commentary by
Hans Arens pp. 303-338.
King, Peter. 1982. Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals in the
Twelfth Century, Princeton University.
Peter Overton King Doctoral Dissertation in Philosophy, Princeton
University, three volumes (available at ProQuest Dissertation Express).
Vol. 2 contains an Appendix with the the following translations:
a) Peter Abailard:
Logica "Ingredientibus" I.ii.1-156 (pp. 1*-28*) [Geyser 1933, pp. 7.25-
32.12]
Logica Nostrorum Petitione Sociorurm ii.1-94 (pp. 29*-51*) [Geyser
1933, pp. 512.6-533.]
Theologia Christiana Liber III.138-164 (pp. 55*-63*) [Translated from
the latin text edited by E. M. Buytaert in Corpus Christianorum
Continuatio Mediaevalis XII, Turnhout, 1969]
Treatise on Understandings (complete) (pp. 64*-91*) [Translated from
the latin text edited by Lucia Urbani Ulivi in La psicologia di Abelardo
e il "Tractatus de intellectibus" Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma,
1976, pp. 103-127]
Logica "Ingredientibus" III.i.1-14 (pp. 92*-95*) [Geyser 1933, pp.
307.1-309.35]
Logica "Ingredientibus" III.ii.1-49 (pp. 96*-103*) [Geyser 1933, pp.
312.33-318.35]
Logica "Ingredientibus" III.iv.1-43 (pp. 104*-110*) [Geyser 1933, pp.
325.12-331.11]
Logica "Ingredientibus" III, On dicta propositionum (pp. 111*-116*)
[Geyser 1933, pp. 365.13-370.22]
708
b) Boethius:
Lesser Commentary on Porphyry 18D-22B (pp. 117*-121*)
[Translated from the latin text appearing in J. P. Migne, Patrologia
Latina, LXIV (Paris 1847)]
Greater Commentary on Porphyry 82A-86A (pp. 122*-127*)
[Translated from the latin text of the aiora commentaria in Porphyrium
appearing in J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina, LXIV (Paris 1847)]
c) Walter of Mortagne:
Tractatus "Quoniam de generali" (complete) (pp. 128*-142*)
[Translated from the latin text edited by Hauréau in Notices et extraits
de quelque manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale Tom. V,
Paris, 1892, pp. 298-320]
d) Pseudo-Joscelin:
On genera and species ( On integral wholes) Text 143*-185* -
Translation 186*-212*
Tweedale, Martin, and Bosley, Richard, eds. 2006. Basic Issues in
Medieval Philosophy. Selected Readings Presenting the Interactive
Discourses among the Major Figures. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
Second edition (First edition 1997).
Includes selections from Abelard on foreknowledge, universals, and
ethics.
FRENCH
Pierre, Abélard. 1945. œuvres Choisies D'Abélard. Paris: Aubier.
Texts presentés et traduits par Maurice de Gandillac.
Logique (Première partie.) [From the Logica Ingredientibus pp. 77-
127]; Éthique; Dialogue entre un philosophe, un juif et un chrétien.
———. 1969. "La Première Critique Du Réalisme." In Abélard Ou La
Philosophie Dans Le Langage, edited by Jolivet, Jules, 111-122. Paris:
Seghers.
RELATED PAGES
709
First Part: A - L
Second Part: M - Z
710
Home
Contents
Last Page
711
Selected Bibliography on Abelard's Logic
and Ontology. First Part A - L
For Abelard's contributions to the theories of supposition and mental
language see: Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental
Language.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abélard. Le 'Dialogue'. La Philosophie De La Logique. 1981.
Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de l'Université.
Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel 16-17 novembre 1979.
Table des matières: Introduction 1; I. Maurice de Gandillac: Le
"Dialogue" 3; II. Sofia Vanni Rovighi: Intentionnel et universel chez
Abelard 21: III. Jean Jolivet: Abélard et Guillaume d'Ockham, lecteurs
de Porphyre 31; IV. Alain de Libera: Abélard et le dictisme 59; V.
Guido Küng: Abélard et les vues actuelles sur les universaux 119;
Index des noms 129-131.
"Peter Abelard." 2007. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no.
81:162-338.
Special Issue edited by Jeffrey E. Brower.
Contents: Jeffrey E. Brower: Editor's Introduction 162; Peter King:
Abelard on Mental Language 169; Ian Wilks: Abelard on Context and
Signification 189; Andrew Arlig: Abelard's Assault on Everyday
Objects 209; John Marenbon: Abelard's Changing Thoughts on
Sameness and Difference in Logic and Theology 229; Jeffrey Hause:
Abelard on Degrees of Sinfulness 251; Sean Eisen Murphy: "The Law
was Given for the Sake of Life": Peter Abelard on the Law of Moses
271; A.L. Griffioen: "In Accordance with the Law": Reconciling
Divine and Civil Law in Abelard 307; Margaret Cameron: Abelard
(and Heloise?) on Intention 323-338.
Arlig, Andrew W. 2005. A Study in Early Medieval Mereology:
Boethius, Abelard, and Pseudo-Joscelin, Ohio State University.
712
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
See Chapter 4. Abelard's Mereology and Its Role in Metaphysics pp.
141-242.
"The study of parts and wholes, or mereology, occupies two of the best
philosophical minds of twelfth-century Europe, Abelard and Pseudo-
Joscelin. But the contributions of Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin cannot
be adequately assessed until we come to terms with the mereological
doctrines of the sixth century philosopher Boethius. Apart from
providing the general mereological background for the period, Boethius
influences Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin in two crucial respects. First,
Boethius all but omits mention of the classical Aristotelian concept of
form. Second, Boethius repeatedly highlights a rule which says that if a
part is removed, the whole is removed as well. Abelard makes many
improvements upon Boethius. His theory of static identity accounts for
the relations of sameness and difference that hold between a thing and
its part. His theory of identity also provides a solution to the problem of
material constitution. With respect to the problem of persistence,
Abelard assimilates Boethius' rule and proposes that the loss of any part
entails the annihilation of the whole. More precisely, Abelard thinks
that the matter of things suffers annihilation upon the gain or loss of
even one part. He also holds that many structured wholes, namely
artifacts, are strictly dependent upon their parts. Yet Abelard insists that
human beings survive a variety of mereological changes. Abelard is
silent about objects which are neither artifacts nor persons. I argue that
Abelard has the theoretical resources to provide an account of the
persistence of these types of object, so long as some forms are
ontologically robust. Pseudo-Joscelin rejects the thesis that the removal
of any part entails the destruction of the whole. The annihilation of a
whole follows only from the removal of essential parts. Pseudo-
Joscelin employs two basic principles in his theory of persistence. First,
forms and the functions encoded in them play a primary role in identity
and persistence. He also makes use of a genetic criterion. Pseudo-
Joscelin expands both principles and employs them when he vigorously
defends the thesis that a universal is a concrete whole composed of
particulars from Abelard's criticisms."
———. 2007. "Abelard's Assault on Everyday Objects." American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:209-227.
713
"Abelard repeatedly claims that no thing can survive the gain or loss of
parts. I outline Abelard's reasons for holding this controversial position.
First, a change of parts compromises the matter of the object. Secondly,
a change in matter compromises the form of the object. Given that both
elements of an object are compromised by any gain or loss of a part, the
object itself is compromised by any such change. An object that
appears to survive change is really a series of related, but non-identical,
objects. I argue that, for Abelard, this series of objects is not itself an
object. Finally, I examine an apparent exception to Abelard's claim that
no thing can survive a gain or loss of parts, and I show that this specific
case does not undermine his general thesis."
Astroh, Michael. 2001. "Petrus Abaelardus on Modalities De Re and
De Dicto." In Potentialität Und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in Der
Geschichte Der Metaphysik, edited by Buchheim, Thomas, Henri,
Kneepkens Corneille and Lorenz, Kuno, 79-95. Stuttgart: Frommann-
Holzboog.
"The distinction between modalities de re and de dicto Abaelard
discusses in his Glossae super Peri hermeneias (1) presents itself as a
topic of traditional predication theory. The two varieties of alethic
modality are bound to opposite forms of predication. In spite of their
uniform linguistic appearance their basic structures are different. Modal
propositions de dicto are semantically, not just grammatically,
impersonal whereas modal propositions de re are truly personal
constructions.(2) Nevertheless Abaelard explains the meaning, scope
and purpose of according modal operators in so uniform a manner that
he can set forth rules of inference between modal propositions de re
and their logical correspondents de dicto.
A systematic presentation of Abaelard's theory pertains to all
constitutive features of predication. The grammatical, but even more so
the semantical, impersonality or personality of a categorical
proposition, its quality and if appropriate its quantity, and finally its
temporality and existential presupposition -- each of these features
predetermines the manner in which modalities de re or de dicto
contribute to a proposition's meaning and validity. These basic aspects
of Abaelard's account of predication do not obstruct his intuitive
conception of alethic modality as determining either de re or de dicto a
predicate's inherence or remotion.(3)" p. 79
714
(1) The text of the relevant treatise will be quoted according to its
critical edition by Klaus Jacobi and Christian Strub: Petrus Abaelardus,
Glossae super Peri Hermeneias, Turnhout: Brepols (Corpus
Christianorum. Continuatio mediaevalis), forthcoming. As this new
edition presents the text with reference to the edition by L. Minio-
Paluello: Twelfth Century Logic. Texts and Studies. Vol. 2:
Abaelardiana Inedita, 1. Glosse Magistri Petri Abaelardi super
Periermeneias Rome 1958, quotations will refer to the latter one
(abbreviated with: G).
(2) For Abaelard's account of semantical impersonality cf. Klaus
Jacobi, "Diskussionen über unpersonliche Aussagen in Peter Abaelards
Kommentar zu Peri Hermeneias", in: E. P. Bos (ed.), Mediaeval
Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L. M. De Rijk on the
occasion of his 60th Birthday, Nijmegen 1985, 1-63.
(3) The usage of this distinction draws on Abaelard's terminology in
Dialectica, cf. for example 191,6. The text of Dialectica is quoted with
reference to the De Rijk edition: Petrus Abaelardus, Dialectica, ed. L.
M. de Rijk, Assen 1970 (abbreviated with: D).
Ballanti, Graziella. 1995. Pietro Abelardo. La Rinascita Scolastica Del
12. Secolo. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.
Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli, Maria Teresa. 1970. The Logic of
Abelard. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Translated from the Italian: La logica di Abelardo, Firenze, La Nuova
Italia, 1964 (second editon with a new foreword 1969) by Simon
Pleasance.
Contents: Premise V; Foreword to the Second Edition VII; Introduction
1; I. What Abelard Means by Logic 13; II. The Problem of Meaning 28;
III. The Meaning of Universal Nouns 42; IV. The Meaning of the
Proposition 71; V. The 'Argumentatio' 80; Appendix: Abaelardiana
Inedita 90; Bibliography 100; Index of Names 101.
"The purely 'philosophical' importance of logical Abelardian research
has been emphasized by Mario Dal Pra in his introduction to the edition
of the Glosse Letterali. In this volume it seems important in my eyes to
illustrate not only the interest of Abelardian dialectic techniques (which
are at times penetrated by positions which are still realistic), but also,
and above all, the importance of his total attitude towards the 'scientia
scientiarum', stated in advance by a freer and braver mentality that is
715
later to use this instrument for its rigorous definition of philosophical
research.
When studying Abelardian dialectic I have preferred to follow the line
of development of his inquiry, from meaning to syllogistic calculation.
This line does not, however, coincide perfectly with the expositive
progress of the various commentaries, from the Isagoge to the Boetian
texts; the trail has thus been marked out for me by some of the Palatine
Master's statements rather than by the order of the comments.
The perspective of this research is, generally speaking, given from the
viewpoint of contemporary formal logic, a viewpoint that is
nevertheless implicit, even, I think, if it is at work in inquiry. In fact, in
an attempt to have a clearer picture of the historical importance of the
author and his meaning in a dialogue which is mediaeval, I have tried,
as far as possible, to keep the language constantly in the tone of those
times, and I have tried to avoid certain equations - unprecise and sterile
in my opinion - between Abelardian logical formulae and contemporary
logical formulae. I hope that what will be of interest from a modern
viewpoint is Abelard's total attitude." (Premise, p. V).
———. 1974. Introduzione a Abelardo. Bari: Laterza.
Second revised and updated edition 1988; translted in English as The
Logic of Abelard.
———. 1974. "La Relation Entre Logique, Physique Et Théologie." In
Peter Abelard. Proceedings of the International Conference: Louvain,
May 10-12, 1971, edited by Buytaert, Éloi Marie, 153-163. Leuven:
Leuven University Press.
———. 1979. "Sull'unità Dell'opera Abelardiana." Rivista Critica di
Storia della Filosofia no. 34:429-438.
Bertelloni, Francisco. 1986. "Pars Destruens. Las Críticas De Abelardo
Al Realismo En La Primera Parte De La Lógica 'Ingredientibus'."
Patristica et Mediaevalia no. 7:49-64.
"This paper analyzes the first part of the "Logica ingredientibus" of
Peter Abelard. First the author intends to show the triple structure of his
philosophical method (exposition, critique, and resolution). Secondly
he expounds the critical part of this structure. Thirdly an attempt is
made to outline the antirealists arguments of Abelard."
———. 1987. "Pars Construens. La Solución De Abelardo Al
Problema Del Universal En La Primera Parte De La Lógica
716
'Ingredientibus' (1* Part)." Patristica et Mediaevalia no. 8:39-60.
———. 1988. "Pars Construens. La Solución De Abelardo Al
Problema Del Universal En La Primera Parte De La Logica
'Ingredientibus' (2* Part)." Patristica et Mediaevalia no. 9:3-25.
Bertola, Ermenegildo. 1960. "Le Critiche Di Abelardo Ad Anselmo Di
Laon Ed a Guglielmo Di Champeaux." Rivista di Filosofia
Neoscolastica no. 52:485-522.
Biard, Joël. 2003. "Logique Et Psychologie Dans Le De Intellectibus
D'Abélard." In Pierre Abélard. Colloque International De Nantes,
edited by Jolivet, Jean and Habrias, Henri, 309-320. Rennes: Presses
Universitaires de Rennes.
Bird, Otto. 1960. "The Logical Interest of the Topics as Seen in
Abelard." Modern Schoolman no. 37:53-57.
Blackwell, Daniel F. 1988. Non-Ontological Constructs. The Effects of
Abaelard's Logical and Ethical Theories on His Ttheology. A Study in
Meaning and Verification. Bern: Peter Lang.
Boler, John F. 1963. "Abailard and the Problem of Universals." Journal
of the History of Philosophy no. 1:37-52.
Brower, Jeffrey E. 1996. Medieval Theories of Relations before
Aquinas: 'Categories' Commentaries, A.D. 510--1250 (Aristotle,
Boethius, Peter Abelard, Saint Albertus Magnus), University of Iowa.
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation available at ProQuest Dissertation
Express.
———. 1998. "Abelard's Theory of Relations: Reductionism and the
Aristotelian Tradition." Review of Metaphysics no. 51:605-631.
"In what follows I focus on the work of Peter Abelard (1079-1142), an
influential medieval logician who developed his theory of relations in
the course of commenting on Categories 7.(4) Like other Aristotelians,
Abelard accepts the view that relations are reducible to the monadic
properties of related things. On his theory, however, the relation
between Simmias and Socrates is not to be explained by a set of
peculiar monadic properties--say, being-taller-than-Socrates and being-
shorter-than-Simmias. Rather it is to be explained by a pair of ordinary
heights--say, being-six-feet-tall in the case of Simmias and being-five-
feet-ten in the case of Socrates. Indeed, according to Abelard, the
relation between Simmias and Socrates is nothing over and above the
possession by these individuals of their respective heights.
717
Although Abelard commits himself to a form of reductionism about
relations, we shall see that his theory is perfectly compatible with the
advances made by twentieth-century logicians. Abelard is careful to
distinguish questions about ontology from questions about logic, and to
commit himself to reducing relations only at the level of ontology.
Thus, he argues that Simmias's being taller than Socrates is nothing but
Simmias, Socrates, and their respective heights. Nonetheless, he denies
that relational statements of the form "Simmias is taller than Socrates"
can be reduced to complex non-relational statements of the form
"Simmias is six-feet-tall and Socrates is five-feet-ten."
The rest of the paper is divided into three parts. As will emerge, there is
an important distinction to be drawn between Abelard's theory of
relations and his account of relatives. hi the first part of the paper
(sections I-II), I present and explain the account of relatives. Here I
focus on one of Abelard's most important logical works, his Logica
'ingredientibus,' but since the relevant portion of this work follows the
subject matter and arrangement of Categories 7, I begin with a brief
sketch of Aristotle's text. In the second part of the paper (sections III-
V), I indicate what Abelard's account of relatives tells us about his own
theory of relations. Although, this requires some reconstruction on my
part, it is possible to determine with some accuracy to what sort of
theory he committed himself. In the third and final part of the paper
(sections VI-VII), I turn to the defense of Abelard's theory. My purpose
in this last part is to begin the project of rehabilitating a much
denigrated tradition in the history of philosophy." pp.605-606.
Brower, Jeffrey E., and Guilfoy, Kevin, eds. 2004. The Cambridge
Companion to Abelard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: List of contributors XI; Method of citation and abbreviations
XIV; Acknowledgments XVII; Chronology XVIII; Jeffrey E. Brower
and Kevin Guilfoy: Introduction 1; 1. John Marenbon: Life. milieu, and
intellectual contexts 13; 2. Winthrop Wetherbee: Literary works 45; 3.
Peter King: Metaphysics 65; 4. Klaus Jacobi: Philosophy of language
126; 5. Christopher J. Martin: Logic 158; 6. Kevin Guilfoy: Mind and
cognition 200; 7. Jeffrey E. Brower: Trinity 223; 8. Thomas Williams:
Sin, grace and redemption 258; 9. William E. Mann: Ethics 279; 10.
Yukio Iwakuma: Influence 305; List of Abelard's writings 336;
Bibliography 341; Index 357-362.
718
Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie. 2007. "Sémantiques Du Nom Propre:
Sources Anciennes Et Discussions Médiévales À L'époque D'Abélard."
Histoire Épistémologie Langage no. 29:137-166.
"La question de la signification des noms propres joue un rôle de
révélateur dans l'analyse médiévale du problème des universaux et de
l'individuation. À la jonction de la grammaire et de la logique, elle
hérite des Institutions de Priscien et des commentaires sur l'Organon de
Boèce un ensemble d'éléments doctrinaux, plus ou moins convergents
ou contradictoires, à partir desquels elle construit une sémantique
originale, qui culmine avec l'oeuvre d'Abélard. Cette approche inédite,
fondée sur une réélaboration des relations entre substance, qualité,
signification et nomination pose essentiellement la question du rôle de
la qualité particulière, souvent appelée « platonitas » et pensée comme
une collection d'accident, dans la signification des noms propres de
substances individuelles."
———. 2008. "Le Problème Du Substrat Des Accidents Constitutifs
Dans Les Commentaires a L' Isagoge D'Abélard Et Du Pseudo-Raban
(P3)." In Compléments De Substance. Études Sur Les Propriétés
Accidentelles Offertes À Alain De Libera, edited by Erismann,
Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine, 67-84. Paris: Vrin.
Comme l'a souligné A. de Libera (L'Art des géneéralités, Paris, Aubier
1999, p. 319-329), Abélard critique dans les Gloses sur Porphyre la
théorie de l'essence matérielle (notée TEM) en soulignant son
incapacité à répondre à la question du sujet d'inhérence des propriétés
constitutives, qu'il s'agisse de l'espèce (et donc, des différences
spécifiques) ou des individus (et donc, des accidents individuels). Un
autre commentaire à l'Isagoge, souvent associé à la TEM et attribué au
Pseudo-Raban (alias P3), tente de répondre à cette double difficulté.
Nous proposons d'étudier les solutions que ce texte tente d'apporter, car
elles permettent, selon nous, de mieux comprendre la réfutation
d'Abélard, et de prendre la mesure de la pertinence de ses attaques." (p.
67)
Buytaert, Éloi Marie, ed. 1974. Peter Abelard. Proceedings of the
International Conference: Louvain, May 10-12, 1971. Leuven:
University Press.
Contents: Preface VII Programme VIII; List of members XI-XIV; G.
Verbeke: Introductory Conference: Peter Abelard and the Concept of
719
Subjectivity 1; L. Engels: Abélard ecrivain 12; T. Gregory: Abélard et
Platon 38; D. E. Luscombe: The Ethics of Abelard: Some Further
Considerations 65; M. Kurdzialek: Beurteilung der Philosophie im
"Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum" 85; R. Thomas:
Die meditative Dialektik im "Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et
Christianum" 99; R. Peppermüller: Exegetische Traditionen and
theologische Neuansätze in Abaelards Kommentar zum Römerbrief
116; E. M. Buytaert: Abelard's Trinitarian Doctrine 127; M. T. Beonio-
Brocchieri Fumagalli: La relation entre logique, physique et théologie
153; J. Jolivet: Comparaison des théories du langage chez Abélard et
chez les Nominalistes du XIVe siècle 163; Index Auctorum 179-181.
Calefato, Patrizia. 2006. "Dimensione Semantica E Problema Della
Comunicazione in Pietro Abelardo." In Linguistica Medievale. Anselmo
D'Aosta, Abelardo, Tommaso D'Aquino, Pietro Ispano, Gentile Da
Congoli, Occam, edited by Corvino, Francesco, 13-53. Bari: Adriatica.
Castello Dubra, Julio A. 2004. "Ontología Y Gnoseología En La
Logica Ingredientibus De Pedro Abelardo." Anales del Seminario de
Historia de la Filosofia no. 43:43-50.
"The paper deals with the section of Peter Abaelard's Glossae super
Porphyrium concerning the three questions about the universals. The
pars destruens, in which Abaelard criticizes the realistic doctrines of
William of Champeaux, does not have a merely negative function, but
it tries to reach the starting-point of Abaelard's own position, namely,
that things differ not only in their forms or accidents, but also in their
matters or essences. When he speaks of the image of the universal term,
he does not explain the process of the elaboration of the universal
concept starting
from the thing, but he rather refers to the intellectual signification of
terms, in so far as they "produce intellections". This default could be
explained because of the fact that, in Abaelard's view, the human
intelligence hardly ever or never grasps the essences of things."
Clanchy, Michael T. 2008. Abelard. A Medieval Life. Malden:
Blackwell.
Contents: Preface XI; Map of France in Abelard's time XIV; Map of
Paris in Abelard's time XVI; 1. The Story of Abelard 1; Part I. Scientia
- 'Knowledge'. Chronological table 1079-1117 24; 2. Scientia -
'Knowledge' 25; 3. Literate 41; 4 Master 65; 5. Logician 95; Part II.
720
Experimentum - 'Experience'. Chronological table 1117-1118 120; 6.
Experimentum - 'Experience' 121; 7. Knight 130; 8. Lover 149; 9. Man
173; Part III. Religio - 'Religion'. Chronological table 1118-1142 204;
10. Religio - 'Religion' 207; 11. Monk 220; 12. Theologian 264; 13.
Heretic 288; 14. Himself 326; Who's Who 336; Abbreviations Used in
the Notes 336; Notes 345; Suggestions for Further Reading 396; Index
399-416.
On the logic see in particular Part I: Scientia - 'Knowledge' pp. 24-118.
"The Structure of This Book.
This book discusses Abelard's roles one by one in successive chapters
(Literate', 'Master', 'Logician', and so on) in order to build up a
composite portrait of him. The sequence of chapters accords very
roughly with the chronology of Abelard's life: from his precocious
success in the schools (chapters 3-5), through his affair with Heloise
(chapters 8-9), to his controversial career as a monk and theologian
(chapters 11-13). Two chapters are devoted to his affair with Heloise
because this was the turning point of his life, even though the events it
comprised were concentrated in not much more than a single year
(1117 or 1118). The concluding chapter (14), entitled 'Himself', centres
on the Delphic subtitle he chose for his book on ethics: 'Know Thyself'.
Overarching the fourteen chapters are the three parts, with their Latin
titles, into which the book is divided: Scientia ('knowledge' or
'science'), Experimentum ('experience' or 'experiment') and Religio
('religion' or 'monasticism'). These three parts characterize Abelard's
successive approaches to life and they function at the same time as an
introduction to medieval culture in the period of the twelfth-century
Renaissance. In Part I, Abelard expounds the 'science' which the
Middle Ages had inherited from classical antiquity. In his native Loire
valley he had begun his road to knowledge as a 'Literate' (chapter 3),
that is, as a literatus and Latinist; then in Paris he had been
acknowledged as a 'Master' (chapter 4) of students. He 'who alone knew
whatever was known' was a 'master' also in the sense of magus. His
wisdom and magic comprehended all the knowledge of the ancient
Greeks in philosophy and logic (chapter 5), the queen of the sciences.
Contrasting with this theoretical and scholastic knowledge is
Experimentum (Part II): learning not from books, but from
experiencing life in the raw. Theory and fact, reflection and action,
721
contrast - and often conflict - in Abelard's life, as they do in medieval
culture as a whole. In his book on ethics, he had argued that actions in
themselves are indifferent; only the intention of the actor makes them
right or wrong. Abelard 'experimented' with sex and violence. He
compared himself to a knight (chapter 7), conducting feuds and mock
battles in the schools, and then suddenly he found himself up against
Fulbert and Heloise's other kinsmen in a real feud. In castrating
Abelard, they took no account of his good intentions, but only of his
action in putting Heloise into a convent. Because the Church put such
value on celibacy, Abelard's castration had the peculiar effect of
converting him to 'religion' (Part III), in the sense that it made him
become a monk. Such was the attraction of monasticism in the twelfth
century that the adjective religiosus (chapter 10) was synonymous with
'monastic', as if there was no religion outside the cloister. Abelard made
repeated efforts to be a good monk (chapter 1), but he never could
reconcile the exclusiveness of monasticism with his broad vision of
theology (chapter 12), in which good pagans worshipped the true God
and acknowledged the Trinity. He was not only a failed 'religious', St
Bernard taunted, he was .1 blasphemer and a heretic (chapter 13).
(...)
Abelard's writings fill a whole volume (no. 178) of Migne's
Patrologiae:Series Latina comprising about 800,000 words. His
Theologia in its various versions (Abelard kept revising it over the
decades 1120-40) contains more than 200,000 words; Sic et Non has
130,000, his sermons 115,000, the commentary on St Paul's Epistle to
the Romans 90,000; for Heloise he wrote another 70,000 words.
Migne's volume does not include Abelard's writings on logic: one big
book, Dialectica, survives (though it is not complete) in addition to
other commentaries and lectures. It is certain that some works have
been lost, like the commentary on the Prophet Ezechiel which Abelard
says he wrote in Paris and the love songs which he reminded Heloise
were still being sung in the 1130s. As his surviving writings amount to
about 1 million words, his total output must have considerably
exceeding that." (pp. 19-22).
Colish, Marcia L. 1992. "Peter Lombard and Abelard: The Opinio
Nominalium and Divine Transcendence." Vivarium no. 30:139-156.
Reprinted as essay VI in: M. L. Colish - Studies in Scholasticism -
722
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006.
"This paper supports the claim that what "nominalism" meant to
twelfth-century thinkers was the doctrine of the univocal signification
of nouns and verbs, with their oblique or tensed forms conveying
consignification of the things or actions they signify in the nominative
case or present tense, respectively. The paper shows that both Peter
Abelard and Peter Lombard called upon this doctrine in their argument
over whether God can do better that He does, indicating that
nominalism so defined has a perceived utility for exponents of differing
logical and theological persuasions at the time."
"With respect to the Lombard's contribution to the history of
nominalism in the twelfth century, then, we may offer three
conclusions. First, from our consideration of Abelard's case, it is clear
that the opinio Nominalium could be, and was, yoked to a post-
Aristotelian kind of logic. From our consideration of the Lombard's
case, it is equally clear that the opinio Nominalium could just as easily
be yoked to a mode of reasoning deemed capable of yielding cogent
ontological conclusions. In this respect, the fact that a twelfth-century
thinker espouses the opinio Nominalium does not mean that he is
automatically or necessarily required to embrace one rather than the
other of these different conceptions of logic. Second, it was not just the
fact that the Lombard was a theologian but his particular agenda as a
theologian who sought to affirm God's omnipotence and God's essence
as the transcendent metaphysical reality that accounts for both his
borrowings from Abelard and his more fundamental hostility to
Abelard in this area. And, finally, thanks to the rapid and enduring
success of the Lombard's Sentences' as a textbook, he was able to place
both his position on divine transcendence, the distinction between
God's absolute and ordained power, and the opinio Nominalium with
which he bolstered these teachings squarely before the eyes of his
scholastic contemporaries and successors." (pp. 155-156.)
Courtenay, William J. 1991. "Nominales and Nominalism in the
Twelfth Century." In Lectionum Varietates. Hommage À Paul Vignaux,
edited by Jolivet, Jean, Kaluza, Zénon and Libera, Alain de, 11-48.
Paris: Vrin.
Reprinted as Chapter Four in: W. J. Courtenay, Ockham and
Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought,
723
Leiden, Brill, 2008, pp.39-80 .
Cranz, Edward F. 2006. "Boethius and Abelard." In Reorientations of
Western Thought from Antiquity to the Renaissance, edited by Struever,
Nancy. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Essay V (20 pages).
"Let me conclude with two brief general addenda. First, I have tried to
outline the main development of Abelard's logic and the one most
dependent upon Boethius. What we have seen may be summarized by
saying that, where Boethius closely connects, sometimes even
identifies, intellections, universals and propositions with 'res' or beings,
Abelard shifts all these relationships to a new context and then denies
them all: intellections, universals and propositions are not 'res'' as
physical things. To repeat a phrase; he desubstantializes them all.
But Abelard never stops thinking. Sometimes his conclusions are more
new questions than new answers, and his second treatment of a
problem is sometimes very different from his first. Some scholars have
described the last stage of his thought as a 'return to Platonism': but I
think he is more creative and original. He has changed Boethius' res
into 'physical things,' and he has denied that intellections or meanings
were 'physical things' and turned them into 'nothings.' But there are
hints, and there is no time to analyze them here, that at the end he
began to move to another new solution in which meanings from having
been nothings turn into the ultimate realities. If I had to suggest
parallels to his last stage, Petrarch, Lorenzo Valla and Nicholas of Cusa
come to mind. So if I have tried to describe Abelard's transformation of
Boethius, what was left, and I don't believe it was ever completed,
might be called Abelard's transformation of Abelard.
Second, while Abelard's writings had no wide dispersion and while he
was not followed by any school or even by very many pupils, I believe
his diffuse influence was greater than one might expect. The
reorientations of thought one finds in his logic and elsewhere often
spread more widely in his own time than did his specific ideas; they
were not destroyed by the reception of Aristotle and in some ways
provided a context within which Aristotle was received. So in
concluding I cannot resist noting that, while I have characterized what
happened as a transformation of Boethius, let us not in this group forget
that it was a transformation of Boethius."
724
Dal Pra, Mario. 1979. "Sul Nominalismo Di Abelardo." Rivista Critica
di Storia della Filosofia no. 34:439-451.
Dambska, Izydora. 1977. "La Sémiotique Des Dictiones Indefinitae
Dans La Dialectique D'Abélard." Cahiers de I´lnstitut du Moyen Age
Grec et Latin no. 21:10-20.
D'Anna, Gabriella. 1969. "Abelardo E Cicerone." Studi Medievali no.
10:333-419.
Sono esaminate tutte le citazioni dirette (pp. 335-357) ed indirette (pp.
357-366) di Cicero nelle opere di Abelardo.
Decorte, Jos. 1999. ""Sed Quoniam Platonis Scripta Nondum Cognovit
Latinitas Nostra...": Que Faire En L'absence D'une Traduction?" In
Tradition Et Traduction. Les Textes Philosophiques Et Scientifiques
Grecs Au Moyen Age Latin. Hommage a Fernand Bossier, edited by
Beyers, Rita, Brams, Jozef, Sacré, Dirk and Verrycken, Koenraad, 69-
87. Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Eco, Umberto. 1984. "Signification and Denotation from Boethius to
Ockham." Franciscan Studies no. 44:1-29.
Fredborg, Karin Margareta. 2003. "Abelard on Rhetoric." In Rhetoric
and Renewal in the Latin West 1100-1540. Essays in Honour of John
O. Ward, edited by Mews, Constant J., Nederman, Cary J. and
Thomson, Rodney M., 55-80. Turnhout: Brepols.
Contains in Appendix the ediiton of Abelard's Super Topica glossae
(pp. 62-80).
Freddoso, Alfred J. 1978. "Abailard on Collective Realism." Journal of
"In the "Logica ingredientibus" Abailard attacks the theory according to
which universals are collections of individuals. I argue that Abailard's
principal objection to this 'collective realism', viz, that it conflates
universals with integral wholes, is actually quite strong, though it is
generally overlooked by recent commentators. For implicit in this
objection is the claim that the collective realist cannot provide a
satisfactory account of predication. The reason for this is that integral
wholes are not uniquely decomposable. In support of my thesis I first
explicate the medieval distinction between integral and subjective parts
and then discuss its application to collective realism."
Gasper, Giles E.M., and Helmut, Kohlenberger, eds. 2006. Anselm and
Abelard. Investigations and Juxtapositions. Toronto: Pontifical Institute
725
of Mediaeval Studies.
On the philosophy of Abelard see: Tetsuro Shimizu: Word and Esse in
Anselm and Abelard 179-195.
Gill, Harjeet Singh. 1989. "The Abelardian Semiotics." In Abelardian
Semiotics and Other Essays, 1-29. New Dehli: Bahri Publications.
"The linguistic theory of Abelard is centred around the correlation or
correspondence between the "word" and the "thing" or the signifiant
and the signifié as we would have them today. According to Abelard, if
a word or a sound signifies, it is because something is added to its
physical being. essentia; this something is the significative function,
officium significandi. The sound, just like the thing that it represents in
a give language, remains the same from one community of speakers to
another, it belongs to the sphere of things, which is natural; the
significance, on the other hand, changes due to the diversity of
languages, it depends upon institution, upon a human convention,
positio hominum, voluntas hominum.(1) We have already the
distinction between the sphere of significance and the sphere of things.
The sound or the physically pronounced utterance is of the order of
nature while significance is created when "something" is added to its
being, and, this "something" is due to human intervention in a human,
social institution. For Abelard, words give birth to or "generate"
intellection which then correspond to things. Thus, argues Abelard,
there is a double series of correspondence between words and
intellections, and between intellections and things, and consequently,
between words and things. These are three distinct but related spheres.
(2)" (pp. 4-5).
(1) Glossae super Peri Ermenias, 320, 12, 27, ed. B. Geyer, Munster
i.w. 1919-23.
(2) Glossae super Prophyrium III, 524, 3-10, ed. B. Geyer, Munster,
i.w. 1919-23.
———. 1999. "The Abelardian Tradition of Semiotics." In Signs and
Gombocz, Wolfgang L. 1980. "Abaelards Bedeutungslehre Als
Schlüssel Zum Universalienproblem." In Petrus Abaelardus, 1079-
1142. Person, Werk Und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 153-164.
Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.
726
Conference at the Trierer Theologischen Fakultät in Trier (18 April
1979).
Guilfoy, Kevin. 1999. Abelard's Theory of the Proposition, University
of Washington.
Express.
———. 2002. "Abelard's Rejection of the Tarski Biconditional."
Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy no. 5:143-158.
"In a fairly opaque passage in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories
Peter Abelard denies both directions of a biconditional sentence very
much like a Tarski biconditional: "A man exists" is true iff a man
exists. "A man exists" is taken to be a sentence token and the right hand
element is taken to be the existence of a man. Neither Abelard's
argument nor his reason for making the argument is clear. It at first
appears that Abelard may be claiming that each of the corresponding
conditionals is false. Such a claim could amount to a rejection of the
correspondence theory of truth and would naturally have serious
repercussions for the study of Abelard's logic. In this paper I argue that
Abelard does not deny the truth of the biconditional only its necessity.
Abelard makes this argument in response to Boethius and certain
twelfth-century masters (I suggest Thierry of Chartres), who argue that
there is a logically necessary connection between words and things, and
hence between sentence tokens and what is the case in the world.
Abelard is not expressing any serious reservations about the
correspondence theory of truth. He is demonstrating the logical
importance of the conventionality of language. Arguing against
authorities, and twelfth-century peers, he shows that there is no
logically necessary connection between words and things, hence the
Tarski biconditional is not necessarily true."
———. 2004. "Peter Abelard's Two Theories of the Proposition." In
Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language, edited by
Maierù, Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 35-57. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki
Editore.
Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and
Semantics - Rome, June 11-15, 2002
———. 2006. "Imagination and Cognition of Insensibles in Peter
Abelard." In Intellect Et Imagination Dans La Philosophie Médiévale /
727
Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto E
Imaginação Na Filosofia Medieval / Actes Du Xie Congrès
International De Philosophie Médiévale De La Société Internationale
Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.),: Porto, Du 26
Au 31 Août 2002, edited by Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos,
José F., 895-902. Turnhout: Brepols.
Häring, Nikolaus M. 1975. "Abelard Yesterday and Today." In Pierre
Abélard - Pierre Le Vénérable. Les Courants Philosophiques,
Littéraires Et Artistiques En Occident Au Milieu Du Xii Siècle, edited
by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 341-403. Paris: Éditions du Centre
national de la recherche scientifique.
Hellemans, Babette. 2010. "The 'Whole Abelard' and the Availability
of Language." In How the West Was Won. Essays on Literary
Imagination, the Canon and the Christian Middle Ages for Burcht
Pranger, edited by Otten, Willemien, Vanderjagt, Arjo and de Vries,
Hent, 349-376. Leiden: Brill.
Henry, Desmond Paul. 1985. "Abelard's Mereological Tterminology."
In Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L. M.
De Rijk, Ph.D., Professor of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy at the
University of Leiden on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, edited by
Bos, Egbert P., 65-92. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
———. 1990. "Master Peter's Mereology." In De Ortu Grammaticae.
Studies in Medieval Grammar and Linguistic Theory in Memory of Jan
Pinborg, edited by Bursill-Hall, Geoffrey L., Ebbesen, Sten and
Konrad, Koerner, 99-115. Amsterdam: John Benjamin.
———. 1991. Medieval Mereology. Philadelphia: Grüner.
"Mereology is the theory which deals with parts and wholes in the
concrete sense, and this study follows its varied fortunes during the
Middle Ages. Preliminary indications as to its metaphysical situation
are followed by a brief sketch of Boethius' contribution. Peter Abelard,
Gilbert of Poitiers, Clarembald of Arras, and Joscelin of Soissons are
among the twelfth-century authors examined. The effect of the
subsequent recovery of Aristotle's Metaphysica on mereology is
typified by sketches of the many and varied uses made of the latter by
Aquinas. A brief sample of Buridanian treatment is followed by an
account of those applications made under the umbrella of thirteenth-
century comment on Aristotle's De Sophisticis Elenchis. The curiously
728
original theories of Wyclif are brought to light, as also samples from
Walter Burleigh, Nicholas of Paris, William of Ockham, and Paul of
Venice."
———. 1991. "Abelard and Medieval Mereology." In Peter Geach:
Philosophical Encounters, edited by A., Lewis Harry, 49-64.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"It is a pity that the stock story of early medieval thought tends to
concentrate on something called the 'universals controversy' and does
so in a way which inappropriately subsumes the twists and turns of a
highly complex situation under somewhat ill-fitting headings. Although
a start has now been made on a saner account of the matter both in
general (1) and insofar as it affects Abelard, (2) nevertheless the usual
connotations of a term such as 'realism' when applied to the topic of
universals render somewhat startling the realisation that one such
theory attacked by Abelard was the polar opposite of any otherworldly
Platonic-style theory, namely the 'collectio' theory. It is yet a greater
pity that in his attack on this theory (3) Abelard by no means does
justice either to it or to his own wide-ranging account of part/ whole
relations. At the time of his attack his maturer thoughts (in the
Dialectica) were still to come, yet some of the essentials of that later
work are already to be found in his gloss on Boethius' De Divisione, a
gloss dated as belonging to the end of his first teaching phase. (4)
In II below is presented a brief and inadequate characterisation of some
of Abelard's theories and themes; in III these are applied to
contemporary discussions which have a bearing on his own sad fate and
on that of a certain cat to whom we have been genially introduced by
Professor Geach."
(1) E.g. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum (3 volumes), Van Gorcum,
Assen, 1962-7; Kretzmann Article on "Semantics, History of", in Paul
Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York,
Macmillan, 1967, vol. 7, pp. 358-406, the Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy and various of the Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-
age Grec et Latin of the University of Copenhagen.
(2) Tweedale Abailard on Universals, Amsterdam, North-Holland,
1976.
(3) Geyer, Abelard's Logica 'Ingredientibus' Munster, 1919.
(4) Dal Pra, Pietro Abelardo: Scritti di Logica, Firenze, La Nuova
729
Italia, 1969, p XXVII: 'fin dal primo periodo del suo insegnamento'
[from the first period of his teaching].
———. 1999. "Signification, Superfluity, and Indeterminacy in
Abelard and Other Medievals." In Signs and Signification. Vol. I, edited
by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 69-83. New Delhi: Bahri
Publications.
"1.1. For Boethius and the medievals, signification is primarily linked
with definition and understanding (intellectus). Abelard maintains these
links as also does Aquinas, for example.
1.2. Definition canonically so-called is of nominal terms and is
effectuated by means of genus, species, and differentia, at least where
substance-names are concerned. Paronyms, or denominative names,
involve incompletenesses which both Anselm of Canterbury and
Abelard characterise most competently according to frameworks other
than the strictly canonical. Non-canonical characterisations in general
were said to be descriptions. The process of definition stricto sensu
would accordingly comprise or entail sentences such as 'Man is a
species', 'Animal is a genus', and so on. It was in his commentary on
Aristotle's Categoriae that Boethius noted how such sentences
embodied the threat of fallacious arguments such as the following:
'Man is a species; but Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is a species'.
One solution, he suggested, would be to reconstrue the 'species' of 'Man
is a species' as one of the names of names (nominum nomina), the
named name being in his case 'man'. Thus the middle teen of the
inference becomes ambiguous, and the illation fails. At the same time,
we witness the foundation of the description 'nominalism' upon this
intra-linguistic analysis of propositions such as the one now in
question, which superficially concern the 'universal' man, and so forth.
(Ockham and Hobbes are two thinkers often characterised as
nominalists, and who quite consciously and overtly preserve this
nominum nomina terminology, in the same sort of context).
1.3. But although definition in the strict medieval sense thus appears to
be of isolated terms, taken out of context, in practice contextual
presuppositions did intervene, and this in various ways. It became
common to work on the significatio of whole propositions, thus
directing attention to the sense or significatio of the whole within which
the defined terms were embedded. The propositions, in their turn, were
730
taken to occur within at least three generally specifiable non-exclusive
anticipated contexts, namely either that of the theoretical (or
'quidditative'), wherein definitional propositions are basic, or within
that of the syllogistic (largely, the four canonical A, E, I, and O forms)
or within that of usus loquendi, the context of usage, whence the
classical grammarians took their starting point, and which was
recognised by medieval investigators of significatio as an area
distinguishable (because of its contingent irregularities) from that of
special technical usages. This latter distinction is already highly marked
in the work of St. Anselm (1033 - 1109). These possible varieties of
presupposed context will be taken account of in my own remarks, and
attention called to them when the occasion arises." pp. 69-70 (notes
omitted).
Hochberg, Herbert. 2009. "Facts and Things." In State of Affairs, edited
by Reicher, Maria, 83-110. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Iwakuma, Yukio. 1992. "Vocales, or Early Nominalists." Traditio no.
47:37-111.
Appendix (pp. 65-133): Edition of Vocalist texts commenting or
discussing Porphyry's Isagoge: I. (Petri Abaelardi (?) Positio Vocum
Sententia (pp. 66-73); II. Roscelini Compendiensis (?) Disputata
Porphyrii pp. 74-102); III.1 Excerpta Pommersfeldensia I pp. 103-107;
III.2 Excerpta Pommersfeldensia II pp. 108-110; III.3 Excerpta
Pommersfeldensia III pp. 110-111.
———. 1992. "Twelfth-Century Nominales. The Posthumous School
of Peter Abelard." Vivarium no. 30:97-109.
———. 1995. "Nominalia." Didascalia no. 1:47-88.
———. 1999. "Pierre Abélard Et Guillaume De Champeaux Dans Les
Premières Années Du Xii Siècle: Une Étude Préliminaire." In Langage,
Sciences, Philosophie Au Xii Siècle, edited by Biard, Joël, 93-123.
Paris: Vrin.
———. 2004. "Are Argumentations Propositions?" In Medieval
Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language, edited by Maierù,
Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 81-110. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore.
———. 2009. "Vocales Revisited." In The Word in Medieval Logic,
Theology and Psychology. Acts of the Xiiith International Colloquium
731
of the Société Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie
Médiévale, Kyoto, 27 September - 1 October 2005, edited by Shimizu,
Tetsuro and Burnett, Charles, 81-172. Turnhout: Brepols.
Iwakuma, Yukio, and Ebbesen, Sten. 1992. "Logico-Theological
Schools from the Second-Half of the 12th Century: A List of Sources."
Jacobi, Klaus. 1980. "Diskussionen Über Prädikationstheorie in Den
Logischen Schriften Des Petrus Abaelardus." In Petrus Abaelardus,
1079-1142. Person, Werk Und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf,
165-179. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.
———. 1981. "Die Semantik Sprachliche Ausdrücke, Ausdrucksfolgen
Und Aussagen Im Abaelards Kommentar Zu Peri Hermeneias."
Medioevo.Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale no. 7:41-89.
———. 1983. "Abelard and Frege: The Semantics of Words and
Propositions." In Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della
———. 1985. "Peter Abelard's Investigations into the Meaning and
Functions of the Speech Sign Est." In The Logic of Being, edited by
Knuuttila, Simo and Hintikka, Jaakko, 1-15. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"Although Peter Abelard was the most distinguished teacher of logic of
his time, a logic understood to be the science of argumentative
discourse, he was not destined to found a new philosophical tradition.
The historical situation offers at Least a partial explanation -- the pace
of philosophical and theological research was so brisk in the twelfth
century that many of the established schools enjoyed life spans of at
most two or three generations of teachers. The restlessness of the times
is embodied to a special degree in Abelard.(1) His writings include
commentaries, in many cases several to a work, on the logical works of
Aristotle and Porphyry then available, handed down in the form of
Boethius' translations, and on Boethius' own logical works. Abelard has
to take a number of positions into consideration here: several
commentaries on Aristotle by ancient scholars, by Boethius, and by
Abelard's own predecessors and teachers, and furthermore the
grammatical theories of Priscian and those deriving from Abelard's
contemporaries. He discovers with distinctive acumen that the tradition
he is examining is disunited and full of tensions on basic questions. It is
732
in the analysis and discussion of these tensions that he finds the field of
his own philosophical research. He expects to reach solutions by
intensifying the controversies, not by seeking harmony. Thus he traces
argument and counter-argument in great thoroughness of detail and
from a dizzying succession of points of view, abandoning theses and
offering countertheses. What his students could learn from him was not
so much a particular theory as his method of formulating and
discussing problems.
The situation is much the same for us. If we turn to Abelard in our
inquiry into the logic and semantics of the speech sign 'est', we must
discover anew the questions which concerned him. In the first Part of
this Paper, I will sketch some of the discussions conducted by Abelard
in order to make clear in what contexts he found himself confronting
questions on the variations of meaning, function, or use of the
expression 'est'. In the second part, I will group various theses which
Abelard deals with appropriately. It is my intention to plot out the full
range of the theories discussed and to mark points of conflict. In the
third and final part, I will make some cautious comments on the deeper
current of unity to be observed in Abelard's reflections, a current
perhaps more easily discernible to the modern eye then it was to
Abelard himself."
(1) Cf. Jolivet (1969), Chapter IV; de Rijk (1980). Also compare
Häring (1975), who explains the meager transmission of Abelard's
works as at least partially attributable to Abelard's style of thinking and
writing. His philosophical "works" were not written as books intended
to be recopied and handed down but as records of his own thinking to
be used in teaching. A thesis which he adheres to with conviction at
one point in his writings may reappear later or even in a reworking of
the first source as being subject lo doubt or in need of revision.
———. 1985. "Diskussionen Über Unpersönliche Aussagen in Peter
Abaelards Kommentar Zu Peri Hermeneias." In Mediaeval Semantics
and Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L. M. De Rijk, Ph.D., Professor
of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy at the University of Leiden on the
Occasion of His 60th Birthday, edited by Bos, Egbert P., 1-63.
———. 1999. ""Homo Sentitur", "Homo Intelligitur". Untersuchungen
Peter Abaelards Zur Referentiellen Opakheit in Intensionalen
733
Kontexten." Studia Mediewistyczne no. 34-35:87-92.
———. 2004. "Philosophy of Language." In The Cambridge
Companion to Abelard, edited by Brower, Jeffrey E. and Guilfoy,
Kevin, 126-157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Abelard's investigations into the philosophy of language are of great
interest not only with respect to the history of philosophy, but also with
respect to systematic considerations. These investigations, however, are
not readily accessible. They offer nothing to a reader who wants to
glean information quickly from them. A thorough study is required, and
this itself requires extraordinary patience. The purpose of this chapter is
to contribute to the project of making Abelard's investigations into the
philosophy of language accessible to the general philosophical
community."
Jacobi, Klaus, King, Peter, and Strub, Christian. 1996. "From
Intellectus Verus / Falsus to the Dictum Propositionis. The Semantics
of Peter Abelard and His Circle." Vivarium no. 34:15-40.
"In his commentary on Aristotle's Peri hermeneias, Abelard
distinguishes the form of an expression (oratio) from what it says, that
is, its content. The content of an expression is its understanding
(intellectus).
This distinction is surely the most well-known and central idea in
Abelard's commentary. It provides him with the opportunity to
distinguish statements (enuntiationes) from other kinds of xpressions
without implying a diference in their content, since the ability of a
statement to signify something true or false (verum vel falsum) cannot
be found in its content. More precisely, Abelard distinguishes
statements both from complete expressions (orationes perfectae) that
are not statements but rather questions, requests, commands, etc. and
from incomplete expressions, that is, mere word strings (orationes
imperfectae), such as homo albus. These kinds of expressions,
according to Abelard, do not differ in the understanding they present
but in the way they present it." (notes omitted)
Jacobi, Klaus, and Strub, Christian. 1995. "Peter Abaelard Als
Kommentator." In Aristotelica Et Lulliana: Magistro Doctissimo
Charles H. Lohr Septuagesimum Annum Feliciter Agenti Dedicata,
edited by Dominguez, Fernando, 11-34. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Jolivet, Jean. 1963. "Abélard Et Le Philosophe. (Occident Et Islam Au
734
Xii Siecle)." Revue de l'Historie des Religions no. 164:181-189.
Repris dans:J. Jolivet, Aspects de la pensée médièvale: Abélard.
Doctrines du langage, Paris, Vrin, 1987, pp. 53-61.
———. 1969. Abélard Ou La Philosophie Dans Le Langage. Paris:
Seghers.
Deuxième edition: Paris Éditions du Cerf 1994.
Choix de textes pp.111-206.
———. 1969. Arts Du Langage Et Théologie Chez Abélard. Paris:
Vrin.
Deuxième édition augmentèe 1982.
———. 1974. "Comparaison Des Théories Du Langage Chez Abélard
Et Chez Les Nominalistes Du Xiv Siècle." In Peter Abelard.
Proceedings of the International Conference: Louvain, May 10-12,
1971, edited by Buytaert, Éloi Marie, 163-178. Leuven: Leuven
University Press.
———. 1975. "Notes De Lexicographie Abélardienne." In Pierre
———. 1975. "Vues Médiévales Sur Les Paronymes." Revue
Internationale de Philosophie no. 113:222-242.
Doctrines du langage, Paris, Vrin, 1987, pp.138-158.
"Cet article a pour objet de signaler un point de rencontre entre le
platonisme et la théorie de la grammaire au moyen âge. La reflexion sur
les paronymes y a conduit presque irresistiblement a des thèses d'allure
platonicienne: le rapport de l'adjectif au nom evoquant celui du sensible
a l'idée. On observe ce fait non seulement chez des auteurs du 12e
siecle (Bernard de Chartres, Abelard...) mais même chez des
aristoteliciens du 13e (Boece de Dacie entre autres; Thomas d'Aquin
aussi, mais dans un contexte different). C'est là une manifestation de ce
qu'on peut appeler le "platonisme grammatical."
735
———. 1980. "Doctrines Et Figures De Philosophes Chez Abélard." In
Petrus Abaelardus, 1079-1142. Person, Werk Und Wirkung, edited by
Thomas, Rudolf, 103-120. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.
———, ed. 1981. Abélard En Son Temps. Actes Du Colloque
International Organisé À L'occasion Du Ixe Centenaire De La
Naissance De Pierre Abélard. (14-19 Mai 1979). Paris: Belles Lettres.
Sur la philosophie d'Abélard: J. Châtillon: Abélard et les écoles 146-
158; Jean Jolivet: Non-réalisme et platonisme chez Abélard. Essai
d'interprétation 175-195.
———. 1981. "Non-Réalisme Et Platonisme Chez Abélard. Essai
D'Interpretation." In Abélard En Son Temps. Actes Du Colloque
International Organisé À L'occasion Du 9e Centenaire De La
Naissance De Pierre Abélard. (14-19 Mai 1979), edited by Jolivet,
Jean, 175-195. Paris: Belles Lettres.
"Le problème des universaux: la doctrine "réaliste" qui croit, plus ou
moins suivant les cas à la réalité des genres et des espèces (Guillaume
de Champeaux, Abélard de Bath, Gautier de Mortagne, Joscelin de
Soissons, Bernard de Chartres, Gilbert de la Porrée), la doctrine
"nominaliste" qui déconnecte le mot et la chose: Roscelin, et enfin la
solution de Pierre Abélard qui se caractérise par une bipolarité:
réalisme et non-réalisme, point de vue sémantique et point de vue
syntactique."
———. 1981. "Abélard Et Guillaume D'Ockham, Lecteurs De
Porphyre." In Abélard. Le "Dialogue", La Philosophie De La Logique,
31-54. Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de l'Université.
———. 1987. Aspects De La Pensée Médiévale: Abélard. Doctrines
Du Langage. Paris: Vrin.
Recueil d'articles (1963-1985).
———. 1990. "Pierre Abélard Et Son École." In Contemporary
Philosophy. Vol. 6.1: Philosophy and Science in the Middle Ages,
edited by Guttorm, Floistad, 97-104. Amsterdam: Kluwer.
736
Review of the recent literature on Abelard up to 1972; see Mews
(1990), for the period 1972-1985.
———. 1992. "Trois Variations Médiévales Sur L'universel Et
L'individu: Roscelin, Abélard, Gilbert De La Porrée." Revue de
Mètaphysique et de Morale:111-155.
2006 pp. 29-70.
"C'est un anachronisme que de vouloir qualifier de réalistes ou
nominalistes des philosophes qui ont travaillé deux cents ans avant les
mises en place doctrinales du xive siècle. D'autre part, il est surprenant
de voir leurs doctrines respectives de l'individu se distribuer autrement
que ne le feraient présumer leurs vues sur l'universel. Ce point gagne en
clarté quand on l'aborde du côté de leurs sémantiques du nom, mais les
cadres de l'historiographie usuelle n'en restent pas intacts pour autant."
(p. 111)
———. 1999. "Sur Les Prédicables Et Les Catégories Chez Abélard."
In Langage, Sciences, Philosophie Au Xiie Siècle, edited by Biard, Joël,
———. 1999. "Sens Des Propositions Et Ontologie Chez Pierre
Abélard Et Grégoire De Rimini." In Théories De La Phrase Et De La
Proposition De Platon À Averroès, edited by Büttgen, Philippe,
Diebler, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan, 307-321. Paris: Éditions Rue
d'Ulm / Presses de l'École normale supérieure.
2006 pp. 103-116.
———. 1999. "Note Sur Le "Non-Réalisme" D'Abélard." In Signs and
2006 pp. 85-92.
———. 2003. "Á Propos D'une Critique Abélardienne Du Réalisme."
In Pierre Abelard. Colloque International De Nantes, edited by Jolivet,
Jean and Habrias, Henri, 109-118. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de
Rennes.
Conférence internationale "Pierre Abélard, à l'aube des universités" 3-4
octobre 2001 Nantes
Jolivet, Jean, and Habrias, Henri, eds. 2003. Pierre Abélard. Colloque
737
International De Nantes (3-4 Octobre 2001). Rennes: Presses
Universitaires de Rennes.
Sur la philosophie d'Abélard voir: Jean Jolivet: Avant-propos 9-14;
François Lejeune: Pierre Abélard et Jean de Salisbury: "Metalogicon"
II, 10 63-75; Jean Jolivet: À propos d'une critique abélardienne du
réalisme 109-118; Joël Biard: Logique et psychologie dans le "De
intellectibus" d'Abélard 309-319; Paul Thom: La logique abélardienne
des modales "de rebus" 321-337.
Kahn, Charles H. 1972. "On the Terminology for Copula and
Existence." In Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays
Presented by His Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on His
Seventieth Birthday, edited by Stern, S.M., Hourani, Albert and Brown,
Vivian, 141-158. London: Bruno Cassirer.
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, Essays on Being, New York, Oxford
University Press, 2009 pp. 41-61.
King, Peter. 1982. Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals in the
Twelfth Century, Princeton University.
Express.
———. 2004. "Metaphysics." In The Cambridge Companion to
Abelard, edited by Brower, Jeffrey E. and Guilfoy, Kevin, 65-125.
"Abelard's philosophy is the first example in the Western tradition of
the cast of mind that is now called nominalism. Although his view that
universals are mere words (nomina) is typically thought to justify the
label, Abelard's nominalism - or better, his irrealism - is in fact the
hallmark of his metaphysics. He is an irrealist not only about
universals, but also about propositions, events, times other than the
present, natural kinds, relations, wholes, absolute space, hylomorphic
composites, and the like. Instead, Abelard holds that the concrete
individual, in all its richness and variety, is more than enough to
populate the world. He preferred reductive, atomist, and material
explanations when he could get them; he devoted a great deal of effort
to pouring cold water on the metaphysical excesses of his predecessors
and contemporaries. Yet unlike modern philosophers, Abelard did not
conceive of metaphysics as a distinct branch of philosophy. Following
Boethius, he distinguishes philosophy into three branches: logic,
738
concerned with devising and assessing argumentation, an activity also
known as dialectic; physics, concerned with speculation on the natures
of things and their causes; and ethics, concerned with the upright way
of life."
———. 2007. "Abelard on Mental Language." American Catholic
"I argue that Abelard was the author of the first theory of mental
language in the Middle Ages, devising a "language of thought" to
provide the semantics for ordinary languages, based on the idea that
thoughts have linguistic character. I examine Abelard's semantic
framework with special attention to his principle of compositionality
(the meaning of a whole is a function of the meanings of the parts); the
results are then applied to Abelard's distinction between complete and
incomplete expressions, as well as the distinction between sentences
and the statements which the sentences are used to make. Abelard's
theory of mental language is shown to be subtle and sophisticated, the
forerunner of the great theories of the fourteenth century."
———. 2009. "Abelard's Answers to Porphyry." Documenti e Studi
sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 18:249-270.
Knuuttila, Simo. 1993. Modalities in Medieval Philosophy. New York:
Routledge.
See Chapter 2: Philosophical and Theological Modalities in Early
Medieval Thought.
Boethius' Modal Conceptions 45, New Theological Modalities: from
Augustine to Anselm of Canterbury 62; Gilbert of Poitiers, Peter
Abelard and Thierry of Chartres 75-98.
———. 2010. "Medieval Commentators on Future Contingents in De
Interpretatione 9." Vivarium no. 48:79-95.
"This article considers three medieval approaches to the problem of
future contingent propositions in chapter 9 of Aristotle's De
Interpretatione. While Boethius assumed that God's atemporal
knowledge infallibly pertains to historical events, he was inclined to
believe that Aristotle correctly taught that future contingent
propositions are not antecedently true or false, even though they may
be characterized as true-or-false. Aquinas also tried to combine the
allegedly Aristotelian view of the disjunctive truth-value of future
contingent propositions with the conception of all things being
739
timelessly present to God's knowledge. The second approach was
formulated by Peter Abelard who argued that in Aristotle's view future
contingent propositions are true or false, not merely true-or-false, and
that the antecedent truth of future propositions does not necessitate
things in the world. After Duns Scotus, many late medieval thinkers
thought like Abelard, particularly because of their new interpretation of
contingency, but they did not believe, with the exception of John
Buridan, that this was an Aristotelian view."
Kretzmann, Norman. 1982. "The Culmination of the Old Logic in Peter
Abelard." In Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, edited
by Benson, Robert L. and Constable, Giles, 488-511. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Küng, Guido. 1981. "Abélard Et Les Vues Actuelles Sur Les
Universaux." In Abélard: Le 'Dialogue'. La Philosophie De La
Logique. Actes Du Colloque De Neuchâtel, 16-17 Novembre 1979, 99-
118. Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de l'Université.
Legowicz, Jan. 1981. "Das Problem Des Ursprungs Der
"Allgemenheit" Von Nahmen in Der Universalientheorie Bei
Abaelard." In Sprache Und Erkenntnis Im Mittelalter. Vol. I, edited by
Bechmann, Jan P., 352-256. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Akten des VI. internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche
Philosophie der Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie
médiévale, 29. August-3. September 1977, Bonn
Lejeune, François. 2003. "Pierre Abélard Et Jean De Salisbury :
Metalogicon Ii, 10." In Pierre Abelard. Colloque International De
Nantes, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Habrias, Henri, 63-76. Rennes:
Presses Universitaires de Rennes.
Lenz, Martin. 2005. "Peculiar Perfection. Peter Abelard on
Propositional Attitudes." Journal of the History of Philosophy no.
43:377-386.
"In the course of the debates on Priscian's notion of the perfect
sentence, the philosopher Peter Abelard developed a theory that closely
resembles modern accounts of propositional attitudes and that goes far
beyond the established Aristotelian conceptions of the sentence.
According to Abelard, the perfection of a sentence does not depend on
the content that it expresses, but on the fact that the content is stated
along with the propositional attitude towards the content. This paper
740
tries to provide an analysis and a consistent interpretation of Abelard's
arguments within the framework of the mediaeval models of language
and mind."
———. 2007. "Are Thoughts and Sentences Compositional? A
Controversy between Abelard and a Pupil of Alberic on the
Reconciliation of Ancient Theses on Mind and Language." Vivarium
no. 45:169-188.
"This paper reconstructs a controversy between a pupil of Alberic of
Paris and Peter Abelard which illustrates two competing ways of
reconciling different ancient traditions. I shall argue that their accounts
of the relation between sentences and thoughts are incompatible with
one another, although they rely on the same set of sources. The key to
understanding their different views on assertive and non-assertive
sentences lies in their disparate views about the structure of thoughts:
whereas Abelard takes thoughts to be compositional, the opponent's
arguments seem to rely on the premise that the mental states which
correspond to sentences cannot be compositional in the way that
Abelard suggested. Although, at a first glance, Abelard's position
appears to be more coherent, it turns out that his opponent convincingly
argues against weaknesses in Abelard's semantic theory by proposing a
pragmatic approach."
Lewis, Neil. 1987. "Determinate Truth in Abelard." Vivarium no.
25:81-109.
Libera, Alain de. 1981. "Abélard Et Le Dictisme." In Abélard. Le
"Dialogue", La Philosophie De La Logique, 59-97. Neuchâtel:
Secrétariat de l'Université.
Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, 16-17 Novembre 1979
———. 1996. La Querelle Des Universaux. De Platon À La Fine Du
Moyen Age. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Chapter 3. Le haut Moyen Age et la querelle des universaux pp.128-
175.
———. 1999. L'art Des Généralités. Théories De L'abstraction. Paris:
Aubier.
See in particular: Chapitre III. Pierre Abélard pp. 281-498.
———. 2002. La Référence Vide. Théories De La Proposition. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
La Théorie abélardienne du statut pp. 120-130.
741
———. 2002. "Des Accidents Aux Tropes. Pierre Abélard." Revue de
Mètaphysique et de Morale:509-530.
"The Author traces the history of individual properties from Antiquity
to the Middle Ages in light of D.C. Williams and Campbell's theory of
tropes. He compares the relation of co-presence to notions which could
seem related such as "syndrome of qualities" or "bundle of qualities".
He then examines the validity of ontological particularism for Abelard's
philosophy. He studies the non-transferability of tropes in Boethius,
Abelard, and its origins in Muslim philosophy (ash'ari theology). He
concludes that such an ontological particularism is not necessarily
linked to nominalism."
Little, Edward F. 1969. "The Status of Current Research on Abelard. Its
Implications for the Liberal Arts and Philosophy of the Xith and Xiith
Centuries." In Arts Libéraux Et Philosophie Au Moyen Age, 1119-1124.
Paris: Vrin.
"In the last decade of the eleventh and in the first half of the twelfth
century questions were asked and argued about the unity and trinity of
God, which attracted great attention and led to an independent,
autonomous study of theology in the due course of time. Leaders in this
movement were Anselm, Roscelin and Abelard. Abelard re-introduced
the term "theology" to popular use. Roscelin and Abelard also debated
questions which are still considered philosophical, but at the early date
even their questions of divinity, or of theology, were not differentiated,
other than potentially. The written arguments remaining in our hands
today are firmly based in dialectical and logical and linguistic
operations. In short they are trivial, in a sense of the word which has
gone out of use. In Abelard's case, which concerns us here, it seems for
this reason that all his work should be taken into account in a treatment
of the liberal arts and philosophy in this period, -- even the
"theologies."
What seems needed most of all at the present time is a review of the
state of our knowledge of Abelard's work. The present paper is directed
to this question. After a quick review of modern scholarship, it will
note the work being done at the present time and some appealing lines
for future activity. It should become clear that, while research of the
twentieth century has emphasized Abelard's theology, it has
rediscovered the logical, dialectical, and linguistic foundation of that
742
theology. A tendency is to examine it no longer strictly upon its own
doctrinal merits, but upon its experimental, logical and philosophical
character. This seems appropriate chronologically, in that it evaluates
these works within the loose and formative context of their own time
and aims. While this article is addressed specifically to this conference,
it is also intended to be of use to the general student of Abelard." (p.
1119)
Louis, René, and Jolivet, Jean, eds. 1975. Pierre Abélard, Pierre Le
Vénérable. Les Courants Philosophiques, Littéraires Et Artistiques En
Occident Au Milieu Du 12. Siècle. Abbaye De Cluny, 2 Au 9 Juillet
1972. Paris: Éditions du C.N.R.S.
On the philosophy of Abelard see: Paul Vignaux: Note sur le
nominalisme d'Abélard 523-527 (discussion: 528-530); Jean Jolivet:
Notes de lexicographie abélardienne 531-543 (discussion 544-546);
Lambert-Marie de Rijk: La signification de la proposition (dictum
porpositionis) chez Abélard 547-555; Tullio Gregory: Considérations
sur ratio et natura chez Abélard 569-581 (discussion: 582-584).
Luscombe, David E. 1969. The School of Peter Abelard. The Influence
of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period. Cambridge:
Contents: Preface IX-XI; List of Abbreviations XII-XIII; I. The
Literary Evidence 1; II. Abelard's Followers 14; III: The Diffusion of
Abelardian Writings 60; IV. The Condemnation of 1140 103; V. The
Theological Writings of Abelard's Closest Disciples 143; VI. The
School of Laon 173; VII. Hugh of St Victor 183; VIII. The Summa
Sententiarum 198; IX: Abelard and the Decretum of Gratian 214; X.
Abelard's Disciples and the School of St Victor 224; XI. Peter Lombard
261; XII. Robert of Melun 281; XIII. Richard of St Victor 299; XIV.
Conclusion 308; Appendices 311; Bibliography 316; Index of
Manuscripts 347; General Index 350-360.
"This book represents an historian's attempt to discern the ways in
which Abelard's thought reached and influenced his contemporaries
and successors. The subject has attracted historical study for nearly a
century if we take as a starting point the classic article by Heinrich
Denifle entitled 'Die Sentenzen Abaelards und die Bearbeitungen seiner
Theologia vor Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts' which appeared in the Archiv
fur Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters in 1885. Since
743
that time much further knowledge of Abelard's school and of his
disciples has accumulated and in addition a vast amount of scholarly
energy has been devoted to the task of understanding and of bringing to
life twelfth-century thought and learning in its many aspects and
moods. With respect to Abelard's following it is perhaps a fitting time
to draw together some threads and to offer an interpretation of its place
in the evolution of the early scholastic movement.
The principal sources of this study are literary, biographical,
palaeographical and doctrinal. The occasional surviving literary
references to Abelard which were made in the twelfth century and later
are numerous enough to convey the intensity and the scale of the
disagreements which existed concerning his personality and
achievement. The names of several of his disciples and hearers are also
known and an examination is here attempted of heir relationships to
Abelard as well as of their reactions to his work and thought. However,
information concerning twelfth century personalities is seldom
abundant and much can also be gained from studying the codicology of
Abelard and his school.
The surviving or known manuscripts of writings by Abelard and by his
disciples offer further knowledge of Abelard's readership and following
and therefore also of the general history of formative period in
medieval thought Abelard's public career was closed in 1140 by an
ecclesiastical condemnation. As a condemned heretic whose errors had
been vigorously denounced by, among others, Bernard of Clairvaux,
Abelard's influence upon his age was limited and tainted. That he was
survived by disciples is an established fact, but what was done by these
disciples to develop or to qualify his teaching still requires
examination. It seems that the condemnation of 1140 raised as many
questions as it solved and that the conflicts between Abelard's critics
and his defenders in the schools entailed serious disagreements not only
over outlook and method but also over specific teachings which
continued to be debated in the years that followed. The stimulus which
Abelard gave to the study of particular ideas and themes outlived the
condemnation of 1140 and some of the criticisms which were levelled
against Abelard at this time were an insufficient guide to his
contemporaries. Already within the school of Hugh of St Victor a more
sophisticated and refined study of Abelard's thought was in progress,
744
and it was this which provided the springboard for many future
doctrinal developments. Throughout the 1130s, 40s and sos the
interaction of the rival traditions of the schools of Abelard and of Hugh
is a striking feature of theological discussion. If the Sentences of Peter
Lombard, which enjoyed such a prolonged influence throughout the
medieval period, may be regarded as the climax of continuous activity
by schoolmen during the first half of the twelfth century, then it is clear
that Abelard, for all his exaggerations and errors, was a major and
continuing stimulus to debate and thought.
I have tried in the following pages to illustrate primarily the
development of theological thought in approximately the first half of
the twelfth century by reference not only to Abelard's disciples but also
to major teachers of the various schools of the period such as Gratian of
Bologna, Hugh and Richard of St Victor, Peter Lombard and Robert of
Melun. I have not tried to be exhaustive and much could be said about
the relationship between Abelard and other writers; the Porretans in
particular are little mentioned. So much is added yearly to knowledge
of the literature and thought of this period that much of what appears
below will soon be subject to modification and revision." (from the
Preface, IX-X).
———. 1983. "St. Anselm and Abelard." Anselm Studies.An
Occasional Journal no. 1:207-229.
———. 1988. "Peter Abelard." In A History of Twelfth-Century
Western Philosophy, edited by Dronke, Peter, 279-307. Cambridge:
Chapter 10
———. 1992. "The School of Peter Abelard Revisited." Vivarium no.
30:127-138.
RELATED PAGES
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Second Part: M - Z
Medieval Theories of Supposition and Mental Language
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Contents
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747
Selected Bibliography on Abelard's Logic
and Ontology. Second Part M - Z
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Malcolm, John. 1979. "A Reconsideration of the Identity and Inherence
Theories of the Copula." Journal of the History of Philosophy no.
17:383-400.
Maloney, Christopher J. 1982. "Abailard's Theory of Universals."
"This paper attempts to fill these lacunae with a formal reconstruction
of Abailard's theory of the relation between statuses, concepts and
individuals. As such, this essay is a contribution not only to the history
of medieval logic but also to the theory of universals and the
philosophy of mind."
Marenbon, John. 1991. "Abelard's Concept of Possibility." In Historia
Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Des
Mittelalters. Festschrift Für Kurt Flasch Zu Seinem 60. Geburtstag.
(Vol. Ii), edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf, 595-609.
Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.
Reprinted as Essay X in: John Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic,
Platonism, and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West.
———. 1992. "Vocalism, Nominalism and the Commentaries on the
Categories from the Earlier Twelfth Century." Vivarium no. 30:51-61.
Reprinted as Essay XIII in: John Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic,
———. 1992. "Abelard, Ens and Unity." Topoi no. 11:149-158.
"Although Abelard arrived at a view of "ens" nearer to Aristotle's than
his sources would suggest, unlike Thirteenth-century thinkers he did
not work out a view of transcendentals in terms of "ens", its attributes
and their convertibility. He did, however, regard unity (though not
goodness or truth) as an attribute of everything. At first, Abelard
suggested that unity, being inseparable, could not be an accident
748
according to Porphyry's definition (' that which can come and leave a
subject without the subject being corrupted') either it is some type of
form not classified by Porphyry, or not a form at all. In his later logical
work, Abelard argued differently. Unity, he said, is an accidental form,
but Porphyry's definition of an accident must be understood negatively,
not as asserting something about what could happen in reality (since the
form of unity could never leave its subject) but rather something about
an absence of connection: were it, per impossible, to occur, the loss by
a subject of its form of unity would not lead to the loss of its specific or
generic status."
———. 1993. "Medieval Latin Commentaries and Glosses on
Aristotelian Logical Texts, before C. 1150 A.D." In Glosses and
Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and
Medieval Latin Traditions, edited by Burnett, Charles, 77-127. London:
Warburg Institute, University of London.
Reprinted as Essay II in: John Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic,
———. 1997. "Glosses and Commentaries on the Categories and De
Interpretatione before Abelard." In Dialektik Und Rhetorik Im
Früheren Und Hohen Mittelalter. Rezeption, Überlieferung Und
Gesellschaftliche Wirkung Antiker Gelehrsamkeit Vornehmlich Im 9.
Und 12. Jahrhundert, edited by Fried, Johannes, 21-49. München:
Oldenbourg.
Reprinted as Essay X in: John Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic,
———. 1997. The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. Cambridge:
Cambrdige University Press.
Paperback edition, with corrections and bibliographical note, 1999.
———. 1997. "The Platonisms of Peter Abelard." In Néoplatonisme Et
Philosophie Médiévale, edited by Benakis, Linos G., 109-129.
Turnhout: Brepols.
Actes du Colloque international de Corfou, 6-8 octobre 1995 organisé
par la Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale.
Reprinted as Essay XII in: John Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic,
"When, in 1966, Father Chenu published Les platonismes au XII siècle,
twelfth-century Platonism had already been a topic of scholarly interest
749
for nearly a century. (1) Chenu's novelty lay in his plural: not
«Platonism» but «Platonisms». He distinguished a strand going back to
Augustine, another deriving from the Timaeus and Boethius, one linked
to pseudo-Dionysius and another to Arab writers. Chenu's is a useful
analytical method which allows the scholar to avoid broad,
oversimplifying labels whilst continuing to see the history of medieval
philosophy in the neat terms of interrelated and interacting traditions.
No doubt it could be fruitfully applied to Abelard -- but that is not my
intention here. The Platonisms I shall be discussing are not those of the
historian, but Abelard' s own: some of the diverse ways in which he
used a notion of Plato and Platonic teaching to formulate, structure and
convey his own thought (2). At the end of this paper, I shall return to
the question of method, and ask what my procedure has to offer by
contrast with other ways of discussing Platon- or any other -ism."
(1) In M.-D. Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle (Études de
philosophie médiévale, 45). Paris, 1966, pp. 108-141. For a sketch of
the historiography of twelfth-century Platonism, see J. Marenbon,
"Platonismus im zwólften Jahrhundert: alte und neue Zugangsweisen"
(translation by A. Snell & O. Summerell), in T. Kobusch and B.
Moisisch (eds.), Platon in der abendländischen Geistesgeschichte, neue
Forschungen zum Plaumismus, Darmstadt, forthcoming. [Darmstadt,
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997 pp. 101-119]
(2) In my general presentation of Abelard's use of Plato and attitude to
him, I summarize arguments put forward in various places and different
contexts in my The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. Cambridge, 1997. But
in my longer and more detailed discussions here -- of Plato universals,
the Timaeus and optimism, and «the Platonism of the Republic» -- I
develop and extend what I have written in the book.
———. 1998. "The Twelfth Century." In Routledge History of
Philosophy. Volume Iii: Medieval Philosophy, edited by Marenbon,
John, 150-187. New York: Routledge.
On Abelard see pp. 155-166.
———. 1999. "Abélard, La Predication Et Le Verbe "Être"." In
Langage, Sciences, Philosophie Au Xiie Siècle, edited by Biard, Joël,
———. 2000. Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early
Medieval Philosophy in the West. Aldershot: Ashgate.
750
———. 2004. "Dicta, Assertion and Speech Acts: Abelard and Some
Modern Interpreters." In Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-
Assertive Language, edited by Maierù, Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 59-
80. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.
Semantics - Rome, June 11-15, 2002.
———. 2005. Le Temps, L'éternité Et La Prescience De Boèce À
Thomas D'Aquin. Paris: Vrin.
Chapitre III: Abélard pp. 55-93.
———. 2006. "The Rediscovery of Peter Abelard's Philosophy."
Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 44:331-351.
"My article surveys philosophical discussions of Abelard over the last
twenty years. Although Abelard has been a well-known figure for
centuries, his most important logical works were published only in the
twentieth century and, so I argue, the rediscovery of him as an
important philosopher is recent and continuing. I concentrate especially
on work that shows Abelard as the re-discoverer of propositional logic
(Chris Martin); as a subtle explorer of problems about modality (Simo
Knuuttila, Herbert Weidemann) and semantics (Klaus Jacobi); as a
metaphysician before the reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Peter
King); and as an ethical thinker who echoes the Stoics (Calvin
Normore) and anticipates Kant (Peter King)."
———. 2007. "Abelard's Changing Thoughts on Sameness and
Difference in Logic and Theology." American Catholic Philosophical
———. 2008. "Was Abelard a Trope Theorist?" In Compléments De
Substance. Études Sur Les Propriétés Accidentelles Offertes À Alain De
Libera, edited by Erismann, Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine,
"It was Christopher Martin who, in 1992, first made the link between
Abelard's views on accidents and differentiae and what are usually
called, in contemporary analytical ontology, 'tropes'. Myself apart,
Alain de Libera is the only writer I know who has taken serious notice
of this idea, discussing it both on its own, and in the wider context of
truth-makers and empty reference.(1) De Libera does not think that
Abelard can illuminatingly be described as a trope-theorist. I still
disagree, and although our disagreement is based on matters of detail, it
751
may illustrate, as I suggest in the conclusion, a wider difference in
approach."
I. C. Martin, 'The Logic of the Nominales, or, The Rise and Fall of
Impossible Positio', Vivarium 30 (1992), 110-26; J. Marenbon, The
Philosophy of Peter Abelard, Cambridge; CUP, 1997, 119-30; A. de
Libera, 'Des accidents aux tropes. Pierre Abélard', Revue de
métaphysique et de morale 4 (2002) 509-30; La Référence vide.
Théories de la proposition, Paris; PUF, 2002, 122-6, 269-97.
———. 2013. Abelard in Four Dimensions. A Twelfth-Century
Philosopher in His Context and Ours. Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press.
Markowski, Mieczyslaw. 1971. Burydanizm W Polsce W Okresie
Prezedkopernikanskim. Warsaw: Zaklad Narodowy Imienia
Ossolinskich (Ossolineum).
The book is in Polish, but with Contents (pp. 635-637) and Summary
(pp. 531-539) in English: Buridanism in Poland in the Pre-Copernican
Times.
Martin, Christopher J. 1986. "William's Machine." Journal of
William of Soissons and Abelard's theory of entailment.
———. 1987. "Something Amazing About the Peripatetic of Pallet:
Abelard's Development of Boethius' Account of Conditional
Propositions." Argumentation no. 1:419-436.
"Mediaeval logicians inherited from Boethius an account of conditional
propositions and the syllogisms which may be constructed using them.
In the following paper it is shown that there are considerable
difficulties with Boethius' account which arise from his failure to
understand the nature of compound propositions and in particular to
provide for their negation. Boethius suggests that there are two
different conditions which may be imposed for the truth of a
conditional proposition but he really gives no adequate account of how
such propositions may be obtained. The true greatness of Peter
Abaelard as a philosophical logician is revealed in what he is able to do
with the material which he found in Boethius. It is shown that he
developed a precise theory of conditionals giving an account of how
true conditionals may be obtained and principles which may be used to
reject others as false. Unlike Boethius Abaelard properly appreciates
752
that conjunctions must be treated as logical units. Even he, however,
falls victim to difficulties which arise when this connective is brought
into contact with negation and the conditions which he lays down for
the truth of a conditional."
———. 1987. "Embarrassing Arguments and Surprising Conclusions
in the Development of Theories of the Conditional in the Twelfth
Century." In Gilbert De Poitiers Et Ses Contemporains: Aux Origines
De La Logica Modernorum, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Libera, Alain
de, 377-400. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
———. 1992. "The Logic of the "Nominales", or the Rise and Fall of
Impossible Positio." Vivarium no. 30:110-126.
———. 1999. Theories of Inference and Entailment in the Middle Ages
(Boethius, Philoponus, Peter Abelard, John Duns Scotus, William of
Ockham), Princeton University.
Express.
———. 2001. "Abaelard on Modality: Some Possibilities and Some
Puzzles." In Potentialität Und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in Der
Geschichte Der Metaphysik, edited by Buchheim, Thomas, Henri,
Kneepkens Corneille and Lorenz, Kuno, 97-125. Stuttgart: Frommann-
Holzboog.
"In his monumental study of William of Sherwood's modal theory
Klaus Jacobi (2) surveys the treatment of modality by philosophers in
the preceding century and shows that their concern was for the most
part to calculate the logical relations between the various forms of
modal proposition which they recognised. Although theology
demanded that they take an interest in the nature of divine power,
without the Physics and Metaphysics, to prompt them, twelfth century
philosophers generally had little to say on the relationship of modal
propositions and their structures to the various sources of modal claims,
to claims, for example, about the nature of potentiality, physical
causation, or action.(3) Some progress was made, however, and in the
present paper I will consider the contribution of Peter Abaelard to the
development of theories of modality and the curious attitude of one of
his followers to his work on modal logic.
Although Abaelard had no access to the Physics or Metaphysics and
precious little, if any, to the Prior Analytics,(4) he did find in the
753
Categories and De Interpretatione texts which posed interpretive
problems whose solution demanded that he discuss the nature of
possibility and necessity. What follows is for the most part an
examination of certain points made by Abaelard in his discussion of
these problems. It is divided into two parts.
In the first part of the paper I propose an account of Abaelard's theory
of possibility and its application both to creatures and to God.(5)
Abaelard's claims about divine power are rather well known and I
mention them only very briefly at the end. His treatment of creaturely
potentiality in commenting on various claims made by Aristotle in the
Categories has, on the other hand, barely been noticed and my concern
in the first part of the paper is to thus set them out in some detail.
The failure to take into account the full range of Abaelard's thinking
about potentiality has led to some very misleading claims about his
views on possibility. What my investigation shows is that Abaelard
employs three different but related notions of potentiality. The first is
the potentiality that an individual has for future action and it is
constrained by its species nature, its particular constitution, and its
present circumstances. The second and third are both introduced to
explain how we may legitimately say, as authority requires, that an
amputee is bipedal. They are different but both reduce all unqualified
possibility to potentiality and all potentiality to compatibility with
species nature. The unqualified possibilities open for an individual
creature of a given natural kind are thus for anything which is not
incompatible with its species nature.
In the second part of the paper I first examine the account of modal
propositions that Abaelard insists upon in discussing chapter 12 of De
Interpretatione. I show that this account of the semantics of such
propositions is completely in agreement with his treatment of the
source of modal properties in natures. In his treatment of modal
propositions Abaelard famously distinguishes between two different
interpretations of propositions such as 'S is possibly P'. A personal, or
'de re' reading, in which S is said to possess a power to be P, and an
impersonal, or 'de sensu' reading in which 'S's being P' is claimed to be
possible where the nominal phrase is held to refer to a proposition,
propositional content, or some other kind of entity. Abaelard argues
that only the de re reading yields a modal claim and that nominal
754
modes are to be resolved into the corresponding adverbial modes. The
truth conditions of modal propositions are thus always, according to
Abaelard, ultimately to be given in terms of what is compatible and
what is not with the specific nature of the subject of the de re reading of
them.
Information about the fate of Abaelard's theories and the views of his
followers is unfortunately very limited and it is pleasant to be able to
add here to our knowledge. The texts that we have on divine and
creaturely power agree with Abaelard's teaching in reducing
unqualified potentiality to compatibility with species nature. In the
concluding part of my paper, however, I show that the author of the
Summa Dialectice Artis attributed to William of Lucca, otherwise an
extremely devoted follower of Abaelard in logic, explicitly rejects his
master's de re account of modality in favour of the alternative de sensu
reading which Abaelard had gone to great lengths to refute. The Summa
thus leaves us with a considerable puzzle about the commitment of
Abaelard's followers in logic to his theory of modality. As
compensation for this, we will see that the Summa also provides us with
a solution to a small puzzle raised by Jacobi and Knuuttila concerning
Abaelard's views on the logical relations between quantified modal
propositions." pp. 97-99
(2) Klaus Jacobi, Die Modalbegriffe in den logischen Schriften des
Wilhelm von Shyreswood, Leiden 1980.
(3) The outstanding exception is St. Anselm's discussion of the logic of
action sentences in the Lambeth Fragments printed in R. W. Southern
and F. S. Schmitt, Memorials of St. Anselm, London 1969, 333-354.
(4) Cf. Dialectica, Introduction,XIII-XIX. The evidence that Abaelard
had direct access to the Prior Analytics is extremely slight. The
Dialectica contains what appear to be two quotations from the Prior
Analytics, the definition of the syllogism from An. Pr. I 1, 24b 18-22 at
Dialectica, 232.5-8 and the distinction between perfect and imperfect
syllogisms from An. Pr. I 1, 24b 22-25 at Dialectica, 233.36-234.3. In
the discussion following the definition of the syllogism, however,
Abaelard refers not to the definition which he apparently quotes from
Aristotle but rather to the definition given by Boethius in De
Syllogismo Categorico II (PL 64, 821A 7 - 822C 12).
(5) Hermann Weidemann, 'Zur Semantik der Modalbegriffe bei Peter
755
Abaelard', in: Medioevo 7 (1981), 1-40, argues that Abaelard thinks of
possibility in this way but he does so very much the hard way by
attempting to show that Abaelard's remarks on temporally determined
modal sentences commit
him to it. Here I take the very much easier course of pointing out
Abaelard's explicit statement of the theory of synchronous possibility in
terms of alternative world histories.
———. 2003. "The Role of Categories in the Development of
Abelard's Theory of Possibility." In La Tradition Médiévale Des
Catégories (Xii-Xv Siècles), edited by Biard, Joël and Rosier-Catach,
Irène, 225-242. Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters.
Actes du XIII Symposium européen de logique et sémantique
médiévales (Avignon, 6-10 juin 2000).
———. 2004. "Logic." In The Cambridge Companion to Abelard,
edited by Brower, Jeffrey E. and Guilfoy, Kevin, 158-199. Cambridge:
"A great deal of Peter Abelard's writing is concerned with what he
regarded as logic, but which we would now classify as ontology or
philosophical semantics. Following Cicero and Boethius, Abelard holds
that properly speaking the study of logic has to do with the discovery
and evaluation of arguments (LI Isag. 3.10). A necessary preliminary
for this is an examination of the issues dealt with by Porphyry in the
Isagoge and by Aristotle in the Categories, and De interpretatione (LI
Cat. 113.26-114.30). In the present chapter, however, I will ignore
most of this material and concentrate on the central issue of logical
theory both for Abelard and for us, that is, on the nature of the relation
of consequence, or following. Even with this limitation there is a great
deal of ground to cover. Abelard sets out his theory of entailment and
argument in two very extended and dense discussions both of which
have suffered considerable textual corruption. The treatment of topics
and hypothetical syllogisms in the Dialectica, is apparently the earlier.
The other is the surviving fragment of Abelard's commentary on
Boethius's De topicis differentiis, Glossae super De topicis differentiis,
which seems to belong with his other commentaries on the works of the
logica vetus published as the Logica "ingredientibus." The two
expositions disagree on some crucial questions, but here I will restrict
myself almost entirely to the discussion in the Dialectica.".
756
———. 2007. "Denying Conditionals: Abaelard and the Failure of
Boethius' Account of the Hypothetical Syllogism." Vivarium no.
45:153-168.
———. 2009. "Imposition and Essence: What's New in Abaelard'
Theory of Meaning?" In The Word in Medieval Logic, Theology and
Psychology. Acts of the Xiiith International Colloquium of the Société
Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale, Kyoto, 27
September - 1 October 2005, edited by Shimizu, Tetsuro and Burnett,
Charles, 173-212. Turnhout: Brepols.
McLaughlin, Mary Martin. 1969. "Abelard's Conceptions of the Liberal
Arts and Philosophy." In Arts Libéraux Et Philosophie Au Moyen Age,
Meinhardt, Helmut. 1981. "Die Philosophie Des Peter Abaelard." In
Die Renaissance Der Wissenschaften Im 12. Jahrhundert, edited by
Weimar, Peter, 107-121. Zürich: Artemis Verlag.
Mews, Constant J. 1984. "A Neglected Gloss on the Isagoge by Peter
Abelard." Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie no.
31:35-55.
Reprinted as Essay II in: Constant J. Mews, Abelard and his Legacy.
"The authorship is examined of the anonymous "Glossae secundum
vocales" on the "Isagoge" of Porphyry in m s Milan, Bibl. Ambrosiana
m63 sup. ff. 73-81v along side known glosses of Abelard ("Logica
ingredientibus"). Geyer's attribution of the work of a pupil is
questioned. It is shown to contain a recension of Abelard's glosses on
Porphyry transitional between "Ingredientibus" and "Nostrorum
petitioni". Its discussion of identity and difference influences that of the
"Theologia summi boni". "
———. 1986. "On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard." Archives
d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age no. 60:73-134.
Reprinted as Essay VII in: Constant J. Mews, Abelard and his Legacy.
———. 1986. "The Sententiae of Peter Abelard." Recherches de
Théologie Ancienne et Mèdiévale no. 52:130-183.
Reprinted as Essay VI in: Constant J. Mews, Abelard and his Legacy.
———. 1987. "Aspects of the Evolution of Peter Abaelard's Thought
on Signification and Predication." In Gilbert De Poitiers Et Ses
Contemporains. Aux Origines De La 'Logica Modernorum', edited by
Jolivet, Jean and Libera, Alain de, 15-41. Napoli: Biblioplis.
757
Actes du septième Symposium Européen d'histoire de la logique et de
la sémantique médiévales, Poitiers, 17-22 Juin 1985.
Reprinted as Essay VIII in: Constant J. Mews, Abelard and his Legacy,
———. 1992. "Nominalism and Theology before Abaelard: New Light
on Roscelin of Compiègne." Vivarium no. 30:4-33.
Reprinted as Essay VII in: C. J. Mews, Reason and Belief in the Age of
Roscelin and Abelard.
———. 1994. "Philosophy and Theology 1100-1150: The Search for
Harmony." In Le Xiie Siècle: Mutations Et Renoveau En France Dans
La Première Moité Du Xiie Siècle, edited by Gasparri, Françoise, 159-
203. Paris: Léopard d'Or.
Reprinted as Essay II in: C. J. Mews, Reason and Belief in the Age of
Roscelin and Abelard.
See in particular: William of Champeaux and Peter Abelard pp. 168-
173.
———. 1995. "Peter Abelard." In Authors of the Middle Ages. Vol. Ii N
° 5-6, edited by Geary, Patrick J., 1-88. Aldershot: Ashgate.
———. 2001. Abelard and His Legacy. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Contents: I.The development of the Theologia of Peter Abelard; II. A
neglected gloss on the Isagoge by Peter Abelard; III. Man's knowledge
of God according to Peter Abelard; IV. The lists of heresies imputed to
Peter Abelard; V. Peter Abelard's Theologia Christiana and Theologia
'Scholarium' re-examined; VI. The Sententie of Peter Abelard; VII. On
dating the works of Peter Abelard; VIII. Aspects of the evolution of
Peter Abaelard's thought on signification and predication; IX. Un
lecteur de Jérôme au XIIe siècle: Pierre Abélard; X. Peter Abelard and
the Enigma of Dialogue; Addenda; Indexes.
———. 2002. Reason and Belief in the Age of Roscelin and Abelard.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
———. 2003. "Peter Abelard on Dialectic, Rhetoric, and the Principles
of Argument." In Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100-1540.
Essays in Honour of John O. Ward, edited by Mews, Constant J.,
Nederman, Cary J. and Thomson, Rodney M., 37-53. Turnhout:
Brepols.
———. 2005. Abelard and Heloise. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
See the following Chapters:
758
2. The early years: Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux
pp-21-42
"This chapter examines Abelard's intellectual debt to both the vocalist
theories of Roscelin of Compiègne and William of Champeaux's
teaching about dialectic in shaping his philosophical nominalism. By
looking at the earliest records of Abelard's teaching of dialectic and
glosses on Aristotle, Porphyry and Boethius, it observes how students
identified him as an iconoclast teacher, who quickly provoked laughter
by the examples that he chose. It traces how Abelard's early conflict
with his teachers laid the foundation for the subsequent difficulties he
would experience in his career."
3. Challenging tje Tradition: the Dialectica pp. 43-57
"This chapter examines Abelard's Dialectica, his first major treatise on
dialectic. The treatise is structured around an analysis both of the major
parts of speech, categories and of different kinds of argument,
categorical and hypothetical. It argues that a driving theme is Abelard's
desire to counter the philosophically realist arguments presented by
William of Champeaux."
5. Returning to Logica pp. 81-100
"This chapter examines the Logica 'Ingredientibus', a series of
commentaries on Porphyry, Aristotle, and Boethius more profound than
any of his earlier glosses. I argue that in these commentaries Abelard
adopts a much more profound theory of universals and of other parts of
speech than in the Dialectica. Rather than emphasizing differences of
opinion with William of Champeaux, they demonstrate how far
Abelard had come to distance himself from the arguments of Boethius.
Instead of speaking uniquely about dialectic, he is now interested in
logica, the arts of language in general."
Mews, Constant J., and Jolivet, Jean. 1990. "Peter Abelard and His
Influence." In Contemporary Philosophy. Vol. 6.1: Philosophy and
Science in the Middle Ages, edited by Guttorm, Floistad, 105-140.
Amsterdam: Kluwer.
"This chronicle is based on one prepared by Jean Jolivet, reviewing
literature on Abelard up to 1972; I have updated it to take into account
publications which have appeared 1972-1985" (p. 105).
Moonan, Lawrence. 1989. "Abelard's Use of the Timaeus." Archives
d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age no. 56:7-90.
759
Nicolau d'Olwer, Lluís. 1945. "Sur La Date De La Dialectica
D'Abélard." Revue du Moyen Âge Latin no. 1:375-390.
Normore, Calvin G. 1992. "Abelard and the School of the Nominales."
Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1973. Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and
North-Holland.
"This is the first part of a history of those problems and theories in the
domain of philosophical semantics which nowadays are commonly
referred to as problems and theories about the nature and the status of
propositions."
See in particular chapter 9.
Panaccio, Claude. 1999. "Le Nominalisme Au Xiie Siècle." In Signs
and Signification. Vol. I, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti,
Pinzani, Roberto. 1983. "Homerus Est Poeta - an Non. Questioni Di
Presupposizione Esistenziale Nella Logica Di Abelardo." Annali del
Dipartimento di Filosofia.Università di Bologna no. 4:87-96.
———. 1983. "Le "Propositiones Coniunctae Temporales" Nel De
Ypoteticis Di Abelardo." In Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia
Della Logica, edited by Abrusci, Michele, Casari, Ettore and Mugnai,
———. 1986. "Temi Filosofici Nella Logica Di Abelardo." Annali di
Discipline Filosofiche dell'Università di Bologna no. 8:165-188.
———. 1989. "Un Approccio Semantico Alla Dialettica Di Abelardo."
In Le Teorie Delle Modalità. Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di
Storia Della Logica, edited by Corsi, Giovanni, Mangione, Corrado and
Mugnai, Massimo, 265-270. Bologna: CLUEB.
———. 1991. "Oggetto E Significato Nella Dialettica Di Abelardo."
Medioevo.Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale no. 17:125-138.
———. 1992. La Grammatica Logica Di Abelardo. Parma: Università
degli Studi di Parma.
———. 1992. "Linguaggio E Teoria in Abelardo." Philo-Logica no.
1:79-94.
———. 1993. "La Sintassi Logica Di Abelardo." Philo-Logica no. 2-
3:91-112.
760
———. 2003. The Logical Grammar of Abelard. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Reiners, Jos. 1910. Der Nominalismus in Der Frühscholastik. Ein
Beitrag Zur Geschichte Der Universalienfrage Im Mittelalter; Nebst
Einer Neuen Textausgabe Des Briefes Roscelins an Abälard.
Ascvhendorff: Münster.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1975. "La Signification De La Proposition
(Dictum Propositionis) Chez Abélard." In Pierre Abélard - Pierre Le
Vénérable. Les Courants Philosophiques, Littéraires Et Artistiques En
Occident Au Milieu Du Xii Siècle, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis,
René, 547-555. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche
scientifique.
Actes et mémoires du Colloque International, Abbaye de Cluny, 2 au 9
juillet 1972.
Published also in: Studia Mediewistyczne 16, 1975 pp. 155-161.
Reprinted as chapter IV in: L. M. de Rijk - Through language to
reality: studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics - Edited by Bos
Egbert. Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.
"Cette communication se borne a un bref examen de la signification de
la phrase complète (propositio) dans la logique de Pierre Abélard.
Il paraît utile de commencer par la définition du verbe signifier
(significare) chez ce logicien.
'signifier' dit des mots (dictiones) c'est produire une intellection dans
l'âme de l'auditeur (Logica ingredientibus 307, 30 ss.), tandis que le
même verbe est également appliqué à la dénotàtion des choses
extérieures (ibid.); dans ce dernier sens, le verbe est synonyme de
appellare, nominare, demonstrare, designare.
'signifier' dit des phrases complètes (propositiones) c'est produire une
intellection laquelle est formée par la liaison des intellections de ses
parties (dictiones)." p. 547
"On peut conclure que selon Abélard le dictum n'est pas un objet qui
serait indépendent de la pensée, mais plutôt le contenu de la pensée,
c'est-à-dire une intellection objectivée, qui correspond soit à un état de
choses réel, soit à un état de choses seulement possible (Dial. II, 205,
28-30: id dicimus quod id quod dicit hec propositio 'Socrates est homo',
est unum de his que natura patitur esse), soit un état de choses tout à
fait impossible (Dial. II, 158, 7-9: la proposition 'Socrates est lapis' ne
reflète pas une inherentia de Socrate et de pierre, ni 'Socrates non est
761
lapis' leur rémotion).
(...)
Ainsi, l'existence qu'établit la proposition en parlant, n'est pas une
existence réelle, mais, pourrait-on dire, une existence parlée, ou plutôt,
une existence pensée ou logique.
Employant la distinction bien connue du XIV siècles (presentée
notamment par Jacques d'Ascoli, Thomas d'York, Pierre Thomae):
res: 1) extra animam (chose extérieure); 2) in anima: a) subiective ( =
acte de l'intellection comme tel) b) obiective (contenu de l'intellection).
on peut dire qu'Abélard a essayé, à sa façon, de montrer que le dictum,
de la proposition, loin d'être une chose extérieure (res extra animam)
est une chose qui doit son existence à l'âme ou a l'intellection (res in
anima), mais qu'il faut en même temps bien le distinguer de l'acte de
l'intellection pris comme tel (res in anima subiective), et reconnaître, sa
propre identité dans le contenu objectif de l'intellection. Par là, le
dictum du grand logicien du XII siècle semble être d'une nature logique
par excellence." pp. 554-555. (notes omitted)
———. 1980. "The Semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the
Problem of Universals." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person,
Werk Und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 139-151. Trier:
Paulinus-Verlag.
Reprinted as chapter III in: L. M. de Rijk, Through Language to
Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics, Edited by Bos
Egbert, Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.
———. 1980. "Peter Abälard (1079-1142), Meister Und Opfer Des
Scharfsinns." In Petrus Abaelardus, 1079-1142. Person, Werk Und
Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 125-138. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.
1979).
Reprinted as chapter II in: L. M. de Rijk - Through language to reality:
studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics - Edited by Bos Egbert.
Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.
———. 1981. "Abailard's Semantic Views in the Light of Later
Developments." In English Logic and Semantics from the End of the
12th Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, edited by
Braakhuis, Henk A.G., Henri, Kneepkens Corneille and Rijk,
Lambertus Marie de, 1-58. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
762
Acts of the 4th European Symposium of medieval logic and semantics.
Leiden-Nijmegen, 23-27 April 1979.
Reprinted as chapter VI in: L. M. de Rijk, Through Language to
Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics, Edited by Bos
Egbert, Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.
———. 1985. "Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard: Some Criticisms of a
Fascinating Venture." Vivarium no. 23:81-97.
"Mr. Tweedale's study is bound to give any of his readers the firm
impression that, as logician, Peter Abailard has accomplished a
tremendous achievement. Unfortunately, however, Tweedale, (...) is on
the wrong track in claiming-throughout his study that the modern
interpreter has to 'ferret' Abailard's answers out of 'rather obscure
passages' (p. 7), and that he is inconsistent (p. X and passim). Tweedale
has failed to appreciate Abailard's lucidity and clear language. He has
missed the point several times and more than once this is due to his
defective knowledge of Latin. However, let me not move too hurriedly
to my conclusion.
In writing this book, the author had two main objectives in mind, as we
learn from the Preface. First, 'to present in a form easily accessible to
professional philosophers, theologians and historians those scattered
portions of Abailard's logical writings which seem to record a very
original scrutiny of the foundations of logic and in particular the
problem of unversals'. Secondly, 'to interpret the texts in a way that
would connect them with the ancient tradition and also make them
intelligible to contemporary philosophers.' So chapters I and II try to
give an insight into the classical and post-classical background. The
core of the essay is to be found in Chapters III-V; Chapter VI contains
a comparison between Abailard and Frege.
Without doubt, the author has succeeded in enlarging the modern
scholar's acquaintance with, and admiration of, Abailard as a logician
and early Medieval philosopher and theologian. Even someone who has
had only a glimpse of the contents of this rich essay, cannot help
experiencing a kind of thrill on realising that he is meeting in Peter
Abailard a remarkable and original thinker.
However, to write a successful book something more is needed. To my
mind the author was heavily hampered in realising the two objectives
he had set himself, as a result of his poor knowledge of (both classical
763
and Medieval) Latin grammar and syntax. Sometimes his judgment of
Abailard's achievements is incorrect, for no other reason than his
inability to correctly read Abailard's concise language." pp. 81-82
———. 1986. "Peter Abelard's Semantics and His Doctrine of Being."
———. 1992. "Peter Abelard (1079-1142)." In Philosophy of
Language/Sprachphilosophie/La Philosophie Du Langage. Eine
Internationales Handbuch Zeitgenössicher Forschung, edited by
Dascal, Marcelo, Gerhardus, Dietfried, Lorenz, Kuno and Meggle,
Georg, 290-296. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
First volume
Duns Scotus, and Radulphus Brito." In Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in
the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition, edited by
Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Henri, Kneepkens Corneille, 207-233.
Rosier-Catach, Irène. 1999. "La Notion De Translatio, Le Principe De
Compositionalité Et L'analyse De La Prédication Accidentelle Chez
Abélard." In Langage, Sciences, Philosophie Au Xiie Siècle, edited by
Biard, Joël, 125-164. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2000. "La Sémantique D'Abélard En Contexte (1) : La Notion
De 'Translatio'." Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes
(Section des Sciences Religieuses) no. 107:361-367.
———. 2001. "La Sémantique D'Abélard En Contexte (2) : Sur Le
Verbe Substantif Et La Prédication." Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des
Hautes Etudes (Section des Sciences Religieuses) no. 108:361-367.
———. 2002. "Abelard and the Meaning of the Propositions." In
Signification in Language and Culture, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh,
23-49. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
Acts of the cooloquium held at Shimla, India, October 2001.
———. 2003. "Variations Médiévales Sur L'opposition Entre
Signification "Ad Placitum" Et Signification Naturelle." In Aristotle's
Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Henri, Kneepkens
Corneille, 165-205. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
———. 2003. "Abélard Et Les Grammairiens: Sur La Définition Du
Verbe Et La Notion D'inhérence." In La Tradition Vive. Mélanges
764
D'histoire Des Textes En L'honneur De Louis Holtz, edited by Pierre,
Lardet, 143-159. Turnhout: Brepols.
———. 2003. "Priscien, Boèce, Les Glosulae in Priscianum, Abélard:
Les Enjeux Des Discussions Autour De La Notion De
Consignification." Histoire Épistémologie Langage no. 25:55-84.
"The term syncategorema, translated by consignificantia, only exists in
Greek in the Latin Institutiones of the grammarian Priscien, and is
introduced in the XIIth century in the grammatical commentaries, the
couple of terms syncategorema / categorema emerging even later, at
the end of the XIIth century. Thus the discussions first focus on the
terms connected to consignificare. The antique heritage is multiple and
diversified. Priscien uses, in a contradictory way, a functional criterium
(a part which is not one of the main parts of speech is consignifying), a
semantic criterium (to be a part of speech is to indicate a concept of the
mind), a criterium of autonomous meaning (something is said to
consignify if it does not signify by itself). Boethius uses the notion in
five different ways, applying to various terms or morphemes:
prepositions and conjunctions, parts of a compound, tense, the verb to
be, quantifiers. The Glosulae on Priscian, at the end of the XIth
century, and especially in the later revision by William of Champeaux,
claim that the consignifying parts signify the thing signified by the
word to which they are attached. Abelard, reading those gloses,
hesitates: the grammarian's solution is not satisfactory, but if, as
Boethius wants it, the consignifying parts did not have any meaning,
then it would not be possible to explain the semantic role they have in
the intellection of the whole proposition. He will thus devise a really
innovative solution, which he applies first to the copula and then
extends to the other consignifying parts: they correspond to a mental
act."
———. 2003. "Abélard Et Les Grammairiens: Sur Le Verbe Substantif
Et La Prédication." Vivarium no. 41:175-248.
———. 2004. "Les Discussions Sur Le Signifié Des Propositions Chez
Abélard Et Ses Contemporains." In Medieval Theories on Assertive and
Non-Assertive Language, edited by Maierù, Alfonso and Valente,
Luisa, 1-34. Firenze: Olschki.
765
———. 2007. "Priscian on Divine Ideas and Mental Conceptions: The
Discussions in the Glosulae in Priscianum, the Notae Dunelmenses,
William of Champeaux and Abelard." Vivarium no. 45:219-237.
"Priscian's Institutiones Grammaticae, which rely on Stoic and
Neoplatonic sources, constituted an important, although quite
neglected, link in the chain of transmission of ancient philosophy in the
Middle Ages. There is, in particular, a passage where Priscian discusses
the vexed claim that common names can be proper names of the
universal species and where he talks about the ideas existing in the
divine mind. At the beginning of the 12th century, the anonymous
Glosulae super Priscianum and the Notae Dunelmenses, which heavily
quote William of Champeaux (as master G.), interpret the passage in
the context of a growing interest in the problem of universals, raising
semantic as well as ontological questions, and introducing a Platonic
view on universals in the discussions on the signification of the noun.
Moreover, this same passage will be used by Abelard to elaborate one
of his opinions about the signification of universal or common names-
that they signify "mental conceptions".
Schüssler, Ursula. 1973. "Das Verhältnis Der Dialektik Peter Abaelards
Zur Modernen Logik." Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch no. 9:39-47.
Seuren, Pieter Albertus Maria. 2009. Language in Cognition. New
Volume I of Language from Within.
Summary of the two volumes: "Volume I begins by setting up certain
central principles of the natural ontology according to which humans
develop a theory of the actual world with the help of nonactual,
thought-up 'worlds' or, better, situations. It then presents a view of how
language expresses thoughts developed in terms of this natural
ontology, with an emphasis on the mechanism of reference not only to
extensional, actually existing objects but also to intensional, thought-up
objects. An important aspect, elaborated in Chapter 4, is the fact that
human communication does not, as is usually thought, consist in the
transfer of propositionally structured information, but, rather, in a
socially binding form of position-taking with respect to such
information.
We then go on to a discussion of the general semantic aspects of
language in the context of the total ecological 'architecture' of language,
766
mind, and world.
This leads to a cursory tour of lexical meaning and of the ways lexical
meanings are structured so as to make linguistic utterances fit into
given contexts or discourses.
Concentrating again on propositional content, basic principles of logic
are introduced in Volume II, although not in the traditional fashion. A
new and unconventional view of logic is developed there, in which the
logical constants are treated as lexical items, in fact as lexical
predicates, with the special property that their meanings allow for the
computation of entailments. It is argued that this reduction of logic to
lexical meaning shows better than anything else the relevance of logic
and logical analysis for the study of linguistic meaning. This point of
view is reinforced in Chapter 10 of Volume II, where it is shown that
presuppositions are a general semantic property of lexical predicates
and where it is argued that a proper theory of presuppositions requires a
trivalent presuppositional logic. We then concentrate, in Chapter 3 of
Volume II, on a reconstruction of the natural logic which nature may be
taken to have instilled into human cognition.
This reconstructed logic is then placed in a historical perspective,
which shows that basic natural predicate logic is, in fact, largely but not
entirely identical with the logic proposed and defended by the
Edinburgh philosopherWilliam Hamilton in the nineteenth century.
Aristotelian predicate logic is dissected in Chapter 5 of Volume II and
reconstructed on the basis of Aristotle's own texts, whereby it is found
that Aristotle was not guilty of the logical error of undue existential
import but left his logic incomplete. It is also found that the twelfth-
century French philosopher Abelard completed Aristotelian predicate
calculus in Aristotle's spirit, avoiding undue existential import in a way
that leads to a logically sound system that is more powerful than
standard modern predicate logic. Chapter 4 of Volume II shows that
traditional predicate logic, with its undue existential import, has
maximal logical power, in stark contrast to standard modern predicate
logic, which has hardly any logical power left. It also shows that the
logically sound Abelardian system of predicate logic has much greater
logical power than standard modern predicate calculus, while still
staying within the bounds of a strictly extensional ontology - a fact
which raises questions regarding the status of standard modern
767
predicate calculus in mathematics and mathematical logic.
In Chapter 6 of Volume II it is shown that traditional predicate logic is
also much more functional from the point of view of transmitting
information than its standard modern counterpart. The fact that, as a
matter of principle, linguistic utterances need anchoring in context
before they can be keyed to a given situation and the objects in it, is
first discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of Aristotle's concept of
proposition.
Chapters 7 to 9 of Volume II are devoted to a further theoretical
elaboration of the context-sensitivity of natural-language sentences and
utterances. The notion of presupposition is central in this respect.
Chapter 10 of Volume II is devoted to the logical aspects of the
context-sensitivity of language. A presuppositional logic is developed
for both the propositional operators and the universal and existential
quantifiers. In this logic, a distinction is made between, on the one
hand, a default, discourse-restricted area of metalogical relations, which
is taken to have some degree of psychological reality, and a purely
theoretical area which has no psychological reality but is presented
merely to show the character and properties of the logic involved." (pp.
7-8).
———. 2010. The Logic of Language. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Volume II of Language from Within.
Shimizu, Tetsuro. 1995. "From Vocalism to Nominalism: Progression
in Abaelard's Theory of Signification." Didascalia no. 1:15-46.
———. 1999. "Words and Concepts in Anselm Et Abelard." In
Langage, Sciences, Philosophie Au Xiie Siècle, edited by Biard, Joël,
———. 2006. "The Place of Intellectus in the Theory of Signification
by Abelard and Ars Meliduna." In Intellect Et Imagination Dans La
Philosophie Médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in Medieval
Philosophy / Intelecto E Imaginação Na Filosofia Medieval / Actes Du
Xie Congrès International De Philosophie Médiévale De La Société
Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale
(S.I.E.P.M.),: Porto, Du 26 Au 31 Août 2002, edited by Pacheco, Maria
Cândida and Meirinhos, José F., 927-939. Turnhout: Brepols.
"The main concern of the present paper is with some theories of
768
significatio in the 12th century, and how intellectus and imaginatio play
a role in them, but not in others. In the present paper, I shall restrict my
attention to Abelard and Ars meliduna, hoping to contrast them.
ABELARD'S THEORY OF SIGNIFICATION
As for Abelard's theory, I will make some comments concerning the
present subject, with a summary of the conclusions that I have
described elsewhere (1). In Glosse super Porphyrium
("Ingredientibus"), Abelard's theory of signification bound up with his
explanation and revision of the vocalist theory of a universal. He starts
with the definition of the universal, which involves the idea of
impositio and nominatio, and so far the theory contains the name-things
relationship only. Abelard, however, also shows its difficulties, by
raising the two cardinal aspects of signification: the first concerns
nominatio, or significatio in the broader sense, while the second, the
intellectus that a name produces in the hearer, and this act of a name is
significatio in the strict sense.
Then he tries to solve the difficulties and presents his revision of the
theory regarding each of the two aspects (2)." (p. 927)
(...)
CONCLUSION
In sum, we can contrast Abelard and the Ars meliduna as for how
intellectus are treated with reference to signification. For both of them,
a status is some thing or some fact in the world, independent of
intellectus, though it might be an object of intellectus,
but by no means a mental entity. This is the only point on which both
will agree. To begin with, they oppose each other as for what is the
status. For Abelard, status is causa impositionis, while for the Ars
meliduna, it is the object of signification. On the contrary, intellectus is
the object of signification for Abelard, while it is the causa impositionis
for the Ars meliduna. Abelard thinks of intellectus from the hearer's
point of view basing himself on Aristotle's De interpretatione, so that
he attends to the act of producing intellectus in the hearer, while the Ars
meliduna thinks of intellectus from the speaker's
point of view, basing itself on Priscian's grammar, so that it attends to
the vocal words as revealing the speaker's intellectus. Thus the Ars
meliduna insists on the reverse of what Abelard insisted on." (p. 939).
(1) Shimizu, T., From Vocalism to Nominalism: Progression in
769
Abaelard's Theory of Signification, Didascalia, 1,15-46.
(2) Abaelardus, Glossae super Porphyrium, hrsg. von Geyer, B., Peter
Abaelards philosophische Schriften I,1933: 16, 25-30; 18,4-19,20.
———. 2006. "Word and Esse in Anselm and Abelard." In Anselm and
Abelard. Investigations and Iuxtapositions, edited by Gasper, Giles
E.M. and Helmut, Kohlenberger, 179-195. Toronto: Pontifical Institute
of Mediaeval Studies.
"The medieval controversy about the nature of universals was about
nothing other than the relationship between word and thing. In order to
understand the history and essence of the controversy, it is most
important to examine the thoughts of the two key figures: Anselm and
Abelard, respectively the revered authority among the realists (reales),
and the founder of the nominalists (nominales). Though there certainly
lies a crucial divergence in their views, nevertheless Abelard, as well as
contemporary realists, owes many of his ideas, conceptions and terms
to Anselm. Having examined elsewhere their views on the relationship
between word and concept, I would like to examine here those on the
relationship between word and the world. Through this examination I
shall show how Anselm's metaphysical investigation about God's
locution was transformed into Abelard's logical one about human
words.
In the following, I shall first examine Anselm's theory of God's
locution, showing how he explains it in terms of human language and
in its relationship with created things, by examining some passages
from his Monologion and De grammatico.
Secondly, I shall focus my attention on Abelard's corresponding
theories in his two commentaries on Porphyry, Glosse 'ingredientibus'
and Glossule 'nostrorum petitioni sociorum'." p. 179
"Conclusion. The terms and concepts that Anselm proposed in his
meditation on God's locution as the origin of created things constitute a
common vocabulary for the controversy about universals. Even
Abelard, the founder of nominalism, when refuting the realists, uses
these terms and concepts to differentiate himself from them. Such
terms, among others, are essentia, esse hominem, and status hominis,
which is Abelard's substitute for Anselm's esse hominis. Again,
Anselm's idea of significatio as an act of producing understanding in
the hearer becomes the main idea in Abelard's semantics. We can,
770
however, recognize elements of discrepancy between them as well as
these examples of agreement. Abelard excludes essentia from his
theory of universals, separating it from esse hominem, and shifts the
idea of esse hominis to the one of status hominis. Again, Anselm's
intellectus produced by a word is the understanding by which an
essentia, or something's esse, is understood, and the latter is based on
the principalis essentia in God, while Abelard's is separated from
essentia and even from the facts in reality (status), in his later theory,
though connected in his earlier one. It seems that Abelard cultivates a
new realm of conceptions independent of things' essentia; this realm is
properly for human beings, not for God, the creator. In this sense, 'Deus
homo' happened between Anselm and Abelard." p. 195
Spencer, Mark K. 2011. "Abelard on Status and Their Relation to
Universals. A Husserlian Interpretation." International Philosophical
"The discussion of universals in Peter Abelard's Logica 'Ingredientibus'
has been interpreted in many ways. Of particular controversy has been
the proper way to interpret his use of the term status. In this paper I
offer an interpretation of status by comparing Abelard's account of
knowledge of universals to Edmund Husserl's presentations of
categorial and eidetic intuition. I argue that status is meant to be
understood as something like an ideal object, in Husserl's sense of the
term. First, I present Abelard's discussion of status and distinguish this
term from universals, things, acts of understanding, and forms. Next, I
consider Husserl's account of categorial and eidetic intuition. Finally, I
draw parallels between the two while showing how an interpretation of
status as ideal object overcomes the interpretive problems encountered
by other commentators on Abelard."
Spruyt, Joke. 2003. "The Semantics of Complex Espressions in John
Duns Scotus, Peter Abelard and John Buridan." In Aristotle's Peri
Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary
Corneille, 275-303. Turnhout: Brepols.
Strub, Christian. 2003. "Propositio Una / Multiplex in Abelard: A Note
on the Relationship of Dialectic and Grammar." In Aristotle's Peri
Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary
771
Corneille, 257-273. Turnhout: Brepols.
Stump, Eleonore. 1988. "Logic in the Early Twelfth Century." In
Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Norman,
Kretzmann, 31-55. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"A radical change took place in the treatment of logic in general and of
dialectical topics in particular in the Twelfth century. In this paper I try
to shed some light on the nature of that change by looking at
discussions of dialectic in a particular group of Twelfth-century
treatises. On the basis of that analysis I make some suggestions about
Abelard's influence on and originality in the developments of logic in
the Twelfth century."
———. 1989. Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval
Logic. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Chapter 5: Abelard on the Topics (pp. 89-109) and Chapter 6: Logic in
the Early Twelfth Century (pp. 111-133).
Sweeney, Eileen C. 2006. Logic, Theology, and Poetry in Boethius,
Abelard, and Alan of Lille. Words in the Absence of Things. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Chapter 2: Abelard: a Twelth-Century Hermeneutics of Suspicion pp.
63-126.
"If Boethius's goal in his logical commentaries is to distinguish in order
to unite, Abelard's goal seems simply to distinguish. Boethius's
construction of a narrative from Aristotle's cryptic remarks in the Peri
hermeneias is one Abelard follows carefully and also criticizes, finding
Boethius's connections more a confusion than a synthesis of the
elements in Aristotle's text. He argues that Boethius constructs a unity
that is inauthentic, which asserts a happy ending, a union between
language, understanding, and the world that is not quite achievable. His
own corpus of commentaries breaks down this narrative to consider its
parts much more carefully.
Abelard's perception of gaps in Boethius's narrative and his desire to
take it apart is signaled in many ways. It comes across at a general and
formal level in his account of the relationship between the Categories
and Peri hermeneias in his later glosses on Porphyry (known as the
Logica nostrorum petitioni sociorum). In these later glosses, he argues
that Aristotle's two works are not two pieces of a single narrative, an
account of words leading to one of sentences, as Boethius claims (and
772
as was a tradition Abelard himself Follows in his earlier glosses), but
the separate consideration of words insofar as they signify things (the
Categories) and words insofar as they signify intellectus (the Peri
hermeneias) (LNPS 508. 32-37). Beginning with this division, then, I
would like to consider Abelard's account of the distinction between
words and things in the earlier Glosses on Porphyry and the later gloss
on Porphyry, and between words and understanding in the Commentary
on the Peri hermeneias. (10) I will attempt to examine the kind of a
narrative Abelard constructs, insofar as he constructs any, of the
processes of abstraction and sentence construction." (pp. 66-67)
(10) See Constant Mews, "On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard,"
ADHLMA 52 (1985): 73-134; Marenbon, Peter Abelard, pp. 40-53;
and L. M. de Rijk, "Peter Abelard's Semantics and His Doctrine of
Being," Vivarium 24, 2 (1986): 103-108. It is widely agreed that the
Glosses on Porphyry and Commentary on the Peri hermeneias, both
part of the Logica ingredientibus, are earlier (1118-20) than the later
glosses on Porphyry (here: LNPS) and De intellectibus (from the mid-
1120s).
Swiniarski, John. 1971. Theories of Supposition in Medieval Logic.
Their Origin and Their Development from Abelard to Ockham, State
University of New York at Buffalo.
Express.
Thom, Paul. 2003. "La Logique Abélardienne Des Modales De Rebus."
In Pierre Abelard. Colloque International De Nantes, edited by Jolivet,
Jean and Habrias, Henri, 321-338. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de
Rennes.
Conférence internationale "Pierre Abélard, à l'aube des universités" 3-4
octobre 2001 Nantes
———. 2006. Medieval Modal Systems. Problems and Concepts.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
Chapter 3: Abélard pp. 43-64
Thomas, Rudolf, ed. 1980. Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person,
Werk Und Wirkung. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.
Trierer Theologische Studien. Band 38.
Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort; Einfuhrung; Biographische Daten;
I. Die Gestalt und das Bild Abaelards.
773
D. E. Luscombe: The Letters of Heloise and Abelard since 'Cluny
1972'19; John F. Benton: A reconsideration of the authenticity of the
correspondence of Abelard and Heloise 41; Peter Dronke: Heloise's
Problemata and Letters: Some Questions of Form and Content 53;
Peter von Moos: Post festum -- Was kommt nach der Authentizitats-
debatte uber die Briefe Abaelards und Heloises? 75;
II: Abaelard, Philosoph und Logiker im 12. Jahrhundert.
Jean Jolivet: Doctrines et figures de philosophes chez Abélard 103;
Mariateresa Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli: Concepts philosophiques
dans l'Historia Calamitatum et dans les autres oeuvres abélardiennes
121; L. M. de Rijk: Peter Abälard (1079-1142): Meister und Opfer des
Scharfsinns / Offentlicher akademischer Vortrag, gehalten am 18. April
1979 in der Promotionsaula der Theologischen Fakultät in Trier 125; L.
M. de Rijk: The semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the
Problem of Universals 139; Wolfgang L. Gombcz: Abaelards
Bedeutungslehre als Schlüssel zum Universalienproblem 153; Klaus
Jacobi: Diskussionen über Prädikationstheorie in den logischen
Schriften des Petrus Abaelardus. Versuch einer Ubersicht 165;
III. Die Stellung Abaelards in der Geschichte der Theologie und
Liturgie.
Constant Mews: The development of the Theologia of Peter Abelard
183; Eileen F. Kearney: Peter Abelard as Biblical Commentator: A
Study of the Expositio in Hexaemeron 199; Heinz Robert Schlette:
Aspiratio. Prareformatorische Akzente in Abälards Erklärung der
vierten Vaterunser-Bitte 211; Rolf Peppermuller: Zu Abaelards
Paulusexegese und ihrem Nachwirken 217; Thaddaeus Kucia: Die
Anthropologie bei Peter Abaelard 223; Elisabeth Gossmann: Zur
Auseinandersetzung zwischen Abaelard und Bernhard von Clairvaux
um die Gotteserkenntnis im Glauben 233; Maurice de Gandillac: Notes
preparatoires a un débat sur le Dialogus 243; Lothar Steiger:
Hermeneutische Erwagungen zu Abaelards Dialogus 247; Chrysogonus
Waddell: Peter Abelard as creator of liturgical texts 267; Rudolf
Haubst: Marginalien des Nikolaus von Kues zu Abaelard (oder:
Abaelard, wie Cusanus ihn sah) 287; Ernst Volk: Das Gewissen bei
Petrus Abaelardus, Petrus Lombardus und Martin Luther 297; Register
zitierter Personen 331; Autorenverzeichnis 333.
Thompson, Augustine. 1995. "The Debate on Universals before Peter
774
Abelard." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 33:409-429.
Tweedale, Martin. 1967. "Abailard and Non-Things." Journal of the
"I explain how Abailard thinks he can justify saying that certain items,
particularly what is said by a sentence, are not things. His grounds are
that they are never referred to by any noun. He holds that
nominalizations of sentences and of verbs, which appear to be nouns
with such a reference, are not logically speaking nouns, and sentences
which have a nominalization for a grammatical subject do not have any
logical subject."
———. 1976. Abailard on Universals. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
"This work shows how Abailard elaborated and defended the view that
universals are words, avoided the pitfalls of an image theory of
thinking, and propounded a theory of "status" and "dicta" as objects of
thought without treating them as subjects of predication. His defense of
these views is shown to depend on certain fundamental departures from
the Aristotelian term logic of his day, including a proposal for
subjectless propositions, the treatment of copula plus predicate noun as
equivalent to a simple verb, and a transformation of the 'is' of existence
into the 'is' of predication."
———. 1980. "Abailard and Ockham: Contrasting Defences of
Nominalism." Theoria no. 46:106-122.
"Although both Ockham and Abailard admit that science is of
necessary truths and is about what is common to many rather than
concrete particulars, Ockham claims knowledge has genuine objects,
namely mental signs, while Abailard denies that knowledge has
genuine objects. Ockham's position, it turns out, cannot do justice to the
objectivity of science and is in difficulties when it comes to explaining
how we know these mental signs. Neither problem afflicts Abailard's
view."
———. 1982. "Abelard and the Culmination of the Old Logic." In The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the
Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-
1600, edited by Norman, Kretzmann, Kenny, Anthony and Pinborg,
Jan, 143-157. Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1987. "Reply to Professor De Rijk's "Martin M. Tweedale on
Abailard: Some Criticisms of a Fascinating Venture"." Vivarium no.
775
25:3-22.
"I reply to professor de Rijk's criticisms of my book "Abailard on
universals". First I admit serious errors in some of my translations and
offering some revisions of those. Second, I defend some of my other
translations as well as my interpretation of what Abailard intends by
'"essentia"' and my contention that Abailard's doctrine on universals is
not a form of conceptualism."
———. 1992. "Logic (I): From the Late Eleventh Century to the Time
of Abelard." In A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy,
edited by Dronke, Peter, 196-226. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Urbani Ulivi, Lucia. 1976. La Psicologia Di Abelardo E Il "Tractatus
De Intellectibus". Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.
Indice: Prefazione di Sofia Vanni Rovighi 7; Introduzione 11; I. Sensus
e imaginatio 21; II. Existimatio, scientia, ratio 33; III. Gli intellectus e
le loro distinzioni 45; IV. Altri tipi di Intellectus 69; V. Sermo e
significatio 85; XConclusione 95; Tractatus de intellectibus [testo
latino] 101; BIbliografia 129-137.
Vanni Rovighi, Sofia. 1981. "Intentionnel Et Universel Chez Abélard."
In Abélard: Le 'Dialogue'. La Philosophie De La Logique. Actes Du
Colloque De Neuchâtel, 16-17 Novembre 1979, 21-28. Neuchâtel:
Secrétariat de l'Université.
Vignaux, Paul. 1975. "Note Sur Le Nominalisme D'Abélard." In Pierre
Wade, Francis C. 1963. "Abelard and Individuality." In Die Metaphysik
Im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung Und Ihre Bedeutung. Vorträge Des 2.
Internationalen Kongresses Für Mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31.
August-6. September 1961, edited by Wilpert, Paul, 165-171. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter.
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. II.
"Peter Abelard in his "Logica ingredientibus" proposed to solve the
problems of genus and species which Porphyry had refused to answer
in his introduction to the "Categories" of Aristotle. The thesis of this
paper is that Abelard, in spite of his diligent enquiry, could not explain
776
genus and species owing to his unanalyzed conception of an individual.
Though Abelard failed in his inquiry, he did not fail philosophy, for he
held firmly to the data: that existents are individuals, that we have
universal knowledge, and that universal knowledge is valid
knowledge."
Wciórka, Wojciech. 2008. "Abelard on Porphyry's Definition of
Accident." Mediaevalia philosophica Polonorum.Bulletin d'information
concernant les recherches sur la philosophie médiévale en Pologne no.
37:168-181.
Weidemann, Hermann. 1981. "Zur Semantik Der Modalbegriffe Bei
Peter Abaelard." Medioevo.Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale
no. 7:1-40.
———. 1993. "Modalität Und Konsequenz. Zur Logischen Struktur
Eines Theologischen Arguments in Peter Abaelards Dialectica." In
Argumentations-Theorie. Scholastische Forschungen Zu Den
Logischen Und Semantischen Regeln Korrekten Folgerns, edited by
Jacobi, Klaus, 695-706. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Wenin, Christian. 1982. "La Signification Des Universaux Chez
Abélard." Revue Philosophique de Louvain no. 80:414-448.
"The text in which Abelard attempts to reply, before 1120, to the
questions left open by Porphyry on the statute of genera and species
furnished a reflection on the meaning of the universal term, understood
since Aristotle as the possible predicate of a proposition true of several
subjects taken individually. Abelard refuses all the kinds of realism
which he knows. The universal word ("vox, simplex sermo") has,
however, more than the physical aspect of an uttered sound; it has the
three meanings of: the individual things to the extent that they resemble
each other, the intellective activity of man and the common conception
with the aid of which it can function."
Wilks, Ian. 1993. The Logic of Abelard's Dialectica, University of
Toronto.
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
———. 1998. "Peter Abelard and the Metaphysics of Essential
Predication." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 36:365-385.
———. 2007. "Abelard on Context and Signification." American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:189-208.
"Abelard maintains that individual words in a sentence represent
777
distinct semantic units of its overall meaning. He employs two
strategies to defend this position in the face of troublesome
counterexamples. One strategy-the earlier of the two-sacrifices normal
intuitions about what a word is, often labeling what seem to be words
as non-signifying syllables. The later strategy invokes a rather fluid
conception of what the signification of a word is, allowing this
signification considerable latitude to alter under the contextual
influence of other words. This evolution of strategy is linked to a new
willingness on Abelard's part to adopt the principle of charity in
interpreting sentences; this approach presumes the truth of the
statement, and tries to find an interpretation which bears that
presumption out. This new willingness to adopt the principle is in turn
linked to Abelard's developing vocation as an interpreter of biblical
texts."
———. 2008. "Peter Abelard and His Contemporaries." In Mediaeval
and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 83-
156. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 2.
"It is standard practice to develop an account of categorical logic which
starts with a discussion of words, and moves through categorical
propositions to the categorical syllogisms themselves. Abelard
consciously adopts a parallel course for the logic of hypotheticals by
beginning with a treatment of topics and hypothetical propositions. In
general we can think of Abelard's development of material as falling
along these two axes: discussion of words and categorical propositions
leading to categorical syllogisms; and then discussion of topics and
hypothetical propositions leading to hypothetical syllogisms. This way
of organizing material is overtly embraced by Abelard in the
Dialectica, in his attempt to depart from the commentary format. So it
can be taken as representing his most basic intuitions on how the
subject matter of logic should be organized.
I will structure my discussion below accordingly. Part 1 deals with
words, categorical propositions and categorical syllogisms. Part 2 deals
with topics, hypothetical propositions and hypothetical syllogisms.
These two parts complete the treatment of Abelard, and Part 3 turns to
his contemporaries and their schools." (pp. 84-85).
Wöhler, Hans-Ulrich. 1979. "Zur Philosophischen Position Des
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Nominalisten Petrus Abaelard. Aus Anlass Seines 900. Geburstag."
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie no. 27:673-683.
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Contents
Last Page
Buridan's Logical Works. I. An Overview

of the Summulae de dialectica
INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF BURIDAN IN
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
"In this essay, I wish to question the view that the distinction between
medieval and early modern philosophy is primarily one of method. I shall
argue that what has come to be known as the modern method in fact owes
much to the natural philosophy of John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361), a secular
arts master who taught at the University of Paris some three centuries before
Descartes. Surrounded by conflicts over institutional governance and
curricular disputes, Buridan emerged as a forceful voice for the independence
and autonomy of teachers in the faculty of arts, arguing that philosophy as
properly practiced belonged to them, the "artists artistae", not to those who
taught in the so-called 'higher' faculties of theology, law, and medicine. Now
such voices had been heard before at Paris, most notably from Averroist arts
masters in the late 13th and early 14th-centuries.(*) Buridan is different,
however, because unlike Boethius of Dacia and John of Jandun, he knew how
to make the case for artistic autonomy without denigrating the theology and
thereby inviting official condemnation. His trick was not to argue that there
are 'two truths', one acquired and the other revealed, which might well come
780
into conflict with each other, or that propositions whose truth has been
revealed in scripture in no way qualify as scientia. It was rather to recognize
the profoundly different methods of theology and philosophy, without losing
sight of the fact that what counts as evidence in a proof in natural philosophy
does not work in a theological argument, even if both have the same
conclusion, such as that the human soul is immortal. Buridan seems to think
that if only people would respect the differences between the rules of
philosophical and theological inquiry, no conflicts would arise. He is not so
naive as to claim this could ever happen, of course. But it does explain why
he almost always diagnoses such conflicts in terms of some logical or
linguistic confusion on the part of the people who propose them.
Buridan is also different because in him the secularizing sentiment already
present in the Latin Averroists begins to take shape as a way of doing
philosophy, i.e., as a philosophical grammar. This is clear in his greatest
work, the Summulae de Dialectica, a comprehensive account of the titles of
philosophical discourse written for the guidance of students and scholars
alike. Due in large part to the enormous popularity of the Summulae and his
commentaries on Aristotle's metaphysics and natural philosophy -- copies
were made or (later) printed and circulated throughout France, Germany,
Italy, Scotland, and Eastern Europe, well into the 16th century -- Buridan
helped make possible the secularization of philosophical practice a crucial
first step on the road to modernism." pp. 34-35
(*) Fabienne Pironet - Le sujet de la science dans les "Regulae" de
Descartes - Medioevo, 24, 1998, pp. 267-281.
From: Jack Zupko - John Buridan and the Origins of Secular Philosophical
Culture - in: Stefano Caroti, Jean Celeyrette (eds.) - Quia inter doctores est
magna dissensio. Les débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIV siècle -
Firenze, Olschki, 1994, pp. 33-48
BURIDAN'S LOGICAL WORK

"The extant writings of Buridan consist of the lectures he gave on subjects
comprised in the curriculum of the faculty of Arts at Paris. In the fourteenth
century this curriculum was largely based on study of the treatises of
781
Aristotle, along with the Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain and other
medieval textbooks of grammar, mathematics and astronomy. Buridan
composed his own textbook of logic, a Summula de dialectica, as a "modern"
revision and amplification of the text of Peter of Spain, and he also wrote two
treatises on advanced topics of logic, entitled Consequentiae and Sophismata,
which are among the most interesting contributions to late medieval logic.
All of his other works are in the form of commentaries, and of critical books
of Questions, on the principal treatises of the Aristotelian corpus. The literal
commentaries are extant only in unpublished manuscript versions, but the
books ofQuestions on Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, De anima, Parva
naturalia, Nicomachean Ethics, and Politics were published, along with
Buridan's writings in logic, after the invention of printing. (...) Most of the
printed editions represent the lectures Buridan gave during the last part of his
teaching career, though earlier versions are found among the unpublished
manuscript materials. Until a critical study of the manuscripts is made,
however, there is no sure way of determining any order of composition
among Buridan's works, or of tracing the development of his thought over the
thirty odd years of his academic career.
Buridan made significant and original contributions to logic and physics, but
one of his major achievements was that of vindicating the independence of
natural philosophy as a respectable study in its own right, and of defining the
objectives and methodology of the scientific enterprise in a manner which
gave warrant for its autonomy in relation to dogmatic theology and
metaphysics. This achievement was intimately connected with the movement
of fourteenth century thought known as Nominalism, and with the
controversies precipitated at the universities of Oxford and Paris by the
doctrines associated with William of Ockham. Buridan's own philosophical
position was thoroughly nominalistic, and indeed very similar to that of Jean
de Mirecourt, a theologian of Paris whose teachings were condemned in 1347
by the chancellor of the university and the faculty of theology. That Buridan
was able to escape the charges of theological scepticism that were directed
against his fellow nominalists of the theological faculty was no doubt due, in
part, to his personal qualities of prudence and diplomacy. But it was also due
to his methodological, rather than metaphysical, way of employing the logic
and the epistemological doctrines of nominalism in formulating the character
and the evidential foundations of natural philosophy.
782
The formal logic presented in Buridan's Summula de dialectica is closely
related, in topical structure and in terminology, to the so-called terminist
logic of the thirteenth century represented by the textbooks of William of
Sherwood and Peter of Spain. Though it presupposes the nominalist thesis
that general terms are signs of individuals and not of common natures
existing in individuals, it does not exhibit any strong evidence of direct
influence by the logical writings of Ockham, and it may well have been
developed independently of such influence on the basis of the modern logic
(logica moderna) already well established in the Arts faculties of Oxford and
Paris. The doctrine of the supposition of terms, basic to this logic, is used in
defining the functions of logical operators or syncategorematic signs in
determining the truth conditions of categorical propositions of various forms,
and in formulating the laws of syllogistic inference both assertoric and
modal. Treatises on topical arguments, fallacies, and on the demonstrative
syllogism, conclude the work. Buridan's Sophismata, designed to constitute a
ninth part of theSummula, was apparently written much later in his life, since
it contains criticisms of the theory of propositional meanings, or complexe
significabilia, which Gregory of Rimini introduced in 1344. This work
presents a very fully developed analysis of meaning and truth which
corresponds fairly closely to that of Ockham's Summa logicae, but it goes
well beyond the work of Ockham in presenting original and highly advanced
treatments of the problem of the non-substitutivity of terms occurring in
intensional contexts, and of the problem of self-referential propositions
represented by the paradox of the Liar. Buridan's treatment of these problems
exhibits a level of logical insight and skill not again equalled until very recent
times. His treatise on Consequentiae, which develops the whole theory of
inference on the basis of propositional logic, marks another high point of
medieval logic whose significance has only been appreciated in the twentieth
century."
From: Moody Ernest A. Moody - Jean Buridan. In Dictionary of Scientific
Biography. Vol. II. Edited by Charles C Gillispie. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons 1969. pp. 603-608. Reprinted in: E. A. Moody - Studies in
medieval philosophy, science, and logic. Collected papers 1933-1969 -
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975, pp. 441-453.
783
PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR
"Anneliese Maier once remarked of later scholastic natural philosophy that,

«what changes is the method of knowing nature», so that «what is interesting
is not the knowledge (scientia), but the method of knowing (modus sciendi)».
(36) Buridan was one of the major agents of this change. His contribution
was to rewrite the grammar of philosophy, supplanting older forms of inquiry
with the more powerful method of the Summulae de Dialectica, the
compendium of logical teachings that was his masterwork. By welding the
logic of the moderni together with the indigenous Parisian tradition of
propositional logic into a single, comprehensive package, he was able to
effect a quiet revolution in the speculative sciences. The Summulae is
essentially a 'how-to' book for the philosopher. The student who mastered its
techniques would be equipped not only to read authoritative texts with
confidence, but also to advance his knowledge through independent study
and dialectical engagement with others.
To modern readers, the Summulae looks like a commentary on another text
(which it is) on the way to a systematic overview of Aristotelian logical
theory. But appearances can be deceiving. Buridan tends to be skeptical of
systematizing pretensions in other fields,(37) and there is nothing in his
remarks to suggest that he is interested in logical theory in the modern sense.
Like most of his colleagues in the arts faculty, he believed that logic and
grammar are not speculative but «practical sciences, for they teach its how to
construct good syllogisms and well-formed expressions».(38) Once, when
asked where the science of dialectic is taught, he does not reply 'in the
Summulae'. Rather, his answer fragments along the lines of the division of
sciences in the arts curriculum: «If it is asked where the science of dialectic is
taught, we say that it is taught in the book of the Metaphysics as far as
metaphysical conclusions are concerned, in the book of the Posterior
Analytics as far as the conclusions of the posterior science [of demonstration]
are concerned, in the book of the Physics as far as physical conclusions are
concerned, and so on for the other [special] sciences». (39) If Buridan does
have a theory of logic, it must be extracted piecemeal from these texts and
from the Summulae, often with great difficulty, and always with the nagging
uncertainty that we have not quite captured what is going on.(40) It seems a
784
better hermeneutical strategy to take Buridan at his word when he says that
what holds logic together is not any single subject matter, but its relation to
other subjects in the arts curriculum, over which it is said to rule.(41)
How did this new logic change the practice of speculative philosophy? Here
we must turn to the details, which I cannot explore here. Suffice it to say that
the extent to which Buridan uses logical techniques to clarify and resolve
speculative questions is striking even by medieval standards. Thus, we find
him considering the nature of universals by determining the significance of
terms such as 'universal', 'whole' and 'part'; the relation between bodies and
souls by establishing which names have been imposed on the soul to signify
distinct natures and which signify merely diverse operations; the limits of
human knowledge by asking how the existence of a substance can be inferred
from the existence of an accident; the proper subject matter of psychology by
distinguishing the various definitions of the soul; the nature of virtue by
representing it in terms of the analytical concept of impetus; or the basis of
human freedom by examining the epistemic character of propositions the will
is capable of accepting or rejecting. What these topics have in common is the
dialectical method taught in the Summulae. The Summulae gives the rules of
the game."
(36) Maier Annelise: Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur
Geistesgeschichte de 14. Jahrunderts, I Bd. Roma, Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura, 1964: «was sich ändert, ist die Methode des
Naturekenntnis» (p. 434); «was interessiert, ist der modus sciendi, nicht
die scientia» (p 439).
(37) For example, he doubts whether anyone could show that the whole of
physics is one, or even the whole of metaphysics (In Metaphysicen Aristotelis
Quaestiones VI, 2, Johannes Buridanus 1518, fol. 33vb). Buridan has a more
organic conception of the unity of each speculative science. Thus, «the whole
of metaphysics derives its unity from our attribution of everything to it to the
term 'being', just as an army is unified by its commander» (In Metaphysicen
Aristotelis Quaestiones VI, 2, Johannes Buridanus 1518, fol. 34ra). The
commander metaphor is used of logic in the preface to the Summulae, but in
the sense of leading reason to its desired goal (demonstrated truth) and
repelling the invader (fallacies), not in the sense of unifying the study of
dialectic.
785
(38) Buridan, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Quaestiones VI, 2, Johannes
Buridanus 1518, fol. 34rb: «logica et grammatica sunt scientiae practicae,
docent enim quomodo faciamus bonos syllogismos et orationes congruas».
(39) Buridan, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Quaestiones VI, 4, Johannes
Buridanus 1518, fol. 15va: «Et si quaeratur ubi traditur illa scientia dialectica,
dicitur quod in libro Metaphysicae quantum ad conclusiones metaphysicales,
et in libro Posteriorum quantum ad conclusions posterioristicas, in libro
Physicorum quantum ad conclusiones physicales, et sic de aliis».
(40) See especially his remarks on modal syllogisms. Of course, by treating
Buridan's logic as praxis rather than theoria, I am not calling into question all
of the good scholarship that has been done on its different aspects over the
past few decades, and from which I -- like every other student of Buridan --
have learned a great deal. These books and articles give legitimate readings
of the text, but in a different way, i.e., by showing Buridan's place within the
broader thematic traditions of medieval logic, e.g., as regards doctrine of
supposition, syllogisms, consequences, sophismata, etc.
(41) In any case, logic as a freestanding discipline would have made little
sense to someone accustomed to thinking of it as «the art of arts (ars
artium)». The value of logic as a discipline is expressed in terms of its
relation to other disciplines. That is why Buridan begins the Summulae with
the quotation from the pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander (Summulae
I, preface, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001, p. 25): «Just as the
commander is the savior of the army, so is reasoning with erudition the
commander of life (ratiocinatio cum eruditione est dux vitae)».
From: Jack Zupko - John Buridan and the Origins of Secular Philosophical
Culture - in: Stefano Caroti & Jean Celeyrette (eds.) - Quia Inter Doctores
Est Magna Dissensio. Les débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIVe
siècle - Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 2004, pp. 44-46.
SUMMARY OF THE SUMMULAE DE DIALECTICA

(to be completed)
References to the English translation are from: John Buridan - Summulae de
Dialectica - Translated by Gyula Klima, New Haven, Yale University Press,
786
2001.
"In its most extensive form Buridan's Summulae consists of the following
eight treatises:
I. On Propositions
II. On Predicables
III. On Categories
IV. On Suppositions
V. On Syllogisms
VI. On Topics
VII. On Fallacies
VIII. On Definitions, Divisions, and Demonstrations
Buridan himself at one time regarded his Sophismata as treatise IX, but
there is no genuine formal connection between treatise IX and the rest,
which are organized quite differently. (5)
On the texts commented upon by Buridan
Buridan's basic idea was to 'read', i.e. comment upon, basic introductory
texts. For Tracts I-VII the basic text was taken from a contemporaneous
interpolated version of Peter of Spain's thirteenth-century handy introduction
to logic, the Tractatus or Summulae logicales. Buridan himself added a
special tract to deal with demonstrative knowledge, which he prefaced with
two short expositions on division and definition, subjects that Peter and the
writers of the adapted texts had neglected, as had other authors of thirteenth-
century handbooks of logic. When dealing with the introductory texts
commented upon by Buridan in his Summulae, one has to distinguish
between the Tracts I-VII and Tract VIII, De demonstrationibus.
[a] As for Summulae I-VII, it is clear throughout the work that Buridan had a
text at his elbow that had already been considerably altered in the course of
transmission, and which he himself may have subjected to further changes,
and time and again major ones at that. Buridan regularly uses the term 'auctor'
when referring to the text he comments on. Peter of Spain's work originally
contained twelve treatises. (6) The 'auctor' had fused Peter's Tracts 8-12 (on
relatives, ampliation, appellation, restriction, and distribution) with his own
version of the tract on supposition (treatise IV). That left seven treatises. Thus
Buridan's additional tract De demonstrationibus became Summulae VIII.
787
Buridan's text of tracts I-VII consists of lemmata from the auctor's Summulae,
where the material is presented in such a way as to be easily memorized, and
more extensive comments on those lemmata. As Pinborg (7) pointed out, the
way Buridan speaks about his choice of Peter's work permits the conclusion
that "using Peter of Spain's manual was not the obvious thing to do", and
Pinborg may well have been right in his conjecture that Buridan was the first
to introduce Peter's manual as a textbook at university level in Paris, where
earlier it had been used only at less exalted levels of education ('pro
iunioribus'; see also section 11.2.4). Buridan might have made his choice out
of the different versions available at the time, but seems to have considered it
unnecessary to make a complete version of his own, as may appear from his
frequently criticizing that auctor's text quoted in the lemmata.
Buridan commented very extensively on the standard material, which he
often re-interprets in ways its authors could scarcely have imagined. He
certainly makes no secret of his intentions, as can be gathered from the
general introduction (Prooemium) prefaced to the whole work:
Prooemium: "Propter quod de logica tota volens sine nimis exquisita
perscrutatione disserere quaedam communia, elegi specialiter descendere ad
ilium logicae tractatum brevem quem venerandus doctor magister Petrus
Hispanus dudum composuit, exponendum et supplendum, immo etiam et
aliter aliquando quam ipse dixerit et scripserit dicendum et scribendum, prout
mihi videbitur opportunum."
[Therefore, wishing to learn something in general about logic in its entirety
without an excessively detailed investigation, I have chosen to deal in
particular with that short treatise of logic which the venerable professor,
master Peter of Spain, composed a while ago, by commenting on and
supplementing it; indeed, occasionally I am going to have to say and write
things that differ from what he has said and written, whenever it appears to
me suitable to do so. Translation by Gyula Klima, Summulae, p. 4]
In the Renaissance edition of what was issued as Buridan's Summulae,(8)
John Dorp's comments have taken the place of Buridan's and thus the reader
had no means of seeing how original Buridan was. This much is certain, as
Buridan went on commenting upon the 'auctor', he seems to have grown
increasingly irritated with the text at his elbow, and sometimes simply
dispensed with it, composing instead an alternative text to comment on (thus
I, 8, IV and VII).
788
[b] The basic text underlying Buridan's eighth treatise De demonstrationibus
is still more difficult to identify. It is not found in any interpolated text of
Peter's Summulae and it is uncertain if it is by Buridan's own hand. The first
major survey of logic to include a chapter on demonstration was William of
Ockham's Summa logicae, which may be only about ten years older than
Buridan's, but it is unknown to what degree, if any, Buridan, or his exemplar,
was inspired by Ockham. In any event, by adding treatise VIII Buridan
produced a book covering all the main subjects of Aristotle's Organon as well
as the usual medieval additions to logic, such as the doctrine of the properties
of terms.(9)"
(5) For more evidence of the independent character of the Sophismata, see:
Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. De practica sophismatum, edited by
Fabienne Pironet, Turnhout 2004, esp. pp. XII-XIV.
(6) See Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. First
Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk,
Assen 1972, ch. 3 of the introduction.
(7) J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus 1, De introductionibus', in: The
Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval
Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, p. 72.
(8) Johannes Buridanus, Compendium totius logicae, cum Joannis Dorp
expositione. Unverand. Nachdr. der Ausg.: Venedig 1499, Frankfurt/Main
1965.
(9) For more information about Treatise VIII, De demonstrationibus, see De
Rijk's edition of this treatise, that appeared as part 8 in the present series.
From: Ria van der Lecq - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus - Summulae de
propositionibus - Turnhout, Brepols, 2005, pp. XIII-XV.
"The first seven treatises of Buridan's work do, indeed, correspond to
this description though the revision is sometimes so thorough that it is
difficult to discern the remaining traces of Peter's text. Treatise 8, in
which the main topic is the theory of knowledge and science, has no
counterpart in Peter's Tractatus, nor has Treatise 9, On Sophisms, though
it is not totally unrelated to Peter's Treatises 8-12. Treatise 8 retains the
format adopted for the earlier part of the work, viz. alternation between
(a) a text consisting of logical theorems (concise definitions, rules, etc.)
and (b) an extensive commentary which explicates and supplements
789
those theorems. The difference of Treatise 9 consists in the fact that the
material for commentaries is furnished by logical examples --
sophismata -- rather than by logical theorems. The treatise on sophisms
illustrates how some of the theorems of the preceding treatises may be
put to use, but it is not a systematic practical companion to the preceding
collection of theorems. In short, Treatise 9 bears all the marks of having
an independent origin from the rest of the Summulae into which it was
never successfully integrated."
From: Fabienne Pironet - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus - Summulae:
De practica sophismatum. Turnhout: Brepols 2004, pp. XII-XIII.
THE EDITORIAL PROJECT OF THE SUMMULAE

"Buridan's philosophical production is closely connected to his work as a
university teacher. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle, some of which have
been edited, as has also his treatise on consequences. And then there is his
Summulae or Summa Logica(e), undeservedly neglected by historians of
logic because it has never been printed. To be sure, there are printed books
from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries purporting to contain the work, but in
fact they do not, despite their frequently going under Buridan's name. A fair
number of preserved manuscripts, however, testify to the popularity of the
Summulae during the late 14th century and well into the 15th, especially at
the Central European universities".
In its most extensive form Buridan's Summulae consists of the following
eight treatises:
I. On Propositions
II. On Predicables
III. On Categories
IV. On Suppositions
V. On Syllogisms
VI. On Topics
VII. On Fallacies
VIII. On Definitions, Divisions, and Demonstrations
Buridan himself at one time regarded his Sophismata as treatise IX, but there
790
is no genuine formal connection between treatise IX and the rest, which are
organized quite differently. (*)" pp. XII-XIII.
(*) For more evidence of the independent character of the Sophismata,
see: Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. De practica sophismatum, edited
by Fabienne Pironet, Turnhout 2003, esp. pp. XII-XIV.
"The present fascicle is number one of the first complete edition of
Buridan's Summulae, which contains nine treatises, including a new
edition of his Sophismata. The plan is being realized by an international
team composed of scholars from Belgium, Denmark and the
Netherlands. A first and overly optimistic version of the project was
discussed in 1975 at the Third European Symposium on Medieval Logic
and Semantics, which was devoted to the logic of John Buridan. In 1986
The Buridan Society was formed with the explicit purpose of producing
an edition of the Summulae, and guidelines for the work were laid down.
The following scholars initially joined the Society: E.P. Bos, H.A.G.
Braakhuis, S. Ebbesen, H. Hubien, R. van der Lecq, E Pironet, L.M de
Rijk, J.M.M.H. Thijssen.
To make the task manageable, it was decided to aim only at an edition based
on a handful of manuscripts carefully selected on the advice of H. Hubien,
who had made pilot studies of the tradition. Also, considering that all
participants in the project were scholars with many other obligations and
hence likely to be distracted from the work on Buridan at unpredictable
times, it was decided to publish each fascicle of the work as soon as it was
finished without regard to regular intervals or an orderly progression from
fascicle 1 to fascicle 9." p. XI
From: Introduction by Ria van der Lecq to: Johannes Buridanus - Summulae
de propositionibus - Turnhout, Brepols, 2005.
Ten fascles are planned, one for each treatise plus a fascicle with a
general introduction and a consolidated index; currently (2010) seven
fascicles has been published (see the following bibliography).
Treatise I. De propositionibus
791
"The opening chapter of De propositionibus consists of six parts and covers
some preliminaries. In the first part dialectic (logic) is defined in a way that
echoes Aristotle's Topics 1.1 101b2-4: dialectic is the art of arts (ars artium),
which has access to the principles of all inquiries (methodi). Dialectic should
be distinguished from science (scientia). In every science training in logic has
to come first, since every science needs to use syllogisms or other types of
argument, the doctrine of which is taught by logic. Since logic is mostly
exercised in a disputation, and a disputation cannot take place without speech
(sermo) nor can speech occur without utterance (vox) or utterance without
sound (sonus), sound is the starting point of Buridan's inquiry. Sound is
divided into utterance and non-utterance, and utterance (vox) into
significative and non-significative. Some significative utterances (voces
significativae) are significative by nature, others by convention. Chapter
concludes with the division of conventionally significative utterances into
complex (expressions or orationes) and incomplex ones (noun and verb). In
his comments on this last distinction Buridan mentions Aristotle's division of
' expression' (oratio) into mental, vocal and written expressions. The
distinction between mental and vocal language plays an important role in the
Summulae and in Buridan's semantics in general. Spoken words and
propositions are meaningful only by convention, whereas mental words and
propositions signify naturally. Mental propositions are the bearers of truth
and falsity. Vocal propositions are propositions only in so far as they
designate mental propositions, and vocal propositions are true or false only in
so far as they designate true or false mental propositions. (22)
Chapter 2 gives the traditional definitions of 'noun', 'verb' and 'expression'
(oratio). Thus, a noun is a conventionally significative utterance, without
time (vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore). Obviously, this definition
does not apply to mental words: mental words are not voces and do not
signify ad placitum. Peter of Spain does not intend to define mental nouns,
but only spoken nouns, concludes Buridan. This is one of the first signs of
Buridan's problems with Peter's text.
In chapter 3 we arrive at the core of this treatise: propositions. Peter's
definition (a proposition is an expression that signifies something true or
false) gives rise to Buridan's repeated warning that this definition applies to
spoken language only (1.3.1). A mental proposition does not signify
something true or false, it is something true or false. Next (1.3.2),
792
propositions are divided in categorical and hypothetical propositions. In this
part Buridan presents his theory that the concepts involved in a mental
proposition are its subject, its predicate and a so-called complexive concept.
Subject and predicate are called the matter of a proposition, because they are
presupposed when a proposition is formed by adding an affirmative or
negative complexive concept, i.e. the copula. The following parts discuss the
definitions of subject and predicate (1.3.3), and various classifications of
propositions: assertoric (de inesse) and modal (1.3.4), universal, particular,
indefinite and singular (1.3.5) and, finally, affirmative and negative (1.3.6).
Chapter 4 is about the opposition between pairs of categorical propositions
that "share both terms", i.e. in which the same two terms occur. If the shared
terms occur in the same order, the propositions are contraries, subcontraries,
contradictories or subalterns. This results in a simple square of opposition
presented in 1.4.2 (page 61). When categorical propositions are per se true,
they are said to be in natural matter (1.4.3). When they are per accidens true,
they are said to be in contingent matter; when they are impossibly true, they
are said to be in remote matter. This is the way Buridan explains Peter of
Spain's text, although he himself prefers to use the term 'matter' for the
subject and predicate of a proposition, as explained in 1.3.2. The fourth and
final part of chapter 4 (1.4.4) explains what it means for propositions to be
contraries, subcontraries, contradictories or subalterns.
Chapter 5 discusses the concept of formal equivalence (aequipollentia or
aequivalentia) of propositions. The various relationships between categorical
propositions with oblique terms and those between categorical propositions in
which the predicate precedes the copula are clarified by means of two
diagrams.(23) In addition four rules of equivalence are formulated.
Propositions can be converted in three ways: simply, accidentally, and by
contraposition. This thesis as found in Peter of Spain's manual is discussed in
chapter 6. What is a conversion? According to Buridan a formal conversion is
the formal consequence holding between two propositions that share both
terms, but in reverse order (1.6.1). In a simple conversion (1.6.2) the quality
and the quantity of the propositions remain the same, as in 'some man is an
animal; therefore, some animal is a man'. More complicated is accidental
conversion (1.6.3), which involves changing the quantity of the proposition,
as in 'every man is an animal; therefore, some animal is a man'. Various
doubts arise, e.g. how should we convert 'some stone is in a wall' or 'a donkey
793
is dead' or propositions about the future or the past? Buridan solves most of
these problems by means of his theory of supposition. Conversion by
contraposition (1.6.4) means changing the finite terms into infinite ones, as in
'some man is not a stone; therefore, some non-stone is not a non-man'.
Buridan shows that conversions of this kind are not formal.
Hypothetical propositions of various kinds are discussed in chapter 7.
Buridan denies Peter of Spain's thesis that a hypothetical proposition contains
two categorical propositions. It would mean that a true hypothetical
proposition like 'if a donkey flies, then a donkey has feathers' would have its
principal parts false, which is absurd. Buridan finally arrives at a definition
which is 'safer' (tutior) than Peter's: a hypothetical proposition is a
proposition that has several subjects, several predicates and several copulas,
but none of these is predicated of the rest by means of one copula (1.7.1).
Peter distinguishes six species of hypothetical propositions: conditional,
conjunctive, disjunctive, causal, temporal, and local. Buridan points out that
some texts do not provide the species 'temporal' and 'local', and with good
reasons, as he argues (1.7.2). In Peter's view the truth of a conditional
requires that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent. Given his
remarks in 1.7.1 Buridan cannot possibly agree with this opinion, although
"for the sake of brevity, and because phrases signify conventionally", he goes
along with Peter's manner of speaking (1.7.3). On the topic of causal
propositions Buridan corrects Peter, saying that "it is not properly said that
the antecedent is the cause of the consequent". One should rather say that "the
thing signified by the antecedent is the cause of the thing signified by the
consequent" (1.7.6). A similar critical attitude regarding Peter's text can be
seen in 1.7.8 (De locali). There Buridan proposes to use a less complicated
method to decide whether a hypothetical proposition (be it temporal or local
or pertaining to some other Aristotelian category) is true or false.
Chapter 8, on modal propositions, is the last chapter of the treatise.
Apparently, the topic was very important for Buridan, for not only is it very
large, he also wrote almost the entire chapter himself, saying that "the author
of the Summulae discusses modal propositions very briefly and
incompletely." Only the first line is Peter's: "A mode is a determination
belonging to the thing" (1.8.1). Obviously, taken literally, this sentence
expresses a realist position, which Buridan rejects. Buridan's ontology and
semantics require that 'thing' (res) in this context is restricted to supposit for
794
significative terms. 24 The first eight paragraphs (partes) of the chapter
discuss propositions that are modal in the proper sense, i.e. propositions in
which the mode ('possible', 'impossible', 'necessary', 'contingent', 'true' or
'false') affects the copula, as in 'every man is necessarily an animal'. These are
distinguished from propositions in which the modal term is predicated of a
dictum, as in 'it is possible that a man runs' (possibile est hominem currere).
The latter are called composite modals, but, according to Buridan, composite
modals are in fact assertoric propositions. In proper modals the mode has to
be placed between the subject and the predicate (1.8.3); the mode is a part of
the copula. In the following parts Buridan discusses the quality (1.8.4) and
quantity (1.8.5) of proper modals. Part 7 is about equivalency (equipollentia)
of modal propositions, resulting in a magna figura of oppositions (see text: p.
100), and part 8 contains some rules regarding conversions of modal
propositions, e.g. 'if the antecedent implies the consequent, then the
contradictory of the consequent implies the contradictory of the antecedent'.
The ninth part (1.8.9) discusses composite modals. Rules regarding their
quality, quantity and conversion are the same as the rules for assertoric
propositions. The remaining part of the book (1.8.10) discusses propositions
that are contingent both ways (de contingenti ad utrumlibet).
11.3.3. Prooemium
"Just as the commander is the savior of the army, so is reasoning with
erudition the commander of life."
This is Buridan's opening statement of the Preface (Prooemium) of the
Summulae. The quotation comes from a "certain letter" of Aristotle to
Alexander. The attribution appears to be false, (25) but this is not the place to
discuss that question. It is Buridan's interpretation of this statement that
concerns us here. The commander of an army, says Buridan, saves the army
in two ways: first, by repelling the enemy, second, by leading it in the right
direction. Logic is to be called reasoning with erudition (ratiocinatio cum
eruditione), because it educates (erudit lit. 'polishes') us in all modes of
reasoning and in every science, and it can be compared to the commander of
an army, because it eliminates false arguments and it directs us to good
arguments.
Furthermore, Buridan points out that, according to Aristotle, there are two
most eligible ways of life: the vita contemplativa and the vita civilis seu
activa: the life of a scholar and a scientist and the life of an active citizen.
795
Training in logic helps the scholar to obtain knowledge and discover the
truth, and it helps the active citizen to decide what to strive after and what to
avoid. In other words, logic is important not only for (future) scholars, but
also for (future) politicians. It is the main constituent of a truly liberal
education.” pp XX-XXV
(22) For the importance of this distinction see my introduction to De
suppositionibus, esp. p. XXV and my paper 'Mental Language: A Key to
the Understanding of Buridan's Semantics'.
(23) Gyula Klima (in his translation pp. 44-45) presents a summary
reconstruction of these figures in which he shows how these two diagrams
are related to the modal diagram of chapter 8. For a detailed discussion of
Buridan's modal diagram Klima (ibid. p. 43, n. 77) refers to G.E. Hughes,
"The Modal Logic of John Buridan," in Atti del Convegno internazionale di
storia della logica: Le teorie delle modalità, ed. G. Corsi, C. Mangione, and
M. Mugnani, Bologna 1989, pp. 93-111.
(24) As I argued in my introduction to Summulae, De suppositionibus (p.
XXVI), Peter's realism might be one of the reasons for Buridan's growing
irritation with Peter's text.
(25) John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, transl. Klima, p. 3, n. 1.
From: Ria van der Lecq - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus - Summulae de
propositionibus - Turnhout, Brepols, 2005.
Treatise II. De praedicabilibus
"The present edition contains the second tract, De praedicabilibus, which

deals with the five 'predicables', introduced by the Neoplatonist commentator
of Aristotle, Porphyry (c. 233 - c. 304 A.D.) in his introductory book
(Isagoge) to the Stagirite's Categories, viz. 'genus', 'species', 'differentia',
'proprium', and 'accidens'. From as early as the eleventh century, medieval
authors commented upon Boethius' (480 - 524) translation of, and
commentary upon, this work.
Buridan's discussion of the predicables is mainly based on the corresponding
tract of Peter of Spain's manual. His comments are preceded by the complete
text of the lemma from Peter to be discussed. It should be no surprise that
796
Buridan's quotations should go back to an adapted version of Peter's text." (p.
XVII)
"II.3.2. A summary of its contents
2.1.1. The opening chapter discusses preliminary items. In this section the
technical use of the word 'praedicabile' is explained. Buridan's terminism
notably appears from his definition of the term 'praedicabile' properly used, in
which the phrase 'praedicari de pluribus' equals 'supponere pro pluribus'.
2.1.2. The formal difference is discussed which exists between 'praedicabile'
and 'universale', in spite of their being said convertibly of one another.
Buridan feels obliged to reject Hispanus' view of the matter. Again, Buridan's
terminism comes to the fore in his identifying 'inesse' and 'praedicari vere et
affirmative'.
2.1.3. The division of the predicables is given, including an alternative one
given by those who start from the erroneous assumption that the main
division of the predicables should be based upon the distinction 'in quid'
versus 'in quale'.
2.2. Chapter II deals with genus.
2.2.1. The common definition of genus is given and explained. Equivocal
terms (such as 'canis') are said not to be the genus of their different meanings.
Buridan's terminism makes him underline that if 'animal' is said to be
predicated of 'man', both the subject and the predicate term have material
supposition.
2.2.2. The concepts 'idem ('differens' or 'diversum') genere, specie' etc. are
discussed. It is noteworthy that the identification of 'subject-substrate' and
'accident' (which is found in some versions of Hispanus' text: 'in aliquibus
libris') is rejected by Buridan (lines 75 ff.).
2.2.3. The phrases 'in eo quod quid' and 'in eo quod quantum' etc. are
explained.
2.2.4. - 2.2.5. An alternative definition of 'genus' and the latter's usual
division into 'genus generalissimum' and 'genus subalternum'.
2.2.6. The definition of 'genus generalissimum' is given and completed by
Buridan. In line with common doctrine, the 'genus generalissimum' is divided
into the ten categories, and 'ens' is said not to be their 'genus superveniens'.
2.2.7. presents the definition of 'genus subalternum'. Again, the role of
material supposition is pointed out.
797
2.3. This chapter discusses 'species'.
2.3.1. - 2.3.4. 'Species' is defined and divided. Buridan corrects Peter of
Spain's definition of 'species specialissima'. The 'Porphyrian Tree' is
introduced and explained.
2.3.5. contains the definition of 'individuum' and discusses some interesting
'dubia' on this matter, e.g. the question whether, contrary to the definition of
'individual', individual terms such as 'Johannes' may be predicated of many.
Buridan rejects such suggestions by pointing to the equivocation involved in
the use of proper names said of diverse individuals. Also the peculiar position
of the term 'deus' is discussed.
2.4. Chapter IV deals with 'differentia'.
2.4.1.-2.4.5. The logical use of the word 'differentia' is explained. In
Buridan's view, the phrase 'differentibus specie' found in the common
definition should be dropped. An alternative definition of 'differentia' is
mentioned, and the use of the phrases 'differentia constitutiva' and 'differentia
divisiva' is explained. Finally, a corollary is added.
2.5. This chapter deals with 'proprium'.
2.5.1.-2.5.2. The predicable 'proprium' is defined. In this context, some key
terms (e.g. 'praedicatio essentialis' versus 'praedicatio denominativa') are
discussed, including Buridan's favourite device 'connotatio aliena'.
2.6. This chapter deals with 'accidens'.
2.6.1. Porphyry's definition of the predicable 'accidens' is explained along the
lines of terminist logic. Buridan remarks that the 'adesse' of the definition
should not be taken in the sense of 'inesse secundum inhaerentiam proprie
dictam', rather 'adesse alicui subiecto' is equivalent to 'praedicari vere et
affirmative de illo'.
2.6.2. Another definition of 'accidens' is given. In an interesting 'dubitatio',
Buridan discusses the relationship between 'praedicabile' and 'praedicatum'
and that between the four 'predicates' found in Aristotle's Topics and the five
'Porphyrian predicables'.
2.6.3. A third definition of 'accidens' is discussed.
2.6.4.-2.6.5. 'Accidens' is divided into 'accidens separabile' and 'accidens
inseparabile', and the proper nature of the latter is explained.
2.7. The final chapter deals with the specific properties of each of the five
predicables and the properties they have in common. It contains a great
number of interesting incidental remarks on various matters, such as
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'praedicatio univoca' vs 'praedicatio aequivoca', and the distinction between
'real priority' and 'formal priority' (2.7.2.); the diverse grammatical 'modi
significandi' (2.7.4.); and the logical difficulties involved in the use of
comparatives and superlatives (e.g. 'albius' as the species of 'hoc album' and
'illud album').
In the seventh chapter, four of Buridan's five lemmata are completely lacking
in Peter's text. Conversely, Peter's final sections (De predicatione and De
denominativis, p. 25, 8-32) are missing in Buridan's tract on the predicables,
but both from a doctrinal and from a didactic point of view this omission is
quite understandable, as these items are more properly discussed in the third
tract, De praedicamentis.(13)
Buridan's work consists of elementary exegesis as well as extensive
objections and dubitationes in which specific questions are dealt with, mostly
in an original fashion." (pp. XXIV-XXXI)
(13) See Johannes Buridanus, Summulae in Praedicamenta, ed. E.P.
Bos, 3.1.3
From: L. M. de Rijk - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus -Summulae: De
praedicabilibus. Edited by L. M. de Rijk - Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers
1995
Treatise III. In praedicamenta
“In his commentary Buridan presents an introductory section (3.1), in which

the so-called antepredicamenta are discussed: first the definitions of
aequivoca ('equivocals') (3.1.1), univoca ('univocals') (3.1.2) and
denominativa ('denominatives') (3.1.2); then the division of voces ('words')
(3.1.4) and of eorum quae sunt ('of those things that are') (3.1.5). Thirdly, two
rules on the logical relations between predicates (3.1.6) and on the relation
between genus and species are discussed (3.1.7). Buridan winds up this
section with a division of incomplexa ('things without combination',
'incomplex things') into the ten categories (3.1.8) and the discussion of a
property common to the ten categories (3.1.9), viz. that incomplex things
cannot form an affirmation or negation.
In section 3.2 Buridan discusses the categories in the proper sense. First a
799
division and some characteristics of substance (3.2.1 - 3.2.3), next six
properties belonging to the members of this category are treated. Section 3.3
is on quantity: first divisions and species of quantity are discussed (3.3.1 -
3.3.4), then three properties (3.3.5 - 3.3.7). Section 3.4 is on relation: first
Buridan gives definitions and species (3.4.1 - 3.4.2), then four properties
(3.4.3 - 3.4.6). The section On quality contains a definition of quality and
quale, and their four kinds (3.5.1 - 3.4.6), then three properties and a note on
terms belonging to different categories (3.5.7 - 3.5.10). In section 3.6 Buridan
discusses the categories of actio (action) and of passio (being acted upon) are
dealt with as a whole; he presents their definitions, kinds and four properties.
In section 3.7 he discusses the four last categories: 'when', 'where', 'being-in-
a-position' and 'having' (quando, ubi, situs and habitus).
Sections 3.8 - 3.10 discuss what are traditionally called the
postpraedicamenta: 3.8 is on four kinds of opposition (oppositio), 3.9 is on
movement (motus) and mutation (mutatio) (their kinds, and what is contrary
to these postpraedicamenta); 3.10 is on the meanings of prius ('prior'), simul
('simultaneous') and habere ('to have' -- in various senses, see below, III, 3. 4,
section IX).
Insight into the philosophical principles which underlie Buridan's
commentary is a precondition for understanding his detailed interpretations of
the categories. These principles can partly be gathered from the Summulae
themselves, but Buridan has made them especially explicit in other treatises,
notably his Praedicabilia (16), Suppositiones, Ampliationes and
Appellationes (17). I shall try to present them here briefly. I shall not discuss
Buridan's position in the history of the theories about tha categories, for this
would exceed the proper limits of our introduction.
It should be noted that Buridan's view of the categories is more elaborate, and
sometimes clearer in his Quaestiones in Praedicamenta than in the treatise
from the Summulae discussed here.” (pp. XIX-XX)
(16) Buridan's commentary (Summulae) on Porphyry (the Praedicabilia)
will be edited shortly by L.M. de Rijk; his Quaestiones in Porphyrium
have not yet been edited [see the edition by Ryszard Tatarzynski in:
Przeglad Tomistyczny 2: 111-195 (1986), note added by R. Corazzon]
(17) ed. M. E. Reina, 'Giovanni Buridano, Tractatus de suppositionibus,
prima edizione a cura di Maria Elena Reina', in Rivista critica di storia della
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filosofia 12 (1957), pp. 175-208; 323-353. In the editorial project of which
the present text is a part, Dr. R. van der Lecq is preparing a new critical
edition of Buridan's De suppositionibus [published in 1998].
[For a detailed summary of the contents see pp. XXIV-XLIV]
From: Johannes Buridanus - Summulae in praedicamenta - Edited by E. P.
Bos - Nijmegen, Ingenium Publishers, 1994
Treatise IV. De suppositionibus
"The present edition contains the fourth treatise De suppositionibus. As can

easily be gathered from the index capitulorum (below, p. 3), it consists of six
chapters, which deal with various aspects of supposition. (20)
Each chapter consists of several parts containing a lemma followed by an
exposition and commentary. Unlike the lemmata of tracts I, II and III, the
lemmata of De suppositionibus are not taken from Peter of Spain's Tractatus.
Buridan discusses the topics of Peter's chapters VI (De suppositionibus), VIII
(De relativis), IX (De ampliationibus), X (De appellationibus), XI (De
restrictionibus) and XII (De distributionibus), but he has used an alternative
text. He does not even refer to Peter of Spain.(21) An indication that Buridan
may have written the basic text himself is found in the lemmata of 4.3.7.5 and
4.3.8.4, which contain a reference to another work of his, theSophismata.
Moreover, the commentary never indicates that Buridan disagrees with the
lemma-text. More than once, e.g. in 4.1.2 and 4.1.4, he expresses some
doubts concerning the text, but he subsequently solves them. Finally, in De
suppositionibus Buridan does not refer to any auctor, as he frequently did in
the previous treatises.
One may wonder why Buridan felt he could not go on commenting upon
Peter's text the way he had done in the first three tracts.” (pp. XVII-XVIII)
(20) For an excellent introduction to Buridan's theory of language see:
M.E. Reina, Il problema del linguaggio in Buridano. Cf. also Th. K.
Scott's introduction to John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth,
New York, 1966, esp. pp. 22-49 and J. Biard, Logique et théorie du
signe au XIVe siecle, Paris 1989, pp. 162-202.
801
(21) A negative reference may be found in 4.3.2 (p. 38).
[Follows a summary of the content of De suppositionibus who will give
ample information to answer this question, pp. XVIII-XXV]
From: E. P. Bos - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus - Summulae de
suppostionibus - Nijmegen, Ingenium Publishers, 1998
Treatise V. On Syllogisms
[In preparation]
Treatise VI. On Topics

(Critical edition not yet published)
Treatise VII. On Fallacies

(Critical edition not yet published)
Treatise VIII. On Definitions, Divisions, and

Demonstrations
"The present edition contains the eighth tract, De demonstrationibus, by far

the greater of which deals with demonstrative argument, and for the sake of
this prefaces it with a discussion of the standard lore concerning division and
definition.
The main division of the work clearly appears from the opening lines (1.1 in
the present edition), in which Buridan proposes to deal with demonstration,
but thinks it indispensable to discuss first the doctrine of division and
definition which lies at the bottom of that concerning demonstrative
argument, despite the fact that 'auctor noster' did not pay any attention to this
important part of logic ('pars logicae magis nobilis et finalis')." p. XXI
"The following sketch of the contents of the three main parts ('materiae')
802
may be given.
PRIMA MATERIA: De divisionibus
8.1 contains the general introduction to the whole treatise, and explains its
design, especially the addition of the two preambulary tracts on division and
definition.
8.1.1 presents its division and the subdivision of the tract on division, and
next it defines the notions 'division' and 'composition'.
8.1.2 explains what is understood by 'componere' and 'dividere'.
8.1.3 discusses the notions 'totum' and 'pars'.
8.1.4 deals with the various divisions of 'totum' and the corresponding kinds
of composition and division.
8.1.5 discusses 'tota praedicabilia' and their parts.
8.1.6 is about perfect and imperfect division. Two problematic questions
('dubitationes') are raised, one concerning the division of some genera into
their species, the other about why in such cases the genus can be regarded as
the totum of its species, rather than the other way round, and how a species is
a subjective part of its genus.
8.1.7 discusses the remaining, less common kinds of division.
SECUNDA MATERIA: De definitionibus
8.2 The eight common properties of definitions and things defined are
enumerated.
8.2.1 The chapter is divided into seven parts, the first of which deals with the
eight properties: (a) definitio (i.e. definiens) and definitum are said
reciprocally, i.e. they have converse relationships as every definiens is the
definiens of its definition, and vice versa; (b) definiens and definitum are
mutually convertible; (c) every definiens notifies the definitum in an explicit
way; (d) every definiens is a phrase ('oratio'), while every definitum is an
incomposite term, or at least less complex than the definiens; (e) neither the
definiens nor the definitum are singular terms; (f) nor are they a proposition;
(g) no definiens has a parabolic or metaphoric sense; (h) no definiens should
suffer from superfluity or deficiency.
8.2.2 Definitions ('definientia') are divided into nominal, quiditative, causal,
and descriptive ones.
8.2.3 Nominal definition is defined and discussed.
8.2.4 Quiditative definition is defined, and its properties are dealt with. In a
lengthy digression three questions of semantical interest are raised and
803
extensively answered: (a) whether phrases such as 'nasus simus' are nugatory;
(b) whether definitions such as 'simum est nasus cavus' is nominal; (c)
whether a subject's property should be defined by including its subject in the
definition.
8.2.5 Causal definition is defined and explained, including the diverse kinds
of cause (formal, material, efficient, and final cause).
8.2.6 Description is defined, and its use is clarified.
8.2.7 discusses complex definitions and their use in demonstrative arguments.
TERTIA MATERIA: De demonstrationibus
8.3 General division of this tract into ten chapters. (...)
8.4 The next chapter deals with similarities and dissimilarities between
demonstrative and dialectical argument, and the distinction between true
knowledge ('scientia') and opinion.(...)
8.5 This chapter discusses first and indemonstrables principles.(...)
8.6 This chapter deals with the notions 'de omni', 'per se' and 'secudndum
quod ipsum'. (...)
8.7 The next chapter is about the diviison of 'demonstratio'.(...)
8.8 This chapter deals with the 'demonstratio propter quid', about which many
difficulties ('dubitationes') can be raised, as has already been observed in the
introductory text.(...)
Like the treatises I-VII the present one, too, consists of elementary exegesis
as well as extensive objections and dubitationes in which specific questions
are dealth with, mostly in an original fashion and always along the lines of
thought found in Buridan's numerous commentaries on Aristotle. (37) "
(37) The conspicuous coherence in Buridan's thought coming to the fore
throughout his various works is rightly highlighted by Sten Ebbesen,
'Proofs and its Limits according to Buridan, Summulae 8', in Z. Kaluza-
P. Vignaux Preuve et raisons ... etc., Paris 1984, p. 97: 'John Buridan
was (...) remarkably consistent. He almost invariably says the same
about the same things, and what he says about one subject is usually
consistent with what he says about any other somehow related subject.
His work abounds in cross-references, from one part of a work to
another, and from one work to another. He obviously wanted his readers
to think of his philosophical works as one coherent corpus presenting
one coherent philosophy.
804
From: L. M. de Rijk - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus - Summulae de
demonstrationibus - Groningen-Haren, Ingenium Publishers, 2001
[Treatise IX.] Sophismata

"The Place of the Sophismata in Buridan's Work.
As a Master of Arts, Buridan was not allowed to teach or write on questions
of theology, but his work covers most of the areas of philosophy. And as was
common, most of his work is in the form of commentaries on the works of
Aristotle. Most important among these are commentaries on the Physica, De
Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, Meteorologica, and the short physical
treatises known as the parva naturalia, together with both commentaries and
quaestiones on the Metaphysica and quaestiones on the Ethica ad
Nicomachum and the Politica.
In the area designated by scholastics as logic, Buridan wrote three major
works, of which the Sophismata is one. The largest of these is the Summula
de Dialectica, and as is noted in its first few lines, the Sophismata may be
regarded as a ninth tract of that general survey of logic. The other major
logical work is the Consequentiae, which is a study of the forms of logical
inference.
While the Consequentiae would be recognized today as a work clearly
belonging to the field of logic, neither the Summula nor the Sophismata could
any longer be so classified. The medieval conception of logic, based on
classical grammar and rhetoric, Stoic logic, and Aristotle's Organon was very
broad indeed by modern standards, embracing not only formal logic, but most
of what is today known as the philosophy of language, together with some
issues that seem now to belong to metaphysics or the theory of knowledge.
Thus Buridan is firmly within the tradition when he includes within a summa
of logic consideration of the nature of language, types of languages, the
nature of signs, types of terms, the structure of concepts, the nature of
propositions, a theory of meaning, a theory of reference, and the nature of
truth. However, because of the way many issues were conceived, even this
way of classifying the topics covered is apt to be misleading, and the reader
would do well to learn the nature of medieval logic not through descriptions
in secondary works, but through a study of representative works of the
805
discipline.
Within the tradition of medieval logic itself, Buridan's work can be further
specified as being of that variety known as "terminist" logic. Terminist logic,
while long in developing, was apparently first brought together in a
systematic way in the thirteenth century e. g. in the Summulae Logicales of
Peter of Spain. It was so named because it was based on a doctrine that the
term is the fundamental unit of all language, and on the view that the
categorematic term is the only independent-
ly meaningful element of language. Theories of meaning and reference were
then developed through an elaborate analysis of what were known as the
"properties of terms".
The two principal properties of terms were significatio and suppositio, though
virtually every author discussed a number of derivative properties based on
these. Neither of these properties was understood in the same way by all
terminists, so that it is difficult to make general remarks about them, a
difficulty compounded by the fact that neither property corresponds very
nearly with any conception in common use today. However, it may not be too
misleading to suggest that significatio was usually the basis of a theory of
meaning (or perhaps better, a theory of predicability), while suppositio was
used to account for the actual referential use of terms in propositions and to
develop truth-conditions for propositions of all sorts. For Buridan in
particular, the theory of significatio is used to explain the relation of
categorematic terms and propositions both to concepts of the mind and to the
things conceived by those concepts. The theory of suppositio is then an
account of the ways in which categorematic terms function as referring
elements in propositions of various forms and in combination with various
syncategorematic words to yield true and false propositions.
Buridan's Sophismata is best understood as an advanced "problems text" in
the terminist tradition, and especially as a treatment of special problems
associated with the properties of terms. Virtually the entire work consists of
problems associated with significatio and suppositio, though it goes without
saying that a great many other sorts of issues get involved in the working out
of these problems. For more than a century prior to Buridan, teachers of logic
had been compiling lists of problem-sentences or sophismata to be employed
by their students as exercises. But Buridan's is different from most of these in
that it is rather highly structured and is deliberately placed after the
806
introduction to the fundamental doctrines of terminist logic in the Summula
de Dialectica as a systematic consideration of special problems growing out
of the application of those doctrines."
From: Theodore Kermit Scott - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus -
Sophismata. Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog 1977, pp. 10-11
"Summary of the Sophismata.

Although a detailed study of the problems dealt with in the work cannot be
undertaken here, it may prove useful, as a guide for the reader, to summarize
briefly the main themes of each chapter.
Chapter I: This chapter is intended to clarify Buridan's doctrine of
significatio. In particular, after the statement of the sixth sophisma, there are
eleven conclusions which together constitute a remarkably clear statement of
the doctrine.
The primary aim of the sophismata of this chapter is to bring out Buridan's
view that truth cannot be a function of significatio, because every
proposition, whether true or false, signifies a corresponding mental
proposition and also signifies concrete particulars. Thus the traditional
definition of truth stating that a proposition is true if qualitercumque
significat esse, ita est, must be understood very broadly.
The fifth sophisma is of particular interest, since it involves Buridan's
rejection of a fairly common scholastic doctrine, according to which every
proposition signifies an abstract entity, known as a complexe significabile.
For Buridan, every pro
position signifies something (even if one of its terms can have suppositio for
nothing), but no proposition signifies anything other than concrete
particulars. Chapter II: Having determined in Chapter I that truth and falsity
are not a function of signification, Buridan proceeds in this chapter to his
own account of the actual truth-conditions for categorical propositions. In
stating these conditions, the doctrine of suppositio is introduced, and it is
shown that truth is determined by identities and differences of suppositio
among the categorematic terms of the proposition in question.
After the sixth sophisma, fourteen conclusions are given. The first eight of
these further clarify the doctrine of significatio and make clear its relation to
truth, while the last six use the doctrine of suppositio to state actual truth-
807
conditions for categorical propositions.
The reader might pay particular attention to the third sophisma, which
appears tautological and yet is held by Buridan to be false, because of the
basis of truth in suppositio.
Chapter III: This chapter contains an extraordinarily clear account of the
doctrine of suppositio. The first five sophismata and the remarks which
follow the fifth sophisma introduce the basic division into suppositio
personalis and suppositio materialis and discuss a number of problems in a
way which helps to clarify the distinction between the two types. The
remaining sophismata and the discussion accompanying them is concerned
with the several divisions of suppositio personalis and the use of these
additional types in providing an analysis of propositions containing
quantifying words. And finally a number of rules are given governing
immediate inferences involving such quantified propositions.
Chapter IV: This chapter requires special attention, since it contains Buridan's
fullest discussion of his doctrine of appellatio, which differs almost entirely
from a doctrine of the same name that occurs in other terminist texts. And
furthermore, Buridan applies the doctrine in two ways that are not merely
distinct, but are so loosely connected as to seem hardly applications of the
same doctrine.
The first application of the doctrine is developed in the first eight sophismata
and the remarks associated with them. According to that discussion, every
categorematic term is said to have appellatio for everything it signifies,
beyond that for which it stands in suppositio personalis. Furthermore,
everything that is thus signified bears some relation to that for which the term
stands and so determines the reason why that certain term is used to stand for
the thing in question. For example, in the proposition 'Socrates is white', the
term 'white' stands for Socrates, but has appellatio for the quality of whiteness
possessed by Socrates.
This discussion in the early part of the chapter also includes Buridan's view
of the way in which the doctrine is to be applied in cases of tensed and other
modal propositions or in cases where the logical subject or predicate of a
proposition consists of more than one term.
The second application of the doctrine of appellatio is covered in the
remainder of the chapter. This application has to do with the reference of
terms following certain verbs usually associated with cognitive attitudes,
808
such as knowledge, belief, opinion, doubt, etc. In such contexts a term is said
to have appellatio not for some concrete substances or properties, but for the
ratio which accounts for the fact that just that term and no other is used in the
proposition. And because the term does have appellatio for that particular
ratio, Buridan holds that it is not possible to substitute another term for that
one in such a context, even though the two terms may have the same
suppositio. Thus in the proposition 'You know the one approaching', the
predicate 'the one approaching' may stand for Plato, but it has appellatio for
the ratio by which Plato is known not as Plato but as the one approaching, so
that one cannot substitute the term 'Plato' for that predicate salva veritate.
Chapter V: This chapter is a rather straightforward discussion of the doctrine
of the extension (ampliatio) and restriction (restrictio) of suppositio.
Buridan's version of this doctrine is orthodox and the exposition is clear. In
general the doctrine is that suppositio may be limited to presently existing
things or it may be extended to things existing in either the past or the future
or both, depending primarily on the tense and modality of the verb of the
proposition, but also on the occurrence of certain other temporal or modal
words, or even on the occurrence of certain prefixes or suffixes.
Chapter VI: The discussion in this chapter is probably more important for
modern readers attempting to understand terminist logic than it was for
Buridan's scholastic contemporaries. Today we are accustomed to a
distinction between sentences and propositions and to thinking of a
proposition as an abstract, timeless entity expressed by a spoken or written
sentence, so that this chapter is important in emphasizing the common
medieval view of a proposition as a purely conventional group of sounds or
marks. It also brings out the distinction between propositions so understood
and mental propositions, which were thought of as natural signs and so as
independent of the human will, both as to content and as to truth. Thus any
group of sounds or marks conventionally instituted might be a true or false
proposition, depending entirely on whether it was understood to be the
correlate of some true or false mental proposition.
Chapter VII: This chapter extends the discussion of the preceding one, by
considering the conception of the proposition as purely conventional in the
light of certain problems concerning time, which had been alive in the
medieval tradition at least since Augustine. Since a proposition is not a
timeless entity, but is rather an object that comes to be as it is spoken or
809
written and exists only so long as it is spoken or preserved in written form,
how are we to understand the truth of such temporal beings? Does a spoken
proposition ever exist, since its words are not all spoken simultaneously?
How can a proposition of present tense be true, since the present is past
before the proposition fully exists? And if we make it a matter of convention
of what duration the present is, it would appear that the same proposition can
be either true or false, depending on which convention is adopted.
Chapter VIII: The final chapter of the work is perhaps its richest, and for that
reason, it is difficult to summarize briefly. It is a collection and discussion of
a number of problems, which were grouped together by medievals and called
insolubilia. Originally used as a pedagogical device, insolubilia eventually
became the vehicle for discussion of the most advanced problems of terminist
logic. Broadly speaking, most insolubilia are paradoxes of some sort and are
usually propositions which, either by what they assert or by their form, seem
to imply, directly or indirectly, their own denials. But this is not true of all.
Some (such as the fifth and sixth sophismata of this chapter) seem to be little
more than puns, while others (for example, the sixteenth and seventeenth
sophismata) pose a dilemma for action. Because of the range of problems
considered, the best brief introduction to the chapter must be an invitation to
the reader to give it his detailed attention. But special mention might be made
of the seventh sophisma, which may be of particular interest to modern
logicians, since it contains Buridan's way of dealing with semantic paradoxes,
which are among the more common and interesting insolubilia."
From: Theodore Kermit Scott - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus -
Sophismata. Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog 1977, pp. 14-16
RELATED PAGES
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Buridan's Logical Works. II. The Treatise

on Consequence and Other Writings
TRACTATUS DE CONSEQUENTIIS
(In preparation)
QUAESTIONES LONGE SUPER LIBRUM

PERIHERMENEIAS
"The present work contains the first critical edition of John Buridan's
Questiones longe super Librum Perihermeneias Aristotilis.
(...)
Now we should have to answer the question: when were the questions on
Perihermeneias written? Little is known about the chronology of Buridan's
works. Even a relative date is difficult to establish. However, some remarks
can be made. First, there is the fact that the questions on Perihermeneias are
quoted several times in Tractatus I of the Summule (4), in a way that makes it
highly probable that the Summule were written after the Questiones on
Perihermeneias (5). Now, according to professor Pinborg the first lectura of
the Summule may be dated as early as the late 1320es (6), that is at the very
beginning of Buridan's career as a teacher of philosophy at the university of
812
Paris. This may be an indication for an early date of the Questiones on
Perihermeneias, possibly as early as 1325.
There are two other reasons for assuming that the commentary on
Perihermeneias is one of Buridan's first works. The first clue is given by the
places where Buridan refers to one of his own works: once he refers to his
commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge (7), twice to his commentary on
Aristotle's Metaphysics (8), and six times to his commentary on the Physics
(9). The way in which he refers to these tracts seems also to be significant:
the reference to his commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge shows that this work
is of an earlier date than the present work. As to the other two works, he only
refers to the number of the book in which he is going to treat a particular
subject, not to the number of the question. A (cross)reference to the Summule
is not given, although, as Pinborg remarks, there is a general doctrinal
concordance between the two works. The questions on Metaphysics do not
contain a (cross)-reference to the questions on Perihermeneias, at least not on
the places where one would expect them. I am not certain about possible
references occurring in the commentary on Physics. However, we should be
very careful to draw conclusions from the occurrence of references, since it is
always possible that we are dealing with a second or third lectura of the text.
(10)
Another argument in favour of an early date of the tract is based on the
content of the work. Doctrinal analysis of the work shows that most subjects
treated in the Questiones on Perihermeneias can also be found in other works
of Buridan's in a more elaborate way. The work as a whole seems to show an
early stage of Buridan's doctrinal development.
Unfortunately, this argument is not as strong as it seems, since the superficial
way in which some subjects are discussed in the work may be related to the
character of the tract: the questions on the Logica vetus were probably
presented to the students in an early stage of their philosophical training.
Thus, there is not much certainty about the date of the questions on
Perihermeneias. There are some reasons to believe that we have to deal with
an early work of Buridan. Although, taken separately, none of these reasons
is in itself sufficient, I am inclined to consider the work as an early tract.
The Questiones breves.
The present work does not contain an edition of the short version of the
questions on Aristotle's Perihermeneias. "
813
(5) Summule I.3.3: Ad tertiam dubitationem ego tractavi expresse et
diffuse I. Perihermeneias in &a questione, ad quam recurrat qui voluit.
(6) Jan Pinborg, The Summule, Tractatis I De Introductionibus. in: The Logic
of John Buridan (1976) pp. 71-90
(7)p. 6,8. The short version gives an explicit reference to the third question of
this tract.
(8) p. 52,36; p. 71,34
(9) p. 35,4 p. 41,11+14+21; p. 58, 27; p. 68, 36
(10) Edmond Faral, "Jean Buridan: Maître és arts de l'Université de Paris,"
Histoire Littéraire de la France 28 (1949), 462-605 (separate edition 1950)
From: Ria van der Lecq - Introduction to: Quaestiones longe super Librum
Perihermeneias. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1983, pp. XIII-XIV
QUAESTIONES TOPICORUM
"The commentary edited here is a question-commentary. This means that --
like most commentaries of its kind -- it offers the reader little help to
understand Aristotle's text. Or to put the same in another manner: Though we
find a considerable number of references to the Topics we could remove
practically all the references and still have almost the same commentary. Or
again: Nearly all the questions are occasioned by a section of Aristotle's text,
but the discussions take place within a purely medieval frame-work.
We find, however, three references to littera (i.e. Aristotle's text) which are
most naturally taken to mean that our work presupposes an exposition of the
text.(11) These references need not mean that there was ever a 'published'
literal-commentary on Aristotle's Topics by Buridan. Yet it has been argued
convincingly by Christoph Flüeler(12) that Buridan's habit was to go through
a prescribed text by expounding it and discussing questions on it within the
same period, though the exposition of the text might proceed at a quicker
pace than the disputation of questions. This will mean that the present work
originally did not stand alone, but had an explanation of the text as its
background. No trace seems to be left of such an exposition of Aristotle's
Topics by Buridan, and perhaps it was never written down, but only spoken
in the class-room.
814
Flüeler further argues that all or most of Buridan's commentaries have come
down to us as students' reportations of oral lectures and not in Flüelera form
finished by Buridan himself.(13) This seems to hold true of the present work:
In I qu. 5, arg. 1a we read: sicut hen dicebatur; in IV qu. 4 arg. 3b: sicut
hodie dicebatur; in V qu. 2 arg. 4a: sicut dicebam heri; and in I qu. 17, dist. I:
descriptiones horum sunt vobis satis notae. Such phrases are more naturally
said in an oral lecture than written in a finished text. Inevitably this leads to
the question: Has the student reported the lecture in the classroom, as it was
spoken, or has he later written down a full text on the basis of notes taken in
the class-room? Flüeler argues convincingly(14) for the existence of
reportations written down in a complete form in the class-room, but certainly
we cannot consider it to be proved that all reportations were made in that
way. It is hardly possible to decide the question concerning our commentary,
but when reading it we should keep in mind that there probably is, so to
speak, a 'mediator' between Buridan and us.
Any reader of our commentary will quickly notice that it does not pay equal
regard to all eight books of Aristotle's Topics. The questions on book I take
up about one third of the work, and the same is true about the questions on
book II. The remaining books are then dealt with quickly in the last third of
the commentary. This selective attitude to Aristotle's text is one which our
work shares with other commentaries from the same period.(15) If we
compare with the much bigger number of questions in the commentaries from
the 13th century by Boethius de Dacia(16) and Radulphus Brito(17) we
cannot avoid the impression that Aristotle's Topics interested the authors of
the 14th century much less than it did earlier commentators. Or perhaps we
could say that the logic of the 14th century followed a course of development
of its own, and was to a lesser degree directly inspired by a reading of
Aristotle than the logic of the 13th century.
Already in the earliest question-commentaries on Aristotle's Topics it became
customary for the authors to use the beginning of book II to discuss problems
about the syncategoreme omnis (all/every).(18) Buridan does the same in our
work. We find discussions of standard sophisms like Omne animal fuit in
arca Noe (II qu. 2); (19) Omnis phoenix est (II qu. 3); Omnes apostoli sunt
duodecim (II qu. 4); Omnis homo est omnis homo (II qu. 4); Omnis homo de
necessitate est animal (II qu. 6); Totus Socrates est minor Socrate (II qu. 4).
Further Buridan discusses sophisms like Quicquid emisti, comedisti; crudum
815
emisti; igitur crudum comedisti(20) (II qu. 6, cf. I qu. 5) and Denarios in
bursa mea scis esse pares(21) (II qu. 6). It is remarkable that, except for the
last two, Buridan does not include these sophisms in his own collection of
sophisms (= the last section of hisSummulae). Rather they belong to the
sophisms commonly discussed in the 13th century. Perhaps it is possible to
suggest that this indicates that the commentary on the Topics was an early
work by Buridan."
(11) I qu. 15; lI qu. 10; VIII qu. I.
(12) Christoph Flüeler, From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries: John
Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics. In Medieval analyses in
language and cognition. Acts of the Symposium: The Copenhagen School of
Medieval Philosophy. Edited by Ebbesen Sten and Friedman Russell L.
Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters 1999, 502-510.
(13) Flüeler 1999, 499-500.
(14) Flüeler 1999, 507-511; 516; 518.
(15) Cf. Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics. The
Commentaries on Aristotle's and Boethius's 'Topics'. München-Wien,
Philosophia, 1984, 89-90; 392-399.
(16) Boethius de Dacia, Topica - Opuscola. Edited by N. J. Green-Pedersen
and J. Pinborg,. Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi V, 1-2.
Hauniae Societas Linguae et Litteraturam Danicarum/Gad 1976, 2, 461-466.
(17) Cf. Jan Pinborg, "Die Logik der Modistae". Studia Mediewistyczne 16
(1975), 82-86.
(18) Boethius de Dacia 1976, 2, 462; Pinborg 1975, 83-84 (Radulphus Brito).
(19) Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, Quaestiones Elenchorum, 8.4.3, P. 35; 9.3.2.1,
p. 38.
(20) Cf. Johannes Buridanus, De Practica Sophismatum, 64; 73-74; cf. the
next section of this introduction.
(21) Cf. Iohannes Buridanus, De Practica Sophismatum, 79-80; 90; cf. the
next section of this introduction.
From: Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen - Introduction to: Johannes Buridanus -
Quaestiones Topicorum - Turnhout, Brepols, 2008, pp. XIII-XV
QUAESTIONES ELENCORUM
816
"The treatment of the problem of the insolubilia may give us some evidence
for a relative date of the Questiones elencorum. The subject is discussed in
question 19 of the present work. Someone who is not familiar with the
discussions on paradoxes may wonder why the subject is treated here at all.
Question 19 is one of the few questions in this work that contain no reference
at all to Aristotle's text and at first sight it seems to have no connection with
the subject of fallacies.
The reason that the subject is discussed here is that paradoxes were very often
considered as originating from the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.(14)
From that point of view an insoluble proposition, like 'Sortes dicit falsum',
supposing that Sortes says no other proposition than this one, is neither
simpliciter false nor simpliciter true, and therefore it deserves the same
treatment as the proposition about the black man with the white teeth. For the
sake of clearness: Buridan has never defended this opinion himself.
According to him the proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', where 'falsum' refers
to the proposition itself, is simply false.
Buridan has dealt with the subject in more than one place in his works, but
the most profound exposition can be found in chapter VIII of the Sophismata.
In sophism 7 he exposes the principles of his solution. First Buridan argues
that in the case presented, viz. that all true propositions have been annihilated
and only false ones has survived, when Socrates says 'every proposition is
false' and nothing more, this proposition is simply false. Then he goes on to
reply to some opposing arguments:
7.7.1: Some people have advanced the following view (and it was my
opinion too at one time): Even if the only thing that the proposition
signifies or asserts, simply in virtue of the meanings of its terms, is that
every proposition is false, nevertheless every proposition, by its very
form, signifies or asserts itself to be true, and as a result any proposition
that either directly or indirectly asserts itself to be false, is false (transl.
Hughes,(15) ital. ours).
(Aliqui enim dixerunt, et ita visum fuit mihi alias, quod licet ista propositio
secundum significationem suorum terminorum non significet vel asserat nisi
quod omnis propositio est falsa, tamen omnis propositio de forma sua
significat vel assent se esse veram. Ideo omnis propositio asserens se esse
falsam, sive directe sive consecutive, est falsa.) (16)
817
Let us follow G.E. Hughes(17) in referring to this theory (viz. that every
proposition signifies its own truth) as the meaning theory.
Next Buridan goes on to say that strictly speaking it is not correct to say that
every proposition signifies or asserts itself to be true. He prefers another
view:
7.7.2: one that is quite close to the truth. According to it every
proposition virtually implies a second proposition in which the subject
would stand for the original proposition and the predicate 'true' would be
affirmed of it.
(Ideo dicitur aliter, propinquius veritati, scilicet quod quaelibet propositio
implicat virtualiter aliam propositionem de cujus subjecto pro ea supponente
affirmatur hoc praedicatum ' verum'.)
Following Hughes we shall refer to this theory (viz. that every
proposition implies its own truth) as the entailment theory. This
introduction is not the right place for a detailed study of Buridan's
solution of the problem of paradoxes. What matters for our purpose here
is that he first presents an opinion of which he says that he had that
opinion too at one time.
Now if we take a look at his remarks in question 19 of the Questiones
Elencorum, it becomes clear that this text must have been written before
the Sophismata. In 19.3.2 Buridan states that every proposition formally
signifies that it is true or at least it follows from every proposition that it
is true:
Et sit prima suppositio quod omnis propositio de significatione forrnali
significat se esse veram. Et ideo quia consequens includitur in
antecedente, quaelibet propositio implicat se esse veram, nam omnis
propositio est affirmativa vel negativa. Modo quaelibet illarum significat
se esse veram vel saltem ad quamlibet illarum sequitur eam esse veram.
From this passage we may conclude that when writing the Questiones
Elencorum he had no objections against the meaning theory, although he
preferred the entailment theory himself.
Another text where the subject is discussed can be found in Buridan's
818
commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. In book VI question 11 the author
argues that some people suppose that every affirmative proposition formally
signifies that in every way the facts are as it says they are (qualitercumque
significat esse ita est).(18) Now 'that in every way the facts are as the
proposition says they are' is considered a truth condition of an affirmative
proposition. So it may be assumed that Buridan here refers to the opinion that
every affirmative proposition formally signifies that this proposition itself is
true: the meaning theory. According to Buridan the defenders of this opinion
see the truth but they do not see it completely. Strictly speaking this opinion
is not correct (iste modus loquendi vel non est verus vel non est proprius). He
politely rejects this opinion with the same arguments as in the Sophismata,
although in the Sophismata he seems to be more convinced of his being in the
right. In the commentary on the Metaphysics as well as in chapter VIII of the
Sophismata his objection against the opinion that every proposition signifies
itself to be true is that in this opinion the signification of e.g. 'a man is an
animal' would be "that a man is an animal' is true', that is, if the expression
'itself to be true' (se esse veram) is taken materially. This is incorrect, because
according to Buridan in the Sophismata, "that a man is an animal' is true' is a
proposition about second intentions, whereas the original proposition 'a man
is an animal' is a proposition about first intentions. In other words, as
formulated in the commentary on the Metaphysics, 'equus est asinus' does not
signify the proposition 'a horse is a donkey'; it only signifies horses and
donkeys. If the expression 'itself to be true' or 'that a horse is a donkey' is
taken not materially but significatively, the opinion would not be correct
either, because in that case ' that a horse is a donkey' would not refer to
anything (pro nullo supponit), since there is no such thing as a horse being a
donkey, and in just the same way there neither is nor can be such a thing as
that proposition being true. Now something that does not and cannot exist
cannot be signified or asserted, according to Buridan. The vocal proposition
'homo est asinus' signifies the corresponding mental proposition, but in
reality outside the mind it only signifies men and donkeys and nothing else.
From Buridan's discussion in the commentary on the Metaphysics and the
Sophismata it can be concluded that this account holds for propositions that
cannot possibly be true, like 'equus est asinus' and for insoluble propositions,
like 'every proposition is false'. What does hold for every proposition is that it
implies its own truth (comm. onMetaphysics: tamen ad omnem
819
propositionem de mundo sequitur quod ipsa est vera), if at any rate it is
formulated (saltem si formaretur).
It is clear that Buridan's theory as well as the arguments he uses to defend it
are very similar in the Sophismata and in the commentary on the
Metaphysics. The treatment in the Sophismata seems to be more formal, but
that can be explained from the context in which the problem is discussed.
Chapter VIII of the Sophismata is a logical treatise about the solution of
insolubilia, whereas the subject in the commentary on the Metaphysics is the
truth conditions of propositions in general and the question whether a
proposition can be true and false at the same time.
Another text where the subject is discussed is the tenth question of Buridan's
Questions on the Posterior Analytics. The subject of this question is the
problem of the truth-condition of a proposition. Is the fact that in every way
the facts are as some proposition says they are, a condition and a sufficient
condition for the truth of that proposition (quaeritur utrum ad veritatem
propositionis requiratur et sufficiat quod qualitercumque ipsa significat ita
sit)? In many cases, our author argues, this is not a sufficient condition, e.g.
in a proposition that expresses its own falsity (' ego dico falsum'). Such a
proposition is false, according to Buridan. Nevertheless the facts are as the
proposition says they are, because the proposition signifies itself to be false,
and it is false. Still the facts are not in every way (qualitercumque) as the
proposition says they are, because it also signifies itself to be true, because
that is what every proposition does (ex communi condicione propositionis).
(19)
It is clear that in this connection Buridan 'defends' the opinion he rejects in
chapter VIII of the Sophismata and in the commentary on the Metaphysics:
the meaning theory.
A comparison of these four texts of Buridan's leads us to the following
tentative conclusion regarding the relative date of these works. The
commentary on the Posterior Analytics should be dated first. Buridan clearly
proposes the meaning theory (every proposition signifies that it itself is true)
as his own. In the commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi (19.3.2) the meaning
theory is still brought forward without any criticism (prima suppositio quod
omnis propositio de significatione formali significat se esse veram), but
Buridan adds the remark that every proposition also implies itself to be true,
because every proposition is affirmative or negative. Supposedly Buridan
820
wants to say that every speaker is implicitly claiming that he is speaking the
truth. This text was probably written after the commentary on the Posterior
Analytics. The commentary on the Metaphysics and the Sophismata are
clearly of a later date. In the former work he speaks about the adherents of the
meaning theory as people who see the truth, but not completely (aliqui
videntes veritatem sed tamen non plene videntes), because properly speaking
one cannot say that a proposition signifies itself (unde non est propria locutio
quod propositio significet seipsam), because in some cases there would be
nothing to be signified. The entailment theory seems to be advanced here as a
better alternative for impossible and insoluble propositions (licet non omnis
propositio significet se esse veram quia forte nihil est ' se esse veram', tamen
ad omnem propositionem de mundo sequitur quod ipsa est vera), whereas in
the Sophismata the meaning theory is simply rejected for every proposition.
TheSophismata text seems to express a more radical point of view. Here
Buridan does not show the sympathy for the adherents of the meaning theory
in the way he did in the commentary on the Metaphysics. He simply rejects
this opinion as incorrect (non videtur mihi valere de proprietate sermonis) for
every proposition, although he had defended it himself before. We are
inclined to take this as an indication (although not as a proof) for a date of the
Sophismata after the commentary on the Metaphysics.(20)"
(14) For a historical survey: P. V. Spade, Insolubilia, in: Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, pp. 246-253.
(15) G.E. Hughes, John Buridan on Self-reference, Chapter Eight of
Buridan's Sophismata, translated with an Introduction and a philosophical
Commentary, Cambridge 1982.
(16) Miss Fabienne Pironet is preparing a new critical edition of this text. The
Latin text has been taken from her manuscript, which she was so kind as to
make available.
(17) Op. cit., p. 106.
(18) A more literal translation of the expression 'qualitercumque significat
esse ita est' would be: howsoever it signifies, so it is. However, we prefer the
translation given by G.E. Hughes, op.cit., p. 48.
(19) Ed. Pironet.
(20) This conclusion is confirmed by Fabienne Pironet: John Buridan on the
Liar Paradox in: Klaus Jacobi (hrsg.) Argumentationstheorie, Scholastische
821
Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns,
Leiden 1993, 293-300. Miss Pironet's study does not include the Questions
Elencorum.
From: Ria van der Lecq and H.A.G. Braakhuis - Introduction to: Johannes
Buridanus - Quaestiones Elencorum - Nijmegen, Ingenium Publishers, 1994,
pp. XV-XIX
RELATED PAGES
Buridan's Logical Works. I. An Overview of the Summulae de dialectica
A-K
L-Z
822
Home
Contents
Last Page
Buridan: Editions, Translations and

Studies on the Manuscript Tradition
INTRODUCTION
I give an updated list of the published and unpublished logical and
metaphysical works of Buridan, and a bibliography of the editions and
translations appeared after 2000.
A complete list of Buridan's works and manuscripts can be found in the '
Introduction' by Benoît Patar to his edition of "La Physique de Bruges de
Buridan et le Traité du Ciel d'Albert de Saxe. Étude critique, textuelle et
doctrinale" Vol. I, Longueil, Les Presses Philosophiques, 2001 (2 volumes),
pp. 33* - 75*.
SUMMARY LIST OF BURIDAN'S LATIN WORKS

ON LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS
Logical Works:
N. B. The treatises known as Artes Veterem and commented by Buridan were

the Isagoge by Porphyry and the Categoriae (Predicamenta) and the Peri
Hermeneias by Aristotle.
823
Expositio Super Artes Veterem
Quaestiones Super Artes Veterem
Expositio in duos libros Analyticorum priorum Aristotelis
Quaestiones in duos libros Analyticorum priorum Aristotelis
Expositio in duos libros Analyticorum posteriorum Aristotelis
Quaestiones in duos libros Analyticorum posteriorum Aristotelis
Quaestiones in octo libros Topicorum Aristotelis
Quaestiones in librum 'de sophisticis Elenchis' Aristotelis
Summulae de dialectica, commentary of the Summulae logicales by Peter of

Spain, composed by the following treatises:
De propositionibus
De praedicabilibus
In praedicamenta
De suppositionibus
De syllogismis
De locis dialecticis
De sophisticis elenchis
De demostrationibus
De practica sophismatum (sometimes considered the ninth treatise of
the Summa logicae)
Tractatus de consequentiis
Metaphysical Works:
Expositio Super Metaphysica [in two redactions]
Lectura Erfordiensis
Quaestiones Super Metaphysica [in two redactions]
824
Polemical Woks:
Duae quaestiones de universali
Tractatus de relationibus
Quaestio de possibilitate existendi secundum eandem et non essendi
simul in eodem instanti
Quaestio de dependentiis, diversitatibus et convenientiis
Determinatio de diversitate generis ad speciem (Defensiones
determinationis de diversitate generis ad speciem)
The Quaestiones super octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis are not a work of
Buridan, but of Nicolaus Girardi de Waudemonte (Nicholas of Vaudémont),
a late Fourteenth-century French writer, as demonstrated by Christoph
Flüeler, Die Rezeption des Politica des Aristoteles an der Pariser
Artistenfakultät im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, in: Jürgen Miethke (ed.), Das
Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert, 1992, pp. 127-138.
DETAILED LIST WITH FULL BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

REFERENCES
Logical Works:
Buridanus, Johannes. Expositio in Artem Veterem.
Unpublished manuscript: Biblioteca de la Catedral de Tortosa (España)
cod. 108 ff. 26r-74v.
———. Quaestiones in Artem Veterem (De Tertia Lectura; Ordinatio).
This work is now available in critical edition (in three separated
editions: see below).
Buridani, Johannis. Quaestione Breves in Artes Veterem.
Unpublished manuscripts available at the Libraries of Cracow, Leipzig,
and Città del Vaticano (two manuscrpits).
Buridan, Jan. 1986. "Komentarz Do Isagogi Porfiriusza [Quaestiones in
Isagogen Porphyrii]." Przeglad Tomistyczny no. 2:111-195.
Quaestiones Super Artes Veterem I.
Critical edition of the Latin text with an introduction in Polish by
825
Ryszard Tatarzynski.
Buridanus, Johannes. 1983. Quaestiones in Praedicamenta. München:
Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Quaestiones Super Artes Veterem II.
Edited by Johannes Schneider.
———. 1983. Quaestiones Longe Super Librum Perihermeneias.
Quaestiones Super Artes Veterem III.
Artistarium Supplementa Vol. 4.
Edited with an introduction by Ria van der Lecq.
Buridan, John. 1976. "Quaestio 3 Perihemeneias." In The Logic of John
Buridan, edited by Jan, Pinborg, 89-90. Copenhagen: Museum
Tusculanum Press.
Buridani, Johannis. Expositio in Duos Libros Analyticorum Priorum
Aristotelis.
Unpublished manuscript of 1356: Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní
Kapituly, cod. L.34, ff. 107r -136v.
———. Quaestiones in Duos Libros Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum.
Unpublished work available in manuscript at the Libraries of: Cracow,
Leipzig, Liège, Münich, Prague, Vienne.
Unpublished transcription by Hubert Hubien available at Peter King's
Website.
Buridanus, Johannes. 1991. "Quaestiones Super Libris Analyticorum
Priorum, Quaestio Xx: Utrum Per Inductionem Probatur Propositio
Immediata." In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Vol. I, edited by
Burkhard, Mojsisch and Olaf, Pluta, 100-103. Amsterdam: B. R.
Grüner.
Edited by Egbert P. Bos in Appendix (Anhang) to his essay: Pseudo-
Johannes Duns Scotus über Induktion pp. 71-99.
Buridani, Johannis. Expositio in Duos Libros Analyticorum
Posteriorum Aristotelis.
Unpublished manuscript: Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica
Vaticana, Urb. lat. 1489, f. 119ra - 150rb.
———. 2006. Quaestiones in Duos Libros Aristotelis Analyticorum
Posteriorum.
This work was attributed to Albert of Saxony and published in 1497 wit
826
the title: Quaestiones subtilissimi Alberti de Saxonia super libros
Posteriorum Milan, Venise (modern anastatic reprint: Hildesheim,
Olms, 1986.
Buridanus, Johannes. Expositio in Topica.
The attribution of this work to Buridan is doubtful.
Unpublished manuscript: Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek,
signature: Clm 12707, ff. 66ra - 99vb.
———. 1994. Quaestiones Elencorum. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
Edited with an introduction, notes and indices by Ria van der Lecq and
H. A. G. Braakhuis.
———. 2008. Quaestiones Topicorum. Turnhout: Brepols.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by Niels Jorgen Green-
Pedersen.
Buridan, John. 1976. "Quaestiones Super Sophisticos Elenchos
[Index]." In The Logic of John Buridan, edited by Jan, Pinborg, 159-
160.
Buridanus, Johannes. Perutile Compendium Totius Logicae Joannis
Buridani Cum Praeclarissima Solertissimi Viri Joannis Dorp
Expositione.
This work, also known as Summulae de dialectica or Lectura de summa
logicae (the title of Hubert Hubien unpublished transcription) is
composed by eight treatises: I. De propositionibus; II. De
praedicabilibus; III. De praedicamentis; IV. De suppositionibus; V. De
syllogismis; VI. De locis dialecticis; VII. De sophisticis elenchis; VIII.
De demonstrationibus.
A ninth treatise, Sophismata, is printed separately in the ancient
editions.
The first edition of the Summulae was edited by Thomas Bricot ( ? -
1516) at Paris in 1487.
An anastatic reprint of the edition of Venice 1499, with the
commentary by John Dorp (late 14th century) was published at
Frankfurt am Main, Minerva, 1965.
For critical editions of treatises I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII and IX see
below; treatise VII is not yet available in a modern edition.
827
Buridan, John. 1976. " Summulae, Tractatus I." In The Logic of John
Buridan, edited by Jan, Pinborg, 82-88.
Edition of: I.1.1; I.1.5; I.1.6; I.2.2; 1.3.2.
Buridanus, Johannes. 2005. Summulae De Propositionibus. Nijmegen:
Summulae Vol. I.
Artistarium Supplementa Vol. 10-1.
Introduction, critical edition, and indexes by Ria van der Lecq.
"The present fascicle contains the first treatise of the Summulae, called
De propositionibus. In earlier fascicles we referred to this treatise as De
introductionibus, which is the name of the corresponding chapter of
Peter of Spain's Tractatus. (19) Buridan himself, however, does not use
the term introductiones; in 1.1.1 he announces that the first treatise is
going to deal with propositions and their parts and attributes. Therefore,
' De propositionibus' seems to be a more appropriate title.
The treatise consists of eight chapters, which correspond with Peter of
Spain's Tractatus 1 ( De introductionibus) in the following way:
chapter in Buridan chapter in Tractatus 1
1 De quibusdam praemittendis 1-3
2 De nomine, verbo et oratione 4-6
3 De propositione 7-10
4 De oppositionibus propositionum categoricarum 11-14
5 De aequipollentiis 18
6 De conversionibus propositionum 15
7 De propositionibus hypotheticis 16-17
8 De propositionibus modalibus 19-25
A closer comparison between the two treatises (20) shows that Buridan
elaborated more on the topics of chapters 6 and 7 (conversions and
hypothetical propositions) than the author of his basic text and that he
had an extraordinary interest in modal propositions. He even preferred
to write a new text for this chapter, because he considered the auctor's
account to be incomplete (1.8.1).
The present edition includes the preface ( Prooemium) of the
Summulae, in which Buridan says some remarkable things about logic
as an art (see below n.3.3) and in which he warns the reader that he will
not follow his author's text in every respect: "occasionally I am going to
828
have to say and write things that differ from what he has said and
written, whenever it appears to me suitable to do so"."
(19) See for an exposition of the term 'introductiones' by John of
Salisbury: Peter of Spain, Tractatus (...), ed. L.M. de Rijk, p.
LXXXIX..
(20) See Jan Pinborg, 'Summulae, Tractatus 1 De introductionibus,' in
Jan Pinborg (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan, Kopenhagen 1976, pp.
74-75.
———. 1995. Summulae De Praedicabilibus. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
Summulae Vol. II.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L. M. De Rijk.
"The present edition contains the second tract [of Buridan's Summulae],
De praedicabilibus, which deals with the five 'predicables', introduced
by the Neoplatonist commentator of Aristotle, Porphyry (c. 233-c. 304
A.D.) in his introductory book ( Isagoge)to the Stagirite's Categories,
viz. 'genus', 'species', 'differentia', 'proprium', and 'accidens'. From as
early as the eleventh century, medieval authors commented upon
Boethius' (480-524) translation of, and commentary upon, this work.
Buridan's discussion of the predicables is mainly based on the
corresponding tract of Peter of Spain's manual. His comments are
preceded by the complete text of the lemma from Peter to be discussed.
It should be no surprise that Buridan's quotations should go back to an
adapted version of Peter's text. (...)
objections and dubitationes in which specific questions are dealt with,
mostly in an original fashion." pp. XVII and XXI.
———. 1994. Summulae in Praedicamenta. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
Summulae Vol. III.
Introduction, critical edition and notes by Egbert P. Bos.
———. 1998. Summulae De Suppositionibus. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
Summulae Vol. IV.
829
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by Ria Van der Lecq.
Buridano, Giovanni. 1957. "Tractatus De Suppositionibus." Rivista
Critica di Storia della Filosofia no. 12.
First part pp. 180-208; Second part pp. 323-352.
Buridanus, Johannes. 2010. Summulae De Syllogismis. Turnhout:
Brepols.
Summulae Vol. V.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by Joke Spruyt
" De syllogismis is the fifth treatise of John Buridan's Summulae
dialecticae, a textbook he wrote for his logic course in the Faculty of
Arts at the University of Paris. De syllogismis contains material related
to Aristotle's Analytica Priora and Boethius's De hypotheticis
syllogismis. The textbook discusses inferences involving not only
propositions de inesse, but also propositions featuring oblique,
reduplicative and infinite terms. Buridan displays a keen interest in
modal inferences and inferences involving propositional attitudes.
Buridan's De syllogismis continues along the lines of his nominalist
conception of the relations between mind, language and reality."
———. 2013. Summulae De Locis Dialecticis. Turnhout: Brepols.
Summulae Vol. VI.
Edited by Niels Jorgen Green-Pedersen.
" De locis dialecticis is the sixth treatise of John Buridan’s Summulae
dialecticae, a textbook he wrote for his logic course in the Faculty of
Arts at the University of Paris. De locis dialecticis immediately builds
upon Peter of Spain, but Buridan shows his awareness that the doctrine
of the loci took its origin in Boethius’ De differentiis topicis, and he
frequently quotes from that work. Though not introducing any basically
new ideas Buridan contributes a large number of precisions to the
standard descriptions of the several loci, and he shows that the list of
the loci and the traditional division of it into three sections is not
something given by nature, but was established by earlier logicians, as
they found convenient. Accordingly such things can be changed if
something better is found. Buridan has here given us perhaps the most
830
precise and most interesting exposition of the doctrine of the loci in the
medieval logical literature."
Buridan, John. 1976. "The Summulae of John Buridan. Tractatus Vi De
Locis." In The Logic of John Buridan, edited by Jan, Pinborg, 121-138.
Edited by Niels Jörgen Green-Pedersen.
———. 1976. "Extracts from the Summulae." In The Logic of John
Buridan, edited by Jan, Pinborg, 153-158.
Edited by Sten Ebbesen: 7.3.2; 7.3.4; 7.3.10 ( de figura dictionis).
Buridanus, Johannes. 2015. Summulae De Fallaciis. Turnhout: Brepols.
Summulae Vol. VII.
Not yet published.
———. 2001. Summulae De Demonstrationibus. Groningen-Haren:
Summulae Vol. VIII.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L.M. de Rijk.
———. 2004. Summulae De Practica Sophismatum. Turnhout:
Brepols.
Summulae Vol. IX.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by Fabienne Pironet.
"Treatise 9, De practica sophismatum, or Sophismata for short, has
been edited once in full and once in part within the last few decades.
The 1977 publication of the full text by Th.K. Scott contributed
significantly to the scholarly community's awareness of the merits of
Buridan's work, but the Latin text was only weakly anchored in the
manuscript tradition; in fact it reproduced an incunabulum (our Z)
emended by means of collation with usually one manuscript (our F).
G.E. Hughes' partial edition of 1982 was based on six manuscripts (our
A, E, F, I, 'I' and W) as well as on an incunabulum (our Z) and
represented a considerable step forward on the road to a sound text. Our
aim is to take one more step along on that road, by re editing the whole
treatise on the basis of not only more but, we think, also better
manuscripts." (p. XI, notes omitted).
Buridan, Jean. 1966. Sophisms on Meaning and Truth. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
831
Latin text and translation by Theodore Kermit Scott.
———. 1977. Sophismata. Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-
Holzboog.
Critical edition with an introduction by Theodore Kermit Scott (now
superseded by Pironet 2004).
———. 1982. John Buridan on Self-Reference. Chapter Eight of
Buridan's Sophismata. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Latin text, translated, with an introduction and a philosophical
commentary, by George E. Hughes.
Buridani, Johannis. 1976. Tractatus De Consequentiis. Louvain:
Publications universitaires.
Critical edition by Hubert Hubien.
Metaphysical Works:
Buridanus, Johannes. Expositio in Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis [First Redaction].
Unpublished manuscript (1340): Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms.
latin 16 131, 124ra - 214vb.
———. Expositio in Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis
[Second Redaction].
Unpublished manuscript (1392): Carpentras, Bibliothèque
Inguimbertine, cod. 292 (L. 288), 1ra - 42va; other manuscripts at the
Libraries of Darmstadt, München, Paris and Wien.
———. 2008. Lectura Erfordiensis in I-Vi Metaphysicam, Together
with the 15th-Century Abbreviatio Caminensis. Turnhout: Brepols.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L. M. de Rijk.
"The aim of the present edition is to make two texts available which
can throw some more light on the role of Aristotle's Metaphysics in
14th-15th academic teaching. One of them contains part of an early
(hitherto unknown) version of John Buridan's Questions on
Metaphysics, the other is a 15th century abbreviation of precisely this
early version. Remarkably, both texts belong to the East European
tradition of Buridan's works, which is the more interesting as they
testify to the master's earlier activities as a Parisian teacher on the
subject of metaphysics. In particular, they elucidate Buridan's ongoing
semantic approach to matters of metaphysics and ontology as well as
832
his attitude to Aristotle's authority."
———. Quaestiones in Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis
[First Redaction].
Unpublished manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. latin 16
131, 2ra - 122vb.
———. Quaestiones in Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis
[Secundum Ultimam Lecturam].
Manuscript: Carpentrat, Bibliothèque Inguimbertine, cod. 292, 45ra -
118rb.
Other manuscript at the Libraries of Erfurt (two copies), Paris (two
copies), Venezia and Wien.
Printed edition: In Metaphysicen Aristotelis questiones, Paris, Josse
Bede, 1518.
Facsimile reproduction of this edition under the title Kommentar zur
Aristotelischen Metaphysik (the date 1588 printed in the frontispice is
an error), Frankfurt am Main, Minerva, 1965.
———. Quaestiones Breves in Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis.
Unpublished manuscript: Biblioteka Narodowa (Poland), cod. 5835,
194 - 216.
Polemical Works:
Buridan, John. 2004. "John Buridan's Treatise, De Dependentiis,
Diversitatibus, Et Convenientiis. An Edition." Vivarium no. 42:115-
149.
Edited by Dirk-Jan Dekker.
Buridani, Johannis. 1987. "Tractatus De Differentia Universalis Ad
Individuum." Przeglad Tomistyczny no. 3:137-178.
Also known with the title: Duae Quaestiones (Tractatus) De
Universali.
Critical edition of the Latin text by Slawomir Szyller.
Buridan, John. 1991. John Buridan's Tractatus De Infinito:
Quaestiones Super Libros Physicorum Secundum Ultimam Lecturam,
Liber Iii, Questiones 14-19. An Edition with Introduction and Indexes.
833
Edited by Johannes M. M. H. Thijssen.
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF THE LOGICAL

AND METAPHYSICAL WORKS
Buridan, John. 2001. Summulae De Dialectica. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
An annotated translation, with a philosophical introduction by Gyula
Klima.
Buridan, Jean. 1985. Jean Buridan's Logic. The Treatise on
Supposition. The Treatise on Consequences. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Translated, with a philosophical introduction by Peter King.
Buridan, John. 2014. Treatise on Consequences. New York: Fordham
University Press.
Translated, with an Introduction by Stephen Read.
Buridan, Jean. 1966. Sophisms on Meaning and Truth. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Latin text and translation by Theodore Kermit Scott.
———. 1982. John Buridan on Self-Reference. Chapter Eight of
Buridan's Sophismata. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Latin text, translated, with an introduction and a philosophical
commentary, by George E. Hughes.
Reprinted, without the Latin text, with the title: Chapter Eight of
Buridan's 'Sophismata', Cambridge University Press, 1982.
———. 1996. "Sophismata, Chapter Viii, "Insolubles"." In Readings in
Medieval Philosophy, edited by B., Schoedinger Andrew, 707-733.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Buridan, John. 2008. "John Buridan on the Predicables." In Medieval
Philosophy. Essential Readings with Commentary, edited by Gyula,
Klima, Fritz, Allhoff and Jayprakash, Vaidya Anand, 79-82. Malden:
Blackwell.
Reprinted from Summulae de Dialectica, translated by G. Klima, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 103-107.
———. 2008. "John Buridan on Being and Essence." In Medieval
834
Klima, Fritz, Allhoff and Jayprakash, Vaidya Anand. Malden:
Blackwell.
From: Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysicam: Kommentar zur
Aristotelischen Metaphysik (Paris: 1518; Frankfurt am Main: Minerva,
1964 reprint), book VIII, quaestio 4 (translation by G. Klima).
———. 2008. "John Buridan on Scientific Knowledge." In Medieval
Klima, Fritz, Allhoff and Jayprakash, Vaidya Anand. Malden:
Blackwell.
First text: Whether It Is Possible to Comprehend the Truth about
Things, pp. 143-147 from Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysicam:
Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik (Paris: 1518; Frankfurt am
Main: Minerva, 1964 reprint) book 2, quaestio 1 (translation by G.
Klima).
Second text: The Differences between Knowledge and Opinion, pp.
147-150 from Summulae de Dialectica, translated by. G. Klima, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 706-711.
———. 1973. "Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book Iv,
Questions 8 and 9." In Philosophy in the Middle Ages. The Christian,
Islamic and Jewish Traditions, edited by Arthur, Hyman and Jerome,
Walsh James, 711-716. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Translated by J. J. Walsh.
———. 1983. "Latin Philosophy in the Fourteenth Century. John
Buridan." In Philosophy in the Middle Ages. The Christian, Islamic and
Jewish Traditions, edited by Arthur, Hyman and Jerome, Walsh James,
751-775. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics: Book II, Question I, pp. 751-754;
Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics: Book IV Question 8 and 9 pp.
760-765.
Ariane, Economos. 2009. Intellectus and Induction: Three Aristotelian
Commentators on the Cognition of First Principles, Including an
Original Translation of John Buridan's "Quaestiones in Duos
Aristotelis Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum".
Unpublished Ph.D thesis by Ariane Economos, available at ProQuest
Dissertations & Theses ref. AAT 3377044.
Abstract: "Recent scholars have argued that the skeptical problem of
induction was unknown until the 18 th century. They claim that a
835
theory of knowledge such as the one embraced by medieval
Aristotelians, which holds that an effect may be demonstratively
proven to follow from its cause, must also hold that a necessary
connection exists between a cause and its effect. What such scholars
overlook is that medieval philosophers also argue that to claim that all
knowledge of causal connections must be obtained demonstratively
would lead to an infinite regress; the premises from which a
demonstration proceeds cannot always themselves be demonstrated if a
regress is to be avoided. Thus, medieval philosophers identify some
indemonstrable premises which are causal in nature. They take
propositions like, "scammony causes the purging of bile," and, "a
certain herb results in the reduction of fever," to be indemonstrable
principles which may serve as the starting-points of demonstrations.
Principles such as these, medieval Aristotelians claim, are known
through induction. Thus, to truly understand whether or not a medieval
"skeptical problem" could pre-date that of Hume, what we must
examine is the medieval account of the acquisition of indemonstrable
first principles.
An examination of such principles and an analysis of the medieval
claim that they are acquired through induction is the theme of this
dissertation. Over the course of the dissertation, I defend three theses.
First, I argue that when medieval philosophers interpret Aristotle's
claim that first principles are obtained through induction, they adapt
this claim so as to apply to a kind of principle which we do not find in
Aristotle, namely, a principle stating a causal connection. Second, I
argue that three medieval commentators on Aristotle--Robert
Grosseteste, Thomas Aquinas, and John Buridan--each interpret the
role which induction plays in the acquisition of these principles in such
diverse ways that we ought not look for one overarching "medieval
view" of induction. Third and finally, I argue that Buridan's unique
approach to induction and its relation to intellectus (the Latin
equivalent of nous ) is fueled almost entirely by his sensitivity to
skeptical concerns."
FRENCH TRANSLATIONS
836
Buridan, Jean. 2009. Questions Sur L'art Ancien. (Isagoge, Traité Des
Catégories, Traité De L'interprétation). Longueil (Canada): Presses
philosophiques.
Traduction et étude critique de Benoît Patar.
———. 2002. Le Traité Des Conséquences, Suivi Du Traité Sur Les
Propositions. Longueil (Canada): Presses philosophiques.
Traduction et commentaire par Benoît Patar, suivie d'une traduction de
l'Introduction au Commentaire des Petites Sommes de Pierre
d'Espagne.
———. 1993. Sophismes. Paris: Vrin.
Texte traduit, introduit et annoté par Joël Biard.
———. 2004. Commentaire Et Questions Sur Le Traité De L'âme.
Montréal: Les Presses Philosophiques.
Introduction, traduction et notes par Benoît Patar.
Traduction de la première version du Commentaire littéral des trois
livres du Traité de l'âme d'Aristote (210 pages) et des 44 Questions
portant sur le même texte (385 pages).
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF STUDIES ON

THE LIFE AND THE MANUSCRIPTS OF
BURIDAN
Bernd, Michael. 1985. Johannes Buridan: Studien Zu Seinem Leben,
Seinen Werken Und Zur Rezeption Seiner Theorien Im Europas Des
Späten Mittelalters. Berlin.
Unpublished dissertation in two volumes.
Vol. I. Der Author, seine Werke, Sein Publikum; Vol. II. Johannes
Buridan: Bibliographie, Überlieferung und Quellenkritik seiner Werke.
Faral, Edmond. 1946. "Jean Buridan. Notes Sur Les Manuscrits, Les
Éditions Et Le Contenu De Ses Ouvrages." Archives d'Histoire
Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge no. 15:1-53.
———. 1949. "Jean Buridan: Maître És Arts De L'université De Paris."
Histoire Littéraire de la France no. 28:462-605.
Publié aussi séparément in 1950.
Federici Vescovini, Graziella. 1976. "A Propos De La Diffusion Des
837
œuvres De Jean Buridan En Italie Du Xive Au Xvie Siècle." In The
Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium on
Medieval Logic and Semantics, edited by Pinborg, Jan, 21-45.
Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum.
Flüeler, Christoph. 1997. "Two Manuscripts of Buridan on the
Metaphysics: Paris, Bn, Lat. 16131 and Darmstadt, Hessische La&Hb,
Hs 516." Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin no. 67:78-
92.
Lohr, Charles H. 1970. "Medieval Aristotle Commentaries. Authors:
Jacobus-Johannes Juff." Traditio no. 26:135-216.
On Buridan see pp. 161-183.
Markowski, Mieczyslaw. 1965. "Le Commentum in Duos Libros
Analyticorum Posteriorum De Jean Buridan." Archives d'Histoire
Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge no. 32:251-255.
———. 1966. "Jean Buridan Est-Il L'auteur Des Quaestiones Sur Les
Seconds Analytiques?" Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum no.
12:16-30.
———. 1971. Burydanizm W Polsce W Okresie Przedkopernikanskim.
Studium Z Historii Filozofii I Nauk Scislych Na Uniwersytecie
Krakowskim W Xv Wieku. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii
Nauk.
Buridanism in Poland in the Pre-Copernican Period. Study of History
and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cracow in the Fifteenth
Century.
This book, written in Polish with an English summary, is cited in the
bibliography of Fabienne Pironet with the French title: Buridanisme en
Pologne avant Copernic. ( Studia Copernicana, II).
———. 1976. "Johannes Buridans Kommentar Zu Aristotles' Organon
in Mitteleuropas Bibliotheken." In The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of
the Third European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics,
edited by Pinborg, Jan, 9-20. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum.
———. 1981. Buridanica Quae in Codicibus Manus Criptis
Bibliothecarum Monacensium Asservantur Ex Descriptionibus a Se
Confectis. Wroclaw: Polska Akademia nauk. Instytut flozofii
socjologii.
———. 1984. "Buridans Metaphysikkommentare in Ihren
Handschriftlichen Überlieferungen in Den Bibliotheken in Darmstadt,
838
Erfurt, München Und Wien." Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum no.
27:73-88.
———. 1984. "L'influence De Jean Buridan Sur Les Universités
D'Europe Centrale." In Preuve Et Raisons À L'université De Paris.
Logique, Ontologie Et Théologie Au Xive Siècle, edited by Kaluza,
Zénon and Vignaux, Paul, 149-163. Paris: Vrin.
———. 1988. "Der Buridanismus an Der Krakauer Universität Im
Mittelalter." In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur
Geschichte Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters. Festschrift Für Kurt
Flasch Zu Seinem 60. Geburtstag. (Vol. I), edited by Mojsisch,
Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf, 245-260. Amsterdam: Grüner.
Patar, Benoît, ed. 1991. Le Traité De L'âme De Jean Buridan. Leuven:
Peeters Publishers.
Édition, étude critique et doctrinale de B. Patar.
Voir pp. 31* - 112*.
———, ed. 1996. Ioannis Buridani. Expositio Et Quaestiones in
Aristotelis De Caelo. Leuven: Peeters Publishers.
Édition, étude critique et doctrinale de B. Patar.
Voir pp. 42* - 133*.
———, ed. 2001. La Physique De Bruges De Buridan Et Le Traité Du
Ciel D'Albert De Saxe. Longueil: Les Presses Philosophiques.
Étude critique, textuelle et doctrinale de B. Patar.
Deux volumes.) Dans le premier volume, aux pages 33* - 75* on
trouve la liste complète des œuvres authentiques de Buridan.
RELATED PAGES
Pages on the Philosophy of Buridan:
Buridan's Logical Works. I. An Overview of the Summulae de

dialectica

Writings
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A-K
L-Z
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Contents
Last Page
Buridan's Logic and Metaphysics: An

Annotated Bibliography (First Part: A -
K)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For Buridan's contributions to the theories of supposition and mental

Language
Anfray, Jen-Pascal. 2007. "Non Ens Intelligitur. Jean Buridan Sur Le
Non-Être." Cahiers de philosophie de l'Université de Caen no. 43:95-
129.
"Est-il possible de parler de ce qui n'est pas ou d'y penser sans
présupposer une forme d'être pour cela même que nous pensons ne pas
exister ? La vieille énigme parménidienne, qui hante toujours la
philosophie contemporaine, est au coeur non seulement de la
philosophie médiévale mais aussi des études médiévales, comme en
témoigne le récent ouvrage d'Alain de Libera sur la référence vide (1).
841
L'objet de cette étude est en comparaison beaucoup très limité, dans la
mesure où nous nous concentrerons sur le traitement de ce problème du
non-être par Jean Buridan. Dans la logique et la métaphysique
médiévale, le non-être (non ens) est l'objet de discussions relevant aussi
bien de la logique des termes que de celle des propositions. En
employant une terminologie moderne, nous pourrions dire que le non-
être apparaît dans la discussion philosophique tant à propos de
l'engagement au domaine de quantification des énoncés qu'à propos de
ce qui rend vrai les énoncés eux mêmes (2)." p. 95
(1) Sous le titre La référence vide, A. de Libera (Paris, Vrin 2002) a
abordé ces deux ensembles de questions, en mettant l'accent sur le
second (comme l'indique le sous-titre : Théories de la proposition). Au
long des chapitres de l'ouvrage, l'auteur n'est jamais loin de l'une des
problématiques annoncée en introduction (p.3-4) : la référence aux
particuliers inexistants, la référence aux objets imaginaires et le signifié
propositionnel. Cependant, conformément à sa propre méthode
historiographique, il soutient que le pont explicite entre ces différentes
problématiques n'apparaît qu'à la fin du XIVe siècle. Pierre de Venise
serait le témoin privilégié de cette quasi-fusion des problèmes à travers
une formule définissant disjonctivement le signifié de la proposition :
aliquid vel aliqua vel aliqualiter. Davantage qu'une fusion, ce serait
même plutôt une absorption des deux premières problématiques au sein
de celle du signifié propositionnel. La page 338 expose
remarquablement ce point de vue: "grâce à la formule disjonctive
[absente avant la deuxième moitié du XIVe siècle], les problèmes de
référence vide d'un terme sont traités ultimement dans le cadre unifié
d'une véritable sémantique des propositions." Si nous devions exprimer
un désaccord avec l'auteur, il porterait seulement sur cette hypothèse
méthodologique, car nous pensons que les problématiques de la
référence vide et du signifié propositionnel sont également abordées
conjointement par un auteur antérieur tel que Jean Buridan. Quoi qu'il
en soit, notre dette envers le travail d'A. de Libera est immense.
(2) Pour un partisan des vérifacteurs, adversaire du nominalisme
comme David Armstrong, il y a par conséquent, outre l'engagement
ontologique classique (au domaine de quantification) un engagement
distinct aux vérifacteurs.
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1991. "Equivocation and Analogy in
842
Fourteenth-Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan." In Historia
Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Des
Mittelalters. Festschrift Für Kurt Flasch Zu Seinem 60. Geburtstag.
(Vol. I), edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf, 23-43.
Amsterdam, Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner.
———. 2004. "Singular Terms and Singular Concepts: From Buridan
to the Early Sixteenth Century." In John Buridan and Beyond. Topics
in the Language Sciences 1300-1700, edited by Ebbesen, Sten and
Friedman, Russell L., 121-151. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.
"This article considers medieval treatments of proper names and
demonstrative phrases in relation to the question of when and how we
are able to form singular concepts. The logical and grammatical
background provided by the authoritative texts of Porphyry and
Priscian is examined, but the main focus is on John Buridan and his
successors at Paris, from John Dorp to Domingo de Soto. Buridan is
linked to contemporary philosophers of language through his
suggestion that, although the name 'Aristotle' is a genuine proper name
only for those who have the appropriate singular concept caused by
acquaintance with Aristotle, it can be properly treated as a singular tem
by subsequent users because of their beliefs about the original
imposition of the name."
Berger, Harald. 2008. "Der Substanzbegriff Im Spätmittelalterlichen
Nominalismus." In Substantia - Sic Et Non. Eine Geschichte Des
Substanzbegriffs Von Der Antike Bis Zur Gegenwart in
Einzelbeiträgen, edited by Gutschmidt, Holger, Lang-Balestra,
Antonella and Segalerba, Gianluigi, 235-255. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
"Late medieval nominalism's ontological commitment is mainly to
Aristotelian individual substances and individual qualities, the status of
quantities is a matter of dispute (not in semantics, however, but in
natural philosophy). In this paper the commentaries on pertinent
Aristotelian texts by three main figures of Fourteenth century
nominalism, William of Ockham, John Buridan, and Albert of Saxony,
are presented and discussed. Regarding the relation between substance
and accident the Christian Aristotelians had to conceive of it as a
relation of dependence according to the natural laws and not as a
relation of logical dependence; otherwise, the sacrament of the
Eucharist could not be explained in Aristotelian terms. Finally, two
843
deviating views are mentioned: According to John of Mirecourt reality
consists solely of substances (with modes of being such and such),
whereas according to Nicholas of Autrecourt ("the Medieval Hume")
physical reality consists solely of accidents in the sense of appearances,
sensations, sense data."
Biard, Joël. 1989. "Les Sophismes Du Savoir: Albert De Saxe Entre
Jean Buridan Et Guillaume Heytesbury." Vivarium no. 27:36-50.
———. 2002. "L'être Et La Mesure Dans L'intension Et La Rémission
Des Formes (Jean Buridan, Blaise De Parme)." Medioevo.Rivista di
Storia della Filosofia Medievale no. 27:415-448.
———. 2002. "L'analyse Logique Des Termes Transcendantaux Selon
Jean Buridan." In Le Problème Des Transcendantaux Du 14. Au 17.
Siècle, edited by Federici Vescovini, Graziella, 51-66. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2003. "La Théorie De L'être Et De L'essence De Jean
Buridan." In Die Logik Des Transzendentalen. Festschrift Für Jan A.
Aerstsen Zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Pickavé, Martin, 383-394.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
———. 2004. "L'organisation Des Sciences Spéculatives Selon Jean
Buridan." In Méthodes Et Statut Des Sciences À La Fin Du Moyen Age,
edited by Grellard, Christophe, 26-40. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses
universitaires du Septentrion.
———. 2006. "John Buridan and the Mathematical Demonstration." In
Mind and Modality. Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of
Simo Knuuttila, edited by Hirvonen, Vesa, Holopainen, Toivo J. and
Tuominen, Miira, 199-213. Leiden: Brill.
———. 2008. "Buridan Et La Connaissance Des Accidents." In
Compléments De Substance. Études Sur Les Propriétés Accidentelles
Offertes À Alain De Libera, edited by Erismann, Christophe and
Schniewind, Alexandrine, 357-371. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2012. Science Et Nature. La Théorie Buridanienne Du Savoir.
Paris: Vrin.
Boh, Ivan. 2001. "Consequence and Rules of Consequence in the Post-
Ockham Period." In Medieval Formal Logic. Obligations, Insolubles
and Consequences, edited by Yrjönsuuri, Mikko, 147-182. Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
Bos, Egbert Peter. 1978. "Mental Verbs in Terminist Logic (John
Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen)." Vivarium no. 16:56-
844
69.
———. 1999. "John Buridan on Substance in His Commentary
(Summulae) on Aristotle's Categories." In Signs and Signification. Vol.
I, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 85-99. New
Delhi: Bahri Publications.
"As a master of arts John Buridan commented on Aristotle's logic. The
quaestiones, in which specific problems are discussed in the traditional
medieval form, are more elaborate and detailed commentaries.
One of Aristotle's text to be commented are the Categories
(Praedicamenta). The Quaestiones in Praedicamenta have been edited
recently by J. Schneider (München, 1983); I have prepared a critical
edition of Buridan's commentary (summulae) on the same work, which
is due to appear soon. This edition is part of an intemational project, of
which it is the intention to issue the first complete edition of Buridan's
Summulae, which contains eight treatises, supplemented with a new
edition of his Sophismata.
In the present contribution I shall give an analysis of Buridan's
commentary on the category of substance. Before entering this subject,
I shall make some remarks on the general nature of the work. This
contribution is practically the same as a part of the introduction to my
forthcoming edition." p. 85
"4. A summary of the Contents
Buridan starts with a discussion on aequivocatio, univocatio and
denominatio. Sometimes, he says, aequivocatio is attributed to a word
having signification, sometimes to things signified. Here (3.1.1.)
Buridan attributes aequivocatio to things as far as they are signified
equivocally by one and the same word. This signification is not
matched by one concept (ratio, 3.1.2), but by two, or more, one for
each thing. E.g. a dog, a star and a fish are signified by the word canis
('dog') that may have supposition for them under different concepts.
There is univocation when the several things signified are united, not
only by a common designation, but also by a common definition.
Buridan emphasizes (3.1.2) that both equivocatio and univocatio are on
the level of conventional terms and propositions, and are not properties
of mental terms and propositions.
Equivocation and univocation are mutually opposed in an exhaustive
division. The third item of the Antepraedicamenta, denomination
845
(denominatio), is different. For a term to be denominative it must
satisfy both a morphological-cum-semantical criterion and a purely
semantical one. First, (1.a) it must be a concrete term (a term signifying
concrete entities), and (1.b) it must be morphologically related to the
corresponding abstract term; album ('white [thing]') satisfies (1.a-b),
having albedo ('whiteness') as its abstract counterpart. Second, (2) the
term must have appellation. This, Buridan explains, means that it must
'evoke' or 'connote' some disposition which is extrinsic to the nature of
that for which the term supposits. Album ('white [thing]') satisfies this
condition; it may supposit, say, for a man, but it also connotes
something which is extrinsic (nonessential) to man, namely whiteness.
By contrast, homo ('man') only satisfies criteria (1.a-b); it is a concrete
noun with a morphologically related abstract counterpart, viz.
humanitas. Criterion (2) remains unsatisfied because humanity is
essential to all supposits of homo and thus cannot fulfil the role of an
extrinsic disposition connoted by the term." p. 91 (notes omitted).
Bos, Egbert Peter, and Krop, Henri A., eds. 1993. John Buridan: A
Master of Arts. Some Aspects of His Philosophy. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
Acts of the Second Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for
medieval philosophy Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 15th
anniversary. Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit) 20-21 June 1991.
Contents: J.A. Aertsen Introduction VII-XI; R. van der Lecq: Confused
Individuals and Moving Trees - John Buridan on the Knowledge of
Particulars 1; J. Spruyt: John Buridan on Negation and the
Understanding of Non-Being 23; L.M. de Rijk: On Buridan's View of
Accidental Being 41; T. Stuart: John Buridan on Being and Essence 53;
H.A. Krop: Kunsttheorie und Physik in via antiqua und moderna - Der
Naturbegriff des Johannes Buridan 69; M.J.F.M. Hoenen Die
Intellektlehre des Johannes Buridan - Ihre Quellen und historisch-
doktrinären Bezüge 89; O. Pluta: Einige Bemerkungen zur Deutung der
Unsterblichkeitsdiskussion bei Johannes Buridan 107; O. Krieger:
Bietet "Buridan's Esel" den Schlüfiel zum Verständnis der Philosophie
des Johannes Buridanus? 121; A. Vos: Buridan on Contingency and
Free Will 141; Bibliography. 1. Primary Sources (editions and
translations) 157 1.1. John Buridan 157; 1.2. Other Primary Sources
158; 2. Secondary Sources 161; Indices. 1. Index of Ancient and
846
Medieval Names 169; 2. Index of Modem Names 171; 3. Selective
Index in English and Latin of Subjects and Terms 173-176.
Caroti, Stefano. 2002. "Generatio / Generare: Ontological Problems in
John Buridan's Natural Philosophy." Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della
Filosofia Medievale no. 27:373-414.
d'Ors, Angel. 1993. "Ex Impossibili Qudlibet Sequitur." In
Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen Zu Den Logischen
Und Semantischen Regeln Korrekten Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus,
Ebbesen, Sten. 1984. "Proof and Its Limits According to Buridan,
Summulae 8." In Preuve Et Raisons À L'université De Paris. Logique,
Ontologie Et Théologie Au Xive Siècle, edited by Kaluza, Zénon and
Vignaux, Paul, 97-110. Paris: Vrin.
Reprinted in: S. Ebbesen, Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th-
14th centuries. Collected Essays Volume 2, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009,
pp. 209-220.
"John Buridan was a remarkable and courageous man. Remarkably
consistent. He almost invariably says the same about the same things,
and what he says about one subject is usually consistent with what he
says about any other somehow related subject. His works abound in
cross-references, from one part of a work to another, and from one
work to another. He obviously wanted his readers to think of his
philosophical works as one coherent corpus presenting one coherent
philosophy. Perhaps this ought to scare the historian away from an
attempt to interpret Buridan on the basis of one work. But, on the other
hand, the fact that he very rarely disagrees with himself and the fact
that he repeats his basic tenets in every work make it possible to
reconstruct the essentials of Buridanian philosophy without using all
available sources, in particular because his pen was as sharp as his
mind. His prose possesses to an eminent degree the virtue of clarity.
This paper is based on treatise 8 of his Summulae, or Handbook of
Logic. As subsidiary sources I have used the remaining part of the
Summulae and his quaestiones on the Prior and Posterior Analytics and
on the Metaphysics.
The very existence of treatise 8 of the Summulae demonstrates that
Buridan was a man of courage. Treatises 1-7, which deal with 1) terms
and propositions, 2) predicables, 3) categories, 4) supposition, 5)
847
syllogistic, 6) topics and 7) fallacies, all have models in earlier
literature which helped him structure his work. Treatise 8 has no known
predecessor. The subject is 'Division, Definition and Demonstration'.
Treatise 8 is the longest treatise of all, and demonstration is the subject
that takes up most space by far.
It lakes a bold man to write a summulistic treatise on a subject not thus
treated by this predecessors. It requires extra courage when one is
Buridan, for the subject is that of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Is the
universalism of the Posterior Analytics compatible with Buridanian
mentalism and particularist ontology? II might seem not, but a
professor from the fourteenth century could not neglect or reject
Aristotle's treatment of a broad and important philosophical topic.
(...)
Buridan proceeds like people who renovate old uninhabitable houses.
He keeps an Aristotelian facade, but changes the interior so that it fits
his purposes. The titles of the ten chapters on demonstration look old-
fashioned and Aristotelian. They are: 8.3 "On the questions about
which knowledge is obtainable and on knowledge preceding
demonstration"; 8.4 "On the affinity and difference between
demonstrations and dialectical arguments, and between knowledge and
opinion; 8.5 "On the indemonstrable principles of demonstration"; 8.6
"On 'being said of all and in itself 'and on 'universal 'or 'qua itself ' ";
8.7 "On various classifications of demonstrations"; 8.8 "On
'demonstration because of ' "; 8.9 "On 'demonstration that' and whether
demonstration may be circular"; 8.10 "On demonstration 'ad
impossibile' "; 8.11 "On comparison of the different sorts of
demonstration"; 8.12 "On how to settle each of the questions about
which knowledge is obtainable". But this is just the facade behind
which Buridan builds up his own doctrine of proof, applying a strongly
biased interpretation to Aristotle's text." pp. 97-98.
Epstein, Richard. 1992. "A Theory of Truth Based on a Medieval
Solution to the Liar Paradox." History and Philosophy of Logic no.
13:149-177.
"In the early part of the 14th century Jean Buridan wrote a book called
Sophismata. Chapter 8 of that deals with paradoxes of self-reference,
particularly the liar paradox. Modern discussions of the liar paradox
have been dominated by the formal analysis of truth of Tarski, and
848
more recently of Kripke, and Gupta. Each of those either denies that the
sentence 'What I am now saying is false' is a proposition, or denies that
the usual laws of logic hold for such sentences. In Buridan's resolution
of the liar paradox that sentence is a proposition, every proposition is
true or false though not both, and the classical laws of logic hold.
In this paper I present a formal theory of truth based on Buridan's ideas
as exposited by Hughes, contrasting it with the analyses of Tarski,
Kripke, and Gupta. I believe that Buridan's ideas form the basis for the
most convincing resolution of the liar paradox in a modern formal
theory of truth.
I first survey the theories of Tarski, Kripke, and Gupta. Then I state the
principles on which the Buridanian theory is based. After a brief
description of how these principles are used in analyzing the truth-
values of propositions, I set out the formal theory. Following that I
discuss a number of examples in which the informal principles and the
technical methods are explained and tested for their aptness; in those
discussions I often draw on Buridan's explanations."
Fitzgerald, Michael J. 2006. "Problems with Temporality and Scientific
Propositions in John Buridan and Albert of Saxony." Vivarium no.
44:305-337.
"The essay develops two major arguments. First, if John Buridan's 'first
argument' for the reintroduction of natural supposition is only that the
"eternal truth" of a scientific proposition is preserved because subject
terms in scientific propositions supposit for all the term's past, present,
and future significata indifferently; then Albert of Saxony thinks it is
simply ineffective.
Only the 'second argument', i.e., the argument for the existence of an
'atemporal copula', adequately performs this task; but is rejected by
Albert. Second, later fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's natural
supposition, given in certain Notabilia from the anonymous author in,
Paris, BnF, lat. 14.716, ff. 40va-41rb, are nothing but an interpolated
hodge-podge of criticisms given earlier in the century against various
views of Buridan's by Albert of Saxony. It is this fact that makes Albert
the real source of late fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's view
of natural supposition.
"
Flüeler, Christoph. 1999. "From Oral Lecture to Written
849
Commentaries: John Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's
Metaphysics." In Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts
of the Symposium: The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy,
edited by Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell L., 497-521.
Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters.
"Summary. This paper focuses on John Buridan's reported
commentaries, especially on the oldest manuscripts, with the aim of
finding new evidence regarding the process from oral lecture to written
commentary. Six among the more than 250 manuscripts containing
authentic works by Buridan were written in Paris during the
philosopher's lifetime, and at least two of them show how the oral
teaching of the Parisian master was converted into a written form. The
Expositions, i.e. the literal commentaries, play an important role in
these oldest manuscripts. These were understood as the foundation of
the subsequently treated Quaestiones, and they had a fixed place in
university teaching. The Parisian manuscript BN, lat. 16131 probably
contains an original reportation (the original student's copy book) of
both exposition of, and questions on, Aristotle's Metaphysics. The
manuscript Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 561 contains a
"compilated", i.e. revised, lecture on the same Aristotelian work, but
not the final version as edited in 1518 by Josse Bade. The present study
will examine the formal character of these different versions and their
relation to one another."
Friedman, Russell L., and Ebbesen, Sten, eds. 2004. John Buridan and
Beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences, 1300-1700. Copenhagen:
Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters.
Contains papers of a symposium held by the Royal Danish Academy of
Sciences and Letters in Copenhagen in September 2001.
"Whereas the impressive contributions made by John Buridan (d. after
1358) to medieval logic and linguistics are widely recognized today, his
influence in the later Middle Ages and Early Modern period remains
largely uncharted, as indeed does the development of the language
sciences more generally in that period. The eight articles and the
introductory essay collected in this volume explore topics in logico-
linguistic theory from Buridan in the fourteenth century through
Hobbes and Vico in the seventeenth and eighteenth. The focus of the
articles range from grammar and logic to epistemology and
850
philosophical psychology, and in nearly every case they demonstrate
the impact of Buridan's ideas in the centuries following his death.
Moreover, by investigating early modern thought against the backdrop
of medieval ideas, the articles address the issue of the continuity or
discontinuity of thought in this period on the border between medieval
and modern, and indicate possible avenues of future research."
Geach, Peter. 1965. "A Medieval Discussion of Intentionality." In
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Vol. 4), edited by Bar-
Hillel, Yehoshua, 425-433. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
"In this paper I shall critically examine the way a fourteenth-century
logician, Jean Buridan, dealt with certain puzzles about intentional
verbs. The class of verbs I shall be considering will all of them be
expressions that can be completed into propositions by adding two
proper names; the class will include, not only ordinary transitive verbs,
but also phrases of the verb-preposition type like 'look for' or 'shoot at',
and furthermore constructions like 'hopes-will be a better man than his
father' or 'believes-to be a scoundrel', which turn into propositions as
soon as we add mention of who hopes or believes this and about whom
he does so. In modern grammar, the term 'a verbal' rather than 'a verb'
is used for this wider class; following a suggestion of Professor Bar-
Hillel, I adopt this term.
In either or both of the proper-name places that go with such a verbal, it
is possible, without destroying the, propositional structure (salva
congruitate, as medieval logicians say), to substitute a phrase of some
such form as 'some A' or 'every A' or 'the (one and only) A'; the letter
'A' here represents a simple or complex general term which is
grammatically a noun or noun-phrase. The peculiarity of certain verbals
that presently concern us comes out when such a phrase formed from a
general term stands in object position, in a construction 'b F'd an A' or
the like. Consider for example the sentence 'Geach looked for a
detective story'. This sentence is ambiguous : in ordinary conversation
we might successfully resolve the ambiguity by asking the question
'Was what Geach was looking for a particular detective story, or was it
just a detective story?' It is an odd psychological fact that this question
would convey the intended distinction of meanings; for logically the
words of the question leave it wholly obscure what is intended. After
all, nothing in this world or in any possible world could be "just a
851
detective story" without being "a particular detective story"; and even if
such an individuum vagum could somehow have being, Geach could
not read it, so it certainly is not what he looked for." p. 425
"In a way parallel to the Buridan convention we may distinguish
between 'There is a poet whom both Smith and Brown admire' and
'Smith and Brown both admire the same poet'; the latter would cover
the case where both Smith and Brown are victims of the same literary
fraud as to the existence of a poet, as well as the more normal case
where they both admire (say) Wordsworth's poetry. Let us use the
expression 'AP' as short for 'admire as a poet someone conceived under
the ratio evoked by'; then 'There is a poet whom both Smith and Brown
admire' would come out as:
For some x, x is,a poet and, for some w, w is a description true just of
x, and-both Smith and-Brown AP w
whereas 'Smith and Brown both admire the same poet', taken as
conveying only intentional identity, would come out in the simpler
form:
For some w, w is a definite description, and Smith and Brown both AP
w.
Unfortunately, the line of solution we have been following leads us into
difficulties. Suppose we use 'D'd' as short for the verbal 'dreamed of
someone under the ratio expressed by'. Then in our present view we
should have to paraphrase 'There is a red-head Harris dreamed of as:
For some x, x is a red-head and, for some w, w is a description true just
of x, and Harris D'd w.
Now suppose we take w to be the description 'the fattest woman in the
world': The paraphrase would be true if Harris dreamed of the fattest
woman ili the 'world and the fattest woman in the world is in fact a
redhead; but the propostion paraphrased might then quite well be false,
because in Harris's dream there may have been no red-head, and the
fattest woman he saw in his dream may have been as bald as an egg. (I
owe this counter-example to my pupil Mr. David Bird) Similar
difficulties arise for our account of intentional identify: for if c and d
each worshipped something under the ratio expressed by 'the deity of
the Sun', it does not follow that c and d both worshipped the same
deity-c might be an ancient Egyptian worshipping the ancestor of
Pharaoh, and d a Japanese worshipping the ancestress of the Mikado.
852
I hope this paper shows why modern logicians still need to take
medieval logicians seriously. In great measure their problems are ours;
while for some of them, like the problems of suppositio, modern logic
provides adequate solutions, there are other problems, about modal and
intentional contexts for example, that are still wide open; and the talent
that was shown by medieval logicians in wrestling with their problems
demands our deepest admiration." pp. 432-433
Ghisalberti, Alessandro. 1975. Giovanni Buridano Dalla Metafisica
Alla Fisica. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
———. 2001. "The Categories of Temporality in William Ockham and
John Buridan." In The Medieval Concept of Time, edited by Porro,
Pasquale, 255-286. Leiden: Brill.
Grellard, Christophe. 2007. "Scepticism, Demonstration and the
Infinite Regress Argument (Nicholas of Autrecourt and John Buridan)."
Vivarium:328-342.
Habib, Nicholas. 1985. "A Medieval Perspective on the
Meaningfulness of Fictitious Terms: A Study of John Buridan."
Hall, Alexander W. 2008. "John Buridan: On Aristotle' Categories." In
Medieval Commentaries in Aristotle's Categories, edited by Newton,
Lloyd A., 295-316. Leiden: Brill.
Herzberger, Hans G. 1973. "Dimensions of Truth." Journal of
Reprinted in: Donald Hockney (ed.), Contemporary Research in
Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics, Dordrecht: Reidel,
1975, pp. 71-92.
Hubien, Hubert. 1975. "John Buridan on the Fourth Figure of the
Syllogism." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 29:271-285.
———. 1981. "Buridan and Lesniewski on the Copula." In English
Logic and Semantics: From the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time
of Ockham and Burleigh, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G., Kneepkens,
Cornelis Henri and Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, 415-425. Nijmegen:
"It has often been contended that Lesniewski's Ontology is the best
system in which to formalize medieval logic. I submit that this is not
the case and propose a new one, which, as I shall show, is both more
faithful to one of the medieval logics (for there is more than one) and
853
richer than Ontology, since it contains it but is not contained in it." p.
415
Hughes, George. 1989. "The Modal Logic of John Buridan." In Atti Del
Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica. Le Teorie Della
Modalità, edited by Corsi, Giovanna, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai,
"This paper will be almost wholly expository. My aim in it is to give an
outline, though I fear a very incomplete one, of the system of modal
logic developed by one of the greatest of mediaeval logicians, the 14th
century French philosopher John Buridan. I shall base my account on
two of his logical works. One is his Consequentiae, a work on
inferences in general, about a third of which is devoted to modal logic.
There is an excellent modern edition of this work by Hubert Hubien, in
the Introduction to which Hubien argues, to my mind convincingly, that
it was written about 1335. The other is his lengthy and comprehensive
work on logic, the Summulae de Dialectica, which contains two
substantial sections on modal logic. There are serious problems
involved in dating this work, but I shall not try to discuss these here.
Most of it, including all the modal material, still exists, unfortunately,
only in manuscript form. The modal material is arranged differently in
these two works, each is fuller than the other on certain topics, and
there are a few discrepancies between them on points of detail; but
substantially they present the same ideas, and for the most part I shall
not try to distinguish between them here." p. 93
Jacquette, Dale. 1991. "Buridan's Bridge." Philosophy no. 66:455-471.
On Sophism 17 of Chapter 8 of Sophismata (Insolubilia).
Karger, Elizabeth. 1984. "Un Débat Médiéval Sur Le Concept De Sujet
D'un Énoncé Catégorique. Étude D'un Texte De Jean Buridan." In
Preuve Et Raisons À L'université De Paris. Logique, Ontologie Et
Théologie Au Xive Siècle, edited by Kaluza, Zénon and Vignaux, Paul,
"Le présent essai porte sur quelques pages du Traité des suppositions
(1) de Jean Buridan. Dans ces pages, l'auteur présente un débat portant
sur l'identification du sujet d'énoncés catégoriques (2) dont le terme
initial est à un cas dit "oblique", c'est-à-dire autre que le nominatif (3).
Selon certains logiciens -- que Buridan ne nomme pas --, c'est ce terme
à un cas oblique qui est le véritable sujet de l'énoncé; selon l'auteur, au
854
contraire, le sujet ne peut être qu'un terme au nominatif.
Un des exemples discutés est le suivant:
(1) Cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit.
Selon l'analyse récusée par Buridan, 'hominis ' est le sujet de cet
énoncé, alors que, selon l'auteur, le sujet de (1) est 'hominis asinus' et
"principalement" (4) 'asinus'.
D'aucuns jugeront peut-être que l'intérêt de ce débat réside dans
l'occasion qu'il fournit de mettre en évidence la difficulté de la tâche à
laquelle s'est épuisée la logique scolastique -- tâche qui aurait consisté à
remédier aux insuffisances de la logique aristotélicienne.
Tel cependant n'est pas notre propos principal. Notre objectif dans
l'étude de ce texte, fut de découvrir plutôt les divergences doctrinales
en raison desquelles les théoriciens en présence proposent, pour les
énoncés concernés, des analyses aussi différentes, et en particulier de
dégager ce qui rend incompatibles les deux concepts de sujet
présupposés par l'une et l'autre des positions adverses.
Nous présentons donc ici les résultats de cette étude. Nous
commencerons par exposer l'essentiel de l'argumentation par laquelle,
d'après Buridan, ces logiciens anonymes défendent leur thèse ; nous
serons ainsi en mesure de dégager les éléments principaux d'une
certaine doctrine logico-grammaticale. Nous passerons en second lieu à
l'examen des objections que Buridan oppose aux raisons de ses
adversaires, découvrant à travers elles ainsi que dans la défense qu'il
apporte à sa thèse propre, les caractéristiques d'une doctrine
profondément différente de la première. Nous terminerons par une
évaluation, du point de vue de leur mérite logique, des deux positions
en présence." pp. 111-112.
———. 1992. "Syllogistique Buridanienne." Dialogue.Canadian
———. 1993. "A Theory of Immediate Inferences Contained in
Buridan's Logic." In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische
Forschungen Zu Den Logischen Und Semantischen Regeln Korrekten
Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 407-429. Leiden: Brill.
———. 2007. "John Buridan's Theory of the Logical Relations
between General Modal Formulae." In Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in
Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Cornelis Henri, 429-444.
855
———. 2010. "A Buridanian Response to a Fourteenth Century
Skeptical Argument and Its Rebuttal by a New Argument in the Early
Sixteenth Cenury." In Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The
Missing Medieval Background, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 215-232.
Leiden: Brill.
Kärkkäinen, Pekka. 2004. "On the Semantics of 'Human Being' and
'Animal' in Early 16th-Century Erfurt." Vivarium no. 42:237-256.
"John Buridan discussed the problem, whether it follows from the
definition of the term 'animal' that all quantitative parts of an animal are
to be called animals. His solution was that parts of the animal are to be
called animals, though in a extraordinary, non-connotative, sense of the
term. The problem was variously discussed by some later Buridanian
authors from Erfurt. Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen ends up to
deny the use of such terms as 'animal' and 'human being' as connotative
terms. Jodocus Trutfetter, however, uses the distinction between the
absolute and connotative senses of these terms without reservation."
King, Peter. 1985. "Introduction to Jean Buridan's Logic." In Jean
Buridan's Logic. The Treatise on Supposition. The Treatise on
Consequences, 3-82. Dordrecht: Reidel.
———. 2001. "Consequence as Inference: Mediaeval Proof Theory
1300-1350." In Medieval Formal Logic. Obligations, Insolubles and
Consequences, edited by Yrjönsuuri, Mikko, 117-145. Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
Klima, Gyula. 1991. "Latin as a Formal Language. Outlines of a
Buridanian Semantics." Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et
Latin no. 61:78-106.
———. 1999. "Buridan's Logic and the Ontology of Modes." In
Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the Symposium
the Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy January 10-13 1996,
edited by Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell L., 473-495.
Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters.
"Summary: The aim of this paper is to explore the relationships
between Buridan's logic and the ontology of modes (modi). Modes, not
considered to be really distinct from absolute entities, could serve to
reduce the ontological commitment of the theory of the categories, and
thus they were to become ubiquitous in this role in late medieval and
856
early modern philosophy. After a brief analysis of the most basic
argument for the real distinction between entities of several categories
("the argument from separability"), I point out that despite nominalist
charges to the contrary, "older realists" - that is, authors working before
and around Ockham's time - were not committed to such real
distinctions, and thus to an overpopulated ontology, by their semantic
principles. However, what did entail such a commitment on their part,
along with the argument from separability, was treating abstract terms
in several accidental categories as "rigid designators", that is, essential
predicates (species and genera) of their supposita. Therefore, although
in the form of "extra-categorial" modi essendi modes were well
established in earlier medieval thought, their appearance within the
theory of categories was conditioned on analyzing several abstract
terms in the accidental categories as non-essential predicates of their
particulars, something that "older realists" would in general not
endorse. (This does not mean that even "older realists" were universally
committed to really distinct entities in all ten categories. See on this e.g.
notes 13 and 18.) Next, I show how this type of analysis is achieved
"automatically" by Buridan's theory of "eliminative" nominal
definitions (in contrast to the older "non-eliminative" theory). However,
since "realist" semantic principles in themselves did not yield a
commitment to really distinct entities in all categories, it was also open
for later "realists" to operate with not-really-distinct modes in several
categories, although using different, "non-nominalist" tactics to treat
the abstract accidental terms signifying them as non-rigid designators.
The conclusion of the paper is that, as a consequence, both nominalist
and later "realist" thinkers were able to achieve the same degree of
ontological reductions in their respective logical frameworks, and so it
was not so much their ontologies as their different logical "tactics" that
set them apart."
———. 2003. "John Buridan." In A Companion to Philosophy in the
Middle Ages, edited by Gracia, Joerge J.E. and Noone, Timothy B.,
340-348. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 2004. "John Buridan on the Acquisition of Simple Substantial
Concepts." In John Buridan and Beyond. Topics in the Language
Sciences 1300-1700, edited by Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell L.,
17-32. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.
857
———. 2004. "Consequences of a Closed, Token-Based Semantics:
The Case of John Buridan." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 25:95-
110.
"This paper argues for two principal conclusions about natural
language semantics based on John Buridan's considerations concerning
the notion of formal consequence, that is, formally valid inference. (1)
Natural languages are essentially semantically closed, yet they do not
have to be on that account inconsistent. (2) Natural language semantics
has to be token based, as a matter of principle. The paper investigates
the Buridanian considerations leading to these conclusions, and
considers some obviously emerging objections to the Buridanian
approach."
———. 2004. "John Buridan and the Force-Content Distinction." In
Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language, edited by
Maierù, Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 415-427. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.
———. 2004. "The Demonic Temptations of Medieval Nominalism:
Mental Representation and "Demon Skepticism"." Proceedings of the
Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics no. 4:37-44.
———. 2005. "The Essentialist Nominalism of John Buridan." Review
of Metaphysics no. 58:301-315.
"To many contemporary philosophers, the phrase "essentialist
nominalism" may appear to be an oxymoron. After all, essentialism is
the doctrine that things come in natural kinds characterized by their
essential properties, on account of some common nature or essence
they share. But nominalism is precisely the denial of the existence,
indeed, the very possibility of such shared essences. Nevertheless,
despite the intuitions of such contemporary philosophers, John Buridan
was not only a thoroughgoing nominalist, as is well-known, but also a
staunch defender of a strong essentialist doctrine against certain
skeptics of his time. But then the question inevitably arises: could he
consistently maintain such a doctrine?
In the following discussion I will first examine Buridan's essentialism
to show why he could reasonably think that he can both adhere to his
nominalist metaphysics and endorse a version of essentialism that can
serve as the foundation of genuine scientific knowledge in the strong
Aristotelian sense.
In the subsequent section I will argue that on the basis of his logical
858
theory of essential predication Buridan is definitely able to maintain a
version of essentialism that is sufficient to provide the required
foundation of valid scientific generalizations, and to refute skeptical
doubts against the possibility of such a foundation.
Next, I will examine the question whether Buridan's solution is
consistent with the broader context of his logic and epistemology. In
this section I will argue that although Buridan's logical theory is
consistent with his nominalist essentialist position, his cognitive
psychology is not. In particular, I will argue that Buridan's
abstractionist account of how we acquire our simple substantial
concepts is incompatible with his account of the semantic function of
absolute terms subordinated to these concepts.
Finally, I will draw some general conclusions from this discussion
concerning the relationships between metaphysical essentialism and the
philosophy of mind and language." (notes omitted)
———. 2005. "Quine, Wyman, and Buridan: Three Approaches to
Ontological Commitment." Korean Journal of Logic no. 8:1-22.
———. 2006. "The Universality of Logic and the Primacy of Mental
Language in the Nominalist Philosophy of Logic of John Buridan."
Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum no. 35:167-177.
———. 2007. "Aquinas Vs. Buridan on Essence and Existence."
Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics no.
7:66-73.
———. 2008. "The Nominalist Semantic of Ockham and Buridan: A
'Rational Reconstruction'." In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited
by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 389-431. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
———. 2008. "Logic without Truth. Buridan on the Liar." In Unity,
Truth and the Liar. The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the
Liar Paradox, edited by Rahman, Shahid, Tulenheimo, Tero and
Genot, Emmanuel, 86-112. New York: Springer.
———. 2009. John Buridan. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2010. "The Anti-Skepticism of John Buridan and Thomas
Aquinas: Putting Skeptics in Their Place Versus Stopping Them in
Their Tracks." In Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The Missing
Medieval Background, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 145-170. Leiden:
Brill.
859
———. 2011. "Two Summulae, Two Ways of Doing Logic: Peter of
Spain's 'Realism' and John Buridan's 'Nominalism'." In Methods and
Methodologies. Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, edited by
Cameron, Margaret and Marenbon, John, 109-126. Leiden: Brill.
Knuuttila, Simo. 1991. "Buridan and Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic." In
Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte Der
Philosophie Des Mittelalters. Festschrift Für Kurt Flasch Zu Seinem
60. Geburtstag. (Vol. I), edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf,
477-488. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.
"In the first section of this paper some remarks are made on Aristotle's
modal syllogistic. In the second part it is shown at a general level how
Aristotle's theory is related to what Buridan says about modal
syllogisms. The purpose of the paper is to elucidate late medieval
attitudes towards Aristotle's modal logic." (p. 477)
Krieger, Gerhard. 2003. Subjekt Und Metaphysik. Die Metaphysik Des
Johannes Buridan. Münster: Aschendorff.
———. 2005. "Menschliche Vernunft Als Terminus Der Reflexion: Zu
Einer Übereinstimmung Zwischen Mittelatlerlicher Philosophie Und
Kant." Kant-Studien no. 96:187-207.
"The article deals with the metaphysical thought of the Magister
Artium John Buridan, who was active in Paris in the first half of the
fourteenth century, in the context of the discussion of the
relationship of medieval to modern philosophy. Systematically, the
justification of this investigation is that Buridan is in agreement with
Kant as to the primacy of practical reason. To this extent, this
consideration of the metaphysics of John Buridan in comparison to that
of Kant deals with the question of the meaning of the primacy of
practical reason for the transcendental justification of knowledge and
science and, with this question, also with the transformation of
metaphysics.""
———. 2006. "Conceptus Absolutus: Zu Einer Parallele Zwischen
Wilhelm Von Ockham, Johannes Buridan Und Nicolaus Cusanus." In
Intellectus Und Imaginatio. Aspekte Geistiger Und Sinnlicher
Erkenntnis Bei Nicolaus Cusanus, edited by, André, João Maria,
Krieger, Gerhard and Schwaetzer, Harald, 3-18. Amsterdam: B.R.
Grüner.
Kukkonen, Taneli. 2005. ""The Impossible, Insofar as It Is Possible":
860
Ibn Rushd and Jean Buridan on Logic and Natural Theology." In Logik
Und Theologie. Das Organon Im Arabischen Und Im Lateinischen
Mittelalter, edited by Perler, Dominik and Rudolf, Ulrich, 447-467.
Leiden: Brill.
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Buridan's Logic and Metaphysics: An

Annotated Bibliography (Second Part: L
- Z)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For Buridan's contributions to the theories of supposition and mental

Language
Lagerlund, Henrik. 2000. Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages.
Leiden: Brill.
See Chapter 5. The systemtization of modal syllogistic pp. 130-164.
"It is unfortunate that of Buridan's logical works dealing with modal
logic and modal syllogistic only the Consequentiae has been edited (*).
This is probably the reason why so few studies of Buridan's modal
logic have been done. The most important of the studies that do exist is
G.E. Hughes' paper, 'The Modal Logic of John Buridan' from 1989. My
present study will mainly extend and clarify what has been said by
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Hughes." p. 36
(*) [This was written before the publication of G. Klima's translation of
the Summulae de Dialectica in 2001].
———. 2004. "Vague Concepts and Singular Terms in a Buridanian
Language of Thought Tradition." Proceedings of the Society for
Medieval Logic and Metaphysics no. 4:25-36.
———. 2006. "What Is Singular Thought? Ockham and Buridan on
Singular Terms in the Language of Thought." In Mind and Modality.
Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila,
edited by Hirvonen, Vesa, Holopainen, Toivo J. and Tuominen, Miira,
———. 2010. "Skeptical Issues in Commentaries on Aristotle's
Posteror Analytics: John Buridan and Albert of Saxony." In Rethinking
the History of Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background, edited by
Lagerlund, Henrik, 193-214. Leiden: Brill.
Lecq, Ria van der. 1981. "Buridan on Modal Propositions." In English
Logic and Semantics: From the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time
of Ockham and Burleigh, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G., Kneepkens,
Cornelis Henri and Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, 427-439. Nijmegen:
———. 2004. Mental Language: A Key to the Understanding of
Buridan's Semantics.
Miller, Richard H. 1985. "Buridan on Singular Concepts." Franciscan
Moody, Ernest. 1965. "Buridan and a Dilemma of Nominalism." In
Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His
Seventy-Fifth Birthday, edited by Lieberman, Saul, 578-596. Jerusalem:
American Academy for Jewish Research.
Reprinted in: E. A. Moody - Studies in medieval philosophy, science,
and logic. Collected papers 1933-1969 - Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1975, pp. 353-370.
———. 1969. "Jean Buridan." In Dictionary of Scientific Biography.
Vol. Ii, edited by Gillispie, Charles C, 603-608. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons.
Reprinted in: E. A. Moody - Studies in medieval philosophy, science,
and logic. Collected papers 1933-1969 - Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1975, pp. 441-453.
863
Normore, Calvin. 1963. "Buridan's Ontology." In Essays in Ontology,
edited by B., Allaire Edwin, 189-203. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
"Here is a recipe for ontology. First divide the expressions of one's
language into those which purport to pick things out and those which
don't. Then see whether some of those which purport to pick things out
can be defined in terms of others. Finally admit into your ontology
whatever an undefinable term purports to pick out. This scheme
expresses (though vaguely and incompletely) one of the central
intuitions behind many ontological programmes. What is admitted by
an ontologist operating within this framework will depend, of course,
upon how he or she divides expressions, on what resources of
definition are available, and, perhaps, on pressures from other theories.
What I hope to do in this paper is to show the influence of the intuition
behind this sketch on the work of the fourteenth century Parisian master
Jean Buridan.
To some extent, I shall compare Buridan's views with those of his
contemporary, William Ockham. In doing so, I hope both to present
Buridan's own very striking contributions to ontology and to shed a
little light on the inner life of 14th century nominalism." (p. 189).
Novaes, Catarina Dutilh. 2004. "The Buridanian Account of Inferential
Relations between Doubly Quantified Propositions: A Proof of
Soundness." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 25:225-243.
"On the basis of passages from John Buridan's Summula
Suppositionibus and Sophismata, E. Karger has reconstructed what
could be called the 'Buridanian theory of inferential relations between
doubly quantified propositions', presented in her 1993 article 'A theory
of immediate inference contained in Buridan's logic'. In the
reconstruction, she focused on the syntactical elements of Buridan's
theory of modes of personal supposition to extract patterns of formally
valid inferences between members of a certain class of basic
categorical propositions. The present study aims at offering semantic
corroboration -- a proof of soundness -- to the inferential relations
syntactically identified by E. Karger, by means of the analysis of
Buridan's semantic definitions of the modes of personal supposition.
The semantic analysis is done with the help of some modern logical
concepts, in particular that of the model. In effect, the relations of
inference syntactically established are shown to hold also from a
864
semantic point of view, which means thus that this fragment of
Buridan's logic can be said to be sound."
———. 2005. "Buridan's Consequentia: Consequence and Inference
within a Token-Based Semantics." History and Philosophy of Logic no.
26:277-297.
"I examine the theory of consequentia of the medieval logician, John
Buridan. Buridan advocates a strict commitment to what we now call
proposition-tokens as the bearers of truth-value. The analysis of
Buridan's theory shows that, within a token-based semantics,
amendments to the usual notions of inference and consequence are
made necessary, since pragmatic elements disrupt the semantic
behavior of propositions. In my reconstruction of Buridan's theory, I
use some of the apparatus of modern two-dimensional semantics, such
as two-dimensional matrices and the distinction between the context of
formation and the context of evaluation of utterances."
———. 2005. "In Search of the Intuitive Notion of Logical
Consequence." In The Logica Yearbook 2004, edited by Behounek,
Libor, 109-123. Prague: Filosofia.
"After decades of predominant focus on the notion of logical truth, the
debate on the concept of logical consequence among philosophers and
logicians was re-ignited by J. Etchemendy's book The Concept of
Logical Consequence (1990). His main tenet was that the model-
theoretic notion of logical consequence did not capture adequately the
corresponding intuitive notion. One of Etchemendy's central claims was
that the intuitive notion could be understood essentially from two
different perspectives, one representational and one interpretational -
and that the model-theoretic notion failed to match either.
Some years ago, S. Shapiro (1998) sought to vindicate the model-
theoretic notion of logical consequence; one of his arguments was that
the dichotomy representational/interpretational notion of logical
consequence was in a certain way infelicitous, since, according to him,
a faithful rendering of the intuitive concept would have to have
elements of both notions. Clearly, the resolution of issue as to whether
the model-theoretic notion correctly captures the intuitive notion
presupposes an at least minimally adequate characterization of this
intuitive notion. Shapiro claimed that
Etchemendy hadn't really provided such a characterization (1), and
865
attempted to formulate one himself. He further claimed that, thus
characterized, the intuitive notion was indeed correctly captured by the
model-theoretic notion (albeit with some adjustements). (2)
In this paper, I do not discuss Shapiro's defense of the model-theoretic
notion; rather I examine his contention that the best rendering of the
intuitive notion of logical consequence is what he called the
'conglomeration' notion, that is, the hybrid notion that combines both
the representational and the interpretational view on consequence.
More specifically, I claim that such a hybrid view was held by the
medieval logician John Buridan (Cf. Hubien, Iohannis Buridani
tractatus de consequentiis, 1976), and that this fact offers significant
historical support to Shapiro's version of the intuitive concept of
(logical) consequence."
(1) Cf. Stewart Shapiro 'Logical consequence: models and modality'. In
Matthias Schirn (ed.), Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 131-156. p.143.
(2) 'My claim is that model-theoretic consequence can be made into a
good model of this notion [the 'hybrid' intuitive notion of logical
consequence] and that both the intuitive notion so characterized and its
mathematical model are useful tools for shedding light on the
normative/modal/semantic notion of correct reasoning in natural
language, the target of logic.' (Shapiro 1998, 148)
———. 2009. "Lessons on Sentential Meaning from Mediaeval
Solutions to the Liar Paradox." Philosophical Quarterly no. 59:682-
704.
"Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially
Bradwardine's and Buridan's, raise issues concerning the meaning of
sentences, in particular about closure of sentential meaning under
implication, semantic pluralism and the ontological status of
'meanings', which are still topical for current theories of meaning. I
outline ways in which they tend to be overlooked, raising issues that
must be addressed by any respectable theory of meaning as well as
pointing in the direction of possible answers. I analyse a Bradwardinian
theory of sentential meaning as it emerges from his treatment of liar
sentences, exploring where it requires more thorough elaboration if it is
to be a fully developed theory of sentential meaning. "
Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1988. "Appellatio Rationis in Buridan,
866
Sophismata Iv, 9-15." In Die Philosophie Im 14. Und 15. Jahrhundert.
In Memoriam Konstanty Michalsky (1879-1947), edited by Pluta, Olaf,
67-84. Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner.
Reprinted as Chapter VIII in: G. Nuchelmans - Studies in the History of
Logic and Semantics, 12th-17th Centuries - Edited by E. P. Bos -
Aldershot, Variorum, 1996.
Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma. 2004. "John Buridan and Jerónimo Pardo on the
Notion of Propositio." In John Buridan and Beyond. Topics in the
Language Sciences 1300-1700, edited by Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman,
Russell L., 153-182. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.
———. 2004. ""Complexio, Enunciatio, Assensus": The Role of
Propositions in Knowledge According to John Buridan." In Medieval
Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language, edited by Maierù,
Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 401-414. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.
Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2008. "John Buridan on the Bearer of Logical
Relations." Logica Universalis:59-70.
"According to John Buridan, the time for which a statement is true is
underdetermined by the grammatical form of the sentence - the
intention of the speaker is required. As a consequence, truth-bearers are
not sentence types, nor sentence tokens plus facts of the context of
utterance, but statements. Statements are also the bearers of logical
relations, since the latter can only be established among entities having
determined truth-conditions. This role of the intention of the speaker in
the determination of what is said by an utterance is not isolated in
medieval semantics."
———. 2011. "John Buridan's Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the
Liar." Vivarium no. 49:184-213.
"The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not
been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of
language. More precisely, there are two important points of the
Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct
understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either
misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory.
The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, 'propositio est vera quia
qualitercumque significat in rebus significatis ita est', once amended, is
a correct way to talk about the truth of a sentence. The second one is
that he has a double indexing theory of truth: a sentence is true in a
867
time about a time, and such times should be distinguished in the
account of the truth-conditions of sentences. These two claims are
connected in an important way: the Aristotelian formula indicates the
time about which a sentence is true. Some interpreters of the
Buridanian solution to the paradox, following the lead of Herzberger,
have missed these points and have been led to postulate truth-values
gaps, or surrogates of truth-value gaps, when there is nothing of this
sort in his theory. I argue against this tradition of interpretation of
Buridan and propose an interpretation of his solution to the Liar."
Perreiah, Alan R. 1972. "Buridan and the Definite Description."
"Previously unpublished commentaries by Buridan on Aristotle's
Physics (Book I, Question X) and Metaphysics (Book VII, Question
XX) are examined in order to determine whether the 14th-century
philosopher and logician anticipated a theory of descriptions. The
writings show that Buridan's distinctions between singular and common
concepts parallels Russell's between knowledge by acquaintance and by
description. Basic features of determinate concepts are studied,
particularly those of existence and identity. Buridan's treatment of these
matters shows that: (a) he had all of the concepts needed to analyze the
iota-operator (b) he was sensitive to the restriction that predication
involving unquoted descriptive phrases presuppose that existence and
identity requirements are met and (c) he appreciated the peculiar
behavior of determinate concepts in logical inference. Buridan's theory
of concepts is applied to some problematic expressions in direct
discourse."
Pinborg, Jan, ed. 1976. The Logic of John Buridan. Copenhagen:
Museum Tusculanum Press.
Acts of the 3rd European Symposium on medieval logic and semantics,
Copenhagen 16-21 November 1975.
Pironet, Fabienne. 1993. "John Buridan on Ther Liar Paaradox: Studfiy
of an Opinion and Chronology of the Texts." In Argumentationstheorie.
Scholastische Forschungen Zu Den Logischen Und Semantischen
Regeln Korrekten Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 293-300. Leiden:
Brill.
Pluta, Olaf. 2002. "John Buridan on Universal Knowledge." Bochumer
philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter no. 7:25-46.
868
Priest, Graham, and Read, Stephen. 2004. "Intentionality:
Meinongianism and the Medievals." Australasian Journal of
"Intentional verbs create three different problems: problems of
nonexistence, of indeterminacy, and of failure of substitutivity.
Meinongians tackle the first problem by recognizing nonexistent
objects; so too did many medieval logicians. Meinongians and the
medievals approach the problem of indeterminacy differently, the
former diagnosing an ellipsis for a propositional complement, the latter
applying their theory directly to non-propositional complements.
The evidence seems to favor the Meinongian approach. Faced with the
third problem, Ockham argued bluntly for substitutivity when the
intentional complement is non-propositional; Buridan developed a
novel way of resisting substitutivity. Ockham's approach is closer to the
Meinongian analysis of these cases; Buridan's seems to raise difficulties
for a referential semantics. The comparison between the Meinongian
and medieval approaches helps to bring out merits and potential pitfalls
of each."
Read, Stephen. 2002. "The Liar Paradox from John Buridan Back to
Thomas Bradwardine." Vivarium no. 40:189-218.
"My aim is to counter recent infatuation with John Buridan's analysis in
his Sophismata (circa 1356-7) of the liar paradox and other insolubles,
and show not only how he derived his solution from Thomas
Bradwardine's Insolulibilia (circa 1324), but how he altered it for the
worse. Buridan was a great logician and philosopher. He was careful,
methodical and had a great influence on succeeding generations. But
his analysis of the liar paradox was flawed. It introduced an ad hoc
supplement to the truth-conditions of just those propositions which
induce paradox to prevent the contradiction from arising. What was
really clever in his analysis, and attracted the attention of, among others
in recent decades, Moody, Prior and Hughes, was in fact derived from
Bradwardine, in whose hands it was dealt with both consistently and
successfully. By all the historical evidence, Bradwardine's proposal was
an original insight. On analysis, it is seen to be a great and instructive
one, too."
———. 2012. "John Buridans's Theory of Consequence and His
Octagon of Opposition." In Around and Beyond the Square of
869
Opposition, edited by Béziau, Jean-Yves and Jacquette, Dale, 93-110.
Baserl: Birkhäuser.
"One of the manuscripts of Buridan’s Summulae contains three figures,
each in the form of an octagon. At each node of each octagon there are
nine propositions. Buridan uses the figures to illustrate his doctrine of
the syllogism, revising Aristotle’s theory of the modal syllogism and
adding theories of syllogisms with propositions containing oblique
terms (such as ‘man’s donkey’) and with propositions of “non-normal
construction” (where the predicate precedes the copula). O-propositions
of non-normal construction (i.e., ‘Some S (some) P is not’) allow
Buridan to extend and systematize the theory of the assertoric (i.e.,
non-modal) syllogism. Buridan points to a revealing analogy between
the three octagons. To understand their importance we need to rehearse
the medieval theories of signification, supposition, truth and
consequence."
Reina, Maria Elena. 2002. Hoc Hic Et Nunc. Buridano, Marsilio Di
Inghen E La Conoscenza Del Singolare. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1976. "On Buridan's Doctrine of
Connotation." In The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third
European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Copenhagen
16-21 November 1975, edited by Pinborg, Jan, 91-100. Copenhagen:
Museum Tusculanum.
Reprinted as chapter XI in: Through language to reality: studies in
medieval semantics and metaphysics.
"Mediaeval Terminist logic was concerned with the so-called properties
of terms (proprietates terminorum), to the extent that it not only studied
the formal structures of Latin language, its logical syntax, and all kinds
of specifications within this scope, but also interpreted the linguistic
elements and structures. This interpretation mainly focussed on what
the moderns would call semantics rather than on formal logic as such.
The properties of terms (significatio, appellatio, suppositio and its
various forms: ampliatio, restrictio, distributio) were investigated in
their relation to the so-called res extra animam (extra-mental reality).
Two statements can be made. First: Who wants to detect a Mediaeval
thinker's implicit ontological points of view, finds a wealth of firm
evidence in his doctrine of the properties of terms. Secondly: Within
the domain of these properties it is Buridan's appellatio that has a very
870
interesting role because of its affinity with the modern concept of
connotation. So Buridan's appellatio is entitled to have the attention of
both the historians of Mediaeval thought and learning as of those
modern logicians who do not want to seclude themselves from the
historical background of modern doctrines.
My approach to the matter concerned now is to compare Buridan's
appellatio with modern connotation, more specifically to put the
translation 'connotation' for Buridan's appellatio to the test." p. 91
———. 1992. "John Buridan on Universals." Revue de Métaphysique
et de Morale no. 97:35-59.
"It is common knowledge that Plato strongly believed that, in order to
explain the nature of whatever is (either things or states of affairs,
including Man and his environment), the assumption of Transcendent
Universal Forms is indispensable. In his view, these universal Forms
are the ontic causes of each and every sublunary entity, which all owe
their being to their sharing in these Forms. Consequently, everyone
who is in want of firm knowledge (episteme) about, the things of the
outside world is bound to direct his attention to the transcendent
domain of the universal Forms'.
However, Plato was the first to recognise, and seriously deal with, the
objections that can be raised to this doctrine. These objections mainly
concern the status (and the dignity, however modest) of our transient
world and, above all, the possibility to obtain, true knowledge of this
world as it stands, in its ever-changing nature, that is." p. 35
(...)
"To be sure, the Medievals all rejected the Platonic Ideas taken as
separate substances and they adhered to the Aristotelian common sense
principle that only individuals have independent existence.
Nevertheless, they were still under the spell of the status of «universal
being» as the indispensable basis of true knowledge.
Marylin McCord Adams has analysed some early fourteenth century
solutions to the problem of universals (Scotus, Ockham, Burley and
Harclay) (*). In McCord's article Buridan's view of the matter is left out
of consideration. Quite understandably so, since Buridan's solution to
the problem differs considerably from the sophisticated arguments
given by his contemporaries. Buridan seeks.for a solution in analysing
the several ways of human understanding. In directing his attention to
871
the propositional attitude involved in the cognitive procedure Buridan
is remarkably close to the ingenious solution Peter Abelard had come
up with two centuries earlier. In the next sections I shall give an outline
of Abelard's treatment of the question of universals followed by an
analysis of Buridan's discussion of the matter (as found in his
commentary on the Metaphysics and elsewhere)." p. 37
(...)
"We may conclude, then, that two bright logicians of the Parisian
tradition have come up with quite an ingenious solution to the problem
of universals. Both of them started out from the firm conviction that
nothing exists but particulars. Nevertheless, they apparently were not
satisfied with purely extensional solutions as brought forward by
Oxford logicians such as Heytesbury and Ockham. Maybe
extensionalists are out to show how people ought to think. Abelard and
Buridan, however, were especially interested in the various ways of
conceiving we actually use in daily life, in our attempts to conceptually
deal with the outside world." p. 59
(*) "Universals in the early Fourteenth century" in Cambridge History
of Later Medieval Philosophy, from the rediscovery of Aristotle to the
desintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600 pp. 411-439.
———. 1993. "On Buridan's View of Accidental Being." In John
Buridan: A Master of Arts. Some Aspects of His Philosophy. Acts of the
Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval
Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of Its 15th Anniversary.
Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 1991., edited by
Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri A., 41-51. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
"One of the most striking characteristics of late medieval metaphysics
is the upgrading of 'accidental being'. The strict opposition between
'esse per se' and 'esse per accidens', which had been of paramount
importance ever since Aristotle, has lost its relevance in the ontological
discussions of the fourteenth century. The status of 'accidental being'
came rather close to that of 'substantial being'. In the views of
philosophers such as Ockham and Buridan (not to mention thinkers like
Crathorn) the nature of 'accidental being' (or rather 'quantitative and
qualitative being') can no longer be properly defined in terms of
ontological dependency upon substance. In other words, 'per se
872
subsistence' is assigned not only to substance but to 'accidental being'
as well.
In the present contribution I will illustrate this development by
discussing some of Buridan's expositions in his Questiones
commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (IV, q. 6 and VII, q. 3-4)." p. 41
———. 1994. "John Buridan on Man's Capability of Grasping the
Truth." In Scientia Et Ars Im Hoch- Und Spätmmittelalter, edited by
Craemer-Rügenberg, Ingrid and Speer, Andreas, 282-303. Berlin, New
York: Walter de Gruyter.
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 22/1.
"As is well-known, two subjects are distinctive of the fourteenth
century theory of cognition, namely 'certitudo' and 'evidentia'. It is true,
thirteenth century philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, were also
concerned with certitude and evidentness as indispensable requisites for
'true knowledge' ('scientia'). However, until the end of the thirteenth
century certitude and evidentness were not prominent in the discussions
about the cognitive procedure nor were they treated as separate matters,
requiring separate attention. In Thomas Aquinas for example, the
conviction that man is really capable of grasping the truth with
certainty is really constitutive of his philosophical (and theological)
thought and praxis (*)', or to speak with J. A. Aertsen, of 'Thomas' way
of thought'.(**) This, however, does not alter the fact that in Aquinas'
philosophy 'certitudo' is not highlighted as such, and the specific role of
'evidentia' is even virtually ignored.
Buridan's theory of cognition, on the contrary, clearly focusses on the
ingredients 'certitudo' and 'evidentia', and, within this framework, on
the notion of 'assensus'. In the present paper I aim to elucidate the role
of this key notion of John Buridan's theory of cognition."
(*) See the excellent paper by Gerard Verbeke, "Certitude et incertitude
de la recherche philosophique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin", in: Rivista
di Filosofia neo-scolastica 66 (1974), 740-57.
(**) Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas' Way of
Thought. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters
herausgegeben von Albert Zimmermann, Band XXI, Leiden etc. 1988,
passim.
Roberts, Louise Nisbet. 1952. "Formalism of Terminist Logic in the
Fourteenth Century." Tulane Studies in Philosophy no. 1:107-112.
873
———. 1952. An Introduction to the Terminist Logic of John Buridan.
Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, available at Proquest Dissertation Express.
———. 1953. "Every Proposition Is False. A Medieval Paradox."
Tulane Studies in Philosophy no. 2:95-102.
"Paradoxes similar to that of Epimenides the Cretan are present in the
highly developed logic of the Late Medieval period. These "sophisms"
were known as the "impossibilia" or "insolubilia." an interpretation is
given of the analysis of "every proposition is false" which is to be
found in the Sophismata of John Buridan."
———. 1960. "A Chimera Is a Chimera: A Medieval Tautology."
Journal of the History of Ideas no. 21:273-278.
"Rejection of the truth of a tautology containing a fiction reveals
something of the complexity of the Terminist logic of the late Middle
Ages. The analysis of "a chimera is a chimera," to be found in the
Sophismata of the Fourteenth century logician John Buridan, involves a
theory of signs and an interpretation of logical truth."
Schönberger, Rolf. 1994. Relation Als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie
Des Johannes Buridan Im Kontext Seines Denkens Und Der Scholastik.
Leiden: Brill.
"All central concepts in philosophy contain a relational aspect. The
type of reality to be accorded to relations is for this reason one of the
core questions of philosophical thought. This is particularly so in the
case of nominalism.
This book is devoted to John Buridan. While his towering importance
in the late Middle Ages and for the development of early modern
science has been recognised, his works are still not really well known.
How does his theory of relations relate to those of his contemporaries,
for example William of Ockham or Gregory of Rimini? The question of
the reality of relations is not only of interest as an "experimentum
crucis of nominalism, but also because Buridan in his ethics frequently
falls back upon older traditions.
The first part of the book contains a discussion of theories of relation
from Thomas Aquinas to Gregory of Rimini. The author then offers an
exhaustive presentation of the basic lines of Buridan's philosophy and
its relation to theology, before turning attention to his theory of
relation. Finally he addresses particular forms of relation (identity,
analogy, causality, etc.)."
874
———. 2003. "Quod Omnia Appetunt? Der Begriff Des Guten in Der
Nominalistischen Metaphysik Des Johannes Buridan." In Die Logik
Des Transzendentalen. Festschrift Für Jan A. Aerstsen Zum 65.
Geburtstag, edited by Pickavé, Martin, 395-417. Berlin: Gruyter.
Sylla, Edith Dudley. 2009. "John Buridan and Critical Realism." Early
Science and Medicine no. 14:211-247.
"In this paper I examine what John Buridan has to say in his
Quaestiones in Analytica Posteriora relevant to the subalternate
mathematical sciences, particularly astronomy. Much previous work on
the scholastic background to the Scientific Revolution relies on texts
that were written in the late sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. Here I
am interested in texts that might reflect the context of Copernicus, and,
in particular those before 1500. John Buridan and Albert of Saxony
were fourteenth century authors influential in Cracow in the fifteenth
century, whose conception of science may be characterized as "critical
realism." Their view would support the autonomy of astronomy, as well
as the idea that sciences may progress over time."
Tabarroni, Andrea. 2010. "John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the
Meaning of Accidental Terms (Quaestiones Super Metaphysicam, Viii,
3-5)." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no.
14:389-407.
Thijssen, Johannes M.M.H. 1987. "Buridan on the Unity of a Science.
Another Chapter in Ockhamism?" In Ockham and Ockhamists. Acts of
the Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval
Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of Its 10th Anniversary
(Leiden, 10-12 September 1986), edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop,
Henri A., 93-105. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
"In an article that appeared in 1974, A.A. Maurer traced the
contemporary notion of science as a body of knowledge to the 13th and
14th centuries. One may doubt Maurer's suggestion that the
development of the notion of science as a body of knowledge is another
chapter in the eclipse of Thomism during the Late Middle Ages.
Nevertheless he has certainly pointed out an important change in the
notion of the unity of a science which took place in the Later Middle
Ages (2).
Within the spectrum of medieval opinions on the unity of a science,
Maurer was of the opinion that the extreme positions were represented
875
by Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham. The purpose of this paper
is to determine the position of John Buridan in the debate on the unity
of a science. Because Buridan is generally pictured as an 'Ockhamist', a
comparison will be made between the essentials of Buridan's and
Ockham's theory of science. Apart from their views on the unity of a
science, these essentials also include their views on the immediate
object of scientific knowledge in general. In this comparison, priority
will be given to Buridan's theory of science, for in contradistinction to
Ockham's texts, his texts on this subject are not yet available in a
modern edition. Besides, some aspects of Ockham's theory of science
which will be touched upon here, have already been studied (3). So,
Ockham's philosophy of science will more serve as general background
for the presentation of Buridan's opinions (4).
This presentation will be rounded off with some brief remarks on the
vexed question as to whether it really makes sense to designate Buridan
as an Ockhamist."
(2) A.A. Maurer, 'The Unity of a Science. St. Thomas and the
Nominalists' in: St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974, p. 275 and already in
'Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science' in: Mediaeval Studies
20 (1958), pp. 100-101 and p. 104. A. Zimmermann, Ontologie oder
Metaphysik? Leiden - Kean 1965, p. 353 has arrived at the same
conclusions with regards to the change that took place in the notion of
the unity of a science. This change is also documented in Spade, 'The
Unity of Science according to Peter Auriol' in: Franciscan Studies 32
(1972).
(3) Especially in Maurer, 'Ockham's Conception of the Unity of
Science', and 'The Unity of a Science. St. Thomas and the Nominalists'.
See further Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, Leiden - KOln
1984, pp. 23-27.
(4) Some aspects of Buridan's theory of the unity of a science are
discussed in Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik, pp. 339-348,
but he confines himself exclusively to a presentation of some passages
taken from Buridan's Commentary on the Metaphysics. He does not
provide a real analysis of Buridan's position, and besides, he does not
draw attention to the differences that exist between Buridan's and
Ockham's theories.
———. 2004. "The Buridan School Reassessed. John Buridan and
876
Albert of Saxony." Vivarium no. 42:18-42.
Thijssen, Johannes M.M.H., and Zupko, Jack, eds. 2001. The
Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan. Leiden: Brill.
Thom, Paul. 2003. Medieval Modal Systems. Problems and Concepts.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
See Chapter 9 Buridan pp. 169-192.
"With Buridan (c.1300 - c.1358), modal syllogistic reaches its highest
point in the Middle Ages, both in terms of completeness and elegance.
Lagerlund observes that it was Buridan who gave modal syllogistic the
form it would retain for the rest of the Middle Ages, and that his
achievement in this field 'surpassed most things done in the history of
logic since Aristotle completed the Prior Analytics'.(1)In this chapter
we will look at his modal logic as expounded in Buridan's Tractatus de
Consequentiis and his Summulae de Dialectica." p. 169
(1) H. Lagerlund, Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages, Leiden, Brill,
2000, p. 30.
Uckelman, Sara L., and Johnston, Spencer. 2010. "John Buridan's
Sophismata and Interval Temporal Semantics." Logical Analysis and
"In this paper we look at the suitability of modern interval-based
temporal logic for modeling John Buridan's treatment of tensed
sentences in his Sophismata. Building on the paper [Øhrstrøm, P.,
Buridan on interval semantics for temporal logic. Logique et Analyse
106: 211-215, 1984], we develop Buridan's analysis of temporal logic,
paying particular attention to his notions of negation and the
absolute/relative nature of the future and the past.
We introduce a number of standard modern propositional interval
temporal logics (ITLs) to illustrate where Buridan's interval-based
temporal analysis differs from the standard modern approaches. We
give formal proofs of some claims in [Øhrstrøm 1984], and sketch how
the standard modern systems could be defined in terms of Buridan's
proposals, showing that his logic can be taken as more basic."
Willing, Anthony. 1991. "Buridan's Divided Modal Syllogistic." Notre
———. 1998. "Unheard of Objects of Knowledge: A Controversial
Principle of Buridan's Epistemic Logic." Franciscan Studies no.
56:203-224.
877
Yrjönsuuri, Mikko. 2008. "Treatments of the Paradoxes of Self-
Reference." In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay,
On Buridan see pp. 600-606.
"John Buridan's massive textbook of logic Summulae de Dialectica
ends with a collection of sophisms, seemingly as a section containing
exercises. The last set in this collection deals with self-referential
propositions and thus also with insolubles.
This is not the only location where Buridan discusses paradoxes of self-
reference, but it is perhaps the most accessible one. The textbook as a
whole was widely used for several centuries, but no other section in it
is directly dedicated to self-reference." p. 600 (note omitted)
"If compared to Bradwardine's work, Buridan's discussion of the
insolubles does not appear very ingenious and original. He wavers and
leaves room for doubt, allowing the reader to get the feeling that his
solution is sketchy. The work is, however, clearly on a very advanced
logical level and the problems obviously result from difficulties in the
subject matter. Given the extremely wide circulation of Buridan's
Summulae, it is very understandable that his solution achieved a very
high reputation and a wide influence in the coming centuries." pp. 605-
606
Zupko, Jack. 1990. "John Buridan on Abstraction and Universal
Cognition." In Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy.
Proceedings of the Eight International Congress of Medieval
Philosophy (Siepm), Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987, edited by Asztalos,
Monika, Murdoch, John Emery and Niiniluoto, Ilkka, 393-403.
Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica.
Vol. II.
"For the nominalist, the claim that the mind can cognize universally, or
that its thoughts can range over non-individual objects such as 'human
being', or 'whiteness', requires further explanation. What is it that
happens, psychologically speaking, when I cognize universally? Given
the standard assumption of nominalist ontologies that the world
contains no non-individual entities, what status do the objects of
universal thought have, and how do they come to be entertained?
There are two distinct questions here: one semantic, asking how a
878
mental act can mean something universal, and the other psychological,
asking about the genesis of universal thoughts. Aristotle's answer to the
second can be found in De memoria, where he says, "... someone who
is thinking, even if he is not thinking of something with a size, places
something with a size before his eyes, and thinks of it not as having a
size;" (1) thus, the intellect thinks of what is common or universal, such
as triangularity, by an effort of abstraction from what is determinate or
particular - triangles having physical dimensions. (2) His answer to the
first can be reconstructed from his famous remark in De anima that "in
the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is
thought are identical." (3)3 The identity in question is formal - thinking
is, like perceiving, defined as the sort of change in which form is
received without matter - and so what makes my thought of
triangularity a thought of that universal is my intellect becoming
triangularity formally. But does this mean that there is something
universal in my mind whenever I think universally?" (p. 393)
"In conclusion, I think Buridan is for most part successful in
reconciling his nominalistic world-view with the problem of how we
think universally. The task for the nominalist is to explain our evident
ability to cognize universally without postulating universals, either as
products of abstraction or thought-objects. Buridan endeavours to steer
clear of both these obstacles by on the one hand stipulating that the
species by which we entertain a universal is itself singular, and on the
other by treating the universality of thought as a function of the way in
which concepts refer not to abstract concepts or entities, but to
individuals in the world. And although his account of concept-
generation explains intellectual abstraction in such a way that its
product still looks like a good candidate for a universal, we can tell a
more suitable story without much difficulty. At least in this respcet,
Buridan's psychology does not compromise his ontology." (p. 403).
(1) Arist. De mem. 1.450a4-6; tr. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory
(Providence: Brown U.P., 1972), 48-49.
(2) Arist., De an. I.1.403b15; cf. III.4.429b18; III.7,431b12,
III.8.432a5.
(3) Arist., De an. III.4.430a3-5.
———. 1993. "Buridan and Skepticism." Journal of the History of
879
———. 2003. John Buridan. Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts
Master. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
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History of Logic FROM 1400 TO 1850
History of Renaissance and Modern Logic
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Modern Logic
Leibniz on Logic and Semiotics: the Project of a Universal Language
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Logic from 1400 to 1850
INTRODUCTION: LOGIC IN CONTINENTAL
EUROPE
"At the end of the fourteenth century there were roughly three categories of
work available to those studying logic. The first category is that of
commentaries on Aristotle's 'Organon'. The most comprehensive of these
focussed either on the books of the Logica Vetus, which included Porphyry's
Isagoge along with the Categories and De Interpretatione; or on the books of
the Logica Nova, the remaining works of the 'Organon' which had become
known to the West only during the twelfth century. In addition there were, of
course, numerous commentaries on individual books of the 'Organon'. The
second category is that of works on non-Aristotelian topics. These include the
so-called Parva logicalia, or treatises on supposition, relative terms,
ampliation, appellation, restriction and distribution. To these could be added
tracts on exponibles and on syncategorematic terms. Peter of Spain is now the
best-known author of parva logicalia, but such authors as Thomas Maulvelt
and Marsilius of Inghen were almost as influential in the late fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. Another group of works belonging to the second category
consists of the so-called 'tracts of the moderns', namely treatises on
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consequences, obligations and insolubles. A third group includes treatises on
sophisms, on the composite and divided senses, and on proofs of terms,
especially the well-known Speculum puerorum by Richard Billingham. The
third and last category is that of comprehensive textbooks. The most famous
example is the Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain, which gives a complete
outline of Aristotelian logic, including categories, syllogisms, topics and
fallacies; but others must be mentioned. John Buridan's Summulae, which
was printed several times with a commentary by John Dorp, was a reworking
of Peter of Spain, but integrated the topic of supposition by placing it in Book
IV. It also added a new tract on definition, division and demonstration. Paul
of Venice's Logica parva, which was to be very popular in Italy, presented
the material of the summulae (except for topics and fallacies) in tract one, and
then added a series of tracts dealing with the parva logicalia and with
consequences, obligations and insolubles. All three categories of works had a
role in the curriculum of the late medieval university, though the authors and
tracts chosen varied from place to place. It is a mistake to think that Peter of
Spain provided the only supplement to Aristotle, for in some places he was
not read at all, and in other places only a part of his work was read.
Moreover, when studied he was studied through the medium of later
commentators.
The medieval traditions of logical writing survived well into the sixteenth
century particularly at Paris and at the Spanish universities, though with
considerable internal changes. Treatises on sophisms and on proofs of terms
ceased to be written; whereas there was a sudden flurry of activity concerned
with the various divisions of terms and with the opposition of propositions,
i.e. the logical relations between different kinds of categorical proposition.
These internal changes were not, however, sufficient to keep the tradition
alive, and after about 1530 not only did new writing on the specifically
medieval contributions to logic cease, but the publication of medieval
logicians virtually ceased. The main exceptions were the logical
commentaries by (or attributed to) such authors as Thomas Aquinas and John
Duns Scotus, which found a place in their Opera Omnia, and which benefited
from a revived interest in the great medieval metaphysicians.
The main changes in the teaching and writing of logic during the sixteenth
century were due to the impact of humanism. First, commentaries on
Aristotle came to display a totally new style of writing. One reason for this
883
was the influence of new translations of Aristotle, and new attitudes to the
Greek text. Another reason was the publication of the Greek commentators
on Aristotle's logic, Alexander, Themistius, Ammonius, Philoponus and
Simplicius. A third reason was the new emphasis on Averroes, which
expressed itself in the great Aristotle-Averroes edition of 1550-1552. (30)
The effects of these new factors can be seen in the commentaries on
individual works of the 'Organon' by such Italians as Agostino Nifo (1473-
1546) and Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589), the latter of whom offered a
particularly influential account of scientific method. They can also be seen in
the 'Organon' edition of Giulio Pace (15501635), which was first published in
1584 and contained the Greek text side-by-side with a new translation which
was designed not only to read well but also to capture the philosophical
significance of Aristotle's words. The culmination of the new style of writing
on Aristotle is found in the Conimbricenses, the great series of commentaries
produced by the Jesuits of Coimbra, especially (for our purposes) the
Commentarii in universam dialecticam Aristotelis which appeared in 1606.
This has aptly been described as presenting a fusion of two late sixteenth
century approaches to Aristotle, the philosophical one of Zabarella and the
philological one of Pace. (31) In addition it contains a wealth of material
about different interpretations of Aristotle found in the Greek and Arab
commentators, the medieval writers such as Aquinas, and more recent
Thomists such as Cardinal Cajetan and Capreolus. One finds the occasional
reference to Ockham or Marsilius of Inghen, but the perception of who
constituted the important logical writers of the middle ages had clearly
changed radically since the beginning of the sixteenth century.
Humanism can also be held at least partially responsible for the virtual
disappearance of works on the specifically medieval contributions to logic,
including the parva logicalia, and for the replacement of medieval textbooks
by textbooks in a completely new style. The disgust that humanists expressed
at the barbarous language and twisted Latin of the scholastics was in itself a
minor factor. More important were the philosophical ideals that lay behind
the work of Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457) and his follower Rudolph Agricola
(1444-1485). As Lisa Jardine has argued, both Valla and, to a lesser extent,
Agricola were concerned to offer a logic which was linked with Cicero's
Academic skepticism rather than with Aristotelian certainties.(32) They
wished to present argumentative strategies for rendering plausible each of the
884
two sides of an undecidable question, or for supporting one of them as,
perhaps only marginally, more plausible than the other. They were thus
drawn to consider a variety of non-deductive strategies in lieu of the formal
techniques which had dominated a large part of medieval logic, especially in
the treatises on consequences, and in lieu of Aristotle's own syllogistic. Their
attention was focussed on the Topics which, especially as presented by
Cicero and Quintilian, seemed to offer a method of classifying these
strategies by their key terms rather than by their form. At the same time,
much of Agricola's concern was with the art of discourse as such, that is, with
the problem of presenting and organizing complete arguments and narrations,
whether written or spoken. Logic, or as he preferred to call it, dialectic, was
to be applied to all types of discourse, and hence to all areas of teaching. As a
result of this interest both in persuasive techniques and in discourse as such,
logic came to embrace much of what had traditionally been regarded as
belonging to rhetoric; and rhetoric came to be seen as concerned not with the
invention of topics but with the ornamentation of discourse.
These doctrines as presented in Agricola's De inventione dialectica libri tres,
first published in 1515, turned out to be seductive. One of those who was
considerably influenced by Agricola was Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560)
whose logic text, first published in 1520 as Compendiaria dialectices ratio,
but replaced by two later versions, became very popular. In it we see how the
insights of Valla and Agricola were transmuted to serve the textbook
tradition. Melanchthon enjoyed the Agricolan emphasis on clarity of style
and the use of literary allusions; he accepted the importance of the Topics and
that part of logic called invention; and some remarks on order in the first
version of his text grew into a full section on logical method as a way of
ordering discourse.(33) At the same time, Melanchthon was a convinced
Aristotelian. The formal techniques he used were those of syllogistic, and his
work included a discussion of the other standard Aristotelian subjects
including the categories and the square of opposition for propositions.
Indeed, the last version of his logic, the Erotemata dialectices of 1547, seems
considerably less Agricolan in tune than the earlier versions, though it retains
references to Cicero and Quintilian. (34)
Another writer who was influenced by Agricola is Petrus Ramus or Pierre de
la Ramée (1515-1572), the most notorious logician of the sixteenth century.
He is known both for his attacks on Aristotle and for the simplified logic
885
presented in his Dialectique of 1555 (published in Latin in 1556 as
Dialecticae libri duo), a work which enjoyed a remarkable publishing
history. Ong lists 262 editions, 151 of which appeared in Germany. (35) The
Dialectique had two parts. The first, on invention, covered the Topics; and
the second, on judgment, presented a deliberately simplified version of the
syllogism followed by an account of method as a means of ordering in the
arts and sciences. No reference was made to such standard material as the
categories, the square of opposition, conversion, demonstration and fallacies.
On the other hand, the work is rich with quotations from the poetry and prose
of classical authors, which must have strengthened the impression among
students that logic was both easy and fun. It is small wonder that (in Jardine's
words), Ramus 'cornered the textbook market' despite the absence of genuine
logical innovation.(36)
Whatever its attractions, the deficiencies of Ramus's book as a teaching tool
became rapidly apparent to those seriously interested in logic at the university
level. As a result, a new school of textbook writers known as the Philippo-
Ramists appeared in Germany in the 1590s. These authors had the aim of
combining what was best in Ramus with what was best in the more
Aristotelian work of Philip Melanchthon. Thus they tended to restore all
those parts of Aristotelian logic which Ramus had deliberately omitted. An
important writer who can be seen as allied to the Philippo-Ramist school,
though he is more frequently described as a Systematic, is Bartholomew
Keckermann (c. 1572-1609). Keckermann was primarily concerned to defend
Aristotle and such Aristotelians as Zabarella, but he paid careful attention to
Ramist doctrines. He was particularly noteworthy for his theoretical
discussion of the notion of a system, and the criteria for determining whether
a body of doctrine, such as logic or ethics, could properly be called a system.
(37) J. H. Alsted (1588-1638) was also an important Systematic, who
displayed a good deal of sympathy toward Ramism.(38)
Another important group of textbooks from the latter half of the sixteenth
century owed a smaller debt to the humanist logic of Rudolph Agricola and
Petrus Ramus, and is noteworthy for an attempt to integrate certain parts of
the specifically medieval contribution to logic into a generally Aristotelian
framework. I shall mention three such texts. The earliest, and most medieval
in tone, is the Compendium logicae by Chrysostomo Javelli (d. c. 1538)
which was first published posthumously in 1551. Javelli retained discussion
886
of such topics as the proofs of terms, and he also retained a number of
sophisms and puzzle- cases from the medieval literature. He can therefore be
described as a transitional author, representing an intermediate stage between
the old medieval textbooks and the Counter- Reformation texts of the Jesuits
Francisco de Toledo (1533-1596) and Pedro de Fonseca (1528-1599).
Toledo's Introductio in dialecticam was first published in 1561 in Rome; and
Fonseca's Institutionum dialecticarum was first published in 1564 in Lisbon.
The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum of 1586 had recommended the Summula of
Fonseca for its breadth, clarity, relevance to Aristotle and lack of sophistry;
(39) and in the Ratio Studiorum of 1599, Toledo was recommended in
addition to Fonseca.(40) The two books share important features. Their main
objective is to present standard Aristotelian logic. This material is
supplemented with an account of certain medieval doctrines, specifically
supposition theory, exponible propositions, and consequences, but the
presentation of these doctrines is new. There is a complete absence of the
sophisms which had formed a prominent feature of late medieval texts. There
is also little discussion of problems caused for such operations as conversion
by the presence of different linguistic structures. The highly technical
language which struck the humanist as barbaric has gone and, in Fonseca at
least, there is a conscious attempt to use classical terminology. All three texts
were widely disseminated in Europe and, interestingly enough, all seem to
have disappeared at much the same time. The last editions that I know of are
as follows: Toledo: Milan, 1621; Fonseca: Lyon, 1625; Javelli: Cologne,
1629."
(30) See C. B. Schmitt, "Renaissance Averroism studied through the
Venetian Editions of Aristotle-Averroes", Atti dei Convegni Lincei 40
(1979), pp. 131-140.
(31) C. B. Schmitt, "Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance
Aristotelianism", History of Science 11 (1973), p. 170.
(32) Lisa Jardine, "Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist
Dialectic", Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (1977), 143-164. For
further discussion and references see the chapter by Jardine in The
Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (forthcoming) [Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1988, Humanistic logic pp. 173-198]
(33) See Philip Melanchthon, Compendiaria Dialectices Ratio in Opera
887
(Corpus Reformatorum XX, Brunsvigae 1854: reprinted New York and
Frankfurt am Main 1963) columns 724-726; and Erotemata Dialectices in
Opera (Corpus Reformatorum XIII, Halis Saxonum, 1846: reprinted New
York and Frankfurt am Main 1963) columns 573-578.
(34) Wilhelm Risse , Die Logik der Neuzeit. 1 Band. 1500-1640 (Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1964), p. 89, wrote of the Erotemata
Dialectices: "Melanchthon proklamiert hier eine reine, unverdebt
aristotelische Logik.... Cicero and Agricola sind nicht mehr als Autoritaten
genannt." Risse's judgment is perhaps too strong.
(35) W. J. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1958). For a full discussion of Ramus, see W.J. Ong,
Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1958).
(36) Jardine, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy.
(37) For some discussion of Keckermann, see Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit,
pp. 440-450; and N.W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 214-220.
(38) For discussion, see Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, pp. 477-485.
(39) Karl Kehrbach, Monumenta Germaniae Paedagogica Band V. (Berlin,
1887) p. 131.
(40) Kehrbach, ibid., p. 332.
From: Earline Jennifer Ashworth, Editor's Introduction to: Robert Sanderson,
Logicae Artis Compendium [1618], Bologna: Clueb 1985, pp. XVI-XXII.
THE TEACHING OF LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY

CURRICULUM
“The period 1500 - 1650 is a distinctive one in the history of logic. It begins
when the great works of fourteenth-century logic, embedded in university
curricula all over Europe (1), are replaced by new and different texts; it ends
when the 'new philosophies', first of Descartes and later of Locke, infiltrate
the study of logic and lead logicians to embrace an '[e]xplicit consideration of
the cognitive faculties and their operations' (2) at the expense of more formal
concerns. Eyed within the 150 year period thus demarcated, there is an
888
enormous variety of change and development to be taken into consideration.
At the expense of over-generalization, four different streams can be isolated.
First, there is the continuity of the medieval tradition, particularly
exemplified by the publications of those working at Paris in the first three
decades of the sixteenth century (3). Second, there is the new rhetorical
humanism of such men as Rudolph Agricola, whose influential De inventione
dialectica libri tres was first published posthumously in 1515 (4). Third,
there is the Aristotelian humanism of those who, especially in Italy, were
involved with the publication of the Greek Aristotle (5), with the publication
and translation of the Greek commentators on Aristotle (6), and with the
production of new commentaries on Aristotle (7). Finally, there is the
investigation of demonstration and scientific method, culminating in the
logical work of Jacopo Zabarella, the well-known Paduan Aristotelian (8).
So far as textbook production was concerned, all these four streams were to
intermingle. Writings purely in the medieval tradition ceased abruptly after
1530, at least outside Spain; but some parts of the medieval contribution to
logic continued to be included in at least some textbooks. The new interests
of rhetorical humanism, the emphasis on the topics, on strategies for plausible
argumentation, on methods of organizing discourse, on the use of literary
examples, had a great impact on the classroom. However, teachers soon
found that the works of Agricola himself or of the later Pierre de la Ramée
contained insufficient formal material, and their writings were soon
supplemented by Aristotelian syllogistic. Thus in Germany from 1520 on,
Philip Melanchthon produced a series of textbooks combining humanist
insights with Aristotelian logics; and in the 1590s, Germany gave rise to
Philippo-Ramism, a school of textbook writers whose aim was to combine
what was best in Pierre de la Ramée with what was best in the works of
Philip Melanchthon (10). The study of the Greek Aristotle and the Greek
commentators had a strong impact on the textbook writers of the second half
of the sixteenth century; and, after Zabarella, sections on scientific method
were also to find their way into logic textbooks." pp. 75-76
I shall begin my investigation by considering the types of logic text that
would have been used at a fifteenth-century university. There are three
groups. First, there is the 'Organon' of Aristotle, together with the
commentaries so exhaustively enumerated by Charles Lohr (21). I shall
889
not be concerned with this type of literature, except to note that it
underwent considerable changes during the sixteenth century owing to
the influence of humanism and to the recovery of the Greek
commentators. Second, there is the textbook proper, such as the
Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain, itself typically presented with a
commentary by some later author. Third, there is the group of
independent texts, each devoted to some aspect of the specifically
medieval contribution to logic. If one is to understand later
developments, this group must be investigated in some detail, and I shall
start by analyzing its subdivisions (22).
The core of the first subdivision is provided by the so-called parva logicalia,
or treatises dealing with the properties of terms, including their reference in
various contexts. Here we find tracts on supposition, on relative terms, on
ampliation, appellation, restriction and distribution. These core treatises were
supplemented in three ways. Logicians wrote about syncategorematic terms,
those logical particles such as 'all', 'some', and 'not', which determine the
logical structure of a proposition; they wrote about exponible terms, those
logical particles such as 'except' and 'only' whose presence requires the
analysis of an apparently simple categorical proposition into several
conjoined propositions; and they wrote about the proof of terms, or the way
in which the truth-conditions of propositions are affected by the presence of
exponible terms, of modal terms such as 'necessary' and 'possible' or of
epistemic terms such as 'knows' and 'believes'. Obviously there was a good
deal of overlap between writings on syncategorematic terms, on exponibles
and on the proof of terms, since one and the same logical particle could be
treated in all three types of treatise.
The second subdivision contains the 'three tracts of the moderns', the treatises
on consequences, obligations and insolubles. Treatises on consequences
covered all types of argumentation, beginning with a good deal of what is
now called propositional logic, and they often included the syllogism as a
special example of one kind of argumentation. They were also noteworthy for
lengthy discussions of the notion of consequence itself, and of the difference
between formally valid and materially valid inferences. Treatises on
obligations dealt with the rules to be followed in a certain kind of disputation
which was specifically designed to test the logical skills of undergraduates,
and which therefore deliberately confined itself to exploring the logical
890
consequences of accepting an often bizarre falsehood. Treatises on insolubles
dealt with semantic paradoxes, such as the standard liar: 'What I am now
saying to you is false', and they explored in some depth the semantic
presuppositions of language, including the truth-conditions for contradictory
and synonymous propositions.
The third subdivision is formed by the treatises on sophisms in which
problematic or puzzling statements were analyzed and tested against various
logical rules. Since these rules were drawn from the areas of investigation
already mentioned, including supposition theory and its ramifications, there
was considerable overlap between the contents of these treatises and those
belonging to the first and second subdivisions. Indeed, the latter treatises, as
well as the commentaries on Aristotle and on Peter of Spain, themselves
made heavy use of sophisms in order to test the rules they enunciated against
possible counter-examples. Thus we get a two-way movement. A treatise on
sophisms begins with the sophisms and proceeds to the rules; a treatise on,
for instance, consequences begins with the rules and proceeds to the
sophisms. Paul of Venice's Logica magna (written 1397 - 98) is a particularly
noteworthy example of the use of sophisms as a testing device (23)". pp. 78-
79
(1) For fuller details and references, see E. J. Ashworth, 'Traditional
Logic' in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, edited by
C. B. Schmitt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 150 -
151.
(2 J. G. Buickerood, The Natural History of the Understanding: Locke and
the Rise of Facultative Logic in the Eighteenth Century', History and
Philosophy of Logic 6 (1985), p. 161.
(3) Ashworth, 'Traditional Logic', pp. 151 - 152.
(4) For discussion, see L. Jardine, 'Humanist Logic' in The Cambridge
History of Renaissance Philosophy.
(5) The first printed edition of the Greek text of Aristotle was produced in
Venice by Aldus Manutius from 1495 to 1498.
(6) See C. B. Schmitt, 'Alberto Pio and the Aristotelian Studies of his Time',
Study VI in C. B. Schmitt, The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance
Universities (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), pp. 55 -
(7) For a complete listing of Renaissance Aristotle commentaries, see C. H.
891
Lohr, 'Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors A-B', Studies in
the Renaissance 21 (1974), pp. 228 - 289; 'Authors C', Renaissance
Quarterly, 28 (1975), pp. 689 - 741; 'Authors D-F', ibid., 29 (1976), pp. 714 -
745; 'Authors G-K', ibid., 30 (1977), pp. 681 - 741; 'Authors L-M; ibid., 31
(1978), pp. 532 - 603; 'Authors N-Ph', ibid., 32 (1979), pp. 529 - 580;
'Authors Pi-Sm', ibid., 33 (1980), pp. 623 - 734; 'Authors So-Z', ibid., 35
(1982), pp. 164 -256.
(8) See N. W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1960).
(9) See E. J. Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period
(Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel, 1974), pp. 13 - 14. His logic text was first
published in 1520 as Compendiaria dialectices ratio, though in the place cited
I mention only the first of the later versions, the Dialectices libri IX of 1527.
(10) Ashworth, Language and Logic, pp. 16 – 17.
(21) For a listing of medieval Aristotle commentaries, see C. H. Lohr,
'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors A-F', Traditio 23 (1967),
pp. 313 - 413; 'Authors G-I', ibid., 24 (1968), pp. 149 - 245; 'Authors
Jacobus-Johannes Juff', ibid., 26 (1970), pp. 135 - 216; 'Authors Johannes de
Kanthi-Myngodus' ibid., 27 (1971), pp. 251 - 351; 'Authors Narcissus-
Richardus', ibid., 28 (1972), pp. 281 - 396; 'Authors Robertus-Wilgelmus',
ibid., 29 (1973), pp. 93 - 197; 'Supplementary Authors', ibid., 30 (1974), pp.
119 - 144.
(22) For more details and references, see Ashworth, 'Traditional Logic', pp.
146 - 149.
(23) See Paul of Venice, Logica magna (Venice, 1499). An edition and
translation of this work is being published under the auspices of the British
Academy. The first volume to appear was: Paul of Venice, Logica Magna.
Part II Fascicule 6, edited and translated by F. del Punta and M. M. Adams
(published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 1978).
For the date of the work, see F. Bottin, 'Logica e filosofia naturale nelle opere
di Paolo Veneto' in Scienza e filosofia all'Universita' di Padova nel
Quattrocento, edited by A. Poppi (Contributi alla Storia dell'Universita. di
Padova 15. Trieste: Lint, 1983), p. 88, pp. 91 - 92.
From: E. J. Ashworth, "Changes in Logic Textbooks from 1500 to 1650: The
New Aristotelianism", in: Aristotelismus und Renaissance. In Memoriam
892
Charles B. Schmitt. Edited by Kessler Eckhard, Lohr Charles, and Sparn
Walter. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz 1988, pp. 75-87.
Logicians of the Fifteenth Century

George of Trebizond (1395 - 1472/3)
Lorenzo Valla (1406 - 1457)
Rodolphus Agricola (1443 - 1485)
Logic in the Modern Age. First Part: 1500 - 1640

Jean Luis Vivés (1493 - 1540)
Domingo de Soto (1494 - 1560)
Philipp Melanchthon (1497 – 1560)
Petrus Ramus (1515 - 1572)
Pedro da Fonseca (1528 - 1599)
Franciscus Toletus (1532 - 1596)
Giacomo (Jacopo) Zabarella (1533 - 1589)
Bartholomäus Keckermann (1572 - 1609)
Joachim Jungius (1587 - 1657)
Robert Sanderson (1587 - 1663)
Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679)
Franco Burgersdijk (1590 - 1635)
893
The Conimbricenses (In universam dialectica Aristotelis, 1606)
Logic in the Modern Age. Second Part: 1640 - 1780
Athanasius Kircher (1601/2 - 1680)
Sebastián Izquierdo (1601 - 1681)
Juan Caramuel y Lobkowtiz (1606 - 1682)
Georges Dalgarno (1616 - 1687)
Antoine Arnauld (1612 - 1694)
John Wallis (1616 - 1703)
Johannes Clauberg (1622 - 1665)
Arnold Geulincx (1624 - 1669)
John Locke (1632 – 1704)
Nicolas Malebranche (1638 – 1715)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 - 1716)
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651 – 1708)
Christian Thomasius (1655 - 1728)
Johann Franz Budde (1667 - 1729)
Giovanni Girolamo Saccheri (1667 - 1733)
Andreas Rüdiger (1673 - 1731)
Johann Peter Reusch (1691 - 1758)
894
Johann Georg Walch (1693 – 1775)
Joahann Andreas Segner (1704 - 1777)
Leonhard Euler (1707 - 1783)
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714 - 1780)
Joachim Georg Darjes (1714 - 1791)
Gottfried Ploucquet (1716 - 1790)
Georg Friedrich Meier (1718 – 1777)
Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804)
Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728 - 1777)
Logicians of the First Half of the Nineteenth Century

Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832)
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831)
Joseph Diaz Gergonne (1771 - 1859)
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 - 1834)
Bernard Bolzano (1781 - 1848)
Richard Whateley (1787 - 1863)
William Hamilton (1788 - 1856)
William Whewell (1794 - 1866)
Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802 - 1872)
895
Augustus De Morgan (1806 - 1871)
John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873)
RELATED PAGES
Selected bibliography on the History of Modern Logic
E. J. Ashworth
L. M. de Rijk
Wilhelm Risse
896
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Selected Bibliography on the History of

Renaissance and Modern Logic
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For the contributions by E. Jennifer Ashworth and Wilhelm Risse see the
separated bibliographies linked at the bottom of the page.
"Sources Et Effets De La Logique De Port-Royal." 2000. Revue de
Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques no. 84:3-92.
"Logiques Et Philosophies À L'âge Classique." 2005. Corpus.Revue de
"Les Logiques De Descartes." 2005. Études Philosophiques no. 75:433-
558.
Anellis, Irving, and Houser, Nathan. 1991. "Nineteenth Century Roots
of Algebraic Logic and Universal Algebra." In Algebraic Logic, edited
by Andréka, H., Monk, J.D. and Németi, I., 1-36. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Angelelli, Ignacio. 1970. "The Techniques of Disputation in the History
of Logic." Journal of Philosophy no. 67:800-815.
"The aim of this paper is to outline tentatively some aspects of the
techniques of disputation in their history, on the basis of some texts.
Modern logic ("mathematical" logic) was conceived more geometrico
by Frege, who intended to improve upon Euclid essentially by adding
897
an explicit list of rules of inference (Grundgesetze I, p. VI). Thus, the
notion of dialectica in the sense of "speech between two," so important
in the past, could hardly be found relevant by modern historians of
logic, who were guided by the new model. These, in fact, have so far
neglected to investigate this portion of the logical heritage.(1) Only
recently there has been an increasing interest in the Topica, not
extended, however, to the medieval and post-medieval developments.
Good old Prantl seems to be still the best source in this respect.
Historical works of a more general nature are of very little help even
when they abundantly refer to disputation, because the formal aspects
are usually overlooked. For example, a direct examination of the
sources mentioned by Thurot would be very rewarding, but what
Thurot himself says on disputation is simply useless from a technical
point of view.(2)
The dialogical logic developed in the last ten years by Paul Lorenzen
and his school provides the needed "modern" motivation to go back to
the ars disputandi.(3) Sources for antiquity and for medieval
obligationes (a form of disputation) are known. Before 1800
disputation was considered by a very large number of books on logic;
after 1800 at least by most neoscholastic treatises. Fortunately, in
recent years bibliographical research in the history of logic has
increased so much (4) that now we also know of a small, yet interesting
list of postmedieval (second-scholastic) works especially devoted to the
theory of disputation."
(1) There are hardly any references in the most distinguished works on
the history of logic. In E. Moody's The Logic of William of Ockham
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1935), the topic of obligations is considered
"not very relevant to logic" 294.
(2) Charles Thurot, De l'Organisation de l'enseignement dans
l'Universiteé de Paris au Moyen Age (Paris: E. Magdeleine, 1850); pp.
87-90 for the disputes.
(3) Paul Lorenzen, Normative Logic and Ethics (Mannheim:
Bibliographisches Institut, 1967); Kuno Lorenz. "Dialogspiele als
Semantische Grundlage von Logik-kalkulen," Archiv fur
mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung (1966).
(4) Above all W. Risse, Bibliographia logica (Hildesheim: 0lms, 1965).
Additions in W. Redmond, Bibliography of Philosophy in the Spanish-
898
Portuguese Colonies (The Hague: Nijhoff, forthcoming) [publlished in
1972 wit the title: Bibliography of the philosophy in the Iberian
colonies of America]; L. Hickman, Late Scholastic Logic: Another
Look; to appear in Journal of the History of Philosophy [1971, 9 pp.
226-234].
———. 1998. "Aristotelian-Scholastic Ontology and Predication in the
Port-Royal Logic." Medioevo: Rivista di Storia della Filosofia
Medievale no. 24:283-310.
———. 2004. "Predication Theory: Classical Vs Modern." In Relations
and Predicates, edited by Hochberg, Herbert and Mulligan, Kevin, 55-
80. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
"This essay aims, first, at describing the conflict between the theory of
predication (classical, Aristotelian) prevailing in philosophy until the
end of the 19th century, and the theory arisen with the new logic
(modern, Fregean). Three features characterize the pre- Fregean period:
1) conflation of predication and subordination (extensionally:
membership and class-inclusion), 2) conflation of identity and
predication, 3) the view of quantificational phrases (e.g. "some men")
as denoting phrases. A possible fourth feature is suggested by the
consideration of the so-called Locke's "general triangle". Most of the
paper is devoted to the first feature, also called the "principal" one,
stated by Aristotle. Frege seems to be the first, in 1884, to reject the
first feature; he E ISO rejected, not less vehemently, the second and the
third features. Fregean predication theory became standard, and just
taken for granted in the subsequent developments of logic as well as in
the mainstream of philosophy. The second aim of this paper is to
evaluate- relative to the notion of predication submitted in section I -
the conflict between the two traditions, and to determine if both are
somehow right, or one is right and the other wrong. The main result is
that the Fregean revolution in predication theory is, at least with regard
to the first and second features of the classical view, a clarification that
would probably be welcomed by the classical authors themselves (pace
Hintikka's "logic of being")."
Ariew, Roger. 2006. "Descartes, the First Cartesians, and Logic."
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy no. 3:241-260.
Also published in French as: "Descartes, les premiers Cartésiens et la
logique" Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (2005): 55-71.
899
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1974. Language and Logic in the Post-
Medieval Period, Synthèse Historical Library Vol. 12. Dordrecht:
Reidel Publishing Company.
This book is the first attempt to provide a general introduction to the
type of logical inquiry pursued in Europe after 1429 by means of a
systematic presentation of the doctrines which were actually written
about and taught. It radically alters traditional views of the period by
demonstrating that not only were medieval doctrines still of overriding
importance at the beginning of the sixteenth century, but that they
continued to be discussed in many European universities at least until
the mid-seventeenth century.
TABLE OF CONTENTS; PREFACE IX; NOTE ABOUT
ABBREVIATIONS XIII; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XV; CHAPTER
I - HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 1; l. The Publication of Medieval
Works 2; 2. Scholasticism in Italy and Germany 4; 3. Scholasticism in
France and Spain 5; 4.Humanism 8; 5. Rudolph Agricola and His
Influence 10; 6. Petrus Ramus and His Influence 15; 7. Seventeenth
Century Logic: Eclecticism 17; 8. Humanism and Late Scholasticism in
Spain 19; 9. Other Schools of Logic 20; 10. A Note on Terminology
22; CHAPTER II / MEANING AND REFERENCE 26; I. The Nature
of Logic 26; 1. The Contents of Logical Text-books 26; 2. The
Definition of Logic 29; 3. The Object of Logic 32; II. Problems of
Language 37; 1. Terms: Their Definition and Their Main Divisions 38;
2. The Relationship between Mental, Spoken and Written Terms 42; 3.
Other Divisions of Terms 45; 4. Sense and Reference 47; 5.
Propositions and their Parts 49; 6. Sentence-Types and Sentence-
Tokens 52; 7. Complex Signifiables and Truth 55; 8. Other Approaches
to Truth 62; 9. Possibility and Necessity 66; III. SUPPOSITION
THEORY 77; 1. Supposition, Acceptance and Verification 78; 2.
Proper, Improper, Relative and Absolute Supposition 82; 3. Material
Supposition 83; 4. Simple Supposition 84; 5. Natural Personal
Supposition 88; 6. Ampliation 89; 7. Appellation 92; IV. SEMANTIC
PARADOXES 101; 1. Problems Arising from Self-Reference 101; 2.
Solution One: Self-Reference Is Illegitimate 104; 3. Solution Two: All
Propositions Imply Their Own Truth 106; 4. Solution Three: Insolubles
Assert Their Own Falsity 108; 5. Solution Four: Two Kinds of
Meaning 110; 6. Solution Five: Two Truth-Conditions 112; 7. Later
900
Writing on Insolubles 114; CHAPTER III / FORMAL LOGIC. PART
ONE: UNANALYZED PROPOSITIONS 118; I. THE THEORY OF
CONSEQUENCE 120; 1. The Definition of Consequence 120; 2. The
Definition of Valid Consequence 121; 3.Formal and Material
Consequence 128; 4. 'Ut Nunc' Consequence 130; 5. The Paradoxes of
Strict Implication 133; 6. Rules of Valid Consequence 136; II.
PROPOSITIONAL CONNECTIVES 147; 1. Compound Propositions
in General 147; 2. Conditional Propositions 149; 3A. Rules for Illative
Conditionals 154; 3B. Rules for Promissory Conditionals 156; 4.
Biconditionals 156; 5. Conjunctions 157; 6. Disjunctions 161; 7. De
Morgan's Laws 166; 8. Other Propositional Connectives 177; III. AN
ANALYSIS OF THE RULES FOUND IN SOME INDIVIDUAL
AUTHORS 171; 1. Paris in the Early Sixteenth Century 171; 2. Oxford
in the Early Sixteenth Century 181; 3. Germany in the Early Sixteenth
Century 183; 4. Spain in the Third Decade of the Sixteenth Century
184; 5. Spain in the Second Part of the Sixteenth Century 184; 6.
Germany in the Early Seventeenth Century 185; CHAPTER IV /
FORMAL LOGIC. PART TWO: THE LOGIC OF ANALYZED
PROPOSITIONS 187; I. The Relationships Between Propositions 189;
1. The Quality and Quantity of Propositions 189; 2. Opposition 192; 3.
Equipollence 194; 4. Simple and Accidental Conversion 195; 5.
Conversion by Contraposition 199; II. Supposition Theory and
Quantification 207; 1. The Divisions of Personal Supposition 207; 2.
Descent and Ascent 213; III. Categorical Syllogisms 223; 1. Figures
and Modes 224; 2. How to Test the Validity of a Syllogism 230; 3.
Proof by Reduction 239; 4. Syllogisms with Singular Terms 247;
APPENDIX / LATIN TEXTS 253; BIBLIOGRAPHY 282; 1. Primary
Sources 282; 2. Secondary Sources on the History of Logic 1400-1650
291; INDEX OF NAMES 297.
———. 1985. Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics. London: Variorum
Reprints.
Reprint of 12 essays already published.
CONTENTS: Preface;
REFERENCE IN INTENSIONAL CONTEXTS; I 'For Riding is
Required a Horse": A Problem of Meaning and Reference in Late
fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic - Vivarium XII. 1974; II I
Promise you a Horse": A Second Problem of Meaning and Reference in
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Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic (Parts 1 & 2) -
Vivarium XIV. 1976; III Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in
the Post-Medieval Theory of Signification - Vivarium XV. 1977;
PROPOSITIONS AND MENTAL LANGUAGE
IV Theories of the Proposition: Some Early sixteenth Century
Discussions - Franciscan Studies 38. 1978 (1981); V The Structure of
Mental Language: Some Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth
Century Logicians - Vivarium XX. 1982; VI Mental Language and the
Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by Early
Sixteenth Century Logicians - Franciscan Studies 41. 1981 (1984);
SCHOLASTIC INFLUENCES ON JOHN LOCKE
VII "Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?" The Scholastic Sources of
Locke's Theory of Language - Journal of the History of Philosophy
XIX. 1981; VIII Locke on Language - Canadian Journal of Philosophy
XIV/1. 1984;
LOGICAL ANALYSIS
IX The Doctrine of Exponibilia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries
- Vivarium XI. 1973; X Multiple Quantification and the Use of Special
Quantifiers in Early Sixteenth Century Logic - Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic XIX. 1978;
SEMANTIC PARADOXES
XI Thomas Bricot (d. 1516) and the Liar Paradox - Journal of the
History of Philosophy XV. 1977; XII Will Socrates Cross the Bridge?
A Problem in Medieval Logic - Franciscan Studies 46. 1976 (1977);
Addenda et Corrigenda; Index
———. 1988. "Traditional Logic." In The Cambridge History of
Renaissance Philosophy, edited by Schmitt, Charles B. and Skinner,
Quentin, 143-172. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"I outline the developments and changes in logic and logic teaching
between 1350 and 1600, paying attention to the survival of medieval
doctrines and to the renewed Aristotelianism of the sixteenth century. I
also discuss the philosophy of language in the same period, paying
attention to speculative grammar, to the doctrines of signs and
signification, and to the clash between medieval doctrines of
conventional signification and the new renaissance interest in the idea
of a naturally significant spoken language."
———. 2008. "Developments in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth
902
Centuries." In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay,
"To understand the significance of these developments for the logician,
we have to consider three questions. First, how much of the medieval
logic described in the previous chapters survived? Second, insofar as
medieval logic survived, were there any interesting new development
in tit? Third, does humanist logic offer an interesting alternative to
medieval logic?
In Part One of this chapter I shall consider the first two questions in the
context of a historical overview in which I trace developments in logic
from the later middle ages thorough to 1606, the year in which the
Jesuits of Coimbra published their great commentary on Aristotle's
logical works, the Commentarii Conimbricenses in Dialecticam
Aristotelis. I shall begin by considering the Aristotelian logical corpus,
the six books of the Organon, and the production of commentaries on
this work. I shall the examine the fate of the specifically medieval
contributions to logic. Finally, I shall discuss the textbook tradition, and
the ways in which textbooks changes and developed during the
sixteenth century. I shall argue that the medieval tradition in logic co-
existed for some time with the new humanism, that sixteenth century is
dominated by Aristotelianism, and that what emerged at the end of the
sixteenth century was not so much a humanist logic as a simplified
Aristotelian logic.
In Part Two of this chapter, I shall ask whether the claims made about
humanist logic and its novel contributions to probabilistic and informal
logic have nay foundation. I shall argue that insofar as there is any
principled discussion of such matters, it is to be found among writers in
the Aristotelian tradition." p. 610
Auroux, Sylvain. 1993. La Logique Des Idées. Paris: Vrin.
Barnes, Jonathan. 2001. "Locke and the Syllogism." In Whose
Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 105-
132. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Barone, Francesco. 1957. Logica Formale E Trascendentale. Torino:
Edizioni di Filosofia.
Vol. I: Da Leibniz a Kant (1957); Vol. II: L'algebra della logica
(1965).
903
Nuova edizione con una nuova introduzione dell'autore ed un
aggiornamento bibliografico a cura di Enrico Moriconi e Arianna
Corotti, Milano, Unicopli, 1999 (vol. I) e 2000 (vol II).
Bellissima, Fabio, and Pagli, Paolo. 1996. Consequentia Mirabilis. Una
Regola Logica Tra Matematica E Filosofia. Firenze: Olschki.
Beth, Evert Willem. 1947. "Hundred Years of Symbolic Logic. A
Retrospect on the Occasion of the Boole-De Morgan Centenary."
Dialectica:331-346.
Broadie, Alexander. 1985. The Circle of John Mair. Logic and
Llogicians in Pre-Reformation Scotland. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Contents: Spelling of Names VI; 1. The circle of John Mair 1; 2.
Definitions of 'Term' 7; 3. Properties of Terms 25; 4. Divisions of
Terms 89: 5. Categorical and Hypothetical Propositions 120; 6.
Exponible propositions 172; 7. Consequences 206; 8. Conclusion 264;
Bibliography I: Logic Works of John Mair and his Scottish Associates
267; Bibliography II: Modern Writings 270; Index 274-290.
"The first Scot to have a book of his printed while he was yet alive was
James Liddell (Jacobus Ledelh) from Aberdeen. The book came out in
1495, and was sufficiently well received to go through several further
editions during the author's lifetime. In view of the chief historical
thesis I am concerned to defend here, Liddell's book is a fitting place at
which to start the defence, for Liddell, though in his latter days a
physician of note, was first and foremost a philosopher and logician,
and the book itself was a work of epistemology entitled Treatise on
Concepts and Signs. Liddell matriculated at the University of Paris, a
very common choice of university for young Scots of that period. He
took his master's degree there in 1483 and in the following year began
teaching in Paris. Two years later he was appointed examiner of
Scottish students working for their bachelor's degree.
In 1491 or 1492 that substantial contingent of Scottish students at Paris
was joined by John Mair from the village of Gleghornie near
Haddington in East Lothian. Mair rose quickly up the academic ladder.
He took his master's degree in 1494 and the following year became a
lecturer in arts, while also beginning his studies in theology in the
College of Montaigu. He published his first book in 1499, a work on
exponible propositions, and by 1506, when he received his doctorate of
theology and began teaching theology at the College of Sorbonne, he
904
had already published numerous volumes on logic. In 1517 Mair
returned to Scotland to take up the post of principal of the University of
Glasgow, though while there he also taught in the Faculties of Arts and
Theology. His very full timetable at Glasgow did not however prevent
him returning to Paris in 1521 to see through the presses his enormous
History of Greater Britain, a book motivated at least in part by a desire
to further the cause of the union of England and Scotland in a single
country, a 'Greater Britain'. In 1523 Mair transferred to the University
of St Andrews where he continued his teaching in arts and theological
subjects though also actively involved in important administrative roles
in that university. Three years later he returned to Paris where he
remained teaching theology till 1531 when, for reasons which remain
obscure, he again took up a post at the University of St Andrews, and
this time he stayed in Scotland. In 1530 he published a critical edition,
with extensive commentary, of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. It
proved to be his last book, though he lived for a further twenty years,
dying an octogenarian in 1550.
Among the pupils of Mair at Paris were several Scots whose writings I
shall be examining in the succeeding chapters. They were David
Cranston, George Lokert, Robert Caubraith, and William Manderston.
David Cranston, a priest of the Glasgow Diocese, arrived in Paris in
1495, studied under Mair at the College of Montaigu, and himself
began to teach in that college in 1499. Within thirteen years, having
completed a number of books of his own and also edited works by Mair
and Martin le Maitre, Cranston had died. We shall be studying his
Terminorum in some detail." pp. 2-3
"Chapter 8. Conclusion.
The discussion of rules of valid syllogistic inference completes our
survey of the formal logic presented in the textbooks of John Mair and
his circle. The survey has not dealt with all the main areas of concern
represented in those textbooks. We have not, for example, discussed
insoluble propositions, that is, paradoxical propositions where typically
the paradoxicality is generated by a self-referential element in the
proposition. The Liar Paradox 'I now speak falsely' is the most famous,
though numerous other paradoxes were investigated. And the problem
of the analysis of future contingent propositions, an important subject
in which present-day philosophers are taking a lively interest, has not
905
been discussed in the foregoing pages, though both Lokert and
Manderston wrote treatises on the subject.
However a great deal of ground has been covered, enough to show that
the poor opinion many have of medieval logic is unjustified. There are
many philosophers and logicians who believe that medieval logic
constituted not so much an advance on the Aristotelian system from
which it emerged, as an inflation of that system by endless definitions
and divisions all made in a hopeless attempt to provide, from within the
resources of natural language, rules for making valid inferences from
propositions expressed in natural language to other propositions
likewise expressed.
But the reputation of medieval logic as Aristotle's logic become obese
is based on a travesty. And the negative purpose of this book has been
to show up that travesty. The first point that has to be made is that the
logic we have been examining marks an immense advance on
Aristotle's system with respect to the area of proprietates logicales, the
logical properties of terms. The single most distinctive contribution of
medieval logic was the doctrine of supposition, with the attendant
notions of descent to and ascent from singulars, and the consequent
ability to give a detailed account of the way quantifier expressions
signify. It was in virtue of the doctrine of supposition and its associated
rules of order of descent under terms with different sorts of supposition,
that the late-scholastic logicians were able to give a detailed exposition
of such fallacies as that of the quantifier shift. And it enabled them also
to give an account of the validity of inferences involving propositions
in which crucially one term stands in genitival relation to another.
The doctrines of ampliation, restriction, and alienation are also
characteristically medieval doctrines, not investigated by Aristotle, but
clearly of the greatest logical importance in view of the need to be able
to state, for example, the truth conditions of past- and future-tensed
propositions, an area which has been within the fold of modern formal
logic since the late Arthur Prior's seminal work on tense logic.
Certainly his employment of tense operators operating on (temporally
or timelessly) present-tense propositions accords with the scholastic
technique of expressing the tensed element of a non-present-tensed
proposition in a predicate whose argument place is to be filled by a
present-tense proposition.
906
The examination of exponible propositions is also a distinctively
medieval contribution to logic. It should not be forgotten that the
medieval logicians at all times stayed close to natural language and
sought to formulate rules of valid inference for propositions in natural
language. And given that propositions expressing, say, something's
being the only member of a given class, or being an exception to a rule,
or being different from something else, or coming to be or ceasing to
be, can imply other propositions, the late-scholastic logicians
considered there to be a real problem concerning the identification of
the associated rules of inference. And if it was not within the remit of
the logicians themselves to identify and formulate those rules then
whose job was it? The recent interest in this field shown by E. J.
Ashworth, Norman Kretzmann, and others, is not merely antiquarian; it
reflects a concern with concepts which are of current philosophical
interest.
In the field of syllogistic itself the late-scholastics made important
advances. Two areas that we considered in which advances were made
were, first, the validity conditions of syllogisms in which the middle
term does not constitute the whole extreme in each premiss, and
secondly the validity
conditions of syllogisms whose premisses and conclusion are non all
present-tensed. Once again it has to be noted that the medieval
logicians were concerned to formulate rules of inference applicable to
the kinds of argument that ordinary people using ordinary language
commonly formulate.
In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries there was a glorious
flowering of logic. It was the last major achievement of the terminist
tradition, and the circle of John Mair was especially prominent in that
final flourish. Why the fortunes of logic suddenly foundered is a matter
for speculation, but there is no good reason to suppose that the
explanation is that there was suddenly nothing interesting left to say in
that tradition. It would itself be even more in need of explanation why a
tradition, which until the third decade of the sixteenth century had been
finding so many interesting things in what had proved such a rich seam,
should suddenly strike clay. But it should be said that whatever the
reason for a dead hand falling on logic at the time of the Reformation,
and whether or not logic itself was a casualty of the Reformation, it
907
remains true that many matters dealt with in the terminist textbooks of
the late-scholastics have an immediate bearing on matters of current
concern to logicians working within the tradition created by Frege, the
man who prised off that dead hand. The logical writings of John Mair
and his circle bore little fruit, and gradually slipped away into nearly
total oblivion. Perhaps after five centuries those writings will at last
come into their own."
Buickerood, James. 1985. "The Natural History of the Understanding:
Locke and the Rise of Facultative Logic in the Eighteenth Century."
Buroker, Jill Vance. 1994. "Judgment and Redication in the Port-Royal
Logic." In The Great Arnauld and Some of His Philosophical
Correspondents, edited by Kremer, Emar J., 3-27. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press.
Ceñal, Ramón. 1972. "La Historia De La Lógica En España Y Portugal
De 1500 a 1800." Pensamiento no. 28:277-319.
Cifoletti, Giovanna. 2006. "From Valla to Viète: The Rhetorical
Reform of Logic and Its Use in Early Modern Algebra." Early Science
and Medicine no. 11:390-423.
"Lorenzo Valla's rhetorical reform of logic resulted in important
changes in sixteenth-century mathematical sciences, and not only in
mathematical education and in the use of mathematics in other
sciences, but also in mathematical theory itself. Logic came to be
identified with dialectic, syllogisms with enthymemes and necessary
truth with the limit case of probable truth. Two main ancient authorities
mediated between logical and mathematical concerns: Cicero and
Proclus. Cicero's 'common notions' were identified with Euclid's
axioms, so that mathematics could be viewed as core knowledge shared
by all human kind. Proclus' interpretation of Euclid's axioms gave rise
to the idea of a universal human natural light of reasoning and of a
mathesis universalis as a basic mathematics common to both arithmetic
and geometry and as an art of thinking interpretable as algebra. "
Cosenza, Paolo. 1987. Logica Formale E Antiformalismo (Da
Aristotele a Decartes). Napoli: Liguori Editori.
Coxito, Amândio A. 1981. Lógica, Semântica E Conhecimento Na
Escolastica Peninsular Pré-Renascentista. Coimbra: Biblioteca Geral
da Universidade.
908
Croizer, Jacques. 2001. Les Héritiers De Leibniz. Logique Et
Philosophie, De Leibniz À Russell. Paris: L'Harmattan.
Easton, Patricia A., ed. 1997. Logic and the Workings of the Mind: The
Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy.
Atascadero: Ridgeview.
Table of Contents: Lorne Falkenstein and Patricia Easton: Preface I-II;
I. Introduction. Frederick S. Michael: Why logic became epistemology:
Gassendi, Port Royal and the reformation in logic 1; Gary Hatfield: The
workings of the intellect: mind and psychology 21; IIa. The Logic of
Ideas in early modern philosophy. E. Jennifer Ashworth: Petrus
Fonseca on objective concepts and the Analogy of Being 47; Elmar J.
Kremer: Arnauld on the nature of ideas as a topic in logic: the Port-
Royal Logic and On True and False Ideas 65; Emily Michael: Francis
Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium and the Glasgow School of logic 83;
IIb. The Logic of relations in early modern philosophy. Jill Vance
Buroker: The priority of thought to language in Cartesian philosophy
97; Fred Wilson: Berkeley's metaphysics and Ramist logic 109; IIc.
The logic of inference in early modern philosophy. Charles
Echelbarger: Hume and the logicians 137; David Owen: Hume on
demonstration 153; Patricia Kitcher: Kant on logic and self-
consciousness 175; ll.d. Modal themes in early modern philosophy.
François Duchesneau: Leibniz and the model for contingent truths 191;
Phillip D. Cummins: Hume on possible objects and impossible ideas
211; Manfred Kuehn: The Wolffian background of Kant's
transcendental deduction 229; III. Faculty psychology in early modern
logic and methodology. Catherine Wilson: Between Medicina Mentis
and medical materialism 251; Eric Palmer: Descartes's Rules and the
workings of the mind 269; Louis E. Loeb: Causal inference,
associationism, and skepticism in Part III of Book I of Hume's Treatise
283; Robert E. Butts: Kant's Dialectic and the logic of illusion 307;
Anthony Larivierère and Thomas Teufel: Bibliography 319; Index 329;
List of Contributors 339-343.
"The papers collected in this volume address two closely related
themes: the faculty psychology and the logic of the early modern
period. The themes are related because, firstly, early modern logic-
especially the early modern "logic of ideas" was explicitly
psychologistic. It dealt with "concepts" rather than terms, "judgments"
909
rather than propositions, and "reasoning" rather than arguments, and it
saw all of these fundamental explanatory categories as grounded in
contents or operations of the mind. And secondly, the lines of influence
ran in the other direction as well. The higher cognitive faculties
identified by early modern (and, indeed, by medieval and ancient)
psychology were determined by logical and even grammatical
considerations. Each cognitive faculty was understood relative to the
notion that reasoning consists of arguments and that judgments assert
relations between concepts. The intellect was understood as the faculty
for abstracting universal concepts from the deliverances of sense;
judgment, as the faculty for compounding and dividing concepts or as
the faculty for inventing the middle term for a syllogism; and finally,
reasoning was understood as the faculty for drawing inferences from
previously made judgments. Faculty psychology cannot, therefore, be
completely understood independently of traditional logic, and early
modern logic certainly cannot be understood independently of faculty
psychology.
For most of this century both of these themes have been neglected by
philosophers and historians of logic, philosophy, and psychology. The
explanatory categories of traditional faculty psychology now seem
naive and ill-founded. And the notion that a normative discipline like
logic might be grounded on purely descriptive facts of our psychology,
or on the arbitrary and conventional features of the grammar of a
particular natural language, is rejected as an instance of the naturalistic
fallacy. The early modern period has accordingly been judged to be the
dark age of logic-a time when the advances of the Middle Ages were
forgotten and the entire discipline was turned down the wrong path.
But, as Fred Michael observes in one of the introductory essays to this
volume, although early modern logic made virtually no contribution to
the history of logic, it was a central part of early modern epistemology
and metaphysics. One does not have to look far into the standard early
modern logic textbook, with its four-part treatment of ideas or
concepts, judgments, reasoning, and method, to find themes of crucial
importance to early modern philosophy. It was obligatory that a
textbook of early modern logic discuss the notions of conceptual
clarity, distinctness and adequacy-notions that played a key role in the
epistemology of Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and Wolff, to name but a
910
few. And in early modern logic, a discussion of general terms could no
more be separated from the issues of abstraction and abstract ideas-
issues that were to become of central importance for later British
empiricism-than a medieval treatment of the same topic could be
separated from the issue of the nature of universals. Similarly, the early
modern logic of propositions, because it could not be separated from
the operation of judgment, dealt not just with the concept of relation,
but with the act of relating, and referred crucially to the basis of that act
in the (rationalist) analysis of concepts and the (empiricist) evidence of
experience. Again, syllogistic reasoning, based as it is on categorical
propositions (out of which the paradigmatic syllogistic forms are
constructed), carried with it an implicit ontology of substance and
property (the subject and the predicate of the categorical proposition)-
an ontology that continued to dominate early modern metaphysics and
epistemology long after substantial forms and real qualities had been
banished from early modern philosophy of nature. Furthermore, such
popular principles of early modern ontology as the notion that whatever
is conceivable is a possible object of experience, are obviously parasitic
on notions of logical and real possibility. And the analytic and synthetic
methods discussed in the fourth part of most early logic textbooks have
an obvious relation to the opposed Cartesian and Newtonian paradigms
for scientific research." pp. I-II.
Friedman, Russell L., and Nielsen, Luge O., eds. 2003. The Medieval
Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Frisch, Joseph C. 1969. Extension and Comprehension in Logic. New
York: Philosophical Library.
Contents: Foreword by John R. Gallup VII; Introduction XV-XVI; Part
I. Historical survey. Chapter I. Modern logicians (1662-1966) 1;
Chapter II. Medieval and ancient logicians (1658-530 B.C.) 78;
General summary of Chapter I and II 124; Part II: A doctrinal survey.
Chapter III. An essay in doctrine 129; 1. Non-logical meanings of
'extension' 129; 2. Non-logical meanings of 'comprehension' 135; 3.
Extension and comprehension with reference to the theory of
knowledge 142; 4. Extension and comprehension in logic 149; 5.
General summary of Chapter III 172; Epilogue 177; Appendix I.
Grammatical sources 179; Appendix II: Different terminology and
911
meanings 183; Bibliography 215; Footnotes 243-293.
"The purpose of this work is to analyze what has been frequently
described by logicians as the extension and comprehension of concepts.
Even if there is a justification for extension and comprehension in
logic, it may be questioned whether there are any concomitant dangers
since one historian of logic claims that this distinction has done more
harm than good. Can it be said that the importance of extension and
comprehension has been magnified out of proportion to the other parts
of logic? Would it be more advantageous to correlate extension and
comprehension with the predicables, or would it be better to try to
eliminate the distinction altogether?
It is the aim of this study to explore the distinction existing between
extension and comprehension, to ascertain whether such distinction is
justifiable, where it should be placed in a treatise on logic, and how it
should be presented. These are questions which should be answered if
one intends to have a thorough grasp of logic.
This treatise will be divided into two parts. The first part will be
subdivided into two chapters. Chapter I will examine the writings of
modern logicians starting from 1662. Chapter II will treat of the works
of classical and ancient authors in a reverse order of time starting from
1658. The second part will present an evaluation of extension and
comprehension as a doctrine of logic.
It might be stated briefly here that the conclusion of this treatise hopes
to present as probable the following declarations: (1) Extension and
comprehension are basically an Aristotelian distinction. (2) Extension
and comprehension are closely allied with the predicables. A logician
cannot have a proper understanding of the former without a thorough
understanding of the latter. (3) Any well-organized treatise on logic
should begin with a study of the predicables.
The method of the first part which will be employed in this research is
the empirical, or a posteriori, method. This particular mode is
characteristic of all historical research. On the other hand,
the deductive, or a priori, method is unsound because it would oblige
one to posit a principle according to which all subsequent facts ought to
correspond. There is a constant danger associated with such procedure,
namely, the tendency to misstate or distort historical facts for the sake
of preserving a methodic balance. However, inasmuch as the second
912
part involves an evaluation, both the a posteriori and a priori methods
will be utilized.
Perhaps it will seem strange to the reader to discover that in the initial
historical research, the philosophical works of modern logicians will be
examined in a chronological order, whereas, when attention is turned to
the classical and ancient authors, the order of time will be reversed for
this historical research. This mode of procedure was not adopted in any
haphazard manner, nor was it introduced merely for the sake of adding
variety to the presentation of the study. Inasmuch as the historical
evidence on the distinction of extension and comprehension is limited
and oftentimes confusing, it was not deemed feasible to begin the
investigation at the very moment when the reality underlying the
distinction was first discovered and introduced into logic so as to trace
its development in one chronological direction. Instead it seemed more
reasonable to select one source of information to which many modern
authors had recourse and by which they were greatly influenced. It was
not difficult to make such a choice. The text which was cited most
frequently and which influenced modern logicians was none other than
the Port Royal Logic (1662)." (pp. XV-XVI).
Gabbay, Dov, and Woods, John, eds. 2004. The Rise of Modern Logic:
From Leibniz to Frege. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Contents: Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods: Preface VII; List of
Contributors IX-X; Wolfgang Lenzen: Leibniz's logic 1; Mary Tiles:
Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic 85; John W. Burbidge:
Hegel's logic 131; Paul Rusnock and Rolf George; Bolzano as logician
177; Richard Tieszen: Husserl's logic 207; Theodore Hailperin:
Algebraical logic 1685-1900 323; Victor Sanchez Valencia: The
algebra of logic 389; Ivor Grattan-Guinness: The mathematical turn in
logic 545; Volker Peckhaus: Schröder's logic 557; Risto Hilpinen:
Peirce's logic 611; Peter M. Sullivan: Frege's Logic 659; Index 751-
770.
———, eds. 2008. Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Contributors IX; John Marenbon: Logic before 1100: the Latin tradition
913
65; Ian Wilks: Peter Abelard and his contemporaries 83; Terence
Parsons: The development of Supposition Theory in the later 12th
through 14th centuries 157; Henrik Lagerlund: The assimilation of
Aristotelian and Arabic logic up to the later thirteenth century 281; Ria
van der Lecq: Logic and theories of meaning in the late 13th and early
14th century including the Modistae 347; Gyula Klima: The nominalist
semantic of Ockham and Buridan: a 'rational reconstruction' 389;
Catarina Dutilh Novaes: Logic in the 14th century after Ockham 433;
Simo Knuuttila: Medieval modal theories and modal logic 505; Mikko
Yrjönsuuri: Treatments of the paradoxes of self-reference 579; E.
Jennifer Ashworth: Developments in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries 609; Peter Dvorák: Relational logic of Juan Caramuel 645;
Russell Wahl: Port-Royal: the stirrings of modernity 667; index 701.
———, eds. 2008. British Logic in the Nineteenth Century.
Contributors XIII-XIV; Gordon R. McOuat and Charissa S. Varma:
Bentham's logic 1; Tim Manes: Coleridge's logic 33; James Van Evra:
Richard Whately and logical lheory 75; Ralph Jessop: The logic of Sir
William Hamilton: tunnelling through sand to place the keystone in the
Aristotelic arch 93; Laurta J. Snyder:
"The whole box of tools": William Whewell and the logic of induction
163; Fred Wilson: The logic of John Stuart Mill 229; Michael E.
Hobart and Joan L. Richards: De Morgan's logic 283; Dale Jacquette:
Boole's logic 331; Maria Panteki: French 'Logique' and British 'Logic':
on the origins of Augustus de Morgan's early logical enquiries, 1805-
1835 381; Amirouche Moktefi: Lewis Carroll's logic 457; James Van
Evra: John Venn and logical theory 507; Bert Mosselmans and Ard van
Moer: William Stanley Jevons and the substitution of similars 515;
Shahid Rahman and Juan Redmond: Hugh McColl and the birth of
logical pluralism 533; David Sullivan: The Idealists 605; William J.
Mander: Bradley's logic 663; Index 719-735.
Gens, Jean-Claude, ed. 2010. La Logique Herméneutique Du Xviie
Siècle. J. C. Dannhauer Et J. Clauberg. Argenteuil: Le Cercle
Herméneutique Éditeur.
Ghisalberti, Alessandro. 2005. "Étapes De La Logique. De La Voie
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Moderne À La Logique De Port-Royal." Les Études
Philosophiques:521-536.
Giard, Luce. 1984. "Du Latin Médiéval Au Pluriel Des Langues, Le
Tournant De La Renaissance in Logique Et Grammaire." Histoire,
Epistémologie, Langage no. 6:35-55.
"L'Auteur étudie la manière dont, dans l'Europe de la Renaissance, les
relations entre langue, logique et grammaire se sont modifiées, passant
de l'étude du latin et des modèles logiques d'analyse à la pluralité des
approches des langues vernaculaires prônées par les Humanistes."
———. 1985. "La Production Logique De L'angleterre Au Xvi Siècle
in Bacon." Études Philosophiques:303-324.
"La production logique éditée en Angleterre, majoritairement rédigée
en latin, est analysée en quatre blocs: l'héritage médiéval de grammaire
modiste et de logique, le renouveau aristotélicien progressif, la querelle
ramiste, enfin les premiers traités en anglais."
Grandt, François de. 2001. "Response to Jonathan Barnes." In Whose
Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 133-
134. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Reply to J. Barnes - Locke and syllogism - in the same volume pp. 105-
132
Hailperin, Theodore. 1988. "The Development of Probability Logic
from Leibniz to Maccoll." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 9:131-
191.
Heath, Terence. 1971. "Logical Grammar, Grammatical Logic, and
Humanism in Three German Universities." Studies in the Renaissance
no. 18:9-64.
Hickman, Larry. 1971. "Late Scholastics Logics: Another Look."
———. 1980. Modern Theories of Higher Level Predicates. Second
Intentions in the Neuzeit. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Table of Contents: Foreword by Ignacio Angelelli 7; Introduction 9;
Part One 15; Chapter One: Predication 17; Chapter Two: Logical
concepts 32; Part Two 57; Chapter Three: Higher level predicates 59;
Chapter Four: Second Intentions: Conceptualism One and Nominalism
73; Chapter Five: Second Intentions: Conceptualism Two 103; Chapter
Six: Second Intentions: Conceptualism Three 132; Part Three 167;
Chapter Seven: Special problems 169; Bibliography 183; Index of
915
names and subjects 189-191.
"The theory of higher predicates (predicates of predicates) contained in
the traditional discussions on second intentions has been largely
ignored, even by historians of logic, who as a rule have concentrated on
nominalism, a scholastic trend so fruitful in formal logic yet so poor in
this particular topic.
Larry Hickman's work makes available for modern readers many of the
riches related to higher predication, that have been so far buried in
rather unknown authors mainly from the post-medieval or "second"
scholasticism.
Hickman not merely shows us selected "pictures" of the unfamiliar
territories he has been exploring: his inquiry, although primarily
historical, is analytical and systematically oriented.
Bochenski wrote about twenty years ago: "Logic shows no linear
continuity of evolution. Its history resembles rather a broken line. From
modest beginnings it usually raises itself to a notable height very
quickly -- within about a century -- but then the decline follows as fast.
Former gains are forgotten; the problems are no longer found
interesting, or the very possibility of carrying on the study is destroyed
by political and cultural events. Then, after centuries, the search begins
anew. Nothing of the old wealth remains but a few fragments; building
on those, logic rises again." (1)
Obviously during the cycle of so-called modern philosophy (Descartes
to Kant, roughly) the problem of higher predication was not found
interesting and this explains why Frege may have believed that the
distinction of proper ties of the second and first level (zweiter and
erster Stufe) was his ("meine, Unterscheidung"). At any rate, one can
hardly find a better example of the "broken line" character of the
history of logic than in this issue of iterated predication and properties
of properties.
Predication is perhaps one of the very few topics in which most if not
all philosophical schools seem to have something in common. This
should be sufficient as a hint at the significance of Hickman's historical
investigations, not merely for the logical historiography but for
philosophy in general." (from the Foreword).
(1) I. M. Bochenski: A History of Formal Logic, Notre Dame, 1961
Introduction § 3.
916
Howell, Wilbur Samuel. 1956. Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-
1700. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Contents: Prefgace V-VII;m 1. Introduction 3; 2. Scholastic logic 12; 3.
Traditional rhetoric: the three patterns 64; 4. The English Ramists 146;
5. Counterreform: systematics an neo-Ciceronians 282; 6. New
horizons in logic and rhetoric 342; Index 399-411.
"Logic, conceived today as the science of validity of thought, and as the
term for the canons and criteria that explain trustworthy inferences, was
in the English Renaissance a theory not so much of thought as of
statement. For all practical purposes, the distinction between thoughts
and statements is not a very real distinction, since the latter are merely
the reflection of the former, and the former cannot be examined without
recourse to the latter. But what distinction there is consists in a
differentiation between mental phenomena and linguistic phenomena,
the assumption being that the thing to which either set of phenomena
refers is reality Itself. Logicians of the twentieth century are primarily
interested in mental phenomena as an interpretation of the realities of
man's environment, and in that part of mental phenomena which we
call valid or invalid inference. Logicians of the English Renaissance
were primarily interested in statements as a reflection of man's
inferences, and in the problem of the valid and invalid statement. Thus
Renaissance logic concerned itself chiefly with the statements made by
men in their efforts to achieve a valid verbalization of reality. Since
such statements were the work of scholars and science, not of laymen,
Renaissance logic founded itself upon scholarly and scientific discourse
and was in fact the theory of communication in the world of learning.
The data upon which this theory rested were all learned tractates of that
and earlier times. The theory itself attempted on the one hand to explain
the nature of these tractates, as to language, sentence structure, and
organization, and on the other to offer assistance to the learner in his
effort to master learned communication, as part of his entrance fee to
the scientific and philosophical world." p. 3
———. 1971. Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Contents: Preface VII-IX; 1. Introduction 5; 2. The Aristotelian
inheritance in logic (1615-1825). I. Some Seventeenth-century
Peripatetics 13; II. Bishop Sanderson and the attack on Ramus 16; III.
917
Crakanthorp's Logicae Libri Quinque 22; IV. John Wallis's Institutio
Logicae 29; V. Dean Aldrich's famous Artis Logicae Compendium 42;
VI. Syllogisms and science: John Sergeant's view 61; 3 The
Eighteenth-century Ciceronians (1700-1759). 1. Rhetoric as the
counterpart of logic 75; II. John Ward's Lectures at Gresham College
83; III. John Holmes's The Art of Rhetoric Made Easy 125; IV.
Separative tensions in rhetoric: a retrospect 142; 4 The British
elocutionary movement (1702-1806). I. Rhetorical delivery adopts a
new name 145; II. Some reflections on a semantic problem 147; III:
Why delivery aroused urgent interest 152; IV. Continental backgrounds
of British elocution 160; V. Le Faucheur's Traitté in England 164; VI.
Betterton: Major actor as minor elocutionist 182; VII. Some rules for
speaking and action 190; VIII. Orator Henley: preacher, elocutionist,
merry-andrew 193; IX. Mason's Essay on Elocution 204; X. Action
proper for the pulpit 209; XI. Sheridan: minor actor as major
elocutionist 214; XII. Burgh, Herries, Walker, Austin 244; 5.The new
logic (1690-1814). I. Seven points of friction 259; II. John Locke and
the new logic 264; III. Other voices: Le Clerc, Crousaz, Watts, Duncan,
Wolff 299; IV. The new accent: Reid, Kames, Campbell, Stewart 372;
6 The new rhetoric (1646-1800). I. Rhetoric versus rhetoric: a litigation
in six issues 441; II. Voices of the Royal Society: Wilkins, Boyle,
Sprat, Glanvill, Locke 448; III. Influences from abroad: Lamy,
Fénelon, Rapin, Bouhours, Rollin 503; IV. The new rhetoric comes of
age: Adam Smith's Lectures at Edinburgh and Glasgow 536; V. George
Campbell and the philosophical rhetoric of the new learning 577; VI.
Discordant consensus: Hume, Lawson, Priestley, Blair, Witherspoon
613; 7 Conclusion 695; Index 719-742
"This book undertakes to present an analysis of the major eighteenth-
century British writings on logic and rhetoric and to place those
writings in a chronological perspective, so that the reader may see them
in relation to their antecedents in the seventeenth and their consequents
in the nineteenth centuries and also in relation to their influences upon
each other. Moreover, this book undertakes, as part of these two
objectives, to introduce the reader to the authors of these writings and
to make them and their works stand together as partners in an
intellectual effort of appreciable size and duration. If history, as Carl
Becker observed, is the memory of things said and done, then the
918
present history is an attempt to tell our modern world what the chief
British logicians and rhetoricians of the 1700's said when they wrote
about their specialties, and what their works mean within the context of
their particular time.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this history is that the changes
which took place in logical and rhetorical doctrine between 1700 and i
800 are perhaps best interpreted as responses to the emergence of the
new science.
The old science, as the disciples of Aristotle conceived of it at the end
of the seventeenth century, had considered its function to be that of
subjecting traditional truths to syllogistic examination, and of accepting
as new truth only what could be proved to be consistent with the old.
Under that kind of arrangement, traditional logic had taught the
methods of deductive analysis, had perfected itself in the machinery of
testing propositions for consistency, and had served at the same time as
the instrument by which truths could be arranged so as to become
intelligible and convincing to other learned men. In short, traditional
logic prided itself upon being a theory of learned enquiry and of
learned communication. Meanwhile, traditional rhetoric also prided
itself upon having a share in these same two offices, its special purpose
being to communicate truths through a process which, on the one hand,
blended scientific conclusions with popular opinions and manners, and,
on the other hand, transmitted that blend to the general populace. For
all practical purposes, the differences between logic and rhetoric,
within the context of the old science, were derived from the differences
between the learned and the popular audience. A good statement of the
concepts which governed this view of the relations of these disciplines
to each other is contained in the epigraph at the head of this chapter.
The new science, as envisioned by its founder, Francis Bacon,
considered its function to be that of subjecting physical and human
facts to observation and experiment, and of accepting as new truth only
what could be shown to conform to the realities behind it. Bacon's
vision became that of the Royal Society of London, and of similar
organizations throughout Europe. The intoxicating novelty and
enormous productivity of the new methods of investigation led young
scientists and scholars to practice them with increasing sophistication;
and logic, which had always claimed anyway to be the theory of
919
enquiry, began to incorporate the new methods into its doctrines and
ended by becoming so enamored of them that it allowed them to crowd
out its waning interest in the methods of learned communication.
Meanwhile, rhetoric began to see itself as the rightful claimant to the
methods of learned communication and as the still unrivaled master of
the arts of popular discourse; and by making these two activities its
new concern, it came ultimately to think of itself as the art which
governed all forms of verbal expression, whether popular or learned,
persuasive or didactic, utilitarian or aesthetic. Thus in the context of
eighteenth-century learning, rhetoric became the sole art of
communication by means of language, and logic moved towards the
realization that it was destined to become the science of scientific
enquiry. A good statement of the concept which controlled these
emerging relations of logic and rhetoric to each other was made by
John Stuart Mill in the first half of the nineteenth century, and I have
quoted it as the epigraph of Chapter 7, although in a real sense it also
belongs to this Introduction." pp. 5-6
Jardine, Lisa. 1974. "The Place of Dialectic Teaching in Sixteenth
Century Cambridge." Studies in the Renaissance no. 21:31-62.
———. 1976. "Humanism and Dialectic in Sixteenth Century
Cambridge: A Preliminary Investigation." In Classical Influences on
European Culture, Ad 1500-1700, edited by Bolgar, Robert Raplh, 141-
———. 1982. "Humanism and the Theaching of Logic." In The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by
Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony P. and Pinborg, Jan, 797-807.
———. 1988. "Humanistic Logic." In The Cambridge History of
"The history of medieval and Renaissance logic has traditionally been
the history of the great medieval syllogistic logicians and the fortuna of
their innovatory treatments down through the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. When historians of logic characterise humanist dialectic as a
misguided and non-rigorous intervention which disrupted the smooth
development of medieval syllogistic logic, they confirm their own
commitment to the interests and techniques pioneered by logicians like
920
William of Sherwood. It is not surprising, then, if these scholars find
the very different approach of the humanists trying. They hold up
against the `non-rigorous' humanist treatment of ratiocination, the
'rigour' of a commitment to formal validity as the central focus for the
study of logic - a commitment, that is to say, to those fixed patterns of
argumentation which guarantee that from any true premises whatsoever
one can only infer a true conclusion Humanist treatments of logic, on
the other hand, have a good deal in common with the interests of some
recent, modern logicians, who have chosen to give a good deal of
attention to non-deductive inference, and to 'good' arguments
(arguments which can be counted on to win in debate), and the
problematic nature of their validity. Like modern logicians they are
interested, above all, in 'good' arguments.
A humanist treatment of logic is characterised by the fundamental
assumption that oratio may be persuasive, even compelling, without its
being formally valid (or without the formal validity of the argument
being ascertainable). It takes the view, therefore, that any significant
study of argument (the subject-matter of logic/dialectic) must concern
itself equally with argument (strictly, argumentation) which is
compelling but not amenable to analysis within traditional formal
logic.' It is this fundamental difference of opinion over what is meant
by 'compelling' argument which accounts for the dogmatic insistence
(on ideological grounds) of the scholastic (and of the historian of
scholasticism) that the humanist is a 'grammarian' or a 'rhetorician'.
Either term announces that what the humanist is concerned with is not
'rigorous' in the restricted scholastic sense: all discourse not amenable
to such 'rigorous' analysis is, for the scholastic, a matter for the
grammarian (to parse and construe) or the rhetorician (to catalogue its
persuasive devices). It is in the same spirit that humanists always refer
to their study of ratiocination as 'dialectic' (reasoning conducted
between two interlocutors), rather than as 'logic', to emphasise the
active, pragmatic nature of the argumentation which captures their
interest." (pp. 175-176, notes omitted)
Kessler, Eckhard. 2002. "Logica Universalis Und Hermeneutica
Universalis." In La Presenza Dell'aristotelismo Padovano Nella
Filosofia Della Prima Modernità, edited by Piaia, Gregorio, 133-171.
Padova: Antenore.
921
Lolli, Gabriele. 1983. "Quasi Alphabetum. Logic and Encyclopedia in
G. Peano." In Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della
Maat, Jaap. 2006. "The Status of Logic in the Seventeenth Century." In
Foundations of the Formal Sciences Iv. The History of the Concept of
the Formal Sciences, edited by Löwe, Benedikt, Peckhaus, Volker and
Rasch, Thomas, 157-167. London: College Publications.
Mangione, Corrado, and Bozzi, Silvio. 1983. "About Some Problems in
the History of Mathematical Logic." In Atti Del Convegno
Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica, edited by Abrusci, Michele,
Casari, Ettore and Mugnai, Massimo, 157-174. Bologna: CLUEB.
Michael, Frederick S. 1997. "Why Logic Become Epistemology:
Gassendi, Port Royal and the Reformation in Logic." In Logic and the
Workings of the Mind. The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in
Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Easton, Patricia A., 1-20.
Atascadero: Ridgeview.
"Introduction.
It is quite obvious that epistemology permeates most of the logic texts
written from a period beginning in the late seventeenth century and
continuing into the beginning of the contemporary era in logic at the
end of the nineteenth century. The model of this kind of logic appears
to be the Port Royal Logic. Since this is a work suffused throughout
with Cartesian doctrine, it is natural to conclude that this kind of logic
is of Cartesian inspiration. Even though Descartes himself did not think
of logic in this way, indeed he appears to have viewed logic, and
abstract thought generally, with suspicion, the epistemological
approach to logic taken in the Port Royal Logic can be seen to be a
natural outgrowth of Cartesian philosophy. The problem with this
judgment is that there had been an earlier logic of this same type and its
author, Pierre Gassendi, not only was not Cartesian, but was
Descartes's principal rival among the moderns. His Institutio Logica,
published not as a separate work, but as part of the Syntagma
Philosophica, which itself is available only as the first two volumes of
Gassendi's posthumous Opera Omnia, was, as I will try to show, both
conceptually and structurally, the Port Royal Logic's principal model.
Inasmuch as each of these logics has as its foundation a theory of ideas,
922
it seems appropriate to call this kind of logic, the logic of ideas.
Historians of logic do not look with much favour upon this kind of
logic. In the introduction to his English translation of Gassendi's
Institutio Logica, Howard Jones states that this work is "not a
revolutionary logic which rejects all that the logical tradition has to
offer, but a logic which Gassendi renders contemporary by selecting
from that tradition only what is appropriate to seventeenth century
needs."(1) Wilhelm Risse's assessment of the Port Royal Logic is
similar. He says of this work, that it is historically one of the high
points of logic, comparable in influence to that of Aristotle, Peter of
Spain, Ramus and Wolff. But he adds: "This logic is certainly not
original. Its extraordinary success is due to its elegance and its
pedagogically effective manner of presentation."(2) With respect to
logic after the medieval period, which includes the humanist logics of
the Renaissance period in addition to the logic of ideas, William and
Martha Kneale in their The Development of Logic remark that "from
the 400 years between the middle of the fifteenth and the middle of the
nineteenth century we have...scores of textbooks but few works that
contain anything at once new and good."(3) The logic of this same era
is called by I.M. Bochenski, "classical logic" and is characterized by
him as "something held the field in hundreds of books for nearly four
hundred years"(4) but while he sees it as new, he certainly does not see
it as good. This is his assessment: "Poor in content, devoid of all deep
problems, permeated with a whole lot of non-logical philosophical
ideas, psychologist in the worst sense-that is how we have to sum up
the "classical" logics.(5)
While I don't think that this attitude is wholly wrong, I would contend
that the logic of ideas was revolutionary. More specifically, it was the
completion of a revolution that took two hundred years to accomplish,
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. This was the era of the
religious reformation, and it would be as appropriate to speak of a
philosophical and scientific reformation in this era as well. It was a
period of intense intellectual ferment and upheaval, in which the
medieval world view was abandoned and replaced by the modern world
view. It began with an attack on medieval logic. This at first sight
seems odd inasmuch as if there is one area of medieval philosophy
which those involved with the history of philosophy do not think was in
923
need of reformation, it is logic. That is no doubt at least part of the
reason why the reformed logics are viewed today with so little
enthusiasm
The reform of logic occurred in two phases. The first phase was largely
reactive. Medieval logic was discredited by the humanists and largely
abandoned. The humanists hoped to convert logic from the formal and
theoretical discipline of the medieval period into a practical study,
which they hoped would be an improved instrument for argumentation
and disputation, and so for the discovery of truth. There was however
no consensus about how this was to be accomplished. The second
phase in the reformation of logic began in the early seventeenth
century, with the abandonment of the view that the way to truth is via
argumentation and disputation. Disputation does not lead to truth, it
was held, rather the road to truth is by the way of ideas.
The logic of this era is, as Bochenski says, something new. It is an
important development in the history of logic. But is it also something
good? Were the humanists responsible for an advance in logic? Was the
epistemological turn which the logic of ideas brought about, the right
turn for logic? For the most part, I would have to answer no. These
developments were on the whole not good for logic; certainly they were
not good for formal logic. In the four hundred years from the end of the
medieval era to the beginning of the era of contemporary logic, while
there was some development in informal logic, formal logic was largely
neglected. It was a reform of logic, a revolutionary change. But
revolutions aren't always good and this one was not good for formal
logic. Contemporary logicians and historians of logic have reason to be
dismayed by its results.
On the other hand, the situation could hardly have been more
favourable for the development of epistemology, and of the theory of
ideas in particular. Logic was typically the first subject in a course of
university studies, and in the logic of ideas, the theory of ideas was the
subject matter to which the student was first exposed. The chief focus
in the logic of ideas was not on form but on content, principally on
epistemological content. Yet it really was a form of logic, as I hope to
make clear and the conception of logic it embodies is legitimate.
My principal purpose in this paper is to examine the logic of ideas as it
is found in Gassendi's Institutio Logica and in the Port Royal Logic, to
924
compare these two works and to explain how this form of logic came
about. But I do not think that this form of logic can be understood
except in its broad intellectual context. Accordingly, it is with this that I
begin." pp. 1-3
(1) Howard Jones, Pierre Gassendi's Institutio Logica (1658) (Assen,
The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1981) p. LXVII. This work will
henceforward be referred to as "Jones," followed by page number(s).
(2) Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit (Stuttgart-Bad Carstatt:
Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1964) vol II, p. 79.
(3) William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford,
1962) p. 298.
(4) I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, translation by Ivo
Thomas (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1961) p.
254.
(5) I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, translation by Ivo
Thomas (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1961) p.
258.
Mugnai, Massimo. 1983. "Alle Origini Dell'algebra Della Logica." In
Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica, edited by
Abrusci, Michele, Casari, Ettore and Mugnai, Massimo, 117-132.
Bologna: CLUEB.
———. 2002. "Denken Und Rechnen: Über Die Beziehung Zwischen
Logik Und Mathematik in Der Frühen Neuzeit." In Neuzeitliches
Denken. Festschrift Für Hans Poser Zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by
Abel, Günter, Engfer, Hans-Jürgen and Hubig, Christoph, 85-100.
Berlin: de Gruyter.
———. 2005. "Logic and Mathematics in the 18th Century: Before and
after Christian Wolff." In Wolffiana 1: Macht Und Bescheidenheit Der
Vernunft: Beiträge Zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs; Gedenkband Für
Hans Werner Arndt, edited by Cataldi Madonna, Luigi, 97-109.
———. 2010. "Logic and Mathematics in the Seventeenth Century."
"According to the received view (Bocheński, Kneale), from the end of
the fourteenth to the second half of nineteenth century, logic enters a
period of decadence. If one looks at this period, the richness of the
topics and the complexity of the discussions that characterized
925
medieval logic seem to belong to a completely different world: a
simplified theory of the syllogism is the only surviving relic of a
glorious past. Even though this negative appraisal is grounded on good
reasons, it overlooks, however, a remarkable innovation that imposes
itself at the beginning of the sixteenth century: the attempt to connect
the two previously separated disciplines of logic and mathematics. This
happens along two opposite directions: the one aiming to base
mathematical proofs on traditional (Aristotelian) logic; the other
attempting to reduce logic to a mathematical (algebraical) calculus.
This second trend was reinforced by the claim, mainly propagated by
Hobbes, that the activity of thinking was the same as that of performing
an arithmetical calculus. Thus, in the period of what Bocheński
characterizes as ‘classical logic’, one may find the seeds of a process
which was completed by Boole and Frege and opened the door to the
contemporary, mathematical form of logic."
Muñoz Delgado, Vicente. 1964. La Lógica Nominalista En La
Universidad De Salamanca, 1510-1530. Ambiente, Literatura,
Doctrinas. Madrid: Revista Estudios.
———. 1972. "Logica Hispano-Portuguesa Hasta 1600 (Notas
Bibliográfico-Doctrinales)." Repertorio de Historia de las Ciencias
Eclesiásticas en España no. 4:9-122.
———. 1973. "España En La Historia De La Lógica Prerrenacentista
(1350-1550)." La Ciudad de Dios no. 186:372-394.
———. 1974. "La Lógica Formal Y Su Dimensión Histórica."
Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 1:111-156.
———. 1975. "Introducción Al Patrimonio Escolastico De Lógica."
Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 2:45-76.
———. 1982. "Lógica Hispano-Portuguesa E Iberoamericana En El
Siglo Xvii." Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 9:279-398.
Normore, Calvin G. 1993. "The Necessity in Deduction: Cartesian
Inference and Its Medieval Background." Synthese no. 96:437-454.
"Although we now dismiss Kant's suggestion that logic was already
essentially a completed science, we ourselves embrace its ghost, the
idea that the conception of logical inference with which we are most
familiar is just the common conception of our illustrious philosophical
ancestors. This ghost works mischief. It causes us to think whiggishly
of the history of logic and so lends respectability to the thought that
926
only since 1879 has there been great logic. More concretely, I shall
argue here, the idea that were is and always has been a single dominant
conception of valid inference (ours) blinds us to part of Descartes's
project. By setting that project against its medieval background I hope
to revive our sense of both its strangeness and its possibilities."
Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1994. "Can a Mental Proposition Change Its
Truth-Value? Some 17th-Century Views." History and Philosophy of
Logic no. 15:69-84.
" In the first half of the seventeenth century the Aristotelian view that
the same statement or belief may be true at one time and false at
another and, on the other hand, the conception of a mental proposition
as a fully explicit thought that lends a definite meaning to a declarative
sentence originated a lively debate concerning the question whether a
mental proposition can change its truth- value. In this article it is shown
that the defenders of a negative answer and the advocates of a positive
answer argued on the basis of different notions of what a mental
proposition is: one side taking it as more or less equivalent to a specific
utterance- meaning and the other side as more or less equivalent to a
generic sentence-meaning."
———. 1998. "Logic in the Seventeenth Century: Preliminary
Remarks and the Constituents of the Proposition." In The Cambridge
History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, edited by Garber, Daniel
and Ayers, Michael, 103-117. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vol. I
———. 1998. "Proposition and Judgement." In The Cambridge History
of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, edited by Garber, Daniel and
Ayers, Michael, 118-131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vol. I
———. 1998. "Deductive Reasoning." In The Cambridge History of
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, edited by Garber, Daniel and Ayers,
Michael, 132-146. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vol. I
Peckhaus, Volker. 1999. "19th Century Logic between Philosophy and
Mathematics." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic no. 5:433-450.
"The history of modern logic is usually written as the history of
mathematical or, more general, symbolic logic. As such it was created
by mathematicians. Not regarding its anticipations in scholastic logic
927
and in the rationalistic era, its continuous development began with
George Boole's The Mathematical Analysis of Logic of 1847, and it
became a mathematical subdiscipline in the early 20th century. This
style of presentation cuts off one eminent line of development, the
philosophical development of logic, although logic is evidently one of
the basic disciplines of philosophy. One needs only to recall some of
the standard 19th century definitions of logic as, e.g., the art and
science of reasoning (Whateley) or as giving the normative rules of
correct reasoning (Herbart).
In the paper the relationship between the philosophical and
themathematical development of logic will be discussed. Answers to
the following questions will be provided:
1. What were the reasons for the philosophers' lack of interest in formal
logic?
2. What were the reasons for the mathematicians' interest in logic?
3. What did "logic reform" mean in the 19th century? Were the systems
of mathematical logic initially regarded as contributions to a reform of
logic?
4. Was mathematical logic regarded as art, as science or as both?"
Picardi, Eva. 1989. "Assertion and Assertion Sign." In Le Teorie Delle
Modalità. Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica,
edited by Corsi, Giovanni, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo,
139-154. Bologna: CLUEB.
Proust, Joëlle. 1989. Questions of Form. Logic and the Analytic
Proposition from Kant to Carnap. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Original French edition: Questions de forme. Logique et proposition
analytique de Kant à Carnap - Paris, Fayard, 1986.
Translated by Anastasios Albert Brenner.
See the Third Chapter: Bolzano's renovation of analiticity - pp. 49-108.
Redmond, Walter. 2002. La Lógica Del Siglo De Oro: Una
Introducción Histórica a La Lógica. Pamplona: Eunsa.
Roncaglia, Gino. 1990. "Cum Deus Calculat -- God's Evaluation of
Possible Worlds and Logical Calculus." Topoi no. 9:83-90.
———. 1996. Palestra Rationis. Discussioni Su Natura Della Copula
E Modalità Nella Filosofia 'Scolastica' Tedesca Del Xvii Secolo.
Firenze: Olschki.
928
Rossi, Paolo. 2000. Logic and the Art of Memory. The Quest for a
Universal Language. New York: Athlone Press.
Reprinted 2006 by Continuum.
Original edition: Clavis Universalis. Arti della memoria e logica
combninatoria da Lullo a Leibniz - Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983
Schuurman, Paul. 2004. Ideas, Mental Faculties and Method. The
Logic of Ideas of Descartes and Locke and Its Reception in the Dutch
Republic, 1630-1750. Leiden: Brill.
Sgarbi, Marco. 2012. "Towards a Reassessment of British
Aristotelianism." Vivarium no. 50:85-109.
"The aim of the paper is to reassess the role of British Aristotelianism
within the history of early modern logic between the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, as a crucial moment of cultural transition from
the model of humanistic rhetoric and dialectic to that of facultative
logic, that is, a logic which concerns the study of the cognitive powers
of the mind. The paper shows that there is a special connection between
Paduan Aristotelianism and British empiricism, through the mediation
of British Aristotelianism. British Aristotelians took the ideas of the
Paduan Aristotelian tradition and carried them to an extreme, gradually
removing them from the original Aristotelian context in which they
were grounded and developing what would later become the
fundamental ideas of British empiricism."
———. 2013. The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British
Empiricism. Logic and the Rise of British Empiricism. Logic and
Epistemology in the British Isles (1570-1689). New York: Springer.
Thiel, Christian. 1982. "From Leibniz to Frege: Mathematical Logic
between 1679 and 1879." In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science, Vi., edited by Cohen, Jonathan L., 755-770. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Logic. Methodology
and Philosophy of Science, Hannover 1979.
Trentman, John A. 1976. "The Study of Logic and Language in
England in the Early 17th Century." Historiographia Linguistica:179-
201.
Ueberweg, Friedrich. 1871. System of Logic and History of Logical
Doctrines. London: Longmans, Green and Co.
Translated from the German, with notes and appendices by Thomas M.
929
Lindsay.
Reprinted by Thoemmes Press 2001.
Vasoli, Cesare. 1974. "Profilo Della Logica Umanistica Nell'età Del
Rinascimento." In I Miti E Gli Astri, 247-282. Napoli: Guida.
———. 2007. La Dialettica E La Retorica Dell'umanesimo.
"Invenzione" E "Metodo" Nella Cultura Del Xv E Xvi Secolo. Napoli:
La Città del sole.
Nuova edizione riveduta (prima edizione: Milano, Feltrinelli, 1968)
Vilkko, Risto. 2002. A Hundred Years of Logical Investigations.
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Princeton: Princeton University Press.
RELATED PAGES
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Leibniz on Logic, Language and

Semiotics. Annotated bibliography (First
Part: A - K)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aarsleff, Hans. 1964. "Leibniz on Locke on Language." American
Reprinted in: H. Aarsleff - From Locke to Saussure. Essays on the
study of language and intellectual history - London, Athlone Press,
1982 pp. 42-83 and in: R. S. Woolhouse - Leibniz. Critical assessments
- Vol. III - New York, Routledge, 1994, pp. 452-495
———. 1975. "The Eighteenth Century Including Leibniz." In Current
Trends in Linguistics, edited by Sebeok, Thomas A., 383-479. The
Hague: Mouton.
Abraham, William E. 1969. "Complete Concepts and Leibniz's
Distinction between Necessary and Contingent Propositions." Studia
Leibnitiana no. 1:263-279.
Aguado, Javier. 1997. "Analisis De Las Relaciones En La Gramatica
Logica De Leibniz. Historia De Un Conflicto Hermeneutico." Revista
de Filosofia (Spain) no. 10:223-263.
Andrews, F.E. 1983. "Leibniz's Logic within His Philosophical
931
System." Dionysius no. 7:73-128.
"The work purports to provide a philosophical history of Leibniz's
logical works. The principal conclusion is that Leibniz's work on
logical calculi, the modifications in it coinciding with the three periods
identified by Couturat, rest upon refinements in the expression of his
philosophical system, and end when his philosophical thought reached
that point at which it is manifest that a logical calculus such as he had
envisaged is not competent to his philosophical standpoint."
Angelelli, Ignacio. 1965. "Leibniz's Misunderstanding of Nisolius'
Notion of "Multitudo"." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no.
6:319-322.
———. 1967. "On Identity and Interchangeability in Leibniz and
Frege." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 8:94-100.
"The main purpose of this paper is to show that Leibniz did not accept
what today is usually known as Leibniz's rule of substitutivity (or
indiscernibility of identicals, etc.). This purpose is attained by quoting
three texts, in Latin, one of them not yet published. Another aim of the
paper is to show how Frege believed that the rule Leibniz had used only
for restricted calculi, could be extended to the ordinary language. This
is construed as the source of the axiomatic status enjoyed by the rule
among philosophers in the last century."
Bailhache, Patrice. 1979. "Un Logicien Déontique Avant La Lettre:
Leibniz Précurseur De A. R. Anderson Et A. N. Prior." Archiv für
Rechts und Sozialphilosophie no. 65:269-274.
Baum, Manfred. 2002. "Zum Verhältnis Von Logik Und Metaphysik
Bei Leibniz." In Societas Rationis. Festschrift Für Burkhard Tuschling
Zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Hüning, Dieter, Stiening, Gideon and
Vogel, Ulrich, 11-27. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Benis-Sinaceur, Hourya. 1988. ""Ars Inveniendi" Et Théorie Des
Modèles." Dialogue no. 27:591-613.
"The aim of this paper is to reassess some cardinal ideas of Leibniz in
the light of the methods and goal of model theory. It is a leitmotiv in
Abraham Robinson's work that, as well as Leibniz wanted logic to be
an "ars inveniendi" for mathematics, model theory has to "produce
useful tools for the development of actual mathematics." This paper
tries to clarify the meaning and the far-reaching consequences of such a
statement by comparing the method of logical analysis of the
932
mathematical language to Leibniz's concepts of 'analysis' and
'characteristica'. Some results of Alfred Tarski and Abraham Robinson
are briefly sketched in order to give evidence of the contemporary
achievement of what Leibniz wished logic to be."
Berliner, Paul. 1987. "Zur Problematik Einer Ars Inveniendi."
Philosophia Naturalis no. 24:186-198.
"The "Ars inveniendi" and her scientific tools, "Ars combinatoria,"
"Ars characteristica," "Ars significandi," cover a creative conception of
Leibniz. The conception combines the idea of theory constitution and
the unlimited formal integrity and stringency of combinatory
techniques. It explains the mechanism of invention and natural
adherence to methodological rules, when scientific theories are not
presupposed to exist. The art is applied to a system of inventive
axiomatics, which embodies a previous work of the author."
Berlioz, Dominique. 1993. "Langue Adamique Et Caractéristique
Universelle Chez Leibniz." In Leibniz and Adam, edited by Dascal,
Marcelo and Yakira, Elhanan, 153-168. Tel Aviv: University
Publishing Projects.
Berlioz, Dominique, and Nef, Frédéric, eds. 2004. Leibniz Et Les
Puissances Du Langage. Paris: Vrin.
Bernardo, Paola. "Questioni Testuali. Hobbes, Leibniz E Il
Nominalismo." Studi filosofici. Annali dell’Istituto universitario
Orientale no. 31:79-97.
Beuchot, Mauricio. 1985. "El Ars Magna De Lulio Y El Ars
Combinatoria De Leibniz." Dianoia no. 31:183-194.
Bradley Bassler, Otto. 1998. "Leibniz on Intension, Extension, and the
Representation of Syllogistic Inference." Synthese no. 116:117-139.
"New light is shed on Leibniz's commitment to the metaphysical
priority of the intensional interpretation of logic by considering the
arithmetical and graphical representations of syllogistic inference that
Leibniz studied. Crucial to understanding this connection is the idea
that concepts can be intensionally represented in terms of properties of
geometric extension, though significantly not the simple geometric
property of part-whole inclusion. I go on to provide an explanation for
how Leibniz could maintain the metaphysical priority of the intensional
interpretation while holding that logically the intensional and the
extensional stand in strictly inverse relation to each other."
933
Brands, Hartmut. 1986. "Eine Anmerkung Zur Vermeintlichen
Unvollständigkeit Der Beiden Regeln Der Qualität in Leibniz'
"Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria"." Studia Leibnitiana no. 18:83-88.
Brekle, Herbert. 1971. "Die Idee Einer Generative Grammatik in
Leibnizens Fragmenten Zur Logik." Studia Leibnitiana no. 3:141-149.
Bssler, O.B. 1998. "Leibniz on Intension, Extension, and the
Representation of Syllogistic Inference." Synthese no. 116:117-139.
Burkhardt, Hans. 1980. Logik Und Semiotik in Der Philosophie Von
Leibniz. München: Philosophia Verlag.
"This book provides the first account of the Janus-headed character of
Leibniz's philosophy. Burkhardt presents not only an exhaustive survey
of the background of Leibniz's thought in scholasticism, but also an
estimation of his significance for contemporary logic and philosophy.
On the one hand Leibniz is a representative of protestant
Aristotelianism. His philosophical training was scholastic; his
terminology is scholastic. On the other hand, it was he who developed
the first logical calculi. His work on the theory of possible worlds
means that he can be regarded as a precursor of possible world
semantics in modal logic. And deontic logic, too, makes its first
appearance in Leibniz's writings. He did original work also in
probability theory, an area which at his time stand in a close
relationship with logic. It was only with the development of
mathematical logic by Boole and Frege that Leibniz's achievements in
logic and semiotic could properly be grasped. An account of his
contributions to these fields therefore presupposes a knowledge of
those branches of Contemporary mathematical logic which he
anticipated. Leibniz was also highly original in the area of linguistics.
He put forward a series of theories and analyses in rational grammar
which have hitherto been little considered in the literature. The present
work offers, then, systematic discussions of the syllogism, of rational
grammar, of the characteristica universalis, of combinatorics. It deals
with the development of logical calculi, the relation between algebra
and logic, geometry, ontic and deontic modal logic, the
interconnections between logic and probability theory, and the relations
between ontology, logic and semiotics."
———. 1983. "Modaltheorie Und Modallogik in Der Scholastik Und
Bei Leibniz." Anuario Filosofico de la Universidad de Navarra
934
Pamplona no. 16:273-292.
———. 1987. "The Leibnizian Characteristica Universalis as Link
between Grammar and Logic." In Speculative Grammar, Universal
Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis of Language, edited by Buzzetti,
Dino and Ferriani, Maurizio, 43-63. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
———. 1988. "Modalities in Language, Thought and Reality in
Leibniz, Descartes and Crusius." Synthese no. 75:183-215.
"This essay tries to give a survey of the theories of modality in the
philosophy of Leibniz. Leibniz distinguishes implicitly between five
different kinds of modality: linguistic, logical, epistemic, ontological,
and metaphysical. "Linguistic" modalities concern the different
linguistic expressions of modalities. "Logical" modality concerns
consistency and maximally consistent concepts in the case of individual
concept. "Epistemic" modalities include understandability, thinkability,
moral certainty and absolute certainty. "Ontological modalities" include
compossibility, necessity and impossibility "per accidens", physical
modality. "Metaphysical modality" is related to God, his thinking and
his action, thus, for example, "prima possibilia", moral necessity and
possible worlds."
———. 1989. "Das Vorurteil Zugunsten Des Aktualen: Die
Philosophischen Systeme Von Leibniz and Meinong." In Le Teorie
———. 1990. "Jungius, Leibniz Und Die Logica Nova." In Praktische
Logik: Traditionen Und Tendenzen. 350 Jahre Joachimi Jungii Logica
Hamburgensis, edited by Klein, Peter, 57-83. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht.
———. 1999. "Aggregate." In L'actualité De Leibniz: Les Deux
Labyrinthes, edited by Berlioz, Dominique and Nef, Frédéric, 307-320.
Caicedo, Xavier, and Martin, Alejandro. 2001. "Completud De Dos
Calculos Logicos De Leibniz." Theoria.Revista de Teoria, Historia y
Fundamentos de la Ciencia no. 16:539-558.
"This work is a contribution to a new view of Leibniz's logic,
pretending to show that his writings were not only rich in projects
(Characteristica, Combinatoria, Mathesis), but also in concrete logico-
935
mathematical developments. We prove that his Numerical
Characteristic, assigning pairs of numbers to terms of categorical
propositions, is a complete and correct semantics for aristotelian
syllogistic, and the algebraic system presented in Fundamentals of
Logical Calculus is essentially a complete version of boolean algebraic
logic."
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1974. "Leibniz's Concepts and Their
Coincidence 'Salva Veritate'." Noûs no. 8:381-398.
"Discusses Leibniz's views of concepts and their coincidence, which is,
not identity of concepts as Ishiguro and others think, but Leibniz's
fundamental copula linking concepts into propositions. Formulates
fifteen Leibnizian theses on the topics. Examines five theses
propounded by Hidé Ishiguro in "Leibniz's philosophy of logic and
language" (1972) arguing that they belittle Leibniz's work in logic and
misrepresent his views in the philosophy of logic and language.
Opposes Ishiguro's Athenian approach, which strings together passages
from anywhere in a philosopher's corpus, regardless of dates, as if the
philosopher had all along before his mind a full-blown consistent
system. Illustrates the contrastive Darwinian approach by staying
within Leibniz's General inquiries about the analysis of concepts and
of truths."
———. 1976. "Leibniz's Syllogistico-Propositional Calculus." Notre
"This is a constructive appraisal of Leibniz's attempts, in three papers
written in 1686-1690, at formulating an equational calculus that
formalizes both classical syllogistics and propositional logic. The
attempts failed to provide a calculus adequate for monadic predicate
logic, because of Leibniz's inadequate treatment of existence and the
particular quantifier. But Leibniz did come remarkably close to
formulating an adequate propositional calculus with biconditional and
negation as primitive connectives, and some primitive rules of
substitution of material equivalents. The degree of closeness can be
appreciated by seeing how easy it was for Castañeda to complement
Leibniz's axioms and rules in order to produce a complete propositional
calculus l C with those primitives. the completeness of LC is shown,
and other alternatives to LC suggested by Leibniz himself are discussed
briefly."
936
———. 1990. "Leibniz's Complete Propositional Logic." Topoi no.
9:15-27.
Cohen, Jonathan L. 1954. "On the Project of a Universal Character."
Mind no. 63:49-63.
Reprinted in: Knowledge and language. Selected essays of L. Jonathan
Cohen - edited and with an introduction by James Logue - Dordrecht;
Kluwer, 2002 pp. 1-14.
Cook, Roy T. 2000. "Monads and Mathematics: The Logic of Leibniz's
Mereology." Studia Leibnitiana no. 32:1-20.
"In this paper I present a careful examination of Leibniz's mereological
views, based in large part on the theory he presents in"The
Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics" (1715). Leibniz begins
with a primitive notion of compresence and, in a step by step manner,
builds up more complex mereological notions culminating in his
definitions of parthood, whole, and composition. I use this
mereological account to clear up a confusion in the literature regarding
whether or not monads can be located in space. Along the way we gain
some insight into Leibniz's views on infinity and the structure of the
universe."
Correia, Manuel. 2002. "Categorical Propositions and 'Logica
Inventiva' in Leibniz's Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria (1666)."
Studia Leibnitiana no. 34:232-240.
Couturat, Louis. 1901. La Logique De Leibniz. Paris: Félix Alcan.
Reprinted Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1985.
Traduzione italiana: La logica di Leibniz - A cura di Ubaldo Sanzo -
Napoli, Glaux, 1973
Danek, Jaromir. 1975. Les Projets De Leibniz Et De Bolzano. Deux
Sources De La Logique Contemporaine. Quebec: Presse de l'Université
de Laval.
Dascal, Marcelo. 1978. La Sémiologie De Leibniz. Paris: Aubier-
Montaigne.
———. 1987. Leibniz, Language, Signs, and Thought. A Collection of
Essays. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
———. 1988. "On Knowing Truths of Reason." In Leibniz. Questions
De Logique, edited by Heinekamp, Albert, 27-37. Stuttgart: Steiner
Verlag.
937
———. 2008. G. W. Leibniz. The Art of Controversies. New York:
Springer.
Doull, Floy Andrews. 1991. "Leibniz's Logical System of 1686-1690."
Theoria.Revista de Teoria, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia no.
6:9-28.
"Logical works of this period, beginning with "Generales Inquisitiones"
and ending with the two dated pieces of August 1, 1690 and August 2,
1690, are read as a sustained effort, finally successful, to develop a set
of axioms and an appropriate schema for the expression of categorical
propositions faithful to traditional syllogistic. This same set of axioms
is shown to be comprehensive of the propositional calculus of
"Principia Mathematica", providing that 'some A is A' is not a "thesis"
in an unrestricted sense. There is no indication in the works of this
period that Leibniz understood just how significant is this logical
system he developed. But it is undeniable that he held tenaciously to
this particular set of axioms throughout the period, a set of axioms of
great power."
Drapeau Contim, Filipe. 1999. "Aspects Sémantique Et Métaphysique
De La Réduplication Chez Leibniz." In L'actualité De Leibniz: Les
Deux Labyrinthes, edited by Berlioz, Dominique and Nef, Frédéric,
321-361. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Studia Leibnitiana. Supplementa 34
———. 2005. "Des Propositions Aux Termes: Logique Et Réduction
Dans Les Recherches Générales." In Leibniz Et Les Puissances Du
Langage, edited by Berlioz, Dominique and Nef, Frédéric, 95-124.
Paris: Vrin.
Duchesnau, François. 1988. "Leibniz on the Classificatory Function of
Language." Synthese no. 75:163-181.
"In the Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain, book III "Des mots"
offers a rather closely knit presentation of Leibniz's ideas about
language and its connection with knowledge. Though genuinely
Leibnizian, this development is cast in a foreign mould, built out of an
empiricist and analytic assessment of the twofold relationship of words
with ideas and essences. Of the many issues in Locke's Essay which
prompted Leibniz's antagonistic replies, I shall select this one: our
natural processes of thought result in complex ideas, which, expressed
in substantive terms, fall short of representing the "real essences" of
938
things, but make it possible to classify them according to "nominal
essences". In contraposition to the nominal/real essence distinction,
which he disqualifies, Leibniz reintroduces and recasts for his purposes
the distinction between nominal and real definitions of terms.
Accordingly, a major trend of his analysis of words consists in
elucidating the principle "the possible governs the real" in its
application to language and to its classificatory function. I will attempt
(1) to tract the origin of this doctrine back to some of Leibniz's previous
reflections on language; (2) to assess Nicholas Jolley's analysis of this
theme in his recent book on the Nouveaux essais;* (3) to show the
possible implications of the principle for Leibniz's concept of empirical
knowledge."
* Leibniz and Locke. A study of the New essays on human
understanding - New York, Oxford University Press, 1984.
Dummett, Michael. 1956. "Review of Nicholas Rescher Leibniz'
Interpretation of His Logical Calculus." Journal of Symbolic Logic no.
21:197-199.
Dürr, Karl. 1930. Neue Beleuchtung Einer Theorie Von Leibniz.
Grundzüge Des Logikkalküls. Darmstadt: Otto Reichl.
Abhandlungen der Leibniz-Gesellschaft 2
Elgueta, Raimon, and Jansana, Ramon. 1999. "Definability of Leibniz
Equality." Studia Logica:223-243.
"Given a structure for a first-order language L, two objects of its
domain can be indiscernible relative to the properties expressible in L,
without using the equality symbol, and without actually being the same.
It is this relation that interests us in this paper.
It is called Leibniz equality. In the paper we study systematically the
problem of its definability mainly for classes of structures that are the
models of some equality-free universal Horn class in an infinitary
language L subscript kappa kappa, where kappa is an infinite regular
cardinal."
Englebretsen, George. 1981. Three Logicians. Aristotle, Leibniz, and
Sommers and the Syllogistic. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Preface VII; Introduction 1; Three logicians; Aristotle 9; Leibniz 28;
Sommers 42; The syllogistic; Contemporary mathematical logic 67;
Syllogistic logic 77; Concluding remarks 109; Bibliography 113; Index
116-118.
939
"In his Introduction to Logical Theory (London, 1952) P.F. Strawson
attempted to show that traditional syllogistic logic was more reflective
of various features of ordinary language than was modern mathematical
logic. P. Geach, the best modern critic of traditional logic, responded to
Strawson in "Mr. Strawson on Symbolic and Traditional Logic", Mind,
72 (1963). His brief remarks there show that Strawson's defense of the
old logic is, at best, naive. Geach clearly believes that there just can be
no sound defense of traditional logic. He even suggests that those who
would persist in their allegiance to the old logic are either irrational or
lazy. He says:
Many readers will vaguely think Strawson has proved that the
traditional system with all its faults is philosophically less misleading
than the new-fangled one. Those Colleges of Unreason where the
pseudo-Aristotelian logic is presented as the only genuine logic, and
those lecturers who would like to teach the philosophy of logic without
having to learn any modern logic, may well thus have been supplied
with a pretext for supine ignorance.
We believe that syllogistic logic is philosophically defensible. What
Geach sees as its faults are either not faults at all or can be remedied.
The result of applying such remedies is a new syllogistic - a logic
which is broader and stronger than Aristotle's original. It is a logic
competitive with the "new fangled" logic of today. This new syllogistic
was invisaged, but not built, by Leibniz. The hope for such a logic lay
dormant during the period when mathematical logic was being born
and nurtured through its rapid maturity. But recently that hope has been
revitalized, and virtually fulfilled, in the work of F. Sommers. The best
general answer to Geach's overall charge is simply a presentation of
this new syllogistic.
While the primary motive in presenting this essay is the defense of
syllogistic against its modern detractors, we also believe that it is time
for a concise introduction to Sommers' logical work. This work is
scattered throughout a wide variety of journals and anthologies; and
there is now no available account of it. Given the great originality of
Sommers' ideas, and the importance of the issues he has chosen to deal
with in logic, this void must be filled. Part of this essay is intended as a
modest start at that task." From the Preface.
———. 1982. "Leibniz on Logical Syntax." Studia Leibnitiana no.
940
14:119-126.
———. 1984. "Feldman and Sommers on Leibniz's Law." Dialogos
no. 43:91-96.
34. "Following suggestions made recently by F. Sommers it can be
shown that Leibniz's law is in fact a principle of term substitutability.
Terms are the same if and only if they are intersubstitutable for one
another. More importantly for Leibniz's general program for syllogistic
is the fact that this principle is but a special case of the dictum de
omni."
———. 1986. "A Note on Truth and Existence in Leibniz."
Manuscrito.Revista Internacional de Filosofia no. 9:7-9.
"Leibniz was able to connect the notion of truth for a sentence with the
idea of existence for individuals. Words and sentences are taken to both
denote individuals and signify concepts. iI a true sentence two
conditions must hold. The concept signified by the subject and the
word denoted by the sentence must be the actual word."
———. 1988. "A Note on Leibniz's Wild Quantity Thesis." Studia
Esquisabel, Oscar M. 2002. "¿Lenguaje Racional O Ciencia De Las
Fórmulas? La Luridimensionalidad Del Programa Leibniziano De La
Característica General." Manuscrito.Revista Internacional de Filosofia
no. 25:147-197.
"In this paper is approached the Leibnizian project for a general
characteristics. Intended as a instrument to help the limitations and
deficiencies of the natural human reason, the general characteristics
presents itself moreover as a tool for expanding the power of the human
thought by adopting and generalizing the methods of the algebraic
representation. This goal however entails a difficulty when it is
attempted to define with accuracy the extent of the project."
Ferriani, Maurizio. 1983. "Boole, Frege E La Distinzione Leibniziana
'Lingua-Calculus'." In Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia
Della Logica, edited by Abrusci, Michele, Casari, Ettore and Mugnai,
Gensini, Stefano. 1991. Il Naturale E Il Simbolico. Saggio Su Leibniz.
Roma: Bulzoni.
———. 2000. "De Linguis in Universum": On Leibniz's Ideas on
Languages. Five Essays. Munster: Nodus Publikationen.
941
———. 2005. "Leibniz on the Arbitrariness of Sign." In Leibniz Et Les
Puissances Du Langage, edited by Berlioz, Dominique and Nef,
Frédéric, 55-68. Paris: Vrin.
"A fact generally accepted by critique is that Leibniz holds a relevant
position within the history of linguistic thought and language studies.
Institutional works such as those of Aarsleff (1975), Heinekamp (1992)
or Rutherford (1995), as well as the more analytical studies of
Heinekamp (1972, 1975), Mugnai (1976), Dascal (1978) or, more
recently, Pombo (1987) and Gensini (1991) agree with this general
statement. Furthermore, against Cassirer' s well known theory,
developed in the first volume of his Philosophie der symbolischen
Formen (1923), growing consent is given to the hypothesis of a
substantial unity of Leibniz's view of language and sign systems.
Whether his focus is on universal languages or on single dialects, on
the general features of natural-historical languages or on the symbolic
systems of chemistry and mathematics, on cryptography or on monastic
languages, his notion of meaning as a flexible dimension of language
and as a semiotic articulation of knowledge can be seen as the device
that connects all the various stances regarding different forms of
language.
Given these assumptions, this work will focus on a particular aspect of
Leibniz's considerations on language, and it will be discussed with
special attention to two writings (the Dialogus of August 1677 and
some pages of the Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain, book III,
1704-1705) which differ as to date of composition and scope and
therefore delimit an entire theoretical itinerary. The topic in question is
the critique to the principle of arbitrariness of linguistic signs. This
issue runs through Leibniz's entire philosophical and linguistic quest
and it is intertwined to a number of more general problems of his
system of thought such as the relationship between knowledge and
truth, the limits of human cognitive skills, the need to affirm the
autonomy (also in a strong semiotic sense) of thought and, the other
hand, to safeguard the platonic reign of essence (or of the possibility of
things) to which even God is in some way subordinated.
Inevitably, this work will focus more on the historical and theoretical
impact that Leibniz's ideas had on philosophy of language than on the
sophisticated internal filigree of his reflections. Hopefully, this will not
942
obscure the complexity of Leibniz's perspective. Given that every
perspective is historically determined, an approach to a classic
necessarily has to face the challenge of finding a balance between the
internal reconstruction of facts and the need to relate to those general
theoretical issues of the tradition that still engage us to this day."
Giannetto, Giuseppe. 2001. "Mondi Possibili E Calcolo Divino in
Leibniz." Metalogicon no. 14:181-222.
Godart, Béatrice. 1987. "Les Enoncés Sui-Falsificateurs: Nouvelle
Classe D'excéptions a La Loi De Leibniz." Logique et Analyse no.
30:235-256.
Görz, Gunther. 2002. "Rationale Grammatik, Characteristica
Universalis Und Moderne Beschreibungslogik." In Medium
Mathematik. Anregungen Zu Einem Interdisziplinären
Gedankenaustausch. Band 1, edited by Löffladt, Günter and Toepell,
Michael, 170-196. Hildesheim: Franzbecker.
Heidegger, Martin. 1984. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Transkated by Michael Heim.
Original German edition: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im
Ausgang von Leibniz - (Sommersemester 1928) - Herausgegeben von
Klaus Held - Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1978, (Heidegger
Gesamtausgabe, 26)
Heinekamp, Albert. 1972. "Ars Characteristica Und Naturliche Sprache
Bei Leibniz." Tijdschrift voor Filosofie no. 34:446-488.
———. 1975. "Naturliche Sprache Und Allgemeine Charakteristik Bei
Leibniz." In Akten Des Ii. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover
17-22 Juli 1972. Band 4: Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Methodologie,
Sprachphilosophie, 257-286. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
———. 1976. "Sprache Und Wirklichkeit Nach Leibniz." In History of
Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, edited by Parret,
Herman, 518-570. Berlin New York: Walter de Gruyter.
———, ed. 1988. Leibniz: Questions De Logique. 15 ed.
Symposion organisé par la Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft,
Hannover (Bruxelles, Louvain-la-Neuve, 26 au 28 août 1985.
Studia Leibnitiana. Sonderheft.
943
———. 1991. "Logica Y Metafisica De Leibniz. Principales Lineas De
Interpretacion Durante El Siglo Xx." Dialogo Filosofico no. 19:4-31.
Spanish translation by Juan A. Nicolás Marín of the Introduction to:
Leibniz' Logik und Metaphysik - edited by Albert Heinekamp (1988)
———. 1992. "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)." In
Sprachphilosophie. Ein Internationales Handbuch Zeitgenössischer
Forschung = Philosophy of Language = La Philosophie Du Langage.
Vol. I, edited by Dascal, Marcelo, 320-330. Berlin: de Gruytuer.
Heinekamp, Albert, and Schupp, Franz, eds. 1979. Die Intensionale
Logik Bei Leibniz Und in Der Gegenwart. 8 ed.
Symposion der Leibniz-Gesellschaft Hannover, 10. und 11. November
1978.
Studia Leibnitiana.Sonderheft.
———, eds. 1988. Leibniz' Logik Und Metaphysik. Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Herget, Don Emil. 1987. "Non-Standard Categorical Syllogism: Four
That Leibniz Forgot." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 6:1-13.
" n his "Mathesis rationis" Leibniz discounted out of hand four
categorical propositions that would have considerably broadened the
resultant syllogistic logic. He did this despite the facts both that he had
devised a suitable manner for expressing the latent quantification over
terms, and that he had reasoned adequately to determine which of the
syllogisms in the resulting broadened logic were valid. Leibniz's
reasons for discounting these non-standard propositions are shown to
be inadequate, and the resultant syllogistic logic is outlined."
Hernández Márquez, Víctor Manuel. 1999. "Leibniz Y La Lingua
Characterica." Dianoia no. 45:35-63.
Ibáñez, Alejandro Herrera. 1982. "La Logica Intensional De Leibniz."
Dianoia no. 28:141-154.
"Couturat's and the Kneales' view that Leibniz's logic was extensional
is examined and rejected. Some misreadings of Leibniz's texts by C. I.
Lewis are exhibited. It is shown that for Leibniz "ens" does not mean
"existens" but "possible". O'Briant's reply to Parkinson's intensional
reading of Leibniz is rejected, and an attempt is made to ground
Leibniz's intensional logic in his ontology of possible worlds and
entities."
Imaguire, Guido. 2006. "A Crítica De Russell À Concepção
944
Leibniziana Das Relações." Manuscrito.Revista Internacional de
"Against the monistic conception of relations that he imputed to
Leibniz, Russell defended the reality, externality and irreducibility of
relations. For Russell, relations are objective and not merely mental
entities; they are not always essential to the individuation of an entity;
and propositions of the relational form cannot be reduced to subject-
predicate propositions. My primary aim in this article is the analysis of
Russell's arguments for this triple thesis. We can say that Russell was
primarily concerned with issues of logic, and because of this
misunderstood Leibniz's metaphysical perspective."
Ishiguro, Hidé. 1972. "Leibniz's Theory of the Ideality of Relations." In
Leibniz. A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Frankfurt, Harry,
191-213. New York: Doubleday.
———. 1981. Contingent Truths and Possible Worlds. Vol. Leibniz.
Metaphysics and philosophy of science. London: Oxford University
Press.
———. 1990. Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language.
Second revised edition.
First edition Lodon, Duckworth, 1972.
———. 2005. "Leibniz Et La Distinction Frégéenne Entre "Sens" Et
"Référence"." In Leibniz Et Les Puissances Du Langage, edited by
Berlioz, Dominique and Nef, Frédéric, 201-210. Paris: Vrin.
Kaehler, Klaus Erich. 1989. Leibniz' Position Der Rationalität. Die
Logik Im Metaphysischen Wissen Der "Natürlichen Vernunft".
Freiburg: Alber.
Kalinowski, Georges. 1977. "La Logique Juridique De Leibniz." Studia
"En fait, Leibniz a apporté à la logique juridique une double
contribution. D'une part, il a oeuvré à la maniere de ses devanciers et
contemporains (Everardus, Freigius, Otto, Schickhardus, Vigelius, etc.)
en formulant des règles d'interprétation juridique, en particulier les
règles de solution des cas difficiles ("de casibus perplexis") et les règles
à appliquer aux dispositions sous condition ("de conditionibus"). De
l'autre, il fait figure de novateur et de precurseur en decouvrant les
fondements logiques des inferences juridiques ("de legum
945
interpretatione, rationibus, applicatione, systemate"), en particulier les
principales thèses de la logique des normes ("elementa juris
naturalis")."
Kalinowski, Georges, and Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1974. "Un Logicien
Deontique Avant La Lettre: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz." Archiv für
Rechts und Sozialphilosophie no. 60:79-112.
"In their introduction the authors sketch the story of Robert Blanché's
rediscovery of Leibniz' texts containing his logic of norms. Then G.
Kalinowski analyses the Theoremata qvibus combinantur iuris modalia
inter se (he draws from them Leibniz' theory of opposition of deontic
statements, based on the analogy between these statements and the
modal ones) and J.-L. Gardies studies the Theoremata qvibus
combinantur iuris modalibus logicis."
Karofsky, Amy. 1999. "The Primitiveness of Leibnizian Alethic
Modalities." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 16:297-320.
Kauppi, Raili. 1960. "Über Die Leibnizsche Logik Mit Besonderer
Berücksichtigung Des Problems Der Intension Und Extension." Acta
Philosophica Fennica no. 12.
Reprint: New York, Garland, 1985
———. 1968. "Substitutivity Salva Veritate in Leibniz." Ratio no.
10:141-149.
"Problems concerning substitutivity are discussed in the light of
examples from Leibniz, Frege, Carnap, Mates, Putnam. Leibniz
reduced truth to interconceptual relations, which accordingly must not
be changed by substitutions salva veritate. In moderm logic "salva
veritate" has an entirely different meaning. Attempts to formulate
conditions of substitutivity, applicable e. g. to belief sentences of
everyday language, in terms of intensional isomorphy, are criticized.
heir failing depends on the fact that a substitution salva veritate in such
a sentence presupposes empirical knowledge, not expressed by this
sentence, about the linguistic usage, theknowledge, the opinions, etc. of
the person concerned."
Knapp, Hans Georg. 1978. "Notwendige Und Zufallige Wahrheiten:
Die Summierung Unendlicher Reihen Im Lichte Der Leibnizschen
Begriffslogik." Studia Leibnitiana no. 10:60-86.
"I want to show that Leibnizian mode to thinking is based in a kind of
logic of concepts. As an example, his first attempt to sum infinite series
946
is analyzed. The question concerning the justification of the Leibnizian
syllogism leads to the analysis of the fundamental definition. A
conclusion obtained by "real-definitions" ("realdefinitionen") is
logically justified. It is classified as a "vernunftwahrheit." A conclusion
obtained by paradoxical definitions ("paradoxe definitionen") is
classified as a "tatsachenwahrheit." according to Leibniz it has validity
by contingency. A conclusion obtained by "impossible definitions" is
logically unjustified."
See: Chapter V. Logic after the Renaissance: § 2. The interests of
Leibniz (p. 320-336) and § 3. Leibniz's Calculus de Continentibus et
Contentis (pp. 336-345).
Knecht, Herbert. 1981. La Logique Chez Leibniz. Éssai Sur Le
Rationalisme Baroque. Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme.
Krajewski, Wladyslaw. 2001. "Aristotelian and Leibnizian Concepts of
Possibility." In Aristotle and Contemporary Science. Vol. 2, edited by
Sfendoni-Mentzou, Demetra, Hattiangadi, Jagdish and Johnson, David
M., 51-56. Bern: Peter Lang.
RELATED PAGES
Second Part of the Bibliography: L - Z
Leibniz on Ontology and Metaphysics (under construction)
947
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Leibniz on Logic, Language and

Semiotics. Annotated bibliography
(Second Part: L - Z)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lenders, Winfried. 1971. Die Analytische Begriffs- Und Urteilstheorie
Von G.W. Leibniz Und Chr. Wolff. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Lenzen, Wolfgang. 1983. "Leibniz Und Die Entwicklung Der
Modernen Logik." In Leibniz, Werk Und Wirkung. Iv. Internationaler
Leibniz-Kongress (Hannover, 14 - 19 November 1983), 418-425.
Hannover: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Gesellschaft.
Reprinted in revised form in: W. Lenzen - Calculus Universalis (2004)
pp. 15-22
———. 1983. "Zur 'Extensionalen' Und 'Intensionalen' Interpretation
Der Leibnizschen Logik." Studia Leibnitiana no. 15:129-148.
pp. 23-46.
"Against the prevailing opinion expressed, e.g., by L. Couturat it is
argued that the so-called "intensional" point of view which Leibniz
mostly preferred to the nowadays usual extensional interpretation is
neither "confuse et vague" nor may it be made responsible for the
948
alleged "échec final de son système" (Couturat, La logique de Leibniz,
387). We present a precise definition of an "intensional" semantics
which reflects the Leibnizian ideas and which may be proven to be
equivalent to standard extensional semantics."
———. 1984. "'Unbestimmte Begriffe' Bei Leibniz." Studia
pp. 99-131.
"In many of his logical writings, G. W. Leibniz makes use of two kinds
of symbols: while a, b, c,...stand for certain determinate or definite
concepts, x, y, z,...are referred to as "indefinite concepts." We
investigate the various roles played by these variables and show: I) that
their most important function consists in serving as (hidden)
quantifiers; II) that Leibniz's elliptic representation of the quantifiers
(both universal and existential) by means of two sorts of "indefinite
concepts" leads to certain difficulties; III) that despite these problems
Leibniz anticipated the most fundamental logical principles for the
quantifiers and may thus be viewed as a forerunner of modern predicate
logic."
———. 1984. "Leibniz Und Die Boolesche Algebra." Studia
pp. 47-64.
"It is well known that in his logical writings Leibniz typically
disregarded the operation of (conceptual) disjunction, confining himself
to the theory of conjunction and negation. Now, while this fact has
been interpreted by Couturat and others as indicating a serious
incompleteness of the Leibnizian calculus, it is shown in this paper that
actually Leibniz's conjunction-negation logic, with 'est ens', i.e., 'is
possible' as an additional (although definable) logical operator, is
provably equivalent (or isomorphic) to Boolean algebra. Moreover,
already in the "Generales inquisitiones" of 1686 Leibniz had
established all basic principles that are necessary for a complete
axiomatization of "Boolean" (or better: Leibnizian) algebra. In this
sense Leibniz should be acknowledged as the true inventor of the
algebra of sets."
———. 1986. "'Non Est' Non Est 'Est Non'. Zu Leibnizens Theorie Der
949
Negation." Studia Leibnitiana no. 18:1-37.
pp. 133-179.
pp. "Leibniz's development of a "calculus universalis" stands and falls
with his theory of negation. During the entire period of the elaboration
of the algebra of concepts, L1, Leibniz had to struggle hard to grasp the
difference between propositional and conceptual negation. Within the
framework of (scholastic) syllogistic, this difference seems to disappear
because 'omne a non b' may be taken to be equivalent to 'omne a est
non-b'. Within the "universal calculus", however, the informal
quantifier expression 'omne' is to be dropped. Accordingly, 'a non est b'
expresses only the propositional negation of (the U A) 'a est b' and is
hence logically weaker than (the U N) 'a est non-b'. Besides Leibniz's
cardinal error of confusing propositional and conceptual negation the
following issues are dealth with in this paper: "aristotelian" vs
"scholastic syllogistic; metalinguistic theory of the truth-predicate;
individual-concepts vs concepts in general."
———. 1987. "Leibniz's Calculus of Strict Implication." In Initiatives
in Logic, edited by Srzednicki, Jan, 1-35. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Translated in German and revised in: W. Lenzen - Calculus Universalis
(2004) pp. 281-308.
———. 1988. "Zur Einbettung Der Syllogistik in Leibnizens
'Allgemeinen Kalkül'." Studia Leibnitiana.Sonderheft no. 15:38-71.
pp. 181-216.
———. 1989. "Mögliche Individuen Und Mögliche Welten. Eine
Begriffslogische Axiomatisierung Der Leibnizschen Ontologie." In
Leibniz. Tradition Und Aktualität. V. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress
(Hannover, 14-19 November 1988), 464-470. Hannover: Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz Gesellschaft.
pp. 325-330.
———. 1989. "Concepts Vs. Predicates. Leibniz's Challenge to
Modern Logic." In The Leibniz Renaissance. International Workshop,
Firenze, 2-5 Giugno 1986, 153-172. Firenze: Olschki.
———. 1989. "Arithmetical Vs. 'Real' Addition. A Case Study of the
950
Relation between Logic, Mathematics, and Metaphysics in Leibniz." In
Leibnizian Inquiries. A Group of Essays, edited by Rescher, Nicholas,
149-157. Lanham: University Press of America.
———. 1989. "Arithmetizismus, Oder Wie Man Die Mengenlehre Aus
Dem Kleinen Einmaleins Ableitet." In Traditionen Und Perspektiven
Der Analytischen Philosophie. Festschrift Für Rudolf Haller, edited by
Wolfgang, Gombocz, Rutte, Heiner and Sauer, Werner, 462-473. Wien:
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
pp. 217-227.
———. 1990. Das System Der Leibnizschen Logik. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Inhalt: Vorwort VII; Danksagung XIII; Leseanweisung XV-XVI; 1.
Syllogisti 1; 2. Die Algebra der Begriffe 28; 3. Quantorenlogik 84; 4.
Syllogistik im allgemeinen Kalkül 122; 5. Satzlogik 159; 6. Metaphysik
178; Verzeichnis der Formeln 213; Verzeichnis dr Zitate 225;
Sachverzeichnis 231-235.
———. 1990. "Precis of the History of Logic from the Point of View
of the Leibnizian Calculus." In Estudios De Historia De La Lógica.
Actas Del Ii Simposio De Historia De La Lógica, Universidad De
Navarra, Pamplona, 25-27 De Mayo De 1987, edited by Angelelli,
Ignacio and D'Ors, Angel, 13-38. Pamplona: Ediciones Eunate.
———. 1990. "On Leibniz's Essay 'Mathesis Rationis' (Critical Edition
and Commentary)." Topoi no. 9:29-59.
———. 1991. "Leibniz on Privative and Primitive Terms."
6:83-96.
"We first present an edition of the manuscript LH VII, B2 39, in which
Leibniz develops a new formalism in order to give rigorous definitions
of positive, of private, and of primitive terms. This formalism involves
a symbolic treatment of conceptual quantification which differs quite
considerably from Leibniz's "standard" theory of "indefinite concepts"
as developed, e.g., in the "General Inquiries".In the subsequent
commentary, we give an interpretation and a critical evaluation of
Leibniz's symbolic apparatus. It turns out that the definition of privative
terms and primitive terms lead to certain inconsistencies which,
however, can be avoided by slight modifications."
———. 1991. "Leibniz on Ens and Existence." In Existence and
951
Explanation. Essays Presented in Honor of Karel Lambert, edited by
Lambert, Karel, Spohn, Wolfgang, Fraassen, Bas C.van and Skyrms,
Bryan, 59-75. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Translated in German as: 'Ens' und 'existens' bei Leibniz in: W. Lenzen
- Calculus Universalis (2004) pp. 75-98
———. 1995. "Frege Und Leibniz." In Logik Und Mathematik. Frege-
Kolloquium Jena 1993, edited by Ingolf, Max and Stelzner, Werner,
pp. 65-74.
"In the essay "Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift" of 1880
and in the posthumously published paper "Ueber den Zweck der
Begriffsschrift" Gottlob Frege had briefly discussed the main elements
of Leibniz's logic. By way of comparison with Boole's logic, Frege
came to interpret Leibniz's expressions ens' and non ens' as equivalent
to Boole's 1' (= universe of discourse) and 0' (= empty domain),
respectively. This interpretation is not fully warranted, however. A
closer examination of Leibniz's formal representation of the categorical
forms in terms of ens' and non ens' reveals that A est ens' does not
mean that (the extension of) concept A is equal to 1. Instead it only
says that (the extension of) A in nonempty or--from an "intensional"
point of view--that concept A is self-consistent."
———. 2000. "Wenn 0=1, Dann Ist Die, 'Reine Inhaltslogik'
Unmöglich. Bemerkungen Zu Liskes Kritik Der Leibnizschen
Begriffstheorie." Studia Leibnitiana no. 32:105-116.
"In a 1994 paper entitled Ist eine reine Inhaltslogik möglich?, M. Liske
attempted to show that Leibniz's theory of intensional concepts suffers
from a serious inadequacy. Liske begins by defining the intension of a
concept in two slightly different ways. Broadly conceived, Int(A) is the
set of all concepts B which are contained in A, while in a narrow sense,
Int(A) consists of all such B other than A itself."
———. 2000. "Guilielmi Pacidii Non Plus Ultra, Oder: Eine
Rekonstruktion Des Leibnizschen Plus-Minus-Kalküls." Logical
Analysis and History of Philosophy no. 3:71-118.
pp. 229-279.
"In the first part of this paper a short review of the recently published
952
4th volume of Series 6 (Philosophical Writings) of the Akademie-
Ausgabe of Leibniz's Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe is given. This
3,000-page volume was edited by the Leibniz-Forschungsstelle in
Münster, Germany. It contains unsurpassable, text-critical versions of
more than 500 pieces which Leibniz composed between 1677 and
1690. One major topic dealt with in these essays is "Scientia Generalis,
Characteristica, Calculus Universalis". Here we find in particular
various fragments of a logical calculus that Leibniz developed around
1687. The main part of this paper presents a detailed reconstruction of
this so-called "plus-minus-calculus" which, by way of its somewhat
unorthodox operators of "addition" and "subtraction", inclusion and
identity, "communication", "commune" and "nothing", provides an
interesting alternative to the Boolean algebra of sets."
———. 2001. "Zur Logik Alethischer Und Deontischer Modalitäten
Bei Leibniz." In Zwischen Traditioneller Und Moderner Logik.
Nichtklassische Ansätze, edited by Stelzner, Werner and Stöckler,
Manfred, 335-351. Paderborn: Mentis.
pp. 309-324.
———. 2003. "Grundfragen Des Logischen Kalküls. Eine Art
Rezension Von F. Schupp (Hrg.), G. W. Leibniz, Die Grundlagen Des
Logischen Kalküls." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 24:141-162.
———. 2004. Calculus Universalis. Studien Zur Logik Von G. W.
Leibniz. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Inhaltverzeichnis: Vorwort 5; 1. Leibniz und die (Entwicklung der)
moderne(n) Logik 15; 2 Zur extensionalen und "intensionalen"
Interpretation der Leibnizschen Logik 23; 3. Leibniz und die Boolesche
Algebra 47; 4 Frege und Leibniz 65; 5 'Ens' und 'existens' bei Leibniz
75; 6. "Unbestimmte Begriffe" bei Leibniz 99; 7 'Non est' non est 'est
non' - Zu Leibniz' Theorie der Negation 133; 8. Zur Einbettung der
Syllogistik in Leibniz' "Allgemeinen Kalkül" 181; 9. Arithmetizismus,
oder: Wie Leibniz die Mengenlehre aus dem kleinen Einmaleins
ableitet 217; 10. Guilielmi Pacidii Non plus ultra 229; 11. Leibni'
Kalkül der strikten Implikation 281; 12. Zur Logik alethischer und
deontischer Modalitäten bei Leibniz 309; 13. Mögliche Individuen und
mögliche Welten - Eine begrifflogische Reknstruktionen von Leibniz'
Ontologie 325; 14. Leibniz' ontologischer Gottesbeweis und das
953
Problems de unmöglichen Dinge 331; 15 Anhänge 343;
Literaturverzeichnis 367; Personenverzeichnis 373; Sachverzeichnis
376-380.
"This book is a collection of essays published by the author in the long
run of 1 about 20 years and is centered on the reconstruction of
Leibniz's logical calculi. All the essays have been revised for the
present edition and some of them constituted the background for
Lenzen's first monograph on Leibniz's logic (Das System der
Leibnizschen Logik, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 1990). A feature
common to all these essays is the vindication of the relevance and
originality of Leibniz's logical achievements. Lenzen manifests strong
dissatisfaction with the evaluations of Leibniz's logic previously
offered by interpreters like Louis Couturat, Clarence I. Lewis, Karl
Dürr, William and Martha Kneale, and states that till now Leibniz's
results in the field of logic have been widely underestimated (p. 22).
The book contains a careful and detailed examination of almost all
Leibniz's papers on the logical calculus and it is based on the
knowledge of a wide range of texts unknown (or only partially known)
to previous interpreters. Lenzen's acquaintance with the entire corpus of
Leibniz's logical texts (including a number of relevant manuscripts) is
impressive. Some chapters of the book in particular contain very solid
and useful logical analyses. Chapter 7, for instance, includes the most
profound account of Leibniz's theory of negation I ever read. Chapter 8
presents in a very clear way Leibniz's attempt to reduce traditional
syllogistic to a calculus based on logical inclusion between terms.
Chapter 14 is devoted to Leibniz's a priori proof of the existence of
God and presents the first edition of an important manuscript on the
proof. On chapters 3 and 5 a series of convincing reasons are given to
argue that Leibniz's concept of ens does not have to be considered a
constant in the logical calculus. In brief: this work discusses a wide
range of topics in such a clear and learned way that it will surely
become a reference book for scholars interested in the study of
Leibniz's logical papers in the forthcoming years."
From the Review of the book by Massimo Mugnai - The Leibniz
Review - vol. 15, 2005, pp. 169-181
———. 2004. "Leibniz's Logic." In The Rise of Modern Logic: From
Leibniz to Frege, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 1-83.
954
———. 2004. "Logical Criteria for Individual (Concepts)." In
Individuals, Minds and Bodies: Themes from Leibniz, edited by
Carrara, Massimiliano, Nunziante, Antonio-Maria and Tomasi,
Gabriele, 87-107. Stuttgart: Steiner.
Studia Leibnitiana. Sonderhefte 32
———. 2005. "Leibniz on Alethic and Deontic Modal Logic." In
Leibniz Et Les Puissances Du Langage, edited by Berlioz, Dominique
and Nef, Frédéric, 341-362. Paris: Vrin.
Levey, Samuel. 2002. "Leibniz and the Sorites." Leibniz Review no.
12:25-49.
Lewis, Clarence Irving. 1918. A Survey of Symbolic Logic. Berkeley:
See Chapter I. The development of symbolic logic pp. 1-117. (On
Leibniz pp. 5-18 and Appendix. Two fragments from Leibniz pp. 373-
388).
Reprinted New York, Dover Publishing 1960, with the omission of
chapter V and VI.
Madouas, Sébastien. 1999. "L'adam Vague Et La Constitution Des
Mondes Possibles: Une Pensée Modale De L'individu." In L'actualité
De Leibniz: Les Deux Labyrinthes, edited by Berlioz, Dominique and
Nef, Frédéric, 363-388. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Marchlewitz, Ingrid, and Heinekamp, Albert, eds. 1990. Leibniz'
Auseinandersetzung Mit Vorgängern Und Zeitgenossen. 27 ed.
Studia Leibnitiana. Sonderheft.
Martin, Gottfried. 1964. Leibniz: Logic and Metaphysics. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
German edition: Leibniz. Logik und Metaphysik - Berlin, de Gruyter
1967; reprint: New York, Garland, 1985
Mates, Benson. 1968. "Leibniz on Possible Worlds." In Logic,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Iii., edited by Rootselaar, Bob
van and Staal, Johan Frederik, 507-529. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Reprinted in: Harry Frankfurt (ed.) - Leibniz. A collection of critical
essays - New York, Doubleday, 1972, pp. 335-364 and in: Roger
Woolhouse (ed.) - Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Metaphysics and its
955
foundations - Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Critical assessments - Vol. I -
New York, Routledge, 1994, pp. 208-229.
———. 1979. "The Lingua Philosophica." Studia
Leibnitiana.Sonderheft no. 8:59-66.
McCadden, Carlos. 2001. "Leibniz's Principle of Contradiction Is Not
What Aristotle Called the Most Certain of All Principles." Aletheia.An
International Journal of Philosophy:469-485.
"The object of this article is to show that the principle of contradiction
in Leibniz is not the same principle that Aristotle called "the most
certain of all principles". The five parts of this study are as follows: the
first part shows the importance of the problem; the second is an exposé
of Aristotle's thought on "the most certain of all principles." The third
part treats of the principle of contradiction according to Leibniz; the
fourth compares the thought of the two philosophers and draws some
conclusions about the ramifications of their differences; the fifth part is
a summary."
Mertz, Donald. 1980. "Leibniz's Monadic Treatment of Relations."
Auslegung no. 7:256-269.
"Continuing in the line of Ishiguro and Hintikka, this paper explicates
further the form of Leibniz's brief logical/syntactical program for
relations, and this is then contrasted with his metaphysical/semantical
treatment of them. The analysis shows a similar though not identical
treatment of relations under both programs. The similarity lies in
Leibniz's treating multi-term relations as one-term, monadic predicates
with all other term-places being either instantiated, or bound by
existential quantifiers, depending upon the program. Both programs
require Leibniz to introduce a new non-truth-functional, yet "relational"
connective between propositions."
Mondadori, Fabrizio. 1975. "Leibniz and the Doctrine of Inter-World
Identity." Studia Leibnitiana no. 7:22-57.
Reprinted in: R. Woolhouse (ed.) - Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Critical
Assessments, Volume 1 - New York, Routledge, 1994, pp. 256-289
———. 2003. "Leibniz on Compossibility: Some Scholastic Sources."
In The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal
Theory, 1400-1700, edited by Friedman, Russell L. and Nielsen, Luge
O., 309-338. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Moriconi, Enrico, and Offenberger, Niels. 1984. "Zur Frage Der Iv
956
Syllogistischen Figur in Der Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria: Eine
Jugendsunde Leibnizens?" Studia Leibnitiana no. 16:212-216.
"This paper is a discussion of Leibniz's juvenile thesis according to
which "quarta figura aeque bona est ac ipsa prima; imo si modo, non
praedicationis, ut vulgo solent, sed subjectionis, ut aristoteles, eam
enunciemus, ex IV fiet I et contra" (Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria,
25). The authors maintain that that thesis is syllogistically untenable,
since the reduction device Leibniz suggested does not change the
logical function of termini, but introduces a difference only from a
grammatical point of view."
Mugnai, Massimo. 1973. "Bertrand Russell E Il Problema Delle
Relazioni in Leibniz." Rivista di Filosofia no. 64:356-362.
———. 1976. Astrazione E Realtà. Saggio Su Leibniz. Milano:
Feltrinelli.
———. 1978. "Bemerkungen Zu Leibniz' Theorie Der Relationen."
Studia Leibnitiana no. 10:2-21.
"Many of the problems traditionally related to the interpretation of
Leibniz' theory of relations may be seen in a better light considering
essentially two factors: 1) the different plans (ontological,
metaphysical, psychological and logical-linguistic) implied by Leibniz
reflections on the subject; 2) the reference to scholastic and late-
scholastic texts read or consulted by Leibniz. Relations for Leibniz are,
from a metaphysical point of view, denominations only seemingly
external, they are in reality "denominationes intrinsecae", and are
founded on the general connection of all things. From a psychological
point of view they are abstract entities that our mind builds by
resemblance. From an ontological point of view they are individual
accidents inherent to the substances. From a logical-linguistic point of
view they are abstract structures that connect the one to the other at
least two subjects. The propositions in which they appear, as for
example the proposition "Paris loves Helen" are transformed by
Leibniz in equivalent propositions joined by operators, which in
medieval logic were known as "termini reduplicantes" (terms which
define mostly intensional contexts)."
———. 1979. "Contesti Intensionali E Termini Reduplicativi Nella
Grammatica Rationalis Di Leibniz." Rivista di Filosofia no. 70:32-44.
———. 1990. "A Systematical Approach to Leibniz's Theory of
957
Relations and Relational Sentences." Topoi no. 9:61-81.
———. 1992. Leibniz's Theory of Relations. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Nef, Frédéric. 1999. "La Philosophie Modale De Leibniz Est-Elle
Cohérente?: Essai Sur Des Problèmes D'interprétation De Notions
Modales Leibniziennes À Propos Du Mythe De Sextus Et De L'oracle
De Kégila." In L'actualité De Leibniz: Les Deux Labyrinthes, edited by
Berlioz, Dominique and Nef, Frédéric, 277-305. Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner.
———. 2000. Leibniz Et Le Langage. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France.
———. 2005. "Accidents Et Relations Individuelles Che Leibniz.
Analyse Linguistique Et Formes Logiques." In Leibniz Et Les
Puissances Du Langage, edited by Berlioz, Dominique and Nef,
Frédéric, 125-139. Paris: Vrin.
Nelson, Alan. 2005. "Leibniz on Modality, Cognition, and Expression."
In A Companion to Rationalism, edited by Nelson, Alan. Malden:
Blackwell.
Noordraven, Andreas. 2001. "Leibniz' onto-Logik Und Die
Transzendentrale Logik Kants." In Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklarung.
Akten Des 9. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Band V: Sektionen Xv-
Xviii, edited by Gerhardt, Volker, Horstmann, Rolf-Peter and
Schumacher, Ralph, 55-64. Berlin: de Gruyter.
O'Briant, Walter H. 1967. "Leibniz's Preference for an Intensional
Logic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 8:254-256.
"G. H. R. Parkinson's contention that Leibniz was led to interpret his
logic intensionally because of his desire to deny existential import to
universal propositions is shown to be defective because (i) it disregards
evidence such as that from 'General investigations' (1686) that Leibniz
never adopted a definitive attitude on the issue of existential import and
(ii) misinterprets Leibniz's statement that "concepts do not depend upon
the existence of individuals". The author claims that Leibniz's
preference is based primarily on his doctrine that the basic relation
between concepts in a proposition is that of containment."
Padilla-Gálvez, Jesús. 1991. "Las Lógicas Modales En Confrontación
Con Los Conceptos Basicós De La Lógica Modal De G. W. Leibniz."
6:115-127.
958
"In the first section we examine Leibniz's "termini necesitas-
possibilitas". In the second section we propose a minimal modal logic,
L (subscript) LM, arises from the addition of modal principles. In the
final section we examine his complex study towards the interpretation
of modal language in the possible worlds. The resulting interplay
between the minimal modal logic and the possible world perspective is
one of the main charms of semantics."
———. 2001. "Modalisatoren Und Mögliche Welten in Den Logisch-
Semantischen Untersuchungen Um 1686." In Nihil Sine Ratione.
Mensch, Natur Und Technik Im Wirken Von G. W. Leibniz. Band 2,
edited by Poser, Hans, Asmuth, Christoph, Goldenbaum, Ursula and Li,
Wenchao, 926-933. Hannover: Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-
Gesellschaft.
Akten der VII. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress (Berlin, 10. - 14.
September 2001)
Parkinson, George H. 1965. Logic and Reality in Leibniz's
Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reprint: New York, Garland 1985
———. 1995. "Philosophy and Logic." In The Cambridge Companion
to Leibniz, edited by Jolley, Nicholas, 199-223. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Patzig, Günther. 1969. "Leibniz, Frege Und Die Sogennante 'Lingua
Characteristica Universalis'." Studia Leibnitiana.Sonderheft:103-112.
Akten des Internationale Leibniz-Kongresses Hannover 14-19
November 1966 - Vol. 3: Erkenntnislehre, Logik, Sprachphilosophie,
Editionsberichte
Peckhaus, Volker. 1997. Logik, Mathesis Universalis Und Allgemeine
Wissenschaft. Leibniz Und Die Wiederentdeckung Der Formalen Logik
Im 19. Jahrundert. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Contents: Vorwort VII-VIII; 1. Einleitung 1; 2. Die Idee der mathesis
universalis bei Leibniz 25; 3. Die frühe Rezeption Leibnizscher
mathesis universalis und Logik 64; 4. Die "logische Frage" und die
Entdeckung der Leibnizschen Logik 130; 5. Leibniz und die englische
Algebra der Logik 185; 6. Ernst Schröder: "Absolute Algebra" und
Leibnizprogramm 233; 7. Schluss 297; Verzeichnisse 309-412.
———. 2002. "Die Entdeckung Der Leibnizschen Logik." In Medium
Mathematik. Anregungen Zu Einem Interdisziplinären
959
Gedankenaustausch. Band 1, edited by Löffladt, Günter and Toepell,
Michael, 149-169. Hildesheim: Franzbecker.
———. 2004. "Calculus Ratiocinator Versus Characteristica
Universalis? The Two Traditions in Logic, Revisited." History and
Peña, Lorenzo. 1991. "De La Logique Combinatoire Des 'Generales
Inquisitiones' Aux Calculs Combinatoires Contemporains."
6:129-159.
"In his 1686 essay, Leibniz undertook to reduce sentences to noun-
phrases, truth to being. Such a reduction arose from his equating proof
with conceptual analysis. Within limits, Leibniz's logical calculus
provides a reasonable way of surmounting the dichotomy, thus
allowing a reduction of hypothetical to categorical statements. However
it yields the disastrous result that whenever A is possible and so is B
there can be an entity being both A and B. Yet, Leibniz was the
forerunner of twentieth century combinatory logic, which
(successfully!) practices -- sometimes for reasons not entirely unlike
Leibniz's own grounds -- reductions of the same kinds he tried to carry
out."
Plaisted, Dennis. 2002. Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations.
Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
Pombo, Olga. 1987. Leibniz and the Problem of a Universal Language.
Münster: Nodus Publikationen.
———. 1990. "The Leibnizian Theory of Representativity of the Sign."
In History and Historiography of Linguistics. Vol. Ii, edited by
Niederehe, Hans-Joseph and Koerner, Konrad, 447-459. Philadelphia:
John Benjamins.
———. 1990. "Comparative Lines between Leibniz's Theory of
Language and Spinoza's Reflexions on Language Themes." Studia
Spinozana no. 6:147-177.
———. 1996. "Leibnizian Strategies for the Semantical Foundation of
the Universal Language." In Im Spiegel Des Verstandes. Studien Zu
Leibniz, edited by Dutz, Klaus D. and Gensini, Stefano, 161-171.
Münster: Nodus Publikationen.
———. 1998. "La Théorie Leibnizienne De La Pensée Aveugle En
Tant Que Perspective Sur Quelques-Unes Des Apories Linguistiques
960
De La Modernité." Cahiers Ferdinand Saussure no. 51:63-75.
Poser, Hans. 1969. "Zum Logischen Und Inhaltlichen Zusammenhang
Der Modalbegriffe Bei Leibniz." Kant Studien no. 60:436-451.
Rabouin, David. 2005. "Logique, Mathémathique Et Imagination Dans
La Philosophie De Leibniz." Corpus.Revue de Philosophie no. 49:165-
198.
Rauzy, Jean-Baptiste. 1995. ""Quid Sit Natura Prius"? La Conception
Leibnizienne De L'ordre." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no.
98:31-48.
"It is well known that Leibniz's logic is grounded in the inherence of
the predicate in the subject and in the compossibility of notions. It
naturally stresses, therefore, relations of equivalence, rather than of
order. Nevertheless, Leibniz provided a logical analysis of order, i.e.,
an account of the meaning of "prior", "subsequent", "concomitant". His
account comprises three points: 1) Given two beings, the one that is
more simple (i.e., the one whose analysis requires less operations of the
mind) is prior by nature ("natura prius"); hence, concomitant ("simul")
being. 2) The degree of composition of being corresponds to its degree
of perfection. Hence, prior beings being simpler, subsequent beings are
more perfect. 3) Given two beings such that one is simpler and the
other more perfect, they differ temporally if they also contradict each
other; conversely, two compossible beings contradict each other if, and
only if, they are not simultaneous (i.e., if they do not belong to the
same "state of the universe"). It will be shown that this relation makes it
possible to characterize the axiomatic order of incomplete notions (in
the field of the "mathesis universalis"). But the attempt to explain the
terms prius, posterius and simul in a metaphysical manner, i.e., by
laying the stress on the order among substances, raises grave
philosophical problems."
———. 2001. La Doctrine Leibnizienne De La Verité. Aspects
Logiques Et Ontologiques. Paris: Vrin.
"Jean-Baptiste Rauzy writes here on Leibniz's theory of truth, construed
broadly, mostly in Leibniz's earlier periods (to 1686). He focuses
mostly on Leibniz's logical theory, particularly as given in the logical
papers, published only with Couturat and others, in 1901 and following.
Unlike a lot of the secondary literature, Rauzy's book gives much detail
about how Leibniz's various logical models work out and apply to more
961
general issues such as the reduction of relations, the ontological square
(first given in Aristotle's Categories 2), haecceity, and the problem of
universals.
In addition to using the full opera of Leibniz, Rauzy incorporates a
wide range of sources into his discussion: the secondary literature on
Leibniz; Leibniz's contemporaries and predecessors, including not
merely those like Malebranche and Hobbes, but also Marius Nizolius,
Joachim Jungius, Francisco Suarez, and Thomas Aquinas. For he
contends that, as in metaphysics, Leibniz in logic looks to the past,
despite what some have thought (pp. 10, 14-16)." (from the review by
Allan Bäck - Review of Metaphysics - March 2003)
Rescher, Nicholas. 1954. "Leibniz's Interpretation of His Logical
Calculi." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 19:1-13.
Reprinted in: N: Rescher - Nicholas Rescher collected papers. Vol. 10.
Studies in the history of logic - Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006, 141-157
Rijen, Jeroen van. 1989. "Some Misconceptions About Leibniz and the
Calculi of 1679." Studia Leibnitiana no. 21:196-204.
"In the April papers of 1679 Leibniz expounds an arithmetical model of
the logic of categorical sentences. In later works one hardly finds any
remaining trace of this project. This fact gave rise to the question why
Leibniz abandoned his views of 1679. Several answers have been
given. In this paper it is shown that all these answers are wrong and,
moreover, that the question itself is pointless. It is argued that, although
the arithmetical calculi are defective, Leibniz never abandoned them.
Instead, he looked upon them as equivalent alternatives to his later
deduction-theoretic representations of the same logic."
Risse, Wilhelm. 1969. "Die Characteristica Universalis Bei Leibniz."
Studi Internazionali di Filosofia no. 1:107-116.
———. 1969. "Zur Klassifiezierung Der Urteile Und Schlüsse Durch
Leibniz." Studia Leibnitiana no. 1:23-53.
Robinet, André. 2000. "Leibniz Et La Logique De Port-Royal." Revue
des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques no. 84:69-81.
"L'oeuvre de Leibniz comporte de multiples impacts, soit des
circonstances historiques qui ont présidé à la composition de la
Logique, soit au sujet des analyses de contenu. Au fond, l'œuvre
combinatoire et la requête vers une mathesis divina commence (le De
Arte combinatoria est de 1666) dès les premières éditions de l'Art de
962
penser qui s'en tient à la mathesis universalis, faute de s'intéresser aux
structures internes de l'incompréhensible que l'infinitisme permet
d'aborder intelligiblement. Aussi le choc est-il constant à travers toutes
les relations épistolaires entre Leibniz et Arnauld. "
———. 2002. "Lexicographie Et Caractéristique Universelle." In
Neuzeitliches Denken. Festschrift Für Hans Poser Zum 65. Geburtstag,
edited by Abel, Günter, Engfer, Hans-Jürgen and Hubig, Christoph,
"Les questions leibniziennes relatives à la 'caractéristique universelle'
ont été amplement étudiées dans les travaux publiés par H. Poser. Est-
ce que la lexicographie statistique, telle qu'elle s'est développée au
cours de notre Informatikzeitalter, est susceptible de contribuer à
l'édification du grand projet de Leibniz? Ces procédures linguistiques,
hautement mathématiques et technologiques, sont survenues dans la
lignée même des objectifs dégagés à partir du calcul binaire, des calculs
statistiques et probabilitaires, dans la direction d'une simulation
cybernétique des procédures pensantes. La machine à calculer en
fonction de la table pythagoricienne des nombres ne pouvait être qu'une
approximation de ce qui deviendrait réalisable à partir de la
Dualzahltheorie. Mais une table combinatoire des concepts était d'une
toute autre envergure et exigeait d'abord qu'on dominât la genèse et la
composition des langues pour en venir à une logique des pensées. Il
fallait, pour cela, résoudre d'abord le problème du signifiant,
corollairement au problème des signes qui seraient mis en regard. La
signification devenait ainsi l'étude du rapport possible entre un signifié
de nature réelle ou conceptuelle et un signifiant naturel ou artificiel.
Indépendamment des considérations concernant les langues
vernaculaires et leurs éventuelles correspondances (cf. des opérations
leibniziennes comme 'pater noster' ou 'langue commune'), Leibniz se
meut à trois niveaux quand il approche la question de la caractéristique
universelle: 1)inventer des procédures sémiotiques pour en rendre le
contenu opérationnel; 2) dégager les notions-clés d'une sémantique
générale; 3) examiner si, sur ce trajet constructif, intervient cette autre
discipline scientifique leibnizienne qu'est la recherche d'une langue
primitive. En un mot, est-ce que les procédures d'une caractéristique
universelle convergent vers les fonctions qu'on peut observer dans la
primitivité expressive du langage?"
963
Rochhausen, Rudolf. 1997. "Leibniz Und Die Einheit Von Logik,
Kombinatorik Und Erkenntnis." In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.
Wissenschaftliche Methoden Heute, edited by Heinz, Melitta and
Reiprich, Kurt, 21-34. Leipzig: Rohrbacher Kreis.
Roncaglia, Gino. 1988. "Modality in Leibniz' Essays on Logical
Calculus of April 1679." Studia Leibnitiana no. 20:43-62.
Ross, George MacDonald. 1981. "Logic and Ontology in Leibniz."
Studia Leibnitiana.Sonderheft no. 9:20-26.
Rossi, Jean-Gérard. 1997. "Sur Deux Types De Rapport Entre Sujets Et
Prédicats Dans La Philosophie Leibnizienne." Studia Leibnitiana no.
29:103-111.
Rossi, Paolo. 1989. "The Twisted Roots of Leibniz' Characteristic." In
The Leibniz Renaissance, 271-289. Firenze: Olschki.
———. 2000. Logic and the Art of Memory. The Quest for a Universal
Language. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Translated from Italian with an introduction by Stephen Clucas.
First edition: Clavis universalis. Arti mnemoniche e logica
combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz - Napoli, Ricciardi, 1960; Second
revised edition: Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983.
See in particular Chapter VII. The construction of a universal language
pp. 145-175 and VIII. The sources of Leibni'z universal character pp.
176-193
Royse, James R. 1980. "Leibniz and the Reducibility of Relations to
Properties." Studia Leibnitiana no. 12:179-204.
"On the basis of his remarks concerning metaphysics and logic, the
thesis that relations are reducible to properties has often been ascribed
to Leibniz. Russell and others have opposed this thesis, primarily by
reference to asymmetrical relations and several precise formulations of
the thesis prove in fact to be false. However, Leibniz's ontology may be
seen as justifying a version of type theory, in which one form of
reducibility can be demonstrated. The method used here shows also
how two monads, each possible in itself, are not able to exist together,
and thus how incompossibility can arise."
Russell, Bertrand. 1900. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of
Leibniz. With an Appendix of Leading Passages. London: Routledge.
Second edition with a new preface 1937; reprint: New York, Cosimo
Classics, 2008
964
Rutherford, Donald. 1988. "Truth, Predication and Complete Concept
of an Individual Substance." In Leibniz. Questions De Logique, edited
by Heinekamp, Albert, 130-144. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag.
———. 1995. "Philosophy and Language in Leibniz." In The
Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, edited by Jolley, Nicholas, 224-269.
Sainati, Vittorio. 1970. "Sulla Logica Leibniziana." Filosofia no.
21:221-258.
———. 1986. "Leibniz E La Verità." Teoria no. 6:81-137.
———. 1989. "Verità E Modalità in Leibniz." In Le Teorie Delle
Modalità. Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica,
edited by Corsi, Giovanni, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo,
113-120. Bologna: CLUEB.
Sanchez-Maza, Miguel. 1991. "Actualisation, Developpement Et
Perfectionnement Des Calculs Logiques Arithmetico-Intensionnels De
Leibniz." Theoria.Revista de Teoria, Historia y Fundamentos de la
Ciencia no. 6:175-259.
Scheine, Erhard. 1990. "Calculemus! Das Problem Der Anwendung
Von Logik Und Mathematik." In Leibniz' Auseinandersetzung Mit
Vorgängern Und Zeitgenossen, edited by Heinekamp, Albert and
Marchlewitz, Ingrid, 200-216. Stuttgart: F. Steiner.
Schmidt, Franz. 1966. "Die Symbolisierten Elemente Der Leibnizschen
Logik." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung no. 20:595-605.
Schneider, Martin. 1995. "Weltkonstitution Durch Logische Analyse:
Kritische Uberlegungen Zu Leibniz Und Carnap." Studia Leibnitiana
no. 27:67-84.
"The question of the possibility of a world-constitution by logical
analysis (i.e., as to the extent the ontological problem of the
explanation of the structure of the real world by logical means can be
achieved) is exemplarily investigated for two philosophers. Both of
them try to the same extent to solve the problem in the context of a
universal method (Einheitswissenschaft, scientia generalis') founded on
the basis of formal logic, while each of them follows opposing aims: on
the one hand the foundation (Leibniz), on the other the elimination
(Carnap) of metaphysics by logical analysis of language."
Schulz, Dietrich J. 1970. "Die Funktionen Analytischer Sätze in
965
Leibniz's Frühen Entwürfen Zur Characteristik." Studia Leibnitiana no.
2:127-134.
Schupp, Franz. 1982. "Einleitung." In Generales Inquisitiones De
Analysi Notionum Et Veritatum / Allgemeine Untersuchungen Über Die
Analyse Der Begriffe Und Wahrheiten, VII-XXXV. Hamburg: Meiner.
———. 2000. "Einleitung." In Die Grundlagen Des Logischen Kalkül,
VII-LXXXIV. Hamburg: Meiner.
See in particular 5. Grundprobleme pp. XX-LXXX and 6. Zur
Geschichte der Leibniz-Programms LXXXI-LXXXIV.
Shim, Michael. 2004. "Leibniz and Modal Realism." In Aufklärung
Durch Kritik. Festschrift Für Manfred Baum Zum 65. Geburtstag,
edited by Baum, Manfred, Hüning, Dieter, Michel, Karin and Thomas,
Andreas, 95-111. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Skosnik, Jeffrey. 1980. "Leibniz and Russell on Existence and
Quantification Theory." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 10:681-
720.
Sommers, Fred. 1976. "Leibniz's Program for the Development of
Logic." In Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, edited by Cohen, Robert,
Feyerabend, Paul and Wartofsky, Marx, 589-615. Dordrecht: Reidel
Publishing Company.
Boston studies in the philosophy of science Vol. 39
———. 1976. "Frege or Leibniz?" In Studies on Frege. Logic and
Semantics, edited by Schirn, Matthias, 11-34. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:
Frommann-Holzboog.
Volume III
Sotirov, Vladimir. 1999. "Arithmetizations of Syllogistic À La
Leibniz." Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics no. 9:387-405.
———. 2001. "Leibniz's Logical Systems: A Contemporary View." In
Nihil Sine Ratione. Mensch, Natur Und Technik Im Wirken Von G. W.
Leibniz. Band 3, edited by Poser, Hans, Asmuth, Christoph,
Goldenbaum, Ursula and Li, Wenchao, 1213-1220. Hannover:
Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft.
Spruit, Leen. 1990. "Reasoning and Computation in Leibniz." History
and Philosophy of Logic no. 11:1-14.
"Leibniz's overall view of the relationship between reasoning and
computation is discussed on the basis of two broad claims that one
finds in his writings, concerning respectively the nature of human
966
reasoning and the possibility of replacing human thinking by a
mechanical procedure. A joint examination of these claims enables one
to appreciate the wide scope of Leibniz's interests for mechanical
procedures, concerning a variety of philosophical themes further
developed both in later logical investigations and in methodological
contributions to cognitive psychology."
Swoyer, Chris. 1994. "Leibniz's Calculus of Real Addition." Studia
"I examine what is probably Leibniz's most complete logical system
and show that it is well- developed formal logic with a number of
original and important features. Among other things, Leibniz discusses
alternative interpretations of his system, provides detailed proofs of
over twenty theorems about (what are now known as) semilattices and
shows their relevance to logic, and he develops what is probably the
first formal theory of the part- whole relation. I then show how
Leibniz's system illuminates other aspects of his logic and philosophy,
including his views on the structure of concepts and on infinite
analysis."
———. 1995. "Leibniz on Intension and Extension." Noûs no. 29:96-
114.
"Leibniz is well-known for his intensional interpretation of logic, but
he also discusses, and sometimes even employs, an extensional
approach. I examine Leibniz's views on intension, extension, and the
connections between them. I show that Leibnizian intensions and
extensions share a common structure that explains the relationships
among the various interpretations he proposes for his logics, that
because of this common structure extensions express intensions in
Leibniz's important, technical sense of expression, and that Leibniz's
views on intension and extension (in conjunction with his views about
truth) require that Leibnizian concepts be extensional."
Thiel, Christian. 1982. "From Leibniz to Frege: Mathematical Logic
between 1679 and 1879." In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science, Vi, edited by Cohen, Jonathan L., 755-770. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of logic. methodology
and philosophy of science, Hannover 1979.
Varani, Giovanna. 1995. "Ramistische Spuren in Leibniz' Gestaltung
967
Der Begriffe ,Dialectica', ,Topica' Und ,Ars Inveniendi'." Studia
"Vers la fin du XVIe siecle, le ramisme se repandit en Allemagne,
gagna un grand nombre de proselytes et fit preuve d'une remarquable
vitalite. L'histoire de ses effets constitue un interessant, neanmoins peu
recherché chapitre de l'historiographie de la philosophie, et la question
portant sur les "dettes" eventuelles de Leibniz envers le ramisme se
tiend au coeur de cet essai. En premier lieu, quelques caractères
théoriques du ramisme allemand et surtout du philippo-ramisme sont
mis en évidence, aprés cela on analyse l'emploi de Leibniz (jusqu'au
1680) des notion "dialectica", "topica" et "ars inveniendi" et l'on
decouvre une syntonisation conceptuelle entre cet emploi et la manière
de penser des ramistes. Sans en tirer des conclusions hasardeuses, on
peut comprendre le ramisme comme un ingrédient essentiel de l'univers
leibnizien complèxe et comme un thème de plus en plus important pour
Leibniz."
———. 1995. Leibniz E La "Topica" Aristotelica. Milano: IPL -
Istituto di Propaganda Libraria.
Velarde Lombraña, Julián. 2002. "Leibniz Y La Lógica."
Themata.Revista de Filosofia no. 29:217-231.
"This paper is a commented review of the studies about Leibniz's logic
made in Spain during the last thirty years. In order to achieve a better
treatment, I have divided the specific topics of Leibniz's logic in the
following sections: (1) Characteristica; (2) Universal Language; (3)
Calculi; (4) General Science (Encyclopaedia): Method of
Analysis/Synthesis; (5) Truth; (6) Panlogism."
Verburg, Pieter A. "The Idea of Linguistic System in Leibniz." In
History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, edited by
Parret, Herman, 593-615. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Vezeanu, Ion. 2006. "Les Lois Fondamentales De La Théorie De
L'identité Absolue." Logique et Analyse no. 49:169-190.
Walker, Daniel P. 1972. "Leibniz and Language." Journal of the
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes no. 35:294-307.
Reprinted in: D. P. Walker - Music, Spirit and Language in the
Renaissance - London, Variorum Reprints, 1985 and in: R. S.
Woolhouse - Leibniz. Critical assessments - Vol. III - New York,
Routledge, 1994, pp. 436-451
968
Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von, and Rudolph, Enno, eds. 1989. Zeit
Und Logik Bei Leibniz. Studien Zu Problemen Der Naturphilosophie,
Mathematik, Logik Und Metaphysik. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Wierzbicka, Anna. 2001. "Leibnizian Linguistics." In Perspectives on
Semantics, Pragmatics, and Discourse. A Festschrift for Ferenc Kiefer,
edited by Kenesei, István and Harnish, Robert M., 229-253.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Wilson, Margaret. 1969. "On Leibniz's Explication of "Necessary
Truth"." Studia Leibnitiana.Sonderheft:50-63.
Akten des Internationale Leibniz-Kongresses Hannover 14-19
November 1966 - Vol. 3: Erkenntnislehre, Logik, Sprachphilosophie,
Editionsberichte
Woolhouse, Roger, ed. 1994. Philosophy of Science, Logic, and
Language. New York: Routledge.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Critical assessments. Vol. III
Zalta, Edward. 2000. "A (Leibnizian) Theory of Concepts." Logical
Analysis and History of Philosophy no. 3:137-183.
RELATED PAGES
First Part of the Bibliography: A - K
Leibniz on Ontology and Metaphysics (under construction)
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CONTEMPORARY LOGIC
The Period from Boole to Gödel
Selected Bibliography on the Contemporary Symbolic Logic

from Boole to Gödel
Appendix: The Great Logicians
A Selection of Prominent Logicians from Aristotle to Gödel (1931)
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The Rise of Contemporary Logic from

Boole to Gödel
INTRODUCTION
(page under construction)
Great Logicians of the Second Half of the Nineteenth

and of the Twentieth Century (1854-1931)
George Boole (1815 - 1864)
Lewis Carroll (1832 - 1898)
John Venn (1834 - 1923)
William Stanley Jevons (1835 - 1882)
Hugh MacColl (1837 - 1909)
Ernst Schröder (1841 - 1902)
Georg Cantor (1845 - 1918)
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Francis Herbert Bradley (1846 - 1924)
Giuseppe Peano (1858 - 1932)
Ernst Zermelo (1871 - 1953)
Jan Lukasiewicz (1878 - 1956)
Thoralf Skolem (1887 - 1963)
Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903 - 1930)
Jacques Herbrand (1908 - 1931)
Kurt Gödel (1906 - 1978)
RELATED PAGES
Selected Bibliography on the History of Contemporary Logic
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Selected Bibliography on The Rise of

Contemporary Logic from Boole to Gödel
BIBLIOGRAPHY (to be completed...)
Anderson, Anthony C. 1980. "Some New Axioms for the Logic of
Sense and Denotation." Nous no. 14:217-234.
Anellis, Irving H. 1990. "From Semantic Tableaux to Smullyan Trees:
The History of the Falsifiability Tree Method." Modern Logic no. 1
(1):36-69.
———. 1991. "Forty Years of "Unnatural" Natural Deduction and
Quantification: A History of First-Order Systems of Natural Deduction,
from Gentzen to Copi." Modern Logic no. 2 (2):113-152.
———. 1992. "On the Selection and Use of Sources in the History of
Logic." Modern Logic no. 3 (1):1-17.
———. 1992. "Jean Van Heijenoort's Contributions to Proof Theory
and Its History." Modern Logic no. 2:312-335.
———. 1994. Logic and Its History in the Work and Writings of Jean
Van Heijenoort. Ames: Modern Logic Publishing.
Bochenski, Joseph M. 1981. "The General Sense and Character of
Modern Logic." In Modern Logic - a Survey, edited by Agazzi,
Evandro, 3-14. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"By 'Modern Logic' (abridged as 'ML') the class of studies is meant
973
which were originated by Leibniz, developed, among others, by Boole,
Peirce, Frege, Peano, Lesniewski and their followers; in other term the
class of studies listed in Alonzo Church's Bibliography and in The
Journal of Symbolic Logic.
The expression 'ML' is sometimes used, it is true, in other ways, e.g. to
denote studies in Hegelian dialectics. Those uses are irrelevant for the
sake of the present paper which will be exclusively concerned with ML
as described above. It may be only said, that no other known sort of
contemporary logic can compare with the latter as far as standards of
procedures and quality of results are concerned.
The aim of the paper is to describe - as the title selected by the
organizers of the conference indicates - the general sense and character
of ML thus understood. In other terms an attempt will be made to find
the fundamental characteristics of ML-al studies.
The method used will be comparative. We are going to ask: How does
ML compare with three fields with which it is usually linked: logic,
mathematics and philosophy? Is ML Logic and, if so, how does it differ
from other types of logic? Is it a mathematical discipline and, if that is
the case, what is the difference between it and other mathematical
sciences? Is it philosophy and, this being admitted, what is its place
among the other philosophical disciplines?
The present paper will be mostly concerned with the first class of
problems, the comparison between ML and the other types of logic; the
other two classes of problems will be treated only marginally. As far as
the main problems are concerned, the method will necessarily be
historical: for, contrary to mathematics and philosophy, all other forms
of logic with which ML may be compared belong to the past." p. 3
Brady, Geraldine. 2000. From Peirce to Skolem. A Neglected Chapter
in the History of Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Contents: Introduction 1; 1. The early work of Charles S. Peirce 9; 2.
Peirce's calculus of relatives: 1870 23; 3, Peirce on the algebra of logic:
1880 51; 4. Mitchell on a new algebra of logic: 1883 75; 5. Peirce on
the algebra of relatives: 1883 95; 6. Peirce's logic of quantifiers: 1885
111; 7. Schröder's calculus of relatives 143; 8. Löwenheim's
contribution 169, 9. Skolem's recasting 197; Appendices. 1. Schröder's
Lecture I 207; 2. Schröder's Lecture II 223; 3. Schröder's Lecture III
251; 4. Schröder's Lecture V 257; 5. Schröder's Lecture IX 295; 6.
974
Schröder's Lecture XI 339; 7. Schröder's Lecture XII 379; 8. Norbert
Wiener's Thesis 429; Bibliography 445; Index 461-468.
"This book is an account of the important influence on the development
of mathematical logic of Charles S. Peirce and his student O. H.
Mitchell, through the work of Ernst Schröder, Leopold Löwenheim,
and Thoralf Skolem. As far as we know, this book is the first work
delineating this line of influence on modern mathematical logic.
Modern model theory began with the seminal papers of Löwenheim
(1915) "On possibilities in the calculus of relatives" and Skolem (1923)
"Some remarks on axiomatized set theory". They showed that in first-
order logic, if a statement has an infinite model, it also has a model
with countable domain. They observed that second-order logic fails to
have this property; witness the axioms for the real number field. Their
papers focused the attention of a growing number of logicians, starting
with Kurt Gödel and Jacques Herbrand, on models of first-order
theories.(1) This became the main preoccupation of model theory and a
large component of mathematical logic as it developed over the rest of
the twentieth century. In addition, the work of Herbrand, based on the
notion of Skolem function, became, through J. Alan Robinson, the
main basis of systems of automated reasoning.
A careful examination of the contributions of Peirce, Mitchell,
Schröder, and Löwenheim sheds light on several questions: How did
first-order logic as we know it develop? What are the real contributions
of Peirce, Mitchell and Schroder, over and above the better known
contributions of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and David Hilbert?
As a result of this investigation we conclude that, absent new historical
evidence, Lowenheim's and Skolem's work on what is now known as
the downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem developed directly from
Schroder's Algebra der Logik, which was itself an avowed elaboration
of the work of the American logician Charles S. Peirce and his student
O. H. Mitchell. We have been unable to detect any direct influence of
Frege, Russell, or Hilbert on the development of Löwenheim and
Skolem's seminal work, contrary to the commonly held perception.
This, in spite of the fact that Frege has undisputed priority for the
discovery and formulation of first-order logic.
This raises yet other intriguing questions. Why were the contributions
of Peirce and Schröder neglected by later authors? Was it because
975
Peirce published in American journals that were not easily available to
Europeans? Was it because Schröder had a verbose and sometimes
obscure style as a writer? Was it because the logical notations used by
Peirce and Schröder were simply less readable than those of Frege?
After reading this book, the reader should be able to form his or her
own opinions." pp. 1-2
(1) We do not discuss here the Frege-Russell-Hilbert tradition leading
to first-order logic and Gödel, since this development has many
excellent treatments in the literature already, such as the beautiful book
of the late Jean van Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel. Van Hejenoort's
book treats Frege, Löwenheim, and Skolem, but does not cover either
Peirce's or Schröder's work, which led to Löwenheim's paper. This
omission is also present in the historical papers of other otherwise very
well-read logicians. There are masterful accounts of the seminal papers
of Löwenheim and Skolem in the late Burton Dreben's introduction to
Gödel's thesis in Collected Works of Kurt Gödel and in the late Hao
Wang's introduction to Skolem's Selected Works in Logic. But Peirce
and Schröder get no attention.
Church, Alonzo. 1951. "A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and
Denotation." In Structure Method and Meaning. Essays in Honor of
Henry M. Sheffer, edited by Henle, Paul, Kallen, Horace M. and
Langer, Susanne K., 3-34. New York: Liberal Arts Press.
"The intensional aspects of Frege's logical doctrine, and his distinction
between the sense (Sinn) and the denotation (Bedeutung) of a name,
were explained by him informally in his paper, Uber Sinn und
Bedeutung, (1) and in incidental passages in a number of his other
publications, including the first volume of his book, Grundgesetze der
Arithmetik (Jena, 1893). In his more formal work, Frege's formalized
language (Begriffsschrift, or Formelsprache) has an entirely
extensional interpretation, and it may even be that his interest in
intensional logic was primarily to clear up certain difficulties regarding
its relationship to extensional logic, (2) so as to be able to proceed with
development of the latter unhampered. Nevertheless, it seems that
Frege would agree that intensional logic also must ultimately receive
treatment by the logistic method. And it is the purpose of this paper to
make a tentative beginning toward such a treatment, along the lines of
Frege's doctrine.
976
While we preserve what we believe to be the important features of the
theory of Frege, we do make certain changes to which he would
probably not agree. One of these is the introduction of the simple
theory of types as a means of avoiding the logical antinomies. Another
is the abandonment of Frege's notion of a function (including
propositional functions) as something ungesattigt, in favor of a notion
according to which the name of a function may be treated in the same
manner as any other name, provided that distinctions of type are
observed. (But it is even possible that Frege might accept this latter
change, on the basis of an understanding that what we call a function is
the same thing which he calls Werthverlauf einer Funktion.)" pp. 3-4
(1) In Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, (1892), 25-
50. See English translations of this paper by Black, in The
Philosophical Review, LVII (1948), 207-230, and by Feigl, in Readings
in Philosophical Analysis (New York, 1949); and also a discussion of
Frege's doctrines by Russell, in Appendix A of The Principles of
Mathematics. In reading these, it is necessary to make allowance for
differences in the translations that are adopted of some of Frege's terms.
We shall here translate Frege's ausdr?cken as "express" and Frege's
bedeuten or bezeichnen as "denote" or "be a name of," so that a name is
said to express its sense and to denote or to be a name of its denotation.
(2) We mention the doctrine of Frege's Begriffsschrift of 1879,
according to which the relation of identity or equality is a relation
between names rather than between the things named, apparently on the
ground that identity construed in the latter sense would be too trivial a
relation to serve its intended purpose. If use and mention are not to be
confused, the idea of identity as a relation between names renders a
formal treatment of the logic of identity all but impossible. Solution of
this difficulty is made the central theme of Uber Sinn und Bedeutung
and is actually a prerequisite to Frege's treatment of identity in
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.
———. 1973. "Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense
and Denotation (Part First)." Nous no. 7:24-33.
———. 1974. "Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense
and Denotation (Second First)." Nous no. 8:135-156.
———. 1993. "A Revised Formulation of the Logic of Sense and
Denotation Alternative (1)." Nous no. 27:141-157.
977
Czezowski, Tadeusz. 1955. "On Certain Peculiarities of Singular
Propositions." Mind no. 64:392-395.
Dawson, John W.Jr. 1993. "The Compactness of First-Order Logic:
From Godel to Lindström." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 14:15-
37.
Gabbay, Dov, and Woods, John, eds. 2004. The Rise of Modern Logic:
From Leibniz to Frege. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Contributors IX-X; Wolfgang Lenzen: Leibniz's logic 1; Mary Tiles:
Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic 85; John W. Burbidge:
Hegel's logic 131; Paul Rusnock and Rolf George; Bolzano as logician
177; Richard Tieszen: Husserl's logic 207; Theodore Hailperin:
Algebraical logic 1685-1900 323; Victor Sanchez Valencia: The
algebra of logic 389; Ivor Grattan-Guinness: The mathematical turn in
logic 545; Volker Peckhaus: Schröder's logic 557; Risto Hilpinen:
Peirce's logic 611; Peter M. Sullivan: Frege's Logic 659; Index 751-
770.
———, eds. 2009. Logic from Russell to Church. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Contributors XI-XII; Andrew D. Irvine: Bertrand Russell's logic 1;
Dale Jacquette: Logic for Meinongian object theory semantics 29; Joan
Rand Moschovakis: The logic of Brouwer and Heyting 77; Jens Erik
Fenstad and Hao Wang: Thoralf Albert Skolem 127; Claus-Peter Wirth,
Jörg Siekmann, Christoph Benzmüller and Serge Autexier: Jacques
Herbrand: life, logic, and automated deduction 195; Michael Potter:
The logic of the Tractatus 255; Peter M. Simons: Lesniewski's logic
305; Wilfried Sieg: Hilbert's Proof Theory 321; Barry Hartley Slater:
Hilbert' Epsilon Calculus and its successors 385; Mark van Atten and
Juliette Kennedy: Gödel's logic 449; Keith Simmons: Tarski's logic
511; Alasdair Urquhart: Emil Post 617; Jan von Plato: Gentzen's logic
667; Felice Cardone and J. Roger Hindley: Lambda-calculus and
Combinators in the 20th century 723; Jonathan P. Seldin: The logic of
Church and Curry 819; Andrea Cantini: Paradoxes, self-reference and
truth in the 20th century 875; Index 1015-1056.
978
Gandy, Robin O. 1977. "The Simple Theory of Types." In Logic
Colloquium 76, edited by Gandy, Robin O. and Hyland, John Martin,
173-181. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Goldfarb, Warren. 1979. "Logic in the Twenties: The Nature of the
Quantifier." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 44 (3):351-368.
Grattan-Guinness, Ivor. 1984. "Notes on the Fate of Logicism from
'Principia Mathematica' to Gödel Incompletability." History and
Hailperin, Theodore. 1990. "Probability Logic in the Twentieth
Century." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 11:71-110.
Heijenoort, Jean van, ed. 1967. From Frege to Gödel. A Source Book in
Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
———. 1992. "Historical Development of Modern Logic." Modern
Logic no. 2 (3):242-255.
Lewis, Clarence Irving. 1951. "Notes on the Logic of Intension." In
Structure Method and Meaning. Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer,
edited by Henle, Paul, Kallen, Horace M. and Langer, Susanne K., 25-
34. New York: Liberal Arts Press.
Lukasiewicz, Jan. 1987. "On the Principle of the Excluded Middle."
Moore, Gregory H. 1980. "Beyond First-Order Logic: The Historical
Interplay between Mathematical Logic and Axiomatic Set Theory."
"What has been the historical relationship between set theory and
logic? on the one hand, Zermelo and other mathematicians developed
set theory as a Hilbert-style axiomatic system. On the other hand, set
theory influenced logic by suggesting to Schr?der, L?wenheim and
others the use of infinitely long expressions. The question of which
logic was appropriate for set theory -- first-order logic, second-order
logic, or an infinitary logic -- culminated in a vigorous exchange
between Zermelo and G?del around 1930."
Mugnai, Massimo. 1983. "Alle Origini Dell'algebra Della Logica." In
Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica, edited by
Abrusci, Michele, Casari, Ettore and Mugnai, Massimo, 117-132.
Bologna: CLUEB.
Murawski, Roman, and Bedürftig, Thomas. 1995. "Die Entwicklung
Der Symbolik in Der Logik Und Ihr Philosophischer Hintergrund."
979
Mathematische Semesterberichte no. 42:1-31.
Myhill, John. 1953. "On the Ontological Siginificance of the
Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem." In Academic Freedom, Logic, and
Religion, edited by White, Morton, 57-70. Philadelpha: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Reprinted in: Irving M. Copi, James A. Gould (eds.) - Contemporary
readings in logical theory - New York, Macmillan, 1967, pp. 40-51
Nagel, Ernest. 1935. "Impossible Numbers: A Chapter in the History of
Modern Logic." Studies in the History of Ideas no. 3:429-474.
Reprinted in: E. Nagel - Teleology revisited and other essays in the
philosophy and history of science - New York, Columbia University
Press, 1979
Peckhaus, Volker. 1997. "The Way of Logic into Mathematics."
Theoria no. 12:39-64.
"Using a contextual method the specific development of logic between
c. 1830 and 1930 is explained. A characteristic mark of this period is
the decomposition of the complex traditional philosophical omnibus
discipline logic into new philosophical sub-disciplines and separate
disciplines such as psychology, epistemology, philosophy of science
and formal (symbolic, mathematical) logic. In the 19th century a
growing foundational need in mathematics provoked the emergence of
a structural view on mathematics and the reformulation of logic for
mathematical means. As a result formal logic was taken over by
mathematics in the beginning of the 20th century as is shown by
sketching the German example."
———. 1999. "19th Century Logic between Philosophy and
Mathematics." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic no. 5:433-450.
"The history of modern logic is usually written as the history of
mathematical or, more general, symbolic logic. As such it was created
by mathematicians. Not regarding its anticipations in Scholastic logic
and in the rationalistic era, its continuous development began with
George Boole's The Mathematical Analysis of Logic of 1847, and it
became a mathematical subdiscipline in the early 20th century. This
style of presentation cuts off one eminent line of development, the
philosophical development of logic, although logic is evidently one of
the basic disciplines of philosophy. One needs only to recall some of
the standard 19th century definitions of logic as, e.g., the art and
980
science of reasoning (Whateley) or as giving the normative rules of
correct reasoning (Herbart). In the paper the relationship between the
philosophical and the mathematical development of logic will be
discussed. Answers to the following questions will be provided:
1. What were the reasons for the philosophers' lack of interest in formal
logic?
2. What were the reasons for the mathematicians' interest in logic?
3. What did "logic reform" mean in the 19th century? Were the systems
of mathematical logic initially regarded as contributions to a reform of
logic?
4. Was mathematical logic regarded as art, as science or as both?"
Proust, Joëlle. 1989. Questions of Form. Logic and the Analytic
Proposition from Kant to Carnap. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Translated by Anastasios Albert Brenner from the original French:
Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à
Carnap - Paris, Fayard, 1986.
Pulkkinen, Jarmo. 1994. The Threat of Logical Mathematism. A Study
on the Critique of Mathematical Logic in Germany at the Turn of the
20th Century. New York: Peter Lang.
Contents: Acknowledgements 7; Introduction 9; 1. History of logic in
Germany 1830-1920 15; 2. Logic and psychology 41; 3. Logic and
linguistics 59; 4. Logic and mathematics 71; 5. The reception of
mathematical logic in Germany 91; 6. Mauthner's critique 121; 7.
Rickert's critique 139; 8. Ziehen's critique 153; Conclusion 169;
Bibliography 177-187.
"This work attempts to throw some light on an interesting feature in the
development of German logic which has not yet received the attention
it deserves. Almost a whole generation of German philosophers did not
accept the new mathematical logic at the turn of the 20th century. In
this respect development in Germany differs greatly from that in
Britain where George Boole's ideas received the attention of
philosophers through the work of W.S. Jevons. However, both Gottlob
Frege and Ernst Schroder, the main representatives of mathematical
logic in Germany, remained isolated figures whose works were either
strongly criticized or completely neglected by philosophers. Schroder
was able to get some attention to his ideas but the influence of Frege
981
remained very limited for a long time. Frege's ideas started to have an
impact in Germany only through the Principia Mathematica by Russell
and Whitehead.
The fate of mathematical logic in Germany cannot be explained away
by saying that German philosophers were not interested in logic. They
were. In fact, the landscape of German traditional logic is at that time
so rich and varied that it is difficult to give a coherent account of it.
What makes the period particularly interesting are the interrelationships
between psychology, logic and linguistics. All these disciplines came of
age in Germany almost simultaneously. Wilhelm Wundt founded
modem experimental psychology during the 1870s. Frege did the same
for modem mathematical logic at the end of the same decade. As
linguistics underwent a deep change at the turn of the 20th century, the
basic concepts of language and linguistics were studied not only by
linguists but also by philosophers and psychologists.
In the late 19th century linguistics, philosophy and psychology were
seen to be much closer to each other than nowadays. Linguists,
philosophers and psychologists alike wrote on logical questions.
Particularly interesting is the relationship between logic and
psychology. In this period philosophers and psychologists were
involved in an intense struggle over the chairs of philosophy. This
struggle influenced deeply the logical discussion of the period (the
debate over the so-called 'psychologism'). One group of logicians
believed that their work could be made easier by the results of the new
experimental psychology. In other words, they believed that the new
scientific psychology could offer a solid foundation for the new
scientific logic. Another group of logicians criticized these attempts
and tried to present logic as an independent philosophical science.
However, both groups had one thing in common: a negative attitude
towards mathematical logic.
The present survey of the critique of mathematical logic at the turn of
the 20th century attempts to answer several interesting questions: How
did the contemporary German philosophers see the role and
significance of logic? What kind of relationships did they claim to exist
between logic, mathematics, linguistics and psychology? What exactly
were the arguments of the (now) almost forgotten critics? I shall start
by giving a historical survey of the development of German logic 1830-
982
1920 as it appears against the background of German academic
philosophy (chapter 1). Next I shall study the interrelationships
between logic and psychology (chapter 2), logic and linguistics
(chapter 3), and logic and mathematics (chapter 4). After this I shall
present the general features of the reception of mathematical logic in
Germany between 1880 and 1920 (chapter 5). This is followed by a
more detailed account of the arguments of three individual critics: Fritz
Mauthner (chapter 6), Heinrich Rickert (chapter 7), and Theodor
Ziehen (chapter 8). I have chosen these three for several reasons.
Firstly, each represents a different viewpoint: Mauthner was mainly
interested in the problems of language, Rickert was one of the most
prominent philosophers of the period, and Ziehen was originally a
psychologist. Secondly, I have wanted to bring forward previously
unknown figures (this is the reason why I did not choose Husserl, for
instance, who wrote much on the subject). Thirdly, I have tried to
choose critics who presented interesting ideas. And lastly, in order to
have a large enough corpus for study I have had to choose writers who
wrote much on the subject."
———. 2005. Thought and Logic. The Debates between German-
Speaking Philosophers and Symbolic Logicians at the Turn of the 20th
Century. New York: Peter Lang.
"The book deals with the reception and critique of symbolic logic
among German-speaking philosophers at the turn of the 20th century.
The first part discusses the period from the late 1870s up to the end of
the 19th century. The main issue is the arrival of the Boolean algebra of
logic in Germany and Austria. It examines also the reasons why
Gottlob Frege was so unsuccessful in his attempts to draw the attention
of philosophers to his logicist programme. The second part deals with
the first two decades of the 20th century. Its main topic of inquiry is the
reception of Bertrand Russell's and Louis Couturat's ideas in the
German-speaking world. In particular, it concentrates on the
relationship between Russell and neo-Kantians."
Rao, A.Pampapathy. 1996. "A Survey of Free Logics." Modern Logic
no. 6 (2):123-191.
Salmon, Nathan. 1993. "A Problem in the Frege-Church Theory of
Sense and Denotation." Nous no. 27:158-166.
Schurz, Gerhard. 1994. "Admissible Versus Valid Rules: A Case Study
983
of the Modal Fallacy." Monist no. 77 (3):376-388.
Thiel, Christian. 1983. "Some Difficulties in the Historiography of
Modern Logic." In Atti Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della
———. 1996. "Research on the History of Logic at Erlangen." In
Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium
on the History of Logic, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo,
Maria, 397-401. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Vega, Reñón Luis. 2001. "La Lógica En España (1890-1930):
Desencuentros." Teorema no. 20:21-38.
"This paper is both a first step towards, and an invitation to go on with,
the study of the reception of modern -- symbolic, mathematical -- logic
in Spain. I examine the first and unsuccessful
introduction of modern logic in mathematical and philosophical circles,
between 1890 and 1930. Such reception failures are usually attributed
to external and/or general circumstances, ranging from personal to
institutional and cultural conditions of Spanish learning.
But here we should also take into account the very working of the so-
called "sowers", i.e., introducing people, as well as some other internal
factors and frames of this non-reception case."
Wolenski, Jan. 1991. "Theories of Reasoning in the Lvov-Warsaw
School." In Topics in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, edited by
Albertazzi, Liliana and Poli, Roberto, 91-101. Bozen: Istituto
Mitteleuropeo di Cultura.
Papers from the International Summer Schools in Bozen - 1989-1990
———. 1995. "Mathematical Logic in Poland 1900-1939: People,
Circles, Institutions, Idea." Modern Logic no. 5 (4):363-405.
———. 2003. "The Achievements of the Polish School of Logic." In
The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945, edited by Baldwin,
Thomas, 401-416. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"In the most narrow sense, the Polish school of logic may be
understood, as the Warsaw school of mathematical logic with Jan
Lukasiewicz, Stanislaw Lesniewski, and Alfred Tarski as the leading
figures. However, valuable contributions to mathematical logic were
also made outside Warsaw, in particular by Leon Chwistek. Thus, the
Polish school of logic sensu largo also comprises logicians not
984
belonging to the Warsaw school of logic. The third interpretation is still
broader. If logic is not restricted only to mathematical logic, several
Polish philosophers who were strongly influenced by formal logical
results, for example Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Kotarbinski,
can be included in the Polish school of logic sensu largissimo. Polish
work on logic can therefore encompass a variety of topics, from the
'hard' foundations of mathematics (e.g. inaccessible cardinals, the
structure of the real line, or equivalents of the axiom of choice) through
formal logic, semantics, and philosophy of science to ideas in ontology
and epistemology motivated by logic or analysed by its tools. Since the
development of logic in Poland is a remarkable historical phenomenon,
I shall first discuss its social history, especially the rise of the Warsaw
school. Then I shall describe the philosophical views in question, the
most important and characteristic formal results of Polish logicians,
their research in the history of logic, and applications of logic to
philosophy. My discussion will be selective: in particular I will omit
most results in the 'hard' foundations of mathematics." p. 401
RELATED PAGES
The Rise of Contemporary Logic from Boole to Gödel
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A Selection of Prominent Logicians from

Aristotle to Gödel (1931)
INTRODUCTION
SEP = There is an entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
IEP = There is an entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Aristotle (384 BC - 322 BC) | SEP | IEP |
Aristotle's Logic: Introductory Readings and the Syllogistic
Aristotle's Theory of Categorical Syllogism in the Prior Analytics
Disciples of Aristotle
Eudemus of Rhodes (c. 350 BC - 290 BC)
Theophrastus of Eresus (371 BC - c. 287 BC) | SEP | IEP |
986
The Dialectical School
Philo the Dialectician (4th century BC)
Diodorus Cronus (second-half of the 4th century BC) | SEP |
Stoics
Zeno of Citium (c. 334 BC - 262 BC)
Cleanthes of Assos (c. 331 BC - c. 232 BC) | IEP |
Chrysippus (c. 280 - c. 207 BC) | IEP |
Epictetus (50 - 130) | SEP | IEP |
Epicureans
Philodemus of Gadara (c. 110 - c. 40 BC) | SEP |
Greek Commentators of Aristotle's Logical Works

Alexander of Aphrodisias (end of 2nd century) | SEP |
Porphyry (234? - 305?) | SEP |
Ammonius Hermeiou (c. 435/445 - 517/526) | SEP |
Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 490 - c. 560)
John Philoponus (c. 490 - c. 570)
Other Greek Logicians

Claudius Galenus (129 - 200) | SEP |
987
Sextus Empiricus (160 - 210)
Plotinus (204 - 270) | SEP |
Proclus Diadocus (412 - 485) | SEP |
Diogenes Laërtius (3rd century)
Latin Logic before Eleventh Century
Cicero (106 BC 43 BC) | SEP |
Lucius Apuleius of Madaura (c. 123/125 - 180)
Marius Victorinus (4th century)
Martianus Capella (5th century)
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c. 480 - 524 or 525) | SEP |
Byzantine Logicians (from 6th to 12th century)
Alcuin of York (c. 735 - 804)
John Scottus Eriugena (c. 815 - 877) | SEP |
Logic in the Eleventh Century

Abbo of Fleury (c. 945 - 1004)
Anselm of Canterbury (1033 - 1109) | SEP | IEP |
Al Kindi (c. 801 - 873) | SEP |
Al-Farabi (c. 872 - 950/951) | SEP |
Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (c. 980 - 1037) | SEP | IEP |
988
Peter Damian (1007 - 1072) | SEP |
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (1126 - 1198) | IEP |
Logic and Grammar in Twelfth Century

The anonymous Glosulae super Priscianum (written between 1080 and
1150)
Roscelin (c. 1050 - c. 1125)
William of Champeaux (c. 1070 - 1122) | SEP |
Garlandus Computista [Gerlandus of Besançon] (early 12th century)
Peter Abelard (1079 - 1142) | SEP | IEP |
Adam Parvipontanus (or Adam of Balsham) (? - 1181)
Gilbert of Poitiers (after 1085 - 1154)
John of Salisbury (c. 1120 - 1180) | SEP |
Moses Maimonides (1135 m- 1204) | SEP | IEP |
Logic and Grammar in Thirteenth Century

William of Sherwood (or Shyreswood) (1200/5 - 1266/71) | SEP |
Albert the Great (1200 - 1280) | SEP |
Peter of Spain (d. 1277) | SEP |
Robert Kilwardby (1215? - 1279) | SEP |
Roger Bacon (1215 - 1294) | SEP | IEP |
989
Henry of Ghent (c. 1217 - 1293) | SEP |
Richard the Sophister (second quarter of the 13th century) | SEP |
Ramón Llull (c. 1233 - 1316)
Giles of Romes (1243 - 1316) | SEP |
Boethius of Dacia (fl. 1260 - 1270)
William Heytesbury (? - d. 1272/3)
Simon of Faversham (c. 1260 - 1306) | SEP |
John Duns Scotus (c. 1266 - 1308) | SEP | IEP |
Radulphus Brito (c. 1270 - 1320)
Logic and Grammar in Fourteenth Century

Pseudo-Scotus (14th century)
Thomas of Erfurt (first quarter of the 14th century) | SEP | IEP |
Walter Burley (c. 1275 - 1344) | SEP |
Peter Aureoli (c. 1280 - 1322)
Siger of Courtrai (c. 1283 - 1341)
William of Ockham (c. 1287 - 1347) | SEP | IEP |
Walter Chatton (c. 1290 - 1343) | SEP |
Robert Holkot (c. 1290 - 1349)
Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1290 - 1349)
990
John Buridan (c. 1300 - after 1358) | SEP |
Gregory of Rimini (c. 1300 - 1358) | SEP |
Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1300 - after 1358) | SEP |
Richard Kilvington (1305 - 1361) | SEP |
Albert of Saxony (c. 1316 - 1390) | SEP |
John Wyclif (c. 1330 - 1384) | SEP |
Marsilius of Inghen (c. 1340 - 1396) | SEP |
Robert Alyngton ( ? - 1398) | SEP |
William Crathorn (fl. 1330) | SEP |
Richard Billingham (fl. 1350 - 1360)
Peter of Mantua (d. 1400)
Vincent Ferrer (c. 1350 - 1420/1)
Peter of Ailly (c. 1350 - 1420)
Sharpe Johannes (c. 1360 - 1515) | SEP |
William Penbygull ( ? - 1420 | SEP |)
Paul of Venice (c. 1369 - 1429) | SEP |
Paul of Pergola (1380 - 1455)
Logicians of the Fifteenth Century

George of Trebizond (1395 - 1472/3)
991
Nicholas of Cusa (1401 - 1464)
Lorenzo Valla (1407 - 1457) | SEP |
Rodolphus Agricola (1444 - 1485)
Pico della Mirandola (1463 - 1494) | SEP |
Logic in the Modern Age. First Part: 1500 - 1640
Jean Luis Vivés (1493 - 1540) | SEP |
Domingo de Soto (1494 - 1560)
Philipp Melanchthon (1497 – 1560)
Petrus Ramus (1515 - 1572) | SEP |
Pedro da Fonseca (1528 - 1599)
Franciscus Toletus (1532 - 1596)
Giacomo (Jacopo) Zabarella (1533 - 1589) | SEP |
Bartholomäus Keckermann (1572 - 1609)
Joachim Jungius (1587 - 1657)
Robert Sanderson (1587 - 1663)
Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) | SEP | IEP |
Franco Burgersdijk (1590 - 1635)
Gassendi Pierre (1592 - 1655) | SEP |
The Conimbricenses (In universam dialectica Aristotelis, 1606)
992
Logic in the Modern Age. Second Part: 1640 - 1780
Athanasius Kircher (1601/2 - 1680)
Sebastián Izquierdo (1601 - 1681)
Juan Caramuel y Lobkowtiz (1606 - 1682)
Georges Dalgarno (1616 - 1687)
Antoine Arnauld (1612 - 1694) | IEP |
John Wallis (1616 - 1703)
Johannes Clauberg (1622 - 1665)
Arnold Geulincx (1624 - 1669)
John Locke (1632 – 1704)
Nicolas Malebranche (1638 – 1715)
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 - 1716) | SEP | IEP |
Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651 – 1708)
Christian Thomasius (1655 - 1728)
Johann Franz Budde (1667 - 1729)
Giovanni Girolamo Saccheri (1667 - 1733)
Andreas Rüdiger (1673 - 1731)
Christian Wolff (1679 - 1754) | SEP |
Johann Peter Reusch (1691 - 1758)
993
Johann Georg Walch (1693 – 1775)
Joahann Andreas Segner (1704 - 1777)
Leonhard Euler (1707 - 1783)
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714 - 1780) | SEP | IEP |
Joachim Georg Darjes (1714 - 1791)
Gottfried Ploucquet (1716 - 1790)
Georg Friedrich Meier (1718 – 1777)
Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) | SEP | IEP |
Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728 - 1777)
Nicolas Condorcet (1743 - 1794)
Logic in First Half of Nineteenth Century

Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) | SEP | IEP |
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831)
Joseph Diaz Gergonne (1771 - 1859)
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 - 1834)
Bernard Bolzano (1781 - 1848) | SEP | IEP |
Richard Whateley (1787 - 1863)
William Hamilton (1788 - 1856)
William Whewell (1794 - 1866) | SEP |
994
Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802 - 1872)
Augustus De Morgan (1806 - 1871)
John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873) | SEP | IEP |
Logic in the Second Half of Nineteenth Century

George Boole (1815 - 1864) | SEP |
Hermann Lotze (1817- 1881) | SEP |
Christoph von Sigwart (1830 - 1904)
Charles Dodgson [Lewis Carroll] (1832 - 1898)
John Venn (1834 - 1923)
William Stanley Jevons (1835 - 1882)
Hugh MacColl (1837 - 1909)
Victoria, Lady Welby (1837 - 1912)
Franz Brentano (1838 - 1917) | SEP |
Charles Saunders Peirce (1839 - 1914) | SEP | IEP |
Ernst Schröder (1841 - 1902)
Georg Cantor (1845 - 1918)
Francis Herbert Bradley (1846 - 1924) | SEP | IEP |
Christine Ladd-Franklin (1847 - 1930)
Bernard Bosanquet (1848 - 1923) | SEP |
995
Gottlob Frege (1848 - 1925) | SEP | IEP |
Logic in the Twentieth Century
John Neville Keynes (1852 - 1949)
Alexius Meinong (1853 - 1920) | SEP |
Giuseppe Peano (1858 - 1932)
Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938) | SEP | IEP |
Alfred Whitehead (1861 - 1947) | SEP | IEP |
David Hilbert (1862 - 1943)
Louis Couturat (1868 - 1914)
Ernst Zermelo (1871 - 1953)
Bertrand Russell (1872 - 1970) | SEP | IEP |
Jan Lukasiewicz (1878 - 1956) | SEP |
Ernst Mally (1879 - 1944) | SEP |
Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (1881 - 1966) | SEP |
Clarence Irving Lewis (1883 - 1924) | SEP | IEP |
Hermann Weyl (1885 - 1955) | SEP |
Kazimierz Twardowski (1886 - 1938) | SEP |
Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886 - 1939) | SEP |
Thoralf Skolem (1887 - 1963)
996
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951) | SEP | IEP |
Rudolf Carnap (1891 - 1970) | IEP |
Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903 - 1930)
Jacques Herbrand (1908 - 1931)
Kurt Gödel (1906 - 1978) | SEP |
RELATED PAGES
Annotated Bibliographies of the following historians of logic:
E. J. Ashworth
L. M. de Rijk
Wilhelm Risse
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BIBLIOGRAPHIES OF HISTORIANS
OF LOGIC
Annotated Bibliographies of Historians of Philosophy
E. J. Ashworth:
1967 - 1976
1977 - 1988
1989 - 1996
1997 - 2015
L. M. de Rijk:
1950 - 1974
1975 - 1982
1983 - 1990
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1991 - 2012
Mauro Nasti de Vincentis:
1981 - 2009
Wilhelm Risse:
1960 - 1988
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Writings of E. Jennifer Ashworth on the

History of Logic. First Part
Earline Jennifer Ashworth (born 1939) studied at Cambridge University and
at Bryn Mawr College, where she was awarded a Ph.D. in 1964 (The Logica
Hamburgensis of Joachim Jungius); she is Distinguished Professor Emerita at
the University of Waterloo, Ontario (retired July, 1st 2005) and her main
interests are Late Mediaeval and Renaissance logic and philosophy of
language; she is Renaissance subject Editor for the Routledge Encyclopedia
of Philosophy.
The bibliography is composed of four parts:

First: Books authored and edited by E. Jennifer Ashworth; Articles
from 1967 to 1976
Second: Articles from 1977 to 1988
Third: Articles from 1989 to 1996
Fourth: Articles from 1997 to 2017
I wish to thank Professor Ashworth for helping me to complete this
bibliography.
BOOKS AUTHORED
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Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1974. Language and Logic in the Post-
Medieval Period. Dordrecht: Reidel.
TABLE OF CONTENTS; PREFACE IX; NOTE ABOUT
ABBREVIATIONS XIII; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XV; CHAPTER
I / HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 1; l. The Publication of Medieval
Works 2; 2. Scholasticism in Italy and Germany 4; 3. Scholasticism in
France and Spain 5; 4.Humanism 8; 5. Rudolph Agricola and His
Influence 10; 6. Petrus Ramus and His Influence 15; 7. Seventeenth
Century Logic: Eclecticism 17; 8. Humanism and Late Scholasticism in
Spain 19; 9. Other Schools of Logic 20; 10. A Note on Terminology
22; CHAPTER II / MEANING AND REFERENCE 26; I. The Nature
of Logic 26; 1. The Contents of Logical Text-books 26; 2. The
Definition of Logic 29; 3. The Object of Logic 32; II. Problems of
Language 37; 1. Terms: Their Definition and Their Main Divisions 38;
2. The Relationship between Mental, Spoken and Written Terms 42; 3.
Other Divisions of Terms 45; 4. Sense and Reference 47; 5.
Propositions and their Parts 49; 6. Sentence-Types and Sentence-
Tokens 52; 7. Complex Signifiables and Truth 55; 8. Other Approaches
to Truth 62; 9. Possibility and Necessity 66; III. SUPPOSITION
THEORY 77; 1. Supposition, Acceptance and Verification 78; 2.
Proper, Improper, Relative and Absolute Supposition 82; 3. Material
Supposition 83; 4. Simple Supposition 84; 5. Natural Personal
Supposition 88; 6. Ampliation 89; 7. Appellation 92; IV. SEMANTIC
PARADOXES 101; 1. Problems Arising from Self-Reference 101; 2.
Solution One: Self-Reference Is Illegitimate 104; 3. Solution Two: All
Propositions Imply Their Own Truth 106; 4. Solution Three: Insolubles
Assert Their Own Falsity 108; 5. Solution Four: Two Kinds of
Meaning 110; 6. Solution Five: Two Truth-Conditions 112; 7. Later
Writing on Insolubles 114; CHAPTER III / FORMAL LOGIC. PART
ONE: UNANALYZED PROPOSITIONS 118; I. THE THEORY OF
CONSEQUENCE 120; 1. The Definition of Consequence 120; 2. The
Definition of Valid Consequence 121; 3.Formal and Material
Consequence 128; 4. 'Ut Nunc' Consequence 130; 5. The Paradoxes of
Strict Implication 133; 6. Rules of Valid Consequence 136; II.
PROPOSITIONAL CONNECTIVES 147; 1. Compound Propositions
in General 147; 2. Conditional Propositions 149; 3A. Rules for Illative
Conditionals 154; 3B. Rules for Promissory Conditionals 156; 4.
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Biconditionals 156; 5. Conjunctions 157; 6. Disjunctions 161; 7. De
Morgan's Laws 166; 8. Other Propositional Connectives 177; III. AN
ANALYSIS OF THE RULES FOUND IN SOME INDIVIDUAL
AUTHORS 171; 1. Paris in the Early Sixteenth Century 171; 2. Oxford
in the Early Sixteenth Century 181; 3. Germany in the Early Sixteenth
Century 183; 4. Spain in the Third Decade of the Sixteenth Century
184; 5. Spain in the Second Part of the Sixteenth Century 184; 6.
Germany in the Early Seventeenth Century 185; CHAPTER IV /
FORMAL LOGIC. PART TWO: THE LOGIC OF ANALYZED
PROPOSITIONS 187; I. The Relationships Between Propositions 189;
1. The Quality and Quantity of Propositions 189; 2. Opposition 192; 3.
Equipollence 194; 4. Simple and Accidental Conversion 195; 5.
Conversion by Contraposition 199; II. Supposition Theory and
Quantification 207; 1. The Divisions of Personal Supposition 207; 2.
Descent and Ascent 213; III. Categorical Syllogisms 223; 1. Figures
and Modes 224; 2. How to Test the Validity of a Syllogism 230; 3.
Proof by Reduction 239; 4. Syllogisms with Singular Terms 247;
APPENDIX / LATIN TEXTS 253; BIBLIOGRAPHY 282; 1. Primary
Sources 282; 2. Secondary Sources on the History of Logic 1400-1650
291; INDEX OF NAMES 297-304.
"Keckermann remarked of the sixteenth century, "never from the
beginning of the world was there a period so keen on logic, or in which
more books on logic were produced and studies of logic flourished
more abundantly than the period-in which we live." (1) But despite the
great profusion of books to which he refers, and despite the dominant
position occupied by logic in the educational system of the fifteenth,
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, very little work has been done on
the logic of the postmedieval period. The only complete study is that of
Risse [a], whose account, while historically exhaustive, pays little
attention to the actual logical doctrines discussed. (2) Otherwise, one
can tum to Vasoli [b] for a study of humanism, to Muñoz Delgado [c]
for scholastic logic in Spain, and to Gilbert [d] and Randall [e] for
scientific method, but this still leaves vast areas untouched. In this book
I cannot hope to remedy all the deficiencies of previous studies, for to
survey the literature alone would take a life-time.
As a result I have limited myself in various ways. In the first place, I
concentrate only on those matters which are of particular interest to me,
1002
namely theories of meaning and reference, and formal logic. For
discussions of such matters as demonstration, the logic of scientific
method, the categories, the topics, informal fallacies, humanist logic,
Ramist logic, and the whole range of commentaries on Aristotle, the
reader will have to look elsewhere. However, in my first chapter, which
I must confess to be based largely on secondary sources, I attempt to
give an overall picture of the period, so that the reader can assess the
place of the people and the theories I discuss in a wider context.
In the second place, although I make extensive references to one or two
medieval logicians, particularly Peter of Ailly, whose work was still
widely read and discussed in the post-medieval period, I have made no
attempt to fill in the medieval background, or to trace the historical
antecedents of every doctrine I mention. There are two reasons for this
deficiency. One lies in my original purpose, which was simply to
describe just what logic a well-read man of the sixteenth or seventeenth
century would have been acquainted with. The other, and most
important, reason lies in the monumental nature of such a task. An
adequate treatment of the historical antecedents would not only double
the size of my book, but would quadruple the number of footnotes, as
well as taking many years to accomplish. Fortunately medieval logic
has been by no means as thoroughly neglected as post-medieval logic,
and a very good idea of its scope and achievements can be obtained
from the following works, which themselves contain extensive
bibliographies:
Nuchelmans, G., Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval
Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, Amsterdam, 1973.
Pinborg, J., Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Uberblick,
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1972.
Rijk, L. M. de, Logica Modernorum, Vol. I, On the Twelfth Century
Theories of Fallacy, Assen, 1962.
Rijk, L. M. de, Logica Modernorum, Vol. II, The Origin and Early
Development of the Theory of Supposition, Assen, 1967. This volume is
in two parts, the second of which contains texts and indices.
In the third place, I have found myself unable to shed very much light
on the historical relations between many of the authors whom I discuss.
So far as those from whom I most frequently quote are concerned, there
is little problem. The bulk of my references are to Caubraith, Celaya,
1003
Clichtoveus, Enzinas, Pardo, de Soto and Tartaretus, all of whom
studied and/or taught at the University of Paris in the first years of the
sixteenth century, or earlier in the case of Tartaretus. Needless to say,
these men were acquainted with each other's works. Many other
references are to Hieronymus of St. Mark of whom I know only that he
studied at Oxford and that he frequently quotes from the work of Pardo;
and to the Germans, Trutvetter, Gebwiler and Eckius, who are of the
same period and who obviously knew the works of the Parisian
logicians as well as the works of Ockham, Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen
and Albert of Saxony.
The only later sixteenth century author of whom I make much use is
Fonseca, and the only seventeenth century author of whom I make
much use is John of St. Thomas. The influences on these men have
been comprehensively described in the works of Munoz Delgado, and
they stem back to early sixteenth century Paris. However, once one
strays outside Spain and the Paris of the early sixteenth century, a
number of obstacles to historical understanding immediately appear.
Despite Risse's efforts, we still do not know exactly how many logic
texts were published, where they were written, or when their first
edition appeared. The books themselves usually contain neither
biographical nor bibliographical information. Authors not only used
each other's work without acknowledgement, but they also criticized
each other's work without giving more specific references than "a
certain doctor said". Little is known about the curricula of most
sixteenth and seventeenth century universities.
Moreover, there is a tremendous amount of sameness about the
contents of logical textbooks, particularly in the later period. They can
be roughly categorized as Philippist, Ramist, Philippo-Ramist,
Aristotelian, or eclectic, but finer distinctions are hard to draw. Even
when an author cites his sources, this may be of little help. For
instance, we know that Joachim Jungius told Rhenius that he based his
logic text upon the works of Dietericus and Johann Kirchmann, (3) but
his work bears little obvious relation to that of Dietericus, and I have
been unable to see a copy of Kirchmann. In any case, the first edition of
Kirchmann listed by Risse appeared in 1638, the very year of the
Logica Hamburgensis.
On the whole, I think that I will be content to leave the task of
1004
unraveling all the relationships between logicians of the later period to
the intellectual historian. It is true that a number of medieval doctrines
were preserved into the seventeenth century, much later than such
authors as Boehner had supposed, and it is true that some new work
was done, particularly with respect to the fourth figure of the syllogism,
but generally speaking, nothing of interest to the logician was said after
1550 at the very latest. Indeed, now that I have written this book, I have
compiled a large list of logic texts from the period 1550-1650 which I
shall be happy never to open again. On the other hand, an enormous
amount of interesting work remains to be done for the period 1450-
1550, and I very much hope that my own research will provide a useful
starting point for research by others." (Preface, X-XI)
(1) Keckermann, Praecognitorum Logicorum Tractatus III, Hanoviae
1606, 109f.
(2) For titles, see the bibliography.
(3) Jungius, Logica Hamburgensis, edited and translated into German
by R. W. Meyer, Hamburg 1957, editor's introduction, xx.
Notes added:
[a] Die Logik der Neuzeit. Band l. 1500-1640, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt
1964.
[b] La dialettica e la retorica dell'umanesimo: 'Invenzione' e 'Metodo'
nella cultura del XVe XVI seeolo, Milano 1968.
[c] Logica Hispano-Portuguesa hasta 1600, Salamanca 1972.
[d] Renaissance Concepts of Method, New York 1960.
[e] The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science, Padua
1961
———. 1978. The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative
Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century: A
Bibliography from 1836 Onwards. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies.
Contents: Preface VII; Part One. Anselm to Paul of Venice (items 1-
632) 1; Part Two. After Paul of Venice (items 633-879) 73; Index of
Names 101; Index of Texts 105; Index of Translations 107; Index of
Subjects 109.
"My main interest in drawing up this bibliography was to list all the
books and articles which have to do with formal logic and semantics
from the time of Anselm to the end of the seventeenth century. I see
1005
this area as including such topics as consequences, syllogistic,
supposition theory, and speculative grammar, but as excluding such
topics as the categories, the struggle between nominalism and realism,
and pure grammar. It is not, of course, always easy to draw a line
between works which are concerned with formal logic and semantics
and works which are not so concerned, and inevitably my choice of
borderline cases will seem too restrictive to some and too liberal to
others. However, my hope is that I have not excluded any book or
article which obviously falls into the area I have delimited.
I have used the phrase "the tradition of medieval logic" in the title in
order to indicate that although I include the seventeenth century, I am
not concerned with the contributions of modern philosophy. The work
of men such as Pascal, Descartes, Arnauld, Leibniz and Locke carries
us far indeed from medieval discussions of logic and semantics.
Moreover, there is already such an extensive literature on these figures
that to include them in my bibliography would completely change its
character. On the other hand, I do include humanist logic and
renaissance Aristotelianism, since they involve a reaction to the
medieval tradition which can only properly be understood in the light
of that tradition.
This is a bibliography of secondary works and of modern editions of
early texts. Accordingly I have excluded those nineteenth century
reprints of earlier works such as Aldrich's Artis Logicae Compendium
which were produced merely as text books, and I have also excluded
modern facsimile editions of early printed texts unless they are
accompanied by substantial editorial material. In addition, I have
omitted a list of the various editions of Milton's Artis Logicae Plenior
Institutio, since printings of his complete works are both numerous and
easily found. The earliest book I list is Victor Cousin's 1836 edition of
Abelard, since this can properly be viewed as the starting point of
modern scholarly work on medieval logicians.
I do not refer to short edited or translated passages in books of
readings. I have included only the more lengthy book reviews, and only
a few unpublished dissertations. I have not included biographical and
general historical works unless they have some specific contribution to
make to the history of logic. I have tried to include all relevant material
published before 1977, but the listing of 1976 publications is inevitably
1006
incomplete, given the delays which so often occur in the printing of
books and journals.
I have endeavoured to look at each item personally, and to include as
much information as possible. In those cases where I have failed to
locate an item, or have located it in a place where I could not
conveniently see it, I have made a note of my failure. The reader should
bear in mind that these entries may be quite inaccurate. Where I have
only been able to see a copy of an article, I have added the note:
"Journal not seen."
Works which deal with the period as a whole will be found in Part One.
Where an author has more than one book or article, the items are
arranged chronologically.
Below each item I list the headings under which it is indexed and,
where relevant, cross-references to reviews, discussions, translations
and reprints. The ordering of the headings corresponds to the four
indexes I have provided: (1) an index of names; (2) an index of texts;
(3) an index of translations; (4) an index of subjects. Only substantial
texts and translations are indexed. In the few cases where a book
review is not cross-referenced, the reason is that only the review
contains material relevant to my purposes. It is my hope that these
indexes, which are based on my knowledge of a work's contents rather
than its title alone, will prove one of the most valuable aspects of my
bibliography.
Readers who wish to find articles dealing with related fields or
published after 1976 are recommended to consult two bibliographical
sources in particular. They are:
1. Repertoire Bibliographique de la Philosophie. Publié par l'Institut
supérieur de philosophic de l'Université catholique de Louvain.
2. The Philosopher's Index. An International Index to Philosophical
Periodicals.
Readers who wish to remedy the omissions I describe in my first three
paragraphs are also recommended to consult the following:
Risse, Wilhelm. Bibliographia Logica. Band II. 1801-1969.
Hildesheim-New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1973.
Risse's work is far more comprehensive than my own, since he includes
not only formal logic, but what might be described as the logic of ideas.
On the other hand, his bibliography is arranged chronologically rather
1007
than alphabetically; and inevitably, given the scope of his work, he
does not give full publication details and his indexes are minimal.
Volume II contains only books, and it is to be hoped that the volume
listing journal articles will appear before too long. (*)
I owe a great debt of gratitude to those people who went through an
earlier version of this bibliography and provided me with a large
number of extra references. In particular I would like to thank William
McMahon, Jan Pinborg, Charles Schmitt, and Paul Vincent Spade. I
would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies for their helpful advice on organization and
presentation, the staff of Inter-Library Loan at the University of
Waterloo for their unfailing help, and the Canada Council for various
grants which have enabled me to work in British libraries. Finally, I
should like to thank the Humanities Research Council of Canada for
aiding the publication of this book." (Preface, pp. VII-IX)
(*) [Bibliographia logica. III. Verzeichnis der Zeitschriftenartikel zur
Logik. Hildesheim-New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1979].
There is a continuation volume: Fabienne Pironet, The Tradition of
Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar. A Bibliography (1977-
1994), Turnhout: Brepols 1997.
———. 1985. Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics. London: Variorum
Reprints.
Reprint of 12 essays already published.
CONTENTS: Preface IX-X;
REFERENCE IN INTENSIONAL CONTEXTS
I 'For Riding is Required a Horse": A Problem of Meaning and
Reference in Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic -
Vivarium XII. 1974; II I Promise you a Horse": A Second Problem of
Meaning and Reference in Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century
Logic (Parts 1 & 2) - Vivarium XIV. 1976; III Chimeras and Imaginary
Objects: A Study in the Post-Medieval Theory of Signification -
Vivarium XV. 1977;
PROPOSITIONS AND MENTAL LANGUAGE
IV Theories of the Proposition: Some Early sixteenth Century
Discussions - Franciscan Studies 38. 1978 (1981); V The Structure of
Mental Language: Some Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth
Century Logicians - Vivarium XX. 1982; VI Mental Language and the
1008
Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by Early
Sixteenth Century Logicians - Franciscan Studies 41. 1981 (1984);
SCHOLASTIC INFLUENCES ON JOHN LOCKE
VII "Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?" The Scholastic Sources of
Locke's Theory of Language - Journal of the History of Philosophy
XIX. 1981; VIII Locke on Language - Canadian Journal of Philosophy
XIV/1. 1984;
LOGICAL ANALYSIS
IX The Doctrine of Exponibilia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries
- Vivarium XI. 1973; X Multiple Quantification and the Use of Special
Quantifiers in Early Sixteenth Century Logic - Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic XIX. 1978;
SEMANTIC PARADOXES
XI Thomas Bricot (d. 1516) and the Liar Paradox - Journal of the
History of Philosophy XV. 1977; XII Will Socrates Cross the Bridge?
A Problem in Medieval Logic - Franciscan Studies 46. 1976 (1977);
Addenda et Corrigenda; Index.
"With one exception (IX) the papers in this volume were written after
my first book, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period
(Synthèse Historical Library 12, Dordrecht: Reidel 1974), and they are
devoted to a single theme, the philosophy of language in the period
from the late fifteenth to the late seventeenth century. The first group of
papers (I, II, III) deals with problems of reference in intensional
contexts, and the second (IV, V, VI) with problems concerning the
nature of propositions and mental language. The last three groups of
papers take up more specialized problems. VII and VIII deal with
scholastic influences on John Locke’s philosophy of language; IX and
X discuss two areas of technical logical analysis which had a close
bearing on semantic issues; and XI and XII discuss two types of
paradox, one of which is clearly semantic, and one of which should
perhaps be classified as pragmatic. Many of the issues had been
touched on in my book, but here they are presented in much greater
depth, on the basis of a closer analysis of the relevant sources. The
papers also represent my growing awareness both of the importance of
the medieval background to post-medieval philosophy, and of the
diversity of intellectual currents which characterized the post-medieval
period. For a summing-up of these matters, which will place the
1009
logicians discussed here in their proper historical context, I refer the
reader to my chapter on logic and language in the Cambridge History
of Renaissance Philosophy, edited by Charles B. Schmitt (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, [1988]).
On re-reading the papers collected here, I found that in general I still
agree with what I wrote. Nonetheless there are some things that I would
now do differently. In particular, I would edit the Latin texts, rather
than presenting them in their raw form. I would also try to standardize
my use of language. For instance, the verb ‘supponere’ is variously
translated here as ‘suppose’ and ‘supposit’. In this reprint the
opportunity has been taken to correct misprints and simple mistakes in
the texts themselves; more complicated mistakes are discussed in the
Addenda et Corrigenda. Where there is, inevitably, an overlap of
material I have sometimes used the Addenda to indicate where my most
up-to-date treatment of the subject is found. I have also brought
bibliographical references up to date, and I have added details of recent
editions of Latin texts." (from the Preface)
———. 2008. Les Théories De L'analogie Du Xiie Au Xvie Siècle.
Paris: Vrin.
Conférences Pierre Abélard, Université de Paris-IV Sorbonne (2004).
Table des matières: Avant-propos par Irène Rosier-Catach 7; Préface de
l’auteur 11; Chapitre premier: Les problèmes: logique, métaphysique,
théologie 13; Chapitre II: Thomas d’Aquin: interprétations et
malentendus 33; Chapitre III: L’analogie et les concepts: le virage vers
l'intérieur 55; Chapitre IV: Autour de l’analogie: ambiguïté et
métaphore 79; Bibliographie 105; Index nominum des auteurs avant
1650 119; Index nominum des auteurs modernes 121.
"Afin de donner au lecteur une idée plus précise du plan de mon
exposé, je dirai que dans les trois premiers chapitres, j'essaierai
d'expliquer le trajet qui mène des Catégories et des Réfutations
sophistiques d'Aristote à la tripartition de l'analogie telle que Burley la
présente. Dans le premier chapitre, je donnerai un bref historique de la
réception des textes et de I 'apparition de l'analogie d'attribution au mn
e siècle. Je parlerai aussi des antécédents de la notion dans les textes
des théologiens de la fin du XII e siècle et du début du XIII e siècle.
Dans le chapitre il, je commençerai par un bref aperçu de la pensée de
Thomas d'Aquin au sujet de l'analogie en général, avant d'examiner
1010
l'analogie de proportionnalité plus en détail. Dans le chapitre in, nous
serons de nouveau avec Gauthier Burley et sa doctrine des concepts
analogiques. Pour terminer, je consacrerai le dernier chapitre à deux
problèmes concernant le langage parlé ou écrit: quand faut- il
désambiguïser les propositions en faisant des distinctions, et quel est le
rôle de la métaphore dans les discussions des théologiens et logiciens
du Moyen Âge?
Prenons comme point de départ la question de savoir pourquoi les
auteurs du Moyen Âge ont cru nécessaire de développer une théorie de
l'analogie sémantique. Afin de trouver une réponse, nous devrons
répondre à trois questions préliminaires: 1) Quelles sont les théories
métaphysiques et théologiques qui ont produit l'analogie
métaphysique? 2) Quelle est la théorie du langage qui prédominait? (3)
Quels sont les textes canoniques qui donnaient les instruments que l'on
pouvait utiliser pour résoudre le problème des rapports entre réalité et
langage? Dans ce qui suit, j'esquisserai une réponse aux trois questions,
avant de parler plus en détail des textes logiques. Ensuite je retournerai
aux théologiens afin de parler d'une solution au problème des noms
divins qui semble contenir les racines d'une théorie de l'analogie. Pour
terminer ce chapitre, j'expliquerai comment l'arrivée des nouvelles
traductions d' Aristote et des écrits arabes a mené à la théorie de
l'analogie telle qu'on la retrouve chez Thomas d'Aquin. Évidemment je
ne serai pas en mesure de donner les réponses avec toute la complexité
qui s'impose, surtout à la première question, mais ces quelques
remarques, même superficielles, pourront déjà nous indiquer la
direction à suivre." (pp. 15-16)
BOOKS EDITED
Bricot, Thomas. 1986. Tractatus Insolubilium. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
Artistarium Vol. 6. Critical edition of the treatise by Thomas Bricot
with an introduction, notes, appendices and indices by E. J. Ashworth.
Table of Contents: Introduction: 1. Thomas Bricot: Life and Works
XIII; 2. The Tractatus Insolubilium XIV; 3. About this Edition XV; 4.
Description of the Early Printed Editions Used XV; Notes to the
1011
Introduction XIX; Bibliography of Secondary Sources XXII; Edition of
text: Table of Contents 5; Signs and Abbreviations 11; Tractatus
Insolubilium Magistri Thomae Bricot 13; Notes to the Text 113;
Appendices: Appendix One 123; Appendix Two 129; Appendix Three
138; Indexes: 1. Index of Names 147; 2. Index of Examples 149; 3.
Subject Index 153-155.
"1. Thomas Bricot: Life and Works
Thomas Bricot was one of the men who laid the foundations for the last
flowering of medieval logical doctrines which took place at the
University of Paris in the first two decades of the sixteenth century. (1)
Little seems to be known about his early life except that he came from
Amiens. (2) He took his BA at Paris in 1478, his MA in 1479, and his
doctorate of theology in March 1490. Diring the 1480s he taught
philosophy at the Collège de Sainte-Barbe, but when he took his
licence of theology in January 1490 he was a bursarius of the Collège
des Cholets. After 1490 he held a variety of ecclesiastical and academic
posts. He spent some time in Amiens; but by 1502 he was back in
Paris. Between 1506 and 1516 he often served as dean of the faculty of
theology; and he was both canon and penitentiary of Notre Dame. He
died in Paris on April 10, 1516. His philosophical work belongs
entirely to his early years in Paris.
Much of his activity was directed toward editing the works of others,
including a 1487 edition of John Buridan's Tractatus Summularum. (3)
He produced abbreviated versions of Aristotle's Organon and of his
natural philosophy; (4) he wrote a series of questions on the Analytica
Posteriora; (5) but most notably he edited and added questions to the
commentaries on Aristotle and on Peter of Spain which had been
written by the Paris master, George of Brussels. (6) Bricot's only
original works seem to have been the Tractatus Insolubilium and the
Tractatus Obligationum which were always published together and
which received at least nine editions between 1489 and 1511. (7) The
Tractatus Obligationum is largely based on the De Obligationibus of
Marsilius of Inghen; (8) the Tractatus Insolubilium will be discussed
below.
Bricot's works enjoyed considerable success in Paris in the last two
decades of the fifteenth century as one can see from the number of
editions printed there, as well as in other French centres. He was also
1012
known outside France. His abbreviation of the Organon was printed in
Basel in 1492 and in Salamanca, ca.1496. It was printed together with a
work by George of Brussels in Venice in 1506. (9) Bricot was
prescribed to be read at the University of Vienna in 1499; (10) and
some of his works were sold by the Oxford bookseller,
John Dorne, in 1520 . (11) Indeed, as late as 1535 the University of
Cambridge found it necessary to forbid the reading of Bricot.(12)
However, I judge that his success was largely due to the usefulness of
his texts as teaching manuals rather than to any great originality. The
only doctrine of his which I know to have been discussed by other
logicians was his solution to the problem of semantic paradoxes found
in the Tractatus Insolubilium, to which I shall now turn.
2. The 'Tractatus Insolubilium'
In the Tractatus Insolubilium Bricot discusses three approaches to the
problem of semantic paradoxes. (13) In the second question he takes up
the solution attributed to Ockham, (14) whereby the part of a
proposition cannot supposit for the whole. Bricot did not favour this
solution. In the third question he discusses two versions of a solution
stemming from Peter of Ailly but reworked by George of Brussels. In
the first question he presents his own view. This owes much to Roger
Swyneshed, but avoids some of the more paradoxical consequences of
Swyneshed's view. Bricot allows self-reference to be legitimate; and he
treats simple insolubles as being straightforward categorical
propositions. However, he revises the conditions under which a
proposition is said to be true. An affirmative proposition is true if and
only if (I) it signifies that things are as they are and (II) it does not
signify itself to be false. On the other hand, a negative proposition
needs to meet only one condition. Either (I) it signifies that things are
not as they are not or (II) its contradictory signifies itself to be false. It
is here that Bricot differs from Swyneshed, who had treated affirmative
and negative propositions alike.
Among the authors who were to discuss Bricot's solution are found
Pierre Tartaret; (15) David Cranston; (16) John Mair; (17) and
Domingo de Soto. (18) In the version of his De Insolubilibus published
in 1516, John Mair said explicitly that opinio magistri nostri thome
Briquot ... nunc est communis. (19)
The Tractatus Insolubilium is noteworthy for its treatment of two other
1013
issues. First, there is a short discussion of non-semantic paradoxes. (20)
Second, there is a very long discussion of the issue of complexe
significabilia or the significates of propositions, when the latter are
viewed as occurrent entities. (21) As with semantic paradoxes, I have
discussed Bricot's treatment of these issues at length in other places,
and will not dwell on them here.
As an appendix to my edition of the Tractatus Insolubilium I have
included two short texts in which Bricot takes up the issue of semantic
paradoxes once more, and a third text in which he discusses complexe
significabilia." (pp. XIII-XIV)
Pauli, Veneti. 1988. Logica Magna. Secunda Pars. Tractatus De
Obligationibus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Classical and Medieval Logic Texts V. Edited with an English
Translation and Notes by E. Jennifer Ashworth.
Contents; Introduction VII-XVI; Part One. 3; Part Two: Concerning
positio; Chapter One: Against the Rules 101; Chapter Two: On
Conjunctions 327; Chapter Three: On Disjunctions 335; Chapter Four:
On Similars and Dissimilars 345; Parth Three: Concerning depositio;
Chapter One: Rules 369; Chapter Two: Theses 379; Chapter Three:
Sophisms 379; Bibliography: I. Oblications Treatises 393; II. Other
Sources 394; Indexes: Index of sophisms 398; Index of names 401;
Index of doctrines 404-409.
"The Purpose of Obligations Treatises
A contentious and as yet unresolved issue has to do with the purpose of
lllillgations treatises. The treatises themselves do not offer much
discussion 111 this point, being content to remark that the opponent in
a disputation is to try to push the respondent into accepting a
contradiction, whereas the respondent has to resist this, even when
faced with the curious consequences Ilf grunting such a propositum as
‘You do not exist.’23 In the process both participants would have their
knowledge of valid inferences thoroughly tested, for each proposition
put forward would be such that it followed from preceding steps, or
such that its negation followed, or such that neither it nor Its negation
followed. In this third case either it or its negation would enter the
sequence as an extra premiss for further conclusions or non-
conclusions. It should also be emphasized that the bulk of almost all
treatises on obligations consisted of a series of sophisms which, as
1014
Edith Sylla has argued Ilf the ‘physical’ sophisms, formed an integral
part of logic teaching, at least in fourteenth century Oxford, and were
designed to develop a student’s subtlety and skill in handling logical
rules.24 These remarks suggest that obligational disputations (if such
were ever in fact held) had the primary function of providing oral
exercise in formal logic, and hence were of mainly pedagogical
significance.
This solution has been adopted by a number of authors; but reflection
on the complex and sophisticated nature of the controversy between
Swyneshed and others has led P.V. Spade to suggest that obligations
treatises offer us an account of counterfactual reasoning.25 This theory
in turn has been criticized by E. Stump, who points out that the treatises
reflect a number of diverse concerns, including ‘epistemic logic,
indexicals, propositional attitudes, and other issues in the philosophy of
language.’26 She also points out that in Burley at least there was ‘a
concern with special sorts of difficulties in evaluating consequences or
inferences as a result of the disputational context in which the
inferences occur.’27
My own view is that there is probably something to be said for all these
accounts. Insofar as the treatises described a routine to be followed in
class-room disputations, the purpose could only have been that of
testing a student’s skill in formal logic, since truth was explicitly not an
issue;28 but the authors and readers of such treatises obviously
welcomed the opportunity to discuss other matters in some depth. Paul
himself was particularly concerned with the difference between use and
mention, as will be seen from many of his sophisms. One must also
bear in mind the often-noted link between treatises on obligations and
treatises on insolubles. They go together not only in Paul, but in
Swyneshed, Albert of Saxony and Strode, to mention but three names.
This suggests a general interest in discussing all kinds of paradoxes,
both semantic and non-semantic. Whatever the final answer is, reading
Paul of Venice should help us to arrive at it, since his Tractatus de
Obligationibus is a compendium of all the main views current in the
second half of the fourteenth century."
23 For detailed references, see Part 1, section 2, note 3.
24 Uditli Dudley Sylla, ‘The Oxford calculators’ in CH, 540-563.
25 See Spade, ‘Some theories’, pp. 1-2, for an account of the literature,
1015
and throughout for a defence of his thesis about counterfactual
reasoning.
26 See Stump, ‘Roger Swyneshed’, pp. 169-174: ‘The purpose and
function of obligations’, p. 171 n. 45 is particularly important for her
discussion of Spade’s thesis.
27 Stump in CH, p. 328.
28 For an account of the distinction between doctrinal disputations,
which were designed to arrive at the truth of some claim, and
obligational disputations, see E.J. Ashworth, ‘Renaissance man as
logician: Josse Clichtove (1472-1543) on disputations’, History and
Philosophy of Logic, 7 (1986), 15-29.
Sanderson, Robert. 1985. Logicae Artis Compendium. Bologna:
Editrice CLUEB.
Reprint of the second edition (1618, first anonymous edition 1615),
edited with an introduction by E. J. Ashworth.
Contents: Editor's Introduction IX-LV; I. Robert Sanderson: Life and
works XI; II. The history of logic in the Sixteenth century XVI; III.
Logic in England XXIII; IV. The Oxford curriculum XXXII; V. An
analysis of the Logicae Artis Compendium XXXV-LV.
Logicae artis compendium. Pars prima 11; Pars secunda 81; Pars tertia
129; Appendix prima 243; Appendix posterior 331; Indices; Index of
pre-twentieth century authors and works 371; Index of twentieth-
century authors 375; Index of names used in examples 377; Index of
Latin terms 379-382.
"V. An Analysis of the Logicae Artis Compendium.
In this section I intend to relate Sanderson to his background by
focussing on four specific aspects of the Logicae artis compendium. I
shall discuss (i) the nature of logic; (ii) the medieval heritage; (iii)
changes in syllogistic; (iv) method and the art of discourse.
(i) The Nature of Logic
I shall begin by analyzing Sanderson's first chapter, which in a brief
compass touches on a range of classificatory issues that were the
subject of lively debate during the sixteenth century. The first of these
issues concerns the very use of the word 'logica' as opposed to
'dialectica'. It was a medieval commonplace that the word 'dialectica'
could be used in two senses, a broad sense which equated dialectic with
logic, and a narrow sense, whereby dialectic was that kind of probable
1016
argumentation discussed in the Topics. (94) Which word was used for
the study of all kinds of argumentation was a matter of taste. Peter of
Spain had used 'dialectica'; John Buridan and others preferred logica'.
However, in the sixteenth century greater doctrinal significance became
attached to the word 'dialectica'. Ramus argued at some length that
Aristotle's 'Organon' did not as was commonly thought discuss three
special kinds of logic, i.e. apodictic or demonstrative, dealing with
necessary material; dialectic, dealing with probable material; and
sophistic, dealing with fallacious material. Instead, there was one
general doctrine, which included a general doctrine of invention. (95)
Hence, there was no specialized use of the term 'dialectic' and it both
could and should properly be applied to logic as a whole. In response
Zabarella, for instance, argued that 'dialectic' did name a distinct part of
logic, and should be used as the name of that part only. (96) Sanderson
allows the wider use; but his remark that logica' is `Synecdochiche
Dialectica' is significant, given that synecdoche is the figure of speech
whereby a part is put for the whole.
Sanderson next classifies logic as an 'ars instrumentalis'. Once more,
his choice of words has to be understood in the light of sixteenth
century polemic. There were four ways in which logic could be
classified. (97) Peter of Spain had called it both an art and a science;
scholastics tended to call it a science; humanists tended to call it an
art;" and Zabarella called it neither an art nor a science but an
instrumental habit. Giulio Pace in turn argued that an instrumental habit
was in fact an art;" and it seems to be this usage that Sanderson has
adopted. Moreover, Sanderson was fully conscious of the implications
of his choice, for in Appendix 1, chapter 2, pp. 31-37, he gives a
sample speech on the genus of logic. He cites Zabarella (as well as
Keckermann) and he concludes that logic is properly speaking an art. In
this he is departing from some of his English predecessors, especially
Seton, who had classified logic as a science. (100)
The final part of Sanderson's initial characterization of logic is the
phrase "dirigens mentem nostram in cognitionem omnium
intelligibilium." This definition is very similar to one found in
Keckermann, who may well have influenced Sanderson here.
Keckermann wrote "[Logica] Est ars humani intellectus operationes
sive Hominis cogitationes ordinandi & dirigendi in rerum cognitione."
1017
(101) According to the Conimbricenses, the view that logic directed the
operations of the mind was found in Fonseca and Suarez, and it is not
found explicitly in the antiquiores. (102) In order to understand the full
significance of Sanderson's definition, it is necessary to relate his
remark about directing the mind to his subsequent discussion of the
divisions of logic, and it is also necessary to explore his reference to the
knowledge of intelligible things in relation to his subsequent
classification of the objects and subjects of logic." (pp. XXXV-
XXXVIII)
(...)
"Conclusion.
Tolstoi’s view of history as an inevitable process, which the actions of
Napoleon affect no more and no less than those of the meanest soldier,
is an overstatement. Yet it is true that the textbook-writers and
schoolteachers of a period may be as important as the leading
intellectuals, for it is by these minor figures that all innovations are
accepted, altered, and made into the new commonplace. To concentrate
solely upon the great thinkers is to obscure the reality of university and
school, of the main stream of orthodoxy which lies behind these
thinkers and which feeds them. To judge the true stature of such men as
Locke it is helpful to know both what they were taught and how their
teaching affected others; but to judge the intellectual quality of the
seventeenth century as a whole, such a wider knowledge is essential.
Great men stand to some extent outside their period, and it is only the
minor thinkers who can provide a safe basis for generalization about
that period. This fact alone would be a sufficient basis for the
investigation of Sanderson’s Logicae artis compendium. One cannot
claim that it shows new insights into formal logic or the philosophy of
language, but it is clearly written and well organized; and, given its
success as a logic textbook, it is a valuable historical document. A
study of this book will throw ihuch light upon the training and the
preoccupations of those who used it; and it will help us to understand
not only the development of logic textbooks in seventeenth century
England, but also the type of education offered at Oxford and
Cambridge." (pp. LIV-LV)
(94) See, e.g., the commentary by John Dorp in Perutile compendium
totius logice Joannes Buridani (Venice 1499, facsimile edition
1018
Frankfurt am Main, 1965), sig.a 2ra. For discussion see Pierre
Michaud-Quantin, "L'emploi des termes logica et dialectica au moyen
age" in Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen age (Montreal, Institut
d'études médiévales, Paris, J. Vrin, 1965), pp. 855-862. See also
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis in universam dialecticam
Aristotelis (Cologne, 1607: facsimile edition Hildesheim, New York,
1976) col. 25.
(95) Petrus Ramus, Scholarum dialecticarum seu animadversionum in
Organum Aristotelis, in Scholae in tres primas liberales antes
(Francofurti 1581, facsimile edition, Frankfurt am Main 1965), pp. 40-
43. He suggested (p. 40) that sophistic was not properly a part of the art
of logic, just as 'barbarismorum doctrina' is not properly a part of the art
of grammar. Virtue is homogeneous but vices are heterogeneous, he
remarked.
(96) Jacobus Zabarella, De natura logicae in Opera Logica (Cologne
1597, facsimile edition Hildesheim 1966), col. 20. Cf. the discussion by
Pedro da Fonseca, Instituiçoes Dialécticas / Institutionum
dialecticarum libri octo, edited by J. Ferreira Gomes (Universidade de
Coimbra, 1964), p. 22. Fonseca remarked that the definition of dialectic
as dealing with the probable could not apply to dialectic in the wide
sense.
(97) For discussions of these alternatives (and a fifth alternative, that
logic is a faculty) see Conimbricensis, cols. 33-37; Zabarella, De
natura logicae, cols. 5-24.
(98) One favourite phrase of those in the humanist tradition was "ars
disserendi". Agricola wrote, for instance, "Erit ergo nobis hoc pacto
definita dialectice, ars probabiliter de qualibet re proposita disserendi":
Rodolphus Agricola, De inventione dialectica (Cologne 1523, facsimile
edition Frankfurt am Main, 1967), p. 193. For discussion and further
references see Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, pp.
178-179; and Conimbricensis, cols. 25-27.
(99) Julius Pacius, In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Organum
Commentarius Analyticus (Frankfurt 1597, facsimile edition,
Hildesheim 1966), p. 2a: "Ergo logica est habitus instrumentalis, id est
ars."
(100) Seton (sig. A 59 wrote: "Dialectica est scientia, probabiliter de
quovis themate disserendi." Cf. John Sanderson, Institutionum
1019
dialecticarum (Oxoniae 1602) p. 3 and Samuel Smith, Aditus ad
logicam (Oxonii, 1684, editio nona) p. I, for similar definitions.
(101) Bartholomaeus Keckermann, Praecognitorum logicorum
tractatus tres in Operum omnium quae extant tomus Primus (Genevae,
1614), col. 90-91.
(102) Conimbricensis, col. 42.
ARTICLES 1967-1976
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1967. "Joachim Jungius (1587-1657) and
the Logic of Relations." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no.
49:72-85.
"In histories of logic, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at least
until Leibniz began his work, are either ignored or are referred to with
the utmost brevity as being hardly worthy of attention (1).
(...)
However, there is one name which appears with fair regularity in the
literature, and that is the name of Joachim Jungius, whose Logica
Hamburgensis is often contrasted favorably with the Port Royal Logic.
Both Bochenski and the Kneales allow this book, published in 1638 for
the use of the Classical Schools at Hamburg, to be one of the better
textbooks of the period (2); while Heinrich Scholz in his influential
Geschichte der Logik, not only praises it highly, but discusses Jungius's
contributions to logic at some length (3). More impressive yet are the
varied tributes paid to Jungius by Leibniz, who called him "one of the
most able men that Germany has ever had" (4); compared him with
Galileo and Descartes (5); and said that "he surpassed all others in the
knowledge of true logic, not even excepting the author of the Artis
Cogitandi [Arnauld]" (6). Of course, much of Leibniz's praise arose
from his admiration of Jungius's varied activities, his career as a
medical doctor, his contributions to physics, botany, mineralogy,
theology, educational theory, and his foundation of the first-learned
society in Germany (7). More specifically, however, Leibniz admired
Jungius for his demonstration that not all inferences could be reduced
to syllogistic form, and he praised his logical acuteness in this respect
on a number of occasions (8). The purpose of this paper is to shed some
1020
light on a much neglected area of the history of logic by inquiring
whether Jungius's treatment of non-syllogistic or, in this context,
relational inferences, is commensurate with the logical distinction
which has been claimed for him; and, more briefly, to see whether there
are any further factors which set Jungius above other logicians of the
same period." (pp. 72-73)
(...)
"In conclusion one may say that although the Logica Hamburgensis
shares in all the faults of its age, the superficiality, the lack of
metalogical perceptiveness, it also has merits which are peculiarly its
own. The body of truth-functional logic contained in it would alone be
sufficient to distinguish Jungius from his contemporaries, and still more
impressive, given the background, is his use of relational inferences. It
is true that the argument a divisis ad composita is both unoriginal and
unremarkable, despite Scholz's praise; it is true that the inversion of
relations is found in other contemporary logicians; while discussion of
the oblique syllogism was quite usual; but the argument a rectis ad
obliqua was both original and clearly presented. Moreover, Jungius
seems to have been fully conscious that relational inferences were
inferences in their own right, to be treated as such and not to be hidden
away among the categories. Without this realization, any amount of
originality in the discovery of actual inferences could have gone for
nought. Hence, while the verdict of Heinrich Scholz needs
modification, his praise of Jungius is basically justified, for it was he
who brought the logic of relations to the attention of his successors,
especially Leibniz." (p. 85)
(1) In this context, it must be acknowledged that historians of thought
have been kinder than those devoted strictly to formal logic. For
instance, Peter Petersen's seminal work, Geschichte der aristotelischen
Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland, Leipzig 1921. contains
much material of interest to the historian of logic. The publication in
1964 of Dr. Wilhelm Risse's work, Die Logik der Neuzeit. 1. Band.
1500—1640, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1964, marks a great step forward
in the study of the field.
(2) I. Bochenski, History of Formal Logic, translated and edited by Ivo
Thomas, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1961, p. 257, W. & M. Kneale, The
Development of Logic, Oxford 1962, p. 313.
1021
(3) H. Scholz, Geschichte der Logik, Berlin 1931, pp. 41—2.
(4) "Letter to Christian Habbeus, Jan. 1676", Samtliche Schriften und
Briefe, edited by the Prussian Academy of Sciences (1923) 1st Series,
Vol. I, p. 443.
(5) Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz, edited by L. Couturat,
Paris 1903, p. 345.
(6) "Letter to Koch, 1708", quoted by Couturat in La logique de
Leibniz, Paris 1901, note 4, p. 74.
(7) The Societas Ereunetica, founded in Rostock in 1622. Unhappily, it
lasted at most only two years. For further information on Jungius's life,
see the following works:
G. Guhrauer, Joachim Jungius und sein Zeitalter, Stuttgart und
Tübingen 1850; Beiträge zur Jungius-Forschung. Prolegomena zu der
von der Hamburgischen Universität beschlossenen Ausgabe der Werke
von Joachim Jungius (1587—1657), edited by A. Meyer, Hamburg
1929; Joachim Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften: Die
Entfaltung der Wissenschaft. Zum Gedenken an Joachim Jungius,
Hamburg 1957. The second work mentioned contains an extensive
bibliography.
(8) Opuscules et fragments inédits, p. 287, p. 330, p. 406.
———. 1968. "Propositional Logic in the Sixteenth and Early
Seventeenth Centuries." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no.
9:179-192.
"Until recently, historians of logic have regarded the early modern
period with unremitting gloom. Father Boehner, for instance, claimed
that at the end of the fifteenth century logic entered upon a period of
unchecked regression, during which it became an insignificant
preparatory study, diluted with extra-logical elements, and the insights
of men like Burleigh into the crucial importance of propositional logic
as a foundation for logic as a whole were lost.(1) Nor is this attitude
entirely unwarranted, for the new humanism in all its aspects was
hostile to such medieval developments as the logic of terms and the
logic of consequences. Those who were devoted to a classical style
condemned medieval works as unpolished and arid, and tended to
subordinate logic to rhetoric; while those who advocated a return to the
original works of Aristotle, freed from medieval accretions, naturally
discounted any additions to the subject matter of the Organon.
1022
But it would be a mistake to dismiss the logical work of the period too
readily. In the first place, the writings of the medieval logicians were
frequently published and widely read. To cite only a few cases, the
Summulae Logicales of Petrus Hispanus received no fewer than 166
printed editions;(2) Ockham's Summa Totius Logicae was well known;
the 1639 edition of Duns Scotus included both the Grammaticae
Speculativae attributed to Thomas of Erfurt and the very interesting In
Universam Logicam Quaestiones of Pseudo-Scotus; (3) the Logica of
Paulus Venetus was very popular; and a number of tracts by lesser
known men like Magister Martinus and Paulus Pergulensis were
printed. Moreover, since logic still played such a preeminent role in
education, contemporary scholars were not backward in producing their
own textbooks; and numerous rival schools of logic flourished.(4) The
purpose of this paper is to make a preliminary survey of some of the
wealth of material available from the sixteenth and first half of the
seventeenth centuries, in order to ascertain how much of the medieval
propositional logic had in fact been retained.(5) It will become clear
that the situation was better than has been thought." (p. 179)
(1) See P. Boehner, ''Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der De
Morgannsche Gesetze in der Scholastik," Archivâr Philosophie, 4
(1951), p. 145.
(2) See J. P. Mullally, The Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain
(Notre Dame, Indiana, 1945), p. LXXVIII.
(3) In Joannes Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, edited by L. Wadding
(Lugduni, 1639), Vol. I.
(4) For a comprehensive account of the various schools of logic, see
Dr. Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit. I. Band 1500-1640,
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964).
(5) I have limited myself to material in the British Museum and the
Cambridge University Library for the purposes of this introductory
survey.
———. 1968. "Petrus Fonseca and Material Implication." Notre Dame
"Little attention has been paid to the question of whether material
implication was recognized in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
although it has been argued that John of St. Thomas was aware of the
equivalence '(p ⊃ q) ≡ (~p v q)'.(1) The other usual test-case for a
1023
knowledge of material implication is '(p ⊃ q) ≡ ~(p . ~q) and I intend
to show that the sixteenth century Jesuit, Petrus Fonseca, whose
Institutionum Dialecticarum libri octo was one of the most popular
textbooks of the period, (2) was well acquainted with this second
equivalence." (p. 227)
(...)
"One must conclude that Fonseca was aware both of strict and of
material implication." (p. 228)
(1) See Ivo Thomas, "Material Implication in John of St. Thomas",
Dominican Studies 3 (1950), p. 180; and John J. Doyle, "John of St.
Thomas and Mathematical Logic", The New Scholasticism 27 (1953),
pp. 3-38.
(2) First published in 1564, it went into at least 44 editions. See
Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, Band I. 1500-1640 (Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt, 1964), p. 362, n. 395.
———. 1969. "The Doctrine of Supposition in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no.
51:260-285.
"The purpose of this paper is to make a preliminary survey of some of
the wealth of material available from the sixteenth and first half of the
seventeenth centuries, in order to ascertain how much of the medieval
propositional logic had in fact been retained.(5) It will become clear
that the situation was better than has been thought.
The vocabulary and organization of the textbooks under consideration
were fairly standard. The discussion of the proposition [Enuntiatio,
Propositio, or, in Ramist texts, Axioma] followed sections on the
predicaments and predicables or the Ramist equivalent, on arguments.
Medieval logicians had called the compound proposition 'hypothetical',
but sixteenth and seventeenth century writers more usually referred to
enuntiatio conίuncta or composita, sometimes with a note to the effect
that it is vulgarly or improperly called 'hypothetical'.(6) Melancthon
retained the name 'hypothetical', as did one or two others.(7) The
Spanish scholastic, Petrus Fonseca, discussed the whole question in
some detail, saying that the name 'hypothetical' most properly applies
to conditional propositions, but can also be used of disjunctions,
because they imply a conditional.(8) A compound proposition was
generally said to consist of two (or more) categorical propositions,
1024
joined by one (or more) of a list of propositional connectives. The
assumption that the truth of these propositions depended upon the truth
of the parts, the kind of connective employed, and in certain cases the
relationship between the parts usually remained implicit, but the
seventeenth century German logician, Joachim Jungius, said explicitly
that truth or falsity depended on "the kind of composition involved";(9)
while Alsted had written previously that truth or falsity depended "on
the disposition of parts". (10)
There was much agreement as to the kinds of compound proposition to
be considered. Conditional, conjunctive, and disjunctive propositions
were always mentioned. Those logicians in the scholastic tradition, like
Campanella, Cardillus, Fonseca, Hunnaeus and John of St. Thomas,
included causal and rational propositions, as did some outside the
tradition like Cornelius Martini and Jungius, who discussed the causal
proposition at length. Only a few, including Fonseca and C. Martini,
mentioned the temporal and local propositions which had been
discussed by such medieval logicians as Ockham and Burleigh; but
both Ramus and Burgersdijck spoke of 'related' propositions which
exhibit 'when' and 'where' among other connectives.(11)
Ramus and those influenced by him added a new kind of compound
proposition, the discretive.
Although compound propositions were rarely called 'hypothetical', the
traditional title of 'hypothetical syllogism' was usually retained for the
discussion of propositional inference forms. Only a few spoke of
syllogismus compositus or coniunctus. (12) In all cases the categorical
syllogism was discussed before the hypothetical, and usually such
matters as sorites, example, enthymeme and induction also came first.
A few books had, in addition, a section on the rules for valid inference
or bona consequeentia.
Melancthon in his Erotemata Dialectices included a chapter entitled De
Regulis Consequentiarum after his discussion of sorites and before his
discussion of the hypothetical syllogism. Alsted placed his canons of
material consequence in the same position; while the remarks of
Caesarius come after his section on the hypothetical syllogism. On the
other hand, the three scholastics, Campanella, Fonseca, and Hunnaeus
introduced their rules for good consequence before they discussed the
syllogism, thus approaching most closely to the later medieval order of
1025
priorities." (pp. 179-180)
(...)
"It is indeed true that the logicians of the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries failed to appreciate the fundamental importance
which the logicians of the later middle ages had attributed to
propositional logic; and a number of the texts I have been concerned
with even give instructions for the reduction of hypothetical syllogisms
to categorical syllogisms.(88) On the other hand, the amount of
propositional logic retained was by no means negligible, and some
authors, such as Fonseca and Jungius, included a great deal. No
startling advances were made, but there were innovations in detail, like
Jungius's discussion of the posterior subdisjunctiva, or the linking of
the conditional with a negated conjunction.
One may therefore conclude that, while the period is not one of great
excitement for the historian of logic, it merits considerably more
attention than it has been granted in the past." (p. 188)
(5) I have limited myself to material in the British Museum and the
Cambridge University Library for the purposes of this introductory
survey.
(6) Cf. Thomas Campanella, Philosophiae Rationalis Partes quinque.
2. Dialectίca (Parisiis, 1638), p. 334; Augustinus Hunnaeus, Dialectίca
seu generalίa logices praecepta omnia (Antverpiae, 1585), p. 147; and
Amandus Polanus, Logicae libri duo (Basileae, 1599), p. 147.
(7) Philippus Melancthon, Erotemata Dialectices, ( ---, 1540?), p. 96.
Cf. Johannes Caesarius, Dίalectica (Coloniae, 1559), Tract. IV [No
pagination]; and Cornelius Martini, Commentatiomm logicorum
adversus Ramίstas (Helmstadii, 1623), p. 204.
(8) Petrus Fonseca, Institutionum Dialectίcarum libri octo
(Conimbricae, 1590), Vol. I, p. 173. Cf. Abelard's discussion of the
same point in his Dialectica, edited by de Rijk (Assen, 1956), p. 488.
(9) Joachim Jungius, Logica Hamburgensis, edited by R. W. Meyer
(Hamburg, 1957), p. 98. '([Enuntiatio conjuncta] . . . secundum illam
compositionis speciem, veritatis et falsitatis est particeps".
(10) J. H. Alsted, Logicae Systema Harmonium (Herbonae
Nassoviorum, 1614), p. 321. "Compositi axiomatis veritas & necessitas
pendet specialiter ex partium dispositione''.
(11) Petrus Ramus, Dialecticae libri duo (Parisiis, 1560), p. 126; and
1026
Franco Burgersdijck, Institutionum Logicarum libri duo, (Lugduni
Batavorum, 1634), pp. 166-167.
(12) E.g., Fonseca, op. cit., vol. II, p. 100, refers to ''syllogismus
coniunctus"; and Polanus, op. cit., p. 165, refers to "syllogismus
compositus".
(88) E.g., Conrad Dietericus, Institutiones Dialecticae (Giessae
Hassorum, 1655), p. 312; Fortunatus Crellius, Isagoge Logica
(Neustadii, 1590),pp. 243-246; and Jungius, op. cit., passim.
———. 1970. "Some Notes on Syllogistic in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no.
11:17-33.
"Although a number of different schools of logic flourished in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (2), they seem to have shared a lack
of interest in formal logic which expressed itself in a greater concern
for the soundness than for the validity of arguments. An example of this
tendency is the emphasis placed upon the Topics, or the ways of
dealing with and classifying precisely those arguments which were not
thought to be susceptible of formal treatment, since they depended for
their effectiveness upon the meaning of the terms involved.(3) It is true,
of course, that the Humanists and, later, the Ramists, devoted
considerably more space to the Topics and to the "invention" of
arguments than did the scholastics, the Aristotelians, the Philippists or
followers of Melancthon, or even the eclectics; but this was balanced
by the greater devotion of the other schools to the categories, the
predicables, the pre-, post-, and even extra-predicaments.(4) However,
there was one subject which was both formal in inspiration and
common to all text-books, namely, the syllogism; and as a result it
provides a very good test of how much interest and competence in
purely formal matters was retained during these centuries of logical
decline." (p. 17)
(...)
"In the light of this discussion, I find myself driven to the reluctant
conclusion that genuine competence in formal logic was not often to be
found in this period, at least where syllogistic was concerned. One
distressing feature is the lack of discussion of issues like the definition
of the major and minor terms or the status of singular propositions.
Frequently one is left to guess differences in meta-theory from
1027
differences in usage.
And even where there is discussion, it is not always adequate. For
instance, a doctrine of the relationship between terms was used to
exclude the fourth figure without any realization that this doctrine
could not properly be applied to the first, second or third figures.
Another characteristic of logicians of this period was a random
introduction of new modes. What reason could be given for listing only
two indirect modes of the second figure, or for allowing singular terms
to appear only in third figure syllogisms? Finally, many logicians
introduced frankly extra-logical considerations into their discussions.
What was natural, what was fitting, what people tended to say, were all
thought to be relevant issues. Only Arnauld and Alsted and, to a lesser
extent, Campanella, present the right doctrines for the right reasons,
unencumbered by extraneous material." (pp. 27-28)
(1) This study is based on an examination of printed texts in the British
Museum, the Cambridge University Library, and the Bodleian. I do not
mention Leibniz because he was not a writer of logical textbooks.
(2) For a comprehensive account of the various schools, see Wilhelm
Risse, Die Logίk der Neuzeίt. I Band. 1500-1640 (Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt, 1964).
(3) The situation is rather different today. For instance, much of the
material discussed under the Topic of genus and species could be dealt
with by set theory, and much of that discussed under the Topic of part
and whole could be formalized by the methods of S. Lesniewski. The
Topics, as treated by Boethius, Abelard, and Peter of Spain, are
discussed by Otto Bird, in his article "The Formalizing of the Topics in
Mediaeval Logic," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 1 (1960),
pp. 138-149.
(4) For a typical account of these matters see Joachim Jungius, Logica
Hamburgensis, edited by R. W. Meyer (Hamburg, 1957), Book I.
———. 1972. "The Treatment of Semantic Paradoxes from 1400 to
1700." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 13:34-52.
"During the middle ages, semantic paradoxes, particularly in the form
of "Socrates speaks falsely", where this is taken to be his sole utterance,
were discussed extensively under the heading of insolubilia. Some
attention has been paid to the solutions offered by Ockham, Buridan,
and Paul of Venice, but otherwise little work seems to have been done
1028
in this area.
My own particular interest is with the generally neglected period of
logic between the death of Paul of Venice in 1429 and the end of the
seventeenth century; and the purpose of this paper is to last some light
both upon the new writings on paradoxes and upon the marked change
in emphasis which took place during the sixteenth century. Although
the traditional writings on insolubilia were available throughout the
period, the detailed discussions of the fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries were soon entirely replaced by briefer comments whose
inspiration seems wholly classical. Even the mediaeval word insolubile
was replaced by the Ciceronian inexplicabile. In this area at least there
is strong evidence for the usual claim that the insights of scholastic
logic were swamped by the new interests and studies of Renaissance
humanism." (p. 34)
(...)
"Whether any of these solutions is likely to bear fruit today is for the
reader to decide. It is, however, clear that the writers of the fifteenth
and early sixteenth century were inspired by a genuine interest in
problems of logic and language, and that they handled them with the
finest tools available. That their discussions should have been so
completely ignored by subsequent logicians, some of whom were
doubtless their pupils, is surprising, given both the availability of their
books and the persistence of other traditional doctrines like supposition.
(81)" (p. 45)
(81) See my article, "The Doctrine of Supposition in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries", Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie vol. 51
(1969), pp. 260-285.
———. 1972. "Strict and Material Implication in the Early Sixteenth
Century." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 13:556-560.
"One of the favorite games played by historians of logic is that of
searching their sources for signs of the Lewis-Langford distinction
between strict and material implication. There are three ways of going
about this, but the first two are often reminiscent of the conjurer
searching for his rabbit, and only the third has real merit, for it alone
involves the study of what was said about the conditional as such. I
shall look at each way in turn, in relation to writers of the early
sixteenth century." (p. 556)
1029
(...)
"I think it is fair to conclude by saying that some early sixteenth
century logicians were beyond doubt aware of the distinction between
strict and material implication; and that no special pleading is necessary
to establish this." (p. 560)
———. 1972. "Descartes' Theory of Clear and Distinct Ideas." In
Cartesian Studies, edited by Butler, Ronald Joseph, 89-105. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
"It is widely agreed that Descartes took ideas to be the objects of
knowledge and that his theory of clear and distinct ideas arose from his
attempt to find a way of picking out those ideas whose truth was so
certain and self-evident that the thinker could be said to know them
with certainty. To say of an idea that it is clear and distinct was, he
believed, to say of it both that it was certainly true and that any claim to
know it was justified. No other criterion need be appealed to. It is at
this point, however, that most of those who set out to expound
Descartes' theory of knowledge are brought to a standstill. The part
played by clear ideas is obvious enough, but what did Descartes mean
by `clear and distinct'? This paper is an attempt, not to make an original
contribution to the study of Descartes, but to elucidate his terms and
evaluate his criterion in the light of what both he and others have
written." (p. 89)
(...)
"The fact that Descartes adopted the word ‘idea’ is itself significant.
When scholastic philosophers discussed human cognition, they spoke
of the mind as containing concepts (species, intentiones). They claimed
that these concepts originated through our sense perceptions, and hence
that they stood in some relation to external objects. The term ‘concept’
was contrasted with the term ‘idea’. Ideas were the eternal essences or
archetypes contemplated by God, and the question of their external
reference did not arise. They were an integral part of God’s mind. God
could create instances of one of his ideas, but his idea was in no way
dependent upon the existence of such instances. Descartes took the
word ‘idea’ and applied it to the contents of the human mind because
he wanted to escape the suggestion that these contents must be in some
sense dependent on the external world as a causal agent. (9) He wished
to establish the logical possibility that a mind and the ideas contained
1030
within it are unrelated to other existents, and can be discussed in
isolation from them.
Descartes saw the term ‘idea’ as having a very wide extension.
He said “ . . . I take the term idea to stand for whatever the mind
directly perceives,”(10) where the verb ‘perceive’ refers to any possible
cognitive activity, including sensing, imagining and conceiving.(11)
Thus a sense datum, a memory, an image, and a concept can all be
called ideas. This, of course, leads to the blurring of distinctions. For
Descartes, “I have an idea of red” may mean that I am now sensing
something red, or that I have a concept of the colour red, even if I am
not now picking out an instance of that concept. Moreover, when
Descartes speaks of an idea, he may be taking it as representative of
some object or quality in the physical world, as when he says “I have
an idea of the sky and stars,” or he may be referring to the meaning he
assigns to a word, as when he says “I have an idea of substance.” Nor
does he make any distinction between “having an idea” and
“entertaining a proposition.” Such statements as “Nothing comes from
nothing” and “The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right
angles” are categorized as ‘common notions’,(12) and are included
among the contents of the mind. Descartes does remark that in some
cases an idea may be expressed by a name, in other cases by a
proposition,(13) but he does not bother to pursue this line of inquiry.
One of the characteristics of an idea is 'objective reality’, a scholastic
phrase which Descartes adopted, but used in a new way. In scholastic
writings the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ have meanings which
are the reverse of the modem meanings. An object like a table exists
subjectively or as a subject if it has spatio-temporal existence, if it is
real or actual. In contrast, the concept of a table can be looked at as
having two kinds of existence. The concept qua concept has formal
existence, but the concept as having some specifiable content is said to
have objective existence, or existence as an object of thought. The
concepts of a table and of a chair are formally similar but objectively
different. So far as subjective realities were concerned, the scholastics
assigned them different grades of reality according to their perfection
and causal power. For instance, a substance is more perfect and
causally more efficacious than an accident, hence a man has a higher
grade of reality than the colour red.
1031
It was also held that every effect had a cause with either an equal or a
higher grade of reality. These doctrines were not seen as having any
relevance to concepts. As formally existent, a concept has of course to
have some cause, but the content of the concept was not seen as having
any independent reality. Descartes, however, felt that the objective
reality could be considered independently of its formal reality, and that
it must be graded just as subjective reality was graded. The idea of a
man, he felt, has more objective reality than the idea of a colour.
Moreover, the cause of the idea containing a certain degree of objective
reality must have an equal or greater degree of subjective reality. For
instance, the idea of God has so high a degree of objective reality that
only God himself is perfect enough to be the cause of such an idea.
(14)" (pp. 91-93)
(...)
"Although Descartes struggled to defend his criterion, his struggles
ended in an impasse. He had made the mistake of trying to prove too
much. He had wanted to develop an introspective technique by which
he could be sure of recognizing those ideas which were objects of
certain knowledge; but such an enterprise was doomed from the start.
He could only escape from the objection that nothing about an idea can
justify us in making judgment about its external reference by entering
into an uneasy and unjustifiable alliance with God; and by such an
alliance he negated his claim that a single criterion for true and
knowable ideas could be found." (p. 105)
(9) E. S. Haldane, G. R. T. Ross (eds.) , The Philosophical Works of
Descartes, (Cambridge, 1911) [cited as 'HR'] vol. II, 68.
(10) HR II, 67-8.
(11) HR I, 232.
(12) HR I, 239.
(13) C. Adam P. Tannery, Oeuvres de Descartes (Paris 1897-1913)
[cited as 'AT'] AT III, 395.
(14) HR I, 161-170.
———. 1973. "Are There Really Two Logics?" Dialogue. Canadian
"As a historian of logic, I am frequently puzzled by the things which
people have to say about the relationship between mathematical logic
and some other kind of logic which is variously described as
1032
‘intentional’ and ‘traditional.’ Part of my puzzlement arises from my
failure to understand precisely what kind of system is being offered
under the guise of intentional logic. I have always taken it that logic is
concerned with valid inferences, with showing us how we may
legitimately derive a conclusion from a set of premisses; yet the
validation of inferences seems to be the least of the concerns of the
intentional logician. He says that it can be done, but he does not bother
to show us how. My purpose in this paper is to list some of the sources
of my puzzlement in the hope that an exponent of intentional logic will
show me how they can be resolved, and how their resolution will
contribute to the building of a system (however informal) in which
different types of argument can be validated."
———. 1973. "Existential Assumptions in Late Medieval Logic."
American Philosophical Quarterly no. 10:141-147.
"There are three types of existential assumption that are commonly
made by logicians: (1) that subject terms refer to non-empty classes; (2)
that proper names have referents; and (3) that formulas are to be
interpreted only within non-empty domains. In the standard first-order
quantificational calculus with constants, the second and third of these
assumptions are retained, but the first, which is attributed to traditional
syllogistic, has been abandoned.
Subject terms may refer to empty classes, and a distinction can be
drawn within the system between those inferences which are valid only
for non-empty classes and those which are valid for both empty and
non-empty alike. For instance, given the assumption that universally
quantified propositions whose subject terms refer to empty classes are
true, but that existentially quantified propositions whose subject terms
refer to empty classes are false, it turns out that the inference from "All
As are B" to "Some As are B" only holds with the addition of the
premiss, "There is at least one A." More recently, systems have been
constructed in which the other two assumptions have also been
discarded. Their valid formulas are valid in both empty and non-empty
domains, and non-denoting constants are admitted. Any inference
whose validity depends on the assumption that the domain of
interpretation is non-empty, or that a constant denotes, is distinguished
from the others by the presence of an extra premiss.(1) Thus, what was
an assumption implicitly applied to all cases, is now made explicit and
1033
is shown to apply only to a subset of formulas within the system.
It is frequently assumed that medieval logic operated with a group of
implicit existential assumptions similar to those I have mentioned, but
this view is erroneous. Late medieval logicians were just as concerned
as contemporary logicians to deal with non-denoting terms within their
systems, and to draw explicit distinctions between those inferences
whose validity involves existential assumptions and those whose
validity does not involve existential assumptions. It is inappropriate to
ask whether they took their formulas to be valid within the empty
domain or not, both because they worked with ordinary language rather
than with formal systems, and because they did not use the notion of
interpretation within a domain. When they interpreted a sentence such
as "All men are animals," they did not speak of a domain of individuals
some of whom were men and some of whom were animals, but only of
those individuals who were either men or animals.
However, they explicitly concerned themselves with the other two
existential assumptions, and they admitted both non-denoting constants
and terms referring to empty classes to their system. In this paper I
intend to examine how some logicians of the late 15th and early 16th
centuries interpreted sentences containing non-denoting terms, how
they assigned truth values to them, and how they dealt with those
inferences which needed an existential premiss to ensure validity." (p.
141)
(...)
"My discussion has been necessarily somewhat sketchy, and I have not
examined all the contexts in which constantia was used,(28) but it
should have become clear by now not only that late medieval logicians
had clear views about the existential import of various types of
sentences, but that they used their initial decisions about the truth and
falsity of sentences containing non-denoting terms to build a consistent
system. It is to be regretted that the vast majority of logicians after the
third decade of the 16th century ceased to discuss these matters, with
the result that modern readers tend to think of traditional logic as
lacking a sophistication which it did indeed possess." (p. 147)
(1) See, for example, W. V. O. Quine, "Quantification and the Empty
Domain" in Selected Logic Papers (New York, 1966), pp. 220-223;
Hugues Leblanc and Theodore Hailperin, "Non-Designating Singular
1034
Terms," The Philosophical Review, vol. 68 (1959), pp. 239-243; B. C.
van Fraassen, "Singular Terms, Truth Value Gaps and Free Logic," The
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 63 (1966), p. 481-495. There is a large and
growing body of literature on the topic of logics which are free from
existential suppositions.
(29)
———. 1973. "Andreas Kesler and the Later Theory of Consequence."
"In another paper I examined the theory of consequence presented by a
number of later fifteenth and early sixteenth century writers, ending
with Javellus, an Italian who died in 1538. (1) For this earlier period,
there was an abundance of material, containing much sophisticated
discussion of semantical issues; but the next hundred years do not offer
more than a few sources, and these are of limited value. The only really
outstanding figure, so far as I can see, is that of Andreas Kesler. He was
a Protestant theologian who was born at Coburg in 1595, educated at
Jena and Wittenberg, and died in 1643 after a long career in education.
In 1623 he published a book entitled De Consequentia Tractatus
Logicae which is unique, both for its own time, and as compared to the
products of this earlier period, in that it explicitly subsumes the whole
of formal logic under the theory of consequence. The laws of
opposition and conversion, the categorical and hypothetical syllogism,
were all seen as different types of consequence. Moreover, no
extraneous material was included. Instead of starting with the
categories, like the Aristotelians, or with the invention of arguments,
like the Ramists, he devoted his first chapter to the definition of
consequence. Topics, informal fallacies and other such subjects found
no place, whereas some rarely discussed matters like exclusive and
reduplicative propositions and the modal syllogism did appear. Thus he
stands out for his contents as well as for his organization." (p. 205)
(...)
"After this brief survey one can only conclude that the theory of
consequence suffered an abrupt decline after the first part of the
sixteenth century. The one outstanding writer on the subject was
Andreas Kesler, but he stands out for a single insight, rather than for
any awareness of the ramifications of the theory. Unlike his sources, he
saw that all of formal logic could be subsumed under the basic notion
1035
of consequence, and he was able to exclude extraneous material, but
that was as far as he went. About the definition and division of
consequence, and about consequential rules, he had nothing to say but
what had been said before him by Fonseca and Regius. Nor did he
betray any knowledge of earlier writers, although some at least must
have been available to him in Wittenberg. For once those who deplore
the loss of mediaeval insights during the sixteenth century seem to be
justified." (p. 210)
(1) See my paper "The Theory of Consequence in the Late Fifteenth
and Early Sixteenth Centuries,", to appear in Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic, vol. XIV (1973), No. 3, pp. 289-315.
———. 1973. "The Theory of Consequences in the Late Fifteenth and
Early Sixteenth Centuries." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no.
14:289-315.
"In this paper I intend to examine the treatment accorded to
consequences by a group of writers from the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, although I shall make some reference to earlier
periods. The subject of consequences (or valid inference) is of central
importance to the historian of logic because those who discussed it
covered such a wide range of logical issues, including criteria for
validity, problems of self-reference, the status of the so-called
paradoxes of strict implication, and the systematization of valid
inference forms. Indeed, a large part of semantics and the whole of
formal logic could be subsumed under this general heading. Whether
the authors themselves fully appreciated that this was so is
unfortunately not such an easy question to answer, for those I am
concerned with frequently leave the reader in doubt as to their view of
the relation of consequences to the rest of logic. So far as they
discussed the matter, syllogistic was seen to be consequential in nature,
(1) but they certainly did not make the subordinate position of the
syllogism as clear as Burleigh had in the fourteenth century, or indeed
as Andreas Kesler was to do in the seventeenth century.(2) A good
guide to the way they viewed the problem is to see where consequences
were discussed.
A very few authors, including J. Major, A. Coronel and J. Almain,
devoted a whole treatise to them, but generally speaking they came in
on the coat-tails of other topics so far as separate treatises were
1036
concerned.
They appear at the beginning of Dolz's treatise on the syllogism, at the
end of Celaya's treatise on supposition and under 'hypothetical
propositions' in the treatises on opposition written by R. Caubraith and
F. Enzinas. The best places to look for a discussion of consequence turn
out to be commentaries on Peter of Spain, where they appear either as
an appendage to the Parva Logicalia or under the heading of
'hypothetical propositions', and, of course, general textbooks of logic.
In these, a separate tract was sometimes devoted to consequences, as it
was by C. Javellus, but more usually they were associated with the
syllogism, whether as an introduction to it or, sometimes, as an
appendix to it. Savonarola, for instance, said all he had to say of
consequences in a section on the powers of the syllogism.
The bibliography at the end of this paper should give a fairly clear
picture of the situation; though it must be noted that the majority of
commentaries and textbooks belonging to the sixteenth century did not
mention consequences at all." (pp. 289-290)
(1) Enzinas, Tractatus Syllogίsmorum, fo.I vo, said "syllogismus est
consequentia bona et formalis . . . omnis consequentia formalis que non
tenet gratia alicuius regule logicalis tenebit syllogistice." Cf. Heirich
Greve, Parva Logicalia nuper disputata, Leipzig (149-).fo. lxxi.
(2) Andreas Kesler, De Consequentia Tractatus Logicus (Wittenberg,
1623). See my paper, '*Andreas Kesler and the later theory of
consequence," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. XIV (1973),
pp. 205-214.
———. 1973. "The Doctrine of Exponibilia in the Fifteenth and
Sixteenth Centuries." Vivarium no. 11:137-167.
Reprinted as essay IX in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"One of the most neglected parts of late medieval logical theory is that
devoted to exponibilia, or those propositions which need further
analysis in order to lay bare their underlying logical form and to make
clear under what conditions they can be said to be true or false. My
main intention in this paper is to examine the rich array of printed
sources which are available to us from the later fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, but I will consider some texts written before the
invention of printing, and I will also give some account of what
happened to the theory in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
1037
The sources fall into three main groups. There are separate treatises on
exponibles, especially those written by Peter of Ailly(*) and later
Parisian logicians; there are commentaries on the treatise on exponibles
attributed to Peter of Spain; and there are those parts of longer works
which were devoted to ‘Proofs of Terms’, as in Paul of Venice and his
followers. These groupings are not, of course, exhaustive. For instance,
Marsilius of Inghen and George of Brussels discussed exponibles in the
second part of a treatise on consequences, and Albert of Saxony
included exponibles in the part of Perutilis Logica devoted to different
kinds of proposition. As might be expected, the authors of the separate
treatises on exponibles were considerably more detailed and careful in
their analysis than were those authors who treated exponibles as a
subsidiary matter. In my view, the two most outstanding treatises are
those written by Peter of Ailly (d. 1420) and by Domingo de Soto (d.
1560). The latter is not original, but it is a very acute and thorough
survey of the doctrines which were current in late fifteenth and early
sixteenth century Paris, where de Soto had studied under and with such
logicians as Major, Celaya and Lax, whose names will frequently occur
in my text. Outside treatises devoted to exponibles, good brief
treatments are to be found in the anonymous commentator on Marsilius
of Inghen, and in George of Brussels, (both of the later fifteenth
century) and in Hieronymus of St. Mark (of the early sixteenth
century). The earlier writers are often disappointing.
For instance, although Paul of Venice’s Logica Magna is sometimes
described as an encyclopedia of medieval logic, the section on
exponibles lacks the precise analysis of types and sub-types of
exponible propositions found in other authors, and the examples are
frequently confusing.
Similarly, the treatise wrongly attributed to Peter of Spain lacks detail,
and derives most of its value from the remarks of commentators." (pp.
137-138)
(...)
"To conclude, one can say that the history of exponible propositions
mirrors the history of medieval logical doctrines in general. At the end
of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries there was a
sudden surge of activity, during which such topics as exponibilia,
insolubilia and suppositiones were analyzed, clarified and elaborated in
1038
works which are highly respectable from the logician’s point of view,
even if they contain little that is original. This period of activity was
followed by a period of decline, in which medieval doctrines continued
to receive some attention, especially in Spain, but they are clearly
subordinated to the main business of expounding Aristotelian logic. By
the end of the seventeenth century they cease ever to be mentioned." (p.
165)
[* Peter of Ailly, Tractatus Exponibilium, Paris c. 1495?]
[** Domingo de Soto, Opusculus Exponibilium, in Introductiones
dialectice, Burgis 1529]
———. 1973. "Priority of Analysis and Merely Confused
Supposition." Franciscan Studies no. 33:38-41.
"In a recent article John J. Swiniarski discusses William of Ockham's
use of merely confused supposition.(1) He claims that, in the case of
universal affirmative propositions, Ockham's method of attributing
merely confused supposition to the predicate accomplishes much the
same result as Peter Thomas Geach's method of attributing determinate
supposition to the predicate and using a priority of analysis rule,
whereby the subject is always analysed first. However, he notes,
Ockham's analytical procedures when applied to particular negative
propositions can lead to erroneous results,which are only avoided by
the adoption of a priority of analysis rule. Since such a rule renders
merely confused supposition unnecessary, he concludes that Geach was
right and that Ockham ought to have employed only distributive and
determinate supposition to get her with a priority of analysis rule in his
treatment of standard categorical propositions. I do not wish to criticize
what Swiniarski has to say about the interpretation of Ockham. Instead,
I wish to make a few remarks about the use of merely confused
supposition by sixteenth century logicians in order to show that it is not
in general so easily dispensed with. (2)" (p. 38)
(...)
"In the light of these two examples, I conclude that there was good
reason for sixteenth century logicians to retain merely confused
supposition, and to use Domingo de Soto's priority of analysis rule
rather than Geach's." (p. 41)
(1) Swiniarski, John J., "A New Presentation of Ockham's Theory of
Supposition with an Evaluation of Some Contemporary Criticisms,"
1039
Franciscan Studies, 30 (1970), 209-217. Those readers who are not
familiar with supposition theory should be reminded that merely
confused supposition involves an analysis into a disjunctive subject or
predicate, whereas distributive supposition involves an analysis into a
conjunction of propositions and determinate supposition involves an
analysis into a disjunction of propositions.
(2) For further details about supposition theory in the sixteenth century,
see my paper: " The Doctrine of Supposition in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries, " Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 51
(1969), 260-285.
———. 1974. "Some Additions to Risse's Bibliographia Logica."
"One of the greatest contributions to the history of logic in recent years
was the publication in 1965 of Wilhelm Risse's Bibliographia Logica,
Vol. I, which covers the years from 1472 to 1800. However, despite the
fact that Risse's monumental work lists an estimated 8,000 logical
works, it is still far from comprehensive, as Mr. Hickman pointed out in
an earlier article in this journal. Why this should be the ease
immediately becomes apparent when one starts to work in a library
such as the Bodleian at Oxford with its handwritten catalogue of books
printed before 1920 and its lack of any specialized bibliographies such
as the British Museum has provided for early printed books. Even in
well catalogued libraries such as the University Library at Cambridge it
can be difficult to locate texts, and one often stumbles across a new
logical work through the accident of its being bound in the same
volume as better known works. As a result of my researches over the
last few years, I have put together a list of works which do not appear
in Risse in the hope that other historians of logic may benefit from my
discoveries. I cannot, however, claim that I have exhausted the
resources of the libraries which I have visited. Doubtless there are still
not only new editions but new authors left to be discovered." (p. 361)
"This paper concerns logic texts published between 1472 and 1800. I
list 20 items whose authors do not appear in Risse, 12 items whose
authors appear in Risse in connection with another title or other titles,
and 58 items which appear in Risse in another edition or in other
editions. I indicate the libraries in which all these items are to be found,
and I also list some useful bibliographical works."
1040
———. 1974. "Classification Schemes and the History of Logic." In
Conceptual Basis of the Classification of Knowledge / Les Fondements
De La Classification Des Savoirs, edited by Wojciechowski, Jerzy A.,
275-283. New York - München - Paris: K. G. Saur.
Proceedings of the Ottawa Conference on the Conceptual Basis of the
Classification of Knowledge, October 1st to 5th, 1971.
"Logic is one of the most important means of classification we have,
for it enables us to appraise our reasoning by drawing the distinction
between valid and invalid inferences. Its aim is a simple one, and easily
stated, but when we get down to the task of specifying under precisely
what conditions a true premiss set will entail a true conclusion, it seems
that a whole range of different types of classification is necessary.
Logicians commonly start by drawing the distinction between informal
or natural languages and formal or artificial languages. Even at this
point, divergent interpretations are possible. One can argue with the
early Wittgenstein that natural language has a hidden ideal structure,
which it is the task of the logician to uncover; or one can argue with the
later Wittgenstein that natural language involves a series of games with
different structures, any one of which the logician can choose to present
as a formal language. Given both the complexities of natural languages
and the variety of formal languages which have been developed, the
latter interpretation is by far the most pausible. Once the notion of a
formal language has been isolated, one can go on to draw the
distinction between syntax, or the study of the relations of signs among
themselves, and semantics, or the study of signs as interpreted, as
having meaning and as being true or false. In turn we can obtain the
notion of different types of logical calculi. For instance, a propositional
calculus has one set of signs with certain limited transformations of
these signs, and it is interpreted by the assignment of truth values to its
constituent parts; whereas a quantificational calculus has a more
elaborate set of signs with transformations to match, and it is normally
interpreted by means of the assignment of members or sets of members
of domains to its constituent parts.
The teacher of logic is often tempted to claim that these types of
classification are integral to the study of logic. This is true when logic
is seen as the foundation of mathematics, but to say that only, through
these distinctions can one sensibly talk about valid and invalid
1041
inferences is a much larger claim, and a more dubious one. I intend to
look at selected aspects of the history of logic in order to throw some
light on the problem of just what kinds of classification are necessary to
the isolation of valid inferences, which I take to be the true task of
logic. In particular, I shall look at the definitions of valid inference
offered by the Scholastic logicians of the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, since this is the historical period with which I am
best acquainted. (1)" (p. 275)
(...)
"Are we now to conclude that elaborate classification schemes are
irrelevant to the pursuit of logic, so long as we have an adequate
definition of a valid inference? The answer to this question will depend
in part on how much one wants out of logic.
If one wishes to study the metalogical properties of formal systems, to
obtain a complete set of rules, or to relate logic to mathematics,
scholastic logic is necessarily inadequate. However, if one wishes to
classify those inferences which are used in ordinary language, then one
can argue that an elaborate classificatory apparatus combined with the
development of formal systems will be a hindrance rather than a help.
Even the simplest sentence contains subtleties which will be lost in
symbolization. Moreover, there is the grave problem of which system
to choose when one is symbolizing and assessing an inference. This
problem has two facets. First, one may pick a system which is
inadequate to one’s purposes. If one attempts to show that a relational
inference is valid in terms of the standard monadic predicate calculus,
one will fail. Yet one has not proved that the inference in question is
not valid. Second, one may pick a system whose standard interpretation
is alien to one’s purposes. A logician who wishes to show that ’—P’,
therefore ’P’ holds would be ill advised to choose the intuitionist
propositional calculus. Similarly a logician who wishes to show that ”
’Fa’ therefore ’(Ex)Fx’ ” should not choose a version of the
quantificational calculus which admits non-denoting constants.
The more systematic one’s approach to formal logic, the more arbitrary
the choise of system seems to be, and hence the less relevant to the
normal day to day task of assessing arguments. Scholastic logic, on the
other hand, seems perfectly adapted to normal requirements. It is both
unpretentious and powerful; it does not violate normal intuitions; and it
1042
is non-arbitrary. Or so one might think.
However, let us look a little more closely. What are we to make of the
following claims? ”An impossible proposition implies any other
proposition.” ”A necessary proposition follows from any other
proposition.” ”If you come to me I will turn you into an ass” is true
provided that you do not come to me.” ’’All chimeras are chimeras” is
false because there are no chimeras, but ”No chimeras are chimeras” is
true for the same reason.” The first two examples, the paradoxes of
strict implication, follow straight from the definition of a valid
inference. The third example is a consequence of the truth-functional
interpretation given to promissory conditionals. The last examples are a
consequence of the arbitrary decision to save the square of opposition
by counting all affirmative propositions with non-referring subjects as
false. Yet none of the examples corresponded to the normal intuitions
of the sixteenth century. They all gave rise to acrimonious debate, and
were accepted only because of the exigencies of the desired system of
rules and the desired interpretation of that system. Thus even the
scholastics, operating within the framework of ordinary language, were
forced to make some of the arbitrary decisions which people tend to
blame modern logic for. One may still prefer scholastic logic to modern
logic for various reasons, but that it enshrines a true and completely
non-arbitrary system of picking out valid inferences cannot be one of
them.
In the last resort, the presence or absence of modern classification
schemes logic does not make so much difference as one would like to
think." (pp. 282-283)
(1) I intend to use the term ’scholastic logician’ more narrowly than is
proper, to refer to those men whom 1 am concerned with.
———. 1974. "For Riding Is Required a Horse: A Problem of
Meaning and Reference in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century
Logic." Vivarium no. 12:146-172.
Reprinted as essay I in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"One of the most interesting features of the works of the logicians
associated with the University of Paris in the late fifteenth century and
the first part of the sixteenth century is their application of medieval
logical doctrines to the discussion of actual examples. In this paper I
intend to present a detailed study of one specific example, "For riding
1043
is required a horse" [Ad equitandum requiritur equus]. I shall first
discuss each of the arguments that was used, showing its place in the
general body of logical doctrine; then I shall present three typical texts,
together with an analysis of the pattern of argument found in each. One
text will deal with the problem in the context of contradiction, one in
the context of conversion, and one in the context of supposition
theory.In this way I hope to deepen our understanding both of the
theories and of the techniques of medieval and post-medieval logic." (p.
146)
(...)
"The claim that the gerund 'riding' implies a reference to particular acts
of riding,which can in turn be identified with individual horses, solved
the problem of "For riding is required a horse" at the expense of raising
further philosophical problems about both language and the world.
However, the claim that the sentence should be regarded as equivalent
either to a simple conditional or to some kind of modal proposition
solved all the problems very neatly without, apparently, raising new
ones. In the light of such an analysis one could maintain the truth of
"For riding is required a horse" without at the same time having to
argue that the sentence had the same truth-value as its contradictory or
a different truth-value from its simple conversion, since these related
sentences would have undergone a similar analysis, thus turning out to
have the desired truth-values. Whichever solution one prefers, it seems
to have been amply demonstrated that the simple minded approach in
terms of personal supposition alone was inadequate. To speak of horses
being required for riding is to do more than to make reference,
successful or otherwise, to individual horses or any other identifiable
objects in the world." (pp. 157-158)
———. 1975. "Descartes' Theory of Objective Reality." New
"In the Third Meditation Descartes, who is at the beginning sure only
of his own existence, presents a complex proof for the existence of God
which is based on the fact that he finds within himself an idea of God. I
intend to ignore the supplementary proof which deals with the
conservation of his existence, and to focus on his discussion of the
properties of ideas, for it is here that Descartes is most difficult to
comprehend yet most vulnerable to criticism. With the exception of
1044
Gassendi's remarks in the fifth objection, I shall concentrate upon what
Descartes himself had to say, for a thorough survey of all the secondary
sources often serves only to obscure the main issue." (p. 331)
(...)
"Descartes reinforced his arguments with various claims about the
nature of predicates and the way in which we come to understand them.
He thought, mistakenly, that one could not only distinguish between
negative and positive predicates, but that one could demonstrate the
logical priority of such positive predicates as 'infinite' or 'perfect' by
showing that one can only understand the finite or imperfect in the light
of a prior acquaintance with the infinite or perfect. (29) However,
although he seems now to be talking about epistemology rather than
ontology, it turns out that his claims rest upon the same assumptions
about the content and causation of ideas as are involved in the main
proof, so they do not need to be discussed further.
However liberal one is in granting Descartes his desired premises, I
think it is fair to conclude that his arguments do not prove what they
purport to prove. This seems to be a strong indication that one will lose
nothing by being illiberal from the very beginning." (p. 340)
(29) E. Haldane and G. Ross, The Philosophical Works 0f Descartes
(Cambridge, 1968), I, 166.
———. 1976. "I Promise You a Horse. A Second Problem of Meaning
and Reference in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century Logic
(First Part)." Vivarium no. 14:62-79.
Reprinted as essay II (first part) in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"The logicians associated with the University of Paris in the late
fifteenth and the first part of sixteenth century were at one with their
medieval predecessors in their attempt to formulate a unified theory of
the reference of such general terms as 'horse'. To be successful, any
such theory has to give a plausible account of what happens to general
terms in modal and intentional sentences, and the logicians I am
concerned with clearly tried to deal with this problem. However,
because of the rather standard way in which logic texts tended to be
organized, the relevant material has to be sought in various places. In
an earlier paper, I made a detailed study of the reference the word
'horse' was said to have in the modal sentence, "For riding is required a
horse"; and in order to carry out that study, I had to draw material from
1045
the discussion of contradiction, of conversion, and of supposition. (1)
In this paper, I intend to make a detailed study of the reference the
word 'horse' was said to have in the intentional sentence "I promise you
a horse", and my material will be drawn from the discussion of
contradiction, of conversion, of supposition and of appellation. (2) I
shall first examine each of the arguments that was used, showing its
place in the general body of logical doctrine; then I shall present four
typical texts, together with an analysis of the pattern of argument found
in each.
One text will deal with the problem in the context of contradiction, one
in the context of conversion, one in the context of supposition, and one
in the context of appellation. In this way I hope to show what problems
intentional sentences were seen to raise for the standard theory of
reference, and how these problems were dealt with." (pp. 62-63)
(...)
"On the whole, it seems fair to say that the logicians I have examined
failed to produce a theory of the reference of general terms which
applied with equal success to all contexts. Some, like Sbarroya, found
themselves forced to emphasize the difference between intentional and
non-intentional contexts by postulating completely different types of
referent. Some, like Heytesbury, overlooked the difference altogether in
their appeal to personal supposition. Some, like Buridan, recognized
that terms in an intentional context have a function which goes beyond
that of referring to individual objects; but they were unable to say with
precision just how this broader function was to be reconciled with the
referential function. However, one thing is common to those who
struggled with the logical problems caused by "I promise you a horse".
That is, they managed to save the validity of those inferences they were
concerned with, either by so interpreting sets of sentences that they
were not to be counted as instances of the inferences in question, or by
so interpreting sets of sentences that they came out to have the desired
truth-values, and could no longer be cited as counter-examples to a
general rule. Thus, they were successful as logicians, if not as
philosophers of language." (p. 78)
(1) " "For Riding is Required a Horse": A Problem of Meaning and
Reference in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century Logic".
Vivarium, XII (1974) pp. 146-72.
1046
(2) Enzinas, Pardo and de Soto discussed the matter in the context of
their discussion of contradiction; Celaya, Coronel (Prima Pars),
Sbarroya and de Soto discussed the matter in the context of their
discussion of conversion; Hieronymus of St. Mark and Martinez Siliceo
discussed the matter in the context of their discussion of supposition;
Tartaretus discussed the matter in the context of his discussion of
descent; and Coronel (Secunda Pars), Dorp, Hieronymus of St. Mark,
Major, Manderston, Mercarius and Pardo discussed the matter in the
context of their discussion of appellation. It will be noted that some
authors discussed the matter in more than one place. For details of the
texts, see the bibliography at the end of the paper. Of the authors cited,
Hieronymus of St. Mark and Sbarroya are not, so far as I know,
specifically associated with Paris, though they are clearly influenced by
Parisian logicians.
For medieval discussions of the problem, see P. T. Geach, "A Medieval
Discussion of Intentionality" in Logic Matters (Oxford, 1972) 129-138,
and J. Trentman, "Vincent Ferrer and His Fourteenth Century
Predecessors on a Problem of Intentionality" in Arts Libéraux et
Philosophie au Moyen Âge (Montréal/Paris,1969) 951-956.
———. 1976. "I Promise You a Horse. A Second Problem of Meaning
and Reference in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century Logic
(Second Part)." Vivarium no. 14:139-155.
Reprinted as essay II (second-part) in: Studies in Post-Medieval
Semantics.
Parto Two: Texts and Analyses.
———. 1976. "Agostino Nifo's Reinterpretation of Medieval Logic."
Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia no. 31:353-374.
"A year ago, if I had been asked to give a brief account of medieval
logic and its relationship to Renaissance logic, I would probably have
said something like this. In the medieval period, logicians had made
great advances in the areas both of semantics and of formal logic. In the
area of semantics, we find lengthy and sophisticated discussions of
terms, of propositions, of supposition theory, which dealt with the
reference of terms in various contexts, and of insolubilia, or semantic
pardoxes, with their farreaching implications for our ordinary
assumptions about the truth and reference of propositions. In the area of
formal logic, we find equally lengthy and sophisticated discussions of
1047
consequentiae,
or valid inference forms for both unanalyzed and analyzed
propositions, and of exponibilia, those propositions whose logical form
needs to be uncovered by means of analysis. A natural result of these
advances was a relative down-grading of Aristotle. Aristotelian
syllogistic was put in a subordinate place, as just one variety of valid
inference, and in general
the logical works of Aristotle did not receive as much attention as one
might have expected. Medieval logicians were as likely to comment on
Peter of Spain or to write independent treatises on particular topics as
they were to comment on Aristotle; and unless they were directly
discussing Aristotle, they were unlikely to pay much attention to the
matters
treated of in the Analytica Posteriora, Topica and De Sophisticis
Elenchis.
All this, however, was to change with the coming of the Renaissance
Ignoring those at the University of Paris and at various Spanish
universities who consciously continued the medieval tradition (2), we
find two completely new developments. On the one hand there is
Humanism, with its bitter attacks on medieval sophistry, its dropping of
virtually all formal logic, and its emphasis on the topics. On the other
hand, there is Aristotelianism, with its emphasis on the pure text of
Aristotle, freed from medieval accretions, and to be interpreted either
directly or with the aid of Greek and Arab commentators. These two
schools certainly differed in important respects, but they were united in
their rejection of what I have described as the great advances of the
medieval
period. Supposition theory, insolubilia, consequentiae and exponibilia
were to be discussed no more; and terms and propositions were to
appear only as described by Aristotle or by the grammarians and
rhetoricians.
My view of the medieval advances remains unchanged, but I am not
now so sure about the abruptness of the change from medieval to
Renaissance logic in the works of the Aristotelians of the period. In this
paper, I intend to present a case study of the transition as it appears in
the works of one Aristotelian, namely Agostino Nifo (or Augustinus
Niphus). I intend to show that medieval doctrines were still relatively
1048
well-known to him, and were discussed by him at length; but that he
presented them in a way which diminished their value and hence made
them easier to abandon. Someone who knew of the theory of terms or
of supposition theory, to mention just two examples, only through Nifo
could well wonder what use these doctrines were, despite the apparent
care with which they had been expounded, and could therefore decide
to abandon them completely in his own work. Whether this is indeed
what happened in the sixteenth century can, of course, only be
established after a good deal of further investigation; and I present the
possibility here only as a tentative hypothesis.
(1) I would like to thank Dr. C. B. Schmitt of the Warburg Institute,
University of London, for inviting me to read an earlier version of this
paper as part of a series devoted to Renaissance Aristotelianism. I
would also like to thank the Canada Council for the generous financial
support which made the research for this paper possible.
(2) For further discussion and bibliography, see E. J. Ashworth,
Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period, Dordrecht (Holland)
- Boston (U.S.A.) 1974
———. 1976. "Will Socrates Cross the Bridge? A Problem in
Medieval Logic." Franciscan Studies no. 14:75-84.
Reprinted as essay XII in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"In their treatises on insolubilia, or semantic paradoxes, medieval
logicians frequently mentioned other cases in which the assumption
that a proposition was true led to the conclusion that it was false, and
the assumption that it was false led to the conclusion that it was true.
Some of these cases were easily solved. If one considers the
proposition "Socrates will enter a religious order" in relation to
Socrates' vow, "I will enter a religious order if and only if Plato does,"
and to Plato's vow, "I will enter a religious order if and only if Socrates
does not," one sees at once that the problem stems from contradictory
premises.(1). But not all cases were of this sort. Consider the favourite
example, "Socrates will not cross the bridge," when said by Socrates, in
relation to the two premises, "All those who say what is true will cross
the bridge" and "All those who say what is false will not cross the
bridge."(2) It is easily demonstrated that "Socrates will not cross the
bridge" is true if and only if it is false, but what is not so easily
demonstrated is the source of the paradox. Certainly it is not a paradox
1049
just like "What I am now saying is false," since the key proposition
does not speak of its own semantic properties, but the premises do
indeed speak of truth and falsity in a way which has implications for
the truth-value of "Socrates will not cross the bridge." The question
thus arises whether "Socrates will not cross the bridge" is to be counted
as a semantic paradox, to be dissolved in the same way as the Standard
Liar is dissolved, or whether it is to be seen as needing another kind of
solution, perhaps less radical in its implications for our common-sense
notions about such matters as the legitimacy of self-reference or the
definition of truth." (pp. 75-76)
(...)
"In conclusion, I would like to say that Paul of Venice's reputation as
the last of the great medieval logicians seems to me to be vastly
overrated. Several logicians of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries, including Bricot, Eckius, Major and de Soto, offer more
acute discussions of logical problems and more satisfactory solutions,
as I hope I have demonstrated by this examination of the bridge
paradox." (p. 83)
(1) Thomas Bricot, Tractatus Insolubilium (Parisius, 1492) sign. b. viii
and sign, c i; Johannes Eckius, Bursa Pavonis (Argentine, 1507) sign, k
v; John Major, Insolubilia (Parrhisiis, 1516) sign, c ii ff. Cf. Albert of
Saxony, Perutilis Logica (Venetiis, 1522) fo. 46 vo; Robertus de
Cenali, Insolubilia in Liber Prioris Posterioris (Parisius, 1510) sign, o
iiii.
One should note here that vows, promises and the like were treated as
propositions with truth-values rather than as performative utterances
with no truth-values. This view was combined with a realization that
there are certain conditions which have to be met before a vow is
binding. For instance, the vower must genuinely intend to do what he
vows to do, and what he vows to do must be both moral and within his
power. These extra conditions were not thought relevant to the question
whether "Socrates will enter a religious order" was true or false.
To the slightly different question of whether Socrates would be bound
by his vow, Major, for instance, held that he would not, on the grounds
that his vow was conditional and that the condition, given Plato's vow,
could not be fulfilled.
For references to Major's text and to other discussions of vows and
1050
promises, see below, note 15.
(2) Paul of Venice, Logica Magna (Venetiis, 1499) fol. 198 and Paul of
Venice, Tractatus Summularum Logice Pauli Veneti (Venetiis, 1498)
sign. e i vo. The latter work which appeared in many editions, is known
as the Logica Parva. See also John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and
Truth, translated and with an introduction by T. K. Scott (New York,
1966), pp. 219-220; Cenali, loc. cit.; David Cranston, Tractatus
Insolubilium et Obligationum [Paris, c. 1512] sign. e iiii; Eckius, op.
cit., sign, k iiii vo; Robert Holkot, Super Quattuor Libros Sententiarum
Questiones (Lugduni, 1497) sign. E ii; Major, op. cit., sign. c ii vo;
Peter of Ailly, Conceptus et Insolubilia (Parisius, 1498), sign. b. viii;
Peter of Mantua, Logica (Venetiis, 1492), sign, o vivo; Domingo de
Soto, Opusculum Insolubilium in Introductiones Dialectice (Burgis,
1529), fol. cxlvi f. Bricot, op. cit., sign. b. vii vo f. speaks of giving a
penny to the truth-teller rather than of allowing him to cross a bridge,
but the principle is the same. Some authors (e.g. Eckius, op. cit., sign. k
v) gave both versions of the paradox, as did Paul of Venice himself
(Logica Magna fol. 197 vo f., Lógica Parva, sign. e i f.) It should be
noted that there are many variations in the names of the characters and
in the phrasing of the propositions. Some authors substituted "You will
throw me into the water" for "Socrates will not cross the bridge."
(15) It is because of this association with promising that we find the
bridge paradox and others similar to it discussed in theological works
as well as logical, e.g. Holkot, op. cit., sign. C iiii ff., sign. D viii vo ff.;
John Major, In Quartum Sententiarum Questiones ([Paris], 1519), sign.
ccxcii vo ff. For general discussions of promising see, e.g., Gratian,
Decretum, Chapter XXII (various editions) and Richard Mediavilla (or
Middletown) Scriptum Super Quarto Sententiarum ([Venice], 1489)
Book IV, distinction 38.
RELATED PAGES
Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental Language (with an

annotated bibliography on the medieval theory of supposition)
1051
Index of the Pages with Annotated Bibliographies of Contemporary
Historians of Philosophy
1052
Home
Contents
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Writings of E. J. Ashworth on the History

of Logic. Second Part: Articles from 1977
to 1988
from 1967 to 1976
ARTICLES
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1977. "Thomas Bricot (D. 1516) and the
Liar Paradox." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 15:267-280.
Reprinted as essay XI in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"Preliminary Remarks.
No one interested in the history of the Liar Paradox will gain a just
appreciation of the variety and sophistication of the solutions that were
offered unless he pays attention to the logicians working at the
1053
University of Paris at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning
of the sixteenth.(1) The study of semantic paradoxes, known as
insolubilia, formed a significant part of the first-year logic curriculum,
which was of course the curriculum for all arts students; and those who
taught the subject by no means confined themselves to a repetition of
earlier views. Although Ockham, Buridan, Paul of Venice and Peter of
Ailly certainly were read and discussed, original work was also
produced. One of the earliest and most influential of these original
treatises was written by Thomas Bricot. First published in 1491, it
received its eighth edition in 1511, (3) and was still being read as late
as 1529 when Domingo de Soto discussed it in his own work on
semantic paradoxes. (4)
(...)
The only original self-contained works of Bricot that I know are his
Tractatus Insolubilium and his Tractatus Obligationum, which were
always printed together. In this paper I intend to discuss only the
Tractatus Insolubilium.
The book’s organization is worthy of some preliminary comment. Its
main division is into three Questiones, each phrased in a similar
manner. In the first Questio Bricot inquires whether there is a way of
saving the possibilities, impossibilities, contingencies, necessities,
truths and falsities of self-referential propositions; the second and third
Questiones ask simply whether there is another Way of saving, that is,
justifying, the attribution of these modalities. The first Questio contains
what is apparently Bricot’s own solution to the problem. In the second
Questio he discusses the solution that stems from Ockham, and the
solution derived from Peter of Ailly is covered in the third. Each
Questio has exactly the same internal organization. At the beginning,
Bricot poses five main questions concerning the proposed solution. He
then divides the subsequent discussion into three sections: the first,
headed notabilia, setting out the main principles of the proposed
solution; the second, conclusiones, giving a brief list of conclusions;
and the third, dubia, taking up a series of problems arising from the
proposed solution. Each doubt is aimed at one of the notabilia and
gives rise to a series of arguments against the proposed solution. Once
these have been stated, they are refuted one by one.
After all the doubts have been dealt with, Bricot offers replies to the
1054
five main questions posed at the beginning of the section. At no point
are the separate solutions compared to one another, though arguments
drawn from one view may be used in the critical discussion of another
view; and at no point does he actually claim that the first solution is his
own and hence to be preferred. Bricot is more forthright in a note on
insolubilia he added to George of Brussels’s commentary on De
Sophisticis Elenchis, where he says that the solution in question is
“omnium probabilissimus.” (6) The first solution is explicitly attributed
to Bricot by de Soto,(7) who himself studied at Paris, and there is also
indirect evidence to support de Soto’s claim. The first solution does not
figure among the fifteen solutions described by Paul of Venice in his
Logica Magna (8) yet it does appear in the works of Parisian logicians
contempory with or junior to Bricot. For example, Tartaretus discussed
it in a treatise on insolubilia first published in 1494, (9) and it was also
discussed by John Major and David Cranston.(10) Unfortunately these
authors followed the normal practice of mentioning names only in a
few outstanding cases. The German Trutvetter did both recommend
Bricot by name and describe the view I attribute to him, but without
specifically linking the two.(11)"
(2) For further details and a bibliography, see E. J. Ashworth,
Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period (Dordrecht Holland
and Boston: Reidel, 1974). For the medieval background, see P. V.
Spade, The Mediaeval Liar: A Catalogue of the Insolubilia-Literature
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975).
(3) Tractatus Insoiubilium (Paris, 1491; reprinted, Paris, 1492; Paris,
1494; Lyons, 1495; Lyons, 1496; Paris, 1498; Paris, 1504; Paris, 1511).
I have examined copies of each printing and have prepared an edition
of the text, on which I base my discussion.
(4) Opusculum Insolubilium, in Introductiones Dialectice (Burgis,
1529), fol. cxliii-cxlix vo.
(5) I draw my material from H. Élie, “Quelques maîtres de l’université
de Paris vers l’an 1500,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du
moyen âge 18 (1950-1951): 197-200; and A. Renaudet, Préréforme et
humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d’Italie 1494-1517
(Paris, 1916), pp. 96 ff.
(6) George of Brussels, Expositio in logicam Aristotelis: una cum
Magistri Thome bricoti textu de novo inserto nec non cum eiusdem
1055
questionibus in cuiusvis fine libri additis (Lugduni, 1504), fol. cclxxv.
(7) Opusculum Insolubilium, fols, cxl vo and cxlvii.
(8) (Venetiis, 1499), fols. 192ff.
(9) Petrus Tartaretus, Sumularum Petri de hispania explanationes
(Friburgensi, 1494), sign, k v-l i vo.
(10) John Major, Insolubilia (Parrhisiis, 1516); David Cranston,
Tractatus insolubilium et obligationum [Paris, c. 1512].
(11) Jodocus Trutvetter, Summule totius logice (Erphurdie, 1501), sign.
UUUvi vo-XXX i vo. Trutvetter’s reference is to Bricot’s note in
George of Brussels, cclxxiii“vo ff.
———. 1977. "Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-
Medieval Theory of Signification." Vivarium no. 15:57-79.
Reprinted as essay III in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"I. Prefatory Note.
In the following paper I shall be discussing a particular problem of
meaning and reference as it was formulated by a group of logicians
who studied and/or taught at the University of Paris in the early
sixteenth century.(1) In alphabetical order they are: Johannes Celaya (d.
1558) who was in Paris from 1500 or 1505 until 1524; Ferdinandus de
Enzinas (d. 1528) who was in Paris from about 15x8 until 1522; John
Major (1469-1550) who was in Paris from 1492 or 1493 until 1517 and
again from 1525 to 1531; William Manderston who taught at Sainte-
Barbe from about 1514 and returned to Scotland in or shortly before
1530; Juan Martinez Siliceo (1486-1556) who left Paris in about 1516;
Hieronymus Pardo (d. 1502 or 1505); Antonius f Silvester who taught
at Montaigu ; and Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) who left Paris in
1519. I shall also discuss the work of the Spaniard Augustinus Sbarroya
and the Germans Jodocus Trutvetter (d. 1519) and Johannes Eckius
(1486-1543). Both Sbarroya and Eckius were well acquainted with the
works of the Paris-trained logicians. Further material is drawn from the
fifteenth-century Johannes Dorp and the anonymous author of
Commentum emendatum et correctum in primum et quartum tractatus
Petri Hyspani. The work of the medieval authors Robert Holkot, John
Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen will appear as it was described by
early sixteenth-century authors.
II. Introduction.
One of the main features of late medieval semantics was the attempt to
1056
formulate a unified theory of the reference of general terms. It is true
that this attempt was not explicitly discussed, but many of the problems
which arose in the context of such topics as signification, supposition,
ampliation, appellation, and the logical relations between sentences
clearly owed their existence to the assumption that general terms
always referred to spatio-temporal individuals; and in the solutions
offered to these problems, much ingenuity was employed to ensure that
this assumption was modified as little as possible, if at all. I have
already shown in two earlier papers how some logicians dealt with
reference in the modal context “For riding is required a horse” and in
the intentional context “I promise you a horse.” (2) At the end of this
paper, I shall discuss another intentional sentence, "A man is
imaginarily an ass”, which was thought to present a difficulty.
However, it would be a mistake to think that context was the only
complicating factor, for there were general terms which placed an
obstacle in the path of those seeking a unified theory, not only by virtue
of the contexts in which they appeared, but by virtue of their meaning.
The favourite example of such terms was “chimera”, but “irrational
man”, “braying man”, and “golden mountain” also served as
illustrations. The problem was not merely that they failed to refer, but
rather that they were thought to be incapable of referring because the
objects which they apparently denoted were impossible just as, for the
modern reader, a round square is impossible. The main purpose of the
present paper is to explore the way in which the problem was
presented, and some of the solutions which were offered." (pp. 57-58)
(...)
"VI. Conclusion.
This survey of the way some early sixteenth century logicians treated
the problem of chimeras reveals very clearly the alternatives faced by
any philosopher who wants to give a unified theory of the reference of
general terms. If one adopts a purely extensionalist interpretation of
propositions, and allows only ordinary spatio-temporal entities into
one’s universe of discourse, then one is faced with the choice between
rejecting as false many sentences, such as “I imagine a chimera”, which
one would wish to accept as true, and accepting as true many sentences,
such as “ “Chimera” signifies an ass”, which one would wish to reject
as false. If one extends one’s universe of discourse to include
1057
imaginary objects which are not just ordinary objects regarded in a
certain way, one faces grave ontological problems. On the other hand,
to appeal to appellation theory is to acknowledge that no purely
extensionalist interpretation of all propositions can be given and that no
unified theory of reference is possible; and to adopt Holkot’s solution is
to admit that sentences which seem to be structurally similar are not in
fact similar and that some sentences which appear to be about objects
in the world are in fact about the contents of our own minds. On the
whole my sympathies lie with those who abandoned the belief that both
general terms and subject-object sentences can be given a uniform
treatment, but I have great respect for the subtlety and sophistication
with which arguments for a uniform treatment were presented. Post-
medieval logicians were by no means mindless followers of their
medieval predecessors." (p. 79)
(2) E. J. Ashworth, 'For Riding is Required a Horse’: A Problem of
Meaning and Reference in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century
Logic, in : Vivarium 12 (1974), 94-123; E. J. Ashworth, Ί Promise You
a Horse’: A Second Problem of Meaning and Reference in Late
Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century Logic, in: Vivarium 14 (1976),
62-79, 139-155." (pp. 57-58)
———. 1977. "An Early Fifteenth Century Discussion of Infinite
Sets." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 18:232-234.
"In the opening years of the fifteenth century, or perhaps a little earlier,
John Dorp (1) wrote a commentary on Buridan's Compendium Totius
Logicae (2) and it is here that one finds a discussion of infinite sets
which is not only quite unexpected (3) but which suggests that other
thinkers of that period were interested in the same topic.
The question of infinite sets arose in the context of the theory of
reference. Medieval logicians assumed that affirmative sentences were
true only if the subject and object terms had reference, but this
assumption conflicted with their intuitions about such sentences as "I
imagine a chimera" and "The word 'chimera' refers to a chimera".
These sentences seem to be true, but "chimera" cannot refer to actual or
possible chimeras, since a chimera is an impossible object, just as a
round square is an impossible object. The question then arose of how
such sentences were to be treated, and one obvious answer was to
postulate a class of imaginary objects which included impossible
1058
objects and to which reference could be made in intentional contexts.
(4) In his discussion of this answer, Dorp presented several arguments
against the claim that one could refer to impossible objects." (p. 232)
(...)
"Historians of logic must always be wary of taking isolated passages
out of context and reading modern developments into them. However,
in the case of Dorp there do seem to be good grounds for claiming that
he was aware of something describable as a non-denumerably infinite
set. It is a great pity that he does not give us more detail about the
reasoning that lay behind his assertions, but it is to be hoped that
further research into late fourteenth and early fifteenth century
mathematics will reveal it to us." (p. 233)
(1) Dorp received his M.A. from the University of Paris in 1393 and he
was last heard of at the University of Cologne in 1418. The dates of his
birth and death are not known.
(2) Johannes Buridanus, Compendium Totius Logicae, Venedig (1499).
Facsimile edition: Frankfurt/Main, Minerva G.m.b.H. (1965). This
edition contains Dorp's commentary.
(3) For another medieval reference to infinite sets, see I. Thomas, "A
12th century paradox of the infinite," The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 23 (1958), pp. 133-134.
(4) For further discussion and references, see E. J. Ashworth,
*'Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-Medieval
Theory of Signification" [1977].
———. 1978. "A Note on Paul of Venice and the Oxford Logica of
1483." Medioevo no. 4:93-99.
———. 1978. "Multiple Quantification and the Use of Special
Quantifiers in Early Sixteenth Century Logic." Notre Dame Journal of
Reprinted as essay X in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"I have three reasons for writing this paper. In the first place, I want to
explain the early sixteenth century practice of using the letters 'a', 'b',
'c', and 'd' as special signs governing the interpretation of terms within
sentences. In the second place, I want to investigate the analysis which
logicians in the medieval tradition gave of such sentences as "There is
somebody all of whose donkeys are running", "Everybody has at least
one donkey which is running", and "At least one of the donkeys which
1059
everybody owns is running".(2) In the third place, I want to show that,
despite what Geach has suggested, (3) logicians in the medieval
tradition were capable of offering good reasons for rejecting such
inferences as "Every boy loves some girl, therefore there is some girl
that every boy loves". My discussion will be based mainly on the work
of a group of logicians who were at the University of Paris in the first
two decades of the sixteenth century, in particular Fernando de
Enzinas, Antonio Coronel, and Domingo de Soto." (p. 599)
(...)
"Although the logicians whose work I have examined display
considerably more flexibility and subtlety than scholastic logicians
have usually been credited with, their discussion reveals two important
weaknesses. In the first place, they can only cope with the relations
expressed in certain kinds of sentences, particularly those containing
genitives; and in the second place, they do not give adequate
instructions for distinguishing the case in which one is speaking of all
members of a class such as donkeys from the case in which one is
speaking only of the members of a subclass, such as the donkeys
belonging to a particular man. On the other hand, they are clearly
sensitive to the different facets of such relationships as donkey-
ownership, and they are also sensitive to the kinds of inference which
have to be debarred. A complete account of these strengths and
weaknesses will have to await further research." (pp. 610-611)
(2) Cf. P. T. Geach, Reference and Generality, Ithaca, New York
(1962), p. 15 ff.
(3) P. T. Geach, "History of a fallacy" in Logic Matters, Oxford (1972),
pp. 1-13.
———. 1978. "Theories of the Proposition: Some Early Sixteenth
Century Discussions." Franciscan Studies no. 38:81-121.
Reprinted as essay IV in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"I. Prefatory Notes
In his excellent book, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and
Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, (1) Gabriel
Nuchelmans carries the story up to Paul of Venice, who died in 1429.
In this paper I intend to consider the discussions of propositional sense
and reference found in the works of a group of authors connected with
the University of Paris in the last decade of the fifteenth century and the
1060
first three decades of the sixteenth century. I confine myself to this
group not only because it is a group, but because I know of few other
sustained discussions of the problem by logicians after Paul of Venice.
Two fifteenth century authors, Stephanus de Monte and Andreas Limos
raised the matter in the context of insolubilia; (2) the Italian Agostino
Nifo (1470-1538) discussed it in two places; (3) and various other
authors, such as the German Jodocus Trutvetter, mentioned the topic
only in passing. (4) Nor is the matter pursued in any of the early printed
Sentence Commentaries I have examined, including those written by
such authors as Celaya and Major. (5)
The authors I shall discuss are first the two Frenchmen, Thomas Bricot
(d. 1516) who did his main logical work in the last decade of the
fifteenth century, and Jean Raulin (1443-1514) who entered the
Benedictine Order at Cluny in 1497. Second, there is one German,
Gervase Waim (c. 1491-1554) who began his studies at Paris in 1507
and was Rector of the University in 1519. Third, there is one Belgian,
Pierre Crockaert (Peter of Brussels) (d. 1514) who became a Thomist.
Fourth, there are two Scotsmen, John Major (1469-1550) who was
taught by Bricot and Pardo before teaching at Paris himself from 1505
to 1517 and again from 1525 to 1531, and George Lokert (d. 1547) who
was a pupil of Major. Fifth, there are five Spaniards, Hieronymus Pardo
(d. 1505), Juan Celaya (d. 1558), Antonio Coronel, Juan Dolz and
Fernando de Enzinas. Finally, there is Hieronymus de Sancto Marco
about whom I know little except that he was at one time connected with
Oxford, and that he studied theology at Paris. (6)
The contexts in which theories of the proposition were discussed
varied. Bricot and Major discussed the matter in their works on
insolubilia, (7) though what Major had to say was reprinted, somewhat
amplified, as a separate section in complete editions of his works.(8)
This context was a natural one, since in order to solve the problem of
semantic paradoxes it was necessary to ask what it was that was true or
false, and how these properties were to be defined. Dolz inquired about
the total significate of the proposition in his treatise on Terms, (9) while
Coronel and Pardo asked the same question in more general logic
treatises. (10) In a commentary on Peter of Spain, Enzinas asked
whether a proposition was true or false by indicating and if so, what it
indicated. (11) Similar questions were posed by Raulin and
1061
Hieronymus de Sancto Marco. (12) Enzinas also asked about the total
significate of a proposition in his work on mental propositions, and
Waim asked the same question in his Tractatus Noticiarum. (13) Lokert
raised the matter in his Tractatus Noticiarum by asking about the object
of judgment. (14) Bricot, Celaya and Coronel asked about the objects
of science, judgment and assent in their commentaries on the Analytica
Posteriora. (15) Finally, Pierre Crockaert asked about the truth of a
proposition in the second quodlibet attached to his commentary on
Peter of Spain. (16) Presumably because of the nature of a quodlibet his
discussion is a good deal more elliptical and allusive than that found in
the other sources." (pp. 81-83)
(...)
"Conclusion.
One of the main features of late medieval logic was the heavy emphasis
placed on the notion of reference. Another feature was the ontological
parsimony which led logicians to reject impossible and imaginary
objects, including complexe and incomplexe significabilia of the sort
proposed by Gregory of Rimini. When we consider the theory of terms,
we can see these two influences joining to produce a series of attempts
to explain the reference of terms in intentional and modal contexts
without abandoning either the view that entities must not be multiplied
beyond necessity or the view that a unified theory of the reference of
general terms is possible. Similar attempts were directed toward the
explanation of the reference of such terms as “chimera,” which were
thought of as having no possible extension. In other places I have
argued that one of the main virtues of Parisian logicians of the early
sixteenth century was their recognition that the views mentioned above
were irreconcilable, and that a purely ex-tensionalist approach to the
signification of terms would have to be abandoned.165 Their
achievements with respect to the theory of the proposition itself are
very similar. A number of them saw that both the attempt to postulate
special objects of reference for propositions and the attempt to argue
that propositions referred to things in the world had failed; and they
also saw that the way of escape lay in the acknowledgement that the
referential role of propositions is not after all primary. Their function is
not to name or to refer, but to make an assertion which can only be
further described by a that-clause or a paraphrase. In the last resort, one
1062
can only see what the meaning of a proposition is by understanding
what claim has been made; pointing to an object or group of objects
will never serve as an answer." (pp. 120-121)
(1) Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and
Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity
(Amsterdam/London: North Holland Publishing Company 1973). This
work should be consulted for discussion, references and bibliography
pertaining to Buridan, Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, and other medieval
authors. For further bibliography see E. J. Ashworth, The Tradition of
Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of
the Seventeenth Century: A Bibliography from 1836 Onwards
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978). [Note added
to the reprint: "Since I wrote this paper, Nuchelmans's book dealing
with the period from 1450 to 1650 has appeared, see Gabriel
Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of Proposition,.
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980.]"
(2) Andreas Limos, Dubia in Insolubilibus (Parisiis 1499) sig. a ii rb-b
iv vb. Stephanus de Monte, Ars Sophistica [Paris, c. 1490?] sign, a vi r-
b i r.
(3) Agostino Nifo, Dialectica Ludicra (Venetiis, 1521) fo. 50V-53V,
cited as DL. Agostino Nifo, Super Libros Priorum Aristotelis (Venetiis
1554), fols. 6ν-γτ. Nifo follows Pseudo-Scotus very closely, especially
in the latter source: cf. Super Librum I Priorum Quaestio VIII in John
Duns Scotus Opera Omnia (Parisius, L. Vivès, 1891) II, 98-101.
(4) Jodocus Trutvetter, Summule Totius Logice (Erphurdie, 1301) sign.
AA vi r.
(5) In the earlier editions of his commentary on Sentences I, John Major
gives a very brief discussion of some of the main views about objects
of faith and knowledge, but he declines to discuss complexe
significabilia on the grounds that they are ‘‘voluntarie ficta et sine
auctoritate et sine ratione.” John Major, In Primum Senlentiarum
(Parisiis 1519) fol. xvi ra. However in the Paris 1530 edition even this
brief discussion has been excluded. He explains in the preface that he
has revised the work so as to exclude many Arts topics such as the
intension and remission of forms, and he refers to the struggle against
Lutheranism as a reason for concentrating on theology.
(6) I draw my information from the title and end pages of Hieronymus
1063
de Sancto Marco, Opusculum de Universali Mundi Machina ac de
Metheoricis Impressionibus, s.l. [1505?], which also tells us that he was
a Franciscan.
(7) Thomas Bricot, Tractatus Insolubilium (Parisius, 1492), cited as TI.
John Major, Insolubilia (Parrhisiis, 1516).
(8) John Major, Inclytarum Artium ac Sacre Pagine Doctoris
Acutissimi Joannis Maioris Scoti Libri Quos in Artibus in Collegio
Montis Acuti Parisius Regentando in Lucem Emisit (Lugduni, 1516).
All references will be to this edition.
(9) Juan Dolz, Termini (Parisius [c. 1511)].
(10) Antonio Coronel, Prima Pars Rosarii (Paris, s.a.), cited as PPR.
Hieronymus Pardo, Medulla Dyalectices (Parisius, 1505).
(11) Fernando de Enzinas, Primus Tr[actatus Summularum] (Compluti,
1523) cited as PT.
(12) Jean Raulin, In Logicam Aristotelis (Parisiaca Urbe, 1500).
Hieronymus de Sancto Marco, Compendium Preclarum quod Parva
Logica seu Summule Dicitur (Impressum in alma Coloniensi
universitate, 1507). All references are to this work.
(13) Fernando de Enzinas, Tractatus de Compositione Propositionis
Mentalis (Lugduni, 1528) cited as PM. Gervase Waim, Tractatus
Noticiarum ([Paris] 1519).
(14) George Lokert, Scriptum in Materiam Notitiarum (Parisius, 1524).
(15) Thomas Bricot, Logicales Questiones Subtiles ac Ingeniose super
Duobus Libris Posteriorum Aristotelis (Parisius, 1504) cited as AP.
Juan Celaya, Expositio in Libros Priorum Aristotelis [Paris, c. 1516].
Antonio Coronel, Expositio super Libros Posteriorem Aristotelis
(Parisius [1510]), cited as AP. Since completing this paper, I have
discovered a similar discussion in the Aristotle commentary of another
Scotsman, David Cranston: Questiones super Posteriorum ([Paris],
1506) sign, g iv ra-h iii ra. He mentions by name Andreas de Novo
Castro, Buridan, Gregory of Rimini, Andreas Limos, Peter of Mantua
and Hieronymus Pardo.
(16) Pierre Crockaert, Summularum Artis Dialetice Utilis Admodum
Interpretatio... una cum Fructuosis Quibusdam Quotlibetis ab Eodem
Fratre Petro Compilatis in Conventu Parisiensi (Parisius, 1508).
(165) See Ashworth, "Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the
Post-Medieval Theory of Signification", Vivarium, 15 (1977), 57-77.
1064
See also E. J. Ashworth, “ 'For Riding is Required a Horse’: A Problem
of Meaning and Reference in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth
Century Logic,’’ Vivarium, 12 1x974), 94-123; and E. J. Ashworth, “ Ί
Promise You a Horse’: A Second Problem of Meaning and Reference
in Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century Logic,’’ Vivarium, 14
(1976), 62-79; continued: Ibid., 14 (1976), 139-155.
———. 1979. "The Libelli Sophistarum and the Use of Medieval Logic
Texts at Oxford and Cambridge in the Early Sixteenth Century."
"I. Introduction
In this paper I intend to analyze two early printed logic texts, the
Libellus Sophistarum ad Usum Cantabrigiensium (or Cantabrigiensem)
published four times between 1497 and 1524, and the Libellus
Sophistarum ad Usum Oxoniensium, published seven times between
1499 and 1530. I also intend to demonstrate the origin of these books in
the manuscript tradition of the early fifteenth century.
A complete description of the various editions of the printed texts,
together with their reference numbers in the new Short Title Catalogue,
(2) will be found in the appendix." (p. 134)
(...)
"Obviously I do not pretend to have done more than sample the
available manuscript sources, but the interested reader will find a large
number of further references in De Rijk’s invaluable studies of the
Logica Cantabrigiensis and the Logica Oxoniensis (7).
The importance of my task stems from the fact that the Libelli
Sophistarum provide the main evidence we have for the nature of logic
teaching at Oxford and Cambridge in the first three decades of the
sixteenth century. The nature of this evidence can best be brought into
focus if we start by considering the state of logic in continental Europe,
as revealed by a study of publication between 1472 and 1530. As a
brief glance at Risse’s Bibliographia Logica (8) will show, European
presses produced an extremely large number of logic texts during this
period. Some of them were editions of medieval authors alone, and
some of them were editions of medieval authors combined with a
contemporary commentary. Many more contained only contemporary
writing, whether this took the form of a general introduction to logic, or
a discussion of a particular topic such as terms or insolubles. Virtually
1065
none were anonymous, and virtually all were highly structured, with
topics following one another in an orderly sequence. Even those few
texts which were a compendium of shorter treatises were united either
by author, as were the editions of Heytesbury’s works, or by theme, as
was the 1517 edition of Strode, Ferrybridge, Heytesbury and others on
the topic of consequences. The texts were devoted purely to logic, and
natural science crept in only in predictable places, such as
commentaries on the Analytica Posteriora, the discussion of incipit and
desinit in works on exponibles, or editions of such earlier writers as
Heytesbury and Menghus Blanchellus Faventinus. In the assessment of
these texts, knowledge of the manuscript tradition is vital only when
one wishes to know how original the writers were, or how accurately
medieval texts were reproduced. On the whole the texts are self-
explanatory, and simply by reading them one can get a good idea of
how they might have been used in teaching.
The situation in England could not have been more different. In the first
place, the number of logic books published was extremely small, even
if one bears in mind that some may have perished without trace.
Including the two Libelli Sophistarum, only seven separate works seem
to have appeared, and of these only two are by named authors, both
medieval. The first author is Antonius Andreas whose commentary on
the ars vetus appeared at St. Albans in 1483, and the second is Walter
Burleigh, whose commentary on the Analytica Posteriora appeared at
Oxford in 1517. Apart from the Libelli Sophistarum, the remaining
works are a Logica which appeared at Oxford in 1483 [StC 16693]; the
Opusculum insolubilium which appeared at Oxford in about 1517 [StC
18833] and in London in about 1527 [StC 18833a]; 9 and the Libellulus
secundarum intentionum which appeared in London in 1498 [STC
15572], in about 1505 [STC 15573], and in 1527 [STC 15574] as well
as in Paris before 150ο.(10) I do not know the provenance of the first
two works, but the third is an edition of the medieval tract which starts
"Bene fundatum preexigit debitum fundamentum”, and which is found
incomplete in both Gonville and Caius 182/215 (p. 70) and Corpus
Christi 378 (1o5 r 107 r).(11)" (pp. 135-136)
(2) A Short Title Catalogue of Books Printed in England, Scotland &-
Ireland and of English Books Printed Abroad 1475-1640. First
Compiled by A. W. Pollard & G. R. Redgrave. Second Edition,
1066
Revised and Enlarged, begun by W. A. Jackson & F. S. Ferguson.
Completed by Katharine F. Pantzer. Volume 2, I-Z, London 1976.
(7) For the Logica Cantabrigiensis see L. M. De Rijk, 'Logica
Cantabrigiensis -- A Fifteenth Century Cambridge Manual of Logic',
in: Revue Internationale de philosophie (Grabmann), 29e année, 113
(1975), 297-315. For the Logica Oxoniensis, see L. M. de Rijk, 'Logica
Oxoniensis. An Attempt to Reconstruct a Fifteenth Century Oxford
Manual of Logic', in: Medioevo, III (1977), 121-164.
(8) W. Risse, Bibliographia Logica. Band 1. 1473-1800, Hildesheim
1965.
———. 1979. "A Note on an Early Printed Logic Text in Edinburgh
University Library." Innes Review no. 30:77-79.
———. 1980. "Can I Speak More Clearly Than I Understand? A
Problem of Religious Language in Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and
Ockham." Historiographia Linguistica no. 7:29-38.
Reprinted in Konrad Koerner, Hans-J. Niederehe and R. H. Robins
(eds.), Studies in medieval linguistic thought dedicated to Geoffrey
L.Bursill-Hall on the occasion of his sixthieth birthday on 15 May
1980, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 29-38.
"The title of this paper is somewhat misleading. The problem I intend
to discuss is certainly one of religious language, but none of the three
authors I am concerned with would have put the problem in the terms
used above. The question Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) asked in his
Summae Quaestionum Ordinariaum was: “Can God be more truly
understood than he is signified or named?”. Duns Scotus (1265-1308)
and William Ockham (1280/85-1349) put their questions in yet another
way. In their commentaries on Book I, Distinction 22, of Peter
Lombard’s Sentences, they asked respectively: “Is God nameable by us
by a name signifying his essence?” (Duns Scotus 1966: 301) and “Can
itinerant man impose a name to signify the divine essence distinctly?”
(Ockham, Sent., sign, z vi rb). The concern of all these authors arose
from their beliefs that a spoken word can only signify if it is
subordinated to an appropriate concept in the speaker’s mind, and that
our concept of God is an imperfect one. When we inquire about the
relationship between the words we use of God and the idea we have of
him, it may seem that our words are more precise than our ideas
warrant; yet it may also seem that our words fail to do justice to what
1067
we know about God. These apparent variations in the relation between
word and concept have to be explained, given the natural assumption
that our words will be neither more nor less precise than our ideas.
Before I consider the actual texts, I will discuss briefly two essential
background issues, the notion of signification, and the question whether
words signify ideas or things. The notion of signification was of course
closely related to the notion of a sign, which Augustine had defined
(1975: 87) as “Something which is itself sensed and which indicates to
the mind something beyond the mind itself.”(1) Accordingly, for a
word to signify was for it to make known, reveal, express, or represent.
Exactly which of these descriptions was most appropriate depended on
the context, for in addition to written and spoken language, if was taken
for granted that there was a mental language formed of elements all of
which were naturally meaningful. A spoken word could make known
an object or reveal it by causing (or by expressing) a concept, but a
mental term, being itself a concept, could not be thought of in this way.
In the early 16th century the Parisian author Raulin (c. 1443-1514)
explained that concepts signified in their capacity as formal
representations of objects, but that spoken words signified because they
were objective representations (Jean Raulin, Commentarium in logicam
Aristotelis, 1500. sign, g v ra-rb). That is, they were both the object and
the cause of a cognition. Thus the explicitly causal definition of
signification, "to signify is to constitute an understanding'', (2) applied,
he said, only to signs which had objective signification and not to
concepts. What it was that a spoken word made known could be an
object in the world, a formal element of an object in the world, the
speaker's concept of that object, or the definition of that object. (3)
Indeed, a spoken word could also make known itself or its speaker, but
these ways of making known were accidental to it as a conventionally
significant unit. It should be obvious that the notion of significatio is by
no means to be identified either with meaning or with reference, though
elements of both meaning and reference were certainly involved." (pp.
29-30)
(...)
" Ockham was in essential agreement with the position adopted by
Duns Scotus in his much briefer treatment of the question “Is God
nameable by us by a name signifying his essence?“. Duns Scotus began
1068
(Opera Omnia. Vol 17: Lectura in Librum Primum Sententiarum,
Civitas Vaticana, 1966:301) by saying that he took the view of Thomas
Aquinas that nothing could be named by us more properly than it was
understood to be false. (10) He said that he would offer no arguments
instead, he offered an example. Suppose that we see a wall as having
both whiteness and shape. Because the colour can vary while the shape
remains, and the shape can vary while the colour remains, we conclude
that there is some substratum. We can name this substratum A, and can
use the general term ‘body’ of it, yet we have no specific notion of it.
All we understand of it is that it is ‘This being', and hence we can name
it more truly than we can understand it. Just the same situation obtains
with respect to God (p. 301). We have a general understanding of him
as "This infinite being which depends on nothing”, and we can refer to
the divine nature by such names as ‘God', yet we have no particular
understanding of the divine nature which our terms denote. We do not
understand it as "This essence'. "Whence”, he wrote," I believe that we
have many names of God which properly signify the divine nature,
even though we do not understand it." (11)
Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham differed in the way they
supported their positions and in their epistemological assumptions; yet
there are two extremely important subjects on which they agreed: first,
that the problem of religious language was not one of religious
language alone; and second, that the Thomistic connection between
spoken language and understanding had to be loosened. They all
accepted the doctrine whereby spoken language was subordinated to
mental language; and they all accepted the commonsense view that in
the absence of mental activity speaking becomes mere parrotting, but
these beliefs did not blind them to the fact that language has functions
which are to some extent independent of the individual’s ability to
understand the world. As Henry of Ghent emphasized, language has a
descriptive function, and because words are common currency, human
beings can describe more, or less, accurately than they understand. As
Duns Scotus and Ockham emphasized, language also has a denotative
function, and human beings can use words to denote objects even if
they know little about these objects. Signification and naming are
essentially linguistic activities, and they must be assessed as such. Our
words can have degrees of truth and distinctness which our
1069
understanding lacks, just as our understanding can go beyond our
words." (pp. 37-38)
(1) The more usual reference is to De Doctrina Christiana II, but Henry
of Ghent made heavy use of De Dialectica.
(2) For discussion of this definition, see Spade "Some Epistemological
Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute," Franciscan Studies 35
(1975), pp. 212–222; see pp. 214-15.
(3) The Latin translation of Metaphysics IV.7 1012 a 23 was "ratio
quam significat nomen est definitio" (Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae 1a 13.6, p.68) and accordingly a word was often said to
signify a rath. But ratio had a variety of meanings, including "concept",
“definition”, "a formal element of things" and the "essence of things."
For discussion see McCord Adams in Paul of Venice, Logica magna:
Part II, Fascicule 6: Tractatus de veritate et falsistate propositionis et
tractatus de significato propositionis, F. del Punta (ed.), M. McCord
Adams (trans.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 272-73.
(10) He does not refer to Thomas by name. "Ad quod dicendum - sine
argumentis -quod, ut mihi videtur, haec propositio falsa est quod nihil
potest nominari a nobis magis proprie quam intelligatur, sicut quidam
dicunt quod sicut intelligimus sic significamus, et quia non intelligimus
Deum nisi ex creaturis, ideo non significamus nisi per nomina accepta a
creaturis. Hoc enim falsum est."
(11) “Unde credo quod multa nomina habemus de Deo quae proprie
significant naturam divinam quam tamen non intelligimus.”
———. 1980. "The Scholastic Background to Locke's Theory of
Language." In Progress in Linguistic Historiography. Papers from the
International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences,
Ottawa, 28-31 August 1978, edited by Köerner, Konrad, 59-68.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
"In III.2.2 of the Essay concerning Human Understanding Locke said:
"Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing
but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them." In the eyes of most
subsequent commentators, this statement encapsulates what Kretzmann
("The main thesis of Locke’s semantic theory", Philosophical Review,
77, 1968, p. 177) has called "one of the classic blunders in semantic
theory", namely, the thesis that words name or refer to ideas rather than
things, and that meaning depends on private mental events. Since
1070
Locke's statement when so interpreted seems clearly false, many
commentators, including Kretzmann and Landesman ("Locke’s theory
of meaning", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 14 1976, p. 35),
have struggled to interpret it in some other way. However, they have
undertaken this task without considering Locke's intellectual
background. In this paper I intend to argue that the work of various
17th-century scholastics who were read at Oxford, particularly the
Polish Jesuit Martin Smiglecius (1564-1618), throws much light on
Locke's thesis, both by filling in the arguments which he only sketched
in passing, and by limiting the ways in which the argument quoted
above can be read.
It is true that no direct link between Locke and Smiglecius has been
established. However, since Locke recorded that two copies of
Smiglecius’ Logica were bought by his students (W. H. Kenney, John
Locke and the Oxford training in logic and metaphysics, unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, St. Louis University, 1959, pp. 31-32), and since the
work was published in Oxford in 1658, the year Locke took his M.A.
degree, it can be hardly a matter of accident that many of his remarks in
Book III of the Essay seem to echo remarks made earlier by
Smiglecius." (p. 59)
(...)
"So far as Locke is concerned, he obviously followed such logicians as
Burgersdijck in adopting the view whereby concepts rather than things
are said to be the immediate significates of words. He may have been
influenced in this by introductory logic textbooks, but it also fitted his
general philosophical position better than the view of Smiglecius. His
discussion of general terms indicates one reason why he thought it
necessary to assign a certain kind of primacy to ideas, and in addition I
think that Kretzmann was right (p. 184) when he mentioned Locke's
representative theory of perception in the context of his theory of
language. If ideas are the immediate objects of perception, then it
makes good sense that they should also be the immediate objects of
signification.
However, if I am right in supposing that Locke was acquainted with
Smiglecius and some of the other authors, if only at second-hand, then
certain limitations are surely imposed on what he could have meant
when he wrote: "Words in their primary and immediate signification
1071
stand for nothing but ehe ideas in the mind of him that uses them". He
cannot have intended to say that words refer to concepts, that when we
way "The man is disputing" we are talking only about our own
thoughts. Nor can he have intended to deny the obvious corollary that
we use words to signify things secondarily and mediately. The
alternative hypothesis, that Locke intended to convey some new
doctrine by his use of the conventional phraseology, could only be
sustained if one were willing to overlook two outstanding features of
Locke's discussion. First, nearly everything he says about language in
the first two chapters of Book III is closely parallel to the scholastic
texts which were read at Oxford when Locke was an undergraduate and
a tutor there. Second, he does not bother to give a detailed explanation
and justification of his claim that words signify ideas primarily and
immediately, which would be a very curious oversight on the part of
one who had in mind a doctrine radically different from that normally
conveyed by these words. Locke was careless, but he was not as
careless as that." (pp. 66-67)
References
Franco Burgersdijck, (1590-1636). 1647. Institutionum Logicarum
Libri duo. Cantabrigiae: Ex officina Rogeri Daniel, Academiae
celeberrimae Typography.
Martin Smiglecius, (1564-1618). 1658. Logica. Oxonii: excudebet A.
Lichfield, impensis H. Crypps, J. Godwin & R. Blagrave.
Kretzmann, Norman. 1968. "The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic
Theory". The Philosophical Review 77.175-96.
———. 1980. "Descartes and Human Reason." Queen's Quarterly no.
86:653-656.
———. 1981. "The Problems of Relevance and Order in Obligational
Disputations: Some Late Fourteenth Century Views." Medioevo no.
7:175-193.
———. 1981. "Two Early Sixteenth Century Discussions of Complexe
Significabilia." In Sprache Und Erkenntnis Im Mittelalter. I. Akten Des
Vi Internationalen Kongresses Für Mittelalterliche Philosophie Der
Société Internationale Pour L'étude De La Philosophie Médiévale, 29
August - 3 September 1977 Im Bonn, 511-516. Berlin, New York:
Walter de Gruyter.
"In bis excellent book Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and
1072
Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, Nucbelmans
states that "after the beginning of the fifteenth Century no really new or
interesting views concerning our topics were put forward."(1) In this
paper I hope to modify his judgment somewhat by examining the
theories presented by Juan Dolz and Fernando de Enzinas, two
Spaniards associated with the University of Paris in the early sixteenth
Century (2). One cannot expect that their views on the signficate of the
proposition were new in every detail, given the thoroughness with
which earlier writers had explored the issue.
Nevertheless, one can argue that they put elements from earlier views
together in a new way, and that they displayed an insight into the nature
of propositions which had not been achieved by their predecessors.
I shall begin by saying a little about the background to their views. In
the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the question of complexe
significabilia was discussed by a small group of logicians. Those
writers in whom I have found more than a passing reference are Bricot,
Juan de Celaya, Antonio Coronel, Dolz, Enzinas, Hieronymus of St.
Mark, Limos, Major, Nifo, Pardo, Peter of Brüssels, Raulin and
Gervase Waim; and all of these except Nifo and possibly Hieronymus
of St. Mark were associated with Paris (3). Although some of them
wrote theological works, they raised the issue only in their logical
writings, either in works on insolubilia, in general introductions to
logic, or in treatises on such topics as terms and mental propositions.
The question was introduced in one of two closely related ways. Either
they took the statement that a proposition was an oratio which signifies
the true or the false by indicating and inquired whether there was
indeed a thing which was true or false, or they took such sentences as "
"Man is an animal" signifies man to be an animal" and asked whether
the dictum or infinitive phrase functioned as the name of some object or
other. In the words of Dolz the question was: "Does a proposition
signify some thing or some things or in some way? Is there to be given
a complexum significabile or not, and if so, is it to be distinguished
from the significates of the terms of the proposition?'" (4) The issues of
theological and scientific knowledge were referred to, if at all, only in
passing, and the question of objects of belief versus objects of
knowledge, objects of doubt and so on, was not often raised. In other
words, we are faced with a discussion which is limited to those aspects
1073
of the matter which primarily concern a logician.
References to earlier authors included mention of Ockham, Duns
Scotus, Ugolino and André de Neufchateau, but the focal point of
discussion was provided by the rival positions of Gregory of Rimini
and the one which, as Coronel put it, "Buridan applauded in whole or in
part." (5)" (pp. 511-512)
(...)
"To conclude, I would like to say that of all the sources mentioned by
late fifteenth and early sixteenth Century authors, Dolz and Enzinas are
obviously most influenced by Peter of Ailly. It is from him that they
take the notion of a proposition signifying aliqualiter, and it is from
him that Enzinas takes his emphasis on the relationship between the
dictum and a phrase beginning with the word "that". But they also go
beyond Peter of Ailly in ways which I find interesting and important.
First, they introduce the notion of the proposition as having a
syncategorematic function, and second, they reconcile the notion of
propositional sense with the notion of propositional reference by
admitting that in some contexts the dictum can have legitimate
referential use (12). Moreover, Enzinas made use of Peter of Ailly's
point about "that" phrases to reinforce the insight that propositions are
not referring phrases. I do not know of any earlier authors who
approached the matter in quite the way that Dolz and Enzinas did; and,
I must confess, I find their view more plausible than any of the others I
am acquainted with." (p. 516)
(1) G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition (Amsterdam-London:
North Holland Publishing Company, 1973) p. 279. This book should be
consulted for a very thorough survey of the medieval background to the
authors I am concerned with.
(2) Little seems to be known about their lives. Dolz came from
Castellar in Spain, and taught at the College of Lisieux in Paris.
Enzinas went to Paris in 1518, where he studied at the Colleges of Saint
Barbara and Beauvais. He later taught at the University of Alcala.
(3) For further details, see E. J . Ashworth, Language and Logic in the
Post-Medieval Period (Dordrecht-Holland/Boston-U.S.A., D. Reidel
Publishing Company, 1974) p. 55ff.
(4) J. Dolz, Termini (Parisius, s.a.) fo. v r.
(5) A. Coronel, Prima Pars Rosarii (Parisiis, 1512) sign, a iiii r.
1074
(12) Cf. Kretzmann, op.cit., p. 767.
———. 1981. ""Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?" The Scholastic
Sources of Locke's Theory of Language." Journal of the History of
Reprinted as essay VII in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"My aim in this paper is to shed some light on Locke's claim that words
signify ideas. Although I shall start by considering two contemporary
attempts to interpret Locke's theory of language, I shall devote most of
my attention to a group of late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century
authors whose views are likely to have influenced Locke. My main
claim will be that Locke's theory of language is easier to understand, if
not to accept, when it is placed in what seems to be its proper context.
When one is dealing with the great figures of early modern philosophy
it is always a mistake to overlook their background. At Oxford, as at
European universities, students were still reading scholastic texts in the
mid-seventeenth century. That is, they were reading works written as
university text books by Roman Catholic philosophers, predominantly
Jesuit, who consciously placed themselves within the tradition of
medieval philosophy and theology while at the same time making use
of sixteenth-century developments in Aristotelian studies. Locke makes
it very clear that he did not approve of the scholastic philosophy he was
acquainted with, but it is prima facie implausible to suppose that
nothing of what he read had any effect upon his writings. As I shall try
to make clear, my own view is that his theory of language was
produced within a scholastic context, and relied heavily on the
arguments which had been developed by scholastic philosophers.
Locke was original and innovative, but not when he said that word s
signify ideas.
Obviously the scholastic philosophers of the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries were themselves writing within a tradition which
cannot be overlooked if one wishes to understand their discussions.
Equally obviously one cannot within the compass of a short paper on
the background to Locke deal adequately with the background to
Locke's background . However, a few brief remarks may be in order.
The view that words signify ideas or concepts (two words which for the
purposes of this paper may be used interchangeably) stems from
Aristotle and in particular from Boethius's translation of Aristotle, De
1075
lnterpretatione I6 a 3. (1) He said that spoken words (ea quae sunt in
voce) were signs (notae) of those passions which are in the mind; and
every commentator agreed that passiones were to be taken as concepts
rather than passions in the normal sense. By the late thirteenth century a
debate was raging over the question whether words could properly be
said to signify concepts rather than things. (2) Roger Bacon said that
there was " not a moderate strife among famous men,'' (3) and a little
later Duns Scotus wrote of a "great altercation. (4) Everyone who wrote
a commentary on De Interpretatione had something to say on the issue;
and it also turned up in other works, in Sentence commentaries and, for
instance, in Buridan's Sophismata. Aristotle commentaries written in
the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were still largely focused
on the arguments of earlier writers, especially Duns Scotus and
Buridan, though occasional use was m a d e of the commentary by St.
Thomas Aquinas. (5) The later-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-
century writers I am concerned with took their theme from the
medieval debates and, for the most part, their conclusions. However, as
I shall explain below, their emphases and some of their arguments are
quite different. Thus a by-product of this paper will be additional
evidence of ways in which late scholasticism differed from medieval
scholasticism." (pp. 299-301)
(...)
"To conclude, I would like to ask whether Locke intended to
summarize his theory of meaning when he said that words primarily
and immediately signify ideas. I have argued that in the scholastic
authors the issue was one of making known rather than of meaning, and
this is borne out by the distinction I earlier quoted from Smiglecius
between the confused idea conveyed by a name and the explicit idea
conveyed by the definition of the name. Obviously one would answer
the question "What does this word mean?" not by exhibiting the
confused idea expressed by the word, but by producing the definition.
If it turns out that a definition just is a sequence of concepts, then
meanings can be identified with concepts; but this is a thesis which has
to be stated and justified separately from the initial thesis, that words
make known concepts. I suggest that the same distinction should be
applied to Locke. In III. 3. 10 he tells us that "the defining of words . . ,
is nothing but declaring their signification." Later, in IV. 8.4., he refers
1076
to the romance knight "who by the word palfrey signified these ideas: --
body of a certain figure, four-legged, with sense, motion, ambling,
neighing, white, used to have a woman on his back"; and I think that
this passage and others like it are certainly intended to give an account
of meaning. What a word means according to Locke just is a series of
ideas. However, one must now ask whether a distinction can be drawn
between this series of ideas and the original complex idea of a palfrey. I
think that it can, at least psychologically.
There is certainly a sense in which a complex idea for Locke just is a
group of less complex ideas, but this group is unified by its name,
"which is as it were the knot that ties them fast together" (III. 5. 10).
Furthermore, giving a meaning must involve a psychological
progression from the original idea to its components listed separately.
The romance knight would have to reflect before he recognized all the
eight components of his complex idea "palfrey," just as one may have
to reflect before one realizes that 12 is identical to 7 + 5. T o be sure,
there is a close link between a word's signifying an idea and a word's
having a meaning. If the speaker cannot on reflection give a definition
for the word he has used, if he cannot break down his complex idea into
its component parts, then one will be tempted to say that he has no idea
of what a palfrey is, and that nothing was made known by his utterance
of the word "palfrey." But the fact that giving a definition serves as a
criterion for having an idea does not entitle one to blur the distinction
between an idea's being made known through the utterance of a word
and a word's having a meaning. Locke has an ideational theory of
meaning, but contrary to what Kretzmann and Landesman assert, it is
not stated in III. 2." (pp. 325-326)
(1) Aristoteles Latinus II I-2. De Interpretatione vel Periermenias
Translatio Boethii Specimina Translationum, edidit Laurentius Minio-
Paulello (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), p. 5. For an interesting discussion
of Aristotle's original text and what he may have meant by it, see
Norman Kretzmann, "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by
Convention," in Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, John
Corcoran, ed. (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1974), pp. 3-21.
(2) There was also a debate among the ancient commentators on
Aristotle, but its influence on the Middle Ages seems to have been only
through references in Boethius's two commentaries on the De
1077
Interpretatione.
(3) K. M. Fredborg, Lauge Nielsen, and Jan Pinborg, "An Unedited
Part of Roger Bacon's 'Opus Maius': 'De Signis'," Traditio 34 (1978):
132.
(4) John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio I d. 27, qq. 1-3, n. 83 in Opera Omnia
VI (Civitas Vaticana, 1963), P. 97.
(5) For further discussion see E. J. Ashworth, "Words, Concepts and
Things: A Study of Perihermenias Commentaries from the Late
Thirteenth to the Sixteenth Century," to appear in a special issue of
Paideia on medieval philosophy [not published]. For interesting
material on the reception of St. Thomas Aquinas's views in the
sixteenth century, see F. E. Cranz, "The Publishing History of the
Aristotle Commentaries of Thomas Aquinas," Traditio 34 (1978): 157-
92. Cranz's work has considerable bearing on what I shall say below
about the differences between late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-
century commentaries on De Interpretatione 16 a 3 and the medieval
commentaries.
———. 1981. "Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions: A
Semantic Problem Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians."
Reprinted as essay VI in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"Gregory of Rimini's influential Sentence Commentary was written in
the 1340s. One of the questions which he discussed in his prologue was
how it is that a mental proposition functions as a united whole, with a
force that its apparent parts taken separately do not possess. (1)
In this article I intend to explore the reactions to Gregory's arguments
among a group of logicians who studied or taught at Paris in the first
three decades of the sixteenth century. The most important of the
authors I shall examine are three Spaniards: Jerome Pardo (d. 1502 or
1505) whose Medulla Dialectices was published in 1500 and again in
1505; Antonio Coronel, whose Duplex Tractatus Terminorum was
published in 1511 and whose Prima Pars Rosarii in qua de
Propositione Multa Notanda was published at about the same time; and
Fernando de Enzinas, whose most noteworthy book for our purposes
was his Tractatus de Compositione Propositionis Mentalis Actuum
Sincathegoreumaticorum Naturam Manifestans, first published in
1521, and reprinted in 1526 and 1528." (p. 61)
1078
(...)
"In conclusion there are two points I would like to make. On the one
hand it is quite clear that when early sixteenth century logicians were
discussing mental language they took it that they were concerned with
philosophy of mind. In part this is the natural result of their approach to
signification as a causal process. If one defines "signify" in terms of
making known or representing to the cognitive faculty, then the
question of the various effects of words upon the hearer's mind, and
what they reveal about the speaker's mind, will embrace both semantic
and psychological issues. One also has to bear in mind the part played
by speaker intentions in endowing linguistic aggregates with their
propositional force.(134) At this level the study of language cannot be
separated from the study of mental attitudes and processes. On the
other hand, if one isolates the part of the discussion which was devoted
to purely semantic issues, then it is no longer necessary to postulate
mental language as such. Everything that was said about the semantic
function of syncategorematic acts, subject and predicate, the unity of
propositions and the equivalence between propositions, could be
described in neutral terms as the study of semantic structure leaving it
quite open what the relationship is between the semantic structure of a
given utterance and the psychological states of the speaker. Nor does
there seem any genuine need to postulate a naturally meaningful
language in addition to conventionally meaningful language, since a
given speaker's psychological states can be adequately described in
terms of conventional language, and since synonymy can be redefined
for conventional languages.
Indeed, one can argue that the notion of a naturally meaningful mental
language is without any function, since we have no criteria for
identifying it or its structures. But this is to go far beyond Gregory of
Rimini and sixteenth century reactions to his arguments." (pp. 95-96)
(1) Gregory of Rimini, Gregorii Ariminensis O.E.S.A. Super Primum et
Secundum Sententiarum (Reprint of the 1522 edition: St. Bonaventure,
N.Y.: The Franciscain Institute; Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts; Paderborn:
F. Schöningh, 1955), fol. 3va-5rb.
(134) But Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London:
Duckworth, 1973, p. 311, reminds us that "linguistic acts should be
classed as conventional actions, not as the external expression of
1079
interior states. Assertion, for example, is to be explained in terms of the
conventions governing the use of those sentences which are understood
as having assertoric force, not as the utterance of a sentence with the
intention of expressing one's interior act of judgment (or interior state
of belief) that it is true."
———. 1982. "The Eclipse of Medieval Logic." In The Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by Kretzmann, Norman,
Kenny, Anthony P. and Pinborg, Jan, 787-796. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
"The view that the insights and developments of medieval logic were
eclipsed during the fifteenth century by a humanist, rhetorically-
oriented logic has long been popular, but it needs considerable revision
and modification. In what follows I shall first give a brief account of
what happened to the writing, teaching, and publication of logical
works in the medieval style, by which I mean those which discuss such
topics as consequences, insolubles, exponibles, and supposition. I shall
then examine in more detail what was actually said about certain
medieval doctrines in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in order
to indicate both where logicians of the period had something new to
contribute, and where there were departures from medieval doctrines
which cannot be attributed to new logical insight. (1) My conclusion
will be that medieval logic as a living tradition did largely disappear,
but that the eclipse dates from about 1530 (in so far as a specific date
can ever sensibly be offered) rather than the mid fifteenth century." (p.
787)
(...)
"Conclusion.
Why did these interesting and varied treatments of medieval logical
themes cease so abruptly after 1530? (9) Humanism alone cannot be the
answer, since it apparently triumphed only by default. Italian
universities continued to teach medieval logic long after the attacks on
it by such men as Lorenzo Valla; and Agricola's logic did not capture
Paris until the production of texts in the medieval style had already
ceased. (10) Humanism certainly had a part to play in the process,
however. Soto, for instance, came to believe as a result of humanist
influences that doctrines which were difficult and not clearly expressed
by Aristotle should be omitted from logic, and that too much time was
1080
devoted to summulist doctrines in the teaching of logic. Accordingly,
the later editions of his Introductiones dialecticae were very much
altered and simplified. Another instructive example is Agostino Nifo's
Dialectica ludicra (1520). Here we have an introductory text written by
a leading Aristotelian who had a good knowledge of medieval
doctrines, yet he distorts them completely by describing only those
parts of the scholastic theory of terms and supposition theory which are
directly applicable to standard categorical propositions. (11) No one
who became acquainted with medieval logic through Nifo would
understand the function of the non-Aristotelian parts at all. A very
plausible account of the indirect effect of humanism on logic teaching
is provided by Terrence Heath, whose study of the teaching of grammar
at three German universities at the end of the fifteenth century and
beginning of the sixteenth century shows that the change to non-
medieval logic was preceded by the change to humanistic grammar.
(12) The significance of this sequence of changes is brought out in
Heath's claim that medieval grammar prepared the student for medieval
logic, whereas humanist grammar did not. One may also speculate that
social changes were influential in creating a need for men with a new
style of education. The rise of modern physics has been cited as a
possible cause, but this suggestion cannot be accepted, given that
modern physics can hardly be said to have risen before the end of the
sixteenth century. (13) The judgement of a contemporary logician
might be that medieval logic came to an end because no further
progress was possible without the concept of a formal system and
without the development of a logic of relations. This view is borne out
by the desperate, complicated attempts to analyse such propositions as
'Every man has a head' that are to be found in the writings of the
Parisian logicians. They certainly pushed medieval logic to its limits,
but whether they gave up in despair because they realised that that was
what they had done is another matter. For the moment our question
must remain without a fully satisfactory answer." (pp. 795-795)
(1) For further details about the period as a whole, and for some of the
doctrines mentioned below, see Ashworth, Language and Logic in the
Post-medieval Period (Synthese Historical Library, 12), Reidel 1974,
and Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit (Band I: 1500-1640),
Frommann Holzboog 1964. For a bibliography of primary sources, see
1081
Risse, Bibliographia Logica. Verzeichnis der Druckschriften zur Logik
mit Angabe ihrer Fundorte, (Band I. 1472-1800), Georg Olms 1965.
For a bibliography of secondary sources, see Ashworth, The Tradition
of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of
the Seventeenth Century: A Bibliography from 1836 Onwards (Subsidia
Mediaevalia, 9), Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1978.
(9) Charles B. Schmitt, 'Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century
Universities: Some Preliminary Comments', in Murdoch, John E. and
Edith Sylla, eds., The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, Reidel
1975, p. 512, notes that certain branches of medieval physics also
declined. He writes: '... several fourteenth-century traditions - including
nominalism, the logical traditions of sophismata and insolubilia, and
the Merton and Paris schools of philosophy of motion - continued on
into the first few decades of the sixteenth century and after that quickly
lost ground to other approaches and sets of problems. The printing-
history of the medieval texts in question as well as new commentaries
being written on Aristotle indicate this. Why this happened is not clear.
Humanism had a strong impact, as did the reintroduction of the
writings of the Greek commentators on Aristotle, but neither of these
facts explains why the calculators and writers on sophismata lost out,
while the commentaries of Averroes did not. In brief, certain medieval
aspects of the tradition expired in the early sixteenth century, while
other equally medieval aspects continued to play an important role.'
(10) For a discussion of Valla, Agricola, and their influence, see Lisa
Jardine, 'Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist
Dialectic', Journal of the History of Philosophy 15:143-64 1977.
(11) See Ashworth, 'Agostino Nifo's Reinterpretation of Medieval
Logic', Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 31 (1976) 355-74.
(12) Terrence Heath, 'Logical Grammar, Grammatical Logic, and
Humanism in Three German Universities', Studies in the Renaissance
18 (1971) 9—64.
(13) William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic,
Clarendon Press 1962, p. 307. It should be noted that the Kneales speak
as if interest in formal logic declined only during the seventeenth
century, so that their reference to modern physics is not implausible in
its context.
———. 1982. "The Structure of Mental Language: Some Problems
1082
Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians." Vivarium no. 20:59-
83.
Reprinted as essay V in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
"Preface.
As is well known, late and post-medieval logicians shared the belief
that were three types of language, spoken, written, and mental. (1)
Spoken and written languages had conventional meaning, and were in
fact, though not necessarily so, different for different groups of people.
Mental language, on the other hand, was thought to have natural
meaning and to be common to all men. The obvious question to ask
about mental language concerns its structure and how this relates to the
structure of spoken or written languages, especiallyLatin. Ockham's
position on the matter has been investigated by more than one author;
(2) so in this paper I intend to focus on the views held by logicians in
early sixteenth centuryParis, and by some of those earlier logicians who
most influenced them. I shall leave firmly aside the obvious
philosophical question of what criteria could possibly be used in
determining a structure for mental language which is independent of
spoken or written language. Sufficeit to say that late medieval logicians
saw no problem here.
The main issues concerning structure arose from a consideration of the
categorical proposition.This was taken to be the simplest kind of
proposition, which at its most basic displays a subject and a predicate,
both in the nominative case, and the copula "is" or "are". To these
ingredients may be added quantifiers such as "all" and "some",
negation signs, adjectives, adverbs, and other modifiers. Two kinds of
problem are presented by this account. First there is the question of
what to say about spoken or written propositions which do not fit the
standard mould. I include here such sentences as "Pluit" "It is raining"
which do not have a subject; sentences displaying so-called adjectival
verbsuch as "runs" in "Socrates runs" which do not have a separate
copula and predicate; and sentences containing pronouns and
demonstrative terms such as "I am running"and "This is white", whose
subject is given only by the context of the utterance. Second, there is
the question of how to account for certain features of those spoken and
written propositions which do fit the standard mould, namely such
features as syncategorematic terms, tense variations (which will not be
1083
discussed in this paper) and variations of number, case and gender. It
was in their discussion of these issues that Parisian logicians gave their
most detailed account of the structureof mental propositions." (pp. 59-
60)
(...)
"It seems that the road was left open to considerable variation in mental
language. Two speakers could perfectly well utter sentences which
were logically equivalent and which picked out the same state of affairs
without using the same mental propositions.As a result,one can suggest
both that it is consistent with the post-medieval view that sentences in
different languages may be equivalent and translatable without
exhibiting precisely the same deep structure, and that there is no reason
why one should speak of mental language as containing "the forms that
are necessary for any true description of the world", as Trentman put it
in his account of Ockham's view of mental language. (110) Ockham
may have had an ideal language in mind; Enzinas and his
contemporaries did not. (111)". (p. 82)
(1) See Gabriel Nuchelmans, (1) Theories of the Proposition. Ancient
and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity,
Amsterdam/London 1973 and (2) Late Scholastic and Humanist
Theories of the Proposition, Amsterdam, Oxford, New York 1980,
passim.
(2) For a discussion of Ockham's views, see Peter Geach, Mental Acts,
London 1957, pp. 101-104 and John Trentman, "Ockham on Mental",
in: Mind, 79 (1970), 586-590.
(110) Trentman, p. 589, my italics.
———. 1983. "English Obligationes Texts after Roger Swyneshed.
The Tracts Beginning Obligatio Est Quaedam Ars." In The Rise of
British Logic. Acts of the Sixth European Symposium on Medieval
Logic and Semantics, Balliol College, Oxford, 19-24 June 1983, edited
by Lewry, Osmund P., 309-333. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval studies.
"Introduction.
In this paper I hope to shed some light on the development of
obligationes in England by examining a number of texts which all have
the same incipit.
'Obligatio est quaedam ars'. A list of the manuscripts and early printed
1084
books I have used, together with the sigla I have adopted, will be found
in Appendix A. (1) In Appendix B I have given a list of other relevant
manuscripts which I was unable to consult for reasons of time. (2) My
paper has three parts. Part One contains a general survey of the texts,
with an account of their relationship to each other and to the Logica
oxoniensis text.
Part Two contains a discussion of the doctrines and influence of
Billingham's Ars obligatoria and the almost identical treatise found in
the Logica oxoniensis. Part Three contains a detailed analysis, with
references, of the texts discussed in Part Two.
It seems appropriate to begin with some further remarks about the
incipit itself. The fullest version is found in Richard Billingham, who
wrotes: (3)
'Obligatio est quaedam ars mediante qua aliquis opponens potest ligare
respondentem ut ad suum bene placitum respondeat ad obligationem
sibi positam; vel obligatio est oratio mediante qua aliquis obligatus
tenetur affirmative vel negative ad obligationem respondere.'
(Obligation is an art whereby some opponent can bind a respondent to
reply at the opponent's pleasure to the obligatory sentence posited to
him. Alternatively, an obligation is a sentence by virtue of which
someone who is obligated is committed to reply affirmatively or
negatively to the obligatory sentence.)
As can be seen from the appendices, a number of variations in this
incipit were possible. A and Q replaced 'opponens potest ligare' in
Billingham's first definition with the phrase 'obligatus tenetur' from the
second definition; and a number of authors added 'affirmative vel
negative' to tyhe first definition.
Dspite these minor variations, there is no doubt that the texts listed in
Appendix A have basically the same incipit; but as il shall show, it does
not follow from this that the texts listed are otherwise identical, or even
similar." (pp. 309-310)
(...)
"I shall finish with a few remarks about the influence of Billingham and
the Logica oxoniensis. Generally speaking, it seems to have been slight.
Apart from Wyclif, no named author, including John of Holland and
Paul of Venice in the Logica parva, adopted Billingham's organization
of the material. There was a little discussion of Billingham's definition
1085
of obligatio, of his attitude to inconsistent posita and of his conjunction
rules, but one cannot claim that these topics loomed large in the
literature. The most striking influence is that of the sophisms
themselves, a number of which reappear in Albert of Saxony (see Part
Three, Section B). I suspect that the apparent popularity (judging by the
number of extant manuscripts) of the Logica oxoniensis in the fifteenth
century, a period when people had on the whole ceased to write original
obligationes treatises, stems solely from its character as a convenient
brief compendium." (pp. 317-318)
———. 1984. "Inconsistency and Paradox in Medieval Disputations: A
Development of Some Hints in Ockham." Franciscan Studies no.
44:129-139.
"The Liar Paradox is well-known, as is the way it calls into doubt some
of our most basic semantic assumptions. In this paper, I intend to
consider a more modest group of paradoxes, that is, propositions which
seem puzzling, absurd or even inconsistent whether because of some
feature of the proposition itself or some feature of the situation in
which it is uttered.(1) Examples from ordinary English include the
familiar cases "I have nothing to say to you," "My lips are sealed," "I
have no comment to make." They also include such sentences as "I'm
sorry, I don't speak any English," "I'm quite incapable of uttering a
grammatically correct sentence," "I never generalize," "Don't talk to
me, I'm asleep," or even "I do not exist." Such pragmatic paradoxes
will turn out to have certain features in common with the Liar Paradox.
Some of them give rise to logical contradictions, some of them are self
referential, some of them seem to include a reference to their own truth
or falsity. But there are also important differences, as I hope to
demonstrate.
Hints of a solution to some of these problems are to be found in
Ockham; but my main discussion will be based on the work of several
later medieval logicians, notably John Buridan, Albert of Saxony and
William Buser, all of whom were active at the University of Paris in the
middle years of the fourteenth century. To be precise, Buridan taught
there from about 1320 to about 1360, Albert taught there from 1351 to
1362, and Buser taught there from 1357 until after 1364. (2) I shall also
draw on the work of Paul of Venice, who wrote his Logica Magna in
1397-1398. These writers all had a very strong interest in pragmatic
1086
paradoxes. The reason for this has to do with the nature of the
university curriculum. Virtually all undergraduate students were in the
Arts Faculty, and at least the first two years of the four year course
were largely devoted to the study of logic." (pp. 129-130)
(...)
"I shall conclude with some brief remarks about the relationship
between pragmatic paradoxes and the Liar Paradox. One general way
of characterizing the cases I have examined is to say that in each case
there is an inconsistency which arises from the relationship between the
rules of the game, the facts of the situation (including the syntactic
properties of what is said) or some initial conditions on the one hand,
and a particular utterance on the other. However, these rather general
remarks could also be applied to the Liar Paradox. Alternatively, one
might say that the difference between pragmatic paradoxes and the Liar
Paradox lies in the importance of the principles which are thrown in
doubt. This is true, but unhelpful. Perhaps the real difference is that in
none of the cases I have mentioned was it difficult to fix a referent for
the sentence uttered, whereas in the case of the Liar Paradox the
apparent reference fails. If I say "My reply is in the negative" the
referent of "my reply" is fixed by the context; and if I say "What I am
now saying is in English" the referent of what I am now saying is
similarly fixed. But if I say "What I am now saying is false," apparent
reference is made to the content of my utterance, and there is now
nothing either in the context of my utterance or in its syntactic features
which fixes that reference.26 Unsurprisingly, it is the presence of the
semantic term "false" which brings about this unhappy situation." (p.
139)
(1) For some twentieth century discussion and further references see A.
Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1958) 259-267; C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies (London:
Methuen &. Co., 1970) 301.
(2) For information about Buser, see C. H. Kneepkens, "The
Mysterious Buser Again: William Buser of Heusden and the
Obligationes Tract Ob rogatum" in English Logic in Italy, edited by A.
Maierù (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1982) 147-166.
(26) These remarks are loosely based on D. Odegard, Knowledge and
Scepticism (American Philosophical Quarterly Library of Philosophy.
1087
Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1984) 44-52.
———. 1984. "Locke on Language." Journal of Philosophy no. 14:45-
73.
Reprinted as essay VIII in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
Reprinted also in: Vere Chappell (ed.), John Locke, Theory of
Knowledge, New York: Garland Publishing 1992, pp. 55-83 and in:
Vere Chappell (ed.), Locke, New York: Oxford University Press 1998
pp. 175-194.
"Locke's main semantic thesis is that words stand for, or signify, ideas.
He says this over and over again, though the phraseology he employs
varies. In Book III chapter 2 alone we find the following statements of
the thesis: (1) '... Words ... come to be made use of by Men, as the Signs
of their Ideas' [111.2.1; 405:10-11] (*); (2) 'The use then of Words, is
to be sensible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they stand for, are their
proper and immediate Signification' [III. 2.1 ; 405:15-17]; (3) Words in
their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the
Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them' [111.2.2; 405:21-2]; (4) 'That
then which Words are the Marks of, are the Ideas of the Speaker'
[111.2.2; 405:27-8]; (5) Words, as they are used by Men, can properly
and immediately signify nothing but the Ideas, that are in the Mind of
the Speaker' [111.2.4; 406:29-31]. Locke offers no explanation of the
terms he uses in these remarks, and I am going to take it that the
phrases 'stand for; 'being a mark of,' and 'being a sign of are all roughly
synonymous with the term 'signify.' The purpose of this paper is to
explore what Locke intended to convey when he said that words signify
ideas. I shall attempt to defend him against some, though not all,
standard objections; and part of my defense will rest on the claim that
Locke was using 'signify' in the same way that his scholastic
predecessors used the Latin term 'significare'. My paper falls into three
parts. First, I shall give a general description of Locke's account of
language; second, I shall look more closely at the scholastic theories of
mental language and of signification, and their relation to Locke's
theory; third, I shall return to Locke's text to examine what he has to
say about the signification of general terms, and how it is that our ideas
conform both to the ideas of other men and to external objects." (pp.
45-46)
(...)
1088
"I have now arrived at the heart of my argument, for not only was
'signify' a quasi-technical term for Locke; it was a genuinely technical
term in the scholastic literature of the period, and indeed, in all
medieval writings concerned with the theory of language. I wish to
contend that Locke's use of the term 'signify' makes much more
philosophical sense if one sees it against the scholastic background than
if one approaches it from the point of view of twentieth century
theories of meaning. It also makes a good deal more historical sense to
suggest that Locke was influenced by his background, rather than being
a complete innovator in every aspect of his thinking.
But before I examine the late and post-medieval doctrine of
signification, I should explain my grounds for supposing that Locke
was acquainted with it. Locke went to Oxford in 1652 at the age of
twenty, and he stayed there until 1665, first as an undergraduate at
Christ Church, and then as a lecturer and tutor at the same college. The
Oxford curriculum, as laid down by the Laudian statutes of 1636,
covered a variety of subjects. (17) The undergraduate was supposed to
study grammar, rhetoric, logic, moral philosophy, political philosophy,
geometry, and music; and at the M.A. level such subjects as
metaphysics, natural philosophy, history and Greek were added. In
theory the main texts studied for logic and metaphysics (as for ethics,
natural, and political philosophy) were those of Aristotle, but in
practice secondary sources were used. The leading metaphysics texts
included some by Catholics such as the Frenchman, Eustace of St. Paul,
and some by Protestants, such as the German, Scheibler, and the
Dutchman, Burgersdijck. They were all predominantly scholastic in
nature, by which I mean that they were highly organized, were heavily
influenced by the renewed Aristotelianism of the sixteenth century, and
were equally heavily influenced by such medieval authors as Thomas
Aquinas (who was undoubtedly more popular in the seventeenth
century than in the thirteenth) and Duns Scotus. Even the Protestant
authors seem to have used mainly Catholic sources. The leading logic
texts were also predominantly Aristotelian, with a few references to
specifically medieval developments such as supposition theory. Two of
the most popular at Oxford were by the Flemish Jesuit, Du Trieu, and
the Polish Jesuit, Smiglecius, though Burgersdijck's logic text was used
as well as his metaphysics text. Indigenous Oxford authors were
1089
represented by such men as the very popular Robert Sanderson whose
logic text was repeatedly published up to 1841. Nothing that anyone
would count as new philosophical work was being done at Oxford
(except by Robert Boyle, who was not a member of the university) and
hardly any attention was paid to such figures as Descartes. Locke
himself may not have read Descartes until 1666 or 1667, after he had
left Oxford.(18)" (pp. 55-56)
(...)
"Conclusion
If Locke has been correctly absolved of the twin accusations that words
mean ideas and that ideas are invariably images, his discussion of
language can be viewed in a somewhat more sympathetic light than is
usually the case. His emphasis on the place of ideas in the significative
process can be interpreted as an emphasis on the importance of a
speaker's concepts, beliefs, and experiences, in the process of
communication; and he can be credited with a genuine awareness that
there is also something public about language use. Not only must the
things spoken of be publicly accessible (at least some of the time), but
definitions too must be publicly ascertainable (and this all of the time).
To this extent Hacking is wrong when he argues that Locke has no
theory of meaning in the sense of a theory of public discourse,(46) but
he is correct if we place the emphasis on the word 'theory.' In so far as
Locke had a fully-fledged semantic theory, as opposed to a collection
of observations." (p. 72)
(*) Page and lines reference are to John Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, edited with a foreword by Peter H. Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
(17) See E.J. Ashworth, "Philosophy Teaching at Oxford"' to appear in
the new edition of J.-P. Schobinger, ed., Friedrich Ueberwegs
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. V. Philosophie im 17
Jahrhundert, (Basel, Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co.), [1988].
(18) Various dates have been suggested including c.1656 and after
1671: see H.A.S. Schankula, "Locke, Descartes and the Science of
Nature," Journal of the History of Ideas, 41 (1980) 461-3. I am
following Maurice Cranston, John Locke. A Biography (London:
Longmans Green and Co. 1957), 99-100.
(46) Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, (New
1090
York: Cambridge Unviersity Press 1975), p. 52.
———. 1985. "An Annotated Bibliography of Medieval and
Renaissance Logic." In The History of Mathematics from Antiquity to
the Present. A Selective Bibliography, edited by Dauben, Joseph, 290-
292. New-York: Garland.
———. 1986. "Renaissance Man as Logician: Josse Clichtove (1472-
1543) on Disputations." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 7:15-29.
"Josse Clichtove represents a turning point in the history of disputation,
for he combines one of the earliest accounts of the doctrinal disputation
with one of the latest accounts of the obligational disputation. This
paper describes the nature and significance of the theories that he
offered. Particular attention is paid to the doctrines of truth, necessity
and possibility which lie behind his doctrines; and also to the light
which his work throws on the aims and nature of an obligational
disputation."
———. 1987. "Jacobus Naveros (Fl. Ca. 1533) on the Question: "Do
Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?"." In Logos and Pragma.
Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honor of Professor Gabriel
Nuchelmans, edited by Rijk, Lambertus Maria de and Braakhuis, Henk
A.G., 189-214. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
"In a volume dedicated to the celebration of Gabriel Nuchelmans’
achievements, it seems appropriate to pick up one of the themes that he
himself has discussed. In his seminal work on post-medieval
philosophies of language, Late Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the
Proposition, Nuchelmans devoted a section to the relation between
written, spoken and mental propositions (1). In it he made reference to
a few writers Grom the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, such as
George of Brussels and Petrus Tartaretus, and he spoke of their
reactions to arguments put forward by Aquinas, Ockham and Buridan.
In this paper I intend to explore in more detail the question of whether
words signify concepts or things, as it was discussed by Jacobus
Naveros, a Spaniard who studied and taught at Alcalâ, and whose
lengthy and interesting commentary on the Perihermenias was first
published in 15332. I shall also discuss the 1530 commentary of
Alphonsus Prado, who taught at Alcalâ juntil 1534, when he moved to
Coimbra3. Both men were influenced by the strong school of logic at
Paris, and I shall make particular reference to the Parisian authors
1091
Johannes Raulin (1443-1514), Petrus Crockaert de Bruxellis (1455/70-
1514), and Johannes Dullaert (ca. 1470-1513)4. A number of other
authors who discussed the question in some detail will be mentioned in
passing, particularly in the footnotes5. I shall thus use my examination
of Naveros to add to the material given by Nuchelmans, and to explore
further the impact of Aquinas, Ockham and Buridan on later writers.
The debate about whether words signified concepts or things was not,
of course, a new one. It was already raging in the late thirteenth
century, when Roger Bacon said that there was "not a moderate strife
among famous men"6. A little later, Duns Scotus wrote of "a great
altercation"7. Nearly everyone who wrote a commentary on the
Perihermenias had something to say on the issue, and it was also
discussed in Sentence commentaries and in Buridan’s Sophismata. The
debate had been triggered by the words of Aristotle, who had opened
his Perihermenias (16a3) by saying that spoken words were signs of
affections in the mind. As translated by Boethius the passage reads:
"Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum
notae, et ea quae scribuntur corum quae sunt in voce"8. What Aristotle
himself had intended to assert can be ignored here9, for the later debate
began not just from Boethius’ Latin, but from a particular interpretation
of it. Notae were taken to be signa, passiones were taken to be
concepts10; and ea quae sunt in voce were taken to be primarily such
substantive nouns as ’human being’ and ’animal’. Those words which
themselves stand for signs were excluded for the obvious reason that, at
least in the case of mental signs, the referents must be concepts11. In
his analysis of the passage in question12, Naveros argued that because
nothing is called a sign of something unless it is representative or
significative of it, Aristotle intended to assert that spoken words do
signify concepts. Moreover, because Aristotle went on to state that
spoken words were not the same for all men, Aristotle had meant to
assert that this signification was ad placitum, i.e. conventional. Naveros
strengthened the claim by adding the word proprie: the signification is
not merely conventional, but conventional in the strictest sense. On the
face of it, Naveros came down very strongly on one side of the debate.
However, as we shall shortly see, this did not involve him in any denial
that words also signified things. Indeed, the very theory of signification
committed him to the assertion of a word-thing relationship." (pp. 189-
1092
190)
(...)
" Conclusion.
I would like to conclude by making three brief observations. First, any
modern attempt to construe the thesis that spoken words signify
concepts as a theory of meaning involves a simple misunderstanding of
the verb significare. Second, although Naveros, like others, asserted
that spoken words did signify concepts, he had no intention of
overlooking the referential function of words. Nor did those who
asserted that spoken words signified things have any intention of
overlooking the place of concepts in the significative process. In many
ways the dispute between the two groups was verbal rather than real.
Third, when one considers the influence of the great medieval
philosophers on the discussions found in the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, it seems that Duns Scotus held pride 'of place,
followed closely by Buridan. Ockham’s conclusions were influential,
though his arguments were not; and the arguments presented by
Aquinas in his Perihermenias commentary had little effect." (p. 214)
(1) Nuchelmans (Amsterdam 1980: 16-24).
(2) For some details about Naveros’ life and works, see V. Munoz
Delgado ("La lógica en la Univesidad de Alcalà durante la primera
mitad del Siglo XVI", Salamanticensis 15, 1968:193-200).
(3) For some details about Prado, see Munoz Delgado, op.cit., pp. 184-
187.
(4) For details of these and other authors, see Lohr ("Renaissance Latin
Aristotle Commentaries", 1974-1982).
(5) On the other hand, there are many Perihermenias commentaries I
have looked at and shall not make any further reference to. Details of
most of the works I exclude are to be found in Risse (Bibliographia
Logica. Verzeichnis der Druckschriften zur Logik mit Angabe ihrer
Fundorte. I. 1472-1800, Hildesheim 1965).
———. 1988. "The Historical Origins of John Poinsot's Treatise on
Signs." Semiotica no. 69:129-147.
"Introduction.
In 1631-1632 John Poinsot (otherwise known as John of St. Thomas)
published his Ars Logica at Alcalá. From this massive work John Deely
has extracted all those parts relating to the theory of signs, and has
1093
given them the general heading of Tractatus de Signis (Treatise on
Signs), though it should be noted that the Treatise on Signs (*) proper
consists of just three Questions related to Aristotle's Perihermenias.
The project is a valuable one, for Poinsot was an interesting writer in
his own right who frequently had original observations to make.
Deely's contribution, so far as the edition and translation are concerned,
is superb; and the book itself is a splendid example of the printer's art.
However, I have some very grave reservations about Deely's
interpretation of Poinsot's work, and it is these reservations that I intend
to discuss here. Others (notably Sebeok, "A signifying man. Review of
Tractatus de Signis" The New York Time Book Review, March 30, 1986,
pp. 14-15) have already sung the praises of Deely and Poinsot; and as
one of the few philosophers who has actually read some of the
sixteenth-century authors to whom Poinsot was indebted, I feel it
incumbent on me to point out that there is another side to the coin.
However, I do not intend my remarks to detract in any way from the
achievement represented by Deely's version of the Treatise on Signs.
I shall first discuss Deely's attitude toward the historical interpretation
of Poinsot and how it differs from my own. In so doing, I shall show
that there was a tradition of placing the discussion of signs in a
Perihermenias commentary. Second, I shall discuss the topic of
relations, since Deely claims that the 'revolutionary' nature of Poinsot's
doctrine of signs stems from his classification of relations. I shall
remark that a very similar classification of relations is found in at least
one of Poinsot's sources, namely Domingo de Soto (1494-1560). Third,
I shall discuss the details of the theory of signs as described by some
early sixteenth-century writers, and I shall show that the general lines
of Poinsot's classification are due to Domingo de Soto. Finally, I shall
make some remarks about other aspects of the translation and editorial
material which seem to need further comment." (p. 129)
* John N. Deely (trans. and ed.), with Ralph Austin Powell, Tractatus
de Signis. The Semiotic of John Poinsot, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985.
———. 1988. "Traditional Logic." In The Cambridge History of
"There were several waves of commentaries during the period after
1094
1350.
Some of these were on individual books from the Organon, such as the
commentary on the Prior Analytics by Marsilius of Inghen, which was
published in Venice in 1516, and the commentary on the Posterior
Analytics by Paul of Venice, which had been published seven times by
1518, nearly always in Venice. (4) In the fifteenth century we find
important commentaries on both the Logica vetus and the Logica nova
being produced by the Thomists at the Bursa Montis in Cologne (5) and
by Johannes Versor in Paris. However,
such commentaries were soon to disappear. Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de
Usingen, who taught at Erfurt, seems to be one of the last to write
specifically on the Logica vetus (1514) and the Logica nova (1507,
1516) as such. Of the earlier medieval commentaries the most popular
was that on the Logica vetus by Walter Burley, which had thirteen
printed editions, the last in Venice in 1541. The most prevalent form of
commentary from the late fifteenth century on dealt with the entire
Organon in one book . The first commentaries of this sort, such as
those by George of Brussels and Petrus Tartaretus (both first published
at Paris in 1493) were in a traditional style, but almost at once the
influence of humanism became apparent. In Paris Jacques Lefevre
d'Etaples produced his Paraphrases et annotationes in libros logicorum
(eleven editions up to 1588) and in Germany in 1516-17 Johannes Eck
published a complete commentary based on the new translations of
Johannes Argyropulos but using the work of logicians in the medieval
tradition. (6) Eck's work was produced for the University of Ingolstadt,
and was prescribed by the statutes of 1519-20; but it is not clear how
much it was actually used." (pp. 143-144)
(...)
"At the end of the sixteenth century we find both new texts and new
emphases in the curricula of various institutions. There are three kinds
of text which are particularly noteworthy. First, there are commentaries
on specific works by Aristotle, such as Jacopo Zabarella's commentary
on the Posterior Analytics which , along with his other works, was to
be extremely popular in the first part of the seventeenth century,
especially in Germany.
Second, there is the extensive commentary on selected parts of the
whole Organon, most notably the Commentarii in universam
1095
dialecticam Aristotelis by the Coimbra Jesuit Sebastian Couto , which
first appeared in 1606. It has been described as presenting a fusion of
two late sixteenth-century approaches to Aristotle, the philosophical
one of Zabarella and the philological one of Pace. (13) Third, there are
numerous shorter works which offer a complete introduction to the
logic of Aristotle, such as those by Toletus and Fonseca (see below, p.
163)." (pp. 145-146)
(...)
By about 1530 most of this activity had come to an abrupt end. New
commentaries on medieval authors disappeared except in Spain, where
Thomas de Mercado's commentary on Peter of Spain was first
published as late as 1571 . Treatises on individual topics ceased to be
written, with an occasional exception such as Antonius Kesler's treatise
on consequences of 1623. (56) The publication both of the newer works
in the medieval tradition and of the older ones virtually ceased . (57) At
the same time the university curricula changed. Authors such as
Rudolph Agricola and Johannes Caesarius were required in place of the
medieval texts, (58) and Philipp Melanchthon's simplified summary of
Aristotelian logic swept Germany.
Later, Petrus Ramus was to enjoy a runaway success. Yet the most
important and influential texts of the last years of the sixteenth century
were by no means simplified humanist manuals, and they contained not
only considerably more syllogistic logic than Lorenzo Valla, Agricola
or Ramus had thought appropriate, but also treatments of such medieval
doctrines as supposition theory." (pp. 152-153)
(4) For general information on both manuscripts and printed editions of
Aristotle commentaries, see Lohr [Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II.
Renaissance Authors (Florence 1988)].
(5) For some information about the Cologne commentators, see Lohr,
'Authors: Johannes de Kanthi - Myngodus ', Traditio, 27 : 251-351
1971, pp. 310-12. A 'bursa' was a kind of college in which students
lived and were taught.
(6) The full title of Aristotle 1516-17 is instructive: Dialectica: cum
quinque vocibus Porphyrii Phenicis: Argyropilo traductore: a Joanne
Eckio Theologo facili explanatione declarata: adnotationibus
compendiariis illustrata: ac scholastico exercitatio explicata: videbis 0
Lector priscam Dialecticam restitutam: ac Neotericorum subtilitati
1096
feliciter copulatam. For discussion of Eck, see Seifert, Logik zwischen
Scholastik und Humanismus: Das Kommentarwerke Johann Ecks,
Munich 1978.
(13) Schmitt, Studies in Renaissance Philosophy and Science, London
1981, § vi, p. 170.
(56) See Ashworth, 'Andreas Kesler and the later theory of
consequences', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 14: 205-14 1973
for a discussion.
(57) For more details see Cambridge History of Later Medieval
Philosophy, 1982, p. 790 (Ashworth).
References
———. 1988. "Changes in Logic Textbooks from 1500 to 1650: The
New Aristotelianism." In Aristotelismus Und Renaissance. In
Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt, edited by Kessler, Eckhard, Lohr,
Charles H. and Sparn, Walter, 75-87. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
"My own interest is in the fate of specifically medieval logical
doctrines and the process whereby they were either lost from view or
were transmuted into a subordinate part of Aristotelian logic. In order
to pursue this theme, I have chosen six textbooks which were used at
various times and places during the period 1500 - 1650; and I intend to
consider their contents in some detail so as to demonstrate the
interaction between medieval logic and the other three streams I
isolated above. It must, of course, be pointed out that there were many
other textbooks which did not contain any medieval logic, and hence
were not suitable for my purposes. The works I have chosen are as
follows: (I) the Libelli Sophistarum, loose collections of late
fourteenth-century material which were used at Oxford and Cambridge
in the first decades of the sixteenth century (11), (II) the Logica parva
(12) of Paul of Venice, probably written 1395 - 1396 (13), printed
many times up to 1614 (or beyond), and used as a textbook particularly
in Italy. Both the Libelli Sophistarum and the Logica parva show how
well-embedded medieval logic could seem, even in the early sixteenth
century. (III) the Summulae of Domingo de Soto, a Spaniard who
studied at Paris (14). The first edition appeared in Burgos in 1529, and
the much-altered second edition in Salamanca in 1539 (15). Soto's
work is illustrative both of early sixteenth-century developments within
the medieval tradition; and, in its second edition, of the impact of
1097
rhetorical humanism. (IV) the Institutionum Dialecticarum libri octo of
Pedro da Fonseca (16). It was first published in Lisbon in 1564, and the
last of its fifty-three editions appeared in Lyon in 1625 (17). This work
typifies the solid, late-scholastic textbook, full of detail and heavily
influenced by Aristotelian humanism. (V) the Logicae Artis
Compendium of Robert Sanderson, dating from 1615, and used as a
textbook in Oxford well into the eighteenth century (18). In this work,
all the four streams are mingled. (VI) the Logica Hamburgensis of
Joachim Jungius, first published as a whole in 1638 (19), though Books
1 to 3 had appeared in 1635 (20). This too is a solid, detailed textbook,
but it brings us to the end of the road so far as the medieval
contribution to logic is concerned." (pp. 76-78)
(11) For full discussion, see E. J. Ashworth, 'The "Libelli Sophistarum"
and the Use of Medieval Logic Texts at Oxford and Cambridge in the
Early Sixteenth Century', Vivarium 17 (1979), pp. 134 - 158.
(12) This work has been published in facsimile: Paulus Venetus, Logica
(Venice 1472; Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms, 1970). For a
translation with notes, see A. R. Perreiah, Paulus Venetus: Logica
Parva (Munchen, Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1984).
(13) See F. Bottin, `Logica e filosofia naturale nelle opere di Paolo
Veneto' in Scienza e filosofia all'Universita' di Padova nel
Quattrocento, edited by A. Poppi (Contributi alla Storia dell'Universita.
di Padova 15. Trieste: Lint, 1983), p. 89 - 91.
(14) For a discussion of Soto's logical work, see V. Munoz Delgado,
Logica formal y filosofia en Domingo de Soto (1494 - 1560) (Madrid:
Edita Revista "Estudios", 1964).
(15) For a discussion of the various editions, see A. d'Ors, 'Las
Summulae de Domingo de Soto', Anuario Filosofico. Universidad de
Navarra 16 (1983), pp. 211 - 213.
(16) There is a modern edition: Pedro da Fonseca, Instituções
Dialecticas Institutionum Dialecticarum libri octo, 2 volumes, edited
and translated by J. Ferreira Gomes (Coimbra: Universidade de
Coimbra, 1964).
(17) See Ferreira Gomes, editor's introduction to Fonseca, see fn. 16
above, I, pp. xxxv-xlvi.
(18) For a facsimile of the 1618 edition, see Robert Sanderson, Logicae
Artis Compendium, with an introduction by E. J. Ashworth (Bologna:
1098
Editrice CLUEB, 1985).
(19) For a modern edition, see R. W. Meyer, editor, Joachimi Jungii
Logica Hamburgensis (Hamburg: J. J. Augustin, 1957).
(20) See W. Risse, Joachimi Jungii Logicae Hamburgensis
Additamenta (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977, p. 7.
———. 1988. "Oxford." In Ueberweg, Friedrich, Grundriss Der
Geschichte Der Philosophie. Vollig Neubearbeitete Ausgabe. Die
Philosophie Des 17. Jahrhunderts. Band 3.1. England, edited by
Schobinger, Jean-Pierre, 6-9; 26-27. Basel: Schwabe & Co.
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of Logic. Third Part: Articles from 1989
to 1996
from 1967 to 1976
ARTICLES
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1989. "La Sémantique Du Xiv Siècle Vue
À Travers Cinq Traités Oxoniens Sur Les 'Obligationes'." Cahiers
d'Épistémologie.
———. 1989. "Boethius on Topics, Conditionals and Argument-
Forms." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 10:213-225.
"Eleonore Stump’s splendid translation of Boethius's In Ciceronis
Topica (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988) is a very
1100
welcome companion to her earlier translation of Boethius's De topicis
differentiis (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978).
Together the iwo volumes provide us with a hitherto unequalled
opportunity to come to grips with the logical work of an author whose
influence on medieval and Renaissance developments in this field was
surpassed only by Aristotle himself. Indeed, it was only because of
Boethius, his translations and commentaries, that Aristotle was first
transmitted to the Latin speaking West. The importance of Boethius's
work on the Topics is not purely historical, for it offers us a valuable
insight into a type of logic which is aimed not at the production of
formal languages or the examination of valid inference forms, but at
ways to produce belief in the context of debate and against a
background of straightforwardly metaphysical doctrines.
In this essay review I shall first make some general remarks about the
nature of Topics-logic, with particular reference to In Ciceronis Topica.
I shall then explore just one Topic, that of incompatibles, which is a
particularly interesting Topic for several reasons. First. Boethius's
attempt to define incompatibles shows the limitations of any formal
approach to the material in hand. Second, Boethius's use of the Topic
casts considerable light on his view of conditionals and their basis in
metaphysical features of the world. Third, the examination of these
issues helps explain Boethius's interpretation of certain key argument
forms and their relation to Stoic logic. Finally, I shall make some
remarks about Stump’s translation and notes." (p. 213)
———. 1990. "Paul of Venice on Obligations. The Sources for Both
the Logica Magna and the Logica Parva Versions." In Knowledge and
the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Vol. Ii, edited by Knuuttila, Simo,
Työrinoja, Reijo and Ebbesen, Sten, 407-415. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.
Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval
Philosophy, Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987.
"Treatises on obligations formed part of the specifically medieval
contribution to logic along with treatises on supposition theory,
consequences, and insolubles.(1) Their history may go back as far as
the late twelfth century; but the most important early treatise was the
Tractatus de Obligationibus of Walter Burley, which dates from around
1302. This work presented the theory in a fully developed form, and set
the stage for all subsequent discussion. For my purposes, the next
1101
leading figure was Roger Swyneshed, who probably wrote between
1330 and 1335, and who held controversial views about the treatment
of conjunctions and disjunctions. His doctrines were presented in a
favourable light by Martinus Anglicus,(2) Robert Fland and Richard
Lavenham, (3) but were otherwise generally rejected. Richard
Billingham, who became a fellow of Merton College, Oxford, in 1344,
wrote a text on obligations which formed part of the Logica
Oxoniensis, a loose collection of logic treatises which was popular in
the fifteenth century, and which was printed in England as late as 1530.
(4) Another Englishman, Ralph Strode, who was a fellow of Merton
1359-1360, wrote a treatise which was especially popular in Italy. (5)
At Paris, we find Albert of Saxony, whose discussion of obligations in
his Perutilis Logica (6) was particularly influential for the 1360 treatise
of the Dutchman William Buser (7). In turn, Buser's treatise was
heavily used in the treatise by his pupil, Marsilius of Inghen. (8) Two
Italian authors must also be mentioned. Peter of Candia, later Pope
Alexander V, wrote an obligations treatise perhaps between 1370 and
1380.(9) Peter of Mantua, writing between 1384 and 1392, included a
long section on obligations in his Logica (10) This is the background
against which Paul of Venice must be considered.
Four independent logic treatises have been attributed to Paul: the
Logica Parva (11) the Logica Magna (12) the Quadratura; and the
Sophismata Aurea. The first two are general texts, each of which
contains a section on obligations. There is also some relevant material
in the Quadratura, but I shall not consider it here. (13) Francesco
Bottin has given reasons for dating the Logica Parva 1395-96 and for
dating the Logica Magna 1397-98. (14) However, there is some
controversy about the relationship between these works; and it has even
been asked whether Paul was the author of both. (15) In this paper I
shall first give a brief survey of the sources for the Logica Magna
treatise on obligations; and I shall then argue that, in light of what I
have discovered, there is good reason to attribute both the Logica
Magna and the Logica Parva tracts on obligations to the same author."
(pp. 407-409)
(...)
"To sum up: the pattern of sources for the Logica Parva's treatment of
obligations is exactly the same as the pattern of sources for the Logica
1102
Magna's treatment. We find Albert of Saxony, Buser, the Logica
Oxoniensis, Strode and Peter of Candia. The rules given are generally
standard rules, but their organization is idiosyncratic, and common to
both the Logica Magna and the Logica Parva. The sophisms in the
Logica Parva are nearly all found in the Logica Magna. Given these
facts, I would be astounded to discover that the same man had not
compiled both treatises. Whether similar conclusions can be drawn for
other parts of the Logica Parva remains to be seen." (p. 415)
(1) For general discussion of obligations and further references, see E.
Stump, "Obligations: A. From the beginning to the early fourteenth
century" in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,
edited by N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (Cambridge etc.:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 315-334; and P.V. Spade,
'Obligations: B. Developments in the fourteenth century', ibid., pp. 335-
341.
(2) See E.J. Ashworth, 'English Obligationes Texts after Roger
Swyneshed: The Tracts beginning "Obligatio est quaedam ars"' in The
Rise of British Logic, edited by P. Osmund Lewry, O.P. (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), pp.311-312.
(3) See Spade, op.cit., pp.334-338. There are some striking similarities
between Martinus Anglicus and Robert Fland.
(4) For Billingham's Ars Obligatoria and the subsequent manuscript
tradition, see Ashworth, 'English Obligationes Texts'. For the Logica
Oxoniensis, see L.M. de Rijk, 'Logica Oxoniensis: An Attempt to
Reconstruct a Fifteenth Century Oxford Manual of
Logic', Medioevo 3 (1977), pp.121-164; and E.J. Ashworth, The
"Libelli Sophistarum" and the Use of Medieval Logic Texts at Oxford
and Cambridge in the Early Sixteenth Century', Vivarium 17 (1979),
pp.134-158.
(5) I am presently preparing an edition of this text in conjunction with
A. Maierù's edition of the rest of Strode's Logica. References in this
paper are to Ralph Strode, Obligationes, in Consequentie Strodi etc.
(Venetiis, 1517), fol. 78ra - fol. 93rb.
(6) Albert of Saxony, Perutilis Logica (Venice, 1522; Hildesheim, New
York: Georg Olms, 1974), fol. 46va-fol. 51vb.
(7) I have used Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Canon. Class.Lat. 278,
fol. 72ra-fol. 78rb. For discussion of Buser, see C.H. Kneepkens, "The
1103
Mysterious Buser Again: William Buser of Heusden and the
Obligationes Tract Ob Rogatum" in English Logic in Italy in the 14th
and 15th Centuries, edited by A. Maierù (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1982),
pp.147-166.
(8) I have used Cracow, Biblioteka Jagiellonska MS 2602, fol. 70r -
101r.
(9) I have used Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Canon.Class.Lat. 278,
fol. 65ra - fol. 69rb. For the date, I have used Green-Pedersen's
conjecture about the date of Peter of Candia's Consequentiae: see N.J.
Green-Pedersen, 'Early British Treatises on Consequences' in The Rise
of British Logic, p.307.
(10) I have used Peter of Mantua, Logica (Venice, 1492), sig. G iira -
sig. G viiivb. For the dating of his logical works, see T.E. James, 'Peter
Alboini of Mantua: Philosopher Humanist', Journal of the History of
Philosophy 12 (1974), pp.161-170.
(11) Paulus Venetus, Logica (Venice, 1472; Hildesheim, New York:
Georg Olms, 1970). For a translation of this edition, see A.R. Perreiah,
Paulus Venetus. Logica Parva (München, Wien: Philosophia Verlag,
1984). I shall use the citation LP, with page references to the 1472
edition. These references are included in Perreiah's translation.
(12) Paulus Venetus, Logica Magna (Venetiis, 1499); E.J. Ashworth,
editor and translator, Paul of Venice. Logica Magna. Part II. Fascicule
8. Tractatus de Obligationibus (printed for the British Academy by the
Oxford University Press, 1988). I shall use the citation LM, with folio
references to the 1499 edition. These references are included in my
edition.
(13) Paulus Venetus, Quadratura (Venetiis, 1493): see Dubium
secundum, cap. 11; Dubium tertium, cap. 6, cap. 23, cap. 29.
(14) F. Bottin, 'Logica e filosofia naturale nelle opere di Paolo Veneto'
in Scienza e Filosofia all'Università di Padova net Quattrocento, edited
by A. Poppi (Contributi alla Storia dell'Università di Padova 15.
Trieste: Lint, 1983), pp.87-93.
(15) See F. del Punta and M.M. Adams, edition and translation, Paul of
Venice, Logica Magna. Part II. Fascicule 6. Tractatus de Veritate et
Falsitate Propositionis et Tractatus de Significato Propositionis
(Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press,
1978), p.xiii: '...while the common authorship of the Logica Magna, the
1104
Logica Parva, the Sophismata, and the Quadratura is highly probable,
it has not been proved with certainty.... We have found that the
teachings of the Logica Parva are in any event often inconsistent with
those of the Logica Magna.' Perreiah, op.cit., pp. 327-343, gives the
strong impression that he doubts common authorship of the Logica
Parva and the Logica Magna.
———. 1990. "The Doctrine of Signs in Some Early Sixteenth-
Century Spanish Logicians." In Estudios De Historia De La Lógica.
Actas Del Ii Simposio De Historia De La Lógica, Universidad De
Navarra, Pamplona, 25-27 De Mayo De 1987, edited by Angelelli,
Ignacio and D'Ors, Angel, 13-38. Pamplona: Ediciones Eunate.
"In this paper I intend to discuss the doctrine of signs as it was
presented by six Spanish logicians from the first half of the sixteenth
century, all of whom except Naveros studied or taught at the University
of Paris. I shall consider the Termini of Gaspar Lax, whose second
edition appeared in 1512; the Termini of Juan Dolz, which appeared
about 1510; the Dialecticae introductiones of Juan de Celaya,
published as early as 1511; the Summulae of Domingo de Soto, which
appeared in 1529 and were heavily revised for their second edition in
1539; the posthumous Termini perutiles of Fernando de Enzinas,
published in 1533; and the Praeparatio dialectica of Jacobo de
Naveros, published in 1542. I shall, of course, be mentioning various
other authors, particularly from Paris, both to set the stage for the work
of the Spanish logicians, and in order to trace subsequent
developments.
There are three reasons why I have chosen to focus on the doctrine of
signs. First, there is the link with the doctrine of signification. For the
early sixteenth-century logician, at least for those writing in the
medieval tradition, to signify was to be a sign; and unless we
understand how the notion of sign was handled we will be unable to
understand such crucial debates as that concerning the question whether
words signify concepts or things (1). In particular, we will be likely to
fall into the modern trap of translating the word 'significatio' by the
word 'meaning', and thereby misreading large portions of medieval and
post-medieval logic and philosophy of language (2). Second, it is in the
late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries that logicians broke away
from the medieval trend of discussing signification only in relation to
1105
voces or utterances (3), and attempted to present the linguistic sign in a
much wider framework. Third, recent attention has been focussed on
the sign-theory of later authors, particularly the seventeenth-century
John of St. Thomas, and I think it is important to reveal the true
pioneers in this field (4)." (pp. 13-14)
(1) See E. J. Ashworth, "Jacobus Naveros (fl.ca.1533) on the Question:
'Do Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?", in Logos and
Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor
Gabriel Nuchelmans, edited by L. M. de Rijk and H. A. G. Braakhuis,
pp. 189-214 (Artistarium, Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1987); and
E. J. Ashworth, "'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?' The Scholastic
Sources of Locke's Theory of Language", Journal of the History of
Philosophy 19 (1981), pp. 299-326, reprinted as Study VII in E. J.
Ashworth, Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics (London: Variorum
Reprints, 1985).
(2) For examples of such misreading, see E. J. Ashworth, "Locke on
Language", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), pp. 45-73,
reprinted as Study VIII in Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
(3) Two medieval exceptions to this trend were Robert Kilwardby and
Roger Bacon. For references, see below notes 31 and 32.
(4) See John N. Deely, translator and editor, with Ralph Austin Powell,
Tractatus de Signis. The Semiotic of John Poinsot (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985). See also E. J. Ashworth, "The
Historical Origins of John Poinsot's 'Treatise on Signs', Semiotica 69
(1988), 129-147.
———. 1990. "Domingo De Soto (1494-1560) and the Doctrine of
Signs." In De Ortu Grammaticae. Studies in Medieval Grammar and
Linguistics Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg, edited by Bursill-Hall,
Geoffrey L., Ebbesen, Sten and Köerner, Konrad, 35-48. Amsterdam-
Philadelphia: Benjamins.
"Doctrines of signs permeated medieval culture, being found in such
diverse fields as medicine, rhetoric and theology (Maierù 1981).
However, despite Augustine's important insight that words could be
treated as one type of sign (Markus 1957; Jackson 1969) it seems true
to say that the notion of a sign as such was not of central importance to
medieval logicians. Certainly words were spoken of as being signs, but
no attempt was made to place them in a wider setting. Peter of Spain in
1106
his Summulae Logicales had focussed on the notion of a vox or
utterance, so that the distinction between significative and non-
significative was introduced only in a linguistic context (Peter of Spain
1972:1-2) and his commentators were thus given no incentive to go
beyond this context. William Ockham did give a general definition of
sign in his Summa Logicae, but he immediately said that he did not
intend to use the word 'sign' in this wider sense (William Ockham
1974:89); and his remarks were later echoed by Albert of Saxony
(Albert of Saxony 1522:f.2ra). The only medieval exceptions to this
trend in the field of linguistic sciences seem to have been Robert
Kilwardby, who discussed signs as such in his grammatical work
(Kilwardby 1975:1-7) and Roger Bacon who, when writing on logic,
followed Augustine in firmly subordinating the notion of a linguistic
sign to the notion of a sign in general (Roger Bacon 1978:81-84;
Pinborg 1981:405). One of Jan Pinborg's many achievements was to
find and publish Roger Bacon's treatise De Signis. Hence, it seems
appropriate that in a volume devoted to Pinborg's memory, some
attention should be paid to another logician, Domingo de Soto, who
attempted to place linguistic signs in a wider context.
It must be recognized that Soto was not the first sixteenth century
author to focus afresh on the notion of a sign. Humanism had resulted
in new attention being paid to the rhetorical concept of sign (cf.
Melanchthon 1854:cols.750-751, and Melanchthon 1846:cols.704-706)
and various fifteenth and sixteenth century logicians referred to the
definitions of sign found in Cicero (Versor 1572:f.6v; Raulin
1500:sig.g 5ra) and Quintilian (Sanchez Ciruelo 1519:sig.B 5vb).
Another factor which should be taken into account was the renewed
interest in medieval metaphysics and theology which characterized
many of the great sixteenth and seventeenth century writers. However,
of the early sixteenth century writers I know only Pedro Sanchez
Ciruelo paid attention to the work on signs found, for instance, in
Thomas Aquinas (Sanchez Ciruelo 1519:sig.B 5vb-6ra); and it seems to
have been the Jesuits of Coimbra who were responsible for bringing
together the rich theological tradition of the Middle Ages with the new
logical tradition (Conimbricensis 1607:11 cols,7-33). This new logical
tradition, found in such authors as Tomas de Mercado (1571:f.3vb-
5va), Alonso de la Vera Cruz (1572:22 A-23 A), Francisco de Toledo
1107
(1596:208 A-209 B) and Diego Mas (1621:11 7 B-10 A) stems almost
entirely from Domingo de Soto. He it was who classified the subject-
matter, and set up the framework within which his successors would
discuss the topic of signs. (1)
The main inspiration for Soto’s work was obviously the then-standard
Parisian doctrine of signification, which was directly derived from
Peter of Ailly’s Conceptus et Insolubilia. In this work, Peter of Ailly (c.
1350-1420) had, without elaboration, remarked that “a term is a sign”
(1980:16; cf. Stanyol 1504:sig.a 3r, Sanchez Ciruelo 1519:sig.B 5va,
Enzinas 1533:sig.b 3rb); that “to ‘signify’ is the same as to be a sign of
something” (17; cf. Buridan 1977:22) and that something can be a sign
in two ways (17). It can itself be an act of knowing a thing, or it can
lead to an act of knowing. In the second case, there is a further division
to be made, since the act of knowing can be either primary or
secondary (18). He also gave a definition of ‘signify’ which reappeared
in text after text “... to ‘signify’ is to represent (a) something, or (b)
some things or (c) somehow, to a cognitive power by vitally changing
it” (16). In the hands of various early sixteenth century logicians at
Paris, Peter’s remarks had been elaborated into a doctrine which Soto
found profoundly misleading; and which he therefore set out to rework
completely." (pp. 35-36)
(...)
"Once Soto had completed his general classification of signs, he came
up against another problem, this time specifically to do with linguistic
signs. According to Aristotle, spoken words were signs of concepts; yet
there seemed to be an obvious sense in which spoken words were signs
not of concepts but of actual things. (7) In order to deal with this issue,
Soto introduced a distinction. When I utter the word ‘homo’ I signify
men in the sense of making them known (facere cognoscere), and I
definitely do not make known my own concept of man. On the other
hand, I do express (exprimer e) the fact that I have such a concept, and
I do so in order to cause my hearers to form similar concepts (Soto
1529:f.6ra). Facere cognoscere and exprimere are two types of
signification, the second being a less general kind which pertains only
to written and spoken words (f.6ra). In the later edition of his work
Soto put the same point in terms of a distinction between two kinds of
instrumental sign, one of which leads the cognitive power to form a
1108
concept of a thing, and the other of which expresses the presence of a
concept. Thus a vocal sign can represent both a thing and a concept, but
in different ways (Soto 1554:f.3rb-va). The whole matter was put more
generally by the later author, Francisco de Toledo, who introduced the
notion of manifestive and suppositive signs. A manifestive sign, he
wrote, is one which leads to the knowledge of another thing. Thus a
sound can be a manifestive sign that reading is to occur. A sign which
is both manifestive and suppositive is one which not only manifests
another thing, but can be used in place of it. Thus a Viceroy both
manifests or makes known the king and acts in his place. Utterances are
signs of both kinds. On the one hand, they manifest concepts; on the
other hand they both manifest and stand for actual things (Toledo
1596:209 A). Clearly Toledo did not find it awkward that a linguistic
sign could perform several significative functions at once. Indeed, he
had already pointed out that all utterances signify their utterer in the
same way that smoke signifies fire, i.e. as an effect does its cause, so
that one and the same sign can have both natural and conventional
signification (Toledo 1596:209 A).
These last remarks point to one of the main strengths of the doctrine of
signs developed by Domingo de Soto and his immediate successors.
While many of the distinctions made seem to be ordinary, common-
sense distinctions without much philosophical novelty, they enable one
to place the linguistic sign in the context of signs in general. As a result
one gets a much better apprehension of the various uses which can be
made of a single utterance. At the same time, it is made perfectly
evident that the doctrine of signification developed by medieval and
post-medieval logicians was not, and should not be confused with, a
theory of meaning in the contemporary sense. To say that words signify
things is to say that they make things known; to say that words signify
ideas is to say that they express ideas; and we are not given any license
to identify the meaning of words with either type of significate. (8)"
(pp. 44-45)
(1) There is a curious tendency among linguists to attribute Domingo
de Soto’s achievements to the much later John of St.Thomas (1589-
1644). For instance Arens (1984:509) refers to John St.Thomas’s
“remarkable faculty for systematization” in relation to a series of
distinctions about signs taken directly from Domingo de Soto; and
1109
Deely (1983:116) calls him “the earliest systematizer of the doctrine of
signs.” In fact John of St.Thomas’s discussion of signs (John of
St.Thomas 1930:9A-10A, 646A-722A) draws very heavily not only on
Soto but also on the lengthy and more ontologically oriented discussion
in the Coimbra commentary. He comes at the end of a tradition, not at
the beginning.
(7) For a survey of medieval discussion of the question whether words
signify ideas or things, see Ashworth (1981); and for a survey of post-
medieval discussion, see Ashworth (1987).
(8) For a fuller discussion of this issue see Ashworth (1984).
References.
Albert of Saxony. 1522. Perutilis logica. Venice. (Repr., Hildesheim:
G. Olms, 1974.)
Arens, Hans. 1984. Aristotle’s Theory of Language and its Tradition.
Texts from 500 to 1750. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benj'amins
Ashworth, E.J. 1981. ‘“Do words Signify Ideas or Things?’ The
scholastic sources of Locke’s theory of language.” Journal of the
History of Philosophy 19:299-326.
Ashworth, E.J. 1982. “The Structure of Mental Language: Some
problems discussed by early sixteenth century logicians.” Vivarium 20.
59-83.
Ashworth, E.J. 1984. “Locke on Language.” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 14. 45-73.
Ashworth, E.J. 1987. “Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the Question:
‘Do Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?’.” Logos and Pragma:
Essays on the philosophy of language in honour of Gabriel
Nuchelmans ed. by L.M. de Rijk & H.A.G. Braakhuis, 189-214.
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Buridan, John. 1977. Sophismata. Ed. by T.K. Scott. Stuttgart-Bad
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Celaya, Juan de. [1516?]. Dialecticae Introductions. Aureliacii.
[Conimbricensis], 1607. Commentarii Conimbricensis in dialecticam
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Deely, John N. 1983. “Neglected Figures in the History of Semiotic
1110
Inquiry: John Poinsot.” History of Semiotics ed. by Achim Eschbach &
Jürgen Trabant, 115-26. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Enzinas, Fernando de. 1533. Termini perutiles et principia dialectices
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George of Brussels. 1504. Expositio in logicam Aristotelis. Lyon.
Hieronymus of St.Mark. 1507. Compendium preclarum. Cologne.
Jackson, B. Darrell. 1969. “The Theory of Signs in St.Augustine’s De
Doc-trina Christiana.” Revue des études augustiniennes 15:9-49. (Repr.
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ascribed to Robert Kilwardby.” Selected texts ed. by Karin Margareta
Fredborg, Niels J. Green-Pedersen, Lauge Nielsen & Jan Pinborg.
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Lewry. (= CIMAGL, 15) Copenhagen.
Maierù, Alfonso. 1981. “‘Signum’ dans la culture médiévale.”
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in Augustine: A collection of critical essays ed. by R.A. Markus, 61-91.
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Mas, Diego. 1621. Commentaria in Porphyrium et in universam
Aristotelis logicam. Mainz.
Melanchthon, Philip. 1854. Compendiaria dialectices in Opera. (=
Corpus Reformatorum, 20.) Brunsvigae. (Repr., New York & Frankfurt
am Main, 1963.)
Melanchthon, Philip. 1846. Erotemata dialectices. in Opera. (= Corpus
Reformatorum, 13.) Halis Saxonum. (Repr., New York & Frankfurt am
Main, 1963.)
Mercado, Tomas de. 1571. Commentarii lucidissimi in textum Petri
Hispani. Seville.
Peter of Ailly. 1980. Peter ofAilly: Concepts and Insolubles. Ed. and
transi, by Paul Vincent Spade. (= Synthèse Historical Library, 19.)
Dordrecht-Boston-London: D. Reidel.
Peter of Spain. 1972. Tractatus called afterwards Summule Logicales,
1111
ed. by L.M. de Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Jackson, B. Darrell. 1969. "The Theory of Signs in St.Augustine's De
Doctrina Christiana." Revue des etudes augustiniennes 15:9-49. (Repr.
in Augustine: A collection of critical essays ed. by R.A. Markus, 92-
147, New York: Anchor Books, 1972.)
Kilwardby, Robert. 1975. "The Commentary on Priscianus Maior'
ascribed to Robert Kilwardby." Selected texts ed. by Karin Margareta
Fredborg, Niels J. Green-Pedersen, Lauge Nielsen & Jan Pinborg.
Introd. by Jan Pinborg, "The Problem of the Authorship," by Osmund
Lewry. (= CIMAGL, 15) Copenhagen.
Maierù, Alfonso. 1981. " 'Signum' dans la culture medievale."
Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13. 51-72.
Markus, R.A. 1957. "St. Augustine on Signs." Phronesis 2:60-83.
(Repr. in Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays ed. by R.A.
Markus, 61-91. New York: Anchor Books, 1972).
Peter of Spain. 1972. Tractatus called afterwards Summule Logicales,
ed. by L.M. de Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Pinborg, Jan. 1981. "Roger Bacon on Signs: A newly recovered part of
the Opus Maius." Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13:403-412.
Roger Bacon. 1978. "An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's Opus Maius:
'De signis'." Ed. by Karin Margareta Fredborg, Lars Nielsen & Jan
Pinborg. Traditio 34:75-136.
William Ockham. 1974. Summa Logicae. Ed. by Philotheus Boehner,
Gedeon Gal & Stephen Brown. (= Opera Philosophica, 1.)
St.Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute.
———. 1991. "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-
Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy." Medieval
Philosophy and Theology no. 1:39-67.
"My study of Aquinas in the context of thirteenth-century logic has two
parts. In the first part, which constitutes the present essay, I shall
explore the general theory of language that lies behind theories of
equivocation and analogy. I shall explain such key concepts as
imposition, signification, and res significata, and I shall pay particular
attention to the notion of modi significandi. In the second part, to be
published separately, (*) I shall survey thirteenth-century accounts of
equivocation from Peter of Spain to John Duns Scotus. I shall show
how the discussion of analogy came to be subsumed under discussions
1112
of equivocation and how logicians developed a threefold classification
of analogy that has a close relation to Aquinas's own classification in
his Sentences-commentary.
In embarking on this study, I am guided by the belief that to understand
Aquinas fully we need to know how his words would have been
understood by his contemporaries. We need to know which phrases had
a standard technical usage and what distinctions were routinely made. I
do not intend to argue that we will always find just one correct
interpretation, nor do I want to claim that Aquinas was never
innovative in his use of material taken from logicians. I am convinced,
however, that a careful reading of the logicians will not only show us
which interpretations of Aquinas's philosophy of language can be ruled
out as fanciful reconstructions, but will also shed light on much that is
currently obscure to the twentieth-century reader." (pp. 40-41)
(...)
"Conclusion.
What I have examined in this paper is a theory of language that tends to
take words as units, endowed both with their signification and their
modi significandi before they enter sentences and independently of
speaker intention on any given occasion, (123) This attitude was
reinforced by Prίscian's claim that the noun has priority over other parts
of speech, which led logicians to argue that the noun received its
imposition first. (124) One might think that equivocal and analogical
terms are precisely those whose functioning is best explained through
context and use, but although Roger Bacon at least did recognize that
any term could be used equivocally, (125) there was a tendency to
speak as if equivocal and analogical terms formed special classes that
could be identified in advance of use. To the extent that Aquinas's
doctrine of analogy is embedded in such a general theory, one may fear
that it will share the theory's defects." (p. 67)
(*) See: Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic.
Aquinas in Context.
(123) For some references to authors who paid more attention to
speaker intention, see Irène Rosier, "Signes et sacrements: Thomas
d'Aquin et la grammaire speculative," Revue des sciences
philosophiques et théologiques 74 (1990): 392-436.
(124) Priscian, Institutionum grammaticarum libri XVIII, in
1113
Grammatici Latini, edited by Heinrich Keil (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855),
reprint ed. (Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms, 1981), 2:115-121.
Priscian's remarks were used to show that an equivocal noun could not
have a conjunctive signification, since syncategorematic terms were
posterior to nouns. See CPDMA 7 [anonymous Quaestiones super
Sophisticos Elenchos, edited by Sten Ebbesen, Copenhagen:Gad,
1977), p. 291. Compare Simon of Faversham, In SE [Sophisticos
Elenchos] p. 68; Duns Scotus, In SE [Sophisticos Elenchos], p. 13A.
(125) Karin Margareta Fredborg, Lauge Nielsen, and Jan Pinborg, "An
Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's Opus maius: De signis," Traditio 34
(1978): 109-110.
———. 1991. "Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth-Century
Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan." In Historia Philosophiae Medii
Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters.
Festschrift Für Kurt Flasch Zu Seinem 60. Geburtstag. Vol. I, edited by
Mojsisch, Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf, 23-43. Amsterdam, Philadelphia:
B. R. Grüner.
"In this paper I shall explore the notions of equivocation and analogy as
they were handled by William of Ockham in his logical writings; (1)
and I shall compare his position with those adopted by Walter Burley
and John Buridan.(2) I realize that Ockham's views on these issues
have already been discussed in print, (3) and I shall not be able to point
to hitherto unnoticed material in his works. My main intention is to
place his views in perspective, by locating them in their historical
context. This project is one which has been touched on only indirectly
by scholars, (4) yet it is crucial to the proper understanding both of
Ockham himself and of later developments in the theory of analogy.
My study of Ockham is part of a series in which I intend to explore the
notions of equivocation and analogy as they were handled by logicians
from the mid-thirteenth to the end of the sixteenth century. (5) I became
interested in this issue when I noticed that virtually the only logician
ever referred to in discussions of Aquinas's theory of analogy is
Cajetan, despite the fact that he wrote over two centuries later, and had
a rather different philosophical agenda. In fact, there are a number of
striking dissimilarities between logicians contemporary with Aquinas
and such sixteenth-century logicians as Domingo de Soto. Some of
these are of minor importance. For instance, sixteenth-century logicians
1114
had access to more of the Greek commentators on Aristotle's
Categories, and they tended to discuss analogy in the context of
commentary on the Categories rather than in the context of
commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi. Others affect the general
approach: here I have in mind the different theories of signification
which were predominant in the two periods, and the more-or-less
complete abandonment of the grammatical doctrines of modi
significandi. Yet others are crucial to the details. In the thirteenth
century, the analogy of attribution was the important kind, and the
analogy of proportionality was barely mentioned. The reverse is true
after Cajetan. In the thirteenth century, the key notion was that of
signification per prius et posterius, and the implications of this were
spelled out partly in terms of concepts (whether one or more), but
especially in terms of common natures. In the sixteenth century the
focus was on concepts, whether one imprecise concept matched with
more than one precise concept, or one formal concept matched with
more than one objective concept. In addition, sixteenth-century
logicians worried about the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic
denomination, not an issue which had concerned late thirteenth-century
logicians.
The fourteenth century had two big contributions to make to the
changes in doctrine that I have just outlined. First, John Duns Scotus's
arguments about the univocity of being seem to have persuaded
logicians that it makes sense to postulate just one concept of being,
even if one goes on to reject the claim that <ens> is a univocal term.
Second, Ockham and his followers diverted attention from common
natures, which they rejected, to words and concepts. Sixteenth-century
discussions of analogy have to be understood in terms of a reaction to
these fourteenth-century developments, and not just in terms of a
reaction to the writings of Thomas Aquinas. I shall leave the
elucidation of Scotus and his influence to others; but it must be
remembered that in concentrating on Ockham and the logicians I am
telling only part of the story." (pp. 23-25)
(...)
"Conclusion.
In this brief paper I have not been able to address the issue of how
Ockham handled religious language (85) or the issue of how he handled
1115
the notion of ens. (86) Nor have I been able to pursue Burley's theory
of analogy in the depth and detail which it clearly deserves. However, I
have shown the place analogy occupies in relation to equivocation in
the logic of both Ockham and Buridan - and a very modest place it is."
(p. 43)
(1) William of Ockham, Summa Logicae, edited by P.Boehner, G.Gál,
S.Brown, Opera Philosophica I (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: St.Bonaventure
University, 1974); Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis,
edited by G. Gal in Opera Philosophica II (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.:
St.Bonaventure University, 1978); Expositio super libros Elenchorum,
edited by F. del Punta, Opera Philosophica III (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.:
St.Bonaventure University, 1979). I shall also refer to the following
theological writings: Scriptum in librum Primum Sententiarum
Ordinatio. Distinctiones II-III, edited by S. Brown with G.Gál, Opera
Theologica II (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: St.Bonaventure University,
1970); Quaestiones in librum Tertium Sententiarum (Reportatio),
edited by F.E. Kelley and G.I. Etzkorn, Opera Theologica VI
(St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1982); Quodlibeta
Septem, edited by J.C. Wey, Opera Theologica IX (St. Bonaventure,
N.Y.: St.Bonaventure University, 1980).
(2) Much research remains to be done on both Burley and Buridan. I
shall draw most of my material relating to Burley from his 1337
commentary on the Categories in Burlei super artem veterem Porphirii
et Aristotelis (Venetiis, 1497). For Buridan I have used Iohannes
Buridanus. Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, edited by J. Schneider
(Munchen: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
1983) and extracts from his Summulae in S. Ebbesen, The Summulae.
Tractatus VII. De Fallaciis in The Logic of John Buridan, edited by Jan
Pinborg (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1976), pp.139-160.
(3) The most recent and best discussion is found in M.McCord Adams,
William Ockham (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1987), Vol.II, pp.903-960, especially pp.952-960. See also G.
Leff, William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975) pp.149-164 for a
detailed but very confused discussion. A much earlier work, containing
some useful material, is M.C. Menges, The Concept of Univocity
Regarding the Predication of God and Creature According to William
1116
Ockham (St.Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute,
Louvain: E.Nauwelaerts, 1952).
(4) For a bibliography of works on fallacies, which of course include
equivocation, and some discussion. see S.Ebbesen, The way fallacies
were treated in scholastic, Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-age grec et
latin 55 (1987), 107-134.
(5) See E. J. Ashworth, Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-
Century Logic: A New Approach to Aquinas. I am currently writing a
paper on equivocation and analogy in sixteenth-century logicians. Full
documentation of my claims about thirteenth and sixteenth-century
logic will be found in these papers.
(85) See e.g. Quodlibet IV q. 4, Ockham, Quodlibeta, pp. 123-128.
(86) See e.g. Quodlibet IV q.12, Ockham, Quodlibeta, pp. 352-359.
———. 1991. "Nulla Propositio Est Distinguenda: La Notion D'
Equivocatio Chez Albert De Saxe." In Itinéraires D'albert De Saxe.
Paris-Vienne Au Xiv Siècle. Actes Du Colloque Organisé Les 19-22
Juin 1990 Dans Le Cadre Des Activités De L'ura 1085 Du Cnrs À
L'occasion Du 600 Anniversaire De La Mort D'albert De Saxe, edited
by Biard, Joël, 149-160. Paris: Vrin.
"Le célèbre statut édicté à l’université de Paris le 29 décembre 1340
exige que personne ne dise qu'aucune proposition ne doit être le sujet
d'une distinction — « quod nullus dicat quod nulla propositio sit
distinguenda » (1). Cette interdiction est liée à la conviction qu'il y a
d'importantes propositions, surtout dans la Bible, qu'on peut regarder
comme fausses de virtute sermonis, c'est-à-dire au sens littéral des
mots, tout en étant vraies d'après les intentions de leurs auteurs (2). Le
statut condamne ceux qui nient tout simplement de telles propositions,
au lieu de les accepter ou de faire une distinction entre leurs divers sens
(3). Dans le passé, les historiens de la philosophie médiévale ont
souvent soutenu que Guillaume d'Ockham était la cible de ce décret,
mais Katherine Tachau et William Courtenay ont récemment attaqué
cette prétention (4). Je ne reprendrai pas leur argumentation, que je
trouve assez convaincante, mais je me concentrerai sur un aspect que
Tachau et Courtenay n'ont pas considéré en profondeur: le lieu que les
distinctions entre les divers sens d'une proposition occupait dans la
logique du XIVe siècle.
Je choisis ce thème à cause de son rapport avec la pensée d'Albert de
1117
Saxe. Assez curieusement, dans sa Perutilis logica (5) ainsi que dans
ses Quaestiones in logicam (6), Albert adopte une position tout à fait
contraire à celle du statut. Il dit carrément qu’aucune proposition ne
doit être le sujet d’une distinction: « nulla propositio est distinguenda ».
En disant cela, il attaque implicitement Aristote, au moins l’Aristote
des logiciens du Moyen Age (7), et en meme temps il attaque
explicitement « Occham et socios eius » (8). Cela peut nous surprendre,
étant donné qu’en général Albert suit Ockham de très près, mais il faut
reconnaître que Guillaume d’Ockham était, entre les logiciens sinon les
théologiens, le défenseur prééminent des distinctions (9).
(1) Le texte du statut est donné par W. J. Courtenay et K. H. Tachau
dans « Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nations at Paris,
1339-1341 », in History of Universities, 2 (1982), p. 84, n. 17.
(2) Pour une discussion récente, voir W. J. Courtenay, « Force of
Words and Figures of Speech: The Crisis over Virtus Sermonis in the
Fourteenth Century », in Franciscan Studies, 44 (1984), pp. 107-128.
(3) Cf. Tachau et Courtenay, loc. cit.: « quod nulli (...] audeant aliquant
propositionem famosam illius actoris cujus librum legunt, dicere
simpliciter esse falsam, vel esse falsam de virtute sermonis, si
crediderint quod actor ponendo illam habuerit verum intellectum; sed
vel cancedant eam, vel sensum verum dividant a sensu falso [...] », Il
faut constater que dans sa traduction des Réfutations sophistiques,
Boèce utilise le mot « dividere » où l'on pourrait s'attendre qu'il utilise
le mot « distinguere »: voir sourtout I, 17-19, 175 a 31-177 a 32. dans
Aristoteles latinus, VI, 1-3: De sophisticis elenchis, éd. B. G. Dod,
Leiden: E. J. Brill, Brussels: Descjée de Brouwer, 1975, pp. 36-41.
(4) Voir n. 1.
(5) Albert de Saxe, Perutilis logica, Venise, 1522, reproduction
photomécanique Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms, 1974.
(6) Ms. Cité du Vatican, Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, Urb. Lat. 1419,
f0s 1ra-31vb. Pour « nulla propositio est distinguenda », voir fo 24va-
vb.
(7) Voir par exemple Jean Duns Scot, In libros Elenchorum
quaestiones, in Opera omnia, II, Paris: Vivès, 1891, p. 14 A : « Item, si
sic esset, propositio multiplex non esset distinguenda. Consequens est
falsum, ut palet per Philosophum ». Cf. S. Ebbesen, « Can
Equivocation be Eliminated?» in Studia Mediewistyczne, 18 (1977), p.
1118
104.
(8) P. L. fo 37vb.
———. 1991. "A Thirteenth-Century Interpretation of Aristotle on
Equivocation and Analogy." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no.
Supplementary volume 17:85-101.
"This paper is a case study of how a few short lines in two of Aristotle's
logical works were read in the thirteenth century. (1) I shall begin with
a quick look at Aristotle's own remarks about equivocation in the
Categories and the Sophistical Refutations, as they were transmitted to
the West by Boethius's translations. (2) I shall continue with an analysis
el the divisions of equivocation and analogy to be found in an
anonymous commentary on the Sophistical Refutations written in Paris
between 1270 and 1280. (3) I have chosen this author's work to focus
on, because it offers a remarkably full account which brings together
the elements found in many other logical works from the second half of
the thirteenth century. In the course of my analysis I shall attempt to
show the part played by four different sources: (I) the Greek
commentators of late antiquity; (II) the new translations of Aristotle's
Physics and Metaphysics; (III) the reception of Arabic works,
particularly the commentaries of Averroes; and (4) new grammatical
doctrines, notably that of modi significandi. At the same time, I hope to
throw some light on the development of the doctrine of analogy as it
was understood by late thirteenth-century logicians." pp. 85-86
(1) For full bibliographies and more information on the matters touched
on here, see E.J. Ashworth, 'Signification and Modes of Signifying in
Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,' Medieval
Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991) 39-67; E.J. Ashworth, 'Analogy and
Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,'
Mediaeval Studies (1992); E.J. Ashworth, 'Equivocation and Analogy
in Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan,' Historia
Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des
Mittelalters, B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta, eds. (Amsterdam: B.R. Gruner
1991).
(2) Aristotelis Latinus I 1-5. Categoriae vel Praedicamenta. L. Minio-
Paluello. Leiden: E.J. Brill 1961 and Aristotelis Latinus VI 1-3. De
Sophisticis Elenchis. B.G. Dod. Leiden: E.J. Brill, Brussels: Desclée de
Brouwer 1975.
1119
(3) Incerti Auctores, Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, S.
Ebbesen, ed. Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi VII.
Copenhagen: Gad 1977. Of the two sets of questions edited by Ebbesen
I shall use only the first (the SF commentary).
———. 1991. "Logic in Late Sixteenth-Century England: Humanist
Dialectic and the New Aristotelianism." Studies in Philology no.
88:224-236.
"In this paper I intend to look at the kind of logic that was taught at
Oxford and Cambridge in 1590, and that was central to the
undergraduate curriculum. I shall begin with a survey of the authors
who were studied during the sixteenth century; then I shall consider the
contents of their texts, with particular emphasis on the interplay
between logic, dialectic and Aristotelianism. My main purpose is to
explain what humanist dialectic might have been, and what it actually
became in the hands of the textbook writers.
Suppose we start by considering the logic texts known to have been
published in England between 1580 and 1590, or more accurately,
between 1580 and 1589, since no logic text survives from the year 1590
itself. (1) There are in all 25 titles, and of these titles five are in
English.
Thomas Wilson's Rule of Reason appeared in 1580. It was first
published in 1551,and was the most popular of all the English
vernacular texts. (2)
The second English text is a translation of Petrus Ramus's Dialectica,
(3) and the last three, all dated 1588, are variants of Abraham Fraunce's
The Lawiers Logike, which is basically a Ramist text. (4) Turning to the
Latin titles, there are four printings of John Seton's Logica which had
first appeared in 1545, and went through 14 editions by the end of the
century. (5) It was by far the most popular of the English non-
vernacular texts. Next there is the first edition in 1584 of John Case's
important work on Aristotle's logic, the Summa Veterum Interpretum,
which received the accolade of five editions in Frankfurt. (6) Of the
remaining works, two are Latin versions of Ramus's Dialectica and
thirteen are about Ramus's logic. There is a good deal we can learn
from this list, both with respect to the languages used and with respect
to what is absent from it." (pp. 224-225)
(...)
1120
"I find the English logic scene in 1590 somewhat depressing. We are
faced with elementary manuals which have lost sight of the important
medieval developments in logic, and which have failed to make
anything theoretically interesting of the humanistic innovations. (53)
What we are left with is basically simplified Aristotle with some
Ciceronian flourishes." (p. 236)
(1) A useful chronological list of logic books printed in England before
1620 is given by Charles B. Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in
Renaissance England (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1983), 225-29. For discussion of English
logic during the sixteenth century, see E. J. Ashworth, Introduction, in
Robert Sanderson, Logicae Artis Compendium, edited by E. J.
Ashworth (Bologna: Editrice CLUEB, 1985), especially xxiii-xxxii;
Luce Giard,"La production logique de l'Angleterre au xvie siècle,"
Les Etudes Philosophiques 3 (1985) :303-24; Lisa Jardine, "The Place
of Dialectic Teaching in Sixteenth-Century Cambridge," Studies in the
Renaissance 21 (1974):31-62. No attention should be paid to W. S.
Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 150o-1700 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1956), since its account of logical
developments, particularly during the medieval period, is inaccurate,
and this vitiates the judgments the author makes about the texts he
describes.
(2) See Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason Conteinying the Arte of
Logique, edited by Richard S. Sprague (Northridge, Califomia:
SanFernando Valley State College, 1972).
(3) Fora modem edition of a translation of Ramus, see Catherine M.
Dunn, ed., The Logike of the Moste Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus
Martyr Translated by Roland MacIlmaine (1574) (Northridge,
Califomia: San Femando Valley State College, 1969).
(4) Probably the appearance of three variants in one year represents the
work's lack of success, since the reissue of a work with a new title page
and reference to a new bookseller was a way of getting rid of unsold
stock: see Giard, 319. For some discussion of Fraunce's work, see Lisa
Jardine,"Humanistic Logic"in The Cambridge History of Renaissance
Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), 190-91.
(5) John Seton, Dialectica (Londini, 1584).
1121
(6) John Case, Summa veterum interpretum in universam dialecticam
Aristotelis (Londini, 1584). For a discussion of Case's work and
significance, see the book by Schmitt cited above. For editions of the
text, see Schmitt, 261.
(53) I would like to thank Lisa Jardine and Eleonore Stump who, over
the years, have persuaded me that formal logic is not the whole story. I
would also like to thank the organizers of the
"London,1590"conference for inviting me to present this paper.
———. 1992. "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century
Logic. Aquinas in Context." Mediaeval Studies no. 54:94-135.
"One of the outstanding features of the extensive literature on
Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy is the complete absence of any attempt
to set him in the context of thirteenth-century logic. (1) Certainly
frequent reference is made to Cardinal Cajetan; but Cajetan wrote over
two centuries later, and he had his own philosophical agenda, which in
many ways owed more to fourteenth-century developments than it did
to Aquinas himself. (2) In this paper I intend to provide some essential
background to Aquinas by examining how equivocation was handled
by logicians, including the young Duns Scotus, between ca. 1230 and
ca. 1300. I shall show how analogy entered the logic texts in the
context of equivocation; and I shah argue that the emphasis on analogy
per attributionem, the absence of the analogy of proportionality, and
the development of a threefold classification of analogy ah throw
considerable hght on Aquinas’s own discussion of analogy, particularly
as found in the passage from his Sentences commentary which was the
focus of Cajetan’s attention. While I do not wish to claim that paying
attention to Aquinas’s historical situation will by itself provide us with
a definitive interpretation of his doctrines, I do believe that such an
endeavour will enable us to rule out certain interpretations as
inappropriate or unlikely, and that it will enable us to make sense of
otherwise obscure remarks.
The present paper is the second part of a two-part study of Aquinas in
relation to thirteenth-century logic. In the first part I discussed the
general theory of language which provides the context for doctrines of
equivocation and analogy. (3) In particular, I explained such key terms
as significatio, res significata, and modi signifìcandi. I also discussed
the effects of context on equivocal and analogical terms. While the
1122
present paper stands by itself, reading it in conjunction with the other
will lead to a fuller understanding of some of the details that I can
mention here only in passing." (pp. 94-95)
(1) An exception to this remark is provided by a paper which has just
appeared: A. de Libera, “Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie
médiévale de l’analogie de l’être,” Les études philosophiques [special
issue on analogy] (1989): 319-45. De Libera, however, is more
concerned with metaphysical than with logical issues. For a very
interesting use of speculative grammar to interpret Aquinas on the
language of the sacraments, see I. Rosier, “Signes et sacrements:
Thomas d’Aquin et la grammaire spéculative,” Revue des sciences
philosophiques et théologiques 74 (1990): 392-436.
(2) For some details, see E. J. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Analogy in
Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan” in Historia
Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des
Mittelalters, ed. B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta (Amsterdam, 1991). I am
currently working on a study of Cajetan in relation to some fifteenthand
sixteenth-century Thomist logicians. Recent studies by Bruno Pinchard
make some attempt to place Cajetan in his philosophical and
theological context but have little to offer so far as relating him to
fifteenth-century logic and semantics is concerned. See B. Pinchard,
Métaphysique et sémantique (Paris, 1987); idem, “Du mystère
analogique à la ‘Sagesse des Italiens,’ ” Les études philosophiques
(1989): 413-27. See also the critical notice of Pinchard’s book by O.
Boulnois, ibid., 517-26.
(3) See E. J. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in
Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,”
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 39-67.
———. 1992. "Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century
Background to Cajetan." Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review no.
31:399-413.
"In 1498 Cajetan published a short book, On the Analogy of Names,
which is often regarded as a masterly summary of Aquinas's doctrine of
analogy. It opens in the very first paragraph with an attack on three
views of the concept of being (ens): first, that it is a disjunction of
concepts; (1) second, that it is an ordered group of concepts; and third,
that it is a single, separate concept which is unequally participated by
1123
substances and accidents. A number of questions immediately spring to
mind. Why are concepts being discussed when analogy is said by
Cajetan to be a theory of language? What is meant by ‘concept’? Who
held the views under attack and why? So far as I can tell, the extensive
literature on both Aquinas and Cajetan offers no satisfactory answers to
these questions.
In this paper I shall locate the views mentioned by Cajetan in some
fourteenth-century sources. I shall limit myself in two ways. First, I
shall focus on those authors, particularly Peter Aureol (d. 1322),
Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), and John of Jandun (d. 1328), whose views
were discussed by Cajetan’s immediate predecessors, (2) and whose
works were to be influential during the Renaissance. Second, I shall for
the most part ignore the Scotists, who held that ‘being’ was univocal,
and the nominalists, who did not accept common natures, and did not
appeal to the distinction between formal and objective concepts.
I hope not only to cast some light on developments in the theory of
analogy between Aquinas and Cajetan but also on medieval theories of
signification. The doctrine that ens is an analogical term provides us
with a useful test case, for given the beliefs that a noun signifies a
concept, and that a concept captures a common nature, we are faced
with an obvious problem. On the one hand, ens does not seem to be
straightforwardly equivocal, in the sense of being subordinated to more
than one concept, since we at least have the illusion of being able to
grasp ens as a general term; on the other hand, there does not seem to
be any common nature involved. The issue is further complicated by
beliefs about the nature of mental language. If the language of thought
is an ideal language, at least to the extent of containing no equivocal
terms, then one can ask what room there is in it for analogical concepts.
Such terms as ‘healthy’ (sanum) are capable of analysis into a complex
of concepts (e.g., a food is healthy because it contributes to the health
of those animals that eat it), but the most important analogical terms,
those used of God, are precisely the terms which do not seem
susceptible of replacement by a complex whose parts are fully clear.
The theory of analogy as presented by medieval philosophers is also
gravely affected by the belief that each word is endowed with its
signification, including its grammatical features or consignification, as
a unit. Such an assumption is not easy to reconcile with the thought that
1124
language is flexible, and that one and the same word can have different
shades of meaning in different contexts without thereby becoming a
different lexical item. This is not the place, however, to cast doubt on
the viability of the whole enterprise, and I shall content myself with
asking how some of the parts of the enterprise were thought to fit
together." (pp. 399-400)
(...)
"Conclusion
This short paper merely scratches the surface of fourteenth- and
fifteenth-century accounts of analogical concepts. Nonetheless, I hope I
have said enough to show that Cajetan needs to be read in the light of
his more immediate predecessors, rather than as a man wrestling in
solitude with the works of Aquinas." (p. 413)
(1) See Bruno Pinchard, Métaphysique et sémantique. Autour de
Cajetan. Étude [texte] et traduction du "De Nominum Analogia" (Paris:
Vrin, 1987), p. 114. The text has “in-disiunctionis,” but this has to be
wrong: cf. p. 133, par. 71, where Cajetan once more lists the three
views, beginning with “conceptum disiunctum.” Pinchard wrongly
suggests (p. 152, par. 1, n. 5) that the latter text should be emended.
(2) Notably Johannes Capreolus (d. 1444), Dominic of Flanders (d.
1479), and Paulus Soncinas (d. 1494).
———. 1992. "New Light on Medieval Philosophy: The Sophismata
of Richard Kilvington." Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review no.
31:517-521.
"The fourteenth-century English philosopher and theologian Richard
Kilvington (1302/5–61) presents a useful correction to popular views of
medieval philosophy in two ways. On the one hand, he reminds us that
to think of medieval philosophy in terms of Aquinas, Duns Scotus and
Ockham, or to think of medieval logic in terms of Aristotelian
syllogistic, is to overlook vast areas of intellectual endeavour.
Kilvington, like many before and after him, was deeply concerned with
problems that would now be assigned to philosophy of language;
philosophical logic and philosophy of science. He discussed topics in
epistemic logic, semantic paradoxes, problems of reference,
particularly those connected with the interplay between quantifiers and
modal or temporal operators, and problems arising from the use of
infinite series in the analysis of motion and change. On the other hand,
1125
this very account of his work raises the important issue of conceptual
domain. I have spoken as if Kilvington's work can be neatly classified
in terms of contemporary interests; and the temptation to read medieval
philosophy in modern terms is only strengthened when one recognizes
Kilvington as the first member of the group of Oxford calculatores,
men such as William Heytesbury and Richard Swineshead, whose
discussions of mathematics and physics have caused them to be hailed
as forerunners of modern science."
———. 1992. "The Obligationes of John Tarteys: Edition and
Introduction." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale
no. 3:653-703.
———. 1992. "Logic in Late Medieval Oxford." In The History of the
University of Oxford, Vol. Ii: Late Medieval Oxford, edited by Catto,
Jeremy C. and Evans, Ralph, 35-64. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Co-author Paul Vincent Spade.
"This chapter discusses three main periods in the history of Oxford
logic that occurred approximately between 1330 and 1500. It talks
about three Merton authors who were accountable for the course of
much subsequent medieval logical theory — Thomas Bradwardine
(1295–1349), William Heytesbury (1313–1372 or 1373), and Richard
Billingham. This chapter also evaluates the logical activities that
occurred during the late medieval period in Oxford by looking at the
collections of texts that circulated in manuscript and were eventually
printed as the two libelli sophistarum. It argues that the libelli
sophistarum shows a disappointing picture of English logic in the
fifteenth century. However, Oxford logic was excellent for it reached a
level of sophistication and insight that was not gained anywhere else
until the end of the seventeenth century with Leibniz, and not surpassed
until the middle of the nineteenth century."
———. 1993. "Ralph Strode on Inconsistency in Obligational
Disputations." In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen
Zu Den Logischen Und Semantischen Regeln Korrekten Folgerns,
edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 363-386. Leiden: Brill.
"Treatises on obligations represent one of the interesting new
developments of medieval logic.(1) They set out the rules which were
to govern a certain kind of disputation, the obligational disputation.
Truth was not at issue in such disputations, since their starting point
1126
was normally a false proposition;(2) nor was any particular subject-
matter explored. Instead, according to Strode, their purpose was both to
provide exercise for beginning students in handling logical inferences;
and to prepare them to reason from truths in real-life situations.(3) He
compared these disputations to the military exercises which young
soldiers had to undergo before they could participate in real battles.(4)
Obviously both the acceptance of falsehoods and the application of
rules in isolation from a given subject-matter have their dangers; and
one of the features of obligations treatises is the way they explore the
different kinds of inconsistency which can arise in a disputational
setting. In this paper I intend to discuss Ralph Strode's reaction to
earlier attempts to amend the rules so as to avoid some of these kinds of
inconsistency. So far as Strode's predecessors are concerned, my main
focus will be on Roger Swyneshed (5) and on an anonymous author
whose treatise on obligations was preserved in a Merton College
manuscript, (6) though I shall also pay some attention to Richard
Kilvington. (7)" (pp. 363-364)
(1) For bibliography and discussion, see Paul of Venice, Logica
Magna. Part II Fascicle 8. [Tractatus de Obligationibus] ed./trad. E. J.
Ashworth, published for the British Academy by the Oxford University
Press, 1988. Two papers which are particularly relevant to the theme of
this paper are: P. V. Spade, ' Three Theories of Obligationes: Burley,
Kilvington and Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning", History and
Philosophy of Logic 3, 1982, 1-32; and E. J. Ashworth, "Inconsistency
and Paradox in Medieval Disputations: A Development of Some Hints
in Ockham", Franciscan Studies 44, 1984, 129-139.
(2) Some authors, including Strode, explicitly allowed the possibility of
a true positum: see Paul of Venice, op. cit., p. 33; Ralph Strode,
Obligationes, Oxford Bodleian Library MS Canon. misc. 219, fol. 37";
Spade, op. cit., p. 12 (for a discussion of Burley on this point).
(3) Strode, ibid., fol. 37', fol. 37va. The second point is made even
more clearly by the anonymous Merton author who refers to jurists and
moral philosophers in this context: see N. Kretzmann and E. Stump,'
The Anonymous De Arte Obligatoria in Merton College MS. 306", in
Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L.M. de
Rik, ed. E. P. Bos, Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1985, pp. 243 sq., § VI. (Short
title: Anon. Merton). It should be noted that I use the phrase
1127
'anonymous Merton author' for convenience, and not because we know
that he was actually a Mertonian. In Paul of Venice, op. cit., I referred
to him as Pseudo-Dumbleton.
(4) Strode, op. cit., fol. 37ra.
(5) Swyneshed's treatise was probably written between 1330 and 1335.
For discussion and an edition of the text, sec P.V. Spade, "Roger
Swyneshed's Obligationes: Edition and Comments", Archives d'histoire
doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age 44, 1977, 243-285. (Short title:
Swyneshed).
(6) See note 3 above. This treatise was probably written during the
period 1335-1349: see Anon. Merton., p. 239.
(7) Since I wrote this paper, The Sophismata of Richard Kilvington,
edited and translated by Norman Kretzmann and Barbara Ensign
Kretzmann, has appeared in two volumes: translation, introduction and
commentary, Cambridge: University Press, 1990; edition, Oxford:
University Press for the British Academy, 1990. However, I have
drawn my material from Spade, op. cit., pp. 19-28, and from E. Stump,
"Roger Swyneshed's Theory of Obligations", Medioevo 7, 1981, 143-
153.
———. 1994. "Obligationes Treatises: A Catalogue of Manuscripts,
Editions and Studies." Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale no. 36:118-
147.
"Obligationes treatises, which deal with the rules to be followed in a
certain kind of logical disputation, still form perhaps the least
wellunderstood part of medieval logic. Although a number of texts
have been edited in recent years, and although various theses about the
nature and purpose of obligational disputations have been put forward,
we are unlikely to achieve a proper understanding of the issues until the
larger part of the surviving material has been edited and assessed. I
have decided to publish the following catalogue of manuscripts,
editions and studies in the hope that it will speed up this process of
edition and assessment.
I am reasonably confident that my bibliographies of edited texts,
studies and translations are complete and accurate. I am also reasonably
confident that my bibliography of early printed editions is more-or-less
complete and accurate. I have indicated those few cases in which I have
not been able to see a book for myself. So far as medieval manuscripts
1128
are concerned, I am less confident, either of completeness or of
accuracy. In the catalogue of manuscripts I have indicated whether or
not I have seen the manuscript in whole or in part, but unfortunately
some of the microfilms I have seen were virtually illegible, owing to
their poor technical quality. In the catalogue of medieval authors, I
have indicated what I know about current editorial projects. My own
editions of John Tarteys, Paul of Venice and Ralph Strode have been
completed, and I am now trying to come to grips with the series of
obligationes treatises associated with Oxford and Cambridge. Needless
to say, I shall be grateful for any comments on, corrections of, or
additions to the lists which follow.
I have to thank those people who have already helped me with
information and advice, including Louis J. Bataillon, Egbert P. Bos,
Julian Deahl, Angel d’Ors, Sten Ebbesen, Gedeon Gal, Alfonso
Maierù, John Murdoch, Paul Spade, and Rega Wood. I also owe a great
debt of gratitude to the Killam Program of the Canada Council for
awarding me the Kfilam Research Fellowship which enabled me to do
much of the work recorded here.
The material is arranged under the following headings:
1. Catalogue of medieval authors.
2. Catalogue of manuscripts.
3. Early printed editions.
4. Edited texts.
5. Studies and translations." (pp. 118-119)
———. 1994. "Les Manuels De Logique À L'université D'oxford Aux
Xiv Et Xv Siècles." In Manuels, Programmes De Cours Et Techniques
D'enseignement Dans Les Universités Médiévales, edited by Hamesse,
Jacqueline, 351-370. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de
Louvain, Publications de l'Institut d'Etudes Médiévales.
"Quand j’ai commencé mes recherches pour cette communication, je
me suis posé deux questions: Qu’est-ce qu’un manuel; et quels sont les
rapports entre l’écrit et l’oral dans l’enseignement de la logique? A
première vue, la notion de manuel semble tout à fait claire. Dans Le
Petit Robert, on lit « Manuel: ouvrage didactique présentant, sous un
format maniable, les notions essentielles d’une science, d’une
technique, et les connaissances exigées par les programmes scolaires ».
D’après cette définition, on peut exclure de cette catégorie les textes de
1129
base, les commentaires, et les monographies destinées aux autres
professionnels. Malheureusement, quand on commence à étudier
l’enseignement à la faculté des arts à Oxford, on constate très vite que
les commentaires étaient utilisés de la même manière que les autres
genres de littérature, et qu’il n’est pas possible de faire une distinction
nette entre les monographies et les manuels. Qui plus est, on ne peut
pas comprendre le contenu ni le but des manuels sans connaître les
textes de base et les techniques d’enseignement.
Ma deuxième question n’a pas de réponse plus claire que la première,
car il faut faire face à deux problèmes. Tout d’abord, il y a la tension
entre l’écrit et l’oral dans l’enseignement lui-même. D’un côté, cet
enseignement était carrément fondé sur l’étude des textes. On prenait
les textes d’Aristote, on les lisait, on les commentait, on les apprenait
par coeur (1). De l’autre côté, la dispute jouait un rôle central dans
l’enseignement, et, par sa structure et son contenu, a stimulé la
production d’une grande partie de la littérature médiévale sur la
logique. Deuxièmement, il y a la question du rapport entre les textes
écrits et les disputes ou les leçons. Est-ce que les textes dont nous
disposons, surtout les collections de sophismata, reproduisent ce qui se
passait dans la salle de classe, ou est-ce qu’on les a écrits pour aider la
discussion de ce qui devait se faire dans la salle de classe?
Je vous ai donné ce bref aperçu de mes questions initiales afin de vous
expliquer pourquoi je vais parler de l’enseignement en général, avant
de me concentrer sur les manuels de logique dans l’acception stricte de
ce terme. Dans la première partie de ma communication, je présenterai
le programme d’études en logique tel qu’on le trouve à Oxford, mais
aussi à Cambridge. Afin de vous donner quelques points de repère,
j’expliquerai le contenu de la Logica vetus et la Logica nova, et
j’examinerai les commentaires qu’on associe avec les universités
anglaises. Ensuite, je parlerai des manuels de logique, et j’essayerai de
montrer comment ils sont liés, et aux silences d’Aristote, et à la dispute
comme méthode d’enseignement." (pp. 351-352)
(...)
Pour terminer, je voudrais revenir à mes deux premières questions:
Qu’est-ce qu’un manuel? Quels sont les rapports entre l’écrit et l’oral
dans l’enseignement de logique? Je pense que la réponse à la première
question est tout simplement qu’un manuel est une oeuvre écrite,
1130
distincte des textes de base, que l’on utilise dans l’enseignement. Donc,
un commentaire des textes de base peut constituer un manuel pour les
étudiants, et un exemple d’un autre genre littéraire en logique peut être
une monographie. Quant à la deuxième question, il n’y a pas de
réponse facile. Considérons les sophismata écrits. Quelques-uns, y
compris les Sophismata de Kilvington et Heytesbury, étaient écrits
comme tels (85); d’autres sont la reportatio ou la determinatio d’une
dispute (86). Ce qu’on peut dire, c’est qu’il y a un grand nombre de
sophismata que l’on trouve dans tous les textes d’un certain genre.
Donc, s’il s’agissait là de reportationes de disputes au début, je pense
que ces sophismata sont très vite devenus de purs exemples écrits, sans
référence évidente à une dispute ayant réellement eu lieu (87)." (pp.
369-370)
(1) Comme Alain de Libera l’a très bien dit, « La philosophie
s’enseigne aujourd’hui comme au Moyen Age: il a des auctores et des
textus; bref, comme auparavant à Athènes, à Alexandrie et à Bagdad,
on lit et on commente ». A. De Libera, Penser au Moyen Age, Paris,
1991, p. 144.
(85) E. Sylla, The Oxford calculators, dans The Cambridge History of
Later Medieval Philosophy, éd. N. Kretmann, A. Kenny, et J. Pinborg,
Cambridge, 1982, p. 546.
(86) Voir A. Maierù, The sophism « Omnis propositio est vera vel falsa
» by Henry Hopton (Pseudo-Heytesbury’s « De Verdate et Falsitate
Propositionis »), dans S. Read (éd.) Sophisms in Medieval Logic and
Grammar, Dordrecht - Boston - London, 1993, p. 103-115.
(87) Je voudrais remercier Luce Giard d’avoir revu ma grammaire et
beaucoup amélioré mon style.
———. 1995. "Suarez on the Analogy of Being. Some Historical
Background." Vivarium no. 33:50-75.
"In his Disputationes Metaphysicae, published in 1597, the great
Scholastic philosopher Francisco Suárez offered an account of the
analogy of being that has long been the focus of attention. (1) However,
little attempt has been made to situate his account historically, despite
the wealth of references to earlier authors given by Suárez himself. (2)
Certainly Suárez is seen as reacting to his predecessors, but only two of
these, John Duns Scotus and Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, are
thought to be of any real importance. In relation to Cajetan, Suárez is
1131
criticized (or praised) for allowing the analogy of attribution to
embrace both intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, and for refusing to
assign the analogy of proportionality any role outside the area of
metaphor. In relation to Scotus, Suárez is accused of following Scotus
so closely in emphasizing the unity of the concept of being that little if
any room is left for genuine analogy. Jean-Luc Marion, for instance,
has claimed that Suárez tried to construct a new model of analogy
which would allow an escape from univocity at the verbal level while
admitting its conceptual presuppositions. (3)
I intend to argue that Suárez is best read as par tof a tradition which
predates Cajetan with respect to the classification of types of analogy,
and which to some extent predates Scotus in its insistence on a concept
of being which is both one and analogical. I add "to some extent"
because the fullest working out of the theory of a single analogical
concept is found in later works which make full use of Scotus' s own
arguments. (4) I shall draw most of my material from three fifteenth
century philosophers and theologians, Johannes Capreolus (d. 1444),
Dominic of Flanders (d. 1479) and Paulus Soncinas (Paolo Barbo da
Soncina, d. 1495). (5) I shall also draw on the sixteenth-century
Spaniard Domingo de Soto (d. 1560). (6) All of these authors were
cited by Suárez, and all had a clear influence on him.
My paper is divided into two parts. In Part I, I consider how different
types of analogy were distinguished and described. In Part II, I turn to
the discussion of ens itself, and the question of whether it is possible
for humans to have a single, separate concept of being.
Because my purpose is to place Suárez in his historical context, I shall
not consider his actual arguments in any depth; nor shall I consider the
philosophical difficulties inherent in his theories. (7)" (pp. 50-51)
(1) For the text, see Francisco Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae in
Opera omnia, vols. 25 and 26,Paris 1866; repr. Hildesheim 1965. I
shall refer to these volumes as DM I and II. For discussion of
Suárez,see John P. Doyle, 'Suárez, on the Analogy of Being', in: The
Modern Schoolman, 46 (1969), 219-49, 323-41; and Walter Hoeres,
Francis Suarez and the Teaching of John Duns Scotus on "Univocatio
Entis" ,in: John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965, ed. John K. Ryan and
Bernardine M. Bonansea, Washington, D.C.
1965, 263-90 (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 3).
1132
(2) Lyttkens does relate Suárez to Petrus Fonseca, who is certainly an
important near contemporary source: see Hampus Lyttkens, The
Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its
Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino,
Uppsala 1953, 234-6. However, Fonseca is too close to Cajetan to serve
my current purposes.
(3) Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes,Paris 1981,
82: "Loin de conclure à l'univocité,Suárez, va entreprendre de
construire un nouveau modèle d'analogie, qui permette à la fois
d'échapper verbalement à l'univocité, et d'en admettre
les présupposés conceptuels".
(4) Olivier Boulnois has recognized the importance of the absorption of
Scotist arguments by Thomists: see Boulnois in Jean Duns Scot, Sur la
connaissance de Dieu et l'univocité de l'étant, introduction, traduction
et commentaire par Olivier Boulnois, Paris 1988 ,36: "Mais l'univocité
triomphe de façon plus éclatante encore à l'endroit où elle est le plus
violemment combattue, dans l'école thomiste, car elle s'impose comme
le fonds commun sur lequel s'engage la polémique. - Cajetan est ici un
cas exemplaire, lui qui entendait défendre l'esprit thomiste contre
l'enseignement scotiste", For some discussion of analogical concepts,
see E. J. Ashworth, Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century
Background to Cajetan, in: Dialogue, 31 (1992), 399-413.
(5) For discussion of Capreolus, see Johannes Hegyi, Die Bedeutung
des Seins bei den klassischen Kommentatoren des heiligen Thomas von
Aquin: Capreolus-Sylvester von Ferrara Cajetan, Pullach bei München
1959. Hegyi has nothing to say about Capreolus on analogy. Some
useful biographical material about Dominic of Flanders and Soncinas,
as well as a compendium of passages about analogy, can be found in
Michael Tavuzzi, Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy, in:
Angelicum, 70 (1993), 93-122.
(6) For discussion of Soto, see E. J. Ashworth, Domingo de Soto
(1494-1560) on Analogy and Equivocation, in: Ignacio Angelelli and
Maria Cerezo (eds.), Proceedings of the Third Pamplona Conference
on the History of Logic, New York-Berlin (Walter deGruyter),
forthcoming [1996].
(7) For these matters, the reader can safely be referred to the two
articles mentioned in note 1.
1133
———. 1995. "Late Scholastic Philosophy. Introduction." Vivarium:1-
8.
"This issue of Vivarium is devoted to late scholastic philosophy, by
which I understand a type of philosophy that coexisted with humanism,
Renaissance philosophy, and early modern philosophy roughly from
the late fifteenth to the late seventeenth century.(1) I shall not attempt
to characterize early modern philosophy, other than by pointing out that
Descartes's Meditations and Locke's Essay concerning human
understanding may be taken as typical works,but a few remarks about
humanism and Renaissance philosophy will help to indicate the types
of contrast I wish to draw. So far as humanism is concerned, I follow
Kristeller in seeing it as primarily "a cultural and educational program
which emphasized and developed an important but limited area of
studies." (2) The studies referred to included grammar,rhetoric, poetry,
history, and moral philosophy, as opposed to the strictly philosophical
disciplines of logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, thought here
was obviously an overlap in the case of moral philosophy." (p. 1)
(1) For slightly different characterizations, see J. Trentman,
'Scholasticism in the seventeenth century', in: N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny,
J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval
Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, 818; and E. Keßler, 'The intellective
soul', in: C.B. Schmitt and Q. Skinner (eds.), The Cambridge History of
Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge 2 P.O. Kristeller, 1988, 507.
(2) P.O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, ed. M.
Mooney, New York 1979, 22.
———. 1995. "La Doctrine De L'analogie Selon Quelques Logiciens
Jésuites." In Les Jésuites À La Renaissance. Système Éducatif Et
Production Du Savoir, edited by Giard, Luce, 107-126. Paris: Presses
universitaires de France.
Traduction de Lucie Giard.
"Je voudrais présenter, sur l'exemple de quelques auteurs de la
Compagnie, la doctrine logique de l'analogie dont j'ai entrepris l'histoire
du XIIIe à la fin du XVIe siècle (1). Jusqu'ici on s'était en général
intéressé à la question de l'analogie telle qu'elle se présente chez les
grands métaphysiciens, notamment Thomas d'Aquin, Jean Duns Scot et
Francisco Suárez, auxquels on ajoutait, pour son court traité De
nominum analogia (1498), un seul logicien, Cajetan (Thomas de Vio)
1134
(2). Si ces choix textuels sont compréhensibles, je les crois pourtant
trompeurs. D'un côté, l'importance donnée aux arguments de Duns Scot
en faveur de l'univocité de l'être a masqué l'existence d'une longue
tradition qui acceptait que des termes analogiques correspondent à un
seul concept, lui-même analogique. De l'autre, on a présenté Cajetan
comme s'il donnait à la fois un résumé des doctrines médiévales et une
interprétation de Thomas d'Aquin, restée pure de tout développement
postérieur à l'Aquinate, en dépit d'un intervalle de plus de deux siècles
entre lui et Cajetan. Je suis persuadée qu'en lisant les logiciens de plus
près on aboutira à un jugement plus équilibré sur les positions de
Cajetan et de Suárez par rapport à leurs prédécesseurs et qu'ainsi on
pourra même mieux comprendre Thomas d'Aquin.
Dans ce chapitre, mon objectif sera limité. Je partirai de la
classification des types d'analogie proposée par Francisco de Toledo
(1532-1596), un logicien jésuite, et j'en expliquerai les origines à partir
des théories médiévales de l'équivocité. Ensuite, en examinant de plus
près l'analogie de proportionalité proprement dite, je comparerai les
thèses de Toledo sur ce point à celles d'autres jésuites, notamment
Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) et Antonio Rubio (1548-1615). Je
voudrais déterminer comment les logiciens de la Compagnie ont
répondu aux demandes de Cajetan. Sans qu'il soit discuté véritablement
de Suárez, ce qui suit sera directement applicable à l'intelligence de son
rejet de l'analogie de proportionalité proprement dite au bénéfice de
l'analogie d'attribution." (pp. 107-108)
(1) On trouvera des bibliographies et des informations sur ce thème
dans une série d'études que je lui ai consacrée: Signification and Modes
of Signifying in 13th c. Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,
Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 1, 1991, p. 39-67; Analogy and
Equivocation in 13th c. Logic: Aquinas in Context, Mediaeval Studies,
54, 1992, p. 94-135; Equivocation and Analogy in 14th c. Logic:
Ockham, Burley and Buridan, in B. Mojsisch et O. Pluta (eds), Historia
Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des
Mittelalters, Amsterdam, 1991, t. 1, p. 23-43; Analogical Concepts:
The 14th c. Background to Cajetan, Dialogue, 31, 1992, pp. 399-413.
(2) Bruno Pinchard, Métaphysique et sémantique. Autour de Cajetan
(...), Paris, 1987.
———. 1996. "Analogy, Univocation, and Equivocation in Some Early
1135
Fourteenth-Century Authors." In Aristotle in Britain During the Middle
Ages. Proceedings of the International Conference at Cambridge 8-11
April 1994 Organized by the Société Internationale Pour L'etude De La
Philosophie Médiévale, edited by Marenbon, John, 233-247. Turnhout:
Brepols.
"In this paper I am going to consider how the definitions of equivocal
and univocal terms from Aristotle’s Categories, together with other
texts from his Physics and Metaphysics were employed by some
logicians and theologians in the early fourteenth century. My main
concern is with the theory of analogy, but I shall also be concerned
with the relationship between words, concepts, and things.
To begin, we need to consider certain standard features of the late
thirteenth-century doctrine of signification (1). One important
assumption is that words are endowed with signification by an original
act of imposition. However this act occurs, each word is endowed not
only with its central signification but also with its grammatical features
or modes of signifying as a unit, independently of and prior to any
sentential context. We can note in passing that such an assumption is
not easy to reconcile with the thought that language is flexible, and that
one and the same word can have different shades of meaning in
different contexts without thereby becoming a different lexical item. A
second assumption, closely related to the first, is that words fall into
specifiable groups. In particular, they are univocal or equivocal; and
although equivocal words have to have univocal uses, it was certainly
not thought to be the case that every univocal word could have an
equivocal use. Third, there is the assumption, based on De
Interpretatione 16 a3, that words signify concepts primarily and
through them things. As we shall see, the precise nature of the concepts
signified by analogical terms came to loom large in discussions of
analogy.
In order to understand how and why this was so, we need to look at the
opening words of Aristotle’s Categories. Following Boethius’s
translation, these are (2):
Those that have only a name in common but a different substantiae
ratio in accordance with that name are said to be equivocals, e.g.,
‘animal’ <in relation to> man and what is painted [...]
Those that have both a name in common and the same substantiae ratio
1136
in accordance with that name are said to be univocals, e.g., ‘animal’ <in
relation to> man, ox.
The meaning assigned to ratio substantiae is crucial to the
understanding of these definitions. It was agreed that the ratio
substantiae of a name included all that in some way expressed the
essence or quiddity of a substance or accident; but when further
clarification was sought, difficulties arose. In the thirteenth century
there had been disagreement between those who saw the ratio
substantiae as an Avicennian nature and those who, like Aquinas,
identified it with the inner word (3). In the fourteenth century, when the
ratio substantiae was normally identified as a concept (4), this
disagreement came to be expressed in terms of the difference between
the formal concept, or the act of knowing, and the so-called objective
concept, or the object insofar as it is known and apprehended by the
formal concept (5). Whatever the vocabulary used, there was a second
disagreement, more important to my present purposes, which
concerned the number and type of the concepts, natures, or rationes
involved. Given Aristotle’s initial definition, there is no problem: a
univocal term is associated with one concept, nature or ratio; an
equivocal term with more than one. However, this simple dichotomy
was complicated by the claim that equivocation can be subdivided, and
by the relationship between these subdivisions and analogy." (pp. 233-
235)
(...)
"To conclude, I would like to remark that one result of these arguments
for the equivocity of the term 'ens' is that the burden of analogy cannot
be carried by single words or single concepts. A term cannot be used to
express priority and posteriority and attribution, and yet these notions
are expressed in language. The obvious solution is to give up the
attempt to categorize terms as equivocal, univocal or analogical, and to
look instead at how they behave in different contexts and in relation to
different sentential structures (41). Unfortunately, this solution seems
to have been incompatible with medieval approaches to language." (pp.
246-247)
(1) For discussion and references, see E.J. Ashworth, « Signification
and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic : A Preface to
Aquinas on Analogy », in Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 1
1137
(1991), pp. 39-67.
(2) Aristotle, Categories, I a1-15 (Aristoteles Latinus, I, 1-5).
Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Leiden, 1961, p.
5 : « Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est,
secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diverse, ut animal homo et
quod pingitur. [...] Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune
est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio, ut animal homo atque
bos [...]».
(3) For discussion, see E.J. Ashworth, « Analogy and Equivocation in
Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context », in Mediaeval Studies,
54 (1992), p. 105.
(4) See, e.g., William of Ockham, Summa Logicae, eds. P. Boehner, G.
Gál and S. Brown (Opera Philosophica, I), N.Y., St.Bonaventure,
1974, p. 45; William of Ockham, Expositio in librum
Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, ed. G.Gál (Opera Philosophica, II),
N.Y, St.Bonaventure, 1978, p. 143, p. 144 ; John Buridan, Iohannes
Buridanus. Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, ed. J. Schneider, München,
1983, p. 4.
(5) For discussion, see E.J. Ashworth, « Analogical Concepts: The
Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan », in Dialogue, 31 (1992),
pp. 403-404.
(41) See J. F. Ross, Understanding Analogy, Cambridge, 1981.
———. 1996. "Domingo De Soto (1494-1560) on Analogy and
Equivocation." In Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the
Third Symposium on the History of Logic, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio
and Cerezo, Maria, 117-132. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"In 1543 the Spanish logician, Domingo de Soto, published a
commentary on Aristotle's Categories. (1) As one might expect, Soto
offers a detailed discussion of the opening lines in which Aristotle
presents a definition of equivocal terms, but his discussion also
includes an analysis of analogical terms, together with an account of
the conceptual correlates of such terms. The purpose of this paper is to
show how Soto's analysis fits into a long tradition of commentary on
the Categories. In particular, I wish to show that although Soto betrays
the influence of Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, whose short book,
On the Analogy of Names, was published in 1498, it is a great mistake
to suppose that the history of analogy from the thirteenth to the
1138
sixteenth century should be read through the eyes of Cajetan. At the
same time, I hope to throw some light on the background to Suarez, for
it seems to me that there is a close relationship between the doctrines
found in Soto and those developed by Suarez.
My paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I shall look at the
notion of equivocation and how it came to be related to analogy. In the
second part, I shall describe Soto's divisions of analogy and how they
are related to those of Cajetan. In the third part, I shall discuss what
Soto had to say about the imposition of analogical terms and about their
relationship to concepts and natures." (p. 117)
(...)
"3. Analogy, Imposition, and Concepts.
The mention of concepts brings us to the last section of my discussion,
in which I shall consider Soto’s explanation of the way analogical
terms were related to conventional signification on the one hand, and to
concepts on the other. For Soto, as for other medieval and post-
medieval logicians, spoken words were endowed with their
signification by arbitrary imposition. Some logicians, including the
sixteenth-century Spaniard Antonio Coronel, argued that deliberate
equivocation involves two acts of imposition, (39) but Soto followed
Dominic of Flanders in affirming that only one act of imposition is
involved for analogical terms. (40) In the case of such analogical terms
as ‘homo’, used of painted men, ‘ridere’, used of fields, and ‘sanum’,
used of urine, there is a transference of signification, and what is
imposed to signify one thing, comes to signify another. In the case of
‘ens’, however, there is no transference. This word was originally
imposed to signify id quod est, and so it signifies substance and
accidents, God and creatures, without any need for a specially extended
use. (p. 124)
(...)
"In his Categories commentary, Soto was more forthright. After giving
a lengthy account of Scotus’s arguments for the univocity of the word
'ens’, he put forward four theses. (46) The first thesis was that there is
one formal concept of being, a view which Soto supported both by
reference to Scotus’s arguments and by extra reasons of his own. One
of these had to do with imposition. Whoever first imposed the word
‘ens’ could not have been thinking specifically of God or of creatures,
1139
of substance or of accidents, any more than do those Latin-speakers
who are ignorant of philosophy. So far as the first thesis was
concerned, Soto saw no difference between Scotus and Aquinas. His
second thesis postulated just one objective concept. Even though many
Thomists deny this, he said, ‘ens’ signifies one formal ratio in the
object, abstracted by reason from substance and accidents. Nonetheless,
in his third thesis he stated that ‘ens’ signifies substance and accidents
not univocally but analogically. This is because the ratio is not found
simply but proportionabiliter in its significates, principally in one and
through attribution in the others. In his fourth thesis, Soto turned to
God and creatures, stating that ‘ens’ is also said analogically of them,
even though the case is not strictly comparable to that of substance and
accidents. Indeed, he remarked, we can understand why Aquinas said
different things in different places if we realize that theological
analogy, as Alain de Libera has called it, (47) involves both similarity
to and difference from philosophical analogy. On the one hand, there is
a similarity to analogy because of the dependence relation between God
and creatures. This is why Aquinas, in Summa theologiae la q.13 a.5,
compared ‘ens’ said of God and creatures with ‘sanum’. As urine is a
sign of an animal’s health, so the perfections of creatures are nothing
other than expressions of perfections in God. On the other hand, there
is a difference from analogy in that ens is said simpliciter of both God
and creatures, and this is why in De Veritate q.2 a. 11 Aquinas said that
there was an analogy of proportionality between God and creatures. As
God exists through the esse formally in him, so do creatures exist
through the esse formally in them. In his conclusion, and without
saying more about proportionality, Soto remarked that the analogy of
being between God and creatures is called univocation because it is
nearer to univocation than is the analogy of being between substance
and accidents.
4. Conclusion.
Soto’s four theses point the way to the subtle and intensive analysis of
ens given by Suarez in his Disputationes Metaphysicae. While Suarez’s
doctrine is not precisely that of Soto, there are clear parallels between
the two great Spaniards, and Suarez cites Soto’s commentary on the
Categories a number of times. A more precise account of how Suarez
made use of Soto’s arguments, and how Soto ranks in comparison to
1140
Suarez’s other sources will, however, have to await another occasion."
(1) I shall use the facsimile edition of the 1587 edition: Domingo de
Soto, In Praedicamentorum, in Soto, In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis
Categorias, librosque de Demonstratione Absolutissima Commentaria,
Venice 1587 /reprinted 1967 Frankfurt: Minerva).
(39) Antonius Coronel, Magistri Antonii coronel Secobiensis super
librum Predicamentorum Aristotelis secundum utriusque vie realium
scilicet et nominalium principia commentaria. Parrhisiis. 1518, fol. ii
va.
(40) Dominic of Flanders, In D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria super
Libres Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis, nec non et in eiusdem
Fallaciarum opus. Quaestiones Perutiles, Pauli quoque Soncinatis
eiusdem ordinis, lucida et subtilis Expositio in Porphyrii Isagogen, et
Aristotelis Praedicamenta, cum suis quaestionibus in unaquaque
expositione Militer disputatis. Venetiis 1600, p. 177B; 1499 sig. i 3vb.
On sig. i 3va he writes “analogum debet significare unam principaliter
et aliud secundaria, una impositione ex parte ipsius imponentis.” (I
have corrected the text slightly.) Soto 1587, p. 119a-b.
(46) Soto 1587, pp. 129a-133a.
(47) Alain de Libera, Albert le Grand et la philosophie, Paris: J. Vrin
1990, p. 96.
———. 1996. "Autour Des Obligationes De Roger Swyneshed: La
Nova Responsio." Etudes Philosophiques (3):341-360.
"D'aprés l'opinion reçue, les Obligationes de Roger Swyneshed,
redigées entre 1330 et 1335, signalent deux nouvelles directions dans
les debats sur les règies qu'on est oblige de suivre dans un certain type
de dispute logique, la dispute obligationnelle (1). D'un côté, ils nous
offrent une analyse des diverses formes de reflexivité beaucoup plus
approfondie que celle de Gauthier Burley, dont les Obligationes de
1302 sont caracteristiques de la théorie standard (2). De l'autre côté, ils
donnent une nova responsio sous la forme de deux règles assez
surprenantes du point de vue de la logique: 1 /On peut nier une
proposition conjonctive après avoir concedé ses deux parties. 2 /On
peut conceder une proposition disjonctive avant de nier ses deux parties
(3).
Récemment, Angel D'Ors, tout en acceptant l'originalité de Swyneshed
à propos des formes de reflexivité, s'est proposé de détruire le mythe de
1141
la nova responsio de Swyneshed (4). Il pretend que, malgré les
apparences, Swyneshead suivait Burley, et qu’il n’y avait qu’une
théorie des obligationes durant le XIVe siècle (5).
D’Ors est surtout motivé par son incapacité de comprendre pourquoi
Swyneshed aurait présenté une nova responsio aussi dépourvue de sens
logique (6). Donc, au lieu de chercher une explication des deux règles,
il cherche plutôt une explication du fait qu’on attribue ces règles à
Swyneshed. Dans ses récents articles, il se concentre sur deux textes
auxquels Spade, entre autres, a fait appel afin d’expliquer Swyneshed.
Tout d’abord, il prétend que les Obligationes de Richard Lavenham
(mort après 1399) (7) ont été mal comprises par ses récents lecteurs. Au
lieu de suivre la supposée nova responsio de Swyneshed, Lavenham
s’intéresse à la différence entre le dialogue d’une dispute
obligationnelle et le métadialogue dans lequel on discute les raisons
pour lesquelles les réponses étaient ou bonnes ou mauvaises, et les
règles auxquelles on aurait dû faire appel (8). En ce qui concerne
Robert Fland, un autre Anglais qui a écrit entre 1335 et 1370 (9), D’Ors
et son collaborateur, Miguel Garcia-Clavel, admettent qu’il parle d’une
nova responsio, mais ils prétendent que Fland a inventé cette réponse à
cause d’un malentendu, et que personne n’a jamais adopté cette réponse
(10). Tout comme les lecteurs de Lavenham, Fland n’a pas réussi à
comprendre que Swyneshed parle à deux niveaux, le niveau du
dialogue de base, et le niveau du métadialogue.
L’hypothèse de la nature mythique de la nova responsio est audacieuse
et provocatrice. Malheureusement, quand on la regarde de plus près,
elle se révèle fausse, le fruit d’un malentendu de la part de D’Ors lui-
même (11). Dans cet article, je vais expliquer pourquoi Fland n’a rien
inventé, et pourquoi il est possible de considérer Lavenham comme un
disciple de Swyneshed.
Mon article se divise en quatre parties. Premièrement, j’aborderai le
problème des textes eux-mêmes. Je suis entièrement d’accord avec
D’Ors quand il dit que le texte de Fland (qui existe dans un seul
manuscrit) est souvent peu fiable, et qu’il y a plusieurs façons de lire le
texte de Lavenham. En général, les textes qui traitent des obligationes
ne sont pas faciles à comprendre. Il y a trop de détails que nous
ignorons; les auteurs écrivaient trop vite, sans donner des explications
en profondeur; les copistes y ont ajouté trop d’erreurs. C’est
1142
précisément à cause de ces problèmes qu’il faut s’appuyer sur une base
textuelle aussi étendue que possible, sans se limiter à deux ou trois
œuvres. Je montrerai qu’il y avait d’autres auteurs que Fland et
Lavenham qui parlaient d’une nova responsio, et qui discutaient des
deux règles de Swyneshed. Deuxièmement, je donnerai un bref aperçu
de la théorie standard des obligationes, et je ferai une comparaison
entre cette théorie et celle de Swyneshed telle qu’elle est présentée par
au moins dix auteurs, à part Fland et Lavenham. En troisième lieu,
j’examinerai de plus près les définitions alternatives de la notion clef de
propositions non pertinentes, et les différentes règles qui gouvernaient
les réponses à ces propositions. Pour terminer, j’expliquerai le rapport
entre les règles de Swyneshed et la théorie d’inférence que nous offre
un auteur anonyme. C’est ici que l’on trouve enfin le raisonnement qui
mena Swyneshed à adopter sa nova responsio." (pp. 341-343)
(...)
"Conclusion.
En somme, il faut accepter l’opinion reçue à propos de Swyneshed. Il y
avait une nova responsio qui se basait sur une théorie d’inférence très
restreinte. Malheureusement pour ceux qui aimeraient interpréter les
obligationes en fonction des contre factuels ou des mondes possibles,
cette théorie restreinte a ses racines dans un manque de compréhension
des arguments que l’on retrouve chez Burley. Les enjeux étaient moins
intéressants qu’on aurait voulu croire." (pp. 359-360)
(1) Paul Vincent Spade, Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes: Edition and
Comments, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age,
44 (1977), p. 243-285. Pour une bibliographie complète, voir E. J.
Ashworth, Obligationes Treatises: A Catalogue of Manuscripts,
Editions and Studies, Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, 36 (1994), p.
118-147.
(2) Romuald Green, The Logical Treatise «De Obligationibus »: An
Introduction with Critical Texts of William of Sherwood and Walter
Burley, dissertation présentée pour l’obtention du grade de docteur en
philosophie, Université de Louvain, 1963.
(3) Swyneshed, p. 257 §32: « Propter concessionem partium
copulativae non est copulativa concedenda nec propter concessionem
disjunctivae est aliqua pars ejus concedenda ».
(4) Angel D’Ors, Sobre las Obligationes de Richard Lavenham,
1143
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, 58 (1991), p.
253-278 (pour l’opinion reçue, voir p. 255); Angel D’Ors, Sortes non
currit vel Sortes movetur (Roger Swyneshed, Obligationes, § 137-138),
Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, 60 (1993), p.
165-172 (pour l’opinion reçue, voir p. 165); Angel d’Ors y Manuel
Garcla-Clavel, Sobre las Obligationes de Robert Fland, Antiqua et nova
responsio, Revista de Filosofia, 7 (1994), p. 51-88 (pour l’opinion
reçue, voir p. 51).
(5) Ici, je laisse de côté les problèmes présentés par les Sophismata de
Richard Kilvington et le texte anonyme de Merton College ms. 306.
Pour discussion et références, voir Mikko Yrjönsuuri, Obligationes,
14th Century Logic of Disputational Duties, Acta Philosophieca
Fennica, vol. 55 (Helsinki, Societas Philosophies Fennica, 1994), un
excellent guide aux obligationes jusqu’en 1335. Yrjönsuuri pense que
le texte anonyme date de 1321 environ, et que son auteur critique
Burley plutôt que Swyneshed: voir p. 77.
(6) D’Ors y Garcia-Clavel, op. cit., p. 55: «... la nova responsio en la
forma en que Fland nos la présenta: no parece obedecer a ninguna
razôn, no parece que pueda encontrarse una razôn que explique tal
propuesta de cambio », cf. p. 56.
(7) Paul Vincent Spade, Richard Lavenham’s Obligationes. (Edition
and Comments by Paul Vincent Spade), Rivista critica di storia della
filosofia, 33 (1978), p. 225-242.
(8) D’Ors, Sobre las Obligationes de Richard Lavenham, p. 274-278;
D’Ors y Garcia-Clavel, op. cit., p. 84-85, 87.
(9) Paul Vincent Spade, Robert Fland’s Obligationes. An Edition,
Mediaeval Studies, 42 (1980), p. 41-60.
(10) D’Ors y Garcia-Clavel, op. cit., p. 53: «... la obra de Fland no
puede servir como guiâ para la interpretaciôn del auténtico sentido de la
doctrina de Swyneshed ; o lo que es lo mismo, que la nova responsio de
la que nos habla Fland, como tal, no ha existido nunca, es decir, que no
se corresponde con ninguna doctrina que alguien, sea éste quien sea,
haya alguna vez realmente defendido, sino que es simplemente el fruto
de una mala interpretaciôn de la doctrina cuyo mis ilustre représentante
es Swyneshed», cf. p. 69.
(11) Bien que je ne sois pas d’accord avec D’Ors en ce qui concerne
Swyneshed, j’ai néanmoins beaucoup appris de lui et de ses œuvres.
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of Logic. Fourth Part: Articles from 1997
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from 1967 to 1976
ARTICLES
Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1997. "Petrus Fonseca on Objective
Concepts and the Analogy of Being." In Logic and the Workings of the
Mind. The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern
Philosophy, edited by Easton, Patricia A., 47-63. Atascadero:
Ridgeview.
"Petrus Fonseca was a Portuguese Jesuit who lived from 1528 to 1599.
He was one of those responsible for drawing up the Jesuit Ratio
1146
Studiorum which set the curriculum for Jesuit schools across Europe,
and he was also responsible for initiating the production of the Coimbra
commentaries on Aristotle, or Conimbricenses, which served as texts
for many schools and universities in the seventeenth century.(1) He was
himself the author of two popular texts, an introduction to logic, and a
commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. (2) His logic text was one of
two alternatives prescribed by the Ratio Studiorum of 1599, and may
have been used at La Flèche; (3) his Metaphysics commentary was used
at many Jesuit schools, and may also have been used at La Flèche. (4)
In short, Fonseca was a leading figure in the Scholastic Aristotelian
tradition of the late sixteenth century, a tradition which lies behind
many of the developments in early modern philosophy, and which in
many ways is more important than the humanist tradition represented
by Petrus Ramus. (5)
I have chosen to discuss Fonseca on objective concepts and the analogy
of being both because an examination of these issues will help us to
understand how logic came to be bound up with the philosophy of mind
and because the history of how these issues were treated helps solve a
small problem about Descartes’s sources. My paper has four parts. I
shall begin by giving a historical outline of treatments of analogy and
their relevance to Descartes. (6) Secondly, I shall discuss late medieval
theories of signification, particularly as they appear in Fonseca, in order
to show how logicians turned away from spoken language to inner,
mental language. Thirdly, I shall explain how it was that analogy, as a
theory of one kind of language use, was particularly bound up with the
discussion of concepts. Finally, I shall look at the distinctions Fonseca
made while discussing the concepts associated with analogical terms.
1 Historical Outline: From Scotus to Descartes
In Meditation 3, Descartes uses a distinction between formal and
objective reality with respect to ideas in order to prove the existence of
God. In the secondary literature this distinction is invariably linked
with a distinction between formal and objective concepts found in
Suarez, whose Metaphysical Disputations (published in 1597) was
cited by Descartes on one occasion. (7) However, as the literature
acknowledges, it is not clear where the distinction originated, or how
Descartes came to know of it. The earliest paper I know of, published
by Dalbiez in 1929, looked in two directions.(8) Dalbiez quite
1147
accurately traced the distinction back to Duns Scotus and his discussion
of the kind of being creatures had in God’s mind prior to creation, (9)
but Dalbiez thought it improbable that Descartes would have read Duns
Scotus. He then suggested that the notion is more likely to have come
from Suarez and another near-contemporary, Vasquez, both of whom
used the notion in a theological dispute about the views of the
fourteenth-century theologian Durandus of Saint Pourçain (d. 1334) on
the nature of truth. (10) Little new light has been shed since 1929. (11)
In recent papers, Norman Wells still privileges both Suarez and the
debate about Scotus on divine ideas. (12) In a paper entitled “Meaning
and Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources,” Calvin Normore first
discusses Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick on objective being in
the context of God’s ideas; and he then shows how the notion was used
by Peter Aureol, William Ockham, and Walter Chatton in a variety of
contexts. However, Normore acknowledges that there is a gap between
about 1340 and the beginning of the seventeenth century. In his
conclusion, he writes that his examination “suggests a Descartes firmly
rooted in a Scholastic tradition which is deeply in debt to Duns Scotus
and closely allied with fourteenth-century developments in
epistemology and in the theory of meaning. This makes the problem of
Descartes’ immediate sources and the question of his originality even
more puzzling.” (13)
My own recent work on analogy as a theory of one kind of language
use shows that at least one historical path between Scotus and the early
seventeenth century can be traced through the Thomistic tradition,
though we must remember that late medieval and Renaissance
Thomism embraced a variety of different approaches and doctrines.
What Thomists had in common was a kind of moderate realism with
respect to common natures that differentiated them from the
nominalists on the one hand and the Scotists on the other. Nonetheless,
Thomists embraced many theses put forward by nominalists, especially
Pierre d’Ailly (d. 1420/1); and much of their agenda had been set by
Duns Scotus rather than by Aquinas himself." (pp. 47-48)
(...)
"Conclusion.
I don’t want to claim that I can point to precise passages in Fonseca
which have influenced Descartes, or Mersenne, or Arnauld, or any
1148
other early modern philosopher. On the other hand, I do want to claim
that this is the style of discussion, and these are the types of
distinctions, with which early modern philosophers, at least up to and
including Locke, would have been familiar through the scholastic texts
by which they were educated." (p. 63)
(1) On Fonseca’s life and works, see Charles H. Lohr, Latin Aristotle
Commentaries: II. Renaissance Authors (Florence: Olschki, 1988), pp.
150-51; and John P. Doyle, “Peter Fonseca," Routledge Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, E. J. Craig, ed. (Routledge: 1998).
(2) Pedro da Fonseca, Instituiçoes Dialécticas. Institutionum
Dialecticarum Libri Octo, 2 volumes, Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, ed. and
trans. (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1964), cited as Instit. Dial.,
Petrus Fonseca, Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis
Stagiritae Libros (2 volumes), (Cologne, 1615; reprinted Hildesheim:
Georg Olms, 1964), cited as In Met. Volume 1 contains Tomus I-II and
has numbered columns; volume 2 contains Tomus ΙΠ-IV, and has
numbered pages.
(3) Timothy J. Cronin, Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez
(Roma: Gregorian University Press, 1966), p. 34
(4) Cronin suggests, pp. 32-33, that Fonseca’s commentary was
normally used in Jesuit schools.
(5) Useful background is provided by Peter Dear, Mersenne and the
Learning of the Schools (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1988). However, Dear overemphasizes the influence of Ramist-style
humanism on Fonseca’s logic: see pp. 19-21. For an alternative
assessment of Fonseca, see E. J. Ashworth, “Changes in Logic
Textbooks from 1500 to 1650: The New Aristotelianism,”
Aristotelismus und Renaissance: In Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt,
Eckhard Kessler, Charles H. Lohr and Walter Spam, eds. (Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), pp. 82-84.
(6) Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), devotes much of his book to
the theme of Descartes’s reaction to Suârez’s doctrine of the analogy of
being. In his discussion, he notes the relation between the analogy of
being and objective concepts (e. g., p. 119), and he also mentions
Fonseca briefly (p. 123). However, the nature and scope of our
investigations is quite different.
1149
(7) Descartes, Replies IV, AT VII 235. For discussion see Roger Ariew,
“Descartes and scholasticism: the intellectual background to Descartes’
thought,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, John Cottingham,
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 58-90, esp. p.
79.
(8) R. Dalbiez, “Les sources scolastiques de la théorie cartésienne de
l’être objectif à propos du ‘Descartes’ de M. Gilson,” Revue d’histoire
de la philosophie 3 (1929), pp. 464-472.
(9) For Fonseca on God’s ideas, including reference to formal and
objective concepts, see In Met., III, pp. 280b-296b, esp. 286a-288b
(Lib. VII, cap. VIII, q. 2).
(10) Dalbiez, pp. 468-470.
(11) Cronin, p. 206, opts for Scotus and Suarez as Descartes’s sources.
One useful source is Gabriel Nuchelmans, Judgment and Proposition
from Descartes to Kant (Amsterdam, Oxford, New York: North-
Holland Publishing Company, 1983). He traces the early history of the
phrases “esse obiective” and “conceptus obiectivus” in Hervaeus,
Aureol, and Durandus, pp. 17-26. In discussing Descartes, he says (p.
41), “it remains difficult to single out any individual sources. His debt
is of a very general nature and could have come from any work
belonging to a certain climate of thought. There can be little doubt,
however, that one of the main determinants of this climate was the
objective-existence theory as it had been developed by such thinkers as
Durandus and Aureolus.”
(12) Norman J. Wells, “Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes,
Caterus, and Suarez,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990),
pp. 33-61, esp. pp. 49-50. See also Norman J. Wells, “Objective Being:
Descartes and His Sources,” The Modern Schoolman 45 (1967), pp. 49-
61; id., “Objective Reality of Ideas in Amauld, Descartes, and Suàrez,”
The Great Amauld and Some of His Philosophical Correspondents,
Elmar J. Kremer, ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto
Press, 1994), pp. 138-183.
(13) Calvin Normore, “Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes and
His Sources,” Essays on Descartes’ "Meditations,” Amélie Oksenberg
Rorty, ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California
Press, 1986), pp. 223-241, esp. p. 240.
———. 1997. "L'analogie De L'être Et Les Homonymes. Categories, 1
1150
Dans La "Guide De L'étudiant"." In L'enseignement De La Philosophie
Au Xiii Siècle. Autour Du "Guide De L'étudiant" Du Ms. Ripoll 109.
Actes Du Colloque International, edited by Lafleur, Claude and
Carrier, Joanne, 281-295. Turnhout: Brepols.
"C’est par trois définitions que s'ouvrent les Catégories d'Aristote (1).
Dans la traduction d'Yvan Pelletier, Aristote écrit: «On dit homonymes
les êtres dont le nom seul est commun, tandis que la définition de
l'essence signifiée par ce nom est différente. Par exemple, l'animal, c'est
à la fois l'homme et son image peinte [...]. Par ailleurs, on dit
synonymes les êtres dont le nom est commun et pour lesquels, de plus,
la définition de l’essence signifiée par ce nom est la même. Par
exemple, l'animal, c'est aussi bien l'homme que le bœuf [...]. Enfin, on
dit paronymes tous les êtres qui, tout en différant d'un autre par leur
cas, reçoivent leur appellation d'après son nom. Ainsi dénomme-t-on,
d'après la grammaire, le grammairien et, d'après le courage, le
courageux » (2).
Ces trois définitions courtes et sèches nous donnent un point de départ
pour examiner les rapports entre la théorie des catégories et la théorie
de l'analogie, ou plutôt les théories de l'analogie, chez les logiciens du
XIIIe siècle. J’ai dit «les théories de l’analogie», parce qu'il y en a au
moins deux. D'un côté, il y a l'analogie comme théorie du langage; d’un
autre côté, il y a l'analogie comme théorie métaphysique des rapports
hiérarchiques entre substance et accident, Dieu et créature. Dans son
analyse approfondie des sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale
de l'analogie de l'être, Alain de Libéra parle de divers textes et
problématiques, soit sémantiques, soit théologiques, qui sont à l'origine
de cette théorie. Pourtant, en soulignant l'importance primordiale des
textes aristotéliciens, il dit: «La théorie médiévale de l'analogie de l'être
est principalement issue de la rencontre de Cat., I, 1, Eth. Nic., 1, 4 et
Métaph., IV, 2», pour ajouter ensuite : « Avant cette synthèse, la notion
d'analogie a été utilisée en dehors de toute préoccupation
métaphysique, comme concept sémantique lié à l’interprétation des
deux problèmes logiques standards de l'homonymie: l'élucidation de la
distinction entre homonymes et synonymes dans Cat., I, 1 ; l'analyse
des mécanismes sémantiques de la fallacia aequivocationis dans Ref.
soph., 17» (3).
De Libera a raison quand il dit que l'on trouve l'analogie comme théorie
1151
du langage ou théorie sémantique dans les manuels de logique plutôt
que l'analogie de l'être, et que, pour comprendre l'analogie de l'être, il
faut faire tout particulièrement attention à la Métaphysique d'Aristote et
à ses commentateurs arabes. Néanmoins, pour des raisons que
j'essaierai d'expliquer dans ce travail, il y a des liens étroits entre les
Catégories et l'étude de l'être comme tel, et il me semble que dans le
«Guide de l'étudiant» et dans les autres sources contemporaines que j'ai
examinées, nous trouvons la préhistoire de l'analogie de l'être, une
préhistoire fondée sur une lecture strictement ontologique des
Catégories d'Aristote. En même temps, étant donné les problèmes
causés par une telle lecture, on peut très facilement comprendre
pourquoi les logiciens de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe
siècle préféraient, soit une interprétation linguistique, soit une
interprétation conceptualiste des catégories elles-mêmes et des notions
liées d'analogie et d'homonymie.
Les textes sur lesquels repose mon interprétation sont tout d'abord le
«Guide de l'étudiant» et le De communibus artium liberalium, édités
par Claude Lafleur avec la collaboration de Joanne Carrier (4). À part
les commentaires sur les Catégories de Boèce et du Pseudo-Augustin
(5), j'utilise le commentaire de Jean le Page, écrit entre 1231 et 1235, le
commentaire de Robert Kilwardby, écrit vers 1240, et les Tractatus
écrits entre 1230 et 1245 (6). Tous ces textes sont à peu près
contemporains du «Guide de l'étudiant». En plus, j'utilise les Summule
dialectices de Roger Bacon, écrites vers 1250, la Summa de Lambert de
Lagny, dont la première rédaction date de 1250-1255, ainsi que le
commentaire sur les Catégories d'Albert le Grand, écrit vers 1260 (7).
Ces trois textes sont à peu près contemporains du De communibus
artium liberalium. Enfin, pour donner une idée des développements
doctrinaux dans la dernière partie du XIIIe siècle, je ferai référence aux
commentaires de Pierre d’Auvergne, de l'Anonyme de Madrid, de
Simon de Faversham et de Martin de Dacie, tous écrits entre 1270 et
1300 (8).
Mon étude se divise en trois parties. En premier lieu, comme
introduction à mon thème principal, je donnerai un bref aperçu de
l'analogie dans les manuels de logique et dans les commentaires sur
Aristote. Ensuite, je traiterai du sujet de la logique aristotélicienne en
général et du sujet des Catégories en particulier. Mon but ici est de
1152
montrer l'importance de l'être, surtout dans le contexte de deux
questions: y a-t-il une science unique des catégories, et quels sont les
rapports entre la logique et la métaphysique ? Pour terminer,
j’aborderai les rapports entre homonymes, synonymes et paronymes,
interprétés comme des réalités et non pas comme des mots, dans le
contexte de la question: pourquoi Aristote a-t-il placé les homonymes
avant les synonymes et les paronymes?" (pp. 281-283)
(...)
"Avant de terminer, je voudrais examiner les paronymes de plus près.
Rappelons la définition aristotélicienne: «on dit paronymes tous les
êtres qui, tout en différant d'un autre par leur cas, reçoivent leur
appellation d'après son nom». L'expression «par leur cas» («solo casu»
en latin) suggère une variation de forme purement linguistique, mais
l'auteur du «Guide de l'étudiant» réussit à trouver une interprétation
ontologique. Il dit que «solo casu» veut dire «par une inclinaison ou
une contraction ou une agrégation relative à un sujet» («inclinatione uel
contractione uel concretione ad subiectum», § 539), et on peut lier ce
passage à celui dans la section sur la grammaire (§ 224) où il dit que le
logicien s'occupe de la relation entre les accidents et la substance
(«logicus intendit de compara-tione quam habent accidentia ad
substantiam»). À première vue, Kilwardby semble donner une
interprétation voisine de celle de notre auteur. Il dit que les termes
dénominatifs signifient cum casu car ils signifient un accident en
fonction de sa relation à un sujet, et que le mot principal signifie sine
casu, c'est-à-dire sans une relation au sujet (61). Cependant, quand il
nous offre ses précisions sur l'expression « sola cadencia ad materiam a
principali» comme explication de «différant solo casu», il parle de la
matière des voces. Roger Bacon nous offre trois interprétations de
l'expression «solo casu», dont deux sont linguistiques (62). En premier
lieu, le cas peut être une simple variation de forme, et on trouve cette
interprétation chez Albert le Grand (63). En deuxième lieu, le cas peut
être une variation de forme relevant de la dérivation lexicale, et ici il
emploie l'expression «sola cadentia unius ab alio, sive formatione». On
trouve cette interprétation chez Lambert de Lagny (64). En troisième
lieu, le cas peut être la chute d’une forme vers la matière et le sujet, et
ici il emploie l'expression «sola cadentia formae ad materiam et ad
subiectum». Cette dernière interprétation est la plus proche de celle de
1153
notre auteur." (pp. 294-295)
Voilà donc un bref aperçu de la façon dont l'auteur du «Guide de
Vétudiant» et ses contemporains traitent de la problématique de l’être
dans le contexte des Catégories. Je suis persuadée qu'une étude plus
approfondie et plus longue que la mienne nous aidera à mieux
comprendre l'apparition de l'analogie de l'être chez les philosophes et
théologiens du XIIIe siècle.
(1) Aristote, Catégories, I (la 1-15).
(2) Les Attributions (Catégories). Le texte aristotélicien et les
prolégomènes d'Ammonios d'Hermeias, présentés, traduits et annotés
par Y. Pelletier, Montréal: Bellarmin/Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1983, p.
23 (Collection d'études anciennes publiée sous le patronage de
l'Association Guillaume Budé. Collection Noêsis publiée par le
Laboratoire de recherches sur la pensée antique d'Ottawa).
(3) A. De Libera, Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de
l'analogie de l'être, dans Les études philosophiques 3/4 (1989), p. 321.
(4) Cl. Lafleur, avec la collaboration de J. Carrier, Le « Guide de
l'étudiant » d'un maître anonyme de la Faculté des arts de Paris au
XIIIe siècle. Édition critique provisoire du ms. Barcelona, Arxiu de la
Corona d'Aragô, Ripoll 109, fol. 134ra-158va, Québec, 1992
(Publications du Laboratoire de philosophie ancienne et médiévale de
la Faculté de philosophie de l'Université Laval, I): j'utilise ici cette
prépublication dont la division du document en paragraphes demeurera
inchangée dans l'édition révisée à paraître chez Brepols, dans la
Continuatio mediaevalis du Corpus Christianorum; Id., Un instrument
de révision destiné aux candidats à la licence de la Faculté des arts de
Paris, le «De communibus artium liberalium» (vers 1250?), dans
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione fllosofica medievale 5, 3 (1994), pp.
129-203.
(5) Boèce, In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor, PL 64, col. 159-294.
Pour les Categoriae decem du Pseudo-Augustin, longtemps attribuées à
Augustin mais aujourd'hui éditées sous le titre de Paraphrasis
Themistiana, voir Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, translatio Boethii
[...] Pseudo-Augustini Paraphrasis Themistiana, éd. L. Minio-Paluello,
Bruges-Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1961, pp. 133-175 (AL, I, 1-5).
(6) Pour Jean le Page, avec extraits de son texte, voir E. Franceschini,
Giovanni Pago: le sue «Rationes super Predicamenta Aristotelis» e la
1154
loro posizione nel movimento aristotelico del secolo XIII, dans Sophia
2 (1934), pp. 172-182, 329-350, 476-486. Pour une discussion de
Robert Kilwardby avec une édition partielle (pp. 367-378) de ses
Notule super librum Predicamentorum, voir P.O. Lewry, Robert
Kilwardby's Writings on the «Logica Vêtus» Studied with Regard to
Their Teaching and Method, Oxford, 1978 (thèse inédite). Pierre
d'Espagne (Petrus Hispanus Portugaliensis), Tractatus Called
afterwards Summule Logicales, éd. L.M. De Rijk, Assen, Van Gorcum,
1972 (Philosophical Texts and Studies, XXII).
(7) Pour l'édition de l'ouvrage de Roger Bacon, voir A. de Libéra, Les
«Summulae dialectices» de Roger Bacon: I - II. De termino, De
enuntiatione, dans AHDLMA 53 (1986), pp. 139-289; Lambert
d'Auxerre (= Lambert de Lagny), Logica (Summa Lamberti), éd. Fr.
Alessio, Firenze, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971; Albert Le Grand,
Liber de praedicamentis, dans B. Alberti Magni, Ratisbonensis
episcopi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia, éd. A. Borgnet, Paris,
Vivès, 1890, t. I, pp. 149-304.
(8) Pour Pierre D'Auvergne, voir R. Andrews, Petrus de Alvernia, «
Quaestiones super Praedicamentis»: An Edition, dans CIMAGL 55
(1987), pp. 3-84; Martin de Dacie, Quaestiones super librum
Praedicamentorum, dans Martini de Dacia Opera, éd. H. Roos,
Hauniae, Gad, 1961, pp. 153-231 (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum
Medii Aevi, II); Simon de Faversham, Quaestiones super libro
Praedicamentorum, dans Magistri Simonis Anglici sive de Faverisham
Opera omnia, volumen primum: Opera logica, t. Ior, éd. P. Mazzarella,
Padova, CEDAM, 1957, pp. 69-148 ; pour ΓAnonyme de Madrid voir
R. Andrews, Anonymus Matritensis, « Quaestiones super librum
Praedicamentorum»: An Edition, dans CIMAGL 56 (1988), pp. 117-
192.
(61) Robert Kilwardby, Notule super librum Predicamentorum, éd.
Lewry, pp. 376-377. Cf. Pierre d'Espagne, Tractatus, III, 1, éd. De
Rijk, p. 27,1. 3-4: «Differunt solo casu, idest sola cadentia que est a
parte rei [...]».
(62) Roger Bacon, Summule dialectices, 1,2, éd. De Libera, pp. 190-
191.
(63) Albert le Grand, Liber de praedicamentis, tract. I, cap. 4, éd.
Borgnet, p. 158a: «Et quod subdicitur solo casu differentia, dicitur hic
1155
casus quaecumque inflexio nominis secundum finem nominis sive
dictionis».
(64) Lambert d'Auxerre (Lambert de Lagny), Logica, III (De
predicamentis), éd. Alessio, p. 64: «Differant enim solo casu, id est
sola cadentia, quia unum cadit ab alio, id est derivatur, ut a grammatica
grammaticus et sic de aliis». Cf. Ibid., III (De predicamentis), p. 66.
———. 1998. "Analogy and Equivocation in Thomas Sutton O.P." In
Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval
Theological Texts (Xiith-Xivth Century). Acts of the Xith Symposium on
Medieval Logic and Semantics. San Marino, 24-28 May 1994, edited
by Marmo, Costantino, 289-303. Turnhout: Brepols.
"One of the most obvious places where theology and logic meet is in
the diuscussion of the divine names. From the 1240s on, the standard
way for theologians to handle the problem of religious language
involved an appeal to the theory of analogy, (1) a theory which was
worked out in the logic textbooks in the context of equivocal and
univocal terms (cfr. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in
Thirteenth-Century Logic. Aquinas in Context", Mediaeval Studies 54,
1992, pp. 94-135). The problem of religious language can be put
roughly like this. Words such as ‘good’, ‘just’, and ‘wise’ do not seem
to have exactly the same sense when used of God as they do when used
of human beings. That is, they are not univocal. On the other hand, they
cannot be used with a completely different sense if religious discourse
it to have any point. That is, they cannot be equivocal. If they are
neither univocal nor equivocal, they must be used with some related
sense,that is, analogically. But what is the appropriate model for
analogical usage? If the model is that of the word sanum (healthy),
which can be applied in an extended sense to a diet on the grounds that
the diet is causally related to the animal which is called healthy in the
primary sense, then we have what Cajetan later called the analogy of
attribution. (2) On the other hand, if the model is that of the word
principium (principle), which is applied both to a point and to a source
on the grounds that the source is related to a river in the way that a
point is related to a line, we have what Cajetan later called the analogy
of proportionality. The first type of analogy, the analogy of attribution,
involves just one relationship whereas the second type, the analogy of
proportionality, involves a comparison between two relationships. As is
1156
well known, Thomas Aquinas appealed to the analogy of
proportionality in De veritate q. 2, a. 11, but more usually appealed to
the analogy of attribution. Cajetan, on the other hand, claimed that the
analogy of proportionality was the only true analogy, and that it should
be employed in metaphysics and theology.
Thomas Sutton, an Oxford Dominican who lived from about 1250 to
1315 or 1320, has attracted some attention because he employed the
analogy of proportionality in his Quaestiones ordinariae, written in the
first decade of the fourteenth century. (3) Insofar as he did so, he was
described by Montagnes (1963, p. 124) as a precursor of Cajetan who
moed away from Aquinas. Schneider (1977), in his introduction to the
Quaestiones tried to modify Montagnes’s judgment, by suggesting that
there was no real break with Aquinas; (4) but none of those who have
discussed Sutton in the literature have done other than suggest that he
appealed to analogy of proportionality to resolve problems of linguistic
use, whereas the analogy of attribution had to do with those relations of
things that ground our language. In an early article on Sutton,
Przezdziecki (1959) presented Question 32 as showing that ens is an
analogical term, but turned to Question 33’s account of proportionality
for an explanation of what type pf analogy was involved, completely
ignoring the discussion of attribution in the earlier question. (5) In a
recent book, Riva ( 1989) noted the presence of the two types of
analogy in Sutton’s work, but argued that the tension between them is
resolved by the distinction between words and things. (6) He claims
that for Sutton proportionality has to do with terms, while attribution
concerns the relations among things on which talk about proportionality
is based.
In this paper I intend to look at the details of Sutton’s theory of analogy
in relation both to the authors with whom he is debating, and to the
basic logical distinctions he employed. In the first section I shall give a
brief outline of what the logicians had to say. In the second section
Ishall discuss the word ens, beginning with three views that Sutton
rejected before going on to examine his own views about ens in
metaphysics in theology. In the final section, I shall consider Sutton’s
discussion of the divine names proper, namely perfection words such as
‘good', 'wise' and ‘just’. I shall show that although Sutton appeals to
proportionality in this last case, he uses the analogy of attribution in his
1157
discussion of how the word ens is applied to substance and accident.
Moreover, he is just as much concerned with language in the one case
as he is in the other. As a result his overall view is a lot more flexible
than Cajetan’s." (pp. 289-290)
(...)
"Despite Montagnes’s description of Sutton as a precursor of Cajetan, I
think that he is in many ways quite different. While holding that the
analogy of proportionality is analogy in the strictest sense, he makes no
attempt to apply it to metaphysical problems in general or to link it with
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. The real
importance of the distinction between the analogy of attribution and the
analogy of proportion is not that one is in fact linguistically more
proper than the other; nor is it that one deals with intrinsic
denomination whereas the other deals with extrinsic denomination, for
both involve at least some cases of intrinsic denomination. Rather, the
real importance of the distinction has to do with the areas of discourse
in which the two types of analogy function. The analogy of attribution
works at the level of (non-theological) metaphysics and the discussion
of created beings; the analogy of proportionality is necessary in
theology given the doctrine that an infinite God creates beings which,
while finite and infinitely distant from their creator, nonetheless
participate in his being and goodness, imitating him as far as they are
able." (p. 298)
(1) See, e.g., Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica, 4 vols, Ad Claras
Aquas (Quaracchi), Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924-1948, I, p. 544b:
“nomina [...] ut iustus, bonus et huiusmodi, non dicuntur aequivoce nec
univoce, quia non penitus secundum aliam rationem nec tarnen
secundum eamdem, sed dicuntur analogice secundum prius et
posterius”. (This passage is continued in note 31.)
(2) For Cajetan, whose De nominum analogia was published in 1498,
see Bruno Pinchard, Métaphysique et sémantique. Autour de Cajetan,
Etude [texte] et traduction du "De nominum analogia”, Paris, Vrin,
1987.
(3) For recent references concerning Sutton’s life and works, see
Alessandro D. Conti, “La composizione metafisica dell'ente finito
corporeo nell’ontologia di Sutton”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione
filosofica medievale 2/2, 1991, pp. 317-60 (317-18, note 1). It should
1158
be noted that Sutton does not use the word proportionalitas, but speaks
of aequivoca secundum proportionem, see, e.g., p. 918.247.
(4) Cf. Johannes Schneider, "Introduction”, in Thomas Sutton,
Quaestiones ordinariae, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften
1977, pp. 241*-262*, especially pp. 257*-258* and p. 261*.
(5) Przezdziecki, Thomas of Sutton’s critique on the doctrine of
univocity”, in An Etienne Gilson tribute, ed. C. J. O’Neil, Milwaukee,
Marquette University Press 1959, pp. 189-208. In this article,
Schneider's Question 32 A is referred to as Question 33 and
Schneider’s Question 33 is referred to as Question 34.
———. 1998. "Aquinas on Significant Utterance: Interjection,
Blasphemy, Prayer." In Aquinas's Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of
Norman Kretzmann, edited by MacDonald, Scott and Stump, Eleonore,
207-234. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
"It may seem perverse to turn to Aquinas's moral philosophy for light
on his philosophy of language, but I argue that his study of human
actions forced him to modify the intellectualism prevalent in much
thirteenth-century logic and grammar. This intellectualism had three
components. First, it privileged the notion of language as a rational,
rule-governed system which could be studied in isolation from context
and speaker intention.(2) Second, it focused on propositions as the
linguistic units which conveyed the information necessary for scientia
and rejected other forms of discourse as irrelevant. Third, it described
individual words as the signs of concepts and ignored utterances which
express passions of one sort and another. These components,
particularly the second and third, do indeed characterize Aquinas's
considered approach to language as expressed particularly in his
commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione. Nonetheless, his
recognition that human beings are animals with passions, together with
his recognition that utterances are themselves a kind of action subject to
moral assessment, forced him to take a different direction in other
places.(3)
I proceed as follows. In sections 1 and 2, I set forth the intellectualist
components of Aquinas's theory, paying particular attention to the
manifestation of truth and to the senses in which conventionally
significant utterances could also be said to be naturally significant. In
sections 3, 4, and 5, I explore the relationships between animal noises
1159
and human utterances, paying particular attention to the role of the
imagination and to interjections. In sections 6 and 7, I consider the role
of human passions and human intentions in the understanding and
production of conventional utterances, especially sinful ones. In
sections 8 and 9, I look at two aspects of language production which
can serve to mitigate sin: slips of the tongue, and linguistic
incontinence, or breaking out into ill-considered words. In the last
section, I turn to the situation in which we recite and appropriate the
words of others, particularly in prayer. Throughout, I examine not only
Aquinas's own doctrines but also those of grammarians and logicians
contemporary with him." (pp. 207-208)
(2) For discussion of this approach in the modistae, and for full
information about grammarians who adopted an alternative approach,
which she has dubbed intentionalist because of its focus on the intentio
proferentis, sec the papers by Irène Rosier cited throughout, all of
which contain further references. See esp. Irène Rosier. “La distinction
entre actus exercitus et actus significatus dans les sophismes
grammaticaux du MS BN lat. 16618 et autres textes apparentés,“ in
Medieval Logic and Grammar, ed. Stephen Read (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1992}, pp. 257-59; and her book (published after
this paper was written), La parole comme acte: Sur la grammaire et la
sémantique au xiiie siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1994). Rosier's work is
particularly important for its demonstration that the modistic paradigm
does not apply to much thirteenth-century grammar. I would like to
take this opportunity of thanking Irène Rosier for the generous way in
which she has shared her as yet unpublished research with me; this
e&sav owes much to her work.
(3) Rosier has shown that in his discussion of the sacraments Aquinas
was far closer to the intentionalist grammarians than he was to the
modistae. See Irène Rosier, "Signes et sacrements: Thomas d'Aquin et
la grammaire spéculative", Revue des sciences philosophiques et
théologiques 74 (1990): 431-32. She writes (p. 394): "Les particularités
linguistiques des formules sacramentaires, et du sacrement comme
signe non seulement cognitif, mais opératif, l'importance accordée à
l'intention du locuteur et du récepteur, la conjonction de ces divers
éléments dans un acte à chaque fois singulier, nous situent d'emblée
dans la dimension 'pragmatique' du langage, devéloppée, à la même
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époque, en ce milieu du Xllle siècle, par les grammairiens
'intentionalistes.' " Both here and later (p. 433) she speaks of the
encounter between grammarians and theologians, but she refuses to
speculate about whose influence was primary (pp. 432-33).
———. 1998. "Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy: One
of the Routes from Early Fourteenth-Century Discussions to
Descartes's Third Meditation." In Meetings of the Minds. The Relation
between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy, edited
by Brown, Stephen F., 43-62. Turnhout: Brepols.
"In this paper I shall use Rubius's tract on analogy to show how a rich
medieval tradition survived into the seventeenth century and to shed
some light on the problem of Descartes's sources for the notion of an
idea's objective reality. I shall proceed as follows. First, I shall state the
problem as it has been set out in recent secondary literature. Second, I
shall trace the distinction between formal and objective concepts from
the early fourteenth century to the early seventeenth century in the
context of the discussion of analogical terms. Third, I shall examine the
analogical use of terms as it was presented by Rubius. Fourth, I shall
explain why a theory of language use and a theory of concepts carne to
be linked together. Finally, I shall discuss what Rubius had to say about
formal and objective concepts, and I shall suggest a relationship
between this account and Descartes's own attitude towards mental
contents and simple natures."
———. 1999. "Text-Books: A Case Study - Logic." In The Cambridge
History of the Book in Britain (Vol. 3), edited by Trapp, Joseph Burney
and Hellinga, Lotte, 380-386. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"This book covers the years 1400 to 1557. In such a long period, we
would expect great changes in the logic text-books used at Oxford and
Cambridge. Indeed, there were great changes, but their timing is some
what unexpected. If one considers just books written by Englishmen
and copied or printed in England, then there is hardly any change at all
between 1400 and 1530, the year in which the last surviving edition of
the compilation text-book known as Libellus Sophistarum was printed.
A period of fifteen years follows in which no surviving logic text was
either written or printed, and then suddenly in 1545 we are confronted
with the Dialectica of John Seton, a work which was to go through
fourteen editions by the end of the sixteenth century, and which
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represents a completely different type of logic.(1) In what follows, I
shall focus on the fortuna of just one type of logic text in use between
1400 and 1530, namely the treatises devoted to obligationes, or the
rules prescribing what one was obliged to accept and reject in a certain
kind of logical disputation.
It is necessary first to consider the place of logic in the curriculum and
the type of instruction which was offered, then to say something about
fourteenth-century logicians and the obligationes texts used in the
fifteenth century, and finally to examine the Libelli Sophistarum and
other early printed texts in relation to fifteenth-century manuscript
collections." (p. 380)
(1) A useful chronological list of logic books printed in England before
1620 is in Schmitt 1983b [John Case and Aristotelianism in
Renaissance England, Kingston and Montreal] pp. 225-9. For English
logic during the sixteenth century: Ashworth 1985b [Introduction to
Robert Sanderson. Logicae artis compendium, Bologna], especially pp.
XXIII-XXXIII; 1991; Giard 1985 [La production logique de
l'Angleterre au 16e siècle, Les Études philosophiques, 3, 303-324];
Jardine 1974 [The place of dialectic teaching in sixteenth century
Cambridge, Studies in the Renaissance, 21, 31-62]. No attention should
be paid to Howell 1956 [Logic and rhetoric in England, 1500-1700,
Princeton] whose account of developments in logic, particularly during
the medieval period, is wildly inaccurate, and this vitiates his
judgements about the texts described.
———. 2000. "Domingo De Soto on Obligationes: His Use of Dubie
Positio." In Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Acts of the 12th
European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, edited by
Angelelli, Ignacio and Perez-Ilzarbe, Paloma, 291-307. Hildesheim:
Georg Olms.
"Soto's Opusculum obligationum was published in 1529 as the last
treatise in his Summulae. (1) I have chosen to discuss it in this paper
both because it is one of the very last serious discussions of the
medieval doctrine of obligationes, and because it sheds some light on
the history of dubie positio as a type of obligational dispute. This is
important, beeause dubie positio is one of the areas pertinent to
medieval epistemie logic, and the material found in obligationes
treatises has not yet been the subject of much investigation. (2) In what
1162
follows, I shall first discuss the nature of dubie positio and its relation
to other types of obligational disputation. I shall then describe the rules
which were used. Third, I shall take up a particular problem concerning
apparently indubitable propositions, such as 'I exist'. Finally, I shall
discuss a sophisma in which the response 'I am in doubt about it'
seemed to cause problems for one of the standard obligational rules.
(1) Domingo de Soto, Opusculum obligationum in Summulae (Burgos,
1529), ff. cl ra-cliii vb; Domingo de Soto, De obligationibus in
Summulae (Salamanca 1554-1555: reprinted Hildesheim, New York:
Georg Olms, 1980), ff 156 ra-159 vb. The latter is a reproduction of the
third edition which, as Dr. Angel d'Ors has shown, modifies the second
edition in certain respects: see Angel d'Ors, "Las "Summulae" de
Domingo de Soto", Anuario Filosôfico (Universidad de Navarra) 16
(1983), p. 212. All my references are to the 1529 edition unless
otherwise specified.
(2) For a good discussion of some other sources, see Ivan Boh,
Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages, (London and New York:
Routledge, 1993). See also William Heytesbury, 'The Compounded and
Divided Senses' (pp. 413-434), and "The Verbs 'Know' and 'Doubt"
[chapter 2 of the Regulae] (pp. 435-479) in Norman Kretzmann and
Eleonore Stump, trans., Logic and the Philosophy of Language, vol. 1
of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)."
———. 2003. "L'equivocité, L'univocité Et Les Noms Propres." In La
Tradition Médiévale Des Catégories (Xiie-Xve Siècles). Actes Du Xiii
Symposium Européen De Logique Et De Sémantique Médiévales
(Avignon, 6-10 Juin 2000), edited by Biard, Joël and Rosier-Catach,
Irène, 127-140. Louvain: Peeters Publishers.
"Dans ses Quaestiones in artem veterem, Albert de Saxe commence la
section consacrée aux Catégories d’Aristote en posant la question «
Est-ce que le même terme peut être équivoque et univoque ? » (1). Un
peu plus tard, Marsile d’Inghen reprend cette question, légèrement
reformulée, dans ses propres Questiones libri predicamentorum (2); et
en 1428, Paul de Venise consacre une partie de son Commentaire sur
les Catégories à la même question (3). De plus, on retrouve une
discussion approfondie des rapports entre les équivoques et les
univoques dans le Compendium totius logice Joannis Buridani de Jean
1163
Dorp, qui date probablement de la dernière décennie du xive siècle (4).
Certes, la question posée par Albert de Saxe n’était pas nouvelle, ayant
son origine dans les commentaires de Boèce et de Simplicius, mais les
réponses à cette question introduisent deux thèmes nouveaux,
l’univocité des noms propres, et l’équivocité des termes mentaux. Ces
deux thèmes sont importants, étant donné que depuis l’Antiquité
classique le nom propre est l’exemple standard d’un mot équivoque par
hasard (a casu), et étant donné la présupposition que le langage mental
est un langage clair, donc univoque.
Mon étude se divise en trois parties. En premier lieu, je donnerai un
bref aperçu de la doctrine des noms propres, telle qu’on la retrouve
chez les grammairiens et les logiciens. Ensuite, je ferai quelques
remarques sur les définitions avec lesquelles s’ouvrent les Catégories
d’Aristote. Finalement, j’aborderai la question principale, celle des
rapports entre les équivoques et les univoques, surtout en ce qui
concerne les noms propres et les termes mentaux.
Avant d’aller plus loin, je dois préciser que je vais laisser de côté la
question, pourtant très intéressante, de l’équivocité du nom propre
appliqué au vivant et au mort. Je me concentrerai sur le cas que l’on
trouve dans les premières sections des commentaires sur les
Catégories, celui d’un nom propre appliqué à deux personnes
différentes." (pp. 127-128)
(...)
"Conclusion.
Les discussions que nous venons d’examiner montrent comment les
logiciens du XIVe et XVe siècles ont essayé de concilier les catégories
du nom offertes par Aristote, c’est-à-dire les noms équivoques et les
noms univoques, avec les catégories du nom offerts par Priscien, c’est-
à-dire les noms propres et les noms communs. En même temps, elles
montrent comment les commentateurs des Catégories d’Aristote ont
absorbé la nouvelle épistémologie qui reconnaissait les concepts
singuliers et la nouvelle sémantique qui utilisait la terminologie de la
grammaire et celle de la logique pour parler de ces concepts." (p. 140)
(1) Albert de Saxe, Quaestiones in Artem Veterem, éd. et trad. esp. A.
Munoz Garcia, Maracaibo, 1988, p. 292. Pour plus d’informations sur
l’équivocité et l’univocité, voir E.J. Ashworth, « ‘Nulla propositio est
distinguenda’ : la notion d’equivocatio chez Albert de Saxe » dans Joël
1164
Biard (éd.), Itinéraires d’Albert de Saxe: Paris-Vienne au XIV siècle,
Paris, 1991, pp. 149-160 ; et E.J. Ashworth, « Equivocation and
Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic : Ockham, Burley and Buridan »,
dans Burkhard Mojsisch et Olaf Pluta (éds.), Historia philosophiae
medii aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,
Philadelphia, Amsterdam, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 23-43.
(2) Marsile d’Inghen, Questiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis,
Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Canon, misc. 381, fos 16 ra-17 ra et fo 8
rb-va.
(3) Paul de Venise, In Praedicamenta, Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS
Canon, misc. 452, f°s 81va-83vb, et MS Canon. Lat. Class. 286, fos
68ra-70vb. Je cite le premier manuscrit dans ce qui suit.
(4) Jean Dorp, tract. III, De predicamentis, dans Johannes Buridanus,
Compendium totius Logicae, Venise, 1499 ; repr. Frankfurt/Main,
1965, sign, e 5 vb - sign, e 6 ra. Pour plus d’informations sur Jean
Dorp, voir E. P. Bos, « Die Rezeption der Suppositions des Marsilius
von Inghen in Paris (Johannes Dorp) und Prag (ein anonymer
Sophistria-Traktat) um 1400 », dans M.J.F.M. Hoenen et P.J.J.M.
Bakker (éds), Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters.
Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit, Leiden-Boston-Köln,
2000, pp. 213-230.
———. 2003. "Language and Logic." In The Cambridge Companion
to Medieval Philosophy, edited by McGrade, Arthur Stephen, 73-96.
"I survey the texts used and the developments from Augustine onwards,
and discuss views of the purpose and nature of language and logic,
emphasizing their cognitive orientation. I examine the basic semantic
notion of signification, the distinction between conventional and natural
language, and the notion of mental language. I discuss extended uses of
language, especially paronymy and analogy, and theories of reference,
especially supposition theory. Finally, I consider various types of
paradox: "There is no truth" in proofs for the existence of God, the Liar
paradox, and the paradoxes of strict implication as treated in theories of
inference."
———. 2004. "Singular Terms and Singular Concepts: From Buridan
to the Early Sixteenth Century." In John Buridan and Beyond. Topics
in the Language Sciences 1300-1700, edited by Ebbesen, Sten and
1165
Friedman, Russell L., 121-151. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.
"This article considers medieval treatments of proper names and
demonstrative phrases in relation to the question of when and how we
are able to form singular concepts. The logical and grammatical
background provided by the authoritative texts of Porphyry and
Priscian is examined, but the main focus is on John Buridan and his
successors at Paris, from John Dorp to Domingo de Soto. Buridan is
linked to contemporary philosophers of language through his
suggestion that, although the name 'Aristotle' is a genuine proper name
only for those who have the appropriate singular concept caused by
acquaintance with Aristotle, it can be properly treated as a singular tem
by subsequent users because of their beliefs about the original
imposition of the name."
———. 2004. "Singular Terms and Predication in Some Late Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Century Thomistic Logicians." In Medieval Theories on
Assertive and Non-Assertive Language. Acts of the 14th European
Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. Rome, June 11-15,
2002, edited by Maierù, Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 517-536.
Florence: Olschki.
———. 2005. "Ockham Et La Distinction Entre Les Termes Abstraits
Et Concrets." Philosophiques no. 32:427-434.
"Quand j'ai lu l'ouvrage magistral de Claude Panaccio (*), je me suis
rendu compte que j'aurais de la difficulté à en discuter, parce que je suis
d'accord avec tout ce dit l'auteur, surtout en ce qui concerne les
problèmes du langage. Je trouve en particulier décisif les arguments
qu'il présente contre les thèses de Paul Spade. Ce dernier a argumenté,
en se basant sur trois prémisses, qu'il n'y a pas de terme connotatif
simple dans le langage mental. Premièrement, chaque terme connotatif
a une définition nominale qui, en principe, ne contient que des termes
absolus. Deuxièmement, un terme connotatif est synonyme de sa
définition.
Troisièmement, il n'y a pas de synonymie dans le langage mental. Il
s'ensuit que, dans le langage mental, un terme connotatif sera remplacé
par une séquence de termes absolus qui, selon Ockham, réfèrent aux
substances et qualités individuelles d'une manière directe. En
opposition à Spade, Panaccio a montré qu'il est impossible d'éliminer
les concepts connotatifs simples du langage mental et que les termes
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connotatifs simples ne sont pas synonymes de leurs définitions
nominales. Il est vrai que par ses analyses du langage Ockham voulait
montrer que l'on pouvait parler du monde sans multiplier les entités,
mais on peut atteindre cet objectif tout en admettant une certaine
complexité au niveau des concepts simples. En outre, Panaccio a établi
deux thèses importantes. D'abord, Ockham ne s'intéresse pas à la
construction d'un langage mental idéal mais plutôt au fonctionnement
idéal de notre esprit. En deuxième lieu, l'étude de ce fonctionnement
idéal ne nous donne pas toutes les solutions aux problèmes de
signification parce que, pour comprendre l'acception des termes, il faut
connaître les intentions des impositeurs, ceux qui ont donné leur
signification primordiale aux termes oraux. Selon Panaccio, Ockham
présente une théorie externaliste de la signification du langage." (p.
427)
(*) Ockham on Concepts, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.
———. 2006. "Logic Teaching at the University of Prague around
1400 A. D." In History of Universities. Vol. Xxi/1, edited by Feingold,
Mordechai, 211-221. New York: Oxford University Press.
Review of: Logica modernorum in Prague about 1400. The Sophistria
disputation 'Quoniam quatuor' (MS Cracow, Jagiellonian Library 686,
ff. 1ra-79rb), with a partial reconstruction of Thomas of Cleves' Logica
- Edition with an Introduction and Appendices by Egbert P. Bos,
Leiden, Brill, 2004.
"This book is largely (45-432) an edition of a Sophistria text that
represents logic teaching at the University of Prague around 1400 A.D.
While the anonymous author shows few signs of intellectual
distinction, both the topics chosen for discussion and the large number
of direct references to other logicians make the work a valuable source
for those interested in the undergraduate curriculum of the late middle
ages. The editor, E.P. Bos, has done an excellent job of presenting the
Latin text in as perspicuous a fashion as possible, and has provided the
reader with an analysis (8-10) of the somewhat haphazard way in which
the Prague master presented his sequences of arguments. However, in
order to understand the text, or to glean from it anything about
university teaching, one needs a good deal more than that. While Bos
does provide some basic information about the logicians referred to
(11-21), he tells the reader very little about Prague or its curriculum,
1167
and his brief list (28-32) of some of the views expressed in the text
sheds little light. On page 28 he writes, 'I shall discuss these views in
more detail later in the introduction', but unfortunately the promised
amplification is never provided. Nor is it clear why some of the views
were listed. For instance, the division of singular terms into three types
(29-30), including the vague individual (individuum vagum), such as
'this human being', is merely the standard interpretation, found in
Albert the Great and many later commentators, of a remark by
Porphyry in his lsagoge. In what follows, I shall provide some context
for the Sophistria text, before attempting to resolve the issue of its
nature and purpose." (p. 211)
———. 2007. "Metaphor and the Logicians from Aristotle to Cajetan."
"In this paper I shall sketch an answer to a series of questions about the
treatment of metaphor by medieval logicians. One question is
linguistic: are the words “translatio” and “transumptio” synonyms of
the word “metaphora”?
Three other questions concern analogy and equivocation. First, is
metaphor a type of equivocation? Second, is metaphor a type of
analogy and if so, what type? Is it linked with analogy in the Greek
sense of a similarity between two proportions or relations, or with
analogy in the new medieval sense of being said secundum prius et
posterius because of some attribution? Third, how many acts of
imposition are required for the production of analogical terms and
metaphors? This last issue is particularly important, given that words
are said to be used proprie only when used in accordance with an act of
imposition, and that metaphors are normally said to be taken improprie.
I will take up these questions in the context of three sets of texts. I will
start with some remarks about the texts of Aristotle and their reception
in the Middle Ages.
Secondly, I will look at translatio and transumptio in ancient grammar
and rhetoric. Finally, I will look at medieval logic texts, especially
commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations.
My study will show how ancient traditions in logic, grammar and
rhetoric were interwoven and used to tackle specifically medieval
problems. Aristotle played a prominent role in the story, but not
primarily because of his explicit discussions of metaphor in his Poetics
1168
and Rhetoric. Stoic thinkers contributed the theory of tropes or figures
of speech; and Neoplatonic commentators such as Porphyry influenced
Boethius’s discussion of equivocation and metaphor.
The thirteenth century theory of analogy itself grew out of the
interweaving of problems in Christian theology, Aristotelian
metaphysics and Aristotelian logic, but was enriched by the long Greek
and Arabic tradition of analysing ambiguous terms as being said
secundum prius et posterius. The resulting syntheses, especially in late
thirteenth and early fourteenth century British logicians, show a skilful
use of whatever parts of ancient traditions seemed relevant to the
particular interests and doctrines of the author in question." (pp. 311-
312)
———. 2008. "Developments in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth
Centuries." In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay,
"To understand the significance of these developments for the logician,
we have to consider three questions. First, how much of the medieval
logic described in the previous chapters survived? Second, insofar as
medieval logic survived, were there any interesting new development
in tit? Third, does humanist logic offer an interesting alternative to
medieval logic?
In Part One of this chapter I shall consider the first two questions in the
context of a historical overview in which I trace developments in logic
from the later middle ages thorough to 1606, the year in which the
Jesuits of Coimbra published their great commentary on Aristotle's
logical works, the Commentarii Conimbricenses in Dialecticam
Aristotelis. I shall begin by considering the Aristotelian logical corpus,
the six books of the Organon, and the production of commentaries on
this work. I shall the examine the fate of the specifically medieval
contributions to logic. Finally, I shall discuss the textbook tradition, and
the ways in which textbooks changes and developed during the
sixteenth century. I shall argue that the medieval tradition in logic co-
existed for some time with the new humanism, that sixteenth century is
dominated by Aristotelianism, and that what emerged at the end of the
sixteenth century was not so much a humanist logic as a simplified
Aristotelian logic.
1169
In Part Two of this chapter, I shall ask whether the claims made about
humanist logic and its novel contributions to probabilistic and informal
logic have nay foundation. I shall argue that insofar as there is any
principled discussion of such matters, it is to be found among writers in
the Aristotelian tradition." (p. 610)
———. 2009. "Le Syllogisme Topique Au Xvi Siècle: Nifo,
Melanchthon Et Fonseca." In Les Lieux De L'argumentation. Histoire
Du Syllogisme Topique D'aristote À Leibniz, edited by Biard, Joël and
Mariani Zini, Fosca, 409-423. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Examiner l'argumentation topique, les règles de validité du syllogisme
topique, les rapports entre l'analytique, la dialectique et la rhétorique
soulève deux problèmes. Tout d'abord, il y a une difficulté de
vocabulaire. Dans son Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis de 1560, le
jésuite Francisco de Toledo parle du syllogismus dialecticus seu
topicus, mais en général les logiciens des XVe et XVIe siècles parlaient
du syllogisme dialectique et non du syllogisme topique (1). Ensuite, il y
a une divergence entre d'un côté l'argumentation, le syllogisme, et les
règles de validité auxquels s'intéressent les logiciens, d'un autre côté les
arguments informels, les techniques de la persuasion et les stratégies
non-déductives auxquels s'intéressent les rhétoriciens (2). Afin d'étudier
les rapports entre ces deux groupes, et la place des arguments informels
dans la logique, s'il y en a, nous devrons aborder la notion de forme
logique, non par le biais d'un examen du syllogisme dialectique, mais
par le biais d'un examen des notions de conséquence, d'argumentation,
et de syllogisme en général. Nous allons découvrir que, pour
comprendre les rapports entre la logique et la rhétorique, l'enthymème
est beaucoup plus important que le syllogisme dialectique.
Les auteurs de petits manuels humanistes et ramistes ne nous offrent
pas de discussion approfondie et détaillée de ces notions. Seuls les
aristotéliciens s'en occupaient, et pour cette raison, nous allons
examiner trois auteurs qui étaient certes influencés par l'humanisme,
mais qui travaillaient dans un cadre aristotélicien enrichi par la logique
médiévale. L'italien Agostino Nifo (ca. 1470-1538) a publié sa
Dialectica ludicra en 1520 (3). Il connaissait très bien la logique
médiévale, mais il connaissait aussi bien les commentateurs grecs, et je
ferai référence à ses propres commentaires sur les Premiers Analytiques
et sur les Topiques d'Aristote (4). L'allemand Philippe Melanchthon
1170
(1497-1560) a publié son premier manuel de logique, Compendiaria
dialectices ratio en 1520, et son dernier, Erotemata dialectices en 1547
(5). Il manifeste l'influence de l'humanisme par ses exemples et ses
simplifications. Le jésuite portugais Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) a
publié ses Institutiones dialecticae en 1564 (6). Chez lui aussi
l'influence humaniste est manifeste, surtout par ses références aux
commentateurs grecs et son vocabulaire plus classique que médiéval.
Mon exposé se divisera en deux moments. À titre d'introduction, nous
examinerons les trois notions clés de conséquence, d'argumentation, et
de syllogisme. Ensuite, nous examinerons les textes de Nifo,
Melanchthon et Fonseca à la lumière de ces trois notions. (7)" (pp. 409-
410)
(1) Francisco de Toledo [Franciscus Toletus], Introductio in
dialecticam Aristotelis, dans Opera omnia philosophica I-III, Cologne
1615-1616 ; réimpr. Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1985, p. 74b. Dans une
édition de Jean Versor [Johannes Versor], Petrus Hispanus. Summulae
logicales cum Versorii Parisiensis clarissima expositione, Venise,
1572, réimpr. Hildesheim, New York, Georg Olms, 1981, f° 138 v, on
trouve le titre "De syllogismo Topico seu probabili", mais dans le texte
Versor parle du syllogisme dialectique. Voir aussi Robert Sanderson,
Logicae artis Compendium, ed. E. J. Ashworth, Bologna, Editrice
CLUEB, 1985, p. 179: "Syllogismus Topicus, qui & Dialecticus stricte,
est qui ex probabilibus vel quasi probabilibus parit probabilem
opinionem conclusionis". Pour deux sources médiévales, voir Gilles de
Rome [Aegidius Romanus], Super libros Posteriorum Analyticorum,
Venise, 1488; réimpr. Frankfurt, Minerva G.M.B.H., 1967, sign. a 5rb :
"sillogismus topicus [...] non est necessarius, sed est ut in pluribus"; et
Guillaume d'Ockham, Summa logicae, ed. P. Boehner, G. Gal et S.
Brown, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., St. Bonaventure University, 1974, p.
359: "Syllogismus topicus est syllogismus ex probabilibus".
(2) Pour plus de détails, voir E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Developments in
the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries", in D. M. Gabbay & J. Woods
(eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic 2. Mediaeval and Renaissance
Logic, Amsterdam-Boston, Elsevier, 2008, p. 609-643.
(3) Agostino Nifo [Augustinus Niphus], Dialectica ludicra tyrunculis
atque veteranis utillima peripatheticis consona : iunioribus
sophisticanribus contraria, Venetiis, 1521.
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(4) Agostino Nifo [Augustinus Niphus], Super libros Priorum
Aristotelis, Venetiis, 1554; et Agostino Nifo [Augustinus Niphus],
Commentaria in octo libros Topicorum Aristotelis, Parisiis, 1542.
(5) Philippe Melanchthon, Compendiaria dialectices ratio, dans Opera.
Corpus reformatorum XX, Brunsvigae, 1854; réimpr. New York et
Frankfurt am Main, 1963; Philippe Melanchthon, Erotemata
dialectices, dans Opera. Corpus reformatorum XIII, Halis Saxonum,
1846; réimpr. New York et Frankfurt am Main, 1963.
(6) edro da Fonseca [Petrus Fonseca], Instituiçoes dialécticas.
Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo, ed. J. Ferreira Gomes,
Universidade de Coimbra, 1964.
(7) Pour quelques textes, voir l'annexe. [pp. 424-430]
———. 2009. "The Problem of Religious Language: What Can We
Learn from Twelfth-Century Discussions?" Paradigmi.Rivista di
Critica Filosofica no. 27:141-152.
"This paper discusses a recent book by Luisa Valente, Logique et
théologie: Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220, in which she
gives a rich account of how twelfth and early thirteenth-century
Parisian theologians attempted to solve the problems of religious
language by appeal to the notions of propriety and translatio. Words
had a proper signification when used in accordance with their original
meaning, whereas translatio involved a semantic shift from the proper
sense to a new extended sense. However, words used in this way were
equivocal, and towards the end of the period theologians tried to save
the univocity of at least some of the words we apply to both God and
creatures. Their efforts form the background to the new thirteenth-
century theory of analogy, a theory to which some contemporary
philosophers of religion have returned."
———. 2010. "Terminist Logic." In The Cambridge History of
Medieval Philosophy. Vol I, edited by Pasnau, Robert and Dyke,
Christina van, 146-158. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Terminist logic is a specifically medieval development.(1) It is named
from its focus on terms as the basic unit of logical analysis, and so it
includes both supposition theory, together with its ramifications,(2) and
the treatment of syncategorematic terms. It also includes other areas of
investigation not directly linked with Aristotelian texts, notably
obligations, consequences, and insolubles (see Chapters to, 13, and 14).
1172
Logic was at the heart of the arts curriculum, for it provided the
techniques of analysis and much of the vocabulary found in
philosophical, scientific, and theological writing. Moreover, it trained
students for participation in the disputations that were a central feature
of medieval instruction, and whose structure, with arguments for and
against a thesis, followed by a resolution, is reflected in many written
works. This practical application affected the way in which logic
developed. While medieval thinkers had a clear idea of argumentation
as involving formal structures, they were not interested in the
development of formal systems, and they did not see logic as in any
way akin to mathematics.
Logic involved the study of natural language, albeit a natural language
(Latin) that was often regimented to make formal points, and it had a
straightforwardly cognitive orientation. The purpose of logic was to
separate the true from the false by means of argument, and to lead from
known premises to a previously unknown conclusion. In this process,
the avoidance of error was crucial, so there was a heavy emphasis on
the making of distinctions and on the detection of fallacies. The
procedures involved often have the appearance of being ad hoc, and
modern attempts to draw precise parallels between medieval theories as
a whole and the results of contemporary symbolic logic are generally
doomed to failure, even though there are many fruitful partial
correlations.
The core of the logic curriculum was provided by the works of
Aristotle with supplements from Boethius, Porphyry, and the
anonymous author of the Liber sex principiorum (about the last six
categories), once attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers. The logica vetus, or
Old Logic, included Porphyry's Isagoge, Aristotle's Categories and De
interpretatione, and the Liber sex principiorum. During the twelfth
century the logica nova, or New Logic, was rediscovered. It included
the rest of the Organon, namely Aristotle's Topics, Sophistical
Refutations, Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics. Boethius's
discussion of Topics, or ways of finding material for arguments, was
also part of the curriculum, though in the fourteenth century his De
differentiis topicis was largely replaced by the account of Topics given
by Peter of Spain in his Tractatus. Together these works provided a
basis for the study of types of predication, the analysis of simple
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categorical propositions and their relations of inference and
equivalence, the analysis of modal propositions, categorical and modal
syllogisms, fallacies, dialectical Topics, and scientific reasoning as
captured in the demonstrative syllogism. The texts were lectured on and
were the subject of detailed commentaries. Nonetheless, a need was felt
for simplified introductions to the material and for the discussion of
issues that were at best only hinted at by Aristotle." (pp. 146-147).
(1) Most of the literature dealing with terminist logic is in the form of
articles and book chapters. 'Two bibliographical guides are E. J.
Ashworth, The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar
from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century. A Bibliography
from 1836 Onwards (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1978), and Fabienne Pironet, The Tradition of Medieval Logic and
Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth
Century. A Bibliography (1977-1994) (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997). The
classic source of material is L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum A
Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic (Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1962-7) vol. I: On Twelfth-Century Theories of Fallacy, and
vol. II: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of
Supposition. Translations of various texts are found in N. Kretzmann
and E. Stump (eds.) : Cambridge Translations of Medieval
Philosophical Texts, vol. I: Logic and the Philosophy of Language
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Useful discussions
are provided by P. Osmund Lewry, "Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric
1220-1320," in J. Catto, (ed.) The History of University of Oxford, vol.
I: The Early Oxford Schools (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1984) 401-33,
and by N. Kretzmann et al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the
Disintegration of Scholasticism. 1100-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982).
(2) Not all of these ramifications will be discussed below. I shall omit
the discussions of non-referring terms and of relations.
———. 2011. "The Scope of Logic: Soto and Fonseca on Dialectic and
Informal Arguments." In Methods and Methodologies. Aristotelian
Logic East and West, 500-1500, edited by Cameron, Margaret and
Marenbon, John, 127-147. Leiden: Brill.
"...I have chosen to examine two sixteenth-century Iberian scholastics,
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the Spaniard Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) and the Portuguese Petrus
Fonseca (1528-1599), in order to see whether the changes in logical
method brought about by the supposed influence of humanism are
apparent. For Soto, I shall use the second edition of his Summulae,
printed in 1539/40, because this was the version that was reprinted in
Salamanca eight times, and that most successfully introduced Spaniards
to earlier sixteenth-century Parisian teachings.(4) Soto's preface (f. ii r-
v) shows that he had responded to humanism by simplifying and
reorganizing the text of the first edition, and by removing many
sophismata. However, he retained much medieval material including
supposition, consequences, exponibilia, insolubilia and obligationes.
For Fonseca, I shall use his popular Institutionum dialecticarum libri
octo, which was first published in Lisbon in 1564.(5) The last of its
fifty three editions appeared in Lyon in 1625. It follows Aristotle's
Organon, taking up material from the Categories, Perihermenias, Prior
and Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistici Elenchi in turn, but as
well as many classical references, it also contains some material about
exponibilia, consequences and supposition." (pp. 127-128)
(4) Domingo de Soto, Aeditio Secunda Summularum, Salamanca, 1539-
1540.
Note that the foliation is often inaccurate. I am grateful to Angel d'Ors
for providing me with photographs of this edition.
(5) Petrus Fonseca, Instituções Dialécticas. Institutionum dialecticarum
libri octo, Introdução, estabelecimento do texto, tradução e notas de
Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, 2 vols, Coimbra, Universidade de Coimbra,
1964.
(6) For further discussion of both textbooks, see Ashworth, Changes in
logic textbooks from 1500 to 1650: the new Aristotelianism, 1988, esp.
81-84.
———. 2013. "Analogy and Metaphor from Thomas Aquinas to Duns
Scotus and Walter Burley." In Later Medieval Metaphysics. Ontology,
Language, and Logic, edited by Bolyard, Charles and Keele, Rondo,
223-248. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press.
"In the history of Aristotelianism and Thomism people often speak
about analogia entis, the analogy of being, (1) or what, following
Giorgio Pini and Silvia Donati, I shall call metaphysical analogy. (2) In
fact, this notion was foreign to Aristotle, and for Thomas Aquinas
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analogy, under that name, was semantic analogy. (3) It belonged to the
theory of language, since it was regarded as a type of equivocation, the
medieval name for homonymy. Metaphor too was closely related to
equivocation, although, unlike analogy, it was an improper use of
language, and produced by usage rather than imposition. In the second
half of the thirteenth century logicians began to worry about how
semantic analogy could be produced by imposition, and how analogical
terms could be related to concepts. If a single term is used in different
but related senses, does this come about through one original act of
imposition, or through two related acts? If there are two acts, can we
speak of a single term? If there is just one act, what of the concept or
concepts to which that term is subordinated? Can there be a single
concept which conveys related senses, and if not, how can the
relationship between two concepts be captured by a single act of
imposition? As a result of such worries some thinkers, especially John
Duns Scotus, abandoned semantic analogy. What was called analogy
was now metaphysical analogy, and, at the linguistic level, metaphor
replaced semantic analogy. It is the history of these developments that I
shall discuss in this essay, and in so doing, I shall show something of
the interplay between logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind." (p.
223)
(1) For the analogy of being see Pierre Aubenque, "Sur la naissance de
la doctrine pseudo-aristotélicienne de l'analogie de l'être," Les études
philosophiques 3/4 (1989): 291-304; Alain de Libera, "Les sources
gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l'analogie de l'être," Les études
philosophiques 3/4 (1989): 319-45; and E. Jennifer Ashworth,
"L'analogie de l'être et les homonymes: Catégories, 1 dans le Guide de
l'étudiant" in L'enseignement de la philosophie au xiiie siècle. Autour
du «Guide de l'étudiant» du ms. Ripoll 109, ed. Claude Lafleur with the
collaboration of Joanne Carrier (Studia Artistarum 5. Tumhout,
Belgium: Brepols, 1997), pp. 281-95. For a general discussion of
analogy, see E. Jennifer Ashworth, Les théories de l'analogie du Xlle
au XVIe siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 2008).
(2) Silvia Donati, "La discussione sull'unità del concetto di ente nella
tradizione di commento della Fisica: commenti parigini degli anni
1270-1315 ca." in Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für fan
A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Martin Pickavé (Miscellanea
1176
Mediaevalia 30. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), pp. 60-
139; and Giorgio Pini, Scoto e l'analogia. Logica e metafisica nei
commenti aristotelici (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2002).
(3) For discussion of Aquinas see E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Signification
and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to
Aquinas on Analogy," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991):
39-67; E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-
Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 94-
135; Joël Lonfat, "Archéologie de la notion d'analogie d'Aristote à saint
Thomas d'Aquin," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen
âge 71 (2004): 35-107; and Seung-Chan Park, Die Rezeption der
mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der Theologie des Thomas von
Aquin. Mit besondere Berücksichtigung der Analogie (Studien und
Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittalters 65. Leiden, Boston, Köln:
Brill, 1999).
———. 2013. "Aquinas, Scotus and Others on Naming, Knowing and
the Origin of Language " In Logic and Language in the Middle Ages. A
Volume in Honour of Sten Ebbesen, edited by Fink, Jakob Leth,
Hansen, Heine and Mora-Márquez, Ana María, 257-272. Leiden: Brill.
———. 2013. "Being and Analogy." In A Companion to Walter
Burley. Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, edited by Conti,
Alessandro, 135-165. Leiden: Brill.
"Burley’s discussion of being (ens) and analogy is notable for his thesis
that the word “being” corresponds to a single analogical concept.
Moreover, he was part of a movement, begun in the later 13th century,
which explicitly opposed semantic analogy, a doctrine of language, to
metaphysical analogy, the doctrine that just as creatures are beings
analogically through their relationship to God, the first cause, whose
very essence is being, so accidents are beings analogically through their
relationship to the substance, a being per se, on which they depend.
Obviously, what is new here is not the doctrine itself, but the fact that
the relations between God and creatures, substance and accident, were
described as analogical. Unlike John Duns Scotus, who insisted that no
single word could express a real relation between things ordered in
accordance with priority and posteriority, and that no single concept
could capture such a relation, Burley retained the link between
semantic analogy and metaphysical analogy, for he believed that our
1177
words and our concepts can mirror the world. On the other hand, he
broke the link between semantics and ontology for other terms
traditionally regarded as analogical, such as “healthy", by construing
these as metaphorical in their secondary senses.
In what follows I shall begin by surveying the sources in which
Burley’s views are expressed. I shall then consider some basic notions
in the medieval theory of language, including analogy, but also
signification, imposition, and metaphor. Next I shall discuss the
standard divisions of equivocation and how these related to both
analogy and metaphor in Burley’s writings. Finally, I will discuss how
Burley deals with ens, first from the point of view of semantics, and
then from the point of view of metaphysics." (p. 135).
———. 2013. "Descent and Ascent from Ockham to Domingo De
Soto: An Answer to Paul Spade." In Medieval Supposition Theory
Revisited. Studies in Memory of L. M. De Rijk, edited by Bos, Egbert
Peter, 385-410. Leiden: Brill.
"Paul Spade has attacked the theory of the modes of personal
supposition as found in Ockham and Buridan, partly on the grounds
that the details of the theory are incompatible with the equivalence
between propositions and their descended forms which is implied by
the appeal to suppositional descent and ascent. I trace the development
of the doctrines of ascent and descent from the mid-fourteenth century
to the early sixteenth century, and I investigate Domingo de Soto's
elaborate account of how descent and ascent actually worked. I show
that although Soto himself shared some of Spade's doubts, including
those about the use of merely confused supposition, he had a way of
reducing at least some propositions containing terms with such
supposition to equivalent disjunctions and conjunctions of singular
propositions. Moreover, he gave explicit instructions on how to avoid
the supposed problem of O-propositions." (p. 385)
———. 2013. "Domingo De Soto on the Categories: Words, Things,
and Denominatives." In Aristotle's Categories in the Byzantine, Arabic
and Latin Traditions, edited by Ebbesen, Sten, Marenbon, John and
Thom, Paul, 263-284. Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of
1178
Sciences and Letters.
"Despite humanist attacks, notably by Petrus Ramus, Porphyry’s
Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories retained their place in university
education throughout the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth
century. Indeed, as late as the 1660s the logic notes in John Locke’s
early manuscripts are largely devoted to predication, the five
predicables, and the ten categories, (1) and in his Essay concerning
human understanding Locke found it necessary to complain about
those “bred up in the Peripatetick Philosophy” who “think the Ten
Names, under which are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly
conformable lo the Nature of Things”. (2) Original and sustained
discussion of these matters is, however, harder to find. Most textbooks
cover the issues only in a summary fashion, and such a leading
commentator as Agostino Nifo wrote no commentary on Porphyry’s
Isagoge or on the Categories. Domingo de Soto is one exception. His
substantial commentary on the Categories, combined with
commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Posterior
Analytics, was published 18 times between 1543 and 1598, mainly in
Salamanca, but with one edition in Louvain and five in Venice. (3)
In his commentary, Soto addresses the main questions faced by
medieval and Renaissance thinkers, namely does the work deal with
words or things, and why is it classified as an introduction to logic? He
then takes up a number of subsidiary questions, two of which I shall
discuss below. First, why does the work begin with the discussion of
equivocals, univocals and denominatives? Second, are denominatives
really like equivocals and univocals in relevant respects? In what
follows I shall begin by sketching Soto’s main conclusions about the
nature and purpose of Aristotle’s Categories as a whole. This will lead
me into a discussion of predication, and what it is that we predicate. I
shall then turn to the subsidiary questions about why the work opens as
it does, and about the status of denominatives." (pp. 263-264)
(...)
"Conclusion.
To conclude, what I find striking about Soto’s discussion of the parts of
the Categories that I have chosen to focus on is not only that he
provides a coherent and thoughtful discussion, but that he displays the
strong influence of the tradition of Oxford realism found in Walter
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Burley and Paul of Venice. It is easy to think of Soto as a Renaissance
Thomist, but in fact, he was a well-read eclectic." (p. 280)
(1) See Ashworth 'Locke and Scholasticism', in M. Stuart (ed.), A
Companion to Locke, Blackwell: Oxford, forthcoming [December
2015].
(2) Locke, Essay, III.x.14, p. 497.
(3) Lohr 1988: 431. For a general summary of Soto’s position, see Bos
2000. For a useful introduction to medieval views, see Pini 200a. For
Soto on equivocation, see Ashworth 1996. Bos and Ashworth give
different dates for Soto’s birth, but Angel d’Ors (in private
correspondence) supported the view that 1494 is the correct date. I owe
much to Angel d’Ors (d. 2012) for his useful comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
———. 2013. "Logic." In The Cambridge History of Science. Volume
2: Medieval Science, edited by Lindberg, David C. and Shank, Michael
H., 532-547. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Medieval logic is crucial to the understanding of medieval science for
several reasons.(1) At the practical level, every educated person was
trained in logic, which provided not only a technical vocabulary and
techniques of analysis that permeate philosophical, scientific, and
theological writing but also the training necessary for participation in
the disputations that were a central feature of medieval instruction. At
the theoretical level, medieval logicians made several contributions.
First, they discussed logic itself, its status as a science, its relation to
other sciences, and the nature of its objects.
Here it is important to note that medieval thinkers took a science
(scientia) to be an organized body of certain knowledge that might
include theology, logic, and grammar as well as mathematics and
physics. Second, they discussed the nature of a demonstrative science
and scientific method in general. Third, they provided a semantics that
allows one to sort out the ontological commitments carried by nouns
and adjectives. The discussion of connotative terms is particularly
important here since it allowed logicians
to analyze such terms as “motion” without postulating the existence of
anything other than ordinary objects and their qualities. Fourth, they
provided particular logical strategies that allow one to sort out the truth-
conditions for scientific claims. Particularly important here are
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supposition theory, the distinction between compounded and divided
senses, and the analysis of propositions containing such
syncategorematic terms as "begins" and "ceases"." (pp. 532-533)
(1) For full information about medieval logic, see Catarina Dutilh
Novaes, Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories: Suppositio,
Consequentiae and Obligationes (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007); Dov M.
Gabbay and John Woods, eds., Handbook of the History of Logic 2:
Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic (Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-
Holland, 2008); Klaus Jacobi, ed., Argumentationstheorie:
Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln
korrekten Folgerns (Leiden: Brill, 1993); Norman Kretzmann, Anthony
Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982);
Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, trans., The Cambridge
Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1: Logic and the
Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988); and Mikko Yrjonsuuri, ed., Medieval Formal Logic:
Obligations, Insolubles and Consequences (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2001).
———. 2014. "Aquinas on Analogy." In Debates in Medieval
Philosophy. Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, edited
by Hause, Jeffrey, 232-242. New York: Routledge.
"In this short chapter, I hope to demonstrate the importance of pay
close attention to the historical context of the theory of analogy, and to
the way in which technical terms were actually used when explicating
Aquinas’ theory of analogy. In addition, I intend to argue that
McInerny gets Aquinas’ theory wrong partly because he places too
little emphasis on the fact that Aquinas was principally concerned with
the names we use of God.
Introduction
Analogy is a notion with various uses. In epistemology one can speak
of coming to know something new on the basis of an analogy or
likeness between two things and such analogies can form the basis for
analogical arguments, including the argument from design for the
existence of God. In ontology, the so-called analogy of being refers to
the doctrine that reality is divided horizontally into the very different
realities of substances and accidents, (1) and vertically into the very
1181
different realities of God and creatures, and that these different realities
are related by some kind of likeness. However, for the purposes of this
discussion, we are primarily concerned with analogy as a doctrine
belonging to the philosophy of language and most especially as a
solution to the problem of religious language.
Aquinas has been hailed through the centuries as making a particularly
important contribution, and recent philosophers of religion have taken
the doctrines seriously (e.g. Swinburne 1977, Alston 1993). But there
are various problems, many stemming from the fact that nowhere does
Aquinas give a sustained account of analogy, but rather he employs the
notion on an ad hoc basis to settle the issues under discussion in a
particular place. One problem, which I shall touch on briefly below, is
whether his account of analogy changed over the years. Two other
problems have been discussed fairly extensively by McInerny. One is
the question of whether it is a theory of language at all, or whether
Aquinas was more concerned with the analogy of being; another
concerns the truth of the long-held belief that Cardinal Cajetan’s book
on analogy, published in 1506, though written in 1498, gave an
accurate account of Aquinas. Mclnerny has successfully argued that
Aquinas was indeed concerned with analogical terms, even though his
account had certain metaphysical views as its basis, and that Cajetan is
not a good interpreter of Aquinas. (2) In what follows, I shall focus on
another aspect of Aquinas: how his theory is embedded in specifically
medieval semantics. It is here that the fourth chapter of Mclnerny’s
book (Analogous Names, chapter 13, this volume) offers a useful object
lesson in the importance of getting such matters straight. Aquinas wrote
in a specific context, and he used terminology with an established
meaning that his readers would have known. It is a mistake to read a
thirteenth-century author (or any other, for that matter) as if he wrote in
a vacuum, and as if his views were only related to thinkers such as
Boethius, Cajetan, and John of St. Thomas, who were all far removed
from him in time. The only author contemporary with Aquinas cited by
McInerny is Albert the Great, and the references are not always
helpful." (pp. 232-233)
(1) Editor’s note: Aquinas explains that, in contrast to a substance, an
accident’s mode of being is to exist in something else. For instance, a
horse is a substance, but its size, color, are accidents because their
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nature is to exist in something else.
(2) While Mclnerny successfully dismisses Cajetan as an interpreter, he
does not recognize that much of Cajetan’s discussion is directed
towards some fifteenth-century authors rather than Aquinas himself.
References
William P. Alston, “Aquinas on Theological Predication: A Look
Backward and a Look Forward.” In Reasoned Faith: Essays in
Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore
Stump. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 145-
178.
Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1996.
Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1977.
———. 2015. "Medieval Theories of Signification to John Locke." In
Linguistic Content. New Essays on the History of Philosophy of
Language, edited by Cameron, Margaret and Stainton, Robert J., 156-
175. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Locke wrote that “Words... came to be made use of by Men, as the
Signs of their Ideas... The use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of
Ideas; and the Ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate
Signification” (Essay, 3.2.1). (1) Behind this brief and controversial
passage lies a long development of interrelated discussions of the
Aristotelian semantic triangle: the discussion of spoken words as signs,
both of things and of concepts; the discussion of whether the things
signified are natures (whatever their ontological status) or individual
existents; and the discussion of ordering: do words signify things or
concepts primarily? In this chapter I hope to do three things: (i) trace
the history of developments from the thirteenth to the seventeenth
century; (ii) throw some light on the issue of whether the theory of
signification is a theory of meaning; (iii) illuminate the immediate
background to Locke on language. (2)
My treatment is partly synoptic, partly chronological. Given the long
period I am dealing with, and the complicated doctrinal history
involved, I shall simplify my account by tracing just a few influential
doctrines and focusing on just a few authors, though I shall make
occasional references to other figures. The main path I intend to follow
1183
starts with Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-74), for, although he was not a
logician, he had many things to say about language, and his views,
particularly as found in his unfinished commentary on Aristotle’s Peri
hermeneias, were influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
(3) I shall then turn to the two fourteenth-century nominalists, William
of Ockham (c. 1287—1347) and John Buridan (1295/1300-1358/ 61 ).
(4) Both men were very influential at the University of Paris in the late
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, though Thomism also had a role
to play there. For my purposes, the most important product of the
Parisian schools is the Dominican, Domingo de Soto (1494-1560),
who, while absorbing many features of nominalist logic, is more
properly described as an eclectic Thomist. He published his popular
logical works after his return to Spain, where he retained a strong
influence into the seventeenth century. Another important Iberian was
the Portuguese Jesuit Petrus Fonseca (1528-99), whose work inspired
the Conimbricenses, commentaries on Aristotle’s works produced by
the Jesuits at Coimbra. The volume on Aristotle’s Organon was first
published in 1606. Other significant Jesuit authors include the two
Spaniards Franciscus Toletus (1533-96) and Antonius Rubius (1548-
1615) and the Polish logician Martinus Smiglecius (1564-1618). The
importance of these late Scholastic authors is twofold. First, they were
all moderate realists in the Thomistic tradition, although they were well
acquainted with nominalism and Scotism. Second, they were read
throughout Europe and, in particular, were used at the University of
Oxford. Descartes told Mersenne that he recalled reading the
Conimbricenses, Toletus, and Rubius (AT III, 185), (5) and, when
Locke was teaching at Christ Church, Oxford, he recorded in a
notebook that his students bought works by Smiglecius (Ashworth
1981: 304)." (pp. 156-157)
(1) Quotations are taken from Locke, An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1975, but references will be given in standard format
so that other editions can also be used.
(2) See Ashworth (1981, 1984, 1987) for discussion of the sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century background.
(3) For a wider perspective on the earlier period, see Rosier, La Parole
comme acte: Sur la grammaire et la sémantique au XIIIe siècle, Paris:
1184
Vrin 1994 and Rosier-Catach, La Parole efficace: Signe, rituel, sacré,
Paris: Editions du Seuil 2004. For more on Aquinas, sec Ashworth
(1999). References to Aquinas will be given in standard format, since
there are many editions (and some translations) of his works.
(4) For nominalism, See Biard, Logique et théorie du signe au XlVe
siècle, Paris: Vrin 1989, Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, Aldershot and
Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2004 and Klima, John Buridan, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2009.
(5) I give standard references to the Adam and Tannery edition
(Descartes 1897-1913).
———. 2015. "Richard Billingham and the Oxford Obligationes Texts:
Restrictions on positio." Vivarium no. 53:372-390.
"The study of Oxford Obligationes texts in the 14th century owes much
to the work of Angel d’Ors.(1) Fittingly, it is also a subject linked with
Spain through the work attributed to Juan de Pastrana, the publication
of the Oxford Sophistrie in 1503, and the presence of texts by Richard
Billingham and others in Spanish libraries. (2) In this paper, I intend to
focus on one aspect of a group of texts associated with the University
of Oxford, namely the restrictions placed on the very first rule of the
type of obligations called positio, and their relation to the sophismata
introduced to illustrate the very difficulties that these restrictions were
intended to counter. One of my intentions here is to show what was
said in a series of rather modest texts that must have been used in actual
teaching.
First, however, it is necessary to say something about the Obligationes
treatises themselves and what they were about." (p. 372)
(1) See especially Angel d’Ors, ‘Sobre las Obligationes de Richard
Lavenham’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge
58 (1991), 253-78; Angel d’Ors, ‘Sortes non currit vel Sortes movetur
(Roger Swyneshed, Obligationes, § 137-138)’, Archives d’histoire
doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 60 (1993), 165-72; Angel d’Ors
and Manuel García-Clavel, ‘Sobre las Obligationes de Robert Fland.
Antiqua et nova responsio’, Revista de Filosofía 7 (1994), 51-8. For
some discussion, see E.J. Ashworth, ‘Autour des Obligationes de Roger
Swyneshed: la nova responsio’, Les études philosophiques 3 (1996),
341-60.
(2) See below for details.
1185
———. 2016. "Locke and Scholasticism." In A Companion to Locke,
edited by Stuart, Matthew, 82-99. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
"Introduction. Locke’s public attitude to scholasticism is well known.
Many are the disparaging references to the schoolmen, their reliance on
disputational success rather than the search for truth, and their obscure
jargon. In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he writes that
“the Schoolmen” found the “very useless Skill” of disputing “a good
Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious and unexplicable
Web of perplexed Words” (3.10.8). Yet public attitudes can be
misleading. Descartes professed to be making a new start, yet historians
of philosophy have become increasingly aware of how much he took
for granted of what he had learned from the Jesuits at La Flèche.
Moreover, philosophers often turn out to be in dialogue with their
predecessors even if they do not make this explicit. We have to ask
whether the same is true of Locke. Did he enter into a secret dialogue
with any scholastics? Are there features of his thought that can be
explained in terms of scholastic assumptions?
In order to answer these questions, we need to look at who the
schoolmen referred to by Locke were, and what he might have learned
from them, particularly with respect to topics in metaphysics, logic, and
language. First, however, we must consider the Oxford curriculum
which provided the framework for Locke’s years of study and teaching
there, as there is little reason to believe that he enriched his
acquaintance with the schoolmen in his later career." (p. 82)
———. 2017. "Philosophy of Language: Words, Concepts, Things,
and Non-Things." In The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth-Century
Philosophy, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik and Hill, Benjamin, 350-372.
New York: Routledge.<br>"One of the big questions raised by the
philosophy of language is how our words relate to the world we live in.
Some of the words we use seem to be names of the things around us:
‘Socrates’ seems to name an actual person, and ‘smiling’ seems to
name something that he does. Similarly, ‘dog’ and ‘horse’ seem to
name ordinary examples of types of living thing, but do they also name
common natures that have a status of their own, apart from individuals?
What about such words as ‘blindness’ and ‘nonbeing,’ or the names of
fictional entities such as ‘chimera’? What about so-called analogical
words such as ‘being,’ which seems to encompass both substances and
1186
accidents, both God and creatures? And what about words in particular
contexts, such as ‘Some men are dead’ or ‘The meadows are smiling’?
In this chapter, I shall first say something about the general background
to sixteenth-century philosophies of language, and I shall then explore
the views of two particular groups of philosopher on how it is that our
words relate to the world, ending with a detailed examination of
doctrines of analogy." (p. 350)
BRIEF ARTICLES
Two articles in Handbook of Ontology and Metaphysics edited by H.

Burkhardt and B. Smith (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1991):
Joachim Jungius,
Post-Medieval Logic.
Seven articles in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Robert

Audi (Cambridge University Press, 1995), Second edition, 1999:
Giordano Bruno,
Tommaso Campanella,
Marsilio Ficino,
Pedro da Fonseca,
Jean Gerson,
Paracelsus,
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.
Nine articles in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (edited by

Edward Craig) London & New York: Routledge 1998:
1187
Giordano Bruno,
Language,
Renaissance Philosophy of,
Lipsius, Justus (1547-1606),
Logic, Medieval,
Logic, Renaissance,
Paracelsus (Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von

Hohenheim) (1493-1541),
Patrizi da Cherso, Francesco (1529-1597),
Paul of Venice (1369/72-1429),
Renaissance Philosophy.
"Logic." in The Classical Tradition, Anthony Grafton, edited by Glenn W.

Most and Salvatore Settis, pp. 540B–543B. Cambridge, Mass., London,
England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.
"Q. 3, § 3: Analysis of Langton’s Arguments" in Stephen Langton,

Quaestiones theologiae liber I, edited by Riccardo Quinto & Magdalena
Bieniak, pp. 217–222. Printed for the British Academy by the Oxford
RELATED PAGES

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Annotated Bibliography of Lambertus

Marie de Rijk. First Part: from 1950 to
1974
INTRODUCTION
L. M. de Rijk, (Hilversum, November, 6 1924 - Maastricht June, 30 2012)
was Professor of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy at the University of
Leiden, and Honorary Professor at the University of Maastricht.
A complete bibliography of his writings up to 1999 is available in: Maria
Kardaun and Joke Spruyt (eds.) - The winged chariot. Collected essays on
Plato and Platonism in honour of L. M. de Rijk - Leiden, Brill, 2000. pp. XV-
XXVI. I made some corrections, updated the bibliography and omitted the
publications in Dutch.
"The present volume is dedicated to De Rijk on the occasion of his 65th

birthday and his retirement as a professor in Ancient and Medieval
philosophy at the University of Leiden. It contains fourteen of De Rijk's
philosophical studies (articles) on medieval logic and semantics. Research on
manuscripts and editions of texts have not been included. As the table of
contents shows, the studies cover the period from Boethius (6th century) to
William of Ockham (ca. 1285 - 1347) and have been ordered according to
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centuries.
Now some remarks on the main lines of De Rijk's interpretations of
mediaeval semantics and metaphysics, as found in the studies collected here.
The title of the volume, first, indicates De Rijk's interest in Mediaeval
thinkers' views on reality. These views were influenced by theology (see esp.
study I). However, medieval semantic views (i.e. the philosophical theories
on how terms signify) were basic as the starting point in ontological
speculation. Man expresses his views on reality by way of language. De
Rijk's aim is to understand how the Medieval philosophers and theologians
interpreted reality according to their own semantic views.
De Rijk distinguishes between the use of a name in its name-giving function
as opposed to statemental predication, where a term acts as the predicate term
of a proposition. The contextual position of a name (in syntax) affects the
semantic value. De Rijk gives as examples of these syntactical contexts: first
of all, the proposition (in its general form: subject - predicate); further on,
intensional contexts (where verbs like 'to know' influence what is said in the
proposition) and modal contexts (with modal terms like 'possible' etcetera).
De Rijk's analysis of an intensional contest can be seen most clearly in his
studies on Peter Abailard (1079 - 1142) (studies II - VI). Universals or
general names occur in contexts with verbs which denote an act of the mind,
viz. abstraction. According to De Rijk, Abailard interprets universals as the
intrinsic objects of the acts of understanding (see especially study III, p. 145).
If someone conceives of the general name 'man', there is, in De Rijk's line of
interpretation, an act of 'man-understanding'.
(...)
Word order is considered a 'rendez-vous' of logic and ontology (see
especially study VIII). In asinus cuiuslibet hominis currit (which means, in an
awkward litteral rendering: 'everybody's ass is running') the subject term 'ass'
which (in the Latin text) precedes the distributive sign 'everybody's' is not
affected by it and, accordingly, refers to one particular individual which is the
common property of everybody. On the other hand, in cuiuslibet hominis
asinus currit ('each man's ass is running'), in following the sign the term 'ass'
is prevented from pursuing its primary inclination to refer to some individual
and stands 'opaquely' for a multitude of individuals.
The verb esse ('to be') and its related forms - e.g. ens ('being'), as well as
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connected terms such as existentia ('existence') - are pivotal terms in
medieval metaphysics, ontology and theology. The first formal object of
metaphysics in the Middle Ages is either the highest spiritual substances -
God and the angels (this interpretation is ascribed to the Arab Averroes) - or
'being in general' (in the interpretation given by the Arab Avicenna). In the
Latin Middle Ages both views are advocated, as well as a combination.
Whichever view is taken, the semantics of esse is crucially important (see
especially studies I and V)."
From the Preface by Egbert P. Bos to: E. P. Bos (ed.), Through Language to
Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics-, Northampton:
Variorum Reprints 1989.
L. M. de Rijk was on of the founder of the review VIVARIUM. An

International Journal for the Philosophy and Intellectual Life of the Middle
Ages and Renaissance.
The Editorial of the first number of Vivarium (1963):

"Issuing a new journal needs some justification. The editors of VIVARIUM
do not intend to found a journal for mediaeval philosophy tout court. The
philosophical systems of the Middle Ages can be approached from more than
one point of view. They can be - and frequently are - studied in their relation
to mediaeval theology. The present journal, however, will be devoted in
particular to mediaeval philosophy in its relations to the whole of profane
thought and learning and the vast field of the Liberal Arts.
The editors of VIVARIUM are of opinion that this approach of mediaeval
philosophy deserves some more attention than usually is paid to it. While
fully aware of the merits of the existing journals concerned with mediaeval
philosophy, they only wish to create a more appropriate forum for what might
be called the profane side of the intellectual life. They hope to stimulate the
achievements of an increasing number of scholars in their country and
abroad, likely to have an active interest in this field of research.
Cassiodorus' monastery is more than a name. It embodies the scientific and
didactic program of one of the important centres of culture 'in early Western
Europe. Therefore the name VIVARIUM has been chosen for this journal.
1191
C. J. de Vogel, L. M. de Rijk, J. Engels."
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1950. "Some Notes on Aristotle,

Metaphysics a 4, 985b9." Mnemosyne no. 4:314-318.
"In Metaph. A 4, 985b4 ff. Aristotle speaks about the atomists
Leucippus and Democritus. For they, he says, the void is by no means
less than the full. (...) W, Jaeger (Hermes, 52, 1917 pp. 486 f.) is right
in maintaining the reading of all the manuscripts." p. 314.
———. 1951. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories."
Mnemosyne no. 4:129-159.
"Most scholars either deny Aristotle's authorship of the first treatise of
the Organon, or else consider the problem of authorship to be insoluble.
I maintain, however, that such judgements are wrong and that the
treatise is of genuine Aristotelian authorship, and of considerable
importance for our knowledge both of Aristotle's own development,
and also that of later Platonism. I shall try to show the authenticity of
the treatise in the following study, and shall divide my investigation
into the following main divisions:
A. The view of the ancient commentators concerning the authenticity of
Categories Chs. 1-9;
B. Modern criticism of the authenticity of Categories Chs. 1-9;
C. The authenticity of Categories Chs. 10-15."
[See also the following note to Ancient and mediaeval semantics and
metaphysics (Second part) - Vivarium, November, 1978, p. 85: "Unlike
some 30 years ago (see my papers published in Mnemosyne 1951), the
present author has his serious doubts, now, on the authenticity of the
first treatise of the Organon"].
———. 1952. The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's
Philosophy. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Ph.D. thesis, Utrecht University.
From the Introduction: "It seems to be the fatal mistake of philology
that it always failed to get rid of Kantian influences as to the question
of the relation of logic and ontology. Many modern mathematical
logicians have shown that the logical and the ontological aspect not
1192
only are inseparable but also that in many cases it either lacks good
sense or is even impossible to distinguish them. Accordingly, the
distinction of logical and ontological truth (especially of propositional
truth and term-truth), that of logical and ontological accident and that
of logical and ontological categories, has not the same meaning for
modem logic as it seems to have for 'traditional' logic (for instance the
logic of most Schoolmen).
I hope to show in this study that the distinction of a logical and an
ontological aspect (especially that of logical and ontological categories)
can be applied to the Aristotelian doctrine only with the greatest
reserve. A sharp distinction carried through rigorously turns out to be
unsuitable when being applied to Aristotelian logic. For both aspects
are, for Aristotle, not only mutually connected but even interwoven,
and this in such a way that the ontological aspect seems to prevail, the
logical being only an aspect emerging more or less in Aristotle's
generally ontological way of thinking." pp. 6-7.
Contents: Bibliography I-III; Introduction 1-7; Chapter I. Aristotle's
doctrine of truth 8-35; Chapter II. The distinction of essential and
accidental being pp. 31-43; Chapter III. Logical and ontological
accident 44-52; Chapter IV. The nature of the categories in the
Metaphysics 53-66; Chapter V. The doctrine of the categories in the
first treatise of the Organon 67-75; Chapter VI. The use of the
categories in the work of Aristotle 76-88; Appendix. The names of the
categories 89-92; Index locorum 93-96.
Petrus, Abaelardus. 1956. Petrus Abaelardus. Dialectica. Assen: Van
Gorcum.
First complete edition of the Parisian manuscript with an introduction;
second revised edition 1970.
From the Introduction: "§ 3. The task of logic according to Abailard.
Abailard understands 'logica' or 'dialectica' as the art which aims at
distinguishing valid arguments from invalid ones. We find a clear
exposition of his opinion on this matter in the prologue to the treatise
Logica Nostrorum petitioni. Abailard here points to the fact that logic is
not a theory of thought, which teaches us how we ought to think and
dispute: its only function is to distinguish valid arguments from invalid
ones and to state why (quare) they are valid or not:
est autem logica Tullii auctoritate diIigens ratio disserendi, idest
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discretio argumentorum per quae disseritur, idest disputatur. non enim
est logica scientia utendi argumentis sive componendi ea, sed
discernendi et diiudicandi veraciter de eis, quare scilicet haec valeant,
illa infirma lint. (Log. Nostr. petit., 506, 24-28).
This distinction is made, as a matter of course, on rational grounds. The
'quare haec valeant, illa infirma sint' finds its answer in the presence
(c.q. absence) of conclusive force (vis inferentiae, vis argumenti, vis
sermonis). It sometimes rests on the pure form of reasoning (ipsa
complesso terminorum): in this case we speak of complexional
arguments; the other case is, if the matter of the argument contributes to
its conclusive force: we speak, then, of topical arguments:
argumentationes quaedam sunt locales, quaedam vero complexionales
quidem sunt quae ex ipsa complexione, idest ex ipsorum terminorum
dispositione, firmitudinem contrahunt; locales vero sunt quibus
convenienter potest assignari locus, idest evidentia conferri ex aliquo
eventu rerum vel proprietate sermonis. (Log. Nostr. petit., 508 9-15).
Since complexional and topical arguments borrow their conclusive
force from respectively the arrangement of the terms (dispositio
terminorum), and the state of affairs (eventus rerum) or the properties
of speech (proprietas sermonis), their valuation requires some insight
into the structure of proposition and into the properties of speech, the
state of affairs being only secondarily the object of logic. The author
elsewhere (Dial. III, 286 31-34) states that the scope of logic is to
inquire into the use of speech, in the full sense of the word; inquiring
into the nature of things (res) belongs to the domain of physics:
in scribenda Logica hic ordo est necessarius: cum logica sit discretio
argumentorum, argumentationes vero ex propositionibus coniungantur,
propositiones ex dictionibus, cum qui perfecte Logicam scribit, primum
naturas s i m p l i c i u m sermonum, deinde compositorum necesse est
investigare et tandem in argumentationibus finem Logicae
consummare. (Log. Nostr. petit., 508 4-9).
..... hoc autem logicae disciplinae proprium relinquitur, ut scilicet
vocum impositiones pensando, quantum unaquaque proponatur
oratione sive dictione, discutiat; physicae vero proprium est inquirere
utrum rei natura consentiat enuntiationi (Dial. III, 286 31-34)
Aristotle deals with the use of speech, Abailard says (Log. Nostr. petit.,
508,32 -- 509,8), in his Categories, De Interpretatione and Topics, and
1194
with argumentations in his Prior and Posterior Analytics: Porphyry
wrote an introduction to the first-mentioned treatise. Thus, the scheme
of his own Dialectica is obvious: he first treats of the parts of speech
(partes orationis) tractatus I; next the categorical propositions and
syllogisms are dealt with: tractatus II; the treatment of the hypothetical
propositions and syllogisms (tractatus IV) is preceded by that of the
topics (tractatus IIII); the author ends his work with a treatise on
division and definition: tractatus V."
(pp. XXIII-XXV - notes omitted).
Garlandus, Compotista. 1959. Garlandus Compotista. Dialectica.
Assen: Van Gorcum.
First edition of the manuscripts with an introduction on the life and
works of the author and on the contents of the work.
From the Introduction: " The author himself says in the preface to his
work that the treatise has been meant as a first introduction to dilectics
for tyroes:
Nec illos (sc. libros) scribere proposuimus introductis, sed rudibus
desiderantibus pervenire ad precepta supradictorum, Boetii scilicet et
Aristotilis.
It makes the impression of being a note-book, as appears from the
words (III, 74, 26) cras finiemus Periermeneias. The preface shows that
Garland
himself subdivided the work into six Books. The first Book deals with
the praedicabilia and praedicamenta; the second with propositio; the
third with nomen, verbum, oratio, and the kinds of proposition; the
fourth treats of the topical 'ingredients', such as propositio, quaestio,
conclusio, argumentum, and argumentatio and of the loci communes;
the fifth Book deals with categorical syllogism and the sixth with
hypothetical syllogism. The expositions are illustrated by a great
number of sophisms and their solutions.
Boethius' translations and commentaries of Aristotle's logical works
and his logical monographies were without any doubt the direct source
of the treatise. Garland explicitly says in his preface that he founds his
expositions of logic on Aristotle and Boethius. (See Dial. Im 1, 2-9).
The work turns out to be an adaptation of the logica vetus, i.e. that part
of Aristotelian logic the Latin translations of which were known before
1150 A. D. The sources of the logica vetus were Boethius' translations,
1195
commentaries and his monographies on logic:
(1) In Isag. Porhyrii Commenta (two editions)
(2) In Categ. Arist. Libri IV (two editions)
(3) In Librum Arist. De Interpr.
(4) Introductio ad categ. syll.
(5) De syllogisimis categoricis
(6) De syllogismis hypoteticis
(7) De differentiis topicis
(8) De divisionibus
It is a striking fact that Garland neither uses nor mention the treatise De
Divisionibus; neither division nor definition are dealt with explicitly by
him. For the rest Boethius is mentioned many times. Garland nowhere
calls his own masters by their names, though he asserts, to have
adopted several explanations from them."
(pp. XLV - XLVI, notes omitted).
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1962. Logica Modernorum. A Contribution
to the History of Early Terminist Logic. Vol. 1: On the Twelfth Century
Theory of Fallacy. Assen: Van Gorcum.
From the Preface: "In this work the author tries to show how the Logica
Modernorum, - which, as is known, exerted, from the thirteenth century
onwards, such a profound influence on the development of Mediaeval
Philosophy -, had its origin in the twelfth century logical and
grammatical theories which arose in the Western centers of studies,
especially in Paris.
The first volume deals with one of the two roots of this development:
the twelfth century doctrine of fallacy; the second volume will treat of
the Logica Modernorum in the grammatical theories of the twelfth
century.
The author thought it of great importance to edit in full the main
treatises on which his studies are based; they are found in the
Appendices A-E. Appendix F contains three passages from twelfth
century Perihermeneias-commentaries; in order to avoid the false
suggestion that one has to do here with fragmentary remnants which
have come down to us, I chose, despite its somewhat culinary sound,
the term 'Frustula' instead of the more usual 'Fragmenta'. Some
information on the manuscripts concerned is given in the course of this
1196
study; for the places, consult the List of manuscripts used.
As to the ratio edendi I refer to the preface of my edition of the
Dialectica of Garlandus Compotista, published as part III in the same
series.
The Index nominum, the Index locorum and the Index sophismatum aim
at completeness. The Index verborum et rerum is not exhaustive: it only
tries to give a number of words and phrases considered as important for
the understanding of the conceptual and doctrinal contents of the edited
treatises and to facilitate the reader's orientation in this study."
Contents: Preface 11; 1. The specific character of the Logica
Modernorum 13; 2. The theory of fallacy in the framework of the
Logica Vetus 24; 3. The theory of fallacy in the great logical works of
Peter Abailard 49; 4. The theory of fallacy in the School of the
Parvipontani 62; 5. The earliest mediaeval commentaries on the
Sophistici Elenchi 82; 6. The theory of fallacy in the later glosses on
the Perihemeneias 113; 7. Two treatises on fallacy from the latter part
of the twelfth century 127; 8. On the use of the doctrine of fallacy in
twelfth century theology 153; Books and articles referred to 179; List
of manuscripts used 181; Appendices: A. Glose in Arist. Sophisticos
Elencos 187; B. Summa Sophistorum Elencorum 257; C. Tractatus de
dissimilitudine argumentorum 459; D. Fallacie Vindobonenses 459; E.
Fallacie Parvipontane 491; F. [Frustula Logicalia] 611; Indices: A.
Index locorum 629; B. Index nominum 642; C. Index sophismatum et
exemplorum 646; D. Index verborum et rerum 659-674.
———. 1963. "On the Curriculum of the Arts of the Trivium at St.
Gall from Ca. 850 - Ca. 1000." Vivarium no. 1:35-86.
"From the hermitage founded about the year 613 by St. Gall, one of the
companions of St. Columban, there arose at the beginning of the next
century an abbey that has been one of the most famous centres of
intellectual and spiritual life in Western Europe.(...)
No doubt one of the most celebrated men of the School of St. Gall was
Notched Label (c. 950-2022). Many works are attributed to this master
or, at least, to the masters of St. Gall who lived about the year 1000. I
confine myself to the works on the Trivium: grammar, dialectics,
rhetoric." p. 35 and 47.
I." Vivarium no. 2:1-49.
1197
"The chronological order of Boethius' works appears to be a rather
difficult problem. Hence, it is not surprising that the numerous attempts
to establish it led the scholars to results which are neither all conclusive
nor uniform. In this article I confine myself to Boethius' works on
logic. Before giving my own contribution it would seem to be useful to
summarize the results of preceding studies and to make some general
remarks of a methodological nature.
(...)
My conclusion from this survey is that the best we can do in order to
establish approximately the chronological order of Boethius' works on
logic is to start a careful and detailed examination of all our data on this
matter. In doing so an analysis of their contents seems to be quite
indispensable, no less than a thorough examination of doctrinal and
terminological differences." pp. 1 and 4.
Ii." Vivarium no. 2:125-162.
"We shall now sum up the results of our investigations. First some
previous remarks. Our first table gives of nine of the works discussed
the chronological interrelation, which can be established with a fair
degree of certainty. The figures put after the works give the
approximative date of their composition (the second one that of their
edition); when printed in heavy types they are based on external data;
the other ones are based on calculation.
Table 1
Boethius' birth about 480 A.D.
In Porphyrii Isagogen, editio prima about 504-505
In Syllogismis categoricis libri duo (= ? Institutio categorica) about
505-506
In Porphyrii Isagogen, editio secunda about 507-509
In Aristotelis Categorias (? editio prima) about 509-511
In Aristotelis Perhemeneias, editio prima not before 513
In Aristotelis Perhemeneias, editio secunda about 515-516
De syllogismis hypotheticis libri tres between 516 and 522
In Ciceronis Topica Commentaria before 522
De topicis differentiis libri quattuor before 523
Boethius' death 524
1198
The rest of the works discussed cannot be inserted in this table without
some qualification. (...)
We may establish the following table for the works not contained in out
first table:
Table 2
Liber de divisione between 505 and 509
possible second edition of the In Categorias after 515-516
Translations of the Topica (and Sophistici Elenchi) and of the
Analytica Priora and Analytica Posteriora not after 520
Commentary on Aristotle's Topica before 523
the so-called Introductio (? = In Priora Analytica Praedicanda)
certainly after 513; probably c. 523
Scholia on Aristotle's Analytica Priora first months of 523 at the latest"
———. 1965. "'Enkylios Paideia': A Study of Its Original Meaning."
"No doubt, the term Enkylios paideia (of which the term 'Artes
liberales' is supposed to be the Latin equivalent) refers to one of the
key-concepts in European culture and education. From as early as Late
Antiquity the Liberal Arts were supposed to embrace the whole circuit
of (human) knowledge and therefore to afford some kind of
'encyclopedical' wisdom. The sixteenth century Grande Encyclopédie
was strongly aware of its origin: 'ce que les Anciens appelaient
encyclopédie, c'était l'ensemble des connaissances générales que tout
homme instruit devait posséder avant d'aborder la vie pratique ou de se
consacrer à une étude spéciale' (quoted by H. Koller in his article
Enkylios paideia in Glossa, Zeitschrift für Griechische und Lateinische
Sprache, 34, 1955, pp. 174-189)." p. 24
———. 1966. "Some New Evidence on Twelfth Century Logic:
Alberic and the School of Mont Ste Geneviève (Montani)." Vivarium
no. 4:1-57.
"It is well known that the art of logic (logica or diale(c)tica) knew a
remarkable flourishing period during the twelfth century. In the first
half of the century its main centres in Paris were: the School of Notre
Dame, of St. Victor, of the Petit Pont and of Mont Ste Geneviève. The
present paper aims to offer some new evidence from the manuscripts on
1199
the teaching of logic as given in the School of Mont Ste Geneviève
(Montani). Part of these sources will be published in full in the second
volume of my Logica Modernorum. This book, to be issued probably
about the middle of 1967 will discuss the doctrinal and conceptual
content of the treatises mentioned here." p. 1
———. 1966. "Some Notes on the Medieval Tract 'De Insolubilibus'
with an Edition of a Tract Dating from the End of the Twelfth
Century." Vivarium no. 4:83-115.
"As is known, one of the important contributions made by the Megarian
School (4th cent. B.C.) to the development of Western logic was the
invention of a number of remarkable paradoxes. Among them there was
the famous Liar: 'a man says that he is lying; is what he says true or
false?'. Generally speaking, paradoxes of this type intend to show the
oddity of making a statement say something about its own truth or
falsity. So the Liar, being one of the many puzzles connected with the
notions of truth and falsity, is one of the most important logical
problems, since the fundamental notion of logic is validity, and this is
definable in terms of truth and falsehood.
Mediaeval logicians, too, devoted their attention and ingenuity to the
Liar paradox and its variants. The twelfth century revisor of the Ars
disserendi written by Adam of the Petit Pont in 1132 mentions as a
current complicated question (illud interrogabile multiplex) the puzzle
of the man who says that he is (only) lying. (...)
To turn, now, to the Mediaeval variants of the Liar paradox, the
sophismata dealing with them attracted special attention from about
1200, if not as early as from the middle of the twelfth century, as may
appear from the revision of Adam's Ars disserendi mentioned above.
From the thirteenth century onwards many tracts have been handed
down to us in which these variants and the logical problems they
involved were discussed. These tracts went under the title De
insolubilibus.
As we are told by the authors themselves in their prologues, this title is
somewhat misleading. In fact they do not deal with which cannot be
solved but rather with what is difficult to solve because of certain
circumstances lying in some human act or some property of the speech
used. The tracts discuss certain propositions that are self-falsifying
since they contain elements which reflect on the propositions
1200
themselves of which they are parts.
The Mediaeval variant of the Liar had this basic form : 'what I am
saying is false' ('ego dico falsum'), provided I do not utter any
proposition other than 'what I am saying is false'.
In the beginning of the fifteenth century no fewer than fifteen different
(or, at least, various) attempts were known to solve the puzzle, as we
are told by Paul of Venice, who in his Logica Magna listed them
industriously. From as early as the thirteenth century we know four
different solutions of this kind of insolubile.
The aim of this paper is to present what is probably the oldest tract De
insolubilibus that has come down to us and to bring out some evidence
for its date and its place in the development of the Mediaeval
insolubilia - literature. For this purpose I start from an examination of
two later tracts on the subject: the De insolubilibus of Walter Burley
written about 1302, and two tracts dating from the first half of the
thirteenth century, the one of which was ascribed to William of
Shyreswood (d. after 1267) by Grabmann, without plausible grounds, it
seems, but certainly belongs, just like the other tract, to the first half of
the thirteenth century." pp. 83 and 86.
———. 1967. "Some Notes on the Twelfth Century Topic of the Three
(Four) Human Evils and of the Science, Virtue and Techniques as Their
Remedies." Vivarium no. 5:8-15.
"In the first of the appendices added by Hugh of St. Victor to the text of
the Didascalicon, which was composed in Paris in the late 1120's (*),
the author gives a division of the contents of Philosophy (printed by
Buttimer (**) as chapters 14 and 15 of Book VI). It opens with the
contradistinction of the three evils of human nature and the three
corresponding remedies:
'There are three things to be considered now: wisdom, virtue, and need.
Wisdom is the understanding of things as they are. Virtue is a habit of
mind, a habit which is in harmony with reason in the way of a nature. A
need is something without which we cannot live, but without which we
would live more happily. These three things are as many remedies
against the three evils to which human life is subject: wisdom against
ignorance, virtue against vice, and need against life's weakness. In
order to do away with these three evils, men have sought after those
three remedies, and in order to find the three remedies, every art and
1201
every discipline was discovered.
For the sake of wisdom the theoretical arts were discovered; for the
sake of virtue the practical arts were discovered; for the sake of our
needs the mechanical arts were discovered. These three were first in
practice, but afterwards, for the sake of eloquence, logic was
discovered. Logic, though fast to be discovered, ought to be the first
learned.
Four, then, are the principal sciences from which all the others descend;
these are the theoretical, the practical, the mechanical, and the logical.'
(ed. Buttimer pp. 130-131).
Thus Hugh starts from ignorance (ignorantia), vice (vitium), and
weakness (infirmitas) as the three fundamental evils to which human
nature is supposed to be subject, and he opposes to them wisdom
(sapientia), virtue (virtus), and need (necessitas) as their three
remedies. The latter are said to have caused the invention of theoretical
science, practical science and mechanical science or techniques.
Afterwards, for the sake of eloquence, logic was invented, but in
Hugh's division of sciences it is apparently not opposed to some fourth
evil of human nature.
As far as we know Hugh was the first to reduce the invention of arts
and sciences to certain defects of human nature. We do not know
whether this reduction is an invention of his own. This much is certain:
his view is frequently found in twelfth century authors both in the
Victorine School and in that of Chartres." pp. 8-9.
(*) For this date, see Jerome Taylor, The Didascalicon of Hugh of St.
Victor. A mediaeval Guide to the Arts, translated from the Latin with an
introduction and notes, New York - London 1961 , p. 3.
(**) Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon, De studio legendi. A
critical text by Brother Charles Henry Buttimer, Washington D.C.
1939.
———. 1967. Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to the History of
Early Terminist Logic. Vol. 2, Part One: The Origin and Early
Development of the Theory of Supposition. Assen: Van Gorcum.
From the Preface: "In this work it will be attempted to show how the
Logica Modernorum had its origin, long before the thirteenth century,
in the logical and grammatical theories current in the Western centers
of studies: Paris, Oxford and presumably a school in Northern Italy.
1202
The first volume dealt with what was considered as one of the two roots
of this development: the twelfth century theories of' fallacy. The
present volume discusses the other source: the development of
Mediaeval grammar from an elementary discussion of (Latin) grammar
to a linguistic-semantic theory of' (Latin) language. It was the latter
contribution that was of extreme importance for the origin of the theory
of supposition, and generally speaking, of terminist logic.
The purpose of this volume is to trace the details of the origin of the.
theory of' supposition, including appellation and copulation, and to
discuss the theory of the properties of terms as found about 1200.
Besides, some historical evidence will be given for the origins of' the
tracts dealing with the properties of syncategorematic terms and those
discussing the other specific elements of the Logica Modernorum.
The author has thought it of some importance for further investigation
in this field to edit in full the main treatises on which the present study
is based. They will be found in the second part of' this book. They have
been arranged chronologically, except for the Quaestiones Victorinae,
which are to be considered as an extra.
The Index nominum, the Index locorum and the Index sophismatum aim
at completeness. The Index verborum et rerum is not exhaustive: it only
tries to give a number of words and phrases considered as important for
our understanding of the conceptual and doctrinal contents of the edited
tracts, and to facilitate the reader's orientation in this study."
Contents: Part One: 1. Introduction, analysis of the manuscripts
concerned 11; 2. On the development of mediaeval grammar 95; 3. The
increasing use of special textbooks of logic in the first half of the
twelfth century 126; 4. The theory of signification in twelfth century
logic up to about 1140 177; 5. On the theory of signification in twelfth
century grammar 221; 6. The tract on logic contained in MS. Oxford,
Digby 174, analysis of its content, its origin and date 264; 7. Ars
Meliduna. On the theory of terms 292; 8. Ars Meliduna. On the
denotation of the terms 306; 9. Ars Meliduna. The theory of proposition
319; 10. Ars Meliduna. The theory of the enuntiabile 357; 11. Some
treatises on logic dating from about 1200 391; 12. The Dialectica
Monacensis preserved in Munich, C.L.M. 14, 763 408; 13. Some early
Oxford tracts on logic 416; 14. The Summe Metenses found in Paris, B.
N. Lat. 11, 412 449; 15. The doctrine of fallacy and the origin of the
1203
theories of supposition 491; 16. The grammatical origin and early
development of the theory of Appellation (Supposition) 513; 17. The
logical theory of the Properties of terms up to about 1200 555; Books
and articles referred to 599; List of the manuscripts used 606; List of
incipits 608-614.
———. 1967. Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to the History of
Early Terminist Logic. Vol. 2, Part Two: The Origin and Early
Development of the Theory of Supposition. Text and Indices. Assen:
Van Gorcum.
Edition of a number of tracts dating from c. 1130 up to c. 1220.
Contents: I. Introductiones Montane minores 7; II. Abbreviatio
Montana 73; III. Excerpta Norimbergensia 109; IV. Ars Emmerana
143; V. Ars Burana 175; VI. Tractatus Anagnini 215; VII. Tractatus de
univocatione Monacensis 333; VIII. Introductiones Parisienses 353;
IX. Logica "Ut dicit" 375; X. Logica "Cum sit nostra" 413; XI.
Dialectica Monacensis 453; XII. Fallacie Londinenses 639; XIII.
Fallacie Magistri Willelmi 679; XIV. Tractatus de proprietatibus
sermonum 703; XV. Quaestiones Victorinae 731; Indices: a. Index
locorum; B. Index nominum; C. Index verborum et rerum; D. Index
sophismatum et exemplorum.
———. 1968. "On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's' Summule
Logicales'. Part I. General Problems Concerning Possible Interpolations
in the Manuscripts." Vivarium no. 6:1-34.
"As is known, Peter of Spain, who afterwards became Pope under the
name of John XXI, wrote a textbook on logic, which was to enjoy a
high renown from the end of the thirteenth up to the seventeenth
century as Summule logicales magistri Petri Hispani (1).
Its fame appears from the noticeable number of manuscripts (more than
300) and of printed editions (about 160), the latter dating from 1474 up
to 1639 (2). This number is tremendous indeed, especially for the future
editor of the first critical edition of the Summule.
However, the printed editions are of no use for the critical
reconstruction of our text. As a matter of fact they all contain quite a
number of interpolations.(3) Therefore an examination of their readings
can properly be dismissed. As is easily seen, the same holds good for
the later manuscripts. They are most of them intended adaptations of
the famous school-book by well-known masters of logic. Their very
1204
intention to emend the text (tractatus duodecim iam emendati) is bound
to make the critical editor suspicious as to the reliability of their text as
a source for the original version.
A first attempt to clear up the situation might be made in confining our
attention to the earlier manuscripts, say those dating from Peter's
lifetime up to about the first decades of the fourteenth century.
However, the result appears to be rather disappointing indeed. Even the
late thirteenth century manuscripts betray such divergencies as to
confirm the supposition of rather early interpolations in a sufficient
way." p. 1.
(1) For Peter's authorship, see Joseph P. Mullally, The Summulae
logicales of Peter of Spain, Notre Dame Indiana, 1945, pp. IX-XVIII.
(2) For a survey, see MuIlally, op. Cit., pp. 133-158: Bibliography of
Editions of the Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain and the
commentaries on the Summulae logicales.
(3) Cf. the introduction to Bochenski's edition (Petri Hispani Summulae
logicales, quas e codice manuscripto Reg. Lat. 1205 edidit M.
Bochenski O. P., Torino, Marietti, 1947) pp. XVI-XVIII.
———. 1968. "On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's 'Summule
Logicales'. Part Ii. Simon Faversham (D. 1306) as a Commentator of
the Tract I-V of the Summule." Vivarium no. 6:69-101.
"Who was the author? Grabmann was of the opinion that the only
logician bearing the name of Simon in the second part of the thirteenth
century was Simon of Faversham, since master Simon of Dacia was a
grammarian, known especially for his tract Domus gramatice (*).
However, his being a grammarian does not at all exclude his possible
authorship of logical works, as may appear from the case of the Modist
Boetius of Dacia, who also wrote a commentary on Aristotle's Topics.
However, our author's apparent preference for Albert the Great and
Avicenna as his sources seems to point to Simon of Faversham as the
author of our commentary. Unfortunately his other works on logic do
not offer any additional evidence for his authorship of the Summule-
commentary, since the works to be considered (especially on
Perihermenias) all have the form of selected Questiones. In his
Questiones super Universalia as found in the manuscript Kassel,
Landesbibliothek, 2° Philos. nr. 30-6 (ff. 1r-9r) a question is read utrum
locus sit principium generationis (f. 3r). (I could not find it in the Milan
1205
manuscript C. 161 Inf. which also contains questiones super universalia
and has the same incipit)." p. 72
(*) It has been edited (together with his Questiones super 2o minoris
voluminis Prisciani) by Alfred Otto in the Corpus Philosophorum
Danicorum Medii Acvi, III Copenhague 1963.
Logicales'. Part Iii. Two Redactions of a Commentary Upon the
Summule by Robertus Anglicus." Vivarium no. 7:8-61.
"The question must be answered mow whether the Robertus Anglicus,
who is the author of Tractatus quadrantis and the commentary on John
de Sacrobosco's De sphera may be also the author of the two redactions
of the commentary on Peter of Spain's Summule logicales which we
found in the Vatican and Todi manuscripts. Three arguments can be
adduced in favour of the identity of our author with the teacher of
Montpellier.
First, the remarkable similarity of the colophon in both the Rome and
Todi redaction of the Summule commentary with that of the De sphera
commentary as found in Paris, B. N. Lot. 7392 and Oxford, Bodleian
Library, Digby 481. This correspondence is the more noticeable since
this kind of colophon which is well-known, indeed, from works
discussing quadrivium subjects, is very unusual in tracts on grammar or
dialectics. If our surmise about the identity of our author and the
teacher of Montpellier is correct, both conjectural corrections of the
Vatican colophon (discussed above, p. 32) may be right, as both 1270
and 1277 fit in pretty well with the dates mentioned in the colophons of
Robert's commentary on De sphera (1271 and 1272). On
palaeographical grounds the year 1270 (septuagesimo instead of
septimo) seems to be the more preferable.
Secondly, the occurrence of several sets of medical, astronomical and
meteorological notes added in the Todi manuscript by the same hand
that wrote our Summule commentary, is a reliable clue for the scientific
interest of the school where that commentary was written and used in
class. Well, the first school to be considered in this regard is that of
Montpellier, where one Robertus Anglicus is reported to have been a
teacher in the 1270's.
Thirdly, an important hint for the place of origin of a commentary on
the Summule is often to be found in the example its author gives in his
1206
discussion of Exemplum in the tract De locis. (...)
In conclusion, it may be said that it seems to be highly probable,
indeed, the the commentary on Peter of Spain's Summule logicales
which is extant in two redactions, was written by the same Robertus
Anglicus whose Tractatus quadrantis and commentary on John of
Sacrobosco's De sphera have been preserved in some manuscripts." pp.
39-40.
Logicales'. Part Iv. The Lectura Tractatum by Guillelmus Arnaldi,
Master of Arts at Toulouse (1235-1244). With a Note on the Date of
Lambert of Auxerre' Summule." Vivarium no. 7:120-162.
"No doubt, this Lectura Tractatuum was written by a Guillelmus, or
Guillermus, Arnaldi who taught the liberal arts at Toulouse. As a matter
of fact I found a teacher of that name in a number of documents
concerning the county of Toulouse. (...)
A number of resemblances found between the usual text of Peter of
Spain's Summule and that of Lambert of Auxerre's treatise of the same
title had frequently raised the question of the interdependence of these
texts. As is known, Konstant Michalski defended the thesis of the large
dependence of Peter of Spain upon Lambert of Auxerre'. As a matter of
fact Michalski had to work upon interpolated texts of both works and
the textual resemblances alluded to by the Polish Mediaevalist
disappear for the greater part when the authentic texts are considered.
Grabmann held the inverse opinion and especially pointed to the
opening words of Lambert's work: Ut novi artium auditores plenius
intelligant ea que in summulis edocentur . . . etc. and saw an allusion to
the title of Peter's Summule logicales in these words. (*) However, the
original title of Peter's work was Tractatus, not Summule, as was
frequently shown in our preceding articles. The question of whether or
not Lambert was really influenced by Peter's work seems to be far more
complicated. It will not be discussed here.
A different question is that of the chronologic order of Peter's and
Lambert's works. Its solution is important for the problem of
interdependence, even if it is not decisive, since priority of one work to
the other does not imply the latter's dependence upon the former.
As to Peter's work, from the existence of a commentary on it which
dates from as early as the 1240's (see our article on Guillelmus Arnaldi)
1207
the conclusion must be drawn that Peter of Spain cannot have written
his Summule logicales (or better: Tractatus) after 1240. (...)
So we have the following dates for Lambert's Summule. The work was
written at Troyes (or Pamplona), not in Paris, between 1253 and 1257
when the king was anointed and is likely to have finished his studies. It
was published afterwards in Paris, when Lambert was a member of the
Dominican Convent there, before he became penitentiary of the Pope."
pp. 125, 160-161
(*) Martin Grabmann Handschriftliche Forschungen und Funde zu den
philosophischen Schriften des Petrus Hispanus, des späteren Papstes
Johannes XXI (d.1277) in: Sitzunsgberichte der Bayerischen Akademie
der Wissenschaft Phil.-Hist. Abt. 1936, Heft 9, pp. 41-42
———. 1969. "Significatio Y Suppositio En Pedro Hispano."
Pensamiento no. 25:225-234.
Translated in Spanish by Th. G. Sinnige.
"En este modesto articulo me propongo hablar de la teoria de la
suposición de Pedro Hispano en la forma en que esta expuesta en el
Tratado No. VI (de suppositionibus). A menudo encontramos la
opinion de que la teoria terminística de la suposición en todos los casos
haya tenido una base de Indole nominalista. Esta opinion está
decididamente equivocada. Basta señalar a un autor como Gualterus
Burlaeus para porter en claro que la teoría de la suposición podia muy
bien ser interpretada en un sentido realista. Por otra parte se puede
comprobar que la teoría de la suposición ya en sus orígenes iba
vinculada estrechamente con la teoría de la significación. La evolución
de la teoria de la suposición por consiguiente está mezclada
Intimamente con las fluctuaciones que se producen en la teoría de la
significacion.
En lo que signe me propongo analizar:
1) lo esencial de la teoría de la suposición, teoría que en su origen no
era otra cosa sino una teoría sobre la interpretabilidad de un término
dentro de la proposición;
2) el estrecho vfnculo que existe entre la teoria de la suposición y la
teoria de la significación. Como consecuencia de esto, a principios del
siglo XIII et concepto de suposición tiende a extenderse hasta incluir
también términos usados fuera del contexto de la proposición (*)" (pp.
226-227)
1208
(*) Para una más amplia información sobre las cosas que se tratan en
estas páginas, véase el segundo volumen de mi obra Logica
Modernorum, en especial las páginas 513-598.
Logicales'. Part V. Some Anonymous Commentaries on the Summule
Dating from the Thirteenth Century." Vivarium no. 8:10-55.
"Mgr. Grabmann found several commentaries on the Summile logicales
dating from as early as the thirteenth century (*) Some of the are
anonymous. This group will be discussed in this part of our study on
the genuine text of Peter of Spain's famous text-book of logic." p. 10
(*) Martin Grabmann Handschriftliche Forschungen und Funde zu den
philosophischen Schriften des Petrus Hispanus, des späteren Papstes
Johannes XXI (d.1277) in: Sitzunsgberichte der Bayerischen Akademie
der Wissenschaft Phil.-Hist. Abt. 1936, Heft 9, pp. 63-70
———. 1970. "On the Life of Peter of Spain, the Author of the
Tractatus, Called Afterwards Summule Logicales." Vivarium no. 8:123-
154.
"Before an attempt will be made to sketch the life of the author of the
so-called Summule, a preliminary question of major importance should
be answered: is the author identical with Peter of Spain (Peters
Hispanics) who in 1276 became Pope under the name John XI?
An alternative question may be added whether, or not, the famous
logician was a Black friar, as was sometimes maintained. (...)
However, other strong evidence can be put forward in support of the
traditional view that Peter Hispanus who afterwards bore the tiara was
the author of the Summule. Since Pope John XXI certainly was a
secular priest, the identification implies an absolute rejection of any
member of a religious Order as the author of the work. pp. 125-127
(notes omitted).
———. 1970. "Die Bedeutungslehre in Der Logik Des 13. Jahrunderts
Und Ihr Gegenstück in Der Metaphysischen Spekulation." In Methoden
in Wissenschaft Und Kunst Des Mittelalters, edited by Zimmermann,
Albert, 1-22. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 7.
Reprinted as chapter VII in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics.
I. Einleintung: Bedeutungslehre und Methode; II. Die
1209
Suppositionstheorie als Bedeutungslhre im 13. Jahrhundert; III: Die
Bedeutungslehre in der metaphysischen Spekulation im 13.
Jahrhundert.
"Ich möchte jetzt meine Ergebnisse noch einmal ganz kurz
zusammenfassen. Es hat sich zuerst, wie ich hoffe, die äußerste
Wichtigkeit einer Bedeutungslehre nicht nur für die Logik, sondern
auch im Interesse der metaphysischen Spekulation ergeben. Es hat sich
herausgestellt, daß sich die immer mehr herausgearbeitete
Bedeutungslehre der Suppositionslogik als Theorie der Interpretabilität
des Terminus im Grunde genommen mit genau denselben Problemen
befaßte, mit denen die Metaphysiker des 13. Jahrhunderts gekämpft
haben. Hier wie dort galt es wesentlich, die fundamentalen
Bedingungen des Seins („esse" oder „est") in der Reflexion über die
menschliche Aussage ausfindig zu machen. Hier wie dort auch
entsprachen sich die unterschiedlichen Betrachtungsweisen, je nachdem
man entweder die „forma universalis" oder das konkrete Individuum
zum Blickpunkt und somit zum Referenzpunkt seiner Spekulation zu
machen versucht hat.
Man wird sich der Folgerung nicht entziehen können, daß namentlich
dem 13. Jahrhundert eine folgerichtige Bedeutungslehre fehlte. Sie
wurde geradezu nur gelegentlich und nebenbei angelegt. So findet man
vielfach nebeneinander Elemente der Bedeutungslehren der Logiker,
der Modisten und jene der metaphysischen Spekulation. Wirklich
begründet wurde die Bedeutungslehre m. E. im Mittelalter nie.
Die jetzige Skizzierung aber könnte vielleicht immerhin als
bescheidene Anregung dienen, die teils implizite Bedeutungslehre des
13. Jahrhunderts und besonders ihre Vorbedingungen gründlicher zu
untersuchen. Das wäre eine Aufgabe, die bei weitem über das Interesse
der Logikhistoriker und vielleicht sogar das historische Interesse
überhaupt hinausgeht. Es war ja die philosophische Methode selbst im
Spiel, und zwar in einem weitaus erheblicheren Maße, als es den
meisten Denkern des Mittelalters zum Bewußtsein kommen konnte." p.
22
Logic. Part I. Natural Supposition as Non-Contextual Supposition."
Reprinted as chapter IX in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
1210
"I had already discussed this matter [naural supposition] in the second
volume of Logica Modernorum (Assen 1967; pp. 571-578) and in the
paper Significatio y suppositio en Pedro Hispano.
The aim of this paper is to elaborate and, partly, correct the view of
natural supposition given there by a discussion of the most
representative thirteenth century authors and of some fourteenth
century logicians with whom natural supposition still played a rôle,
such as John Buridan and Vincent Ferrer.
The thirteenth century authors are Peter of Spain, William of
Sherwood, the anonymous author of the Tractatus de proprietatibus
sermonum, and Lambert of Auxerre. It should be remarked at the outset
that there is no interdependence between these thirteenth century
authors, apart from the rather vague relation effected by their standing
in a common tradition of logic." pp. 71-72
Peter, of Spain. 1972. Peter of Spain. Tractatus, Called Afterwards
Summule Logicales. Assen: Van Gorcum.
First critical edition from the manuscripts with an introduction.
From the Introduction: "Contents of the Tractatus.
As to the doctrinal contents, the Tractatus may be divided in two main
parts: one (A) discussing doctrines found in the so-called logica
antiquorum (=logica vetus and logica nova), the other (B) those
commonly dealt with in the logica modernorum (the tracts discussing
the so-called proprietates terminorum):
A: De introductionibus (Tract I), De predicabilibus (Tract II), De
predicamentis ((Tract III), De sillogismis (Tract IV), De locis (Tract
V), De fallaciis (Tract VII)
B: De suppositionibus (tract VI), De relativis (Tract VIII), De
ampliationibus (Tract IX), De appellationibus (Tract X), De
restrictionibus (Tract XI), De distributionibus (Tract XII)."
(pp. LXXXVIII-LXXXIX, notes omitted)
Contents: 1. Pope John XXI (Peter of Spain) as the author of the so-
called Summule logicales IX; 2. Life and works of Peter of Spain
XXIV; 3. The Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales. Title,
order and number of the tracts. Their date XLIII; 4. Sources. 'The
Byzantine thesis'. Peter's possible masters of logic LXI; 5. Contents of
the Tractatus LXXXVIII; 6. The early diffusion of the Tractatus.
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Commentaries and editions XCV; 7. The manuscripts used for this
edition C; Books and articles referred to CXI; List of manuscripts used
CXVI; Index of names CXXI.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1973. "The Development of Suppositio
Naturalis in Medieval Logic. Part Ii. Fourteenth Century Natural
Supposition as Atemporal (Omnitemporal) Supposition." Vivarium no.
11:43-79.
Reprinted as chapter X in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"I - Status quaestionis
From the investigations in the first part of this article the conclusion
was drawn that in the thirteenth century doctrine of supposition natural
(or habitual, or absolute) supposition was considered the natural
capacity of a term to stand for something partaking in the essence (or:
universal nature) signified by that term; accidental supposition was the
term's actual being taken for something in virtue of the term's
combination with some other term in either a phrase or a proposition, or
of its having a special meaning in a special social context. Briefly
stated : natural supposition was decidedly non-contextual, whereas all
kinds of accidental supposition were of the contextual type.
Two characteristics of the thirteenth century doctrine of supposition are
to be noticed
(a) accidental supposition, being contextual, does not always imply a
propositional context
(b) natural supposition, being something midway significatio and
suppositio (as opposed to significatio), seems to enervate the clear-cut
distinction all thirteenth century logicians made between suppositio and
significatio.
ad a Thirteenth century logicians turn out to consider the proposition as
just one of the possible contexts of a term, not as the only one required
for a term's having supposition.
ad b The introduction of natural supposition was due to the peculiar
fact that those logicians apparently held it to be indispensable to
distinguish between a word's having signification (viz. its representing
some universal nature) and its capacity to stand for individuals
partaking in this universal nature (c.q. the universal nature participated,
taken as such), which capacity was the direct, or natural, counterpart of
1212
its having signification. This natural capacity must be seen as a
reference to a possible context, which supplies an adjunct to limit, or
restrict, the term's original capacity (c.q. which causes its having an
unrestricted exercise of its natural capacity). (...)
As is well known, when studying the problems of signification
fourteenth century logicians showed an increasing interest in the
contextual approach to language. Their investigations were focussed on
the congruitas locutionis and the veritas propositionis as the basic
requirements (exigentie) for stating the actual meaning of terms. Their
theories of supposition may be taken as an attempt to specify the truth
conditions for (mostly affirmative) categorical propositions. Thus, the
various kinds of supposition were characterized by fourteenth century
logicians by means of implications (consequentie)'. Consequently, they
were bound to lay the most explicit stress on the proposition as the only
possible context in which a term could have supposition.
The most obvious conclusion from the theoretical point of view would
be that natural supposition, being of the non-contextual type, had to
disappear in fourteenth century logic. To my mind, it certainly had - as
certainly as it never should have appeared. However, it did occur in
those days, not only in the Realist tradition but with a logician as John
Buridan as well.
It is the aim of this article to discuss the reinterpretation of natural
supposition and the controversies it provoked, and is still provoking up
to the present days." pp. 43-44
———. 1973. "A Note on Aganafat(?)'S 'Thesaurus Philosophorum'."
"Some years ago I found in the Vatican Library (Vat. Lat. 4537, ff.
45ra-52ra, s. XIII) an incomplete copy of a tract on the modus
opponendi et respondendi, the author of which calls himself Aganafat
(or: Aganasat).
Further investigations have shown that this tract, called Thesaurus
philosophorum, must have been the source of the well known Tractatus
de modo opponendi et respondendi found in several manuscripts (Paris,
BN Lat. 16.930, 16.617 and Montecassino 362 VV) and printed under
Albert the Great's name. (See M. Grabmann, in Sitzungsberichte der
bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., Phil-Hist. Abt. Jahrg. 1937, H. 10 (Munich
1937), 24 f.) (...)
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I hope to edit the Thesaurus philosophorum in full next year, together
with the adaptations and a study on its place in the development of the
ars obligatoria et exercitativa. At this moment I confine myself to edit
the argumentum and the prologus in order to enable students of Arab
(or Hebrew?) logic to get some impression of this work and its author. I
should be very pleased if some information could be given on his
identity." p. 105.
———. 1974. "Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of
Obligation. Part I. Two Separate Tracts on 'Falsi Positio' and
'Impossibilis Positio'." Vivarium no. 12:94-123.
"In his thorough study on Sherwood's and Burley's tracts De
obligationibus, Father Romuald Green (*) rightly describes the aim of
these tracts as follows:
The purpose was to inculcate knowledge of logical rules by practice, to
sharpen the pupil's mind to avoid contradiction -- the basis of any
disputation ... it was a general introduction to a number of fundamental
logical notions and their use in disputation'.
I give his succinct description of the general plan of the obligation:
'Briefly, the plan of an exercise de obligationibus is as follows. It is a
disputation involving an opponens and a respondens. The opponens
proposes a statement, which, for example, he wishes to be upheld. The
respondens accepts the initial statement and binds himself (se obligat)
to the wishes of the opponens, that is, in this case, to uphold it. This is
the meaning of obligatio -- the opponens asks the respondens to take on
the obligation, for example, of upholding a particular statement. Once
the respondens has accepted the obligation, the opponens proposes a
number of other statements which the respondens must concede or
deny -- but always the respondens must maintain the initial statement
according to the obligation accepted, and he must observe the logical
rules of inference, if the various statements proposed are logically
connected, at all times avoiding a contradiction. Precisely it is this last
point -- contradiction -- which provides the key to the exercises in De
obligationibus. The aim of the opponens is to involve the respondens in
contradiction, and the respondens has to avoid it'. (op. cit. p. 18-19).
(...)
The aim of these articles will be to publish some tracts, found in
Munich and in some other libraries, which seem to date from the first
1214
half of the thirteenth century, if not, in part, from the end of the
twelfth." pp. 94-96.
(*) Romuald Green O.F.M. An Introduction to the Logical Treatise De
obligationibus, with critical texts of William of Sherwood ( ?) and
Walter Burley. vol. I: Introduction; vol. II: Critical Texts of William of
Sherwood (?) and Walter Burley. Unfortunately, this Louvain thesis
written in 1963 has not been published yet. As to Sherwood's
authorship, Green seems to be a bit over-anxious in doubting it.
RELATED PAGES
Annotated Bibliography of L. M. de Rijk:
1975 - 1982
1983 - 1990
1991 - 2012

Abelard: Logic, Semantics, Ontology and Theories of the Copula
History of Logic in Relationship to Ontology: an annotated bibliography

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Marie de Rijk. Second Part: from 1975 to
1982
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1975. "Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on
the Game of Obligation. Part Ii. The Obligationes Parisienses Found in
Oxford, Canon. Misc. 281." Vivarium no. 13:22-54.
"In his description of the Oxford manuscript Canon. misc. 281 Coxe
only mentions (*) anonymous glosses on Priscian's De constructione
(Priscianus minor). However this manuscript contains also a tract of
logic.
(...)
The treatise as a whole has the following parts (the subdivisions printed
in minuscules are mine)
Prologus
De obligatione einsque speciebus
I DE POSITIONE
De positione determinata
De quibusdam regulis circa ponibile positum
Sophisma
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Consimile sophisma
Idem sophisma
Aliud sophisma
Aliud sophisma
Aliud sophisma
De positione indeterminata
De indeterminate positionis duplici modo
II DE DUBITATUR
Utrum 'dubitatur' sit obligatio annon
De quibusdam regulis
Sophisma
III DE DEPOSITIONE
De eius diffinitione et regulis
De speciali depositione
Utrum non debeat esse obligatio
Sophisma."
pp. 22 and 25.
(*) H. O. Coxe - Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae
Bodleiane pars tertia codices graecos et latinos canonicos complectens,
Oxford 1854, col. 646.
———. 1975. "Logica Cantabrigiensis. A Fifteenth Century
Cambridge Manual of Logic." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no.
29:297-315.
Special number in memory of Martin Grabmann.
"The manuscript 182/215 of the important manuscript collection of the
Library of Gonville and Caius College at Cambridge contains a number
of tracts on logic which were probably written at Cambridge as notes of
lectures. Part of them are also found in other manuscripts all over
Europe. It seems rather difficult to discern the exact extent of this work,
since in nearly all manuscripts the number and arrangement of the
tracts is different and other logical works are mixed up with those
treatises which doubtless belong to the Cambridge Logic." p. 297
———. 1975. "Quaestio De Ideis. Some Notes on an Important
Chapter of Platonism." In Kephalaion. Studies in Greek Philosophy and
Its Continuation, Offered to Professor C. J. De Vogel, edited by de
Rijk, Lambertus Marie and Mansfeld, Jaap, 204-213. Assen: Van
1217
Gorcum.
"The opponents of Platonism as well as its adherents have to agree that
there is a lot of truth in Whitehead's famous statement that the safest
general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that
it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato (*).
I think one of the everlasting items of that tradition is what has been
termed since St. Augustine the quaestio de Ideis. Indeed, the status
(either ontic or merely mental) of the Ideas has fascinated many
philosophers, especially the Christian, who could not dispense with a
statement concerning the relationship of the eternal and immutable
Ideas to God. In this short contribution to the dedicatory volume for our
academic teacher C. J. de Vogel, I shall confine myself to roughly
sketch the development of the problem of that relationship from Plato's
days down to some fourteenth century Franciscan thinkers." p. 204
(*) Alfred Nort Whitehead - Process and reality. An essay in
cosmology - Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh
during the session 1927-28. Camvrdige, 1929, p. 53.
———. 1975. "The Place of Billingham's Speculum Puerorum in
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Century Logical Tradition, with the Edition of
Some Alternative Tracts." Studia Mediewistyczne no. 16:97-151.
"From the second half of the fourteenth century onwards the Speculum
puerorum (or iuvenum) compiled by the English logician Richard
Billingham was very popular, especially in Southern and Central
Europe. However, this popularity does not extend to his other works.
The Speculum, which together with works such as those of Thomas
Manlevelt, William of Heytesbury and Marsilius of Inghen, was a
formidable competitor of Peter of Spain's Tractatus, is an introduction
to what from about the 1330's onwards has been one of the cardinal
items, if not the most characteristic one, of fourteenth century logic,
rather than a Summule of the type of Peter of Spain's Tractatus, which
contains all the topics of the Logica antiqua and moderna favoured in
Peter's days. Generally speaking, fourteenth century philosophy
focussed its attention on the search for certainty (certitudo and
evidentia). That fourteenth century logic paid special attention to the
procedures of proving a sentence, is evidenced by the numerous tracts
entitled De probationibus propositionum or De veritate ac falsitate
propositionum which have been handed down to us in fourteenth and
1218
fifteenth century manuscripts.
Billingham's Speculum is one of them." pp. 99-100 (Notes omitted).
———. 1975. "La Signification De La Proposition (Dictum
Propositionis) Chez Abélard." In Pierre Abélard - Pierre Le Vénérable.
Les Courants Philosophiques, Littéraires Et Artistiques En Occident Au
Milieu Du Xii Siècle, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Louis, René, 547-555.
Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.
Published also in: Studia Mediewistyczne 16, 1975 pp. 155-161.
Reprinted as chapter IV in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"Cette communication se borne a un bref examen de la signification de
la phrase complète (propositio) dans la logique de Pierre Abélard.
Il paraît utile de commencer par la définition du verbe signifier
(significare) chez ce logicien.
'signifier' dit des mots (dictiones) c'est produire une intellection dans
l'âme de l'auditeur (Logica ingredientibus 307, 30 ss.), tandis que le
même verbe est également appliqué à la dénotàtion des choses
extérieures (ibid.); dans ce dernier sens, le verbe est synonyme de
appellare, nominare, demonstrare, designare.
'signifier' dit des phrases complètes (propositiones) c'est produire une
intellection laquelle est formée par la liaison des intellections de ses
parties (dictiones)." p. 547
"On peut conclure que selon Abélard le dictum n'est pas un objet qui
serait indépendent de la pensée, mais plutôt le contenu de la pensée,
c'est-à-dire une intellection objectivée, qui correspond soit à un état de
choses réel, soit à un état de choses seulement possible (Dial. II, 205,
28-30: id dicimus quod id quod dicit hec propositio 'Socrates est homo',
est unum de his que natura patitur esse), soit un état de choses tout à
fait impossible (Dial. II, 158, 7 -9: la proposition 'Socrates est lapis' ne
reflète pas une inherentia de Socrate et de pierre, ni 'Socrates non est
lapis' leur rémotion).
(...)
Ainsi, l'existence qu'établit la proposition en parlant, n'est pas une
existence réelle, mais, pourrait-on dire, une existence parlée, ou plutôt,
une existence pensée ou logique.
Employant la distinction bien connue du XIV siècles (presentée
notamment par Jacques d'Ascoli, Thomas d'York, Pierre Thomae):
1219
res: 1) extra animam (chose extérieure); 2) in anima: a) subiective ( =
acte de l'intellection comme tel) b) obiective (contenu de l'intellection).
on peut dire qu'Abélard a essayé, à sa façon, de montrer que le dictum,
de la proposition, loin d'être une chose extérieure (res extra animam)
est une chose qui doit son existence à l'âme ou a l'intellection (res in
anima), mais qu'il faut en même temps bien le distinguer de l'acte de
l'intellection pris comme tel (res in anima subiective), et reconnaître, sa
propre identité dans le contenu objectif de l'intellection. Par là, le
dictum du grand logicien du XII siècle semble être d'une nature logique
par excellence." pp. 554-555. (notes omitted)
———. 1975. "Review Of: Thomas Erfurt. Grammatica Speculativa.
An Edition with a Translation and Commentary by Geoffrey L. Bursill-
Hall (London, 1972)." Linguistics no. 157:160-164.
———. 1975. "Another Speculum Puerorum Attributed to Richard
Billingham." Medioevo no. 1:203-235.
"Every student of Mediaeval logic knows the tract on the truth and
falsity of the propositions by the hand of Richard Billingham.
It goes under the titles Speculum puerorum, Speculum iuvenum, and
also Terminus est in quern, after the well known incipit borrowed from
Aristotle's Prior Analytics (I I, 24b16-18) Terminus est in quem
resolvitur propositio ut predicatum et de quo predicator, apposito vel
diviso esse vel non esse. In 1970 Dr. Alfonso Maierù published a very
useful school edition of the work, (*) to the effect that the scholary
world has now that text at its disposition which exerted a tremendous
influence in fourteenth and fifteenth century logic, especially in the
universities of Eastern and Southern Europe.
The text has come down to us in two different redactions, an English
and a Central European one.(**) Elsewhere (***) I tried to show that
Billingham's work is the most famous specimen of quite a number of
similar tracts De veritate et falsitate propositiomun, but certainly not
the oldest of them. It is the aim of this article to introduce and edit
another treatise of this type, which like the well known treatise edited
by Maierù goes under the title Speculum puerorum and is likewise
attributed to Billingham. It is found in a late fourteenth century
manuscript of the Archivo General de la Corona de Aragon at
Barcelona, Spain, viz. Ripoll 141." p. 203
(*). A. Maierù, Lo "Speculum puerorum sive Terminus est is quem" di
1220
Riccardo Billingham. «Stud. Med.», 3 (1969), 297-397.
(**) See Maierù, Introd. 318 sqq. Maierù seems to be wrong in
distinguishing a third class of manuscripts; in fact at least two of this
class contain quite a different tract which also goes under the name
Terminus est is quem. See L. M. de Rijk, The Place of Billingham's
Speculum puerorum in 14th and 15th Century Logical Tradition, with
the edition of some alternative tracts, (1975).
(***) Study quoted in the previous note.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, and Mansfeld, Jaap, eds. 1975. Kephalaion.
Studies in Greek Philosophy and Its Continuation, Offered to Professor
C. J. De Vogel. Assen: Van Gorcum.
"This volume is offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel, who for more than
twenty-five years held the chair of Ancient and Medieval (since 1968
of Ancient and Patristic) Philosophy in the University of Utrecht."
Contents: W. J. Verdenius: Heraclitus' conception of fire 1; René
Schaere: Héraclite jugé par Platon 9; Jaap Mansfeld: Alcmaeon:
'Physikos' or Physician? With some remarks on Calcidius' 'On vision'
compared to Galen, Plac. Hipp. Plat. VII 26; E. de Strycker S. J.: The
oracle given to Chaerephon about Socrates 39; G. J. de Vries: A
general theory of literary composition in the Phaedrus 50; Pierre-
Maxim Schuhl: Platon et la pureté de l'altitude 53; Enrico Berti:
Logical and ontological priority among the genera of substance in
Aristotle 55; Suzanne Mansion: Une passage obscur du deuxième livre
de la Physique 70; G. Verbeke: Moral behaviour and tiem in Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics 78; Olof Gigon: Phronesis und Sophia in der
Nicomach. Ethik des Aristotle; B. L. Hijmans: Athenodorus on the
Categories an a pun on Athenodorus 105; Heinrich Dörrie: Logos-
Religion? Oder Noûs-Theologie? Die Hauptsächlichen Aspekte des
kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus 115; Walter Burkert: Plotin, Plutarch un
die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles 137;
Theo Gerard Sinnige: Metaphysical and personal religion in Plotinus
147; A. H. Armstrong: Beauty and the discovery of divinity in the
thought of Plotinus 155; Modestus van Straaten O. S. A.: On Plotinus
IV, 7 [2], 8, 3 164; F. P. Hager: Proklos and Alexander von
Aphrodisias über ein Problem der Lehre von der Vorsehung 171; Maria
Timpanaro-Cardini: Two questions of Greek Geometrical terminology
183; Robert Joly: Remarques sur Dion Chrysostome et le Nouveau
1221
Testament 189; Cornelia W. Wolfskeel: Christliches und
Neoplatonisches im denken Augustins 195; L. M. de Rijk: Quaestio de
Ideis. Some notes on an important chapter of Platonism 204; Hans-
Rudolf Schwyzer: The Intellect in Plotinus and the archetypes of C. G.
Jung 214; Bibliography of C. J. de Vogel, compiled by J. van Heel 223;
Tabula gratulatoria 231.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1976. "Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on
the Game of Obligation. Part Iii. The Tract De Petitionibus
Contrariorum, Usually Attributed to William of Sherwood." Vivarium
no. 14:26-49.
"William of Sherwood (born between 1200-10 died between 1266-71)
(*) is commonly (*) considered the author of not only a tract De
obligationibus but also a short tract called in the only manuscript (Paris,
B. N. Lat. 16.617, f. 64v) Petitiones contrariorum. This small work
deals with the solution of logical puzzles (sophismata) that arise from
hidden contrariety in the premisses of an argumentation.
The aim of this paper is to publish the shorter tract from the Paris
manuscript and to investigate its attribution to Sherwood.
(*) The most extensive biography of Sherwood is found in Norman
Kretzmann, William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic translated
with an introduction and notes. University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis 1966, Introd. pp. 3-12.
(**) See Kretzmann, op. cit., p. 15.
———. 1976. "On Buridan's Doctrine of Connotation." In The Logic of
John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium on Medieval
Logic and Semantics, Copenhagen 16-21 November 1975, edited by
Pinborg, Jan, 91-100. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum.
Reprinted as chapter XI in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"Mediaeval Terminist logic was concerned with the so-called properties
of terms (proprietates terminorum), to the extent that it not only studied
the formal structures of Latin language, its logical syntax, and all kinds
of specifications within this scope, but also interpreted the linguistic
elements and structures. This interpretation mainly focussed on what
the moderns would call semantics rather than on formal logic as such.
The properties of terms (significatio, appellatio, suppositio and its
various forms: ampliatio, restrictio, distributio) were investigated in
1222
their relation to the so-called res extra animam (extra-mental reality).
Two statements can be made. First: Who wants to detect a Mediaeval
thinker's implicit ontological points of view, finds a wealth of firm
evidence in his doctrine of the properties of terms. Secondly: Within
the domain of these properties it is Buridan's appellatio that has a very
interesting role because of its affinity with the modern concept of
connotation. So Buridan's appellatio is entitled to have the attention of
both the historians of Mediaeval thought and learning as of those
modern logicians who do not want to seclude themselves from the
historical background of modern doctrines.
My approach to the matter concerned now is to compare Buridan's
appellatio with modern connotation, more specifically to put the
translation 'connotation' for Buridan's appellatio to the test." p. 91
———. 1976. "Richard Billingham Works on Logic." Vivarium no.
14:121-138.
"Since Professor Alfonso Maierù published (*) his most useful work-
edition (strumento di lavoro) of Richard Billingham's Speculum
puerorum every student of Mediaeval logic has been acquainted with
that famous work which exerted such a great influence in the fourteenth
and fifteenth century logic curriculum, especially in the schools of
Eastern and Southern Europe. Elsewhere (**) I have tried to show that
Billingham's work is part of a certain tradition of similar works on the
truth and falsity of propositions and certainly not unique in the, genre
nor at its origin.(...)
The aim of this paper is to recollect all manuscript evidence for
Billingham's logical works." pp. 121 and 123.
(*)Alfonso Maierù, Lo 'Speculum puerorum sive Terminus est in quem'
di Riccardo Billingharn. Estratto da A Giuseppe Ermini, Centro italiano
di studi sull' alto Medioevo, Spoleto 1970, 297-397. (= Studia
medievalia 3, (1969), 297-397).
(**) L. M. de Rijk, The Place of Billingham's Speculum puerorum in
14th and 15th Century Logical Tradition, with the Edition of Some
Alternative Tracts in: Studi Mediewistyczne 16 (1975), 99-153.
———. 1977. "Logica Oxoniensis. An Attempt to Reconstruct a
Fifteenth Century Oxford Manual of Logic." Medioevo no. 3:121-164.
"In a recent paper (*) I have attempted to show that the study of logic at
Cambridge University during the fifteenth century led to the
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compilation of an own textbook. It seems rather obvious that the rival
school of Oxford had also its specific textbook in usum delphini.
However, our manuscript tradition is less clear at this point; whereas
the Cambridge logic seems to be handed down as a whole, its Oxford
counterpart presents itself in a rather scattered form, to the extent,
indeed, that, to my knowledge at least, no manuscript contains all
(presumable) parts of this work. This paper attempts to reconstruct the
(supposed) Oxford textbook." p. 121
(...)
"Conclusions. It is quite clear from the previous investigations that
about 1400 the study of logic in the Oxford schools led to a remarkable
production of tracts. There seems to have existed a more or less
established set of tracts on the different logical topics of those days. Far
from having one specific author this «Oxford Logic» seems to consist
of adaptations of famous fourteenth century tracts. This holds also good
for other famous Oxford treatises. So is Bradwardine's well-known
tract on proportion frequently found in various anonymous adaptations
in our fifteenth century manuscripts (see also some of the manuscripts
analysed above). (...)
Much work is still to be done about the exact affiliations and
interdependency of the tracts of the «Oxford Logic» and eponymous
works of the 14th and 15th centuries. Again, as with the Cambridge
Logic, the Southern Europe (especially Italian tradition, will turn out to
be of the utmost importance. The only aim of this paper is to give a
survey of the manuscript evidence. Most of the conclusions drawn can
only be accepted with all proper reserves." p. 163-164.
(*) 'Logica Cantabrigiensis' A fifteenth century manual of logic
———. 1977. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and
Metaphysics. Part I." Vivarium no. 15:81-120.
"1. Introduction. The aim of this study is, rather than to give a
contribution to the history of semantics as such, to show (i) the
interdependence of Ancient (and Mediaeval) semantic views and
metaphysical doctrines, and (2) how some Mediaeval semantic points
of view may be clarified when traced back to the corresponding
Ancient views. As far as Antiquity is concerned, Plato, Aristotle and
the Stoics as well as Neoplatonism and Peripatetics are discussed.
However, it should be noticed at the outset that in many cases it is
1224
practically impossible to discern exactly what precisely in the different
views found in Late Antiquity came from what School, let alone to
attribute the various views to specific authors. To my mind, in his
inspiring paper on the logical doctrines in the Neoplatonic and the
Peripatetic schools (*) A. C. Lloyd made the correct approach to the
subject matter. When discussing the question how much of the
Neoplatonic views is borrowed from Stoic logicians his answer is that
substantially it is nothing but the fact that the forms of Neoplatonism
are sometimes conditioned by Stoic logical doctrine and terminology;
what still remained under those adventitious shapes is the intrinsic
impetus and natural direction of Neoplatonism itself (Lloyd, 158)." p.
81.
(*) Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic in: Phronesis, A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy (1) 1956, 58-72 and 146-160, henceforth
quoted as Lloyd. This study should be corrected in many points,
however.
2. Participation and the multiplication of the Form in Plato; 2.1. A
particular's partaking of several Forms; 2.2. The Forms' capacity for
mutual communion; 2.3 The Forms and their being known;
"2.4. The Forms' epistemologic function and their ontological status.
The basic question of what is the extent of the World of Forms appears
with Plato in two distinct shapes: (a) which are the several classes of
things belonging to the Ideal World? and (b) where Forms are found?
As a matter of fact the two questions are clearly related.
The former is concerned whenever is asked about the transcendent
nature of organic and even anorganic (both honorable and undignified)
things as well as mathematical and moral entities (**). In last analysis
this form of the question has much to do with the hierarchic order of
the transcendent world. However, it is first the second question that
should come under review now; it is concerned with the status of the
Forms. Next, the former question as confined to the Hierarchy of Being
will be discussed in the second part of this section." pp. 96-97.
(**) The classical passages are found in the Phaedo, Republic,
Parmenides, Timeus, and the Seventh letter, 342 A.D.
2.4.1. The different status of the Platonic Form; 2.4.2. The hierarchic
arrangement of the Forms; 2.5. The threefold status of the Forms as
found with Plato; 2.5.1 The Form taken in its transcendent status;
1225
2.5.2. The Form taken in its immanent status; 2.5.3. The Form taken in
its mental status.
Metaphysics. Part Ii. The Multiplication of Being in Aristotle's
Categories." Vivarium no. 16:81-117.
"3. The multiplication of being in Aristotle's Categories.
3.1. Introduction. One of the results of the preceding section may be
that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's
view the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that
only by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of
the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been
multiplied. As a matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his
followers of the Middle Academy on this score would seem to be a
different one. The ontological problems of participation were felt as
early as in the Platonic dialogues (see our section 2), as well as the
logical ones concerning predication (which will be discussed in a later
section). Well, the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., introduced
explicitly a threefold distinction I of the Platonic Form or rather of its
status which was (only) implied with Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly
more fortunate in ascribing (ibid.) this introduction chiefly to the
influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic interpretation. It is true, in
stating the basic distinction between en hypokeimenôi and kath'
hypokeimenou Aristotle tried to face the same cluster of fundamental
problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of the Forms
as taken before or after the methexis (cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Categ.,
79, 12ff.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most unfaithful one,
in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged on the
same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his
most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a
catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic
Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in
the Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his
pupils with a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of
participation and logical predication. It was certainly not left quite
unsolved in the later dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous
solution which could be accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So
any of his serious followers, (who were teachers in the School, at the
1226
same time) was bound to contrive, at least, a scholastic device to
answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should
be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly
on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic
and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the
Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of
his development, Oxford 1949, 308)." pp. 81-82
3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the Categories; 3.2.1.
The common view: categories = predicates; 3.2.2. The things said
'aneu symplokés'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the
Categories; 3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification;
3.2.5. Some obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status
of the 'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2.
The second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the
classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in
the items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7.
The relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and
predicables; 3.3.1. The opposition of category and predicable; 3.3.2.
The impact of the opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the
differentia; 3.3.4. Conclusion..
———. 1979. "Facts and Events. The Historian Task." Vivarium no.
17:1-42.
"English translation (by Jop Spiekermann) subsidiezed by the
University of Leyden of part of my introductory book on Medieval
Philosophy (Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing.
Assen 1977) being part of Chapter II (On the philosophical
presuppositions of historical periodization)." p. 1
"Summary. Basically, a historian's conception of history is to be judged
by the status he assigns to historical fact. We on our part have defined
fact as the mental entity to which direct reference is made by a
descriptive statement accepted as true (1.2-1.4). Next, we have tried to
throw further light on this conception, not least by enlisting the aid of
linguistics (1.5-1.7).
History -- as distinct from what others have termed 'history in an
objective sense' -- has been defined as 'histoire connaissance', whose
central concerns it is to render insightful what we have called the vis-à-
vis (XYZ), sometimes indicated by the, to me repellent, term 'histoire
1227
réalité' (2.2).
Further reflection on what ultimately constitutes fact has led us to
adopt, in line with others, an extension of Kuhn's paradigm concept:
paradigms is whatever is constitutive of any external world experience,
regardless of what this experience may be; it is of a compelling nature.
When the historian, intent on getting a grip on his vis-à-vis (XYZ),
delineates and structures it, any such structuring operation is, from the
perspective of the vis-à-vis, arbitrary and intrusive. On the historian's
part, however, it is of a compelling, paradigmatic nature (3.1). This
lends piquancy to such phrases as 'Historical truth dictates the
observation that...', since it is not any 'past reality' which dictates to us.
Rather, it is our own, indeed historical (!) paradigmatically determined
experience of our vis-à-vis which, without dictating anything, compels
us.
But a paradigm can be reversed, thereby giving rise to a different,
eventually perhaps completely different, mode of experiencing the vis-
à-vis (3.2-3.3)
The historian-the medievalist no less than his fellow-historians-is
confronted with this matter on two counts. In his probing quest he
himself is tied clown to the contemporary paradigm. Though he is
unable to discern the outlines of the paradigm he is caught up inwhich
must indeed, by definition, be postulated-yet his realization that his
mode of experiencing the vis-à-vis determines his scientific activities
and that both are shaped by the prevailing paradigm, should restrain
him from entertaining unwarranted ideas about 'objectivity'. Equally, he
must take into account that his documentary sources, in turn, are
paradigmatically determined. For anyone writing at any moment in the
past it was possible to be 'objective' only in the sense that he honestly
recorded what lie saw." pp. 41-42.
———. 1980. Die Mittelalterlichen Traktate De Modo Opponendi Et
Respondendi: Einleitung Und Ausgabe Der Einschlägigen Texte.
Münster: Aschendorff.
Inhalt.
EINLEITUNG
1. Eine jüdisch-arabische (?) Vorlage des bekannten pseudo-
albertischen Traktats De modo opponendi et respondendi 1; 2. Der
Thesaurus philosophorum des 'Aganafat' 11; 3. Die Albert dem
1228
Grossen fälschlicherweise zugeschriebene Überarbeitung des
Thesaurus philosophorum 26; 4. Eine weitere Bearbeitung des
Thesaurus aus der Feder eines Magisters Gentilis aus dem 14.
Jahrundert 35; 5. Eine selbständigere Überarbeitung des Thesaurus in
einem Erlanger Kodex. Weitere Spuren des Genres 43; 6. Die Technik
und Methode der drei edierten Traktate. Der vermutliche Umfang der
Originalfassung des Thesaurus 54; 7. Die Stellung des Thesaurus c.s.
im mittelalterlichen Lehrbetrieb 68; 8. Zur Ausgabe. Beschreibung der
Handschriften. Die Ratio edendi 84.
DIE TEXTE
1. Die Thesaurus Philosophorum des Aganafat 106; 2. Die Prager
version des Thesaurus philosophorum 159; 3. Pseudo-Alberti Magni
De modo opponendi et respondendi 193; 4. Gentilis de Monte Ste
Marie in Georgio De arte et modo disputandi 287-379.
Metaphysics. Part Iii. The Categories as Classes of Names." Vivarium
no. 18:1-62.
"4. The Categories as class of names; 4.1. Status quaestionis. The
previous sections contain several hints to the close interrelation
between three major issues in Plato's doctrine, viz. the question about
the true nature of the Forms and those about participation and
predication. Indeed, for the founder of the theory of the Forms,
predication was bound to become a problem. Forms are immutable and
indivisible; yet other Ideas have to participate in them; they are unique,
by themselves and subsistent; yet, when saying 'John is man' (or white),
'Peter is man' (or white), should there be one perfect, eternal,
immutable etc. Form of MAN (or WHITE) in the one and another in
the other? Or, as I have put it above [1977: 85]: if John, Peter, and
William are wise, does this mere fact mean that there must be
something which they are all related to in exactly the same manner,
namely WISDOM itself? And if 'John is wise', 'Peter is wise', and
'William is wise' are all true statements, what exactly is the meaning of
the predicate name 'wise'? The former question is concerned with
participation, the latter with predication. Well, that the crux of the latter
problem is not the separate existence of the Forms (chôrismos) clearly
appears from the fact that also the author of the Categories, who had
entirely
1229
abandoned all kind of chôrismos, could apparently not get rid of a
similar problem: if the categories really are classes of 'things there are'
(1 a 20) (i.e. 'real' substances, 'real' natures, and 'real' properties), rather
than concepts (i.e. logical attributes), what kind of 'thing' is meant by a
term qua 'category'? So for Aristotle the semantic problem still
remained. His distinction between en hypokeimenôi and kath'
hypokeimenou could only hide the original problem. It is often said that
these phrases refer to different domains, the metaphysical and the
logical one, respectively. We have already found some good reasons to
qualify this opposition (see [1978], 84; 88). It seems to be useful now
to collect all kind of information from Aristotle's writings, not only the
Categories, about the proper meaning of the categories. This will be the
aim of our sections 4.2-4.7." pp. 1-2
4.2. On some modern interpretations of 'kata symplokên'; 4.3.
Aristotle's use of the categories; "For this section see also my Utrecht
dissertation, The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's
philosophy, Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my
former views on several points."; 4.31. The categories as a
classification of reality; 4. 32. The categories as a classification of
sentence predicates; 4.33. The categories as a classification of
'copulative being'; 4.4. How did Aristotle arrive at his list of
categories?; 4.5. Are the categories the 'highest predicates'?; 4.6. The
categories taken as names in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. I 4; 4.7. An
attempt at a reinterpretation of Categories, chs. 1-5; 4.8. Aristotle's
view on relatives; 4.9. Conclusion.
———. 1980. "The Semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the
Problem of Universals." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person,
Werk Und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, Jolivet, Jean,
Luscombe, David and de Rijk, Lambertus Marie, 139-151. Trier:
Paulinus-Verlag.
Reprinted as chapter III in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"It is most unfortunate that as late as in the second edition of his Theory
of Universals Richard Aaron has based his rather unfavourable view on
Peter Abailard's contribution to the solution of the problem of
universals on the older work of our famous logician only, viz. the
Logica Ingredientibus. As is known, the French Master's most mature
1230
solution is found in the Logica Nostrorum petitioni (LNP) (*).
In this work (LNP 522, 10 ff.) Abailard attributes the commonness of
common nouns neither to extramental things nor to words (voces),
rather he states that it is significant word (sermo), that is either singular
or universal. He finds much support in Aristotle's definition of the
universal: 'a universal is that which is by its nature predicated of a
number of things.' (**) Abailard lays much stress on the nature of the
formation of sermones, which to his mind is a human establishment
(hominum institutio), unlike the formation of extramental things and
that of words taken as articulated sounds, which are creations of nature.
His solution is entirely focused on his explicit distinction between the
material identity of vox and sermo as opposed to their formal diversity
('non-identity').
There is, he says, a clear formal distinction between 'being predicable
of many,' or: 'predicability' and 'that which is predicable of many'. It is
predicability that must belong to a vox for it to be a universal; just
being something that is predicable of many is not enough.
Well, Abailard makes every effort to explain the formal difference
between vox (word, i. e. articulated sound) and sermo (significant
word), which should be put beside their material identity. The
distinction is so important to him that we need not wonder that
throughout the whole discussion Abailard makes use of his best
weapon, his incomparable skill in the field of linguistic (or rather:
semantic) analysis."
(*) Richard I. Aron, The theory of Universals, Oxford, 1967 (2nd ed.),
p. 13.(...)
(**) De interpretatione 7, 17a 39-40.
———. 1980. "Peter Abälard (1079-1142), Meister Und Opfer Des
Scharfsinns." In Petrus Abaelardus, 1079-1142. Person, Werk Und
Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 125-138. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.
1979).
Reprinted as chapter II in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"Kehren wir zum Abschluss nochmals zu Abälards eigenen Worten
zurück: „Von der ganzen Philosophie sagte mir die Logik am meisten
zu: für ihre Waffen gab ich die Ritterwaffen dahin." Ihrer Stimme ist er
1231
tatsächlich gefolgt, nicht nur als Theoretiker der Logik, sondern auch
durch Anwendung seiner subtilen Logik auf sonstige Wissensgebiete.
Aber der Einfluss seiner logischen Natur lässt sich auch des weiteren
spüren: Sein ganzes Leben wurde von seinem Scharfsinn geprägt:
wusste er doch auch die Schwächen seiner Gegner erbarmungslos zu
analysieren.
Sein Schüler Berengar von Poitiers schrieb nach der Verurteilung
seines Lehrers (durch die Synode von Sens im Jahre 1140) eine
Verteidigungsschrift, die u. a. Abälards Glaubensbekenntnis (Confessio
fidei) enthält (= Epist. 17). Nun denn, die Confessio fidei gleicht
keineswegs Augustins Retractatio, scheint doch Abälard vielmehr
versucht zu sein, abermals recht zu behalten. Was er beiseite zu
schaffen wünscht, sind nicht etwa eigene Irrtümer, sondern
Missverständnisse seitens anderer, worunter ihm wohl das Wichtigste
war, dass die Leute seinen aufrichtigen Glauben angezweifelt hatten.
Seine Stärke, die Logik, hat ihn bei vielen verhasst gemacht, indem
man sie dem christlichen Glauben gegenüberstellte." p. 138.
———. 1980. Each Man's Ass Is Not Everybody's Ass. On an
Important Item in 13th Century Semantics. In Historiographica
Linguistica
Studies in medieval linguistic thought. Dedicated to Geoffrey L.
Bursill-Hall on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday on May 15, 1980.
Reprinted as chapter VIII in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"After the discussion of the well-known sophism "Cuiuslibet hominis
asinus currit" William of Sherwood rejects an alternate analysis in the
following words: "quod sic vel sic iudicetur non est ex parte sermonis
sed ex parte nostra tantum" (...)
The aim of this paper, written in honour of a meritorious scholar in the
history of medieval linguistic thought, Geoffrey Bursill-Hall, is, first, to
discuss Sherwood's treatment of the sophism (and especially clarify his
concluding sentence); then, to put the question into its proper historical
context, viz. the medieval discussion of the logico-semantic impact of
the structure of discourse (i. e., the effect of word order on the meaning
of a given sentence)." p. 23
(...)
"3. The semantic impact of the discussion.
1232
Kilwardby's formulation of the condemned position is well-suited to
clarify the semantic impact of the whole discussion. It seems to be
focused on the question of whether, or not, nouns (names), by their own
nature (secundum propriam inventionem) refer to existent things alone.
As is known the affirmative answer is energetically defended by Roger
Bacon (Braakhuis 1977). However, Roger's position is certainly not an
isolate one. Not only a William of Sherwood came very close to it
(Braakhuis 1977), but, generally speaking, many medieval logicians
adhere to the view that a noun's primary inclination is to refer to
particular, demonstrable individuals and that class-designation and
connotation is just a secondary function of names. To take our sophism.
In 'asinus cuiuslibet hominis currit' the subject term 'asinus' preceding
the distributive sign 'cuiuslibet' is not affected by it and, accordingly,
refers to one particular individual.
On the other hand, in 'cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit', in following the
sign the term 'asinus' is prevented from pursuing its primary inclination
and cannot help being confused over (confundi) a multitude of
individuals.
Elsewhere (De Rijk 1980a, 1980b) I have tried to show that as early as
from Abelaird's days medieval logicians developed semantic views to
the effect that, in fact, they endowed names with, at least, two levels:
(a) a name in its own nature refers to an existent thing alone, and (b)
when occurring in a syntactic formation (constructio), especially when
joined to a verb of a tense other than the present, a name is reduced to a
confused level on which it designates realization of a certain nature
(form), including that in the past or future, or even a possible one.
Later discussions of our sophism (e.g., the controversy between Paul of
Venice and Peter of Mantua on the issue (as found in the former's
Logica magna, Treatise Two make clear that our sophism should be put
into the general semantic framework of the period. Medieval word-
order problems, indeed, were often considered very important since
word-order was viewed as the rendez-vous of grammar and ontology."
p. 230.
Braakuhuis 1977 = The views of William of Sherwood on some
semantical topics and their relation to those of Roger Bacon in
Vivarium 15: (1977) pp. 111-142
De Rijk 1980a = The semantical impact of Abailard's solution of the
1233
Problem of Universals
De Rijk 1980b = Abailard's semantic views in the light of later
developments
Metaphysics. Part Iv. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (First
Part)." Vivarium no. 19:1-46.
"5. Plato's semantics in his critical period; 5.1. Introduction. In
concluding the previous section I argued (1980: nr. 4.9, p. 62) that
Aristotle's Categories may be viewed as dealing with the several ways
in which an individual man can be named without destroying his
concrete unity. A well-known passage of Plato's Sophist (251 A 8ff.)
was referred to in which Plato deals with the puzzle of one man with
many names. It is true, Plato labels the puzzle as just 'a magnificent
entertainment for the young and the late-learners' (251 B), and is more
interested in the related question of how 'things' like Rest and Change
(presently called Kinds) can also have several attributes (attributive
names) and the general problem of attribution as implying the
'Communion' of Kinds'. But it is obvious at the same time that in this
shape too the puzzle is mainly concerned with the notions of naming,
asserting and predication. So Plato's Sophist unavoidably has to be part
of our discussion.
A further argument for taking the Sophist into consideration may be
found in Ammonios' commentary to Aristotle's De interpretatione. He
remarks (ad 17 a 26ff.: Comm. in Aristot. graeca IV 5, p. 83, 8-13, ed.
Busse) that the analysis of the apophantikos logos as given by Aristotle
is to be found scattered all over Plato's Sophist (261 Cff.) right after
that master's excellent expositions about Non-being mixed with Being
(peri tou synkekramenou tôi onti me ontos). For that matter, on more
than one item of Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione the
Ancient commentators refer to related questions and discussions in
Plato's later dialogues, especially the Sophist. I hope to show in
sections (5) and (6) that the views found in the Categories and De
interpretatione are most profitably compared with what Plato argues in
the related discussions of the Sophist." p. 1.
5.2. On the main theme of Plato's Sophist; 5.3. Plato's preliminary
attempt to search 'the Sophist' (216A-231E); 5.4. The semantic
character of the procedure; 5.5. On current views about 'what is' and
1234
'what is not'; 5.5.1. Introductory: on the genus of image-making; 5.5.2.
What should be understood by the phrase 'what is not'? (237B-242B);
5.5.2.1. On the notion of 'what absolutely is not'; 5.5.2.2. On the
association of 'what is not' with likeness and falsehood; 5.5.3.
Pluralists and Monists about 'what is'; 5.5.3.2. On 'what is' as taken by
the Monists; 5.5.4. Materialists and Idealists about 'what is'; 5.5.4.1.
The Materialists (245E-247E); 5.5.4.2 The Idealists (248A-249D);
5.5.4.3. Does 'what is in change' include Forms?; 5.6. The general
problem of name-giving (249D-256D); 5.6.1. 'Being' as a (formally)
separate and (materially) all-embracing Form.
Metaphysics. Part V. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Second
5. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Continuation); 5.6.2. The
problem of giving several names and the Communion of Kinds; 5.6.2.1.
On the 'trivial' question of 'one individual -- many names'; 5.6.2.2.
Giving several names and the Communion of Kinds;
"5.6.3. Dialectic and the Communion of Forms
In order to clarify the Communion of Kinds an analogy is drawn
between the vowels which 'form a sort of bond running through the
whole system (253 A 4-5) and certain Forms that are 'running through
all' (253 C 1). Just as without the help of vowels it is impossible for one
of the other letters to fit in with any other (A 5-6), similarly it is the
special Forms that make possible Communion and are responsible for
Division (C 2-3). It seems to be useful to have a look at the impact of
this analogy." p. 95
5.6.3.1. The precise impact of the wovel-analogy; 5.6.3.2. The proper
task of Dialectic; 5.6.3.3. The description of the dialectician's practice;
5.6.4. On the Communion of Forms as occurring in particulars; 5.6.5.
The question of 'what is not' reduced into a problem of name-giving;
5.6.6. Four antinomies concerning the Five Kinds raised and solved
(254D-255E); 5.6.6.1. The first round: on the relations of Being, Rest
and Change; 5..6.6.2. The second round: on the relations of Change,
Rest, Same and Other; 5.6.6.3. The third round: 'What is' and 'the
Same' disentangled; 5.6.6.4. The fourth round: 'What is' and 'the Other'
disentangled; 5.6.6.5. On the different uses of kath' hauto; 5.6.6.6.
'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled. Continuation; 5.6.6.6. 'What is'
1235
and 'Other' disentangled. Continuation.
———. 1981. "Die Wirkung Der Neuplatonischen Semantik Auf Das
Mittelalterliche Denken Über Das Sein." In Sprache Und Erkenntnis Im
Mittelalter. Akten Des 6. Internationalen Kongresses Für
Mittelalterliche Philosophie Der Société Internationale Pour L'étude
De La Philosophie Médiévale, 29. August-3. September 1977 Im Bonn,
edited by Beckmann, Jan P., 19-35. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Reprinted as chapter V in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"Das Thema dieser Plenarsitzung, SPRACHE UND LOGIK, könnte
man als ein rein logisches, bzw. rein linguistisches Problem auffassen.
Der Titel dieses Vortrags jedoch genügt, um deutlich zu machen, dass
dies nicht meine Absicht ist; uns interessiert zur Stunde das
Bedeutungsproblem als philosophische Frage. Ich halte es für nicht
ganz unwichtig zu bemerken, dass es sich für mich dabei nicht um eine
durch diesen Philosophiekongreß bedingte Wahl handelt, sondern um
eine prinzipielle Auffassung, und zwar, dass überhaupt das
Bedeutungsproblem nur als ein semantisches aufgefasst werden sollte.
Wer aber Semantik sagt, kann die Fragen der Ontologie und
Metaphysik nicht ausser acht lassen.
Diejenigen unter uns, die auf dem Gebiet der Logik eher Amateure als
Liebhaber sind, dürfen sich aber nicht darüber freuen, dass jetzt das
Verhältnis Sprache und Metaphysik unmittelbar, ich möchte sagen,
geradlinig, zu Wort gebracht werden wird. Es bleibt ja immer, zur
Vermeidung eines Kurzschlusses, der Umweg über die Logik
wesentlich, da sonst eine rein evokative, mehr andeutende als deutende
Bewältigung der metaphysischen Fragen in den Vordergrund treten
würde.
Ich möchte von einem logischen Spezialfall der Seinsdeutung
ausgehen. Zuerst wird er in seinen logisch-semantischen Kontext
gestellt; danach wird der Doppelcharakter des Verbums „est" näher
analysiert, wobei die generelle Frage der Namensbezeichnung sich als
das eigentliche Problem entpuppt, und zum Abschluss wird sich dies
besonders auf die Relation Aktualität und Faktizität verlegen." p. 19
———, ed. 1981. Anonymi Auctoris Franciscani Logica Ad Rudium.
Edited from the MS. Vat. lat. 946 with a short introduction, notes and
1236
indices
———. 1981. "Boèce Logicien Et Philosophe: Ses Positions
Sémantiques Et Sa Métaphysique De L'être." In Atti Del Congresso
Internazionale Di Studi Boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 Ottobre 1980), edited by
Obertello, Luca, 141-156. Genova: Accademia Ligure di scienze e
lettere.
"Le grand historien Etienne Gilson a bien remarqué que c'est à propos
du problème du Bien que la pensée de Boèce fut la plus personnelle et
la plus féconde. Avec Platon et Saint Augustin, il identifie dans son
opuscule Quomodo substantiae l'être au Bien (comme le Mal au non-
être). Il est évident que dans l'opinion de Boèce la doctrine de l'être
obtient une importance décisive comme base de la théorie du Bien.
Aussi la solution du problème du Bien et du Mal fut esquissé dans sa
métaphysique de l'être.
L'identification de l'être et du Bien implique que pour tout ce qui est,
c'est une seule et même chose d'être et d'être bon. Mais si les choses
sont substantiellement bonnes, en quoi diffèrent-elles du Bien en soi,
qui est Dieu? Dans cette question la problématique du Sophiste de
Platon a dû revivre. On sait que dans cette dialogue Platon a essayé de
resoudre le problème fondamental de l'être des choses périssables par
une analyse vraiment pénétrante des notions de «Même» (tauton) et
«Autre» (heteron).
Il me semble que Boèce fait une chose comparable. Il n'est pas étonnant
qu'il commence (dans De hebdomadibus = Quomodo substantiae etc.;
voir l'edition de Stewart-Rand) ses exposés approfondis sur la notion de
l'être par l'axiome qui a dû provoquer tant de commentaires pendant le
moyen âge: diversum est esse et quit quod est (II 28-30: «il ya diversité
entr "être" et "ce qui est"»). Cette formule, qui est valable pour tout être
composé concerne la différence ontologique entre l'élément constitutif,
ou la forme, de tout être composé d'un côté, et la chose elle-même, ou
le tout établi par cette forme, de l'autre. Le tout doit son être à l'élément
constitutif qui est la forme substantielle, sans laquelle il n'est pas du
tout. Cependant la question sur son essence ne peut pas être resolue en
désignant cette forme. (...)
Il semble être utile de prendre au sérieux la suggestion des
commentateurs médiévaux et d'entreprendre la réponse à notre question
du point de vue sémantique. Je propose de discuter d'abord (1) la notion
1237
de qualitas chez Boèce (2), ensuite son modèle sémantique (3), et ses
idées sur le rôle (logico-sémantique) du nom et du verbe (4-5); enfin la
signification exacte de sa notion de l'être (esse) sera discutée (6) et
éclarcie en mettant en lumière le but et la méthode du traité Quomodo
substantiae (7)." pp. 141-142 (Notes omitted).
———. 1981. "La Lexicographie Du Latin Médiéval Et L'histoire De
La Logique." In La Lexicographie Du Latin Médiéval Et Ses Rapports
Avec Les Recherches Actuelles Sur La Civilisation Du Moyen Âge.,
289-293.
Colloque international, Paris 18-21 October 1978.
"J'arrive à la conclusion de cette courte intervention. Comme le fait
remarquer Olga Weijers dans sa contribution, il faut que les divers
lemmes montrent bien quelles sont les distinctions principales des
divers sens d'un mot, quelles sont les nuances, quelles sont les
différentes expressions dans lesquelles le mot est utilisé dans le cadre
d'une même signification; bref, il faut établir le tableau sémasiologique
de façon détaillée et structurée. Cette chose ne peut se faire qu'en se
fondant sur une interprétation des textes assez élaborée. Cette
interprétation exige l'assistance de spécialistes de divers domaines,
surtout en ce qui concerne tous ceux qui, dès la période médiévale,
étaient de nature assez particulière et parfois tellement ésotérique que
les contemporains des auteurs médiévaux qui n'appartenaient pas au
petit cercle des initiés, ne comprenaient, pas plus que la plupart d'entre
nous, cette terminologie spécialisée. Un de ces domaines était celui
de la logique terministe et de la sémantique à partir du XIII siècle. Dans
cette période bien des mots-clé ont été forgés, qui devaient être d'une
grande importance pour la terminologie philosophique jusqu' à nos
jours. Dans cet ordre d' idées il est essentiel que le lexique du latin
médiéval
ne manque pas à sa tâche." p. 292
———. 1981. "Abailard's Semantic Views in the Light of Later
Developments." In English Logic and Semantics: From the End of the
Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, edited by
Braakhuis, Henk A.G., Kneepkens, Corneli Henri and de Rijk,
Lambertus Marie, 1-58. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and
Semantics, Leiden-Nijmegen 23-27 April 1979.
1238
Reprinted as chapter VI in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"1. Semantics in Abailard's solution of the problem of universals.
Abailard's attempt at solving the problem of universals may be
characterized as a remarkable achievement in the filed of semantics.
The procedure of this solution found in his mature work, the Glosses on
Porphyry (*) can be divided into two stages: first, the extensive
discussion of the formal distinction between vox and sermo, the the
semantic analysis of the intensional act of intellection." p. 1
(*) Logica nostrorum petitioni, ed. Geyer (Münster 1933), pp. 505-533
(henceforth quoted as L.N.P.)
"Finally, I will briefly sum up some of the important items of
Mediaeval semantics which may be fitted into the frame-work of what I
have labeled the 'semantic stratification of appellative names'.
First. There is the distinction of esse actuate and esse habituate as
adhered to by many 13th century authors but energetically rejected by
Roger Bacon, whereas William of Sherwood turns out to stand
somewhere half-way between Roger and the majority. The point at
issue is the significative force of an appellative noun. Whereas others
commonly accepted a name's referring to an esse habituale (that is,
being common to present, preterite and future being and even to what
actually is and what actually is not), Roger most strictly held that even
in such metaphysical propositions as 'omnis homo de necessitate est
animal' the subject term can only refer to actually existing things
(therefore they are all false on Roger's view). William, though
admitting the distinction between esse actuale and esse habituale,
regarded such propositions as equivocal. This reminds us of William's
view that a name's meaning is determined by the language - users rather
than by speech itself (Syncat., 52, 25 - 26). The pivotal point of this
controversy seems to be the different application of our F.R. On
Roger's view, for instance, the determination 'de necessitate' in
propositions such as 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal ' is unable
to strip an appellative noun of its primary function, of signifying only
existing things, whereas his opponents are apparently of the opinion
that that phrase compels the noun to withdraw to its second semantic
level of designating just an esse habituale, with the result that the
proposition is true.
1239
Secondly, the problems concerning verbs expressing a mental attitude
may be looked at from the same point of view. To quote Abailard
(L.N.P. 531, 9 - 13; cfr. also above, pp. 4 - 5 ): When it is said: "I want
a hood (desidero cappam); well, every hood is this or that hood", yet it
does not follow that I want this or that hood. If, however, one would
say as follows: "I want a hood; well, every one who wants a hood is
wanting this or that hood; (therefore I am wanting this or that hood ) ",
then, indeed, the argument would go on correctly.
However, the assumption would be false, then. This much is certain,
Abailard rejects that in 'I want a hood' and 'every hood is this hood or
that hood' the term 'hood' has the same signification. As a matter of fact
the term 'hood' in the former proposition, unlike that in the latter
proposition, does not designate a hood actually existing, (except in
case, I have some particular hood in mind, of course). So we have to
conclude that the verb 'desidero' governing the object 'cappam'
precludes us from taking it for an actually existing hood and compels
us to understand it in the second-level-meaning of 'a concrete,
particular, hood', whether or not actually existing." pp. 50-51.
No doubt, it is Abailard who initiated many developments in Mediaeval
semantics. So I have considered it useful to draw the attention to the
achievements of this great master in the field of logic, since 'the logic
before Ockham' cannot be properly understood unless Abailard is
recognized as the man who stood, in many respects, at the craddle of
fourteenth century logic." p. 52.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, and Weijers, Olga. 1981. Répertoire Des
Commentaires Latins Du Moyen Âge Sur Aristote Conservés Dans Les
Bibliothèques Publiques Aux Pays-Bas. Amsterdam: North Holland
Publishing Company.
Avant-propos.
"Il y a quelques années, la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la
Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.) decida d'entreprendre un projet
visant à cataloguer et à décrire tous les manuscrits contenant des
commentaires latins du moyen âge sur les oeuvres (authentiques ou
pseudépigraphes) d'Aristote, y compris, en ce qui concerne la logique,
les commentaires sur l' Isagoge de Porphyre et sur les Opuscules de
Boèce. Dans le présent volume nous avons voulu, conformément au
projet, décrire les manuscrits qui se trouvent aux Pays-Bas.
1240
Notons en passant que le manuscrit Utrecht, Universiteitsbibliotheek
695, qui contient selon le catalogue des questions sur le De Anima
d'Aristote, est un recueil de textes médicaux et que le passage en
question (f. 79r-90"a) est en fait un ouvrage de médecine. Il ne sera
donc pas décrit dans ce volume.
Les descriptions codicologiques sont toutes de la main du second
cosignataire. Le premier soussigné, en faisant l'analyse du contenu des
manuscrits, a bénéficié du concours de dr. É.P. Bos (Leyde) qui a
notamment mis à sa disposition ses analyses circonstanciées des mss.
Cuyck, La Haye Meermanno-Westreenianum 10 A 8 et 9 et Utrecht
825.
L. M. de Rijk, Olga Weijers"
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1982. "Semantics in Richard Billingham and
Johannes Venator." In English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th
Centuries, edited by Maierù, Alfonso, 167-183.
Acts of the 5th European Symposium, Rome, 10-14 November 1980.
Reprinted as chapter XII in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"I shall try to elucidate in this paper some remarkable developments of
the theory of meaning found in Venator's comments upon Billingham"
p. 168.
"I shall try to give a general framework of fourteenth century semantic
views.
A specimen of a model of Mediaeval semantics.
It should be noticed first that any model designed in order to elucidate
the peculiarities of Mediaeval semantic views should start from the
well-established fact that Mediaeval logic was substantially dialogic:
any statement is considered (or supposed to be) actually occurring in a
disputation." p. 178
Metaphysics. Part Vi. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Third
5.6.7. How the diverse Kinds have communion with one another; 5.7.
The reinstatement of 'What is not' (256d-259D); 5.7.1. Forms being and
Forms not being: 5.7.2. The not-being of 'What is'; 5.7.3. The being of
what is not'; 5.7.4. Are there Forms corresponding to negative
expressions?; 5.7.5. The Parmenidean dogma refuted. Summary;
1241
"5. 8 Conclusion. From our analysis of Soph., 216 A-259 D it may be
concluded that Plato did certainly not abandon his theory of Forms. We
may try to answer, now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply
divided about (see Guthrie [A History of Greek Philosophy] V, 143ff.).
They are, in Guthrie's formulation: (1) does Plato mean to attribute
Change to the Forms themselves, or simply to enlarge the realm of
Being to include life and intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is
he going even further in dissent from the friends of Forms and
admitting what they called Becoming --changing and perishable objects
of the physical world -- as part of the realm of True Being?
The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is
defending a certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their
immanent status and, accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather
than the 'Forms themselves' (or: 'in their exalted status' as Guthrie has
it, p. 159). As to the second question, to Guthrie's mind Plato's
language makes it almost if not quite insoluble. I think that if one pays
Plato's expositions the patient attention he asks for 'at 259 C-D and
follows his analysis stage by stage, the exact sense and the precise
respect in which he makes his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2: ekeinêi kai
kat' ekeino ho physi) about Being and Not-being, Sameness and
Otherness, and so on will appear. It will be easily seen, then, that there
is no recantation at all in Plato's development. He still maintains, as he
will maintain in his later works (e.g. Philebus, 14 D ff.) the
Transcendent Forms as what in the last analysis are the only True
Being. But Plato succeeds in giving a fuller sense to the old notions of
'sharing' and 'presence in' without detracting the 'paradigm' function of
the Forms in any respect. Matter, Change and Becoming is given a
better position in the Theory of Forms in that their immanent status has
been brought into the focus of Plato's interest. From his Parmenides
onwards Plato has been searching for the solution of his metaphysical
problems and has actually found it in the Sophist in a new view of
participation. Forms in their exalted status are just a too eminent cause
for the existence of the world of Becoming. But their being shared in,
i.e. their immanent status, make them so to speak 'operable' and yet
preserve their dignity of being paradeigmatic standards. What makes
something to be a horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent Form,
HORSENESS, but it only can partake of that Form and possess it as an
1242
immanent form. So the Highness of the Form and the unworthy matter
can come together as matter 'informed', that is, affected by an
immanent form.
Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only
True Being. In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being
(taken, of course, as a Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A)
that the true philosopher, through his devotion to the Form, 'What is'
('Being'), dwells in the brightness of the divine, and the task of
Dialectic, accordingly, is described from that very perspective (see Part
(5), 96ff.). Focussing on the immanence of the Forms does not detract
anything from their 'exalted status', since immanent forms are nothing
else but the Transcendent Forms as partaken of by particulars.(...)
In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent
World. The important development occurring there consists in his
taking more seriously than before their presence in matter and their
activities as immanent forms. In the Sophist he uses all his ingenuity to
show that a correct understanding of the Forms may safeguard us from
all extremist views on being and not-being and zealous exaggerations
of the Friends of Forms as well." pp. 125-127.
———. 1982. Some 14th Century Tracts on the Probationes
Terminorum (Martin of Alnwick O.F.M., Richard Billingham, Edward
Upton and Others). Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
An edition of four current textbooks, with an introduction and indexes
———. 1982. "The Origins of the Properties of Terms." In The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the
Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, edited
by Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony Patrick, Pinborg, Jan and
Stump, Eleonore, 161-173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Beginning as early as the eleventh century, the relationship between
thought and language was a focal point of medieval thought. This does
not amount to saying that the basic nature of that relationship was being
studied; rather it was accepted without discussion, as it had been in
antiquity. Thought was considered to be linguistically constrained by
its very nature; thought and language were taken to be related both to
each other and to reality in their elements and their structure. In the
final analysis, language, thought, and reality were considered to be of
the same logical coherence. Language was taken to be not only an
1243
instrument of thought, expression, and communication by also in itself
an important source of information regarding the nature of reality. In
medieval thought, logico-semantics and metaphysical points of view
are, as a result of their perceived interdependence, entirely interwoven."
p. 161.
RELATED PAGES
1950 - 1974
1983 - 1990
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Marie de Rijk. Third Part: from 1983 to
1990
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1983. "Did Parmenides Reject the Sensible
World?" In Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval
Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, Cssr on the Occasion of His
Seventy-Fifth Birthday and the Fiftieth Anniversary of His Ordination,
edited by Gerson, Lloyd, 29-53. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies.
"Two camps of scholars interpreting Parmenides' poem have recently
been distinguished and labeled as the Majority and the Minority. The
former holds that, unlike the Alêtheia part, the Doxa part presents an
altogether untrue account of things that properly speaking have no real
existence. According to the Minority, however, the Doxa was put
forward as possessing some kind or degree of cognitive validity. I shall
try to show that both these two positions are ambiguous and
accordingly fail in giving a clear insight into what Parmenides intends
to tell us. They both seem to need correction to the extent that
Parmenides does distinguish the Alêtheia route from the Doxa route(s),
but there is nothing in the text to tell us that he makes a distinction
1245
between two separate domains. one true and the other untrue. As any
genuine philosopher he was concerned about the sensible world, our
world and it was that which he wanted to truly understand." pp. 29-30
(...)
One cannot deny that Heraclitus faced the primitive approach of the
physicists in a radical way. So Parmenides in defending another steady
inner nature ('Be-ing') sees in him his most dangerous rival. No wonder
that his offences against Heraclitus are the most bitter. And indeed he
tries to bring Heraclitus into the company of those who, two-headed as
they are, are not able to make the great decision.
Subsequent thinkers had to take into account Parmenides' doctrine and
in fact could not help digesting its rigidity. Plato was the first to take
the big decision so seriously that he left the idea of one world as
approached by mortals along two different Routes and settled on the
assumption of two separate worlds, one of Unshakable Being, the other
of Unreliable Becoming. Aristotle, for his part, thought it possible to
dispose of Plato's chorismos and find the inner nature of things right in
themselves. No doubt it is Parmenides, cited by Fr. Owens as 'one of
the truly great philosophic geniuses in the history of Western thought,'
(*) who was the catalyst of all subsequent metaphysics" p. 53
J. Owens, A history of ancient western philosophy (New York 1959) p.
76
———. 1985. "Walther Burley's Tract De Exclusivis. An Edition."
"Some years ago the late Jan Pinborg drew our attention to Burley's
early work on propositions which contains some syncategorematic
terms effecting an exclusion ('tantum', 'solus'; 'only'). (...)
The treatise is found in only three manuscripts, and one of these
contains only its beginning. It belongs to the oldest group of logical
writings which may be assigned to this famous English logician whose
great renown is mainly due to his sagacious tract De puritate artis
logicae. The earlier corpus comprises six tracts which in fact form a
course of logic in general use in those days:
(1) De suppositionibus, recently edited by Brown (Stephen F. Brown,
Walter Burleigh's Treatise De suppositionibus and Its Influence on
William of Ockham, in: Franciscan Studies, 32 (1972), 15-64)
(2) De exclusivis, which will be edited here
1246
(3) De exceptivis, which will be edited in the next issue of this journal
(4) De consequentiis, edited by Green-Pedersen (Niels Jorgen Green
Pedersen, Walther Burley's "De consequentiis". An Edition, in:
Franciscan Studies, 40 (1980), 102-66)
(5) De insolubilibus, edited by Roure (M. L. Roure, La problématique
des propositions insolubles au XIIIe siècle et au début du XIVe, suivie
de l'edition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th.
Bradwardine, in: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen
age, 45 (1970), 205-84)
(6) De obligationibus, not edited so far. For the MSS tradition, see J.
Weisheipl, Repertorium Mertonense, in: Mediaeval Studies, 31 (1969),
[174-224], 196." pp. 23-24.
———. 1985. "Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard. Some Criticisms of a
Fascinating Venture." Vivarium no. 23:81-97.
See also: "Reply to Professor de Rijk's 'Martin M. Tweedale on
Abailard: some criticisms of a fascinating venture' by Martin M.
Tweedale in: Vivarium (25), 1987 pp. 3-22 and the postscript by L.M.
de Rijk. id. p. 23.
"Some years ago Martin M. Tweedale wrote a book on a quite
fascinating subject: Abailard on Universals (North Holland Publishing
Company, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1976). (...)
Mr. Tweedale's study is bound to give any of his readers the firm
impression that, as logician, Peter Abailard has accomplished a
tremendous achievement. Unfortunately, however, Tweedale, (...) is on
the wrong track in claiming-throughout his study-that the modern
interpreter has to 'ferret' Abailard's answers out of 'rather obscure
passages' (p. 7), and that he is inconsistent (p. X and passim). Tweedale
has failed to appreciate Abailard's lucidity and clear language. He has
missed the point several times and more than once this is due to his
defective knowledge of Latin. However, let me not move too hurriedly
to my conclusion.
In writing this book, the author had two main objectives in mind, as we
learn from the Preface. First, 'to present in a form easily accessible to
professional philosophers, theologians and historians those scattered
portions of Abailard's logical writings which seem to record a very
original scrutiny of the foundations of logic and in particular the
problem of unversals'. Secondly, 'to interpret the texts in a way that
1247
would connect them with the ancient tradition and also make them
intelligible to contemporary philosophers.' So chapters I and II try to
give an insight into the classical and post-classical background. The
core of the essay is to be found in Chapters III-V; Chapter VI contains
a comparison between Abailard and Frege.
Without doubt, the author has succeeded in enlarging the modern
scholar's acquaintance with, and admiration of, Abailard as a logician
and early Medieval philosopher and theologian. Even someone who has
had only a glimpse of the contents of this rich essay, cannot help
experiencing a kind of thrill on realising that he is meeting in Peter
Abailard a remarkable and original thinker.
However, to write a successful book something more is needed. To my
mind the author was heavily hampered in realising the two objectives
he had set himself, as a result of his poor knowledge of (both classical
and Medieval) Latin grammar and syntax. Sometimes his judgment of
Abailard's achievements is incorrect, for no other reason than his
inability to correctly read Abailard's concise language." 81-82
———. 1985. La Philosophie Au Moyen Âge. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Translation from Dutch by Pierre Swiggers of: Middeleeuwse
wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing, Assen, 1981
"Le présent ouvrage rassemble un nombre de cours préparatoires, tous
consacrés à la philosophie médiévale. L'auteur y insiste sur le problème
du caractère spécifique de cette philosophie. Il cherche à préciser son
propre point de vue, e.a. par la mise-en-cause des problèmes posés par
la philosophie de l'histoire. Son classement de la philosophie au Moyen
Age part de la même trame. Le chapitre IV traite de la méthode
scolastique et fournit des renseignements sur les points de départ des
penseurs médiévaux dans le domaine des différentes disciplines.
Dans le chapitre sur la croyance et la connaissance au Moyen Age
l'auteur commence par donner un exposé général du problème et
ensuite il trace son évolution au moyen des preuves de l'existence de
Dieu, d'Anselme (11e s.) jusqu'à Guillaume d'Ockham (14e s.). Une
analyse de l'ontologie de Thomas d'Aquin donne lieu à l'auteur
d'étudier la confrontation des pensées néoplatonicienne et
aristotélicienne de ]'époque. Le chapitre sur la logique et la sémantique
médiévales perrmet au lecteur de s'initier à la relation entre la
sémantique et le point de vue philosophique d'un auteur du Moyen Age.
1248
Le dernier chapitre traite de la différence profonde entre le criticisme
médiéval et la scepticisme de penseurs comme Montaigne. L'auteur
rnontre que Descartes a été profondément influencé par la pensée
médiévale en ce qui concerne sa victoire du scepticisme."
TABLE DES MATIÈRES. Avant-propos de l'édition française XI; 1.
Le Moyen Age: périoede 'typiquement médiévale'? 1; 2. Périodisation,
critique des sciences et philosophie de l'histoire 25; 3. La division de la
philosophie médiévale 65; 4. La méthode scolastique 82; 5. Croire et
savoir: les arguments pour l'existence de dieu d'Anselme à Occam 106;
6. La métaphysique de l'ëtre chez saint Thomas d'Aquin (1) 142; 7. La
métaphysique de l'ëtre chez saint Thomas d'Aquin (2) 164; 8.
Lasupposition naturelle: une pierre de touche pour les points de vue
philosophiques 183; 9. Scepticisme antique et criticisme médiéval 204;
Notes 219; Index 235.
———. 1986. Pedro Hispano. Tractatus Llamado Después Summule
Logicales. Ciudad de México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas,
UNAM.
Spanish translation by Mauricio Beuchot of: Tractatus, called
afterwards Summule logicales.
———. 1986. "Walther Burley's De Exceptivis. An Edition." Vivarium
no. 24:22-49.
"Here is the edition of Walther Burley's early tract on the so-called
'exceptive propositions.' For some information on it, see the
Introduction preceding my edition of Burley's De exclusivis, in this
journal, vol. 23 (1985), pp. 23-54.
Contents
Chapters
1-3 Introductio
4 Regula 1a: omnis propositio in parte vera et in parte falsa potest
verificari per exceptionem
5-15 Dubitatio
16 Regula 2a: exceptiva est preiacenti instantia
17-23 Instantiae
24 Regula 3a: si tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur, exceptiva est
impropria
25-34 Instantiae
1249
35-69 DE SUPPOSITIONE IN EXCEPTIVA
36-40 De supposìtione subiecti
41-61 De suppositione partis extracapte
42-45 De prima opinione
46-54 De secunda opinione
55-62 De tertia opinione
63-69 De suppositione predicati
70-84 DE HABITUDINE INTER EXCEPTIVAM ET EXCLUSIVAM
70-77 An omnis exclusiva inferat exceptivam et econverso
78-82 An exceptiva inferatur ex negativa exponente exclusive
83-84 An exceptiva inferatur ex affirmativa exponente exclusive
85-91 UTRUM EXCEPTIVA POSSIT ESSE FALSA, UTRAQUE
EXPONENTE EXISTENTE VERA
92-99 AN POST EXCEPTIONEM FIAT DISTRIBUTIO
100-109 QUID DETERMINET PREPOSITIO CUM SUO CASUALI"
p. 22
———. 1986. Plato's Sophist. A Philosophical Commentary.
Contents. Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's Sophist to be reconsidered?
11; Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22;
Chapter 2. The evolution of the doctrine of Eidos 30; Reconsidering
Plato's Sophist 69; Chapter 3. The dialogue's main theme and procedure
71; Chapter 4. On current views about 'what is not' 82; Chapter 5. On
current views about 'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's novel metaphysical
position 103; Chapter 7. The variety of names and the communion of
kinds 110; Chapter 8. An important digression on dialectic 126;
Chapter 9. The communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How the five kinds
combine 159; Chapter 11. The reinstatement of 'what is not' (256d-
259d) 164; Chapter 12. On philosophic and sophistic discourse 186;
The framework: semantics and philosophy in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's
semantics in the Cratylus 217; Chapter 14. Naming and representing
254; Chapter 15. Language and knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics
and metaphysics 327; Bibliography 355; Index of passages quoted or
referred to 365; Index of proper names 377; Index of terms and topics
383-394.
From the Preface: "The way in which Plato announces (Sophist, 249c-
1250
d) his novel metaphysics has been puzzling modern scholars for a long
time: 'What is and the All consist of what is changeless and what is in
change, both together'. Did Plato really introduce Change into the
Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory of Unchangeable
Forms?
Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern
techniques of logico-semantical analysis can be a valuable aid in
unravelling this problem and other difficulties Plato raised and
attempted to solve. However, not all modern distinctions and tools can
be applied without reservation; for many of these are entirely alien to
Plato's thought. Interpreters of Plato must also resist the temptation of
applying methods as disjointing the dialogue and selecting specific
passages only, in their eagerness to prove that Plato was explicitly
interested in (their own favourite) problems of 'identity and predication'
(not to mention such oddities as the 'self-predication of Forms'), or the
distinctions between different senses (or applications) of 'is'.
The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of
the complete dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the Sophist
to Plato's general development. Close reading Plato involves following
him in his own logico-semantical approach to the metaphysical
problems, an approach which shows his deep interest in the manifold
ways to 'name' (or to 'introduce into the universe of discourse') 'what is'
(or the 'things there are').
The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this
subject is far greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of
those who have gone in quite different directions than mine have been
of great importance to me in sharpening my own views and
formulations. Two authors should be mentioned nominatim: Gerold
Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two scholars, whose invaluable
works deserve far more attention than they have received so far.
I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not
followed them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps
barbariously) literal: I do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to
improve Plato by modernising him."
———. 1986. "Peter Abelard's Semantics and His Doctrine of Being."
"6. Conclusion. Upon surveying Abelard's investigations about
1251
sentencehood it may be stated that it certainly developed gradually and,
as a result, so to speak, of our author's continuously scrutinizing the
recalcitrant problems concerning the ways in which, in our linguistic
behaviour, we deal with the vital problem of being.
First, Abelard makes us recognize the peculiar nature of the substantive
verb 'to be' ('esse'), peculiar indeed, since it is the only verb that is
capable of conjoining but, at the same time, when serving, thus, as a
device for predication, conveys, due to its proper invention, the notion
of 'substantialness' ('essentia'). As was said before (above, p. 109),
Abelard's entire discussion of the problem is ostensibly concerned with
mastering the antagonism between coupling and predication. First, he
considers the vicissitudes the predicate noun cannot escape undergoing
as the very result of this antagonism and finds a remedy in splitting up
the different strata present in nouns such as 'album' ('the or a white
thing'). In this endeavour, the chimaera and the like (the 'non-existents')
turn out to be a real spoil-sports.
In the Dialectica, then, Abelard maintains, a a whole, his previous
position (which is found in two parts of the Logica Ingredientibus, viz.
the Perihermeneias commentary and the one on Boethius De topicis
differentiis), but sets on to refine it in that he gives the coupling of
'substantialness' a predominant position over and against the
predication of a (substantial or accidental) form. However, he aptly
combines this move (quite unavoidably, it may seem) with a subtle
emptying of the notion of 'essentia' ('substantialness'), with the result
that, from now on, 'est' ('is') has developed into a mere container
(meaning 'undetermined substantialness') for a 're-al' ('thing-like')
content (or sememe) conveyed by a predicate noun (which also may be
a participle of an ordinary verb). An additional result is that, on this
interpretation, the existential import seems to come from the predicate
noun, so that our chimaera is no longer a spoil-sport. Finally, the
empty-container view of the copula is completed by Abelard's
suggestion to take the 'is' plus the predicate noun as merely one
linguistic construct.
(...)
However this may be, Abelard's achievements in semantics are
astonishingly great and even remain unparalleled for centuries." pp.
123-124 and 125.
1252
1. Preliminary: Significatio in Abelard; 2. Nomen, verbum, oratio; 3.
On the predicative-copulative function of the verb; 4. The noun and
verb in Abelard. A survey; 5. Sentencehood: connection and
predication; 5.1. Some preliminary remarks on naming and predication;
5.2. Predication as a semantic problem: linguistics vs semantics 5.3. On
dating the logical works of Abelard; 5.4. Abelard's tackling of the
problem of Predication in Glossae super Periermeneias; 5.5. The
present interpretation confirmed by Super Topica Glossae; 5.5. The
discussion of predication in the Dialectica; 6. Conclusion.
Note: This paper is meant as a continuation to the series 'On ancient
and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics' published in this Journal
[Vivarium] from 1977-82. For bibliographical reasons the original title
has been dropped and the studies will be continued under separate
titles.
———. 1986. "Abelard and Moral Philosophy." Medioevo no. 12:1-27.
"When speaking of ethics in this connection, we are not referring to a
'doctrine on human behaviour'; rather it is to be understood as the
philosophical (or theological) pursuit concerning the justification of
such a theory. Beforehand it must be said that Abelard's Ethica seu
Scito te ipsum can be regarded as a theological work in being part of
the curriculum presented in theological training. The central question
this work deals with can be expressed as follows: what are the exact
standards by which human behaviour is judged good or evil?
One should not ask whether Abelard's Ethics is a theological or
philosophical work, for that is not the point. As we have already
mentioned, ethics was part of theological enquiry and teaching. This
answer is not a final one, however. For Abelard's conception of
theology was such that philosophy, as an ultimate rational justification,
was certainly admitted to theology, but, moreover, it even implied that
philosophy was an essential constituent of fundamental theological
enquiry. We must examine his Ethics in detail in order to see how
Abelard in fact discusses the issue." p. 1
———. 1987. "The Anatomy of the Proposition. Logos and Pragma in
Plato and Aristotle." In Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy
of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, edited by de
Rijk, Lambertus Marie and Braakhuis, Henk A.G., 27-61. Nijmegen:
1253
"Introductory
This study is written in honour of a scholar who, among many other
things, has laid the solid basis for the study of what may be considered
the kernel of the semantics of the statement-making utterance, viz. the
definition of the bearers of truth and falsity.
In the first section I present a survey of Plato's semantics of the
statement-making expression and a number of key notions involved.
Next, I explore Aristotle's views of the matter, starting with a
discussion of Aristotle's notion of pragma including that of being qua
truth and not-being qua falsehood. In search for the nature of Aristotle's
logos, I discuss this notion as it occurs on the onomazein level as well
as the way in which it acts on the legein level. Next, I investigate the
important notions of synthesis and dihaeresis and the role of einai as a
monadic functor and qua syncategorematic container of categorial
being. Finally, I attempt to present a characterization of Aristotle's
statement-making utterance.
(...) p. 27
"Epilogue
We may summarize what we have found as follows:
1 For Plato,
1.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of a name (onoma) and
an attribute (rhêma) which as such is not yet a statement-making
utterance
1.2 a logos represents a state of affairs (pragma), i.e. an actual
combination of some participata (dynameis) in the outside world
1.3 a logos eirêmenos is a statement-making utterance; it asserts that
the pragma represented by the logos is actually the case.
2 For Aristotle,
2.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of an onoma and a
rhêma which represents both a notional and an ontological state of
affairs. It may be characterized as a 'statable complex'
2.2 a pragma is a state of affairs either ontologically: state of affairs
being part of the outside world or semantically: state of affairs
conceived of and expressed by a logos
2.3 a logos apophantikos ('statement-making utterance') is a logos
actually stated (either asserted or denied)
1254
2.4 a logos may as such be used either on the onomazein level or on the
legein level (qua logos apophantikos). Similarly, phasis (kataphasis,
apophasis) may be used on either of these levels
2.5 synthesis is either synthesis1, = the act of uniting an onoma and a
rhêma into a logos (on the onomazein level) or synthesis2 = the
assertion of such a union accomplished in a logos apophantikos, (on
the legein level), while dihairesis is always the denial of such a union
(on the legein level)
2.6 the esti forming part of a logos apophantikos is not a copula,
properly speaking. Rather, it is a sign of (it consignifies, to speak with
De interp. 3,16b24-5) synthesis2. The onoma and rhêma are already
united to make up a logos ('statable complex') by synthesis, and, then,
the esti rather than acting as a dyadic copulative functor, is merely a
monadic sign of the 'statable complex' being actually stated
2.7 The propositional structure found in the logos apophantikos may be
described as follows:
linguistically: a logos expressing categorial being (i.e.
syncategorematic being implemented by one or more of the ten
categories of being) is stated (either affirmatively or negatively) by
means of the monadic functor 'be' or 'not be'
semantically: the pragma represented by the logos is said to be (or not
to be, respectively) part of the outside world (or: 'be (not) the case')."
———. 1987. "Logic and Ontology in Ockham. Some Notes on His
View of the Categories of Being and the Nature of Its Basic
Principles." In Ockham and Ockhamists. Acts of the Symposium
Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium
Aevum on the Occasion of Its 10th Anniversary (Leiden, 10-12
September 1986), edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri, 25-40.
Reprinted as chapter XIII in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"Conclusion. There is no single reason, I think, to ascribe to Ockham
any feelings of hostility towards metaphysics on this account. God
created 'true and real being', but He created it in shaping 'what is truly
and really being', individual beings, that is. As created, it is radically
changeable and contingent as well. Uncreated, unchangeable being is
1255
not to be created, not even as some mysterious constituent present in
creatural being. Human beings are not entitled to sublimate their
(indispensable) conceptual tools (e.g. universal terms) so that they
represent unchangeable ontic standards. Whenever we are inclined to
do so, Ockham's razor comes in, not however, to make us say that the
metaphysical domain is void. Rather logic (and human thought in
general) should make us recognize our own limitations, and refrain
from speaking about the unspeakable when, and inasmuch as, our
linguistic tools are bound to lead us astray. The same applies to
Ockham's view of proofs of God's existence. He only admits the proof
of God as first preserver of these actual things in this actual world and
rejects all atemporal proofs. However, his faith is unshakeable and not
involved in any philosophical thinking either. Likewise it is Ockham's
ontology (doctrine of being) which is modest, the onta 'beings') are as
abundant as they are. For that matter, Ockham let them really be (ontôs
einai Plato would say). Well, in order to let them be, human thinking
should be prudent in cautiously managing its homemade conceptual
apparatus." pp. 38-39
———. 1987. "Gilbert De Poitiers. Ses Vues Sémantiques Et
Métaphysiques." In Gilbert De Poitiers Et Ses Contemporains: Aux
Origines De La Logica Modernorum. Actes Du Septième Symposium
Européen D'histoire De La Logique Et De La Sémantique Médiévales.
Centre D'études Supérieures De Civilisation Médiévale De Poitiers,
Poitiers, 17-22 Juin 1985, edited by Libera, Alain de and Jolivet, Jean,
147-171. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
"La contribution à notre Symposium que je vous propose maintenant a
pour but de n'envisager l'oeuvre théologique du fameux maître
chartrain qu'au profit de notre connaissance de sa pensée
philosophique. A l'intérieur de cette entreprise, on portera un intérêt
spécial à l'interférence des vues sémantiques et métaphysiques chez
Gilbert.
Prenons notre point de départ dans son commentaire sur le De
hebdomadibus de Boèce. On va voir que l'étude de cette oeuvre nous
fera entrer dans le coeur même de la problématique." p. 147
(...)
" Je suis d'avis que la finesse des expositions théologiques et
philosophiques que nous offre le Porrétain nous échappe, à moins
1256
qu'elles ne soient replacées dans leur contexte sémantique. C'est bien
dans le domaine de la sémantique que Gilbert est digne du vif intérêt de
l'historien de la logique médiévale. Non pas seulement parce que ses
expositions sont bien imprégnées de la pensée logico-grammaticale de
son temps; cela n'a rien d'étonnant étant donné qu'il s'agit d'un savant
de son envergure. Mais ce qui est d'un plus grand intérêt pour nous, ce
sont les contributions que Gilbert a lui-même faites à l'évolution de la
pensée sémantique au douzième siècle.
L'étude des oeuvres théologiques de Gilbert nous permet d'avancer les
deux thèses suivantes:
(1) C'est par l'étude sémantique qu'est favorisée au plus haut point notre
compréhension des pensées théologiques et philosophiques du
Porrétain; je considère comme essentielles la manière et la mesure dont
Gilbert a habillé, pour ainsi dire, sa pensée théologique et
philosophique du vêtement de ses pensées grammatico-logicales.
(2) En expliquant les difficultés assez pénibles dans les opuscula sacra
de Boèce, Gilbert a formulé ses propres vues sémantiques. Celles-ci,
aussi empreintes de la tradition platonicienne qu'elles soient, ne
témoignent pourtant pas moins d'une profondeur vraiment originale." p.
171
———. 1987. "War Ockham Ein Antimetaphysiker? Eine Semantische
Betrachtung." In Philosophie Im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien Und
Paradigmen. Wolfgang Kluxen Zum 65. Geburstag, edited by
Beckmann, Jan P., Honnefelder, Ludger and Wieland, Georg, 313-328.
Hamburg: F. Meiner.
Reprinted as chapter XIV in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"IV. Schlußbetrachtung. Ockham anerkennt ohne Einschränkung den
transzendenten Bezirk, d. h. das Metaphysische oder Übersinnliche als
Bezirk; in diesem Sinne ist er also gewiß kein Antimetaphysiker. Aber
verwirft er denn die Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, oder höhlt er sie
zumindest aus? Zuerst muß anerkannt werden, daß Ockham im Prinzip
der Metaphysik das Weisungsrecht über die Seienden (d. h., für
Ockham, die individuellen Seienden) keineswegs abspricht. Zugleich
kann nicht geleugnet werden, daß bei ihm der Metaphysik eine
auffallend bescheidene Stelle zukommt. Wie läßt sich das unter
Berücksichtigung von Ockhams unzweifelbarer Ehrfurcht vor dem
1257
Übersinnlieben erklären?
Der Schlüssel zur Lösung dieser Frage liegt nicht bloß in Ockhams
Ontologie des individuellen Seins, sondern auch in seinen
anthropologischen Auffassungen. Der Mensch ist nach ihm in seinen
Denken und Sprechen nicht imstande, das Erhabene wesentlich zu
durchforschen. Dessen soll sich der Mensch fort während eingedenk
sein. Dies ist für Ockham in zwei deutliche Strategien übersetzbar:
a) nicht jedem modus significandi oder loquendi entspricht ein modus
essendi in der Wirklichkeit
b) viele maßgebende Aussagen, sowohl sakrale wie profane, soll man
nicht de virtute sermonis (dazu reicht unser Sprechen zuwenig aus),
ondern der Ab sicht des Redners oder Schriftstellers entsprechend
deuten." pp. 326-327 (Notes omitted).
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, and Braakhuis, Henk A.G., eds. 1987. Logos
and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of
Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Table of contents: Introduction XI; List of Professor Nuchelmans'
publications 1950-1987 XI-XVII; W. E. Abraham: The strategy of
Plato's philosophy of language 1; L. M. de Rijk: The anatomy of
proposition: Logos and Pragma in Plato and Aristotle 27; N.
Kretzmann: Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's sea battle 63; H.
A. G. Braakhuis: The view of Peter of Spain on propositional
composition 99; E. P. Bos: The theory of the proposition according to
John Duns Scotus' two commentaries on Aristotle's Perihermeneias
121; E. Stump: Consequences in Ockham's Summa Logicae and their
relation to syllogism, topics and insolubles 141; K. H. Tachau:
Wodeham, Crathorn and Holcot: the development of the Complexe
significabile 161; E. J. Ashworth: Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the
question: 'Do spoken words signify concepts or things?' 189; E. M.
Barth: Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical Interregnum.
An essay in empirical logic 215; E. Morscher: Propositions and all that:
ontological and epistemological reflections 241; M. F. Fresco: Über das
Verhältnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt. Ontologische Fragen unter
besondere Berücksichtigung der Philosophie von J. A. der Mouw 259;
Bibliography 281; Index of passages quoted or referred to 299; Index of
names 311; Index of concepts and terms 317.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1988. "De Quelques Difficultés De Nature
1258
Linguistique Dans Le Vocabulaire De Gilbert De La Porrée." In Actes
Du Colloque Terminologie De La Vie Intellectuelle Au Moyen Âge,
edited by Weijers, Olga, 19-25. Turnhout: Brepols.
Colloque at Leyde/La Haye, 20-21 September 1985.
"On sait que, comme ceux de l'Antiquité, les philosophes du moyen âge
ont fait aussi leur propre vocabulaire technique.
Le but de cette courte communication est de mettre en lumière quelques
difficultés spéciales du vocabulaire philosophique et théologique de
Gilbert de Poitiers, auteur bien connu de la première moitié du XIIe
siècle.
D'abord, il faut remarquer que ces difficultés ressortent de l'usage très
personnel et très original que fait Gilbert des termes courants de la
langue philosophique du XIIe siècle.
Il va de soi que ces difficultés sont délicates une fois de plus pour les
philologues, en général pour les non-initiés en ce qui concerne l'histoire
de la philosophie, parce que la confusion terminologique se présente
déjà dans le domaine philosophique lui-même.
Aussi va-t-on commencer par quelques termes connus, c'est-à-dire les
termes substantia, subsistentia et subsistens et, dans ce contexte, la
différence entre esse et esse aliquid. On va essayer de placer la
terminologie dans le contexte des vues philosophiques de Gilbert, en
particulier de la doctrine porrétaine sur le statut ontique de la chose
concrète." p. 19.
———. 1988. "'Categorization' as a Key Notion in Ancient and
Medieval Semantics." Vivarium no. 26:1-18.
"The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for Aristotle
the verb 'katêgorein' does not as such stand for statemental predication,
let alone of the well-known 'S is P' type, and (b) 'non-statemental
predication' or 'categorization' plays an important role in Ancient and
Medieval philosophical procedure.
1. Katêgorein and katêgoria in Aristotle
Aristotle was the first to use the word 'category' (katêgoria) as a
technical term in logic and philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean
'highest predicate' and explained in terms of statement-making. From
the logical point of view categories are thus considered 'potential
predicates'.(*)
(...)
1259
1.3 Name giving ('categorization') as the key tool in the search for 'true
substance'
What Aristotle actually intends in his metaphysical discussions in the
central books of his Metaphysics (Z-Th) is to discover the proper
candidate for the name 'ousia'. According to Aristotle, the primary kind
of 'being' or 'being as such' (to on hêi on) can only be found in 'being-
ness' (ousia; see esp. Metaph. 1028b2). Unlike Plato, however,
Aristotle is sure to find 'being as such' in the domain of things
belonging to the everyday world. Aristotle's most pressing problem is
to grasp the things' proper nature qua beings. In the search for an
answer name-giving plays a decisive role: the solution to the problem
consists in finding the most appropriate ('essential') name so as to bring
everyday being into the discourse in such a way that precisely its
'beingness' is focussed upon.
(...)
2. The use of 'praedicare' in Boethius
The Greek phrase katêgorein ti kata tinos is usually rendered in Latin
as praedicare aliquid de aliquo. The Latin formula primarily means 'to
say something of something else' (more precisely 'of somebody'). Of
course, the most common meaning of the Latin phrase is 'to predicate
something of something else in making a statement of the form S = P'.
However, the verb praedicare, just as its Greek counterpart katêgorein,
is used more than once merely in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating
by means of a certain name', regardless of the syntactic role that name
performs in a statement. In such cases praedicare stands for the act of
calling up something under a certain name (designation), a procedure
that we have labelled 'categorization'. (...)
Boethius' use of praedicare is quite in line with what is found in other
authors. Along with the familiar use of the verb for statemental
predication, Boethius also frequently uses praedicare in the sense of
'naming' or 'designating something under a certain name' whereby the
use of the designating word in predicate position is, sometimes even
explicitly, ruled out." pp. 1, 4, 9-10.
(*) See L. M. de Rijk, The Categories as Classes of Names (= On
Ancient and Medieval Semantics 3), in: Vivarium, 18 (1980), 1-62, esp.
4-7
———, ed. 1988. Some Earlier Parisian Tracts on Distinctiones
1260
Sophismatum. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Edited with introduction and indexes.
Content: I. Tractatus Vaticanus De multiplicatibus circa orationes
accidentibus -- II. Tractatus Florianus De solutionibus sophismatum --
III. Tractatus Vaticanus De communibus distinctionibus.
———. 1988. "Semantics and Metaphysics in Gilbert of Poitiers. A
Chapter of Twelfth Century Platonism. Part I." Vivarium no. 26:73-
112.
"1 The Ontic Constituents of Natural Bodies
There is one distinction that is of paramount importance in order for us
to understand Gilbert's ontology, viz. the Boethian contradistinction of
id quod and id quo. We have to start with this pair of key notions.
1.1 Preliminary: 'id quod' and 'id quo'
According to Gilbert, our world consists of a number of individual
'things'. This world and its inhabitants appear to have the following
characteristics:
(a) each and every 'thing' is in fact to be considered as one self-
contained entity, (a 'subsistens') whose identity and ontological unity
are due to the singularity of what is proper to it (sue proprietatis
singularitas; Eut. 30, 88; Trin. 144, 58-62),
(b) however, every 'subsistent' (henceforth my rendering of Latin
'subsistens') itself consists of a plurality of forms; in addition, there are
'circumstantial features' (rather than 'forms' properly speaking) that
determine its actual state or condition ('status'); Trin. 137, 55; cf.
Nielsen(*), 56-8 and below, our nrs 1.2 and 1.72.
In fact, Gilbert's ontology is one continuous attempt to establish two
basic relationships, one between a natural thing and its Creator and the
other between the thing's diverse actual constituents, which while being
totally different from each other grant it its intrinsic unity at the same
time.
(...)
1.9 Summary
Each inhabitant of our world Gilbert calls (following Boethius) an id
quod est or subsistens. Its main constituents are the subsistentiae (or the
subsistent's id quo which is sometimes taken collectively to stand for ea
quibus) and these are accompanied by the 'accidents', quantity and
quality. The subsistent owes its status (or transitory condition) to a
1261
collection of inferior members of the Aristotelian class of accidents,
which to Gilbert's mind are rather 'accessories' or 'attachments from
without' (extrinsecus affixa).
The term 'substantia' is used both to stand for substance and substantial
form (subsistentia), i.e., that by which something is subsistent (or 'is a
substance').
The collection of subsistentiae (substantial forms) or the forma totius is
called natura. However, 'natura' is also used to stand for either just one
subsistentia or all the forms found in a subsistens even including its
'accidental' forms (quantity and quality). The inclusion of all kinds of
accidents (including those inferior ones that make up a thing's status) is
seldom found in the intension of the word 'natura'.
One of the key notions featuring in Gilbert's ontology is esse aliquid.
'To be a-something' has a threefold import. First, it means 'to be only
some thing', and to miss perfection. Second, it has the positive sense of
'being a something', i.e. 'being determinate and well-delineated', not
indefinite, not formless that is. Third, 'to be a something' implies
concreteness, corporealness and singularity." pp. 74, 111-112
(*) Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth
Century. A study of Gilbert Porreta's thinking and the theological
expositions of the doctrine of the Incarnation during the period 1130-
1180, Leiden 1982.
———. 1988. "On Boethius' Notion of Being. A Chapter of Boethian
Semantics." In Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies
in Memory of Jan Pinborg, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 1-29.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Reprinted as chapter I in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in
"From Parmenides onwards, ancient and medieval thought had a
special liking for metaphysical speculation. No doubt, speculative
thought was most influentially outlined by Plato and Aristotle.
However, what the Christian thinkers achieved in metaphysics was
definitely more than just applying and adapting what was handed down
to them. No student of medieval speculative thought can help being
struck by the peculiar fact that whenever fundamental progress was
made, it was theological problems which initiated the development.
This applies to St Augustine and Boethius, and to the great medieval
1262
masters as well (such as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus). Their
speculation was, time and again, focused on how the notion of being
and the whole range of our linguistic tools can be applied to God's
Nature (Being).
It is no wonder, then, that an inquiry into Boethius's notion of being
should be concerned, first and foremost, with his theological treatises,
especially De hebdomadibus.
(...)
My final section aims at showing how Boethius's notion of being is
clearly articulated in accordance with his semantic distinctions. This is
most clearly seen in the main argument of De hebdomadibus where
they may be actually seen at work.
As is well known, the proper aim of De hebdomadibus is to point out
the formal difference between esse and esse bonum, or in Boethius's
words: 'the manner in which substances are good in virtue of their
being, while not yet being substantially good' (38.2-4). Its method
consists in a careful application of certain formal distinctions, viz.:
(a) The distinction between an object 'when taken as a subsistent whole
and id quod est = the constitutive element which causes the object's
actually' being; it is made in Axiom II and used in Axiom IV.
(b) The distinction (closely related to the preceding one) obtaining
between the constitutive element effecting the object's actual being
(forma essendi, or ipsum esse) and the object's actuality as such (id
quod est or ipsum est); it is made in Axioms VII and VIII.
(c) The distinction between esse as 'pure being' (= nihil aliud praeter se
habens admixtum), which belongs to any form, whether substantial or
incidental, and id quod est admitting of some admixture (lit. 'something
besides what it is itself'); it is made in Axiom IV and in fact implies the
distinction between esse simpliciter and esse aliquid.
(d) The distinction between 'just being some thing', tantum esse aliquid,
and 'being something qua mode of being'. It is made in Axiom V and
used in Axiom VI and is in fact concerned with a further distinction
made within the notion of id quod est. It points out the differences
between the effect caused by some form as constitutive of being some
thing and that caused by the main constituent (forma essendi) which
causes an object's being simpliciter.
(e) The distinction between two different modes of participation, one
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effecting an object's being subsistent, the other its being some thing,
where the 'some thing' (aliquid) refers to some (non-subsistent) quality
such as 'being white', 'being wise', 'being good', etc.
The application of these distinctions enables Boethius to present a
solution to the main problem: although the objects (ea quae sunt, plural
of id quod est) are (are good) through their own constitutive element,
being (being good), nevertheless they are not identical with their
constitutive element nor (a fortiori) with the IPSUM ESSE (BONUM
ESSE) of which their constituent is only a participation." pp. 1 and 22-
23.
———. 1989. "Semantics and Metaphysics in Gilbert of Poitiers. A
Chapter of Twelfth Century Platonism. Part Ii." Vivarium no. 27:1-35.
"Gilbert's View of Transcendent Reality.
Gilbert's world consists of quite a lot of singular subsistent objects
which owe their being and 'being-a-something' to a collection of forms,
both subsistential and accidental. Well, God has created this world after
what in the Platonic tradition was called the 'exemplary Forms'. For
Gilbert, creation and concretion are two complementary notions which
play an important role in his ontology. Creation is the reception of a
total form or collection of subsistentiae; it is also called generation. As
a natural process it amounts to 'beginning to be-of-acertain-kind'.'
(...)
POSTSCRIPT. In his short study on Gilbert of Poitiers (in A History of
Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. Peter Dronke, Cambridge
1988, 328-52) John Marenbon rightly argues that when presenting an
account of Gilbert's thought one should not separate his philosophy
from his theology. However, I fully disagree with his suggestion (p.
351) that as a metaphysician Gilbert proves to have been a thinker
whose 'treatment is inadequate and confused'. On the contrary, when
dealing with really intricate theological problems Gilbert of Poitiers,
like many other Medieval thinkers (e.g. Thomas Aquinas), develops his
(NeoPlatonic) metaphysics as a 'clear-minded and subtle writer', and so
there seems to be no reason at all to oppose Gilbert against people like
Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and others. They were all real philosophers,
albeit in a theological context, which as such confronted them with a
series of genuinely philosophical issues. In fact, why should any
historian of philosophy approach only Gilbert of Poitiers 'as a thinker
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who tackled a set of changeless (sic!) metaphysical problems-identical
(sic!) to those which faced, for instance, Plato and Aristotle, or Kant
and Hegel'?" pp. 1, 34-35.
———. 1989. Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval
Semantics and Metaphysics. Northampton: Variorum Reprints.
The volume is dedicated to L. M. De Rijk on the occasion of his 65th
birthday.
Contents
Preface IX-XI; SIXTH CENTURY: I. On Boethius's notion of Being.
A chapter of Boethian semantics; TWELFTH CENTURY: Peter
Abälard (1079-1142): Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns; III. The
semantical impact of Abailard's solution of the problem of universals;
IV. La signification de la proposition (dictum propositionis) chez
Abélard; V. Die Wirkung der neuplatonischen Semantik auf das
mittelalterliche Denken über das Sein; VI: Abailard's semantics views
in the light of later developments; THIRTEENTH CENTURY: VII.
Die Bedeutungslehre der Logik im 13. Jahruhndert und ihr Gegenstück
in der metaphysischen Spekulation; VIII. Each man's ass is not
everybody's ass. On an important item in 13th-century semantics; IX.
The development of Suppositio naturalis in mediaeval logic, I. Natural
suppositiojn as non-contextual supposition; FOURTEENTH
CENTURY: X. The development of Suppositio naturalis in mediaeval
logic, II. 14th-century natural supposition as atemporal (omnitemporal)
supposition; XI: On Buridan's doctrine of connotation; XII. Semantics
in Richard Billingham and Johannes Venator; XIII. Logic and ontology
in Ockham. Some notes on his view of the categories of Being and the
nature of its basic principles; XIV. War Ockham ein
Antimetaphysicker? Eine semantische Betrachtung; Indexes. 1.
Manuscripts; 2. Anonymous tract; 3. Ancient and medieval names; 4.
Modern names; 5. Subjects and terms. (This volume contains XII + 322
pages).
———. 1989. "Ist Logos Satz? Zu Heideggers Auffassung Von Platons
Stellung 'Am Anfänge Der Metaphysik'." In Heideggers These Vom
Ende Der Philosophie. Verhandlungen Des Leidener Heidegger-
Symposiums (April 1984), edited by Fresco, Marcel, Van Dijk, Rob and
Vijgeboom, Peter, 22-32. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag.
———. 1989. "Einiges Zu Den Hintergünden Der Scotistischen
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Beweistheorie: Die Schlüsselrolle Des Sein-Könnens (Esse Possibile)."
In Die Kölner Universität Im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln Und Soziale
Wirklichkeit, edited by Zimmermann, Albert, 176-191. Berlin: Walter
de Gruiyter.
Peter, of Spain. 1990. Language in Dispute: An English Translation by
Francis P. Dinneen of Peter of Spain's Tractatus Called Afterwards
Summulae Logicales. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.
On the basis of the critical edition established by L. M. De Rijk
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1990. "Ockham's Theory of Demonstration:
His Use of Aristotle' S Kath' Holou and Kath' Hauto Requirements." In
Die Gegenwart Ockhams, edited by Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm and
Schõnberger, Rolf, 232-240. Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft.
"Far from being a sceptic William of Ockham made every effort to
corroborate the basis of philosophical and theological thought by
purifying it of all sorts of untenable presuppositions. His main
contribution to fourteenth century philosophical and theological
development lies in systematically rethinking scholastic doctrines, and
especially their assumptions, on the firm basis of his own favourite
leading principles: the strictly individual nature of all that really is and
the radical contingency of all creatural being.
These two principles also play a major part in Ockham's way of dealing
with the Aristotelian theory of demonstration. The present paper aims
at investigating Ockham's doctrine of demonstrative proof, focusing on
the way in which he felt forced to adapt or rephrase the special
requirements Aristotle had laid down for propositions to enter into
syllogistic proof, especially strict proof (the so-called 'demonstratio
potissima'). Our main argument will concern Aristotle's rather peculiar
'kath holou' requirement and Ockham's appliance of the 'kath hauto'
(Latin: 'per se') notion which is also involved in framing correct
premisses for demonstrative proofs. A few preliminary remarks will be
made about the essentials of Aristotle's theory of demonstration." p.
232
(...)
"Conclusions.
To sum up our findings: Ockham's adaptations and manipulations of
Aristotle's requirements for genuine demonstrative propositions are as
many demands imposed by his own metaphysical views. He comments
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on Aristotle, always starting from his own favourite views. Though
Aristotle is the Master, Ockham is the one to say what the Master
meant, or what he should have meant. On the other hand, his
introducing the 'per se strictissimo modo' rather seems to be a matter of
technicality. Whereas in Posterior Analytics Aristotle deals with the
scientific procedure of apodeixis in general, in which the apodeictic
syllogism is merely a vehicle for correctly framing an apodeixis, the
Medievals, and Ockham in particular, were apt to reduce Aristotle's
theory of demonstrative proof to a theory of demonstrative syllogism.
That is why the 'demonstratio potissima' (including its specific
demands) so heavily influenced Ockham's theory of demonstration." p.
239
———. 1990. "Specific Tools Concerning Logical Education." In
Méthodes Et Instruments Du Travail Intellectuel Au Moyen Âge, edited
by Weijers, Olga, 62-81. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Unlike in our days logical doctrine was very influential in the Middle
Ages. Logic was indeed considered then the vehicle par excellence both
in matters of teaching and scientific inquiry in any field of knowledge.
When embarking upon a discussion of the specific terminology
concerning logical education, some preliminary remarks seem to be
indispensable.
The reader should be warned, first. Logical theory taken as such, which
comprises a great mass of specifically logical terms (such as
'praedicamentum', 'predicable', 'syllogism', 'fallacy', 'supposition',
'appellation', 'ampliation', 'distribution', 'syncategorema', and so on) is
out of scope now; those terms and their like will be mentioned only in
passing, inasfar namely as they occur in educational practice.
Another remark better starts from the well-known Medieval distinction
between logica docens and logica utens, the former of which being
logical doctrine as developped, expounded and taught for its own sake,
whereas the latter is rather logic practically applied in any sort of
logical analysis or argumentation. To be sure, logica utens does not
merely coincide with the more or less explicit occurrence of logical
argumentation in whatever context. Even qua logica utens the art of
logic displayed a high degree of technicality. In other words: medieval
logica utens rather than being practical argumentation as loosely
accomplished by somebody who exhibited a remarkable natural ability
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for logical reasoning consisted in the performance of somebody being
really well-versed in all those logical techniques he had been taught in
his youth in class room. So, whoever is interested in specific terms of
logical teaching and learning should surely not leave exhibitions of
logica utens out of consideration (*).
Our third remark which is in the line of the previous one, concerns the
remarkably wide scope of logica utens. Of course, logica docens played
a very important part in Medieval education, as may be also gathered
from its predominant position in Medieval curricula. However,
according to a good Peripatetic tradition, logic was taken to serve as the
organon or instrument of all other branches of learning and science,
which means that logic, and logic alone, provided other disciplines with
the correct art of thinking and reasoning. Thus logic proves to have
been effectually present, for example, in theological disputation, a fact
that every student of Medieval theology is fully aware of. But it had an
equally prevailing position in other fields of learning, too, such as
Natural science ("Physics"), Ethics and even Political philosophy.
A final preliminary remark aims at elucidating the large scope of
Medieval logic from still another point of view, viz. the close
relationship between scientific inquiry and exposition as well as
scientific education in the Middle Ages. That is to say that scientific
inquiry and exposition as well as education and learning were
controlled by the same didactics of exposition and argumentation.
Indeed, nearly all Medieval writings that contain scholarly
investigations in any field of learning whatsoever display didactic
approaches which are quite similar to those used by works mainly
intended for instruction, no matter for the benefit of beginners or
advanced people." pp. 62-63
(*) For the contradistinction of dialectica docens and dialectica utens
both of them especially concerned with the use of logical topics (loci),
see Eleonore Stump, Topics: their development and absorption into
consequences in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,
1982, p. 281, n. 41.
———. 1990. "The Posterior Analytics in the Latin West." In
Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of
the Eight International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (Siepm),
Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987, edited by Asztalos, Monika, Murdoch,
1268
John Emery and Niiniluoto, Ilkka, 104-127. Helsinki: Acta
Philosophica Fennica.
Volume I.
"It is common knowledge that Aristotle had the conviction that all
reality was to be found within our world of sensible experience and that
Plato's assumption of another, Transcendent World of Perfect Being
was merely 'empty talk and poetic metaphor' (Metaph. A9, 991a20).
Indeed, Aristotle took Plato's Forms to be quite useless for explaining
the possibility of true knowledge about our world. However, like his
master, Plato, Aristotle stuck to the Parmenidean conviction about the
real existence of unchanging formal principles of being. As is well-
known, his formal principles are in things as their immanent dynamic
natures (eidê).
For Aristotle, true knowledge concerns the essential natures immanent
in things (see e.g. Metaph., 991a12-3; 999a24-9; 1018b36; 1032b1 ff.
et alibi). To be sure, all being is individual being and so Aristotle is
compelled to answer the quite intriguing question: if the proper object
of true knowledge is universal nature and everything real is a particular,
how, then, are we able to gain genuine knowledge about the things in
their own right? In his Posterior Analytics Aristotle explains what he
understands by truly knowing things. Well, quite in line with his
philosophical stand, Aristotle claims that all scientific knowledge is
concerned with discerning a universal nature as immanent in a
particular. In I 2, 72a75-7 e.g., it is explicitly said that the elements of
the deduction are such and such in concreto (cf. 73a29-31). For
Aristotle, demonstration in fact concerns some phenomenal state of
affairs of which the investigation aims to clarify the essential
structures." p. 102
(...)
"Aristotle's description of induction and its role in the scientific process
fits in remarkably well with what he has earlier remarked about the
process of proper categorization. Referring to the well-known battle
simile - how a general retreat comes to an end after one man makes a
stand, and then another etc., the author argues that 'as soon as one of
the undifferentiated percepts makes a stand, there is a primitive
universal in the mind ... until the highest genera have been reached' (II
19, 100a14-b4).
1269
The faculty, or rather cognitive attitude, by which we become familiar
with the first principles is the Nous or intellective apprehension. Well,
just as the Nous precedes all principles (such as axioms etc.), in the
same way scientific knowledge covers the whole domain of states of
affairs (pragmata), Aristotle concludes (100b16-17).
Let us try, now, in the next sections, to discover the Medievals'
doctrinal reception of the Posterior Analytics by discussing their views
of some themes characteristic of Aristotle's scientific method. It would
be useful, to that end, to single out the following items: the Medievals'
discussion of the well-known four questions, their views of the three
requirements for 'hunting essential attributes', their (different) views of
necessity, and, finally, the Medieval conceptions of induction and our
knowledge of the First Principles." p. 110
———. 1990. "Un Tournant Important Dans L'usage Du Mot 'Idea'
Chez Henri De Gand." In Idea. Vi Colloquio Internazionale Del
Lessico Internazionale Europeo. Roma, 5-7 Gennaio 1989, edited by
Fattori, Marta and Bianchi, Massimo Luigi, 89-98. Roma: Edizioni
dell'Ateneo.
"1. Introduction. On sait que le terme 'idée' était un mot-clé dans la
métaphysique de Platon. Les exposés importants de ce matin ont rendu
entièrement superflu de rappeler le rôle du mot idea chez Platon ainsi
que dans la tradition platonicienne et dans la patristique.
Les communications que nous venons d'écouter cet après-midi nous ont
fait comprendre l'importance du mot latin idea, ou plutôt la valeur de la
notion d'idée, dont le mot idea n'était que l'un des véhicules à côté de
forma, species, notio, conceptus, intentio, etc.
Il n'est pas nécessaire d'être spécialiste de l'histoire de la philosophie
médiévale pour bien savoir que, quelle que soit la dette des auteurs
médiévaux envers des sources antiques, et quel que fût le respect qu'ils
ont ressenti envers toute autorité -- les sources ne les ont cependant
jamais empêchés de suivre leur propre voie au fur et à mesure que cela
s'imposait dans l'intérêt de leur réflexions philosophiques.
C'est pourquoi l'étude de l'usage des termes philosophiques et leur
développement au cours du moyen-âge n'est pas seulement d'intérêt
linguistique. Au contraire, l'analyse de ce développement est tout à fait
indispensable pour bien comprendre les doctrines philosophiques elles-
mêmes de la période médiévale.
1270
Je me propose dans cette communication de mettre en relief le tournant
important qu'a subi l'usage du mot latin idea chez certains auteurs de la
seconde moitié du 13e siècle, usage, bien entendu, qui s'est prolongé au
14' siècle. La figure centrale sera celle du philosophe flamand Henri de
Gand (mort en 1293).
Comme je viens de vous suggérer, ce tournant est significatif d'un
développement doctrinal chez ces auteurs. Aussi ce développement
doctrinal s'impose comme le cadre adapté aux exigences d'un exposé
sémantique à propos de l'usage du mot idea, disons après saint Thomas
d'Aquin (mort en 1277)." p. 89
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Marie de Rijk. Fourth Part: from 1991 to
2012
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1991. "Two Short Questions on Proclean
Metaphysics in Paris B. N. Lat. 16.096." Vivarium no. 29:1-12.
" The collectaneous manuscript Paris, B.N. lat. 16.096 (formerly
belonging to the codices Sorbonnenses) contains (ff. 172va-177vb,
which part dates, it seems, from the second half of the 13th century)
some anonymous questions referred to by the catalogue (*) as
Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum. This description, however, is
incorrect as these questions have no bearing whatsoever on the doctrine
of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Actually, they are two short
metaphysical questions (called expositiones by the author) on the key
notions of 'beingness' and 'oneness' respectively, followed by a longer,
incomplete treatise on the nature of the components of a definition (or
rather a diffinitum).
(...)
Only two of the five questions announced in the beginning of this third
treatise are preserved. One of them deals with the problem of whether
1272
the definition consisting of genus and differentia requires a real
composition of the components of the diffinitum, the other examines
whether immaterial substances are composite in some respects. Unlike
the first two tracts, the third does not show any influence of
Neoplatonic doctrine.
To my knowledge, the expositions on Ens and Unum have only come
down to us in the Paris manuscript. They are interesting in that the
author makes a successful effort to penetrate some of the basic views of
Proclean metaphysics." pp. 1-2 (notes omitted)
(*) L. Delisle, Inventaire des manuscrits latins de la Sorbonne,
conservés à la Bibliothèque Impériale sous les nos. 15.176-16.718 du
fonds latin, in: Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes, 31 (1870), 135 ff.
Peter, of Spain. 1992. Peter of Spain. Syncategoreumata. Leiden: Brill.
First critical edition with an introduction, critical apparatus, indexes
and an English translation by Joke Spruyt.
Peter of Spain (ca 1205-77) who, in 1276, became Pope under the name
of John XXI, was the author of an impressive number of scholarly
works, inter alia the Tractatus (a textbook of logic, widely known
afterwards under the title Summule logicales) and the
Syncategoreumata. The latter work, which deals with syncategorematic
terms, is here critically edited for the first time, together with an
English translation.
Peter's authorship of the Syncategoreumata is beyond all doubt: it is
confirmed again and again by nearly all our manuscripts. As to the date
and place of origin of the Syncategoreumata: they were surely written
after the Tractatus (which were written not later than the 1230's, see my
Introduction to the edition of this work, p. LV-LVII).
There is no reason at all to assume a connection between the
Syncategoreumata and Peter's stay at the University of Paris, which he
left in 1229, before the composition of the Tractatus. Clearly, Paris
does not play any role in the early diffusion of the Syncategoreumata. It
seems highly probable, therefore, that the Syncategoreumata were
written by Peter in the same region where he wrote the Tractatus, i.e.
Northern Spain or Southern France. The work's most likely date is
between 1235-1245 (cf. my Introduction to the Tractatus, pp. XXXIV-
LXI). From Peter's use of lectio (see X, cap. 8) it may be concluded that
the Syncategoreumata were meant as a piece of school-teaching.
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Content of the English translation: Introduction 39; Chapter 1. On
composition 45; Chapter 2. On negation 73; Chapter 3. On exclusive
words 105; Chapter 4. On exceptive words; Chapter 5. On consecutive
words 197; Chapter 6. On the verbs 'begins' and 'ceases' 249; Chapter 7.
On the words 'necessarily' (necessario) and 'contingently'
(contingenter) 283; Chapter 8. On conjunctions 307; Chapter 9. On
'Quanto', 'Quam' and 'Quicquid'; Chapter 10. On answers 425; Critical
apparatus 434; Index locorum 572; Index rerum notabilium 574; Index
sophismatum 613.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1992. "Causation and Participation in
Proclus. The Pivotal Role of Scope Distinction." In On Proclus and His
Influence in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Meijer, Pieter Ane and
Bos, Egbert Peter, 1-34. Leiden: Brill.
1. Status questionis; 2. Causation and participation in Plato; 3.
Procession and participation in Plotinus and Jamblichus; 4. Proclus'
refined metaphysics; 4.1 Preliminary; 4.2 The Proclean universe from
the viewpoint of causation; 4.3 The Proclean universe from the
viewpoint of participation; 5. The meaning of amethekton and
metekomenon in Proclus; 5.1 Méthexis c.a. in the Elementatio; 5.2
Méthexis c.a. in the Platonic Theology; The basic role of the
metexomenon for continuity and reversion; Scope distinction in
Neoplatonic doctrine and procedure; 7.1 Two famous cases of scope
distinction in Proclus; 7.2 Scope distinction deliberately applied and
recommended; 7.3 The philosophical impact of scope distinction in
Neoplatonism.
"The present paper aims to investigate in some more detail the
transcendence-immanence antinomy. First an outline of its historical
background will be presented from Plato onward through Plotinus and
Jamblichus up to Proclus. Next I shall discuss Proclus' doctrine on
these matters in the larger perspective of his philosophy, and focus on
the intriguing notion of amethekton. Finally a few remarks will be
added on the important role of what we might call 'scope distinction' in
Proclus' doctrines and dialectical arguments." p. 2.
———. 1992. "John Buridan on Universals." Revue de Métaphysique
et de Morale no. 97:35-59.
"It is common knowledge that Plato strongly believed that, in order to
explain the nature of whatever is (either things or states of affairs,
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including Man and his environment), the assumption of Transcendent
Universal Forms is indispensable. In his view, these universal Forms
are the ontic causes of each and every sublunary entity, which all owe
their being to their sharing in these Forms. Consequently, everyone
who is in want of firm knowledge (episteme) about, the things of the
outside world is bound to direct his attention to the transcendent
domain of the universal Forms'.
However, Plato was the first to recognise, and seriously deal with, the
objections that can be raised to this doctrine. These objections mainly
concern the status (and the dignity, however modest) of our transient
world and, above all, the possibility to obtain, true knowledge of this
world as it stands, in its ever-changing nature, that is." p. 35
(...)
"To be sure, the Medievals all rejected the Platonic Ideas taken as
separate substances and they adhered to the Aristotelian common sense
principle that only individuals have independent existence.
Nevertheless, they were still under the spell of the status of «universal
being» as the indispensable basis of true knowledge.
Marylin McCord Adams has analysed some early fourteenth century
solutions to the problem of universals (Scotus, Ockham, Burley and
Harclay) (*). In McCord's article Buridan's view of the matter is left out
of consideration. Quite understandably so, since Buridan's solution to
the problem differs considerably from the sophisticated arguments
given by his contemporaries. Buridan seeks.for a solution in analysing
the several ways of human understanding. In directing his attention to
the propositional attitude involved in the cognitive procedure Buridan
is remarkably close to the ingenious solution Peter Abelard had come
up with two centuries earlier. In the next sections I shall give an outline
of Abelard's treatment of the question of universals followed by an
analysis of Buridan's discussion of the matter (as found in his
commentary on the Metaphysics and elsewhere)." p. 37
(...)
"We may conclude, then, that two bright logicians of the Parisian
tradition have come up with quite an ingenious solution to the problem
of universals. Both of them started out from the firm conviction that
nothing exists but particulars. Nevertheless, they apparently were not
satisfied with purely extensional solutions as brought forward by
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Oxford logicians such as Heytesbury and Ockham. Maybe
extensionalists are out to show how people ought to think. Abelard and
Buridan, however, were especially interested in the various ways of
conceiving we actually use in daily life, in our attempts to conceptually
deal with the outside world." p. 59
(*) "Universals in the early Fourteenth century" in Cambridge History
of Later Medieval Philosophy, from the rediscovery of Aristotle to the
desintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600 pp. 411-439.
———. 1992. "Peter Abelard (1079-1142)." In Philosophy of
Language/Sprachphilosophie/La Philosophie Du Langage. Eine
Internationales Handbuch Zeitgenössicher Forschung, edited by
Dascal, Marcelo, Gerhardus, Dietfried, Lorenz, KUno and Meggle,
Georg, 290-296. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
First volume
———. 1993. "Der Streit Über Das Medium Demonstrationis: Die
Frucht Eines Misverständnisses?" In Argumentationstheorie.
Scholastische Forschungen Zu Den Logischen Und Semantischen
Regeln Korrekten Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 451-463. Leiden:
Brill.
"In der alten Ausgabe des Kommentars zu den Zweiten Analytiken von
Aegidius Romanus' findet sich nach dem Kommentar eine kurze
Abhandlung aus der Feder des Augustiner-Eremiten Augustinus de
Biella. Sie wurde zur Verteidigung der Auffassung des Aegidius über
das medium demonstrationis geschrieben. Aegidius hatte gelehrt, daß
bei einer demonstratio potissima (also bei der aristotelischen Apodeixis
im strengsten Sinne) das medium sich aus der Definition des Attributs
(passio) ergebe, und nicht, wie die communis opinio lautete, aus der
Definition des Subjekts. Wie üblich, fängt Biella damit an, Argumente
gegen die Auffassung Aegidius' anzuführen, um dieselben anschließend
zu widerlegen. Biella hat aber augenscheinlich den Text von Aegidius
nicht zur Hand gehabt, denn er fährt fort, dominus Aegidius sei wohl
dieser Auffassung über (las rnedium demonstrationis gewesen, "wie ich
von den doctores ordinis (Tatrum heremitarum gehört habe" (oder:
"wie ich es deren Schriften entnommen habe")." p.451
———. 1993. "La Supposizione Naturale: Una Pietra Di Paragone Per
I Punti Di Vista Filosofici." In Logica E Linguaggio Nel Medioevo,
edited by Fedriga, Riccardo and Poggioni, Sara, 185-220. Milano:
1276
LED, Edizioni universitarie di lettere, economia, diritto.
Italian translation of: "La philosophie au moyen âge" chapter 8, pp.
184-203
———. 1993. "On Buridan's View of Accidental Being." In John
Buridan: A Master of Arts. Some Aspects of His Philosophy. Acts of the
Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval
Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of Its 15th Anniversary.
Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 1991., edited by
Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri, 41-51. Nijmegen: Ingenium
Publishers.
"One of the most striking characteristics of late medieval metaphysics
is the upgrading of 'accidental being'. The strict opposition between
'esse per se' and 'esse per accidens', which had been of paramount
importance ever since Aristotle, has lost its relevance in the ontological
discussions of the fourteenth century. The status of 'accidental being'
came rather close to that of 'substantial being'. In the views of
philosophers such as Ockham and Buridan (not to mention thinkers like
Crathorn) the nature of 'accidental being' (or rather 'quantitative and
qualitative being') can no longer be properly defined in terms of
ontological dependency upon substance. In other words, 'per se
subsistence' is assigned not only to substance but to 'accidental being'
as well.
In the present contribution I will illustrate this development by
discussing some of Buridan's expositions in his Questiones
commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (IV, q. 6 and VII, q. 3-4)." p. 41
———. 1993. "Works by Gerald Ot (Gerardus Odonis) on Logic,
Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy Rediscovered in Madrid, Bibl.
Nac. 4229." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge
no. 60:173-193; 378.
"Some twenty years ago I discovered in the Biblioteca Nacional in
Madrid a very interesting manuscript with works (all of them
anonymous, to be sure) on logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy.
In fact, my discovery turned out to be a rediscovery, for the manuscript
contained a note written by the famous historian of Franciscan
philosophy and theology, Father Ephrem Longpré OFM, which said
that, with the exception of the writings occurring from fol. 204r
onwards, all tracts found in this codex are by a Franciscan master,
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Gerardus Odonis. (...)
Gerard Odon OFM (who as Patriarch of Antiochia died in 1349 of the
plague, at Catania, Sicily, where he was gifted with the benefices of a
wealthy church) is especially known as the much troubled successor of
the deposed Michael of Cesena as Master General of the Franciscan
Order and a close adherent of Pope John XXII in the debate on the
beatific vision." p. 173
"The Ms Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229 appears to be of the utmost
importance for our knowledge of Gerard Odon's doctrine on several
subjects in the fields of logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy. To
establish his authorship of all the works as occurring in the present Ms
with certainty requires more research. The results of the present
investigations can be summarised in the following survey:
I LOGIC:
1.1 Quid est subiectum in logica (69va-74rb)
1.2 De sillogismis (1ra-19va)
1.3 De tribus dubiis circa naturam dictionum exclusivarum et
suppositionis simpliciter simplicis (37rb-43ra)
1.4 De principiis scientiarum (45ra-69va)
II METAPHYSICS:
2.1 De intentionibus (incomplete; 74va-122vb)
2.2 De esse et essentia (125ra-132vb)
2.3 De principiis nature (156ra-174vb, together with 19va-28vb)
2.4 De natura universalis (incomplete; 204ra-207vb)
III NATURAL PHILOSOPHY:
3.1 De augmento forme (132vb-150rb)
3.2 De intensione et remissione formarum (175ra-179ra)
3.3 De continuo (179rb-186vb)
3.4 De loco (187ra-192va)
3.5 De tempore (192vb-199va)
3.6 De motu (199vb-203vb)" p. 193
———. 1994. "John Buridan on Man's Capability of Grasping the
Truth." In Scientia Et Ars Im Hoch- Und Spätmmittelalter, edited by
Craemer-Rügenberg, Ingrid and Speer, Andreas, 282-303. Berlin, New
York: Walter de Gruyter.
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 22/1.
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"As is well-known, two subjects are distinctive of the fourteenth
century theory of cognition, namely 'certitudo' and 'evidentia'. It is true,
thirteenth century philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, were also
concerned with certitude and evidentness as indispensable requisites for
'true knowledge' ('scientia'). However, until the end of the thirteenth
century certitude and evidentness were not prominent in the discussions
about the cognitive procedure nor were they treated as separate matters,
requiring separate attention. In Thomas Aquinas for example, the
conviction that man is really capable of grasping the truth with
certainty is really constitutive of his philosophical (and theological)
thought and praxis (*)', or to speak with J. A. Aertsen, of 'Thomas' way
of thought'.(**) This, however, does not alter the fact that in Aquinas'
philosophy 'certitudo' is not highlighted as such, and the specific role of
'evidentia' is even virtually ignored.
Buridan's theory of cognition, on the contrary, clearly focusses on the
ingredients 'certitudo' and 'evidentia', and, within this framework, on
the notion of 'assensus'. In the present paper I aim to elucidate the role
of this key notion of John Buridan's theory of cognition."
(*) See the excellent paper by Gerard Verbeke, "Certitude et incertitude
de la recherche philosophique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin", in: Rivista
di Filosofia neo-scolastica 66 (1974), 740-57.
(**) Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas' Way of
Thought. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters
herausgegeben von Albert Zimmermann, Band XXI, Leiden etc. 1988,
passim.
———. 1994. Nicholas of Autrecourt. His Correspondence with
Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo. Leiden: Brill.
A critical edition from the two Parisian manuscripts with an
introduction, English translation, explanatory notes and indexes.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Introduction 1; 1. Nicholas of
Autrecourt. Life and works 1; 2. Nicholas' correspondence with
Bernard and Giles 5; 3. The extant letters. Their tradition and structure
24; 4. Principles of the present edition and translation 37; Conspectus
siglorum 45; Text and translation 46; Explanatory notes 113;
Appendices 139; Indices 209; Bibliography 238.
"The present edition is based on the two Mss hitherto known, Paris, BN
lat. 16408 (A) and 16409 (B). They are far from being perfect as they
1279
derive from exemplars that were themselves not quite reliable witnesses
of the letters. However, they provide sufficient support for constituting
a critical edition.
(...)
A translation is provided in order to make the letters accessible to all
those who are not well-acquainted with Latin grammar and idiom. For
that matter, Nicholas writes in a fairly clear and occasionally vivid
Latin, but he is not a talented stylist. At times, he is not very particular
about contaminated constructions. I have tried to smooth away some of
these solecisms." pp 37-38.
———. 1994. "A Special Use of Ratio in 13th and 14th Century
Metaphysics." In Ratio. Vii Colloquio Del Lessico Intellettuale
Europeo. Roma, 9-11 Gennaio 1992, edited by Fattori, Marta and
Bianchi, Massimo Luigi, 197-218. Firenze: L. S. Olschki.
"In the opening lines of the fifth tract of his Summulae Peter of Spain
deals with six different meanings of the terminus technicus 'ratio'. (a)
Three of them are relevant to the present discussion:
'Ratio' is used in more than one way. In one way it is the same as
definition or description, as in «univocal things are those which have a
name in common and whose 'ratio substantie' corresponding to that
name is the same» (b) [...]. In another way 'ratio' is the same as the
form imposed on matter (forma materie), e.g. in a knife iron is the
matter and the arrangement imposed on the iron is the form. In yet
another way 'ratio' is the same as a common essence that is predicable
of many things, e.g. the essence of a genus, a species or a differentia.
[...].
The aim of the present paper is to elucidate the important role of the
term 'ratio' in metaphysical discussions from the thirteenth century
onwards. The three above mentioned senses all refer to (what belongs
to) a thing's essential nature. The first sense, however, is the one that
comes
most close to the subject matter of our discussion. (c) The opening lines
of Aristotle's Categoriae, which are referred to by Peter may serve as
the starting point of our investigation." p. 197
(...)
"7. Conclusion.
We may summarise the foregoing observations as follows:
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(1) As early as in Boethius (Aristotle) ratio (Greek 'logos') was used to
stand for one specific (ontic or logical) characteristic that a thing has in
common with other things, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of their
respective 'complete natures'. Thus 'man' and 'cow' have the ratio
animalis in common and a white wall and a white statue have
whiteness in common.
(2) Ratio may also be used to refer to a thing's 'complete nature' as
distinct from either the nature of other things (e.g. the ratio hominis vs
the ratio lapidis) or from the thing's individuality (ratio singularitatis).
(3) Distinguishing several rationes in one and the same thing is a
procedure which is typical of man's intellectual capability. This
procedure forms the backbone of many philosophical and theological
arguments concerning God and the entities occurring in the outside
world.
(4) Possible translations of ratio as used in the special sense discussed
in this paper are:
- logically: 'logical aspect', 'logical characteristic'; 'concept', 'notion'
(bearing on some aspect characteristic or feature); 'meaning',
'descriptive account', 'definition'.
- ontologically:'ontic aspect', 'characteristic', 'feature' (including formal
ones)." p. 218
(a) Peter of Spain, Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales. First
Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L. M. de
Rijk, Assen, 1972, p. 55, 4-14. Cf. the English translation in The
Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. I: Logic
and the Philosophy of Language, edited by Norman Kretzmann and
Eleonore Stump, Cambridge etc., 1988, p. 226.
(b) ARISTOTLE, Categoriae, 1, 1 a 8-9.
(c) For that matter, the distinction between the three senses as given by
Peter of Spain is not entirely clear-cut: they are, at least partially,
overlapping.
John, Buridan. 1995. Johannes Buridanus Summulae De
Praedicabilibus. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L.M. De Rijk.
"The present edition contains the second tract [of Buridan's Summulae],
De praedicabilibus, which deals with the five 'predicables', introduced
by the Neoplatonist commentator of Aristotle, Porphyry (c. 233-c. 304
1281
A.D.) in his introductory book (Isagoge) to the Stagirite's Categories,
viz. 'genus', 'species', 'differentia', 'proprium', and 'accidens'. From as
early as the eleventh century, medieval authors commented upon
Boethius' (480-524) translation of, and commentary upon, this work.
Buridan's discussion of the predicables is mainly based on the
corresponding tract of Peter of Spain's manual. His comments are
preceded by the complete text of the lemma from Peter to be discussed.
It should be no surprise that Buridan's quotations should go back to an
adapted version of Peter's text. (...)
objections and dubitationes in which specific questions are dealt with,
mostly in an original fashion." pp. XVII and XXI.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1995. "Teaching and Inquiry in 13th and
14th Century Logic and Metaphysics." In Vocabulary of Teaching and
Research between Middle Ages and Renaissance. Proceedings of the
Colloquium London, Warburg Institute, 11-12 March 1994, edited by
Weijers, Olga, 83-95. Turnhout: Brepols.
———. 1995. "Ockham as the Commentator of His Aristotle. His
Treatment of Posterior Analytics." In Aristotelica Et Lulliana:
Magistro Doctissimo Charles H. Lohr Septuagesimum Annum Feliciter
Agenti Dedicata, edited by Domínguez Reboiras, Fernando, Imbach,
Ruedi, Pindl, Theodor and Walter, Peter, 77-127. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff.
1. Introduction; 2. Preliminary: Aristotle on demonstrative or
epistemonic proof; 2.1 On the three requrements 'kata pantos', kath'
'hauto', 'kath' holou', 2.2 On the notion of necessity; 2.3 On the four
types of questions. On 'Middle' and 'Definiens'; 2.3.1 Subject and
attribute. The Middle; 2.3.2. On definition and the four question-types;
2.3.3 The role of definitions in epistemonic proof; 2.3.4 Recipes for the
discovery of definitions; 2.4 The 'kath' holou' requirement revisited; 2.5
Particulars and the proper objects of Aristotle's epistemonic proof; 3.
Ockham as a Commentator of Posterior Analytics; 3.1 Ockham's
treatment of the four basic question-types; 3.2 Ockham's view of the
'kath' holou' requirement; 3.3 The impact of Ockham's ontology upon
his theory of demonstration; 3.3.1 Ockham's problem concerning the
First Subject; 3.3.2 Ockham's introduction of 'Non-First Subject'; 3.3.3
'Demonstratio particularis' in Ockham; 3.3.4 Ockham's view of
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necessity; 3.5 'Dici per se' and 'propositio per se vera' in Ockham; 3.5.1
Two kinds of 'per se' assignment; 3.5.2 The 'propositio per se (vera)' in
Ockham; 3.5.3 The strict and strictest senses of 'per se'; 4. Comclusion.
"The present paper aims to clarify the attitude towards Aristotle
adopted by one of the leading lights of fourteenth century philosophical
and theological thought, William of Ockham, by investigating (a) how
in some of the vital subjects of Aristotelian doctrine, the Venerable
Inceptor understood and interpreted the Master, (b) how and why on
specific occasions, he deliberately took the liberty to stray from
Aristotle's teachings. It goes without saying that in such an undertaking,
one has to confine oneself to certain doctrinal themes the choice of
which might seem quite arbitrary. The present author has picked out the
Aristotelian doctrine of demonstrative proof as interpreted by
Ockham." p. 78
———. 1995. "Ockham's Horror of the Universal. An Assessment of
His View of Individuality." Mediaevalia.Textos e Estudos no. 7-8:473-
497.
Quodlibetaria: miscellanea studiorum in honorem prof. J. M. da Cruz
Pontes anno iubilationis suae, Conimbrigae MCMXCV
———. 1996. "The Key Role of the Latin Language in Medieval
Philosophical Thought." In Media Latinitas. A Collection of Essays to
Mark the Occasion of the Retirement of L. J. Engels, edited by Nip,
R.I.A., 129-145. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Everyone embarking on the theme 'Medieval Latin and Philosophy'
should realise that this theme involves more than just a juxtaposition of
two separate items which are quite interesting in themselves. On the
contrary, Medieval Latin and philosophy had a great mutual impact and
thus were most closely related. To put it differently, in Medieval
philosophical teaching and inquiry linguistic analysis was considered
by the Medievals themselves really indispensable. (*)
Like the Ancients, the Medieval thinkers firmly believed that,
ultimately, the outside world is not-chaotic. In their view it has a
'logical' or intelligible structure, which, as such, is accessible to the
human mind, insofar as the latter has the same 'logical' structure'. In
other words, in the view of the Medievals there is an isomorphic
relationship between the realms of thought and of being. (**)
(...)
1283
The Medievals have largely expanded the logico-semantical approach
they had inherited from the Ancients, especially in their so-called
'logica modernorum', which has its root in the logico-grammatical
discussions found as early as in the eleventh century.
Coming now to the proper subject of my contribution I should like to
discuss three extremely important themes that featured in Medieval
philosophy, viz. [1] the 'Object-Thought' issue, [2] the problem of the
Universals, and [3] the metaphysics of 'Accidental Being'. Our
discussion will focus on the linguistic aspects of the solutions to each
one of these problems. Three things in particular will be considered: [a]
the semantical development of a terminology which was already
common usage (e.g. 'idea', 'ratio'), [b] the introduction of new
philosophical tools (e.g. 'suppositio', 'appellatio', 'connotatio'), and [c]
the role of (artificial) word-order. I shall argue that for the Medievals,
the Latin language was not only the vehicle of philosophical thought,
but also an inspiring source of pioneering philosophical insight." pp.
129-130.
(*) For a broader discussion see L.M. de Rijk, 'Teaching and Inquiry in
13th-14th Century Logic and Metaphysics'
(**) In this connection the word 'logical' should be associated with the
Greek 'logos', rather than the discipline of logic.
———. 1996. "On Aristotle's Semantics in De Interpretatione 1-4." In
by Algra, Keimpe, Van der Horst, Pieter and Runia, David, 115-134.
Leiden: Brill.
"By and large, in De interpretatione Aristotle is concerned with our
capability to speak about all that presents itself to our mind. From
chapter 4 onwards, he deals with the statement-making expressions
(affirmation and negation), which are the main tools for conveying our
thoughts about things. This discussion is prepared (chapters 1-3) by
some important observations concerning the basic elements of such
expressions, viz. onoma and rhema. The present contribution contains
some comments on Aristotle's view of the proper nature of statement-
making as put forward in De interpretatione. First, I would like to
highlight Aristotle's, what Sir David Ross has called 'frankly
'representative' view of knowledge' by discussing the terms omoioma
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and pragma. Next, I will discuss what is meant by a term's 'time-
connotation', and finally I will examine the semantics of onoma, rhema
and logos." p. 115
———. 1996. "Burley's So-Called Tractatus Primus, with an Edition
of the Additional Quaestio 'Utrum Contradictio Sit Maxima
Oppositio'." Vivarium no. 34:161-191.
"The extensive list of works by Walter Burley contains a collection of
some eagerly disputed questions concerning natural philosophy, which
in most of the manuscript catalogues goes under the blank title
Tractatus primus. (...)
In the shorter version of his Expositio super librum Sex principiorum,
written after he had left Paris in 1327, he deals with the position
concerning the specific sameness of whiteness and blackness he had
argued for ín the fourth quaestio, and refers to his 'primus tractatus de
formis accidcntalibus" (...)
This reference seems to imply that the title 'De formis accidentalibus'
covers both the Tractatus primus and the Tractatus secundus, which
was afterwards called 'De intensione et remission formarum.' I think it
would be better to call the first treatise 'De formis accidentalibus, pars
prima,' with the subtitle 'De quattuor conclusionibus circa formas
accidentales'. The second treatise, then, which contains a discussion of
a closely related subject matter, should go under the title 'De formis
accidentalibus, pars secunda,' with the subtitle 'De causa intrinseca
susceptionis magis et minus'. Later on, its current tide became De
intensione et remissione formarum." pp. 161-162
Giraldus, Odonis. 1997. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera Philosophica.
Vol I. Logica. Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; List of manuscripts
63; Bibliography 65; TEXT 69; Argumentum 71; Liber Primus: De
sillogismis 85; Annexum I: De natura oppositionis contradictorie 186;
Liber secundus: De suppositionibus 231; Annexum II: De tribus dubiis
293; Liber tertius: De principiis scientiarum 325; Annexum III: De
primo subiecto in logica 467; Index locorum 493; Index nominum 498;
Index verborum et rerum notabilium 500-543.
From the Introduction: "It may be useful to say something about the
general nature of Girald's Logica, Libri I-III, which now appear in print
for the first time as a whole. Generally speaking, the work is well-
1285
composed and written in a lucid style. The Addenda even contain rather
passionate passages, when Girald is rejecting opponent views,
especially in those cases where Walter Burley is (anonymously) under
attack. The characteristic given by Brown (1) of De suppositionibus
seems to be well to the point for the entire Logica: Girald's treatise is
structured in his own individual way, but all with its personal stamp,
especially emerging in De suppositionibus." p. 25
(1) Stephen F. Brown "Gerard Odon's De suppositionibus" in:
Franciscan Studies 35 (1975), 5-44 cfr. p. 10
"As we have remarked before, Girald's tract on "the two most common
and well-founded principles of knowledge" is the most original part of
his Logica. To assess its place in Girald's thought requires an
investigation into the proper nature of the two principles and what the
Medieval commentators used to call the 'conditions' ('specific
properties') of these principles, as well as what to Girald's mind plays
the key role in such an inquiry, the proper subject of logic. I shall deal
with these themes here briefly; they will be extensively discussed in our
Introduction to the edition of Girald's metaphysical works." p. 37
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1997. "Le "Guide De L'étudiant" Et Les
Exigences Particulières De La Preuve Demonstrative Selon Aristote."
In L'enseignement De La Philosophie Au Xiii Siècle. Autour Du 'Guide
De L'étudiant' Du Ms. Ripoll 109., edited by Lafleur, Claude and
Carrier, Joanne, 353-366. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Les Seconds Analytiques, qui constituent sans doute la pièce maîtresse
de l'oeuvre logique d'Aristote et dont l'importance philosophique
surpasse de beaucoup le domaine de la logique proprement dite, étaient
considérés dès le Moyen Âge comme un texte extrêmement difficile.
On y traite de la théorie de la démonstration poursuivant la
connaissance certaine, stable et nécessaire, fondée sur des prémisses
elles-mêmes nécessaires.
Après quelques remarques générales sur la nécessité de connaissances
préexistantes', sur la nature de la science et de la démonstration, suivies
par une énumération des opinions erronées à ce propos, le Stagirite
aborde la question des conditions requises pour construire des
prémisses nécessaires, qui s'appellent condiciones principiorum dans le
vocabulaire médiéval." p. 353
———. 1997. "Guiral Ott (Giraldus Odonis) O.F.M. (1273-1349): His
1286
View of Statemental Being in His Commentary on the Sentences." In
Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval
Theological Texts (Xiiith-Xivth Century), edited by Marmo, Costantino,
355-369. Turnhout: Brepols.
Acts of the 11th Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, San
Marino, 24-28 May 1994.
"The fourteenth-century Franciscan master Giraldus Odonis (Guiral Ot)
who at the time he was Patriarch of Antiochia died of the plague in
1349, in Catania, Sicily, is mainly known as the unfortunate successor
of the deposed Michael of Cesena as Master General of his Order and a
faithful adherent of Pope John XXII in the debate on the beatific
vision" p. 355
It is the intention of the present contribution to discuss the author's
second question [in his commentary on the Sentences] which deals with
esse tertio adiacens, or what is nowadays mostly called 'copulative
being', but I would prefere to label it 'statemental being' ". p. 356
(...)
"7. Conclusion. To Odonis' mind, statemental being is a kind of being
sui generis, so to speak, which, no doubt, is something more than a
kind of being that entirely owes its existence to the soul's activity.
Rather Odonois' statemental being should be regarded as the
metaphysical indivision (in as far as, on the statemental level,
affirmative sentences are concerned), or division (in the case of
negative sentences) which exist in the realm of the natura communis.
Thus, statemental being is the basic precondition for the existence of
both real being and conceptual being, to the extent that within the
domain of the natures communis it specifically concerns the ontological
(whether essential or incidental) relationships of indivision and division
that exist between the common natures. When defending against his
numerous opponents the real character of statemental being, Odonis has
the metaphysical reality of the realm of the common natures in mind,
rather than the reality of the actual world. To put it briefly, like his
doctrine of the nature of the universal, Odonis' view of statemental
being clearly betrays a Platonic flavour, which makes him join the
camp of the extreme realists." p. 364
———. 1997. "Gerardus Odonis O.F.M. On the Principle of Non-
Contradiction and the Proper Nature of Demonstration." Franciscan
1287
"One of the most original works by the Franciscan Master Gerardus
Odonis (Guiralt Ot) is the third part of his Logica, De principiis
scientiarum. This treatise is not just a commentary on Aristotle's
Posterior Analytics, nor is it a specialized treatment of its subject
matter, which is demonstrative (or rather epistemonic) knowledge, as is
found in Ockham's Sum of Logic. Rather, Odonis took his treatise to be
a supplement to the Aristotelian work, where the demonstrative
principles proper to the different 'sciences' (principia propria) as well
as those they all have in common (principia communia) are extensively
discussed by Aristotle, but less attention is paid to the most common
principles of the intellect (principia communissima intellectus), such as
the twofold principle of noncontradiction. What Odonis means to do,
then, is to discuss the well-known seven requirements concerning the
proper and the common principles insofar as they apply to the principle
of non contradiction (henceforth PNC).
(...)
Accordingly, the author has divided his treatise into ten chapters, the
first of which deals with the subject matter of PNC and its constituents
or terms. This chapter presents first ten basic assumptions
(suppositiones), next twelve theses (conclusiones) together with the
discussion of a number of notable statements (notabilia) and
corollaries, and finally the refutation of objections (dubia).
In the present paper the conclusiones 6-11 concerning the nature of
being as involved in PNC will be discussed." pp. 51-53 (Notes
omitted).
———. 1997. "Foi Chrétienne Et Savoir Humain. La Lutte De Buridan
Contre Les Theologizantes." In Langages Et Philosophie. Hommage À
Jean Jolivet, edited by Libera, Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and
Galonnier, Alain, 393-409. Paris: Vrin.
"Introduction. Pendant tout le Moyen Age, comme durant la période
patristique, les penseurs chrétiens se sont beaucoup intéressés aux
rapports entre la raison et la foi. On sait que le principal thème de
recherche et de discussion, en ce domaine, était l'harmonisation de la
foi et de la raison, ce qui revenait au début à faire une apologie du le
caractère rationnel de la foi, mais ce qui, chez des géants comme
Anselme ou Abélard, a conduit à une élaboration de la théologie grâce
1288
à l'emploi de ce que notre collègue, Jean Jolivet, dans son étude de
pionnier sur la théologie d'Abélard, a si heureusement appelé les « arts
du langage (1) ». D'autre part, les penseurs médiévaux ont toujours
reconnu l'importance du « dépôt de la foi » en tant que collection des
vérités garanties, si bien que l'on prenait ces vérités pour des
renseignements supplémentaires sur les phénomènes terrestres. Le
simple « Soleil, arrête-toi » de Josué (Livre de Josué 10, 12) a suffi
pour maintenir le système géocentrique.
A partir de la deuxième moitié du XIIIe siècle, c'est surtout la
toutepuissance divine et la contingence radicale de tout le créé qui
conduisent certains penseurs à regarder le monde d'un point de vue tout
différent. La nouvelle attitude a dû stimuler, d'une manière générale,
l'intérêt des philosophes pour les implications épistémologiques de la
toute-puissance divine, en particulier pour celles qui concernent les
limites de la connaissance humaine.
Jean Buridan (né en Picardie, peut-être à Béthune, vers l'an 1300, mort
vers 1361) a bien fait face à ces problèmes épistémologiques. En
rendant à César ce qui est à César, et à Dieu ce qui est à Dieu, il a pu
déterminer sa propre attitude devant la foi et la théologie. Le
philosophe picard a trouvé les theologizantes sur sa route. La lutte de
Buridan contre leur point de vue n'était qu'un corollaire de ses idées
optimistes (et bien fondées) sur les possibilités et la validité du savoir
humain." p. 393
(1) J. Jolivet, Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard, Paris, Vrin
(Études de philosophie médiévale, LVII), 1969.
———. 1997. "The Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics." In
L'enseignement Des Disciplines À La Faculté Des Arts (Paris Et
Oxford, Xiiie-Xve Siècles). Actes Du Colloque International, edited by
Weijers, Olga and Holz, Louis, 303-312. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Considering the rich survey Professor Lohr has presented this
afternoon of Medieval commentaries on Aristotle's philosophical works
including Metaphysics, there is no point in discussing in general terms
the vicissitudes of this Aristotelian work at the Parisian Faculty of Arts.
On top of that, in the lettre d'invitation of the organizers we were asked
to say something about our own recent research in the field under
discussion. Therefore I shall confine myself to John Buridan's (c. 1290-
c. 1360) commentaries on Metaphysics. Fortunately, Buridan's activity
1289
as a commentator on Metaphysics may to a large degree be regarded as
representative of the period. As we learn from Lohr's survey, from the
fourteenth century only some five commentaries on this important
Aristotelian writing are extant, quite unlike the thirteenth and fifteenth
centuries, from which a considerable amount of such works have
survived. (*)" p. 303
(*) For the reception of the Metaphysics into the curriculum of the
Parisian Faculty of Arts see A. L. Gabriel, Metaphysics in the
Curriculum of Studies of the Mediaeval Universities. in P. Wilpert ed.,
Die Melaphysik im Mittelalter. lhr Ursprung and Ihre Bedeutung
(Miscellanea Mediuevalia 2) Berlin, 1963, pp. 92-102 ; G. Leff, Paris
and Oxford Universities in the XIIIth and XIVth Centuries, New York,
1988, p. 189 sqq.
Johannes, Venator. 1999. Johannes Venator Anglicus. Logica.
Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
First critical edition from the manuscripts.
Vol. I: Tractatus I-II, Vol. II: Tractatus III-IV. Grammatica
speculativa.
"Properly speaking, nothing is known about our author's life with all
due certainty. In recent times, he is commonly identified with the
English logician John Hunt(e)man listed by Emden, who was from
York diocese and a master in Oxford still in the 1390's, when Paul of
Venice stayed there. He is reported as a fellow of Oriel College as early
as in 1373 and still being there in January 1383. He was Robert Rygge's
Junior Proctor of Oxford University in 1382-3, and, like Rygge, he was
delated in 1382 for sympathising with the heretic views held by John
Wyclif. In 1390, he was Chancelor of Lincoln, and on June 14, 1414,
he was appointed Vicar General of the Bishop of Durham. These dates
of the John Huntman are all well compatible with his identification
with the author Johannes Venator. It is interesting in this connection
that the Vatican manuscript does ascribe the Logica to an English
author ("Johannes Venator doctor anglicus"). Unfortunately, there is no
other positive evidence so far for this plausible identification." p. 7.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2000. "Logica Morelli. Some Notes on the
Semantics of a Fifteenth Century Spanish Logic." In Medieval and
Renaissance Logic in Spain. Acts of the 12th European Symposium on
Medieval Logic and Semantics, Held at the University of Navarre
1290
(Pamplona, 26-30 May 1997), edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Pérez-
Ilzarbe, Paloma, 209-224. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
"The present paper, which is presented as a modest contribution to the
general theme of our Symposium on the History of Spanish Logic,
intends to highlight some interesting topics discussed in a fifteenth
century introductory Sum of Logic which is extant in (at least) two
Spanish manuscripts.
When visiting Spanish libraries in the Autumn of 1971 I came across a
copy of a Sum of Logic in the Biblioteca Capitular Colombina at Sevilla
(cod. 7-3-13). This work attracted my attention because of its clear
design and lucid execution. Another copy of this work turned up in the
Biblioteca del Cabildo Metropolitano at Zaragoza (cod. 15-57), under
the name "Logica Morelli", and was dated 1476.
(...)
The work consists of five parts:
(1) the logic of terms, including the well-known properties of terms,
supposition, ampliation, and appellation.
(2) the logic of propositions, including their various "probationes" (in
the wake of Richard Billingham, Speculum, and the widespread
adaptations of this work)
(3) the theory of argumentation
(4) the doctine of the predicables and the categories
(5) the doctrine of the so-called "obligations".
(...)
This treatise seems to nicely testify to fifteenth-century logical
education in Spain. We owe a survey of the contents of this work
together with a description of the two manuscripts to our colleague
Joke Spruyt." pp. 209-210-
[A printed edition of the work is now available: Logica Morelli - Edited
from the manuscripts with an introduction, notes and indices by Joke
Spruyt - Turnhout, Brepols, 2003]
John, Buridan. 2001. Johannes Buridanus. Summulae Viii: De
Demonstrationibus. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
Nicolas, d'Autrecourt. 2001. Nicolas D'autrecourt. Correspondance,
Articles Condamnés. Paris: Vrin.
Texte latin établi par L. M. de Rijk; introduction, traduction et notes par
1291
Christophe Grellard.
French translation of: Nicholas of Autrecourt. His correspondence with
Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology.
Volume I: General Introduction. The Works on Logic. Leiden: Brill.
perceptions of 'predication', and statement-making in general to
function of 'be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical
less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic
use of 'be' to be the central one in Greek (pace Kahn), on the
stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I
term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's
'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse
statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and
'assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric
'appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring
in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in
1292
evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic
my purposes."
———. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume Ii: The
Metaphysics, Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument. Leiden:
Brill.
From the Preface to the first volume: "The lion's part of volume two
(chapters 7-11) is taken up by a discussion of the introductory books of
the Metaphysics (A-E) and a thorough analysis of its central books (Z-
H-O). I emphasize the significance of Aristotle's semantic views for his
metaphysical investigations, particularly for his search for the true
ousia. By focusing on Aristotle's semantic strategy I hope to offer a
clearer and more coherent view of his philosophical position, in
particular in those passages which are often deemed obscure or
downright ambiguous.
In chapter 12 1 show that a keen awareness of Aristotle's semantic
modus operandi is not merely useful for the interpretation of his
metaphysics, but is equally helpful in gaining a clearer insight into
many other areas of the Stagirite's sublunar ontology (such as his
teaching about Time and Prime matter in Physics).
In the Epilogue (chapter 13), the balance is drawn up. The unity of
Aristotelian thought is argued for and the basic semantic tools of
localization and categorization are pinpointed as the backbone of
Aristotle's strategy of philosophic argument.
My working method is to expound Aristotle's semantic views by
presenting a running commentary on the main lines found in the
Organon with the aid of quotation and paraphrase. My findings are first
tested (mainly in Volume II) by looking at the way these views are
applied in Aristotle's presentation of his ontology of the sublunar world
as set out in the Metaphysics, particularly in the central books (ZHO).
As for the remaining works, I have dealt with them in a rather selective
manner, only to illustrate that they display a similar way of
1293
philosophizing and a similar strategy of argument. In the second
volume, too, the exposition is in the form of quotation and paraphrase
modelled of Aristotle's own comprehensive manner of treating
doctrinally related subjects: he seldom discussed isolated problems in
the way modern philosophers in their academic papers, like to deal with
special issues tailored to their own contemporary philosophic interest."
———. 2003. "Boethius on De Interpretatione (Ch. 3): Is He a
Reliable Guide?" In Boèce Ou La Chaîne Des Savoirs. Actes Du
Colloque International De La Fondation Singer Polignac (Paris, 8-12
Juin 1999), edited by Galonnier, Alain, 207-227. Paris: Peeters
Publishers.
"There can be no doubt whatsoever about Boethius's exceptional merits
for transmitting Aristotle's logic to us. But while 'Aristotelian' logic is
in many respects synonymous with 'Aristotelico-Boethian' logic, the
question can be raised whether Aristotle himself was an 'Aristotelian'.
To give just one example: from Lukasiewicz onwards there has been
much debate among scholars about the telling differences between
traditional syllogistic and that of the Prior Analytics. (1)
In this paper I intend to deal with two specimens of Boethius's way of
commenting upon Aristotle's text. They are found in his discussion of
De interpretatione, chapters 2 and 3, which present Aristotle's views of
ónoma and rhema. (2) One concerns the semantics of indefinite names,
the other that of isolated names and verbs." p. 227
(1) Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of
Modern Formal Logic, Oxford, 1951. G. Patzig, Aristotle's Theory of
the Syllogism. A logico-philological study of Book A of the Prior
Analytics, Dordrecht, 1969.
(2) Rhema properly stands for 'what is said of', including not only our
'verb' but also adjectives, when used in attributive position. One should
realise, however, that 'verb' refers to a word class, rather than a
semantic or syntactical category, as rhema does.
(...)
"Conclusion. Returning now to Boethius' manner of commenting upon
Aristotle's texts, the following points can be made:
[1] In the wake of Ammonius, (3) Boethius explains [De int.] 16b22-25
on the apophantic level, i.e. in terms of statement-making, instead of
framing significative concepts, i.e. on the onomastic level.
1294
[2] Whereas in Ammonius' report of the predecessors, Alexander and
Porphyry, as well as his own exposition of the issue, there are many
clues to the previous alternative reading and interpretation on the
onomastic level, Boethius does not even refrain from cleansing the text
(including his 'quotations'), by changing, at any occurrence, 'ens' into
'est'.
[3] In doing so, Boethius decisively influenced the commentary
tradition on account of the purport of De int. 3, 16b19-25. He
effectively contributed to the common verdict on this paragraph in
terms of 'a curious medley'.
[4] As far as the semantics of the indefinite verb (3, 16b14-15) is
concerned, Boethius' apparently adhering to the so-called 'Ammonii
recensio' was far less desastrous for the common understanding of
Aristotle on this score, and, in effect, merely provided us with some
stimulating Medieval discussions of the semantics of term infinitation.
[5] Finally by way of speculative surmise, it might be suggested that
both the fact that Boethius dealt with the 'Ammonii recognise' without
reading it in his lemma of 16b14-15, as well as his rather ruthlessly
interfering in the quotations of the pre-Ammonian sources, should
make it more plausible that Boethius had extensive, but incomplete
marginal notes to his Greek text of Aristotle at his disposal, rather than
a full copy of Ammonius' commentary (or those of other Greek
commentators).
To comment upon Aristotle's work naturally includes developing his
lore. But nothing can ever guarantee that this will happen ad mentem
auctoris. (4)"
(3) It is unmistakably plain that in De int. ch. 3, Boethius is strongly
influenced by what he read in Ammonius (or in marginal notes on
Ammonius' view).
(4) Cf. the interesting paper on this subject by Frans A.J. de Haas,
"Survival of the Fittest? Mutations of Aristotle's Method of Inquiry in
Late Antiquity" (forthcoming). [Conference: The Dynamics of Natural
Philosophy in the Aristotelian Tradition (and beyond), Nijmegen, 16-
20 August 1999.]
Duns Scotus, and Radulphus Brito." In Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in
1295
Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneli Henri, 207-233.
"Aristotle's doctrine of indefinite names (nouns) was handed down to
the Middle Ages together with Boethius' comments and explanations.
Boethius' view of the matter has two characteristic features. For one
thing, there is a certain ambiguity on his part concerning the precise
semantic value of such terms; for another, Boethius deviates
considerably from Aristotle in that he explicitly assigns the property of
'holding indifferently of existents and non-existents' not only to the
indefinite rhéma (as it is found in Aristotle, De interpr. 3, 16b15) but to
the indefinite name (onoma) as well.
Until the end of the 12th century the logic and grammar (1) of
indefinite terms (nouns and verbs) was a much debated issue. Although
assiduously echoing the well-known auctoritates Medieval thinkers did
not always go the whole way with their predecessors. For example,
Abelard and Scotus, starting from their own philosophical tenets, more
or less inconspicuously corrected some dubious elements in Boethius'
interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the indefinite name. Peter
Abelard, especially, took great pains to precisely define the meaning of
indefinite terms. He focussed his attention on the proper meaning of
indefinite terms rather than on the question whether they are 'holding
indifferently of existents and non-existens'. In contrast, 13th-century
scholars like Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito based their discussion
of the proper meaning of the indefinite name upon the question 'Utrum
nomen infinitum aliquid ponat' ("Whether an infinite name posits
something"), which calls to mind Boethius' claim that indefinite names
'hold indifferently of existent and non-existents'.
Abelard's discussion of the proper meaning of the indefinite name is
also interesting in that it helps us to gain a good understandiiip of what
Boethius had in mind in claiming that the indefinite name 'siginifes an
infinite number of things' ('significat infinita'). For, thanks to Äbelard's
expositions, it becomes clear that the phrase 'significare infinita',
which, on the face of it, may be taken as referring to the extensional of
the indefinite name, on closer inspection proves to concern its
intension, because the controversy between Abelard and Boethius turns
out to be about two different views of the indefinite name's intension
rather that about any opposition of intension as against extension." pp.
1296
207-208.
———. 2003. "The Aristotelian Background of Medieval
Transcendentia: A Semantic Approach." In Die Logik Des
Transzendentalen. Festchrift Für Jan A. Aertsen Zum 65. Geburstag,
edited by Pickavé, Martin, 3-22. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
1. Aristotle's notion of 'connotative' or 'intensional be'; 2. The so-called
'termini transcendentes' in the Middle Ages; 2.1. How to bring the
general notions 'be' and 'one' into focus; 2.2. On the peculiar use of the
label 'transcendens' in prioristic syllogistic; 3. On the use of
'transcendens' to bring general, extra-categorial ontic notions in focus;
3.1. The commonness of the general ontic notions; 3.2. The
epistemological aspect: the emergence of the idea of conceptual
primacy 3.3. On the contaminative shift to Platonic transcendence; 4.
The (Aristotelian) semantic sense underlying 'transcendentia' retained;
5. Concluding remarks."
"1. As I have argued for elsewhere, the Greek notion 'ES-' or 'be' as
coming to the fore in its several grammatical appearances - the
infinitive einai, the articular participle to on, and the verbal noun ousia
- not only refers to what is actually there ('exists') or actually is the
case, but can also represent a form of 'be' that does not, as such, include
actual existence, and indeed indicates the general ontic condition that
underlies, and is in fact connoted by, any categorial designations. To
Aristotle in particular, each and every noun includes what I have
termed 'connotative' or 'intensional' be-ing. (...)" The semantic view
that every nominal or verbal sememe by connotation contains the
fundamental notion of be-ing is at the basis of Aristotle's argument
against Plato. To Plato, transcendent Being is the fullness of Forms
(later called 'plenitude formarum'), whereas particular forms existing in
the outside world are merely as many shares of such-and-such be-ing in
virtue of which the outside things share in the transcendent Source of
Beingness. In Aristotle, things are quite different: there is no being-ness
other that what is found in particular beings. It is their immanent forms
which are constitutive of their (modes of) be-ing, rather than some
putative transcendent Source (on the contrary, as it is worded later on:
'forma dat esse'). By itself, 'be' even is a categorially empty notion The
fact that to Aristotle, 'be-ing' is a categorially empty notion by no
means implies that Aristotle should be unaware of the fundamental
1297
importance of the notion of be-ing when it comes to metaphysical
investigation. It need not come as a surprise that it is in his
"Metaphysics" that the notion of 'be-ingness' (ousia) is the very nucleus
of the metaphysical search for the quiddity of things: this search
concerns true 'ousia' or true 'being-ness'. All things considered, despite
his obstinately arguing for the (categorial!) emptiness of the notion 'be',
Aristotle recognizes the basic sememe of 'be-ing' present in each and
every categorial notion, and at the same time he is, to some extent,
aware that there are also some other general ontic notions, which are
equally fundamental to metaphysics." pp. 3-4
Giraldus, Odonis. 2005. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera Philosophica.
Vol Ii. De Intentionibus. Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Acknowledgements XIII; Introduction 1;
A study on the medieval intentionality debate up to ca. 1350 (pp. 19-
371) by L. M. de Rijk.
Chapter I. Preliminary matters p. 19; Chapter II. The common doctrine
of Cognition ca 1260 p. 41; Chapter III. The "epistemological turn"
around 1270 p. 79; Chapter IV. The intentionality issue before
Faversham and Radulphus Brito p. 113; Chapter V. Simon Faversham
on Second Intentions p. 165; Chapter VI. Radulphus Brito on
intentionality p. 191; Chapter VII. Hervaeus Natalis's Treatise De
secundis intentionibus p. 251 Chapter VIII. Giraldus Odonis's Treatise
De intentionibus p. 303; Chapter IX. Conclusion p. 333; Bibliography
p. 359; List of manuscripta referred to p. 373; Text of De intentionibus
p. 377-596;
Appendices p. 597; A. William of Ware (Guillelmus Guarro) p. 607; B.
James of Metz (Jacobus Mettensis) p. 619; C. Hervé Nédellec
(Hervaeus Natalis) p. 625; D. Durand of St. Pourçain (Durandus de S.
Porciano) p. 635; E. Raoul le Breton (Radulphus Brito) p. 643; F.
Pierre d'Auriole (Petrus Aureolus) p. 695; G. Franciscus de Prato p.
749; H. Stephan of Rieti (Stephanus de Reate) p. 777
Indices p. 823; A. Indices locorum p. 825; B. Index nominum p. 839;
C. Index verborum rerumque notabilium p. 845-894.
"This volume contains the first critical edition of Girald Odonis (d.
1349), De intentionibus, in which the author deals with the multifarious
problems around conceptualization with which philosophers and
theologians from around 1300 were faced when attempting to bridge
1298
the gap between thought and reality. Girald appears to have been an
unyielding defender of the 'realistic' position, holding that our variously
articulated concepts (intentiones) are representative of as many
distinctions in Reality. The main target of his severe criticism upon
contemporaneous views of the matter is Hervé de Nédellec, who was
the first to write a monograph De intentionibus, which betrays his
adherence to a moderate realism. The editor's extensive study of the
intentionality debate of those years focusses on the development of the
cognition theory in the period between Thomas Aquinas and Peter
Auriol (d. 1322)."
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2005. "Girald Odonis on the Real Status of
Some Second Intentions." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione
Filosofica Medievale no. 16:515-551.
———. 2006. "Giraldus Odonis, Godfrey Fontaines, and Peter Auriol
on the Principle of Individuation." In "Ad Ingenii Acuitionem". Studies
in Honour of Alfonso Maierù, edited by Caroti, Stefano, Imbach, Ruedi,
Kaluza, Zénon, Stabile, Giorgio and Sturlese, Loris, 403-436. Louvain-
la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales.
"Everyone interested in the history of philosophy knows that the
problem of the universal has played a predominant role. Ockham may
indeed have tried to highlight the importance of this problem by
nullifying its counterpart, the problem of individuation, to the great
majority of Medieval thinkers, however, the problem area surrounding
the principle of individuation remained of serious interest. Against the
background of the phenomenon of universality as strictly required for
obtaining genuine knowledge, they kept regarding the individuality
issue as a source of philosophic and theological perplexity which could
not be underestimated with impunity. The purport of this paper is to
evaluate Girald Odonis's treatment of the individuation issue (In II
Sent., dist. 6, q. 4, and, in addition, In III Sent., dist. 1, qq. 1-3) in the
context of what others brought forward on the subject, particularly
Godfrey of Fontaines and Peter Auriol.
As Russel Friedman has rightly observed, from the beginnings of 14th
century onwards, the Sentences commentary came into its own as a
preferred medium of scholastic theological and philosophical discourse,
certainly rivaling in this respect, and often outshining, other vehicles of
theological expression (e. g. Quodlibetal questions, Summae, Biblical
1299
commentaries). The Ftanciscan Master, Giraldus Odonis (c. 1280-
1349) was among the numerous scholars who were beginning to use the
Sentences commentary as a vehicle for mature thought about a gamut
of controversial philosophic as well as theological issues. Therefore the
occurrence of this philosophically hotly debated item in his Sentences
commentary cannot come as a surprise.
In the sixth Distinctio of the Second Book, Gerald comes (in the fourth
question) to speak about the individuation problem, asking what it is in
virtue of which there is a multiplication of individuals within one
species. He proposes to deal with this question by firstly summing up a
number of previous or current opinions, then to advance his own
position, and thirdly to reply to the ins and outs, including the
backgrounds of the rival positions." pp. 403-404 (notes omitted).
Johannes, Buridanus. 2008. Johannes Buridanus Lectura Erfordiensis
in I-Vi Metaphysicam, Together with the 15th-Century Abbreviatio
Caminensis. Turnhout: Brepols.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L. M. de Rijk.
"The aim of the present edition is to make two texts available which
can throw some more light on the role of Aristotle's Metaphysics in
14th-15th academic teaching. One of them contains part of an early
(hitherto unknown) version of John Buridan's Questions on
Metaphysics, the other is a 15th century abbreviation of precisely this
early version. Remarkably, both texts belong to the East European
tradition of Buridan's works, which is the more interesting as they
testify to the master's earlier activities as a Parisian teacher on the
subject of metaphysics. In particular, they elucidate Buridan's ongoing
semantic approach to matters of metaphysics and ontology as well as
his attitude to Aristotle's authority."
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2011. Hervaeus Natalis. De Quattuor
Materiis, Sive Determinationes Contra Magistrum Henricum De
Gandavo. Vol. I. Turnhout: Brepols.
De formis (together with his De unitate formae substantialis in eodem
suppositio).
"The aim of the present edition of Harvey Nedellec's De quattuor
materiis is to make a collection of texts available that can throw some
more light upon the ongoing debates around 1300 about some highly
controversial issues, including the plurality of forms, the relationship
1300
between being and essence, the significance (or superfluity) of the
intelligible species, and the intellect's priority to the will. Harvey's
polemic interventions, which are explicitly directed against the
ontological positions held by Henry of Ghent, are the more interesting
as they are coloured by a manifest animosity against his opponent and
the Ghentian way of doing philosophy in general. The author's attitude
is most prominent in the first tract of the collection presented in the first
volume, De formis. In order to put the impact of this tract into a larger
perspective, Harvey's extensive treatise De unitate formae substantialis
in eodem supposito has been added."
De Rijk, Lambertus Marie. 2013. "Semantics and Ontology. An
Assessment of Medieval Terminism." In Medieval Supposition Theory
Revisited. Studies in Memory of L. M. De Rijk, edited by Bos, Egbert
Peter, 13-59. Leiden: Brill.
"This paper aims to assess medieval terminism, particularly supposition
theory, in the development of Aristotelian thought in the Latin West.
The focus is on what the present author considers the gist of Aristotle's
strategy of argument, to wit conceptual focalization and categorization.
This argumentative strategy is more interesting as it can be compared to
the modern tool known as 'scope distinction'."
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2013. Hervaeus Natalis. De Quattuor
Materiis, Sive Determinationes Contra Magistrum Henricum De
Gandavo. Vol. Ii. Turnhout: Brepols.
De esse et essentia. De materia et forma. A Critical Edition from
Selected Manuscripts.
"This second volume presents a critical study of Hervaeus Natalis’s De
quattuor materiis, and compares it with the rival systems of the
metaphysics of creation that were upheld by Giles of Rome and Henry
of Ghent.
This second volume of Hervaeus Natalis’s polemical work, De
quattuor materiis contains his De esse et essentia. In this work the
author criticizes the rival systems of the metaphysics of creation that
were upheld by Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent, and presents an
exposition of his own notion of being. To explain Harvey’s antagonistic
1301
attitude to Henry of Ghent and his simultaneous rejection of Giles’s
positions (the rigid Aegidian real distinction between essence and
existence in particular) it was necessary to provide a thorough
investigation of the ontological positions of both Henry and Giles.
Hence the lion’s part of the Introduction is devoted to these two rivals
of Harvey’s.
The selection of the manuscripts used for the present edition of De esse
et essentia as well as the ratio edendi, orthography, punctuation and
headings employed, are explained in the General Introduction to
volume one, De formis.
This second volume had been finished by the editor, L. M. de Rijk, just
before his sudden death on July 30, 2012. The final version has been
read by Joke Spruyt and Olga Weijers.
The third and last volume of the edition of Hervaeus’ work, already
well advanced by the editor, will be finished by two of his main
disciples: Henk Braakhuis and Onno Kneepkens. Thus we will have
kept our promise, in respect and friendship for our master."
RELATED PAGES
1950 - 1974
1975 - 1982
1983 - 1990

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Annotated Bibliography of Mauro Nasti

de Vincentis
BIBLIOGRAPHY
This is a bibliography of the studies on the history of ancient logic by Mauro
Nasti de Vincentis (Rome, 1937 - ), Professor of Logic (Emeritus) in the
Department of Communication Sciences, University of Salerno, Italy.
Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro. 1981. Il Capitolo 9 Del De Interpretatione

Di Aristotele Nel Commentario Di Al-Farabi. Napoli: Istituto
Universitario Orientale.
Co-autore: Carmela Baffioni.
Con un'appendice di Emanuela Galanti.
———. 1981. "Logica Scettica E Implicazione Stoica. A Proposito Di

Adv. Math. Viii 462-481." In Lo Scetticismo Antico. Vol. Ii, edited by
Giannantoni, Gabriele, 501-532. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
———. 1981. "L'affermazione Da Trasposizione in De Int. 10 E A. Pr.

A 46." In Atti Del Congresso Nazionale Di Logica. Montecatini Terme,
1-5 Ottobre 1979, edited by Bernini, Sergio, 617-645. Napoli:
Bibliopolis.
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———. 1983. "Chrysippean Implication as Strict Equivalence." In Atti
Del Convegno Internazionale Di Storia Della Logica, edited by
Abrusci, Michele, Casari, Ettore and Mugnai, Massino, 235-240.
Bologna: CLUEB.
———. 1984. "Stopper on Nasti's Contention and Stoic Logic."

Reply to M. R. Stopper [pseudonym of Jonathan Barnes], Schizzi
Pirroniani, Phronesis, 28, 1983, pp. 265-297.
———. 1988. "The Third and Fourth Acccount of Conditionals in

Sextus Empiricus." In Temi E Prospettive Della Logica E Della
Filosofia Della Scienza Contemporanee. Vol. I: Logica, edited by
Cellucci, Mario and Sambin, Giovanni, 219-226. Bologna: Clueb.
———. 1989. "Stoic Implication and Stoic Modalities." In Le Teorie

Massino, 258-263. Bologna: CLUEB.
"A new account of Stoic connexive conditional is given, according to
which (in order to agree with textual evidence) the truth-conditions for
the so-called Chrysippean implication are a function of the modality of
the clauses."
———. 1994. "Connexive Implication in a Chrysippean Setting. An

Extended Handout." In Logica E Filosofia Della Scienza: Problemi E
Prospettive. Atti Del Congresso Triennale Della Società Italiana Di
Logica E Filosofia Delle Scienze (Lucca, 7-10 Gennaio 1993), edited
by Cellucci, Mario, Di Mario, Maria Concetta and Roncaglia, Gino,
595-603. Pisa: ETS.

Empirico E Boezio (Parte I)." Dianoia no. 3:45-75.

Empirico E Boezio (Parte Ii)." Dianoia no. 4:11-43.
1305
———. 2002. Logiche Della Connessività. Fra Logica Moderna E
Storia Della Loica Antica. Bern: Haupt.
Indice: Premessa 7; Introduzione 11; 1. L'interpretazione classica e le
sue varianti 39; 2. La pars destruens: le difficoltà dell'interpretazione
classica 69; 3. La pars construens: verso una nuova interpretazione 95;
4. Obbiezioni, risposte e conferme 123; 5. Implicazione crisippea e
implicazione boeziana 151; 6. Considerazioni conclusive e problemi
aperti 173; Appendice: La dottina boeziana della repugnantia - Scelta
di testi 193; Riferimenti bibiografici 231-232.
Recensione di Luca Castagnoli, Elenchos, 25, 2004, pp. 179-192.
———. 2004. "From Aristotle's Syllogistic to Stoic Conditionals:

Holzwege or Detectable Paths?" Topoi.An International Review of
"This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet
almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the
Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's
metasyllogistic equimodality condition (as stated at Prior Analytics I
24, 41b27-31) and truth-conditions for third type (Chrysippean)
conditionals (as they can be inferred from, say, Sextus Empiricus
Outlines of Pyrrhonism II 111 and 189). In fact, as is shown in §1,
Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his (propositional)
metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-
conditions of which turn out to be logically equivalent to truth-
conditions of third type conditionals, according to which only the
impossible (and not the possible) follows from the impossible.
Moreover, Aristotle is given precisely this non-Scotian conditional
logic in two so far overlooked passages of (Latin and Hebraic
translations of) Themistius' Paraphrasis of De Caelo (CAG V 4, 71.8-13
and 47.8-10 Landauer). Some further consequences of Aristotle's
equimodality condition on his logic, and notably on his syllogistic (no
matter whether modal or not), are pointed out and discussed at length.
A (possibly Chrysippean) extension of Aristotle's condition is also
discussed, along with a full characterization of truth-conditions of
fourth type conditionals."
1306
———. 2006. "Boethiana. La Logica Stoica Nelle Testimonianze Di
Boezio: Nuovi Strumenti Di Ricerca." Elenchos no. 27:377-408.
"In view of the importance of Boethius' "In Ciceronis Topica" as a
source for Stoic logic, argues for the constitution of an index of
divergent readings between the editions of Orelli (Zurich 1833) and
Migne, including those omitted by Stangl (1882). Such an index would
show that while Orelli's edition is better, sometimes the reading of
Migne is to be preferred. Includes considerations on the gradual
Stoicization of Aristotelian syllogistics, on Boethius' reliability as a
source for Stoic logic, and on the genuine editio princeps of Boethius'
"De topicis differentiis" (Rome 1484, rather than Venice 1492."
———. 2006. "Conflict and Connectedness: Between Modern Logic

and History of Ancient Logic." In Logic and Philosophy in Italy. Some
Trends and Perspectives, edited by Ballo, Edoardo and Franchella,
Miriam, 229-251. Monza: Polimetrica.
———. 2009. "Dalla Tesi Di Aristotele Alla Tesi Di Boezio: Una Tesi
Per L'implicazione Crisippea?" In La Logica Nel Pensiero Antico,
edited by Alessandrelli, Michele and Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro, 165-
———. 2010. "Forme Della Contraddizione E Sillogistica

Aristotelica." In La Contradizion Che Nol Consente, edited by Puppo,
Federico, 67-84. Milano: Angeli.
Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro, and Alessandrelli, Michele, eds. 2009. La

Logica Nel Pensiero Antico. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Atti del Colloquio, Roma, 28-29 novembre 2000.
Indice: Mauro Nasti de Vincentis: Premessa 9; Francesco Ademollo:
Un'interpretazione del Cratilo di Platone 15; Fabio Acerbi:
Osservazioni sulle origini aritmetiche della teoria aristotelica del
sillogismo 75; Luca Castagnoli: Sunártesis crisippea e tesi di Aristotele
105; Mauro Nasti de Vincentis: Dalla tesi di Aristotele alla tesi di
Boezio: una tesi per l'implicazione crisippea? 165; Anna Maria
Schiaparelli: La fallacia della composizione e della divisione in
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Aristotele e in Galeno 249; Indice delle fonti 281; Indice dei nomi
antichi 291; Indice degli autori moderni 293-295.
RELATED PAGES
Early Stoic Logicians: Zeno Cleanthes Chrysippus. A Bibliography

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Bibliography of Wilhelm Risse's Writings

on the History of Logic
INTRODUCTION
Wilhelm Risse was one of the greatest historians of logic of the 20th century.
"Risse possessed the rare ability to go to the core of his subject matter,
defining and distinguishing, while ever attentive to the essential structures,
controlling his inquiry. His subject matter was indeed immense. In fact, Risse
set himself the task of taking up where Carl Prantl had left off a century
before him, viz. to provide as complete as possible an exposition of all the
treatises oil logic produced by Western Civilization from 1500 to 1780. Like
Prantl, Risse never relied on the accounts of others. He travelled throughout
Europe to read the books about which he was writing. For Risse, the word
'autopsy' was no trifle. This enterprise found its realization in the two
volumes of Logik der Neuzeit (1964-70) and in the four volumes of
Bibliographia logica (1965-78). In his later years, Risse concentrated his
energies on a bibliographical inventory of all philosophical disciplines from
the invention of book-printing to the year 1800, publishing, shortly before his
death, the awesome nine volumes of Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus
(1998).
From: Riccardo Pozzo, Obituary. Wilhelm Risse 11 January 1931 - 26 May
1309
1998, History and Philosophy of Logic, 20, 1999 p. 145.
BOOKS
Risse, Wilhelm. 1964. Die Logik Der Neuzeit. I. Stuttgart - Bad

Cannstadt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag.
Erste Band: 1500 - 1640.
"Inhalt: Einleitung 9; Kap. I: Die rhetorische Logik der Ciceronianer.
Rhetoridialektiker und Synkretisten. Nationalsprachige
Logiklehrbücher. Juristische Logik. Platoniker. Skeptiker. 14; Kap. II:
Die Melanchthonschule. Humanistisch-aristotelische Logik in der
protestantischen Schule. Logik und Theologie 79; Kap. III: Die
ramistische Dialektik. Kampf gegen Aristoteles. Ausbildung einer
namentlich bei den Calvinisten verbreiteten Kompendienliteratur. Streit
der Ramisten mit den Melanchthonianern und Aristotelikern 122; Kap.
IV: Altaristoteliker und Averroisten. Verwurzelung der italienischen
Schule in den Kommentaren von Alexander und Averroes.
Verschmelzung beider Schulen. Aristoteleskommentare und -editionen.
201; Kap. V: Die scholastische Logik des 16. und frühen 17.
Jahrhunderts. Weiterleben der Scholastik in Spanien. Escolasticos
decadentes. Aristoteliker und Humanisten. Thomisten und Scotisten.
Die portugiesische Schule. Spanische Jesuiten. Außerspanische
Scholastiker 308; Kap. VI: Systematiker und Aristoteliker des 17.
Jahrhunderts. Aristotelisch-scholastisch-ramistischer Synkretismus.
Systemtheorien. Theorie der intelligentia. Neubelebung des
Formalismus. 440; Kap. VII: Die lullistische Tradition. Kombinatorik.
Lingua universalis. Mathematisierung 532; Exemplarnachweis.
Sigelverzeichnis der Bibliotheken 561; Sachregister 563;
Namenregister 566.
"These two volumes expound, in Prantl's manner, but more
systematically, the treatises on logic from the mentioned periods. The
studies of Risse, as well as those of Prantl, are indispensable to all
researches in the field of history of logic."
Anton Dumitriu - History of logic - Vol. I Tunbrdige Wells, Abacus
Press, 1977 p. XV.
———. 1970. Die Logik Der Neuzeit. Ii. Stuttgart - Bad Cannstadt:
1310
Friedrich Frommann Verlag.
Zweite Band: 1640 - 1780.
Inhalt: Einleitung 11; Kap. VIII: Die rationalistischen Systeme 14. Das
Problem des Skeptizismus und seine Überwindung (14). - Descartes
(30). - Die cartesische Schule (47). - Der Streit um die mathematische
Methode (132). - Mathematische Logiker des 17. Jahrhunderts (143). -
Leibniz (170). - Mathematische Logiker des 18. Jahrhunderts (252). -
Psychophysik (290). Kap. IX: Die scholastische Logik des 17. und 18.
Jahrhunderts 294. Scotisten (297). - Jesuiten (315). - Thomisten (333). -
Scholastische Eklektiker (349). - Portugiesische und spanische Logiker
(378). Kap. X: Die Aristoteliker des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts 386.
Schulliteratur (388). - Lehrbücher (394). - Verfall des Aristotelismus
(405). Kap. XI: Rationalismus und Empirismus in England 418.
Rationalisten (420). - Empiristen (430). - Logiker (442). -
Erkenntnistheoretiker (459). - Schottische Schule (498). Kap. XII: Die
französische und deutsche Aufklärung 507. Französische Aufklärung
(512). - Deutsche Aufklärer der älteren Generation (553). - Wolff und
seine Schule (579). - Rüdiger, Crusius und ihre Schule (659). -
Eklektiker (706). - Popularphilosophie (721). Exemplarnachweis.
Sigelverzeichnis der Bibliotheken 735. Sachregister 737.
Personenregister 743.
Zur Logik Mit Angabe Ihrer Fundorte (1472-1800), Studien Und
Materialien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Volume I.
"No other branch of philosophy presently possesses a bibliography
quite so extensive and comprehensive as this one for logic, which is a
by-product, as the Vorwort explains, of Risse's systematic history of the
development of logic, Die Logilc der Neuzeit.
Volume 1 (1965, 293p.) lists in chronological arrangement monographs
published from 1472 to 1800. Volume 2 (1973, 494p.) does the same
for the period 1801-1969. Both volumes cite holding libraries (mainly
European but also some American) for most of the works listed.
Volume 3 (1979, 412p.) lists articles published both in periodicals and
in anthologies, arranged according to a detailed classification system
outlined in the front. Volume 4 (1979, 390p.) is a catalogue of 3,006
manuscripts, arranged by author if known and by title if anonymous,
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with separate sections for medieval and more recent manuscripts.
Holding libraries or archives are indicated.
All volumes are thoroughly indexed."
From: Hans E. Bynagle, Philosophy. A Guide to the Reference
Literature. Third Edition - Westport, Libraries Unlimited, 2006, pp.
724-725.
Zur Logik Mit Angabe Ihrer Fundorte (1801-1969), Studien Und
Materialien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Volume II.
———. 1979. Bibliographia Logica. Verzeichnis Der
Zeitschriftenartikel Zur Logik, Studien Und Materialien Zur Geschichte
Der Philosophie. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Volume III.
"Preface: The third volume of the "Bibliographia Logica" lists papers
on logic and the history of logic which have appeared in periodicals
and anthologies. The list is incomplete for two reasons: (1) Numerous
works were inaccessible to me, particularly earlier periodicals and
those published outside Germany; (2) applications of logic in other
disciplines are included only if logical themes are mentioned in the
titles.
The variety of themes and conceptions of logic led to an arrangement
of titles in three categories:
A: Logic ("traditional logic", "classical logic"), starting with Aristotle;
B: Logistics ("symbolic logic", "mathematical logic"), representations
of logic in the mathematical tradition and using mathematical means;
C: History of logic.
The criterion used in categorizing the individual titles is the theme dealt
with, not the point of view of the author.
The three categories are indicated by letters; sub - categories by
numbers. The arrangement of material is given in the table of contents
in German, English, and French (p. 9*). Titles of frequently quoted
periodicals are abbreviated (Table of symbols p. 401)."
———. 1979. Bibliographia Logica. Verzeichnis Der Handschriften
Zur Logik, Studien Und Materialien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie.
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Volume IV.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 1: Philosophia
Generalis. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
"In something of a tour de force, Risse has compiled a comprehensive
short-title bibliography that attempts to include all independently
published works of Western philosophy from the invention of printing,
ca. 1455, up to 1800, in (he carefully qualifies) all Western languages
accessible to him. This includes not only works of philosophers who
lived and wrote within the specified timeframe, but also editions of
philosophers from the ancient, medieval, and early Renaissance
periods. They amount to an estimated 76,400 titles. These are divided
over eight volumes of varying length, defined by a combination of
subject-field and genre categories (...)
Parts 1-7 are uniformly arranged chronologically by year of
publication, within each year alphabeticalfy by author. Each part
includes an author index, index of titles of anonymous works, index of
authors who are the subjects of others' commentaries, and a topical
index. Part 8, which lists printed academic theses in volumes 1-2, is
arranged alphabetically by author of the originaf thesis (disputatio),
regardless of publication year.
Under each thesis entry it lists, where applicable, published responses
to it by other writers. The latter are also indexed in volume 3 of Part 8
with references hack to the relevant entries in volumes 1 and 2.
The ninth volume, titled Syllabus auctorum, contains a complete author
index, with birth and death dates, places of birth and activity, and
profession (as available); a concordance of Latin and vernacular place
names; and a short list of abbreviations of monastic orders.
For nearly every entry in this bibliography Risse provides, besides the
customary bibliographic data, one or more location codes for holding
libraries where exemplars are available. These included numerical
codes for major German research libraries, alphabetical codes for some
350 additional libraries in Europe and America. As Risse notes, many
of the works listed are rare, and some were found only in "smaller"
libraries (preface). Those he has personally inspected are marked by an
asterisk."
From: Hans E. Bynagle - Philosophy. A guide to the reference
literature. Third edition - Westport, Libraries Unlimited, 2006, pp. 127-
1313
128.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 2: Logica.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 3: Metaphysica.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 4: Ethica Et
Politica. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 5: De Anima.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 6: Philosophia
Naturalis. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 7: Doxoscopia
(Geschichte Der Philosophie). Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 8: Theses
Academicae (Index Disputationum, Opera Anonyma, Index
Respondentium). Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Three volumes.
———. 1998. Bibliographia Philosophica Vetus. Pars 9: Syllabus
Auctorum. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
———. 1973. Metaphysik. Grundthemen and Probleme. München:
Fink.
Uni-Taschenbücher Nr. 253; 194 pages.
PAPERS
Risse, Wilhelm. 1960. "Die Entwicklung Der Dialektik Bei Petrus

Ramus." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie:36-72.
———. 1963. "Zur Vorgeschichte Der Cartesischen Methodenlehre."
———. 1965. Averroismo E Alessandrinismo Nella Logica Del
Rinascimento. Torino: Edizioni di Filosofia.
Translated by Enrico De Angelis (16 pages).
———. 1969. "Zur Klassifiezierung Der Urteile Und Schlüsse Durch
Leibniz." Studia Leibnitiana no. 1:23-53.
———. 1969. "Die Characteristica Universalis Bei Leibniz." Studi
Internazionali di Filosofia no. 1:107-116.
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———. 1983. "Zabarellas Methodenlehre." In Aristotelismo Veneto E
Scienza Moderna, edited by Olivieri, Luigi, 155-172. Padova:
Antenore.
EDITIONS
Rudolph, Agricola. 1976. De Inventione Dialectica Libri Tres.
Anastatic reprint of Köln's 1528 edition, with a preface by Wilhelm
Risse.
Collegii, Conimbricensis. 1976. Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis
E Societate Jesu in Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis. Hildesheim:
Georg Olms.
Anastatic reprint of the Köln's 1607 edition, with a preface by Wilhelm
Risse.
———. 1977. Complutenses Discalceati. Collegii Complutensis
Disputationes in Aristotelis Dialecticam Et Philosophiam Naturalem.
Anastatic reprint of the Leiden's 1668 edition with a preface by
Wilhelm Risse.
Joachim, Jungius. 1977. Logica Hamburgensis Additamenta.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Edited by Wilhelm Risse.
Petrus, Ramus. 1964. Dialecticae Institutiones: Aristotelicae
Animadversiones. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Anastatic reprint of Paris' 1543 edition, with an introduction by
Wilhelm Risse.
Saccherius, Hieronymus. 1980. Logica Demonstrativa. Hildesheim:
Georg Olms.
Anastatic reprint of Turin's 1697 edition with an introduction by
Wilhelm Risse.
Dominicus, de Soto. 1980. Summulae. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Anastatic reprint of Salamanca's 1554 edition by Wilhelm Risse.
———. 1982. In Dialecticam Aristotelis Commentaria. Hildesheim:
Georg Olms.
Anastatic reprint of the 1574 edition edited by Wilhelm Risse.
1315
Franciscus, Toletus. 1985. Opera Omnia Philosophica. Hildesheim:
Georg Olms.
Two volumes: I: Introductio in universam Aristotelis logicam; II:
Commentaria, una cum quaestionibus in universam Aristotelis logicam;
III: Commentaria, una cum quaestionibus in tres libros Aristotelis de
anima; IV: Commentaria, una cum quaestionibus in octo libros
Aristotelis de physica auscultatione; V: Commentaria in libros
Aristotelis de generatione et corruptione.
With an introduction by Wilhelm Risse.
Tschirnhaus, Ehrenfried Walter von 1964. Medicina Mentis Et
Corporis. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Anastatic reprint of Leipzig's 1695 edition, with am introduction by
Wilhelm Risse.
Zabarella, Jacobi. 1966. Opera Logica. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Anastatic reprint of Köln's 1597 edition, with an introduction by
Wilhelm Risse.
RELATED PAGES

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About This Site
History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel created January 5 2016, contains the
pages previously published under the section "History of Logic" in the
website Theory and History of Ontology; a mobile version (with a different
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GENERAL INDEX
Aristotle's Logic
Ancient Logic after Aristotle
History of Medieval Logic
History of Modern Logic
History of Contemporary Logic
Bibliographies of Historians of Logic
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Table of Contents

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HISTORY OF LOGIC FROM

Logic and Ontology from an Historical Perspective

General Works and Bibliographies on the History of Logic

The Logical Works of Aristotle

Aristotle's Logic: General Survey and Introductory Readings

Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Aristotle: General and

Aristotle's Earlier Dialectic: the Topics and Sophistical Refutations

Aristotle's De Interpretatione: Semantics and Philosophy of Language

Aristotle's Prior Analytics: the Theory of Categorical Syllogism

Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Categorical

Aristotle's Prior Analytics: the Theory of Modal Syllogism

Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Theory of Modal Syllogism

Aristotle's Posterior Analytics: The Theory of Demonstration

Selected Bibliography on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics

Ancient Logic after Aristotle

Peripatetic Logic: Eudemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus of Eresus

Selected Bibliography on the Logic of Eudemus and

History of Ancient Logic in the Hellenistic Period

Bibliography of Ancient Logic in the Hellenistic Period

The Dialectical School and the Origins of Propositional Logic

Selected Bibliography on the Dialectical School and the Origins

The Master Argument: The Sea Battle in De Intepretatione 9,

Logic in Ancient Stoicism

Critical Editions and Translations of the Fragments and Testimonia

The Stoic Doctrine of Lekta (Sayables)

Ancient Stoic Rhetoric (under construction)

Stoic Philosophy of Language and Grammar (under construction)

Selected Bibliography on Stoic Logic: A - E

Selected Bibliography on Stoic Logic: F - Z

Bibliography on Stoic Philosophy of Language, Grammar,

Early Stoic Logicians: Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus

Other Aspects of Ancient Logic

Critical Editions and Translations of the Philosophical Works of

Logic and Rhetoric in the Philosophical Works of Cicero

The Philosophical Works of Cicero. A Selected Bibliography

Sextus Empiricus and the Skeptical Criticism of Logic and Truth

Porphyry's Isagoge and his Commentary to Aristotle's

Boethius' Contribution to the Development of Medieval Logic

The Philosophical Works of Boethius. Editions and Translations

Selected Bibliography on the Logical Works of Boethius

The Development of Medieval Logic

General Bibliography on Medieval Logic:

Latin Logic until the Eleventh Century

Selected Bibliography on Latin Logic until the Eleventh Century

The Birth of the Liberal Arts: the Trivium (Grammar, Dialectic,

Logic and Grammar in the Twelfth Century

Selected Bibliography on the Twelfth Century

The Development of Logic in the Thirteenth Century

The Development of Logic in the Fourteenth Century

Selected Bibliography on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries

Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental Language

Bibliography on the Medieval Theories of Supposition and Mental

Abelard: Logic, Semantics, Ontology and His Theories of the Copula

Abelard's Logical Works: Editions, Translations, Selected Texts

I. Logic, Semantics and Ontology in the Work of Abelard

Bibliography on the Logic and Metaphysics of Peter Abelard: