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    De Roy vs. CA G.R. No. 80718

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    kai lumague
    1) The petitioners sought to nullify two resolutions from the Court of Appeals that denied their motion for an extension to file a motion for reconsideration and denied their actual motion for reconsideration as untimely filed. 2) The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the rule that the 15-day period to file an appeal or motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. 3) While there was a grace period to adjust to this rule ending in June 1986, the petitioners' motions in 1987 were long after the expiration of the grace period, so no relief could be provided.

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    De Roy vs. CA G.R. No. 80718

    Uploaded by

    kai lumague
    71 views4 pages
    1) The petitioners sought to nullify two resolutions from the Court of Appeals that denied their motion for an extension to file a motion for reconsideration and denied their actual motion for reconsideration as untimely filed. 2) The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the rule that the 15-day period to file an appeal or motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. 3) While there was a grace period to adjust to this rule ending in June 1986, the petitioners' motions in 1987 were long after the expiration of the grace period, so no relief could be provided.

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    De Roy vs. CA g.r. No. 80718

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    1) The petitioners sought to nullify two resolutions from the Court of Appeals that denied their motion for an extension to file a motion for reconsideration and denied their actual motion for reconsideration as untimely filed. 2) The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the rule that the 15-day period to file an appeal or motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. 3) While there was a grace period to adjust to this rule ending in June 1986, the petitioners' motions in 1987 were long after the expiration of the grace period, so no relief could be provided.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    71 views4 pages

    De Roy vs. CA G.R. No. 80718

    Uploaded by

    kai lumague
    1) The petitioners sought to nullify two resolutions from the Court of Appeals that denied their motion for an extension to file a motion for reconsideration and denied their actual motion for reconsideration as untimely filed. 2) The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the rule that the 15-day period to file an appeal or motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. 3) While there was a grace period to adjust to this rule ending in June 1986, the petitioners' motions in 1987 were long after the expiration of the grace period, so no relief could be provided.

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    of 4

    241 Phil.

    804

    THIRD DIVISION

    [ G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988 ]

    FELISA P. DE ROY AND VIRGILIO RAMOS, PETITIONERS,


    VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA
    BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL,
    NAMELY, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL AND LUIS BERNAL,
    SR., RESPONDENTS.

    RESOLUTION

    CORTES, J.:

    This special civil action for ​certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2)
    resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of ​Luis
    Bernal, Sr., et al., v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first
    resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
    extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
    judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second
    Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for
    having been filed out of time.

    At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being
    verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the
    instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and
    substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

    The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned
    by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of
    private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
    Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
    vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed
    to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
    Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment
    finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
    respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed ​in toto by the
    Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of which was
    received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of
    the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
    time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
    appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
    motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987, but this was denied in the
    Resolution of October 27, 1987.

    This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
    discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion
    for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for
    reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in ​Habaluyas Enterprises,
    Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the
    fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
    extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on
    May 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to
    wit:

    Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
    strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
    reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
    Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
    filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
    may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p.
    212)

    Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court,


    [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went
    further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
    Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986, 144
    SCRA 161], stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the
    operation of the grace period, to wit:

    In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May
    30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June
    30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new
    trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

    Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is
    still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be
    allowed.

    This grace period was also applied in ​Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R.
    No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].

    In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on
    September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on
    June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
    Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
    promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
    petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule
    for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

    Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the ​Habaluyas case should not be
    made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the ​Habaluyas
    decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of
    Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring
    the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can
    be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
    counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
    Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
    published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such
    publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
    This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
    discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article
    2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure
    is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should
    be due to the lack of necessary repairs."

    Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had
    the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to
    vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners' prior negligence should be
    disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance", which has been applied to
    vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

    WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant
    petition for lack of merit.

    Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano,​ and ​Bidin, JJ.,​ concur.

    Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: November 13, 2014

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