Lessons From Russias Operation in Crimea RAND - RR1498

C O R P O R AT I O N
Lessons from Russia’s

Operations in Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine
Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk,

Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, Jenny Oberholtzer
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Preface
This report is the third in a series about the impact and implications of
the Ukraine crisis on European security. This report examines covert
and conventional operations in Crimea in February and March 2014,
as well as the origins of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, its phases of
escalation, and the series of events that led to the outbreak of limited
conventional war between Russia and Ukraine in summer 2014. These
operations offer important insights into Russian approaches and objec-
tives in the conflict.
This report should be of interest to those concerned with Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
Research for this project was conducted from May 2015 to October
2015.
This research was sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) Office in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8,
Headquarters, Department of the Army, and was conducted within
RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program.
RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a feder-
ally funded research and development center sponsored by the United
States Army.
The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project
that produced this document is HQD146843.
iii
Contents
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures and Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER TWO
The Annexation of Crimea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
How Russia Annexed Crimea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Balance of Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A Chronology of Events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Russia’s Information Campaign.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Characteristics of the Crimean Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Russian-Crimean History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Geography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Russia’s Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . 18
Target of Opportunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Factors Enabling Russia’s Operational Successes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Force Composition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Mobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
v
vi Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower. . . . . . . . . 25
Preparing for Counterattack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Factors Contributing to Russia’s Operational Shortcomings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Turning Local Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Psychological Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Planning for Nonviolent Resistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Political Management of Local Elites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Information Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Conclusion: Implications and Effects.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
CHAPTER THREE
Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March–May 2014). . . 33
How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Chronology of Events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
The Ukrainian Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
The Information Campaign .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
The “Separatists”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Russia’s Possible Lessons Learned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Small Investments Yield Small Benefits.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Nonstate Actors Matter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters........65
Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Political Timing Is Important. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Russia’s Operational Shortcomings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Russia Was Ineffective at Inspiring Separatism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Poor Assumptions Guided Moscow’s Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Conclusion: Implications and Effects.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Contents vii
CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
APPENDIXES
A. Information Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
B. Timeline (February 18–May 31, 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Figures and Table
Figures
1.1. Map of Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Map of Crimea and Russian Operations, March 2014.. . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Map of Eastern Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2. Results of the 2010 Presidential Elections in Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3. Separatist Groups in the Army of Novorossiya.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Table
2.1. Themes of Russia’s Strategic Communication on Crimea. . . . . . . 14
ix
Summary
Russia sought to regain its influence over Ukraine and retake own-
ership of Crimea after the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych by pro-Western forces. This report examines the two over-
lapping operations to understand the Russian campaign in Ukraine
in early 2014. Events unfolded rapidly after the February 22, 2014,
ouster of Yanukovych, as Russia executed a covert operation using both
its naval infantry forces already in place and special forces lifted to
Crimea. Russia disguised troop movements with a snap exercise, which
also deployed a distraction force near Ukrainian borders. Leveraging
mobility, speed of action, surprise, and the capability to command
forces securely at the small-unit level, Russian troops quickly seized
control of the peninsula.
The circumstances of the Crimean annexation presented Russia
with substantial advantages, which have only partial analogues else-
where in former Soviet republics. These factors included the confined
geography of the peninsula, its proximity to Russia, and its existence
as a separate political unit within Ukraine. Russia not only had forces
in place at its Black Sea Fleet, but legitimate transit arrangements that
could be leveraged for a covert operation and the introduction of key
military capabilities. The invading force benefited from such practical
advantages, as well as from the historical legitimacy of Russian military
presence in the peninsula and a commonality of language and culture,
along with other social ties.
The Russian information campaign accompanying its military
movements was no more than a minor contributor to what proved to
xi
xii Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
be a conventional takeover. This effort was principally a by-product of

the general information campaign to convince the Russian domestic
audience that Ukraine’s interim government was the result of an ille-
gitimate coup. Moscow capitalized on several political errors of the
Ukrainian government. In particular, it leveraged the Ukrainian Par-
liament (Rada) vote repealing the official status of the Russian lan-
guage to argue that the ethnic Russian population in Crimea and East-
ern Ukraine was in imminent danger. The combination of Ukrainian
government errors and facilitating circumstances enabled a rapid and
well-coordinated deployment of Russian forces.
The Crimean experience is not easily generalized for future sce-
narios. Moscow deployed elite and special components of its force that
are not representative of overall capabilities. Additionally, Ukraine’s
overall superior forces on the peninsula offered no resistance. It is also
difficult to gauge the effectiveness, if any, of the information campaign.
Russia appeared unprepared to manage the political dimensions of the
annexation, and its information campaign in the aftermath of the sei-
zure of the peninsula consisted of a series of loosely connected mes-
sages rather than a carefully considered narrative. This suggests that
the decision to annex Crimea was not made well in advance. However,
operations in Crimea did involve a preplanned covert action, which
enabled a conventional invasion. The effort owed its success as much
to the operating environment and structural factors—including the
politically unstable situation in Ukraine—as to the Russian military’s
execution.
Russia’s operations in Eastern Ukraine were based on a decidedly
different approach and not intended to replicate the seizure of Crimea.
Immediately following Yanukovych’s ouster, Russia fostered an anti-
government movement in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk,
along with several major cities in other regions. Rather than introduc-
ing special operations forces to enable a conventional invasion, Moscow
launched a political-warfare campaign to subvert the authority of the
interim government. The objective was to first destabilize the situation
and, if possible, convince the new Ukrainian authorities to accept a
federalization scheme that would reduce their power nationwide and
allow Russia to have substantial influence over individual regions.
Summary xiii
A coterie of well-known local political agitators, businessmen,

and members of fringe political organizations with a Russian imperial-
ist bend led the initial effort. Moscow sought to foster this movement
in Ukraine through oligarchic connections and intertwined circles of
powerful regional business interests, combined with local criminal ele-
ments. The tactics appeared to be improvised, employing a diversity
of individuals with little in common other than their opposition to
Ukraine’s new government. Russia fostered this subversion with a sup-
porting cast of intelligence operatives, its own citizens, an informal
network of fighters from the post-Soviet space, and local security forces
who turned against Ukraine’s government.
When Ukrainian authorities responded by arresting the protest
movement leaders, the effort switched to direct action, spawning an
externally supported separatist insurgency. The conflict quickly esca-
lated, arguably beyond Moscow’s ability to control events, in April
2014, as ideologically minded Russian paramilitaries switched to using
force in pursuit of a separatist agenda. Within a few months, the con-
frontation went from a protest movement to irregular warfare and the
steady introduction of conventional capabilities by Russia as part of
a steady vertical escalation of the war. Oligarchs and other nonstate
actors helped shape the course of conflict, both facilitating and defend-
ing against the Russian effort to destabilize Ukraine. Ultimately, Russia
was unable to gain the leverage necessary to force Ukraine’s leaders into
major political concessions without resorting to a conventional inva-
sion with regular units, which took place in late August 2014.
Russia’s efforts in Eastern Ukraine proved to be a series of impro-
visations in response to resistance and friction when the initial political-
warfare effort foundered. A mix of actors with their own agendas and
sponsors reduced the operational cost and political consequences for
Moscow but at the price of control, coherency, and effectiveness. The
lessons of Eastern Ukraine are rather mixed, demonstrating the limits
of low-cost asymmetrical approaches even against a relatively weak
and vulnerable state. In the end, Russian leaders are likely to consider
Crimea an operation that could not be easily repeated elsewhere and
Eastern Ukraine to be a strategic success but an unsuccessful opera-
xiv Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
tion. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost
than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Timothy Muchmore for initiating

and supporting this project. We also thank Bryan Frederick, Niko-
las K. Gvosdev, and Stephen Watts for their helpful comments. A
number of other people also helped make this study possible, including
Olga Oliker, James Dobbins, and Stephanie Pezard. Our thanks go
to Andriy Bega, Scott Boston, Roger McDermott, and Gerard Toal,
whose insights and comments were greatly helpful, and to Clifford
Grammich, Thomas Browne, Stephanie Lonsinger, Linda Theung, and
Natalie Ziegler for providing editorial support. Any errors are solely
our responsibility.
xv
Abbreviations
APC armored personnel carrier

DDoS distributed denial of service
DNR Donetsk People’s Republic
EU European Union
FSB Federal Security Service (Russia)
GRU Russian military intelligence
KSO Special Operations Command (Russia)
MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSPU Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine
SBU Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny
(Ukrainian intelligence services)
SVR Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki
(Russian Foreign Intelligence Service)
VDV Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska
(Russian Federation Airborne Forces)
xvii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
In fall 2013, a series of popular protests erupted in Kyiv’s central square,

the Maidan, in response to the Ukrainian president’s decision not to
sign the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) under
its Eastern Partnership program. Eventually this protest movement,
and the government response, turned violent, resulting in the ousting
of then–Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. A pro-Western coali-
tion of political forces took control in the capital, organizing an interim
government, while many of the ruling elites fled the country to Russia.
The consequence was a sudden loss of influence for Russia in one of
its most important neighbors, one that its leadership likely viewed as a
major geopolitical defeat for Moscow.
Rather than wait for the political situation in Ukraine to stabilize,
Russian leaders sought to re-exert Moscow’s influence over Ukraine
and retain the ability to control the country’s strategic orientation. The
Russian response took shape in the form of two separate and concur-
rent military operations. First, Moscow chose to invade and annex
Crimea in late February through early March 2014. At the same time,
Russia fomented a political protest movement that quickly transformed
into a violent insurgency in Eastern Ukraine between February and
May of that year.
Today, more questions than answers remain about what hap-
pened and what lessons should be drawn from Russian actions: Was
Russia successful? If so, what did it seek to accomplish? Is it possible
to infer military and political objectives from the operations? Are these
reproducible events—a possible model of operations—or were the cir-
1
2 Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
cumstances and conditions unique? Would Russian leadership con-

sider them to be successful? What can we glean for the potential desire
of Moscow to replicate a similar course of events elsewhere? Did the
combat, social-mobilization, and information-warfare aspects of these
operations appear planned or improvised? What lessons about Russia’s
strategy and doctrine can we take away from the Ukrainian experience?
This report seeks to address these questions by assessing the two
campaigns waged by Russia in Ukraine (Figure 1.1), including its
covert and conventional operations. Chapter Two examines the bal-
ance of Ukrainian and Russian forces before the conflict, the sequence
of events during the invasion and annexation of Crimea, along with
the successes and shortcomings of the operation. In Chapter Three, the
report charts the course of conflict in Eastern Ukraine and its phases
of escalation from political warfare to a hybrid approach and the even-
tual outbreak of a conventional war between Russia and Ukraine by
summer 2014.1 These critical months are not only less understood
than later periods of the war but offer important insights into Russian
approaches and possible objectives in the conflict. Chapter Four pres-
ents our conclusions and derived implications from this analysis.
1 Hybrid warfare occurs when an adversary simultaneously and adaptively employs a mix
of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and possibly criminal behavior in the
pursuit of political objectives. See Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” Armed
Forces Journal, October 1, 2009. We use the term political warfare to describe the employ-
ment of political, economic, diplomatic, and information instruments of power in both overt
and covert ways to influence another country. Political-warfare tactics range from psycho-
logical warfare, propaganda, and incitement of the populace to the support of friendly ele-
ments inside the state. See George F. Kennan, “George F. Kennan on Organizing Political
Warfare,” April 30, 1948, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, obtained and
contributed to the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center
for Scholars by A. Ross Johnson, reproduced in the Wilson Center Digital Archive, undated.
Introduction 3
Figure 1.1
Map of Ukraine
RUSSIA
BELARUS
Kovel Shostka UKRAINE

Chernihiv
POLAND VOLYNSKA Chernobyl Nizhyn Konotop
OBLAST Korosten
Lutsk Rivne Romny Sumy
Novohrad- Pryluky
Volynskyi Brovary
Lviv Zhytomyr Kyiv Lubny Kharkiv

Berdychiv
Drohobych Poltava
Stryl Bila Tserkva Cherkasy Starobilsk
Ternopil
SLOVAKIA
Khmelnytskyi Izyum
Kalush Smila Kremenchuk
Uzhhorod Ivano-Frankivsk Vinnytsya Sloviansk
Lozova Kramatorsk Luhansk
Mukacheve Kamianets-Podilskyi Uman
Kolomyya Pavlohrad Kostyantynivka
AKARPATSKA Dniprodzerzhynsk Stakhanov
OBLAST Kirovohrad Dnipropetrovsk Horlivka Alchevsk
HUNGARY
Chernivtsi Zhovit Vody Yenakiieve Krosnyi
Donetsk Luch
Kryvyi Rih Makiyivka
Pervomaysk
ROMANIA Zaporizhzhia
Nikopol Marhanets
Mariupol
UKRAINE MOLDOVA
Mykolayiv Melitopol
Nova Kakhovka
National capital Odessa Berdyansk
Oblast center or capital Kherson
of Autonomous Republic Sea of Azov
of Crimea RUSSIA
Dzhankoy
Ketch
City, town Izmayil AUTONOMOUS
Reni REP. OF CRIMEA
International boundary Yevpatoriya Simferopol
Feodosiya
Oblast boundary
Sevastopol
Oblast names are the same as Yalta 0 50 100 Miles
their respective centers except Black Sea
where labeled. 0 50 100 KM
BULGARIA
RAND RR1498-1.1
CHAPTER TWO
The Annexation of Crimea
How Russia Annexed Crimea
This chapter looks at Russia’s operation to annex Crimea. We begin

with the basic question of what happened. The chapter provides a con-
cise chronology of the events that took place during the Russian inva-
sion and then delves into analysis of the Russian successes and fail-
ures during the operation. What follows is an exploration and an effort
to discern what broader takeaways can be made from the Ukrainian
experience for other countries. We discuss the important factors that
enabled—or hindered—Russia’s invasion of the peninsula. At the end
of this chapter, we address whether the annexation of Crimea should be
considered as a potential model for Russian military action elsewhere
and what it might tell us about the military capabilities of Russia’s
armed forces.
The Balance of Forces

According to a credible source, at the onset of its conflict with Russia,
Ukraine kept a force of roughly 18,800 personnel stationed in Crimea,
most of which were in its navy.1 However, in February, Ukraine’s
interim defense minister assessed this number as closer to 15,000 troops.
1 “Ukraine Troops Leave Crimea by Busload; Defense Minister Resigns After Russia Seizes
Peninsula,” CBS News, March 25, 2014; “Transcript of a Secret Meeting of the National
Security Council February 28, 2014 [Стенограмма секретного заседания СНБО 28
февраля 2014 года],” ECHOMSK blog, February 23, 2016. This reference is the Russian-
language version of Ukraine’s declassified National Security Council meeting on February
28, 2014, to discuss the response to Russian military activity in Crimea.
5
This force included 41 tanks, 160 infantry fighting vehicles, 47 artil-

lery systems, and heavy mortars.2 The navy’s coastal defense troops
included a missile artillery brigade, two independent marine battal-
ions, and a coastal defense brigade.
Other Ukrainian assets in Crimea were not as potent. Most of
Ukraine’s air force units were in disrepair. Of the 45 MiG-29 fighters
at Belbek airbase near Sevastopol in southwest Crimea, only four to
six were operational.3 Ukrainian air defenses included Buk-M1 and
S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, which were at questionable
readiness levels but could still be potent deterrents. A contingent of
2,500 Ministry of the Interior troops was also present, although they
perhaps had little defense value. During national leadership meetings
in February, Ukraine’s minister of defense considered approximately
1,500–2,000 troops as dependable and willing to follow if ordered to
fight the Russian military.4
Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel in the Black Sea
Fleet at the time, the only infantry unit of which was the 810th Inde-
pendent Naval Infantry Brigade. The Russian Naval Infantry was
staffed by contract troops, who are better trained, paid, and equipped
than typical conscript units. In terms of numbers and available fire-
power, these forces were inferior to Ukraine’s units in Crimea, lacking
infantry fighting vehicles, armor, or artillery. However, the terms of
Russia’s basing agreement with Ukraine offered substantial leeway to
transfer in units from the mainland if needed, offering a large upload
capacity.
A Chronology of Events
Ukrainian and Russian units went on alert on February 20, 2014, as
Maidan protests in Kyiv escalated into violent clashes with government
security forces. Russian operations in Crimea effectively began on
2 Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in
Ukraine, Minneapolis, Minn.: Eastview Press, 2014.
3 Howard and Pukhov, 2014.
4 “Transcript of a Secret Meeting of the National Security Council February 28, 2014
[Стенограмма секретного заседания СНБО 28 февраля 2014 года],” 2016.
The Annexation of Crimea 7
February 22 and 23, as battalions of Spetsnaz (elite infantry) units and

Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska (Airborne Forces or VDV) left their
bases, while others were airlifted close to the strait separating Russia
from Crimea. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of Russian operations in
Crimea through March 9.
On February 24, the city council in Sevastopol installed a Rus-
sian citizen as mayor, and several units from the 810th Naval Infantry
arrived in the city square in armored personnel carriers (APCs), in vio-
lation of the rules governing basing arrangements in Crimea.5 This was
the first tangible sign that Russia had decided to intervene militarily
to change the political order on the peninsula. On February 25, the
Nikolai Filchenkov, an Alligator-class landing ship carrying 200 Rus-
Figure 2.1
Map of Crimea and Russian Operations, March 2014
UKRAINE NORTH OF CRIMEA
Armyansk Chonhar March 8. Russian troops arrive and

start installing boundary pillars.
March 1. Russian armored
vehicles arrive and start March 3.
digging trenches. March 1. Russian troops take
Russian Dzhankoy control of Kerch ferry port; Kerch
troops Ukrainian military unit
Chornomorske take airfield.
A
surrounded. YS
SSI
March 9. Russian troops VO

CON
SIAN
RU
capture missile depot. RUS

CRIMEA
Novoozerne
Feodosiya
March 1. Russian
warship blocks port.
Simferopol Ukrainian base
Russian warships blockade Feb. 27. Masked gunmen
Ukrainian warships. seize government buildings. beseiged.
March 6. Parliament votes for
independence; sets referendum.
Sevastopol
Yalta
Feb. 24. Russian armored
Feb. 25.
vehicles move out of
Russian troops arrive.
Russian bases.
RAND RR1498-2.1
5 Howard Amos, “Ukraine: Sevastopol Installs Pro-Russian Mayor as Separatism Fears

Grow,” Guardian, February 25, 2014.
sian special operations forces (likely Special Operations Command,

Russia [KSO]),6 arrived in Sevastopol. In addition to bringing special-
operations forces units that would subsequently be used in the covert
takeover of Crimea, it also may have later evacuated Yanukovych.7
On February 26, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a
snap inspection involving 150,000 troops from parts of the Western
and Central Military District.8 A drill of this scale was not unusual.
The new minister of defense, Sergei Shoigu, had been frequently order-
ing large snap readiness checks and simultaneous drills since 2013.
This exercise, however, was used specifically as a diversion and cover
for troop movements. Ostensibly, the exercise was not focused on
Ukraine’s borders but to move VDV and Spetsnaz troops northward in
Russia. Roughly 40 Ilyushin Il-76 military transports left Ulyanovsk
airbase in Russia, with a large portion of these moving units to Anapa,
a staging area just east of Crimea.
On February 27, 50 special-forces operators from the KSO unit
pretending to be a local “self-defense militia” seized the Crimean Par-
liament and raised a Russian flag over the building.9 Another large
landing ship with 300 Russian soldiers arrived following proper border
procedures to enter Ukraine but without advance notice to Ukrainian
authorities as stipulated in agreements. Later that night, Russian sol-
6 In early 2012, Russia formed a new special-forces unit called KSO. This is a small unit
modeled closer to Delta Force in the United States, designed to operate independently and
abroad. By contrast, the Spetsnaz are military reconnaissance and saboteur units intended to
operate alongside conventional formations and more representative of elite infantry.
8 Niklas Granholm, Gudrun Persson, Johannes Malminen, Jakob Hedenskog, Carolina
Vendil Pallin, Anna Sundberg, Johan Eellend, Johan Norberg, Carina Lamont, Tomas
Malmlöf, Mike Winnerstig, Kaan Korkmaz, Märta Carlsson, Mikael Eriksson, Niklas Ross-
bach, Susanne Oxenstierna, Bengt-Göran Bergstrand, Ulrik Franke, John Rydqvist, Erika
Holmquist, and Fredrik Westerlund, A Rude Awakening. Ramifications of Russian Aggres-
sion Towards Ukraine, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI-R-3892, June 16,
2014.
9 Video of the entry and seizure of the Crimean Parliament by Russian special forces was
recorded by the building closed-circuit television cameras at the entrance. Their entry is vis-
ibly facilitated by the local police. Euromaidan PR, “Ukraine War: Russian Special Forces
Seize Parliament Building in Crimea Ukraine,” August 16, 2014.
diers without markings surrounded Belbek Air Base. On the morning

of February 28, a convoy of three Mi-8 transport helicopters and eight
Mi-35M attack helicopters crossed into Ukraine without permission,
giving Russia the ability to neutralize Ukrainian armor and operate at
night.10 Ukraine scrambled fighters, deterring further helicopter units
from transferring, but the Mi-35s already were operating openly over
Crimea and supporting Russian forces on the ground.
In sum, Russian movements of late February 2014 effectively
boxed in Ukraine forces, even though Russian capabilities were
limited to one incomplete naval infantry brigade and several hundred
special-forces operatives. On February 28, Russian forces also seized
Simferopol airport, canceled all flights, and began airlifting VDV
units into Crimea. Still at a distinct numerical disadvantage, on March
1–2, Russia brought reinforcements by heavy landing ships. These
units spread across the peninsula without much resistance, quickly
encircling or taking over bases and military facilities. Armed with light
utility vehicles and APCs, the Russian units had little firepower but
high mobility.
Ukraine saw its docked fleet blockaded by Russian ships; the com-
mander of its navy, Denis Berezovsky, defected to Russia.11 Russia had
hoped this would prompt further defections, but it did not. Instead,
Russian forces made ad hoc arrangements with trapped Ukrainian
troops at bases across the peninsula to maintain the siege without
violence. Russian troops applied heavy psychological pressure, propa-
ganda, and promises to Ukrainian commanders to get them to defect,
with little success until after the annexation in March.12
From March 6 on, Russia began a conventional troop buildup
over the Kerch ferry crossing in eastern Crimea, bringing in units from

11
Of these, mostly smaller support vessels were operational. Ukraine’s only major surface
combatant, a Krivak-class frigate, was away at the time and not in the Black Sea.
12 Large numbers of enlisted and officers either switched sides or resigned their commission
and stayed in Crimea after the official annexation was complete. These included some high-
profile commanders and unit members who managed to escape Crimea with their equipment
but subsequently returned.
motor rifle brigades, towed artillery, a variety of air-defense units, and

antiship missile batteries. The Russian military also began to mass
units on Ukraine’s eastern border as a threat and diversion. Russian
forces sealed Crimea off from mainland Ukraine at its northern cross-
ing points. They severed landline communications between the Ukrai-
nian mainland and bases on Crimea; supposedly, in some areas, cell-
phone signals were jammed, possibly from ship-based equipment.13
Russian soldiers also cut electricity to some bases to apply pressure on
the besieged Ukrainian troops within.
In brief, Ukraine had lost effective command and control over
its units on the peninsula roughly one week into the operation. Rus-
sian intelligence also used this time to organize self-defense units con-
sisting of local militia,14 Cossacks (a distinct cultural group of East
Slavic people common to the region), and former special police called
Berkut.15 Russian airborne troops also donned police uniforms to help
keep order among the population under the pretense of being local
security forces.
Crimea’s local leadership likely did not coordinate with the
Kremlin, and the lack of integration was evident in the scheduling of a
plebiscite on Crimea’s fate. The Crimean Parliament initially declared
a referendum on independence for May 25, then moved it to March
30, before finally deciding on March 6 to hold the vote on March
16. As the likelihood of its operation’s success increased, without any
apparent resistance or evidence of counterattack by Ukrainian forces,
Moscow sought an earlier referendum date, moving up the timetables
for annexation. Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, who would help lead the insur-
gency in Eastern Ukraine, later recounted that local officials were not
13 Shane Harris, “Hack Attack,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2014.

14 Roger N. McDermott, Brothers Disunited: Russia’s Use of Military Power in Ukraine, Fort
Leavenworth, Kan.: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015.
15
Berkut were a special unit within Ukraine’s police force under the Ministry of Interior.
They were responsible for much of the fighting on the Maidan and, allegedly, for deaths
among civilians. The interim government disbanded Berkut; many former “Berkuts” then
came to Crimea and the Donbas to join the separatist cause.
enthusiastic participants in the events but had to be rounded up by

paramilitaries to hold the official vote on accession to Russia.16
The political process to hold a referendum appeared to be hastily
organized and improvised. Indeed, there were two votes: one to leave
Ukraine, which was necessary for Crimea to become an independent
polity, and a final referendum to accede to the Russian Federation.
Russia may have considered turning Crimea into a frozen conflict (i.e.,
bringing about a cessation of active conflict without a change in political
status) before the Crimean Parliament voted to secede from Ukraine.17
The March 16 referendum would become the political instrument to
annex the peninsula, a process that concluded on March 18.
Russia annexed Ukraine with no direct Russian casualties. There
were perhaps six associated deaths, including from interactions among
opposing groups, such as when, on March 19, a vigilante shot a Ukrai-
nian warrant officer and a Russian Cossack during negotiations out-
side a base. From March 19 to March 25, Russian forces seized Ukrai-
nian bases in Crimea, most of which offered no resistance. Moscow
promised to honor the rank of and provide better pay and benefits to
any Crimea-based Ukrainian soldiers who defected and accepted Rus-
sian citizenship. Most did so, in large part because they were stationed
near families and homes on the peninsula.18 Ukraine’s defense minis-
ter was subsequently forced to resign, announcing that, out of 18,000
soldiers and families, only 6,500 chose to leave for Ukraine proper.19
Even among those who left, such as the 10th Naval Aviation Brigade,
16 “Girkin: ‘Militia’ Pressured Crimean Deputies into the Auditorium for Voting [Гиркин:
«Ополченцы» сгоняли крымских депутатов в зал для голосования],” Krymr.org,
January 24, 2015.
17
Michael B. Kelley, “Crimean Parliament Votes Unanimously to Become Part of Russia,”
Business Insider/Military and Defense, March 6, 2014.
18 Officers in Ukraine and Russia are provided with apartments, which are often in short
supply. More than likely, any officer that left Crimea could expect to have housing difficulty,
since Ukraine lacked the apartments and funds to address the displaced.
19 “Ukraine Troops Leave Crimea by Busload; Defense Minister Resigns After Russia Seizes
Peninsula,” 2014.
some soldiers later resigned and returned to Crimea.20 By March 26,

the annexation was essentially complete, and Russia began returning
seized military hardware to Ukraine.21
Russia’s Information Campaign

An information campaign preceded, accompanied, and followed
Russian military operations in Crimea. Its primary audience was the
Russian public at home, with Crimean residents as a secondary con-
sideration. The Russian media always maintained some coverage on
events in Crimea for its own domestic public, but this intensified as the
clashes between the pro-government forces and the protesters in Kyiv
grew more violent. The Maidan protest movement, which began in
November 2013, had animated Russia’s already-intense manipulation
of information aimed at its own citizens, warning them of the dangers
of closer ties with the EU. Its campaign included subsuming or push-
ing to the margins the few remaining domestic independent media
outlets, thereby gaining further control and power to shape views in
Russia of the events in Ukraine.22 Existing government outlets, such as
RIA Novosti and Voice of Russia, were consolidated into Russia Today,
now known as RT.23
At the time, most of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea watched Rus-
sian television and, typical of the former Soviet space, the overwhelm-
ing majority of the population received their news from televised
20 bmpd (user), “The Defection Of Ukrainian Navy Troops Into the Russian Armed Forces
After Leaving Crimea [Переход военнослужащих ВМС Украины в Вооруженные
Силы России после оставления Крыма],” Livejournal blog, March 5, 2016.
21 The process of returning Ukrainian military equipment was halted when Kyiv launched
the Anti-Terrorist Operation in Eastern Ukraine later that year. However, Russia did return
a large portion of Ukraine’s aviation and naval assets because most of it was not serviceable.
Russia did keep a handful of operational ships, adding them to its Black Sea Fleet. “Russia
Will Give Ukraine the Military Equipment from Crimea [Россия передаст Украине
военную технику из Крыма],” RG.RU, March 28, 2014.
22
Olga Oliker, Christopher S. Chivvis, Keith Crane, Olesya Tkacheva, and Scott Boston,
Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context: A Reassessment, Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, PE-144-A, September 2015.
23 Stephen Ennis, “Putin’s RIA Novosti Revamp Prompts Propaganda Fears,” BBC Monitor-
ing, December 9, 2013.
media. Ukraine had largely ceded Russian-language information to

Russian-based outlets since its independence from the Soviet Union in
1991, particularly in Crimea. While Moscow did not officially promote
Russian media in Ukraine, Russian media markets were so much larger
than Russian-language markets in Ukraine that their information
and entertainment channels were dominant among Russian-speaking
Ukrainians. Russian forces turned off nine Ukrainian television chan-
nels on March 9, leaving access to Russian channels only.24 Channels
from Ukraine remained accessible via satellite receivers.
When the Yanukovych government collapsed in early 2014, Rus-
sian rhetoric on the events in Ukraine became more severe. Russian
media typically referred to Ukraine’s interim government and the pro-
test movement that brought it about as a “fascist junta.” There were
three goals to Russia’s information campaign during the operation to
seize Crimea: discrediting the new government in Ukraine, emphasiz-
ing the grave danger to Russians in Ukraine, and ensuring the display
of broad support for Crimea’s “return home” to the safety of Russia.
Table 2.1, based on additional RAND research, summarizes strategic
themes of Russian messaging on Ukraine.
On February 26, Russia began aggressively promoting its mes-
sage that regime change in Ukraine was illegitimate. That day was one
day prior to the Russian military takeover of government buildings
in Crimea. This message was advanced by several Russian figures and
elites; for example, Sergei Mironov, leader of Russian political party
Spravedlivaya Rossiya, on the Russia 24 news channel,25 and Ramzan
Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic, on the LifeNews channel 26
contended that Russians were under threat in Crimea and required
protection and that Russia needed to act to secure their safety. The
message was straightforward: “[N]ationalists and fascists took power
24
“How the Audience of Ukrainian TV Channels Changed in Crimea [Як змінився
перегляд українських телеканалів у Криму],” Forbes, April 2, 2014.
25 “Mironov: Russia Must Protect Russians in Crimea,” vesti.ru, February 26, 2014.
26 “Ramzan Kadyrov: Russia Will Not Give Ukraine into the Hands of the Bandits [Рамзан
Кадыров: Россия не позволит отдать Украину в руки бандитам],” LifeNews, Febru-
ary, 26, 2014.
Table 2.1
Themes of Russia’s Strategic Communication on Crimea
On the Ukrainian On the Role of Western

General Themes Government Countries
• The Crimean land • The Ukrainian gov- • Western countries,

historically belonged ernment acts in and especially the
to Russia. the interests of the United States, are the
• The transfer of Crimea United States and core orchestrators of
to Ukraine in 1954 was other foreign powers. the events in Ukraine.
a historical mistake of • The Maidan move- • The primary U.S.
the Soviet period. ment is over- motivation is the
• Ethnic Russian and all run by (violent) expansion of the
Russian-speaking popu- ultra-nationalists. North Atlantic Treaty
lations in Crimea were • Ukraine’s president Organization (NATO)
under imminent ultra- was overthrown in and containing
nationalist threat. an illegitimate coup Russia.
• Russia was not involved d’état, backed by the • The United States is
in events in Crimea. West. pressuring Europe
• The March 16 referen- • The pro-European to impose sanctions
dum on independence population of against Russia and is
was legitimate, demon- Ukraine are ideologi- the driving force of a
strating the will of the cal descendants of policy of containment
people of Crimea. Nazi supporters and against Moscow.
• Ukrainian soldiers fascists. • Russian policy is not a
voluntarily gave up departure from previ-
their weapons and ous Western interven-
pronounced their alle- tions to change bor-
giance to Russia. ders and create new
political entities, such
as in Kosovo.
NOTE: Based on RAND research into the Russian information campaign led by one of
the authors in 2015. See Appendix A for a more detailed analysis of the themes and
tools used in Russia’s strategic-communication campaign.
in Kyiv, they will force Russians to abandon the Russian language and
present a general threat.”27
At a March 4 press conference, Putin said that his country had
no plans to annex Crimea and that there were no Russian soldiers on
Crimean soil. Such claims were part of the official campaign of public
denial; this, after all, intended to be a covert takeover. Putin claimed
that the dismay of Western powers over the situation was utterly hypo-
27 “Mironov: Russia Must Protect Russians in Crimea,” 2014; and “Ramzan Kadyrov:
Russia Will Not Give Ukraine into the Hands of the Bandits [Рамзан Кадыров: Россия
не позволит отдать Украину в руки бандитам],” 2014.
critical and if Crimea were to return to Russia, it would not violate any
norms or create new precedents. Putin further claimed that Russia was
not planning to invade Ukraine, but the country might be forced to
intervene if the situation of Russians in Ukraine worsened. This was
a veiled threat, given the large amount of Russian forces arrayed near
Ukrainian borders. He also claimed that the snap military exercises on
Ukraine’s border were planned long ago and had nothing to do with
the ongoing events.28
In addition to traditional media, a seemingly grassroots mobi-
lization campaign in Crimea to counter the Maidan movement also
played a role in Russia’s strategic communications. This campaign
originated from the Russian-speaking population of Crimea, although
some alleged the Russian government was behind it.29 A movement
called Stop Maidan emerged in Simferopol. Its message relied on visual
outdoor ads—tents with logos, in addition to banners saying “no to
extremism” and “no to foreign intervention.” The messages used by the
anti-Maidan activists in Crimea resonated with Russian-media state-
ments depicting Maidan protests as foreign organized and Maidan
participants as fascist extremists.30 The movement also used direct calls
28
“Anti-Constitutional Coup and Seizure of Power—President Gave an Assessment of
What Happened in Kiev [Антиконституционный переворот и захват власти—
Президент РФ дал оценку тому, что произошло в Киеве],” Channel One [Смотрите
оригинал материала на], March 4, 2014.
29 Allison Quinn, “Why Moscow’s Anti-Maidan Protesters Are Putting on an Elaborate
Pretence,” Guardian, February 26, 2015.
30 “In Simferopol, the Activists of the ‘STOP Maidan’ Collect Signatures for Greater Auton-
omy of Powers [В Симферополе активисты «СТОП Майдан» собирают подписи
за расширение полномочий автономии],” Arguments of the Week, February 13, 2014;
“Flier distributed in Crimea,” February 1, 2015, noted:
Your neighbor, Aleksandra Dvoretskaya—the traitor of Crimea, supports criminal
Maidan. The blood and lives of those killed are on her consciousness. She receives
money from an American secret services funded organization and had received
training in extremism in the USA [Ваша соседка Александра Дворецкая—
предательница Крыма, поддерживает преступный Майдан. На ее
совести кровь и жизни убитых людей. Получает деньги в общественной
организации, финансируемой американскими спецслужбами, Прошла
обучение экстремизму в США].
to action, suggesting people sign a government petition and demand

greater autonomy in Crimea.
Characteristics of the Crimean Operation
Russian operations in Crimea represented, by all accounts, an efficient

seizure of territory from another state executed with speed and com-
petency. However, the lack of resistance on the Ukrainian side pres-
ents important caveats to that assessment. The next section discusses
noteworthy structural conditions, decisions, and variables that enabled
Russian success or became a hindrance. We consider such aspects as
history, geography, language, and social factors, along with existing
military agreements, forces in place, and decisions made by Ukrainian
authorities during the crisis.
Russian-Crimean History
Invasion and annexation are significantly easier if the invading force
is perceived to be friendly and legitimate. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was
historically based in Crimea; therefore, much of the population viewed
its personnel as a friendly force. Crimea was distinct in that militaries
belonging to two different states were based there. Both were viewed
as legitimate by the population, their presence historically valid. Nikita
Khrushchev and the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union transferred
Crimea from under the government of the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic to the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic in 1954. As both republics were a part of the Soviet Union,
the move was largely symbolic and of little practical consequence.
Because of its large Russian population, Crimea’s links with Russia
have remained very important,31 and Russia’s military on the peninsula
represented a bond to Russians on the mainland and was perceived to
be an important part of the economy. Furthermore, the Crimeans had
fewer economic reasons to fear or protest annexation, as incomes, sala-
31 Calamur Krishnadev, “Crimea: A Gift to Ukraine Becomes a Political Flash Point,” NPR,
February 27, 2014.
ries, and pensions were substantially higher in Russia than in Ukraine.

According to the World Bank, the gross domestic product per capita
in Ukraine in 2014 was $3,082.50, compared with $12,735.90 in Rus-
sia.32 The history, identity, and economic links of Crimea to Russia
were structural factors, reducing the likelihood of popular resistance
and contributing to the ease of Russia’s operation.
Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea

Russian troops and intelligence operatives shared the language, culture,
and ethnicity of most Crimeans, giving them advantages as an invad-
ing force. Russian agents were able to blend readily among Crimeans to
organize or coordinate self-defense units. Paratroopers could pretend
to be police or interior troops and conduct riot control against pro-
testers. In short, the common language and culture allowed Russian
forces to rapidly insert themselves into the operating environment and
take control of the peninsula. Furthermore, the Russian military could
readily communicate with sympathetic elements of the population to
facilitate the takeover.
Geography
Given its geography as a peninsula, Crimea was easy to seal from
the mainland. A rather low number of nodes was required for con-
trol, and it was relatively simple to defend from counterattack. Russia
was also easily able to sever communications between Crimea and the
mainland. Crimea was a well-defined administrative entity, with its
own polity and history, including some degree of political autonomy,
allowing it to be neatly separated from Ukraine as an annexed terri-
tory. Crimea was closest to Russia’s Southern Military District, which
had the highest state of readiness among Russian forces, manned at
90 percent, according to some estimates.33 Russia probably could not
32
Figures provided by the World Bank: “GDP per Capita (Current US$),” World Bank,
undated.
33 Jakob Hedenskog and Carolina Vendil Pallin, eds., Russian Military Capability in a Ten-
Year Perspective—2013, Kista, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R-3734-SE,
December 2013.
have mounted such an operation on the same time table against a region
abutting its Far East or even its Central Districts, where distances are
much larger and force readiness levels lower.
Circumstances conspired against Ukraine because the Southern
Military District was already on high readiness given that Russia was
hosting the Olympic Games in Sochi in February and March 2014.
The proximity of Crimea to a well-staffed and high-readiness concen-
tration of Russian forces allowed for a rapid military buildup once the
airborne, naval infantry, and special forces took initial control. Ukraine
effectively lost all prospects for a counterattack when regular ground
units began pouring into the peninsula. Finally, Crimea’s small size
relative to Ukraine (the largest country in Europe) made the Russian
annexation much more feasible.34
Russia’s Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine

Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was a leading and supporting
asset for the operation, with antiair and antinaval capabilities. The
naval base at Sevastopol allowed Russian military units to deploy early
in operations and provided the logistics for inserting special forces and
reinforcements. In addition to Crimea, Russia has four other bases
with independent brigades in former Soviet republics: the 102nd Mili-
tary Base in Armenia, the 4th in South Ossetia, the 7th in Abkhazia,
and the 201st in Tajikistan.35 Russia also maintains several bases in
Syria, the most prominent of which are the Tartus naval facility and
Hmeymim Air Base near Latakia, with a contingent of roughly 4,000–
5,000 personnel at both bases.
Russia had transit agreements with Ukraine that allowed it to
deploy personnel and materiel to Crimea before and during the mili-
tary operation. There was a sizeable troop limit in the basing agree-
ment, which gave Russia capacity to increase its military presence while
still being within the terms of its deal with Ukraine. Early in the crisis,
34 We must consider that Russia took control of roughly 2 million people with just a few
thousand troops. Retaining control of 3.5 million in Eastern Ukraine would prove far more
difficult.
35 Granholm et al., 2014.
Ukraine’s interim government was surprised to discover its relative

helplessness at preventing Russian reinforcements from arriving, given
the logistics and agreements in place.36 This permitted Russia to insert
special forces without initially drawing alarm and introducing the
necessary capabilities to conduct the operation. Similarly, Russia has
agreements for military forces to transit to its exclave in Kaliningrad
through Lithuania. It also had a transit agreement through Ukraine
for its forces in Transnistria (Moldova), although Kyiv unilaterally can-
celed this deal on May 21, 2015.
Target of Opportunity
Ukraine’s government was in transition following the ouster of Yanu-
kovych. As a result, it did not react to the Russian operation when
launched. Russia’s task was made relatively easy by the confusion and
chaos that generally follows an uprising, such as what happened in
Kyiv. Moscow capitalized on the tensions and uncertainty in Crimea,
as well as on the inexperience of Ukraine’s provisional government.
Meeting notes of the discussion among Ukrainian leadership reveal a
great deal of anxiety, uncertainty, and unwillingness to take action for
fear of escalation.37 It is unclear if any action would have been success-
ful, as Ukraine’s head of intelligence services (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukray-
iny [SBU]) reported during a decisive meeting that the military and
security forces were demoralized and not receptive to the interim gov-
ernment.38 Not only was Kyiv doubtful of their loyalty, but the situa-
tion was assessed to be particularly dire among the navy stationed in
Crimea, which central authorities believed could defect.39
36
“Transcript of a Secret Meeting of the National Security Council February 28, 2014
37
38
39
Russia also had the element of complete surprise, something it

will not likely have should similar opportunities present themselves
among its now-wary neighbors. However, there is a host of former
Soviet republics surrounding Russia today with aging autocratic lead-
ers. These include Belarus, Uzbekistan,40 and Kazakhstan. Each of
these is set for an uncertain transition in the near to medium term,
while others, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have experienced
political instability and crisis in their recent past.
Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success

Ukraine’s political leadership made several important errors follow-
ing the victory of the Maidan revolution in Kyiv, all of which played
decisively to Russia’s favor. These errors also provide lessons for under-
standing where Russia will be able to capitalize in its operations.
The first error occurred when the Ukrainian Parliament, the
Rada, pursued nationalist projects following the ouster of Yanukovych.
On February 23, the Rada repealed legislation that had given the Rus-
sian language official status and protection. The vote even drew criti-
cism from Poland’s foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski (a staunch
supporter of the Maidan), who said that the new government should
instead “signal very eloquently to the ethnic minorities in Ukraine that
they are welcome in Ukraine; that they are going to be part of the
new Ukraine.”41 The interim president, Oleksandr Turchynov, chose
not to sign the changed law, but its legislative passage had caused great
damage. The Russian-speaking public saw it as the hallmark of an anti-
Russian agenda. It would come as no surprise later when minister of
the interior Arseny Avakov assessed in closed-door discussions that the
majority of Crimeans were taking the Russian side against Ukraine’s
national government.42
40 Theleader of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, died on September 2, 2016, as this report was
going through final editing before the publication.
41 Palash Ghosh, “Watch Your Tongue: Language Controversy One of Fundamental Con-
flicts in Ukraine,” International Business Times, March 3, 2014.
42 “Transcript
of a Secret Meeting of the National Security Council February 28, 2014
The second error occurred on February 24, when Igor Mosi-

ichuk, a leader of Right Sector, a far-right political party and para-
military group in Ukraine, publicly threatened to bring paramilitary
fighters to Crimea. Russian-language media used Mosiichuk’s state-
ments to convey a sense of imminent danger for those living in Crimea.
Crimean Berkut riot-police officers, reinforced with Kuban Cossacks,
who reside in parts of Russia near the Black Sea, set up checkpoints
under the guise of responding to a potential right-wing threat. Clashes
between Crimean Tatars and Russian nationalists, protests for seces-
sion from Ukraine, and counterprotests for unity ensued, leading to a
general state of chaos and disorganization and facilitating Russia’s take
over. While Right Sector did not, per se, speak for the government, the
inability of the government to control postrevolutionary forces played
into Russia’s narrative that locals were in imminent danger. In effect,
this validated the need for Russian help in Crimea and the legitimacy
of Russia’s intervention to its domestic audience.
The third error occurred on February 25, when Ukraine’s minis-
ter of interior disbanded the Crimean Berkut riot police returning to
Sevastopol after suppressing protests in Kyiv. Specifically, the central
government first sent the unit back to Crimea and then disbanded it.
This was a humiliation for the security forces, which believed they were
carrying out their duties as ordered, and forced them to search for new
employment. Upon their return to Sevastopol, these units were greeted
as heroes by the people and issued Russian passports by Moscow.
They defected to the Russian side and provided auxiliary units in early
operations, when Russia was short on manpower. Some participated
in further operations in paramilitary units, which left Crimea for the
Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine to fight on behalf of the Russian
government.43 The decision to fire the Russian-speaking Berkut contin-
ues to haunt Ukraine’s government, as many continue to fight with the
separatists.44 The first two of these errors sowed fear and discord among
43 Alec Luhn, “Pro-Russian Occupiers of Ukrainian Security Service Building Voice Defi-
ance,” Guardian, April 9, 2014a.
44 AnastasiaVlasova and Oksana Grytsenko, “Former EuroMaidan Enemies Now Fight
Side-by-Side Against Kremlin Backed Separatists in Slovyansk,” KyivPost, May 30, 2014.
the population, while the last provided supporting forces to facilitate

the Russian occupation.
Factors Enabling Russia’s Operational Successes

Force Composition
Russia chose to use only elements of professional contract troops with
high levels of training. It began by leveraging its naval infantry in place
and special forces, followed by Spetsnaz, airborne, and, eventually, reg-
ular infantry.45 Most of its reinforcements were VDV contract soldiers,
who went on to fight extensively in Eastern Ukraine.46 The operation
succeeded because Moscow deployed its best-trained, best-paid, and
most professional forces. It was thus able to surround a numerically
superior force equipped with heavy firepower at a speed that surpassed
the decisionmaking capability of its adversary. Russia was able to retain
control over its forces and encountered no unexpected crises or inci-
dents that could have turned the population against it. On the contrary,
Russian troops got the moniker the “polite people”—a euphemism
for the heavily armed and unidentified soldiers that took over Crimea.47
This depiction was a stark contrast from previous military operations,
which showed a lack of discipline within the force, such as the war
between Russia and Georgia or the Second Chechen War.
45 According to several sources, troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Federation (MVD) were also involved. Recently, Russia has declared the complete reorgani-
zation of the MVD and other internal security components into the National Guard, which
will be roughly 400,000 strong. See, also, McDermott, 2015.
46 VladmirGundarov, “Russia’s General Staff Is Debating Increasing the VDV Airborne
from 45,000 to 60,000 Troops [Численность ВДВ резко возрастет—примерно с 45
тыс. до почти 60 тыс. человек],” Independent Military Review, August 16, 2015.
47 This phrase was coined by a Crimean blogger who headed the Voice of Sevastopol. He
reported on how the Ukrainian airport security chief had “politely asked” his staff to leave.
Gogo Lidz, “Polite People of Russia: Not Who You Might Expect,” Newsweek, April 11,
2015.
Mobility
Russia’s military demonstrated it could put national leadership deci-
sions into effect almost immediately, implementing operational plan-
ning quickly and without major errors. It was able to move the neces-
sary forces thanks to numerous snap exercises that tested readiness of
personnel and equipment. Air and sea transportation—essential logis-
tics for seizing a foreign peninsula—proved reliable and responsive.
This suggests that, in a conflict near its borders, Russia’s forces are
likely to be on the ground relatively quick in a contingency, allowing
Moscow to seize the initiative against any adversary slower to respond.
Russia’s armed forces proved more nimble than in previous conflicts,
prizing mobility over conventional firepower and speed of action over
numerical superiority.
Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels

The Crimean operation does not represent a case of hybrid warfare,48
but rather a fairly traditional covert operation to shape the battlefield
for a conventional invasion. In launching its operations, Russia prac-
ticed tactical, operational, and strategic deception, deceiving the local
population, the Ukrainian leadership, and the West. Called maskirovka
in Russian, this is an ancient operational art of concealment and cam-
ouflage in the conduct of conventional operations. At the tactical level,
Russian soldiers were successful in making the local population believe
they were either native self-defense forces or indigenous police units.
Perhaps most importantly, they convinced the locals that they were not
a hostile force.
At the operational level, they confused Ukraine’s leadership as
to Russia’s true intentions and thereby delayed a Ukrainian response.
The Ukrainian government understood that there were Russian forces
in Crimea but could not discern their ultimate intent and therefore
chose restraint for fear of escalation. During a decisive meeting of the
National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, prominent figures
feared any action would be used by Russia as the premise to legitimize
an invasion, as was the case of the 2008 war between Russia and Geor-
48 Hoffman, 2009.
gia. As a result, almost none of the cabinet ministers and party leaders
who gathered to discuss the situation was willing to commit to a mili-
tary response in Crimea.49
At the strategic level, the West mistook Russian tactics aimed to
create plausible deniability as signs of an effort to negotiate a politi-
cal settlement and then de-escalate, rather than annex the peninsula.
Western officials urged caution and sought to freeze conflict, thinking
that Moscow might be seeking an off-ramp to the crisis.50 The decep-
tion also afforded Russia multiple points for disengagement and plau-
sible deniability should the operation have gone awry. It was, in effect,
Russia’s exit strategy. Because Ukraine and the West responded slowly
and cautiously during the critical first week when Russian forces seized
Crimea, Moscow is likely to use this tactic in the future.
Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover

A covert invasion requires “cover,” in other words, a plausible reason
for unusual redeployments or noticeable troop movements. Moscow
effectively used a pattern of unannounced readiness checks and
snap exercises to move forces around, eventually deploying them to
Ukraine’s borders to divert attention. While much of the force was
indeed conducting readiness checks and drilling, a small element was
being mobilized for the invasion of Crimea. Later into the annexation,
Russia began a mass deployment of forces near the Ukrainian border
to threaten escalation and stymie Ukraine’s response.
Russia’s sequence of movements was to launch a diversion to cover
troop movements, then deploy a large force near Ukraine’s borders.
Eventually, Russia built up more than 40,000 troops on the border
by April 2014 as part of the same exercise and snap-readiness check
initially employed to shift select units toward Crimea. Likely both
were planned maneuvers, one to distract and the other to intimidate
Ukraine’s leadership and impinge upon national-level decisionmaking.
49 ECHOMSK, 2016.
50
Bob Dreyfuss, “Obama Offers Putin a Face Saving Off-Ramp on Crimea,” The Nation,
March 13, 2014.
Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower

Russian forces relied on BTR-80/82 APCs, troop trucks, and Tigr
light-utility vehicles to isolate Ukraine’s units and sever the penin-
sula. These afforded speed but provided little firepower. Russia supple-
mented these forces with air-attack and air-lift capabilities, proceeding
with the operation without waiting for tanks and mechanized infantry.
Since the covert operation would effectively decide matters prior to an
occupation by conventional forces, Moscow risked that its forces would
be heavily outgunned. Communications made the entire affair pos-
sible. Without secure communications at the small-unit level, Russia
could not have deployed such a force, relied on it to conduct a sensitive
operation, and counted on its responsiveness to decisions in Moscow.51
Russia denied communications to the opposition while demonstrat-
ing that it had the ability to command a light, mobile, and responsive
force, composed of battalions and companies rather than brigades and
divisions.
Preparing for Counterattack

Russian forces were prepared for Ukrainian resistance and a counterat-
tack. The 50 special-forces personnel who seized the Crimean Parlia-
ment were equipped with body armor and night-vision devices and
armed with sniper rifles, machine guns, and heavy rocket-propelled
grenades. These units were capable of repelling an initial Ukrainian
response and were supported by additional naval infantry units on the
peninsula. When Russia seized the Kerch Strait ferry crossing, its units
moved to defend Crimea from the Ukrainian mainland. Additionally,
Moscow quickly committed its long-range anti-access and area-denial
capabilities. Artillery was deployed to the north to guard against any
approaches from the mainland.
51
C. J. Chivers, and David M. Herscenhorn, “In Crimea, Russia Showcases a Rebooted
Military,” New York Times, April 2, 2014.
Factors Contributing to Russia’s Operational

Shortcomings
While Russia enjoyed many operational successes in Crimea that it

might replicate elsewhere, it also had several shortcomings. These
included failure to induce Ukrainian forces to defect, lack of planning
for nonviolent resistance, incoherent political management of local
elites, and information operations of little influence. We review each of
these in the next section.
Turning Local Forces

It is unknown whether the Russian military expected a significant
number of Ukrainian units to prove disloyal to the government—espe-
cially in a time of crisis—and to defect. Ukraine’s SBU intelligence
service appears to have held such expectations. The Berkut and local
police turned almost immediately to Russia, but efforts to encourage
defections throughout the Ukrainian garrison on the peninsula were
largely unsuccessful. Despite an initial success with turning the com-
mander of the navy, who may have been on the Russian payroll prior
to the events of March 2014, the rest of the Ukrainian navy did not
follow him. Even this important defection was in part serendipitous,
since it was the interim Ukrainian leadership in Kyiv that chose to pro-
mote him to this position in the first place. In effect, this was another
unforced error on the part of Kyiv authorities that contributed to the
overall Russian success. High-level defections did occur after Crimea’s
annexation, including the commander of the Ukraine’s flagship, the
Hetman Sahaydachniy, and a number of the ship’s crew.52
Psychological Operations
Russia’s efforts to get Ukrainian forces to surrender their bases will-
ingly met with mixed results. Despite heavy psychological pressure to
coerce them, many chose to remain at least to maintain the appearance
52
eagle_rost (user), “About Those Who Left the Ukrainian Navy and About Captain Roman
Pyatnitsky” [Об ушедших из ВМСУ, и о капитане 2 ранга Романе Пятницком],”
March 6, 2016.
of being taken by force. Russian troops were unable to achieve surren-

der either through conciliatory overtures or punitive measures, such
as electricity cutoff. They were not able to bribe or cajole many of the
units they had initially isolated. One in particular, the Naval Aviation
regiment, successfully evacuated its functioning aircraft and helicop-
ters rather than surrender them. While Russia expected corruptibility
and low morale to be a vulnerability of Ukrainian forces, it failed to
capitalize on these in a substantive way during the annexation.
Planning for Nonviolent Resistance

To maintain the semblance of a friendly force and avoid critical media
coverage, an invading force must manage nonviolent resistance. While
Russian forces appeared to minimize use of force, one of their check-
points was clearly unprepared when 300 unarmed Ukrainian soldiers
marched out of Belbek airbase with Western journalists in tow. The
Russian troops who fired into the air and called back for orders were
surprised by the Ukrainian commanders’ initiative and visibly not in
control of the situation. Units were given rules of engagement but likely
were untrained for managing nonviolent resistance or handling media
coverage.
Political Management of Local Elites

Moscow also appeared unprepared for interaction with local Crimean
politicians on what should happen once it seized the peninsula. Rus-
sia’s back and forth with the Crimean Parliament suggests Moscow did
not fully plan out the sequence of political events that would follow the
invasion to effect an annexation. If indeed it did, the mechanics were
poorly executed. The movement of the referendum date forward and
back suggests the plan had changed several times as part of an iterative
process. It is unclear if annexation was Russia’s original goal or became
so only after Moscow saw it had seized Crimea without fighting, achiev-
ing its initial aim of separating the peninsula from Ukraine. Perhaps
the most important factor was the popularity of the invasion at home.
It is possible Russian leaders first waited for the domestic and interna-
tional response to the invasion of Crimea prior to deciding whether to
proceed with annexation or another political rearrangement.
Information Operations
Moscow leveraged social media effectively to generate domestic sup-
port and spread vast amounts of disinformation about the Maidan pro-
tests and the intentions of the new government in Kyiv. One analysis
of Russia’s information operations in the Ukrainian conflict found five
elements of its propaganda campaign. These were:
• massive and long-lasting impact (repeat the same themes over and
over again)
• desired information (manipulate messages to play upon the fears
of ethnic Russians in Ukraine)
• emotional agitation (use themes that will make ethnic Russians in
Ukraine act out of irrational anger)
• clarity (present the Ukrainian conflict in simple terms of good
and evil)
• supposed obviousness (match propaganda messages with widely
held Russian myths and legends).53
Russian media also helped ensure domestic approval of a rapid

transition from a confusing conflict to a politically acceptable seizure
of territory. Putin used Russian media to great effect in presenting
the historical and emotional arguments about why Crimea belongs to
Russia in a March 18, 2014, speech. One analyst suggests that Russians
place greater emphasis on “justice” than on the legal system, which is
seen as transient and serving the elites; as a result, Russians overwhelm-
ingly supported Putin’s attempt to unite Crimea and Russia, which
they perceived as a just cause despite it breaking international law.54
Rule of law does not have deep roots in Russia and hence was a lesser
53
See Jolanta Darczewska, “The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean
Operation, A Case Study,” Warsaw, Poland: Centre for Eastern Studies, Point of View
Number 42, May 2014, p. 25.
54 “Video: Nikolai Zlobin Discusses Russian National Idea at Kennan Institute,” interview
at Center on Global Interests, Washington, D.C., July 25, 2015.
consideration in the question of whether Putin was justified in seizing

or occupying Crimea.55
Unfortunately, it is difficult to discern any tangible operational
advantages Russia gained from its information campaign during the
Crimean annexation. Surveys conducted by U.S. experts found that,
unlike many Ukrainians, 85 percent of Crimeans did not perceive
themselves to be European.56 Opinion polls indicate more generally that
Crimeans were perhaps a more distinct polity than many other Ukrai-
nians.57 On the ground, Russian agents and their auxiliaries, rather
than the information campaign, were the organizing force behind
mobilization. Although the information campaign undoubtedly had
a polarizing effect on the population, its key turning points resulted
from Ukrainian mistakes rather than Russian successes. Moscow used
these errors to achieve greater mobilization and internal discord, but
the information war was a sideshow to the operation itself.
Russian television programming focused more on its domestic
audience than on influencing Ukrainian public opinion within or out-
side Crimea. Russia did not create special agencies, tools, or media to
engage Ukrainians in Crimea. Information operations aimed at Ukrai-
nian citizens were essentially a by-product of Russia’s information cam-
paign to manage its own domestic opinion. During the annexation,
Russian forces sought to shut down access to Ukrainian media, forcing
the local population to rely on news sources controlled by Moscow.
However, surveys suggest that most Crimeans received their informa-
tion from Russian television to begin with—and still do today.58 Given
Crimea’s proximity to Russia, this approach was sufficient and effective
and could be reproduced elsewhere along Russia’s borders.
55 Masha Gessen, “Most Russians Believe the Crimea Is Theirs—Putin Has Acted on His
Belief,” Guardian, March 1, 2014.
56
John O’Loughlin and Gerard Toal, “Mistrust About Political Motives in Contested
Ukraine,” Washington Post, February 13, 2015a.
57
John O’Loughlin and Gerard Toal, “The Crimean Conundrum,” openDemocracy.net,
March 3, 2015b.
58 Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin, “Russian and Ukrainian Viewers Live on Different
Planets,” Washington Post, February 26, 2015.
Conclusion: Implications and Effects
There are indicators that the invasion of Crimea was a contingency

Russia had been preparing for since Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in
2004 and updated following the beginning of the Maidan protests in
2013.59 This point continues to be debated and contested today. The
initial actions were conducted with special-forces units that were only
formed in 2012, implying that the plans were probably finalized at a
much later date, perhaps between the time when the Maidan began in
November 2013 and the actual launch of the operation in late February
2014.60 Russia’s military was able to quickly and effectively put plans
into action in response to a decision made by the national leadership.
Ukraine did not resist militarily, and therefore this operation
cannot be analyzed for lessons on how Russia intends to fight war or
as a model for any Russian doctrine. Warfighting did not take place in
Crimea. We cannot generalize the events in Crimea to other broadly
established concepts involving hybrid war, nonlinear warfare, or any
concept of operations commonly mentioned in reference to Russia’s
military today.61 Did Russia use disguised forces or paramilitary auxil-
iaries? Yes, but it is hard to judge whether or not they were of substan-
tive value relative to conventional forces. Their presence in the battle
space does not confer relevance.
Crimea stands as a singular operation against a particular target
and at a distinct time of opportunity when Ukraine was vulnerable. It
provides evidence of the restoration of competence, professionalism,
and effectiveness to a very select component within the Russian armed
forces.62 We can infer a good deal about mobility, logistics, and the
speed with which national decisionmaking results in use of force, but
59
Yekaterina Kravtsova, “Observers Say Russia Had Crimea Plan for Years,” Moscow Times,
March 27, 2014.
60 Dmitry Litovkin, “Defense Ministry to Revive Russia’s Special Operation Forces,” Russia
Beyond the Headlines, June 20, 2013.
61 “NATO to Counter Hybrid Warfare from Russia,” BBC World News, May 14, 2015.
62
Johan Norberg, “The Use of Russia’s Military in the Crimean Crisis,” Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, March 13, 2014.
this operation tells us little about the warfighting ability of Russia’s

armed forces against a conventional opponent. Current Russian opera-
tions in Syria offer precisely such lessons, which are sorely missing from
the case of Crimea.
It is difficult to determine what conclusions Russia made from
the Crimean annexation for its campaign in Eastern Ukraine, which
began almost simultaneously. Not only were these concurrent rather
than sequential efforts, but they also differed starkly in execution. That
said, events in Crimea may have strengthened long-held Russian views
about the weakness and incompetence of the Ukrainian state. Ukrai-
nian leaders made substantial errors during the early days following the
Maidan and at the outset of the Russian invasion. Kyiv’s national deci-
sionmaking certainly did not discourage Russian military activity. The
Crimean experience likely made military escalation in Eastern Ukraine
an enticing proposition, although Moscow’s preferred approach there
was to attempt classical political warfare and subversion, as we discuss
in the next section of this report.
CHAPTER THREE
Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine

(March–May 2014)
How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine

Chronology of Events
Protests in Eastern Ukraine (Figure 3.1) against the new Ukrainian
government began almost immediately after the Maidan protests
prompted Yanukovych’s flight from power. As noted in Chapter Two,
the Rada voted to repeal the official status of the Russian language
on February 23, stoking fear and anger in the east, where most citi-
zens spoke Russian. This measure, coupled with Russia’s operation in
Crimea, encouraged the mobilization of both leftist and right-wing
organizations in Eastern Ukraine. Their leaders, previously existing on
the margins of Ukrainian political life, proclaimed themselves as “peo-
ple’s mayors” and “people’s governors.” The opening events of political
turmoil in Eastern Ukraine closely followed the popular appointment
of a Russian citizen as mayor in Sevastopol, Crimea, on February 24.
The protesters portrayed their actions as spontaneous and self-
initiated, driven by public anxiety about the future after the victory
of the Maidan movement in the capital. The Ukrainian government
dismissed the outbreak of protests as provocations organized by pro-
Russian agitators and intelligence operators. Russian intelligence may
have played a role in fomenting discontent, but the public agitation
and outcry appeared genuine and not disconnected from the country’s
political divisions. Some Russian citizens were allegedly paid to cross
the border and participate in these events (professional agitators), and
some Russians likely came to help the cause of their own accord, but
33
Figure 3.1
Map of Eastern Ukraine
RUSSIA
Kyiv
UKRAINE
Kharkiv
RUSSIA
CRIMEA
Sloviansk
Kramatorsk Artemivsk
Druzhkivka Luhansk
UKRAINE Horlivka Yenakiyevo
Donetsk Makiyivka
Zaporizhya
DONETSK
MOLDOVA
Mariupol
Sea of Azov
Russian as
native
CRIMEA language
ROMANIA
<20%
0 50 100 Miles 20–50%
Black Sea 0 50 100 KM >50%
RAND RR1498-3.1
most protestors were local Ukrainians.1 Most of the people in East-

ern Ukraine had voted for Yanukovych and traditionally supported his
political party, the Party of the Regions (see, for example, Figure 3.2).
They were dismayed by his overthrow and uncertain about Ukraine’s
political direction.
An initial surge of activity took place in early March with a series
of large demonstrations by mostly unarmed pro-Russian protesters. On
March 1, while the Crimean operation was already unfolding, pro-
testers seized the regional administration buildings in Kharkiv and
Donetsk. On March 9, protesters took over the regional administration
building in Luhansk and demanded a referendum be held on annex-
ing the Luhansk Oblast (region) to Russia. Russian military support
1 Andrew Roth, “Russia Tourists Stir the Protests,” New York Times, March 3, 2014.
Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March–May 2014) 35
Figure 3.2
Results of the 2010 Presidential Elections in Ukraine
Voted for Tymoshenko

BELARUS 50–74% ≥75%
Voted for Yanukovych
50–74% ≥75%
POLAND
RUSSIA
Kyiv
SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
MOLDOVA
ROMANIA
Sea of Azov
RUSSIA
CRIMEA
Simferopol
Sevastopol
0 50 100 Miles
Black Sea 0 50 100 KM
BULGARIA
RAND RR1498-3.2
for the installment of a new mayor in Sevastopol may have convinced

these protesters that they could count on Moscow’s backing.
Some suggest that the early protests were somewhat staged. One
account described a protest as “street theater,” in which “both sides
would show a mix of on-camera resolve, even as they clashed they
would knowingly flash moments of politeness, mutual respect, and
restraint—as if many of them were a common people caught in their
divided rulers’ fight.”2 In some cases, local security forces permitted the
2 The account notes examples of the rioters’ restraint:

For a short while, one group of protesting men—cleareyed and sober, but projecting
toughness—deliberately defended the police. When there was a briefly chaotic rush for
the building’s side door, and a much smaller police contingent blocking it, these men,
seeming to take instructions by cellphone, intervened. They ordered the crowd back to
protesters to temporarily take over government buildings, recognizing

that the protesters would soon depart.3 The protesters’ official causes
included a referendum on federalization, recognition of Russian as the
second official state language, and a Customs Union with Russia. The
call for a referendum was apparently a bid to pressure the Ukrainian
government for devolution of more autonomy to the regions.4
In Luhansk, Aleksander Kharitonov, Oblast Secretary of the Pro-
gressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU), declared himself people’s
governor. Pavel Gubarev, a member of the neofascist organization Rus-
sian National Unity, did the same in Donetsk. In Kharkiv, Vladimir
Varshavskiy, a car mechanic and a blogger, was proclaimed popular
mayor at a public rally. In Slovyansk, an owner of a small business,
Vacheslav Ponamorev, emerged as popular mayor, with unknown back-
ers. These individuals could be described as pro-Russian and certainly
anti-Maidan oriented, but they were also obscure figures of little-to-no
political significance in the country or the region. They would be prop-
the front steps. The crowd complied. Today is going to be a peaceful march,” said one of
their leaders, Pavel, 27, who declined to give his surname. . . . A riot shield that protesters
wrested from one police officer was returned with an apology. A woman among the pro-
testers came forward and wiped tears from another police officer’s face; he allowed her to
reach up under his plexiglass face shield. (C. J. Chivers and Andrew Roth, “The Curtain
Goes Up, and the Clash Begins,” New York Times, March 18, 2014)
3 Per James Marson, “Pro-Russia Demonstrators Break into Government Buildings in
Donetsk,” Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2014:
As a few dozen protesters, including one young man recording on his iPad, stormed
the government buildings, police offered little resistance, apparently intent on avoid-
ing clashes so as not to give Russia a pretext to invade. The demonstrators soon left
the buildings. “There was no one there, but we made ourselves heard,” said a man over
loudspeakers strapped to the top of a Soviet-era hatchback after people left the security
service building. After leading chants of “Russia” he turned on a Soviet tune from World
War II.
4 See, for example, the chronology of Luhansk Guard activities, “Tags: Lugansk Guard,”
cxid.info, undated; the interview with PSPU’s leader, Nataliya Vetrenko (Lyudmila Klushina
[Клушина Людмила], “Natalia Vitrenko: Neo-Nazis Intimidate People [Наталия
Витренко: Людей запугивают неонацисты],” Vecherniy Peterburg, December 10, 2015;
and Aleksey Sochnev, “The International Community Must Help Us to Free Ourselves from
the Neo-Nazis [Mirovoye Soobshchestvo Doljno Pomoch Nam Osvoboditsya ot Neonat-
sisma],” Russkaya Planeta, March 12, 2014.
erly characterized as local and regional political outsiders, adherents of

extreme movements who exist on the margins of the political landscape.
What little is known of their biographies reveals local criminals,
small businessmen, and ideological extremists colored by Russian
nationalism. Denis Pushilin, who was the first leader of the Donetsk
People’s Republic (DNR), spent his time selling shares in a Russian
pyramid scheme.5 Vyacheslav Ponomarev, the aforementioned mayor
of Slovyansk, had supposedly moved from one business venture to
another before taking ownership of a small soap company.6 Their mete-
oric rises seem improbable without external backing. Given these fig-
ures’ backgrounds, the proposition that they were the pillars of a long-
planned Russian intelligence operation is equally dubious. If so, these
individuals appeared, and subsequently proved to be, poorly adapted
to the task.
The period of political mobilization to demand for federalization
and greater regional autonomy was short-lived. Regional law enforce-
ment cracked down on these people’s governors and, by removing
them, inadvertently paved the way for a different set of leadership to
take over the movements. Valeriy Bolotov replaced Kharitonov as the
new people’s governor of Luhansk after Kharitonov’s arrest. Bolotov
was a retired paratrooper, a veteran of several conflicts, and the head
of the Paratroopers Veteran Union.7 He had been a representative of
Oleksandr Yefremov, a former governor, businessman, and prominent
member of Yanukovych’s party. Yanukovych and many of his associates
fled to Russia, making it likely that Moscow could tap their patronage
connections and business networks. As a result, some of the political
agitators who were arrested were replaced with or backed by the enforc-
ers from the business circles of local elites.
5 In interviews, Pushilin indicated that he had previously worked as a security guard and
candy salesman before his employment at a joint stock company called MMM, which sup-
posedly was an investment Ponzi scheme. Griff Witte, “Pro-Russian Separatists in Eastern
Ukraine Were ‘Nobodies’—Until Now,” Washington Post, April 30, 2014.
6 Witte, 2014.
7 Nadezhda Shostak, “Who Is the ‘People’s Governor’: Kharkov Headed Smith and
Lohansk Paratrooper [Kto Oni, ‘Narodniye Gubernatory’: Kharkov Vozglavil Avtoslesar, a
Luhansk Desantnik],” Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 23, 2014.
By March 10, local police managed to regain control of all the

captured administration buildings in the three cities. In Kharkiv, inte-
rior minister Avakov stated that 70 separatists were arrested in the
clearing of the state administration building.8 Street clashes between
pro- and anti-Maidan protesters continued for several days in major
cities.9 Meanwhile, the interim Ukrainian government appointed oli-
garchs as new governors, assuming they would use their patronage net-
works to retain control and defend their own economic interests. One
of the more important decisions by Kyiv early in March was to appoint
Ihor Kolomoisky as governor of Dnipropetrovsk, where he already had
substantial economic influence and vested interests.
Ukrainian authorities removed the local political figureheads of
the protest movement but, as a consequence, they were replaced by
individuals with ties to Russian security services, military experience,
and associations with business interests in Russia. Many were either
local to the Donbas region or came from Crimea, likely at the behest of
Russian intelligence in early March. The new leaders were more inter-
ested in mounting direct action and had the military experience to
command a paramilitary force.
In Donetsk, Aleskandr Boroday, a Russian citizen and editor of
the conservative newspaper Zavtra, replaced Gubarev as people’s gov-
ernor after Gubarev’s arrest. In Slovyansk, Boroday’s close associate,
Strelkov, sacked Ponamorev and proclaimed himself as the people’s
mayor of Slovyansk.10 Strelkov, a veteran of conflicts in Transnistria,
Serbia, and the Chechen wars and allegedly an operative for Russia’s
military intelligence (GRU), would become an important figure in
this conflict.11 This change in leadership marks the true beginning of
8 “Ukraine Authorities Clear Kharkiv Building, Arrest Scores of Separatists,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, October 27, 2015.
9 “Deadly Clashes in East Ukraine Ahead of Crimea Vote,” BBC News, March 15, 2014.
10 Luke Harding, “Pro-Russian Mayor of Slovyansk Sacked and Arrested,” Guardian, June
12, 2014; Anna Dolgov, “Missing Slovyansk Mayor Detained on Orders of Russian Militant,
Report Says,” Moscow Times, June 12 2014.
11
Irina Bobrova, “Igor Strelkov: How a Book Boy Became the Commander of the Militia of
Donbass [Игорь Стрелков: как книжный мальчик стал командующим ополчением
the separatist movement and the transition from political warfare to

insurgency.
Rather than wait to hold a referendum on the status of the regions,
commanders, such as Strelkov and his comrade Igor Bezler (whose
nom de guerre is Bes [Demon]),12 stormed the buildings of the local
administration and proclaimed the territories under their control as
republics. Strelkov publicly takes credit for launching the conflict.13 It
is unknown if he operated under Russian command or independently,
but his actions prevented a restoration of order by Ukrainian authori-
ties as occurred in Odessa and Kharkiv, where crackdowns ended pro-
tests and the local elites chose to side with the national government.14
When Strelkov declared the Donetsk Republic, he shifted the cause
from federalization to outright secession from Ukraine, which was
always his personal intention.
From April 6 to 23, the separatists employed groups of armed
men to capture and hold the administration buildings that were lost
by the pro-Russian civilian demonstrators in early March. It is unclear
whether these assaults were coordinated with Russian authorities. Sep-
aratists seized the main administrative building in Donetsk on April
6, overran an Interior Ministry rapid-response force at the Luhansk
Донбасса],” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, May 28, 2014.

12 Bezler is originally from Crimea and allegedly a separatist leader working with Russian
intelligence. A Russian citizen, he supposedly saw active service and was later in the GRU.
Some say he fought in Chechnya and Afghanistan. His name is most prominently associated
with an audio recording when Malaysia Airlines flight 17 was shot down in July 2014, con-
firming the plane was civilian. Julia Ioffe, “I Met Igor Bezler, the Russian Rebel Who Said
‘We Have Just Shot Down a Plane,’” New Republic, July 18, 2014.
13
Igor Strelkov, “Strelkov Admitted Responsibility for Military Operations in Ukraine
[Стрелков признал ответственность за военные действия на Украине],” LENT.ru,
November 20, 2014.
14 The minister of the interior in Kharkiv cracked down on the pro-Russian protesters there,
stifling attempts to create a nascent people’s republic. “Ukraine Authorities Clear Kharkiv
Building, Arrest Scores of Separatists,” 2015. Protests in Odessa resulted in 42 deaths of
pro-Russian activists on May 2, and the tragedy led to disengagement among the warring
protesters. “How Did Odessa’s Fire Happen?” BBC News, May 6, 2014; “Strelkov: ‘Shooters’
War I Began, Not Donbas’ [Стрелков: Войну на Донбассе начал я],” Korrespondent,
November 20, 2014.
administration complex on April 11, and took the city halls in Slovy-
ansk, Kramatorsk, and Krasny Liman on April 12. In Donetsk, sepa-
ratists seized the state security services building to gain access to 300
assault rifles and 400 handguns, allowing them to arm fighters and
further spread the insurgency.15 At this stage of the movement, the
demands vacillated between autonomy within a federalized Ukraine
and secession in order to join Russia.
The proclamation by Strelkov of the DNR on April 7 marked
a more concerted attempt to unify effort and command among the
separatists behind a political structure. Pro-Russian separatists would
declare a Luhansk People’s Republic a few weeks later. Eventually Strel-
kov took overall command and control of a large conglomeration of
fighters called the South-East Army, becoming the leading political
figure of the separatist movement. Although he was able to attract
members of some pro-Russian organizations, including the East Front
and Donbas People’s Movement, Strelkov was unable to monopolize
the use of force in the area.16 Local elites, who formed their own battal-
ions, preferred to maintain their autonomy. Such units as Vostok Bat-
talion in Donetsk, headed by a former commander of Ukrainian Alfa
special forces in the region, and Zarya in Luhansk, primarily compris-
ing local residents, acted independently of Strelkov’s South-East Army.
From April 15 to 23, Ukrainian army and Interior Ministry forces
mounted efforts to respond to the separatists. Most of the deployed
units in the east were halted outside the captured cities by a handful
of crude checkpoints and several pro-Russian civilian mobs. Ukrai-
nian security forces were ineffective for two reasons. First, at the time,
the Ukrainian army existed largely on paper, with perhaps only 6,000
15 Ukraine’s ministry stated the objective of this attack was the firearms. This would become
emblematic of the separatist attacks on security buildings and police stations in order to seize
arms and equip a paramilitary force. Andrew Higgins, “Armed Men Seize Police Station in
Eastern Ukraine City,” New York Times, April 12, 2014.
16 “In Donetsk, the Formation of the Republican Army [В Донецке началось
формирование республиканской армии],” May 4, 2014; Igor Korotchenko, “Army
Units Began to Form Self-Defense Southeast Ukraine [Началось формирование
отрядов Армии самообороны Юго-Восточной Украины],” Livejournal blog, March
23, 2014.
combat-capable troops available.17 Second, Ukrainian army command-

ers spoke Russian and were disinclined to fight against fellow Russian
speakers or order troops into civilian areas. As a whole, the Ukrai-
nian military was completely unprepared for the launch of combat
operations.
The local police in Donetsk, Luhansk, Slovyansk, and Krama-
torsk were either intimidated by the separatists or defected to them.
By August 2015, Ukraine’s chief military prosecutor would report that
some 5,000 police and 3,000 servicemen had defected to the separat-
ist cause.18 Ukrainian soldiers and their commanders were confused
by the situation on the ground and did not know how to deal with the
separatist forces that were accompanied by supportive civilian mobs.19
Many Ukrainian units retreated by April 23. In one embarrassing
instance, six Ukrainian airborne vehicles from the 25th Airborne Bri-
gade were captured by separatists and local civilians without a fight.20
This handful of airborne infantry fighting vehicles (known as Boye-
vaya Mashina Desanta) and a Nona self-propelled mortar were used by
17
Jeanne Whalen and Alan Cullison, “Ukraine Battles to Rebuild a Depleted Military,”
Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2014; Linda Kinstler, “Why Is Ukraine’s Army So Appalingly
Bad?” New Republic, May 9, 2014.
18 “8 Thousand Ukrainian Officers Have Defected to the Separatists,” meduza.io, August
14, 2015.
19
Ralph Ellis, Laura Smith-Spark, and Tim Lister, “Ukraine Military Push Appears to Lose
Momentum in the East,” CNN, April 17, 2014.
20 One account of the Ukrainian military noted:
A military operation that the Ukrainian government said would confront pro-Russian
militants in the east of the country unraveled in disarray on Wednesday with the entire
contingent of 21 armored vehicles that had separated into two columns surrendering or
pulling back before nightfall. . . . One of the armored columns stopped when a crowd
of men drinking beer and women yelling taunts and insults gathered on the road before
them, and later in the day its commander agreed to hand over the soldiers’ assault rifles
to the very separatists they were sent to fight. Another column from the same ostensi-
bly elite unit, the 25th Dnipropetrovsk paratrooper brigade, surrendered not only its
weapons but also the tracked and armored vehicles it had arrived in, letting militants
park them as trophies, under a Russian flag, in a central square here. (Andrew Kramer,
“Ukraine Push Against Rebels Grinds to Halt,” New York Times, April 17, 2014)
the separatists from April until June, when heavier conventional equip-
ment was eventually supplied directly by Moscow.
From late April to late May, the Ukrainian army mounted a more
deliberate campaign to contain the pro-Russian rebellion by securing
key terrain around Donbas cities held by the separatists. The objec-
tive of this strategy was to position the military for a decisive offensive
against the rebel enclave once Ukraine’s national mobilization, includ-
ing the May 1 reintroduction of mass conscription for men, had been
completed. After taking outlying cities, Ukraine’s army planned to iso-
late and besiege Donetsk and Luhansk.21
Meanwhile, the separatists obtained short-range air-defense weap-
onry, presumably from Russia or possibly from stocks in Ukraine.22 In
late April and May, several Ukrainian military helicopters and fixed-
wing transport aircraft were shot down in the Donbas region. Russia
apparently supplied the rebels with shoulder-fired and self-propelled
Strela-10M short-range systems.23 Russian forces massing on Ukraine’s
borders grew beyond 40,000, diverting Ukraine’s deployments to its
borders, defending cities such as Kharkiv, rather than to the conflict
zone, because of the threat of large-scale invasion.24
In the last week of April, the Ukrainian army made probing
attacks against the outskirts of Slovyansk. On May 2, a Ukrainian
offensive made gains, seizing part of the city, with casualties on both
21 “Ukraine Says Forces Retake Two More Rebel Cities,” BBC World News, July 7, 2014.
22 Some of the antiaircraft systems employed by the separatists may have been captured
from Ukrainian units. It is worth noting, however, that merely operating and sustaining
some of these systems, let alone successfully employing them, requires a degree of expertise
beyond that present in typical armed groups. It is also worth noting that while Ukrainian
aircraft were shot down with some frequency throughout this period, the first shoot-down
of a fixed-wing aircraft at medium altitude took place on July 15. See “Shooting Down of
Ukrainian Military Aircraft at Cruising Altitude Reflects Ongoing Escalation Risk and Pos-
sible Russian Support,” Jane’s Online Country Risk Daily Report, July 15, 2014.
23 “Armored Vehicles with an Inscription in Kiev and Lviv 5.07 [бронетехника с
надписями На Киев и На Львов 5.07],” YouTube video, July 6, 2014.
24 Dan Bloom, “Satellite Photos Expose 40,000 Russian Troops, Tanks, and Fighter Jets
Massed Near Ukraine’s Borders as NATO Warns Kremlin Could Order Invasion Within
12 Hours,” Daily Mail, April 10, 2014.
sides and at the cost of losing two helicopters.25 In the subsequent

weeks, fighting spread to other towns in Donetsk, with seesaw battles
between government forces and separatists in Kramatorsk, Slovyansk,
and Mariupol. Separatist leaders organized a referendum on May 11,
without any discernible legal basis, in which 89 percent of participants
supposedly voted in favor of self-rule.26 Violence continued until the
May 25 presidential election, with several attacks by separatist forces
possibly aiming to disrupt the election. Shortly after the elections, the
First Battle of Donetsk Airport broke out, with more than 50 separat-
ists reported killed, marking a transition point in the conflict.
This attack was the first featuring a large group of volunteers from
Russia who arrived to reinforce the separatists, but it proved a military
disaster for the separatist fighters. Scores were killed at the airport and
on the way back to the city by friendly fire from the Vostok Battalion,
which confused them for Ukrainian units, perhaps emblematic of the
lack of communication among the disparate separatist forces.27 It is
difficult to identify the point at which significant numbers of Russian
soldiers become involved in this conflict under the guise of volunteers.
Russian citizens took command of the separatist movement in mid-
April, and they had Russian volunteers with them. However, the May
25 David Cenciotti, “Two Ukrainian Gunship Helicopters Shot Down by Maenads in East-
ern Ukraine,” The Aviationist, May 2, 2014.
26 Thereferendum and its results are not considered credible by Ukraine, international
observers, or other countries. “Ukraine Rebels Hold Referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk,”
BBC News, May 11, 2014.
27 Several unflattering accounts of this battle appeared in Russian blogs. This episode
was considered one of the single worst losses for the separatists throughout the history of
the conflict. See El_Murid, “Three Weeks Ago, I Spoke with People Who Were Directly
Involved in One of the Most Unsuccessful Operations of Donetsk Militia—An Attempt
to Capture the Airport In Donetsk. Per My Request, They Put Together a Text in Which
They Describe in Detail What Was Happening From the Point of View of a Direct Par-
ticipant. Below Is This Text, in Full [Недели три назад я разговаривал с людьми,
которые непосредственно участвовали в одной из самых неудачных операций
донецкого ополчения - попытке захвата аэропорта в Донецке. По моей просьбе
они составили текст, в котором относительно подробно описали происходившее
с точки зрения непосредственного участника. Ниже этот текст, целиком, как
пришел],” Livejournal blog, May 26, 2014.
26 battle for Donetsk Airport likely marks a departure point for greater
involvement of “volunteers” from Russia to bolster separatist ranks.
The battle for Donetsk airport and Ukraine’s subsequent offen-
sive operations escalated the conflict vertically for Russia, resulting
in the steady transition to conventional warfare. From June until the
end of August, Russia trickled in mechanized equipment, armor, and
advanced munitions to the separatist forces, as well as medium air
defenses (such as Buk-M1 capable of high-altitude interception) oper-
ated by its own units.28 By mid-August, Ukraine had lost so much tac-
tical and transport aviation that its air force was unable to participate
in the conflict because of the presence of strong air defense. The Anti-
Terrorist Operation (the Ukrainian government’s official name for its
campaign against the separatists) was essentially a siege-warfare cam-
paign, leveraging Ukraine’s vastly superior numbers, artillery, and air
power to steadily encircle and push out the separatists from fortified
terrain. Together with volunteer battalions, Ukraine’s military ate away
at separatist territory, a fitful campaign replete with setbacks, minor
defeats, and costly mistakes for Russia.
In August 2014, the situation became critical for the separatists,
as the territory under their control shrank and Ukraine edged closer
to regaining control of the border and encircling them completely.
A wedge was being driven between Donetsk and Luhansk, threaten-
ing to separate the two putative breakaway republics. On August 24,
Russia abandoned an effort to mix in conventional weaponry, such as
tanks and air defense, in support of the separatist forces. Instead, it
switched to conventional operations, invading with perhaps 4,000 reg-
ular troops (accurate figures are unavailable) and defeating Ukraine’s
military at the Battle of Ilovaisk.29 With the Minsk I ceasefire signed
in early September, Russia began a more robust train-and-equip mis-
sion designed to turn the separatists into a more capable conventional
force. Although artillery skirmishes continued, both sides took a break
28 This is the weapon system widely believed responsible for the downing of Malaysian Air-
lines MH17 in July 2014.
29
“Serving Russian Soldiers on Leave Fighting Ukrainian Troops Alongside Rebels, Pro-
Russian Separatist Leader Says,” Telegraph, August 28, 2014.
to rearm, train, and consolidate between September 5, 2014, and Jan-

uary 13, 2015, when Russia launched a second offensive. Following
a second encirclement and defeat at Debaltseve, Ukraine signed the
Minsk II ceasefire on February 12, 2015, with terms highly favorable
for Moscow.
The terms of the Minsk II deal obliged Ukraine to grant the sepa-
ratist regions special status, amend its constitution for greater decen-
tralization, and reintegrate them. While sporadic fighting has con-
tinued, by mid-July 2015, Ukraine began taking the political steps
necessary to implement its obligations under that agreement, albeit at a
glacial pace. The deal may give Moscow its permanent frozen conflict
in Ukraine, making the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk
technically Ukrainian territory, but providing Moscow a strategic hook
in the country. If the agreements are not implemented, Russia still has a
useful means for destabilization and, at the very least, may have denied
Ukraine a path to NATO or EU membership.
Today the separatist force continues to undergo consolidation
and conversion into a conventional army, equipped by Russia and sup-
ported by a capable contingent of Russian troops who serve as a quick
reaction force. The conflict intensity is cyclical, largely quiet in fall
2015 with a ceasefire, then experiencing a strong uptick in artillery
skirmishes and fighting in winter and spring 2016. Russia has achieved
some of its political objectives in Ukraine and will lock in further gains
if Ukrainian leaders implement the political concessions they accepted
under the Minsk II accord. However, Ukraine’s government experi-
enced a political crisis in winter 2015–2016, with a spate of infighting
among ruling elites and corruption scandals that delayed any prospects
for constitutional reform or reintegration of the Donbas. At the time of
the writing of this report, the conflict remains unsettled and unfrozen.
Characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine Operation
Russia sought to avoid what it perceived to be a geopolitical disaster,

with Ukraine leaving its sphere of influence and transitioning into a
Western orbit, possibly entering the EU or NATO. It did so by employ-
ing political warfare and subversion, which spiraled out into a full-
blown insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, eventually leading to a conven-
tional war. Moscow could have secured a strategic victory if it could
bend the interim government in Kyiv to accept federalization (a pro-
cess that would devolve power) and neutralize its ability to strategically
reorient Ukraine in a Western direction. It would also make nation-
wide reforms impossible to implement. This would substantially limit
the impact of the Maidan victory. Thus, we argue that Russia orches-
trated a secession movement in the eastern regions as leverage to force
Ukraine into accepting federalization.30
These are important assumptions in the analysis of the Russian
objectives throughout the evolution of this conflict. The basis for this
assessment is threefold. First, as the chronology indicates, Russia had
ample military opportunity to invade Ukraine, defeat its forces, and
conquer any eastern region if it so chose. In fact, even after consid-
erable time to organize, arm, and prepare, Ukraine was still soundly
defeated in August 2014 and February 2015 at the battles of Illovaisk
and Debaltseve. Second, the report assumes that the initial demands
for devolution of power, federalization, and the protection of the Rus-
sian language made by upstart people’s governors, agitators, and sepa-
ratist leaders were representative of Moscow’s objectives. That is, this
was the core purpose of the political-warfare campaign and the follow-
on separatist movement. The origins and evolution of the protests were
discussed earlier in the chronology of events provided in this chapter.
Finally, numerous official Russian statements throughout this
conflict, from the Russian president to cabinet ministers, support that
this was Moscow’s official policy and desired plan for Ukraine. One
example is provided below from an interview early on in the conflict
given by foreign minister Sergei Lavrov on March 29, 2014:
All the more important as that this was the obligation signed by
Vitaly Klichko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Oleh Tyahnybok [Maidan
leaders] and German French and Polish foreign ministers, with a
30 Vladimir Socor, “Pro-Russia Paramilitaries Seize Ground in Eastern Ukraine Ahead of

International Negotiations,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 11, Issue 72, April 16, 2014.
view to start constitutional reform, which would be comprehen-

sive and include each and every political power and regions with
an equal voting right. They should start agreeing on a federation,
within the framework of which each region has broad authority
in the area of economics, finance, culture, language, education,
foreign economy and cultural ties with neighboring countries or
regions and where rights of all minorities are ensured.31
Lavrov further elaborates:
This is what the eastern and southern regions request. We are con-
vinced that this is absolutely correct way to achieve this. Repre-
sentatives of the Ukrainian foreign ministry reply to us that Rus-
sian propositions are a provocation and interference into domestic
affairs because they propose ideas which are incompatible with
the foundations of the Ukrainian national identity. What ideas?
Firstly, federalization, and secondly, official language. I do not
know why they are incompatible with foundations of Ukrainian
national identity.32
In March 2014, Ukrainian leaders refused to entertain such

proposals. The Russian proposition was rightfully seen as a stalking
horse for the political partitioning of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian For-
eign Ministry termed it an attempt to “divide and destroy Ukrainian
statehood.”33 Later that year, Putin spoke publicly of his disappoint-
ment with Ukraine’s refusal to entertain federalization and argued that
the official terms for it did not matter:
31 These excerpts are taken from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official website.
Sergei Lavrov’s statement would become an oft-repeated Russian position regarding the need
for Ukrainian constitutional reform. Such provisions are eventually included in the Minsk II
agreement, requiring Ukraine to vote in amendments to the constitution. “Interview Given
by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the Programme ‘Vesti v sabot s Serge Bri-
lyovim,’” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation official site, March 29, 2014.
32
“Interview Given by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the Programme
“Vesti v sabot s Serge Brilyovim,” 2014.
33 Vladimir Ryzhkov, “Putin’s Federalization Card in Ukraine,” The Moscow Times, April 7,
2014.
It is all really a play on words. It is important to understand what

these notions mean: decentralization, federalization, regionaliza-
tion. You can coin a dozen other terms.34
A year later, following several battlefield setbacks, many of these

demands would be integrated into the Minsk II ceasefire agreement,
which today is the governing document for cessation of hostilities in
Ukraine. Even its early provisions are yet to be implemented, but the
document is the only agreed-upon roadmap for ending the conflict.
The Ukrainian Context

To understand how Russia fostered an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine,
we must account for the powerful nonstate actors in Ukraine, an ana-
lytical lens often neglected in this conflict. Although authority was
centralized in Kyiv, the national leadership typically used its powers for
corruption and redistribution of resources among patronage networks.
Ukraine was, and arguably remains, an oligarchy, run by powerful and
wealthy individuals who control slices of the economy, own national
media channels and major state enterprises, and have politicians on
retainer across the country. In effect, a small number of individuals
own and control large parts of the Ukrainian economy and political
system. Through much of Ukraine’s history as an independent coun-
try, Ukrainian leaders represented whichever oligarchic faction was on
top, perhaps with the exception of Yanukovych, who enriched his own
family clan at the expense of all others.35
In early 2014, the state was an outer shell under which the struc-
ture consisted of oligarchs and their political patronage networks. Oli-
garchs profited immensely from ownership of state enterprises and con-
verted that wealth into political influence. Political parties served as
instruments to secure the interests of oligarchs, while corruption was
considered the norm in all aspects of life. Oligarchs still remain a pow-
34 “Russian
President Putin Says Ukraine Needs Federalization to Settle Conflict,” TASS
(Russian News Agency), November 17, 2014.
35
Mikhail Minakov, “A Decisive Turn? Risks for Ukrainian Democracy After the Euro-
Maidan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 4, 2016.
erful force in Ukrainian politics today—reformist-minded ministers

struggle against vested interests and corruption schemes.36 Since inde-
pendence, groups of oligarchs have competed for power in the capital
while fighting each other for control of key industries.
Before 2014, Ukraine was a country with political and economic
divisions borne of its history and Soviet inheritance. In December
2013, Leonid Peisakhin aptly stated that Ukraine “has never been and
is not yet a coherent national unit with a common narrative or a set of
more or less commonly shared political aspirations.”37 Opinion surveys
highlighted these differences. An April 2013 survey found 42 percent
of Ukrainians favored closer relations with the EU, while 31 percent
preferred the Russian-led Customs Union.38 More importantly, 76 per-
cent of those in Western Ukraine thought EU association would be
good for the economy, but 53 percent in Eastern Ukraine saw the Rus-
sian Customs Union as more beneficial.39 At the time, exports to Russia
and the EU were roughly equal in value, but Eastern Ukraine was
heavily integrated into the Russian economy, while Western Ukraine
had strong ties with the rest of Europe. Political choices also tended to
follow an East-West division (as represented in Figure 3.2).
The Donetsk and Luhansk regions that hosted the separatist
movement were an industrial zone with a population of roughly 6.5
million, most being Russian speaking. Their economy was based on
mining and manufacturing and exporting ores, metals, and chemicals;
it was heavily integrated with the Russian economy. The people and
local business elites there felt they had the most to lose from a turn
toward the EU because of their strong links with Russia. A popula-
tion that viewed Russia favorably and an assortment of local elites with
36 Julia Mostovaya [Юлия Мостовая], “Behind the Screen [За ширмой],” zn.ua, Febru-
ary 5, 2016.
37 Max Fisher, ed. “What Does Ukraine’s East-West Divide Have to Do with the Current
Crisis?” Card 10 of “Everything You Need to Know About the Ukraine Crisis,” Vox, Septem-
ber 3, 2014.
38 Leonid Peisakhin, “Why Are People Protesting in Ukraine? Providing Historical Con-
text,” Washington Post, December 19, 2013.
39 Peisakhin, 2013.
Russian ties would prove to be useful and important entry points for
Moscow.
The Information Campaign

Several information campaigns were waged over Eastern Ukraine,
along with sporadic cyberattacks. Even before Yanukovych’s ouster,
Euro-Maidan in Kharkiv, which helped organize the first pan-Ukrai-
nian Forum of Euro-Maidans, suffered a major distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attack.40 In February, following Yanukovych’s ouster,
DDoS attacks targeted government websites. The initial attacks were
not very disruptive, but hackers in October 2014 were able to dis-
able the electronic system for compiling Rada election results, forc-
ing manual tallying of ballots and delaying reporting of results.41 The
hacker group CyberBerkut claimed credit for the attack, claiming it
was a protest against “the junta regime.”42
Social media also became a focus of the information campaign.
Because the two most popular social-media platforms in Ukraine,
VKontakte and Odnoklassniki,43 were hosted on Russian servers, Rus-
sian authorities were able to block pro-Maidan pages and force ser-
vice providers to share personal information about those who “liked”
them.44 Pavel Durov, the founder of VKontatke, sold his remaining
40 “TheSite of the Kharkov Euromaidan Movement Experiences Powerful Hacker Attack,

[Сайт харьковского Евромайдана подвергается мощной хакерской атаке],” Gor-
donua.com, January 9, 2014.
41 “Cyber Attacks in Ukraine: Who and How Carries Out the ‘Offensive’ on Sites
[Кибератаки в Украине. Кто и как осуществляет “штурм” сайтов],” Korrespon-
dent.net, October 17, 2014; “Large-Scale Cyberwar Conducted Against Ukraine” [Против
Украины ведется масштабная кибервойна],” obkom.net.ua, April 14, 2014.
42 “Cyberattacks
on the Central Election Commission Website,” unian.net, October 26,
2014; “CEC Postponed the Announcement of the Results of Cyberattacks on ‘Elections’
System [ЦИК перенес дату оглашения результатов из-за кибератак на систему
«Выборы»],” nbnews.com.ua, October 25, 2014.
43 In 2011, as many as 67 percent of Ukrainian social-media users had active vKontakte
accounts, 54 percent Odnoklassniki, and 43 Facebook accounts. See Smartica/Skykillers,
“Internet in Ukraine,” presentation, 2012.
44 Gianluca Mezzofiore, “Ukraine Crisis: Russia Blocks 13 Maidan Protest Internet Pages,”
International Business Times, March 3, 2014; and “Durov Refused to Give Personal Data of
stake and fled Russia in April 2014.45 As violence on the ground esca-
lated, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki provided a tool for soliciting con-
tributions and recruiting in Russia for such groups as “AntiMaidan,”
“Donbas People’s Militia,” and “Fund to Help Novorossiya.”46 Social
media also captured the activities of the separatists, the Russian equip-
ment being provided to them, and much of the violence waged against
them.
One significant element of the Russian information campaign
was the rekindling of the term Novorossiya.47 Putin mentioned this con-
cept in a speech on April 17, 2014, recalling that Eastern and South-
ern Ukraine—or the third of the country from Donbas to Odessa,
including the regions that are predominantly Russian speaking—were
historically parts of the Russian Empire. Putin’s rendition of history of
Novorossiya was self-serving, as the term existed only on the margins of
Russian body politic since 1990, although some state officials imagined
it as a potential lever against Ukraine should it turn sharply West.48
The use of this term raised concerns in the West in that it implied that
Russia intended to dismember Ukraine in pursuit of a larger irredentist
the Organizers of Euromaidan Social Media Groups [Дуров отказался выдать ФСБ
личные данные организаторов групп Евромайдана],” uainfo.org, April 17, 2014.
45 Danny Hakim, “Once Celebrated in Russia, the Programmer Pavel Durov Chooses
Exile,” New York Times, December 2, 2014.
46 JamesBradshaw, “MH17: Ukraine Rebels Find a Gathering Place on VKontakte,” Globe
and Mail, July 18, 2014; Mark Snowiss and Danila Galperovich, “Russian Social Media
Fortify Rebellion in Ukraine,” Voice of America, June 30, 2014; “How Social Media Trans-
formed Pro-Russian Nostalgia into Violence in Ukraine,” The Conversation.com, Octo-
ber 16, 2014; Mumin Shakirov, “I Was a Separatist Fighter in Ukraine,” Atlantic, July 14,
2014; “The ‘Titushki’ Got Their Own Meme. It Is Funny and Sad at the Same Time! [У
«титушек» появился собственный мем. Смех и грех!],” argumentinedeli.ua, February
5, 2014.
47 A reference to a part of the Russian Empire stretching across Southern and Eastern
Ukraine. This was formed into a province in the 18th century, comprising lands from the
Hetmanate and those gained from the Ottoman Empire. The region has its own distinct his-
tory and changed hands several times in the early 20th century during the Russian Revolu-
tion and the anti-Bolshevik White Movement.
48 Anatol Lieven, Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry, Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute for Peace, 1999.
cause.49 The term, with its historical overtones, helped Moscow appeal
to imperialist nationalists, rekindling memories of when large swaths
of Ukraine belonged to Russia. A leader of this movement was Pavel
Gubarev, a far-right separatist leader and one of the so-called people’s
governors, who founded the Partiya Novorossiya in May 2014.50
Novorossiya also made the case for justice and historical legitimacy
of the separatists’ actions in the eyes of some Russians. It helped Rus-
sian leaders foster the cause among leaders in Eastern Ukraine, and
gave a grand concept and idea to the separatist movement and a reason
for Russian volunteers to join it. This political slogan turned the sepa-
ratist effort into a cause and eventually a common banner for the dispa-
rate forces (Figure 3.3). In May 2014, the self-proclaimed Luhansk and
Donetsk republics formed the confederation of Novorossiya and the
United Armed Forces of Novorossiya. In short order, it became appar-
ent that separatism had rather shallow roots, leading Russian officials
to quickly drop the term Novorossiya; nevertheless, it continues to be a
rallying cry for the separatists and a unifying term for various groups
in the breakaway republics. Putin may have only mentioned it a few
times, but the frame was used to glue together the political ideology
behind the separatist military effort and construct an imagined histori-
cal foundation.
However, by the time of the September 2014 Minsk accords, the
project had effectively been abandoned by the Kremlin because it was
incompatible with schemes to reintegrate the Donbas with Ukraine.
Although the United Armed Forces of Novorossiya technically lives on
in separatist imaginings, for Russia, this was an information mecha-
nism that lost utility by the beginning of summer 2014. One study
concluded that this project “was abandoned in Moscow either due to
49
Adrian A. Basora and Aleskandr Fisher, “Putin’s ‘Greater Novorossiya’—The Dismember-
ment of Ukraine,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2014.
50 John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Vladimir Kolosov, “The Rise and Fall of ‘Novoros-
siya’: Examining Support for a Separatist Geopolitical Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine,”
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2016.
Figure 3.3
Separatist Groups in the Army of Novorossiya
DPR
DPR Republican Guard
3rd “Horlivka” Motor Rifle Brigade
Vostok Brigade
Kalmius Brigade
Oplot Battalion
Miners’ Division/4th Motor Rifle Battalion
Voshod Battalion
DPR Security Service Battalion
Steppe Battalion
Sparta Battalion
Somalia Battalion
Russian Orthodox Army
Independent DPR forces
Orthodox Dawn
Chechen “Death” Battalion
Varyag Battalion
“Batman” Battalion
Legion of Saint Stephen
Jovan Sević Detachment
South Ossetian and Abkhaz Groups
Luhansk People’s Republic

Zarya Battalion
Leshiy “Forest-Spirit” Battalion
Great Host of Don Cossacks
Independent LPR forces
Prizrak “Ghost” Brigade
Cossack National Guard
Continental Unit
Unit “404”
J F MAM J J A S O N D J F MAM J J A S O N D
2014 2015
NOTE: List based on research conducted by Roger McDermott of the Jamestown Foundation
and Michael Kofman (coauthor of the report) of the CNA Corporation in addition to known
data about the various separatist groups that participated in the conflict. Great Host of Don
Cossacks, Independent LPR forces, and Prizrak “Ghost” Brigade are not part of the same
group; they are different groups fighting for the same cause.
RAND RR1498-3.3
its implausible nature, or manifest failure in the face of resistance across

many parts of southeast Ukraine.”51
Moscow sought to dredge up a political entity from the past
with its own coterie of ideological fighters and leaders that sought to
use the specter of Novorossiya as leverage to bargain with Ukrainian
authorities. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the Russian leadership’s
attempt to advance Novorossiya as a political and information project
was ambitious. Russia sought to conjure an imaginary country to trade
it for political concessions from the Ukrainian government.
Russia’s information campaign was more successful at agitating
the West than at delivering tangible results in Ukraine. Studies using
survey data and technical analysis of the penetration of Russian broad-
casting signals found that the impact of the campaign was grossly over-
estimated. The message proved polarizing rather than mobilizing, even
where Russian television signals had the most coverage and viewer-
ship. While the campaign increased hostility toward and distrust of the
Ukrainian national government, it did little to mobilize public support
of separatism.52 Ultimately, Ukraine banned Russian broadcasts to the
extent it could in the rest of the country, while national viewership of
Russian news and other media drastically declined.53
In the Donbas, support for the national government and the sepa-
ratist cause was equally tepid. Russian-backed separatists had to resort
to force because the information campaign failed to rally an indigenous
uprising that could sweep Eastern Ukraine.54 Far from being an inte-
gral element, the information campaign remained a sideshow through-
out the conflict. In characterizing the importance of the information
campaign, it is often assumed that activity translated into achievement
and because Russia invested in the effort, it must have had an impact.
51 O’Loughlin, Toal, and Kolosov, 2016.

52
Leonid Peisakhin, “Russian Media and Ukraine’s Domestic Politics,” presentation at the
Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., April 15, 2015.
53 “Ukraine Bans Russian TV Channels for Airing War ‘Propaganda,’” Reuters, August 19,
2014.
54 Kofman and Rojansky, 2015.
The “Separatists”
Despite the ineffectiveness of the central government, Ukraine never
had a power vacuum. Indeed, like the central government, even the
protest-movement leaders were likely backed by some of the oligarchs
and local power brokers.55 The separatists and the vested interests
behind them were intertwined in a complex game. Oligarchs in the
east had plenty to lose in the aftermath of the Maidan movement,
since their patronage party (Party of the Regions) was politically deci-
mated, and much to gain from backing protests as part of a bargain-
ing game with those newly arrived in power. Pro-Russian opportunists
and ideologues hoped that they could ride the wave of public outrage
into power, while Russian imperialists expected that Moscow would
intervene militarily in Eastern Ukraine as it did in Crimea. These indi-
viduals were not interested in devolution of power or preservation of
the Russian language but outright fragmentation of Ukraine, and they
hoped military action would spur a Russian intervention.
At the point of inception, the separatist movement seized on
the mobilization of the ‘anti-Maidan’ sentiments emanating foremost
from Crimea. Russian media fostered and sought to spread the griev-
ances and political fears of this movement (as discussed earlier in this
report). The separatist movement was an evolution of the earlier effort
to support political agitation in Eastern Ukraine, with an eye to force
national-level concessions from the central government. If Kyiv lost
control of eastern regions to separatists, the instability would let Russia
press for the federalization of Ukraine. In the most optimistic scenario
for Russia, Southern Ukraine would join these separatist movements
as well.
The separatist movement underwent a significant transition in
March 2014, when the initial protest leaders were arrested, making
space for figures such as Strelkov to take charge. Strelkov is often
described as a Russian intelligence officer,56 and he was indeed a retired
55 Oleg Shynkarenko, “Who’s Funding East Ukraine Militancy?” Institute for War and Peace
Reporting, May 16, 2014.
56 Irena Chalupa, “Russians’ Once-Secretive Commander in Ukraine Is on the Air,” Atlan-
tic Council, November 18, 2014.
Federal Security Service (FSB) colonel, but this is an overly simplistic

representation of why he became involved. He was also a well-known
ideologue and Russian nationalist who participated in the annexation
of Crimea as a paramilitary fighter and subsequently decamped for
Eastern Ukraine—most likely with Russian assistance and a hand-
ful of fighters (possibly former Berkut).57 His adventure in Ukraine
may have been sanctioned by the Russian authorities, but a variety of
sources have reported that he was acting in the interests of Konstan-
tin V. Malofeev, a wealthy Russian oligarch with deeply religious and
nationalist views that closely aligned with Strelkov’s own.58
Strelkov was joined by Alexander Borodai, another right-wing
nationalist, who became prime minister of the DNR in May 2014.
With extensive media experience, Borodai was quite likely the politi-
cal strategist brought to help glue together the concept of the separat-
ist republics. Borodai knew Girkin from the Transnistrian conflict in
the early 1990s,59 had been a member of various nationalist causes,
and worked for the ultranationalist newspaper Zavtra.60 Like Girkin,
Borodai is alleged to have links to Malofeev and was also involved in
the annexation of Crimea as a political consultant for Sergei Aksyonov,
who has been the political leader of Crimea since annexation.
Later in summer 2014, Girkin and Borodai were both replaced.
By August, it was clear the separatists were on the precipice of fail-
ure, and a negotiated settlement with Ukraine would prove difficult
57 Alexander Mercouris, “Insight and Limitations of Russia’s Most Popular Military Hero
(Igor Strelkov),” Russia Insider, February 7, 2015.
58 Courtney Weaver, “Malofeev: The Russian Billionaire Linking Moscow to the Rebels,”
Financial Times, July 24, 2014; “Konstantin Malofeev: Fringe Christian Orthodox Financier
of the Donbas Separatists,” Jamestown Foundation, August 8, 2014.
59 The Transnistria War was a short conflict in Moldova that broke out in 1992 following
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, Transnistria remains a largely unrecognized
country which sought to break away from Moldova, and a frozen conflict, with Russian
forces still stationed in the region. Several of the prominent separatist leaders, like Borodai
and Girkin, allegedly participated in pro-Russian protests during this conflict. They also
supposedly had links to Crimea’s governor (and criminal leader) Sergei Aksyonov. Harriet
Salem, “ Who’s Who in the Donetsk People’s Republic,’ July 1, 2014.
60 Tom Balmforth, “A Guide to the Separatists of Eastern Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, June 3, 2014.
to orchestrate given that the leaders of the separatist republics were

both Russian citizens (i.e., externally introduced actors who could not
negotiate on behalf of the breakaway regions). In effect, the facade of a
locally inspired rebellion became pointless. The two separatist leaders
were compelled to give up leadership in mid-August 2014, 61 with Boro-
dai replaced as head of the DNR by Alexander Zaharchenko. Since
returning to Russia, Strelkov has been banned from appearing in the
media despite being considered the hero of the insurgency by many
Russians, and he only gives interviews to fringe media outlets.62
Employment of an informal network of fighters in post-Soviet
republics as well as of individuals such as Strelkov with shady busi-
ness and intelligence connections indicates that Moscow sought entry
into Ukraine through existing informal networks and linkages among
elites. The use of nationalist-minded fighters suggests that rather than
a professional covert operation, Russia was engaged in an ad hoc effort
using available auxiliaries and ideologues with extensive military expe-
rience. Separatist commanders in Eastern Ukraine shared common
traits and history, some having fought in Transnitria, the Chechen
Wars, and a series of post-Soviet conflicts.63 Individuals such as Strel-
kov engaged in historical reenactments between conflicts, dreamed of
restoring the Russian Empire, and craved an opportunity to fight in
any war on Russia’s periphery.64
At the heart of this approach were flexibility, opportunism, and
an economy of resources, which came at the price of cohesion, control,
and eventually would result in problems for Moscow. Strelkov’s fight-
ers, who may have been funded by Malofeev, were one of the major
elements in the overall separatist force, a mishmash grouping whose
61 Carol J. Williams, “Two More Top Separatist Leaders Abandon Eastern Ukraine Battle,”
Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2014.
62 Benjamin Bidder, “Russian Far-Right Idol: The Man Who Started the War in Ukraine,”
Spiegel Online International, March 18, 2015.
63
Politica-UA, “Strelkov-Girkin Decided to Restore Russian Empire 20 Years Ago
[Стрелков-Гиркин задумал восстановить Российскую Империю еще 20 лет
назад],” June 14, 2014.
64 Politica-UA, 2014.
leaders had military experience and connections to Russia’s intelli-

gence services. Early volunteers from Russia constituted the backbone
of these small units, supported by local Ukrainian Berkut and Alfa
units.65 There is an abundance of information in Russian sources about
international fighters traveling to fight with the separatists and the
recruitment of volunteers in Russia to fight in Ukraine.66
Strelkov’s so-called South-East Army would encompass a ragtag
group of volunteers, criminals, and misfits. Strelkov’s own accounts
of his experience commanding forces in Chechnya indicate that he
never commanded a force larger than a company of 150 soldiers.67
Moscow could not count on controlling such a force through Strel-
kov. Hence, other military units, such as the Vostok battalion, repre-
sented the real firepower and military experience for the movement.
Vostok, formed in 1999, was originally a Chechen battalion during
the Second Chechen War. The unit in Ukraine was probably formed
around a core of veteran fighters from the original Chechen unit along
with experienced fighters from the Caucasus, including Dagestanis,
Abkhazians, and South Ossetians.68 The chain of control probably
consisted of Chechen fighters who were present with the permission of
65 “These Are Our People [Это наши люди],” vz.ru, April 12, 2014.
66 “There Is a Problem: In Perm, Volunteers are Recruted for Border [Есть проблема В
Перми набирают добровольцев на границу],” 59.ru website, September 18, 2014;
“Four Natives of Ingushetia Were Killed in the Fighting in Ukraine,, Said Yevkurov [В
боях на Украине были убиты четыре выходца из Ингушетии, заявил Евкуров],”
kavkaz-uzel.eu, June 6, 2014; “Volunteers from Chechnya Arrived in Novorossiya to Catch
Militant Isa Munayev [Добровольцы из Чечни приехали в Новороссию, чтобы
поймать боевика Ису Мунаева (видео)],” Lugansk News, October 29, 2014; Glas
Rusije, “The Commander of the Serbian Unit in Luhansk: Passenger Plane Was Hit by
Ukraine [Командир сербского отряда в Луганске: пассажирский самолет сбила
Украина],” RuSerbia.com, August 19, 2014; “New Volunteers from Serbia to Join the
Franco-Serbian Team [Новые добровольцы из Сербии присоединяются к франко-
сербской бригаде],” Rusvesna.su, September 22, 2014; “Chinese Volunteers Arrive in
Donbass [В Донбасс прибывают китайские добровольцы],” on-planet.ru, September
30, 2014; and “Tags: Lugansk Guard,” cxid.info, undated.
67
“Igor Strelkov: To Crush the Ukrainian Army, It Is Necessary to Fight [Игорь Стрелков:
«Чтобы разгромить украинскую армию, надо воевать],” December 1, 2014.
68
Claire Bigg, “Vostok Battalion, A Powerful New Player in Eastern Ukraine,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, October 27, 2015.
Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov, 69 who is fiercely loyal to Putin.

The Ukrainian unit was being armed and funded by Russian elites to
maintain plausible deniability. Vostok was led by Alexander Khoda-
kovsky, the commander of an Ukrainian Alfa unit who defected before
taking Vostok’s lead.70
Vostok was possibly the enforcing unit within the separatist move-
ment, deployed to impose Moscow’s control over some of the disparate
elements involved in this conflict. In May 2014, it raided the headquar-
ters of the Donetsk Republic as part of an effort to clean up the criminal-
ity and institute discipline among the separatists. There were numerous
personality conflicts, with commanders such as Khodakovsky openly
criticizing the political leadership of the separatist republics. The vari-
ous fighting units saw little utility to the political organization placed
in charge of the DNR. Different elements of the Russian government
may have been responsible for the political and military aspects of this
operation.71 While the political process of annexing Crimea did not go
smoothly, Eastern Ukraine seems to have posed a far greater military
and political coordination challenge for Moscow.
Strelkov coordinated with Vostok through personal contact
only.72 Another prominent battalion, Oplot, was also under his partial
control. This unit formed as a more militant anti-Maidan movement
in Kharkiv and would later become the armored spearhead of the sepa-
ratists, who fought alongside Vostok. The overall force represented a
diffuse Russian effort, with nationalists leading a group of motivated
volunteers and a professional mercenary unit ensuring that the Krem-
lin could retain some semblance of a guiding hand. It appears Russia
allowed Strelkov to figurehead the overall effort because he proved
69
Alice Speri, “Yes, There Are Chechen Fighters in Ukraine, and Nobody Knows Who Sent
Them There,” VICE News, May 28, 2014.
70 Alec Luhn, “Volunteers or Paid Fighters? The Vostok Battalion Looms Large in War with
Kiev,” Guardian, June 6, 2014b.
71
Jaroslav Koshiw, “Donestsk Separatists in Dispute—Khodakovsky vs Strelkov,” Open-
Democracy.net, August 11, 2014.
72 Aleksandr Prohanov and Igor Strelkov, “Who Are You, ‘Shooter’? [Кто ты,
«Стрелок»?],” Zavtra, November 20, 2014.
both popular and successful and distrusting because of his zealotry. An

alternative reading of why the separatist structure was so incoherent is
that it proved to be the outcome of competing Russian intelligence ser-
vices operating inside Ukraine, including the GRU, FSB, and Foreign
Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki [SVR]).
The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp

Oligarchs were as important as Russian or Ukrainian decisionmakers
in the early phases of the conflict. A complete analysis requires consid-
ering the role of surrogates and powerful nonstate actors in the conflict.
Konstantin Malofeev, a Russian billionaire vested in Orthodox
Christian causes, was readily able to fund Strelkov’s campaign and the
entire movement. He was interested in getting “the Russian Empire
back.” Strelkov and Borodai, both early leaders of the separatist move-
ment, were his former employees, as was Sergey Aksyonov, who orga-
nized the Crimean referendum. In Crimea, Strelkov had complained
that he had no official status or support from local authorities and
was only able to operate on the basis of his personal relationship with
Aksyonov.
It is not known if Malofeev acted as a conduit for Moscow’s inter-
ests or if he acted independently and later received sanction for his
initiative. It made sense for Russia to use private networks of indi-
viduals, such as Malofeev, and their connections in Ukraine to achieve
its objectives while maintaining deniability. Elements within the sepa-
ratist movement likely received support from Ukrainian elites, former
Yanukovych associates in exile, and other Russian oligarchs, hence,
they did not start with a single agenda or unified command.73
Kolomoisky, who was made governor of Dnipropetrovsk, sent
squads to round up and dispose of any pro-Russian agitators. He
funded and equipped volunteer battalions, namely Dnipro-1, along
with others, and sent them to Mariupol in Eastern Ukraine. This force
was improvised, but it stopped the separatist advance in the city and
was the major source of resistance that Strelkov’s forces encountered
in the early phases. Moscow did not anticipate that Russian-speaking
73 Shynkarenko, 2014.
elites in Ukraine had strong nationalist sentiments and were willing to

defend the country.74
Rinat Akhmetov controlled Donetsk’s economy and local poli-
tics. He was the largest employer in the Donbas, with more than
280,000 workers, and the de facto ruler of Mariupol. In some respects,
the Donetsk region was his economic fiefdom. He is still the richest
man in Ukraine, valued at $12.5 billion, several times more than other
oligarchs.75 When fighting broke out in Mariupol between separat-
ists and volunteer militias in April 2014, Akhmetov sent thousands of
steelworkers from his companies Metinvest and DTEK to take control
of the streets and establish order.76 This was a self-interested action, but
it halted fighting in the city, hindering the separatist ambitions and
allowing more time for a Ukrainian response.
Akhmetov may have played a critical yet subtle role in the con-
flict; he had the potential to be the most powerful Ukrainian power-
broker. During the early period of popular protests, Akhmetov saw
Russia’s attempt to push for federalization as a welcome opportunity, as
he hoped this would leave him in charge of Donetsk but with a much
stronger hand relative to the national government.77 Those ambitions
quickly evaporated, and Akhmetov was sidelined by Russian separatist
leaders, forced to enter into a sort of cooperation with them. He con-
trolled the industrial enterprises responsible for much of the economy,
while separatists were politically and militarily in charge of the region;
neither side could live without the other. Ultimately, Akhmetov could
prove to be the long-term victor of this entire war, with the separatist
republics returning to Ukraine with some of his most loyal supporters
74 Alan Cullison, “Ukraine’s Secret Weapon: Feisty Oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky,” Wall Street
Journal, June 27, 2014.
75 “The Owner of Donbass, Businessman Rinat Akhmetov Survived the War and Is Pre-
paring to Return to Politics [Хозяин Донбасса Бизнесмен Ринат Ахметов пережил
войну и готовится вернуться в политику],” meduza.io, March 25, 2016.
76
Andrew Kramer, “Workers Seize City in Eastern Ukraine from Separatists,” New York
Times, May 15, 2014.
войну и готовится вернуться в политику],” 2016.
installed in leadership roles—a choice that could prove acceptable to

both Moscow and Kyiv.78
Russia’s Possible Lessons Learned
In this section, we explore the Russian experience in Ukraine and

the lessons Moscow may draw on as a result of this operation. These
include proportionality of investments versus desired benefits, know-
ing the target, working with nonstate entities, attracting fighters, and
the timing of operations. Admittedly speculative, we review some of
the possible lessons below.
Small Investments Yield Small Benefits

In contrast to Crimea, where Russia executed a quick and successful
operation, the separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine seemed to be an
improvised effort. Unlike Crimea, Russian efforts in Eastern Ukraine
met resistance from the outset and resulted in a sequence of adapta-
tions. These led to a vertical escalation of the conflict, which, by all
appearances, Russia wished to avoid, as it would result in a conven-
tional war and necessitate its direct participation. Even the early phases
did not involve the concentrated use of Russia’s intelligence and mili-
tary assets. Russia sought to use an economy of force effort, leveraging
private networks, business interests, and useful operatives.
While this had the advantage of low cost and deniability, its
drawbacks were in effectiveness and predictability. Russia succeeded
in destabilizing Ukraine, but the process was fitful and challenging
to control. There were two lessons: First, starting an insurgency in a
politically and militarily weak neighboring state is not difficult, and,
second, such an insurgency does not necessarily translate into national-
level concessions. The outcome Russia sought—the federalization of
войну и готовится вернуться в политику],” 2016.
Ukraine—was well beyond the scope of the resources it devoted to the

insurgency.
The strategy behind Russia’s evolving approach focused on mini-
mizing political and geopolitical costs. Russia could have started with
conventional war, a quick invasion, and victory over Ukraine’s mili-
tary, but that would have been exercising force far in excess to that
required for its objective of destabilizing Ukraine. A military invasion
of the Donbas would have profound ramifications for Russia’s relation-
ship with the West and an unpredictable domestic reception among
Russians. However, Russia precisely mounted a conventional invasion
after trying lower-cost options. Russia wanted the Donbas as leverage
to gain control over Ukraine’s strategic orientation, not to sever it, and
sought to pay the lowest price possible to accomplish this.
Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target

Russia’s effort at political warfare was based on poor assumptions about
Ukraine. While Moscow leveraged the help of some oligarchs for its
cause, other nonstate actors blocked Russian efforts. Kyiv eventually
proved willing to fight, first at the civil society and eventually at the
national leadership level. Russia seized upon a large degree of inter-
nal instability, however, at a time of strong nationalist sentiment in
Ukraine following the victory of a popular movement. This political
operating environment proved unpredictable. Arguably, Ukraine was
a difficult target from the outset: the largest country in Europe, with a
complex network of nonstate actors, local power brokers, and a diver-
sity of ethnic and linguistic groups. Russia found Ukrainian support
for a national identity stronger than expected and the prevalence of
pro-Russian or separatist sentiments to be much weaker.
Were Russia to attempt political warfare or launch a state-
sponsored insurgency elsewhere, would it follow a similar path as in
it did in Ukraine? The answer depends on the overarching objectives.
In Ukraine, this approach lent itself to sowing instability but proved
incapable of forcing major concessions from the national leadership
without escalating to conventional warfare. Perhaps in another former
Soviet Republic, with a different set of structural and operational con-
ditions, political warfare would have greater impact.
In that case, the stages of conflict escalation may not be dissimi-

lar, but Russia would be going into this with the Ukrainian experi-
ence in mind and a clearer understanding of what political warfare can
and cannot accomplish. For several months, Russia was able to deny
Ukraine control of the eastern regions, but this campaign was not able
to deliver national-level concessions. Moscow did not get the deal it
wanted until several conventional battles were won, with the last in
February 2015. Moscow may eschew an indirect approach in favor of a
conventional operation, which, in the case of Syria, has yielded demon-
strable results. The conventional operation, however, lacks some of the
advantages of political warfare, which is comparably cheaper, less risky,
and deniable.
Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control

Russia had too few of its own operatives in Ukraine at the onset of
the conflict, especially given the size of the geography. It was not able
to control the leaders and irregulars that it had sponsored—powerful
personalities with their own ideology and interpersonal conflicts. In
the future, Russia may avoid this approach in favor of covert action,
backed by conventional forces, which worked in Crimea. By employing
paramilitaries, mercenaries, and ideologues, Russia invested in a mess
instead of a constructive means to achieve political objectives. Despite
several prominent assassinations and dismissals, the conglomeration of
personalities and agendas continues to plague the present-day separat-
ist republics.
Nonstate Actors Matter

Oligarchies are based on the rule of a few elites, which means that the
most powerful actors may not be government officials. Thus, in oligar-
chies, taking on the state is not enough to achieve a political change
within it. Oligarchs are independent actors who need to be co-opted or
neutralized for political warfare to be successful. If their power remains
unaddressed, it may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle and block
such efforts as, for example, the spread of insurgency (Kolomoisky and
his lieutenants did just that in April 2014). Russia incorrectly focused
on the central government in Ukraine, which was weak, and failed
to account for the actions Ukrainian oligarchs might take. The oli-
garchs helped Ukraine take action against the insurgency and formed
a bulwark against rapid expansion of separatist control, albeit for their
own rather than the state’s interests. Weak states often have powerful
nonstate actors and vested interests. Russia’s periphery is replete with
countries with weak national governments and without functioning
institutions but with strong networks of undemocratic elites who could
offer surprising resistance.
Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters

Frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union provide pools of fighters
from which Russia may draw. Russia can count on standing fighters in
autonomous republics such as Chechnya and perhaps elsewhere in the
North Caucasus (e.g., Abkhazia and Ossetia). Russia can hire combat
groupings from these regions, where each conflict generates more fight-
ers. The annexation of Crimea helped create volunteers to fight in the
Donbas; with thousands of enlisted locals, armed Russian volunteers,
and other trained fighters, it has offered a large resource pool for future
wars. Russia may not have as many fighters available in the Middle
East or Central Asia, but it now has a growing manpower resource for
use in future wars. Using such fighters can be advantageous compared
with employing regular soldiers: the latter comes with an array of polit-
ical consequences and international implications, such as deniability
concerns, potentially fragile domestic support, political fallouts from
casualties, and legal issues.
Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent

Russia deployed a large number of military personnel on Ukraine’s
borders, but this conventional threat lost effectiveness as a deterrent
over time. A Royal United Services Institute report in April 2014 esti-
mated that 48,500 troops in maneuver units alone were positioned
near the Ukrainian border, with perhaps 94,000 if counting support
units. This was a consideration that would weigh heavily on Ukrainian
decisionmakers and affect advice provided by the West to politicians in
Kyiv.79 However, by May, it was increasingly doubtful that Russia had

the intention to conduct a large-scale conventional invasion; by end of
June, the Russian Parliament revoked the authorization to use force.
That decision ended the utility of conventional forces for intimidation.
The initial impact of Russia’s large military deployment was a dif-
fusion of Ukrainian defense efforts but in summer 2014, this effort
failed to discourage the launch of the Anti-Terrorist Operation to
retake separatist-held cities. In early March and April 2014, Ukraine
hastily shifted units from the west to the east, but not necessarily to the
combat zone. Still fearing Russian invasion, Ukraine has built miles of
trench lines along its border to the north, far from the Donbas or any
place of fighting.80 Overall, the threat of an invasion worked for Russia
in Crimea, but not in Eastern Ukraine. Moscow likely walked away
with an understanding that the window of time for using its conven-
tional force to distract and deter a military response is quite narrow. It
has potent coercive power, but the effect dissipates quickly if the force
is not used.
Political Timing Is Important

A government turnover in Kyiv resulted in public outrage, anxiety, and
protests in the east. Russia sought to act before the Ukrainian state
could politically consolidate itself after the Maidan demonstrations.
In retrospect, it may have been prudent for Russian leaders to wait and
see, taking time to plan their actions, but Moscow saw Ukraine as vul-
nerable and likely did not wish to allow political cohesion to take place.
This unusual situation may recur in any of Russia’s autocratic neighbors
should there be a poorly managed political transition or internal crisis.
Was internal instability absolutely necessary for Russia to launch
a campaign of political warfare? No, and the history of the Cold War is
replete with the United States and Soviet Union using political warfare
79 Igor Sutyagin and Michael Clarke, “Ukraine Military Dispositions, The Military Ticks
Up While the Clock Ticks Down,” Royal United Services Institute Briefing Paper, April
2014.
80 ThomasBarrabi, “‘Great Wall of Ukraine’ Is ‘a Priority,’ Petro Poroshenko Says: Donbas
Defense Construction Set for April,” International Business Times, March 27, 2015.
to effect change in countries that otherwise would have been stable. The
Ukrainian experience suggests that while Moscow seized the advantage
during a time of national vulnerability for Ukraine, it may have also
behooved Russian leaders to wait and construct a more thoughtful, less
improvised plan for handling their neighbor.
Russia’s Operational Shortcomings
While Russia achieved its overarching goal of destabilizing Ukraine

and imposing a peace settlement that is favorable to Moscow’s position
in this conflict, the campaign in Eastern Ukraine illustrated numerous
operational shortcomings for Russia. It failed to achieve the leverage
necessary without resorting to conventional war and outright invasion,
while its strategic impact remains inconclusive, as the conflict is still
unsettled. In the next section, we review some of the operational mis-
takes that hindered the campaign’s success.
Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare

The events from protests in March to direct action in April indicate
that Russia’s intelligence apparatus struggled to manage the various
moving pieces within its political-warfare campaign. Russia thought
it could maintain control over the disparate elements but struggled
to manage the groups, their leaders, and competing agendas. In some
instances, Moscow appeared to be sponsoring more than controlling
the movement; its grip was challenged by the existence of other actors.
Strelkov, for example, expected that, once his fighters seized Slovyansk
in mid-April, Russia would intervene militarily as it did in Crimea.81
The expectation of a Crimea scenario is a common thread that runs
through expectations on both sides of the conflict. Moscow clearly
had other plans and sought to avoid an overt military invasion. Russia
would later make major changes to reassert control over the separat-
ists in late May and again in July by removing Strelkov and Borodai.
81
“Crimea and the Kremlin: From Plan ‘A’ to Plan ‘B’ [Крым и Кремль: от плана ‘А’ к
плану ‘Б’],” Radio Liberty, October 27, 2015.
The interaction among Russian intelligence, business interests, and

Ukrainian oligarchs was also convoluted and merits more investiga-
tion. Rinat Akhmetov, for example, clearly sought to play both sides,
was sidelined, and has reemerged as still the strongest nonseparatist
powerbroker in the region.
Moscow is, no doubt, capable of launching a gray-zone or ambig-
uous conflict, but Ukraine indicates that it may be unable to control
the course of such a war, particularly in the short term. It is impossible
to say if Russian leaders will conclude that the attempts at political
warfare and irregular warfare in Ukraine were ill-conceived or poorly
executed—possibly both. If the purpose was to avoid escalation to a
conventional war, then the operation failed. Moscow may conclude
that repeating such an operation is too fraught with risk and unpredict-
ability. However, Russia more likely will use the lessons from Ukraine
to refine how it goes about political warfare, particularly where use of
conventional force is prohibitive. Undoubtedly, the Ukraine case offers
a significant amount of data and experience for Russia’s military and
civilian intelligence services: GRU, FSB, and SVR.
Russia Was Ineffective at Inspiring Separatism

Unlike calls for federalization and autonomy, the separatist movement,
bannered as Novorossiya, did not gain traction with the population.
Despite efforts to brand it and to infuse the movement with histori-
cal legitimacy, the Ukrainian public remained unenthusiastic. Instead,
the information campaign was most effective on the Russian popula-
tion, popularizing the mission of the separatists and endowing them
with a purpose. As the separatist movement encountered resistance,
Russia found itself without good options other than steady escalation.
Naturally, Russia found it easier to enlist those among its population
who were ideologically inclined for nationalist or religious reasons to
fight in Ukraine, rather than convince Ukrainian citizens to embark
on what would effectively be a civil war.
Poor Assumptions Guided Moscow’s Strategy

Moscow’s approach appeared to be based on several false assumptions
founded in historical views of Ukraine and in the remarkable success
of operations in Crimea. The annexation of Crimea was an easy opera-

tion for Russia but also, as noted, likely an experience that could be
difficult to repeat. By contrast, Russia’s campaign in Eastern Ukraine
was one of adaptation and perpetual adjustments. Russia appeared to
assume that:
• It could exploit divisions between Eastern and Western Ukraine.

• Russian-speaking populations in Eastern Ukraine did not value a
Ukrainian identity and would support separatism.
• Russian speakers in Ukraine would not resist pro-Russian move-
ments or defend the new Ukrainian government because it repre-
sented Western Ukrainian interests.
• Ukraine was a failed state that was incapable of effective govern-
ment response to a security challenge.
• Ukraine would not be able to muster an effective military response.
Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict

Some Western analysts characterized the campaign in Eastern Ukraine
as a hybrid war; this perspective is incorrect. Rather, the conflict from
February to August cycled through four different types of warfare:
political, irregular, hybrid, and conventional. There are no indicators
that Russia intended to conduct a hybrid war, despite arguments in
some circles that such a doctrine and approach exists within the think-
ing of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Little about the early days of the conflict in Ukraine is indicative of the
supervision and involvement of the General Staff. Russia’s selection of
tactics was not doctrinally driven but, rather, it was a series of impro-
vised responses to Ukrainian resistance.
Although the conflict cannot be neatly separated, there was a
brief but important period from May 26 (First Battle of Donetsk Air-
port) to August 24 (Russia’s conventional invasion) in 2014, during
which Russia employed a hybrid approach. The integration of irreg-
ular fighters, conventional capabilities, and regular Russian units in
summer 2014 seems to have been an effort to bridge the desire for
vertical escalation with low costs and deniability. By late August 2014,
these attempts visibly had failed, resulting in a conventional inva-
sion by regular Russian units. Subsequently, Russia chose to turn the

separatist forces into a conventional army mirrored on Russia’s own
force, which can be read as Moscow’s verdict on the utility of hybrid
approaches in Ukraine. Hybrid approaches did not disappear from the
battlefield, just as information warfare did not cease to be employed,
but they became relatively inconsequential to the large presence of con-
ventional forces engaged in what became classical position and maneu-
ver warfare. Ukraine is a case study not in pioneering new nonlinear
approaches but in the failure of hybrid warfare to deliver the desired
political ends for Russia.
Conclusion: Implications and Effects
Russian leaders sought to pay the lowest price possible for destabiliz-
ing Ukraine and gaining major political concessions from the interim
government during a time of crisis. The cycle of escalation reflects an
attempt to bid low in an effort to insert instability, and then press
for a federalization scheme. Russia seems to have acted on ill-formed
assumptions and in doing so, underestimated the costs and instigated
a chaotic campaign of warfare with the intention of staying below the
conventional threshold. The policy imperatives in Ukraine were such
that Russian leaders proved eventually willing to pay a high political,
economic, and military price.
Russia remains unable to freeze the conflict on the terms it
achieved in Minsk II, but in many respects, this effort proved effective
in establishing a point of influence over Ukraine’s domestic and inter-
national affairs. It is difficult to deny the importance of this unsettled
conflict in Eastern Ukraine. A war, and a host of fighters on Ukrainian
territory that Russia can control, has important ramifications for Kyiv’s
hopes of moving the country into NATO or the EU. Of course, the
future is far from certain.
Some would argue that, as a consequence of the conflict, Russia
has galvanized Ukrainian public opinion and political discourse in a
decidedly Western direction. This assertion could be correct, but the
geopolitical implications of a Western shift are uncertain. Ukraine was
allegedly on such a path following the Orange Revolution in 2004,

which failed to deliver. Indeed, the Orange Revolution eventually
resulted in the election of Yanukovych, the same president who was
forced to flee after the Maidan protests of 2013–2014. These political
forces and even the same individuals who participated in that move-
ment’s collapse ten years ago are still very much involved in Ukrainian
politics today. Hence, the future of Russian influence depends on how,
and if, the Minsk agreements are implemented, along with whether
or not Ukraine’s political leadership is able to reform the country and
break with its oligarchic past.
CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusion
This report aimed to explore what occurred during the annexation of

Crimea and the early days of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. As part
of the research into these events, we looked at tactics, intentions, and
important factors that contributed or detracted from Russian opera-
tions. We also investigated the relevance of information warfare and
the important social, historical, and political contexts in which it
evolved. This report attempted to draw lessons and conclusions about
what Russian military and political leaders may have learned from the
successes and failures of operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
At the same time, because a variety of nonsystemic factors contributed
to Russian decisionmaking on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, we have
refrained from drawing wider conclusions about a Russian model or
doctrine of warfighting.
Russia’s operation to annex Crimea represented decisive and com-
petent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Although the
political steps toward annexation appeared clumsily managed, Russia
was able to seize the territory of a neighboring state with speed and
mobility, deploying a nimble and professional force, while using its
conventional superiority as an operational distraction. The political
maneuvering on the peninsula during the invasion suggests that it
may have been launched without a predetermined political outcome
in mind. Russia likely sought to seize Crimea, and then evaluated
its political options depending in part on how the intervention was
received at home and abroad.
73
There was no tailored information-warfare element for Crimea,

and the information warfare that Russia did wage is difficult to assess
as a decisive element relative to the actual use of force. Information
operations and their influence on Russian-speaking Crimeans were a
by-product of the domestic campaign being waged inside Russia to
manage public opinion and ensure approval. In Crimea, both the
information war and the operation as a whole benefited greatly from
several missteps by Ukrainian leadership and the pervasive sense of
public anxiety after the ouster of Yanukovych. Russia took advantage
of these sentiments in a predatory manner, fueling public fears of right-
wing violence.
Russia’s operations in Crimea also benefited from a series of highly
favorable circumstances—political, historical, geographical, and mili-
tary—that limit this case from serving as a model for similar opera-
tions in the future. Many unknowns remain about Russia’s military
capabilities after the reforms and modernization program launched in
2009. Given Ukraine did not resist and only a small, distinctly capable
slice of the Russian force was used, it is impossible to make broader
assumptions about the state of the Russian army based on this episode.
Moscow did demonstrate effectiveness in using deception and surprise,
but its greatest success was capitalizing on Ukrainian weakness, mis-
steps, and slow or ineffectual decisionmaking.
There is little basis for generalization from Crimean operations
about Russia’s doctrine or preferred method of waging war. This was a
covert operation that resulted in a conventional invasion. Despite limi-
tations in analysis, we can infer a good deal about the performance of
elite or special forces, along with mobility, lift, and communications.
The integration of national decisionmaking with the deployment of the
military and the speed of that command chain is noteworthy.
Some of the political and societal conditions and economic fac-
tors that were present during the events in Ukraine may be found else-
where in the former Soviet Union, but certainly not all. It is difficult
to envision the same combination of political, military, and geographi-
cal circumstances intersecting to create another similar situation. The
unanswered question is whether or not all such conditions are required
for Russia to pursue a similar outcome elsewhere. The experience in
Conclusion 75
Eastern Ukraine lends credence to the notion that, when offered resis-
tance and when less suitable conditions prevail, operations become
more iterative, escalatory, and far less surgical.
In Crimea, Russia achieved quick success through direct applica-
tion of military power, while in Eastern Ukraine, its leadership took an
entirely different approach. There, Russia sought to negate the strate-
gic impact of the victory of a pro-Western uprising in the capital and
retain influence in Ukrainian regions by engaging in political war-
fare. Moscow hoped a grassroots anti-Maidan movement—comprising
local elites, opportunists, and a network of provocateurs—could force
the new government in Kyiv to devolve power to the regions and fed-
eralize the country. Oligarchs and vested interests provided networks
for access to Ukraine and served as enablers for such an approach. Ulti-
mately, Russia sought Ukraine’s destabilization and hoped to force a
federalization scheme on the country. Moscow leveraged private net-
works, some with their own agents, in the hopes of accomplishing this
goal at low cost and with plausible deniability.
As sponsored political upheavals met resistance, Russia under-
took more direct action in hopes of inspiring a broader insurgency in
Ukraine and accomplishing the same objectives by leveraging limited
use of force. These events began concurrently with the annexation of
Crimea but followed an entirely different scheme. As operatives seized
Ukrainian security forces’ infrastructure, Russia could have pursued a
conventional invasion, but instead Russian leadership did not appear
to seek the annexation of the Donbas. This surprised the separatist
leaders, who assumed that Russia intended to replicate the Crimean
annexation on a larger scale and had hoped for such an outcome. There
was to be no replication of the Crimean approach to Eastern Ukraine.
Moscow attempted to spread the insurgency but kept its objectives
limited to instability and undermining the interim Ukrainian govern-
ment. It did not seek to annex the Donbas because the region was
useful to Russia primarily if it remained an unstable part of Ukraine
that Russia controlled. If Russia annexed it, then it would assume all
the financial responsibility for it and sacrifice the region’s strategic
value to influence Ukraine. While Donbas may de facto be fully under
Russian control today, for Russia, bearing responsibility for Donbas is
undesirable. According to the Minsk II agreement, which remains the

only framework for settling the conflict, the Donbas and its associ-
ated costs will be returned to Ukraine. Attempts to seize control were
ultimately a tactic in a strategic bargaining game. The entire Russian
effort in Eastern Ukraine could be characterized as an ineffectually
implemented—and perhaps ill conceived—campaign to gain lever-
age over the central government and the country’s long-term strategic
orientation.
Russia’s information war in Eastern Ukraine polarized the popu-
lation, but ultimately Ukraine proved infertile ground for separatism.
Moscow’s information campaign achieved partial success in conjuring
a historical and justifiable cause for the separatist movement (Novoros-
siya) that would attract Russian volunteers at home. However, this too
was a failure, since it did not scare Ukraine’s leaders and was promptly
abandoned by Moscow. Russia’s efforts in Eastern Ukraine may have
failed in part because of false notions about Ukrainian society, along
with poor planning for dealing with nonstate actors. Russia was not
able to effectively control the disparate elements involved in its efforts.
Moscow devoted an increasing amount of resources to the conflict,
ultimately escalating it to a conventional war with its own regular units
in the lead.
It is difficult to say what the Russian leaders and national secu-
rity establishment took away from the Ukrainian experience. Do they
view it as a mixed success, the costly outcome of a messy operation?
No doubt, given the high levels of popularity and public support at
home, Russian leaders may consider Crimea to have been worth it: a
clean demonstration of Russian power with tangible gains. Russian
leaders likely walked away from Crimea seeing it as a highly effective
operation, but one that could not be easily repeated elsewhere. Mean-
while, Eastern Ukraine achieved some strategic objectives but was
marred with operational failures, and it is highly doubtful Moscow
would want to reproduce the situation elsewhere. Russia still stands to
achieve its primary objectives, but at a much higher cost than desired
and through a painful cycle of adaptation.
If Russia seeks to spread instability to other neighboring states,
then it may seek to use an adapted version of its approach in Ukraine.
Conclusion 77
Valery Gerasimov, the current head of the General Staff, wrote in his
famous 2013 article that each conflict requires the formulation of its
own logic.1 That frame of mind is likely to persist in the Russian mili-
tary establishment. Ukraine offers lessons, but not necessarily models.
Gerasimov’s article commented on the modern nature of warfare,
rather than outlining a particular doctrine or institutional approach.
There is nothing here to suggest that the Russian military sees the util-
ity of a Crimea- or Eastern Ukraine–type approach against a NATO
member.
There is undoubtedly some broader applicability to other former
Soviet Republics with Russian-speaking populations. In these regions,
such as Belarus or Kazakhstan, Moscow may feel it has a larger stake.
Russian interests in its near abroad may compel a similar or modified
intervention in the event of a political crisis or overturn of friendly
leadership, and enabling factors that were found in Ukraine are at least
partially present elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. However, Rus-
sia’s seizure of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine may have insti-
gated preparations among its neighbors that would render such opera-
tions more complex to conduct in the future. If Russia draws lessons
from its experience in Ukraine, so will other countries on its periphery,
and they will become more wary and implement reforms to reduce
their chances of suffering a similar fate.
1 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science in Prediction,” Military-Industrial Courier,

February 27, 2013.
APPENDIX A
Information Campaign
This appendix provides an outline of Russian messaging during both

campaigns. It offers further details about the content of Russian mes-
sages, tools or mechanisms used for propagation, and other notable
aspects of the information warfare component to these operations.1
I. Main Themes
1. Crimea-Specific Messaging
• Land historically belonged to Russia.

• The acquisition of Crimea by Ukraine in 1954 was a historical
mistake.
• KrymNash (“Crimea Is Ours” [КрымНаш]) campaign.
• Ethnic Russian and all Russian-speaking populations of Crimea
are under severe ultra-nationalist threat.
• In no way was Russia involved in events in Crimea; the referen-
dum was initiated and carried out by the people of Crimea.
• Crimean soldiers voluntarily gave up their weapons and pro-
nounced their allegiance to Russia.
• Bright images of oppressed “Russian population,” “Berkut”
heroes, “polite green men.”
1 This appendix is a compilation based on research conducted by Katya Migacheva and

research assistant Andriy Bega in 2015.
79
2. Maidan Uprising
• The West orchestrated the uprising.

• Majority of protesters were violent anti-Russian ultra-nationalists.
• Yanukovych fled as a result of a violent coup d’état against his
government; the new government of Ukraine is illegitimate.
• Signing the association agreement would betray Ukraine’s rela-
tionship with Russia.
• Signing the association agreement would have devastating conse-
quences for Ukraine.
• In fear for their lives, hundreds of thousands of Russians fled
Ukraine.
• Maidan revolution is fascist, nationalist, and anti-Semitic.
3. Weakening Ukraine as a State
• Ukraine is an economically failed state.

• Ukraine is an artificial state that did not exist before 1991.
• The Ukrainian language is nothing more than a combination of
Russian and Polish.
• Ukraine has no viable future without Russian subsidies and
patronage.
4. Vilifying Ukraine as a State
• The Ukrainian government acts in the interests of the United

States and other foreign powers.
• The Ukrainian government is overrun by violent ultra-nationalists.
• The pro-European population of Ukraine are ideological descen-
dants of Nazi supporters and fascists.
5. Glorifying Russia
• Russian history and tradition necessitate its own Russian

Path—a unique approach to human rights and development
trajectory.
Information Campaign 81
• The fall of the Soviet Union was a disaster of global proportions.

• Russia constitutes the center of the Slavic/Orthodox world.
• Russia is the principal fighter of fascism.
• Russia stands for truth and against the world domination and
hegemony of the United States.
• Russia bears the responsibility of protecting Russian diaspora
(Russkiy Mir) everywhere.
• Russia has finally gotten off its knees and mustered strength to
resist the greedy and self-serving policies of the West.
6. Strengthening Russia
• Updated Military Doctrine (2010)

• Announcement of the new Military Doctrine (January 2015).
7. Identifying Internal Enemies
• Opposition is betrayal.
• Search for the “fifth column.”
8. Weakening the West
• The morality of the Western world fundamentally differs from

the morality of the Russian people.
• European countries are gravely dependent on Russia for gas and
import-export relationships.
• The time of Western civilization is decadent and has come to an
end: It is rotting from the inside.
• Western countries and the United States are simply displeased and
afraid of Russia’s rising power, hence their reaction to its actions
and their isolationist policies.
9. Vilifying the West
• Western countries, and especially the United States, are the core
orchestrators of the events in Ukraine.
• NATO expansion and limiting Russia’s capabilities are the main

motivations for the actions of most countries in the EU, the
United States, Canada, and Australia.
• The United States is pressuring European countries to continue
sanction policies against Russia.
II. Main Tools

1. Media Channels
• Russia-controlled television channels in Russia, Ukraine, and the

West
–– news reports
–– talk shows
–– documentaries and “special reports.”
• Internet news sites based in Russia, Ukraine, and the West

• social-media blogs and communities
• Print newspapers based in Russia, Ukraine, and the West
• Leaflets and printed materials distributed at events
• Billboards during the Crimea referendum.
2. Speakers
• Vladmir Putin, Sergei Lavrov, and other Russian politicians and

experts
• Ukrainian politicians and experts
• Pro-Russian organizations and political parties in Ukraine
• Western politicians and experts from Europe and the United
States
• Local protest leaders
• Regular citizens and “professional” protest participants
• Celebrities and intelligentsia.
Information Campaign 83
3. General Tone and Methods
• Undermining legitimacy of Ukraine’s government

• Creating sense of threat and emergency
• Manipulating historical facts and memory
• Strong emotional emphasis, combined with fact manipulation,
misinformation, and half-truths
• Oversimplifying the reality—“one big dividing line in Ukraine”
• Creating ambiguity.
4. Oppressing Alternative Views
• Almost absolute media control in Russia

• Harassment of journalists during events in Ukraine
• “Trolling” of alternative media or opinions.
APPENDIX B
Timeline (February 18–May 31, 2014)
• February 18–20: Severe violence in Kyiv: about 100 shot and

more than 300 missing.
• February 20
–– Ukrainian Parliament orders a ceasefire in Kyiv.
–– EU sanctions against Yanukovych and other politicians respon-
sible for violence.
• February 21
–– Opposition leaders and Yanukovych sign a settlement agree-
ment mediated by Russia (which declined to sign the docu-
ment), France, Germany, and Poland. The agreement stipulates
that early presidential elections will take place in December
2014, a national unity government will be created by early
March 2015, and Ukraine will return to its 2004 constitution.
–– Protesters contest the agreement and demand immediate snap
presidential elections and immediate return to 2004 constitu-
tion.
–– Yanukovych and a large number of his party members flee to
Russia through Eastern Ukraine.
• February 22: Ukrainian Parliament impeaches Yanukovych and

returns to 2004 constitution.
–– Yanukovych denies impeachment, claims he remains president
of Ukraine, and has no intention of resigning.
–– Putin condemns Yanukovych’s impeachment and supports the
“ousted president.”
85
–– U.S. and European leaders support the people of Ukraine and

its Parliament’s decision.
–– Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Ioulia Tymochenko is
released from prison.
• February 23
–– Ukrainian Parliament appoints interim president Turchynov
and decides to hold snap presidential elections on May 25.
–– Ukrainian Parliament repeals 2012 law on the principles of the
state language policy.
• February 25: Thousands of pro-Russian protestors rally in Sevas-

topol in favor of greater autonomy from Ukraine and closer ties
to Russia; Pro-Russian businessman Alexei Chaliy is “appointed”
as mayor.
• February 27
–– Ukrainian Parliament votes for the interim government; Yatse-
nyuk becomes prime minister.
–– “Polite military people,” also known as “green men,” take over
the Council of Ministers and the Parliament of the Autono-
mous Republic of Crimea.
–– In an “emergency session,” the Crimean Parliament dismisses
Crimean Prime Minister A. Mohylyov and “appoints” V.
Aksenov in his place.1
–– Russian forces occupy strategic facilities in Crimea and carry
out the blockade of the Ukrainian army and fleet, roads, and
airports to prevent interference from Ukrainian authorities.
Some military and law-enforcement agencies defect to the Rus-
sian side.
1 The legitimacy of the vote is dubious as the Parliament’s “emergency” meeting was held
in a building surrounded by the “green men” in the absence of a Parliament quorum and
Aksenov’s party had received less than 4 percent of the votes in the 2010 Crimean Parliament
elections. As a result, Ukraine’s General Prosecutor Office immediately stated that the deci-
sions of the new Crimean government were unconstitutional and illegal.
Timeline (February 18–May 31, 2014) 87
• February 28: Acting Ukraine President Turchynov vetoes Parlia-

ment repeal of 2012 law on the principles of the state language
policy; Russian language retains its status as regional language.
• March 6
–– Ukrainian television channels are shut down in Crimea and
Internet connections are interrupted.
–– Crimean Parliament sets a “referendum” to determine the
future of Crimea on March 16.
–– Behind closed doors and with some ministers of Parliament
not allowed to participate, the Parliament of Crimea “votes”
to secede from Ukraine and join Russia and “asks” Russia to
“launch the procedure of Crimea becoming part of Russia.”
–– Crimean government sets to create new government ministries
independent from Kyiv and announces plans to take ownership
of all Ukrainian state-owned enterprises on Crimean territory.
–– Russia begins preparations for annexation of Crimea.
–– The United States announces sanctions “on individuals and
entities responsible for violating the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ukraine.”2
• March 11: Crimean Parliament “declares” Crimea independence

from Ukraine.
• March 13
–– Clashes take place between several hundred of pro-Kyiv dem-
onstrators with pro-Moscow protestors in the Eastern Ukrai-
nian city of Donetsk, resulting in the death of one pro-Kyiv
protester and at least another dozen injured.
–– Russia’s Defense Ministry announces that military exercises
involving thousands of troops in the Rostov, Belgorod, Kursk,
and Tambov regions bordering Ukraine will continue through
the end of March.
2 U.S. Department of State, “Ukraine and Russia Sanctions,” undated.

–– Ukrainian Parliament votes to create a new National Guard of

60,000 men recruited from the Maidan and Ukrainian mili-
tary academies.
• March 15
–– Russian troops occupy a natural gas distribution center near
Strilkove, on a strip of land outside the Crimea peninsula
(Kherson Oblast).
–– Russia is the only country to veto the United Nations Security
Council Resolution on Ukraine.
• March 16: Crimean “referendum” takes place with no access to

independent observers, under the threat of armed “green men”
and militia in the streets and polling locations, who intimidate
pro-Kyiv groups, including Crimean Tatars (who, along with
Ukrainians, boycotted the “referendum”). Because Ukrainian
authorities refuse to share voters list, the “referendum” uses an
ad-hoc voters list. Voter participation is estimated at 30–50 per-
cent, but Crimean authorities report an 83-percent participation
rate.
• March 17
–– Results of the “referendum” show 97 percent of voters in the
referendum reportedly favored Russia.
–– The EU and the United States sanction Russian officials.
–– Putin recognizes Crimea as sovereign state.
• March 18
–– Putin, Crimean “Prime Minister” Aksyonov, Chair of the
Crimean Parliament Konstantinov, and “Mayor” of Sevastopol
Alexey Chaly sign a treaty on “reunification of Crimea with
Russia.”
–– One Ukrainian solider is killed and another wounded during
a confrontation while Russian military forces and pro-Russian
militia storm a military base in Simferopol, Crimea.
–– Ukrainian Ministry of Defense authorizes the use of deadly

force by the Ukrainian military in cases of self-defense.
• March 19
–– Ukrainian National Security Council announces evacuation
of all 25,000 of Ukraine’s military personnel from Crimea to
mainland Ukraine.
–– Approximately 300 Crimean “self-defense” forces and “green
men” seize and raise the Russian flag over the headquarters
of the Ukrainian navy in Sevastopol and another naval base.
Ukrainian military personnel leave the base while Ukrainian
Rear Admiral Gaiduk is detained as hostage and released later
that day after Ukraine’s Acting President’s ultimatum.
• March 20: The EU expands its sanctions against Russian officials

and U.S. President Barack Obama announces additional sanc-
tions.
• March 21: Putin signs laws formally “admitting Crimea to Rus-

sian Federation.”
• March 22
–– Russian armed forces, supported by armed militia, take con-
trol of Belbek airbase in Crimea in an assault that injures one
Ukrainian military officer.
–– Pro-Russian protestors rally in Donetsk in favor of greater
autonomy within Ukraine for the eastern regions, the return of
former president Yanukovych to power, early local and regional
elections, and a referendum on the future of the eastern region.
–– Beginning of the six-month special monitoring mission from
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in
Ukraine.
• March 24
–– Russian forces seize another naval base in eastern Crimea,
resulting in two Ukrainian servicemen wounded and more
than 50 detained.
–– The Ukrainian government orders its troops to pull out of

Crimea.
• March 27
–– International Monetary Fund announces an agreement to pro-
vide up to $18 billion in loans in return for tough economic
reforms and to prevent the country’s default.
–– In a 100 to 11 vote (including 58 abstentions), the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopts a measure calling the
“referendum” in Crimea invalid.
• March 28
–– About 2,000 Right Sector members rally outside of the Ukrai-
nian Parliament, demanding a full investigation of the death of
one of their leaders and the resignation of the interior minister.
–– Russian State Duma unilaterally renounces Russian-Ukrainian
Naval-Base-for-Gas treaty signed in 2010.
• April 1
–– In a unanimous vote, the Ukrainian Parliament passes legisla-
tion that orders the Ministry of Interior and the Special Ser-
vices to immediately disarm the illegal groups, including the
ultranationalist Right Sector and others throughout Ukraine.
–– NATO suspends all civilian and military cooperation with
Russia.
–– Gazprom eliminates a discount on natural gas imports given to
Ukraine in November 2013, raising the price from $268.5 to
$385.5 per 1,000 cubic meters.
• April 3: Gazprom announces that it will end the 2010 gas dis-
count agreement with Ukraine, resulting in a price increase to
$485.5 per 1,000 cubic meters.
• April 5: Ukraine’s interim Prime Minister Yatsenyuk rejects Rus-

sia’s gas price hike and blames Moscow for “economic aggres-
sion,” resulting in a new “gas war” between Ukraine and Russia.
• April 6
–– In Donetsk, pro-Russian activists storm the regional govern-
ment building and demand that the Donetsk Oblast vote to
authorize a referendum on allowing the “Donetsk Republic”
to join Russia.
–– In Luhansk, separatists surround the regional SBU, break into
an armory room, and seize guns.
• April 7: Pro-Russian activists in Donetsk proclaim the region’s

independence from Ukraine, the creation of the DNR, and set
May 11 for a “referendum” that would allow the region to become
part of the Russian Federation.
• April 8: Ukrainian forces conduct an “antiterrorist” operation by

in the eastern city of Kharkiv after pro-Russian protestors seized
a local government building. They retake the seat of the regional
administration, and arrest approximately 70 separatists, seizing
their weapons.
• April 12: Pro-Russian forces take control of security facilities

and weapons in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhivka, while
an additional attack is turned back in Krasnyi Lyman; unrest in
Donetsk continues.
• April 14: Pro-Russian protesters seize the police headquarters in

the Eastern Ukrainian city of Horlivka and raise the Russian flag.
• April 15: The Ukrainian military and special police forces begin
“antiterrorist operations” in Eastern Ukraine to oust pro-Russian
forces that are occupying government buildings and security
facilities.
• April 19: Kyiv authorities suspend “antiterrorist operations”

during the Easter holiday.
• April 20: The New York Times publishes photographs provided by

the Ukrainian government to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe that show direct Russian military involve-

ment in Eastern Ukraine.
• April 21: The United States announces a $50 million assistance

package for Ukraine.
• April 22: The bodies of two men, including one local politician
supportive of Kyiv, showing signs of torture are found outside of
Slovyansk, prompting interim Ukrainian President Turchynov to
call for the resumption of antiterrorist operations by Ukrainian
forces.
• April 23
–– Ukrainian military retake Sviatogirsk from pro-Russian fight-
ers.
–– “Emergency talks” on natural gas supply begin between Russia
and Ukraine.
• April 24
–– Ukrainian forces take back the city hall in the Black Sea town
of Mariupol from pro-Russian separatists.
–– Ukrainian forces clash with pro-Russian militants in Slovy-
ansk and Artemivsk.
–– Russia orders its forces along the border with Ukraine to engage
in military exercises.
• April 25: Pro-Russian forces in Slovyansk seize a group of seven

international observers tied to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe as well as five Ukrainian army personnel
and their driver.
• April 26: Russian fighter jets violate Ukrainian airspace seven

times.
• April 28
–– Gennady Kernes, the mayor of the Eastern Ukrainian city of
Kharkiv and an ally of Yanukovuch, is shot in an apparent
assassination attempt.
–– The United States announces a new set of sanctions against
seven additional Russian government officials and 17 compa-
nies with ties to “Putin’s inner circle.”
• April 29: In Luhansk, pro-Russian separatists open fire on a

police station, take the headquarters of the Luhansk regional gov-
ernment, and gain control of the regional prosecutor’s office and
television headquarters.
• April 30
–– International Monetary Fund board approves a two-year $17
billion aid package for Ukraine.
–– In the city of Horlivka, north of Donetsk, “green men” with
automatic weapons occupy the city council building.
–– As a response to the threat of Russia starting a war against
mainland Ukraine Ukraine’s Acting President places the armed
forces on “full combat alert.”
• May 2
–– Reported attempt of Russian armed fighters to cross Ukrainian
border.
–– Fans of Odessa football club Chornomorets and Kharkiv club
Metalist march after the match For United Ukraine under the
protection of the local police. Pro-Russian separatists attack
the fans. In the ensuing battle, pro-Russian separatists retreat
to the Trade Unions house, which is lit on fire, resulting in 42
deaths.
• May 7: Putin announces that Russian troops pulled back from

Ukraine’s border (NATO sees no signs of pull back).
• May 9: Putin visits Crimea.

• May 11: Eastern rebel-held regions held a referendum to vote on

whether or not these provinces should be given more autonomy.
• May 14: In Antratsyt, separatists hold meeting against Ukrainian

presidential elections.
• May 17: All-Ukraine unity dialogue in Kharkiv.
• May 18: Pro-Russian meeting in Odessa gathers about 300 people.
• May 25: Ukrainian presidential election results in Petro

Poroshenko’s victory.
• May 26: Ukrainian military defends Donetsk Airport from sepa-

ratist attack.
• May 31: Pro-Russian separatists meet in Donetsk.

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This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February–March 2014)
and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern
Ukraine (late February–late May 2014). It examines Russia’s approach, draws
inferences from Moscow’s intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods
being used again elsewhere.
These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons
for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia’s operation to
annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in
pursuit of political ends. Russia’s operations in Crimea benefited from highly
favorable circumstances—political, historical, geographical, and military—that
limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are
many remaining unknowns about Russia’s military capabilities, especially in the
aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds
that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented—and
perhaps ill-conceived—effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via
federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives
but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation.
This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course
of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation
to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within
Russia’s armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the
structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether
it can be repeated elsewhere.
A RRO YO CENT ER
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ISBN-10 0-8330-9606-0
ISBN-13 978-0-8330-9606-7
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C O R P O R AT I O N

Lessons from Russia’s

Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk,

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public

Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

be a conventional takeover. This effort was principally a by-product of

A coterie of well-known local political agitators, businessmen,

The authors would like to thank Timothy Muchmore for initiating

APC armored personnel carrier

In fall 2013, a series of popular protests erupted in Kyiv’s central square,

cumstances and conditions unique? Would Russian leadership con-

Kovel Shostka UKRAINE

Lviv Zhytomyr Kyiv Lubny Kharkiv

The Annexation of Crimea

How Russia Annexed Crimea

This chapter looks at Russia’s operation to annex Crimea. We begin

The Balance of Forces

This force included 41 tanks, 160 infantry fighting vehicles, 47 artil-

February 22 and 23, as battalions of Spetsnaz (elite infantry) units and

UKRAINE NORTH OF CRIMEA

Armyansk Chonhar March 8. Russian troops arrive and

March 9. Russian troops VO

capture missile depot. RUS

5 Howard Amos, “Ukraine: Sevastopol Installs Pro-Russian Mayor as Separatism Fears

sian special operations forces (likely Special Operations Command,

diers without markings surrounded Belbek Air Base. On the morning

10 Howard and Pukhov, 2014.

motor rifle brigades, towed artillery, a variety of air-defense units, and

13 Shane Harris, “Hack Attack,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2014.

enthusiastic participants in the events but had to be rounded up by

some soldiers later resigned and returned to Crimea.20 By March 26,

Russia’s Information Campaign

media. Ukraine had largely ceded Russian-language information to

On the Ukrainian On the Role of Western

• The Crimean land • The Ukrainian gov- • Western countries,

to action, suggesting people sign a government petition and demand

Characteristics of the Crimean Operation

Russian operations in Crimea represented, by all accounts, an efficient

ries, and pensions were substantially higher in Russia than in Ukraine.

Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea

Russia’s Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine

Ukraine’s interim government was surprised to discover its relative

Russia also had the element of complete surprise, something it

Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success

The second error occurred on February 24, when Igor Mosi-

the population, while the last provided supporting forces to facilitate

Factors Enabling Russia’s Operational Successes

Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels

Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover

Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower

Preparing for Counterattack

Factors Contributing to Russia’s Operational