GROUP 5: CONSTI 2 CASES - MICHO

4. Assistant Executive Secretary vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76761

10. People vs. Bolasa, G.R. No. 125754
16. People vs. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137
22. UNIDO vs COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17
28. Islamic Da'wah Counsil vs Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9,
2003
34. People vs Samus, G.R. 135957-58, September 17, 2002
40. Moslares vs CA, 291 SCRA 440 (1998)
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Assistant Executive Secretary vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76761
Facts:
Larrabaster applied with the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) for a home lot at
the Marbel Settlement District, Cotabato and was granted. He leased the lot to private
respondent, Basilio MENDOZA, and tolerated Jorge Geller to squat on the portion thereof. Land
Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) took over the functions of the NLSA.
Larrabaster and his wife assigned their rights and interests over the Disputed Property to Jose B.
PEÑA. Notwithstanding the transfer, PEÑA allowed Mendoza and Geller to stay on the lot.
Republic Act No. 1160 transferred the custody and administration of the Marbel Townsite to the
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). PEÑA requested NARRA to
approve the transfer of rights but the latter did not act thereon in view of Proclamation No. 336,
series of 1956, returning to the Bureau of Lands the disposition of the lots which remained
unallocated by the LASEDECO at the time of its abolition. The Bureau of Lands did not act on
PEÑA's request either, prompting him to bring up the matter to the Board of Liquidators
(BOL).The BOL denied the request. PEÑA moved for reconsideration but the BOL again denied
the same under its Resolution No. 439, series of 1967. PEÑA appealed to the Office of the
President. Upon PEÑA's motion for reconsideration, it was granted and BOL approved his
request. Private respondent MENDOZA addressed a letter-protest to the BOL and responded by
advising MENDOZA to direct its protest to the Office of the President. He did and while his protest
with the Office of the President was still pending, MENDOZA resorted to Civil Case for certiorari
before the then Court of First Instance of Cotabato against the petitioners-public officials and
PEÑA. MENDOZA followed up with a Supplemental Petition to annul the administrative Decision
denying his protest.
TC dismissed his petition. CA reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in holding that private respondent Basilio Mendoza
has been denied due process of law.

Held: Yes. In ruling that the Decisions of the Office of the President were vitiated by failure to
accord due process of law to MENDOZA, respondent Appellate Court relied on its observations
that MENDOZA was: (1) not made a party to the administrative case; (2) not served with a copy
of the 10 February 1969 Decision; and (3) not notified of proceedings before the 13 May 1969
Decision nor served a copy thereof. The foregoing observations do not justify the conclusion
arrived at. After the Office of the President had rendered its Decision dated 13 May 1969,
MENDOZA filed a letter-protest on 1 August 1969 with the BOL. The latter office directed him to
file his protest with the Office of the President, which he did. On 28 September 1971, MENDOZA's
request for reconsideration was denied by said Office. So that, even assuming that there was
absence of notice and opportunity to be present in the administrative proceedings prior to the
rendition of the 10 February 1969 and 13 May 1969 Decisions by the Office of the President, such
procedural defect was cured when MENDOZA elevated his letter protest to the Office of the
President, which subjected the controversy to appellate review but eventually denied
reconsideration. Having thus been given a chance to be heard with respect to his protest there is
sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.

It should also be recalled that MENDOZA filed his petition for certiorari before the then Court of
First Instance of Cotabato seeking to annul the 13 May 1969 Decision. At the time it was
presented on 27 January 1970, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration with the Office of the
President, involving the same Decision, was still pending. In fact, it was only on 28 September
1971 that said Office denied reconsideration. Evidently, MENDOZA had abandoned his pending
administrative request for reconsideration in favor of judicial proceedings. Again, therefore,
MENDOZA cannot justifiably claim that he was denied due process.
REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT: DETERMINATION BY A JUDGE
People vs. Bolasa, G.R. No. 125754

Facts:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening
of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain
house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon
together with SPo1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and
parked their car some 300 meters away. They walked towards their quarry’s lair accompanied
this time by their unnamed informer. When they reached the house they “peeped (inside)
through a small window and x x x saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana.”
They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and
thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who
turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent
examination of the tea bags by the NBI however denied on the witness stand ownership over the
confiscated tea bags and drug implements.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizure and subsequent arrest were valid?

Rule:
No. The court held that the tea bags containing the marijuana “were not seized in plain view or
inadvertently discovered.” There was “no valid intrusion” and the accuse were “illegally
arrested.” The police officers “intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw
and ascertained the activities of accused inside the room.” Further, the court contended that the
apprehending officers “should have conducted first a surveillance” considering that the identities
and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance
and “determining the existence of probable cause” for arresting the accused, they should have
“secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure.” The court stated that “the
arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal.” Every evidence thus
obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against the accused. The court held that the
State “cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their
houses, papers and effects.” The constitutional provision “protects the privacy and sanctity of
the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.”
SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE
People vs. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137

Facts:
Appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates were caught in a COMELEC checkpoint a bag
filled with marijuana on April 10, 1995 at Ulas, Davao City. The three were on board a Honda TMX
motorcycle speeding past the checkpoint area. They were obliged to return to the checkpoint as police
officers blew the whistle and made the order. The huge military back pack was first suspected to contain
a bomb and so they were ordered to open it. The three refused to open the bag and instead passed it on
to one another. When found out what the bag contained Vinecario denied ownership of the bag and
dissuaded the police that it was only handed to him by a fellow military as a request to bring it on for his
cousin in Tagum Roxas because the latter could no longer ride the vehicle as it can only accommodate
three persons.

RTC find the three guilty of violating the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. Appellants questioned the validity
of the evidence obtained in the searches as it was allegedly a product of an illegal search.

Issue: Whether or not the search was illegal.

Rule: No. The search was legal. Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as
pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be
stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the
men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or
have been instruments of some offense.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according
to the facts of each case.

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because
of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY AND PETITION: ASPECTS – FREEDOM FROM CENSORSHIP OR
PRIOR RESTRAINT

United Democratic Opposition vs COMELEC GR 56515 03 April 1981

Facts:

A plebiscite will be held for the amendments to the 1973 Philippine Constitution. United Democratic
Opposition is a political organization campaigning for “No” votes. On the other hand, President-PM
Marcos will lead the campaign for “Yes” votes in his nationwide “Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo” radio-
television program. Due to this UNIDO requested COMELEC to direct the tv/radio facilities to give them
the same prime time all over the country which were utilized by Marcos pursuant to equal opportunity
clause. COMELEC denied the said request and the succeeding appeals.

Issue: Whether or not UNIDO was deprived of equal opportunity?

Decision:

Petition denied. The president holds the sacred responsibility to protect and defend the security of all
the people, the stability of the government and the integrity of the national territory, not only for the
tenure to which he has been elected but for all times. He deems it warranted by the circumstances to
present to them a plan of government which includes the modification of the existing structure of
government together with its concomitant allocation of governmental powers, it is not only his right but
his duty to take the people directly into his confidence and impart to them to the fullest measure of his
capacity and by all available adequate means the reasons therefore and the corollary advantages
thereof to their welfare. The opposition has naturally the indisputable right to make every effort to
thwart his objective. But, surely, this is far from saying that it is the duty of the administration to
generously grant to them the means to wage their campaign against it. There are other political parties
similarly situated as petitioner. To grant to petitioner what it wants, it must necessarily follow that such
other parties should also be granted.

Dissecting opinion (Justice Teehankee)

The controlling doctrine of fair and proper submission as laid clown by the Court in Tolentino vs.
Comelec specially in the light of the proposed complex, complicated and radical changes of our structure
of government requires that the people be given adequate time and information as to the "i
amendments to be voted upon for their conscientious deliberation and intelligent consent or rejection .

The Comelec would but faithfully discharge its Constitutional duty if it fully implemented the cited
statute and regulations of its own to assure the widest dissemination of the affirmative and negative
views on the proposed amendments. The technical questions raised in the majority decision as to the
non-impleader of the mass media as parties and other groups and aggrupations who also want to be
heard are mere administrative problems which the Constitution has precisely entrusted to the Comelec
to resolve and determine fairly and equitably.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION: PUBLIC AID TO RELIGION

Islamic Da'wah Counsil vs Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition filed by the Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP)
praying for the declaration of nullity of EO 46 and the prohibition of the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO. IDCP is an NGO that extends
voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. It is accredited by the
Regional Islamic Da’wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) to issue halal certifications in
the Philippines. In 1995, the IDCP formulated internal rules and procedures based on the Qur’an and the
Sunnah for the analysis and inspection of food, and the issuance of halal certifications. That same year,
IDCP began issuing, for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. In 2001, the
Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and
designating the OMA to oversee its implementation. The EO gave the OMA exclusive authority to issue
halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

Issue: Whether or not EO 46 violates the non-establishment clause and the free exercise of religion
provision found in Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: EO 46 violates Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. OMA was created in 1981 through EO
697 “to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due
regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political
and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a national cultural community and not as a
religious group. The OMA should not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the free exercise of religion provision. Classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
OMA the exclusive power to classify products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations like IDCP to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption.

By virtue of the EO, the State has forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an and
Sunnah on halal food. To justify EO 46’s intrusion on the subject, the Solicitor General offered the
argument that freedom of religion is subservient to the police power of the State. The government
allegedly seeks to protect and promote the Muslim Filipinos’ right to health, and to instill health
consciousness in them. The Court rejects this contention. Only the prevention of an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. In the case at bar, there is no compelling justification for the government
to deprive muslim organizations of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise
that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power
to issue halal certifications.
RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION: REQUIREMENT OF COMPETENT &
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
People vs Samus, G.R. 135957-58, September 17, 2002

Facts: Guillermo Samus was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay Niugan,
Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, 62 year old Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson, 6 year old John Ardee Balisi, were
the neighbors of Samus’ father at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. At 4:20 P.M. on 2
September 1996, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia was at his office at the 4th PNP Criminal
Investigation Group Regional Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna when he received an order from his
superior to investigate the murder of the two victims. Their office had received a telephone call from a local
barangay official informing them of the victims’ deaths. Arriving at the victims’ residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San
Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Garcia and his team conducted an investigation, making a sketch of the relative
positions of the victims, lifting fingerprints from the crime scene and taking pictures. Thereafter, an investigation
report was prepared by Garcia and signed by his superior, Colonel Pedro Tango. The investigators likewise found a
pair of maong pants, a white T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A
pair of earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise reported missing from her body by her daughter, Nora B.
Llorera. The victims’ bodies were brought to the Funeraria Señerez de Mesa in Calamba. On that same day,
Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a resident of Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an acquaintance of Samus, happened to
meet Samus at Sammy Pacheca’s house in the same barangay where Samus asked Ponciano to accompany him to
Ponciano’s wife to pawn a pair of earrings. Ponciano’s wife was mad at first but upon Ponciano’s prodding, gave
Samus P300.00 with no interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry box; thereafter, Samus received another
P250.00. At 6:00 P.M. on 10 September 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal Investigation Group received
information that Samus was the principal suspect in the killing of the 2 victims and that he was sighted inside the
residence of spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then formed and led a
team composed of SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence Commission Officer Casis and SPO3 Mario Bitos. Arriving at the site at
past 7:00 P.M., the team, accompanied by local barangay authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo spouses to
enter the house, which was granted. Shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing outside,
they saw Samus crawling on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly jumped from the roof and landed
hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on his ankle and bruises on his left and right forearm. At that point, the
police team closed in on Samus who, while trembling and shaking, admitted the killings upon a query from Rolly
Vallejo. Samus was brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP Investigation Office where he was informed of his
constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the morning of 11 September 1996, Samus, assisted by Atty.
Arturo Juliano, gave his statement admitting the killings. SPO3 Malabanan also took the statements of tricycle
driver Rafael Baliso, the victims’ relatives Salvacion and Mona Balisi and witness Mary Arguelles, who saw Samus
enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi. On the same day, PNP Fingerprint Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra took fingerprint
samples from Samus. His prints exactly matched with a set of prints found at the crime scene. Later that day, SPO3
Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned earrings from Ponciano who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan.

Issue: Whether uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible.

Held: After being illegally arrested, Samus was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during
custodial investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits, the police officers readily admitted
that Samus was subjected to a preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open court, they tried to
skirt this issue by stating that it was only the media that had questioned Samus, and that they were merely present
during the interview. However, an examination of the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the folly of their
crude attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence. In the absence of testimony from any of the media persons
who allegedly interviewed Samus, the uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned and led him to his
confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated Samus and elicited from him uncounselled
admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they executed on 11 September 1997, as well as by their
testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible,
under the present circumstances the Court cannot rule it out because of Samus' failure to make timely objections.
Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution,
because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the
defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have
waived objection to its admissibility. If only Samus had made a timely objection to the admissibility of Pontaños
testimony and the picture of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt, which Samus identified during
his testimony, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to support its
case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present
additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental
fairness.
RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED: DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO BE HEARD

Moslares vs CA, 291 SCRA 440 (1998)

Facts: On 19 February 1991, Honor P. Moslares purchased three units of Toyota Corolla 1600 from
Toyota Bel-Air, Inc. which were thereupon registered under his name, under the name of Manila
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, and under the name of Austra-Phil Homes
Inc. In payment thereof, Moslares issued Philippine Bank of Communications Check 841644 dated 24
May 1991 in the amount of P1,425,780.00. When presented for payment, said check was dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. Thus, Moslares was charged for violation of Batas
Pambansa 22 and for Estafa. The hearings of the case were postponed several times either at the
instance of Moslares or the prosecution, or motu proprio by the court. On 13 September 1995, the
scheduled date of the presentation of evidence by Moslares, he failed to appear, but was represented
by a newly retained lawyer, Atty. Dionisio Landero, who claimed that he was not ready to proceed with
the trial as he was not yet familiar with the case. As a result, the trial court set the promulgation of the
decision on 30 October 1995. On 9 October 1995, Moslares filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Re-Trial.
However, on 26 October 1995 the trial court issued its decision, stating that "Moslares did not attend
during the presentation of evidence for the prosecution nor for the defense. The Court set the
presentation of evidence for the defense 19 times, 4 of which were cancelled on the ground that there
was a typhoon and the public prosecutor was 'indisposed'. But the accused did not even testify and
presented only one witness, a certain Sixto Avila. Subject cases were submitted for decision 4 times for
failure of the accused to present evidence but was lifted in the interest of justice upon motion of the
accused. He changed his lawyer four times everytime the Court ordered the case submitted for decision
for failure of the accused to present his evidence in order to gain a delay." The court therein found
Moslares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of BP 22 (Criminal Case 92-0099 and Criminal Case
92-0100), and sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of 1 year for each criminal case. On 30 October
1995, the trial court proceeded to promulgate in absentia the 26 October 1996 decision. On 14
November 1995, Moslares filed a notice of appeal which was denied due course by the lower court in its
assailed order dated 1 February 1996. The lower court, relying on the case of People vs. Mapalao (197
SCRA 79 [1991]), considered Moslares to have waived his right to appeal. On 14 February 1996,
Moslares filed a petition for relief from judgment which was likewise denied by the trial court. On 14
March 1996, Moslares filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which treated the petition as
one for certiorari. Moslares also filed on 3 October 1996, a petition to post bail, later supplemented. On
29 November 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition for review and
denying the petition to post bail. Motions for reconsideration subsequently filed by Moslares were
denied. Moslares filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Moslares has waived his right to present evidence and deprived of right to be heard.

Held: While it is true that the right to present evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it cannot
be said that Moslares had waived said right in the present case. The postponements sought by Moslares
and counsel appear to be justified and were not vexatious and oppressive. The intention and the
willingness of Moslares to present evidence can be gleaned from the fact that he had already presented
one witness and has other witnesses ready for presentation, although this was delayed, but for
meritorious reasons, such as illness of Moslares and his counsel, Moslares' confinement at a hospital,
ongoing negotiations between the parties, and substitution of counsel. The rights of an accused during
trial are given paramount importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure. Among the
fundamental rights of the accused is the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Verily, this right is
even guaranteed by the Constitution itself. This right has been recognized and established in order to
make sure that justice is done to the accused. Further, the constitutional right of the accused to be
heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to
deprive him of that right. It would have thus been more befitting and seemly of the Court of Appeals
had it ordered the trial court to reopen the case for the reception of Moslares' evidence. Granting that
Moslares had sought a number of postponements, the requirements of substantial justice mandate that
he should have been given his day in court. The grant of a reasonable continuance would have been
sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy disposition of the case but at
the expense of a fundamental right. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have proceeded with the
promulgation of decision on the premise that Moslares had waived his right to appear in court to
present his evidence. Likewise, the Court of Appeals, in affirming said decision, gravely abused its
discretion as it sustained a decision of the lower court rendered in violation of Moslares' right to due
process.