Ecfr79 Euroscepticism Brief Aw PDF
Ecfr79 Euroscepticism Brief Aw PDF
Ecfr79 Euroscepticism Brief Aw PDF
POLICY
THE CONTINENT-
WIDE RISE OF
EUROSCEPTICISM
Jose Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark Leonard
It was once seen as a British disease. But Euroscepticism has In the past, there was an unwritten rule that EU institutions
now spread across the continent like a virus. As data from would police the single market and other technical areas
Eurobarometer shows, trust in the European project has of policy - from common standards for the composition of
fallen even faster than growth rates. Since the beginning of tomato paste to lawnmower sound emissions - while national
the euro crisis, trust in the European Union has fallen from governments would continue to have a monopoly on the
+10 to -22 percent in France, from +20 to -29 percent in delivery of services and policymaking in the most sensitive
Germany, from +30 to -22 percent in Italy, from +42 to -52 areas on which national elections depended.
percent in Spain, from +50 to +6 percent in Poland, and from
-13 to -49 percent in the United Kingdom. Since the crisis began, citizens in creditor countries have
become resistant to taking responsibility for the debts of
What is so striking is that everyone in the EU has been losing others without having mechanisms for controlling their
faith in the project: both creditors and debtors, and eurozone spending. With the fiscal compact and demands by the
countries, would-be members, and “opt-outs”. Back in 2007, European Central Bank (ECB) for comprehensive domestic
people thought that the UK, which scored -13 percent in reforms, Eurocrats have crossed many of the red lines of
trust, was the Eurosceptic outlier. Now, remarkably, the four national sovereignty, extending their reach way beyond food
largest eurozone countries have even lower levels of trust in safety standards to exert control over pensions, taxes, salaries,
the EU institutions than Britain did back in 2007. So what is the labour market, and public jobs. These areas go to the
going on? heart of welfare states and national identities.
The old explanation for Euroscepticism was the alleged To an increasing number of citizens in southern European
existence of a democratic deficit within the EU. Decisions, countries, the EU looks like the International Monetary
critics said, were taken by unaccountable institutions rather Fund (IMF) did in Latin America: a golden straitjacket that
than elected national governments. But the current crisis is squeezing the space for national politics and emptying
is born not of a clash between Brussels and the member their national democracies of content. In this new situation,
states but a clash between the democratic wills of citizens governments come or go but policies remain basically the
in northern and southern Europe - the so-called centre and same and cannot be challenged. Meanwhile, in northern
periphery. And both sides are now using EU institutions to European countries, the EU is increasingly seen to have failed
advance their interests. to control the policies of the southern rim. The creditors have
a sense of victimhood that mirrors that of the debtors.
If sovereignty is understood as the capacity of the people as a community of the prosperous. Czechs are glad that, unlike
THE CONTINENT-WIDE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM
to decide what they want for their country, few in either the Slovaks, who joined the single currency, they were not
the north or the south today feel that they are sovereign. A pressured to contribute to the bailouts of southern eurozone
substantial part of democracy has vanished at the national countries that are seen as relatively rich, irresponsible,
level but it has not been recreated at the European level. and profligate. Meanwhile, Czechs do not see any looming
security threats that might make them think they need the
In a fully functioning national political system, political EU for protection. Recent Czech governments, which have
parties would be able to voice these different perspectives been led by moderate and even die-hard Eurosceptics such
- and hopefully act as a referee and find common ground as former President Václav Klaus, have also contributed to
between them. But that is precisely what the European the general anti-EU mood.
political system cannot deliver: because it lacks true political
parties, a proper government, and a public sphere, the EU
cannot compensate for the failures of national democracies.
Instead of a battle of ideas, the EU has been marred by a Denmark
vicious circle between anti-EU populism and technocratic
agreements between member states that are afraid of their
citizens. Although 2012 is the fortieth anniversary of Denmark’s
accession to the EU, there seems to be little for Danish
Is the rise of anti-EU populism here to stay? The hope is pro-Europeans to celebrate. Net trust in the EU declined
that as growth picks up, Euroscepticism will weaken and from +36 percent in 2007 to +2 percent by 2012. This fall
eventually recede. But the collapse of trust in the EU runs in popular support matters because Denmark sits outside
deeper than that. Enthusiasm for the EU will not return the most integrated part of the EU and cannot integrate
unless the EU profoundly changes the way it deals with its further without referendums. Two of the six referendums
member states and its citizens. held on Europe in the past were lost by the pro-EU camp:
the nej to the Maastricht treaty in 1992 led to opt-outs on
defence, justice, and home affairs and the euro, and laid the
legal foundation for a two-speed Europe. Because of growing
Bulgaria Euroscepticism, Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt
has postponed the referendum on Europe that she promised
in her election manifesto. This means Denmark would be
Trust in the EU has actually increased slightly since Bulgaria unable to follow the eurozone countries into a banking, fiscal,
joined in 2007: 60 percent “tend to trust” the EU now or political union.
compared to 54 percent in 2007 (although distrust has also
slightly increased, from 21 to 24 percent). Citizens trust
Brussels because of the unpopularity of domestic institutions
(the most recent Eurobarometer poll suggested that 74 Finland
percent distrust the national parliament and 79 percent hold
a negative view of political parties). The EU continues to
serve as an external corrective for dysfunctional politics at Attitudes towards the EU in Finland are slightly contradictory:
home - illustrated by the wave of mass protests in February while levels of support for Finnish membership of the EU and
and March that triggered snap parliamentary elections. But the single currency remain high, levels of trust in the EU are
although popular anger was directed at Bulgarian elites who much lower and there is little sense of a European identity.
were blamed for poverty and rampant corruption, the EU The economic crisis has polarised Finns and the bailouts
was no longer invoked as the cure. Private investors from of indebted eurozone countries have been particularly
other member states also came under fire, suggesting a shift controversial. The sharp rise in Euroscepticism in Finland
to economic nationalism that might also provide fertile gave a boost to the True Finns party, which became the third-
www.ecfr.eu
ground for Euroscepticism in the future. largest party in parliament, with 39 seats, in the general
elections of 2011. But the increase in criticism of the EU has
also led to some strengthening of pro-European sentiments
among its supporters. This suggests that while the True
Czech Republic Finns will be able to gain political capital by mobilising latent
dissatisfaction with the EU, they are less likely to be able to
May 2013
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
The Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Spain
-10
UK
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
-70
2007 2012
Source:
Standard Eurobarometer 67, Spring 2007
Standard Eurobarometer 78, November 2012
* “Net support in the EU” has been calculated by subtracting the people who “tend
to trust the EU” from the people who “tend not to trust the EU”. A methodological
note including a detailed table summarising the data for 27 EU member states can
be found on ECFR’s website: http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_
continent_wide_rise_of_euroscepticism207
3
France As Greece has experienced widespread civil unrest and anti-
THE CONTINENT-WIDE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM
Before the crisis began in 2012, EU membership was from the growing Euroscepticism of voters. Recent opinion
associated in Greece with economic progress, prosperity, polls indicate that the Dutch still support EU membership.
and modernity following totalitarian rule. But since then,
Greece has gone through severe recession, harsh austerity,
structural reform, and humiliating bailouts. Unsurprisingly,
this traumatic experience has led to a precipitous fall in Poland
May 2013
Greek support for the EU: in 2007 net support was +26
percent; by 2012 it was -63 percent. Support for the two
biggest political parties, New Democracy and PASOK, has In May 2012, for the first time since Poland joined the EU,
also collapsed. The main beneficiary has been the radical the percentage of Poles who “tend not to trust” the EU (46
ECFR/79
Syriza party, which opposes the austerity programme agreed percent) was higher than the percentage of Poles who do
with the “troika” of the IMF, the European Commission, and “tend to trust” it (41 percent) - a remarkable development for a
the ECB but wants Greece to remain in the single currency. country that has traditionally been pro-European. To be sure,
4
the EU still has higher approval ratings than the national UK
government, parliament, or public television. However, the
EU seems to have lost its reputation as the anchor of stability
for a country undergoing a huge social and economic Perceptions of the EU in the UK have changed less
transformation. In particular, the Poles are sceptical about dramatically than in many other member states: even
the future of the common currency and only 29 percent in 2004 there was a relatively low level of trust in, and a
of them now wish to join it. These public attitudes pose a relatively negative image of, the EU. The percentage of those
dilemma for the country’s political elite whose ambition is who “tend not to trust” the EU has gone from 48 percent in
to be at the centre of power in Europe. Poland’s objective in 2004 to nearly 80 percent in 2012. But this increase began
the years ahead will be to stay as close to the core as possible long before the crisis started and is unlikely to be reversed
while defending the integrity of the whole EU project. even if and when the crisis is resolved. Given that the UK
is unlikely to join the single currency in the foreseeable
future, it will be in the third tier of the emerging three-tier
Europe (the first made of eurozone members, the second of
Portugal would-be “ins”, and the third of eurozone “outs”, in other
words those who would not join the eurozone even if they
could). Thus the question from a British perspective is how
The pro-European consensus at the heart of Portuguese the UK can retain influence from the margins of Europe. In
politics has been shaken by the euro crisis: net support particular, there is likely to be a demand for a new settlement
for the EU has declined from +41 percent in 2007 to -24 that guarantees the rights of eurozone “outs”.
percent in 2012. The three main parties had all pushed for
Portugal to be at the heart of European integration, which
was associated with economic progress and political stability.
However, this also led to stagnation after Portugal joined the
single currency despite relative disadvantages in economic
productivity and competitiveness. Harsh austerity measures
and reforms following the onset of the crisis at first led to
relatively few violent demonstrations and little political
upheaval. But the deepening recession has led to more
public unrest, with anger at Portugal’s situation directed
at the EU member states believed to be imposing austerity -
above all, Germany. The government of Pedro Passos Coelho
now hopes to get more leeway over budget targets to avoid
exacerbating this public anger.
Spain
5
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7
The European Council on Foreign Ingrid Bonde (Sweden) Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Charles Grant (United Kingdom)
Relations is a unique strategic CFO & Deputy CEO, Vattenfall AB Poet and Cultural Critic Director, Centre for European Reform
THE CONTINENT-WIDE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM
Governor, National Bank of Poland; Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Former Speaker of the Parliament;
former Prime Minister Former International Advocacy
Siemens former Foreign Minister Director, Open Society Foundation
Roland Berger (Germany) Maria Cuffaro (Italy) Timothy Garton Ash
Founder and Honorary Chairman, Anchorwoman, TG3, RAI Jo Johnson (United Kingdom)
Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (United Kingdom) Member of Parliament
GmbH Daniel Daianu (Romania) Professor of European Studies, Oxford
Professor of Economics, National University Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)
Erik Berglöf (Sweden) Professor, London School of Economics
School of Political and Administrative Carlos Gaspar (Portugal)
Chief Economist, European Bank for Studies (SNSPA); former Finance Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey)
Reconstruction and Development Chairman of the Portuguese Institute of
Minister International Relations (IPRI) Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) of Turkey on foreign policy and public
Massimo D’Alema (Italy)
May 2013
www.ecfr.eu
The European Council on Foreign
Relations does not take collective
positions. This paper, like all
publications of the European Council on
Foreign Relations, represents only the
views of its authors.
ISBN: 978-1-906538-79-8