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469
OZAETA, J.:
In a four-to-three decision promulgated on September
13, 1941,1 this Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in favor of the respondents and against the
petitioner for the sum of P25,000, representing the value of
two insurance policies issued by the petitioner on the life of
Evaristo Feliciano. A motion to reconsider and set aside
said decision has been filed by the petitioner, and both
parties have submitted exhaustive and luminous written
arguments in support of their respective contentions.
The facts of the case are set forth in the majority and
dissenting opinions heretofore handed down by this Court,
the salient points of which may be briefly restated as
follows:
Evaristo Feliciano, who died on September 29, 1935, was
470
"I declare on behalf of myself and of any person who shall have
or claim any interest in any policy issued hereunder, that each of
the above answers is full, complete and true, and that to the best of
my knowledge and belief I am a proper subject for life insurance."
(Exhibit K.)
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472
The petitioner insists that upon the facts of the case the
policies in question are null and void ab initio and that all
that the respondents are entitled to is the refund of the
premiums paid thereon. After a careful re-examination of
the facts and the law, we are persuaded that petitioner's
contention is correct. To the reasons adduced in the
dissenting opinion heretofore published, we only desire to
add the following considerations:
When Evaristo Feliciano, the applicant for insurance,
signed the application in blank and authorized the
soliciting agent and/or the medical examiner of the
Company to write the answers for him, he made them his
own agents for that purpose, and he was responsible for
their acts inxthat connection. If they falsified the answers
for him, he could not evade the responsibility for the
falsification. He was not supposed to sign the application in
blank. He knew that the answers to the questions therein
contained would be "the basis of the policy," and for that
very reason he was required with his signature to vouch for
the truth thereof.
Moreover, from the facts of the case we cannot escape
the conclusion that the insured acted in connivance with
the soliciting agent and the medical examiner of the
Company in accepting the policies in question. Above the
signature of the applicant is the printed statement or
representation: "* * * I am a proper subject for life
insurance." In another sheet of the same application and
above another signature of the applicant was also printed
this statement: "That the said policy shall not take effect
until the first premium has been paid and the policy has
been delivered to and accepted by me, while I am in good
health." When the applicant signed the application he was
"having difficulty in breathing, * * * with a very high
fever." He had gone three times to the Santol Sanatorium
and had X-ray pictures taken of his lungs. He therefore
knew that he was not "a proper subject for life insurance."
When he accepted the policy, he knew that he was not in
good health. Nevertheless, he not only accepted the first
policy of P20,000 but then and
473
474
YULO, C.J., concurring:
I can find no quarrel with the legal considerations and
conclusions set forth in the original decision promulgated
by this Court. As. general rules of law they find f uil
support not only in reason and in logic, but also in simple
human sense of justice. More so, modern and complicated
practices attendant to the ever growing trade in life
insurance demand the strictest accountability by insurance
companies for acts of their authorized agents. In this way
only may the State afford reasonable protection to the
unwary public from abuse by such organizations as may be
found to be of questionable moral standards.
But a careful consideration of the evidentiary facts as
set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals leads me to
conclude that the ends of justice would not be served by the
application to the present case of the rules so enunciated.
Rather, to serve the ends of justice the case of the
respondents should be removed from the protection of such
rules.
The subject of the insurance policies under consideration
is the life of the assured. It is contended by his
beneficiaries that they took these policies on the basis of a
life expectancy of a person gravely stricken with
tuberculosis. They have consistently made protestations
that they had so informed the agents of the insurance
company. But the policies were issued upon the life of the
assured, as a perfectly normal and healthy person. The
error is vital and goes to the very existence of the contract
itself. Who is responsible for the error ?
The direct cause, of course, is the false recitals in the ap-
plication for insurance. While it is true that it was the
agents of the insurance company who filled out such
application, yet it was the assured who, by signing the
applica-
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476
477
acted in good faith, since, under such circumstances, the insured may
rely upon the presumption that he has been honestly dealt with by the
insurer." (Otto vs. Hartford Ins. Co., 38 Minn., 423).
"Besides, the principles that the insured is not bound to know the
contents of the application, and may rely on the agent's assurances that
his answers have been correctly written will, of course, apply with special
force where the insured is illiterate and unable to read, or is ignorant of
the language." (Vol. 5, Cooley's Briefs on Insurance, 2nd Ed. p. 4138,
cases cited.)
"And also where the photostatic copies of the application embodied in
the policy are practically illegible, the insured is not bound to know the
contents of the application." (New York Ins. Co. vs. Holpem D. C, 57 Fed.
2d, 200).
"According to the great weight of authority, if an agent of the insurer,
after obtaining from an applicant for insurance a correct and truthful
answer to interrogations contained in the application for insurance,
without knowledge of the applicant fills in false answers, either
fraudulently or otherwise, the insurer cannot assert the falsity of such
answers as a defense to the liability on the policy and this is generally
without regard to the subject matter of the answers or the nature of the
agent's duties or limitations on his authority, at least if not brought to
the attention of the applicant. It is equally well settled that if a correct
representation is made in a written application, or the insurance agent
issuing the policy is appraised of the true facts concerning the matter in
question, as for instance the title to the insured premises, but the agent
inserts an incorrect statement in the policy, the insurer cannot rely upon
the error in avoidance of its liability". Home Ins. Co. vs. Mendenhall, 154
111., 452, 45 NE., 1078, 36 LRA., 374; Phoenix Ins. Co. vs. Tucker, 92
111., 64, 34 Am Rep., 106; Commercial Ins. Co. vs. Spanknoble, 52 111.,
53, 4 Am. Report, 582; Young vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 45 Iowa, 377, 24
Am. Rep., 754; Welsh vs. London Assur. 151 Pa., 607, 25 A, 142, 21
478
Am St. Rep., 726·(Taken from Am Juris, on Insurance Vol. 29, par. 843).
"An insured may be justified in signing an application in blank at the
request of the insurer's agent, who agrees to fill it in from data furnished
by the insured or from an old application. In fact, an insurer cannot
urge the falsity of representations contained in the policy issued, or in
the application, where such representations were inserted therein, either
by the company or its agent, after the application was signed, without
the knowledge or consent of the insured, who has made no such
representations." (Couch on Insurance, Vol. 4, par. 842 b.)