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CASES REPORTED
SUPREME COURTS REPORTS ANNOTATED
 
____________________
 

A.C. No. 7399. August 25, 2009.*

ANTERO J. POBRE, complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, respondent.

Administrative Law; Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official;

Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed
while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct
also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.—The lady
senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting
injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession
with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed
while in the discharge

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago

of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a

violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.
Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Public Officers;
 When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court
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speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to

one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of
lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which
—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would
show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which their license and the law invest in them.—Lawyers may be
disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity
or good demeanor, a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or
“misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which their license and the law invest in them.
Same; Same; Same; It is imperative on our part to re-instill in
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice,
especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own
benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall.—We, however, would be remiss in our duty if
we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that
definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her
duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and
remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus
granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the
people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office
without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect
members of Congress

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Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago

against government pressure and intimidation aimed at

influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.
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ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Disbarment.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Defensor Santiago Law Firm for respondent.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006,
with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s
attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:

“x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I

am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on
the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather
be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots
x x x.”

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total

disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the
Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007,
Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making
the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that
those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her
speech, according to her, was

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Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago

to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in

governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She
averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be
an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],” which,
after sending out public invitations for nomination to the
soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices
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of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She

felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted
primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the
House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.” Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña,
Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

“Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is

a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public
to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every
one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.”1

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative

privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a
means of

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1  109 Phil. 863 (1960); cited in Bernas, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 643 (1996).

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Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago

perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the

legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a
polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of
their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but
for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and

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distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to

the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a
judge’s speculation as to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in
the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and
oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk
about how the country and its citizens are being served.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members
in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not
destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the
assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for
the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the

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2 Tenney v. Brandhove, 34 US 367, 71 S. Ct. 783786.

3 Id.
4 Osmena, Jr., supra.
5 Tenney, supra note 2.

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Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the

last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the
language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in
her speech and its effect on the administration of justice.
To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the
limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at
once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to
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spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and

his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a
“Supreme Court of idiots.”
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We
draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she
should have taken to heart in the first place:

“x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and

integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.”

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the

respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the
people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator
clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide:

“Canon 8, Rule 8.01.—A lawyer shall not, in his professional

dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Canon 11.—A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.”

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most

lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was
a former

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6 82 Phil. 595, 602 (1949).

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Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago

Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited

authority on constitutional and international law, an
author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator
of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a
member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other,
is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court and to maintain the respect due its members.
Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and
are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in
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private practice.7 Senator Santiago should have known, as

any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would
make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege
speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the
JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought
in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote
the passage once more:

“x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I

am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on
the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather
be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots
x x x.” (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily

show that her statements were expressions of personal
anger and frustration at not being considered for the post
of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were
outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions.
Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be
used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the Court and its

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7 Ali v. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 1, 13.

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magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.

Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not
an individual privilege accorded the individual members of
the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but
rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the
institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to
her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and
offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was
directly traceable to what she considered as an “unjust act”

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the JBC had taken in connection with her application for

the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions
under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save
perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex
officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice.
The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator
Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the
members of the Court and her choice of critical and
defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and
debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec.
5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

“Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.” (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules

concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,

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8 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 8.

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Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago

exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing

the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the
integration of the Bar will, among other things:

“(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend

itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics
and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.”9

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S.

Sorreda,10 we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of
the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the
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courts can only be maintained by rendering no service

involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they
are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the
Philippines:

“x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which

pronounces that “[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards
the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance.” That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
“unjust criticism and clamor.” And more. The attorney’s oath
solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be “with all good
fidelity x x x to the courts.”

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:

“A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself,

an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty
is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he
owes

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9 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22,

26-27.
10 A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 43.
11 No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441, 444.
12 No. L-27072, January 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1, 16-17.

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fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.”

Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.”
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court,
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.”13

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound

by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the
law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined
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as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in

the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct
committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,15 a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
“conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to
one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit
for the office

_______________

13 Id.; citing People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855; Sotto,
supra note 6; Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 160 (1949); and People v.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).
14 Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 172, 178.
15 Gacias v. Balauitan, A.C. No. 7280, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA
11, 12.

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and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the

law invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the
people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers
who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to
obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with
the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the
men and women who compose them. We have done it in the
case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of
Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty.
Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly
insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent
manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of
disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect
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on her part towards the Court and its members. The

factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter
the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse
from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this
kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the
Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that
definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty.
Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially
this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary
non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is
not to protect them against prosecutions for their own
benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office
without fear of being made responsible before the courts or
other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended
to protect members of Congress against

_______________

16 Id.
17 G.R. No. 159286, April 5, 2005 (En Banc Resolution).
18 Osmeña, Jr., supra.

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government pressure and intimidation aimed at

influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress
and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on
Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or
improper language against another Senator or against
any public institution.”19 But as to Senator Santiago’s
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not
apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter
to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate
disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules
of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in
filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings
must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We
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cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the

senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and
denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation
of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has
failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in
question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she
has not categorically denied making such statements, she
has unequivocally said making them as part of her
privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for
the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre
against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution,
DISMISSED.

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19 Rule XXXIV, Sec. 93.

20 Id., Secs. 95 & 97.
21  Tiongco v. Savillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1719, March 31, 2006, 486
SCRA 48, 63.

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