Article 11-20 Cases - Persons

Compiled by: CAJETA, Geena Marie S.
Persons
Article 11-20 (Cases)
Article 14:
Article 15: Nationality Theory:

1.) G.R no. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Full Case
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children
born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing
in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court
in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed
which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it
would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition
filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property
in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the
law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4 p. 98, Rollo.
5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga,
Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."
Case Digest
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established
their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the
petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce
is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal
assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
2.) G.R No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Full Case:
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal
of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage
started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is
still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A.
de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to
Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of
Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar
petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary
of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in
said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending
before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is,
petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to
be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing
the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts
the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try
the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of
the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the
State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses
of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or
guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words,
only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined
as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that
the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the
present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within
his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status beforeor subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby
have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal
capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as
to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it
is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have
no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must
be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of
such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time
the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing
of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed
a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect
of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect
or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of
a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled
to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal
judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage
from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no
longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the
purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The
same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was
effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised
as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve
a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of
the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely,
American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a
divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one
of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people
or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the
divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of
the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely,
American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a
divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one
of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people
or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part
of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the
divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together
in Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there
was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila on
January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter
had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.
Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice
Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
Held:
The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file
the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that private
respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent
is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
3.) G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
Full Case
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick
A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties
can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of

Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate
of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing
that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required
in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of
foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional

judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation
is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus,
the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B"
– Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D.
Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick
A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law
Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit
"3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi
of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" –
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case
to the court a quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Case Digest
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May
18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again
to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married
her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in
Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the
ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more
marital union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage
to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be
an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed
that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity
of evidence on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence.
The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
4.) G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
Full Case
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted
in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married
for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named
in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of
Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing
and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming
to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as
well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties
due to lack of judicial approval. 3On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged
Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards
Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net
hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus
on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated
in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing,
in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between
petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be
resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse
of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines,
the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary
and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying
the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set
for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded
to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and
were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding
on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied
with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted
as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must
have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original
of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered
that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase
the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings
to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering
the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only
to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim
to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and
issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed
before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of
certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the
existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its
decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED.
The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the
net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto
Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by
the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Case Digest
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941.
No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment
of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On
August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the
marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because
there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito
under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
5.) G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006
Full Case
ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-
CATINDIG, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25,
2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 which set aside and declared
as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 84, granting petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint-
in-Intervention3 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004 Resolution4 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig5 twice on May 16, 1968. The
first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street,
Ermita, Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon
City. The marriage produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from
each other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican
Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing
an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.6
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in
the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently,
on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete
separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States7 and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one
offspring.8
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized
in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. When
she confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her that he would legalize their union after he
obtains an annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he
would adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that of each of
his children with Lily.9
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case No. Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention10 claiming that she has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain information which might aid the
trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which the trial court
granted on September 30, 2002. Petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul
the order dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
and declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of the trial court granting the motion
for leave to file intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case between
Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.

Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error subject
of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was granted by a court with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper
remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.11 This is based on the premise
that in issuing the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower
court.12
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed
decision and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or
to act at all in contemplation of law.13 The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with the
term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the
corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion is imperative.14
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person, not a party to a case can intervene,
thus:
Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.15
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed
or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or
not.16
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.17 Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply
contingent and expectant.18
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with
the requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules of Court.
Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence
her claim of legal interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily.
The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved
the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will
be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her
status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was
married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not
recognize such absolute divorce.20
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code21 which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22
we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to
the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad
lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.
Since petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of the indispensable requirement
of legal interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order granting the same and admitting the
complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals correctly set aside and declared as null and void the said order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and
Resolution dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Asscociate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Case Digest
Facts:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig[5] twice on May 16, 1968.
The first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street,
Ermita, Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic
Church in La Loma, Quezon City.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from
each other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican
Republic.
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in
the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily.
Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the
complete separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States[7] and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized
in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine... law.
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention[10] claiming that she has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation
Issues:
the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the
annulment case... between Tristan and Lily.
Ruling:
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily.
The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved
the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and... duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.[19] Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or
she will be governed by Philippine laws with... respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to
his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she
was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse
and eventually becomes... successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not
recognize such absolute divorce.
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code[21] which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v.
Escano[22] we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party... by the divorced consort, subsequently
to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad
lacks merit.
Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention
is based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Principles:
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine
laws with... respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal
capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates
a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes... successful
in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
6.) G.R. No. 133743 Feb. 6, 2007
Full Case
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-
3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal
and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11
denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further,
she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,
13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration.
It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by
Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even
date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May
5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his
previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but
said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers
to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition
for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view —
sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be
denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by
the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous
with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo
never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They
argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested
rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the
surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down
the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44
dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital
for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address,
and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by
the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged
that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized
the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not
a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in
the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63
(Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings
in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68
the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,

she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless,
we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties
that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to
the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,
79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his
co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Asscociate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Case Digest
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions
to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and
a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence,
the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that
her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the
co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October
24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
7.) G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
Full Case
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA

ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent
marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second
marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September
10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan
on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L.
Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost
two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from
each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into
a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA
from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance
of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same
date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until
1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to
be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in
the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was
issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated
that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY.
LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used
a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against
the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through
their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her
½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint
prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the
same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the
share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the
subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs
of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts,4
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is

adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence
the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with
respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and
defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have
been madefor transport and storage.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE

TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE

OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES;
and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE

INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN
THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S
MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July
12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is
hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces
Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still
subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry
of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s
approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof
of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject
law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia)
had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into
by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the
Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by
virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16
even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective
marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies
against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted
up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family
life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect
for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon
a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is
because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify
the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage
settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides,
to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply.
The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as
an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action
for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for
being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not
also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of
gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during their
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976
was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before

the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of
its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As
the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation
that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties
to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case,
the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after
the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party
alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase
of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of
₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of
which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to
make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his
own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under
Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not
readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if
the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for
it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of
the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares
were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while
conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355,
thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed

to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish
that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court,
viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued
on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement,
Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89,
Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the
loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated
May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for
₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered
by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection
was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole
industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as
vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty.
Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were
loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for
them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN
LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
"married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY.
LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather
than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo
them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden
of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the
purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to
the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.
Chief Justice
Case Digest
Only Available:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted byPhilippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriageinvolving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lackscompetent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband whocontracts a subsequent
marriage.Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad was void for being bigamous, on the ground
thatthe marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce
Decreerendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until
thedeath of Atty. Luna.Given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, the presumptionthat Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and
effort remained. Itshould then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to
their conjugalpartnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of
the 25/100pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the law books pertained
to therespondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna
Principles:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a... foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent
marriage.
Pursuant to the... nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna
and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated
their marriage.
The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code,[16]... even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.[17]
Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such... defective marriages have been limited to
the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the... divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad,
did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of
his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage
as an inviolable social... institution,[19]... and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.
8.) G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
Full Case
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David
was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco,
California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:
PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc, Manila
(Sampaloc property)
₱1,693,125.00
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
₱400,000.00
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
₱490,000.00
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. located at Sabang Baler, Aurora
₱175,000.00 3
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora
₱750,000.00
USA
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings
$3,000
Jewelries (ring and watch)
$9,000
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck
$13,770.00
Bank of America Checking Account
$8,000
Bank of America Cash Deposit
Life Insurance (Cash Value)
$100,000.00
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities
$56,228.00 4
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan
from a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the
couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned
his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed
toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias
Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to
Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the
Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the
conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00
from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce
on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted
to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to
comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal
properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her
children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the
Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on
29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the
conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all
expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same
can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights
over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion
sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against
their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are hereby
ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United
States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia
Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The
titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of
the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph
are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles
covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to
them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting January
2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras
a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children
with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income from
these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half of
January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras
shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their
presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing,
education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due
from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his
financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the
Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but the
share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account
tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be
made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook
of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the
same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them
individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been
dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the
absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and
custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as
absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court
ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply
because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the
provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community
properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court
observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle
of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of
the children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code,
the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division
of the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the
amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the

assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil
Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby
divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent
David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall
pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January,
starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the
amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from
the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited
to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit
shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the
corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period,
withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the
amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of
Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street
corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and
to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the
California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was
part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that
allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor
of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties
in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation
ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by
a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in
an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner
must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates
to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on certification
where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the
office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with respect to
the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because,
to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration
of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially
approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the
Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs
4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused
that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of
property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate
judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial
court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid
cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if
the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
within the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the
alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their
children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in
October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for
dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and
the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the
Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled
in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation
of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had
not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation
form.20 Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the
California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition
for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves
the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code,
thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community
and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such
share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such
majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the
risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the
modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to
liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that
real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses
in the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras
property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to
have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of
the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount
of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts
or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle
the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family.
In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children
and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.**
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Case Digest
Facts:
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce
on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.[6] The California court granted
to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.[7]
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to
comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer... all
conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the
subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of
her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of
Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00
litigation expenses.[8]
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on
29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the
conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and... that
all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership.
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia
obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court
awarded all the properties in the USA to
Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial
separation of conjugal properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses
had been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set
up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked
in the hospital... where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed
as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June
2005.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result into the forfeiture of the parties' properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same
can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent
David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter's property rights over their
conjugal properties.
Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the P2.2 [M]illion
sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and... charges.
How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
Whether or not the attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against
their conjugal properties.
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses
had been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set
up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked
in the hospital... where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed
as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June
2005.
Ruling:
real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country... where it is situated.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses
in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.
While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear
showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have... come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption
money.
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses... in the
amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of
receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,... expenses
incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not
benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net
of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets of the absolute
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their
presumptive legitimes therefrom.[21]
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall
adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court's Decision with respect to
liquidation.
real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country... where it is situated.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses
in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.
While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear
showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have... come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption
money.
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses... in the
amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of
receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,... expenses
incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not
benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net
of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of
P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets of the absolute
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their
presumptive legitimes therefrom.[21]
9.) G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014
Full Case
ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion)
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision2 dated August 23, 2012 and the
resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.
The Factual Antecedents
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met
with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and
a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title (CCT) No. 18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118]5 were for sale
for ₱3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot
were clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. On
August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 833496 for
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as reservation fee.7 On August 21, 2003, Suzuki
issued Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350,8 this time for ₱2,700,000.00 representing the
remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 26, 20039 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took
possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior
of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties,
which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for
safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later
on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties
with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42
contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This
notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified
that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 53610 and Parking Slot No. 42.11 CCT
No. 18186 representing the title to the condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except for
anannotation under Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance or
encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement
Authority (PRA). Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February
2, 1999 representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a ₱1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 dated September 8,
2003, withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186
in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez),
however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its
reason.
On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating
that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he
executed a Dacion en Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion,
however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42
(covered by CCT No. 9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the parking
lot’s title.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang
and Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:
That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking
Slot No. 42;
That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No.
66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T
No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for
the alleged Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;
That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and
That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.
The RTC Ruling

In its decision14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong
City ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.
The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties
prevailed over Orion’s. The RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of
the properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance inthe titles. Although Orion claims to
have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two (2)
months after he bought the properties because Orion never bothered to register or annotate the
Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos. 18186 and 9116.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation and cost ofsuit. Orion
timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it
upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. The CA further noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186
pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only serves as a warning to an SRRV
holder about the implications of a conveyance of a property investment. It deviated from the RTC
ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
expenses for litigation and cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its January 25,
2013 resolution. Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:15
The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner’s duplicate copies of the CCTs;
Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any
conveyance or encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by
Suzuki; and
Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal.
Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the
operation of the presumption of conjugal ownership.17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a
purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of the law.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made is manifestly mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally excludes a factual and evidentiary
re-evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform factual conclusions of the trial court
and the appellate court.18 In the present case, while the courts below both arrived at the same
conclusion, there appears tobe an incongruence in their factual findings and the legal principle they
applied to the attendant factual circumstances. Thus, we are compelled to examine certain factual
issues in the exercise of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken inference that may have been
made.19
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold
this position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA.
It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a
reviewing court.20 To consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay,
justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an
end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located.21 The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property
— its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights
over them have their natural center of gravity there.22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by what is
known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from
one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.23 This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property
and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.24
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable
property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title
to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law
of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is
undoubted.25
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national
law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved
as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic
or the law of the forum.28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may
be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having
a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be governed by
South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual

presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not
proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.31
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Kang.32 In other words, the import from the certificates of title is
that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is
married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the
name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community
property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the
name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.34 Accordingly,
we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack
of spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the Dacion en
Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code presupposes the existence of two or more
duly executed contracts of sale. In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 200335
between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by Orion36 and was properly identified by Suzuki’s
witness Ms. Mary Jane Samin (Samin).37
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract
of sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to
deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the seller.38 The
execution of the notarized deed of saleand the actual transfer of possession amounted to delivery
that produced the legal effect of transferring ownership to Suzuki.39
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under the principle of prius tempore,
potior jure (i.e.,first in time, stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence and due execution of
the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to
prove the existence of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008.
Orion likewise offered in evidence the supposed promissory note dated September 4, 2002 as
Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional ₱800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied
the admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in its order dated August 19, 2008 "since the
same [were] not identified in court by any witness."40
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a tender
ofexcluded evidence, as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For this reason
alone, we are prevented from seriously considering Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit
"12" in the present petition.
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present
petition, the copious inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and documentary
evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion that the Dacion en Pagowas duly executed. First,
there appears to be no due and demandable obligation when the Dacion en Pago was executed,
contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orion’s witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that
Kang was in default in his ₱1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination, he stated:
ATTY. CRUZAT:
Q: Okay, so this loan of ₱1.8 million, what happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?
A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest payment by Mr. Kangand...
Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]
A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank through loans and we have executed
a dacion en pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no money. So we just execute[d] the dacion en
pago rather than going through the Foreclosure proceedings.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?
A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.41
A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that there was nodefault to speak of
when the supposed Dacion en Pagowas executed.
Based on the promissory note, Kang’s loan obligation wouldmature only on August 27, 2003.
Neither can Orion claim that Kang had been in default in his installment payments because the
wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand its interest and other
charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS.42 "There
was thus no due and demandable loan obligation when the alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.
Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only have a vague
idea of the transaction he supposedly prepared. During his cross-examination, he testified:
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
xxxx
Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the penalties, interest and surcharge due
from Mr. Yung Sam Kang?
A: It’s just the principal, sir.
Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?
A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We may actually includethat but....
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?
A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the second party and as of February 10,
2003, the outstanding obligation which is due and demandable principal and interest and other
charges included amounts to ₱1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.
xxxx
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest and other charges, based on
this document?
A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43
Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the ₱1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage. However, no document was ever presented to prove this real estate mortgage aside from
it being mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a supplement to that Credit Line Agreement
referring to this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says that there was a
subsequent collateralization or security given by Mr. Yung [Sam]
Kang for the loan?
xxxx
A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44
Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin
demanded the delivery of the titles sometime in August 2003,and after Suzuki caused the
annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim. Records show that it was only on October 9, 2003,
when Orion, through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates first spoke of the Dacion
en Pago.45 Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on October 1, 2003, when he personally
received a letter demanding the delivery of the titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter and
opted to first consult with his lawyer.46
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material inconsistencies in its recital of facts
surrounding the execution of the Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned that "on [September
4, 2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang] applied and was granted a new Credit Line Facility
by [Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,800,000.00)."

Perez, however, testified that there was "no cash movement" in the original ₱1,000,000.00 loan.
In his testimony, he said:
COURT:
xxxx
Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real estate mortgage for that first
₱1,000,000.00 loan?
A: It’s a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.
xxxx
Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this ₱1,000,000.00 loan?
A: None sir.
Q: No payments?
A: None sir.
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way of payment to the principal, by
way ofpayment of interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this loan?
A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.
Q: There was no actual cash?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank still extended an ₱800,000.00
additional right?
A: Yes, sir.47
Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of theDacion en Pago on

February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the
records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the property even six (6) months
after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer
possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon.
If Orion really purchased the condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its true
owner, why did it not assert its ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why did
it have to assert its ownership only after Suzuki demanded the delivery of the titles? These gaps
have remained unanswered and unfilled.
In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent index of simulation is the complete absence
of anattempt on the part of the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the property in
question. After the sale, the vendee should have entered the land and occupied the premises. The
absence of any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right of dominion over the property
allegedly soldto it is a clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding the execution of the Dacion en
Pago, Kang remained in possession of the disputed condominium unit – from the time of the
execution of the Dacion en Pagountil the property’s subsequent transfer to Suzuki – unmistakably
strengthens the fictitious nature of the Dacion en Pago.
These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of
Orion’s witness, indubitably prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en Pago.
The fact that the Dacion en Pago

is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true
conveyance
Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to be
considered as containing all the terms of the agreement.49 While a notarized document enjoys this
presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents."50
The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.51
In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the regularity in the execution of the
Dacion en Pago and the loan documents was challenged in the proceedings below where their
prima facievalidity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances surrounding their
execution.52
Effect of the PRA restriction on

the validity of Suzuki’s title to the
property
Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In
particular, Orion assails the status of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in view of the express
PRA restriction contained in CCT No. 18186.53
We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind, the PRA restriction cannot affect
the conveyance in favor of Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur withthe following findings
of the CA:
x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who holds a Special Resident Retiree’s
Visa(SRRV) that he shall lose his visa if he disposes his property which serves as his investment
in order to qualify for such status. Section 14 of the Implementing Investment Guidelines under
Rule VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the
Philippine Retirement Park System Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purpose ( otherwise
known as the Philippine Retirement Authority) states:
Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment from the Philippines, or transfer
the same to another domestic enterprise, orsell, convey or transfer his condominium unit or units
to another person, natural or juridical without the prior approval of the Authority, the Special
Resident Retiree’s Visa issued to him, and/or unmarried minor child or children[,] may be
cancelled or revoked by the Philippine Government, through the appropriate government
department or agency, upon recommendation of the Authority.54
Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the basis
of the PRA restriction. Orion knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted with Kang.
Incidentally, Orion admitted accommodating Kang’s request to cancel the mortgage annotation
despite the lack of payment to circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion, thus, is estopped from
impugning the validity of the conveyance in favor of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction
that Orion itself ignored and "attempted" to circumvent.
With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no
reason for the application of the rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to establish the validity of conveyance
in his favor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Case Digest
Facts:
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met
with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang
(Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang
and Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:
That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No.
42;
That the mortgage in favor of Orion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-
10186 dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated
June 16, 2000;
That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for the
alleged Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;
That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and
That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.
Issues:
Orion's petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:[15]
The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner's duplicate copies of the CCTs;
Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any
conveyance or encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by
Suzuki; and
Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
Ruling:
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold
this position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It
is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and... arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a
reviewing court.[20] To consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fair
play, justice, and due... process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an
end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by
South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"[29] to prove the existence of Korean Law. This... certification, does not qualify as
sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.[30]
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine
Law.[
Principles:
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located.[21] The reason is found in the very nature of immovable
property its immobility. Immovables are part of the... country and so closely connected to it that
all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is
known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from
one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or... lost.[23] This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property
and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.
10.) G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
Full Case
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled
People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known
as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To
date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14
Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing
of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse
and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year
old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner
also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without
the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription
of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who
are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s
duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating
R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A.
9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not
bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case
should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the
fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with
this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the
RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme
Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or
not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable
under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability
of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which
will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition
and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts.
Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice
should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do
not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued
in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed
by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since
the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a
foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being
a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation
to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does
not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was
issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not
disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT
and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles
of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation
to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to
wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x
xxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject
to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is
a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has
been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in
the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child
calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on
the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a
son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the... instant petition
was sixteen (16) years of age.[3]
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.[5] Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home to the Philippines.[6]
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in... the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.[9] Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality... of Pinamungahan,
Cebu City.[10] To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A.
No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support his minor child with... petitioner.
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an...
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.[16] Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.
without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2)
prescription of the crime charged.
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21] dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an... alien
Issues:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine la
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.
Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's
contentions.
we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15[35] of the New
Civil Code stresses the... principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their... national law with respect to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-
Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether... he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support... petitioner's son
altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.[40] In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by... such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.[41] While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,[42] has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is... the same as
our local or domestic or internal law.[44] Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
to be the same with Philippine law, which... enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera',[45] the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the
nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner's
allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent's obligation to...
support his child is specifically stated,[46] which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in
Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,[47] to wit:
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis
Definition of Terms:
1. Renvoi Doctrine
Renvoi takes place when the conflicts rule of the forum makes a reference to a foreign law,
but the foreign law is found to contain a conflict rule that returns or refers the matter back
to the law of the forum (Remission).
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. Consequently, the court of the domicile
cannot and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country in which the decedent was a citizen and
the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent. (Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749,
January 31, 1963)
2. Transmission Theory
Provides that when the conflicts rule of the forum makes a reference to a foreign law, but
the foreign law is found to contain a conflict rule that refers it to a third country, the law of
the third country shall apply.
ARTICLE 16 (A) LAW GOVERNING REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
1.) Refer to number 9 under article 15
ARTICLE 19 PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE, RIGHTS, ELEMENTS
1.) G.R. No. 157314 January 31, 2005

Found:
2.) G.R. No. 146322 December 6, 2006
Full Case
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure
others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles
of law and order in society. We reaffirm them in this petition for review on certiorari assailing the
July 26, 2000 decision1 and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 47571.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan,2 Josefino Gabutero
and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery3 filed by
Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy
of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the
three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open
space inside respondent’s business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible
and accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero
by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner
Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to
petitioner corporation.4
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and
continued the payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining
installments and told petitioner corporation’s collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had
allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,5 went
to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt.
Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and
the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for
respondent in his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take
photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-
AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching’s instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took
the motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law6 against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City.7 Respondent moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an
offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint8 and denied petitioner Uypitching’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, Branch 37.9 He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking
of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3)
precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed
the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity.
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision10 finding that petitioner Uypitching was
motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an
abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. Petitioners’ acts were found to be contrary to Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil
Code. Hence, the trial court held petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000 moral damages,
P200,000 exemplary damages and P50,000 attorney’s fees plus costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with
modification, reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages to P300,000 and P100,000,
respectively.13 Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved
here is whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and costs in favor of respondent.
Petitioners’ suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a
groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking
the motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner.
Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only
the public imputation of a crime to respondent14 but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners
were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold
petitioners liable for damages to respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners’ concern, we also find that the trial and appellate courts
correctly ruled that the filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners
themselves in fact described their action as a "precipitate act."15 Petitioners were bent on
portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with approval the following findings
of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office]
because Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there
was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity
against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no personal knowledge that [respondent] stole the
motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Veraño[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining
installment(s) for the motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It
must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo Veraño in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching
of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was [‘]taken[’], not
[‘]unlawfully taken[’] or ‘stolen.’ Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching
not only executed the [complaint-affidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as ‘the suspect’ of the
stolen motorcycle but also charged [respondent] of ‘qualified theft and fencing activity’ before the
City [Prosecutor’s] Office of Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily signifies the
presence of malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the
motorcycle, did not accuse [respondent] or the latter’s men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much less
bother[ed] to file a case for qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty. Uypitching’s act in
charging [respondent] with qualified theft and fencing activity is tainted with malice is also shown
by his answer to the question of Cupid Gonzaga16 [during one of their conversations] - "why
should you still file a complaint? You have already recovered the motorcycle…"[:] "Aron
motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to the thief of motorcycle.")17
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of
fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see
no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA.
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation’s exercise of its right
as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or
protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery
of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged
property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession
as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.18
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession
of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with
his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order.
Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed
a slanderous statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded
the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners’
acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use
his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.19
It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust
ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.20 The exercise
of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.21 Otherwise, liability for
damages to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in
accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the
totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly
ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they
should indemnify him.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.
Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer
and an officer of the court, for his improper behavior.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Case Digest
FACTS: Quiamco has amicably settled with Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso for the crime of
robbery and that in return, the three had surrendered to Quiamco a motorcycle with its registration.
However, Atty. Ramas has sold to Gabutero the motorcycle in installment but when the latter did
not able to pay the installment, Davalon continued the payment but when he became insolvent, he
said that the motorcycle was taken by Quiamco’s men. However, after several years, the petitioner
Ramas together with policemen took the motorcycle without the respondent’s permit and shouted
that the respondent Quiamco is a thief of motorcycle. Respondent then filed an action for damages
against petitioner alleging that petitioner is liable for unlawful taking of the motorcycle and
utterance of a defamatory remark and filing a baseless complaint. Also, petitioners claim that they
should not be held liable for petitioner’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the
mortgaged motorcycle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in
case of default.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the petitioner is correct.
RULING: No. The petitioner being a lawyer must know the legal procedure for the recovery of
possession of the alleged mortgaged property in which said procedure must be conducted through
judicial action. Furthermore, the petitioner acted in malice and intent to cause damage to the
respondent when even without probable cause, he still instituted an act against the law on
mortgage.
3.) GR No. 160273, Jan 18, 2008
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB
v.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE
566 Phil. 65
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated January 31, 2003 and Resolution
dated October 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506.
The facts are:
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit
and non-stock private membership club, having its principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu
City. Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of CCCI,
designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager
for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member.
The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI's Board of Directors.
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The application
was indorsed by CCCI's two (2) proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano
Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then
president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however,
purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6,
1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action
on respondent's application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting
held on July 30, 1997, respondent's application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on August 1,
1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI's corporate secretary, informing him
that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of

reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of
reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997, responden again sent CCCI a letter
inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed a Civil Case No.
67190.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P2,340,000.00 as actual
or compensatory damages.
Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P5,000,000.00 as moral
damages.
Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by
way of attorney's fees and P80,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Costs of suit.
Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[2]
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed
the trial court's Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 14, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the
amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
mount of P500,000.00 as attorney's fees and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
Costs of the suit:
The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to set the
motion for oral arguments. In its Resolution[4] dated October 2, 2003, the appellate court denied
the motions for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving respondent's application for proprietary
membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so, whether their
liability is joint and several.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to
respondent despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith in disapproving the latter's
application; and in disregarding their defense of damnum absque injuria.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition lacks merit, hence, should be denied.
CCCI's Articles of Incorporation provide in part:

SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation and membership therein as well as the right of
participation in its assets shall be limited to qualified persons who are duly accredited owners of
Proprietary Ownership Certificates issued by the corporation in accordance with its By-Laws.
Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCI's Amended By-Laws provides:
SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED The procedure for the admission of new
members of the Club shall be as follows:
(a) Any proprietary member, seconded by another voting proprietary member, shall
submit to the Secretary a written proposal for the admission of a candidate to the
"Eligible-for-Membership List";
(b) Such proposal shall be posted by the Secretary for a period of thirty (30) days on
the Club bulletin board during which time any member may interpose objections to the
admission of the applicant by communicating the same to the Board of Directors;
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, if no objections have been
filed or if there are, the Board considers the objections unmeritorious, the candidate
shall be qualified for inclusion in the "Eligible-for-Membership List";
(d) Once included in the "Eligible-for-Membership List" and after the candidate shall
have acquired in his name a valid POC duly recorded in the books of the corporation as
his own, he shall become a Proprietary Member, upon a non-refundable admission fee of
P1,000.00, provided that admission fees will only be collected once from any person.
On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to read as follows:
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, the Board may, by unanimous vote of all
directors present at a regular or special meeting, approve the inclusion of the candidate in the
"Eligible-for-Membership List".
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the "black ball system"
of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents
conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to
Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When
respondent's application for proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on
July 30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his
application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to
approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be
exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations
provide restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,[5] we expounded Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21,
thus:
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law
as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. (Emphasis in the original)
In rejecting respondent's application for proprietary membership, we find that petitioners violated
the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent's
applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable
for
damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.

It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI's Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printedon the
application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the
original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes needed for
admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic
reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being
extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before
respondent filed his application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf
country club, like the CCCI, whose members are all affluent, did not have enough money to cause
the printing of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required.
When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his
application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of
treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary
member of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the
very least, they should have informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper
norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.[6] It bears
reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners' disapproval of
respondent's application is characterized by bad faith.
As to petitioners' reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury,
suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez,[7] we held that this principle
does not apply when there is an abuse of a person's right, as in this case.
As to the appellate court's award to respondent of moral damages, we find the same in order. Under
Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered, among others, in acts and
actions referred to in Article 21. We believe respondent' testimony that he suffered mental anguish,
social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application.
However, the amount of P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in
determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the same should not
be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to
the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[8] Taking into
consideration the attending circumstances here, we hold that an award to respondent of
P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 allows it by way of example or correction
for the public good. Nonetheless, since exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions,[9] we reduce the amount from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00 only.
On the matter of attorney's fees and litigation expenses, Article 2208 of the same Code provides,
among others, that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in cases when
exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered, as in this case. In any event, however, such
award must be reasonable, just and equitable. Thus, we reduce the amount of attorney's fees
(P500,000.00) and litigation expenses (P50,000.00) to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Lastly, petitioners' argument that they could not be held jointly and severally liable for damages
because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of respondent's application lacks merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
members and other persons. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506 are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a) the
award of moral damages is reduced from P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the award of exemplary
damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses is reduced from P500,000.00 and P50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,. C.J. (Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna, and Leanardo-De Castro., JJ., concur.
Case Digest
Facts:
respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then
president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however,
purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on
September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action
on respondent's application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting
held on July 30, 1997, respondent's application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on
August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI's corporate secretary,
informing him that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of
reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of
reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997, responden again sent CCCI a
letter... inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did
not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed a Civil Case No.
67190.
ter trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
HEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P2,340,000.00 as actual
or compensatory damages.
Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P5,000,000.00 as moral
damages.
Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by
way of attorney's fees and P80,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Costs of suit.
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed
the trial court's Decision with modification,... Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to respondent despite the lack of evidence that they
acted in bad faith in disapproving the latter's application; and in disregarding their defense of
damnum absque... injuria.
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the "black ball system"
of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents
conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to
Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When
respondent's application for proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on
July 30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his...
application was disapproved.
Issues:
whether in disapproving respondent's application for proprietary membership with CCCI,
petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so, whether their liability is joint and
several.
Ruling:
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to
approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be
exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human
Relations provide restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of... his duties,
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that... is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for... the damage.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI's Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printedon the
application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon... was the
original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes needed for
admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.
As to petitioners' reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury,
suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez,[7] we held that this principle
does not apply when there is an abuse of... a person's right, as in this case.
Under Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered, among others, in
acts and actions referred to in Article 21. We believe respondent' testimony that he suffered...
mental anguish, social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his
application. However, the amount of P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast
rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the... same
should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a
penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[8] Taking
into consideration the attending circumstances here, we... hold that an award to respondent of
P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
4.) GR No. 165443, Apr 16, 2009
Full Text
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB
v.
SIXTO CLEMENTE
TINGA, J.:
Seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated 1 June 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 62331 and the reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November 2000 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC Case No. 04-98-5954, petitioner Calatagan Golf Club, Inc.
(Calatagan) filed this Rule 45 petition against respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr. (Clemente).
The key facts are undisputed.
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of Calatagan, indicating in his application for
membership his mailing address at "Phimco Industries, Inc. - P.O. Box 240, MCC," complete
residential address, office and residence telephone numbers, as well as the company (Phimco) with
which he was connected, Calatagan issued to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990
after paying P120,000.00 for the share.[2]
Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet expenses for general operations, as well
as costs for upkeep and improvement of the grounds and facilities. The provision on monthly dues
is incorporated in Calatagan's Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at the
back of each certificate of stock.[3] As reproduced in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock No. A-
01295, the provision reads:
5. The owners of shares of stock shall be subject to the payment of monthly dues in an amount
as may be prescribed in the by-laws or by the Board of Directors which shall in no case be
less that [sic] P50.00 to meet the expenses for the general operations of the club, and the
maintenance and improvement of its premises and facilities, in addition to such fees as may
be charged for the actual use of the facilities x x x
When Clemente became a member the monthly charge stood at P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for
his monthly dues on 21 March 1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then he ceased
paying the dues. At that point, his balance amounted to P400.00.[4]
Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial step to collect Clemente's back accounts by
sending a demand letter dated 21 September 1992. It was followed by a second letter dated 22
October 1992. Both letters were sent to Clemente's mailing address as indicated in his membership
application but were sent back to sender with the postal note that the address had been closed.[5]
Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having failed to pay his monthly dues for more than
sixty (60) days, specifically P5,600.00 as of 31 October 1992. Calatagan also included Clemente's
name in the list of delinquent members posted on the club's bulletin board. On 1 December 1992,
Calatagan's board of directors adopted a resolution authorizing the foreclosure of shares of
delinquent members, including Clemente's; and the public auction of these shares.
On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final letter to Clemente, this time signed by its
Corporate Secretary, Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains a warning that unless
Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his share would be included among the delinquent shares to
be sold at public auction on 15 January 1993. Again, this letter was sent to Clemente's mailing
address that had already been closed.[6]
On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted on the Club's bulletin board, as well as on
the club's premises. The auction sale took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993, and Clemente's
share sold for P64,000.[7] According to the Certificate of Sale issued by Calatagan after the sale,
Clemente's share was purchased by a Nestor A. Virata.[8] At the time of the sale, Clemente's
accrued monthly dues amounted to P5,200.00.[9] A notice of foreclosure of Clemente's share was
published in the 26 May 1993 issue of the Business World.[10]
Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in November of 1997.[11] He filed a claim with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration of his shareholding in
Calatagan with damages.
On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a decision dismissing Clemente's complaint. Citing
Section 69 of the Corporation Code which provides that the sale of shares at an auction sale can
only be questioned within six (6) months from the date of sale, the SEC concluded that Clemente's
claim, filed four (4) years after the sale, had already prescribed. The SEC further held that
Calatagan had complied with all the requirements for a valid sale of the subject share, Clemente
having failed to inform Calatagan that the address he had earlier supplied was no longer his
address. Clemente, the SEC ruled, had acted in bad faith in assuming as he claimed that his non-
payment of monthly dues would merely render his share "inactive."
Clemente filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 1 June 2004, the Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the SEC. The appellate court restored Clemente's one
share with a directive to Calatagan to issue in his a new share, and awarded to Clemente a total of
P400,000.00 in damages, less the unpaid monthly dues of P5,200.00.
In rejecting the SEC's finding that the action had prescribed, the Court of Appeals cited the SEC's
own ruling in SEC Case No. 4160, Caram v. Valley Golf Country Club, Inc., that Section 69 of the
Corporation Code specifically refers to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, and not to any other
debt of stockholders. With the insinuation that Section 69 does not apply to unpaid membership
dues in non-stock corporations, the appellate court employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code as the
proper rule of prescription. The provision sets the prescription period of actions to recover
movables at eight (8) years.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that since that Calatagan's first two demand letters had been
returned to it as sender with the notation about the closure of the mailing address, it very well knew
that its third and final demand letter also sent to the same mailing address would not be received
by Clemente. It noted the by-law requirement that within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered
the sale at auction of a member's share of stock for indebtedness, the Corporate Secretary shall
notify the owner thereof and advise the Membership Committee of such fact. Finally, the Court of
Appeals ratiocinated that "a person who is in danger of the imminent loss of his property has the
right to be notified and be given the chance to prevent the loss."[12]
Hence, the present appeal.
Calatagan maintains that the action of Clemente had prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of the
Corporation Code, and that the requisite notices under both the law and the by-laws had been
rendered to Clemente.
Section 69 of the Code provides that an action to recover delinquent stock sold must be commenced
by the filing of a complaint within six (6) months from the date of sale. As correctly pointed out
by the Court of Appeals, Section 69 is part of Title VIII of the Code entitled "Stocks and
Stockholders" and refers specifically to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, the sale of which is
governed by the immediately preceding Section 68.
The Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagan's and the SEC's reliance on Section 69 by citing
another SEC ruling in the case of Caram v. Valley Golf. In connection with Section 69, Calatagan
raises a peripheral point made in the SEC's Caram ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as take-off
Section 6 of the Corporation Code which refers to "such rights, privileges or restrictions as may
be stated in the articles of incorporation," pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of Valley
Golf does not "impose any lien, liability or restriction on the Golf Share [of Caram]," but only its
(Valley Golf's) By-Laws does. Here, Calatagan stresses that its own Articles of Incorporation does
provide that the monthly dues assessed on owners of shares of the corporation, along with all other
obligations of the shareholders to the club, "shall constitute a first lien on the shares... and in the
event of delinquency such shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the manner
provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other obligations of the shareholders."[13] With its
illative but incomprehensible logic, Calatagan concludes that the prescriptive period under Section
69 should also apply to the sale of Clemente's share as the lien that Calatagan perceives to be a
restriction is stated in the articles of incorporation and not only in the by-laws.
We remain unconvinced.
There are fundamental differences that defy equivalence or even analogy between the sale of
delinquent stock under Section 68 and the sale that occurred in this case. At the root of the sale of
delinquent stock is the non-payment of the subscription price for the share of stock itself. The
stockholder or subscriber has yet to fully pay for the value of the share or shares subscribed. In
this case, Clemente had already fully paid for the share in Calatagan and no longer had any
outstanding obligation to deprive him of full title to his share. Perhaps the analogy could have been
made if Clemente had not yet fully paid for his share and the non-stock corporation, pursuant to
an article or by-law provision designed to address that situation, decided to sell such share as a
consequence. But that is not the case here, and there is no purpose for us to apply Section 69 to the
case at bar.
Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clemente's suit is barred by Article 1146 of the Civil Code
which establishes four (4) years as the prescriptive period for actions based upon injury to the
rights of the plaintiff on the hypothesis that the suit is purely for damages. As a second alternative
still, Calatagan posits that Clemente's action is governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which
sets five (5) years as the period of prescription for all other actions whose prescriptive periods are
not fixed in the Civil Code or in any other law. Neither article is applicable but Article 1140 of the
Civil Code which provides that an action to recover movables shall prescribe in eight (8)
years. Calatagan's action is for the recovery of a share of stock, plus damages.
Calatagan's advertence to the fact that the constitution of a lien on the member's share by virtue of
the explicit provisions in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is relevant but ultimately of
no help to its cause. Calatagan's Articles of Incorporation states that the "dues, together with all
other obligations of members to the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares, second only to
any lien in favor of the national or local government, and in the event of delinquency such shares
may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy
said dues or other obligations of the stockholders."[14] In turn, there are several provisions in the
By-laws that govern the payment of dues, the lapse into delinquency of the member, and the
constitution and execution on the lien. We quote these provisions:
ARTICLE XII - MEMBER'S ACCOUNT
SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members, Posting of Delinquent Members - The Treasurer shall bill al
members monthly. As soon as possible after the end of every month, a statement showing the
account of bill of a member for said month will be prepared and sent to him. If the bill of any
member remains unpaid by the 20th of the month following that in which the bill was incurred,
the Treasurer shall notify him that if his bill is not paid in full by the end of the succeeding month
his name will be posted as delinquent the following day at the Clubhouse bulletin board. While
posted, a member, the immediate members of his family, and his guests, may not avail of the
facilities of the Club.
(b) Members on the delinquent list for more than 60 days shall be reported to the Board and their
shares or the shares of the juridical entities they represent shall thereafter be ordered sold by the
Board at auction to satisfy the claims of the Club as provided for in Section 32 hereon. A member
may pay his overdue account at any time before the auction sale.
Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of Share at Auction- The club shall have a first lien on every share
of stock to secure debts of the members to the Club. This lien shall be annotated on the certificates
of stock and may be enforced by the Club in the following manner:
(a) Within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a member's share of
stock for indebtedness under Section 31(b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof,
and shall advise the Membership Committee of such fact.
(b) The Membership Committee shall then notify all applicants on the Waiting List and all
registered stockholders of the availability of a share of stock for sale at auction at a specified date,
time and place, and shall post a notice to that effect in the Club bulletin board for at least ten (10)
days prior to the auction sale.
(c) On the date and hour fixed, the Membership Committee shall proceed with the auction by viva
voce bidding and award the sale of the share of stock to the highest bidder.
(d) The purchase price shall be paid by the winning bidder to the Club within twenty-four (24)
hours after the bidding. The winning bidder or the representative in the case of a juridical entity
shall become a Regular Member upon payment of the purchase price and issuance of a new stock
certificate in his name or in the name of the juridical entity he represents. The proceeds of the sale
shall be paid by the Club to the selling stockholder after deducting his obligations to the Club.
(e) If no bids be received or if the winning bidder fails to pay the amount of this bid within twenty-
four (24) hours after the bidding, the auction procedures may be repeated from time to time at the
discretion of the Membership Committee until the share of stock be sold.
(f) If the proceeds from the sale of the share of stock are not sufficient to pay in full the
indebtedness of the member, the member shall continue to be obligated to the Club for the unpaid
balance. If the member whose share of stock is sold fails or refuse to surrender the stock certificate
for cancellation, cancellation shall be effected in the books of the Club based on a record of the
proceedings. Such cancellation shall render the unsurrendered stock certificate null and void and
notice to this effect shall be duly published.
It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a clear and comprehensive procedure to govern
the payment of monthly dues, the declaration of a member as delinquent, and the constitution of a
lien on the shares and its eventual public sale to answer for the member's debts. Under Section 91
of the Corporation Code, membership in a non-stock corporation "shall beterminated in the manner
and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." The By-law provisions
are elaborate in explaining the manner and the causes for the termination of membership in
Calatagan, through the execution on the lien of the share. The Court is satisfied that the By-Laws,
as written, affords due protection to the member by assuring that the member should
be notified by the Secretary of the looming execution sale that would terminate membership
in the club. In addition, the By-Laws guarantees that after the execution sale, the proceeds of the
sale would be returned to the former member after deducting the outstanding obligations. If
followed to the letter, the termination of membership under this procedure outlined in the By-Laws
would accord with substantial justice.
Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law provisions when it sold Clemente's share? The
appellate court's finding on this point warrants our approving citation, thus:
In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sent the third and final demand letter to Clemente on
December 7, 1992. The letter states that if the amount of delinquency is not paid, the share will be
included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public auction. This letter was signed by Atty.
Benjamin Tanedo, Jr., Calatagan Golf's Corporate Secretary. It was again sent to Clemente's
mailing address - Phimco Industries Inc., P.O. Box 240, MCC Makati.As expected, it was returned
because the post office box had been closed.
Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to "give or cause to be given, all notices
required by law or by these By-Laws. .. and ... keep a record of the addresses of all
stockholders. As quoted above, Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further provides that "within ten (10)
days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a member's share of stock for indebtedness
under Section 31 (b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof and shall advise the
Membership Committee of such fact.," The records do not disclose what report the Corporate
Secretary transmitted to the Membership Committee to comply with Section 32(a). Obviously,
the reason for this mandatory requirement is to give the Membership Committee the opportunity
to find out, before the share is sold, if proper notice has been made to the shareholder member.
We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is knowledgeable on the law and on the
standards of good faith and fairness that the law requires. As custodian of corporate records, he
should also have known that the first two letters sent to Clemente were returned because the P.O.
Box had been closed. Thus, we are surprised - given his knowledge of the law and of corporate
records - that he would send the third and final letter - Clemente's last chance before his share is
sold and his membership lost - to the same P.O. Box that had been closed.
Calatagan argues that it "exercised due diligence before the foreclosure sale" and "sent several
notices to Clemente's specified mailing address." We do not agree; we cannot label as due
diligence Calatagan's act of sending the December 7, 1992 letter to Clemente's mailing address
knowing fully well that the P.O. Box had been closed. Due diligence or good faith imposes upon
the Corporate Secretary - the chief repository of all corporate records - the obligation to check
Clemente's other address which, under the By-Laws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on
file. One obvious purpose of giving the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep the addresses of
members on file is specifically for matters of this kind, when the member cannot be reached
through his or her mailing address. Significantly, the Corporate Secretary does not have to do the
actual verification of other addressees on record; a mere clerk can do the very simple task of
checking the files as in fact clerks actually undertake these tasks. In fact, one telephone call to
Clemente's phone numbers on file would have alerted him of his impending loss.
Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the spirit and
letter of its own by-laws. The by-law provisions was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the
delinquent member of the impending sale, and not just to provide an intricate façade that would
facilitate Calatagan's sale of the share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagan's part is palpable. As
found by the Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that Clemente's postal box to which it
sent its previous letters had already been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to the
same postal box. What for? Just for the exercise, it appears, as it had known very well that the
letter would never actually reach Clemente.
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address
along with his residence and office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagan's By-
Laws requires that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely through the member's mailing
address. Clemente cites our aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals[15] that "[a] simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x
x could have prevented this present controversy." That memorable observation is quite apt in this
case.
Calatagan's bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss
of Clemente's privilege to play golf at its golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in
significant pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that could be thrown Clemente's
way was his failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold
Calatagan would cost Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he deserve answerability for
failing to notify the club of the closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing as he did that Calatagan
was in possession of his home address as well as residence and office telephone numbers, he had
every reason to assume that the club would not be at a loss should it need to contact him. In
addition, according to Clemente, he was not even aware of the closure of the postal box, the
maintenance of which was not his responsibility but his employer Phimco's.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code,[16] under the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of Appeals
did apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith
towards one another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in
its treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in
good faith extends even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves
contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot
be a charter of dehumanization.
We turn to the matter of damages. The award of actual damages is of course warranted since
Clemente has sustained pecuniary injury by reason of Calatagan's wrongful violation of its own
By-Laws. It would not be feasible to deliver Clemente's original Certificate of Stock because it
had already been cancelled and a new one issued in its place in the name of the purchases at the
auction who was not impleaded in this case. However, the Court of Appeals instead directed that
Calatagan to issue to Clemente a new certificate of stock. That sufficiently redresses the actual
damages sustained by Clemente. After all, the certificate of stock is simply the evidence of the
share.
The Court of Appeals also awarded Clemente P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney's fees. We agree that the award of such damages
is warranted.
The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for violation of Article 32 of the Civil Code, which allows
recovery of damages from any private individual "who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs" the right "against deprivation of property without
due process of laws." The plain letter of the provision squarely entitles Clemente to damages from
Calatagan. Even without Article 32 itself, Calatagan will still be bound to pay moral and exemplary
damages to Clemente. The latter was able to duly prove that he had sustained mental anguish,
serious anxiety and wounded feelings by reason of Calatagan's acts, thereby entitling him to moral
damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. Moreover, it is evident that Calatagan's bad faith
as exhibited in the course of its corporate actions warrants correction for the public good, thereby
justifying exemplary damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio Morales, and Velasco, Jr.,* JJ., concur.
5.) G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
Full Text
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,

VS.
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER

DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA
Decision affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-
three (153) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-
473, Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide
all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00.
The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second
Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by
Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was
never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999,
without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the
Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that
she was delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to the months of December 1998, January
1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18,
1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the
instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On
the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who
authorized the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.,
answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente
that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a] complaint for
damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected when the
[trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p.
237).[4]
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
x x x x
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with justice,
gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water
supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice
to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department of
defendant COWD. There was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on
March 12, 1999. The due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with
justice. Neither did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have
investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told
them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off
of the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the
patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4)
years ago and not hers. She should have been very careful. x x x[5]
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente,

COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) P200,000.00 for moral damages;

(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed.
The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were
influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should be liable.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with

the modification that the awarded damages is reduced to P100,000.00 each for moral and
exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to P25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor the possession and use
of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that
when [petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury
to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."[8]
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of disconnection and
derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent
spouses Pastorfide]."[9]
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but these were
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not
commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a
Resolution[10] issued by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality through this Court's Resolution [11] dated
June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following Assignment of
Errors:
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY

INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE
WITH CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D.
GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS
SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S
REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF
RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE
(3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS

ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND
THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY
FAILED TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF
THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE.
RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A
GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT

DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE
LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE
EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT
WITH JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD
FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN

AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS
AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.[12]
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-defendants
before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instant
petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot,
in the instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is
a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents.
There is no basis to do so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner
filed a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against
COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present
petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed
CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD
and Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot
resurrect their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating
the same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues raised by
petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the
Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this instant
petition.[13] This is especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as
in this case.[14]
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant petition lacks
merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent spouses'
water supply, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she admitted
in the present petition that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's
water supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner.
While it was COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be
denied that it was through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was
disconnected in the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause
the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum
of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose
for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention
to harm another.[15] Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.[16]In the
present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the
disconnection of respondent spouses' water supply without warning or informing the latter of such
request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD
personnel and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their
agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If
such was petitioner's only intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses before or
immediately after submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her request was
simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But
she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also
without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply despite
payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and
Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing
Corporation[17] is instructive, to wit:
x x x x
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one's rights as well
as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe
honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while
Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the
defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among
these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
x x x x
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions
of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right
is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. x x x[18]
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her
failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and
Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent
neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their
delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both
the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article
2219,[19] in connection with Articles 20[20] and 21[21] of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.[22] In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA
in sustaining the award of exemplary damages, although it reduced the amount granted,
considering that respondent spouses were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9)
months, and such deprivation would have continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, among others,
that such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's act
or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs' plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
July 24, 2013
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___July 17, 2013___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office
on July 19, 2013 at 2:25 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD)
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO

Division Clerk of Court
Case Digest
Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the then decision of the RTC
regarding its judgment sums of money for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The decision being contested sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of Pastorfide by the
Cagayan de Oro Water District as requested by Ardiente. In this case, Ardiente owned a piece of
property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to Pastorfide, however, the connection of
water supply as well as other utilities remained in the name of Ardiente which was never
questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became delinquent in paying the water bill.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with Cagayan De Oro Water district to
cut off the water supply of Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already conveyed
ownership of property to Pastorfide.
Ruling: No, it was not proper. Petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned
provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply
disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such
intention. The principle of abuse of Rights in the enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code provides
that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
6.) G.R. No. 160689 March 26, 2014
Full Case
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN I. COROMINA (SUBSTITUTED BY ANITA
COROMINA, ELIZABETH COROMINA and ROSIEMARIE COROMINA), VICENTE E.
GARCIA (SUBSTITUTED BY EDGAR JOHN GARCIA), FELIPE CONSTANTINO,
RONALD ARCILLA, NORBETO ABELLANA, DEMETRIO BALICHA, ANGELITA
LHUILLIER, JOSE E. GARCIA, AND VISA YAN ELECTRIC COMPANY (VECO),
Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H. Sesbreño founded on abuse of
rights. Sesbreño accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the
Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable
search in his residential premises. But the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Cebu City
rendered judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim;1 and the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the dismissal on March 10, 2003.2
Hence, this appeal by Sesbreño.
Antecedents
At the time material to the petition, VECO was a public utility corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines. VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity within
Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño was one of VECO’s customers under the metered service contract
they had entered into on March 2, 1982.3 Respondent Vicente E. Garcia was VECO’s President,
General Manager and Chairman of its Board of Directors. Respondent Jose E. Garcia was VECO’s
Vice-President, Treasurer and a Member of its Board of Directors. Respondent Angelita Lhuillier
was another Member of VECO’s Board of Directors. Respondent Juan Coromina was VECO’s
Assistant Treasurer, while respondent Norberto Abellana was the Head of VECO’s Billing Section
whose main function was to compute back billings of customers found to have violated their
contracts.
To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning, and that none of it meters had been
tampered with, VECO employed respondents Engr. Felipe Constantino and Ronald Arcilla as
violation of contract (VOC) inspectors.4 Respondent Sgt. Demetrio Balicha, who belonged to the
341st Constabulary Company, Cebu Metropolitan Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City,
accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors during their inspection of the households of its
customers on May 11, 1989 pursuant to a mission order issued to him.5
The CA summarized the antecedent facts as follows:
x x x. Reduced to its essentials, however, the facts of this case are actually simple enough, although
the voluminous records might indicate otherwise. It all has to do with an incident that occurred at
around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 11, 1989. On that day, the Violation of Contracts
(VOC) Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha,
conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including
that of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes,
jumpers, wiring connections, and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected the electric meter and found that it had been
turned upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took photographs of the upturned electric meter.
With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they removed said meter and
replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño was in his office and no one
called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie
Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of appliances and
light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed
the Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition of the electric meter on May 11, 1989
when the VOC Team inspected it, with notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test. She
also signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at all with what
the VOC Team did on May 11, 1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding
premises was effected without his permission and over the objections of his maids. They
threatened, forced or coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned
it upside down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new electric meter. They
searched the house and its rooms without his permission or a search warrant. They forced a visitor
to sign two documents, making her appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he found
that some of his personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they
searched the house.6
Judgment of the RTC
On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.7 It did not accord
credence to the testimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses, Bebe Baledio, his housemaid, and Roberto
Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to inconsistencies on material points in their respective
testimonies. It observed that Baledio could not make up her mind as to whether Sesbreño’s children
were in the house when the VOC inspection team detached and replaced the electric meter.
Likewise, it considered unbelievable that Lopez should hear the exchanges between Constantino,
Arcilla and Balicha, on one hand, and Baledio, on the other, considering that Lopez could not even
hear the conversation between two persons six feet away from where he was seated during the
simulation done in court, the same distance he supposedly had from the gate of Sesbreño’s house
during the incident. It pointed out that Lopez’s presence at the gate during the incident was even
contradicted by his own testimony indicating that an elderly woman had opened the gate for the
VECO personnel, because it was Baledio, a lady in her 20s, who had repeatedly stated on her direct
and cross examinations that she had let the VECO personnel in. It concluded that for Lopez to do
nothing at all upon seeing a person being threatened by another in the manner he described was
simply contrary to human experience.
In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the respondents showing that the VOC inspection
team had found the electric meter in Sesbreño’s residence turned upside down to prevent the
accurate registering of the electricity consumption of the household, causing them to detach and
replace the meter. It held as unbelievable that the team forcibly entered the house through threats
and intimidation; that they themselves turned the electric meter upside down in order to incriminate
him for theft of electricity, because the fact that the team and Sesbreño had not known each other
before then rendered it unlikely for the team to fabricate charges against him; and that Sesbreño’s
non-presentation of Chuchie Garcia left her allegation of her being forced to sign the two
documents by the team unsubstantiated.
Decision of the CA
Sesbreño appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC on March 10, 2003,8 holding thusly:
x x x. plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s account is simply too implausible or far-fetched to be

believed. For one thing, the inspection on his household was just one of many others that the VOC
Team had conducted in that subdivision. Yet, none but plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño complained of
the alleged acts of the VOC Team. Considering that there is no proof that they also perpetrated the
same illegal acts on other customers in the guise of conducting a Violation of Contracts inspection,
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño likewise failed to show why he alone was singled out. It is also
difficult to believe that the VOC Team would be brazen enough to want to antagonize a person
such as plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño. There is no evidence that the VOC Team harbored any evil
motive or grudge against plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, who is a total stranger to them. Until he
came along, they did not have any prior criminal records to speak of, or at least, no evidence
thereof was presented. It is equally difficult to believe that their superiors would authorize or
condone their alleged illegal acts. Especially so since there is no indication that prior to the incident
on May 11, 1989, there was already bad blood or animosity between plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño
and defendant appellees to warrant such a malevolent response. In fact, since availing of defendant-
appellee VECO’s power services, the relationship between them appears to have been uneventful.
It becomes all the more apparent that the charges stemming from the May 11, 1989 incident were
fabricated when taken together with the lower court’s evaluation of the alleged theft of plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño’s personal effects. It stated that on August 8, 1989, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño
wrote the barangay captain of Punta Princesa and accused Chuchie Garcia and Victoria Villarta
alias Victoria Rocamora of theft of some of his things that earlier he claimed had been stolen by
members of the VOC Team. When he was confronted with these facts, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño
further claimed that the items allegedly stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part of the loot taken by
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla. Yet not once did plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño or any
of his witnesses mention that a conspiracy existed between these people. Clearly, much like his
other allegations, it is nothing more than an afterthought by plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
All in all, the allegations against defendants-appellees appear to be nothing more than a put-on to
save face. For the simple truth is that the inspection exposed plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño as a likely
cheat and thief.
xxxx
Neither is this Court swayed by the testimonies of Baledio and Lopez.1âwphi1 The lower court
rightly described their testimonies as fraught by discrepancies and inconsistencies on material
points and even called Lopez a perjured witness. On the other hand, it is odd that plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño chose not to present the witness whose testimony was very crucial. But even though
Chuchie Garcia never testified, her absence speaks volumes. Whereas plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño
claimed that the VOC Team forced her to sign two documents that made her appear to be his
authorized agent or representative, the latter claimed otherwise and that she also gave them
permission to enter and search the house. The person most qualified to refute the VOC Team’s
claim is Chuchie Garcia herself. It is axiomatic that he who asserts a fact or claim must prove it.
He cannot transfer that burden to the person against whom he asserts such fact or claim. When
certain evidence is suppressed, the presumption is that it will adversely affect the cause of the party
suppressing it, should it come to light. x x x9
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Sesbreño appealed.
Issue
Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Sesbreño’s main contention is that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was an
unreasonable search for being carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly done with
malice or bad faith.
Before dealing with the contention, we have to note that two distinct portions of Sesbreño’s
residence were inspected by the VOS team – the garage where the electric meter was installed, and
the main premises where the four bedrooms, living rooms, dining room and kitchen were located.
Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was installed, the respondents assert that the
VOC team had the continuing authority from Sesbreño as the consumer to enter his premises at all
reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling.
The authority emanated from paragraph 9 of the metered service contract entered into between
VECO and each of its consumers, which provided as follows:
9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorized employees or representatives of the

COMPANY to enter his premises at all reasonable hours without being liable to trespass to
dwelling for the purpose of inspecting, installing, reading, removing, testing, replacing or
otherwise disposing of its property, and/or removing the COMPANY’S property in the event of
the termination of the contract for any cause.11
Sesbreño contends, however, that paragraph 9 did not give Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha the
blanket authority to enter at will because the only property VECO owned in his premises was the
meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla should enter only the garage. He denies that they had the
right to enter the main portion of the house and inspect the various rooms and the appliances therein
because those were not the properties of VECO. He posits that Balicha, who was not an employee
of VECO, had no authority whatsoever to enter his house and conduct a search. He concludes that
their search was unreasonable, and entitled him to damages in light of their admission that they
had entered and inspected his premises without a search warrant.12
We do not accept Sesbreño’s conclusion.1avvphi1 Paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC team with
unquestioned authority to enter the garage to inspect the meter. The members of the team obviously
met the conditions imposed by paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly, their entry had the
objective of conducting the routine inspection of the meter.13 Secondly, the entry and inspection
were confined to the garage where the meter was installed.14 Thirdly, the entry was effected at
around 4 o’clock p.m., a reasonable hour.15 And, fourthly, the persons who inspected the meter
were duly authorized for the purpose by VECO.
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO,16 his participation was to render police
assistance to ensure the personal security of Constantino and Arcilla during the inspection,
rendering him a necessary part of the team as an authorized representative. Under the
circumstances, he was authorized to enter considering that paragraph 9 expressly extended such
authority to "properly authorized employees or representatives" of VECO.
It is true, as Sesbreño urges, that paragraph 9 did not cover the entry into the main premises of the
residence. Did this necessarily mean that any entry by the VOS team into the main premises
required a search warrant to be first secured?
Sesbreño insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the clause guaranteeing
the right of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
He states that a violation of this constitutional guaranty rendered VECO and its VOS team liable
to him for damages by virtue of Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code, which pertinently provides:
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secured in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
x x x x.
Sesbreño’s insistence has no legal and factual basis.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint against
the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure
freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power. The Court has made this clear
in its pronouncements, including that made in People v. Marti,17 viz:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured
if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative
of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar,
and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.18
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main premises only after finding
the meter of Sesbreño turned upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would
enable them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his household. The circumstances
justified their decision, and their inspection of the main premises was a continuation of the
authorized entry. There was no question then that their ability to determine the unbilled electricity
called for them to see for themselves the usage of electricity inside. Not being agents of the State,
they did not have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.
Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did not make the inspection a search by an agent of
the State within the ambit of the guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part of the team by
virtue of his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort the team during its routine
inspection.19 Consequently, the entry into the main premises of the house by the VOC team did
not constitute a violation of the guaranty.
Our holding could be different had Sesbreño persuasively demonstrated the intervention of malice
or bad faith on the part of Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection of the main premises, or
any excessiveness committed by them in the course of the inspection. But Sesbreño did not. On
the other hand, the CA correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreño’s
residence because the other houses within the area were similarly subjected to the routine
inspection.20 This, we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not guilty of
abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. The
rationale for the concept is to present some basic principles to be followed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and the stability of social order.21 Moreover, according to a
commentator,22 "the exercise of right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused, especially to the prejudice of others[;] [i]t cannot be said that a person exercises a right
when he unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of the Civil Code23 sets the standards to be
observed in the exercise of one’s rights and in the performance of one’s duties, namely: (a) to act
with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty and good faith. The law
thereby recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights – that in the exercise of the rights, the
standards under Article 19 must be observed.24
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an abuse of rights,
like when the act is performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability may attach
under the concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.25 There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The resolution of the issue depends
on the circumstances of each case.
Sesbreño asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or Chuchie Garcia to let anyone enter his
residence in his absence; and that Baledio herself confirmed that the members of the VOC team
had intimidated her into letting them in.
The assertion of Sesbreño is improper for consideration in this appeal.1âwphi1 The RTC and the
CA unanimously found the testimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses implausible because of
inconsistencies on material points; and even declared that the non-presentation of Garcia as a
witness was odd if not suspect. Considering that such findings related to the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them now because it is not a
trier of facts, and is not also tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.26 Verily, a review
that may tend to supplant the findings of the trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses themselves should be undertaken by the Court with prudent
hesitation. Only when Sesbreño could make a clear showing of abuse in their appreciation of the
evidence and records by the trial and the appellate courts should the Court do the unusual review
of the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts.27 Alas, that showing was not made here.
Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreño was denied due process by the refusal of the trial judge
to inhibit from the case. Although the trial judge had issued an order for his voluntary inhibition,
he still rendered the judgment in the end in compliance with the instruction of the Executive Judge,
whose exercise of her administrative authority on the matter of the inhibition should be
respected.28 In this connection, we find to be apt the following observation of the CA, to wit:
x x x. Both Judge Paredes and Judge Priscila Agana serve the Regional Trial Court and are
therefore of co-equal rank. The latter has no authority to reverse or modify the orders of Judge
Paredes. But in ordering Judge Paredes to continue hearing the case, Judge Agana did not violate
their co-equal status or unilaterally increased her jurisdiction. It is merely part of her administrative
responsibilities as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, of which Judge
Paredes is also a member.29
Lastly, the Court finds nothing wrong if the writer of the decision in the CA refused to inhibit from
participating in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed by Sesbrefio. The motion for
her inhibition was grounded on suspicion of her bias and prejudice,30 but suspicion of bias and
prejudice were not enough grounds for inhibition.31
Suffice it to say that the records are bereft of any indication that even suggested that the Associate
Justices of the CA who participated in the promulgation of the decision were tainted with bias
against him.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pet1t1on for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on March 10, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Chief Justice
Case Digest
FACTS:
Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement and
backwages imploring Atty. Pacquiao as counsel who was later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno. The
employees and Atty. Sesbreno agreed that he is to be paid 30% as attorney’s fees and 20% as
expenses taken from their back salaries. Trial court decided in favor of the employees and ordered
the Province of Cebu to reinstate them and pay them back salaries. The same was affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise agreement was entered
into by the parties in April 1979. The former employees waived their right to reinstatement among
others. The Province of Cebu released P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through Atty.
Sesbreno as “Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.” The amount represented back salaries, terminal
leave pay and gratuity pay due to the employees. Ten employees filed manifestations before the
trial court asserting that they agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 40% to be taken only from their back
salaries. The lower court issued two orders, with which petitioner complied, requiring him to
release P10,000.00 to each of the ten private respondents and to retain 40% of the back salaries
pertaining to the latter out of the P2,300,000.00 released to him. On March 28, 1980, the trial court
fixed the attorney’s fees a total of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. However, trial court
modified the award after noting that petitioner’s attorney’s lien was inadvertently placed as 60%
when it should have been only 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming
additional fees for legal services but was even further reduced to 20%.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded
to petitioner Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed
by private respondents
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of professional services entered into by the parties
6 authorized petitioner to take a total of 50% from the employees’ back salaries only. The trial
court, however, fixed the lawyer’s fee on the basis of all monies to be awarded to private
respondents. Fifty per cent of all monies which private respondents may receive from the
provincial government, according to the Court of Appeals, is excessive and unconscionable, not
to say, contrary to the contract of professional services. What a lawyer may charge and receive as
attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial control. A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a
written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting
lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable
unconscionable. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally
recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. if the attorney’s fees
are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning
“as much as he deserves,” is used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the
absence of a contract. The Supreme Court averred that in balancing the allocation of the monetary
award, 50% of all monies to the lawyer and the other 50% to be allocated among all his 52 clients,
is too lop-sided in favor of the lawyer. The ratio makes the practice of law a commercial venture,
rather than a noble profession. It would, verily be ironic if the counsel whom they had hired to
help would appropriate for himself 50% or even 60% of the total amount collectible by these
employees. 20% is a fair settlement.
Petition is DENIED
7.) AC. No. 4697, Nov 25, 2014
Full Case
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA
v.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege burdened with

conditions,[1] including continuing fidelity to the law and constant possession of moral
fitness. Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society, and a
consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.[2] Failure
to live by the standards of the legal profession and to discharge the burden of the privilege
conferred on one as a member of the bar warrant the suspension or revocation of that privilege.
The Factual Antecedents
Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a "Deed
of Sale with Right to Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with right of
repurchase) to complainant a parcel of coconut land located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-662 for P15,000.00. Under the said deed,
respondent represented that he has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple" the subject
property and that the said property is "free from all liens and encumbrances."[3] The deed also
provided that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property,
and if not repurchased within the said period, "the parties shall renew [the]
instrument/agreement."[4]
Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in the deed, and
no renewal of the contract was made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated
May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property. Complainant remained in peaceful
possession of the property until December 1989 when he received letters from the Rural Bank of
Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged by respondent to
RBAI, that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that complainant should
therefore vacate the property.[5]
Complainant was alarmed and made an investigation. He learned the following:
(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as early as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;
(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and his wife
on January 4, 1982 pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27, 1979 between PNB and respondent;
(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on
the property, and subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991.[6]
Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the property by RBAI.[7]
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte approved the Resolution[8] dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95-144 finding that
"[t]he facts of [the] case are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that Estafa x x x has been
committed and that respondent herein is probably guilty thereof."[9] Accordingly, an
Information[10] dated January 8, 1996 was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Baybay, Leyte, formally charging respondent with the crime of estafa under Article 316,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code,[11] committed as follows:
On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 7661 of the Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera,
Leyte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor and
owner at that time was private complainant Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale
which accused executed in favor of private complainant on 2nd December, 1981, without first
redeeming/repurchasing the same. [P]rivate complainant knowing of accused['s] unlawful act only
on or about the last week of February, 1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him of the property,
the mortgage having been foreclosed, private complainant thereby suffered damages and was
prejudiced by accused['s] unlawful transaction and misrepresentation.
The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A.
Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases against respondent by filing before
this Court an Affidavit-Complaint[12] dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental
Complaint[13] dated February 27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728,
respectively. In both complaints, complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[14]
In his Consolidated Answer[15] dated August 16, 2003 filed before the IBP, respondent denied that
his agreement with complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He claimed that it was an equitable
mortgage and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of
the land, the total amount would have exceeded P15,000.00.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors
In a Report and Recommendation[16] dated April 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with
complainant and executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" but later on claimed that
the agreement was one of equitable mortgage. Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when
he represented in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 that the
property was covered by TCT No. T-662, even giving complainant the owner's copy of the said
certificate of title, when the said TCT had already been cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT
No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB). Respondent made matters even
worse, when he had TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his
and his wife's name on January 4, 1982 without informing complainant. This was compounded
by respondent's subsequent mortgage of the property to RBAI, which led to the acquisition of the
property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of complainant. Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be (1) suspended from the practice of law for one
year, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2)
ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00, the amount he received as consideration for the pacto de
retro sale, with interest at the legal rate.
Considering respondent's "commission of unlawful acts, especially crimes involving moral

turpitude, acts of dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and deceit," the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation with
modification as follows: respondent is (1) suspended from the practice of law for two years, with
warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to
return the sum of P15,000.00 received in consideration of the pacto de retro sale, with legal
interest.[17]
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent
from the practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the
P15,000.00 consideration, plus interest.
Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December
2, 1981 in favor of complainant. However, respondent insists that the deed is not one of sale
with pacto de retro, but one of equitable mortgage. Thus, respondent argues that he still had the
legal right to mortgage the subject property to other persons. Respondent additionally asserts that
complainant should render an accounting of the produce the latter had collected from the said
property, which would already exceed the P15,000.00 consideration stated in the deed.
There is no merit in respondent's defense.
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of
sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondent's actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest
standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers,
for which respondent should be held administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to
"obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion."[18] He gravely violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed,
that respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
as he was the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument. Respondent could have simply
denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as
"mortgagor" and "mortgagee," respectively, rather than as "vendor a retro" and "vendee
a retro." If only respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation
of the deed, then the controversy between him and complainant could have been avoided or, at the
very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face
betrayed lack of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to "conduct
[him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."
More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations
as embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer,
he should have seen to it that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that
clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to
it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the contracting
parties. Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be
uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty
caused by respondent's poor formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a
significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and complainant. Such poor
formulation reflects at the very least negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act,[19] the law in effect at the time the PNB acquired
the subject property and obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor of
a purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in foreclosure proceedings becomes final, such
purchaser becomes entitled to the issuance of a new certificate of title in his name and a
memorandum thereof shall be "indorsed upon the mortgagor's original certificate."[20] TCT No.
T-662, which respondent gave complainant when they entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right
to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981, does not bear such memorandum but only a
memorandum on the mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963 and the subsequent amendment of
the mortgage.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it
appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant
the owner's copy of the said certificate of title, when the truth is that the said TCT had already been
cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not even care
to correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT
No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982,[21] or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told,
respondent clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes,
he is moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01
states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.[22]
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient
to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element
of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.[23]
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy;
lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On
the other hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:
[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is
used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or
acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms,
and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in
reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.[24]
The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They
violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a disregard for Section 63 of the Land Registration
Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondent's part. Thus, respondent
deserves to be sanctioned.
Respondent's breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are
compounded by his gross disregard of this Court's directives, as well as the orders of the IBP's
Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to the Court's
referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation), which caused
delay in the resolution of these administrative cases.
In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on complainant's Affidavit-Complaint in

A.C. No. 4697 and Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and June 25,
1997, respectively.[25] While he requested for several extensions of time within which to submit
his comment, no such comment was submitted prompting the Court to require him in a Resolution
dated February 4, 1998 to (1) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure, and (2) submit the consolidated comment.[26] Respondent neither
showed cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure,
nor submitted the consolidated comment.
When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the proceedings before the IBP's
Investigating Commissioner, respondent was again required several times to submit his
consolidated answer. He only complied on August 28, 2003, or more than six years after this
Court originally required him to do so. The Investigating Commissioner also directed the parties
to submit their respective position papers. Despite having been given several opportunities to
submit the same, respondent did not file any position paper.[27]
Respondent's disregard of the directives of this Court and of the Investigating Commissioner,
which caused undue delay in these administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
x x x x
CANON 12 A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
x x x x
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to
do so.
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes.
Respondent's infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a disciplinary
sanction before. In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga,[28] respondent was held liable for conduct unbecoming
an attorney for which he was fined P2,000.00.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.
The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the IBP to order respondent to return
the sum of P15,000.00 he received from complainant under the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase." This is a civil liability best determined and awarded in a civil case rather than the
present administrative cases.
In Roa v. Moreno,[29] the Court pronounced that "[i]n disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability. Our
findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other." While the respondent lawyer's wrongful actuations may give rise at the same
time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the appropriate
case; and every case must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the
quantum of proof required in each. Section 5,[30] in relation to Sections 1[31]and 2,[32] Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, such as the ones at bar, only substantial
evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of
evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[33]
The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as the present administrative cases,
complainant instituted a criminal case for estafa against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 3112-A, before the MTC. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.[34] Unless the complainant waived the civil
action, reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action, then his civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the estafa committed by
respondent is deemed instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that
complainant may recover in Criminal Case No. 3112-A includes restitution; reparation of the
damage caused him; and/or indemnification for consequential damages,[35] which may already
cover the P15,000.00 consideration complainant had paid for the subject property.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of the following: breach of the Lawyer's
Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing undue
delay of these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, reckoned from receipt of this Decision, with WARNING that a similar misconduct in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate
this Decision to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.
Case Digest
Principles:
Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege burdened with conditions,[1]...
including continuing fidelity to the law and constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers, as
guardians of the law, play a vital role in... the preservation of society, and a consequent obligation
of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.[2]
Failure to live by the standards of the legal profession and to discharge the burden of the privilege
conferred on one as a... member of the bar warrant the suspension or revocation of that privilege.
8.) G.R. No. 190667, November 07, 2016

Full Text
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER,
VS.
SPOUSES JOSE R. BERNARDO AND LILIBETH R. BERNARDO, DOING BUSINESS

UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE "JOLLY BEVERAGE ENTERPRISES," RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review[1] filed by Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), from the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] and Resolution[3] in CA-GR. CV No. 91096. The CA
affirmed in toto the Decision[4] of Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 88 in Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-00-42320.
This case originated from the claim for damages filed by respondent spouses Jose and Lilibeth
Bernardo (respondents) against petitioner for violation of Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of the Civil
Code. The RTC found petitioner liable to pay respondents temperate damages in the amount of
P500,000 for loss of goodwill, to be offset against the latter's outstanding balance for deliveries in
the amount of P449,154. The trial court ordered petitioner to pay P50,000 as moral damages,
P20,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000 as attorney's fees.
Petitioner asserts that the Complaint had no basis, and that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
award temperate damages in an amount equivalent to the outstanding obligation of respondents. It
prays not only for the reversal of the assailed judgments, but also for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. It also asks that respondents
be ordered to pay P449,154 plus legal interest from the date of demand until full payment.[5]
We deny the Petition.
FACTS
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the large-scale manufacture, sale, and distribution
of beverages around the country.[6] On the other hand, respondents, doing business under the name
"Jolly Beverage Enterprises," are wholesalers of softdrinks in Quezon City, particularly in the
vicinities of Bulacan Street, V. Luna Road, Katipunan Avenue, and Timog Avenue.[7]
The business relationship between the parties commenced in 1987 when petitioner designated
respondents as its distributor.[8] On 22 March 1994, the parties formally entered into an exclusive
dealership contract for three years.[9] Under the Agreement,[10] petitioner would extend
developmental assistance to respondents in the form of cash assistance and trade discount
incentives. For their part, respondents undertook to sell petitioner's products exclusively, meet the
sales quota of 7,000 cases per month, and assist petitioner in its marketing efforts.[11]
On 1 March 1997, the parties executed a similar agreement tor another two years, or until 28
February 1999.[12] This time, petitioner gave respondents complimentary cases of its products
instead of cash assistance, and increased the latter's sales quota to 8,000 cases per month.
For 13 years, the parties enjoyed a good and harmonious business partnership.[13]While the
contracts contained a clause for breach, it was never enforced.[14]
Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, before the contract expired, petitioner required respondents
to submit a list of their customers on the pretext that it would formulate a policy defining its
territorial dealership in Quezon City.[15] It assured respondents that their contract would be
renewed for a longer period, provided that they would submit the list.[16] However, despite their
compliance, the promise did not materialize.[17]
Respondents discovered that in February 1999, petitioner started to reach out to the persons whose
names were on the list.[18] Respondents also received reports that their delivery trucks were being
trailed by petitioner's agents; and that as soon as the trucks left, the latter would approach the
former's customers.[19] Further, respondents found out that petitioner had employed a different
pricing scheme, such that the price given to distributors was significantly higher than that given to
supermarkets.[20] It also enticed direct buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area with its "Coke
Alok" promo, in which it gave away one free bottle for every case purchased.[21] It further engaged
a store adjacent to respondents' warehouse to sell the former's products at a substantially lower
price.[22]
Respondents claimed that because of these schemes, they lost not only their major customers -
such as Peach Blossoms, May Flower Restaurant, Saisaki Restaurant, and Kim Hong
Restaurant but also small stores, such as the canteen in the hospital where respondent Jose
Bernardo worked.[23] They admitted that they were unable to pay deliveries worth P449,154.[24]
Respondents filed a Complaint[25] for damages, alleging that the acts of petitioner constituted
dishonesty, bad faith, gross negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in commercial
enterprise.[26] The Complaint was later amended[27] to implead petitioner's officers and personnel,
include additional factual allegations, and increase the amount of damages prayed for.
Petitioner denied the allegations.[28] It maintained that it had obtained a list of clients through
surveys, and that promotional activities or developmental strategies were implemented only after
the expiration of the Agreements.[29] It opined that the filing of the complaint was a mere ploy
resorted to by respondents to evade the payment of the deliveries.[30]
The RTC held petitioner liable for damages for abuse of rights in violation of Articles 19, 20, and
21 of the Civil Code and for unfair competition under Article 28. It found that petitioner's agents
solicited the list of clients in order to penetrate the market and directly supply customers with its
products.[31] Moreover, the trial court found that petitioner had recklessly ignored the rights of
respondents to have a fair chance to engage in business or earn a living when it deliberately used
oppressive methods to deprive them of their business.[32] Its officers were, however, absolved of
liability, as there was no showing that they had acted in their individual and personal capacities.[33]
In the body of its Decision, the RTC stated that petitioner should pay respondents P500,000 as
temperate damages, and that it was only just and fair that the latter offset this amount against their
outstanding obligation to petitioner in the amount of P449,154.[34] In the fallo, the trial court
awarded P50,000 as moral damages, P20,000 as exemplary damages, and P100,000 as attorney's
fees.[35] It denied petitioner's counterclaim for damages for lack of factual and legal
basis.[36] Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.[37]
Petitioner then elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. According
to the appellate court's ruling, petitioner had used its sizable resources to railroad the business of
respondents:[38]
[Petitioner] infiltrated certain areas in Quezon City at the expense of and later, in derogation of its
wholesalers, particularly [respondents]. As admitted by Allan Mercado, the Integrated Selling and
Marketing Manager of appellant, it was previously dependent on wholesalers to circulate its
products around the country. x x x.
x x x x
[T]owards the end of the partnership, appellant employed a different marketing scheme
purportedly to obviate the poor dealership management from wholesalers in major areas. But as
may be shown by the incidents leading to the filing of this case, this method was designed
strategically to overrun [respondents'] business and take over the customers of its wholesalers.
x x x x
One such method was "different pricing schemes" wherein the prices given to supermarkets and
grocery stores were considerably lower than those imposed on wholesalers. No prior advice thereof
was given to [respondents] or any of the wholesalers. In fact, they only knew of it when their
customers began complaining about the variation in prices of softdrinks sold in supermarkets and
those that were sold by them. When in fact [respondent] Bernardo personally inspected the
products in grocery stores, he discovered that a box of Coke-in-can is sold at P40.00, lower than
those offered by them as wholesalers.
About the same time, [petitioner] also implemented the "Area Market Cooperatives" (AMC) and
the "Coke-Alok" promo. Under the AMC, customers of wholesalers can purchase [petitioner's]
products from prominent stores in heavily crowded areas for P76.00 per case, as opposed to
[respondent's] offering of P112.00. In "Coke-Alok," [petitioner] directly sold Coke products to
wholesale customers with incentives as free bottle of Coke for every case of softdrinks purchased.
Being of limited resources, [respondents had no] means to equal the lucrative incentives given by
[petitioner] to their customers.
x x x x
Apart from direct selling and other promotions, [petitioner] also employed high-handed means that
further shrunk [respondents'] market coverage. In one instance, [petitioner's sales representative]
advised [respondents] and other wholesalers to keep away from major thoroughfares. Apparently,
[petitioner] was going to supply their products to these stores themselves. x x x.
x x x x
x x x Furthermore, one of [petitioner's] representatives, Nelson Pabulayan, admitted that he sold

products at the canteen in V. Luna Hospital [which was then being serviced by respondents].
As if that was not enough, petitioner engaged other stores, such as Freezel's Bakeshop that was
located adjacent to [respondent's] warehouse, to sell Coke products at a price substantially lower
than [that offered by respondents].
ISSUES
Petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award temperate damages that were not
prayed for in the Complaint. It further asserts that it did not violate Articles 19, 20, 21 or 28; hence,
the award of damages and attorney's fees was improper.
OUR RULING
The CA did not err in affirming the finding that petitioner was liable for temperate, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, tor abuse of rights and unfair competition.
The Petition raises questions of fact.
Petitioner ignores the nature of a petition for review as a remedy against errors of law. Instead, it
raises factual matters that have already been passed upon by the RTC and the CA.
It insists on the following facts: 1) the "promotional activities" were implemented after the
dealership agreements expired;[39] 2) the "developmental strategies" were implemented nationwide
and were not meant to destroy the business of respondents;[40] 3) its agents did not follow the trucks
of Jolly Beverages;[41] 4) the price difference resulted because respondents could no longer avail
of trade discounts and incentives under the expired Agreement;[42] and 5) there is no causal
connection between the promotional activities and the claimed losses of respondents.[43]
Petitioner contends that since it did not assign any exclusive territory to respondents, the latter had
no exclusive right to any customer.[44] It supposedly decided to rely on its own sales personnel to
push the sale of its products, because the distributors had violated the terms of their agreements by
selling competing products, failing to meet the required sales volume, or failing to pay on
time.[45] Petitioner, however, did not allege that respondents committed any of these actions during
the existence of the agreement.
We have repeatedly held that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are given great weight, even finality, by this Court.[46]Petitioner fails to make a
convincing argument that this case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule. On the contrary,
the Decisions of the RTC and theCA appear to be supported by the records.
Petitioner bewails the fact that the RTC and the CA, in establishing the facts, relied heavily on the
testimony of respondent Jose Bernardo.[47]
Petitioner, however, forgets that trial courts are in an ideal position to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and can therefore discern if the latter are telling the truth or not.[48] In this case, both the
trial and the appellate courts found the testimonies of respondent Jose Bernardo and his witnesses
more credible than those of the witnesses presented by petitioners. We shall not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court, absent any compelling reason.
Petitioner is liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair competition under the Civil Code.
Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had employed oppressive and high-handed schemes
to unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the investment returns of respondents. [49] The
CA summarized its findings as follows:[50]
This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in order to take over the market:
directly sell its products to or deal them off to competing stores at a price substantially lower than
those imposed on its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers suffered losses, and in [respondents']
case, laid ofT a number of employees and alienated the patronage of its major customers including
small-scale stores.
It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the
products; hence, it sets the price. In addition, it took advantage of the infonnation provided by
respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business area. Distributors like
respondents, who had assisted petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves with
fewer customers. Other distributors were left with no choice but to fold.[51]
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a
party who suffers damage whenever another person commits an act in violation of some legal
provision; or an act which, though not con'itituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless
violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.[52] The provisions read:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,[53] this Court held that under any of the above provisions of
law, an act that causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. As
explained by this Court in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:[54]
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears; and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives
it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a
right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good customs. Over and above
the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and
which are expressed in three principles: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique
tribuere; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse
our rights to prejudice others.
Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair
competition also gives a right of action to the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through
the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby sutlers damage.
Petitioner cites Tolentino, who in turn cited Colin and Capitant. According to the latter, the act of
"a merchant [who] puts up a store near the store of another and in this way attracts some of the
latter's patrons" is not an abuse of a right.[55] The scenario in the present case is vastly different:
the merchant was also the producer who, with the use of a list provided by its distributor, knocked
on the doors of the latter's customers and offered the products at a substantially lower price.
Unsatisfied, the merchant even sold its products at a preferential rate to another store within the
vicinity. Jurisprudence holds that when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the
sake of profit, but regardless of Joss and for the sole purpose of driving a competitor out of
business, in order to take advantage of the effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of
a wanton wrong.[56]
Temperate, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, were properly awarded.
Petitioner argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant an award of temperate
damages, because respondents did not specifically pray for it in their Amended Complaint:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court
render a judgment directing defendants to:
1. Pay plaintiffs the amount of P1,000,000.00 representing loss of goodwill nurtured over the
past 13 years as actual damages.
2. Pay plaintiffs the amount of P200,000 representing moral damages.
3. Pay plaintiffs the amount of P100,000 representing exemplary damages.
4. Pay plaintiffs the amount of P100,000 representing attorney's fees.
Other reliefs which are just and equitable under the premises are also prayed for.
Petitioner's argument is flimsy and unsupported even by the cases it has cited.[57] The CA correctly
ruled that the award of temperate damages was justified, even if it was not specifically prayed for,
because 1) respondents did pray for the grant of "other reliefs," and 2) the award was clearly
warranted under the circumstances. Indeed, the law permits judges to award a different kind of
damages as an alternative to actual damages:
Civil Code, Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less
than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
(Emphasis supplied)
Compensatory damages may be awarded in the concept of temperate damages for injury to
business reputation or business standing, loss of goodwill, and loss of customers who shifted their
patronage to competitors.[58]
It is not extraordinary for courts to award temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. In Canada
v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation,[59] this Court awarded temperate damages in
recognition of the pecuniary loss suffered, after finding that actual damages could not be awarded
for lack of proof. In Public Estates Authority v. Chu,[60] this Court held that temperate damages
should have been awarded by the trial court considering that the plaintiff therein had suffered some
pecuniary loss.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that respondents had similarly suffered pecuniary
loss by reason of petitioner's high-handed machinations to eliminate competition in the market.[61]
We see no grave error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that the unpaid obligation of
respondents shall be offset against the temperate damages due them from petitioner.[62] However,
the trial court was not accurate in considering the P500,000 temperate damages as adequate to
completely extinguish the obligation of respondents to petitioner.[63] We note that while the
principal was P449,154, this amount earned legal interest from the time of demand. Nonetheless,
in view of the established fact that respondents incurred the losses after their business was
systematically crippled by petitioner, it is only proper and just that the obligation, as well as the
legal interest that has accrued, be deemed totally compensated by the temperate damages.
Therefore, respondents do not need to tender the amount of P449,154 plus legal interest to
petitioner, while the latter does not have to tender any amount as temperate damages to the former.
With regard to moral damages, petitioner argues that respondents failed to provide satisfactory
proof that the latter had undergone any suffering or injury.[64] This is a factual question that has
been resolved by the trial court in a Decision affirmed by the CA. The award finds legal basis
under Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code, which states that moral damages may be recovered in
acts and actions referred to in Articles 21 and 28.[65]
Petitioner likewise questions the award of exemplary damages without "competent proof."[66] It
cites Spouses Villafuerte v. CA[67] as basis for arguing that the CA should have based its Decision
regarding the fact and the amount of exemplary damages upon competent proof that respondents
have suffered injury and upon evidence of the actual amount thereof. We enjoin petitioner's
counsel to fully and carefully read the text of our decisions before citing them as authority.[68] The
excerpt lifted pertains to compensatory damages, not exemplary damages. We remind counsel that
exemplary damages are awarded under Article 2229 of the Civil Code by way of example or
correction for the public good. The determination of the amount is left to the discretion of the
judge; its proof is not incumbent upon the claimant.
There being no meritorious argument raised by petitioner, the award of exemplary damages must
be sustained to caution powerful business owners against the use of oppressive and high-handed
commercial strategies to target and trample on the rights of small business owners, who are striving
to make a decent living.
Exemplary damages having been awarded, the grant of attorney's fees was therefore warranted.[69]
Petitioner's counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, were properly denied.
The counterclaim for the payment of P449,154 plus legal interet was effectively granted when the
trial court offset the temperate damages awarded to respondents against the outstanding obligation
of the latter to petitioner.
The counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, had no basis and were properly denied. The fact that petitioner was compelled to engage
the services of counsel in order to defend itself against the suit of respondents did not entitle it to
attorney's fees.
According to petitioner, it is entitled to moral damages, because "respondents clearly acted in a

vexatious manner when they instituted this suit."[70] We see nothing in the record to sustain this
argument.
With respect to the prayer for exemplary damages, neither do we find any act of respondents that
has to be deterred.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 23 July 2009 and Resolution dated
19 November 2009 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91096, which
affirmed in toto the Decision dated 28 September 2007 issued by Regional Trial Court Branch 88
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-00-42320, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the damages awarded shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until its full satisfaction. The total compensation of respondents' unpaid obligation,
including legal interest that has accrued, and the temperate damages awarded to them, is hereby
upheld.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Case Digest
Facts:
Sps. Bernardo, doing business as “Jolly Beverage Enterprises”, were distributors of petitioner’s
products from 1987-1999. In their agreement, Coca Cola will extend cash assistance and trade
discount incentives to the respondent while the latter undertook to sell petitioner's products
exclusively, meet the sales quota of 7,000 cases per month, and assist petitioner in its marketing
efforts in exchange. Before the expiration of their contract, Coca Cola required the respondents to
submit a list of their customers on the pretext that it would formulate a policy defining its territorial
dealership in Quezon City and as a condition for the renewal of their contract. Despite their
compliance, the contract was not renewed.
Respondents later on found out that, Coca Cola started to reach out to the persons whose names
were on the list and that the respondent’s delivery trucks were being trailed by petitioner's agents;
and that as soon as the trucks left, the latter would approach the former's customers. Further,
respondents found out that petitioner had employed a different pricing scheme, such that the price
given to distributors was significantly higher than that given to supermarkets. It also enticed direct
buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area with its "Coke Alok" promo, in which it gave away
one free bottle for every case purchased. It further engaged a store adjacent to respondents'
warehouse to sell the former's products at a substantially lower price.
The respondents filed a case against Coca-Cola PH, for violation of Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of
the Civil Code and alleging that the acts of petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad faith, gross
negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in commercial enterprise.
Issue:
Whether the acts of the petitioner constitutes a violation of the petitioner’s right under Articles 19,
20, 21, and 28 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC held that the acts of the petitioner constitutes abuse of rights and unfair competition
under the Civil Code. The SC denied the Petition and affirmed but modified the damages awarded
by the lower court, that it shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the
Decision until its full satisfaction.
According to the SC, the petitioner shall liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair
competition under the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had employed
oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the
investment returns of respondents. The CA summarized its findings as follows:
This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in order to take over the market:
directly sell its products to or deal them off to competing stores at a price substantially lower than
those imposed on its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers suffered losses, and in [respondents']
case, laid of a number of employees and alienated the patronage of its major customers including
small-scale stores.
It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also the manufacturer of the
products; hence, it sets the price. In addition, it took advantage of the information provided by
respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual business area. Distributors like
respondents, who had assisted petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves with
fewer customers. Other distributors were left with no choice but to fold.
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a
party who suffers damage whenever another person commits an act in violation of some legal
provision; or an act which, though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless
violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. The provisions read:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, this Court held that under any of the above provisions of
law, an act that causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. As
explained by this Court in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears; and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives
it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a
right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or good customs. Over and above
the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and
which are expressed in three principles: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique
tribuere; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse
our rights to prejudice others.
Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair
competition also gives a right of action to the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through
the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
Petitioner cites Tolentino, who in turn cited Colin and Capitant. According to the latter, the act of
"a merchant [who] puts up a store near the store of another and in this way attracts some of the
latter's patrons" is not an abuse of a right. The scenario in the present case is vastly different: the
merchant was also the producer who, with the use of a list provided by its distributor, knocked on
the doors of the latter's customers and offered the products at a substantially lower price.
Unsatisfied, the merchant even sold its products at a preferential rate to another store within the
vicinity. Jurisprudence holds that when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the
sake of profit, but regardless of Joss and for the sole purpose of driving a competitor out of
business, in order to take advantage of the effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of
a wanton wrong.
9.) G.R. No. 217426, December 04, 2017
Full Case
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC., PETITIONER,
V.
LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated July 11, 2014 and the
Resolution[3] dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125451,
which affirmed with modification the Decision[4] dated December 15, 2011 and the Order dated
May 25, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 (RTC) in SCA Case
No. MC11-879 (Civil Case No. 21881), and thereby ordered herein petitioner St. Martin
Polyclinic, Inc. (petitioner) to pay respondent LWV Construction Corporation (respondent)
temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
The Facts
Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi
Arabia.[5] On the other hand, petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council
Approved Medical Centers Association (GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct medical
examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment.[6]
On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin
(Raguindin) to petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination in accordance with the
instructions from GAMCA.[7] After undergoing the required examinations, petitioner cleared
Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as evidenced by a Medical Report[8] dated January
11, 2008 (Medical Report).[9]
Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring
expenses in the amount of P84,373.41.[10] Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent another
medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia (General Care Dispensary)
on March 24, 2008, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry
of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Health) required a re-examination of
Raguindin, which the General Care Dispensary conducted on April 28, 2008.[11] However, the
results of the re-examination remained the same, i.e., Raguindin was positive for HCV, which
results were reflected in a Certification[12] dated April 28, 2008 (Certification). An undated HCV
Confirmatory Test Report[13] likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such finding,
thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.[14]
Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that Raguindin is "fit
for employment" when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia revealed that he was positive for
HCV, respondent filed a Complaint[15] for sum of money and damages against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 (MeTC). Respondent essentially
averred that it relied on petitioner's declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence. Thus,
respondent prayed for the award of damages in the amount of P84,373.41 representing the
expenses it incurred in deploying Raguindin abroad.[16]
In its Answer with compulsory counterclaim,[17] petitioner denied liability and claimed that: first,
respondent was not a proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract between them; second,
the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the interpretation and implementation of
a contract of employment; third, the action is premature as Raguindin has yet to undergo a post-
employment medical examination following his repatriation; and fourth, the complaint failed to
state a cause of action as the Medical Report issued by petitioner had already expired on April 11,
2008, or three (3) months after its issuance on January 11, 2008.[18]
The MeTC Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated December 17, 2010, the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent
and ordered petitioner to pay the amount of P84,373.41 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's
fees, and the costs of suit.[20]
At the onset, the MeTC held that it had jurisdiction over the case, since respondent was claiming
actual damages incurred in the deployment of Raguindin in the amount of P84,373.41.[21] It further
ruled that respondent was a real party in interest, as it would not have incurred expenses had
petitioner not issued the Medical Report certifying that Raguindin was fit to work.
On the merits, the MeTC found that respondent was entitled to be informed accurately of the
precise condition of Raguindin before deploying the latter abroad and consequently, had sustained
damage as a result of the erroneous certification.[22] In this relation, it rejected petitioner's
contention that Raguindin may have contracted the disease after his medical examination in the
Philippines up to the time of his deployment, there being no evidence offered to corroborate the
same.[23]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC, contending,[24] among others, that respondent failed to
comply with the requirements on the authentication and proof of documents under Section
24,[25] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, considering that respondent's evidence, particularly the April
28, 2008 Certification issued by the General Care Dispensary and the HCV Confirmatory Test
Report issued by the Ministry of Health, are foreign documents issued in Saudi Arabia.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated December 15, 2011, the RTC dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the
MeTC Decision in its entirety.[27] Additionally, the RTC pointed out that petitioner can no longer
change the theory of the case or raise new issues on appeal, referring to the latter's argument on
the authentication of respondent's documentary evidence.[28]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[29] was denied in an Order[30] dated May 25, 2012.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.[31]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[32] dated July 11, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with the modification
deleting the award of actual damages and instead, awarding temperate damages in the amount of
P50,000.00.[33]
The CA held that petitioner failed to perform its duty to accurately diagnose Raguindin when it
issued its Medical Report declaring the latter "fit for employment", considering that he was
subsequently found positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia.[34] Further, the CA opined that the
Certification issued by the General Care Dispensary is not a public document and in such regard,
rejected petitioner's argument that the same is inadmissible in evidence for not having been
authenticated. Moreover, it remarked that petitioner's own Medical Report does not enjoy the
presumption of regularity as petitioner is merely an accredited clinic.[35] Finally, the CA ruled that
petitioner could not disclaim liability on the ground that Raguindin tested positive for HCV in
Saudi Arabia after the expiration of the Medical Report on April 11, 2008, noting that the General
Care Dispensary issued its Certification on April 28, 2008, or a mere seventeen (17) days from the
expiration of petitioner's Medical Report.[36] Hence, the CA concluded that "it is contrary to human
experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would immediately
contract a serious virus at the very beginning of a deployment."[37]
However, as the records are bereft of evidence to show that respondent actually incurred the
amount of P84,373.41 as expenses for Raguindin's deployment, the CA deleted the award of actual
damages and instead, awarded temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00.[38]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration,[39] which the CA denied in a
Resolution[40] dated February 27, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner was negligent
in issuing the Medical Report declaring Raguindin "fit for employment" and hence, should be held
liable for damages.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is granted.
I.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done
acting on a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews
only questions of law.[41] Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari,only questions of law may
generally be put into issue. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, such as "when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible"; or "when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based."[42] Finding a
confluence of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court would not apply, and the
Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom.[43]
II.
An action for damages due to the negligence of another may be instituted on the basis of Article
2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence in
the performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal connection between the
negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-existing contractual relation.[44]
As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the purview of Article 2176 gives rise to a
cause of action under quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a claim of damages.[45] Notably,
quasi-delict is one among several sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code states:
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
However, as explained by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) in his opinion
in Alano v. Magud-Logmao[46] (Alano), "Article 2176 is not an all-encompassing enumeration of
all actionable wrongs which can give rise to the liability for damages. Under the Civil Code, acts
done in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 will also give rise to damages."[47] These provisions
- which were cited as bases by the MTC, RTC and CA in their respective rulings in this case - read
as follows:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
"[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in
the performance of one's duties."[48] Case law states that "[w]hen a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would [then] be proper."[49] Between these two
provisions as worded, it is Article 20 which applies to both willful and negligent acts that are done
contrary to law. On the other hand, Article 21 applies only to willful acts done contra bonos
mores.[50]
In the Alano case, Justice Leonen aptly elaborated on the distinctive applications of Articles 19,
20 and 21, which are general provisions on human relations, vis-a-vis Article 2176, which
particularly governs quasi-delicts:
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the
basis of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable
tort may arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It allows recovery should the
act have been willful or negligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do the act and the desire to
achieve the outcome which is considered by the plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence
may refer to a situation where the act was consciously done but without intending the result which
the plaintiff considers as injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be caused by acts which are not
necessarily proscribed by law. This article requires that the act be willful, that is, that there was an
intention to do the act and a desire to achieve the outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal
issues revolve around whether such outcome should be considered a legal injury on the part of the
plaintiff or whether the commission of the act was done in violation of the standards of care
required in Article 19.
Article 2176 covers situations where an injury happens through an act or omission of the
defendant. When it involves a positive act, the intention to commit the outcome is irrelevant. The
act itself must not be a breach of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation. What will
be considered is whether there is "fault or negligence” attending the commission of the act which
necessarily leads to the outcome considered as injurious by the plaintiff. The required degree of
diligence will then be assessed in relation to the circumstances of each and every
case.[51] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it should therefore be discerned that Article 20
of the Civil Code concerns "violations of existing law as basis for an injury", whereas Article 2176
applies when the negligent act causing damage to another does not constitute "a breach of an
existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation."
In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the provisions of
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because respondent did not proffer (nor have
these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which damages may be recovered due to petitioner's
alleged negligent act. In its amended complaint, respondent mainly avers that had petitioner not
issue a "fit for employment" Medical Report to Raguindin, respondent would not have processed
his documents, deployed him to Saudi Arabia, and later on - in view of the subsequent findings
that Raguindin was positive for HCV and hence, unfit to work - suffered actual damages in the
amount of P84,373.41.[52] Thus, as the claimed negligent act of petitioner was not premised on the
breach of any law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no pre-existing contractual relation
was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 - instead of Articles 19, 20 and 21 - of the
Civil Code should govern.
III.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.[53]
As early as the case of Picart v. Smith,[54] the Court elucidated that "the test by which to determine
the existence of negligence in a particular case is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence."[55] Corollary thereto, the Court stated
that "[t]he question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value x x x:
Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to
them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence[,] they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger."[56]
Under our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular.[57] In effect, negligence cannot
be presumed, and thus, must be proven by him who alleges it.[58] In Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers,
Inc.:[59]
[T]he negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden
of proof is upon [the plaintiff]. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that "burden of
proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." It is then up for the plaintiff to establish
his cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in
his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden
of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns.
The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.[60] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to
establish petitioner's negligence are: (a) the Certification[61] dated April 28, 2008; and (b) the HCV
Confirmatory Test Report.[62] However, these issuances only indicate the results of the General
Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own medical examination of Raguindin finding him to
be positive for HCV. Notably, the examination conducted by the General Care Dispensary, which
was later affirmed by the Ministry of Health, was conducted only on March 24, 2008, or at least
two (2) months after petitioner issued its Medical Report on January 11, 2008. Hence, even
assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested positive for
the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the same medical state at the time
petitioner issued the Medical Report on January 11, 2008. In this regard, it was therefore incumbent
upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was
issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures were not carefully
observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for
deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when respondent only proffered evidence which
demonstrate that months after petitioner's Medical Report was issued, Raguindin, who had already
been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for
employment".
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV only after his
medical examination with petitioner on January 11, 2008. Based on published reports from the
World Health Organization, HCV or the hepatitis C virus causes both acute and chronic infection.
Acute HCV infection is usually asymptomatic,[63] and is only very rarely associated with life-
threatening diseases. The incubation period[64] for HCV is two (2) weeks to six (6) months, and
following initial infection, approximately 80% of people do not exhibit any
symptoms.[65] Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after
petitioner's medical examination and hence, could have possibly contracted the same only when
he arrived thereat. In light of the foregoing, the CA therefore erred in holding that "[h]ad petitioner
more thoroughly and diligently examined Raguindin, it would likely have discovered the existence
of the HCV because it was contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker,
such as Raguindin, would immediately have contracted the disease at the beginning of his
deployment"[66]
While petitioner's Medical Report indicates an expiration of April 11, 2008, the Court finds it
fitting to clarify that the same could not be construed as a certified guarantee coming from
petitioner that Raguindin's medical status at the time the report was issued on January 11, 2008
(i.e., that he was fit for employment) would remain the same up until that date (i.e., April 11,
2008). As earlier intimated, the intervening period could very well account for a number of
variables that could have led to a change in Raguindin's condition, such as his deployment to a
different environment in Saudi Arabia. If at all, the expiration date only means that the Medical
Report is valid - and as such, could be submitted - as a formal requirement for overseas
employment up until April 11, 2008; it does not, by any means, create legal basis to hold the issuer
accountable for any intervening change of condition from the time of issuance up until expiration.
Truly, petitioner could not be reasonably expected to predict, much less assure, that Raguindin's
medical status of being fit for employment would remain unchanged. Thus, the fact that the
Medical Report's expiration date of April 11, 2008 was only seventeen (17) days away from the
issuance of the General Care Dispensary's April 28, 2008 Certification finding Raguindin positive
for HCV should not - as it does not - establish petitioner's negligence.
IV.
At any rate, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV could not have been properly
established since the courts a quo, in the first place, erred in admitting and giving probative weight
to the Certification of the General Care Dispensary, which was written in an unofficial language.
Section 33, Rule 132 ofthe Rules of Court states that:
Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. - Documents written in an unofficial
language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or
Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial.[67]
A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains English words,
the majority of it is in an unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino provided
by respondent, the same should not have been admitted in evidence; thus their contents could not
be given probative value, and deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein.
Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not proven in
accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
(c) Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the Certification does not fall within the classes of
public documents under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[68] - and hence, must be
considered as private. It has been settled that an unverified and unidentified private document
cannot be accorded probative value.[69] In addition, case law states that "since a medical certificate
involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given
weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. It
is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity
to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or
author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity
to question its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the medical
certificate renders its contents suspect and of no probative value,"[70] as in this case.
Similarly, the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia
should have also been excluded as evidence. Although the same may be considered a public
document, being an alleged written official act of an official body of a foreign country,[71] the same
was not duly authenticated in accordance with Section 24,[72] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. While
respondent provided a translation[73] thereof from the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos,
Bureau of External Relations, Office of the President, the same was not accompanied by a
certificate of the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Saudi Arabia,
where the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.[74]
To be sure, petitioner - contrary to respondent's contention[75] - has not changed its theory of the
case by questioning the foregoing documents. As petitioner correctly argued, it merely amplified
its defense[76] that it is not liable for negligence when it further questioned the validity of the
issuances of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health. In Limpangco Sons v. Yangco[77],
the Court explained that "[t]here is a difference x x x between a change in the theory of the case
and a shifting of the incidence of the emphasis placed during the trial or in the briefs." "Where x x
x the theory of the case as set out in the pleadings remains the theory throughout the progress of
the cause, the change of emphasis from one phase of the case as presented by one set of facts to
another phase made prominent by another set of facts x x x does not result in a change of theory x
x x".[78] In any case, petitioner had already questioned the validity of these documents in its
Position Paper[79] before the MeTC.[80] Hence, there is no change of theory that would preclude
petitioner's arguments on this score.
All told, there being no negligence proven by respondent through credible and admissible
evidence, petitioner cannot be held liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as
above-discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 11, 2014 and the
Resolution dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125451
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is entered, DISMISSING the complaint of
respondent LWV Construction Corporation for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Case Digest
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What is the case about?

What is the case about?

What arguments did the petitioner raise?

What arguments did the petitioner raise?

Compiled by: CAJETA, Geena Marie S.

Article 15: Nationality Theory:

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

xxx xxx xxx

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).

3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.

2.) G.R No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J., concurring:

PARAS, J., concurring:

3.) G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of

Ruling of the Trial Court

Hence, this Petition.18

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Divorce as a Question of Fact

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

4.) G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

5.) G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,

The petition lacks merit.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Church in La Loma, Quezon City.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

6.) G.R. No. 133743 Feb. 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

The petition lacks merit.

Brief Historical Background

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

7.) G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,