Article 8 Consti

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I 1
PROF. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA

ATENEO LAW 1-E 2013: CLASS DIGESTS
SECTION 1
148 SCRA 382
In re: LAURETA
FACTS:
- In letters dates October 20, 1986, Eva Maravilla wrote to the Supreme Court, she asked that the
justices’ attention be called to the dismissal of her case by a resolution promulgated by the same.
She only addressed 4 justices, in complete and feigned ignorance of the rule that the first division
of the SC must act through 5 members.
- In the letters, the asked that they be informed of those who participated in the promulgation of the
said resolution in question. The authors of the letter also said that if no reply to the letter was
received, their silence would be considered as support of the dismissal of the petition by the
resolution.
- Also attacked was Justice Pedro Yap, chairman of the first division in the wise, saying that since
he is the law partner of Atty. Ordonez, who was the counsel for the respondents and was
subsequently positioned as the Solicitor General, Yap should have notified Ordonez of his
disqualification from the case.
- The letter also reflected the suspicion that Chairman Yap convinced the division members that the
Maravilla case had no merit. That even though the members knew nothing about the case, readily
dismissed it. After all, the resolution that dismissed the petition did not have the signatures of the
members.
- Upon careful deliberation of the division, they said that the division has rendered justice already
and that even though the decision is not favorable to the one party does not mean that it is an
unjust decision.
- The petitioners answered with another letter saying that they merely asked who participated in
the dismissal of the petition. They even threatened that the case would be brought before the
eyes of the nation and another forum of justice because they did not practice judicial integrity for
not having signed the controversial resolution in full.
- True enough, she filed a case with a tanodbayan saying that the members acted in bad faith in
the unjust resolutions thereby conceding the vast estates to her opponents. The Tanodbayan
(ombudsman) dismissed petitioner’s complaint.
- In another resolution on January 1986, the court ordered that Maravilla and her counsel Laureta
explain why they should not be held in contempt. They answered that
o There was no intention to affront the honor and dignity of the court,
o The letter addressed to the justices were private in character,
o If the contents of the letters were indeed contemptuous, they should have immediately
take n disciplinary proceedings.
o That she instituted the case before the tanodbayan in good faith that injustice was done
to her,
o That the publicity of the case in newspaper was no fault of hers,
o That laureta was not her counsel in the case filed with the tanodbayan,
o That she actually proved the collective culpability of the justices,
o Lastly that the 53 page motion for reconsideration filed before the tanodbayan was an
integral part of her answer.
- The SC found their answers unsatisfactory. They explained that Laureta was indeed involved
(courtesy of his name printed on the envelopes sent to the newspapers containing the elements
of the case) and that the attacks on the SC were an affront to the dignity of the court. They also
“He who has less in life should have more in law” – Quoted from Dean Bautista
explained that the conviction of contempt was not vindictive reprisal but rather the duty of the
court to protect itself from scurrilous attacks.
ISSUE:
- Should Laureta and Maravilla be held in contempt?
DECISION:
- Maravilla was held in contempt, with a fine of P1,000 pesos.

- Laureta guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law.
REASON:
- To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member
of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of
official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the
judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. For it is a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the
action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy
that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.
- To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted "with
deliberate bad faith" and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of
their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at
hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts
and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To
allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.
- The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were
submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the
contempt committed.
G.R. No. 143351, September 14, 2000
VILLAROSA, petitioner
VS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent
FACTS:
Private respondent Ricardo V. QUINTOS filed an election protest case against petitioner Amelita
C. VILLAROSA before the HRET. Both are the only candidates as representative of the Lone Legislative
District of Occidental Mindoro, where Villarosa was proclaimed the winning candidate on May 27, 1998
with a margin of 3,032 votes.
Villarosa’s husband, Jose T. Villarosa, has a nickname or stagename of “JOE-JTV”. Villarosa
decided to use the nickname/stagename “JTV”. In her affidavit, she asked that she be allowed to insert
the name GIRLIE so that her name, as read in full, would be MA. AMELITA “Girlie” C. VILLAROSA in
every barangay/s of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, as she is known as “Girlie Villarosa”.
The Provincial Election Supervisor notified COMELEC that the authorized nickname of Villarosa
in her certificate of candidacy is JTV and a memorandum was issued by the former. There was a petition
filed with COMELEC to invalidate the use of “JTV” where none of the Protestant/Protestee were made
formal parties. COMELEC resolution ruled that Villarosa cannot use the nickname “JTV” as she is not
popularly known in that nickname/stagename. Villarosa then files a protest challenging the said resolution
of COMELEC (pending).
Before filing of this protest, Quintos filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Villarosa on
the grounds that the latter had ‘given money of material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public official performing electoral functions and committed acts of terrorism to enhance her
candidacy (pending).
HRET rules of procedure required both parties to designate 25% of protested and counter-
protested precincts as respective pilot precincts. Ballots bearing JTV, JTB, GTV, GTB, Jitivi, Gitivi, Jitibi,
Gitibi and Girlie on line during the revision were classified as ballots for Villarosa which revisors of
Quintos objected to. Quintos filed withdrawal of the remaining non-pilot protested precincts, thus limiting
the issue to ‘whether or not the “JTV” votes should be counted in favor of Villarosa’.
HRET promulgation resolved to PROCEED with the revision of the ballots and another resolution
informing the parties that by a vote of 5-4 of its member, not to count ‘JTV’ and its variations as valid votes
for Villarosa as they were considered stray ballots.
Quintos contests the result of the election on the following grounds:
1. Ballots were misread and counted in favor of Villarosa
2. Rampant substitution voting—persons other than the registered voters voted
3. Villarosa and her followers committed violence and intimidation against unknown supporters
of Quintos
4. Previously prepared ballots favoring Villarosa were prepared and deposited in the ballot
boxes
5. Illiterate Mangyan voters voting for Quintos were assisted by self-appointed assistors of
Villarosa who wrote JTV on the ballots contrary to the instruction of said illiterate voters
HRET maintained the issue of whether to count JTV in favor of Villarosa. Its reasons were first,
her affidavit asking for the insertion of “GIRLIE” and stating that she was known in such nickname in
every barangay of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, an admission that her nickname is the GIRLIE and
not JTV.
The use of nicknames and appellations of affection and friendship, if accompanied by the first
name or surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote, except when they were used as a
means to identify the voter, in which case the whole ballot is invalid; Provided, That if the
nickname used is unaccompanied by the name or surname of a candidate and it is the one by
which he is generally or popularly known in the locality, the name shall be counted in favor of said
candidate, if there is no other candidate for the same office with the same nickname.
The HRET thus agreed with the COMELEC in its resolution that disallowed Villarosa to use "JTV"
as a nickname because the same was not her nickname with which she was popularly known.
ARGUMENTS:
Villarosa filed a Petition for Certiorari alleging that HRET gravely abused its discretion in (a)
issuing the above-mentioned resolutions in that it violated her right to due process when it disposed by a
5-4 ruling a vital election incident without stating therein the findings of fact and law on which the
resolutions were based; and (b) treating "JTV" votes as stray and invalid, resulting in the
disenfranchisement of the voters of Occidental Mindoro.
She argued that "JTV" was her designated nickname in the official list of candidates submitted by
the provincial election supervisor to the COMELEC in Manila; it was the nickname she used in her
posters, handbills and other election propaganda throughout the campaign period. In her speeches during
the rallies, she urged the voters who might have found her full name difficult to write to simply vote "JTV,"
as she had decided to use that nickname as a shortcut of her name as a married woman under Article
370 of the Civil Code
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not due process was observed by the HRET in rendering the decision in question.
2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in not counting in favor of
VILLAROSA the votes for "JTV" or derivatives thereof.
3. Whether or not this Court can still sustain the enforcement of the decision of the HRET
considering its rules on finality of judgment and the fact that QUINTOS has taken his oath of
office
RULING:
1. YES. Villarosa was not denied due process.

2. NO. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
3. YES. The HRET rule on finality of its judgment CANNOT divest the Supreme Court of its
power and duty under Section 1 of Article VIII.
RATIO/REASON:
1. Due Process observed by HRET
The requirement of Due Process is satisfied if the following conditions are present:
a) presence of a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
b) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the proper
which is the subject of the proceeding;
c) defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
d) judgment must be rendered upon the lawful hearing.
The essence of due process is the ‘reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one’s defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
Villarosa was not only heard, but she even moved that the HRET make a categorical ruling that
all ballots cast for JTV are valid ballots for her. She cannot now be heard to complain that she
was denied due process.
2. HRET acted within its powers
Under the Constitution, the HRET is "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Grave abuse of discretion—implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;
—or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.
—it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The HRET was thus correct in applying Rule 14 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which provides:
14. Any vote containing initials only or which is illegible or which does not sufficiently identify
the candidate for whom it is intended shall be considered as a stray vote but shall not
invalidate the whole ballot.
Under this rule three kinds of votes are considered stray:

(1) a vote containing initials only,
(2) a vote which is illegible, and
(3) a vote which does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended.
The only error of the HRET is its ruling that if the votes are in initials only, they are to be
considered stray votes if they do not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom the votes are
intended.
The first category of stray votes under this rule is not to be qualified by the third category in the
sense that votes in initials only may be counted for a candidate provided that the initials would
sufficiently identify the candidate voted for. Such construction of the rule fails to give meaning to
the disjunctive conjunction OR separating the first category from the second, and the second from
the third.
*From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of VILLAROSA was evident when, in her
certificate of candidacy and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her
husband, the incumbent Representative of the district in question whom she wanted to succeed
in office. She tried to make a mockery of a process whose credibility is essential in preserving
democracy.
« Nullus commodum potest de injuria sua propia » —No one should be allowed to take
advantage of his own wrong.
3. SC cannot be divested of its power and duty
Should HRET commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then
the party aggrieved may come to the Courts to seek redress by way of ‘special civil action for
certiorari’ under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even if by the HRET Rules of
Procedure the assailed judgment has become final and the prevailing party has taken his oath of
office or assumed his position.
The HRET rule on finality of its judgment cannot divest the Supreme Court of its power and duty
under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution to determine in a proper case whether there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of HRET.
In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
Concurring and Dissenting—Justice Gonzaga-Reyes:
“…I cannot agree with the majority in its resolution of the issue of whether the Tribunal gravely abused its
discretion in declaring the "JTV" votes and its variations invalid. To the contrary, I submit that an
application of the plain provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, consistent with their spirit and
intendment to respect and uphold the will of the voters, will lead to no other conclusion than that the "JTV"
votes and their variations are valid, and that the Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in grossly
misapplying the provisions of the law in favor of a strained and technical interpretation that resulted in the
disenfranchisement of more than 6,000 voters of Occidental Mindoro.”
According to the applicable provision of the Omnibus Election Code is Section 211, paragraph 13, a
nickname alone is a valid vote, provided:
(1) it is that by which a candidate is generally or popularly known in the locality, and
(2) there is no other candidate with the same nickname running for the same office.
G.R. No. 152295 July 9, 2002
MONTESCLAROS, petitioner
VS.
COMMISSSION OF ELECTIONS, respondent
FACTS:
The SK is a youth organization originally established by P.D. No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay
(KB) the purpose of which is to give members the opportunity to express their views and opinions on
issues of transcendental importance. It shall be composed of all barangay residents who were less than
18yrs old, without specifying the minimum age.
Local Government Code of 1991 renamed KB to SK limiting the membership to those youths “at
least 15 but not more than 21 years of age.” It remains as a youth organization in every barangay tasked
to initiate programs "to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and
physical development of the youth." It shall be composed of a chairperson and seven (7) members
elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan composed of all citizens actually residing in the barangay for at
least 6 months and who meet the membership age requirement.
Antoinette V.C. Montesclaros sent a letter to the COMELEC on Feb. 18, 2002 demanding that the
SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002 and urged the latter to respond within 10 days upon
receipt of the letter, otherwise she will seek judicial relief.
Then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House and
Senate President concerning the status of the pending bills on SK and Brgy. Elections. In his letter,
Benipayo suggested that it is “operationally difficult” to hold both elections simultaneously and to
postpone the SK elections to November. 10 days lapsed and petitioners received a copy of the
COMELEC En Banc resolutions.
March 6, 2002, Senate and House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing
the SK elections. The consolidated bull of the Bicameral Committee reset the SK and Barangay elections
to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of
age.
Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayer's and class suit, on their own
behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated. They claim that they are in danger of being
disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be
postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the
SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.
ARGUMENTS:
1. The postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises them, preventing them from
voting and being voted for in the SK elections.
2. Petitioners' theory is that if the SK elections were postponed to a date later than May 6, 2002, the
postponement would disqualify from SK membership youths who will turn 21 years old between
May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK elections.
3. A reduction in the SK membership age to 15 but less than 18 years of age from the then
membership age of 15 but not more than 21 years of age would disqualify about seven million
youths.
4. Public respondents' failure to hold the elections on May 6, 2002 would prejudice petitioners and
other youths similarly situated.
ISSUES:
Whether or not COMELEC, Senate President, Speaker of the House, and other respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
DECISION:
NO. Public respondents, having acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and duties,
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in their assailed acts.
RATIO/REASON:
The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the
following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
In the case at bar, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are
nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No.
9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the
date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention.
It does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill:
-is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law.
-creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court.
-having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty.
-the Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that
would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress.
The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or
from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of
Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by
members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the
Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each
chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional
rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes
or procedures of Congress.
The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress
should enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power
to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus
to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the
Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government.
In addition, the Comelec exercised its power and duty to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and to
"recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending." The Comelec's acts enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. These acts cannot constitute proof, as
claimed by petitioners, that there "exists a connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in
contravention of the present law." As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec, the "Comelec, as the
government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections laws, is entitled to the
presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections."
SECTION 3
G.R. No. L-3066, May 22, 1950
RADIOWEALTH, INC., petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL AGREGADO, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, CASIMIRO L.
DACANAY, MARIANO VASQUEZ, and FERNANDO DIZON, as chairman and members respectively
of the Property Requisition Committee of the Office of the President of the Philippines,
respondents.
FACTS:
Upon certification made by the clerk of the Supreme Court, the purchase and installation of a
Webster Teletalk Model 206 MA and Webster Telephone Speakers from Radiowealth, Inc. amounting to
P585 was supposed to be executed. However, this action was disapproved by Chairman Dacanay of the
Property Requisition Committee appointed by the President. Respondent contended that the purchase
and installation of said apparatus violated certain executive orders and policies. This prompted
Radiowealth, Inc. to file the present petition. Petitioner prays for the dissolution of the Property
Requisition Committee, the nullity and inapplicability of the Executive Orders and that the Auditor General
be ordered to countersign the treasury warrant which will effect the payment.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner questions the decision of the Auditor General affirming the contention posed by
respondent members of the Property Requisition Committee.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Executive (through the Property Requisition Committee and subsequently, the
Auditor General) has the authority to bar the purchase made by the Supreme Court.
HELD:
NO. The Executive may not encroach upon the Judiciary’s power to acquire books and other
office equipment reasonably needed to the convenient transaction of its business.
REASONS:
1. Applying the principles of a similar case, Province of Tarlac, etc. vs, Gale, where it was found
that it was the duty of provincial boards and officers to “furnish court room, furniture, fixtures,
supplies, equipment, etc., when in the serious and deliberate judgment of the court, they, they
or any of them, are necessary for the adequate administration of justice”, the court ruled that:
a)in case of conflict, the court has the final say on what is necessary for its efficiency and b)
that in the event that the provincial board refuses to perform its duty, the court has the power
to procure the equipment that it needs either directly or by renting or by ordering the officials
to furnish them. The power to determine what is essential to their business lies with the
judge.
2. The Supreme Court is independent of the Executive under the principle of separation of
powers stipulated in the constitution.
3. In the absence of express and valid legislation, (and by valid legislation we mean one which
does not unreasonably infringe upon the legitimate prerogatives of the Supreme Court), the
Auditor General may not question the court's expenditures except when they are, in the
words of the organic law, "irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant." Outside of
these exceptions his duty to approve the payments is mandatory; and even when the
objection is that the expenditures are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant, his
decisions are not final.
SECTION 4
334 SCRA 465
FIRESTONE CERAMICS INC., petitioner

VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
FACTS:
1) The case at bar is for the resolution of petitioners’ Motion to refer these consolidated cases to the
Court En Banc.
2) The Republic of the Philippines presumptively owns a vast tract of land with an area of around 99
hectares. This land has been adjudicated to private individuals by a court that was alleged to
have no jurisdiction to have rendered decision to. Since the validity of the said decision and the
original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on
the classification of subject area at the time it was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of
the disposition thereof is in order.
3) The decision does not indicate the classification of the land when the private respondents
obtained their decree of registration thereover. Hence, there was submitted to the Court en
consulta, petitioners’ Motion to refer to the Court en banc these consolidated cases.
4) On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners’ motion to transfer these cases
to the Banc. Thus on March 14, the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter voted 9-5 to
accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon view of the finding that the case merits its attention.
The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and
consideration. The Court was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion
of the majority of its actual membership-that, indeed subject cases are of sufficient importance
meriting the action and decision of the whole court.
ARGUMENTS:
Under SC Circular No. 2-89, Feb 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of Nov 18, 1993, the ff are
considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty
3. Cases raising novel questions of law
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections and Commission on Audit
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed os the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more
than one year of a fine exceeding P10 000 or both
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three members thereof merit eth
attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of actual membership of the court
en banc and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
sufficient importance to merit its attention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case at bar is an en banc case. ("by the full court" "in the bench" or "full bench."
When all the members of an appellate court hear an argument, they are sitting en banc. This refers to
court sessions with the entire membership of a court participating rather than the usual quorum.)
DECISION:
The consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc cases; and petitioners’ motions for
reconsideration are set for oral argument.
REASONS:
Under SC Circular No. 2-89, Feb 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of Nov 18, 1993, the ff are
considered en banc cases:
10. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question
11. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty
12. Cases raising novel questions of law
13. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
14. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections and Commission on Audit
15. Cases where the penalty to be imposed os the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more
than one year of a fine exceeding P10 000 or both
16. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed
17. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three members thereof merit eth
attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of actual membership of the court
en banc and
18. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
In the two consolidated cases under consideration, the Motions for reconsideration of the
petitioners, RP and Firestone Ceramics are pending and unresolved. Taking into account the
importance of these cases, the Court sees the enormous value of the area which is claimed to be as
government property. There is merit in the prayer of the petitioners that their pending motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the Court en banc. The act of the SC in accepting cases for the
En banc to pass upon is a legit ante and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the
contemplation of par.9 of the Resolution En Banc of 18 Nov 1993, which reads; “
All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of
DISSENTING:
GONZAGA-REYES: the fact alone that the property involved covers an area o 99 hectares does not
provide a cogent reason to elevate the cases to the Court en banc. The Court en banc is not an appellate
court to which a decision or resolution may be appealed; The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an
appellate court vis a vis its Divisions and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. The
resolution dated Nov 18, 1993 is an amendment to Sec 15 and 16 Rule 136 of the Rule of Court which
deals with the form of unprinted and printed papers to be filed with the Supreme Court and was clearly not
intended to lay down new guidelines or rules for referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a
Division. The prerogative to take out a case from a Division without the concurrence of the majority should
be used for compelling reasons.
PANGANIBAN: the majority has not given any cogent or compelling reason for this unprecedented action
of yanking the case out of against the will of a Division. There must be simple justice for all.
G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY BAULA,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
VS.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
FACTS:
Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC) owns a 144-hectare
land in Sumilao, Bukidnon. In 1984, NQSRMDC leased the land to Philippine Packing Corporation
presently known as Del Monte Philippines, Inc. for use as a pineapple plantation. The land was leased to
the said corporation for ten years under the Producer and Growers’ Agreement.
In October 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and estimated its value at Php. 2.38 million.
NQSRDMDC complained of DAR’s action to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). DARAB subsequently
issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Provincial Agrarian Officer of Bukidnon, Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines and their authorized
representatives to desist from any activities until further notice. However, the DAR Regional Director
disregarded the order o the DARAB and issued a memorandum on May 21, 1992, directing the Land
Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary
proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property.
NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the
DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR
Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of property.
On October 22, 1992, the DARAB acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR
Regional Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992;"
(b) nullifying the DAR Regional Director's memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary
proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of
Petitioner NQSRMDC's subject Property to the DAR until further orders." The Land Bank then complied
with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.
Meanwhile, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O.
Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre
Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
In relation to this, on March 4, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon enacted Ordinance
No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can
inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
Nevertheless, on November 14, 1994, the DAR issued an Order denying the instant application for the
conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and directed the
distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries.
Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and
prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the
people of Bukidnon. The Office of the President subsequently decided in favor of converting the 144-
hectare property to an industrial land on March 29, 1996 which the DAR contested.
On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the order from the Office of the President, NQSRMDC and
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby the former donated four hectares from the land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High
School. However, it was discovered that the land title of the said property was cancelled by the DAR and
had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries.
On October 9, 1997, the farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger-strike in front of the Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in Quezon city to protest the decision of President in awarding the land to
NQSRMDC.
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the controversy by issuing the so-called
"Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona which allowed for
the conversion of the said land to an agro-industrial area only to the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered
the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. A copy of the "Win-Win"
Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries
through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were "previously identified by
respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare" property subject of this case.
ARGUMENTS:
The petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to grant the said resolution "after a
very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring
and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to
appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying a decision which has been declared final and executory.
Furthermore, the petitioners alleged that then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona "committed
grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of
November 7, 1997.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the recourse of the petitioners in filing the petition for review directly with the Court
of Appeals was proper. Was there an error of jurisdiction or an error of judgment?
2) Whether or not the petitioners committed a procedural lapse in when they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration before seeking judicial recourse.
3) Whether or not NQSRMDC was guilty of forum-shopping.
4) Whether or not the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially
modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court granted the petition of Carlos Fortich, Rey Baula, and NQSRMDC. The Resolution
dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the President was nullified and set aside. The Motion
For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries was denied.
REASONS:
The Supreme Court said that an error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction
is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, and can be corrected by a petition for certiorari. Thus, it held that the case involved an error
of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment. The Supreme Court further claimed that the petitioners were
correct in filing the petition for certiorari based on Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the petitioners did not commit a procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration since the Resolution being challenged in the case was a patent nullity.
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners were not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining
whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. The cases filed by the petitioner were not similar
with each other. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the
nullification of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997.
With regard to the last issue, the Supreme Court said that “When the Office of the President issued the
Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the
case, more so modify its Decision.” Its basis was the Administrative Order No. 18. which provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases.
SECTION 5
5 U.S. 137 (Cranch)
WILLIAM MARBURY
VS.
JAMES MADISON, Secretary of State of the United States
FACTS:
Thomas Jefferson, a member of the Republican Party, won the election of 1800. Before Jefferson took
office, John Adams, the outgoing President, appointed a total of 58 members to fill government jobs
created by Congress.
It was the responsibility of Adams' Secretary of State, John Marshall, to finish the paperwork and give it to
each of the newly appointed officials. Although Marshall signed and sealed all of the papers, he failed to
deliver 17 of them to the appointees. Marshall thought his successor would finish the job. But when
Jefferson became President, he told his new Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver some of
the papers. Those individuals couldn't take office until they actually had their papers in hand.
William Marbury, whom Adams had appointed as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia, was one
of these last-minute appointees who did not receive his commission. Marbury sued James Madison and
asked the Supreme Court of the United States to issue a writ of mandamus, a court order that requires an
official to perform or refrain from performing a certain duty. In this case, the writ would have ordered
Madison to deliver the commission.
When the case came before the Court, John Marshall — the person who had failed to deliver the
commission in the first place — was the new Chief Justice.
ARGUMENTS:
Charles Lee, counsel for William Marbury argued that the nature of the office of Secretary of State are of
two kinds, and he exercises his functions in two different capacities: 1. as a public ministerial officer of the
United States and 2. as agent of the president. In the first his duty is to the United States or its citizens; in
the other, his duty is to the President; in the one, he is an independent and an accountable officer; in the
other he is dependent upon the President, is his agent, and accountable to him alone. In the former
capacity he is compellable by mandamus to do his duty; in the latter he is not.
Marbury argued that he was entitled to the job and that the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court
of the United States original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus, which is the type of court order he
needed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not William Marbury is entitled to hold office as justice of peace of the District of Columbia.
2. Whether or not the law of the United States can afford him any remedy.
3. Whether or not the US Supreme Court is the place where he can get the relief he requests.
HELD:
1. YES. He entitled to hold office.
2. YES. The laws of the United States afford him remedy.
3. YES. It is within the province of the judiciary, where people who have rights to have been violated, to
grant them the relief they seek.
REASONS:
1. His right originates in an act of Congress passed in February, 1801, concerning the District of
Columbia.
After dividing the district into two counties, the 11th section of this law enacts:
That there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties, such number of discreet
persons to be justices of the peace as the president of the United States shall, from time
to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five years.
It appears, from the affidavits, that in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury, as a
justice of the peace for the county of Washington, was signed by John Adams, then President of the
United States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the commission has never
reached the person for whom it was made out.
In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to inquire whether
he has been appointed to the office. For if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five
years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office, which, being completed, become
his property.
Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution provides that
The President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate shall
appoint, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other officers of the
United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.
Article II, Section 2 further provides that:
He shall commission all the officers of the United States.
An act of congress directs the secretary of state to keep the seal of the United States, "to make out and
record, and affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States, to be
appointed by the president, by and with the consent of the senate, or by the president alone;
provided, that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same shall have
been signed by the President of the United States."
These are the clauses of the constitution and laws of the United States, which affect this part of the case.
When a commission has been signed by the President the appointment is made; and that the commission
is complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the Secretary of State. Where an
officer is removable at the will of the executive, the circumstance which completes his appointment is of
no concern; because the act is at any time revocable, and the commission may be arrested, if still in the
office. But when the officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not revocable,
and cannot be annulled. It has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed.
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once
made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases where by law the officer is not
removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute,
unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.
William Marbury then, since his commission was signed by the President, and sealed by the Secretary of
State, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years,
independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights,
which are protected by the laws of his country.
To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of
a vested legal right.
2. That by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the President of the United States appointed him a
justice of peace for the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia; and that the seal of the United
States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and
of the completion of the appointment, and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office
for the space of five years. And having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the
commission a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country
afford him a remedy.
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
It behooves us, then, to inquire whether there be in its composition any ingredient which shall exempt it
from legal investigations, or exclude the injured party from legal redress. In pursuing this inquiry the first
question which presents itself is, whether this can be arranged with that class of cases which come under
the description of damnum absque injuria -- a loss without an injury.
This description of cases never has been considered, and it is believed never can be considered, as
comprehending offices of trust, of honor, or of profit. The office of justice of peace in the District of
Columbia is such an office; it is therefore worthy of the attention and guardianship of the laws. It has
received that attention and guardianship. It has been created by special act of congress, and has been
secured, so far as the laws can give security, to the person appointed to fill it, for five years. It is not, then,
on account of the worthlessness of the thing pursued, that the injured party can be alleged to be without
remedy.
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers in
the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to
appoint certain officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The
subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive,
the decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to
the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President. He is the mere organ by whom
that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the
courts.
The question whether a right has vested or not, is, on its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial
authority. If, for example, Mr. Marbury had taken the oaths of a magistrate, and proceeded to act as one;
in consequence of which a suit had been instituted against him, in which his defence had depended on
his being a magistrate, the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority.
So, if he conceives that, by virtue of his appointment, he has a legal right either to the commission which
has been made out for him, or to a copy of that commission, it is equally a question examinable in a court,
and the decision of the court upon it must depend on the opinion entertained of his appointment.
That question has been discussed, and the opinion is, that the latest point of time which can be taken as
that at which the appointment was complete and evidenced, was when, after the signature of the
President, the seal of the United States was affixed to the commission.
3. The intimate political relation subsisting between the President of the United States and the heads of
departments, necessarily renders any legal investigation of the acts of one of those high officers
peculiarly irksome, as well as delicate; and excites some hesitation with respect to the propriety of
entering into full investigation. Impressions are often received without much reflection or examination, and
it is not wonderful that in such a case as this the assertion, by an individual, of his legal claims in a court
of justice, to which claims it is the duty of that court to attend, should at first view be considered by some,
as an attempt to intrude into the cabinet and to intermeddle with the prerogatives of the executive.
It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to such jurisdiction. An extravagance, so
absurd and excessive, could not have been entertained for a moment. The province of the court is, solely,
to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform
duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under color of his office, by which an individual
sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the
ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment of the law. How, then, can his
office exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct if the case be such a
case as would, were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process?
It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, that
the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined. Where the head of a department
acts in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive
will, it is again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct would be
rejected without hesitation.
But where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the
performance of which he is not placed under the particular direction of the President, and the
performance of which the President cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is never presumed to have
forbidden; as for example, to record a commission or a patent for land, which has received all the legal
solemnities, or to give a copy of such record; in such cases, it is not perceived on what ground the courts
of the country are farther excused from the duty of giving judgment that right be done to an injured
individual, then if the same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a department.
It is true that the mandamus, now moved for, is not for the performance of an act expressly enjoined by
statute.
It is to deliver a commission; on which subject the acts of congress are silent. This difference is not
considered as affecting the case. It has already been stated that the applicant has, to that commission, a
vested legal right, of which the executive cannot deprive him. He has been appointed to an office, from
which he is not removable at the will of the executive; and being so appointed, he has a right to the
commission which the secretary has received from the President for his use. The act of congress does
not indeed order the Secretary of State to send it to him, but it is placed in his hands for the person
entitled to it; and cannot be more lawfully withheld by him than by any other person.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such
inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly
extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may
be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a
party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.
It has been insisted, at the bar, that if the original grant of jurisdiction, to the Supreme and inferior courts,
is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, contains no negative or
restrictive words, the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other
cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the
judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power
between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been
useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it
should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if
such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where
the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is
form without substance.
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited, and that those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are
of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if
the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a
power in its own nature illimitable.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind
the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a
rule as operative as if it were a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory;
and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more
attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
laws conflict with each other the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular
case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution;
or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that the framers of the
constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the
legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly
applies in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on
them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they
swear to support.
G.R. Nos. L-.34161, February 29, 1972.
EUGENE A. TAN, SILVESTRE J. ACEJAS, and ROGELIO V. FERNANDEZ, on their behalf and on
behalf of the people of the Philippines petitioners,
VS.
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL, on his behalf and on behalf of the other Delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 6, 1971, Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas, and Rogelio V. Fernandez filed a five-page
petition for declaratory relief. The petitioners, suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people,
assailed the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution which dealt with the range of authority of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. The Convention sought to revise the 1935 Philippine Constitution which was
enforced at that time. The petitioners argued before the Supreme Court and said that the 1971
Constitutional Convention was “without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and
Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution
through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution
[the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without
altering the general plan laid down therein." The said petition was subsequently dismissed on October 8,
1971.
On October 31, 1971, the petitioners filed a 32-page motion for reconsideration but was again denied
because they based their legal arguments on American Jurisprudence which the Supreme Court
considered merely as a secondary source. Hence, the motion was not deemed to be persuasive.
ARGUMENTS:
The Supreme Court challenged the petitioners’ legal standing in the case by stating that “the
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.”
The petitioners, on the other hand, questioned the validity of the 1971 Constitutional Convention which
they claimed was designed to revise the 1935 Constitution. The petitioners further argued that the
Convention sought to adopt a form of government that was different from what the1935 Constitution
provided.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners had the requisite standing to seek a declaration of the alleged nullity of a
resolution of the Constitutional Convention.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
REASONS:
The Supreme Court conceded that there were instances in the past wherein ordinary citizens, acting in
their capacity as taxpayers, had their arguments heard by the same Court. Nevertheless, such cases
merely involved suits filed by petitioners that questioned the disbursement of public funds. One can gain
legal standing if, as a taxpayer, he files a suit that questions the legality of a law that provides for the
disbursement of public funds which is taxpayers’ money. The Supreme Court said the petitioners in the
aforementioned case did not belong to such category and thus lacked the required legal standing to
pursue their case.
In addition, the Supreme Court ruled that the matter at hand was not yet ripe for adjudication since the
1971 Constitutional Convention still had to introduce the amendments to the 1935 Constitution. They said:
“More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification
may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the
command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court.”
In accordance with the principle of separation of powers, the Supreme Court also ruled that other
departments of government should be left alone to discharge their duties. As such, the Supreme Court
should not interfere when other branches of government are rightfully performing their functions. Each
branch of government should not meddle in the affairs of the other.
G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner

Vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION AND THE BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents
FACTS:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools
and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B. They
deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their
provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that, (1) the
matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the
constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (3)
the Acts are constitutionally valid.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law
and government.
"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description, either general or specific, of
what constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there any indication of any basis
or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the public.' Nowhere in this Act is there any
statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education must take into account to
determine the 'efficiency of instruction.”
The most significant grievance of the petitioner is the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross
receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision
and regulation. Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right—the right to
open a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on
the privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaper—both constitutional privileges—
have been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a constitutional right.
The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to
present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of
their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke
their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law—and, naturally need no relief in the
form they now seek to obtain.
The Solicitor General further argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrain the
further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes by
injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is one against the State
without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving "the legality of any tax impost or
assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a justiciable controversy to be resolved?

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Education?
3. Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
1. No, the Court found no justiciable controversies.
2. No, there was no undue delegation of legislative power.
3. No, Commonwealth Act No. 2706 is constitutional.
REASONS:
No Justifiable Controversies
The Court stated that, as a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to
the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider
petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert,
petitioners suffered no wrong—nor allege any—from the enforcement of the criticized statute.
The Solicitor General pointed out they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education
has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law—and,
naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of
Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy.
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U.
S. 610; Coffman vs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant
require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical
threat being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)
No undue delegation of legislative power
This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in
them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have
authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same
In response the Court maintains, “The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the
Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the
memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission
and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily
in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the
educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and
formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any
private school.”
" Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those
inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedings—not to invalidate the law. For it needs
no argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.”
In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have
transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list of
circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to indicate which of such
official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious," or pain "nuisance"; and it is
one of our decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued, the court will not consider it. (Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.)
The Court added, We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the
hands of the Secretary of Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why
the statute should be struck down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute does not in
express terms give the Secretary complete control. It gives him powers to inspect private schools, to
regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate under certain conditions, and to revoke
such permits for cause. This does not amount to complete control. If any of such Department circulars or
memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seeks to establish complete
control, it would surely be invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but besides not having
before us the text of such circulars, the petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with the recent
approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating the National Board of Education, opportunity for administrative
correction of the supposed anomalies or encroachments is amply afforded herein petitioners. A more
expeditious and perhaps more technically competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity,
convenience or relevancy of the measures criticized by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.) If however
the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools, the question arises
whether the power of supervision and regulation granted to the State by section 5 Article XIV was meant
to include control of private educational institutions. It is enough to point out that local educators and
writers think the Constitution provides for control of Education by the State. (See Tolentino, Government
of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez, Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.)
The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal
discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. (Malcolm
& Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.)
The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to
control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of
private education was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that the Constitution grants
power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean greater power than mere regulation.
The constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 2706
Since the Court found that there was no undue delegation legislative powers to the Secretary of
Education, another question to the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 is the assessment of 1 per cent levied
on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their
supervision and regulation.
Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right—the right to open a
school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on the
privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaper—both constitutional privileges—have
been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a constitutional right.
The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to
restrain the further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of
taxes by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is one against the
State without its consent. Anyway he concludes the action involving "the legality of any tax impost or
assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.
The Court supported the Solicitor General’s position: “If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a mere fee
—and not a tax—to finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to regulate and supervise
private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation and examination of
relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the other hand it is a tax,
petitioners' issue would still be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.”
G.R. No.L-31685, July 31, 1975
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner

VS.
IMELDA R. MARCOS, as Chairman of the Cultural Center of the Philippines, Father HORACIO DE
LA COSTA, I. P. SOLIONGCO, ERNESTO RUFINO, ANTONIO MADRIGAL, and ANDRES SORIANO,
as Members thereof, respondents
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 330 was issued on June 25, 1966. Executive Order No. 30 created a trust for the
benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines entrusted
with the task to construct a national theatre, a national music hall, an arts building and facilities, to
awaken our people's consciousness in the nation's cultural heritage and to encourage its assistance in
the preservation, promotion, enhancement and development thereof, with the Board of Trustees to be
appointed by the President, the Center having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as
well as donations received, financial commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be
forthcoming in the future.
Congress until the time of the filing of the petition on August 26, 1969 remained quiescent. Petitioner
waited until almost the day of inaugurating the Cultural Center on September 11, 1969 before filing his
petition in the lower court.
The petition is about the impermissible encroachment by the President of the Philippines on the legislative
prerogative with regard to Executive Order No. 330.
Petitioner also alleged that Board of Trustees did accept donations from the private sector and did secure
from the Chemical Bank of New York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the National Investment &
Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from President Johnson of the United States in
the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the construction of the Cultural Center building
estimated to cost P48 million. The Board of Trustees has as its Chairman the First Lady, Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, who is named as the principal respondent.
In an order of dismissal dated December 4, 1969 by the Court of First Instance of Manila, stress was laid
on the funds administered by the Center as coming from donations and contributions, with not a single
centavo raised by taxation, and the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could
in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the general public.
On October 5, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 15 was promulgated creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines, defining its objectives, powers and functions and other purposes. Section 4, thereof was
amended by Presidential Decree No. 179 which was enacted on April 26, 1973.
Petitioner appeal by certiorari to review the lower court's order of dismissal dated December 4, 1969.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner argues about the impermissible encroachment by the President of the Philippines on the
legislative prerogative with regard to Executive Order No. 330.
Respondent claim that Executive Order No. 30 represented the legitimate exercise of executive power,
there being no invasion of the legislative domain and that it was supplementary to rather than a disregard
of Republic Act No. 4165 creating the National Commission on Culture.
Moreover, the funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations and contributions, not one centavo
being raised by taxation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the creation of Executive Order No. 30 is valid?
HELD:
1. YES. The creation of Executive Order No. 30 is valid. In fact it is now moot and academic to
discuss the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 30 considering the promulgation of PD Nos.
15 and 179, done by the President in the exercise of legislative powers under martial law.
REASONS:
Executive Order No. 30 had been superseded by Presidential Decree Nos. 15 and 179, which makes the
appeal moot and academic in character.
President acted by disposing of a matter of general concern (Section 63, Rev. Adm. Code) in accord with
the constitutional injunction to promote arts and letters (Section 4, Article XIV, Constitution of the
Philippines) and in issuing Executive Order No. 30, he simply carried out the purpose of the trust in
establishing the Cultural Center of the Philippines as the instrumentality through which this agreement
between the two governments would be realized.
According to Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1935 Constitution: "Arts and letters shall be under [the State's]
patronage." Such a provision is now found in Article XV, Section 9, par. (2) of the present Charter and
reads: "Filipino culture shall be preserved and developed for national identity. Arts and letters shall be
under the patronage of the State."
According to Article XVII, Section 3, par. (2) of the Constitution: "All proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of
the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the
ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly
modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."
The funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations and contributions, not one centavo being
raised by taxation.
G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA

NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization

of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters.
The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations
throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of B.P. 811 Sec 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property
without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to bring their issues to Court?
2. Whether or no R.A. No. 6646, B.P. No. 881 sec. 90 & 92, is unconstitutional on the grounds that it
takes away property(air time) without due process of law and that it’s operation gives the
Comelec excess power to regulate and supervise the media?
DECISION:
1. The Court held that Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP), suing as taxpayers, does not have legal standing to bring this issue to court. GMA
Network, Inc. (GMA) on the other hand, has shown that they may lose millions on the
implementation of the Comelec Time as regulated and supervised by the Comelec under R.A. No.
6646, B.P. No. 881 sec. 90 & 92. Therefore, as GMA may stand to be injured or monetary loss
may be incurred, GMA has legal standing to bring this controversy to court.
2. No, the Court held that the mandatory and free airing of “Comelec Time” by the Comelec by virtue
of R.A. No. 6646, B.P. No. 881 sec. 90 & 92 does not take away the property, in this case air time,
of the petitioner GMA. The petitioner, GMA, has been given a franchise to operate radio and
television stations by the Congress. This franchise is a grant of special privilege. However, with
this privilege, is the responsibility of contributing public service when it is so required.
REASON:
Legal standing of Petitioners
TELEBAP
In those cases in which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court upheld their standing in view of
the "transcendental importance" of the constitutional question raised which justified the granting of relief.
In contrast, petitioner's substantive claim is without merit. To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing
is determined by the substantive merit of his case or preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP
must be held to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question
only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury fairly is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. TELEBAP have not shown that they have
suffered harm as a result of the operation of Sec 92 of B.P. No. 881.
Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters since this case
does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in Sec. 92 of B.P. No. 881 should be precisely in
upholding its validity.
They do not have and interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has
a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.
Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights of radio and
television broadcasting companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown that the
party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot assert his
constitutional right, or that the eight of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to
espouse the third party's constitutional claim. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the
broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the affected
companies.
GMA Network, Inc.
GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement
of Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free airtime to
the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioner, GMA, claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and
that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner's allegation that
it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide free airtime is sufficient to give it standing to
question the validity of Sec 92.
The Constitutionality of R.A. No. 6646, B.P. No. 881 sec. 90 & 92
The pertinent sections of the questioned statutes are as follows:
R.A. No. 6646
Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any person
making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or
other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. . .
B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus Election Code)
Sec. 90. Comelec space. — The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general
circulation in every province or city; Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper,
publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be
known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be
allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area
in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978 EC).
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as
"Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during
the period of the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
Thus, the law prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space and airtime to the
candidates and requires the COMELEC instead to procure print space and airtime for allocation to the
candidates. It will be noted that while Sec. 90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to procure print
space which, as we have held, should be paid for, Sec. 92 states that air time shall be procured by the
COMELEC free of charge.
The petitioner, GMA, contend that that air time is their property and their primary source of
revenue and that Comelec in mandating its prohibition of its donation or sale, and that this be given free
for the purpose of Comelec Time would incur them losses in the millions without the respondent,
Comelec, giving the petitioner just compensation and therefore depriving them of their constitutional right
of receiving just compensation when their property is taken away for public use.
The Court stated that this is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege
subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that
"any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely
given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public
service.
In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and
television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations.
It would be strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render public service by giving free air time.
Air time is not owned by broadcast companies. As held in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,
which upheld the right of a party personally attacked to reply, "licenses to broadcast do not confer
ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using them." Consequently, "a
license permits broadcasting, but the license has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the
license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the
First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with
others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices
which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the
airwaves." As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is
taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
In fact the law which gives GMA its franchise, R.A. 7252, states:
Sec. 4. Responsibility to the Public. — The grantee shall provide adequate public service time to enable
the Government, through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on important public
issues;
In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on the grantees
or licensees. The reason for this is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds for the
allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry. To require the radio and television broadcast industry
to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. In addition,
their plea that Sec. 92 (free air time) and Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid political ads) should be
invalidated would pave the way for a return to the old regime where moneyed candidates could
monopolize media advertising to the disadvantage of candidates with less resources.
In closing the Court had this statement:
To affirm the validity of Sec 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their
obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is
maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free
speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people
have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to
the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of Sec 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold
the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social
function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media
can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render
in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner

VS.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents
FACTS:
On May 5, 1994, the President signed into law RA 7716 entitled “AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE
VALUE-ADDED TAX SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE , AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”. It was
published in two newspapers of general circulation on May 12, 1994 and on May 28, 1994 it took effect
although its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow for the registration of business
entities. It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped by the court
because the Supreme Court granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on
the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10 percent of the gross selling price or gross value in
money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
Between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills were introduced in the House of
Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to
the VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for
approval a substitute measure. House Bill No. 11197 (HB 11197). It was considered on second reading in
November 6, 1993 and on November 17 of the same year, it was approved after third and final reading.
On November 23, 1993, the bill was sent to Senate and was later referred to the Senate Committee on
Ways and Means. On February 7, 1994, the Committee submitted its report to the Senate and stated that
Senate Bill No. 1630 (SB 1630) was in substitution of SB 1129, taking into consideration Presidential
Resolution No. 734 and HB 11197.
On March 24, 1994, it finished debates on the bill and approved it on second reading. On the same day, it
approved the bill on third reading. HB 11197 and SB 1630 were then referred to a conference committee
and after several meetings recommended that HB 11197 and SB 1630 be approved with the attached
copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees. A conference committee is an extra-
constitutional creation of Congress, consisting of members nominated from both houses, whose function
is to propose to Congress ways of reconciling conflicting provisions found in the Senate version and in the
House version of a bill.
The Conference Committee Bill, the one signed into law by the President, was thereafter approved by
both houses on April 27, 1994 and May 2, 1994 respectively.
ARGUMENTS:
A. Procedural
1. RA 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives as required by Article
VI. Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two
distinct bills, HB 11197 and SB 1630.
2. SB 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because
the second and third readings were done on the same day, February 24, 1994 and the President
when he certified SB 1630 as urgent dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of the reading of the bill on three separate days.
3. The Conference Committee Report included provisions not found in either House Bill or Senate
Bill and that these provisions were surreptitiously inserted by the committee meeting behind
closes doors.
4. One of the petitioners, Philippine Airlines Inc. argues that it violated Article VI, Section 26(1)
which provides that “Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
B. Substantive
1. Petitioners Philippine Press Institute (PPI) and Philippine Bible Society (PBS) claim violations
of their rights under Section 4 and 5 of Article III of the Constitution. They argue that the RA 7716
is discriminatory in that it impinges on press freedom and the Free Exercises clause. Philippine
Educational Publishers Association (PEPA), also a petitioner, argues that increase in the price of
books violates Section 17, Article II of the Constitution.
2. It violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners’ right of due
process and equal protection of the laws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7716 violates Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not RA 7716 violates Article III, Sections 1, 4, 5, 10 and Article VI, Sections 28(1)
and 28(3) of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to adjudicate where the formal requirements
for the enactment of statutes has been observed.
HELD:
1. NO. The procedural requirements have been complied with by Congress.
2. NO. The law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press nor interfere with
the free exercise of religion nor deny any of parties the right to an education. That the law is
regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and violates the Contract Clause are prematurely raised.
3. NO. It is precluded in the separation of powers.
REASONS:
1) a. What is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” from the House of

Representatives is NOT the law BUT the revenue bill. It is worth emphasizing this because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result will be
a rewriting of the whole. It is not necessary that a revenue bill must substantially be the same as
the House bill because it would deny Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. It would be a violation of the coequality of the legislative power of
the two houses of Congress and in fact, make the House superior to the Senate.
b. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving HB 11197 up to the enacting
clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause and on the other hand,
separately presenting its own on the same subject matter. In either case, the result is two bills on
the same subject. What the Constitution simply means is that the INITIATIVE for filling revenue,
tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt and bills of local application MUST come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that they are elected as they are from districts
and that they are more sensitive to local needs and problems. The Senate on the other hand,
approaches the same problems from a national perspective. Combining these two perspectives
will be germane to the enactment of such laws.
c. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House so as the action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House Bill which the Senate did because it only considered its own version of the
bill AFTER the House submitted HB 11197 as evidenced by the facts of the case.
d. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirements not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. Article VI, Section 26 (2) states that:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings
on separate days and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage except when the president certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency…
The emphasized phrase qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become law: i) the bill
has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved. The unless clause must be read in relation to
the except clause because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To
construe except clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the unless clause
negates the very premise of the except clause: the necessity of securing the immediate
enactment of the bill which is certified to meet a public calamity of emergency (growing budget
deficit).
e. There is nothing unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in
executive sessions. Often, the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet
behind closed doors with only the conferees present. Under the Rules of the Senate and the
Rules of the House of Representatives:
In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives (and vice
versa) on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by
a conference committee of both houses which shall meet within ten days after
their composition x x x Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a
detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the
subject measure and shall be signed by the conferees.
2. a. RA 7716 does not abridge press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its
importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the
State. Likewise, the law is not also discriminatory because there are no privileges granted to the press
which have been withdrawn. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication.
b. The registration fee being imposed on the printing, publication and importation of books and religious
articles as well as their printing and publication is a mere administrative fee, not one imposed on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
c. The contention that the law is regressive, denies due process and equal protection and impairment of
contracts is a mere academic discussion. As RA 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system and
its coverage as provided in the original VAT law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of the law
is within the province of the legislature.
3. That the duty of the court to exercise its power of judicial review must still be performed in the context
of a concrete case or controversy and that the other departments of the government may have
committed grave abuse of discretion is not independent ground for exercising the courts power. It does
not add anything, therefore, to invoke this duty to justify the Supreme Court’s intervention in what is
essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by
the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in the undermining of the Supreme
Court’s authority as a court of law.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, petitioner

VS.
METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY, respondent
NOTES:
PD 1605 – Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission certain powers related to traffic management
and control in metropolitan manila, providing penalties.
Letter of Instruction (LOI) 43 – to effect the removal of all impediments on streets, sidewalks and
highways that shall obstruct free passage
EO 392- Constituting the Metropolitan Manila Authority providing for its powers and functions.
Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991- authorizes Metropolitan Manila Authority to detach license plates and
tow or impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of
traffic.
Ordinance No. 7 Series of 1988 - authorizes the confiscation of driver’s licenses and the removal of
license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
Metropolitan Manila Commission = Metropolitan Manila Authority
FACTS:
The case at bar originated from Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M.
Gonong where the lower court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD
1605.
Subsequently the following developments transpired:
 October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the court that when he was stopped for an
alleged traffic violation, his driver’s license was confiscated in Quezon City
 On December 18, 1990, the Caloocan Manila drivers and Operators association sent a letter to
the court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they
could seek damages for confiscation of their driver’s licenses.
 On February 14, 1991 Stephen Monsanto complained against the confiscation of his driver’s
license by traffic enforcer AD Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
 On March 7, 1991 Atty Dan Calderon also complained against the confiscation of his driver’s
license by the Makati Police Force.
 On April 29, 1991, another lawyer, Atty. Grandy Trieste protested the removal of his front license
plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Ceneter and the
confiscation of his driver’s license by AV Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-
Western Police District.
 For the case in Mandaluyong (Stephen Monsanto), AD Martinez, the traffic enforcer invoked
Ordinance No. 7 Series of 1998 of Mandaluyong, which authorizes the confiscation of driver’s
licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
 For the case in Makati (Atty Calderon), AV Emmanuel of the Makati Police Force said that he
confiscated Trieste’s driver’s license pursuant to a memo from the District Commander of the
Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police.
 The Lower Court ruled that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations was not among sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission
under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of
stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets.
For clarification: The court resolved to require the MMA and the Solicitor General (on behalf of the
individual citizens) to submit separate comments:
MMA’s stand: They are defending the said ordinance as it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred
upon it by EO 392, which dictates that formulation of policies and promulgation of resolutions and other
issuances of metropolitan wide application are within their powers. They further asserted that there was
no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not
supplant the latter.
The confiscation of license plates was invalid win the absence of a valid law, which is why Ordinance No.
11 exists.
Solicitor General’s stand: the Sol gen stands by the belief that the ordinance was null and void because
it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it
violated existing laws, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not PD 1605 should supersede over the local enactments.

2) Whether or not law enforcement authorities have the power to remove
license plates and confiscate driver’s licenses for traffic violations.
DECISION:
Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7 Series of 1988
is declared Null and Void.
The SC enjoined all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates
of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver’s license for traffic
violations within the said area.
RATIO:
Although the court recognized the validity of the delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures (by the 2 Ordinances), the question at hand is not the validity of the delegation of legislative
power, the question being resolved is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The pertinent law in this case is PD 1605, and incidentally it does not allow either the removal of license
plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila area.
The ordinances at hand impose sanctions that the PD 1605 does not allow (in fact, prohibits).
The court also recognized the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the
effective reduction of traffic problems, but must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that
may attend the enforcement of such sanctions – including the illicit practices.
G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993
DEAN JOSE JOYA, et. al, petitioners
VS.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in

his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS,
respondents
FACTS:
On August 9, 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, Chairman of PCGG, wrote President Corazon C. Aquino,
requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie’s) concerning the
scheduled sale on January 11,1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware
seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth
of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. President Aquino, through former Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement
allowing Christie's to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
On October 26, the Commission on Audit (COA) through Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to
President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement stating that:
(a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of
doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor
track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were historical
relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.
However, on November 15, the Director of The National Museum Gabriel S. Casal, issued a certification
that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected
cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Hence,
petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and/or Restraining Order seeking to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on
January 11, 1991.
After the oral arguments of the parties on January 9, the Court immediately issued a resolution denying
the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that
petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been
impleaded and on January 11, the sale at the public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation
and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents
Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations
as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A.
4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and
disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise
that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in
general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in
selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process
of law in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for the SC to exercise it’s power of
judicial review over the case.
HELD:
NO. There was no compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry.
REASONS:
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual
case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that
the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-
plaintiff in an action. Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court provides that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject
of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise it’s
power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise
the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when the Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing,
as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the
fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a
governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds. However, petitioners arguments claiming
that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of
the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary
and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the
Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 governing the preservation and disposition of
national and important cultural properties are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They
themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to
the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporation
established to promote non-Philippine arts. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the
foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to
view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit. Similarly, as alleged in the
petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and
dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding anniversary, an occasion personal to them. If
these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their
acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties — the true owners
thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or
that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal
right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Furthermore, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill
the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, the Court laid down the rule
that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners
are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution.
What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover,
petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a
privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can
qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only
if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Petitioners however, are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of
what they allege to be public properties.
Petitioners also argue that this case should be resolved by the Court as an exception to the rule on moot
and academic cases because the novelty and importance of the issues raised by the petition deserve this
Court's attention because the issues in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on
the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a
whole.
For a court to exercise it’s power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy —
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. The case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to
enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date —
January 11, 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and
academic.
G.R. No. 107921 July 1, 1993
POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.), in his capacity as the consultant of

the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Task Force on Demolition
and/or in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD and NATIONAL MAPPING RESOURCES INFORMATION AUTHORITY,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of

Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992 that was approved on 24 March 1992 and published in the 4 May 1992 issue of
the Official Gazette. The challenged provisions are regarding Eviction and Demolition
(Sec. 28) and Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition (Sec. 44). The Court required the
respondents for comment thereon.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges
that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as
drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of
the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he
assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has
a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed."
Respondent National Mapping and Resource Information Authority alleges that the
implementation of the assailed sections of the Act does not belong to or fall within its
jurisdiction and disagrees with the petitioner's stand. Section 28 merely provides for the
"humanitarian approach" towards less privileged, citizens and does not in fact prohibit
but merely discourages eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covers program
beneficiaries. The Office of the Government Corporate (OGCC) filed a comment for the
respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) expressed as its official stand on the
instant petition that Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 are indeed
unconstitutional.
The Solicitor General maintains that the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-
compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases
involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or
controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, seeing that the
petitioner is not the proper party to question the said Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party to question the constitutionality of
Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279.
HELD:
NO. The Court declares this petition to be without merit.
REASONS:
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts
unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is
necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very
lis mota presented. The essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving
a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional
question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question must be
raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the decision of the case. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained
of. The first two requisites are absent in this petition. Judicial review cannot be
exercised in vacuo. It is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants."
G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
FACTS:
Two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional, which is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati.
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila—all
suing as taxpayers.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 under the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of
the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by
Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(b) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 are unconstitutional.
HELD:
NO. The Court finds no merit in the petitions.
REASON:
Section 2. Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical
descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such
description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose
which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local
government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive
to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development.
Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws
have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at
bar.
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The Court cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of
section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality
must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself.
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events: that Mayor Binay will run again in
this coming mayoralty election; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law,
such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law, which was exactly done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
OPOSA, petitioners
VS.
FACTORAN, DENR respondents
The case filed before the Supreme Court is a special civil action, by way of a class suit, for certiorari on
the dismissal order by RTC Makati, Br. 66.
FACTS:
Originally, the plaintiffs (petitioners) filed a class suit before the RTC:
1) To cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country.
2) To cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreement.
Rainforests in the country used to constitute 53% of the land mass. As of 1987, only 4% constitute such.
The massive deforestation taking place is related to “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-
generational justice” that should be considered in the many Timber License Agreements (TLA) issued
(clear constitutional right pursuant to ART II sec. 16).
Secretary Factoran Jr. filed and Motion to Dismiss the complaint on two grounds, namely: 1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him 2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of government. The motion to dismiss was
granted by the RTC. Hence the Petition,
Upon order of this Court, the petitioners and the respondents were asked to submit each a memorandum
before the OSG. In the said memoranda, the petitioners reiterate articles 19, 20, 21 of the Civil Code,
Section 4 of E.O. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of the Philippine Environmental Policy and Article II
Sec. 16 of the Constitution as well as Secretary Factoran’s grave abuse of discretion in granting TLA
agreements to cover more areas for logging than what is available are judiciable grounds to be judged by
the Court.
The respondents argue that said claims have no valid cause of action and a bill should be lobbied in
Congress to pass the banning of TLAs. Also, the termination or cancellation of the TLAs issued will result
in the impairment of contracts.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) in filing the class suit.
2) Whether or not the cancellation of the TLAs should be upheld, thus setting aside the Decision of
the lower court.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged dismissal order of the RTC
is SET ASIDE. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders
or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
RATIO:
The Court reiterates Art. II Section 16 of the Constitution, which reads, “State shall advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature” as the
legal basis of the petitioners since it is a right that concerns all people and a declared policy that should
be upheld by the State. The Court has jurisdiction in reviewing since the defendant violated this right of
the people (Art. VIII Sec. 1).
Also, a timber license agreement, cited by the Court in Tan v. Director of Forestry, is a privilege allowed
by the State and can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or welfare. The same goes
with property rights and contracts in which either of them are absolute.
G.R. No. 114222 April 6, 1995
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ET AL. petitioner

vs.
JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., ET AL. respondent
FACTS:
 Petition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to prohibit respondents from further
implementing and enforcing the “Revised and Restricted Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer
a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA” and the “Supplemental Agreement to the Revised and
Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA”.
 In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light rail transit line along EDSA, a major thoroughfare in
Metro Manila, which shall traverse the cities of Pasay, Quezon, Mandaluyong, and Makati. The
plan referred to as EDSA LRT 3 was intended to provide a mass transit system along EDSA and
alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem in the metropolis.
 In July 1991, Exec. Sec. Orbos, acting on instructions of the President, issued a directive to the
DOTC to proceed with the negotiations.
 On July 16, 1991, the EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its bid proposal to DOTC.
 Finding the proposal to be in compliance with the bid requirements, DOTC and respondent EDSA
LRT Corp., Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA Consortium, entered into an “Agreement to Build,
Lease, and Transfer a LRT for EDSA” under the terms of the BOT Law.
 DOTC Secretary Garcia submitted the two Agreements to President Ramos for his consideration
and approval. In a Memorandum to Secretary Garcia on May 6, 1993, President Ramos approved
the said Agreements.
 According to the agreements, the EDSA-LRT 3 will use light rail vehicles from the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republics and will have a maximum carrying capacity of 450, 000 passengers a
day, or 150 million a year to be achieved through 54 vehicles operating simultaneously. The
EDSA LRT 3 will run at grade, or street level, on the mid-section of EDSA for a distance of 17.8
kilometers from Harrison, Pasay City to North Avenue, Quezon City.
 Private respondent shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete
operational light rail transit system.
 Upon full or partial completion and viability thereof, private respondent shall deliver the use and
possession of the completed portion to DOTC which shall operate the same.
 DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of
Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and intentionally accredited inspection
firm to be appointed by the parties.
 As agreed upon, private respondent’s capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid by the
DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the earnings of EDSA LRT 3.
 After 25 years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the project
shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only U.S $1.00.
 On May 5, 1994, RA 7718, an “Act Amending Certain Sections of RA 6957, ‘An Act Authorizing
the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private
Sector, and for Other Purposes’” was signed into law by the President. The law expressly
recognizes a BLT scheme and allows direct negotiation of BLT contracts,
 Hence, this petition.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitoners’ argument:
1. Agreement of April 22, 1992, as amended by Supplemental Agreement of May 6, 1993,
insofar as it grants EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd., a foreign corporation, the ownership pf EDSA LRT
3, a public utility violates the Constitution.
2. The action was filed by the petitioners in their capacity as taxpayers and as Senators.
Respondent’s and Private respondent’s argument: petitioners are not the real parties in interest
and have no legal standing to institute the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Agreement of April 22, 1992, as amended by the Supplemental Agreement of
May 6, 1993 is unconstitutional?
2. Whether the petitioners have legal standing to institute the petition?
HELD:
1. Petition is DISMISSED.
2. Yes.
RATIO:
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by
the national government or government-owned or government-controlled corporations allegedly in
contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110) and to disallow the same when
only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176
SCRA 240).
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it
and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action.
G.R. No. 118910 July 17, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO
C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE
ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN,
QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P.
ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
This comes as a petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction . That the following are the factual
antecedents: That there has already been a decision regarding a case prior to the case at bar, involving
the same parties and ‘seemingly’ the same structure and issues i.e. G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, 1994); that the same decision held the supposed contract of lease between PCSO (Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office) and PGMC (Philippine Gaming Management Corporation) invalid, on
grounds that it is in violation of PCSO’s Charter i.e. the contract of lease was held to be a ‘joint venture’;
that right after the decision was executed, PCSO and PGMC decided to enter into a ‘new’ agreement, in
the form of an ‘Equipment Lease Agreement’ (Hereafter, referred to as ELA) whereby PGMC is to lease
online lottery equipments to PCSO in exchange for a corresponding rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of
its ticket sales, which amounts to 35,000 pesos per terminal, and an additional payment if ever PCSO
fails to pay the rental as such; It is also important to note that the contract stipulates that during the period
of contract, PCSO is responsible for any loss of, or damage to the equipment on lease, and that at the
end of the ELA, PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of twenty-five million pesos.
The said ELA is the subject matter of this case.
ARGUMENTS:
That the following are the contentions of the opposing parties:
Petitioners argue that: (a.) The ELA is null and void since it is substantially ‘identical’ with the old contract
(contract of lease), as expressed and admitted by the PGMC and PCSO; (b.) that ELA-even if materially
different with the old contract-is still null and void because it is still inconsistent with PCSO’s charter and
the court’s decision regarding the previous case; (c.) The ELA should’ve been first put as subject to a
public bidding in accordance to E.O. No. 301, and that it is not most advantageous to the government;
and that (d.) the ELA is violative of section 2 of article XI of the constitution.
Respondents-separately- in answer to the contentions of the petitioners, submit the following contentions:
(a.) that the ELA is different from the old contract because it is ‘not’ a ‘joint venture’ anymore; (b.) that the
ELA did not have to be put as subject to a public bidding because it fell within the exceptions of E.O. No.
301; (c.) that the power of determination to hold the ELA as advantageous to the government is vested in
the board of directors of the PCSO; (d.) that PCSO was unable to buy the equipment in totality for the
reason that it did not have enough funding; and (e.) that the petitioners’ motive for this action is merely
political in nature.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ruling on the previous case may be applied to the case at bar, by virtue of the
doctrine of res judicata and/or the principle of law of the case. And whether or not the petitioners
Individually and collectively considered-have standing and/or substantial interest with regard to
the case at bar.
2. The inquiry toward the nature of the ELA i.e. is it a valid lease contract, or is it-like the old
contract-a joint venture agreement.
3. Should the same interpretation of R.A. 1169(as held in the previous case) should and ought to be
upheld in the case at bar.
4. Whether or not the ELA needed to be put as subject to a public bidding.
HELD:
1. No. And the petitioners do not have standing

2. Yes. It was held that the ELA was a valid lease contract
3. No.
4. No.
RATIO:
1. The court gave a lot of reasons as to why ‘re-examination’ of the previous is needed. First and
foremost, it is the position of the court that even if the same parties are involved in the case at
bar, the ‘cases’ (or from how it was used, perhaps a more suitable term would be ‘issues’) are
different. For instance, the old case did not involve any question of constitutionality, whereas the
case at bar does. From this buttress, it would follow that the doctrine of res judicata, and even the
doctrine of “conclusiveness of judgment” cannot be applied, furthermore because the two cases
have different subject matters, and because they involve different ‘questions of law’.
In addition, the court contends that the principle of ‘law of the case’ also cannot be applied for it
merely expresses the practice of the court to refuse a reopening of what has been decided by the
court or even an appellate court, when the supposed subsequent case is basically tautological
with the previous one.
To shed more light on this, it is best to widen the demarcation between res judicata and law of the
case by scouring into their descriptions. Res judicata (or preclusion of claims)-in a nutshell-is the
doctrine that serves as the bar to litigation for the end of avoiding double jeopardy (this is to be
made distinct from the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, as conclusiveness of judgment
expresses that ‘an issue actually directly and indirectly passed upon and determined in a former
suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a
different cause of action). Law of the case, on the other hand, is the principle that holds that, the
court may refuse to reopen a case if it would seem that the same parties and ‘cases’ are involved.
As to the standing (locus standi) of the petitioners, it is vital to note, that the standing of the
petitioners on the previous case(as the procedural rule of locus standi was relaxed), cannot be
carried over to the new suit, and so examination of their standing with regard to the present suit
proves to be necessary .
“Standing is a concern of constitutional law”. To determine standing, there is a need to prove that
the party has such a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions” (See Valmonte c. PCSO), in other words, a
party has standing if his rights or privileges has been injured by the subject matter of the case. In
application, the petitioners in the case at bar would have to show the negative effect of the ELA to
their rights or privileges.
Note that in the previous case, it was held that the petitioners have standing because the issue at
hand was of a great significance to the state as a whole.
Standing is to be differentiated with ‘real party of interest’, a real party of interest-as contrasted to
standing-is a party that directly benefits or injured depending on the outcome of the judgment.
However, the petitioners were unable to show that they had standing on the case at bar, nor were
they able to show that they were real parties of interest.
It must also be mentioned that the court gave other ‘commonsensical’ reasons for the re-
examination e.g. the court was divided in their decision in the previous case (7 against 6), that the
subsequent ELA contract was entered upon by PCSO and PGMC in good faith, changes in the
membership of the court, etc.
2. In the previous case, the court ruled that the old contract between the PCSO and PGMC was
actually a joint venture agreement, or at the very least, a contract of collaboration or association.
It was for this reason that the court held the contract in violation of the charter of PCSO, in effect,
the contract was declared void. As buttress to this claim, the court scoured into the following
features of the contract: (a.) that PCSO could not possibly handle a lottery system without being
dependent on PGMC for the operations; (b.) that the PGMC would be liable for any loss or
damage of the equipments, and other irregularities with the contract;(c.)that in consideration of
human resources, it would actually be PGMC that would operate the online lottery. All these
served as premises to the conclusions that the operations of the online lottery would not actually
be in the hands of PCSO, and that the contract was actually a ‘joint agreement’.
The above features of the old contract was obliterated in the ELA, and to add to that, the rental
paradigm was also altered. In the old contract, there was vagueness as to the rental of the
equipments because it was simple expressed in percentage(with no specifications), but in the
new contract, there are specifications given with regards to the amount in totality, the
corresponding payment annually, and even the additional payment in the event that PCSO fails to
meet the annual quota.
In accord to article 1643 of the civil code, the rental must be a “price certain”, meaning that the
rental must be expressed in a definite amount. The petitioners also contend that the rental in ELA
is not expressed in price certain simply because it is expressed in percentage. But the court ruled
out this fact for the reason that the very financial allocation of the charter of PCSO is also based
on percentage, to wit: 55 percent for prizes; 30 percent for charity; and the other 15 percent for
operating expenses and capital expenditures. Furthermore, in the question of whether the rental
involved is consistent with the charter per se, it was the court’s position that the 4.3 percent of
rental rate was covered well within the 15 percent allocation fixed by the law.
The petitioners also contended that considering the procedure in the contract, it would be highly
specious that the PGMC might still be involved in the operations of the online lottery system. But
the court ruled that these postulations are merely speculative because it is also highly probable-
and honestly debatable-that the contrary of it might occur.
In summation, the court held that ELA, with the obliteration of all features / characteristics of the
old contract that were considered “badges of a joint venture agreement”, is a lease of contract.
3. In their decision on the previous case, the court employed a construction of R.A. 1169, that
leaned more on the idea that the charter of PCSO prohibits any form of collaboration, association,
or joint venture for the holding of sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar. But in the case
at bar, the court upheld the construction that the provisions in R.A. 1169 should be relaxed i.e. the
PCSO is not completely prohibited to enter into a joint venture for the holding of activities as
specified above, but rather, what PCSO is prohibited to do is to ‘invest’ on businesses engaged in
such activities-whether in a joint venture or by itself-that involves competition with the private
sector.
To shed light to this, let us cite the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 1169:
§ 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.- The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes

Office, hereinafter designated the office, shall be the principal government, agency for raising and
providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national
character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act
Numbered One thousand Four hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended shall have the authority:
a. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,
in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and
regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors
b. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health
and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be
profit-oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the
activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing for
permanent and continuing sources of funds for health programs, including the
expansion of existing ones, medical assistance and services, and/or charitable
grants: Provided, That such investments will not compete with the private sector in
areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority.
From the reading of the court, they held that in order to ‘extract’ the true meaning of subsection b,
the prohibition cannot apply to the holding of a lottery by the PCSO ‘in itself’, otherwise,
subsections a and b would be contradictory. Hence, the PCSO is not entirely prohibited to invest
alone or with others, it is only prohibited when the investment would result to a competition
against the private sector. The court also suggested that if it was the legislators’ intention to
prohibit the PCSO to enter into ‘any’ form of joint venture, then they would have placed it in
subsection a, which is not the case.
It is also important to note that the court made efforts to further scour into this matter by looking
into the deliberations(whereupon, now Supreme Court Justice Davide, was involved). But the
court stood firm on its ground and held that the deliberations-all but-supported their contention.
[Author’s note: although in reading through the deliberations, we would find that it was more
leaning towards the contrary.]
With all the above premises considered, the court decided that they are to pan away from their
previous construction of R.A. 1169, and uphold the interpretation that R.A. 1169 does not
completely hinder the PCSO from joining a joint venture agreement.
4. In deciding whether the ELA was to be subject for public bidding or not, the court scoured into
E.O. No. 301, which reads:
§ 1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision of law, decree, executive order or
other issuances to the contrary notwithstanding , no contract for public services or for
furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches,
agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding,
except under any of the following situations.
a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which

may involve the loss of or danger to, life and/or property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity
which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer
who does not have the sub-dealers selling at lower prices and for which no
suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more advantageous terms
to the government;
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed
on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the
offers received in each instance were exorbitant or non-conforming to
specifications;
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies
through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the government to be
determined by the Department Head concerned; and
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.
Petitioners argue that even if the general description of E.O. No. 301 includes contracts for public
services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment, the exceptions found in the
subsections cannot be applied to the ELA, because the reference of subsections a, b, d, e, and f
are supplies, and in the case of c, it only refers to materials i.e. there is no mention of
equipments. But the court found it counterproductive to accept this construction as it would
directly defeat the very purpose of which the exceptions are made. The court further explains, in
that for instance, a calamity occurs, would public bidding really be necessary to furnish ‘supplies’
for the victims? (subsection a)
Also, the court found it difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 would apply to the ELA because E.) No.
301 only applies to contracts of purchase and sale, whereas the ELA is not a contract of purchase
and sale. And that, at the most, the option to buy given to the PCSO may be thought of as a
contract of purchase and sale, which in itself is not a contract at all.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Padilla and Vitug (Concurring Opinion),
Both Padilla and Vitug concurs with the decision of the ponente(Mendoza), for the reasons that:
(a.) the procedural principle of locus standi must not stand in the way of the re-examination of the
previous case, in that the previous lease of contract was already ‘changed’ in the form of the ELA.; and
that (b.) the determination of whether the ELA is advantageous to the government or not is purely the
function of the executive branch and not the judiciary (Separation of Powers).
Feliciano( Dissenting Opinion),
Feliciano-in his dissent to the majority decision-offers three contentions, Two of which are most
pertinent are as follows: First, it is his opinion that since Justice Davide was one of the authors of the
amendment to the charter of the PCSO(evident in the deliberations), his opinion toward the proper
construction of R.A. 1169 should be given more priority, as what was the case in G.R. No. 113375. And
that the interpretation rendered by Mendoza with regard to the exceptions found in R.A. 1169 completely
disregarded the actual language used e.g. the use of the word “engage” as substituted with “invest”. And
second, he argues that the ELA was supposed to be subject to public bidding because as Order No. 301
expressly state, it includes the “furnishing” of supplies, materials and equipments to the government, this
again was construed to mean a “purchase” or a “sale”, this according to Feliciano is not actually the case.
Davide (Dissenting Opinion),
Davide dissents the decision of the majority. And as buttresses, he offers the following: (a.) that
the decision, in relation to the previous case, upsets the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis, as
well as the principle of law of the case, in that the PCSO and PGMC are supposed to be bound by the
ruling of the previous case itself, the locus standi of the petitioners, and the interpretations given
rendered.; (b.) that being the ponente of the previous case, and an author of the amendment of PCSO’s
charter, he believes that it is rather imperative to uphold his interpretation of the same, moreover because
of the doctrine of stare decisis which suggests that “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines; (c.)that the interpretations given in the
majority decision rather appeals to the “loose” sense of the terms used i.e. it disregarded the strict
meaning of the wording; and lastly (d.) that the majority erred in concluding that the petitioners failed to
offer more advantageous substitutes/remedies, in that this fact was precisely because there was no public
bidding.
G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO

C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE
ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO,
JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, WIGBERTO TANADA, and REP.
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
VS.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President;
RENATO CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Executive Secretary and Chairman of the
Presidential review Committee on the Lotto, Office of the President; PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPTAKES OFFICE, and PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
The PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base
and diversifying its sources of funds. Upon learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line
lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational company and one of the ten largest public
companies in Malaysia,” long “engaged in, among others, successful lottery operations in Asia, “became
interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.” As an initial step, the company organized with
some Filipino investors a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through which the technical and
management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”
The PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery
system for the PCSO.PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. The bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-
Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was
submitted to the Office of the President. The Office of the President announced that it had given the
respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s on-line lottery system.
KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up to the on-
line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. The media reported that
despite the opposition, “Malacanang will push through with the operation of an on-line lottery system
nationwide” and that it is actually the respondent PCSO which will operate the lottery while the winning
corporate bidders are merely “lessors.”
KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. The Executive Secretary informed KILOSBAYAN that the requested documents
would be duly transmitted before the end of the month. However, on that same date, an agreement
denominated as “Contract of Lease” was finally executed by respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC.
The President approved it on 20 December 1993. Hence this special civil action for prohibition and
injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to
prohibit and restrain the implementation of the “Contract of Lease” executed by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection
with the on-line lottery system, also known as “lotto.”
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners claim that the Office of the President, acting through respondents Executive Secretary and/or
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, and the PCSO gravely abused their discretion and/or
functions tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and/or authority in respectively: (a) approving the award of the
contract to, and (b) entering into the so-called “Contract of Lease” with Respondent PGMC for the
installation, establishment and operation of the on-line lottery and telecommunication systems required
and/or authorized under the said contract, considering that:
(a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited from holding and
conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity.”
(b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is required
before any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunication system;
(c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino owned and/or
controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like the said
telecommunication system; and
(d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its Charter and under the Foreign Investment Act
(R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications
systems.
In its Comment, PGMC asserts that:
(a) It is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the building and maintenance
of a lottery system to be used by PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise); and
(b) As such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with
PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise , “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with
PGMC---as such statutory limitation is viewed from the context, intent, and spirit of Republic Act
1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa 42.
PGMC further claims that as an independent contractor for a piece of work, it is neither engaged in
“gambling” nor in “public service” relative to the telecommunications network, which the petitioners even
consider as an “indispensable requirement” of an on-line lottery system. Finally, it states that the
execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue
on the “morality” of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which
should be ventilated in another forum; and that the petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or
real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought.
Public respondents Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary Renato
Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner’s interpretation of the phrase “in collaboration,
association or joint venture” in Section 1 is “much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of logic” for it
“ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to
enter into all kinds of transactions or contrasts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes
and objectives.” With respect to the challenge Contract of Lease, the “role of PGMC is limited to that of a
lessor of facilities” for the on-line lottery system.
It is further claimed that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the Contract of
Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility;
moreover, PGMC’s “establishments of telecommunications system is not intended to establish a
telecommunications business,” and it has been held that where the facilities are operated “not for
business purposes but for its own use,” a legislative franchise is not required before a certificate of public
convenience can be granted.
Public Respondents also argued that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991;
that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that the
issue of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of
judicial review.”
Finally, the public respondents allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the suit, citing the
resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid in light of Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether
domestic or foreign.” .
HELD:
1. YES, the Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers,
members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to
initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions,
or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
2. NO, the Contract of Lease is declared contrary to law and invalid.
REASONS:
1. As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the
importance of the issues raised. Insofar as taxpayers’ suits are concerned, the Court has declared
that it “is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained,” or that it “enjoys an
open discretion to entertain the same or not.”
In line with the liberal policy of the Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress,and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate
and prosecute actions to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings,or
orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
The petition is found to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic,
and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition.
2. Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company,
or entity, whether domestic or foreign.”
The challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.
A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the
contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a
contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but one
where the statutorily prescribed collaboration or association, in the least, or joint venture 1, at the most,
exists between the contracting parties.
The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its
own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and that although it wished to
have the system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the government." Because of these serious
constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state
1
An association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise; generally all contribute
assets and share risks. It requires a community of interest in the performance of the subject matter, a right to direct
and govern the policy in connection therewith, and duty, which may be altered by agreement to share both in
profit and losses.
in its RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities
needed to operate and maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating expenses and
expansion expenses and risks"; and submit "a comprehensive nationwide lottery development plan . . .
which will include the game, the marketing of the games, and the logistics to introduce the game to all the
cities and municipalities of the country within five (5) years"; and that the operation of the on-line lottery
system should be "at no expense or risk to the government" — meaning itself, since it is a government-
owned and controlled agency.
In short, the only contribution the PCSO would have is its franchise or authority to operate the on-line
lottery system; with the rest, including the risks of the business, being borne by the proponent or bidder.
The PCSO, however, makes it clear in its RFP that the proponent can propose a period of the contract
which shall not exceed fifteen years, during which time it is assured of a "rental" which shall not exceed
12% of gross receipts.
From the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between
them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-
line lottery system while the PCSO would, primarily, provide the franchise.
The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Its denomination as such is a
crafty device, carefully conceived, to provide a built-in defense in the event that the agreement is
questioned as violative of the exception in Section 1 (B) of the PCSO's charter. The joint venture is
established by the following:
(a) Under the contract, rent will be paid to PGMC as compensation for the fulfillment of its
obligations. This rent is not a fixed amount. Although it is stated to be 4.9% of gross receipts from
ticket sales, payable net of taxes required by law to be withheld, it may be drastically reduced or,
in extreme cases, nothing may be due or demandable at all because the PGMC binds itself to
“bear all risks if the revenue from the ticket sales, on an annualized basis, are insufficient to pay
the entire prize money.” This risk-bearing provision is unusual in a lessor-lessee relationship, but
inherent in a joint venture.
(b) In the event of pre-termination of the contract by the PCSO, or its suspension of operation of
the on-line lottery system in breach of the contract and through no fault of the PGMC, the PCSO
binds itself "to promptly, and in any event not later than sixty (60) days, reimburse the Lessor the
amount of its total investment cost associated with the On-Line Lottery System, including but not
limited to the cost of the Facilities, and further compensate the LESSOR for loss of expected net
profit after tax, computed over the unexpired term of the lease." If the contract were indeed one of
lease, the payment of the expected profits or rentals for the unexpired portion of the term of the
contract would be enough.
(c) The PGMC cannot "directly or indirectly undertake any activity or business in competition with
or adverse to the On-Line Lottery System of PCSO unless it obtains the latter's prior written
consent." If the PGMC is engaged in the business of leasing equipment and technology for an on-
line lottery system, we fail to see any acceptable reason why it should allow a restriction on the
pursuit of such business.
(d) The PGMC shall provide the PCSO the audited Annual Report sent to its stockholders, and
within two years from the effectivity of the contract, cause itself to be listed in the local stock
exchange and offer at least 25% of its equity to the public. If the PGMC is merely a lessor, this
imposition is unreasonable and whimsical, and could only be tied up to the fact that the PGMC
will actually operate and manage the system; hence, increasing public participation in the
corporation would enhance public interest.
(e) The PGMC shall put up an Escrow Deposit of P300,000,000.00 pursuant to the requirements
of the RFP, which it may, at its option, maintain as its initial performance bond required to ensure
its faithful compliance with the terms of the contract.
(f) The PCSO shall designate the necessary personnel to monitor and audit the daily performance
of the on-line lottery system; and promulgate procedural and coordinating rules governing all
activities relating to the on-line lottery system. The first further confirms that it is the PGMC which
will operate the system and the PCSO may, for the protection of its interest, monitor and audit the
daily performance of the system. The second admits the coordinating and cooperative powers
and functions of the parties.
(g) The PCSO may validly terminate the contract if the PGMC becomes insolvent or bankrupt or
is unable to pay its debts, or if it stops or suspends or threatens to stop or suspend payment of all
or a material part of its debts.
Such confirm the indispensable role of the PGMC in the pursuit, operation, conduct, and management of
the On-Line Lottery System. They exhibit and demonstrate the parties' indivisible community of interest in
the conception, birth and growth of the on-line lottery, and, above all, in its profits, with each having a right
in the formulation and implementation of policies related to the business and sharing, as well, in the
losses — with the PGMC bearing the greatest burden because of its assumption of expenses and risks,
and the PCSO the least, because of its confessed unwillingness to bear expenses and risks. In a manner
of speaking, each is wed to the other for better or for worse.
G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, respondents.
FACTS:
President Estrada by virtue of E.O No. 43, created the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
to “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the
manner of implementing the same.”
Petitioner, Ramon Gonzales filed a petition for prohibitions a citizen and taxpayer assailing the
constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR and of the Presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of PCCR is constitutional
HELD:
NO. PCCR was already dissolved when the petition was filed and that the petitioner lacked locus standi
on the petition
REASONS:
President Estrada created PCCR in November 26, 1998 and its function which must end by June 30,
1999. However by virtue of E.O. 73 their existence was extended until December 19, 1999. Upon
submission of its recommendations by December 20, 1999, the president dissolved it. With PCCR
dissolved, it would be impossible for the court to grant the petition of Gonzales since the body sought to
be enjoined no longer exists thus, moot and academic.
In addition to the mootness of the issue, the petitioner lacked a locus standi. In invoking his right as a
citizen, the court found no direct nor even indirect injury that can be sustained by the petitioner in the
creation of the PCCR. As a taxpayer, he also lacked standing for the appropriations for the creation of the
PCCR. The appropriations for the PCCR was authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there
was no an appropriation at all. “In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than
the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury’,
while appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.’.
The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President; in the
exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the
Constitution.
The prayer of the petitioner that he must be furnished with certain information regarding PCCR was
granted under Section 7 of the Bill of Rights regarding right to information.
G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA
(Iglesia Filipina Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.),
DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE
SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILOM, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO
BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 138572. October 10, 2000.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC. (PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADO

GAT INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, VS. HON. RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as Secretary of National Defense,
and HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.
G.R. No. 138587. October 10, 2000.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S.ROCO, and SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, petitioners, VS. JOSEPH
E. ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO,
MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
respondents.
G. R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National President, Jose Aguila
Grapilon, petitioner, VS. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of
the Philippines, and HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
respondents.
G.R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAÑADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON-AVENCEÑA, ROLANDO

SIMBULAN, PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P.
ARROYO, FRANCISCO C. RIVERA, JR., RENE A. V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN, MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. petitioners VS. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO B. FERNAN,
SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO G. BIAZON, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING
UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO THE
VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA), respondents.
FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel.
On August 30, 1951, the two countries entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty to further strengthen their
defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
The Philippines and the United States negotiated in 1991 for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement with the pending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. However, the Philippine
Senate rejected the proposed agreement that would have extended the presence of the US military bases
in the Philippines. Nonetheless, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the
United States continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
On July 18, 1997, the United states panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo
Severino, Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the United states and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” After a series of conferences and negotiations, President Fidel
Ramos approved the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which was signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary
Domingo Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph Estrada, through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.
The next day, October 6, the President, through Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, transmitted to the
Senate of the Philippines, the letter of the President and the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign
Relations, chaired by Senator Blas Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by
Senator Rodlofo Biazon, for their joint consideration and recommendation. Joint public hearings were
then held by the two Committees.
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending the
concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its
implementation.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds
vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between Foreign Affairs
Secretary Domingo Siazon and US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition were then filed by the petitioners to the Supreme Court.
ARGUMENTS:
Respondents challenge petitioner’s standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not shown any
interest in the case, and that petitioners, failed to substantiate that they have sustained or will sustained
direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the validity or
invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance which justifies their standing.
Another point of contention is the determination of which provision of the Constitution applies in the case.
Petitioners claim that Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution is applicable considering that the VFA
has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. In contrast, respondents state
the Section 21, Article VII should apply since the VFA is not a basing agreement but an agreement which
involves the temporary visits of US personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
In line with these, respondents further argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling because: a)
the VFA does not contain provision for the permanent establishment of military bases; b) no foreign
military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities are involved in the VFA; On the other hand,
petitioners contend that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” embodied in Section 25, Article XVIII means
that the VFA should have the advice of the US Senate in accordance with its own constitutional process,
and that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the United States. Petitioners
claim that the VFA is not a considered a “treaty” by the United States, but merely an “executive
agreement.”
Likewise, petitioners contend that the President committed grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the VFA
pursuant to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1) Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA?
2) Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVII of the
Constitution?
3) Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?

a) Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US
military personnel?
b) Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua of higher?
4) Does the VFA violate:

a) the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?
b) the prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?
c) Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from taxes and duties for
the equipment, materials, supplies and other properties imported into or acquired in the
Philippines by, or on behalf, of the US Armed Forces?
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions.
REASONS:
Petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of
sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. Similarly, Representatives Wigberto
Tañada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus
standi (legal standing) to maintain the present suit since they have not clearly shown that they will
likewise suffer direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong.
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show “not only that the
law is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.”
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases.
The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring the suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of
Governors authorizing Jose Aguila Grapilon, its National President, to commence the present action.
Given the different Constitutional provisions cited by the adverse parties, the Supreme Court ruled that
Section 25, Article XVIII should apply in the case since a special provision or law prevails over a general
one. However, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.
Similarly, the Supreme Court stated that the respondents’ argument that Section 25, Article XVII is not
controlling is misplaced since the said provision in the Constitution does not make a distinction between
“transient” and “permanent.” Simply, the respondents were wrong in claiming that Section 25, Article XVII
is inapplicable. The respondents, in support of the VFA, argued that the establishment of foreign military
bases in the Philippines should be allowed since it would only be temporary. Respondents claim that
Section 25, Article XVII contains prohibition against permanent military bases when in fact there is no
such provision in the Constitution. The Constitution does not distinguish between “permanent” or
“transient” military bases. In the same manner, the Supreme Court did not also subscribe to the argument
that Section 25, Article XVII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops
and facilities are involved in the VFA. The Supreme Court ruled that the words in the phrase “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities” under the same provision are to be taken as separate and
independent subjects. Thus, the presence of at least one of the three elements (foreign bases, foreign
troops, or foreign facilities) would place the VFA under Section 25, Article XVII.
The Supreme Court stated in its decision that it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law,
the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. In addition, international law continues to make no
distinction between treaties and executive agreements since they are equally binding obligations upon
nations. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty there is indeed marked compliance with
the mandate of the Constitution.
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that President Joseph Estrada did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in ratifying the VFA because by constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President is
the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. The negotiation of the VFA and its
ratification are exclusive acts pertaining solely to the President.
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
MARCOS, petitioner
VS.
MANGLAPUS, respondent
FACTS:
On September 15,1989, the Supreme Court, by split decision, dismissed the petition of the Marcoses,
after finding that the President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. After the former President Marcos died on September 28, 1989, President Aquino, for the
same reason, likewise did not allow the remains to be brought back to the country. On the premise that
the circumstance has changed because of the demise of the former President Marcos, the Marcoses filed
this Motion for Reconsideration to the ruling of the Supreme Court on September 15, 1989.
ARGUMENTS:
1. To bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them
not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the
Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily;
and,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to bar a Filipino from his own country ?
Whether or not President Aquino has the power to bar the return of the remains of former President
Marcos and his family?
RULING:
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The President has the power.
REASONS:
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual
scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government have not been
shown to have ceased when Mrs. Marcos called President Aquino illegal.
The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. The President has powers other
than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S.
Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3)
separate branches.
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted Hamilton's proposition that the federal executive,
unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the
constitutional text. It is neither a recognition, however, that the President's implied or residual powers is
tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. There is no similarity between the residual
powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of
power and not implied, to wit :
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any
matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which
shall form part of the law of the land,
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution is to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr.
Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In
the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in
arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
G.R. NO. 86344, December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,

vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent
FACTS:
1. The House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on
Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance with
Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.
2. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the
House of Representatives.
3. Twenty-four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
members.
4. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this
to the newly-formed LDP.
5. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the
LDP.
6. Hence, the instant petition challenging his removal from the Commission on Appointments and
the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner contends that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political
realignment because the LDP is
a. Not a duly registered political party and
b. Has not yet attained political stability.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and
so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
HELD:
Petition is dismissed. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI,
Section 18 of the Constitution.
RATIO:
The petitioner bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims has not
provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization.
D: the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right
of representation in the Commission of Appointments only to political parties who are duly registered with
the COMELEC.
The COMELEC in an en banc resolution affirmed the petition of the LDP for registration as political party.
The petitioner’s contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable.
D: If the petitioner’s argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments, and for
that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. The independents also cannot be represented because they
belong to no political party.
D: The issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed
by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. Moreover, where serious constitutional
questions are involved, “the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
G.R. NO. 125865, March 26, 2001
JEFFREY LIANG (HUE FENG), petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development
Bank.
2. On two separate occasions, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce Cabal, a
member of the clerical staff of ADB.
3. The Metropolitan Trial Court, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs
that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Information against
him.
4. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig, however, annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan
Trial Court.
5. Hence, the petition for review of the decision of the RTC of Pasig.
6. Affirming the decision of RTC of Pasig, the petitioner filed for Motions for Reconsideration, and
the Court also granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner, as an official of an international organization is entitled to diplomatic

immunity.
2. Whether or not an international official is immune from criminal jurisdiction for all acts, whether
private or official.
3. Whether or not the authority to determine if an act is official or private lodged in the courts.
HELD:
The Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and intervener of DFA are denied with finality.
1. No.
2. No.
3. Yes.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner is not entitled to diplomatic immunity; hence, his immunity is not absolute.
D: Officials of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those
necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes..
In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local
courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.
Moreover, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the
purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Slander, in general, cannot be
considered as an act performed in an official capacity.
2. An international official is entitled to immunity limited only to acts done in their official capacity.
D: The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement are clear that the immunity can be waived only
with respect to official acts because this is only the extent to which the privilege has been
granted.
3. The local courts have jurisdiction over the determination whether or not a given act is official or
private.
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner

VS.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion to the Court of First Instance that his case be remanded from the Justice of the
peace of Masantol, in order that he be able to cross-examine and question the complainant and her
witness.
It was stated in the memorandum submitted to the Court of First Instance, that during the preliminary
investigation, the petitioner assisted by his counsel was asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty upon
which he entered the plea of not guilty. His counsel moved that complainant present her evidence so that
he can cross-examine such. The prosecutor and the fiscal objected invoking Sec. 11 of rule 108, which
denies defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 11 of Rule 108 infringes sec. 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution (Sec. 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution)
“The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules….shall not diminish, increase,
increase or modify substantive rights…..”
HELD:
NO. Sec. 11 of Rule 108 is not a substantive law but a remedial or procedural law.
REASONS:
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains redress for their invasion.
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the
punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the
steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. Preliminary investigation is eminently and
essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process of law. While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the
defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his
witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both
at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged.
Resolution, March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1943;
Albino Cunanan et. al, petitioners
FACTS:
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the Bar, “in order that a candidate (for admission to
the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general weighted average of 75 percent in all subjects, without falling below 50 percent in any
subject.” Considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946, the
Supreme Court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who obtained an average of only 72
percent in the 1946 bar examinations, 69 percent in 1947,70 percent in 1948 and 74 percent in 1949. In
1950 to 1953, the 74 percent was raised to 75 percent.
Unsuccessful candidates who obtained a few percentages lower than those mentioned above, believing
that they are as qualified as those considered and passed by the Supreme Court and feeling
discriminated against, agitated Congress and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which
reduced the passing general average in the bar examinations to 70 percent effective since 1946. After
reading the comments of the Court expressing their view on the matter, which the President himself
requested, the President vetoed the bill.
Congress did not override the veto. Instead, on July 21, 1953, Congress enacted without executive
approval Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill eventually
became the law in question which is Republic Act. 972 otherwise known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of
1953”. RA 972 entitled An Act Fixing the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from Nineteen
Hundred and Forty-Six Up to and Including Nineteen Hundred and Fifty Five provided inter alia, that
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 percent in the July 1946 to August 1951 bar
examinations, 71 percent in the 1952 bar examinations, 72 percent in the 1953 bar examinations, 73
percent in the 1954 bar examinations and 74 percent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a
grade below 50 percent in any subject shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as a member of the Philippine Bar.
After the approval of said law, many of the unsuccessful bar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
ARGUMENTS
According to its author, then Senator Pablo Angeles David, the reason for relaxing the standard 75
percent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy
of the preparation of students who took up law soon after liberation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act 972 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES AND NO. That portion of Article 1 of RA 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of
Article 2 are UNCONSTITUTIONAL. That part of Article 1 of RA 972 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law (1953-1955), because of the lack of votes to nullify it,
CONSTITUTIONAL.
REASONS:
1. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Supreme
Court to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 percent without falling below 50 percent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice
of law, the disputed law is NOT a legislation; it is a JUDGMENT – a judgment revoking those promulgated
by this court cited a year after affecting the bar candidates concerned. And although the Supreme Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that ONLY this
court and not the legislative nor executive department that may do so. Any attempt on the part of any of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions.
In the 1935 Constitution, Section 13, Article VIII provides that:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts and admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure and
admission to the practice of law.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the Supreme Court equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in the Supreme Court. Congress may repeal, alter
and supplement the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court BUT the authority and responsibility over
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision
REMAIN VESTED in the Supreme Court.
3. The Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar. The power to repeal, later and supplement the rules DOES NOT signify nor permit
that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its PRIMARY POWER on the
matter. The Constitution DOES NOT say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate
directly attorneys at law or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is LIMITED
to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a
BETTER service of the legal profession requires it. But this power DOES NOT relieve the Supreme Court
of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of
the legal profession.
4. The reasons advanced for the pretended classification of candidates is contrary to facts which are of
general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared.
The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 is not embraced in the title of the law and being inseparable from the provisions of Article 1,
the entire law is void.
G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992
EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner

VS.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT and LUIS T. SANTOS, SECRETARY,
respondents
FACTS:
This petition for certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his profession
while employed in the Government.
Attorney Erwin B Javellana, an incumbent City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental, and a lawyer
by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose
from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by the DILG Memorandum
Circulars. On July 8, 1989, Javellan, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case
against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for “Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with
Damages” putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and
civil cases in the city without prior authority of the DILG.
City Engineer Divinagracia filed an administrative case against Javellana for (1) violation of the DILG
Memorandum and RA 6713, also known as, the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees”, and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority. DILG Memorandum
provides that
“members of the local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the mayors, …[are] allowed
to practice their professions provided that in doing so an authority… be first secured from the Regional
Directors… provided, however, that no government, personnel or property, equipment or supplies shall be
utilized in the practice of their professions.
On September 10, 1990, Secretary Santos replied on Javellana’s request for a permit to continue his
practice of law, which stated that:
“we interpose no objection thereto, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his
official functions”
On September 21, 1991, Secretary Santos issued a memorandum setting forth guidelines for the practice
of professions by local elective officials:
1. The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of Local Government;
2. Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors… are prohibited to engage in the practice of their
profession and to accept private employment during their incumbency.
3. Other local officials may be allowed to practice their profession or engage in private employment on a
limited basis at the discretion of the Secretary of Local Government, subject to existing laws and to the
following conditions:
a. That the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the local chief executive
concerned to the end that it will not impair any way the efficiency of the officials concerned,
b. That no government time, personnel, funds, or supplies shall be utilized in the pursuit of one’s
profession or private employment,
c. That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession or engagement in private
employment and the official duties of the official shall arise thereby;
d. Such other conditions that the Secretary deems necessary to impose on a particular case, in the
interest of public service.
On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground
that the DILG memorandum circulars used as basis on his case are unconstitutional because the
Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. His motion to dismiss
was denied by the public respondents. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
On October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law. Sec.90 of
which provides:
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions… provided that sanggunian members who are
members of the Bar shall not:
1. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
2. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
3. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit
of which he is an official.
4. Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, that the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
The administrative case against Javellana was again set for hearing. He thereupon filed this petition for
certiorari.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner invokes that DILG Memorandum Circulars used as basis in the case at bar, and the new Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) should be declared unconstitutional and null void because:
(1) they violate Article VIII, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court will have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions
for only sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their
profession while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not
so restricted. (RA 7160, Sec.90)
ISSUES:
Whether or not the DILG Memorandum Circulars used as basis in the case at bar, and the new Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) are unconstitutional and should be declared null and void.
HELD:
No. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
REASONS:
The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior and
Local Govenrment, in issuing the question DILG Circulars and in denying the petitioner’s motion to
dismiss the administrative charge against him.
The complaint filed by Javellana against Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government
of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against
the City Engineer would actually be judgment against the City Government and by serving as counsel,
Javellana violated the Memorandum circular prohibiting a government employee from engaging in the
private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner’s contention that the circulars mentioned and RA 7160 violate Article VIII, Sec. 5 of the
Constitution is off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power
and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DILG
Memorandum Circular simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest
between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances
where the law allows it.
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to
all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly
provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is
because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area
of public service.
G.R. No. 104392, February 20, 1996
MANIAGO, petitioner
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago owns shuttle buses for transporting employees of Texas Instruments, Inc. in
Baguio City.
Shuttle bus driver Herminio Andaya had a vehicular accident with a jeepney owned by private respondent
Alfredo Boado.
Maniago filed a criminal case for reckless imprudence against Boado
Boado then filed a civil case for damages against the petitioner himself
Maniago moved for the dismissal of the civil case against him and was denied by the RTC on the ground
that the Civil Code provides that a civil case could proceed independently from a criminal case, in addition
to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused.
Maniago took the matter on certiorary and prohibition to the Court of Appeals but was likewise dismissed
on the ground that no reservation of the right to bring the civil action in the criminal case was made by the
petitioner.
Thus this petition for review on certiorary.
ISSUE:
WON despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for
civil damages against petitioner under the Civil Code.
HELD:
NO. RTC and CA decisions reversed.
RATIO:
Respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action against Maniago.
He claims that such rights are substantive rights and is beyond the rulemaking power of the court.
Section 1 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action
UNLESS the offended party (1) waives the civil action (2) reserves his right to institute it separately or (3)
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of civil liability must be tried in a
single proceeding has always been regarded as a matter of procedure and since rulemaking power has
been conferred by the constitution on this Court, it is for the keeping of this court.
Furthermore, the practical reason for requiring the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil
Code separately from the criminal action must be reserved in order to avoid the filing of more than one
action for the same act or omission.
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner
VS.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents
FACTS:
Petitoner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor V.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when
he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the
FMED, and private respondent, taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an
amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted
PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner
tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995 on the grounds of violating
Section 19, RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) and Section 36 of PD 807 (Civil Service Decree). On January 31,
1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His
resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo
Aportadera. However, upon its appeal, it was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F
Guerrero who set aside the order and exonerated private respondent from administrative charges.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner argues that Section 7 Rule III of the Administrative Order No. 7 which states that whenever a
respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding, the decision of the Ombudsman is
final and unappealable, is contrary to Section 27 of RA 6770 which allows administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman to be appealable to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within 10 days from the receipt of the notice of the order, directive, or
decision. In short, the petitioner submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority under the law
to restrict the right of appeal or to limit the power of review of this court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the said rules are constitutional
2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to review the said case
3. Are the rules substantive or merely procedural?
HELD:
1. NO. Rule III of the Administrative Order No. 7 and Section 27 of RA 6770 are unconstitutional and
together with all of the acts implementing such are rendered INVALID.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction under Article VIII Section 5(2) to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the said final judgments or orders.
3. The rules are merely procedural since the transfer of appellate jurisdiction is not an act of creating
a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to
subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural power.
REASONS:
1. Article VI Section 30 provides that “no law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent" Based on the deliberations of the Senate, Senator Angara, as co-author and the
principal sponsor of the act, admitted that the said provision will expand the court’s jurisdiction,
and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights has not consulted the court on this matter.
There is also proof, that even up to its enactment, RA 6770 was not ever referred to this Court for
its advice and consent. Thus, as a clear violation to Article VI Section 30 of the Constitution, Rule
III of the Administrative Order No. 7 and Section 27 of RA 6770 are unconstitutional.
2. Article VIII Section 5(2) provides that the Court has the power to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the said final judgments or orders. This is
applicable not only to the final decisions or orders of the lower courts composing the integrated
judicial system but it also applies to quasi-judicial bodies or agencies. Provisions regarding the
power of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to review such appellate procedure
involving decisions or resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies do not need to be stated in the law that
creates the said agency since such power is already given to the Court by said Constitutional
provision.
3. In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule
really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them. 31 If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates
as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with
exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. 33 This is so because it is not
the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been
preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed.
The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be
changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of
procedure which relate to the remedy.
SECTION 6
MACEDA, petitioner,
VS.
OMBUDSMAN VASQUEZ, respondent
FACTS:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which
have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered
in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
DECISION:
Petition granted. Ombudsman was directed to dismiss the complaint filed by Atty. Abiera and to refer the
same to the supreme court for appropriate action.
RATIO:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct
and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised
Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates
of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.
**note: Judge is liable for falsification of certification for receiving salary despite his failure to render
decisions within the required 90 day period (Lagaret vs. Bantua, 114 SCRA 603)
G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner

VS.
GACOTT, JR. et. al., respondents
FACTS AND ARGUMENTS:
A complaint for the violation of the Anti-Dummy Law was filed by Assistance City Prosecutor Perfecto E.
Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal
case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under
Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution
filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of
Implementation No.2, Series of 1972. Despite the objections, respondent judge granted the motion to
Dismiss espousing the position that the Letter of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is no the
“law” contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A 1130.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as to
warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari as prayed for by petitioners herein.
HELD:
Yes. Not only that but the respondent judge did not even bother to read the text cited in the LOI, else he
would have acknowledged the validity of the prosecution’s argument.
REASONS:
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1,
LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have
been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto
Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of
LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in
implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of
the National Government, the following agencies of the Department of Justice are hereby reorganized or
activated in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the
following instructions: . . .
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would
have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former
President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by
Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former
President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other
acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise
of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been
expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law.
JUDGE FUENTES, petitioner

VS.
OMBUDSMAN, respondent
FACTS:
Pursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the Republic of the
Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties
affected by the project (defendants), one of which was Tessie Amadeo. As of May 19, 1994, the DPWH
still owed the defendants/lot owners, the total sum of P15,510,415.00. Hence, in an order dated April 5,
1994, the lower court granted Tessie Amadeo's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the
DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim, which was later on issued by the Clerk of Court and served by
repondent Sheriff Paralisan, who issued a notice of Levy. An auction sale soon followed suit wherein Alex
Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Sheriff Paralisan soon issued the corresponding certificate of
sale in favor of Alex Bacquial. When these two attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties, they were
prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties who claimed that his office was
totally unaware of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding
area of the depot were still serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation. Alex Bacquial filed an
ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a 'break through' order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of
the auctioned properties. The motion was granted by Judge Fuentes on the same date and Bacquial
together with Paralisan
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for
violation of R. A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an investigation of said complaint against
petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel.
ISSUE/S:
The issue is whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of
his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of
an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
HELD:
The petition of Judge Renato A. Fuentes was granted by the SC and the Ombudsman was directed to
dismiss the case and refer the complaint against petitioner Fuentes to the Supreme Court for appropriate
action.
REASONS:
No. RA 6770, Sec. 21 provides that the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the
judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., petitioner,

VS.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City
alleged that on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Piñas City, he
requested petitioner Judge Jose Caoibes to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; that
petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner
blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw and in the process, broke
his glasses.
On May 23, 1997, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman - a Criminal
Complaint seeking that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan for physical injuries, malicious
mischief and assault upon a person in authority. On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another
Complaint against petitioner, this time with the Supreme Court - an administrative case with the SC,
seeking the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a judicial officer.
The Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit but instead, petitioner filed an
"Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," asking the Office of the Ombudsman
temporarily suspend its investigation and refer the same to the Supreme Court which, through the Office
of the Court Administrator, is already investigating the incident. The Office of the Ombudsman denied the
motion for referral to the Supreme Court. Invoking Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of
the Ombudsman held that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate the criminal charges of respondent
Judge against petitioner. Subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied hence the petition for
certiorari was filed.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to
make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who,
both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control. Petitioner argues that
the Office of the Ombudsman should either refer the case to the Supreme Court for preliminary
evaluation, or await the latter's resolution of the administrative case. Otherwise, the absurd situation may
result wherein the Office of the Ombudsman files criminal charges against petitioner who, on the other
hand, is declared without fault by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case pending resolution of the
administrative case filed with the Supreme Court.
HELD:
YES. The Office of the Ombudsman should defer action pending the resolution of the case filed with the
SC.
REASONS:
Although the case constitutes simple criminal charges falling within the parameters of the Ombudsman’s
constitutional power and duty to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or
employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, under Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, the SC is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. It must have all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before it, referred to the SC for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is
involved. The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the SC, to its findings that a case before it does or
does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the SC of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to give unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a
dangerous policy which encroaches upon judicial independence and the doctrine of separation of powers.
SECTION 10
July 23, 1987
NITAFAN, petiitoner
VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents
FACTS:
Petitioners, the duly appointed Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively of the RTC,
National Capital Judicial Region, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Office of the SC, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes
a decrease of diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provisions of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that ‘during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased,’ even
as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned and said by the Constitution. On
June 4, 1987, The Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice’s directive to its Finance Officer to
discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench.
With the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the legal issue rose through these
judicial pronouncements. As will be shown, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to
delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary,
so as to “give substance to equality among the three branches of Government.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not any tax withheld from the emoluments or compensation of judicial officers constitutes a
decrease of diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provisions of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution
DECISION:
the PETITION for prohibition is DISMISSED
RATIO:
It was made clear especially with regard to Bernas’ accepted amendment to the amendment of
Commissioner Rigos that the salaries of members would be subject to the general income tax applied to
all taxpayers.
Although the intents may have been obscured by the failure to include it in the General Provisions, the
Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries
of the members of the SC, as well as the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. It reiterates that
the salaries of Justices and Judges are subject to a general income tax law adnt hat the payment of such
income tax does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance of office.
The provisions in the 1987 Constitution reads:
“The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the SC and of the judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance of office, their salary shall not be decreased.”
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commsission relevant to Section 10, Artivle VIII, negates the
contention that the intent of the framers is to revert the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of
judicial officers.
THE DRAFT PROPSAL OF Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief justice and the Associate Justices of the SC and of judges of
the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not eb
diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the
Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of___ and each Associate Justice_______ pesos.”
And during the amendments on the draft Article on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos
proposed that the term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the words “nor subjected to
income tax “ be deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three branches in the
government.”
Father Bernas proposed an amendment to the amendment: “During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX. “ Commissioner
Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. As Bernas announced:
“During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED.”
The true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of
Members of the Judiciary taxable.
SECTION 11
80 PHIL 297
VARGAS, petitioner
VS.
RILLORAZA, respondent
FACTS:
Section assailed is a provision (Sec 14) in the People’s Court Act (Commonwealth Act 682) that
provides for disqualification of certain Justices in presiding over particular “collaboration” cases, and the
designation of Judges from the CTI etc. to sit in the SC in the deliberation of such treason cases.
Section 14 of the People’s Court Act provides that:
“Any justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive
Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any case brought
to that court under Section 13 hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or position
under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch,
instrumentality, and/or agency thereof.”
The abovementioned section provides for 1) qualification of members of the Supreme Court, other than
those provided in Section 6 Article 8 of the Philippine Constitution; 2) it authorizes the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the qualifications set forth in Section 6 Article 8 of
the Philippine Constitution; 3) it removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a
procedure other than impeachment, contrary to Article 9 of the Philippine Constitution; 4) it deprives the
Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to confirm or reject
appointments to the Supreme Court; 5) it creates two Supreme Courts……..
If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in
Rule 126, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability the
requisite number of judges necessary to constitute a quorum or tender judgment in any case is not
present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-Large of First
Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having non of the disqualification set forth in said Section 1 hereof, as may
be necessary to wit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in
said case is reached.
ARGUMENTS:
1. Whether or not the Congress had the power to add to the pre-existing grounds of disqualification
of a Justice of the Supreme Court;
2. Whether or not a person may act as Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (COA) pursuant to the
Constitution, even if only a “designee”
3. Whether or not the method of “designation” created by the aforecited Section 14 of a Judge of
First Instance, Judges-at-Large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, designated by the
President under the same section can constitutionally, “sit temporarily as Justice” of the Supreme
Court by virtue thereof.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Section 14 of the People’s Court Act or Commonwealth Act 682 is constitutional
(temporary replacement; uninterrupted security of tenure)
DECISION:
NO. Section 14 of the PCA is unconstitutional.
RATIO/REASONS:
1. It is not only the power but the duty of all the members of the Supreme Court to sit in judgment in
all treason cases brought to the Court. The assailed provision prohibits the SC to try cases hence
encroaching their power of judicial review. What the Constitution directs, the statute prohibits. To
disqualify a judge would be to deprive him of his judicial power.
The Court ruled that if Section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who “held any
office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called the
Philippine Republic” would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the collaboration case. In
other words, what the Constitution ordained as the power and duty to be exercised and fulfilled by
the members of the Court (to sit in judgment before cases duly brought or appealed to the Court)
would be prohibited by Section 14. Were it not for the challenged Section 14, there would have
been uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced Justice and in his exercise of the
powers and fulfillment of the duties appertaining to his office. What matters here is not only that
the Justice affected continue to be a member of the Court and to enjoy the emoluments as well
as to exercise the powers and fulfill the other duties of his office, but that he be left unhampered
to exercise all the powers and fulfill all the responsibilities of said office in all cases properly
before his Court under the Constitution.
2. The designation proposed in the statute cannot suffice as the substitute of the mode of
appointment as mandated by the Constitution. There are qualifications as mandated by the SC.
The designees might not possess the proper qualifications.
No temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the Constitution. This tribunal,
as established under the Organic Law, is one of the permanent institutions of the government.
The clause “unless otherwise provided by law” found in Section 4 of Article 8 cannot be construed
to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court as
determined by the Constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined. In principle, what
really matters is not the length or shortness of the alteration of the constitutional composition of
the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability of that composition so long as the
Constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. Said clause refers to the number
of Justices who were to compose the Court upon its initial organization under the Commonwealth,
and the manner of its sitting; that is, the legislative, when providing for the initial organization of
the Supreme Court under the Commonwealth, was authorized to fix a different number of
Justices than eleven, and determine the manner of the Court’s sitting differently from that
established in Section 4 Article 8 of the Constitution, but it was and is not empowered to alter the
qualifications of the Justices and the mode of their appointment, which are matters governed by
Section 5 and 6 of said Article 8 wherein the clause “unless otherwise provided by law” does not
ever exist, nor the provision on who shall be the component members of the Court. There can be
no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required by the Constitution to compose
the Supreme Court are the regular members of the Court – indeed, a “temporary member” thereof
would be a misnomer, implying a position not contemplated by the Constitution.
3. As already adverted to, a mere designation under Sec. 14 of the PCA does not satisfy the
Constitutional requirement of appointment. Legislation cannot go against provisions of the
Constitution.
To disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the Court in a treason case, is
nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the
fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is disqualification of his judicial power.
SECTION 14
G.R. No. 143468-71 January 24, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FREDDIE LIZADA, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
 That one Freddie Lizada is found guilty of four (4) counts of rape and is sentenced to death for
each count of rape and threatened to kill the victim if she told on him.
 Accused raped victim Analia Orillosa Agoo on four (4) separate occasions as alleged, victim is
the daughter of his wife Rose Orillosa, who owns a small but thriving video store business.
 A certain Dr. Umil testified that the medical examination shows no evidence of rape.
 Accused-appellant contests that he did not rape the victim, that because his wife wanted full
ownership and control of the lucrative video shop business she “trained” the daughter to testify
as if he had raped her.
 Mother of victim executed "dagdag na salaysay ng paghahabla then charged Lizado for rape.
 Judgment rendered was that of guilty on four (4) counts of rape.
 Review shows conflicting testimony and evidence, but Solisitor Genral did contends that guilt
was proved anyway.
ARGUMENTS:
 Accused-appellant argues that he did not rape the daughter of his partner, but he was indeed
angry with her because she was hard-headed and did not obey him.
 Accused-appellant argues that the daughter was told and trained to accuse him of rape because
his wife wanted to control and wanted to gain more from the video shop business by being the
sole owner.
 Accused-appellant argues that court erred, in not making a finding of fact in its decision and
failure is reversible and that there was failure of prosecution to prove guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
 Accused-appellant argues that decision should be null and void because of failure to comply with
Section 14 Article VIII of 1987 Constitution and Rule 36 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Court
did not make finding of fact.
 Accused-appellant argues as well, failure to state in decision factual and legal basis of supreme
penalty (death).
 Contention lies in provision art VIII par 14 (no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based) as well as in
sec. 2 on rules of criminal procedure (The judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and
distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based.
 Prosecution argues that Mr. Lizada indeed rape the victim. That the decision was correct and
valid.
 Prosecution argued that no mechanical reliance on said Constitutional Provision. Courts can very
well synthesize and simplify decisions considering court is crowded with dockets and time
constraints, even if elucidated findings and decision is the same.
 Court wishes to avoid delays and on merits, resolve the case for a right to a speedy trial.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of first instance erred in its handing down of a decision without the specifications
as mentioned by the accused-appellant.
Whether or not Court of first instance was correct in not including the specifications as mentioned in the
provisions brought up by the accused-appellant.
Whether or not Lizada is guilty of acts of lasciviousness or attempted rape.
HELD:
Court ruled that, yes court erred in passing judgment without the specified details on how it arrived to a
decision, the court of first instance erred in handing down a decision without details on how it made it so.
Yes, court was not correct in its exclusion of specifications mentioned by provisions in the Constitution as
well as those mentioned in Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.
From the review of the case, Lizada is not guilty of all four counts of rape, but of two counts of simple rape
only as a review of evidence and testimony show. He is to be imprisoned and charged 25,000 and 50,000
respectively for each account of simple rape.
REASONS:
Lower court failed on the grounds mentioned by the accused-appellant to provide what he mentioned was
necessary in the ruling of the case at bar.
Lower court erred in falling for testimony of prosecution hook, line and sinker. Failed to explain why more
weight was given to prosecution. Ignored accused-appellants evidence was seen as well.
Lower court did not give factual legal basis on its decision it did not specify it though. Merely based it on
RPC.
Court failed to see merits of other evidence of accused-appellant.
Court was not persuaded by accused-appellant’s argument of conflicting testimony and evidence court
still finds him guilty of two (2) counts of rape on evidence alone (testimony)
Testimony of victim was convincing enough given the said case. Plus at a tender age full penetration
could not have been possible thus wounds would not show.
Accused-appellant after rigorous cross-examination shows testimony that victim was indeed raped in
certain two-week intervals.
Agrees with accused-appellant of 2 counts of simple not qualified rape which is penalized by life
imprisonment and 50k for each count of moral damages (200k total)
From testimony, penetration of penis was not evident and was not proven, thus not liable of consummated
rape.
G.R. No. 132424, May 2, 2006
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, petitioners
VS.
SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA FABELLA, respondents
FACTS:
Spouses Bonifacio Valdez and Venida Valdez are owners of a piece of land in Antipolo, Rizal. Such piece
of land is inhabited by spouses Gabriel Fabella and Francisca Fabella. Valdez asks the court for unlawful
detainer and that the piece of land be evacuated by the Fabellas. Some important claims in the complaint
of the Valdez’s are “that defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupied the said lot by building
their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof; That for
several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them,
but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied; That despite plaintiffs’ referral
of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot
peacefully”
The request of the petitioners was granted by the MTC, ordering the respondents to vacate the property
and pay necessary rent and attorney’s fees incurred by the Valdez. Appeal was brought to the RTC but
the MTC decision was still affirmed. Appeal was again brought in the court of appeals and it was then the
decision was reversed favoring the respondents reasoning that petitioners failed to make a case for
unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents’ possession of the same, which is a
requirement in unlawful detainer cases.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer having
alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the property in question,
which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer.
ISSUES:
2. Whether or not the allegations of the complaint qualify for unlawful detainer.
3. Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
2. NO. Petition fails to qualify for unlawful detainer.

3. NO. MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
REASONS:
There are 3 kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property

 accion interdictal
 accion publiciana
 accion reivindicatoria
Accion interdictal comprises of 2 distinct causes of action

 forcible entry (detentacion)
o one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, or stealth
o illegal from the very beginning
 unlawful detainer (desahuico)
o one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied
o legal at first, but due to expiration or termination of process became illegal
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise,
if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
The allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’
claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint
contains only bare allegations that respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in
question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof.
Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started.
Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.
G.R. No. 166051, April 08, 2008
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,

VS.
EVELINA LASERNA AND GLORIA CAJIPE, respondents.
FACTS:
 Respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz,
as buyers, entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI), a corporation engaged
in the development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller.
 The subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3, Block I, Phase II, Loyola
Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less amounting to
P172,260.00, to be paid in the following manner: (1) the P33,060.00 down payment should be paid
upon the signing of the contract; and (2) the remaining balance of P166,421.88 was payable for a
period of three years at a monthly installment of P4,622.83 beginning 1 April 1977.
 When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the execution and
delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the
final payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the respondents.
 The respondents filed against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of
Sale with Damages, dated 28 June 1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).
 HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean rendered a Decision denying respondents prayer for the issuance of
the Deed of Sale and the delivery of the TCT. Also, he directed the petitioner to execute and deliver the
aforesaid Deed of Sale and TCT the moment that the purchase price is fully settled by the respondents
and ordered the petitioner to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees from the
respondents other than those authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957 and similar statutes.
 Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, thus, it
appealed the same before the Office of the President.
 After evaluating the established facts and pieces of evidence on record, the Office of the President
rendered a Decision affirming in toto the 10 August 1994 Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. In rendering its Decision, the Office of the President merely adopted by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners.
 The petitioner thereafter elevated its case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the same was denied. Hence, this
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that the decision of the Office of the
President, which merely adopts by reference the findings and conclusions of the Board of Commissioners
of the HLURB, is in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution that the decision should be based on
the findings of facts and law to arrive at a decision.
HELD:
No, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the decision of the Office of the President is in
accordance with the mandate of the Constitution.
RATIO:
 Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that:
“No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefore.”
 The constitutional mandate that, a decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
 It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions
rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions
rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled Judiciary, and all of its provisions have
particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to
hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to
meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.
 The Decision of the Office of the President readily made available to the parties a copy of the Decision
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted and affirmed in toto, because it was attached
as an annex to its Decision.
 The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the HLURB Board of Commissioners have been
embodied in the Decision of the Office of the President and made an indispensable part thereof. With
the attachment of a copy of the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Decision of the
Office of the President, the parties reading the latter can also directly access the factual and legal
findings adopted from the former. As the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in its Decision dated 21 July
2004, the facts narrated and the laws concluded in the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners
should be considered as written in the Decision of the Office of the President. It was still easy for the
parties to determine the facts and the laws on which the decision were based. Moreover, through the
attached decision, the parties could still identify the issues that could be appealed to the proper tribunal.
 It was categorically stated in the Decision of the Office of the President that it conducted a careful study
and thorough evaluation of the records of the present case and it was fully convinced as regards the
findings of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SECTION 15
RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN
RESOLUTION:
The Case:
- Submitted to the court for consideration is a resolution of the Board of Governors,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommending an inquiry into the causes of
delays in the resolution of incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending
before the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS:
- Important parts of the resolution:

o Section 16, Article III of the constitution guarantees that all persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
o It is the duty of the IBP to undertake measures to assist in the speedy disposition
of cases pending before the various courts and tribunals.
o Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10-94 requires all RTC, MTC, MCTC, to
submit to the SC a bi-annual report indicating the title of the case, its date of
filing, the date of pre-trial in civil cases and arraignment in criminal cases, the
date of the initial trial, the date of the last hearing and the date that the case is
submitted for decision, and, to post, in a conspicuous place within its premises, a
monthly list of cases submitted for decision.
o Circular 10-94 has not been made applicable to the Sandiganbayan.
o Considering that the Sandiganbayan is also a trial court, the requirements should
be imposed on the Sandiganbayan as well.
- The Board of Governors of the IBP resolves as follows:
o “To recommend to the SC that Circular 10-94 be made applicable to the
Sandiganbayan in regard cases over which the Sandiganbayan has original
jurisdiction.”
o “To recommend to the SC an inquiry into the causes of delay in the resolution of
incidents and motions and in the decision of cases before the Sandiganbayan for
the purpose of enacting measures intended at avoiding such delays.”
- The SC then required the Sandiganbayan President Garchitorena to comment on the
letter of the IBP and to submit a list of all cases pending decision or with motion for
reconsideration pending resolution. Garchitorena then complied and was found that the
Sandiganbayan had a total of 415 cases for decision remaining undecided long beyond
the reglementary period to decide.
- The IBP then replied saying that:
o The IBP is not in a position to comment on the accuracy of the compliance,
nonetheless, it showed inefficiency in the disposition of cases particularly with
the first division of the Sandiganbayan.
o That the compliance did not include pending motions.
o Since the Sandiganbayan is a trial court it is also required the same requirements
as the other courts.
o The constitution clearly states that all lower collegiate courts must decide or
resolve cases or matters before it within 12 months from the date of submission.
(The Sandiganbayan still had undecided cases as far back as 1990) The
Sandiganbayan, as it is a trial court is required to decide cases within 3 months or
at the most 6 months from the date of submission.
- The court then ordered a judicial audit of the Sandiganbayan especially on the cases
subject of this administrative matter. In a letter to the Chief Justice of the SC,
Garchitorena admitted that the first division had a backlog of cases.
- On Jan. 26, 2001, the Court administrator stated that the causes of the delay are:
o Failure of the Special Prosecutor to submit investigation reports
o Filing of numerous incidents such as motion to dismiss, motion to quash,
demurrer to evidence, etc… that remained unsolved for years.
o Suspension of proceedings due to a pending petition for certiorari and
prohibition from the SC.
o Cases remain unacted upon.
o Unloading of cases already submitted for decision even if the Ponente is still in
service.
- Thus the resolution of the IBP is considered as an administrative complaint against
Garchitorena for delays of cases. (Gross misconduct in office, neglect of duty,
inefficiency)
ISSUES:
- What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must decide its cases?
- Is Circular 10-94 applicable to the Sandiganabayan?
DECISION:
- Impose a P20,000 peso fine on Garchitorena for inefficiency and gross neglect of duty
- To relieve Garchitorena of his powers, functions, and duties as the Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, so that he may devote himself entirely to DECISION WRITING, until
the backlog of cases are fixed.
- To decide/resolve all cases within 3 months of the date of submission
- To order the Sandiganbayan to comply with Circular 10-94.
- That the Sandiganbayan should create internal rules for the distribution of cases so as
not to cause a backlog, and to submit the said internal rules to the SC for approval.
REASON:
- Period to decide/resolve cases:

o First view is that the Sandiganbayan has 12 months to resolve cases, the second
view is that it has only 3 months to decide cases. The Sandiganbayan is a special
court with the same powers as the CA and possesses all the inherent powers of a
court of justice.
o Under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution, “Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
SC.” PD 1606 is clear with this issue, it states: “the trial of cases before the
Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the
judgement shall be rendered within 3 months from the date the case was
submitted for decision.”
- Undecided cases beyond the reglementary period:
o According to the compliance submitted by the Sandiganbayan, they have 341
cases were submitted for decision but were undecided as of September 15, 2000.
o The court has held that a delay of 3 years with deciding a single case is
inexcusably long, thus the SC cannot accept the excuse of Garchitorena that the
Sandiganbayan was reorganized in 1997.
o The court also cannot accept Garchitorena’s excuse that a single case constitutes
50% of the backlog, as said, such a delay in a single case is inexcusable. Thus the
court finds that Garchitorena failed in his duty manage the sppedy and timely
disposition of cases.
- Applicability of SC Adm. Circular 10-94:
o The court reiterates that this circular applies to the Sandiganbayan. Quoting the
admonission of the SC on Oct. 10, 2000: “This court has consistently impressed
upon judges to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that
justice delayed is justice denied. Decision making is the primordial and most
important duty of the member of the bench. Hence, judges are enjoined to
decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency.”
Dissenting Opinion:
De Leon, Jr. J.:
- De Leon dissents with the resolution of the SC insofar as it declares that the decision
making should be done in 3 months not 12 months.
- De Leon states that Circular 10-94 has not reduced the 12 month period mentioned in
Section 15(1) and (2) Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The fact that the Constitution
is the highest law of the land, it must prevail over the Circular.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I 1

PROF. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA

- Should Laureta and Maravilla be held in contempt?

- Maravilla was held in contempt, with a fine of P1,000 pesos.

1. YES. Villarosa was not denied due process.

1. Due Process observed by HRET

2. HRET acted within its powers

Grave abuse of discretion—implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

Under this rule three kinds of votes are considered stray:

3. SC cannot be divested of its power and duty

Concurring and Dissenting—Justice Gonzaga-Reyes:

G.R. No. 152295 July 9, 2002

RADIOWEALTH, INC., petitioner,

FIRESTONE CERAMICS INC., petitioner

G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998.

3) Whether or not NQSRMDC was guilty of forum-shopping.

5 U.S. 137 (Cranch)

2. YES. The laws of the United States afford him remedy.

Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution provides that

Article II, Section 2 further provides that:

He shall commission all the officers of the United States.

G.R. Nos. L-.34161, February 29, 1972.

No. The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner

1. Whether or not there is a justiciable controversy to be resolved?

The constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 2706

G.R. No.L-31685, July 31, 1975

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner

1. Whether or not the creation of Executive Order No. 30 is valid?

G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization

Legal standing of Petitioners

G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner

1. NO. The procedural requirements have been complied with by Congress.

3. NO. It is precluded in the separation of powers.

1) a. What is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” from the House of

SOLICITOR GENERAL, petitioner

Metropolitan Manila Commission = Metropolitan Manila Authority

Subsequently the following developments transpired:

1) Whether or not PD 1605 should supersede over the local enactments.

G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993

DEAN JOSE JOYA, et. al, petitioners

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in

G.R. No. 107921 July 1, 1993

POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.), in his capacity as the consultant of

Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of

NO. The Court declares this petition to be without merit.

G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

NO. The Court finds no merit in the petitions.

G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

G.R. No. 114222 April 6, 1995

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ET AL. petitioner

G.R. No. 118910 July 17, 1995