CIVIL PROCEDURE FINALS CASES

1. St Martin funeral homes vs NLRC, gr 130866

St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, Bienvenido Aricayos
Date: September 16, 1998
DOCTRINE: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NLRC DECISIONS (RULE 65 PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE CA)

FACTS:
Private respondent Bienvenido Aricayos alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin
Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner,
nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for
allegedly misappropriating P38,000 which was intended for paymentby petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner avers that private respondent was not its employee, but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin’s Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, a former overseas contract worker, asked
for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. In January 1996, Amelita’s mother passed away, so
Amelita took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes
and other government fees, though the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made
some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof. As a consequence, the private respondent filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. Unsatisfied, private respondent appealed
to the NLRC contending that the LA erred in holding that he worked as a “volunteer” and not as an employee of St. Martin
Funeral Home.

The NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its
resolution for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari before the SC alleging that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not appeals of NLRC Decisions are to be filed before the SC.

HELD: No, the Supreme Court has concluded that all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to
reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still
follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court
and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 442 (The Labor Code
of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and
warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
It is noted be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court
of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically
referred to therein except, among others, “those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x.” This would
necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet,
under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but
to this Court by necessary implication. The excepting clause provided for in paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7902, contradicts what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions
of the NLRC.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These
cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However,
because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and
Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards wherein they are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other
court for that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an
oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine,
Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court,
but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly
but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on
Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.

The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated,
the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted
could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the
Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction
of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship
speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add
the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier
of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual
findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its
component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major
aspect of constitutional protection to labor. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all
pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition
consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

2. Roquero vs Chancellor of Manila

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Capt. Wilfredo Roquero for the Court under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the order
and decision of the CA on the complaint filed by Abutal.

Wilfredo Roquero is an employee of UP Manila assigned at the PGH as Specia Police Captain. The action filed by Abutal
with the UP Chancellor was Grave Misconduct which occurred during Ms. Abutal’s interview with him. In that incident,
Roquero told Ms. Abutal that if she agreed to be his mistress, he would give her a permanent position which Abutal turned
down. She rejected his proposal but Roquero still demanded sexual favor for which in the preliminary investigation, he
was charged with grave misconduct and was suspended for 90 days from Oct.1, 1999. He was also asked to report to the
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal where his presence was required.

The tribunal was then organized with Atty: Zaldy Dopcena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara. Atty Paul Flor as University
Prosecutor who was replaced bny Atty. Asteria Felicen. Roquero had a Pao lawyer as Counsel, Atty Leo Lee.
Only one witness was presented by the prosecution that of Abutal. After the completion of the cross exam, it was agreed
that a Formal Offer of Evidence was to be submitted on or before July 16, 1999. The prosecution failed to submit is Formal
Offer of Evidence within the agreed time.

On Aug. 10, 1999 when the case was called only Roquero and counsel were present. Atty Flor called Atty Docena to reset
case on Aug. 11 and 21, 1999 yet no representative appeared from the prosecution only Roquero and Counsel. Atty
Docena issued an order that the hearing was set for Sept. 29, 1999 and should there be any party who fails to appear, the
case will be submitted for resolution based on the evidences obtained on the record of the case On Aug. 11, representative
from prosecution failed to appear.

On October 22, 1999, Roquero filed for motion thru counsel praying the private respondent be declared to have waived
her rights to formal offer within the given period of 15 days from Jul1 1-16, 1999.

For almost 5 years, the ADT (Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal) never acted on Motion. Due to unreasonable delay,
petitioner on 19 May 2001 filed another Motion asking for the dismissal of the administrative case against him. The
Motion to dismiss was based on:
1) That the prosecution had not formally offered its evidence and the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed in
Oct. 212, 1999.
2) The unfounded charges in the administrative case were filed to harass him
3) He is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the case.

On May 26, 2004 the prosecution represented by Atty Felicen due to Atty Flor’s resignation in Aug. 1999 filed its
comment/opposition of the motion to dismiss. The prosecution alleged that the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
was filed on June 24, 2004 and a copy was received by counsel of petitioner on Jan. 30, 2004. Due to Atty Flor’s resignation
in Aug. after his leave in July, no one could prepare the Formal Offer with the transcript of stenographic notes not
submitted by the stenographer who was in and out of the hospital. On July 8, 2004 Atty Docena denied the motion to
dismiss. Instead an order was issued for failure of Roquero to file his comments on the Prosecution’s Formal Offer of
Evidence, the exhibits by prosecution are admitted for the purpose of which is offered. Roquero was ordered to present
his evidence on June 22, 2004. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but was denied on Nov. 9, 2004.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that therein ADT committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against him. On May 22,
2007 the Court of Appeals denied the petition with prayer for TRO reasoning that the ADT committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed orders.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ADT gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the order
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against him.

RULING: Yes. ADT admitted the Formal Offer of Evidence of Abutal filed for almost 5 years violated the constitutional right
of Roquero to a speedy disposition of cases.

The doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether the right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are: 1) length of delay 2) reason for the delay 3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

The violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following: 1) the delay for
almost five years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner which resolution petitioner reasonably found
necessary before he could present his defense 2) the unreasonableness of the delay and 3) the timely assertions by
petitioner of the right to early disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss over and above this. The delay was
prejudicial to petitioner’s cause as he was under preventive suspension for 90 days and during the time of almost five
years, the trial of the accused remained stagnant at the prosecution staff.

The Constitution guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases and was intended to stem the tide of
disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The
administration of justice may not only be done in an orderly manner that accord with the established rules of procedure
but must also be promptly decided to better service the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders
the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and various legislations inutile.

Petition is GRANTED. The assailed order dated 20 March 2007 and Resolution dated Feb 1, 2008 of the CA reversed and
set aside. The ADT of UP Manila are hereby ordered to Dismiss the Administrative Case vs. Roquero for violating the
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

3. Spouses Afulugencia vs Metrobank

SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA vs METROBANK
715 SCRA 399
DOCTRINE: Section 6,1 Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a party not served with written interrogatories
may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal." The
provision seeks to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain order and facilitate the conduct
of trial.
FACTS:
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction
sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
(Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the RTC of Malolos City. With the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners
filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and
testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-
chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial
foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being
a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and
pro forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse
parties – may not be compelled to appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served
with written interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to
be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.
On October 19, 2006, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the defective notice was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s
Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to notice. They further argued that Metrobank’s officers – who are the subject
of the subpoena – are not party-defendants, and thus do not comprise the adverse party; they are individuals separate
and distinct from Metrobank.
In an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, Metrobank insisted that since a corporation may act only through its
officers and employees, they are to be considered as adverse parties in a case against the corporation itself.
The RTC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration prompting them to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
asserting this time that their Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum is not a litigated motion; it
does not seek relief, but aims for the issuance of a mere process. They added that Rule 21 of the Rules requires prior
notice and hearing only with respect to the taking of depositions. Finally, petitioners claimed that the Rules – particularly
Section 10,22 Rule 132 – do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.
The CA affirmed the assailed decision.

ISSUE:
WON an adverse party can be required to take the witness stand (Sec. 6 of Rule 25) without complying with the notice
and hearing requirement under Sec. 4 and 5 of Rule 15

RULING: NO. On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing
was thus cured by the filing of the Opposition.

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with
written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition
pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order
and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the
adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party
to the witness stand as its witness.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses,
and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is tantamount
to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners,
not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank
may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.

4. Napocor vs Malapascua, gr 211731

Napocor vs Sps. Conchita Malapascua-Milijan and Lazaro Milijan,
GR No. 211731, Dec. 7, 2016
DOCTRINE: Actual taking of the property is the reckoning period in the payment of just compensation

FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) sought to expropriate a 3,907-square-meter portion of a property owned by the
Spouses Conchita Malapascua-Malijan and Lazaro Malijan (the Spouses Malijan) located at Barangay San Felix, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas and covered by Tax Declaration No. 15032. An expropriation case was, therefore, filed with the RTC, Branch 6 of
Tanauan City, Batangas.

The Spouses Malijan did not interpose any objection to the expropriation of the property, hence, the sole issue that
needed to be resolved was the determination of the just compensation. In an Order dated August 22, 2007, the RTC
created a Board of Commissioners that would recommend the amount of just compensation. In the Commissioner's
Report submitted by the same Board, the recommended price of the property was P3,500.00 per square meter or a total
amount of Thirteen Million Six Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P13,674,500.00). Such amount of
just compensation was based on the ocular inspection made on the property; the local market condition; and the
standards set in Section 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974. In view of the
presence and proliferation of the several commercial and industrial establishments near the subject property, the
Commissioners found it more prudent and reasonable to appraise the property as commercial or industrial.

NAPOCOR opposed the Board's recommendation for being excessive, unconscionable, exorbitant and without legal basis
and claimed that they entered the subject property in 1972. Based on the provisions of Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the just compensation of the property should be based on the value of the property at the time the taking of the
same or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

The RTC, on February 22, 2008, rendered its Decision denying NAPOCOR's plea that the just compensation be based on
the value of the property in 1972. NAPOCOR elevated the case to the CA and on June 13, 2012, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision in favor of NAPOCOR, and directed the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan City, Batangas, Branch 6, to
immediately determine the just compensation due to appellees Spouses Lazaro and Conchita Malijan based on the fair
market value of the subject property at the time it was taken in 1972 with legal interest at the rate of six (6%) percent
per annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. NAPOCOR however is ORDERED to pay appellees the
amounts of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and P100,00.00 as attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that just compensation be based in 1972 when the subject property
was allegedly taken.

RULING: NO. The Court ruled in the negative.

It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation.

Indeed, the expropriator's action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still
amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of
ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying
its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the
property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.

Thus, there exists no reversible error on the part of the CA when it ruled that just compensation must be computed at the
time of the taking in 1972.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated May 11, 2014 of
Conchita Malapascua-Malijan and Heirs of Lazaro Malijan in G.R. No. 211818 is DENIED for lack of merit, while the Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 dated April 21, 2014 of the National Power Corporation is GRANTED. Consequently,
the Decision dated June 13, 2012 of the Court of Appeals and its subsequent Resolution dated March 12, 2014, reversing
the Decision dated February 22, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tanauan City, Batangas, are AFFIRMED with
the modification that the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees is DELETED.

5. Spouses Augusto Navarro vs Rural Bank of Tarlac. gr 180060

*taken from Rule 48-50 report
FACTS:
Petitioners obtained a loan from the bank in the amount of P558,000.

The Petitioner filed an ordinary appeal under rule 41, instead of a petition under rule 45, when they questioned the
correctness of the decision of the RTC to resolve the dispute through a summary judgment before the CA.

The bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court. It alleged that the only
issue before the trial court was whether the selling price of the vehicle was enough to satisfy the unpaid balance, interest,
and other charges. It argued that a summary judgment was proper, since there was no more genuine issue relating to any
material fact, and that the matter before the court was merely the computation of the remaining balance.

RULING:
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
or an evaluation of the truth or falsity of the facts admitted. Here, the doubt revolves around the correct application of
law and jurisprudence on a certain set of facts or circumstances. The test for ascertaining whether a question is one of
law is to determine if the appellate court can resolve the issues without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Where
there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is
considered a question of law. Conversely, there is a question of fact when doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged information or facts; the credibility of the witnesses; or the relevance of surrounding circumstances
and their relationship to each other.
It is a settled rule that the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or of both law and fact is
best left to the CA, and that all doubts as to the correctness of its conclusions shall be resolved in its favor. We have
nevertheless reviewed its determination and found no reason to disturb its finding that petitioners only raised pure
questions of law in their ordinary appeal before it. The CA did not commit any reversible error when it dismissed Spouses
Navarro's appeal outright.