Citation: Lindahl, Jared, and Travis Chilcott.

"Religious Experiences, Transformative

Section of Review Symposium

Religious Experiences, Transformative Paths, and Religious Goals

Jared Lindahla1 and Travis Chilcotta

ABSTRACT: Though McNamara indicates that his focus is mainly on theistic forms of

religious experience common in the West, it is important to consider how his broadly

stated thesis might be affected by data from traditions other than those that are the focus

of his book. Although he is right to call our attention to the processes through which

religious traditions promote and religious practitioners cultivate experiential states, his

approach is limited by his non-attributional conceptualization of religious experience as

the culmination of one path toward one goal. A more nuanced approach would require

attending more closely to 1) the diversity of ‘experiences’ that religious traditions set

apart as being of particular importance, 2) the diversity of practices that are prescribed as

being efficacious towards the attainment of those experiences, and 3) the dynamic

relationship between individual practitioners and authorities of a religious tradition,

wherein questions of authenticity arise and experiences are deemed ‘religious’ or not.

KEYWORDS: Patrick McNamara, neuroscience, religious experience, path schema

a
Department of Religious Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa
Barbara, CA 93106-3130, USA.
E-mail: Lindahl, [email protected]; Chilcott, [email protected].
1
Present address: Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne, Department of
Philosophy, 2101 E. Coliseum Boulevard, Fort Wayne, IN 46805, USA.
 Patrick McNamara notes in his preface to his book, The Neuroscience of

Religious Experience, that his ‘focus is mainly limited to the theistic forms of religious

experience common in the West,’ with ‘some account of non-Western [and] non-theistic

[…] forms of religious phenomena’ (McNamara, 2009, p. x). While we certainly cannot

fault McNamara for acknowledging the limitations to his knowledge of the diversity of

religious traditions, it is important to consider how the underlying (or overarching) theses

of his project might be reconsidered in light of data from traditions other than those that

are the focus of his book. To this end, we will address what we consider some of the

strengths and weaknesses of McNamara’s understanding of religious experience, his use

of an implicit path schema, which he refers to as ‘the journey,’ and his formulation of the

goal of religious practices.

Religious experience

Throughout his discussion, McNamara seems to take the noun ‘religion’ and the

adjective ‘religious’ for granted. In his study of religious experience, McNamara rightly

diverts our attention from looking for a precise region of the brain to investigating

‘networks’ of brain activity that are the neural basis for ‘religious experience.’ However,

instead of seeking to determine a particular network of the brain associated with religious

experience, it would be more productive to look at the range of phenomena (and their

corresponding brain states, to be sure) that people tend to identify as religious

(McNamara, 2009, p. 13). We should not assume that there is a network in the brain that

produces inherently religious experiences; by contrast, we need to be attentive both to the

process of ascribing religious value to an experience and to the variety of experiences that

traditions deem religious (Taves 2009).

as a ‘subset of a broader range of “ultimacy experiences,”’ which ‘point to ultimate

concerns and elicit our most intense cognitive-emotional-spiritual

engagement/commitment’ (McNamara, 2009, p. 148). In his discussion of the

phenomenological properties of religious experiences, McNamara claims that ‘hundreds

of controlled analyses of the phenomenological properties of so-called religious mystical

practices are characterized by a consistent set of [seventeen] properties,’2 many of which

McNamara argues ‘will be present most of the time when you hear a report of a religious

experience from an ordinary and healthy person.’ Moreover, he claims ‘you tend to get

the whole suite of these experiences in mystical or intense states and only a few of them

in mundane, everyday forms of religious experience’ (McNamara, 2009, p. 16).

We have several issues with this characterization of religious experiences. First,

while we agree in principle with McNamara that ‘reports of religious experience by many

individuals can be sorted and studied using standard scientific and rational approaches,’

he does not cite nor are we aware of the ‘hundreds of controlled analyses of the

phenomenological properties’ from which he argues this set of seventeen is derived

(McNamara, 2009, p. 14).

2
He cites the following properties: 1) ‘unity or a sense of integration,’ 2) ‘transcendence
of time and space,’ 3) ‘deeply felt positive mood,’ 4) ‘a sense of sacredness,’ 5) ‘a noetic
quality,’ 6) ‘paradoxicality or the ability to respectfully hold opposing points of view,’ 7)
‘alleged ineffability,’ 8) ‘transiency of euphoria,’ 9) ‘persisting positive changes in
attitudes and behavior,’ 10) ‘enhanced sense of personal power’ or sense that ‘one has
been specially blessed by God,’ 11) enhanced ‘capacities to accurately guess the mental
states and intentions of others,’ 12) ‘changes in sexual behaviors,’ 13) ‘changes in
reading/writing behaviors,’ 14) ‘enhanced awareness and appreciation of music,’ 15)
‘complex visual and metaphoric imagery,’ 16) ‘ritualization,’ 17) ‘encounter with God or
spirit beings’ (McNamara, 2009, pp. 15-16).
 Second, his list of properties does not adequately account for the variation of

religious experiences across cultures. For example, in some prominent Hindu devotional

traditions the path of practice is understood to culminate in an experience that is

characterized more by anguish and anxiety over separation from the beloved deity than

by a ‘deeply felt positive mood’ or a ‘sense of integration within oneself and with others’

(McNamara, 2009, p. 15). Moreover, McNamara largely ignores the more ‘mundane,

everyday forms of religious experience,’ privileging instead religious experiences that are

claimed to have a profound and positive effect on the religious practitioner. This is

evidenced by his particular interest in experiences that lead to long lasting effects and

personal growth, the reports of which ‘are most reliable in individuals who can be called

“mystics” or in those who undergo a conversion or who rediscover their religious life as

mature adults’ (McNamara, 2009, p. 17). While McNamara does acknowledge that not all

of the properties he associates with religious experience are always present, he neglects to

integrate this insight into a more nuanced definition of religious experience.

Third, while we appreciate McNamara’s attempt to understand and articulate a list

of stable phenomenological characteristics associated with religious experiences, these

characteristics are not inherently religious. Rather, they may also be found in a range of

experiences that people might not consider religious. For example, the experience of a

home team scoring a winning point the last few seconds of a game may give rise to a

feeling of ‘unity’ or sense of ‘integration with others’, a lost sense of or ‘transcendence of

time,’ a ‘deeply felt positive mood,’ a ‘transient’ state of ‘euphoria,’ and an ‘enhanced

sense of personal power’ or feeling of specialness; or a graduate student may experience

a profound ‘feeling of insight’ while analyzing the influence of historical and contextual
factors on the development of a religious tradition or sociological phenomenon that

results in a sustained and ‘enhanced interest in writing.’ While many of the experiential

properties that McNamara ascribes to religious experiences ‘will be present most of the

time when you hear a report of religious experience,’ it is important to recognize that they

may also be found in a range of experiences for which people do not necessarily ascribe

religious value. That is to say, they are not exclusively religious.

Religious paths and their goals

McNamara rightly suggests that ‘there are regular patterns in religious

transformation’ that comprise ‘a kind of journey’ (McNamara, 2009, p. 17). It is often the

case that religious traditions prescribe practices or behaviors that are intended to promote

self-transformation in pursuit of or as part of religious goals. Attending to the similarities

and differences of these transformations in the context of a path structure is a potentially

very useful way of considering the significance of religious practices and resultant

experiences cross-culturally. Religious paths, like other paths, share a similar structure

insofar as they involve movement from one point to another. They do not, however,

always involve the same kinds of experiences or lead to the same destination (Buswell

and Gimello, 1992; Taves, 2009). McNamara, however, neglects the differences between

various religious paths and instead puts forth a theory of the transformative path that

attends to a singular pattern oriented towards a specific goal that he argues is common

across traditions. It is here in McNamara’s attempt to chart the trajectory of this path, or

‘journey,’ that the Western Christian bias of his theory is most apparent. He articulates

this trajectory as a ‘God-Self relationship journey’ during which the practitioner

undergoes sequential stages of ‘infatuation, bliss, and love,’ followed by ‘a period of

freedom, peace, tranquility, vibrancy, contentment, generosity […], patience […] and a

quiet determination to do “God’s Will.”’ Moreover, ‘throughout the journey, there may

be experiences of ineffable happiness and joys when one experiences a kind of

forgetfulness or dissolution of Self and a corresponding union with God’ (McNamara,

2009, pp. 17-18).

McNamara presents us with a structure in which one path leads to one goal: the

unification of the divided self and the ‘linking up’ to an ideal self through the efforts of

the executive self. He writes: ‘I contend that the goal of religious practices is the

strengthening of this executive Self. Religion creates this executive Self by providing an

ideal Self towards which the individual can strive and with which the individual can

evaluate the current Self’ (McNamara, 2009, p. 41). That many religious practices are

about self-transformation is a reasonable claim. But McNamara goes on to suggest the

following:

Religion is required to help build a Self that is capable of choosing the good and

the appropriate over long periods of time. The Self can choose the true and the

good by aiming at an ideal Self, ultimately God. Religion helps the Self attain to

or become the ideal Self (McNamara, 2009, p. 41).

This characterization of both ‘religion’ and the transformative path is premised upon an

individualistic path structure in which the goal is necessarily an ideal self that can be

identified if not with God than with a Platonic ‘good’ that affords particular advantages in

terms of behavior, mood, or cognitive development (see, McNamara, 2009, pp. 15-17).

Formulated in this way, McNamara’s theory of religious experience draws heavily and
quite obviously from Christianity. Because of his indebtedness to Christian figures like

St. John of the Cross and St. Thomas Aquinas (McNamara, 2009, pp. 18, 39-43),

McNamara has taken a culturally specific path structure and extrapolated a general theory

of ‘religion’ and ‘religious experience.’ It is not surprising, then, that this schema would

not provide a sufficient explanatory model for other religious contexts.

McNamara’s discussion of the journey also suffers from overemphasizing

‘mystical experiences’ and the positive qualities associated with those states as the

singular goal of the religious path. This limits the utility of his path structure for the study

of other religious traditions in two significant ways: first, it employs a culturally specific

theological framework that can not accommodate emic understandings of the

transformative path in other traditions and second, it does not facilitate discussion of the

wide range of goals within and across religious traditions that could otherwise be

meaningfully discussed with the interpretive framework of a path structure.

However, we can still preserve the notion of the path or journey, while

articulating it in such a way that it facilitates cross-cultural and comparative analysis.

Paths articulated in other traditions, however, such as those found in Buddhist, Daoist,

and various Hindu traditions, for instance, do not conceive of the goal as a union of the

self with God. For example, the goal of meditation for many Tibetan Buddhists is the

realization that the ‘self’—along with all other phenomena—is an illusory conceptual

construct that lacks inherent existence of its own. They do hold that this knowledge is

valuable in shaping the tradition’s understanding of an ‘ideal self,’ but they would never

associate the ideal self with God. Furthermore, in various Hindu devotional traditions, the

final stage of the practitioner’s journey would be better characterized by fits of ecstasy,
periods of agonizing longing, and devotional obsession than ‘a long period of quiet joy,’

‘patience,’ and ‘contentment.’ Nor should we assume that every path is structured around

a purificatory stage that leads to the cultivation of positive qualities. For example, certain

Tantric traditions promote a transformative path wherein practitioners engage in a variety

of ritual practices that practitioners of other traditions would see as deeply ‘polluting.’

Nor are the goals of these practices always the cultivation of positive qualities associated

with the good and the ‘ideal self’; rather, their aim is often pleasure, bodily immortality,

and worldly power. Thus, McNamara’s discussion of the journey suffers on account of

being entirely too culturally specific, and too specifically Christian, to hold as a theory of

‘religious experience’ that works for the cultural diversity of religious traditions.

When implementing a path structure in the study of religion, it is also important

to attend to the diversity of goals that may inform religious practices. For example, for

lay Buddhists in Tibet, the practice of pilgrimage—which involves a variety of ritual

offerings, prayers, and prostrations while circumambulating a sacred site, such as a

mountain—is oriented not towards the attainment of enlightenment or even the

cultivation of virtues, but rather to the accruing of positive merit in order to ensure a

better rebirth. Or, in the case of Hindu traditions, practitioners engage in rituals to

achieve a variety of goals. These can range in purpose from getting a good spouse or

healthy child to attaining magical powers to achieving various forms of liberation to

counteracting mistakes in other rituals. As scholars of a diverse array of cultural practices

that are associated with ‘religion,’ we need an interpretive framework that allows us to

investigate the path structure in a variety of contexts. In so doing, we need also to

recognize that just as there is not one goal, so too there is not one path. Across traditions,
we can find a wide range of practices advocated as being efficacious towards similar

goals; and within traditions, there are frequently important debates on which practices are

the most efficacious (or efficacious at all) in attaining a commonly shared goal.

In summary, McNamara is right to call our attention to the processes through

which religious traditions promote and religious practitioners cultivate experiential states.

However, this is best achieved by taking a closer look at 1) the diversity of ‘experiences’

that religious traditions set apart as being of particular importance, 2) the diversity of

practices that are prescribed as being efficacious towards the attainment of those

experiences, and 3) the dynamic relationship between individual practitioners and

authorities of a religious tradition, wherein questions of authenticity arise and experiences

are deemed ‘religious’ or not.

References

Buswell, R.E., Gimello, R.M., eds., 1992. Paths to Liberation: The marga and its

transformations in Buddhist thought. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

McNamara, R., 2009. The Neuroscience of Religious Experience. Cambridge University

Press, New York.

Taves, A., 2009. Religious Experience Reconsidered: A building-block approach to the

study of religion and other special things. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Wildman, W.J., Brothers, L.A., 1999. A neuropsychological-semiotic model of religious

experiences: in Russell, R.J. et al., eds., Neuroscience and the Person. Center for

Theology and the Natural Sciences, Berkeley, CA.

Jared Lindahl received his Ph.D. in Religious Studies from the University of California

at Santa Barbara in August 2010 and is presently Visiting Assistant Professor at Indiana
University-Purdue University Fort Wayne. His research focuses on the doctrines,

practices, and experiences of light in Greek Orthodox Christian and Tibetan Buddhist

traditions.

Travis Chilcott is currently completing his PhD in Religious Studies at the University of

California at Santa Barbara with specializations in South Asian Religious traditions, the

study of religious experiences, and cognitive science of religion. His current research

focuses on the relationship between religious practices and beliefs, cognition, and the

generation of experiences considered religious in the context of medieval Hindu

devotional traditions.