ConstruCtion subContraCting A Comprehens PDF
ConstruCtion subContraCting A Comprehens PDF
ConstruCtion subContraCting A Comprehens PDF
Subcontracting
Editors
339
I. Introduction
Although subcontracting on a public project is in many ways the same as on
any other project, there are some important legal differences. The most signif-
icant of these differences are discussed below. Further complicating matters
are the many differences among federal, state, and local governments’ require-
ments. While it would not be possible to list in this chapter every approach
taken by every jurisdiction, the most prevalent and significant approaches
that impact subcontracting on public projects are included.
1. For further discussion, see chapter 14. See also, e.g., CD 752, Standard Subcontract
Agreement for Use on Federal Construction Projects, § 9.3.
2. For further discussion, see chapter 12.
3. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Miller v. Mattingly Bridge Co., 344 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.
Ky. 1972); W.T. Andrew Co. v. Mid-State Sur. Corp., 221 Mich. App. 438 (1997), aff’d, 461
Mich. 628 (2000); A.C. Legnetto Constr., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.Y.2d 275 (Ct.
App. 1998); T&R Dragline Serv., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1986); L. Suzio
341
Concrete Co. v. New Haven Tobacco, Inc., 28 Conn. App. 622 (1992); James J. O’Rourke, Inc.
v. Indus. Nat’l Bank of R.I., 478 A.2d 195 (1984).
4. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 3133 (former 40 U.S.C. § 270b); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3247–3252.
For further discussion, see chapter 14.
5. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3148 (former 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a–276a-5); Cal. Lab.
Code § 1770, et seq. For further discussion, see chapter 12.
6. FAR 3.502-1, 19.701, 44.101, 52.244-2(a); 48 C.F.R. § 44.101; see also Richmond
Eng’g Co., IBCA No. 426-2-64, 64 BCA ¶ 4465 (Oct. 1, 1964).
7. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq.; Mont. Code Ann. § 18-2-401, et seq.; Or. Rev.
Stat. 279C § 800, et seq.; Alaska Stat. § 30.910.
8. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-222, 34-223, 34-224; Ala. Code § 39-1-1;
Alaska Stat. § 36.25.010; Cal. Pub. Cont. Code §§ 10220–10232; 30 Ill. Comp. Stat. 550;
N.Y. Fin. Law § 9-137; see also 5 Steven G. Stein, Construction Law § 17.03 (2013) (dis-
cussing the Little Miller Acts and some of the differences among them).
9. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Garrett Corp., 437 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Md. 1977), aff’d,
601 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1979); Wallace Process Piping Co. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 251 F.
Supp. 411 (E.D. Va. 1965).
law and regulations, such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),10 may
preempt state law. A few courts have analyzed the question and chosen appli-
cable law based on the degree to which the outcome of the case will affect the
interest of the federal government.11 While a few courts have held that federal
common law governs the interpretation of a subcontract on a federal project,12
most decisions have, without discussion, applied state law.13 A rare exception
is when the federal government orders the prime to assign its subcontract to
the government and sues the subcontractor; in such cases, courts are apt to
apply federal law.14 Due to courts’ inconsistency in determining what law
applies to subcontracts under government prime contracts,15 many prime con-
tractors include a choice-of-law clause in their standard form of subcontract,
which incorporates federal contract law as the primary source, with a speci-
fied state law as backup in the absence of relevant federal law.16
V. Competitive Bidding
Competitive bidding has been and continues to be the cornerstone of the
method by which a public entity procures construction contracts. The con-
struction of public buildings, utilities, roadways, bridges, and other structures
is usually governed by a well-defined contractual process of competitive bid-
ding. The primary purpose of competitive bidding is to protect the public
against the misuse of public funds and prevent abuses such as fraud, collu-
sion, and favoritism.17
The public entity’s award of a construction contract to a prime contractor is
ordinarily regulated by statute or constitutional provision, and the prescribed
method must be followed. Although the requirement for public bidding does
not apply to all projects, if the project requires a significant expenditure of
public funds, government entities usually must use a bidding process. In the
awarding of construction contracts, the public entity invites prime contrac-
tors to submit bids. A prime contractor’s bid must substantially and materially
conform to the details contained in the bid specifications—generally referred
to as the “responsiveness” requirement.18 Failure to substantially comply with
the bid requirements will result in rejection of the bid as nonresponsive. The
other key component to public bidding is that the bid must be submitted by a
“responsible” contractor, which generally relates to the contractor’s ability to
perform the work.19
The traditional “design-bid-build” project delivery method—in which
the public entity provides a detailed, complete design, puts it out to bid, and
awards the contract to the lowest responsive bid—continues to be the primary
method of awarding public construction contracts. Through federal, state, and
local legislation, however, other project delivery methods have been autho-
rized, including design-build contracts, whereby the public entity provides
the general design intent and performance standards rather than a complete
design, and prime contractors’ bids include the cost of completing the design
to deliver the finished project.20
17. See, e.g., John C. Grimberg Co. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1297, 1300–01 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Konica Bus. Machs. USA, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. App. 3d 449, 456–57
(1988); Datatrol Inc. v. State Purchasing Agent, 379 Mass. 679 (1980).
18. See, e.g., B-G Mech. Serv., Inc., B-265782, 96-1 CPD ¶ 6; Bishop Contractors, Inc.,
B-246526, 91-2 CPD ¶ 555; Tropabest Foods, Inc. v. State Dept. of Gen. Svcs., 493 So. 2d 50
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Transit Team, Inc. v. Metro. Council, 679 N.W.2d 390 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2004); AT&T Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nassau, 214 A.D.2d 666 (N.Y. 1995); Smith & John-
son Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 134 Ohio App. 3d 521 (1998); Valley Crest Land-
scape v. City Council, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1432, 1442 (1996); Ghilotti Constr. Co. v. City of
Richmond, 45 Cal. App. 4th 897, 906 (1996).
19. See, e.g., John C. Grimberg Co., 185 F.3d at 1300–01; Great W. Contractors, Inc. v.
Irvine Unified Sch. Dist., 187 Cal. App. 4th 1425, 1450–51 (2010); D.H. Williams Constr., Inc.
v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 146 Cal. App. 4th 757, 763 (2007).
20. For a discussion of alternative project delivery, see chapter 18.
24. Alaska Stat. § 36.30.115; Ark. Code Ann. § 22-9-204; Cal. Pub. Cont. Code
§ 4104; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4b-93; Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 6962; Fla. Stat. § 255.0515; Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 103D-302; Idaho Code Ann. § 67-2310; Iowa Code § 8A.311(15); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 75-3741; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38:2212; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 44A; Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 338.141); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 40A:11-16; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-34; N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law
§ 101; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-128; Or. Rev. Stat. § 279C.370; S.C. Code Ann. § 11-35-3020;
Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-119; Utah Code Ann. § 63A-5-208; Wash. Rev. Code § 39.30.060;
W. Va. Code § 5-22-1; Wis. Stat. § 66.0901; see also Sean Calvert, Preference Programs in
Public Projects: The Future Is Now (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/directories/construction_industry_knowledge_base/dp_plenary_2_2.authcheckdam
.pdf.
25. Cal. Pub. Cont. Code § 4104(a)(1).
26. See statutes cited in note 24.
27. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Cont. Code § 4104(a)(1) (requiring listing of only the “name
and location of the place of business”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:11-16(b) (no requirement for
subcontract amount).
1. Typical Features
Disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) programs target specific subcon-
tractor groups that may not have the economic ability on their own to par-
ticipate in large construction projects. Among the types of subcontractors that
participate in these programs are businesses that are small, women owned,
minority owned, veteran owned, or service-disabled-veteran owned, located
in economically distressed areas, local, or combinations thereof.30 Some
programs result in artificially lowering a DBE prime contractor’s bid price
through credits or incentives, which increases the likelihood the DBE prime
contractor will submit the winning bid. Other programs require the prime
contractors as part of the bidding process to reach out to small or DBE sub-
contractors to encourage their participation. To participate in these programs,
the subcontractors and suppliers typically must be certified by the governing
agency or meet specific qualifications.
2. Federal Programs
The federal government has developed a variety of programs to provide bet-
ter opportunities to small and disadvantaged businesses.
28. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Cont. Code § 4107; Utah Code Ann. § 208(3)(d).
29. See, e.g., Finney Co. v. Monarch Constr. Co., 670 S.W.2d 857, 858, 863 (Ky. 1984).
30. See, e.g., FAR 19.702 (small business); Ala. Code § 39-3-5 (resident bidder); Cal.
Gov’t Code § 7118; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 1896.6 (small business); Fla. Admin. Code
Ann. r. 25-25.025 (minority-owned company); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-28-2930(F) (disadvan-
taged ethnic minority or women owned).
or subcontracts for property and services for the Government (including con-
tracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) are placed
with small business concerns.”31 A small-business concern is defined as “one
which is independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its
field of operation.”32
The SBA’s eligibility requirements vary by industry. In the construction
industry, eligibility is based on annual receipts (rather than number of employ-
ees as in other industries). The eligibility requirements also vary among dif-
ferent areas of construction. For example, the SBA’s eligibility requirements
differ for subcontractors performing “Construction of Buildings” than for
“Specialty Trade Contractors.”33
31. Irving Maness, The Emergence of the Current Interest in the Defense Small Business
and Labor Surplus Area Subcontracting Programs, 18 Mil. L. Rev. 119 (1962) (citing 75 Stat. 666
(1961), 15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. 111, 1962)).
32. 72 Stat. 384 (1958); 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1958).
33. 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, sector 23.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 695, et seq.
35. 13 C.F.R. § 124.101.
36. 13 C.F.R. § 124.104(c)(2).
37. 13 C.F.R. § 124.107.
38. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.1001–.1014.
SDB program is currently higher than that for the 8(a) program—$750,000 as
opposed to $250,000.39 Additionally, unlike the Section 8(a) program, the indi-
vidual does not have to meet the same standards for reasonable prospects of
business.
39. 13 C.F.R. § 123.1002(c) (for SDB); 13 C.F.R. § 124.104(2) (for Section 8(a)).
40. 13 C.F.R. § 126.100.
41. Pub. L. No. 105-135 (Dec. 2, 1997).
42. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.200 (different requirements apply to certain identified groups).
43. 13 C.F.R. §§ 125.8–.10; 13 C.F.R. pt. 127; 13 C.F.R. § 124.520; 49 C.F.R. pt. 26.
44. FAR 19.702, 52.219-9.
In order to meet its contract obligations to the government, the prime con-
tractor must flow down these requirements to its subcontractors.50 Similar
requirements are contained in the federal Trade Agreements Act and Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.51
45. FAR 19.704. The SBA’s various small disadvantaged business programs, such as
Section 8(a), HUBZones, and others, are located in title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
46. FAR 52.219-9(d)(9). See, e.g., CD 752, § 12.9.
47. 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a–10d.
48. FAR 52.225-9(b)(1).
49. FAR 52.225-9(b)(3)(i)–(iii).
50. CD 752, § 3.7.2.
51. 19 U.S.C. § 2501, et seq.; Pub. L. No. 111-5.
In every state agency, department and authority which has let more
than ten million dollars in service and construction contracts in the
prior fiscal year, the chief executive officer of that agency, department
or authority shall develop a mentor-protégé program to foster long-term
relationships between approved mentor firms, and small business con-
cerns and minority and women-owned businesses certified pursuant
to article fifteen-A of the executive law, in order to enhance the capa-
bilities of small and minority and women-owned business concerns,
improve their success in contracting with the state or receiving subcon-
tracts under a state contract, and to create sources of reliable contractors
and subcontractors ready to perform larger jobs and responsibilities.53
to advise and assist in obtaining bonds, credit, and insurance for the MBEs,
WBEs, and OBEs.54
C. Bid Protests
In a competitive bid, it is not uncommon for the presumptive low bidder’s bid
to be challenged. The challenge usually comes from the bidder next in line for
the award but can come from other bidders if there is a basis to challenge each
of the bids above. Additionally, if the bid fails to comply with the material
requirements of the invitation for bids, the public entity may determine the
bid “nonresponsive” on its own.
The presumptive low bidder ordinarily is entitled to reasonable notice
and a hearing prior to rejection of its bid. Additionally, unsuccessful bidders
can protest the public entity’s determination of the winning bid through the
administrative process, typically set forth in the invitation for bids. In many
jurisdictions, if unsuccessful in protesting the proposed award, the unsuc-
cessful bidder can initiate a lawsuit for an injunction to prevent the award.
The subcontractor generally does not fall into the category of those that
have standing to submit a protest and challenge the award of the prime con-
tract. Moreover, except for very limited circumstances, the subcontractor
cannot protest the prime contractor’s award of a subcontract to another sub-
contractor. For example, the federal Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)
54. L.A. City Charter, Office of the Mayor, Exec. Directive No. 2001-26 (2001), http://
bca.lacity.org/site/pdf/soe/Executive%20Directive%202001-26.pdf.
55. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
56. Ritchey Produce Co. v. State Dep’t of Admin. Servs., 707 N.E.2d 871, 928 (Ohio
1999) (re: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 125.081).
57. Rex Paving Corp. v. White, 531 N.Y.S.2d 831, 839 (App. Div. 1988).
limits its definition of “interested parties” that may protest a federal contract
award to actual or prospective bidders,58 and the Government Accountability
Office, which hears many federal bid protests, states in its rules that it “will
not consider a protest of the award or proposed award of a subcontract except
where the agency awarding the prime contract has requested in writing that
subcontract protests be decided. . . .”59 There have been a few state court deci-
sions allowing subcontractors to protest subcontract awards,60 but these are
exceptions to the general rule.
In some cases, the subcontractor’s qualifications may be the issue being
protested. For example, the protest may concern reduced scoring or dis-
qualification of the portion of the prime’s bid due to the subcontractor’s lack
of required qualifications or certifications. In those cases, the subcontrac-
tor should, and often will, play an active role in support of the prime’s bid.
Finally, because public contracts are matters of public interest, some jurisdic-
tions allow citizen suits or taxpayer suits to contest proposed contract awards;
in those jurisdictions, a subcontractor for a disappointed bidder may have
standing to bring such suits.61
B. Government-Directed Subcontractors
While the regulations are not clear, it is likely that the federal government
may direct the prime contractor to use a specific subcontractor when there
is a compelling justification for doing so.64 A number of federal tribunals
have adopted the view that when the government, as the owner, designates
a particular subcontractor as a sole source, the government necessarily war-
rants the performance by that subcontractor.65 At least one federal tribunal
(the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals) has chosen not to follow this
view, finding that the government warrants only that the source exists and
has the ability to produce the product, not that it will do so without defect.66
64. See Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Def., Audit Report D-2000-129, Air
Force Contract for Installation of Radios and Antennae (May 22, 2000); U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, GAO-04-206, Satellite Communications—Strategic Approach
Needed for DoD’s Procurement of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth (2003).
65. Franklin E. Penny Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 668 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Kaplan Con-
tractors, Inc., GSBCA 2747, 70-2 BCA ¶ 8511; Electro-Nav, Inc., DCAB No. NOAA-1-74, 75-1
BCA ¶ 11,162; Engineered Sys., Inc., B-184098, 76-1 CPD ¶ 144.
66. Salisbury Special Tool Co., ASBCA 37530, 89-2 BCA ¶ 21,838.
67. FAR 52.233-1. For further discussion of subcontractor claims, see chapter 8.
68. See section X.
69. See, e.g., CD 752, §§ 3.5, 7.1–7.7.
C. Pass-Through Claims
1. Where Allowed
Generally, pass-through claims are allowed for subcontractor claims on federal
construction projects.77 Most states that have considered pass-through claims
have allowed them. For example, in Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dal-
las, a Texas court allowed such a claim, finding that 18 of 19 states that have
70. FAR 49.108-8, 52.249-2(b)(4); see also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943); United States v. Taylor, 333 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1964). For discussion of termina-
tions, see chapter 9.
71. Nw. Bank Ariz., NA v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 605, 610 (1997); K&S Elec., Inc.,
ASBCA 30759, 85-2 BCA ¶ 18,088.
72. Topco, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Highways, 912 P.2d 805 (Mont. 1996).
73. Winter v. Floorpro, Inc., 570 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (theory recognized but claim
not allowed); D&H Distrib. Co. v. United States, 102 F.3d 542 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (claim allowed).
74. See, e.g., Lake Cnty. Grading Co. v. Antioch, 935 N.E.2d 638 (Ill. 2013); Electrical
Electronic Control, Inc. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 126 Cal. App. 4th 601 (2005).
75. See, e.g., Imperial Mfg. Ice Cold Coolers, Inc. v. Shannon, 101 P.3d 627 (Alaska
2004); O&G Indus., Inc. v. Town of New Milford, 640 A.2d 110 (Conn. 1994).
76. Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 264 (1999).
77. E.R. Mitchell Constr. Co. v. Danzig, 175 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999); J.L. Simmons
Co. v. United States, 304 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435
(1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 733 (1944).
2. Severin Doctrine
From the 1943 decision in Severin v. United States emerged a substantial limita-
tion on the ability of the subcontractor to pass through its claim to the public
entity. Known commonly as the Severin doctrine, it provides that unless the
subcontractor has a valid recoverable claim against the prime contractor, the
prime contractor cannot pass through the subcontractor’s claim, even when
the subcontractor’s damages result from the action or inaction of the public
entity. In the Severin case, the prime contractor brought suit against the project
owner for recovery of both its damages and the damages claimed by its sub-
contractor. The court allowed recovery for the prime contractor but disallowed
recovery for the subcontractor’s portion of the claim, reasoning that, since the
subcontract provided that the prime would not be liable to the subcontractor
for any “loss, damage, detention or delay caused by the owner,” there was no
liability to pass through to the government.80
The Severin doctrine has been limited by later cases. The government now
has the burden to show that the sponsoring contractor has no liability to the
subcontractor that is making the claim. A contingent liability (to pay over
sums recovered) is usually sufficient to defeat the government’s defense.81
3. Procedure
Typically the prime contractor and subcontractor enter into a liquidating agree-
ment wherein the prime contractor takes on the obligation to pursue the sub-
contractor’s claims against the owner. In exchange for sponsoring the claim,
the prime contractor often negotiates a limit to its liability. This may entail a
waiver of other claims unrelated to the pass-through claim and/or a limit of
the recovery on the pass-through claim to the amount received from the public
owner. Due to the Severin doctrine, it is important for the liquidating agree-
ment to state that the subcontractor retains its right to recover against the prime
contractor, at least for those sums recovered from the owner. This will help to
avoid the harsh results suffered by the subcontractor in Severin and its progeny.
82. See generally Aaron P. Silberman, False Claims Issues in Subcontracting, Briefing
Papers, 2d Series, July 2006.
83. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733; see Thompson Pac. Constr., Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale, 155
Cal. App. 4th 525 (2007); United States ex rel. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 38
v. C.W. Roen Constr. Co., 183 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Perry v. Hooker
Creek Asphalt & Paving, LLC, No. 08-6307-HO, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144522 (D. Or. Dec.
13, 2011); United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
84. For a link to 29 states’ false claims laws, go to False Claims Act Resource Center,
http://www.falseclaimsact.com/states-municipalities-fcas. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code
§ 12650 (state and local); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32C-1; N.Y. State Fin., art. 13, §§ 187–194 (state
and local); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1201, et seq. (retrieved June 6, 2013); D.C. Code § 2-308.14,
et seq. (1986); Fla. Stat. § 68.081 (1994); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 661-21, et seq.; 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.
§ 175, et seq. (1992); Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5, et seq. (2005); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:437.1, et seq.
(1997); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 5, et seq. (2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 17-8-401 (2005); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 357.010, et seq. (1999); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-1, et seq. (1978); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 4-18-101, et seq. (2001) (state and local); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-216.1, et seq. (2002).
85. N.Y.C. Local Law 34 of 2012 (amended Local Law 53 of 2005); Chi. Ill., Mun.
Code §§ 1-21-010 to -22-060 (2005); D.C. False Claims Act § 2-308.14 (retrieved June 6, 2013).
86. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(A)(1)(a), (b) (amended 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A),
(B)); Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12651(a)(1); D.C. Code § 2-308.14(a)(1); Fla. Stat. § 68.082(2)(a).
87. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610 (6th Cir.
2006), vacated and remanded by Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S.
662 (2008) (Court ruling concluded that a defendant itself must intend that the government
itself pay the claim and thereby excluded subcontractors from liability where evidence only
showed that they intended to defraud the general contractor); see also Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 1617 (enacted May 20, 2009)
(Congress amending 31 U.S.C. § 3729 in response to Supreme Court ruling by siding with
the Sixth Circuit; changes the definition of “knowingly” and expands the definition of
claim used in the FCA to ensure that the definition is more in line with the intent of the
law); United States v. Sequel Contractors, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150–51 (C.D. Cal.
2005); City of Pomona v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 4th 793, 795 (2001).
88. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12650(b)(2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
12, § 5A(a); N.Y. State Fin. Law, art. 13, §§ 187–194; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32C-1.
89. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12651(a)(3).
90. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12651(a)(8); D.C. Code § 2-308.14(a)(8); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
12, § 5B(9); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 357.040(1)(h).
91. See, e.g., Armenta ex rel. City of Burbank v. Mueller Co., 142 Cal. App. 4th 636 (2006).
92. See, e.g., Lamb Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 106, 110 (2003).
93. See, e.g., id.; Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Lockheed
Martin Corporation Reaches $15.85 Million Settlement with U.S. to Resolve False Claims
Act Allegations (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/12-civ-367
.html (settlement reached in case where subcontractor inflated cost; government sued
prime contractor for reckless and inadequate oversight).
94. See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 793 (4th Cir.
1999); Sequel Contractors, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1150–51; United States ex rel. Ervin &
Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton Secs. Grp., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 18, 41 n.12 (D.D.C. 2005); United
States ex rel. Wilkins v. N. Am. Constr. Corp. (Wilkins I), 101 F. Supp. 2d 500, 523–24 (S.D.
Tex. 2000).
Other common ways in which a prime contractor may violate false claims
laws based on its subcontracting include false certification that it has paid
its subcontractors and false certifications of its subcontracting with disad-
vantaged business entities. Under many public contracts, and in some juris-
dictions under prompt payment statutes, the prime expressly or impliedly
certifies that it has promptly paid its subcontractors.95 If a prime has not done
so and submits a request for payment, it may violate the false claims law.96
Likewise, many public projects require use of DBEs or give bid preferences
based on DBE utilization.97 If a prime contractor falsely certifies in its bid that
it will utilize a DBE subcontractor and that certification qualifies the prime
for award or, due to application of bid preferences, puts it ahead of other bid-
ders for a public contract, it may have tainted the entire contract.98 Under the
“fraud in the inducement” theory of false claims liability, the prime may be
liable for multiple violations of the false claims laws for all requests for pay-
ment it submits under that contract.99
If a prime or subcontractor violates a false claims law, it will be liable for
the government’s actual damages, tripled (“trebled”), and a penalty for each
violation.100 The penalty amount varies by jurisdiction.101 When the violation is
committed by the subcontractor, an issue arises concerning how to count viola-
tions for the calculation of penalties. The question is which governs: the num-
ber of requests the subcontractor makes to the prime or the number the prime
95. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3901; CD 752, § 8.1; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7108.5. For
further discussion, see chapter 4.
96. See, e.g., Lamb Eng’g, 58 Fed. Cl. at 110; United States ex rel. Told v. Comtrol, Inc.,
No. 2:02CV593DAK, 2005 WL 2177225 (D. Utah Sept. 6, 2005); United States v. Gatewood,
173 F.3d 983 (6th Cir. 1999); see United States ex rel. Wall v. Circle, No. 3:07-0091, 2010 WL
1170468, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2010) (prime contractor certified that payments were
made to subcontractor’s employees); United States ex rel. Wall v. Circle Constr., LLC, 697
F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2012) (federal contractor violated the False Claims Act when its subcon-
tractor failed to pay prevailing wages to its employees).
97. See section V.B.
98. See, e.g., Ab-Tech, 31 Fed. Cl. 429; S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court, 30
Cal. App. 4th 713 (1994).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d 770, 772, 775 (2d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Ehrlich, 643 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940 (1981); United
States ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Ind. 1998); United States ex rel.
Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 880 F. Supp. 636, 639–40 (W.D. Wis. 1995); Fassberg Constr. Co.
v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 152 Cal. App. 4th 720 (2007); City of Pomona, 89 Cal. App. 4th 793.
100. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12651(a); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12,
§ 5B(a).
101. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3 (although the False Claims Act pro-
vides for penalties in the range of $5,000 to $10,000, the Department of Justice has adjusted
the penalties to $5,500 and $11,000 pursuant to other statutory authority); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-2311 ($5,500 to $11,000); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12651(a) (same); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 17-8-402, et seq. ($5,000 to $10,000); N.Y. State Fin. Law, art. § 189 ($6,000 to $12,000); tit.
7, ch. 8, § 7-801, et seq., tit. 46, ch. 3, § 3-10, et seq. ($5,000 to $15,000).
makes to the owner? A court evaluating this question under the federal statute
has held that the number of requests to the government should be used.102
When parties negotiate a subcontract for work on a public project subject
to a false claims law, certain provisions should be included. One provision
should require the subcontractor to certify the truth and correctness of any
requests for payment it submits with regard to the completeness and compli-
ance of the work for which payment is sought; a second should require that
the subcontractor’s own subcontractors and suppliers have been paid for their
portions of prior payments received. A third provision should give the prime
the ability to take reasonable steps to ensure the truth and correctness of a
subcontractor’s claim before it will be obligated to pass it on to the govern-
ment or government-funded owner.
When a subcontract provides for arbitration of disputes,103 the parties should
be aware that it may not be enforceable for resolution of alleged false claims.
While courts have enforced such provisions in direct actions by government
owners against prime contractors,104 at least one decision has stated in dicta that
they would not apply in qui tam actions.105 Additionally most subcontracts con-
tain indemnification provisions, most commonly requiring the subcontractor to
defend and indemnify the prime for claims arising out of the subcontractor’s
work;106 the courts are unlikely to enforce such provisions if the prime is sued by
the subcontractor (as a qui tam relator) for false claims, even if the alleged false
claims are based on the conduct of that subcontractor.107 Courts are more likely,
however, to enforce contractual indemnity when the indemnitor is not a party
to the false claims action.108 Finally, many subcontracts require the subcontrac-
tor to obtain specific types and levels of insurance and to name the prime as
an additional insured.109 Whether these provisions will be effective to provide
102. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 312–13 (1976) (Supreme Court held that
a subcontractor was liable for penalties for three violations based on three false subcontrac-
tor requests that were submitted to the government in 35 prime-contractor invoices); see
also United States ex rel. V.I. Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 299 F. Supp.
2d 483 (D.V.I. 2004) (district court found a contractor liable for penalties for 10 violations
based on 10 subcontractor requests that were submitted to the government in one prime
request for payment).
103. See chapter 16.
104. United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2001) (compelling
United States to arbitrate all claims arising out of contract, including those for federal False
Claims Act violations); Cnty. of Solano v. Lionsgate Corp., 126 Cal. App. 4th 741, 749 (2005).
105. Cnty. of Solano, 126 Cal. App. 4th at 749.
106. See, e.g., CD 752, § 9.1. For further discussion, see chapter 11.
107. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154 (D.D.C.
2009).
108. See, e.g., Cell Therapeutics, Inc. v. Lash Grp., Inc., 586 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir.
2010); United States ex rel. Pub. Integrity v. Therapeutic Tech., 895 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Ala.
1995).
109. See, e.g., CD 752, § 9.2. For further discussion, see chapter 13.
insurance coverage for the prime or the subcontractor for false claims defense
and liability will depend on the terms of the policy, the applicable law, and the
alleged conduct.110 For example, if the insured allegedly had actual knowledge
of the falsity, coverage may be excluded, whereas if the only allegation is reck-
lessness, the exclusion may not apply.111
The federal false claims law and state laws modeled after it provide for
two types of enforcement actions: direct actions brought by the government
and qui tam actions brought by whistle-blowers, aka “relators.”112 Where false
claims arise from a subcontractor’s work or conduct, the government may,
and often does, sue both the prime and sub.113 This may implicate subcon-
tract indemnity and defense provisions.114 Indemnity or defense claims, when
enforceable, generally will not be allowed as counterclaims in a false claims
lawsuit; rather, they must be brought in a separate action.115 When both the
prime and subcontractor are sued for false claims, they may be held jointly
and severally liable.116 Their interests will often be aligned, in whole or in
part, such that joint defense privileges may apply. A joint defense agreement
is often worth considering.
In qui tam actions, may a subcontractor sue a prime as a relator, even in
cases arising out of the subcontractor’s own work? It has been held that false
claims laws define who may sue as a relator broadly enough to include sub-
contractors.117 A whistle-blower action by a subcontractor, however, may be of
limited value. The false claims laws discourage such lawsuits by limiting the
recovery of a relator that is found to have been a participant in the fraud.118
110. See, e.g., Health Care Indus. Liab. Ins. Program v. Momence Meadows Nursing
Ctr., 566 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2009); Zurich Am. Ins. v. O’Hara Reg’l Ctr. for Rehab., 529 F.3d
916, 921–22 (10th Cir. 2008); Watts Indus., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 121 Cal. App. 4th
1029 (2004).
111. See, e.g., M/G Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 234 F.3d 974,
978–79 (6th Cir. 2000) (held that, under Ohio law, an insurer had no duty to defend its
insured against a False Claims Act lawsuit because the insured’s policy contained exclu-
sions of coverage for willful negligence, misconduct, fines, penalties, and punitive and
exemplary damages); New Mem’l Assocs. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Corp., 973 F. Supp. 1027
(D.N.M. 1997) (New Mexico law); Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 686 F. Supp. 115 (D. Md. 1988).
112. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12652(a)(1); N.Y. State Fin. Law,
art. 13, § 190.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 800 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D.D.C.
2011); United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 242 (D.P.R. 2000).
114. For further discussion, see chapter 11.
115. See, e.g., Mortgs., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Nardone, 782 F. Supp. 996, 999 (M.D. Pa. 1990); United States v. Kennedy, 431 F.
Supp. 877 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
116. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 242.
117. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(1), (d)(1); Told, 2005 WL 2177225; Del. Code Ann. tit.
6, § 1203; Fla. Stat. § 68.083.
118. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1205; Fla. Stat. § 68.085(6).
Subcontractors also should consider that, by filing against the prime, they will
be drawing government attention to the alleged false claims. Once a relator
files a qui tam action, the government may intervene in the case and, even if it
does not intervene, retains certain rights (for example, to approve of or object
to dismissals or settlements).119 By filing suit, a subcontractor may lead the
government not only to intervene but also to sue the subcontractor as an addi-
tional defendant.
A subcontractor also may be concerned that, if it sues its prime for false
claims, the prime will retaliate against the subcontractor (e.g., by terminating
its subcontract, refusing to do further business with the sub, “black balling,”
etc.). There may be contractual or common law remedies for certain acts (e.g.,
suing for breach of contract or defamation), and at least some false claims laws
themselves provide protection against retaliation. For example, the federal act
provides that any contractor “shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make
[it] whole, if [it] is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in
any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment because of lawful acts done by the . . . contractor . . . in furtherance of”
either a qui tam action or “efforts to stop 1 or more violations” of the act.120
119. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b); United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy Inc., 950 F.
Supp. 2d 888 (E.D. Va. 2013); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12652(3); N.Y. State Fin. Law, art. 13,
§ 190.
120. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
121. FAR 3.301, 3.303(c); see FAR 3.303(a); 41 U.S.C. § 253b(i); 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(9).
122. FAR 3.103-2(b)(2).
123. 10 U.S.C. § 2402; 41 U.S.C. § 253g.
B. Subcontractor Kickbacks
Federal and state law prohibit prime contractors from accepting and subcon-
tractors from offering anything of value as consideration for the prime using
or proposing the subcontractor on a public project. The federal Anti-Kickback
Act of 1986127 prohibits providing or accepting kickbacks, or attempting to do
so. It also prohibits including the amount of any kickback either in the price
of any prime contract with the federal government or in any price of a sub-
contract charged to a prime contractor or a higher-tier subcontractor.128 Many
state laws prohibit similar conduct.129
The federal statute defines kickbacks broadly to include
any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or com-
pensation of any kind which is provided, directly or indirectly, to any
prime contractor, prime contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcon-
tractor employee for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding
favorable treatment in connection with a prime contract or in connec-
tion with a subcontract relating to a prime contract.130
132. Id. at 800 (quoting United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1998)).
133. Id. at 801.
134. Id. at 800.
135. FAR 3.502-2(b).
136. 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1); see also FAR 3.502-2(c); United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg
Brown & Root, 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013).
137. FAR 3.502-2(d), 52.203-7(c)(4).
138. FAR 3.502-2(i)(1); see also FAR 52.203-7(c)(1).
of the contracting agency if the agency does not have an inspector general,
or the Department of Justice.”139
The Anti-Kickback Act is enforced through a contract clause, FAR 52.203-7,
Anti-Kickback Procedures. The Anti-Kickback clause must also be flowed down
to all subcontracts worth more than $100,000.140
X. Flow-Downs
Generally speaking, a prime contractor will include a provision in each sub-
contract that incorporates or “flows down” some or all of the requirements of
the prime contract.141 Many prime contracts require that the prime contractor
flow down certain prime contract provisions—that is, mandatory flow-down
clauses—while others are permissive. Even when not mandatory, the prime con-
tractor will have a practical reason for flowing down many prime-contract provi-
sions because the prime contractor cannot be in a position where it has promised
certain performance that it did not secure from its subcontractor(s). However,
without careful drafting, flow-down clauses can result in conflicts between
the prime contract and subcontract requirements. Generally these conflicts are
resolved through an order of precedence clause in the subcontract that sets a
hierarchy to the documents in the event of a conflict.142 General flow-down pro-
visions also may be contrary to the prime and subcontractor’s intent, or, at least,
they will not make the parties’ intent clear. For this reason, courts, particularly
state courts, may decline to enforce such general provisions.143
151. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. For further discussion of FCA issues, see section VIII.
152. See 73 Fed. Reg. 67,064 (Nov. 12, 2008).
153. FAR 3.1004(a), 52.203.13(d); see also CD 752, § 12.7.
154. FAR 3.1002(b)(2).
155. Id.
156. FAR 52.203-13(b)(2).
False Claims Act. Violations that are uncovered related to any of the contrac-
tor’s federal contracts or subcontracts must then be disclosed to the relevant
agency's OIG.
Third, separate FAR provisions make the failure to disclose any viola-
tions and overpayments on any federal contract or subcontract grounds for
suspension or debarment.157 There is no dollar threshold for the debarment
and suspension provisions: they apply to all contractors and subcontractors
on any federal government contracts that have not been closed out for more
than three years. The definition of “contractor” for purposes of the debarment
and suspension applies to any party that submits an offer or is awarded a
contract with the federal government and any subcontractors to such a party,
of any tier.158 It also applies to anyone who “[c]onducts business, or reasonably
may be expected to conduct business, with the Government as an agent or
representative of another contractor.”159
Taken in combination, these FAR provisions essentially establish a manda-
tory disclosure system applicable to all companies that do business—including
construction—with the federal government, including small businesses, com-
mercial contractors, and companies who do all of their work outside the United
States.
A prime contractor is required to disclose credible evidence of violations
by and overpayments to not only itself but also its subcontractors.160 But it
is required only to disclose known violations by the subcontractor, and the
prime contractor is not required to review or approve subcontractor internal
control systems.161
A major subcontractor on a government construction contract can take on
an independent mandatory disclosure requirement, even if it has no direct con-
tracts with the federal government. The clause at FAR 52.203-13 must be flowed
down to all subcontracts that meet the same threshold as the prime contract: a
value in excess of $5 million and performance period of more than 120 days.162
When subcontractors are required to make disclosures, they are required to
disclose directly to the agency's OIG and not through the prime contractor.163