Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2976-2983 OF 2019

SATYAN ….Appellant

Versus

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER & ORS. ….Respondents

JUDGMENT

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1. The State Government of Karnataka granted lands to members

of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community, free of

charge, to assist in their economic empowerment and to provide them

with opportunity for self-employment through agriculture, the lands

granted being agricultural lands. In the early 1980s, the private

1
respondents No.3 were made beneficiaries of such grants on

12.8.1982, of lands measuring approx. two (2) acres for each of these

beneficiaries, numbering eight (8), in Bannikuppe Village, Bidadi

Hobli, Ramanagaram, Bangalore Rural District. These grants came

with certain restrictions, especially qua transfer, so that the very

objective with which the lands have been allotted is not defeated. We

are concerned, in the present appeals, with the transfer of these lands

to the appellant by all the eight (8) beneficiaries, in August and

September, 1997, which were sought to be annulled by the orders of

the competent authority, under The Karnataka Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’).

2. The grants made are on similar terms, and for the present

controversy, clause 8 of the grant is material, which puts a condition

of non-alienation for a period of fifteen (15) years. This clause

appears to be in pursuance of Rule 9(i) of the Karnataka Land Grant

Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Rules’), formulated in

pursuance of the powers conferred under Section 197 of the Karnataka

2
Land Revenue Act, 1964. The said Rule 9, to the extent applicable on

the relevant date, reads as under:

“9. Conditions of Grant:- (1) The grant of lands under these

rules (for agricultural purposes) shall be subject to the
following conditions namely:-

(i) the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of fifteen
years from the date of taking possession:

Provided that he may, after a period of five years, with the

previous permission of, and subject to the provisions of the
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes ( Prohibition
of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act 2 of
1979), and such conditions as may be specified by the Deputy
Commissioner, alienate the whole or any portion of such land.
But however, the Deputy Commissioner shall not grant such
permission unless he is satisfied that the alienation is for the
purpose of acquiring other land or for improving the remaining
land and the grantee credits to Government an amount equal to
fifty percent of the market value of such land as on the date of
sanction of such alienation as determined by the Deputy
Commissioner:

Provided that no person who has obtained permission to

alienate land under the rule shall, notwithstanding the
provisions of Rule 4 be eligible for grant of any Government
Land."

We may notice that the period of fifteen (15) years in clause

(i) stands substituted by the Notification dated 23.4.2005, with

effect from 25.4.2005, with twenty-five (25) years, amongst certain

other amendments.
3
3. The appellant purchased the lands from the private respondents

vide sale deeds of different dates, but beyond the period of fifteen (15)

years. The sale deeds have been executed by the private respondents,

in favour of the appellant through their attorney, who is the wife of the

appellant herein. The date of the General Power of Attorney (for short

‘GPA’) is stated to be 16.12.1996 (disclosed in pursuance of the order

dated 5.4.2019) and the consideration is same for each of the sale

deeds, i.e., Rs.4.50 lakhs and all such payments have been made in

cash. It may be noted herein itself that the date of the GPA is before

the expiry of fifteen (15) years. It is the case of the appellant that

these sale deeds were executed after having obtained the permission

of the competent authority under Section 4 of the said Act. The said

provision reads as under:

“4. Prohibition of transfer of granted lands. – (1)

Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or
instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or
after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the
terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such
grant, or sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title
or interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to
have conveyed by such transfer.

4
 (2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act,
transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the
previous permission of the Government.

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) and (2) shall apply also to
the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a Civil
Court or any award or order of any other authority.”

4. An application was filed on 10.10.2005 by the villagers alleging

that the sale deeds were illegal and have been executed without prior

permission of the competent authority. This triggered off an inquiry

into the transactions in question.

5. On inquiry, the Assistant Commissioner passed an order dated

5.5.2006, setting aside the sale deeds and directing restoration of the

lands to the original allottees under Section 5 of the said Act. The

appeal preferred against this order before the Deputy Commissioner

was dismissed vide order dated 14.11.2006. The appellant assailed

these orders in a writ petition filed before the Karnataka High Court,

but that endeavour also failed when the learned single Judge

dismissed the petition on 15.12.2008. The writ appeal filed against

the same has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 16.10.2009.

In the Special Leave Petitions (for short ‘SLPs’) filed against the

5
impugned order, an interim order to maintain status quo, as on date,

was passed on 23.3.2012 and, subsequently, leave was granted on

11.3.2019.

6. We may notice that all the forums have found that the

documents purporting to indicate prior permission for execution of the

sale deeds had been found to be forged and fabricated, and separate

criminal proceedings are stated to be pending against the same.

7. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant, in

the course of his arguments, actually sought to adopt a completely

different plea, which had not been raised in the forums below. The

plea is predicated on an interpretation sought to be given to Section 4

of the said Act. It was, thus, contended that Rule 9 of the said Rules

(albeit enacted under a different statute) makes a reference to the said

Act, insofar as the conditions of grant are concerned. In this behalf,

our attention was invited to Rule 9, extracted aforesaid, where the said

Rule prescribes for a non-alienation restriction for a period of five (5)

years from the date of taking possession. This is, however, subject to

6
a proviso stipulating that after the initial period of five (5) years,

previous permission may be obtained subject to such conditions, as

may be specified by the Deputy Commissioner, and the permission is

subject to the satisfaction that the alienation is for the purpose of

acquiring other land or for improving the remaining land and that the

grantee credits to the Government an amount equal to 50 per cent of

the market value of such land as on the date of sanction of such

alienation, as determined by the Deputy Commissioner. The

contention, thus, formulated is that the restriction is only for a period

of fifteen (15) years, and even within that window, beyond the period

of five (5) years, on meeting certain conditions, alienation is possible.

Thus, it was sought to be contended that there is no question of grant

of any permission post the period of fifteen (15) years, as neither the

grant nor the aforesaid Rule 9 deals with such an eventuality. One

subsequent development, post the enactment of the said Rules, but

prior to the transaction in question, is the insertion of the proviso vide

GSR 169 dated 26.8.1993, with effect from 6.9.1993 (extracted

aforesaid), which clearly stipulates that the permission to be granted

7
 within the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years would also be

subject to the provisions of the said Act.

8. In a nutshell, the contention of the learned senior counsel was

that the issue, whether the permission was or was not granted becomes

irrelevant as no such permission was required to be obtained after

fifteen (15) years from the date of grant of land.

9. Learned counsel sought to draw strength from the observations

of this Court in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 1

more specifically para 24. The said case dealt with a constitutional

challenge laid to Sections 4 and 5 of the said Act. The challenge was

repelled. As to the nature of controversy examined by the Court, it

would be apposite to reproduce para 7 of the said judgment, which

reads as under:

“7. The validity of the Act has been challenged mainly because of
the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act which
purport to declare transfers of “granted land” made either before or
after the commencement of the Act in contravention of the terms of
the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant null and
void and confer powers on the authority to take possession of such
land after evicting all persons in possession thereof and to restore
1 (1984) 3 SCC 301

8
 such lands to the original grantee or his legal heirs and where it is
not reasonably practicable to so restore the land to a person
belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in
accordance with the rules relating to the grant of such land. It may
be noted that the validity of the Act insofar as it imposes
prohibition on transfer of granted land after the commencement of
the Act has not been challenged and the principal objection to the
validity of the Act is taken because of the provisions in the Act
seeking to nullify the transfers of granted lands effected before the
commencement of the Act.”

10. The aforesaid would, thus, show that the real controversy arose

on account of the provisions of the said Act being made applicable

even to grants made prior to the commencement of the Act. It is in

this context that the Court observed in para 24 as under:

“24. Though we have come to the conclusion that the Act is

valid, yet, in our opinion, we have to make certain aspects clear.
Granted lands which had been transferred after the expiry of the
period of prohibition do not come within the purview of the
Act, and cannot be proceeded against under the provisions of
this Act. The provisions of the Act make this position clear, as
Sections 4 and 5 become applicable only when granted lands
are transferred in breach of the condition relating to prohibition
on transfer of such granted lands. Granted lands transferred
before the commencement of the Act and not in contravention
of prohibition on transfer are clearly beyond the scope and
purview of the present Act. Also in case where granted lands
had been transferred before the commencement of the Act in
violation of the condition regarding prohibition on such transfer
and the transferee who had initially acquired only a voidable

9
 title in such granted lands had perfected his title in the granted
lands by prescription by long and continuous enjoyment thereof
in accordance with law before the commencement of the Act,
such granted lands would also not come within the purview of
the present Act, as the title of such transferees to the granted
lands has been perfected before the commencement of the Act.
Since at the date of the commencement of the Act the title of
such transferees had ceased to be voidable by reason of
acquisition of prescriptive rights on account of long and
continued user for the requisite period, the title of such
transferees could not be rendered void by virtue of the
provisions of the Act without violating the constitutional
guarantee. We must, therefore, read down the provisions of the
Act by holding that the Act will apply to transfers of granted
lands made in breach of the condition imposing prohibition on
transfer of granted lands only in those cases where the title
acquired by the transferee was still voidable at the date of the
commencement of the Act and had not lost its defeasible
character at the date when the Act came into force. Transferees
of granted lands having a perfected and not a voidable title at
the commencement of the Act must be held to be outside the
pale of the provisions of the Act. Section 4 of the Act must be
so construed as not to have the effect of rendering void the title
of any transferee which was not voidable at the date of the
commencement of the Act.”

11. The contention, however, of Mr. Dave was that the aforesaid

para indicates that granted lands, which had been transferred after the

expiry of the period of prohibition, do not come within the purview of

the said Act. These granted lands, transferred before the

commencement of the said Act, and not in contravention of the

conditions regarding transfer are clearly beyond the scope and

10
 purview of the said Act. Similarly, transfers made prior to the

commencement of the said Act in violation of the conditions

regarding prohibition of transfer, where titles were perfected before

the commencement of the Act, by prescription, by long and

continuous enjoyment, in accordance with law, have been excluded

from the purview of the said Act.

12. The second limb of the submission of Mr. Dave, learned senior

counsel for the appellant, was that settled transactions cannot be

disturbed after a long period of time. The transactions were of the

year 1997. They were sought to be unsettled after almost eight (8)

years, by preferring an application in the year 2005. To support this

plea, he referred to the following judicial pronouncements:

a. Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K.

Suresh Reddy & Ors.2 – the question posed to be decided in the

appeal is referred to in para 1 and the question has been

answered in para 19. Both paras 1 and 19 are read as under:

“1. In all these appeals, the following question of law arises

for consideration:

2 (2003) 7 SCC 667

11
 “Whether the Collector can exercise suo motu power under
sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950
at any time or such power is to be exercised within a
reasonable time.”

…. …. …. …. ….

“19. It is also necessary to note that the suo motu power was
sought to be exercised by the Joint Collector after 13-15
years. Section 50-B was amended in the year 1979 by
adding sub-section (4), but no action was taken to invalidate
the certificates in exercise of the suo motu power till 1989.
There is no convincing explanation as to why the authorities
waited for such a long time. It appears that sub-section (4)
was added so as to take action where alienations or transfers
were made to defeat the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act.
The Land Ceiling Act having come into force on 1-1-1975,
the authorities should have made inquiries and efforts so as
to exercise the suo motu power within reasonable time. The
action of the Joint Collector in exercising suo motu power
after several years and not within reasonable per;iod and
passing orders cancelling validation certificates given by the
Tahsildar, as rightly held by the High Court, could not be
sustained.”

The ratio, thus, is that such suo moto powers have to be exercised

within a reasonable period of time.

b. Situ Sahu & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors. 3 – the exercise

of power in respect of transactions, which required prior

3 (2004) 8 SCC 340

12
 sanction of the Deputy Commissioner was again observed to be

one which had to be exercised within a reasonable period of

time.

c. Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. v. Hari Kishore Yadav (Dead)

through Legal Representatives & Ors.4– the view expressed is

the same as in the aforesaid two judgments in para 13, as under:

“13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed,

the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the
application of the parties, within a reasonable time.
Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the
circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In
the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly
delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in
view of the fact that the land was transferred several times
during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not
encumbered by any rights.”

d. Vivek M. Hinduja v. M. Aswatha & Ors.5– the provisions of the

said Act were in issue, where suo moto action was sought to be

taken in 1998, in respect of transactions of the vintage 1967,

and this was held to be a long delay, which did not warrant the

exercise of such power.

4 (2018) 12 SCC 527

5 Civil Appeal No. 2166/2009, decided on 6.12.2017

13
13. On the other hand, Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel

appearing for the respondents sought to defend the impugned orders.

He disputed the interpretation sought to be given to Section 4 of the

said Act, read with Rule 9 of the said Rules, by emphasizing that

under Section 4(2) of the said Act, there is an absolute embargo to

transfer any land without previous permission of the Government.

The bar being statutory in character, it was his submission, that this

bar under the said Act prohibits such transfer, even though the grant

may have put the restriction only for a period of fifteen (15) years.

Thus, in case of both, the five (5) to fifteen (15) years’ window, as

well as post the fifteen (15) year period, this bar would apply, as the

bar is not qualified by any period of the grant, under the said Act.

14. Mr. Ahmadi also contended that Rule 9 of the said Rules could

not in any manner dilute the effect of the provisions of the said Act,

especially as the said Act had come into force subsequently. The

amendment to the proviso of Rule 9 would not imply that permission

has to be obtained only for the window period of five (5) to fifteen

(15) years, while no such permission was required for a period beyond

fifteen (15) years.

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15. In putting forth this proposition, apart from the plain reading of

the provision, he sought to support his contention also on the larger

objective of the said Act, as is available from the Statement of Objects

and Reasons, which reads as under:

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

KARNATAKA ACT No.2 of 1979
Karnataka Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 30.6.1978

The non-alienation clause contained in the existing Land Grant

Rules and the provision for cancellation of grants where the
land is alienated in contravention of the above said provision
are found not sufficient to help the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes grantees whose ignorance and poverty have
been exploited by persons belonging to the affluent and
powerful sections to obtain sales or mortgages either for a
nominal consideration or for no consideration at all and they
have become the victims of circumstances. To fulfil the
purposes of the grant, the land even if it has been alienated,
should be restored to the original grantee or his heirs.

The Government of India has also been urging the State

Government for enacting a legislation to prevent alienation of
lands granted to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by
Government on the lines of the model legislation prepared by it
and circulated to the State Government.

Hence the Bill.”

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 16. The objective being to prevent exploitation of the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes persons by more affluent persons,

through the process of acquisition of the land, there was no reason

whatsoever to read down the provisions of Section 4(2) of the said

Act, based on the earlier Rule 9 of the said Rules, enacted under a

different enactment.

17. Insofar as the observations in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of

Karnataka & Ors6 are concerned, emphasis was laid on the fact that

while learned senior counsel for the appellant sought to read para 24

in isolation, the same had to be read in the context of what was sought

to be decided, which would be apparent from paras 7 and 14. We

have already extracted paras 7 and 24 aforesaid. The plea which was

sought to be urged is set out in para 14, which reads as under:

“14. What has been strongly urged before us is that the provisions
contained in Section 4 insofar as the same seek to nullify transfers
effected before the Act had come into force, are invalid.”

18. It is his submission that, thus, the reading of the three

paragraphs together supports the case advanced by the State

6 (supra)

16
 Government rather than what was sought to be made out by learned

senior counsel for the appellant.

19. Insofar as the requirement of prior permission from the

competent authority is concerned, learned counsel submitted that it

was never the case of the appellant, prior to the hearing before us, that

such prior permission was not required. In this behalf, he invited our

attention to the pleadings in this behalf, including in the synopsis.

20. Learned counsel also referred to certain judicial

pronouncements to advance the proposition that such prior permission

would be required in the cases of the like kind at hand, including

under the provisions of the said Act. We proceed to discuss the same

as under:

a. Dharma Naika v. Rama Naika & Anr. 7 – the judgment deals

with the provisions of the said Act. It was observed in paras 17

to 21 and 24 as under:

“17. Keeping these provisions and the objects and reasons of

the Act in mind, let us now deal with the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
7 (2008) 14 SCC 517

17
appellant. According to the learned counsel for the appellant,
having regard to the fact that the transfer of the granted land
was made after the expiry of the prohibited period and
before the coming into force of the Act, such transfer could
not be hit by the provisions contained in Section 4(2) of the
Act. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant
had drawn our attention to Section 3(1)(e) of the Act, which
defines “transfer”. We have already dealt with the definition
of “transfer” hereinearlier. According to the learned counsel
for the appellant, the prohibition imposed under Section 4 of
the Act would not be applicable to the facts of the present
case. As noted hereinearlier, the learned counsel, therefore,
submitted that in view of the above, the High Court as well
as the authorities below had committed an error in holding
that the sale deed, having been executed and registered after
the commencement of the Act, must be found to be null and
void and that by the said sale deed, the right, title or interest
in the granted land must be restored by the Assistant
Commissioner, in the exercise of his power under Section 5
of the Act, to the respondents.
18. This submission of the learned counsel for the appellant
was contested by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents. According to the learned counsel for the
respondents, the transfer of the granted land must be hit by
Section 4 of the Act as, admittedly, the sale deed was
executed and registered after the commencement of the Act.
The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that
in view of the prohibition contained in Section 4 of the Act,
even if the transfer was made before the commencement of
the Act in view of the agreement for sale, still since the sale
deed was executed and registered after the commencement
of the Act, the same must be hit by Section 4 of the Act and,
therefore, no right, title or interest in such granted land shall
be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such
transfer and that being the position, no interference could be
made with the impugned judgment as well as with the orders
of the authorities.

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19. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
after examining the objects and reasons and the relevant
provisions of the Act, as noted hereinearlier, in depth and in
detail, we have no hesitation to hold that the submissions of
the learned counsel for the appellant cannot at all be
accepted. It is true that the agreement for sale in respect of
the granted land was executed before the commencement of
the Act. It is also an admitted position that “transfer” under
the Act includes an agreement to sell as well. Keeping this
fact in mind, let us now see whether in view of Section 4 of
the Act, the transfer of the land, in respect of which the
agreement for sale was executed before the commencement
of the Act but which was effected after the commencement
of the Act by execution and registration of the sale deed,
could be said to be null and void. Section 4(1) of the Act in
clear terms provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any
transfer of granted land made either before or after the
commencement of the Act in contravention of either (a) the
terms of grant of such land; or (b) the provisions of the law
providing for such grant; or (c) sub-section (2) of Section 4
of the Act, shall be null and void and no right, title or
interest in such land shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to
have conveyed by such transfer. Therefore, under Section
4(1) of the Act, it can be safely concluded that this provision
declares any transfer of granted land made either before or
after the coming into force of the Act, to be null and void if
it is in contravention of the conditions specified therein.
20. Section 4(2) of the Act, as noted hereinearlier, deals with
the transfer of granted land after the commencement of the
Act i.e. after 1-1-1979. For the purpose of Section 4(2), the
court must be satisfied that (1) the sale deed was executed
and registered after the commencement of the Act, and (2)
the same was executed and registered without seeking prior
permission of the State Government. Therefore, Section 4(2)
clearly postulates that a transferee cannot acquire the
granted land from the grantee without seeking the

19
permission of the Government nor can the grantee transfer it
without seeking prior permission from the Government.
21. We have already considered the scheme of the Act as
also the objects and reasons for which it was introduced. It is
an admitted position that the Act was introduced to help and
protect the right, title and interest of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes, in respect of the granted lands, whose
poverty and status in the society was taken advantage of by
some rich and affluent persons who took their lands either
by paying a paltry sum or even without paying anything to
them.”
…. …. …. …. ….
“24. Let us, therefore, consider whether any of the
conditions is satisfied in the present case and thereby,
whether, the transfer shall be null and void conveying or
deeming ever to have conveyed no right, title or interest of
such land by such transfer. So far as the first condition,
namely, transfer in contravention of the terms of the grant of
such land is concerned, it cannot be disputed in the facts of
this case that there was no contravention of the terms of the
grant of such land as the transfer was admittedly made after
15 years of the date of certificate, which was the only
condition regarding prohibition of transfer in the grant. It is
also not in dispute that there is no contravention of any law
providing for such grant. Therefore, so far as these two
conditions are concerned, it cannot be disputed that they are
not satisfied. Now, let us take into consideration the third
condition i.e. transfer made in contravention of sub-section
(2) of Section 4 of the Act. In respect of this condition, a
transfer of any granted land made after the commencement
of the Act in contravention of sub-section (2) shall be null
and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be
conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such
transfer. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 clearly says that:

20
 “4. (2) No person shall, after the commencement of
this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted
land without the previous permission of the
Government.”
Therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 4 prohibits transfer or
acquisition by transfer, either by the transferor or by the
transferee of any granted land without the previous
permission of the Government. Therefore, after the
commencement of this Act, if any transfer is effected or any
person acquires any granted land by transfer, without the
previous permission of the Government, such transfer shall
be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land
shall be conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by
such transfer.”

As to how the judgment in Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of

Karnataka & Ors.8 has to be considered, it was further observed, in para

27 as under:

“27. Before parting with this judgment, we may note that the
learned counsel for the appellant in support of his
contention, as noted hereinabove, relied on a decision of this
Court in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka [(1984) 3 SCC
301]. This decision was also relied on by the learned counsel
who appeared for the appellant before the learned Single
Judge of the Karnataka High Court. In our view, the decision
of this Court in Manchegowda [(1984) 3 SCC 301] was
rightly distinguished by the learned Single Judge. We are in
agreement with the decision of this Court in Manchegowda
[(1984) 3 SCC 301] but the scope of challenge by the
petitioners in that decision was limited which was stated at
para 7 of the said judgment, as follows: (SCC p. 306, para 7)
8 (supra)

21
 “7. … It may be noted that the validity of the Act insofar
as it imposes prohibition on transfer of granted land after
the commencement of the Act has not been challenged
and the principal objection to the validity of the Act is
taken because of the provisions in the Act seeking to
nullify the transfers of granted lands effected before the
commencement of the Act.”
Therefore, we are in full agreement with the views
expressed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
that the scope of challenge by the petitioners in the
aforesaid decision of this Court was limited and,
therefore, that decision cannot be of any help to the
appellant in the present case.”

b. Harishchandra Hegde v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 9 – Once

again, the case pertains to the same said Act and discusses the

effect of Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.10

In that context, it has been observed that Section 4, by virtue of

containing a non obstante clause, would apply notwithstanding

anything contained in any agreement or any other Act for the

time being in force.

c. Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors. 11 –

The provisions of the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of

9 (2004) 9 SCC 780

10 (supra)
11 (2004) 10 SCC 65

22
 Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes) Regulations, 1956

were examined, and in that context, observations were made in

para 25 that the State is the custodian and trustee of the

immovable property of tribals, and is enjoined to see that the

tribals remains in possession of such property. In the

Regulations in that case, no period of limitation was prescribed,

and the period of twelve (12) years in Article 65 of the

Limitation Act became irrelevant so far as the immovable

property of a tribal was concerned. Such tribal need not file a

civil suit which will be governed by the law of limitation since

it is enough if he or anyone on his behalf moves the State or the

State itself moves into action to protect him and restore

property to him.

21. Insofar as the factual aspects of the execution of the document,

stated to be the sale deeds, is concerned, it was highlighted that the

land owners were represented by a GPA, who was the wife of the

vendee (appellant), and the entire amount was paid in cash. This GPA

was executed even prior to the fifteen (15) years period, and thus

23
obviously, the nature of transaction was such that it had occurred prior

to the fifteen (15) year period, though the formal sale deed was

executed after the fifteen (15) years period. In either eventuality, it

was submitted that prior permission would be required.

22. Another aspect which was sought to be highlighted by Mr.

Ahmadi, learned senior counsel was that it was not even open to the

appellant to have raised any contention before this Court, much less a

new contention, in view of the conduct of the appellant, who grossly

misrepresented facts before this Court. The gravamen of the case of

the appellant throughout is that they have obtained prior permission

and that such prior permission was required. It was found that the

documents purporting to be prior permission were forged and

fabricated, for which criminal proceedings are separately pending.

However, while making the relevant averments in the appeal, it has

been categorically stated that the permission to transfer land had been

granted. The documents which were found to be forged, were in fact,

suppressed. Such suppression, it was submitted, would disentitle the

appellant to any relief whatsoever.

24
 23. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel sought to

refer to certain judicial pronouncements on the effect of suppression

as under:

a. K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited & Ors. 12 – In

para 37 of this judgment, a reference was made to the

proposition as propounded by the King’s Bench in the

following terms:

“37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs. [(1917) 1 KB 486:

86 LJKB 257: 116 LT 136 (CA)] Viscount Reading, C.J.
observed: (KB pp. 495-96)

“… Where an ex parte application has been made to this

Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to
the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application
was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated
them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true
facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent
an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with
the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the
Court, but one which should only be used in cases which
bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been
deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful
examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they
have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything
will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the
Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts.
But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave
no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will
refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a

12 (2008) 12 SCC 481

25
 proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a
misleading affidavit.”

(emphasis supplied)”

The aforesaid principle was observed to have been followed

while dealing with prerogative writs, whether under Article 32 or

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and a litigant cannot be

permitted to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts

he likes to disclose, and to suppress or not to disclose other facts.

Thus, a party with “soiled hands” is not liable to be entertained.

b. A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu

Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam represented by

its President & Ors.13

c. Hari Narain v. Badri Das14 - the leave granted was revoked on

the basis that where such leave has been obtained by

suppression of facts, the mere fact that leave was granted,

would not come in the way of the Court disentitling the

appellant to relief.

13 (2012) 6 SCC 430

14 (1964) 2 SCR 203

26
24. We have examined the aforesaid elaborate contentions

advanced by both the learned senior counsel for the parties. In our

view, the matter is in a very narrow compass.

25. Turning to the last aspect first, i.e., suppression of material fact,

we must observe that the manner of dealing with facts by the appellant

does leave much to be desired. There ought to have been full

disclosure of documents. However, we cannot be oblivious of the fact

that all the orders below are predicated on a reasoning that while the

appellant sought to make out a case that permission had been granted,

no such permission had actually been granted by the competent

authority, and the documents furnished in this behalf were found to be

forged and fabricated. The criminal proceedings, however, are still

pending qua that aspect, and we would not like to delve in the matter

any further, on this aspect, which is really in the nature of a

preliminary objection by the respondent-State. It is not necessary to

non-suit the appellant on this ground itself, as we feel that the merits

of the matter itself ought to be dealt with.

27
26. There is substance in the contention of the respondent-State that

the appellant had throughout sought to make out a case based on prior

permission by the competent authority. It was nobody’s case that

permission was not required to be obtained. At this stage of the civil

appeal, without any pleadings being there, it is not even really open to

the appellant to have pleaded the interpretation they so sought to

plead. This really cannot be categorized as a legal plea alone, and that

too raised at the fifth level of scrutiny in the hierarchy of proceedings.

The appellant, really faced with a factual situation where the

permissions do not exist, now sought to build another bridge to

contend that be that as it may, no permission is required. Such a plea

cannot be countenanced.

27. If we analyze the aforesaid plea also, we find no merit in the

same. We cannot lose sight of the objective with which the said Act

was enacted. The non-alienation clause existing in the said Rules, and

incorporated in the grants, was found to be inadequate to protect the

interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who were given

land owing to their ignorance and poverty. Influential and powerful

28
sections of society were stated to be obtaining sales and mortgages for

consideration, and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes became

victims of circumstances. The objective of the State Government in

enacting the said Act was to prevent such misuse and, therefore, in

categorical terms, transfer with permission was prescribed. This

would be de hors the terms of the grant or the said Rules. Thus,

whether it was a case where it was within the window of five (5) to

fifteen (15) years, or the period beyond fifteen (15) years, such

permission would be required.

28. No doubt Rule 9 of the said Rules, enacted under a different

enactment, prior to the enactment of the said Act (and thereafter even

amended), does contemplate transfer between the window of five (5)

to fifteen (15) years on certain terms and conditions, which are

required to be satisfied by the Deputy Commissioner. There is, in

fact, a prohibition in grant of such permission until and unless there is

satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner that the alienation is for the

purpose of acquiring other land, or for improving the remaining land

and that the grantee credits to Government an amount equal to fifty

29
percent of the market value of such land as on the date of sanction of

such alienation. Thus, more rigorous terms have been put for transfer

within the window of five (5) to fifteen (15) years.

29. The reason for the competent authority to arrive at a decision

whether to grant permission or not after the period of fifteen (15)

years may or may not be coloured by such considerations. But

certainly, he may satisfy himself that the members of the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes only, who have been allotted the land,

are not taken for a ride, and it is possibly in their best interest for

recorded reasons that such permission should be granted. The

wordings of Section 4(2) of the said Act are quite clear in its terms.

30. Section 4 of the said Act, dealing with prohibition of transfer of

granted land, in sub-section (1), begins with a non obstante clause. It

is notwithstanding anything in any agreement, contract or instrument,

or for that matter in any law. Section 11 of the said Act further

enforces this by giving the said Act an overriding effect over any other

law. The said Section 11 reads as under:

30
 “11. Act to override other laws.- The provisions of this Act shall
have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in force or any
custom, usage or contract or any decree or order of a Court,
Tribunal or other Authority.”

31. The aforesaid Section is applicable for grants made either

before or after the commencement of the Act. The terms of the grant

cannot be contravened, but the last part of sub-section (1) of Section 4

of the said Act makes any transfer in violation of sub-section (2) also

null and void. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act is crisp and

clear in its terms, putting an absolute ban on transfer after the

commencement of the Act, without previous permission of the

Government. Thus, a bare reading of the provision makes it

abundantly clear that it brooks no two interpretations. After the period

of fifteen (15) years also, thus, permission was required to be taken.

32. The legal position enunciated in various judicial

pronouncements is also very clear in this behalf. The observations in

Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 15 in para 24,

cannot be taken out of context, as what would have to be scrutinized is

15 (supra)

31
 the proposition sought to be determined in that case. The validity of

the Act had been challenged mainly because the provisions contained

in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act purported to declare transfer of “granted

land” made before or after the commencement of the Act, in

contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or law, null and

void. In para 14, what was urged before the Court has been set out,

i.e., the challenge being to Section 4 insofar as it seeks to nullify the

transfer effected before the Act came into force. In the conspectus of

the aforesaid observations, para 24 has to be read.

33. The aforesaid aspect is really not in doubt, in view of the

subsequent judicial pronouncements, more specifically in Dharma

Naika v. Rama Naika & Anr.16 The context of the observations made

in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka17 has been clearly enunciated.

It is noted that the agreements for sale were executed before the

commencement of the Act. The sale deed was executed afterwards.

In that context it was observed that it could be safely concluded that

provisions of Section 4(1) declared any transfer of land made either

16 (supra)
17 (supra)

32
 before or after the commencement of the said Act to be null and void

if it contravened the conditions specified therein. Section 4(2) was

held to make it abundantly clear that if the sale deed was executed and

registered after the commencement of the said Act, and was without

prior permission of the State Government, such transfer would be

invalid and null and void. The scheme of the said Act was also

discussed in detail with the objective with which it was enacted.

Before parting with the judgment, this Court observed in para 27 that

Manchegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 18 has to be read

in the context of the limited scope, as enunciated in para 7 of that

judgment. Nothing more is really left to be said after this judgment,

though there are certain other judicial pronouncements referred to

aforesaid, cited by learned counsel for the State. Suffice to say that a

delay of eight (8) years by itself cannot come in the way of the

competent authority taking the action, as limitation principles would

not apply, as observed in Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur

Prajapati & Ors.19 The cases referred to by learned senior counsel for

18 (supra)
19 (supra)

33
the appellant involved huge gaps of around twenty (20) to thirty (30)

years, which is not so in the present case.

34. The period of eight (8) years cannot be said to be such, as to

amount to such delay and laches as would make the action void,

considering that it is in respect of a beneficial legislation for the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes community.

35. We may also add that the documents of transfer executed

themselves, also do not evoke much confidence. As observed

aforesaid, complete consideration is paid in cash. Further, the

documents of transfer were executed by the allottee, but through the

attorney, who is none other than the wife of the appellant. The GPA

was executed prior to the period of fifteen (15) years, and it is

inconceivable that the same would have been executed without

consideration. It does seem to suggest that for all practical terms, the

alleged transfer took place prior to the lapse of the fifteen (15) year

period, but the sale deed was executed after such fifteen (15) year

period. Be that as it may, in any case, it would not make any

difference to the result of the case.

34
 36. We are of the view that the courts below committed no error,

and the competent authority has acted within its jurisdiction to nullify

the transactions which are contrary to the statutory provisions of

Section 4(2) of the said Act, and the manner of execution itself raises

many doubts.

37. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to

bear their own costs.

..….….…………………….J.
[Sanjay Kishan Kaul]

...……………………………J.
[Indira Banerjee]
New Delhi.
April 30, 2019.

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