Sorenson 2008
Sorenson 2008
Sorenson 2008
12 Entrepreneurship: A Field
of Dreams?
a b
Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart
a
Rotman School of Management , University of
Toronto
b
Harvard Business School
Published online: 01 Apr 2009.
To cite this article: Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart (2008) 12 Entrepreneurship:
A Field of Dreams?, The Academy of Management Annals, 2:1, 517-543, DOI:
10.1080/19416520802211669
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The Academy of Management Annals
Vol. 2, No. 1, 2008, 517–543
12
Entrepreneurship:
A Field of Dreams?
Downloaded by [Northeastern University] at 15:59 06 October 2014
OLAV SORENSON*
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
TOBY E. STUART
Harvard Business School
Academy
10.1080/19416520802211669
RAMA_A_321333.sgm
1941-6520
Original
Taylor
2102008
[email protected]
OlavSorensen
00000August
and
& Article
Francis
of(print)/1941-6067
Francis
Management
2008 Annals
(online)
Abstract
This paper has two objectives. We begin by contrasting two potential paths for
future research in entrepreneurship. One is the establishment of an indepen-
dent field of research with a clear jurisdiction, a common theoretical canon, and
autonomy from related fields. The second is a phenomena-based approach, in
which scholars congregate around common interests in empirical phenomena
but approach them with distinct disciplinary lenses. After discussing these
alternatives and lobbying for the phenomena-based approach, we then review
some of the recent, discipline-based research in economic and organizational
sociology relevant to entrepreneurship, and identify significant gaps in that
literature.
517
518 • The Academy of Management Annals
I. Introduction
But should scholars flock to this cause? Let us discuss (and begin to refute)
the arguments for independence. One rationale for organizing scholarly activ-
ity according to a subject of study is that the pertinent phenomena merit
greater attention than they have attracted from members of the relevant disci-
plines. Here, the so-called “area studies” departments come to mind as
examples. Many universities have founded departments to focus on topics
such as African-American studies, Latino studies, and Women’s studies.
These departments are typically staffed with researchers drawn from across
the humanities and social sciences with loosely related research interests. In
part, these departments fulfill teaching needs, but more importantly they pro-
vide havens for scholars researching disadvantaged groups. Given the history
of discrimination against these groups, one can easily imagine that some
members of the home disciplines of the scholars congregating in area studies
departments might denigrate research on these subjects as second rate.
Though a relatively common form of organization, these departments do not
develop common theoretical cannons. Instead, they simply serve as (perhaps
temporary) sanctuaries for scholars studying socially disadvantaged groups.
Unlike area studies, however, entrepreneurship research per se does not
appear to suffer from discrimination. Among the achievements of those argu-
ing for the establishment of entrepreneurship as a dedicated field has been the
uncovering of many important facts and empirical puzzles that have attracted
a great deal of popular and scholarly attention, (ironically) securing entrepre-
neurship’s legitimacy as a subject of study. Though we agree that many of the
questions related to the founding and growth of new firms warrant additional
research attention, mainstream scholars in economics, psychology and sociol-
ogy do not appear in any way averse to entrepreneurship as a context for their
investigations. Indeed, relevant research regularly appears in the flagship jour-
nals of these fields. Particularly in economics and sociology, as well as the
business school departments, a cadre of each discipline’s most distinguished
scholars has exhibited strong interest in phenomena related to entrepreneur-
ship—for example, Will Baumol and Art Stinchombe in economics and soci-
ology respectively. In the absence of such discrimination, this first rationale
for an independent field is unpersuasive.
Entrepreneurship: A Field of Dreams? • 521
II.B. Phenomena
Against the potential benefits of reorganizing entrepreneurship studies into a
focused field, we see several additional, serious shortcomings. First, the isola-
tion of scholars researching some settings (e.g., mature organizations) from
those examining others (e.g., startup companies) may hinder the advance-
ment of knowledge. Theory building often begins with induction; the scientist
identifies an apparent pattern by observation. Scientists move from discovery
of patterns in the data to the development of propositions or hypotheses to
theory testing. The accumulation of knowledge and understanding comes
from elaborating theories more consistent with empirical observation and
discarding those less consistent with it (Lakatos, 1978). In turn, the ability to
discriminate among competing theories rises with the number and indepen-
dence of the settings in which one can test them.
The isolation of one group of settings, such as those pertaining to entrepre-
neurship, from the broader research community therefore has at least two
costs. On one hand, since those researching entrepreneurship would have
fewer settings in which to examine their propositions—and fewer still inde-
pendent from the observations generating those insights—they would be less
able to adjudicate between alternative explanations than otherwise might be
the case. But the broader disciplines also have something to lose here. To the
extent that entrepreneurship has unique contextual elements, it could offer a
valuable laboratory for examining general theories developed in other contexts
and it could provide inspiration for theoretical innovations. In our review of
the literature below, we discuss both directions of influence.
Entrepreneurship: A Field of Dreams? • 523
Babson, that fall outside the most highly ranked national business schools have
independent departments and faculties that have made major contributions to
research in the area. However, an examination of the websites of the 25 schools
ranked between 25th and 50th in 2008 by US News & World Report suggests
that, at most, three of them maintain entrepreneurship departments. If
anything, investments in the study of entrepreneurship appear most concen-
trated among the elite institutions. According to the Kauffman Foundation’s
survey of endowed professorships in entrepreneurship, for example, Harvard,
Wharton, and Stanford lead other schools in terms of having the greatest
number of chairs devoted to the subject.
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Or, Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p. 220), who follow Kirzner in asserting
that:
Indeed, the litany of definitions proffered and the community’s repeated (and,
it seems to us, increasingly self-conscious) efforts to forward definitions of the
field are probably more reflective of the breadth of the subject matter than of
the oft-claimed culprit for such ambiguity—the youth of the area.
Though we cannot say whether any of these offer tenable definitions for a
field of research, upon dissection, they would limit the field to a sufficiently
slender set of conditions and activities so as to disqualify on semantics the rel-
evancy of most research that we consider to fall squarely within the domain of
entrepreneurship. For instance, Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) emphasis
on the novelty of the entrepreneurial act in terms of means–ends relationships
would presumably exclude all but a small (maybe even miniscule) fraction of
the many millions of firms founded in the USA each year and, we imagine, an
even larger proportion of businesses founded outside of it. A tenable definition
of entrepreneurship therefore imposes a stark tradeoff: we can pigeon-hole
the field to a restricted range of questions that a unified, but correspondingly
narrow, theoretical perspective may address, or we can acknowledge the
inherent complexity of the phenomena and approach it through the lenses of
a correspondingly diverse set of scholarly perspectives.
Before concluding this section, we hasten to add that as a purely philosoph-
ical matter, we sympathize with the members of the community of entrepre-
neurship researchers in seeing the appeal of a distinct, largely freestanding,
field of research and a self-identifying community of scholars. As a practical
matter, however, we consider it unlikely that such a field will truly succeed. In
addition, we underscore that it is not that we believe that entrepreneurial phe-
nomena have received the research attention that their socioeconomic impor-
tance merits. They have not. Research centers and grants, however, offer
alternatives to the formation of a field for stimulating research. The Kauffman
Foundation, for example, has used grants successfully to encourage established
scholars from a variety of disciplines to engage entrepreneurial phenomena.
526 • The Academy of Management Annals
problems in other contexts have already shown great relevance for under-
standing entrepreneurship.
virtuoso and the homerun hitter, for example, possess exceptional skills yet
cannot completely explain how they deliver their outstanding performances.
Other kinds of knowledge involve such complex interactions that they elude
codification. And, of course, in the entrepreneurial domain, much useful
information remains private because it originated from acts of individual
insight, creativity, or innovation. When people foresee that the knowledge
they have discovered or created potentially has economic value, they often try
to preserve its confidentiality.
Even when information is openly available, such as in a book or on a web-
site, it still might not receive attention far and wide. On one hand, the diffi-
culty of searching through vast archives can frustrate potential users of the
information. On the other hand, even when they can locate appropriate infor-
mation, they might question its veracity. Does it come from a reputable
source? Might the author have incentives for misleading readers? Witness the
recent press surrounding conflicts of interest in equity and credit analysts’
reports and ratings, and the partisan editing of Wikipedia entries. In these
cases as well, information travels slowly from its source—questions of its
reliability add friction to its flow.
Regardless of the reason why information has remained private, by defini-
tion, access to private information is restricted. Insofar as private information
does circulate, it moves through relationships. In Podolny’s (2001) memorable
language, relationships serve as the “pipes” for the transmission of private,
market-related information. Consequently, those close to the origin of the
information (in terms of the number of social connections between them and
the source) become aware of it before the general public. Or, as Marsden
(1983) put it, the flipside of the benefits of social connections for some is that
the network necessarily “restricts access” for others.
This localization of information has several consequences. One is that the
bits of data necessary to perceive an entrepreneurial opportunity may reside in
disparate locations within a community. Since only someone with access to
these socially distant domains could detect the opportunity, it may remain open
for a long time before being (if ever) exploited. Another consequence appears
in the economic geography of entrepreneurship. Traditional explanations for
528 • The Academy of Management Annals
the co-location of similar firms into geographic clusters have relied on the idea
that these firms share a need for some valuable resource (e.g., a natural
resource, such as coal, or specialized service providers, such as intellectual
property law firms or industry-knowledgeable headhunters and consultants)
and therefore jointly benefit from their proximity to one another (Sorenson &
Baum, 2003). But the localization of important information could also produce
geographic concentration. In industries that rely on specialized human and
social capital, only those with connections within the industry can create (or
discover) and exploit profitable opportunities. Because relationships them-
selves generally remain concentrated within regions, however, such connec-
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tions are primarily available to individuals living in the same regions as—and
very often working for—incumbent firms in the industry. Geographic concen-
tration therefore might arise and persist, and perhaps even become more
pronounced, even if firms do not benefit from locating near to their rivals—in
other words, even if positive agglomeration economies do not exist (Sorenson,
2005; Sorenson & Audia, 2000; Stuart & Sorenson, 2003b).
Sociologists have primarily investigated two mechanisms through which
social systems shape the diffusion of information. First, individuals can span
social boundaries by maintaining relationships with others on both sides of a
border. To the extent that these connections provide paths for the movement
of private information, they allow it to diffuse and recombine. In other cases,
individuals themselves carry the information as they move through social
space, leaving one firm to join another or emigrating from one region to
another. These two mechanisms are closely related, but in one the “links”
transmit information across locations, while in the other the information
moves with the “nodes” themselves.
The idea that so-called bridging ties reaching into otherwise unconnected
communities provide advantages to the individuals sitting at the nexus of those
connections has been central to research on boundary spanning, brokerage
and structural holes (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). In fact, this idea has
appeared in multiple streams of sociological research. For instance, in his clas-
sic text on human ecology, Amos Hawley (1950) observes that cities at the
crossroads of major transportation routes offer ripe environments for the
recombination of diverse streams of knowledge. To the extent that diverse
information travels along these transportation routes and that the information
has complementarities, those at the nexus of major passageways should have
early opportunities to reap the rewards of combining these otherwise disjoint
sets of synergistic knowledge. In a corporate setting, Burt’s (2004) study of
employees’ ideas within a large firm finds that senior management perceives
greater value in the ideas of those who talk with more diverse contacts. How-
ever, Burt’s work provokes an interesting question: Do individuals with diverse
networks actually generate better ideas, or are they merely advantaged in hear-
ing others’ good ideas or at anticipating what appeals to senior management?
Entrepreneurship: A Field of Dreams? • 529
start businesses at higher rates than those with more homogenous contacts.
However, the absence of information on the performance of the ventures in
Renzulli et al. (2000) prevents us from determining the wisdom of these entry
decisions. Once again, ample opportunities exist for further research. Future
studies could usefully examine: what drives founding team composition, how
these choices vary as a function of the nature of the business or the opportu-
nity, and how founding team choices influence the early performance and
growth trajectories of new firms?
In other cases, researchers focus not on the patterns of connections across
actors but on the movement of individuals between firms and regions.
Saxenian (1994), for instance, calls attention to the importance of the move-
ment of engineers across firms in Silicon Valley both to the maintenance of
inter-firm social connections and to the recombination of knowledge to gen-
erate new ideas (for more systematic evidence, see Almeida & Kogut, 1999). In
part, Saxenian attributes the phenomenal economic success of Silicon Valley
to the high rate of mobility of technologists across firms and the role of these
connections in the rapid diffusion of information. But this apparent relation-
ship might simply reflect the ease with which individuals can leave their
employers rather than the value of mobility per se to entrepreneurship (Stuart
& Sorenson, 2003a). We need far more research into how new ventures recruit
their early employees, whether these individuals maintain connections to their
prior colleagues, and when these connections might prove most valuable.
If there are two primary social mechanisms for the diffusion of private infor-
mation—one involving transmission over a portfolio of contacts and the other
through the actual mobility of actors—it is likely that these mechanisms differ
in their implications for the spread of private information. Much as Hansen
(1999) argues that different configurations of relations facilitate different forms
of knowledge exchange within organizations, the nature of the knowledge
being transferred across firms may determine which of these mechanisms oper-
ates. As in Hansen (1999), the first mechanism, spanning ties across clusters of
relations, likely has more relevance to situations that require the transmittal of
“thin” information, in the sense that one could convey it quickly and would
not worry about trusting the recipient. Meanwhile, the second mechanism,
530 • The Academy of Management Annals
themselves) and therefore never open new organizations. But uncertainty also
has consequences for those that do establish new ventures and for incumbent
firms—and anything with a major effect on incumbents in turn inevitably
shapes the opportunity structure for startups. Hannan and Freeman (1984)
argued that investors, employees and other stakeholders favor organizations
that possess reliable and accountable systems. Though these characteristics
themselves do not necessarily appeal to organizations’ constituents, they
produce firms that behave consistently and in a manner that conforms to
expectations. The same features that engender reliability and accountability,
however, also produce inertia—a tendency to persist in the same strategies
and courses of action even in the face of environmental changes that would
appear to warrant changes in firm behavior. One can then begin to see the
complex and surprising consequences of uncertainty for entrepreneurial
behaviors. If uncertainty underlies established-firm inertia, it must then indi-
rectly serve as a source of opportunity for yet-to-be-founded firms; because
any impediment that precludes established organizations from recasting
themselves to pursue new opportunities provides openings for entrepreneurs.
Social mechanisms for dealing with uncertainty vary both in the sources of
uncertainty they address and in the levels at which they operate. At a more
micro-level (at least in the extant literature) is the notion of an endorsement.
Endorsements can play an important role when young firms, investors, poten-
tial employees, customers or suppliers have (often mutual) questions about
the quality of the partners with whom they might interact. In such situations,
actors with credibility both in the information they provide and in their ability
to assess the quality of potential partners can resolve this uncertainty when
others observe their choices. Parties in such advantaged positions can include
both public and private institutions. Baum and Oliver (1991), for example,
study how institutional affiliations affect the performance of day care centers
in Toronto. Parents have substantial concerns about the quality of day care,
but they cannot easily determine which providers offer high quality service.
Consistent with the idea that endorsements help to reduce uncertainty, Baum
and Oliver (1991) find that day care centers survive longer either when they
receive a contract from the city (an implicit endorsement by the state) or when
532 • The Academy of Management Annals
they operate on location at some large company to serve its employees (an
endorsement by the organization). Presumably, these large institutions care
about securing high quality service providers and have far more resources at
their disposal to evaluate agencies than the typical parent.
Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) similarly investigate the role of endorse-
ments among private biotechnology companies. Young firms in this industry
with either alliances or investments from highly regarded pharmaceutical
companies both undergo public stock offerings at earlier ages and receive
higher valuations when they go public. Since pharmaceutical companies have
a great deal of expertise in the science and the markets of these young firms,
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others view them as able evaluators of the prospects of these businesses. The
endorsement effects that Stuart and his coauthors find prove largest when they
come in the form of equity investments, as one would expect given that these
investments not only suggest greater certainty on the part of the endorser
but also align the incentives of these actors with those of the biotechnology
company.8
Even when the “endorsers” do not have great stature, however, they may
still provide useful signals when enough of them converge on the same
choices. Despite the uncertainty, each actor often possesses some unique
information regarding the true quality of potential partners. Third parties
then might rationally prefer to transact with those that others have chosen,
on the assumption that these other choices reflect this private information.
Consistent with this logic, in the days before restaurant guides, a common
approach to selecting a place to eat in an unfamiliar location was to dine at the
location with the largest crowd. Gould (2002) verifies this reasoning in a for-
mal model, demonstrating that higher quality actors should receive more rela-
tionships from others; in the language of network analysis, they should occupy
central positions. More intriguing is that Gould’s model also reveals that this
centrality can confer a level of perceived quality in excess of an actor’s true
quality. Actors therefore pursue high status partners because of their beliefs
that status signals intrinsic quality, and actors in high status positions reap
rewards from this attention (Podolny, 2005).9
Endorsements can also take a more passive form, as when the (in this case,
implicit) endorser has not judged the current venture but shares some past
affiliation with the actors associated with the endeavor. Burton, Sørenson and
Beckman (2002), for example, study how the prior employment experiences of
company founders influence their ability to attract outside funding. They
report that those from companies with a history of employing people that
went on to become successful entrepreneurs more commonly receive venture
capital funding for their ventures. Though their prior employers did not
necessarily sanction these startups, these past affiliations nonetheless serve as
signals for would-be investors trying to sift the high potential entrepreneurs
from the chaff. Higgins and Gulati (2003) further find that these entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurship: A Field of Dreams? • 533
also attract higher prestige underwriters when the time comes for them to go
public. Prior affiliations with well-regarded organizations therefore appear to
provide ongoing advantages.
Though endorsements provide a means of mitigating the problems of
uncertainty surrounding the choice of particular partners, uncertainly also
plagues entire classes of activities. One hundred years ago, the idea of a busi-
ness that broadcasts radio signals for a profit would have seemed like grist for
a science fiction novel. Thirty years ago it would have been difficult to con-
vince either investors or customers of the viability of a commercial bank with-
out a physical location. Today, essentially everyone owns a radio, and although
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rather than falling neatly within a single category. She nevertheless offers a
somewhat different account for this effect, attributing it to the “principle of
allocation”; in essence, a producer cannot please everyone, so the broader the
range of audiences the producer attempts to engage, the less likely the product
appeals to any particular group. Ongoing research finds similar effects in
whether eBay sellers specialize in a product category or cross boundaries (Hsu,
Koçak & Hannan, 2007), and in whether wine producers use a single method
of production or mix them (Negro, Hannan, & Rao, 2007). The evidence there-
fore is mounting that conformance to socially accepted categories enhances
organizational performance.
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Though the general idea that organizations could benefit from the legiti-
macy of their activities has been around since the earliest formulations of
organization ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), only recently has that com-
munity begun to think deeply about the process of legitimation, in particular
why some proto-forms become “populations” (i.e. recognizable industries)
while others do not. Hannan, Pólos and Carroll (2007) build on an established
literature on the cognitive basis of categorization to argue that legitimate
forms emerge when a group of organizations shares a large set of features
internally and when one or more of those features clearly distinguishes it from
other kinds of organizations. Imagine a Venn diagram created with a can of
spray paint. When the dots representing the organizations cluster tightly and
do not overlap with other dots, then audiences (investors, employees, con-
sumers, etc.) perceive the organizations within a cluster as an archetype. At
this point, key audiences accord the members of the set the status of a form.
Though these ideas have yet to receive much empirical attention—either in
entrepreneurial settings or elsewhere—they appear broadly consistent with
Ruef’s (2000) findings in his study of the emergence of organizational forms in
the medical sector.
Cognitive perspectives offer one approach to understanding better the
sources of industry-level legitimacy, but other approaches have also been sug-
gested. Drawing on the literature on social movements, for example, Rao,
Monin and Durand (2003) portray the diffusion of nouvelle cuisine within
French elite restaurants as being driven by an “identity movement” in which
the efforts of the pioneers of this new cuisine use cognitive framing techniques
to overcome the entrenched identity of classical cuisine. Similarly, Carroll and
Swaminathan (2000) describe the emergence of microbrewers as a social
movement formed in reaction to the consolidation of mass breweries in the
USA. Stuart and Ding (2006) meanwhile extend the concept of endorsement
to the level of a class of activity. Studying academic life scientists, they argue
that before entrepreneurship became a legitimate activity among faculty
members, only prominent scientists at prestigious universities could attract
the resources to found new firms. However, the movement of these admired
members of the scientific community into commercial science conferred
Entrepreneurship: A Field of Dreams? • 535
discussed since Berle and Means (1932) wrote about the separation of owner-
ship and control in the corporation, investors worry that entrepreneurs (and
managers more generally) might misuse funds if they receive private benefits
from doing so. Even when entrepreneurs hold substantial ownership positions
in their ventures, they routinely have incentives that act at cross-purposes
with those of the outside investors in the venture. For example, one might
imagine that an entrepreneur would want to pay himself a large salary. But
more subtle options also exist. The entrepreneur, for instance, may hope to
build resources, relationships, or skills that might pay off in a future venture,
even if they do not in this one. In fact, it is generally believed that pervasive
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trade with the same partners and even accepted less favorable prices from
their past partners than from “strangers”. Interestingly, these effects proved
even stronger when Kollock had students trade goods of uncertain quality (i.e.
an experimental condition allowing greater latitude for opportunistic behav-
ior). Even minimal prior contact produces a preference toward the familiar in
the lab.
These dynamics also appear to play out in the field. Sorenson and
Waguespack (2006), for example, studied the relationships between film pro-
duction companies and distributors. Not only do distributors exhibit a strong
tendency to contract with the same teams of talent, but when partnering with
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familiar parties, they also advertise their films more heavily and schedule their
releases on the best dates, even though their contracts do not require them to
do so. As with Kollock’s undergraduates, distributors appear positively predis-
posed toward those with whom they have prior interactions. These invest-
ments moreover have an interesting, unexpected effect: Films from their prior
partners perform better at the box office, possibly leading distributors to
believe that they made the right choices. But this effect depends entirely on the
investments of the distributors; once one accounts properly for the effects
of advertising and release dates, it becomes clear that distributors would do
better to spread their resources more broadly.
One could easily imagine that similar dynamics might underlie the resource
mobilization process. Prior connections, and the biased evaluations that they
promote, may allow entrepreneurs to attract capital from friends and family
and to recruit prior colleagues as early employees at relatively low cost. Though
biased assessments of the quality and trustworthiness of the entrepreneur may
predicate these exchanges, they nonetheless may solve market failures associ-
ated with the misalignment of incentives (and with uncertainty). Research into
these dynamics holds high promise, but it has yet to be applied to entrepre-
neurial settings.
Finally, social relations can also influence the enforcement of contracts. In
particular, the possibility of losing future trades with the same partner or with
others may deter actors from reneging on their agreements. However, the
strength of the disincentive to behave opportunistically depends on the posi-
tions of transacting partners. Using an analytical model, Raub and Weesie
(1990) demonstrate that connections among individuals matter greatly to the
efficiency of an actor’s reputation as a check on malfeasant behavior in
exchange relations. Assuming that social connections provide the channels
through which information about an actor’s past behavior moves through a
community (i.e. assuming that those with prior experience with an actor, and
their associates, know the integrity of an actor), the overall topology of the net-
work and the positions of actors within it determine the speed and severity of
the punishment for reneging on agreements. Robinson and Stuart (2007)
investigate these dynamics in a study of alliances in the biotechnology industry.
538 • The Academy of Management Annals
They find that the use of equity in alliance agreements declines among more
similar and more central partners. More similar partners more frequently share
contacts, allowing the enforcement of the agreement to substitute for the align-
ment of incentives. Also, because more central actors have more to lose from
being excluded from future transactions (because their reputations and posi-
tions are of greater value) and because their extensive social reach creates the
capacity for them to sanction others by spreading negative information
through the community, central actors are least likely both to behave oppor-
tunistically and to become a victim of a partner’s untrustworthy conduct.
Future research may consider whether these processes also play out at the level
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of the individual.
Another important domain for future research on incentive misalign-
ment—indeed, for work on the problems of uncertainty reduction and the
transmission of private information as well—is the role that online interaction
may play in fostering and shaping entrepreneurial activity. Despite enormous
advances in communication technologies in the last century, much scholarly
research suggests that geographically bounded, face-to-face interaction
remains vital to the development of the social structures that influence
exchange (cf. Sorenson & Audia, 2000; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). The past few
years have nevertheless witnessed an explosion in memberships on social net-
working sites, a rapid advancement in collaborative technologies (“web2.0”), a
proliferation of electronic communication in developing economies, and con-
tinued evolution in open source innovation communities. It is conceivable
that these developments may require us to revisit our understandings of
how social structure influences many of the fundamental information and
incentive problems in entrepreneurial processes. For instance, if online rela-
tionships become conduits for private or socially important information, the
volume of information exchanged, the shape and inclusiveness of “social” net-
works, the role of ascribed characteristics (e.g., gender, race) in structuring
interaction, the processes by which individuals rise to positions of status and
influence, and indeed every other social structural dynamic, may change.
Whether one is interested in how entrepreneurial activity depends on the
exchange of private information, the passing of referrals, the extent of trust
and level of reciprocity in relationships, the endorsements of prominent
actors, the diffusion of ideas, the formation of founding teams, and so forth,
the question of how these new forms of interaction may complement, substi-
tute, or somehow alter the functions of physical-world social connections
looms very large.
IV. Conclusion
Entrepreneurship-related activities represent a vitally important set of
phenomena. Not only are they relevant to the growth of economies in general,
but also they can have major effects on the career trajectories, wealth and
Entrepreneurship: A Field of Dreams? • 539
Acknowledgements
We thank Howard Aldrich for provocative discussions about the issues in
Section II of this paper, and Art Brief and Jim Walsh for their detailed comments.
Endnotes
1. According to data available from the Kauffman Foundation, the number of
endowed chairs in entrepreneurship more than doubled from 1999 to 2003, to a
total of 563. More strikingly, the number outside the USA has grown from 4 in
1991 to 158 in 2003.
2. Thornton (1999) discusses social and institutional factors that influence the
“demand” for entrepreneurs. Hoang and Antoncic (2003) summarize studies on
social networks and entrepreneurship, and Caroll and Khessina (2005) review the
implications of the organizational ecology literature to firm founding. Stuart and
Sorenson (2007) meanwhile build off of existing studies to outline an agenda for
future research on entrepreneurship and social networks.
540 • The Academy of Management Annals
3. Of course, our logic is admittedly circular; if the field could attain coherence and
independence, its scholars could more easily establish independent departments.
4. Of course, some issues, such as the mobilization of resources to build an organi-
zation, differ greatly from those of large or established firms, but the breadth of
issues is similar in extent.
5. We do not suggest that settings do not matter. Contextual elements, of course,
influence how social problems manifest, and scholars must familiarize themselves
with the settings they study. In most examples of good applied disciplinary
research in the social sciences, the investigators have far more than passing famil-
iarity with the empirical contexts in which they test (and sometimes develop)
their ideas.
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