Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

OTILIA STA. ANA, G.R. No. 164340

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SPOUSES LEON G. CARPO and AURORA CARPO,
Respondents. Promulgated:

November 28, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated March 5, 2004
which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) dated June 24, 1998 and reinstated the Decision[4] of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Laguna dated October 12, 1993.

The Facts

Respondent Leon Carpo[5] (Leon) and his brother Francisco G. Carpo are the registered co-
owners of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2175 of the Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision,
situated at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17272[6] of
the Register of Deeds of Laguna, with an area of 91,337 square meters, more or less. A portion
thereof, consisting of 3.5 hectares, pertained to Leon and his wife, respondent Aurora Carpo. It
was devoted to rice and corn production (subject land) and was tenanted by one Domingo
Pastolero (Domingo), husband of Adoracion Pastolero (Adoracion).[7] When Domingo passed
away, Adoracion together with her son Elpidio Pastolero, assumed the tenancy rights of
Domingo over the subject land.

However, on December 29, 1983, Adoracion, by executing a notarized Pinanumpaang

Salaysay[8] with the conformity of Leon, and for a consideration of P72,500.00, transferred her
rights in favor of petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana[9] (petitioner) who, together with her husband,
Marciano de la Cruz (Marciano), became the new tenants of the subject land.
At the outset, the parties had a harmonious tenancy relationship.[10] Unfortunately,
circumstances transpired which abraded the relationship. The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) mediated in order to amicably settle the controversy, but no settlement was reached by
the parties. Thus, the instant case.

In their Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment of Lease Rentals[11] dated

December 1, 1989, respondents alleged that it was their agreement with petitioner and
Marciano to increase the existing rentals from 36 cavans to 45 cavans, and that, if respondents
wanted to repossess the property, they only had to pay the petitioner the amount of P72,500.00,
the same amount paid by the latter to Adoracion. Respondents further averred that despite
repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay the actual rentals from July 1985 to September
1989, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817; and that the subject land had been
declared, upon the recommendation of the Human Settlements Committee, suitable for
commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta.
Rosa, Laguna. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ejected from the subject land and be
directed to pay P75,016.00 as unpaid rentals.

In their Answer[12] dated January 26, 1990, petitioner and Marciano denied that there
was an agreement to increase the existing rental which was already fixed at 36 cavans of palay,
once or twice a year depending on the availability of irrigation water; that neither was there an
agreement as to the future surrender of the land in favor of the respondents; that they did not
refuse to pay the rentals because they even sent verbal and written notices to the respondents,
advising them to accept the same; and that in view of the latters failure to respond, petitioner
and Marciano were compelled to sell the harvest and to deposit the proceeds thereof in Savings
Account No. 9166 with the Universal Savings Bank at Sta. Rosa, Laguna under the names of
Leon and Marciano. As their special affirmative defense, petitioner and Marciano claimed that
Marciano is a farmer-beneficiary of the subject land pursuant to P.D. 27. Petitioner and
Marciano prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint and for the declaration of Marciano
as full owner of the subject land.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The PARADs Ruling

On October 12, 1993, the PARAD ruled that petitioner and Marciano deliberately defaulted in
the payment of the rentals due the respondents. The PARAD found that the deposit made with
Republic Planters Bank was actually in the names of petitioner and Marciano, hence, personal
to them. The PARAD also found that it was only during the hearing that petitioner and Marciano
deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the Universal Savings Bank for the unpaid rentals. As
such the PARAD considered the deposits as late payments and as implied admission that
indeed petitioner and Marciano did not pay the past rentals when they fell due. The PARAD
further held and disposed thus:

The intent of the defendant to subject the said area under PD 27 should pass the
criteria set. Foremost is the determination of the aggregate riceland of plaintiff.
He must have more than seven (7) hectares of land principally devoted to the
planting of palay. Area over seven (7) hectares shall be the one to be covered by
PD 27 on Operation Land Transfer (OLT). In the case at bar, defendants failed to
prove that plaintiff has more than the required riceland. In fact the subject 3.5
hectares are jointly owned by two. Hence, coverage for OLT is remote.
 Defendant claimed that plaintiff is covered by LOI 474, and therefore, he is zero
retention of area. In reference to said law, wherein it provides landowner with
other agricultural land of more than 7 hectares, or have other industrial lands
from where he and his family derived resources, then, the owner cannot retain
any riceland. However, this is not applicable in the instant case, as the defendant
failed to prove that plaintiff has other source of income from where they will
derive their sustenance.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Ordering the ejectment of defendant from the subject landholding

for non-payment of lease rentals;

b) Ordering the defendant Marciano de la Cruz to surrender the

possession and cultivation of the subject land to herein plaintiffs;

c) Ordering the defendant to pay as actual damage the amount

of P75,016.00 corresponding to the unpaid rentals from July 18, 1985
up to September 16, 1989[; and]
d) [D]eclaring the subject land not covered by Presidential Decree No.
27, Republic Act [No.] 6657, and Executive Order No. 228.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner and Marciano sought relief from the DARAB.[13]

The DARABs Ruling

On June 24, 1998, the DARAB held:

It is a fundamental rule in this jurisdiction that for non-payment of lease

rentals to warrant the dispossession and ejectment of a tenant, the same must
be made in a willful and deliberate manner (Cabero v. Caturna, et al., CA-G.R.
05886-R, March 10, 1977). For a valid ouster or ejectment of a farmer-tenant,
the willful and deliberate intent not to pay lease rentals and/or share can be
ascertained when there is a determination of will not to do a certain act.

Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be

concluded that the defendants-appellants deliberately failed or refused to pay
their lease rentals. It was not the fault of defendants-appellants herein that the
rentals did not reach the plaintiffs-appellees because the latter choose to lend a
deaf ear to the notices sent to them. Clearly, therefore plaintiffs-appellees failed
to show by substantial evidence that the defendants-appellants deliberately
failed or refused to pay their lease rentals. It has been held that the mere failure
of a tenant to pay the landowners share does not necessarily give the latter the
right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the
tenant to pay (Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, 1 SCRA 1106).
 Thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the appeal interposed by the defendants-appellants to be

meritorious, the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and another
judgment issued as follows:

1. Enjoining plaintiffs-appellees to respect the peaceful possession

and cultivation of the land in suit by the defendants-appellants; and

2. Directing the MARO of Sta. Rosa, Laguna to assist the parties in the
proper accounting of lease rentals to be paid by the defendants-
appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. On April 16, 2003, Marciano passed away.[14]

The CAs Ruling

On March 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the PARAD that petitioner and
Marciano failed to pay the rentals and that there was no valid tender of payment. The CA added
that this failure to pay was tainted with bad faith and deliberate intent. Thus, petitioner and
Marciano did not legally comply with their duties as tenants. Moreover, the CA held that the
subject land was not covered by P.D. 27, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 228, since the same had become a residential, commercial and industrial land, to wit:

In the case at bar, We opted to give more weight to the petitioners contention
that the subject landholding is for residential, commercial, and industrial
purposes as declared by zoning ordinance of 1981 of the town of Sta. Rosa,
Laguna upon recommendation of the Human Settlement Committee xxx. The
vicinity map of the subject landholding shows that it is almost beside Nissan
Motors Technopa[r]k and surrounded by the South Expressway and several
companies such as the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and Toyota Motors
Philippines along the Pulong Santa Cruz, National Road. The vicinity map shows
therefore that the subject landholding is a residential, commercial, and industrial
area exempted from the coverage of P.D. No. 27, Republic Act. No. 6657 and
Executive Order No. 228.

The CA ruled in favor of the respondents in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to applicable law and

jurisprudence on the matter, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board-Central Office, Elliptical Road, Diliman, Quezon City (promulgated on
June 24, 1998) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered-
REINSTATING the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board-Region IV, Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (dated
October 12, 1993). No pronouncement as to costs.
 SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] assailing the aforementioned Decision which the
CA, however, denied in its Resolution[16] dated June 28, 2004.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARROGATI

NG UPON ITSELF WHAT IS OTHERWISE DARS POWER TO DETERMINE W
HETHER THE SUBJECT AGRICULTURAL LAND HAS
BECOME RESIDENTIAL/INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT

EQUATED LAND RECLASSIFICATION WITH LAND CONVERSION FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE PROPRIETY OF EJECTMENT OF AN
AGRICULTURAL LESSEE.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT

FAILED TO NOTE THAT AN EJECTMENT SUIT BASED ON A CLAIM OF NON-
PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTAL IS DIAMETRICALLY ANTITHETICAL TO THE
CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS NO LONGER AGRICULTURAL BUT A
RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL AREA EXEMPTED FROM
THE COVERAGE OF P.D. NO. 27, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228.

THE DECISION DATED MARCH 5, 2004--INSOFAR AS IT ADOPTED THE

FINDING OF DARAB-REGION IV, OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL
ADJUDICATOR, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA INSTEAD OF THAT OF THE DARAB-
CENTRAL--IS VIOLATIVE OF SEC. 14, ART. VIII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION FOR HAVING DECIDED WITHOUT EXPRESSING THEREIN
CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH SAID
DECISION IS BASED.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

RESORTING TO SURMISES AND CONJECTURES WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE FAILURE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER AND HER DECEASED
HUSBAND TO DELIVER THE LEASE RENTALS TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS,
WAS DONE SO IN BAD FAITH AND WITH DELIBERATE INTENT TO
DEPRIVE THE LAND OWNERS THEREOF.

Petitioner asseverates that there is no evidence to support respondents' claim that the failure to
pay the lease rentals was tainted with malevolence, as the records are replete with acts
indicative of good faith on the part of the petitioner and Marciano and bad faith on the part of
respondents.

Moreover, petitioner claimed that the power to determine whether or not the subject land
is non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL), lies with the DAR, and not with the courts; that mere reclassification by way of a
zoning ordinance does not warrant the dispossession of a tenant but conversion does, and
entitles the tenant to payment of disturbance compensation; the legal concepts of
reclassification and conversion are separate and distinct from each other; that respondents'
complaint before the PARAD alleged and established the fact that the subject land is a riceland,
therefore, agricultural; that the CA failed to explain why it upheld the findings of the PARAD on
the issue of non-payment of lease rentals; and that though the issue of non-payment of lease
rentals is a question of fact, due to the conflict of the factual findings of the PARAD and CA with
those of the DARAB, petitioner asks that this Court review the evidence on record, and pursuant
to the CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna, et al.,[17] rule on whether petitioner willfully and
deliberately refused to pay lease rentals as to warrant her dispossession from the subject
land.[18]

On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioner and her family are wealthy, as they
own numerous properties in Sta. Rosa, Laguna including a luxurious house;[19] that, as such,
petitioner cannot be considered as a landless tenant deserving the protection of agrarian reform
laws; that the DARAB negated the highest degree of respect the factual findings of the
PARAD deserved; that petitioner's claims that Marciano repeatedly made

verbal and written notices[20] for Leon to accept their lease rentals were fraudulent designs to
disguise the deliberate intent of petitioner not to pay the lease rentals; that when Leon went to
petitioner's residence, petitioner did not pay the P10,000.00 due as lease rentals; that during the
hearing before the PARAD, when respondents' counsel requested that they be furnished a bank
certificate as to the existence of said bank deposits in Republic Planters Bank as of April 20,
1987 and October 1, 1987, petitioner herself commented,Nagdeposito ho talaga kami sa
pangalan namin;[21] that the statement of petitioner is an admission that bank deposits, if any,
were made, not in the name of Leon as contained in the written notices, but rather in the names
of petitioner and Marciano; that such certificate was not introduced in evidence and that upon
inquiry, said deposits do not actually exist; that per recent inquiry, the bank deposit in Universal
Savings Bank only contains P1,020.19 due to previous withdrawals made by Marciano; that the
foregoing circumstances indicate a pattern of fraudulent misrepresentations by the petitioner to
mislead the DARAB into believing that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately refuse to pay
the lease rentals; that from July 18, 1985 up to the present, petitioner failed to pay the lease
rentals showing again, the deliberate refusal to pay; that this default on the part of the petitioner
has been recurring for several years already, thus depriving the respondents as landowners of
their share of the subject land in violation of the principle of social justice; that as raised in
respondents Omnibus Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[22] before the DARAB and as
found by the CA based on its vicinity map,[23] the subject land is of a residential, commercial and
industrial character, exempted from agrarian reform coverage; and that the DARAB erred in not
finding the sale of the tenancy rights of Adoracion to petitioner and Marciano for P72,500.00
violative of P.D. 27 even if the same was with Leon's consent. The sale, respondents contend
was therefore, null and void ab initio, not susceptible of any ratification.[24]
Our Ruling

Before we resolve this case on the merits, a procedural issue must be disposed of.

Respondents strongly argue that the instant Petition was filed out of time because, while
petitioner originally claimed to have received her copy of the CA Resolution[25]dated June 28,
2004, denying her Motion for Reconsideration,[26] on July 12, 2004, petitioner eventually
admitted, after respondents showed proof to the contrary, that she actually received the said
Resolution on July 7, 2004.[27] Thus, petitioner had only up to July 22, 2004 to appeal the CA's
ruling to this Court. In this case, petitioner filed her Motion[28] for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review on Certiorari (Motion) on July 23, 2004. As such, there was no more period
to extend. Further, the instant Petition was filed on August 27, 2004, or three (3) days beyond
the thirty-day extended period. Hence, respondents submit that the CA decision had already
become final and executory.[29]

Petitioner alleges that on July 15, 2004, she met with her counsel to engage the latter's
legal services. During said meeting, counsel asked petitioner about the date of receipt of the
assailed CA Resolution. Petitioner replied that she received her copy on July 12, 2004. On July
20, 2004, counsel filed an Entry of Appearance with the CA.[30] On July 23, 2004, petitioner
through counsel filed the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. On August 11,
2004, petitioner received a copy of respondents' Opposition to the Motion. Thereafter, upon
verification, petitioner admitted that she received the copy of the CA Resolution on July 7, 2004.
Thus, her Motion was admittedly filed one day late. Petitioner begs the indulgence of this Court
for her oversight and mistake, attributing the same to her lack of education and old age.

Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always within
our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural rules, even
the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.[31]

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo[32] is instructive:

We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that

merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the
circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the
appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases
where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a
clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system
and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the
full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.

In this case, petitioner was one day late in filing her Motion for Extension. To deny the
Petition on this ground alone is too harsh a penalty for a days delay, taking into consideration
the time, resources and effort spent by petitioner and even by the respondents, in order to
pursue this case all the way to this Court. Thus, we dispense with the apparent procedural
defect and resolve this case on the merits. The ends of justice are better served when cases are
determined on the merits with all parties given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and
defenses rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.[33]

The Petition is impressed with merit.

In sum, there are two (2) ultimate issues that require resolution in this case:
1) Whether the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had already become
residential, commercial and/or industrial, thus, excluded from the coverage of our laws
on agrarian reform; and
 2) Whether the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant, failed to pay her lease rentals when the
same fell due as to warrant her dispossession of the subject land.

On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative.

To recapitulate, the instant case sprang from a Complaint for Ejectment based on Non-
Payment of lease rentals. Though an allegation was made by the respondents that the land had
been declared, upon the recommendation of the Human Settlements Committee, suitable for
commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta.
Rosa, no argument was advanced by respondents to support such allegation, in the same way
that no prayer for the ejectment of the tenants was raised based on that allegation. The PARAD
held that petitioner should be ejected for non-payment of lease rentals. It also ruled that the
subject land is not covered by P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and E.O. No. 228, not on the basis of
the allegation in the complaint, but on the respondents' right of retention.

On appeal, the DARAB concentrated on the issue of petitioners failure to pay lease
rentals. When the DARAB ruled that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately fail to pay said
rentals, respondents raised a new issue in their Omnibus Motion that the transaction between
Adoracion and petitioner was void in violation of P.D. No. 27, despite the conformity
of Leon. This issue was not resolved by the DARAB.

Finally, when the case reached the CA, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the
PARAD that petitioner and Marciano deliberately and in bad faith did not pay the lease
rentals. The CA, however, also held that the subject land had already become a residential,
commercial and industrial area based on the vicinity map showing that the land was surrounded
by commercial and industrial establishments.
Without doubt, the PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the subject land
was no longer covered by our agrarian laws because of the retention rights of the
respondents. The CA likewise acted without jurisdiction when it ruled that the land had become
non-agricultural based on a zoning ordinance of 1981 on the strength of a mere vicinity map.
These rulings violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which
jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence. For
agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive
Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.[34]

In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid,[35] we held:

As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno [343 SCRA 153], "the DAR is vested
with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program." The DARAB has primary,
original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. No.
6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No.
 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations."

Under Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined
to include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating
to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions
of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee."

Simply put, agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in jurisprudence, are within
the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB, while issues of
retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform, among others, are within the
domain of the DAR Secretary.

Thus, Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:

SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or the

Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative
implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by
pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive
prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in
accordance with his issuances, to wit:

3.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the

agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of CLOAs and
EPs, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for
lifting of such coverage;
3.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or
disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries;
3.3 Subdivision surveys of land under CARP;
3.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates of Land
Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in
cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816,
including the issuance, recall, or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not
yet registered with the Register of Deeds;
3.5 Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;
3.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA
6657;
3.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ)
Opinion No. 44 (1990);
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock,
swine, and poultry raising;
3.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fish pond and prawn farms from the
coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
3.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found
unsuitable for agricultural purposes;
3.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses and
purposes including protests or oppositions thereto;
3.12 Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to
homelots;
3.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenants/farmer-beneficiary's
landholdings;
3.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
3.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and its
predecessors; or
3.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to
it by the Secretary of the DAR.