Statutory Construction, Chapter 2: Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. vs. ISSUE: Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of
POSTMASTER GENERAL, the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966 intended meaning of the words used therein?
CASTRO, J., En Banc
HELD: No. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering Caltex is not a lottery that may be administratively and
and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. The term in
of the law with respect to its application to a given case, question is used in association with the word "lottery".
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not "Lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of
explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions,
Laws, p. 1). prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are:
FACTS: In 1960, Caltex (Philippines) conceived a First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (El
promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its oil Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio). In the present case, the
products – i.e. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest." It calls elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the
for participants therein to estimate the actual number disputed Caltex’s scheme. However, with regards to the
of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will third element – i.e. consideration, SC found nowhere in
dispense during a specified period. Participation is to the said rules of any requirement that any fee be paid,
be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or
and/or licensed drivers". No fee or consideration is any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products participate. The scheme does not only appear to be, but
required to be made. actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by
chance. Like a lottery, a “gift enterprise” comes also
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for the said within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the
contest, Caltex made a letter to the postal authorities to tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration.
justify its position that the contest does not violate the The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon
the then Acting Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, are not identical, the terms "lottery" and "gift
opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the enterprise" are used interchangeably; every case must
provisions of The Postal Law – i.e. Chapter 52 of the be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
Revised Administrative Code, sections 1954(a), 1982 applicable statutory provision.
and 1983, which prohibits the non-mailable matter of
any information regarding "any lottery, gift enterprise, With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to
or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur
or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any a sociis — it is only logical that the term under a
kind". construction should be accorded no other meaning than
that which is consistent with the nature of the word
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only
a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmaster if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
General, praying that judgment be rendered declaring enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in
its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate
the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise"
petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the therein included. Gratuitous distribution of property by
attention of the public. The trial court ruled that the lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not
contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the resorted to as a device to evade the law and no
Postmaster General has no right to bar the public consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the
distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court. cultivated or stimulated thereby. Under the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum
like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was
ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and petition.
JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents.
G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997 Issue: (1) Whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction
PANGANIBAN, J., Third Division over the subject matter of the controversy. (2) Whether
petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason
of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal
Legislative intent is determined principally from the
Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to
Held: No. SC finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his
its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals
only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice erroneously charged before and convicted by
Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction
(Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596,
over them.
September 28, 1995).

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated Rationale: (1) It is hornbook doctrine that in order
"(to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not,
an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His
services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he the provisions of the law should be inquired
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla into." Furthermore, "the jurisdiction of the court must
whose trucks were left at the former’s premises. appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held
to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied." And for this
purpose in criminal cases, "the jurisdiction of a court is
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal
determined by the law at the time of commencement of
Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its
the action."
Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a
Section 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the
sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent
taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only
instances when the Sandiganbayan will have
subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him
to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or
then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck
employee who has been charged with a crime within its
owned by Ancla.
jurisdiction. However, the Information does no charge
petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal,
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir
accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing
of BIR stating that while he had made representations
an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime
said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his charged.
equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said
that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of
the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility. Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are.
Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for
the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before commenced to take part in an activity constituting
the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public functions, he obviously may not be deemed
public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the authorized by popular election. Neither was he
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the
appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2
to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National ESCHEAT - is a proceeding whereby the real and personal
Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint property of a deceased person in the Philippines, become
Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a the property of the state upon his death, without leaving
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be any will or legal heirs.
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a
public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer. FACTS: In January 1968, pursuant to Section 2 of Act
No. 3936 (Unclaimed Balance Law), some 31 banks
(2) Legislative intent is determined principally from the forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines all
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to names of such depositors or creditors known to be
its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have
only where a literal interpretation would be either not made further deposits or withdrawals during the
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." This preceding ten years or more. Respondent Bank, has only
is particularly observed in the interpretation of penal two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a balance of
statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of
to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . . ." P62.91.

Article 222 of the RPC “apply to private individuals who, Thereafter, or on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the
in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, Philippines instituted before the CFI of Manila a
provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property complaint for escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks,
and to any administrator or depository of funds or including herein private respondent. Likewise named
property attached, seized or deposited by public defendants therein were the individual depositors
authority, even if such property belongs to a private and/or creditors. Summonses were accordingly issued
individual.” The language of the foregoing provision is to defendant banks and the creditors/depositors
clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of requiring them to file severally their answers to the
the public funds or property enumerated therein and complaint within 60 days after the first publication of
commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions the summons with notice that should they fail to file
of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise their answers, plaintiff would take judgment against
be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring them by default.
public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed
or implied that a private individual falling under said Private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion
Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer. to dismiss the complaint as against it on the ground of
improper venue. Opposed by the petitioner, the motion
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. to dismiss was granted in the first assailed Order. Its
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH motion for reconsideration of said dismissal order
XIII, HON. JESUS P. MORFE, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND having been denied in the second assailed order,
petitioner interposed the instant appeal on pure
PRES. ROXAS RURAL BANK INC., respondents.
questions of law.
G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988
FERNAN, C.J., Third Division
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a
A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party
real party in interest in the escheat proceedings (2)
who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment of
Whether or not venue of action has been properly laid
the suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. Indeed, if in the City of Manila, since all defendant banks,
the bank were not a real party in interest, the legislature
wherever they may be found, could be included in one
would not have provided for its joining as a party in the single action (3) Whether or not Section 2(b), Rule 4 of
escheat proceedings.
the Revised Rules of Court on venue, likewise, governs
escheat proceedings.
The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant.
It manifests awareness on the part of the legislators that
HELD:
a single action to cover all banks wherever located in the
Philippines would not be legally feasible.

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2
1. A "real party in interest" has been defined as CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs.
the party who would be benefitted or injured by COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to PHILIPPINES, respondents.
avail of the suit. There can be no doubt that G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
private respondent bank falls under this BELLOSILLO, J., First Division
definition for the escheat of the dormant
deposits in favor of the government would
necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be
deposits. It is in this sense that it stands to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
"injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is the evils sought to be remedied.
for this reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936
specifically provides that the bank shall be FACTS: Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a CENRO assigned
joined as a party in the action for escheat. in Kidapawan, Cotabato, being investigated by the
Indeed, if the bank were not a real party in Ombudsman on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty,
interest, the legislature would not have abuse of authority and illegal cutting of mahogany trees
provided for its joining as a party in the escheat and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. To have a
proceedings. copy of the complaints against him, he was asked by his
counsel, Atty. Francis Palmones, to take his letter-
2. The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 request to the Office of the Ombudsman in the absence
directs the Attorney General, now Solicitor of his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez. Before
General, to commence an action or actions in proceeding, he talked to Perez who advised him not to
the name of the People of the Philippines in the worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he
Court of First Instance of the province where would be required to acknowledge receipt of the
the bank is located. The phrase "or actions" in complaint.
this section is very significant. It manifests
awareness on the part of the legislators that a
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the
single action to cover all banks wherever
Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the
located in the Philippines would not be legally
security officer to register in the visitors' logbook.
feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such
Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the
action under the same section, i.e., the province
name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed
where the bank is located. Thus, the addition of
to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
the last sentence, which the lower court had complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty.
correctly interpreted to mean "that for escheat
Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division,
of unclaimed bank balances all banks located in
Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the
one and the same province where the Court of
complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing
First Instance concerned is located may be
the name "Oscar Perez." Before petitioner could leave
made parties defendant "in one action" was
the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa
clearly intended to save on litigation and
Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They
publication expenses, but certainly not as conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned
authority for the lumping together of all banks
that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar
wherever found in the Philippines in one single
Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a
escheat proceedings.
customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida
reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who
3. Anent the third issue raised, suffice it to say that
recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court cannot govern escheat proceedings
principally because said section refers to The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A.
personal actions. Escheat proceedings are No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced
actions in rem which must be brought in the to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day
province or city where the rem in this case the of prision correccionalminimum as minimum, to four (4)
dormant deposits, is located. years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with
all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2
pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. Petitioner appealed as amended. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed just the same statute, it should be construed strictly against the State
the conviction of petitioner but nevertheless modified and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle
the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals
(1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and the object is to establish a certain rule by
and a fine of P5,000.00. conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be
violated Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act
6085, and is guilty of using an alias? done by him.

HELD: No. While the act of petitioner may be covered PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner, vs.
by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAÑO, Presiding Judge, Court of
offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII,
under which he is prosecuted. and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983
Rationale: Time and again we have decreed that DE CASTRO, J., Second Division
statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should If only for the above observation as to how the law should
be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with be applied in order that its objective could be realized
reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court and achieved, We cannot but find respondent judge's
may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a reasons for his denial of the petition for probation
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the liberality with which the law should be applied.
lawmakers.
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge
An “alias” is a name or names used by a person or of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a
usually in business transactions in addition to his real bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the indeterminate penalty of from seven years and eight
first time or substitute name authorized by a competent months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and
authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds four months of prision mayor, as maximum. He
by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and appealed to the Court of Appeals which reduced the
by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is penalty to one year and one day of prision
known by several different names and these are known correccional as minimum, to one year and eight months
as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a as maximum.
different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final,
intends to be known by this name in addition to his real petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he filed a
name from that day forth does not fall within the petition for probation with respondent judge, who,
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation
Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other following grounds: (a) to grant probation to petitioner
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under committed, and (b) petitioner is not a penitent
which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in offender.
business transactions which the anti-alias law and its
related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to
the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those probation?
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2
HELD: Yes. SC finds no sufficient justification for Legislature to automatically cover every violation of a
respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non- municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a
penitent offender. The liberality with which the nominal fine to enforce it.
Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
applicant for its benefits affords the better means of FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman was
achieving the purpose of the law (Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. appointed patrolman in the Quezon City Police
Leviste). Department by Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto on August
16, 1965. He was a civil service eligible having taken
Rationale: Under Section 9, P.D. 968 (Probation Law), and passed the civil service patrolman's examination
petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to given on November 24, 1962. He had also passed the
the benefits of probation based from a reading of the law usual character investigation conducted before
in its entirety, with liberality rather than undue appointment. As a newly appointed patrolman, the
strictness. In expressly enumerating offenders not petitioner went through and successfully completed the
qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the clear police training course.
intent is to allow said benefits to those not included in
the enumeration. On March 21, 1966, the petitioner's appointment was
forwarded to the Commissioner of Civil Service. On
The respondent judge’s reasons of denying petitioner’s August 18, 1966, or a year after the appointment and
probation - i.e. (1) petitioner will depreciate the with no action on the appointment papers being taken
seriousness of the offense committed, and (b) by the respondent commissioner, the respondents city
petitioner is not a penitent offender – are all erroneous. treasurer and city auditor stopped the payment of the
First, for purpose of probation, what the law gives more petitioner's salaries.
importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry
is more on whether probation will help the offender On May 12, 1967, the respondent commissioner
along the lines for which the probation system has been returned the Petitioner's appointment papers, without
established, such as giving the first-time offender a action thereon, to the respondent mayor on the ground
second chance to maintain his place in society through a that Mr. de Guzman was disqualified for appointment
process of reformation. Respondent judge would thus under Republic Act No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966,
be writing into the law a new ground for disqualifying a Section 9 (5) because of the presence of criminal record
first-offender from the benefits of probation. Second, culled from his information sheet, where the petitioner
the appeals made by the petitioner do not make him a “Yes” for Jaywalking-paid fine P5.50; Municipal O.d.
non-penitent offender. If petitioner appealed the (Mla.) Sect. 1187 (cochero) paid fine of P5.00.
decision of the respondent judge to the Court of
Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insisting on his The petitioner filed for certiorari and mandamus with
version by which he could hope either to be acquitted or preliminary injunction at the CFI but he was denied
at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to because according to the court, the requirement of “no
the benefits of probation. The recourse he took has, criminal record” means without any criminal record
indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His penalty and makes no distinction whether an act violates a state
was reduced on appeal which placed him within the law or only a municipal or city ordinance.
benign purpose of the Probation Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not violations and/or convictions of
ERNESTO M. DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. municipal ordinances, one, for 'Jaywalking' and the
HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Civil Service other, Manila Municipal Ordinance No. 1187,
Commissioner, HON. NORBERTO AMORANTO, as prohibiting the cochero from 'occupying any part of the
Mayor of Quezon City, ET AL., respondents vehicle except the seat reserved for him', constitute
G.R. No. L-31683 January 31, 1983 'CRIMINAL RECORD' to disqualify the petitioner under
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: the Police Act of 1966 (Rep. Act No. 4864) from
appointment to the Quezon City Police Force?

The phrase “criminal record” governing qualifications for HELD: No. Respondent Subido (Civil Service
appointment could not have been intended by the Commission Commissioner) should have gone deeper

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2
into the nature of the petitioner's acts instead of taking latter in substitution for REMEDIOS O. FORTICH, as
every "Yes" answer in Question 15 of the information Chairman, ANGELINO M. BANZON, RAFAEL B. HILAO,
sheet as an automatic disqualification. VALERIANO PLANTILLA and SEVERO YAP, as
members of the Board of Directors of the defunct
The requirements for applicants to a policeman’s National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
position may be quite stringent but the basic policy of Administration (NARRA), respondents.
attracting the best qualified is not served by G.R. No. L-30057 January 31, 1984
automatically excluding any person who in an absent MAKASIAR, J.: Second Division
minded mood or while hurrying to an urgent
appointment may unwittingly have crossed a street or It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term"
stepped down from the curb in violation of a jaywalking with the purview of statutes so as to effectuate the
ordinance. The same thing is true of a person who may statutory scheme pertaining to the office under
have worked his way through college as a cochero and, examination.
who, pitying his horse struggling up an incline or a
bridge, leaves his seat to stand aft and forward to FACTS: On January 15, 1960, members of the Board of
balance the calesa load or who, alone on his way home, Directors of the defunct National Resettlement and
sits in the seat intended for passengers only to be fined Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) approved
for violating an obscure municipal ordinance. Resolution No. 13, appointing petitioner Mr. Bruno 0.
Aparri, as General Manager. On March 15, 1962, the
The phrase “criminal record” governing qualifications same Board of Directors approved Resolution No. 24,
for appointment could not have been intended by the resolving and fixing the term of office of the incumbent
Legislature to automatically cover every violation of a General Manager up to the close of office hours on
municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a March 31, 1962.
nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a municipal
ordinance to qualify as a “crime “ must involve at least a Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with
certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, preliminary injunction with the then Court of First
corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably Instance of Manila on March 29, 1962. The petition
related to the requirements of the pubic office. prayed to annul the resolution of the NARRA Board
dated March 15, 1962, to command the Board to allow
Under Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, petitioner to continue in office as General Manager until
the respondent commissioner had 180 days from he vacates said office in accordance with law and to
receipt of the appointment papers to act on them. sentence the private respondents jointly and severally
Inaction means the appointment is approved as to pay the petitioner actual damages in the sum of
properly made. The papers were returned more than a P95,000.00, plus costs.
year by the commissioner after he received them. The
appointment, not having any defect of record except the On August 8, 1963, when the case was still pending
matter in issue in this case, must be deemed complete decision in the lower court, R.A. 3844 (Agricultural
and properly made after the 180 days period. The Land Reform Code), took effect. The said law abolished
termination of the petitioner's services was, therefore, the NARRA and transferred its functions and powers to
an illegal and invalid removal. The petitioner should be the Land Authority. The then CFI of Manila rendered
reinstated, assuming he meets the physical and other judgment, finding the case as moot and academic and
requirements of the Integrated National Police under dismissed the said case.
the new legislation and procedures governing police
forces. In addition to being paid any salaries for services On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the appellate
actually rendered but not paid, the petitioner, following tribunal affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
the formula in cases of illegal dismissals is entitled to motion for reconsideration by petitioner in the then
five years backpay (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA Court of Appeals was denied on January 10, 1969. On
175,187). January 20, 1969, the petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari to review the decision of the then Court of
BRUNO O. APARRI, petitioner, vs. Appeals dated September 24, 1968. The same was
THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY, the initially denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2
January 27, 1969; but on motion for reconsideration It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term"
filed on February 11, 1969, the petition was given due with the purview of statutes so as to effectuate the
course. statutory scheme pertaining to the office under
examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not
ISSUE: Whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series fixed by law. The power to fix the term is vested in the
of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of petitioner Board of Directors subject to the recommendation of the
without cause. Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks
HELD: Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of
before the expiration of his term. The petitioner in this the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the
case was not removed before the expiration of his term. rule in statutory construction that if the words and
Rather, his right to hold the office ceased by the phrase of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its
expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term to hold such meaning and the intention of the legislature must be
office. determined from the language employed, and, where
there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 51).
and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO
creating power. By "appointment" is meant the act of MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs.
designation by the executive officer, board or body, to MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO,
whom that power has been delegated, of the individual ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO
the power of appointment is absolute, and the HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing
appointee has been determined upon, no further officer,respondents
consent or approval is necessary, and the formal G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
evidence of the appointment, the commission, may CONCEPCION, J., En Banc
issue at once. Where, however, the assent or
confirmation of some other officer or body is required,
the Commission can issue or the appointment is
complete only when such assent or condition is What has been said above, relative to the conditions
obtained. Thus, the petitioner was appointed as general antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of
manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13, which is still section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals
incomplete because of the lack of approval of the clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority
President of the Philippines to such appointment. Such party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that
appointment was made complete only upon approval of the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium
Resolution No. 24, wherein President submitted to the between the majority and the minority parties therein,
Board his "desire" to fix the term of office of the with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are
petitioner up to the close of office hours on March 31, members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting
1962. balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said
provision for the selection of members of the Electoral
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play.
definite period of time which the law describes that an it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence,
officer may hold an office. Upon the expiration of the compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts
officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold performed in violation thereof are null and void.
over, his rights, duties and authority as a pubic officer
must ipso facto cease. In the law on Public Officers, the In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may
most natural and frequent method by which a public not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term those Senators who have not been nominated by the
for which he was elected or appointed. political parties specified in the Constitution; that the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate
may nominate not more than three (3) members
thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, CHAPTER 2
the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the
exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators
who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that
neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may
be nominated by a person or party other than the one
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate
or its representative therein; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make
such nomination and that the nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the
election of said respondents by the Senate, as members
of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

Case Digest by F.M. Orpilla, Jr. SBC1D (2012)

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