Operational Art Requirements in The Korean War: A Monograph by Major Thomas G. Ziegler United States Marine Corps

Operational Art Requirements in the Korean War
A Monograph
by
Major Thomas G. Ziegler
United States Marine Corps
School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Historical examples are an expedient way to develop an understanding of operational art
theory and concepts. A historical illustration of both operational success and failure is
the Korean War. Several aspects of the Korean War remain relevant to operational art in
contemporary conflicts. It had a complex and evolving strategy, a dramatic interplay of
tactical success and failures, uncertainty and miscalculation, shortages of means to
accomplish ends, and the difficult challenge to set the conditions for a satisfactory
conclusion to the conflict.
An examination of three distinct operational periods in the Korean War using the
requirements of operational art as described in Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 Unified
Land Operations will reveal whether operational art was a factor in success or failure.
This monograph argues that the commander met the requirements for operational art in two
of the three periods observed. Consequently, these two phases resulted in operational
success and contributed to the strategic aim. Additionally, this monograph will show the
design and execution of operations the requirements of operational art is a prerequisite
for success in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
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i
Abstract
The Requirements of Operational Art in the Korean War by Major Thomas G. Ziegler, USMC,
48.
Historical examples are an expedient way to develop an understanding of operational art
theory and concepts. A historical illustration of both operational success and failure is the Korean
War. Several aspects of the Korean War remain relevant to operational art in contemporary
conflicts. It had a complex and evolving strategy, a dramatic interplay of tactical success and
failures, uncertainty and miscalculation, shortages of means to accomplish ends, and the difficult
challenge to set the conditions for a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict.
America’s full-scale involvement in the Korean War began on 25 June 1950, when the North
Korean People’s Army (NKPA) invaded the south intent on reunifying the country through force
of arms. In little more than a month, aided by the element of surprise and superiority in almost
every category of military performance, the NKPA captured nearly ninety percent of the Korean
Peninsula. MacArthur’s conceptualization and execution of Operation CHROMITE was a
brilliant example of operational art. The amphibious assault at Inchon and subsequent breakout of
the Pusan Perimeter by Eighth Army achieved the strategic objective–the preservation of the
Republic of Korea. Then, after a hasty reassessment of strategic priorities, MacArthur led the
U.N. forces in a disastrous attack into North Korea. During this period, operational art
requirements were absent, and communist China intervened in the conflict. U.N. forces were
nearly defeated. After a withdrawal from North Korea, U.N. forces were able to reorient and
stabilize the conflict primarily due to the superb leadership and vision of General Matthew
Ridgway.
requirements of operational art as described in Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 Unified Land
Operations will reveal whether operational art was a factor in success or failure. This monograph
argues that the commander met the requirements for operational art in two of the three periods
observed. Consequently, these two phases resulted in operational success and contributed to the
strategic aim. Additionally, this monograph will show the design and execution of operations the
requirements of operational art is a prerequisite for success in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
ii
Table of Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Operational Art: Doctrine, Definition, and Requirements .............................................................. 5
Strategic Context ............................................................................................................................. 7
Case One: Operation CHROMITE: 15 Sept - 2 Nov 1950 ........................................................... 21
Case Two: Attacking into North Korea and CCF Intervention, 1 Oct 1950-24 Jan 1951 ............. 28
Case Three: U.N. Counteroffensive, 25 January - 8 July 1951 ..................................................... 38
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 48
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 50
i
Introduction
For at least two centuries, a fundamental tenet of American military theory is the idea that
the function of military force is to serve a political purpose through strategy. 1 Operational art
theory supports this idea by establishing the links between tactical actions and strategic
objectives. Using operational art, the operational commander organizes his vision for the
campaign into coherent actions informed by the purpose and understanding of strategic goals and
policy objectives. Without the necessary link that operational art provides, tactical actions lack a
unified purpose and can be counterproductive to the achievement of strategic goals. Using this
premise, assuming the strategy is sound, one would expect a campaign conceived and executed
within the guidelines of operational art to contribute to strategy aims.
Understanding and applying the art and science of operational art theory requires mastery
achievable through a combination of rigorous study and experience. Historical case studies can
provide concrete examples to test the validity of theory and doctrine. A critical analysis of the
examples provided by history to “derive lessons that prove or negate the validity of operational
[concepts] and ways of using one’s military sources of power” is the best method of education
available, short of real experience.2 Thus, the thoughtful consideration of military history, as
viewed through the perspective of theory and doctrine, is instructive for the military professional
seeking to excel in both understanding and application of operational art.3
A historical example of both operational success and failure is the Korean War.
America’s full-scale involvement in the Korean War began on 25 June 1950, when the North
1
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard, and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 90-99.
2
Milan Vego, "Military History and the Study of Operational Art," JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly,
Number 57 (2010): 124-129.
3
Clausewitz, On War, 170-174. Clausewitz discusses the necessity and limitations of historical
examples in the study of warfare.
1
Korean People’s Army (NKPA) invaded the south with 10 army divisions intent on reunifying the
country through force of arms. In little more than a month, aided by the element of surprise and
superiority in almost every category of military performance, the NKPA captured nearly ninety
percent of the Korean Peninsula. The United States decided to intervene in the defense of the
South and proceeded to press the United Nations (U.N.) for a resolution condemning the NKPA
invasion. Days later, the U.N. passed a resolution calling upon member countries to render
assistance to South Korea. General Douglas MacArthur, then in charge of U.S. forces in the
Pacific and of the occupation of Japan, became Commander of the United Nations Forces. As
U.N. and American forces echeloned into the fray, South Korea held on to the 160-mile Pusan
Perimeter protecting the only viable seaport in South Korea at Pusan.
In the first year of the war, operations shifted the balance of advantage several times. The
volatile character of the conflict demonstrated “rapid [changes in policy] with the success of the
initial North Korean advance, then the equally dramatic U.N. counter-attack and eclipse of the
North Koreans, followed by the intervention of China and the forcing back of U.N. forces, and
finally the relative stabilization of the military conduct of war…”4
Several aspects of the Korean War remain relevant to operational art in contemporary
conflicts. It had a complex and evolving strategy, a dramatic interplay of tactical success and
failures, uncertainty and miscalculation, shortages of means to accomplish ends, and the difficult
challenge to set the conditions for a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict.
requirements of operational art as described in the Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 Unified Land
Operations will reveal whether operational art was a factor in success or failure. The periods of
the Korean War presented here are 1.) The U.N. Counter Offensive: Operation CHROMITE, 15
4
Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: New York: Longman, 1955), 206.
2
Sept - 2 Nov 1950, 2.) The U.N. attack into North Korea triggering the Communist Chinese
Forces (CCF) intervention, 3 Nov 1950-24 Jan 1951, and 3.) U.N. Counteroffensive, 25 January-
8 July 1951.
This monograph argues that the commander met the requirements for operational art in
the first and third case, but not the second. Consequently, operations in the first and third case
correspond with operational success, in that they contributed to the strategic aim; however, the
second case was an operational failure. By examining the events of the Korean War using the
requirements of operational art found in doctrine, this monograph demonstrates when the
commander’s campaign met the requirements of operational art and when it did not. Additionally,
this monograph will show that fulfilling the requirements of operational art is a prerequisite for
success in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
Despite the claim by many that it is “The Forgotten War,” ample material exists for
research on the Korean War. Detailed historical accounts of the tactical actions of the Korean
War are easy to obtain, as are explanations of strategy. However, finding overt references or
analysis of operational art concepts in the Korean War is a difficult task. Considering the milieu
of the Korean War, this is understandable; operational art concepts first appeared in American
military doctrine in the 1980s. Thus, it is largely up to the researcher to establish the links
between the descriptions of tactical actions to the commander’s achievement of strategic
objectives.
Of the numerous historical publications concerning the Korean War, these works
primarily fall into three broad areas of scholarship: the American strategy concerning Korea and
the Cold War, chronological and encyclopedic histories of the war itself, and tactical accounts of
the battles and fighting during the Korean War.
Several comprehensive works exist on the Korean War and they contributed to the
research in this monograph. Of the many books consulted, the best comprehensive accounts
include Allen Millet’s first two volumes of a three volume set The War for Korea , 1945-1950 A
3
House Burning and 1950-1951 They Came From the North, Roy Appleman’s South to the
Naktong North to the Yalu, and Clay Blair’s The Forgotten War: America and Korea in 1950-
1953. These books contain detailed accountings of the strategic context as well as detailed
narratives of the tactics and operations. Each work contains a slightly different analysis of
specific events, but all are factually consistent. Diverse interpretations of events from multiple
sources provide the reader with a broader understanding of the complexities of the conflict. Two
other books of honorable mention are General Matthew Ridgway’s The Korean War and Max
Hastings’ The Korean War. Both offer insightful analysis of the political environment, strategy
decisions, and the realities on the ground.
The U.S. Army’s official history of the Korean War, which includes South to the Naktong
North to the Yalu, is a four-volume collection. Each volume is a well-researched and detailed
account covering the different periods of the war. In this collection, Billy Mossman’s The U.S.
Army in the Korean War: Ebb and Flow November 1950-July 1951 and Policy and Direction:
The First Year by James F. Schnabel are indispensable resources for military-focused research.
Several books explain specific aspects of the conflict. For example, Malcolm Cagle and
Frank Mason’s The Sea War in Korea describe naval operations. This book explains how the U.S.
Navy achieved maritime superiority of the waters around Korea allowing U.N. forces to stop the
communist invasion. Similarly, Robert Futrell’s The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-
1953 is a good analysis of aviation operations in Korea. Futrell provides an account of the Air
Force’s role in Korea providing transportation, evacuation, intelligence, and interdiction of enemy
forces.
Roy Appleman is arguably the most prolific writer on the subject of the Korean War. In
addition to South to the Naktong North to the Yalu, the research for this monograph relied on four
of his other works. The first, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur, explains the
Eighth Army’s defeat in North Korea. The second, East of Chosen: Entrapment and Breakout in
Korea 1950 is primarily about the Marines but deals with command of X Corps and Eighth
4
Army. The third, Escaping the Trap: U.S. Army X Corps in Northeast Korea 1950 is an inclusive
study of the overall X Corps actions in North Korea. Finally, Ridgway Duals for Korea describes
how General Matthew Ridgway consolidated and reinvigorated the Eighth Army and led them to
regain the initiative, recapturing Seoul, and reestablishing the 38th parallel.
Operational Art: Doctrine, Definition, and Requirements

An analysis of operational art requires beginning with a common understanding and a
definition. As is the case with all theory, operational art is an abstract concept. Doctrine, as an
interpretation of theory, allows room for judgment. 5 The interpretation of operational art differs
somewhat between joint and service doctrine. There is no right or wrong doctrinal interpretation
of theory so long as the concepts convey a shared understanding. With this in mind, the next
requirement is to choose which doctrinal reference to use for case analysis of this monograph.
The capstone publication establishing the doctrinal foundation of operational art for the
U.S. Army is Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations (ADP 3-0). ADP 3-0
provides a clear and succinct definition of operational art: “Operational art is the pursuit of
strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space,
and purpose.” 6 The core logic of operational art is that military force exists solely to contribute to
the realization of strategic objectives. Embedded in this logic is a responsibility of political and
senior military leaders to provide strategic guidance and the means to achieve it.
The function of operational art is to cognitively link tactical actions to strategic
objectives. This requires the commander to visualize tactical actions and anticipate how they
5
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 1-02 2004: Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2004), 494. FM 1-02 provides a definition of doctrine as:
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of
national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.
6
U.S. Department of the Army, ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations (October 2011), 9.
5
contribute to the strategic aim within the context of the operational environment. In other words,
arrange tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. ADP 3-0 further elaborates:
Hypothetically, military forces might accomplish a strategic objective through a single

tactical action, eliminating the need for operational art. In reality, the scale of most
modern conflicts and the ability of enemy forces to retain their operational capacity –
even in the face of significant tactical defeats – make this an exceptionally rare event.
Creating the military conditions necessary for the termination of conflict on favorable
terms usually requires many tactical actions. The effective arrangement of military
conditions in time, space, and purpose is the task of operational art.7
The task of this monograph is to assess if operational art concepts contributed to strategic
success or failure in the Korean War. Did operational commanders cognitively link actions in
time, space, and purpose in pursuit of the strategic objectives? To assist in this task, this
monograph will primarily assess the included case studies using the requirements for operational
art. ADP 3-0 describes the essential requirements for operational art:
Operational art is how commanders balance risk and opportunity to create and
maintain the conditions necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and
gain a position of relative advantage while linking tactical actions to reach a
strategic objective. It requires commanders who understand their operational
environment, the strategic objectives, and the capabilities of all elements of their
force. These commanders continually seek to expand and refine their
Understanding and are not bound by preconceived notions of solutions.8
The above paragraph, describes six requirements for the commander to achieve in the
application of operational art. They are:
1. Balance risk and opportunity.
2. Create and maintain the conditions necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative.
3. Gain a position of relative advantage while linking tactical actions to reach a
strategic objective.
7
Ibid., 9.
8
Ibid., 2.
6
4. Understand the operational environment, the strategic objectives, and the
capabilities of all elements of the friendly force.
5. Continually seek to expand and refine understanding.
6. Avoid the constraint of preconceived notions of solutions.
This monograph examines whether operational commanders met the requirements of
operational art during the three periods described above, and if operational art contributed to
success. It attempts to prove that if a commander meets only some or none of these requirements,
he likely will direct an ineffective campaign that does not achieve the political goal.
Strategic Context
Any critical analysis of operational art in a historical case requires an understanding of
the strategic context. The Korean War is no exception. General Matthew B. Ridgway begins his
book The Korean War by stating, “no one can fully understand the Korean War who does not
own at least elemental knowledge of the geography, the history, the climate, and the economic lot
of that country and its people. Knowledge of the strategic context of the Korean War enables the
reader to better understand decisions made in the strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions,
the motivations and decisions of the commanders, and how the U.S. led forces fought on the
ground, in the air, and on the seas surrounding the Korean Peninsula.” 9
Doctrine provides a useful framework to outline the strategic context. ADP 3-0 describes
the strategic context defined by “the specific operational environment, the character of the
friendly force, and the character of the threat.” 10 The operational environment is a “composite of
the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear
9
Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), 1.
10
U.S. Department of the Army, ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations (October 2011), 9.
7
on the decisions of the commander.” 11 The Korean War’s operational environment was a
dynamic mix of complexities “…greatly influenced by domestic conditions rooted deep in the
history of Korea, and by the topography of the peninsula where it took place.”12 The war was
also an event characterized by the power politics of stronger nations involving mainly the U.S.,
China, and the U.S.S.R., and the post World War II division of Korea into separate nations with
conflicting ideologies.
Korea’s geographic location makes it strategically important. Korea lies at the point
“where the Russian, Chinese, and Japanese spheres meet – the apex of the three great power
triangles in Asia.” 13 Competing interests continued to shape the Korean War as China, the United
States, and to a lesser extent, the U.S.S.R. sought to maintain Korea as a buffer against potential
future aggression and protect national interests in the region.
The topography of Korea presented significant operational challenges. “Few habitable
areas of the earth are more unsuited for large scale, modern military operations. The rugged
landscape, a lack of adequate roads, rail lines and military harbors, the narrow peninsula, and, not
least climatic extremes restrict and hamper maneuver, severely limit logistics support, and
intensify the normal hardships of war.” 14 Mountain ranges cover a majority of the Korean
Peninsula, particularly in the North and East. The Taebaek Mountain Range separates the east and
west coast with only one road in the north leading from Wonsan to Pyongyang. In 1950, few
improved roads existed in Korea. The limited roads were crucial for the movement of supplies,
11
Ibid., 2.
12
James F. Schnabel, The United States Army and the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The
First Year (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), 1.
13
Roy Edgar Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Department
of the Army, 1961), 1.
14
Schnabel, The United States Army and the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year, 1.
8
and forces, particularly when fighting damaged or destroyed the rail network. 15 Overall, U.S. air
superiority turned this into somewhat of an advantage as allied power punished the enemy using
the roads, forcing the enemy to move at night and through the slower restrictive terrain. The
effectiveness of close air support and air shaping operations was instrumental in supporting
friendly maneuver.
Compounding movement constraints were the several major rivers and large streams
flowing westward to the Yellow Sea and south to the Korea Strait.16 These rivers and the few
bridges that span them presented significant mobility considerations for military forces transiting
north or south. Both sides attempted to use geography of Korea to their advantage during the
course of the war.
Natural water boundaries surround Korea on all sides. 17 As a Peninsula, Korea has nearly
5,000 miles of coastline, with transportation routes following the coast. Few adequate harbors or
ports existed on the peninsula. Extreme tidal variations occur on the west coast. This geographic
reality made the peninsula exceptionally vulnerable to naval interdiction and blockade. 18 As a
maritime power, the U.S. leveraged particular advantage in naval superiority during the course of
the war for operational maneuver, logistics, and naval fires and air support.
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the Korean geography was the effect of weather
on men, equipment, and operations. The climate of the Korean peninsula differs dramatically
from north to south and season to season. The southern regions experience warm weather affected
15
David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War (New York: Hyperion,
2007), 507.
16
South Korea's four largest waterways, the Han, Kum, Naktong, and Somjin Rivers descend from
the Taebaek Mountains to the west and south. Both sides of the conflict used these natural defensive
boundaries and the bridges that span them to their advantage.
17
The Korean Peninsula’s borders are defined by the Yellow sea on the west, the Sea of Japan on
the East, the Korea Strait in the south, and the Yalu and Tumen Rivers on the north.
18
Harry G. Summers, Korean War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 4.
9
by warm ocean waters and the northern regions experience an extreme cold climate. The entire
peninsula experiences the East Asian monsoon in midsummer, turning roads into muddy tracks
and making off road movement impossible. The extreme cold in northern Korea, reaching -30 to -
40 degrees, severely restricted operations. More than just a tactical consideration, weather also
affected the conduct of operations. 19 Korea’s extreme weather often hampered crucial air and
naval operations. The onset of the severe weather conditions in North Korea contributed to
MacArthur’s decision to rush the rapid offensive into North Korea.
A prominent influence on the operational environment was the politics and history
behind the decision to divide Korea at the 38th Parallel. At the end of World War II, world
powers seeking to dismantle the Japanese Imperial Empire did not recognize Japanese dominion
over Korea. There was general agreement that Korea was not yet capable of exercising and
maintaining an independent government and a post war occupation was necessary as a temporary
expedient. 20 In February 1945, the Yalta Conference granted to the Soviet Union European buffer
zones – “satellite states accountable to Moscow”– as well as an expected Soviet pre-eminence in
China and Manchuria in return for joining the Allied Pacific War effort against Japan. 21 If the
Soviet Union would enter the war with Japan, it stood to gain significant territory and influence in
the Asia Pacific Region, including sharing occupation of postwar Korea.
As per a U.S. – Soviet agreement, the U.S.S.R. declared war against Japan on 8 August
1945. The U.S. dropped nuclear weapons on the city of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and over
Nagasaki on 9 August. On 15 August, six days after the bombing of Nagasaki, Japan
19
Stanley Weintraub, MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (New
York: Free Press 2000), 167.
20
James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York: W. Morrow 1988), 24. At
the Cairo Conference in November 1943, Nationalist China, the United Kingdom, and the United States
declared, "in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”
21
Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books 1982),16-18.
10
announced its surrender to the Allies. The Soviet Red Army moved to occupy the northern part of
the Korean peninsula as agreed. On 26 August, the Soviets halted at the 38th parallel for three
weeks to await the arrival of U.S. forces in the south. 22
U.S. military planners recommended the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th
parallel. 23 Despite popular belief, the location of the division was not arbitrary. They wanted to
include Seoul and a minimum of two ports in the U.S. Korean Zone of Occupation. 24 The Soviets
agreed to and abided by the proposed US occupation zone and the 38th parallel despite reaching
the boundary almost a month before US forces arrived.
Most Koreans did not welcome either the trusteeship or occupation of foreign troops.
After World War II, Koreans naturally identified with a broader global decolonization movement
and the desire among the Korean people to be an independent and unified nation fueled strong
nationalism. 25 Despite thirty-five years of Japanese occupation and subjugation, Koreans retained
a distinct culture and national identity. Two separate views of nationalism, one communist and
the other democratic emerged after World War II and formed the basis of the conflict between the
divided Koreas. In 1948, the U.N. administered democratic elections for the government south of
the 38th parallel, while the communist government in the North did not recognize them.
Consequently, the U.N. declared the 38th parallel an internationally recognized boundary
between North and South. 26
22
Summers, Korean War Almanac, 11.
23
Allan R. Millett, The War For Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 2005), 45.
24
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 19.
25
Millett, The War For Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning, 12-13.
26
Allan Reed Millett, The War for Korea,1950-1951: They Came From the North (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2005),125.
11
Tensions heightened between the Koreas as leaders in the North and South, created and
propped up by their respective foreign backers, sought to unify the peninsula under their rule.
Border clashes occurred frequently in the interwar period, and the two sides continued to grow
increasingly entrenched in separate visions of a Unified Korea. In the north, the Soviets and
Chinese aided North Korea’s leader, Kim Il-Sung in a significant build-up of military capabilities.
The U.S. assisted build-up of South Korea was considerably less robust. It provided the South
Korean leader, Syngman Rhee, enough for defense but not enough to precipitate South Korean
offensive actions to unify Korea. 27
Adding to the tension in the region, the Chinese Communists won the nation's Civil War.
In July 1949, the Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China. 28 The
perception of the growing communist threat was “ a critical force in United States Policy toward
the far east by the summer of 1950… the deep bitterness and frustration of the American people
about the “loss” of China to the communists... merely persuaded much if the United States that
anti-Communist regimes must be sustained and supported.” 29 In the “logic and language” US
policy makers, thwarting communist expansion would prevent a direct confrontation with the
U.S.S.R. and an eventual third world war. 30 Following this logic led President Truman and the
U.S. to commit to Korea in 1950. 31
In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson publicly declared South Korea,
Taiwan (Formosa) and Southeast Asia beyond the ‘defense perimeter’ of areas vital to American
national interests and announced the withdrawal plan of U.S. forces from their World War II
27
Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster 1987), 391.
28
Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene 1986), 558.
29
Hastings, The Korean War, 53.
30
Michael D. Pearlman, Truman & MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and
Renown (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 30.
31
Ibid., 30.
12
security zones. 32 In doing so, he unintentionally signaled that the United States would not
interfere with an invasion of South Korea. Russia’s Stalin and China’s Mao gave Kim cautious
approval for an invasion of the South. 33
The NKPA launched the invasion into the Republic of Korea with 135,000 men including
eight infantry divisions, a tank brigade, three reserve divisions and five constabulary divisions. 34
Despite a multitude of signs and warnings, the NKPA invasion caught both the Republic of South
Korea and the United States off-guard. The ROK could not react quickly enough with their eight
ROK Army (ROKA) divisions to the surprise and shock effect the NKPA forces achieved. 35
On 27 June, under the leadership and prompting of the United States, the U.N.
condemned the invasion. 36 Armed with the Security Council’s endorsement, President Truman
took resolute action. He immediately authorized air and naval operations south of the 38th
parallel to support ROK Forces. He ordered the U.S. Army to fight in Korea, directed the navy to
shell North Korean targets ashore, authorized air strikes north of the 38th parallel, and reactivated
the draft. 37
On 7 July 1950, the Security Council passed a third resolution authorizing the United
States to act as executive agent for the prosecution of the Korean War.38 Truman immediately
appointed General Douglas MacArthur the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command,
32
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 30.
33
Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North, 12.
34
35
Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North, 37,125.
36
Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Duell,
Sloan and Pearce, 1961), 774.
37
Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene 1986), 33-34, 49-50.
38
William Stueck, The Korean War in World History (Lexington, KY: The University Press of
Kentucky, 2004), 58.
13
a coalition dominated by the United States, the Republic of Korea, Britain, Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada.
General MacArthur was convinced that the ROKA “would soon be incapable of sustained
resistance” and could not prevent the NKPA from seizing the entire peninsula. 39 The ROK Army
lost 60 to 70 percent of its fighting strength in the first week and faced annihilation at the hands
of the North Koreans. 40 General MacArthur requested the introduction of ground forces and
promptly began committing elements of the four U.S. divisions in Japan to the fighting in Korea.
On 5 July 1950, the first element of the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan engaged the North Koreans in
South Korea. America optimistically thought U.S. presence and resolve to defend South Korea
would deter the NKPA. However, U.S. presence did not result in this effect. 41
Throughout July and August, Eighth Army and the ROKA, assisted by air and naval
support, delayed NKPA units in a withdrawal south to Pusan. MacArthur correctly identified the
port city of Pusan as the critical geographical point and resolved to defend it. In American hands,
Pusan would be the strategic funnel through which the allied build-up of men and materiel would
flow from shipment points in nearby Japan. If U.N. forces lost Pusan, they would lose the
peninsula and the war. Return would be extremely difficult or impossible. MacArthur placed the
U.S. Eighth Army in a cordon north and west of the city with orders to hold at all costs. The so-
called ‘Pusan Perimeter’ encircled an area 50 miles wide and 80 miles in length.42 The NKPA
continued to launch attacks against the perimeter, but increasingly resupplied and reinforced
39
Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost,19.
40
41
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Anchor Books
1989), 94-99
42
Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, 252-253
14
American and South Korean defenders held. In failing to pierce the perimeter the North Koreans
lost the hope of a quick victory.
From the late 1940s to the early 1990s, the United States was engaged in a continuing
state of political and military tension against communist countries often referred to as the Cold
War. As the free world's only superpower, the United States accepted responsibility for
“organizing the defense of the noncommunist world”. 43 The U.S. strategic objective to defend
South Korea was more than a U.N. restoration of the 38th parallel; it was a demonstration to the
Soviet Union that the United States and the free world would not tolerate communist
aggression. 44 Consequently, The United States viewed the conflict in Korea as a requirement to
contain communist expansion in the Cold War.
Within the U.S. policy of containing communist expansion, the strategic objective was
the preservation of the Republic of Korea and the restoration of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur’s
operational end state was the destruction of the NKPA. How far he could go to achieve this end
was a matter of some debate. U.S. policy makers had justifiable concerns over Chinese and Soviet
reaction to the unification of Korea under the U.N. banner. President Truman and the JCS viewed
the Soviets as the real enemy as wanted to avoid escalation of the war into a global
conflagration. 45 However, as early as 13 July 1950, MacArthur developed his plan to do more
than reestablish the territorial integrity of the ROK. MacArthur’s logic was with the destruction
of the NKPA, the path to the unification of Korea would be wide open. Here is where U.S.
Strategy failed to give clear guidance to its operational commander with a definitive long-range
policy concerning the Korean War. MacArthur “disagreed with a Europe-first strategy and, as a
43
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 23.
44
Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press,1985), 4.
45
Pearlman, Truman & MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger For Honor and Renown,
139.
15
result, cared little about preventing the Korean conflict either from expanding into other areas or
from involving directly Communist China, the Soviet Union, or both. The idea of halting U.S.
ground forces in Korea at the 38th parallel so as to avert Soviet or Chinese intervention never
occurred to him.” 46 MacArthur was willing “…to carry the war as far as the Kremlin if
necessary.” 47 Clay Blair in his book The Forgotten War, effectively summarizes MacArthur's
campaign plan:
He would first "isolate the battlefield" by closing off NKPA supply routes at the
China and Russia borders with American air power . . . After the battlefield had
been isolated and stabilized MacArthur went on, his intention was not merely to
drive the NKPA back across the 38th Parallel but rather to "destroy" it. This he
would do by reviving the recently canceled Inchon amphibious landing plan,
designed to trap the NKPA in giant pincers between those forces and an attacking
Eighth Army . . . After the NKPA had been destroyed the problem would be to
"compose and Unite Korea," and that might require American occupation of the
entire peninsula. 48
General MacArthur, as the unified commander was designated Commander in Chief, Far
East. He received orders directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army Chief of Staff. The
Army Component Command for Korea was Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker’s Eighth U.S.
Army. In June of 1950, Eighth Army consisted of four under-strength divisions (1st Cavalry and
7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions). Other units that would eventually deploy to Korea by the
end of September were the 1st Marine Division, and the 2d Infantry Division. During the first six
months, MacArthur established X Corps, which combined the 1st Marine Division, the 7th
Infantry Division and other US Army and ROKA units under its command. In February 1951,
MacArthur placed X Corps and its units under the command of Eight Army. The only American
46
Stueck, The Korean War in World History, 75.
47
Edwin P. Hoyt, On To the Yalu (New York: Stein and Day, 1985), 194.
48
Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953, 124.
16
soldiers stationed in Korea at the start of the war were the 468 members of the United States
Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). 49
The status of U.S. ground forces at the time of the North Korean invasion was not
favorable for the defense of Korea. Forces in the Far East were postured to defend the Japanese
islands from soviet invasion, however an unlikely scenario, but not much else. Defensive plans
for Korea did not exist. By 1949, all U.S. occupation forces redeployed from Korea and only a
handful of KMAG advisors to the ROKA remained in Korea. Government economies in the
aftermath of WWII reduced the U.S. Army active strength to approximately 591,000, about on
third of which were serving overseas in occupation duties. Lack of funds and occupation duties
hampered training programs. Additionally, post war reductions cut supply and procurement to the
very basics, exacerbating the readiness problems. 50
One of MacArthur’s primary objectives was keeping the traumatized ROKA fighting.
U.S. assistance to the ROKA deliberately created a forced “organized entirely for
defense…unable to take an offensive war across the border.” 51 On 15 June 1950, the Korean
Army numbered 95,000. 52 The National Police, organized for internal security and anti-guerilla
activity, totaled 48,273. The ROKA had eight divisions, four of which had only two regiments,
and two separate regiments comprised the Korean Army organization. Four divisions and one
regiment defended the 38th parallel; the remainder was in reserve. Yet, this force, which appeared
formidable, was hardly prepared to fight in a sustained operation. They were ill equipped and
marginally trained with only 10-15 days of supply. 53 The meager Korean logistical situation
49
Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North, 18.
50
Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost, 46-52.
51
Brian Catchpole, The Korean War, 1950-53 (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers 2000), 9.
52
Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, 39-40.
53
Millett, The War for Korea,1950-1951: They Came From the North, 29-31.
17
steadily deteriorated readiness. Supply and service provided logistic support only on a bare
subsistence standard. Fifteen percent of the weapons and thirty-five percent of the vehicles of the
Korean Army were unserviceable. 54
The United States actively fought two enemies in the Korean War – North Korea and
China. When the Korean War began, China was not involved. China issued an explicit warning
they would intervene if United Nations forces crossed into North Korea. U.S. leaders ignored this
warning. Chinese decided to enter the war in October 1950, when U.N. intervention caused the
collapse of the NKPA and U.N forces crossed into the 38th parallel. 55 North Korea’s strategic aim
was the unification of Korea under the leadership of the North. The Chinese believed that the
U.N. and a unified Korea posed a threat on their border and were afraid the United Nations would
use the Korean War to reopen the Chinese Civil War whose outcome the United States had not
yet accepted. The U.S.S.R. was at the time backing both countries with arms and support. 56 The
Soviets saw the expansion of communism as directly beneficial to their national interests.
Unlike the military buildup in South Korea, the NKPA, aided by the Soviets, amassed an
impressive force capable of offensive action. “By June of 1950, the North Koreans built up a
formidable military force: 130, 000 men under arms, plus 100,000 trained reserves.” 57 The
Soviets provided the NKPA weapons, including 150 T-34 tanks and significant indirect fire
capability including 122 mm howitzers, 45 mm antitank guns, and heavy and medium mortars. 58
54
Ibid., 30.
55
Roy Edgar Appleman, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (College Station
TX: Texas A & M University Press 1989), 10-11.
56
Millett, The War for Korea,1950-1951: They Came From the North, 29, 292-293.
57
E.B. Porter, Sea Power: A Naval History, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981),
363.
58
Schnabel, The United States Army and the Korean War Policy and Direction: The First Year,
39.
18
An additional factor that affected the character of the NKPA was the experience level and
number of trained personnel. Approximately one third of NKPA personnel served in combat with
Chinese Communist forces during World War II against the Japanese. After World War II, many
continued to serve with the CCF against the Chinese Nationalist during the Chinese Civil War.
After the Chinese Civil War, many battle-hardened and experienced soldiers repatriated to Korea
and formed a substantial portion of the NKPA. 59
North Korea began the war with 180 Russian built planes, but after the first weeks of the
war, they were nearly all destroyed by U.N. air forces. U.N. air forces achieved air superiority
after the first month of the war. 60 When China entered the war, they had a formidable air force of
650 planes. By the end of the war, the Communist Chinese Air Force (CCAF) increased to 1050
planes including 445 MiG-15 jets. 61 The CCAF primarily focused on defense against U.N.
bombers and largely ignored aerial interdiction and close air support missions. The CCAF
enjoyed a significant advantage of sanctuary in Manchuria, which was off limits to U.N. attack. 62
Neither North Korea nor Chinese Communist naval forces posed a significant threat to
the United Nations during the Korean War. While enemy naval forces were not a significant
threat, the use of naval mines was damaging to the U.N. effort, particularly at the Wonsan
Harbor. During the course of the war, mines sank five U.S. warships. 63
Between 13 and 25 of October 1950, the CCF crossed into North Korea with a force of
380,000 men organized into two army groups. The two Army groups attacked U.N. forces in
November 1950. The CCF lacked sufficient supporting arms. Their rifles consisted of “a mixture
59
Millett, The War for Korea,1950-1951: They Came From the North, 8-9.
60
Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 31-32.
61
62
Stanlis David Milkowski, “After Inchon,” in On Operational Art, ed. Clayton R. Newell and
Michael D. Krause (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994) , 222.
63
19
of Chinese, Japanese, German, and Czech” weapons.64 They lacked sustainment, particularly in
food and ammunition. 65 CCF tactics were not sophisticated. Lacking supporting arms, the CCF
used infiltration and massive frontal assaults aimed at fixing and isolating U.N. formations.
Initially these tactics were very successful as the U.N. forces fought separated and not in a
position to give mutual support. Later, when U.N. forces organized into prepared defensive
positions offering mutual support and maximum use of supporting arms, CCF tactics resulted in
massive casualties, and were not as successful.66
As both NKPA and later the Chinese operations extended further South, their material
and reinforcements were increasingly vulnerable to attacks from allied air. MacArthur’s
campaign design isolated the battlefield and exploited the biggest weakness in the NKPA force,
their inability to sustain operations with little or no logistics planning and preparation. The effect
of NKPA extended lines of communication and bombing shaped MacArthur's chances for success
in Korea. 67
By the end of July 1950, the last of the retreating U.N. forces in Korea were south of the
Naktong River, including the American 2nd division, 24th division, 25th division, 1st Calvary
division, 1st Marine brigade, and five ROK divisions, consolidated in a defense known as the
Pusan Perimeter. 68 For six weeks, U.N. forces fought desperately to retain the Pusan perimeter
from successive attacks and counter attacks pushing the Eighth Army to exhaustion. Supplies and
reinforcements continued to arrive by ship at Pusan. Until the perimeter stabilized, the U.N.
strategic objective–defense of the ROK–remained uncertain.
64
Appleman, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur, 456.
65
Ibid., 351.
66
Ibid., 353.
67
Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 262-268.
68
Hastings, The Korean War, 84-89.
20
Case One: Operation CHROMITE: 15 Sept - 2 Nov 1950
Operation CHROMITE began with the amphibious assault at Inchon on 15 September
and subsequent breakout of the Pusan Perimeter by Eighth Army. It ended with the link up of
forces south of the Han River and consolidation and the capture of Seoul. CHROMITE is an
exceptional illustration of operational skill, fulfilling all the requirements of operational art.
CHROMITE consisted of the following missions:
1. Seize the port of Inchon and capture a force beachhead line.

2. Advance and seize Kimpo airfield.
3. Cross the Han River.
4. Occupy blocking positions North, Northeast, and East of Seoul.
5. Using forces in the Inchon-Seoul area as an anvil crush the Communists with a
stroke from the south by Eighth Army.
Through operational maneuver aimed at achieving surprise, U.N. forces limited their
losses to 3,500 casualties – comparatively low to those that might have occurred from a frontal
attack against the NKPA. General MacArthur's forces demoralized the NKPA, destroyed large
amounts of equipment, killed 14,000 of its soldiers, and captured 7,000 enemy prisoners of war. 69
Landing on 15 September 1950, the Marines took the fortress island of Wolmi-do and
then captured Inchon. The 7th Infantry Division landed on the 17th of July and pushed on to join
the Marines, in the attack to Seoul. Eighth Army broke free of the Pusan Perimeter, pushed the
North Koreans back and eventually joined X Corps. U.N. forces recaptured Seoul on 29
September. In a special ceremony, General MacArthur returned the city to ROK president
Syngman Rhee.
CHROMITE was a brilliant example of balancing risk and opportunity. X Corps,
composed of 1st Marine Division and 7th Army Division landed on Korea’s west coast, cutting off
69
Appleman, U.S. Army in the Korean War, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, 489.
21
and entrapping the North Koreans besieging Pusan. Near simultaneously, Eighth Army conducted
a breakout of the Pusan perimeter and defeated the NKPA between the pincers of the two forces.
Several aspects of the amphibious landing at Inchon were risky in themselves, but
together, many assumed that the risk was unacceptable. The harbor on the west coast of Korea
has an extreme tidal range, dangerous approaches, and a high seawall. The geography of the
operation made the landing achievable only a handful of times a year, and then only brief
windows of opportunity existed. 70 X Corps required the reassignment of the First Marine
Provisional Brigade to 1st Marine Division from its critical support to the Pusan perimeter.
Amphibious expertise of the staff, although residual in the higher ranks left over from World War
II, was lacking in the lower ranks across the force. Just five years after World War II,
demobilization of forces and equipment depleted the ranks and made amphibious operations
almost unthinkable. 71
What was once the greatest amphibious force in the world was now barely able to scrap
together enough resources and trained personnel to conduct a two-division amphibious assault.
MacArthur lacked enough amphibious ships to carry out the task, but salvaged an amphibious
task force fleet from decommissioned ships crewed by former Japanese Navy personnel.
However, the potential benefit of accepting risk is often greater opportunity. The biggest aspect
mitigating MacArthur’s risk was the potential for operational surprise. “MacArthur’s selection of
Inchon as the point of assault was a blend of his strategic, psychological, political, and military
reasoning.” 72
70
Robert D. Heinl, “Inchon, 1950,” in Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious
Warfare ed. Merrill L. Bartlett (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 340.
71
Ibid., 340-343.
72
Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 77.
22
In this phase, MacArthur effectively created the conditions to seize the initiative
from the enemy. In order to take back the initiative, Macarthur had to first build enough combat
power to go on the offensive. MacArthur’s preparation for CHROMITE began months earlier
with shaping actions against the NKPA and efforts to build a force large enough to take the
offensive. The U.N. employment of supporting arms was critical to gaining the initiative. As the
North Koreans began attacking south, Truman authorized the use of air and naval assets in
support of South Korean operations. Strategic and tactical bombing operations began to slow the
progress and limit freedom of movement of the NKPA as the buildup of forces in Pusan began.
He persuaded Washington to send forces to halt the NKPA offensive. Throughout the summer,
the United States committed all the forces it could muster to delay the NKPA and defend the
Pusan Perimeter. By August, the remnants of five ROKA divisions, four Army infantry divisions,
a Marine Provisional Brigade, and a British Infantry brigade defended the 160-mile perimeter.
Replacements and supporting units including artillery and tank battalions continued to flow in
daily. By August, U.N. forces strength relative to the NKPA was almost 2:1 and was better armed
and supplied. 73
It is clear that MacArthur understood the operational environment, the strategic
environment, and the capabilities of his force. His strategic objective was the preservation of
the Republic of Korea under the political purpose of containing communist expansion.
MacArthur’s operational objective was destruction of the NKPA. To accomplish this end,
CHROMITE leveraged an indirect approach to attack the enemy’s key vulnerability – the lines of
communication of the enemy. During the movement south, the enemy’s lines of communication
became increasingly spread-out and vulnerable. The deliberate defenses around the Pusan
73
Hastings, The Korean War, 103. “…in reality. Kim Il Sung’s ruined regiments besieging Pusan
could now only muster some 70,000 men, against a total of 140,000 in Walker’s command.”
23
perimeter caused further vulnerabilities as the enemy’s concentrations around Pusan made them
open to air interdiction, and increased their necessity on supply through lines of communication.
With the NKPA attack now stalled, maritime and air superiority established, and a strong force
that in all areas was capable of domination of the NKPA, MacArthur was ready to seize initiative
away from the enemy.
MacArthur recognized his force lacked sufficient amphibious capable forces in the Far
East Command to execute such a bold maneuver under the precarious conditions at Inchon. He
needed Navy and Marine Corps expertise. He requested the 1st Marine Division and assembled a
planning staff. Both Navy and Marine planners, with experience from the World War II
campaigns in the Pacific produced the detailed plan. To conduct the landing at Inchon and
liberation of Seoul, the Navy created an expeditionary Task Force, Joint Task Force 7, and
MacArthur established X Corps, consisting of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry
Division. 74
MacArthur’s efforts to shape the operational environment allowed the U.N force to
gain a position of relative advantage while linking tactical actions to reach a strategic
objective. MacArthur effectively linked the shaping actions of the U.N. air and naval forces
against the NKPA, and the Eighth Army to halt the NKPA advance and retain the port of Pusan,
X Corps to conduct operational envelopment, and finally all the components of his force to
liberate Seoul and defeat the NKPA. The persistent weakening of enemy supply, the continued
build-up of friendly forces and logistics at the Pusan Perimeter, and dominance of the air and sea
began to turn the tide on the war by giving U.N. forces a position of relative advantage. These
actions also purchased crucial time to organize X Corps and conduct planning and preparations
74
Heinl, “Inchon, 1950,” in Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare,
453.
24
for CHROMITE. Through Operation CHROMITE, MacArthur further solidified his advantage
through the seizing of Suwon and Kimpo airfields and the Inchon port, allowing him to rapidly
flow supplies and troops to the front lines. Additionally, the recapture of Seoul gave the South
Koreans and their armed forces renewed spirit to continue fighting in the war.75
Operation CHROMITE changed the entire course of the war and was a brilliant example
of linking tactical actions in pursuit of strategic objectives. In a synchronized attack U.N. forces
took advantage of space, time, and force, and employed operational intelligence, operational fires,
and operational maneuver that allowed them to concentrate their forces against the NKPAs
critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities. By liberating Seoul and dislocating the communist
logistics system, CHROMITE caused the disintegration of the NKPA. The result of this phase of
the war was the U.N. returned to the 38th Parallel and thus the Republic of Korea preserved.
MacArthur continually sought to expand and refine his understanding of the
operational environment. During this phase of the war, MacArthur traveled frequently to the
front lines of Korea to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation. He correctly assessed the NKPA
was near culmination stemming from its long supply lines and massive casualties. NKPA
casualties before the execution of CHROMITE depleted the ranks of the communists who lost
almost 58, 000 troops and only had 40 of its original 150 T-34 tanks remaining. The NKPA
overextended supply lines ran almost 300 miles from Pyongyang to the units scattered on a wide
front. 76 MacArthur focused air and naval fires to further weaken the enemy’s lines of
communication and combat formations. They were under constant attack from naval fires and
U.N. air support from carriers and bases in Japan. Although the defense of the Pusan perimeter
was tenuous, MacArthur knew the well-supplied and well-supported troops could hold long
75
D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964, Volume 3
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1985), 482-484.
76
Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953, 172.
25
enough to execute CHROMITE. All MacArthur felt needed to accommodate a breakout was to
sever the vulnerable North Korean supply lines.
Despite serious problems with Inchon as a landing site, and opposition from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur continued to plan for the landing at Inchon. Several of his staff as well
as they JCS preferred a shorter, less risky envelopment. 77 However, MacArthur recognized that
only Inchon would result in a deep enough envelopment to liberate Seoul and cut the NKPA
supply lines. MacArthur correctly identified Seoul as the center of gravity for the enemy. Seoul
was a point where major lines of communication from north to south converge, making it a
strategic hub for logistics. Recapturing Seoul effectively unhinged the North Koreans and cut
them off. Additionally, as the capitol of South Korea, its recapture had a major psychological
effect.
During CHROMITE, preconceived notions of solutions did not constrain
Macarthur, possibly because his plan worked so well. MacArthur was famous for his strong
opinion, bordering on obstinacy and his ability to persuade others to his way of thinking. This
does not detract from the fact that his assessment of the situation at the beginning of the conflict
was sound, and his actions regarding Inchon as a landing site, the decisiveness of CHROMITE,
and the ability to get the forces he required. Unfortunately, this is almost the last time he was
right. Nevertheless, the conception of CHROMITE was both creative and original. The location
of the landing and the status of his force made many aspects contentious but thorough planning
and execution of Operation CHROMITE provided hope for the U.N. forces. For the first time
during the Korean War, the U.N. forces achieved operational success against the NKPA. With
CHROMITE, MacArthur achieved the principle of surprise, maneuvered his forces to put the
77
Millet, The War For Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North, 214-215.
26
enemy in a position of disadvantage, seized and exploited the initiative, and allocated combat
power to decisive points in the area of operations.
As planned, CHROMITE severed the North Korean overextended supply lines. 78 It
effectively linked tactical actions in time, space and purpose and contributed to the strategy
objective. U.N. forces soundly defeated the NKPA and forced them out of South Korea. As
September ended, U.N. forces reached the 38th parallel and halted shortly. CHROMITE achieved
the goals of the U.N. resolution; the border between South Korea and North Korea was
reestablished. In CHROMITE, all the requirements of operation art as outlined in ADP 3-0 were
present in MacArthur’s plan and the operational success is undeniable.
After the success of CHROMITE, MacArthur and the United States were more than
willing to lead U.N. forces into a new phase of the war. 79 On 30 September, China stated it would
not tolerate the invasion of North Korea. On 3 October, China stated that if U.N. forces entered
North Korea, China would intervene. U.S. State Department officials discounted these warnings
as empty threats. 320,000 Chinese staged in Manchuria. U.S. citizens thought the war would be
over soon.
On 27 September, the same day MacArthur returned Seoul to South Korea, MacArthur
received the mission from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “destroy the North Korean Armed Forces
and the authority to conduct military operations north of the 38th parallel to that end.” 80
78
Stueck, The Korean War in World History, 88.
79
James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964, 417-418.
80
Milkowski, “After Inchon,” in On Operational Art, 224.
27
Case Two: Attacking into North Korea and CCF Intervention, 1
Oct 1950-24 Jan 1951
The U.N. attack into North Korea can be considered a separate phase in the Korean War.
This phase began in October of 1950 with the U.N. pursuit of the NPKA into North Korea,
subsequent seizure of Pyongyang, and the drive to the Manchurian border on the Yalu River. It
ended with the Chinese attack on U.N. forces, causing the U.N. withdrawal from Korea and the
eventual recapture of Seoul by the Communists. In contrast to CHROMITE, the ill-conceived
U.N. attack into North Korea was a hastily planned, unsynchronized episode with competing
tactical actions that quickly unraveled U.N. momentum. It did not sufficiently achieve any of the
six requirements of operational art.
Although CHROMITE achieved operational success, the hammer and anvil strategy
envisioned for X Corps and Eighth Army was not completely effective. The linkup between
Eighth Army and X Corps took over a week. As a result, an estimated 25,000 to 40,000 NKPA
soldiers slipped north escaping U.N. forces. 81 North Korea’s leader, Kim Il Sung did not offer to
surrender and sufficient NKPA forces remained to pose a credible threat to the security of the
Korean peninsula.
America now had to decide how to “relate its military objectives to its political goals” in
choosing how to terminate the conflict. 82 “Truman had three choices; He could order a halt on the
38th parallel and restore the status quo ante. He could authorize an advance farther north to exact
a penalty for aggression. He could authorize MacArthur to unify Korea up to the Chinese border;
in other words, to let the outcome of the war be dictated entirely by military considerations.”83
81
Hoyt, On To the Yalu, 194.
82
Kissinger, Diplomacy, 912.
83
Ibid., 480.
28
After the successful Inchon landing, American opinion favored the later course of action–
U.N. forces should move into North Korea, liberate its population, and unite the country. 84 This
course of action aligned well with the 1947 U.N. aim of a unified Korea with democratized
processes. 85 Since Kim Il Sung refused to capitulate, authorizing MacArthur to conduct ground
operations in North Korea was “justifiable.” 86
On 27 September, twelve days after the Inchon landing, MacArthur received
authorization from the JCS to cross the 38th Parallel:
Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces. In
attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations...north
of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has
been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces,
no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations
militarily in North Korea... 87
With JCS authorization, , U.S. and ROK forces attacked with orders not to cross into
Manchuria or conduct aerial attacks north of the border. The ROKA continued the pursuit of the
NKPA, attacking into North Korea on 2 October. The South Koreans conducted a relentless
pursuit of the NKPA and seized Pyongyang on 11 October. On the same day, the ROK I Corps
seized Wonsan before X Corps could complete its backload on amphibious shipping. Eighth
Army, due to shortages in supply, did not commence drive towards Pyongyang until parallel 8-9
October. Nine days later X Corps completed its backload at Inchon. The X Corps plan called for
the First Marine Division to seize a base of operations at Wonsan while 7th Division would attack
88
west to link-up with Eighth Army near Pyongyang.
84
Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, 276.
85
Millett, The War for Korea,1945-1950: A House Burning, 121-122.
86
87
182.
88
Milkowski, “After Inchon,” in On Operational Art, 422-21.
29
In mid-October President Truman and General MacArthur conferred on Wake Island as
U.N. troops reached the limit of advance prescribed in the JCS . In discussions with Truman on
Wake Island, MacArthur told the president he did not think the Chinese would intervene to save
North Korea. He further added, if the Chinese entered the war, he would be able to isolate them
from Korea or defeat them in “the greatest slaughter.” 89
On 12-16 October, Chinese forces began crossing the border into North Korea
undetected. As U.N. forces moved north, evidence of communist Chinese forces in Korea
increased. Eighth Army forces continued their drive and secured Pyongyang by 21 October. On
24 October, General MacArthur unilaterally moved the limit of advance to the Manchurian border
and ordered his forces to proceed with all available forces to the north border of Korea on the
Yalu. 90 The Communist Chinese, concerned about American intentions, again warned of action if
the advance continued. On 26 October, the first South Korean Units of ROK II Corps reached the
Manchurian border on the Yalu River. Almost immediately, the CCF attacked and nearly
destroyed two ROK divisions of ROK II Corps and the 1st Calvary Division, causing Walker to
retreat to a defensive line south of the Chongchon River. 91 By the end of October, “the Chinese
had destroyed four regiments of the ROK 6th and 8th divisions–the bulk of ROK II Corps–as
effective fighting units.” 92
On 6 November, the CCF broke contact and withdrew. However , MacArthur, still
convinced that the CCF threat was a bluff, remained confident that China would not enter the
89
213-14.
90
Appleman, U.S. Army in the Korean War, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, 812.
91
92
Ibid., 20.
30
war. 93 He ordered both Almond and Walker of to continue the advance north. 94 On 23 November,
the main Chinese assault attacked U.N. forces causing them to withdraw under pressure toward
both coasts to evacuate North Korea. X Corps evacuated at Hungnam and disembarked at Pusan.
They immediately deployed back north to join Eighth Army into the fight. The CCF attack
advanced and recaptured Seoul on 5 January.
The decision and the conduct of ground operations in North Korea demonstrate an
unfortunate evaluation of risk in relation to opportunity. The opportunity to end the five-year
division of Korea presented a tempting strategic opportunity with obvious benefits. However,
attacking into North Korea carried an enormous risk of widening the war with China or the
U.S.S.R., whose intentions were still unclear. The decision to conduct ground operations in North
Korea was not MacArthur’s decision alone, but it was the course he preferred. Before the CCF
intervention, MacArthur was “…confident that the war for Korea had been won, and that his
armies were victorious. Now it was just a matter of cleaning up.” 95 Macarthur also remained
convinced that the threat of Chinese intervention was a bluff, despite intelligence that the Chinese
had massed 450,000 troops in Manchuria.
During this phase, MacArthur unnecessarily assumed considerable operational risk. The
plan for operations in North Korea relied on the incorrect assumption that China or the U.S.S.R
would not intervene. In the hasty reassessment of strategic objectives, little planning for
operations after CHROMITE took place. MacArthur did not inform his subordinates of the plan
for the Wonsan amphibious maneuver until 26 September.96 In light of the complicated
93
Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953, 447-449.
94
James, The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964, 527.
95
96
31
maneuver, the planning horizon was extremely short. Had subordinates known earlier, they could
have postured resources and forces to mitigate the impacts.
U.N. forces lacked sufficient planning to counter CCF intervention as well. MacArthur
and his subordinate leaders largely discounted the CCF threat. The only planned measure taken to
counter the contingency was to isolate North Korea from Manchuria through air operations
against enemy forces and bridges on the Yalu. 97 For various reasons, air operations were
unsuccessful at preventing “men and material in large force from pouring across the bridges over
the Yalu from Manchuria.” 98 U.N. bombing was successful in destroying only 4 of the 12 main
bridges spanning the Yalu. 99 Further, CCF forces and material continued to cross on pontoon
bridges and across the frozen Yalu River ice. However, even if U.N. air forces had successfully
isolated North Korea from Manchuria, “the bulk of the 300,000 CCF troops hiding in North
Korea, had arrived there before the bridge raids were under way…” 100
In neglecting to respect the potential and effect of CCF intervention, MacArthur
assumed unnecessary operational risk and left himself and his command susceptible to
operational surprise. MacArthur squandered the opportunity to exploit success and maintain the
initiative with inadequate planning and anticipation of the transition to operations in North Korea
and the potential for CCF intervention.
As he attacked into North Korea, MacArthur’s plan failed to maintain and exploit
the initiative gained at Inchon. Several events caused the initiative to pass to the enemy in this
phase. First and most prominent was the failure to anticipate and plan for China’s intervention
and the CCF offensive. Without a plan, U.N. forces ceded the initiative to the enemy and, in
97
98
Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, 222.
99
100
Ibid., 524.
32
operational shock, hastily retreated out of North Korea. U.N. forces possessed several advantages
in relation to the capabilities of the CCF. U.N. forces were “a modern force with the latest
weapons and communications, transport and resupply system with naval and air supremacy.” 101 In
contrast, the CCF was “a primitive force of light infantry with only light hand weapons, for the
most part, no resupply capability and primitive communications.”102 When Eighth Army
conducted its precipitous withdrawal from North Korea, it represented “the total disintegration of
the fighting force.” 103 Eighth Army failed to conduct rear guard actions or attempt to maintain
contact with CCF lead elements. This resulted in a complete lack of knowledge of the enemy’s
disposition, and unnecessary loss of life and equipment. U.N. forces had the capability to counter
and defeat the Chinese attack in the North but leadership failed to develop a comprehensive plan
for the CCF contingency and did not provide solid leadership when the CCF attacked.
Another event contributing to the loss of the initiative was the effect of the decision to
use X Corps to conduct an amphibious envelopment. Dictated by the compartmented terrain and
the need to secure a logistics port on the eastern side of the peninsula, MacArthur planned to land
X Corps on the east coast at Wonsan. Additionally, X Corps would seal the Wonsan-Pyongyang
corridor to trap fleeing NKPA forces. Securing the Port at Wonsan was a logistical necessity –the
U.N. logistics system was in a precarious position with most supplies originating from Pusan over
roads growing steadily worse with increased use. Six months of fighting heavily damaged the
road and rail system in the entire country and Inchon could not supply forces on the east coast.
However, The Wonsan operation did more to negatively affect the momentum of the U.N. attack
than to positively influence it. The combination of the backload at Inchon, heavy mining at
Wonsan Harbor, and travel time delayed the landing of X Corps for several weeks, effectively
101
102
Ibid., 353.
103
Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, 483.
33
taking X Corps out of the fight. Additionally, the backload of X Corps divisions at Inchon tied up
the port and delayed the offload of critical supplies at both Wonsan and Pusan.
Because of the Wonsan move, Eighth Army suffered critical logistics shortfalls during its
attack into North Korea. 104 Logistics delayed Eight Army’s attack north by several days allowing
NKPA remnants to reconstitute and defend the approaches to Pyongyang. 105 After months of
fighting on the Pusan perimeter, and the rapid advance of the Pusan breakout to link up with X
Corps at Seoul, Eighth Army was exhausted and near culmination. Macarthur’s inability to
transition quickly and smoothly caused a critical loss of momentum for the U.N. attack and
missed an important opportunity to employ X Corps to pressure the weakened NKPA. Even in the
absence of CCF intervention, the plan for the offensive in the north was not optimal.
Operations in North Korea did little to leverage a position of relative advantage
while linking tactical actions to reach a strategic objective. The basic tactical actions of
MacArthur’s plan appear sound. MacArthur planned for Eighth Army to seize Pyongyang, while
X Corps secured Wonsan Harbor and then link-up with Eight Army along the Wonsan-
Pyongyang corridor to trap fleeing NKPA. However, late in October, MacArthur directed Eighth
Army forces and ROK elements of X Corps to advance as rapidly as possible toward the
Manchurian border. 106 This terrain-focused directive did little to hasten the defeat of the NKPA.
Additionally it put U.N. forces in a disadvantageous position. As forces moved north, the
peninsula becomes wider, resulting in wide dispersion of divisions. 107 The plan described above,
with forces arrayed to defeat a weak and demoralized NKPA, did not posture U.N. forces to
104
105
106
Ibid., 499.
107
Ibid., 532.
34
counter a massive CCF assault. What was missing in MacArthur’s directive was a plan that
leveraged the U.N. strength in firepower and with forces postured for mutual support.
The plan to invade North Korea demonstrated little understanding of the potential
change in the operational environment resulting from CCF intervention, hastily changed
strategic objectives, and transition to operations in North Korea. Two major shifts in the
operating environment affected operations in this phase. First, the addition of a new enemy, the
CCF, after fighting for months and sent north with limited supplies approached its culminating
point.
As he ordered the attack into North Korea, MacArthur was unaware of the CCF
intentions or capabilities. MacArthur should have anticipated the nature of the developing
battlefield further in advance and with greater clarity. “…neither Eighth Army nor X Corps knew
the size and extent of the Chinese forces in their front. They were so poorly informed and
simultaneously so confident of their capability to overcome the Chinese who might oppose them,
that…the U.N. expected a quick victory…” 108 MacArthur discounted the threat of the CCF to the
point that realistic planning for the transition to fighting a new enemy would require.
MacArthur’s lapse in anticipation continued even while the CCF attacked in force. ‘MacArthur,
until better appraised of the situation, was pressing Walker to continue his advance.” 109
Truman and the JCS changed the strategic objective from preservation of South Korea to
defeating the NPKA north of the 38th Parallel to unification the North and South only after the
success of CHROMITE. A decision of this magnitude should be well thought out and
comprehensively planned. Occupying all of North Korea would necessitate a colossal post war
commitment of resources and personnel, but most importantly, it required plan for immediate
108
109
35
operations including contingency plans for Chinese or Soviet intervention. In changing the
strategic objective, MacArthur neglected the later stages of CHROMITE which included
defeating as much of the NKPA force in South Korea as was possible.
As operations unfolded, the ROKs secured Wonsan and Eighth Army secured Pyongyang
before X Corps could complete the backload at Inchon. Additionally the North Koreans mined
the harbor at Wonsan with over 3000 floating mines. 110 Although the Navy would need to clear
Wonsan port eventually, the urgent need to need to conduct the amphibious assault using X Corps
was no longer necessary sine the ROKA secured some three weeks earlier. Had MacArthur
obtained a better understanding of the operational environment he could have avoided the
confusion of unnecessary movements, loss in momentum, and logistics shortfalls caused by tying
up critical assets. As the operational environment unfolded, adaptations that could provide a
better employment of the force were not considered.
During this phase, MacArthur did not seek to expand and refine understanding of
the operational environment. The lack of understanding of the operational environment in this
phase is confounding, especially considering MacArthur’s brilliant vision and execution up to this
point. Although a matter of strategic importance, MacArthur failed to adequately anticipate the
operational impact of CCF intervention and the limits of air power to secure the border. After the
Success of Inchon, his superiors hesitated to question his judgment when pushing North to the
Yalu “ despite all evidence that prophesized disaster.”111 When the plan began to unravel, he did
little with the force he had to prevent it. He believed the CCF had the capability to force U.N.
forces out of Korea, despite the military advantages the U.N. possessed. He made
recommendations to the president and JCS to expand the war to China, which was fundamentally
110
Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, 146-147.
111
George C. Mitchell, Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar,
Citizen (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books 2002), 92.
36
not in line with policy. In a 6 December, MacArthur informed the Army Chief of Staff “If the
existing restrictions on his forces were continued and no reinforcements were forthcoming, [he]
believed the UNC forces should be evacuated to avoid their destruction. If Red China were
subjected to naval blockade and bombing and nationalist reinforcements were approved his forces
could hold in Korea.” 112 This recommendation to expand the war or evacuate, and the optimism
that air power alone could isolate the Korean peninsula demonstrates that that MacArthur did
little to expand his understanding of the operational environment in this phase of the war. By
February 1951, MacArthur’s drastic assessment of the situation and the measures that the U.N.
should take were proved categorically wrong as early as January 1951. 113
During this period, MacArthur displayed an inability to avoid the constraint of
preconceived notions of solutions. Macarthur and his subordinates discounted intelligence on
CCF intentions despite the multitude of intelligence pointing to the CCF entrance into the war.
Later Ridgway assessed that MacArthur had an “overriding belief he was right closed his mind to
all counsel. It simply cannot be argued that MacArthur was unaware of the enemy’s presence or
his capabilities.” 114 Later when CCF intervention could no longer be ignored, MacArthur’s only
planned reaction, isolation of the battlefield with airpower, was also flawed. U.N. forces may
have been able to defeat the CCF attacks in North Korea with proper analysis and effective
counter measures. He also failed to amend his plan for fighting with X Corps separately, even
when the ROKA secured Wonsan before X corps finished back loading at Inchon. The plan,
designed with the preconceived notion that CCF intervention was unlikely “was perfectly suited
to the pursuit and destruction of a weakened [NKPA] whose remnant forces were fugitive deep in
112
113
38. “Although the measures [MacArthur] had recommended against the Chinese outside of Korea had not
been taken and no reinforcements had arrived, MacArthur’s command had not been driven out of Korea.”
114
Mitchell, Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen, 92.
37
North Korea.” 115 Even after the first CCF attack in late October checked Eighth Army’s advance,
MacArthur failed to alter his preconceived notion of Chinese intentions or the possibility that his
forces were committed past the point of culmination. Instead, he ordered all forces to continue
the “drive forward to the Yalu as rapidly as possible with all forces under their command.” 116
Overall, the operational leadership of MacArthur in this phase failed to adequately meet
the requirements of operational art in every category and resulted in a military defeat. After the
withdrawal of U.N. Forces back south of the 38th Parallel, the strategic aim of the U.N eventually
reverted back to an armistice and status quo ante. 117
Case Three: U.N. Counteroffensive, 25 January - 8 July 1951

The transition of the operational initiative from the CCF to the U.N. forces in January
1951 also marked the transition to a separate phase of the Korean War. In this phase, Ridgway
radically retooled Eighth Army’s fighting spirit and professionalism. Furthermore, he
synchronized the operations of the entire U.N. force, enabling them to not only resume the
operational initiative, but to avoid an embarrassing strategic defeat at the hands of a primitive
communist force. This phase begins with the U.N. Forces in the defense south of Seoul postured
to resume the offensive and regain the initiative. It ends with the U.N. forces advanced to "Line
Kansas,” north of the 38th parallel. This phase of the war was another excellent example of
operational art in practice. In just under two months after the initial CCF attack, U.N. Forces
again turned the tide of the war by wresting the initiative from the enemy and therefore denying
the communists the ability to defeat the U.N. in Korea by military means alone for a second time.
115
116
117
The term status quo ante is Latin, meaning literally "the state in which things were.” The term
used in treaties to refer to the withdrawal of enemy troops and the restoration of prewar leadership. When
used as such, it means that no side gains or loses territory or economic and political rights.
38
Significant developments occurred in the midst of the Chinese intervention and U.N.
withdrawal from North Korea. By early January, the communist occupied territory south of the
38th parallel and recaptured Seoul. “In just two months, the Chinese changed the conflict’s
strategic context.” 118 U.N. forces withdrew to a defensive line south of the Han River. China’s
official entrance into the war caused the U.N. and the United States to abandon its short-term aim
of unifying the two Koreas. The ambiguity of the strategic aim of the U.N. slowly solidified to
preservation of the Republic of South Korea with the two countries somewhat approximating the
pre-war boundaries at the 38th parallel or status quo ante.119
In another critical development, a jeep accident in late December 1950 killed the Eighth
Army Commander, General Walker. General Matthew Ridgway “assumed command of a
defeated, retreating, and broken Eighth Army.” 120 Ridgway, a distinguished airborne general, set
out immediately to stabilize the crisis in Korea and set the conditions for an immediate offensive.
Latitude was not a privilege MacArthur extended to Almond or Walker. However, in the
operational aftershock of the fiasco in North Korea, MacArthur allowed Ridgway maximum
latitude to carry out operations, in effect making him the most prominent operational commander
in this case study.
Starting on 25 January 1951, Ridgway's Eighth Army, now with X Corps consolidated
under its command, pushed northward in a sharp series of carefully planned offensives aimed at
advancing to defensible terrain.121 By late April, Eighth Army recaptured almost all of South
118
Millett, The War for Korea,1950-1951: They Came From the North, 291.
119
Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951: United States Army in the
Korean War (Washington, D.C. : Department of the Army, Chief of Military History 1988), 490. Although
a general understanding existed to the shift in the strategic aim, the JCS did not officially direct Ridgway to
seek a negotiated settlement until 1 June 1951.
120
Adrian R. Lewis, The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World
War II to Operation Enduring Freedom, 2 ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 109.
121
Operations conducted in this Phase:
39
Korea and occupied a defensive line generally well above the 38th Parallel. In mid-May, the CCF
attempted a massive counter offensive, gaining ground across the peninsula, but at such great
expense that U.N. forces quickly recovered their losses and advanced further into North Korean
territory. The U.N. operational offensive ended in June of 1951. U.N. forces reverted to an
operational defense on the Kansas-Wyoming Line near the Iron Triangle. 122 The front remained
relatively static for much of the rest of the war. Further gains in North Korean territory were
militarily unnecessary to negotiate for the status quo ante.
In April, Truman relieved MacArthur as Commander of the United Nations Forces.
Despite several warnings from Truman, MacArthur has repeatedly made public statements, which
conflicted with the President’s policy in Korea and Taiwan.123 Truman replaced MacArthur with
Ridgway and General James Van Fleet replaced Ridgway as commander of the U.S. Eighth
Army.
Ridgway’s approach in this phase of the conflict correctly balanced risk and
opportunity. With China now in the war, “the Korean problem would not be solved by military
action alone.” 124 Military operations had to strike a balance of retaining the initiative but remain
restrained in order to reduce the risk of escalation. Total annihilation of a communist opponent
OPERATION THUNDERBOLT - Armed reconnaissance to retake offensive 25 Jan-20 Feb 1951;

OPERATION KILLER – Attack to reestablish U.N. Line east of Wonju 21 Feb-7 March 1951;
OPERATION RIPPER – Attack to outflank Seoul and capture Chunchon 7 March-4 April 1951;
OPERATION RUGGED - Attack secure Phase Line Kansas n. of 38th parallel 1-15 April 1951; and
OPERATION DAUNTLESS - Attack secure Phase Line Utah forward to Line Kansas 10-22 April 1951
122
The Iron Triangle is an area located 20 to 30 miles above the 38th parallel in the center of the
peninsula south of Pyongyang. It served as a key communist assembly area and communications junction.
It contained the major road and rail links between the port of Wonsan in the northeast and Seoul in the
southwest.
123
Pearlman, Truman & MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger For Honor and Renown,
192-195.
124
384.
40
was excessively dangerous. The JCS directed purpose of Ridgway’s operations was to "create
conditions favorable to the settlement of the Korean conflict." 125 Clausewitz phrased this purpose
similarly: "The end is either to bring the enemy to his knees or at least deprive him of some of
his territory–the point in that case being not to improve the current military position but to
improve one's general prospects in the war and in peace negotiations.” 126 In Ridgway’s case,
U.N. actions now had to overcome the will of the enemy without eliminating his capability to
resist. Ridgway’s approach, similar to General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City campaign in 1847,
was the deliberate and inevitable advance of his army. 127 The aim of this approach was to erode
the will of the enemy by demonstrating the futility in resistance. Ridgway now viewed his
operational objective as inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy without risking his force
unnecessarily. Ridgway’s job, in other words, was “to make the Chinese pay so high a price that
victory would seem out of reach.” 128 He decided the war “was no longer going to be primarily
about gaining terrain as an end in itself, but about selecting the most advantageous positions
available, making a stand, and bleeding enemy forces, inflicting maximum casualties on them.” 129
He limited risk by advancing beyond the 38th parallel only as far as justified by military necessity
to bring them to the bargaining table. Using this approach, Ridgway skillfully managed
transitions between offense and defense to balance operational risk to his force while at the same
time retaining the initiative to exploit the opportunity to deplete the enemy’s combat power and
political endurance.
125
Ibid., 396.
126
Clausewitz, On War, 570.
127
The flaw in this comparison is that in June of 1951, The U.N. stopped advancing for various
reasons of policy. The result is that the CCF felt no pressure to conclude an armistice and the Korean War
continued into 1953.
128
129
Ibid., 501.
41
Ridgway was committed to return to the offensive just as quickly as Eighth Army’s
strength permitted. He immediately created and maintained the conditions necessary to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative. Before he could recapture the initiative, he first had to restore
the fighting spirit and confidence of Eighth Army. Ridgway noted, “Before going on the
offensive, we had work to do, weaknesses to shore up, mistakes to learn from, faulty procedures
to correct, and a sense of pride to restore.” 130
When the CCF mauled U.N. forces in North Korea, Eighth Army suffered tremendous
casualties and loss of equipment, but the far greater damage was “the resulting defeat had crushed
[Eighth Army’s] morale.” 131 While Ridgway believed the Eighth Army had the strength and
means to defeat the enemy “most of his commanders did not share his confidence.” 132 His
dominant problem was "to achieve the spiritual awakening of the latent capabilities of this
command." If he could manage this, he was certain that the Eighth Army would "achieve more,
far more, than our people think possible-and perhaps inflict a bloody defeat on the Chinese which
even China will long remember." 133 Ridgway immediately initiated actions to improve the
welfare and morale of soldiers, to retrain them, and to restore their fighting spirit. He directed his
leaders to provide their soldiers everything they needed to fight in the harsh Korean winter, to
include hot meals and warm clothing. Additionally, Ridgway reinforced to soldiers the purpose of
the war by telling them why they were fighting in Korea.
To generate enough combat power to seize retain and exploit the initiative, Ridgway
directed adjustments to the tactical employment of Eighth Army to match his operational
130
Ridgway, The Korean War, 97.
131
132
Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951: United States Army in the Korean War,
209.
133
Ibid., 209.
42
approach. He believed Eighth Army was not fighting has effectively as it should against an
inferior CCF. He had "found only one or two cases where a Division has shown any appreciable
resourcefulness in adapting its fighting tactics to the terrain, to the enemy, and to conditions in
this theater." 134 In Ridgway's appraisal, the Eighth Army was "…opposed by an enemy whose
only advantage is sheer numbers, whose armament is far inferior quantitatively and qualitatively,
who has no air support whatsoever, meager telecommunications and negligible armor." 135
On his initial tour of the front, he gathered his corps commanders and issued simple
standing orders guiding U.N. actions and tactics.136 He directed immediate improvements in
leadership presence on the front lines, increased reconnaissance and patrolling, and mandated
immediate training in night fighting and marches. He mandated maintaining mutual support with
adjacent units in all operations. Additionally he directed improvements in the planning and
employment of one of the U.N. key combat advantages specifically tailored to defeat he
numerically superior enemy – massive artillery firepower. 137 Results of these changes were
instantly evident in the improved the combat proficiency of Eighth Army.
In this phase of the Korean War, Ridgway achieved a position of relative advantage
by clearly linked tactical actions to reach a strategic objective. His efforts to improve the
morale and fighting spirit of Eighth army were the first step in gaining a position of relative
advantage and stopping the communist advance south. Next Ridgway stabilized his position south
of the Han River in defensible terrain. He requested additional artillery divisions and Korean
134
Ibid., 210.
135
Ibid., 209.
136
Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953, 586-587.
137
Ibid., 586. Ridgway noted that infantry units typically used less than a third of their artillery
fire provided to them, yet routinely requested other means of support and reinforcement. In Ridgway’s
view, using artillery effectively not only contributed to his purpose of attrition of the CCF, it also limited
risk of CCF penetration.
43
laborers to help move supplies and prepare positions. Not wanting to stay in a static defense, he
transitioned operations to a “limited offensive-defensive posture” aimed at establishing contact
with the enemy and assess his disposition and strength. 138 When he found the CCF had limited
presence to his front, he conducted reconnaissance in force operations to secure forward
positions. This methodical approach not only enabled Ridgway to recover Korean terrain, it
established continuous contact with the enemy and allowed Ridgway to set the tempo of
operations.
Ridgway’s overall offensive plan was to advance and occupy a series of phase lines
running laterally across the peninsula along defensible terrain. Throughout the spring of 1951,
these phase lines served as successive operational objectives to advance the forward line of troops
north. To Ridgway, movement was less important than attrition of the enemy. Ridgway’s
offensives, intended to kill Communist troops with no particular territorial gains in mind, had the
opposite effect. The CCF “for the most part pulled back intact before the U.N. offenses, but in
doing so gave up substantial territory. It was the Communist offensives that killed off so many of
their troops.” 139 Before Ridgway’s directions, U.N. forces, would withdraw to avoid anticipated
encirclement when attacked in strength. “Ridgway realized it was a disaster to retreat once the
Chinese hit” and instead encouraged U.N. units stand and fight.140 He disciplined leaders who
withdrew “without evidence of having inflicted any substantial losses on the enemy.” 141 Major
engagements in February 1951 such as Wonju and Chip’yong-ni signaled a change in U.S.
battlefield tactics and demonstrated the effectiveness of Eighth Army’s tactical improvements.
138
Ibid., 571.
139
Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: An Interpretative History (London: Routledge, 1999), 67.
140
141
216.
44
U.N Forces backed by artillery and air, stood and fought against massive CCF assaults. Stopping
the CCF offenses demonstrated Eighth Army substantially regained the confidence and spirit it
lost during the long retreat from North Korea. His guidance for Eighth Army to maintain contact
and fight enabled his tactical actions to serve the operational objective of inflicting heavy
casualties on the enemy.
Ridgway understood the operational environment, the strategic objectives, and the
capabilities of all elements of his force. Before arriving in Korea, Ridgway had a unique
perspective of the complexities of the Korean War. Ridgway assumed command in Korea directly
from his previous assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army, where he monitored the
events of the war daily. He also was aware of the Pentagon views of how to prosecute the war.
Ridgway had served with MacArthur as his aide and was aware “just how shrewdly MacArthur
rationed the truth.” 142 This outside perspective enabled Ridgway to form an independent opinion
and a plan on how to win in Korea.
The JCS informed Ridgway that he could not expect further reinforcements.
Consequently, Ridgway had to exercise his tactical options conservatively to limit the risk to his
force. Ridgway explained his concept for operations as “inflict maximum damage on the enemy
with minimum [on U.N. Forces], the maintaining of all major units in fact, a careful avoidance of
being sucked into a trap – by ruse or as a result of our own aggressiveness – to be destroyed
piecemeal. We will pursue only to a point where we are able to provide powerful support.” 143 He
limited operational maneuver to a series of well-planned phase lines. Aided by thorough
reconnaissance and patrolling, he advanced his front only to occupy defensible terrain and to
142
143
Ridgway, The Korean War, 108.
45
maintain continuous contact with the CCF. By doing this, he avoided the risk of pursuing
objectives that were beyond his force’s capability to reinforce or defend.
Ridgway took steps to continually expand and refine understanding of the
operational environment. He focused intelligence efforts to develop an understanding of the
CCF tactics and even the capabilities of its units and commanders. He routinely traveled from
unit to unit meeting with commanders. For a time he “started his day flying in a small
plane…looking for enemy.” 144 He used the knowledge he acquired about the enemy to play at
least as big a role in the selection of the battlefield as his Chinese opposites.” 145 His ability to
learn from the enemy was the marked difference from his predecessors. In effort to offset gaps in
intelligence, he immediately ordered vigorous patrolling to establish and maintain contact with
the enemy. Ridgway saw the main mission of vigorous patrolling was “to acquire better combat
intelligence, which in his judgment had been sadly neglected and which was a prime requisite for
the still larger offensive action that he intended would follow.”146 Patrolling revealed the enemy
position and strength, permitting Ridgway to "obtain an accurate picture of the enemy’s power
and deployment." Although the lack of reliable intelligence was of concern to Ridgway, he did
not allow it to deter the offensive operations. For example, frustrated with the lack of intelligence
but suspecting the enemy lightly defended the area south of the Han River, Ridgway began
Operation KILLER and immediately followed it with Operation Ripper, resulting in the eventual
liberation of Seoul.
Ridgway demonstrated the ability to avoid the constraint of preconceived notions of
solutions. There were several prevailing notions of solutions that did not constrain Ridgway. One
144
145
Ibid., 502.
146
216.
46
such notion was that victory in Korea required a decisive military defeat of the enemy. Ridgway
strictly aligned his operations to the strategy objective– the limited objective of forcing the enemy
to negotiations table. Ridgway understood that gradual and deliberate attrition would defeat the
communists on the battlefield and enforce the U.N. bargaining position while not escalating the
conflict. Another preconceived notion, promoted by MacArthur, was that unless heavily
reinforced, the U.N. could not win against the numerically superior CCF. When Ridgway took
command of a defeated Eighth Army, the prevailing attitude was that the U.S. should withdraw
from Korea as quickly as possible. 147 Ridgway smashed such notions when he stopped the CCF
offensive and south of Seoul and immediately began an effective advance back to the 38th
Parallel. Ridgway was almost alone in thinking the dire situation in Korea was reversible.
The third notion was that Eight Army was beaten and helpless against the CCF. He did
not believe this and to counter it, he focused on rebuilding the fighting spirit of the demoralized
Eighth Army. Ridgway changed leadership when he saw that his subordinates, including
regimental, division, and corps commanders, could not or would not execute his orders. His
immediate efforts to improve sustainment to Eighth Army and medical capability to improved
fighting spirit and morale. He modified the tactics used by his Eighth Army from one of constant
retreat and limited contact with the CCF to maintaining constant pressure on their forces designed
to cause as much destruction to the enemy force as possible. Realizing a vulnerability of the
enemy was his susceptibility to culminate relatively early after an offensive, he exploited the
opportunity to counter attack after CCF major offensives, ensuring Eight Army focused on
inflicting casualties.
Ridgway’s campaign demonstrates an effective application of the six requirements of
operational art. After completing a successful withdrawal and defense, Ridgway’s Army mounted
147
Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, 665.
47
a series of offensive operations to regain lost territory and reestablish the defensive line along the
38th Parallel. Ridgway, as the operational commander, successfully wrested the initiative back
from the enemy. During the period of Ridgway’s command, from late December of 1950 through
April of 1951, the Eighth Army stopped a major offensive campaign conducted by the CCF. He
set the stage for Van Fleet’s assumption of command of eighth army and continued his
stewardship of the war as Commander of U.N. forces. The success of this phase within the
guidelines of policy is undeniable. Thus, this case study illustrates the importance of operational
arts requirements
Conclusion
The Korean War serves as an example of how both strategy and policy strategy can
evolve during the course conflict and how the conduct of operations must adapt to meet strategy
requirements. Both the success and failures of the operational commanders in the Korean War
serve equally as examples of the value of operational art. The three phases of the Korean War
presented above, illustrate the validity of the requirements of operational art as framework for a
successful campaign. The Korean War, particularly with the changing nature the first year,
provides an excellent subject for operational art study. Analyzing operational art requirements in
relation to the operational actions of the Korean War provide an example of how the success or
failure is determined by the commander’s ability to link tactical actions in time, space, and
purpose in pursuit of a strategic objective.
The conditions that cause the Korean War began long before June 1951. The US and the
U.N. fought in Korea to protect vital interests larger than Korea itself. American shortsightedness
in recognizing the strategic importance of Korea after World War II and the intentions of the
USSR and China to build an offense of capable North Korea contributed to the strategic context
of the conflict. In the beginning of the war, the method of prosecution of the conflict was easy to
determine. MacArthur needed to build up enough combat power to seize the initiative, when the
48
offensive has taken back the initiative, seek a decisive victory through military means. During the
first three months of the war, MacArthur designed and executed a brilliant campaign in a
seemingly textbook example of operational art. However, MacArthur disregarded prudence and
the concepts at the core foundation of operational when he recklessly attacked into North Korea.
When the Chinese entered the war in the second phase, military means were not enough to reach
the strategic objective within the price the political leaders were willing to pay. Ridgway had to
adjust his operational approach to completely new strategic problem. MacArthur was not willing
to adjust what he believed was the outcome of victory in Asia, and so he was relieved of his
command. Ridgway, understanding the strategic purpose of the war as containing communist
aggression without expanding the war, limited his operations and focused on defeating the CCF
inside of Korea. Ridgway’s knowledge of his mission and employment of his force fulfilled all
six requirements of operational art.
Finally, the requirements of operational art, as stated in ADP 3-0 are crucial guidelines in
designing a cohesive campaign. Although not codified in doctrine at the time of the Korean War,
operational concepts remain unchanged in modern warfare. An analysis of the Korean War shows
when operational art concepts were taken into account for the purposes of designing and
executing the campaign, and when they were not. The instances also correlate to success and
failure, demonstrating the validity of operational art in today’s theory and doctrine.
49
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Operational Art Requirements in the Korean War

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Title of Monograph: Operational Art Requirements in the Korean War

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within the guidelines of operational art to contribute to strategy aims.

seeking to excel in both understanding and application of operational art.3

Perimeter protecting the only viable seaport in South Korea at Pusan.

finally the relative stabilization of the military conduct of war…”4

challenge to set the conditions for a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict.

success in the pursuit of strategic objectives.

between the descriptions of tactical actions to the commander’s achievement of strategic

the battles and fighting during the Korean War.

decisions, and the realities on the ground.

Operational Art: Doctrine, Definition, and Requirements

The function of operational art is to cognitively link tactical actions to strategic

Hypothetically, military forces might accomplish a strategic objective through a single

application of operational art. They are:

1. Balance risk and opportunity.

3. Gain a position of relative advantage while linking tactical actions to reach a

capabilities of all elements of the friendly force.

5. Continually seek to expand and refine understanding.

6. Avoid the constraint of preconceived notions of solutions.

This monograph examines whether operational commanders met the requirements of

future aggression and protect national interests in the region.

The topography of Korea presented significant operational challenges. “Few habitable

course of the war.

MacArthur’s decision to rush the rapid offensive into North Korea.

zones – “satellite states accountable to Moscow”– as well as an expected Soviet pre-eminence in

the Asia Pacific Region, including sharing occupation of postwar Korea.

weeks to await the arrival of U.S. forces in the south. 22

the boundary almost a month before US forces arrived.

between North and South. 26

offensive actions to unify Korea. 27

U.S. to commit to Korea in 1950. 31

approval for an invasion of the South. 33

Zealand, and Canada.

lost the hope of a quick victory.

contain communist expansion in the Cold War.

Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). 49

very basics, exacerbating the readiness problems. 50

Korean Army were unserviceable. 54

and formed a substantial portion of the NKPA. 59

massive casualties, and were not as successful.66

strategic objective–defense of the ROK–remained uncertain.

CHROMITE consisted of the following missions:

1. Seize the port of Inchon and capture a force beachhead line.

CHROMITE was a brilliant example of balancing risk and opportunity. X Corps,

It is clear that MacArthur understood the operational environment, the strategic

away from the enemy.

MacArthur continually sought to expand and refine his understanding of the

sever the vulnerable North Korean supply lines.

During CHROMITE, preconceived notions of solutions did not constrain