I. SHORT TITLE: Imbong vs.

Ochoa
II. FULL TITLE: JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for
themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., VERSUS HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government(OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- They were also one of the respondent parties)
– G.R. No. 99031, April 8, 2014; J. MENDOZA
III. TOPIC: State Principles and Policies- Constitutionality of RH Bill
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
“Freedom of religion was accorded
preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good."
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur
on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and
two (2) petitions- in-intervention. to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong
and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition, filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation
Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche and
several others in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the
generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari, filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc.,
and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force
Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc., Rosevale Foundation, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution, and several others, in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition, filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, in their capacities as a citizens and
taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc., and several others in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(PAX);
(8) Petition, filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by spouses Francisco and Maria
Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his
capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation
Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on
behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition, filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc., Attys.
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia
Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others, in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Couples for Christ Foundation,
Inc. and several others, in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M.
Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention, filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as
a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention, filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an
accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH
Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception.
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal
access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer
and other health problems.
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that
the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it
authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to
their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels
medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on
reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious
beliefs and convictions.
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the RH Law (RH-IRR), provides that skilled health professionals who are public
officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers,
medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses,
public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with
the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory
sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious
beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is
not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present
danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the
right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they
are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment.
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by
PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean
that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners
services.
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the
RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any
violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated
as "violation" of the RH Law.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the
right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their
own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer." It ignores the management prerogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a
full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only
his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they
are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform
the service or procedure.
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive
health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between
the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also
claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of
parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative
authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
 power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1
), Article VI of the Constitution.
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units
(LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended
that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local
government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs
and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective
comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside
from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions
in behalf of the respondents, Congressman Edcel C. Lagman, former officials of
the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr.
Alberto G. Romualdez, the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health
(C4RH), Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, and Atty. Joan De Venecia also filed their
respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June
4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the
petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1]
there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe
for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH
Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: (NOTE: Di na to dumaan sa lower court SC agad
kaya yung mababasa niyo dito yung preliminary conference palang bago
mag start yung proceedings)

On March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the
Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels
of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties
and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases
were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended
until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their
clarification on some contentions of the parties.

X(THIS IS A BACKGROUND OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE and THE RH LAW)X

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws)

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale,
dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as
June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices."
Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner."

In addition, R.A. No. 5921, approved on June 21, 1969, contained

provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances
and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical
product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on

Population, which recognized that the population problem should be considered
as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures
that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.
Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971,
entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the
Commission on Population and for Other Purposes." The law envisioned that
"family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and
effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size;
mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos

issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, dated December 8, 1972, which, among
others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided
"family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all
acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
 Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. Under
that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of
family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments
made in the International Conference on Population and Development. Thus, on
August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for
Women,” which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive
health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex
education.

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country

kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27
million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in
the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. The executive and the legislative, thus,
felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law
was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access
and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health
education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to
carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and

make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population
control.
X(END OF BACKGROUND OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE and THE RH LAW)X

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the
right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior
to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per
se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale
and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription
duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant
under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
 bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the
remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The
State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods
and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and
supplies. X x x

VI. ISSUE/S:
The court synthesized and redefined the contentions into:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
VII. RULING:
“Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing
rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.”
I. Procedural Issue:
The Power of Judicial Review
OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of
Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it
being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency." The OSG posits that the authority of the Court
to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the
Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. It further
asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are
improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.
 Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot
prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its
face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the
actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper
its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government,
which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution.
in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In order
to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only
at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive
and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave
abuse of discretion.
Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution.
The Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may
be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise.
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but,
rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review,
the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. “Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional
provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis
supplied]
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present
any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.
They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe
for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions
and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite
and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.
Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question
being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are
not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures
to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
The petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the
subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face"
as it is not a speech regulating measure.
The court was not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as
a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right
of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
This court under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain
the supremacy of the Constitution.
***Considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their
respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the
petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them, and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices
that are abortive.
Petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite
locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that
one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of
his own rights.
Transcendental Importance
Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest."
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an
"as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the
locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not
otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule
on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more
than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such
as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to
the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for
the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression
and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among
a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise
issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before
taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this
time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperiled to be
violated.

Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so
the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.
The respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive
health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming
that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population
control measure.
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court
sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-
preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on
the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family
planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to
reduce the number of births in the country.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea
of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the
RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related
to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows
that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed
in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the
human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination
of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the
right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law
must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed
of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act."
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving
"sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
II. Substantive Issue:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and
health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The
assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively
sanctions abortion.

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion,

Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford
protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-
abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectable and other
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies,
medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate
to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.

The petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use

contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be
used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited.

Position of the Respondents

 For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend
that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes
that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices
products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that

contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law.

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of
one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show
that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he
argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that
only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right
to life.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning

methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A.
No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of
male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population
control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic
development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other
family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.

Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population

program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these
principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates
from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it
was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception.

This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of.
For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription
prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because,
amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life
begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

Those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with

"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the
spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the
fertilized ovum in the uterus.

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution

should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of
law to prevail.
 In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources,
means that life begins at fertilization.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US

Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the
pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting
fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby
or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of

the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization."

It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the
earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would
allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the
right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is
an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

Medical Meaning
 Conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby
s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the
beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote."

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),used

by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human
person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the
sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with
a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and
therein concluded that:

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time
that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at
this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred
from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit,
no matter what the purported good outcome would be.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human

organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well
defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the
factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or
religious view of human life or of human embryos.

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical

parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and
that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by
Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or

scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of
the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind.
To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the

utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at
the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and

abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record
of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:

The intention is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever
passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and
actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH
Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the
fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for
implantation.

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the
Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized
ovum.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting

abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. By using the word “or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs
or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those
that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an
abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,
upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the
RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces
abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which
induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits
any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third
kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to
the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the
Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. And as defined
by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or
destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the
law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd.

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and
non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of
Section 9, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the
FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot
be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire
by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will
be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-
IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient. Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are
well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section
3.0l (a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be

declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life
of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a
contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect
is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized
ovum.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in

line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word “primarily" in
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l (a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy
the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution."

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion"

embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion
of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all
national hospitals. "Sexual health" under Sections 4(p) and (w) of the RH Law, the
petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women
have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution
is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and
policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute
the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this

regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the
right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to
provide for the health of the people.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-

executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly

ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays
that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a
prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of

hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the
National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination
by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of

contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives
violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their
religious beliefs.

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address
religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes
upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive
health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for
the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend

that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is
still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers.
They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine
of Benevolent Neutrality. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive
effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health
services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom
they are required.

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector
to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings.
 Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state
interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no
emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how
the rights of the people are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the
impairment of religious freedom.

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring

would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars
and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes
their religious beliefs. As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners
claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and
information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs
afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not
provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or
artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. They point out that
the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible,
effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child
health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution, and that what the law only prohibits are those acts
or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning
should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional
right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality
of the RH Law. In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the
Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on
the entire citizenry.

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does
not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who
needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally.

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal

as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.
 For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural
family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic
hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and
note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in
planning their families.

The Church and The State

The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever
they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment
in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the
State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The
principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual

respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church,
much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot
impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that
they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be
preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the
term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia,
or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample
barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the
Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI,
Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two

guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
 The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring
any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle

that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute.

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of
the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is
"subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare."

Legislative Acts and the Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the
Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." In the same
case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these

governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote
the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."
"What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or
its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling

state interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test is the
notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should
be subject to strict scrutiny. In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits.

Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society,
and the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as
the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise
provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law.
The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After
Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent
case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the “clear and present danger" test in the
maiden case of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases
on freedom of expression.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in American Bible Society,
Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave
and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or
immediate effects. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is
involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's
interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and
far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However,
not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise
Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of
limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher
sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental
right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable
state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the
state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires
the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would
allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are
destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and
religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest"
serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in
Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the
"compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state,
seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.
[Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine
whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem
reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courtsThe jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the
Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where
it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule
on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority
to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and
religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be
compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions
against his free will.

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the
use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot
do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government
to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the

State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion.

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health

manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment
Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and
24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under
the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by

government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the
Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than
strict scrutiny.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the
medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act
against his beliefs.

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is,
however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit
in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be
the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.

The guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right

to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in
turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in
communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being
silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in
his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law seeks
to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of
compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of

individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the
birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the
mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions
should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and
Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative
of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health
procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be
respected.

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law
endeavor to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active
violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-
protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment
of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to
another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient
because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional
guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or

municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives,
among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief
of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. After all, the freedom to believe
is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none

in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills,
whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral
discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or
gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and
freedom of association.

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is

stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection
clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict
between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit
the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the
government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means
the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom
is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health

of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a
couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers
to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt
or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even
decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a
patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the

infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents
have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests"
which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom.
Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show
that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means. Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action
being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health
concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation.
Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance
deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature
to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they
stand now, R.A. No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The
Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health
services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive
health services and programs for women.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the

compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." He, however, failed
to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization

reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990
to 2008, although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation,
the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a
compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social
healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure
that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set
forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to
render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require
the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of
the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger.

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child,
the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of

the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect
wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified
to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child
and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is
medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's
life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be
guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because
both their lives are equally valuable.

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures

endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious
sentiments of the medical practitioner.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof
violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family
rather than promote its solidarity and total development.

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as

it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to
the family.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population

growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the
parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already
a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) Refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on

any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the
following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of

disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
[Emphasis supplied]

The above provision by their very nature, should require mutual consent
and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses
that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person
cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-

making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a
procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would
drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity,
and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.

The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively

to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own
destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that
they chart their destiny together as one family.

Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a

shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should
not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to
undergo reproductive health procedure.

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone
of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of
spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to
privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc, where the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection."

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor,
who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,

whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a

minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from
the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if
she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because
there is a need to tame population growth.

The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to
providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that

"the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government."

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be violative of the recognition that the
State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit
in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a
state substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided
in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse
under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on
one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph
of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of
her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the
State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering
that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the
protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that
parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are
not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

An exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the

performance of emergency procedures. It should be emphasized that no person
should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the
primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should

be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only
in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for
the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of
this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof,

mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of
academic freedom .
 At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14
of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the
Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. The 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable
role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society.
Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right
of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents
in the moral development of the youth. Considering that Section 14 provides not
only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values
formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against
discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other
forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible
parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the
RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender
sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court
finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements,
rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development
of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive

health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other interest groups. By imposing
such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section
14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.

The Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates
the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l)
mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held
punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider."
They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to
a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts
hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service
and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions
are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l),
or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and
providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect
information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private

health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution,
which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance
and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public
health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4)
barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any
accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care
services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the
local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of
the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of
confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the

right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the
providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law
punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and
provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or

intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range
of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree
with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree
with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
deliberateness that is intentional. Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as
to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. While
health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal
opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right
must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public
deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection
clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive
use. They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor,
the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and definition of terms
of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders
it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to
expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that

all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and intuitions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever
guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must

include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense
that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class
is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application
of the law to him."

It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be

in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude"
those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.
 To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause.
In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes
the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that
they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and

marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks
to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion.

While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples
with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way,
a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the
mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational
institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because
there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it

violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that
Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive
health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires
medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in
Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner
and time of giving pro bono services.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably

imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. A fortiori, this
power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the
practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions
or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude

connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals
that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion,
force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will.
While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden,
but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should
be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision
as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render
reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of

the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List (EDL).

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have
the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services
and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services
and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and
methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."

The functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the
agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole
agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the
FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.
Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the
FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that
are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those
medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest
and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region of Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioner’s claim that the RH Law
infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under
Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities,
as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government
units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions
and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the

functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the
national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services. Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign
sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for
such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national

government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains
to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health
professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy
is not absolute.

There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making
the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot
be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The provisions relied upon by
the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the
State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After
all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.
Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to
legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.

11 - Natural Law
 With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice
it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or
invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted
by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged
to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. Natural
laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested
in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.
Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as
a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, - “the Court is not duty-
bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms to both the
Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the
most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable”.

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking
away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to
the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional

insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious
freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the
law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom
is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one

religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society.
Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may
continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large
population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is
controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands
of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the
long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program
generations ago, are now burdened with ageing populations.
 And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from
our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young
able-bodied workers.

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State
should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its
duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not
the same as saying what the law should be or what the correct rule is in a given
set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom
of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it
the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from
the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt
judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function
of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and
mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere

compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court
decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population
Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive
health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the
coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-
abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method
should be maintained.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)

require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services
on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as

they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as

they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his
or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the

rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended
by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of
R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.