Ubeda Vs Zialcita
Ubeda Vs Zialcita
Ubeda Vs Zialcita
That said mark was registered at the office of the late Direccion
General de Administracion Civil of the Spanish Government on
December 24, 1898; that on July 31,1905, the plaintiff cautioned
the defendant to stop using a mark similar to his own, but,
notwithstanding the warning, the defendant continued to use said
mark; that the defendant, in addition to a general denial in his
answer, alleged as a special defense: (1) That no similarity or
resemblance exists between the trade-marks used by him and those
of the plaintiff; (2) that long prior to 1880, the distinctive device or
trade-mark " Ginebra de la Campana" of Van Den Bergh & Co. was
entered and registered in the old Direccion General de
Administracion Civil, at present the division of patents, copyrights,
and trade-marks of the Executive Bureau, which trade-mark is
similar to or greatly resembles the one described by the plaintiff in
his complaint; and (3) that the device now used by the plaintiff,
which is different from that registered by him, is also another
falsification of that of Van Den Bergh & Co., and which he managed
to register by taking advantage of the first days of American
occupation of the city of Manila; said plaintiff has been using both
marks, one after the other, for the purpose of defrauding and
deceiving the public as to the nature, origin, and properties of his
gin, mixing it with that of Van Den Bergh & Co., and thus selling a
cheap product at the same price as the gin of Van Den Bergh & Co.,
which for the reason that it is imported from Europe, costs more
than his.
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Second. That on the other hand there appears from the certified
copy, Exhibit 8, that a certificate was issued on the 11th of
December, 1873, by the Ministerio de Fomento in Spain to Van Den
Bergh & Co., manufacturers of wines at Antwerp, according them
the use of the mark " Ginebra de la Campana, Van Den Bergh &
Co.," with the right to use said trade-mark in Spanish territory and
foreign possession, said mark appears as Exhibit 3, and bears a
great resemblance to Exhibit A, the title of ownership of which,
according to said exhibit, was issued to said plaintiff by the
aforesaid Direccion General de Administracion Civil; the only
difference between the two trade-marks being that three bells are
printed on that of the plaintiff, in the center of the two circles, with
the signature of Patricio Ubeda in black ink crossing the two circles,
while that of Exhibit 3 has only one bell inside the circles, with the
signature of Van Den Bergh & Co., crossing the said circles; there
has been and there still is on the sale in this market bottled gin
bearing the said trade-mark, as was also proven at the trial; said
trade-mark was registered in the Bureau of Archives in November,
1903, in view of the fact that no record could be found of the
registration of the trade-mark " Tres Campanas," and for the reason
that said trade-mark of Van Den Bergh & Co. had already been
registered in the United States. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Third. That the similarity existing between the trade mark " Ginebra
de la Campana, Van Den Bergh & Co.," and the trade-mark
" Ginebra de tres Campanas, Patricio Ubeda," under the
circumstances mentioned with respect to the registration or
issuance of the title of ownership of the second of the said trade-
marks in favor of the plaintiff, should be taken into account for the
due appreciation of the acts of the parties herein, and their
respective rights in this litigation, because it all tends to explain in
some way the conduct of the defendant . . . and at the same time
shows that all trade-marks bearing more or less bells, familiar to
the trade here on gin bottles, are nothing more than a variation of
the mark " Ginebra de la Campana, Van Den Bergh & Co.," or bear
some resemblance thereto, and shows that if it was a matter of
judging simply from the similarity or resemblance between two
trade-marks, the plaintiff has no right to charge the defendant with
being a competitor in bad faith for having used the trade-mark
" Dos Campanas."
But the said trade-mark reads on the lower part, " Amberes," and in
diminutive characters toward the right had bears the lithographer's
name, " Litografía Ramírez y Ca., Madrid." So that the license
granted him was for the use of an Antwerp trade-mark, for gin
imported into these Islands, while the trade-mark described in the
complaint as being imitated, is one for gin manufactured in these
Islands, for which the license granted was not obtained; and
according to a certificate of the Bureau of Archives of this
Government, there is only one entry on file, as follows:
This entry is not exactly that of the title, Exhibit A, issued on the
16th of December, 1898, but its recording in the division of
agriculture, industry, and commerce of the saidDirección which
actually appears under entry No. 8 on folio 3 of the second register
of industrial and commercial trade-marks, dated December 24,
1898.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The fact that both have fraudulently imitated the trade-mark of the
third person, one which antedated both of theirs, and which with
variations was copied in order to sell as " La Campana" gin from
Antwerp, those gins which the one and the other have offered the
public under the trade-marks of " Dos Campanas" and " Tres
Campanas," can not be considered res inter alios acta for the
foundation of an action between the plaintiff and the defendant. The
usurpation of a trade-mark by means of an imitation is punished by
law, and this is what the plaintiff puts forward as his right of action
against the defendant. The latter in turn, in answer to the plaintiff
and for the purpose of denying his right of action sets up the same
charge of imitation, and supports his exception by offering in
evidence the trade-mark that was imitated, substituted, and
originally usurped; the right of a third person is not contested
except as a defense against the plaintiff, and whatever is legitimate
as a cause of action is equally legitimate as a defense. If the action
is a legitimate one, although the usurped trade-mark was not
entered or registered, legitimate must also be the defense, although
the mark, usurped in turn by the complaining and injured party,
may not have been recorded or registered. Therefore, there is no
injury to him who in turn appears as guilty of identical usurpation;
evidence to this effect with respect to an act relating to a third
person is not res inter alios acta, but necessary proof of the defense
of the defendant. And, inasmuch as the provision of the law must be
complied with, it is needless in order to decide this case to consider
the other exceptions or defenses of the defendant; the lack of right
of action stands foremost owing to its conclusive effect. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library