ERB V CA

Avon v Luna
Sambeli v Province of Isabela
Special Audit Team COA v CA
Funa v MECO
Talaga v COMELEC
Maquiling v COMELEC
Chua v COMELEC
Dela Cruz v COMELEC
National Press Club v COMELEC
Sobejana-Condon
Aguilar v COMELEC
Settled is the rule that it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc which, in
accordance with Article IX-A, Section 7[15] of the Constitution, may be brought to this Court
on certiorari.[16] But this rule should not apply when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto
itself, and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, as in this
case. Further, the rule is not ironclad; it admits of exceptions as when the decision or resolution
sought to be set aside, even if it were merely a Division action, is an absolute nullity.[17]
In this case, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his appeal was not
resolved by the COMELEC en banc, but by the COMELEC First Division, in obvious violation of the
provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Stated differently, the
division, after dismissing petitioners appeal, arrogated unto itself the en bancs function of
resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Eriguel v COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner Sandra Eriguel (Eriguel) and private respondent Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena
(Dumpit) were mayoralty candidates in Agoo, La Union during the May 14, 2007elections.
On May 18, 2007, after the canvassing and counting of votes, Eriguel was proclaimed as the duly
elected mayor of the Municipality of Agoo.
On May 28, 2007, Dumpit filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Agoo alleging that some of the ballots cast in favor of Eriguel were erroneously counted
and appreciated in the latter’s favor despite containing markings and identical symbols. Dumpit
also alleged that while a number of ballots containing Eriguels name were written by only one (1)
person, the same were still counted in the latter’s favor.
On Dumpits motion, the RTC conducted a technical examination of the ballots. The trial court
issued a decision upholding Eriguel’s proclamation.
Unsatisfied with the findings, Dumpit appealed to the COMELEC. The case was docketed as EAC
No. A-01-2008, and was initially assigned to the Special Second Division composed of Presiding
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento and Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer. Commissioner Ferrer,
however, decided to inhibit himself. This prompted Presiding Commissioner Sarmiento to issue an
Order dated July 22, 2009 elevating the appeal to the Commission en banc.The transfer of the case
to the Commission en banc was apparently made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which states,
SEC. 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) x x x
(b) When sitting in Divisions, two (2) Members of a Division shall constitute a quorum to transact business.
The concurrence of at least two (2) Members of a Division shall be necessary to reach a decision, resolution,
order or ruling. If this required number is not obtained, the case shall be automatically elevated to the
Commission en banc for decision or resolution.

Thereafter, the Commission en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested
ballots. After an exhaustive appreciation of all the contested ballots, the Commission en
banc promulgated a resolution nullifying 3,711 ballots cast in favor of Eriguel after finding the
same to have been written by only one (1) or two (2) persons. On this note, the Commission en
banc set aside the RTCs decision and declared Dumpit as the duly elected mayor of Agoo, La Union,
for having garnered 167 more votes than Eriguel.

Aggrieved, Eriguel now comes before us via a petition for certiorari.

Issues:
1. May a division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) elevate an appeal to the
Commission en banc without first resolving it?
2. And in connection with the said appeal, may the COMELEC en banc legally proceed with a
fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining that the same have
been kept inviolate?

Held:
1. No. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow the
provision set forth in Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present
case, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only
upon motion for reconsideration.
Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court or an agency
exercising quasi-judicial functions (such as the COMELEC) over the subject-matter of an action is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of
the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or
omission of the parties. Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court, more
particularly so in election cases where the interest involved transcends those of the contending
parties.
2. No. In Rosal,[26] we painstakingly explained the importance of ascertaining the integrity of
the ballots before conducting a revision. There, we said:
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board
of canvassers is the true and lawful choice of the electorate. Such a proceeding is usually instituted on the
theory that the election returns, which are deemed prima facie to be true reports of how the electorate
voted on election day and which serve as the basis for proclaiming the winning candidate, do not
accurately reflect the true will of the voters due to alleged irregularities that attended the counting of
ballots. In a protest prosecuted on such a theory, the protestant ordinarily prays that the official count as
reflected in the election returns be set aside in favor of a revision and recount of the ballots, the results of
which should be made to prevail over those reflected in the returns pursuant to the doctrine that in an
election contest where what is involved is the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most
conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves.
It should never be forgotten, though, that the superior status of the ballots as evidence of how the
electorate voted presupposes that these were the very same ballots actually cast and counted in the
elections. Thus, it has been held that before the ballots found in a [ballot] box can be used to set aside the
returns, the court (or the Comelec as the case may be) must be surethat it has before it the same ballots
deposited by the voters.
The Rosal doctrine finds equal, if not more, importance in the instant case where the proceeding
adopted by the COMELEC involved not only a revision of ballots, but a fresh appreciation
thereof.
Thus, however exhaustive the COMELECs findings may appear to be, the same is still rendered
void due to its lack of jurisdiction and its failure to ensure that the integrity of the ballots has
been preserved prior to conducting a fresh appreciation thereof.

Alvarez v COMELEC
Facts: On May 12, 1997, petitioner Arsenio Alvarez, with 590 votes, was proclaimed Punong
Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City, his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento,
obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest in the Metropolitan Trial Court
claiming irregularities in the reading and appreciation of ballots by the Board of Election
Inspectors. After a recount of the ballots in the contested precincts, the Trial Court ruled that the
private respondent won the election, garnering 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes. On
appeal, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled that private respondent won over petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion for
Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion
for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for
Execution pending appeal. Petitioner brought before the Supreme Court this petition for Certiorari
assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
herein petitioner and affirming the Resolution of its Second Division alleging that the COMELEC En
Banc granted the respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal when the appeal was no
longer pending, thus the motion had become obsolete and unenforceable.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely
acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal?

Held: We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a
motion for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motion for reconsideration
suspended the execution of the resolution of the Second Division. Appropriately then, the division
must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second Division resolved both
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and private respondent’s motion for execution pending
appeal, it did so in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Correspondingly, we do not
find that the COMELEC abused its discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal.
Petition is DISMISSED, and the En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC is AFFIRMED.

Antonio v COMELEC
The parties here are rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Bgy. Ilaya, Las Pinas, Manila. After
Antonio was proclaimed winner, Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest. The trial court ruled in favor
of the latter; and nine days from receipt of the decision, Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal. The
Commission, however, dismissed the same on the ground that Antonio failed to perfect his appeal
within the prescribed time. The issue here is, whether the period to appeal a decision of a
municipal trial court to the COMELEC in an election protest involving a barangay position is 5 days
per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or 10 days as provided for in RA 6679 and the Omnibus Election
Code.
When the Court declared in the case of Flores v. COMELEC that decisions of the
Municipal/Metropolitan Court in election protest cases involving barangay officials are no longer
appealable to the RTC but to the COMELEC, the same includes the 10-day period of appeal. The
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform 5-day period for taking an appeal
consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would then be absurd and
therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ELECTION PROTESTS
INVOLVING BARANGAY OFFICIALS; PERIOD OF APPEAL; CASE OF FLORES VS.
COMELEC, ELUCIDATED.- Petitioner points out that in Flores vs. Commission on Elections, this
Court had declared that decisions of the Metropolitan or Municipal Court in election protest cases
involving barangay officials are no longer appealable to the Regional Trial Court but to the
COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner submits that
the dispositive portion in the Flores case only declared unconstitutional that portion of Section 9
of Republic Act 6679 providing for appeal to the Regional Trial Court but not the ten (10) day
period of appeal. Petitioners argument raises the presumption that the period to appeal can be
severed from the remedy or the appeal itself which is provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 and
survive on its own. The presumption cannot be sustained because the period to appeal is an
essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy. What was invalidated by
the Flores case was the whole appeal itself and not just the question of which court to file the
petition.
2. ID.; ID.; RULES OF PROCEDURE; UNIFORM PERIOD OF APPEAL IS FIVE DAYS.- Section 6, Article IX-
A of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform five (5) day period for
taking an appeal consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be
absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election
contests. In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a regional trial court. The Court en
banc has held in Rodillas vs. COMELEC that the procedure for perfecting an appeal from the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. More recently, in Calucag vs. Commission on Elections, the Court en
banc had occasion to state that: xxx. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed
with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within five days after the
promulgation of the MTC s decision. xxx. Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution
provides in part that [r]ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF.- The period for filing an appeal is by no means a
mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right of appeal
is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in
accordance with, the provisions of the law. By virtue of Section 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure which provides that an appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party
or at the instance of the Commission for failure to file a notice of appeal within the prescribed
period, the COMELEC is precisely given the discretion, in a case where the appeal is not filed on
time to dismiss the action or proceeding.

Galido v COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local elections for
the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Petitioner was
proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected
Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of eleven (11) votes.
Private respondent appealed. Through its First Division, the COMELEC reversed the trial court's
decision. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc
resolution of 20 September 1990 which affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC
held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial "C" after the name
"Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and injunction, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 95135.
The SC resolved to dismiss the said petition for failure of petitioner to comply with paragraph 4 of
the Court's Circular No. 1-88 which requires that a petition shall contain a verified statement of
the date when notice of the questioned judgment, order or resolution was received and the date
of receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any was filed. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which we denied with finality in the resolution of 4 October 1990.
Undaunted, petitioner filed on 6 October 1990 the present petition for certiorari and injunction
with prayer for a restraining order (G.R. No. 95346) which contains the same allegations and legal
issues contained in G.R. No. 95135.
On 11 October 1990, we issued the temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioner and
required respondents to file comment on the petition.

Issue: Whether in accordance with Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987
Constitution, final decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable
Held:
No.
The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude
a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. It does not rule out the
possibility of an original special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as the case
may be, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Chong v Senate
Facts:
This petition for certiorari1 and/or prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, assails the constitutionality of Sections 8, 9, 10
and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436,2 as amended by Section 93 of R.A. No. 9369,4 providing for
the creation of an Advisory Council (AC) and a Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC), on the
ground that it encroaches on the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) mandate to administer and
enforce all laws relating to the elections as provided for in Section 2(1),5 Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution.

Issue: whether Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No.
9369, insofar as they provide for the creation of the AC and the TEC, are unconstitutional for
allegedly being violative of Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
The AC and the TEC were created to aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its mandate and authority to use
an effective AES for free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible and informed elections. The actions
of the AC and the TEC neither bind nor prohibit the COMELEC from enforcing and administering
election laws. the Congress created the [AC] and the TEC not to encroach upon the exclusive
power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer laws relating to the conduct of the elections,
but to (1) ensure that the COMELEC is guided and assisted by experts in the field of technology in
adopting the most effective and efficient [AES]; and (2) to ensure clean elections by having
disinterested parties closely monitor the COMELEC in procuring systems that operate properly,
securely, and accurately. As such, it is apparent that, through the [AC] and the TEC, the Congress
merely checks and balances the power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer R.A. No. 8436,
as amended by R.A. No. 9369. It does not, however, substitute its own wisdom for that of the
COMELEC.

Moreso, the AC and the TEC are not permanent in nature. This is evident in Sections 8 and 11 of
R.A. No. 8436, as amended. The AC shall be convened not later than 18 months prior to the next
scheduled electoral exercise, and deactivated six months after completion of canvassing, while the
TEC shall be immediately convened within 10 days after the effectivity of R.A. No. 9369; however,
the TEC shall make the certification not later than three months before the date of the electoral
exercises.
Lastly, the petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the assailed provisions are valid and constitutional since they failed to present substantial evidence
to support their claim.

Roque v COMELEC
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned
citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project
(automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and
Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM
and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award. They
contend the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the constitutional right of the
people to the secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in Sec. 2, Art. V
of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Is the Poll Automation Law unconstitutional for infringing the constitutional right of the
people to the secrecy of the ballot?
2. Does the conduct of pilot testing a condition sine qua non?

RULING:
1. No. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted
with a “three feet” long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the
Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference
in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will
personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy
of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least regard
for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote known.
2. No. From the practical viewpoint, the pilot testing of the technology in question in an
actual, scheduled electoral exercise under harsh conditions would have been the ideal
norm in computerized system implementation. The underscored proviso of Sec. 6 of RA
8436 is not, however, an authority for the proposition that the pilot testing of the PCOS in
the 2007 national elections in the areas thus specified is an absolute must for the
machines' use in the 2010 national/local elections. The Court can concede that said
proviso, with respect to the May 2007 elections, commands the Comelec to automate in
at least 12 defined areas of the country. But the bottom line is that the required 2007
automation, be it viewed in the concept of a pilot test or not, is not a mandatory
requirement for the choice of system in, or a prerequisite for, the full automation of the
May 2010 elections.

Cayetano v Monsod

FACT:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the said nomination.
Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess
the Constitutional qualification requirement.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:
(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the
last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
It was known to us that Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and having hurdled the
bar, worked in his father’s law office. After then, he worked as operations officer in the World
Bank Group for about two years (1963-1970). Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with
the Meralco Group as a Chief Executive Officer, and subsequently rendered services to various
companies either as legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. He also served
as former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, as a member of
the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Monsod possess the required qualification for the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC.

2. WHETHER OR NOT there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of Commission on
Appointments regarding the confirmation of nomination of Monsod.

RULING:
1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-

entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
 2. NO. The power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm the nomination of the
COMELEC Chairman by the president is mandated by the Constitution. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much
less a grave abuse of discretion for has been clearly shown.

Brillantes v Yorac
FACTS:
The President of the Philippines designated Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman
of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of
the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’état attempt. For this reason,
petitioner questions such designation contending that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and
that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in
this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief
Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

ISSUE:
Whether the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting
Chairman of the Commissions on Elections is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
"independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President
of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its
own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its
decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the
Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely
have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that
choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best of
motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot
sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the
designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections,
foremost among which, is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commissions on Elections by designation of the President of the
Philippines.

Flores v Drilon
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) of RA 7227 otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 is challenged in this original petition.
Under Section 13, par. (d) RA 7227:
"The President shall appoint a professional manager as the Administrator of the Subic Authority
with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Budget, who shall be the ex-officio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Authority. Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
Chairman and Chief executive officer of the Subic Authority."
Respondent Franklin Drilon was then the incumbent Mayor of the City of Olongapo.
With this petitioners, who claims to be taxpayers, employees of the US Facility at the Subic
Zambales and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in US Facilities
in the Philippines, maintain that the provision in par (d) of Section 13 infringes the following
constitutional and statutory provisions:
(a) Sec. 7 (1) Art. IX-B of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure."
(b) Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
(c) Sec. 261 par. (g) of the Omnibus Election Code which provides Prohibition on Appointments
within prohibited 45-day period prior to the May 11, 1992 Elections.

ISSUE: Whether the provision in Section 13 (d) of RA 7227 violates:

a. Sec. 7 (1) Art. IX-B of the Constitution
b. Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution
c. Sec. 261 par. (g) of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING:
a. Yes. The provision violates constitutional prohibition.
Under Section 7 of Article IX-B:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
This section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services.
The first paragraph of Section 7 prevents a situation where a local elective official will work for his
appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.
In this case, the provision directing the President to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City, an
elective official to other government posts contravenes Section 7, first paragraph of Article IX-B of
the Constitution.
There must be a clear-cut difference in the wording of the 2 paragraphs of Section 7 Article IX-B
of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an
appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as one
particularly recognized in the constitution itself.
The contention of the respondent that the holding of the position is merely ex-officio cannot
stand. The position he held is not adjunct to the functions of his office being the Mayor. Ex-officio
positions are those positions in extension of the primary function of the elective official.

b. Yes
The legislative enactment also encroach the Power of the President to appoint because the
questioned act actually dictates the President whom to appoint. Appointment is in essence
discretionary on the part of the appointing authority, hence the appointing authority has the
power to choose whom to appoint, the one he thinks knowledgeable and able to hold the position.
c. No
The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now evident, other matters affecting
the legality of the questioned proviso as well as the appointment of said respondent made
pursuant thereto need no longer be discussed.

Funa v Executive Secretary

Facts:
Funa questions the constitutionality of the designation of Bautista as MARINA officer-in-charge
when he is already the DOTC Undersecretary, alleging that it violates Section 13, Article VII .
Issue:
1. Does the designation of Bautista as MARINA OIC fall under the stricter prohibition under Article
VII, Section 13 of the Constitution or is the exemption of ex-officio designation applicable?
2. Is there still violation of the stricter prohibition provided that he is designated as OIC?
Held:
1. Yes, because the only exception to the stricter prohibition is that the designation should
be ex-officio.
ART. VII. SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
SEC. 7. x x x

Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment
in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of
their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Lack of compensation is not enough to consider the position as ex-officio. Given the vast
responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, the contention that the designation
is merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is untenable.
2.
Yes. while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words hold
the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation
because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987
Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the
holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were
not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office
means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which implies
nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

Liban v Gordon
Facts:
During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board... of Governors, respondent
has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution
Issues:
Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI
of the Philippine Constitution
Ruling:
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions... the Philippine government does not own
the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from
the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and
private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The
PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC
members are private individuals, including students.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The
PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Garcia v Molina
Facts:
A letter that circulated and was published containing libelous statements against GSIS President
Garcia was allegedly written by Molina leading to an administrative investigation for grave
misconduct against him and a Memorandum issued by Garcia formally charging the respondent
of grave misconduct. Molina filed a petition for certiorari challenging the legality of the
Memorandum. The CA granted the petition, nullifying the charge and the 60-day preventive
suspension, ordering that petitioner is entitled to his backwages during the period of preventive
suspension.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. What are the two types of preventive suspension?
2. Is respondent entitled to backwages?
Held:
1. There are two types: preventive suspension pending investigation and preventive
suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is
suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated.
In this case, the preventive suspension was done pending investigation.
2. No. Since the preventive suspension was done pending investigation, respondent is not
entitled to compensation because such suspension is not a penalty but only a means of
enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. Backwages
corresponding to the period of suspension of a civil service employee who is reinstated is
proper only if he is found innocent of the charges and the suspension is declared to be
unjustified. Considering that the preventive suspension was due to a pending investigation
and therefore, with legal basis, he was not entitled to backwages.
Yamson v Castro
Facts:
Respondents who are officials of Davao City Water District filed joint affidavit-complaint with the
Ombudsman against petitioners who are members of the Pre-Bidding and Awards Committee, and
two others who are the Division Manager of the Engineering and Construction Department and
the Assistant General Manager of Administration charging them with Grave Misconduct, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Dishonesty and Gross Negligence, adopting their allegations in the separate
criminal complaints they filed with the Ombudsman against petitioners. The complaint alleges that
the petitioners awarded contracts for the drilling of two wells as initial stage for the Cabantian
Water Supply System Project to Hydrock Wells Incorporated without the necessary competitive
public bidding, opting to resort to simplified bidding or negotiation when the circumstances did
not call for the application of the exception to the general rule on competitive public bidding.
On their part, the petitioners contend that it was the General Manager who awarded the project
and their opinion is merely recommendatory, and that simplified bidding or negotiated
procurement is necessary given that there was a public outcry for water supply which is
categorized as a natural calamity.
The Ombudsman found them administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, ordering their
dismissal from service.
Issue: Whether the period when an employee was preventively suspended pending appeal should
be credited to form part of the penalty of suspension imposed?
Held:
Yes. In Hon. Gloria v CA, the Court ruled that the period when an employee was preventively
suspended pending appeal shall be credited to form part of the penalty of suspension imposed. An
employee is considered to be on preventive suspension pending appeal while the administrative
case is on appeal. Such preventive suspension is punitive in nature and the period of suspension
becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. Consequently, the period within
which petitioners Chavez, Navales, Almonte and Laid were preventively suspended pending
appeal, i.e., from 2008 until the promulgation of the Decision, shall be credited in their favor, and
they may now be reinstated to their former positions having served more than eight years of
preventive suspension. With regard to petitioners Yamson and Guillen, their separation from
DCWD has rendered any modification as to the service of their respective penalties moot. Their
permanent employment record, however, must reflect the modified penalty.
Campol v Balao-as
The Constitution mandates that no employee of the civil service shall be removed from office
except for cause provided by law. Corollary to this, any employee illegally dismissed from office is
entitled to reinstatement. Any other employment he or she obtains while the case challenging his
or her dismissal is pending does not bar his or her right to be reinstated. Similarly, he or she is
entitled to the payment of his or her backwages from the time of his or her dismissal until his or
her actual reinstatement. The Constitutional requirement of valid cause before an employee of
the civil service may be dismissed and the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of full
backwages encapsulate the essence of security of tenure. –Justic Jardeleza
Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Boliney, Abra, where respondents won as mayor and vice-mayor, issued
a resolution after the elections, terminating Campol as SB Secretary for alleged absence without
approved leave. The Sanggunian Panlalawigan transmitted the matter to CSC-Abra which wrote
the vice-mayor informing him that Campol cannot be removed because is protected by the
Administrative Code. Sianen still issued a memorandum dropping Campol from the rolls.
Campol challenged the memo before the CSC-CAR, which ruled in his favor. On appeal, the CSC
overturned the decision of CSC-CAR. Campol filed a petition for review under Rule 43 before the
CA. The CA ruled in his favor, but refused to order his reinstatement since he is already gainfully
employed with the PAO when the case was appealed with the CA. Campol filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the SC, challenging the CA’s refusal to order his reinstatement.
Issue:
1. Whether an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement despite the fact that
he is already employed pending appeal?
2. If yes, is the employee entitled to full backwages from the time of dismissal until
reinstatement and not until his employment with PAO?
Held:
1. Yes.
Section 2, paragraph 3 of Article IX-B of the Constitution states -

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
A necessary consequence of the importance given to security of tenure is the rule that an
employee invalidly dismissed from service is entitled to reinstatement.

As early as 1960, in Tan v. Gimenez, etc. and Aguilar, etc., the SC have pursued the doctrine that
an employee of the civil service illegally dismissed from office has the right to reinstatement. Any
other employment he or she obtains while waiting for the court to rule on the propriety of his or
her dismissal should not be construed as an abandonment of his or her position. The employee
had the right to live during his appeal which necessarily means that he can accept any form of
employment.
Note:
1. Reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee is proper even when another person is
already occupying the position because when a regular government employee was illegally
suspended or dismissed, legally speaking, his position never become vacant, hence there
was no vacancy to which a new incumbent could be permanently appointed it being
considered that the incumbency of the person appointed to the position is temporary and
he has to give way to the employee whose right to the office has been recognized by the
competent authorities. (Tañala v. Legaspi)
2. Acceptance of a lower position in the same employment, pending appeal, cannot be
construed against him such as to foreclose his right to question the legality of his
termination and to claim the position he held previous to reorganization. (Salvador v. Court
of Appeals (Special Sixth Division)
3. Removal by virtue of a law which was eventually declared as unconstitutional, and
acceptance of a government appointment during the pendency of the case, still entitles
 employee to reinstatement to his prior position, although he must first resign from his
second employment. (Canonizado v. Aguirre)

2. Yes, he is entitled to full backwages from dismissal to reinstatement. The right to receive
full backwages means exactly this-that it corresponds to Campol's salary at the time of his
dismissal until his reinstatement. Any income he may have obtained during the litigation
of the case shall not be deducted from this amount. This is consistent with our ruling that
an employee illegally dismissed has the right to live and to find employment elsewhere
during the pendency of the case. At the same time, an employer who illegally dismisses an
employee has the obligation to pay him or her what he or she should have received had
the illegal act not be done. It is an employer's price or penalty for illegally dismissing an
employee.
Note: even in labor law, this is now the prevailing rule

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
DBP v COA
Facts: The hiring by the DBP of a private auditor was a condition imposed by the World Bank for
the grant to the Philippine government in early 1987 of a US$310 million Economic Recovery Loan,
at a time when the government desperately needed funds to revive a badly battered
economy. One of the salient objectives of the US$310 million loan was the rehabilitation of the
DBP which was then burdened with enormous bad loans.
COA disallowed the payment of billings made by DBP to private auditors. DBP now assails this
decision.
Issue: whether or not the COA has the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government
banks involves an interpretation of Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
No.

This Section provides as follows:

Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned and held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, x x x.

(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefore,
and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.
The framers of the Constitution intentionally omitted the word exclusive in the first paragraph
of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external auditors.
 The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COAs
power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COAs authority to define the
scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary
expenditures is exclusive.
The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private
audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private
investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is
privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from
abroad.

Also, the COAs claim clashes directly with the Central Banks constitutional power of supervision
over banks under Section 20, Article XII of the Constitution. This provision states as follows:

Sec. 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of
whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism,
the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other
qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy direction in
the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise
such regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other
institutions performing similar functions.