Government of India Act, 1935

The Government of India Act, 1935 was originally • the establishment of a Federal Court
passed in August 1935 (25 & 26 Geo. 5 c. 42), and
is said to be the longest Act (British) of Parliament ever However, the degree of autonomy introduced at the
enacted by that time. Because of its length, the Act was provincial level was subject to important limitations: the
retroactively split by the Government of India Act, 1935 provincial Governors retained important reserve powers,
(Re-printed) (26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 c. 1) into two sepa- and the British authorities also retained a right to suspend
rate Acts: responsible government.
The parts of the Act intended to establish the Federa-
1. The Government of India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5 & 1 tion of India never came into operation, due to opposition
Edw. 8 c. 2), having 321 sections and 10 schedules. from rulers of the princely states. The remaining parts of

2. The Government of Burma Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5 & the Act came into force in 1937, when the first elections
1 Edw. 8 c. 3), having 159 sections and 6 schedules. under the act were also held.

References in literature on Indian political and constitu-

tional history are usually to the shortened Government of
2 The Government of India Act,
India Act, 1935 (i.e. 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 c. 2), rather 1935
than to the text of the Act as originally enacted.
2.1 Background to the Act
1 Overview Indians had increasingly been demanding a greater role in
the government of their country since the late 19th cen-
The most significant aspects of the Act were: tury. The Indian contribution to the British war effort
during the First World War meant that even the more
• the grant of a large measure of autonomy to the conservative elements in the British political establish-
provinces of British India (ending the system of ment felt the necessity of constitutional change, resulting
diarchy introduced by the Government of India Act, in the Government of India Act, 1919. That Act intro-
1919) duced a novel system of government known as provincial
“diarchy”, i.e., certain areas of government (such as edu-
• provision for the establishment of a “Federation of cation) were placed in the hands of ministers responsible
India”, to be made up of both British India and some to the provincial even for those areas over which they had
or all of the "princely states" gained nominal control, the “purse strings” were still in
the hands of British officialdom.
• the introduction of direct elections, thus increasing
the franchise from seven million to thirty-five mil- The intention had been that a review of India’s con-
lion people stitutional arrangements and those princely states that
were willing to accede to it. However, division between
• a partial reorganisation of the provinces: Congress and Muslim representatives proved to be a ma-
jor factor in preventing agreement as to much of the im-
• Sindh was separated from Bombay portant detail of how federation would work in practice.
• Bihar and Orissa was split into separate Against this practice, the new Conservative-dominated
provinces of Bihar and Orissa National Government in London decided to go ahead with
• Burma was completely separated from India drafting its own proposals (the white paper). A joint par-
• Aden was also detached from India, and estab- liamentary select committee, chaired by Lord Linlithgow,
lished as a separate Crown colony reviewed the white paper proposals at great length. On
the basis of this white paper, the Government of India
• membership of the provincial assemblies was al- Bill was framed. At the committee stage and later, to ap-
tered so as to include any number of elected Indian pease the diehards, the “safeguards” were strengthened,
representatives, who were now able to form majori- and indirect elections were reinstated for the Central Leg-
ties and be appointed to form governments islative Assembly (the central legislature’s lower house).

1
2 3 DIARCHY

The bill duly passed into law in August 1935. riod of gradual constitutional development, with suffi-
As a result of this process, although the Government of cient “safeguards”.
India Act, 1935 was intended to go some way towards This tension between and within Indian and British views
meeting Indian demands, both the detail of the bill and resulted in the clumsy compromise of the 1935 Act hav-
the lack of Indian involvement in drafting its contents ing no preamble of its own, but keeping in place the 1919
meant that the Act met with a lukewarm response at best Act’s preamble even while repealing the remainder of that
in India, while still proving too radical for a significant Act. Unsurprisingly, this was seen in India as yet more
element in Britain. mixed messages from the British, suggesting at best a
lukewarm attitude and at worst suggesting a “minimum
necessary” approach towards satisfying Indian desires.
3 Diarchy
The diarchy system included a list of subjects reserved by 3.1.2 No Bill of Rights
the British Government and a list of subjects transferred
to the Indians. The British had complete control over the In contrast with most modern constitutions, but in com-
reserved subjects and could exert “special powers"(they mon with Commonwealth constitutional legislation of the
could change any act or project proposed by the Indians) time, the Act does not include a “bill of rights” within the
into the transferred subjects. new system that it aimed to establish. However, in the
case of the proposed Federation of India there was a fur-
The Reserved subjects were: Taxation, Revenue, Foreign
ther complication in incorporating such a set of rights, as
Relations/Policies, Justice department, Police, Power Re-
the new entity would have included nominally sovereign
sources and Publications/Press.[1]
(and generally autocratic) princely states.
The Transferred Subjects included: Forest Department,
A different approach was considered by some, though,
Local Government, Education, Public Health and Social
[2] as the draft outline constitution in the Nehru Report in-
Welfare.
cluded such a bill of rights.

3.1 Some Features of the Act

3.1.3 Relationship to a Dominion Constitution
3.1.1 No preamble: the ambiguity of British com-
mitment to dominion status In 1947, relatively few amendments in the Act made it the
functioning interim constitutions of India and Pakistan.
While it had become uncommon for British Acts of Par-
The Act was not only extremely detailed, but it was rid-
liament to contain a preamble, the absence of one from
dled with ‘safeguards’ designed to enable the British Gov-
the Government of India Act, 1935 contrasts sharply with
ernment to intervene whenever it saw the need in or-
the 1919 Act, which set out the broad philosophy of that
der to maintain British responsibilities and interests. To
Act’s aims in relation to Indian political development.
achieve this, in the face of a gradually increasing Indi-
The 1919 Act’s preamble quoted, and centred on, the anisation of the institutions of the Government of India,
statement of the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Mon- the Act concentrated the decision for the use and the ac-
tagu (17 July 1917 – 19 March 1922) to the House of tual administration of the safeguards in the hands of the
Commons on 20 August 1917, which pledged: British-appointed Viceroy and provincial governors who
were subject to the control of the Secretary of State for
…the gradual development of self- India.
governing institutions, with a view to the ‘In view of the enormous powers and responsibilities
progressive realisation of responsible govern- which the Governor-General must exercise in his discre-
ment in India as an integral Part of the British tion or according to his individual judgment, it is obvi-
Empire. ous that he (the Viceroy) is expected to be a kind of su-
perman. He must have tact, courage, and ability and be
Indian demands were by now centering on British In- endowed with an infinite capacity for hard work. “We
dia achieving constitutional parity with the existing have put into this Bill many safeguards,” said Sir Robert
Dominions (Australia, Canada, the Irish Free State, New Horne… “but all of those safeguards revolve about a sin-
Zealand and the Union of South Africa) which would gle individual, and that is the Viceroy. He is the linch-pin
have meant complete autonomy within the British Com- of the whole system…. If the Viceroy fails, nothing can
monwealth. A significant element in British political cir- save the system you have set up.” This speech reflected the
cles doubted that Indians were capable of running their point of view of the die-hard Tories who were horrified
country on this basis, and saw Dominion status as some- by the prospect that some day there might be a Viceroy
thing that might, perhaps, be aimed for after a long pe- appointed by a Labour government.’
3.1 Some Features of the Act 3

3.1.4 Reality of Responsible Government Under the G.D.'s original opinion that the differences be-
Act – Is the Cup Half-Full or Half-Empty? tween the two countries were largely psycho-
logical, the same proposals open to diamet-
A close reading of the Act[3] reveals that the British Gov- rically opposed interpretations. He had not,
ernment equipped itself with the legal instruments to take probably, taken in before his visit how consid-
back total control at any time they considered this to be erable, in the eyes of British conservatives, the
desirable. However, doing so without good reason would concessions had been… If nothing else, suc-
totally sink their credibility with groups in India whose cessive conversations made clear to G.D. that
support the act was aimed at securing. Some contrasting the agents of the Bill had at least as heavy odds
views: against them at home as they had in India.[5]

“In the federal government… the sem-

blance of responsible government is presented.
But the reality is lacking, for the powers in de- 3.1.5 False Equivalences
fence and external affairs necessarily, as mat-
ters stand, given to the governor-general limit “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids
vitally the scope of ministerial activity, and the the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
measure of representation given to the rulers bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
of the Indian States negatives any possibility of bread.”[6]
even the beginnings of democratic control. It
will be a matter of the utmost interest to watch
the development of a form of government so
unique; certainly, if it operates successfully, Under the Act, British citizens resident in the UK and
the highest credit will be due to the political British companies registered in the UK must be treated
capacity of Indian leaders, who have infinitely on the same basis as Indian citizens and Indian registered
more serious difficulties to face than had the companies unless UK law denies reciprocal treatment.
colonial statesmen who evolved the system of The unfairness of this arrangement is clear when one con-
self-government which has now culminated in siders the dominant position of British capital in much of
Dominion status.”[4] the Indian modern sector and the complete dominance,
maintained through unfair commercial practices, of UK
shipping interests in India’s international and coastal ship-
Lord Lothian, in a talk lasting forty-five minutes, came
ping traffic and the utter insignificance of Indian capital
straight out with his view on the Bill:
in Britain and the non-existence of Indian involvement in
shipping to or within the UK. There are very detailed pro-
“I agree with the diehards that it has been visions requiring the Viceroy to intervene if, in his unap-
a surrender. You who are not used to any con- pealable view, any India law or regulation is intended to,
stitution cannot realise what great power you or will in fact, discriminate against UK resident British
are going to wield. If you look at the constitu- subjects, British registered companies and, particularly,
tion it looks as if all the powers are vested in British shipping interests.
the Governor-General and the Governor. But
is not every power here vested in the King?
Everything is done in the name of the King
but does the King ever interfere? Once the “The Joint Committee considered a sugges-
power passes into the hands of the legislature, tion that trade with foreign countries should be
the Governor or the Governor-General is never made by the Minister of Commerce, but it de-
going to interfere. …The Civil Service will be cided that all negotiations with foreign coun-
helpful. You too will realise this. Once a pol- tries should be conducted by the Foreign Office
icy is laid down they will carry it out loyally and or Department of External Affairs as they are
faithfully… in the United Kingdom. In concluding agree-
We could not help it. We had to fight the ments of this character, the Foreign Secretary
diehards here. You could not realise what great always consults the Board of Trade and it was
courage has been shown by Mr. Baldwin and assumed that the Governor-General would in
Sir Samuel Hoare. We did not want to spare like manner consult the Minister of Commerce
the diehards as we had to talk in a different lan- in India. This may be true, but the analogy it-
guage… self is false. In the United Kingdom, both de-
These various meetings — and in due partments are subject to the same legislative
course G.D. (Birla), before his return in control, whereas in India one is responsible to
September, met virtually everyone of impor- the federal legislature and the other to the Im-
tance in Anglo-Indian affairs — confirmed perial Parliament.”[7]
4 3 DIARCHY

3.1.6 British Political Needs vs. Indian Constitu- 3.3 Federal Part of the Act
tional Needs – the Ongoing Dysfunction
Unlike the provincial portion of the Act, the Federal por-
From the moment of the Montagu statement of 1917, it tion was to go into effect only when half the States by
was vital that the reform process stay ahead of the curve if weight agreed to federate. This never happened and the
the British were to hold the strategic initiative. However, establishment of the Federation was indefinitely post-
imperialist sentiment, and a lack of realism, in British poned after the outbreak of the Second World War.
political circles made this impossible. Thus the grudging
conditional concessions of power in the Acts of 1919 and
3.3.1 Terms of the Act
1935 caused more resentment and signally failed to win
the Raj the backing of influential groups in India which it
desperately needed. In 1919 the Act of 1935, or even the The Act provided for Dyarchy at the Centre. The British
Simon Commission plan would have been well received. Government, in the person of the Secretary of State for
There is evidence that Montagu would have backed some- India, through the Governor-General of India – Viceroy
thing of this sort but his cabinet colleagues would not have of India, would continue to control India’s financial obli-
considered it. By 1935, a constitution establishing a Do- gations, defence, foreign affairs and the British Indian
minion of India, comprising the British Indian provinces Army and would make the key appointments to the
might have been acceptable in India though it would not Reserve Bank of India (exchange rates) and Railway
have passed the British Parliament. Board and the Act stipulated that no finance bill could
be placed in the Central Legislature without the consent
of the Governor General. The funding for the British
responsibilities and foreign obligations (e.g. loan repay-
‘Considering the balance of power in the ments, pensions), at least 80 percent of the federal ex-
Conservative party at the time, the passing of penditures, would be non-votable and be taken off the
a Bill more liberal than that which was enacted top before any claims could be considered for (for ex-
in 1935 is inconceivable.’[8] ample) social or economic development programs. The
Viceroy, under the supervision of the Secretary of State
for India, was provided with overriding and certifying
powers that could, theoretically, have allowed him to rule
3.2 Provincial Part of the Act autocratically.[9]

The provincial part of the Act, which went into effect au-
3.3.2 Objectives of the British Government
tomatically, basically followed the recommendations of
the Simon Commission. Provincial dyarchy was abol-
The federal part of the Act was designed to meet the
ished; that is, all provincial portfolios were to be placed
aims of the Conservative Party. Over the very long term,
in charge of ministers enjoying the support of the provin-
the Conservative leadership expected the Act to lead to a
cial legislatures. The British-appointed provincial gover-
nominally dominion status India, conservative in outlook,
nors, who were responsible to the British Government via
dominated by an alliance of Hindu princes and right-wing
the Viceroy and Secretary of State for India, were to ac-
Hindus which would be well disposed to place itself un-
cept the recommendations of the ministers unless, in their
der the guidance and protection of the United Kingdom.
view, they negatively affected his areas of statutory “spe-
In the medium term, the Act was expected to (in rough
cial responsibilities” such as the prevention of any grave
order of importance):
menace to the peace or tranquility of a province and the
safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities. In
the event of political breakdown, the governor, under the • win the support of moderate nationalists since its
supervision of the Viceroy, could take over total control formal aim was to lead eventually to a Dominion of
of the provincial government. This, in fact, allowed the India which, as defined under the Statute of West-
governors a more untrammeled control than any British minster 1931 virtually equalled independence;
official had enjoyed in the history of the Raj. After the
resignation of the congress provincial ministries in 1939, • retain British control of the Indian Army, Indian
the governors did directly rule the ex-Congress provinces finances, and India’s foreign relations for another
throughout the war. generation;
It was generally recognised, that the provincial part of • win Muslim support by conceding most of Jinnah’s
the Act, conferred a great deal of power and patronage Fourteen Points;[10]
on provincial politicians as long as both British officials
and Indian politicians played by the rules. However, the • convince the Princes to join the Federation by
paternalistic threat of the intervention by the British gov- giving the Princes conditions for entry never likely
ernor rankled. to be equaled. It was expected that enough would
3.3 Federal Part of the Act 5

join to allow the establishment of the Federation. thus exercising the veto provided by the Act pre-
The terms offered to the Princes included: vented the Federation from coming into existence.
Among the reasons for the Princes staying out were
• Each Prince would select his state’s represen- the following:
tative in the Federal Legislature. There would
be no pressure for Princes to democratise their • They did not have the foresight to realise that
administrations or allow elections for state rep- this was their only chance for a future.
resentatives in the Federal Legislature. • Congress had begun, and would continue,
• The Princes would enjoy heavy weightage. agitating for democratic reforms within the
The Princely States represented about a quar- Princely States. Since the one common con-
ter of the population of India and produced cern of the 600 or so Princes was their desire
well under a quarter of its wealth. Under the to continue to rule their states without inter-
Act: ference, this was indeed a mortal threat. It
was on the cards that this would lead eventu-
• The Upper House of the Federal Legisla- ally to more democratic state regimes and the
ture, the Council of State, would consist election of states’ representatives in the Fed-
of 260 members: 156 (60%) elected from eral Legislature. In all likelihood, these repre-
the British India and 104 (40%) nomi- sentatives would be largely Congressmen. Had
nated by the rulers of the princely states. the Federation been established, the election
• The Lower House, the Federal Assem- of states’ representatives in the Federal Legis-
bly, would consist of 375 members: 250 lature would amount to a Congress coup from
(67%) elected by the Legislative Assem- the inside. Thus, contrary to their official po-
blies of the British Indian provinces; 125 sition that the British would look favorably
(33%) nominated by the rulers of the on the democratisation of the Princely States,
princely states. their plan required that the States remain au-
tocratic. This reflects a deep contradiction on
• ensuring that the Congress could never rule British views of India and its future.
alone or gain enough seats to bring down the gov-
ernment
‘At a banquet in the princely state of
Benares Hailey observed that although the new
This was done by over-representing the Princes, by giv- federal constitution would protect their posi-
ing every possible minority the right to separately vote tion in the central government, the internal evo-
for candidates belonging to their respective communities lution of the states themselves remained un-
(see separate electorate), and by making the executive certain. Most people seemed to expect them
theoretically, but not practically, removable by the leg- to develop representative institutions. Whether
islature. those alien grafts from Westminster would suc-
ceed in British India, however, itself remained
in doubt. Autocracy was “a principle which is
3.3.3 Gambles Taken by the British Government firmly seated in the Indian States,” he pointed
out; “round it burn the sacred fires of an age-
• Viability of the proposed Federation. It was long tradition,” and it should be given a fair
hoped that the gerrymandered federation, encom- chance first. Autocratic rule, “informed by wis-
passing units of such hugely different sizes, sophis- dom, exercised in moderation, and vitalised by
tication and varying in forms of government from a spirit of service to the interests of the sub-
autocratic Princely States to democratic provinces, ject, may well prove that it can make an ap-
could provide the basis for a viable state. However, peal in India as strong as that of representative
this was not a realistic possibility (see e.g. The Mak- and responsible institutions.” This spirited de-
ing of India’s Paper Federation, 1927-35 in Moore fense brings to mind Nehru’s classic paradox of
1988). In reality, the Federation, as planned in the how the representatives of the advanced, dy-
Act, almost certainly was not viable and would have namic West allied themselves with the most
rapidly broken down with the British left to pick up reactionary forces of the backward, stagnant
the pieces without any viable alternative. East.’[11]
• Princes Seeing and Acting in Their Own Long-
Range Best Interests - That the Princes would Under the Act,
see that their best hope for a future would lie in
rapidly joining and becoming a united block with- ‘There are a number of restrictions on the
out which no group could hope, mathematically, to freedom of discussion in the federal legislature.
wield power. However, the princes did not join, and For example the act forbids ... any discussion
6 3 DIARCHY

of, or the asking of questions about, a matter the prospects for an independent India that would be
connected with an Indian State, other than a both united and democratic.
matter with respect to which the federal leg-
islature has power to make laws for that state,
unless the Governor-General in his discretion 3.3.4 Indian Reaction to the Proposed Federation
is satisfied that the matter affects federal inter-
ests or affects a British subject, and has given No significant group in India accepted the Federal portion
his consent to the matter being discussed or the of the Act. A typical response was:
question being asked.’[7]
‘After all, there are five aspects of every
• • They were not a cohesive group and probably Government worth the name: (a) The right of
realised that they would never act as one. external and internal defence and all measures
• Each Prince seemed consumed by the desire to for that purpose; (b) The right to control our
gain the best deal for himself were his state to external relations; (c) The right to control our
join the Federation: the most money, the most currency and exchange; (d) The right to con-
autonomy. trol our fiscal policy; (e) the day-to-day admin-
istration of the land…. (Under the Act) You
• That enough was being offered at the Centre to shall have nothing to do with external affairs.
win the support of moderate nationalist Hindu You shall have nothing to do with defence. You
and Muslim support. In fact, so little was offered shall have nothing to do, or, for all practical
that all significant groups in British India rejected purposes in future, you shall have nothing to do
and denounced the proposed Federation. A major with your currency and exchange, for indeed
contributing factor was the continuing distrust of the Reserve Bank Bill just passed has a fur-
British intentions for which there was considerable ther reservation in the Constitution that no leg-
basis in fact. In this vital area the Act failed Irwin’s islation may be undertaken with a view to sub-
test: stantially alter the provisions of that Act except
with the consent of the Governor-General….
‘I don't believe that… it is impossible to there is no real power conferred in the Cen-
present the problem in such a form as would tre.’ (Speech by Mr Bhulabhai DESAI on the
make the shop window look respectable from Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee
an Indian point of view, which is really what on Indian Constitutional Reform, 4 February
they care about, while keeping your hand pretty 1935.[12]
firmly on the things that matter.’ (Irwin to
Stonehaven, 12 November 1928)
However, the Liberals, and even elements in the Congress
were tepidly willing to give it a go:
• That the wider electorate would turn against the
Congress. In fact, the 1937 elections showed over-
whelming support for Congress among the Hindu “Linlithgow asked Sapru whether he
electorate. thought there was a satisfactory alternative to
the scheme of the 1935 Act. Sapru replied
• That by giving Indian politicians a great deal of that they should stand fast on the Act and the
power at the provincial level, while denying them federal plan embodied in it. It was not ideal
responsibility at the Centre, it was hoped that but at this stage it was the only thing…. A
Congress, the only national party, would disin- few days after Sapru’s visit Birla came to see
tegrate into a series of provincial fiefdoms. In the Viceroy. He thought that Congress was
fact, the congress High Command was able to con- moving towards acceptance of Federation.
trol the provincial ministries and to force their res- Gandhi was not over-worried, said Birla, by
ignation in 1939. The Act showed the strength and the reservation of defence and external affairs
cohesion of Congress and probably strengthened it. to the centre, but was concentrating on the
This does not imply that Congress was not made up method of choosing the States’ representatives.
of and found its support in various sometimes com- Birla wanted the Viceroy to help Gandhi
peting interests and groups. Rather, it recognises the by persuading a number of Princes to move
ability of Congress, unlike the British Raj, to main- towards democratic election of representa-
tain the cooperation and support of most of these tives. …Birla then said that the only chance
groups even if, for example in the forced resignation for Federation lay in agreement between
of Congress provincial ministries in 1939 and the re- Government and Congress and the best hope
jection of the Cripps Offer in 1942, this required a of this lay in discussion between the Viceroy
negative policy that was harmful, in the long run, to and Gandhi.”[13][14]
 7

3.4 The Working of the Act [1] History and Culture of Pakistan

[2] History and Culture of Pakistan Page 63

The British government sent out Lord Linlithgow as the
new viceroy with the remit of bringing the Act into ef- [3] Shah 1937.
fect. Linlithgow was intelligent, extremely hard working,
honest, serious and determined to make a success out of [4] Keith 1937, p. viii.
the Act. However, he was also unimaginative, stolid, le- [5] Ross, p. 99 ff.
galistic and found it very difficult to “get on terms” with
people outside his immediate circle. [6] Anatole FRANCE, The Red Lily, 1894.

In 1937, after the holding of provincial elections, Provin- [7] Smith.

cial Autonomy commenced. From that point until the
declaration of war in 1939, Linlithgow tirelessly tried to [8] Moore 1988, p. 63.
get enough of the Princes to accede to launch the Feder- [9] Terms of the Act.
ation. In this he received only the weakest backing from
the Home Government and in the end the Princes rejected [10] Jinnah’s Fourteen Points at Story of Pakistan.
the Federation en masse. In September 1939, Linlith- [11] Cell, p. 210.
gow simply declared that India was at war with Germany.
Though Linlithgow’s behaviour was constitutionally cor- [12] Gwyer & Appadorai, p. 320.
rect it was also offensive to much of Indian opinion that
[13] Viceroy at Bay pp. 87–8.
the Viceroy had not consulted the elected representatives
of the Indian people before taking such a momentous de- [14] GANGULEE, The making of federal India, p. 165.
cision. This led directly to the resignation of the Congress
provincial ministries. [15] History and Culture of Pakistan

From 1939, Linlithgow concentrated on supporting the [16] History and Culture of Pakistan
war effort.

7 References
4 Remarks made by Political Lead-
• Bibliography
ers
• Essay on The Government of India Act 1935
Nehru called it,"a machine with strong
brakes but no engine.” • Muldoon, Andrew Robert, “Making a 'moderate' In-
dia: British conservatives, imperial culture and In-
[15] dian political reform, 1924—1935”

Jinnah called it,"thoroughly rotten, funda- 8 External links

mentally bad and totally unacceptable.”
• Text of the Act as originally enacted in 1935, from
[16]
OPSI
• The Act as amended up to 15 August 1943, from the
Indian Law Ministry
5 See also
• Government of India Act (disambiguation)

6 Notes
1 ^ Keay, John. India: A History. Grove Press Books,
distributed by Publishers Group West. United States:
2000 ISBN 0-8021-3797-0, pp. 490
2 ^ Keay, John. India: A History. Grove Press Books,
distributed by Publishers Group West. United States:
2000 ISBN 0-8021-3797-0, pp. 490
8 9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1 Text
• Government of India Act, 1935 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_India_Act%2C_1935?oldid=773987146 Con-
tributors: Leandrod, Gabbe, Nine Tail Fox, Jooler, Mboverload, SoWhy, Eregli bob, Pluke, Alistair1978, Dbachmann, Bender235, Cmdr-
jameson, Wikidea, DrDaveHPP, Kelly Martin, Woohookitty, Ardfern, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, George Burgess, MZMcBride, King of Hearts, John
Smith’s, Gaius Cornelius, Thiseye, Davidsteinberg, Silverhelm, ArielGold, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Hmains, Bluebot, Rama’s Arrow,
Grover cleveland, Gujuguy, Skinsmoke, Dl2000, Iridescent, Vivek2108, Courcelles, Hemlock Martinis, Cydebot, Thijs!bot, IvanStepaniuk,
JustAGal, Deflective, Kaobear, Robina Fox, Magioladitis, Xn4, Tinucherian, EagleFan, BilCat, Gwern, [email protected], Rrostrom,
Reedy Bot, DMCer, VolkovBot, Mkpumphrey, Dietmar Lettau, SieBot, Wikifex, Denisarona, ClueBot, GorillaWarfare, Wysprgr2005,
Indopug, PrasanthVRegy, GDibyendu, Addbot, Douglas the Comeback Kid, Mr Hall of England, Ehrenkater, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Frag-
gle81, AnomieBOT, NFD9001, Umar Zulfikar Khan, DivineAlpha, FoxBot, An0n1730, Onel5969, Super48paul, Dewritech, ZéroBot,
Jonathansammy, ClueBot NG, Ronakshah1990, Andrew Gwilliam, BG19bot, Sid5480, Wikih101, Frosty, Paul2520, Signoredexter,
TheMagikCow, Swarnakumarv, Capankajsmilyo, AusLondonder, Filpro, Glide08, Muhammad Umair Mirza, DarkAgea, Jn045, Tsah2011,
Anurag.akc and Anonymous: 98

9.2 Images
• File:Ambox_important.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg License: Public do-
main Contributors: Own work, based off of Image:Ambox scales.svg Original artist: Dsmurat (talk · contribs)
• File:Coat_of_Arms_of_the_United_Kingdom_(1837-1952).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/
Coat_of_Arms_of_the_United_Kingdom_%281837-1952%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist:
Sodacan
• File:Edit-clear.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The
Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist:
The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the file, specifically: “Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although
minimally).”
• File:Question_book-new.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/99/Question_book-new.svg License: Cc-by-sa-3.0
Contributors:
Created from scratch in Adobe Illustrator. Based on Image:Question book.png created by User:Equazcion Original artist:
Tkgd2007

9.3 Content license

• Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0