ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES • IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is

affirmed, with costs.

A) CARDENAS VS. CAMUS (July 30, 1962)

G.R. No. L-17191 July 30, 1962

JOSE PEREZ CARDENAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO CAMUS, defendant-appellant.
Florentino M. Guanlao for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro Camus for and in his own behalf as defendant-appellant.
DIZON, J.:

Facts:
• On May 26, 1941 appellant Pedro Camus, with appellee J. Perez
Cardenas as guarantor in solidum, executed in favor of Jose Garrido a
promissory note in the sum of P2,000.00, payable as follows:
• During the first twelve consecutive months beginning June 1941, the sum
of P360.00 in twelve equal installments of P30.00, each installment to be
paid on or before the fifth day of every month; B) CURDIAMAT VS. BATANGAS SAVINGS (March 9, 2010)
• Then the balance of P1,640.00 in thirty-two equal installments of P50.00
and one installment of P40.00 beginning the thirteenth month and [G.R. No. 182403 : March 09, 2010]
consecutively thereafter, each installment to be paid on or before the fifth ATTY. RESTITUTO G. CUDIAMAT, ERLINDA P. CUDIAMAT[1] AND
day of every month; CORAZON D. CUDIAMAT, PETITIONERS, VS. BATANGAS SAVINGS
• The note further provided that if any two installments were not paid as AND LOAN BANK, INC., AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, NASUGBU,
stated therein, the whole unpaid principal shall forthwith become due and BATANGAS, RESPONDENTS.
payable.
• Appellant and appellee having failed to pay as agreed upon, Garrido Facts:
instituted against them the corresponding action.
• As appellant could not be served with summons, the case proceeded with • Petitioner Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the
respect to herein appellee only, against which decision was rendered for registered co-owners of a property in Batangas.
"the sum of P2,000.00 with 6% interest thereon from the filing of the • Restituto, who resided in Ozamiz City with his wife, entrusted the custody
complaint on December 15, 1953, until its full payment, plus the sum of of the title to who was residing in the subject land.
P200.00 for attorney's fees.” • In 1979, Perfecto, without the knowledge and consent of Restituto,
• The above decision was affirmed by us on appeal and, after the case was obtained a loan from respondent Batangas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.
returned to the lower court for execution, appellee paid the total sum of (the bank).
P2,910.00 in full satisfaction thereof. • To secure the payment of the loan, Perfecto mortgaged the property for
• Thereafter appellee made verbal as well as written demands for payment the purpose of which he presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
upon appellant and, as a result thereof, in the month of September, 1958, purportedly executed by Restituto, with the marital consent of his wife-
the parties agreed that appellant would pay appellee the total sum of herein co-petitioner Erlinda Cudiamat.
P3,123.00 at the rate of P25.00 every payday beginning from December • On June 19, 1991, Restituto was informed, via letter from the bank, that
24, 1958. the property was foreclosed.
• After making three of these payments, however, appellant defaulted, thus • He thus, by letter informed the bank that he had no participation in the
giving rise to the institution of the present action in the Court of First execution of the mortgage and that he never authorized Perfecto for the
Instance of Rizal to secure judgment. purpose.
• The answer filed by appellant (Pedro), after admitting some material • In the meantime, Perfecto died in 1990.
averments of the complaint and denying others, alleged the following • In 1998, as Perfecto's widow petitioner Corazon was being evicted from
affirmative defenses: the property, she and her co-petitioner-spouses Restituto and Erlinda filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan a complaint “for quieting
x x x “1. That under Rule 8, Sec. 1(e) plaintiff's cause of action is barred by of title with damages" against the bank and the Register of Deeds of
a prior judgment and by the statute of limitations, he having failed to Nasugbu, assailing the mortgage as being null and void as they did not
interpose a cross-claim against the herein defendant in Civil Case No. authorize the encumbrance of the property.
21439;” x x x
• In its Answer to the complaint, the bank, maintaining THAT:
• Issues having thus been joined, the case was set for trial on March 22, • The validity of the mortgage, alleged that it had in fact secured a title in
1960. its name after Perfecto failed to redeem the mortgage;
• However, on March 18, 1960, that is, four days before the date thus set for • that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the bank had
the trial of the case, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on been placed under receivership and under liquidation by the Philippine
the ground that: Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC);
• (a) "the court had no jurisdiction over the case, the venue of the • that PDIC filed before the RTC of Nasugbu a petition for assistance in
action having been improperly laid" and the liquidation of the bank which was docketed as SP No. 576; and
• (b) "that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by prior judgment due to • that jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed claims against it is lodged with
his failure to interpose a cross-claim against the herein defendant the liquidation court-RTC Nasugbu.
who was his co-defendant in Civil Case No. 21439 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila.” • The bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending, inter alia, that the
• Appellant set this motion for hearing on Saturday, March 26, 1960, that is, Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint for quieting of
four days after the date set for the trial of the case on the merits. On the title.
same day — March 18, 1960 — appellant also filed a motion for
continuance. CA Ruled: “the Balayan RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, should have
• When the case was called for trial on March 18, nobody appeared for deferred to the Nasugbu RTC which sits as a liquidation court, given that the
appellant, and the lower court, after denying his motion for continuance for bank was already under receivership when petitioners filed the complaint for
lack of merit, received appellee's evidence, and on March 23, 1960, it quieting of title.” M.F.R denied.
rendered judgment “in favor of plaintiff (J. Cardenas) and against the
defendant, by ordering the defendant Pedro Camus to pay to plaintiff the UPON PETITION TO THE SC, Petitioner’s allegation: Assailing the
total sum of P3,048.45, with legal rate of interest thereon from the date of appellate court's ruling that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over their
the filing of this case until fully paid for plus attorney’s fees. complaint, petitioners argue that their complaint was filed earlier than PDIC's
• From the above judgment appellant Pedro took the present appeal petition for assistance in the liquidation; and that the bank is now estopped
claiming that the lower court committed the following errors: from questioning the jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC because it actively
1. The lower court erred in ignoring defendant's motion to dismiss and failing participated in the proceedings thereat.
to decide the same before trying and deciding this case.
2. The lower court erred in denying defendant's motion for continuance The petition is impressed with merit.
considering the fact that there was a motion to dismiss still pending which
challenged the very jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: WON respondent bank is already estopped in questioning
3. The lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction of this case when the jurisdiction?
venue of the action was improperly laid.
Ruling: YES.
Issue: Whether or not lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction?
Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the
Ruling: NO. The court denied Appellant Pedro’s appeal. Balayan RTC.

• Appellant had no right to do so as a means of forcing upon the court and In Lozon v. NLRC,[7] the Court came up with a clear rule on when jurisdiction
his opponent the desired postponement of the trial. by estoppel applies and when it does not:
• Moreover, after denying appellant's motion for continuance, it cannot be
said that the trial court was still under obligation to pass upon the motion The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
to dismiss which appellant set for hearing four days later. on whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no
• To the foregoing must be added the further consideration that the question jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
of jurisdiction raised in the aforesaid motion is manifestly unsubstantial. jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
• Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel." However, if the
plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon all or some of the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a
claims asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and result of given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the
the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
upon the pleas or defenses pleaded by the defendant in his answer assume an inconsistent position - that the lower court had jurisdiction...
or motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the (underscoring supplied)
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the
defendant. In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general
• As regards the alleged bar by prior judgment, we believe that the same is jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title filed by
also without merit. As stated heretofore, appellant could not be summoned petitioners. The Nasugbu RTC, as a liquidation court, assumed jurisdiction
when, together with appellee, he was sued by Jose Garrido in Civil Case over the claims against the bank only on May 25, 2000, when PDIC's
No. 21439 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. This, obviously, was petition for assistance in the liquidation was raffled thereat and given due
not appellee's fault at all. How could he be blamed for not filing a cross- course.
claim.

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While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and
can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches, the the court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment against him. Therefore in an
present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has
their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been been effected exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency
given the opportunity to present their respective evidence in a full-blown trial can be entered.
before the Balayan RTC which had, in fact, decided petitioners' complaint
(about two years before the appellate court rendered the assailed decision)
would be an exercise in futility and would unjustly burden petitioners.

The Court, in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,[9] held that as a general rule, if

there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims against the bank
should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The Court in Valenzuela,
however, after considering the circumstances attendant to the case, held
that the general rule should not be applied if to order the aggrieved party to
refile or relitigate its case before the litigation court would be "an exercise in
futility.”

In the present case, the Court finds that analogous considerations exist to
warrant the application of Valenzuela. Petitioner Restituto was 78 years old
at the time the petition was filed in this Court, and his co-petitioner-wife
Erlinda died[10] during the pendency of the case. And, except for co-
petitioner Corazon, Restituto is a resident of Ozamis City. To compel him
to appear and relitigate the case in the liquidation court-Nasugbu RTC
when the issues to be raised before it are the same as those already
exhaustively passed upon and decided by the Balayan RTC would be
superfluous.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of December 21,

2007 and Resolution dated March 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated January 17, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
C) BANCO FILIPINO VS. PALANCA(37 Phil. 291)

G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918

EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant.
Hartigan and Welch for appellee.
STREET, J.:

Facts:
• Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real
property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino.
• Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810
without returning again to the Philippines.
• The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a
D) RAPID CITY VS. VILLA (February 11, 2010)
non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication.
• The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the [G.R. No. 184197 : February 11, 2010]
defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China.
• It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
• Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause PETITIONER, VS. ORLANDO VILLA AND LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA,[1]
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. RESPONDENTS.
• The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was
held with the bank as the highest bidder. FACTS:
• On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
• However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was • Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation
made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . .
wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and . mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses
the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents).
• The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction • After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, court process
server resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon
over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
respondents’ househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and
refused to divulge their names.
Issue: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter of the action? • Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer,
prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein
respondents] in Default" which the trial court granted by Order of May 3,
Held: Yes. 2005.
• Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in
• More than eight months thereafter respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order
a mortgage foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to of Default,3 claiming that on January 27, 2006 they "officially received all
entertain the action primarily from the statutes organizing the court. pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. And they denied the
• Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and
responsible object which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that
that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is based exclusively on the power assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to
which, under the law, it possesses over the property; and any discussion relative receive the documents.4
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart
from the case. • By Order the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein
respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did
• The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive object not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them
of such action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and
in default, which the trial court again granted..
considerations, namely:
• So, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second
(1) that the property is located within the district; order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming
(2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to
obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and invalid service of summons.
(3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into • The trial court denied respondents’ Omnibus Motion by Order and
custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence for petitioner.
mortgage debt.
• Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court by Resolution of August 12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition
• An obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than
such as can be enforced against the property. The Court then formulated the for review on certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, in filing the
first Motion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to
following proposition relative to the foreclosure proceeding against the property
the jurisdiction of the court.
of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself personally to
the jurisdiction of the court: ISSUE: W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants [respondents].
(I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which it possesses
over the property; RULING: YES
(II) that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is nonessential;
(III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be enforced • The petition is impressed with merit.
against the property itself.
• It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s
• In Pennoyer vs. Neff, involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings
in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:

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• Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in • Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a candidacy is proven, the trial court has jurisdiction, but that if such fact is
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the not proven the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case.
person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. • There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the
jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case.
• And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong
Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:
JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUE JURISDICTION OVER
• Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either THE SUBJECT-MATTER
by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his
voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an • Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike • Although an issue is
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be not duly pleaded it may
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the conferred by consent either express or validly be tried and
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for implied of the parties. (Rule 17, sec. 4, decided if no timely
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion Rules of Court.) objection is made
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s thereto by the parties.
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional This cannot be done
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to when jurisdiction over
challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be the subject-matter is
considered to have submitted to its authority. involved.
• Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
• In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general expression of a principle that is involved in
rule on voluntary appearance; jurisdiction over the persons of the parties.
Where, for instance, an issue is not duly
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the
pleaded in the complaint, the defendant
person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in
cannot be said to have been served with
an unequivocal manner; and
process as to that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc.
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the Co. vs. Domingo, 44 Phil. 680).
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading
or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the • At any rate, whether or not the court has
court for resolution. jurisdiction over a specific issue is a
question that requires nothing except an
Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a examination of the pleadings, and this
special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their function is without such importance as to
persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court. call for the intervention of this Court.
•

Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is a well-settled

rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the
court may examine all the ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order
to determine which are legal and which are illegal, even though neither of
the parties raised any question as to their illegality. (Yalung vs. Atienza, 52
Phil. 781; Cecilio vs. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689; Cosculluela vs. Gaston, 63
Phil. 41).

Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.

E) REYES VS. DIAZ (73 Phil. 484)

[ GR No. 48754, Nov 26, 1941 ]

EMILIO V. REYES v. APOLONIO R. DIAZ
73 Phil. 484

MORAN, J.:
This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the ground
that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. The supposed questions of
jurisdiction are, first, whether or not there is sufficient evidence to show that
the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy, and second,
whether the trial court has or has no authority to pass upon the validity of
the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which have not been challenged by
the protestee in his counter-protest.

Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the Supreme
Court jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial
court is in issue." Section 138, No. 3, of the Revised Administrative F) LAM VS. CHUA (March 18, 2004)
Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, provides
that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over "all cases [G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004]
in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue." It has been JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
held that the word "jurisdiction" as used in the constitutions and in the DECISION
statutes "means jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
exception arises by reason of its employment in a broader sense.”
FACTS
There is in our Constitution or in the law aforecited nothing which may lend  March 11, 1994 Adriana filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the word "jurisdiction" therein used a broader meaning than jurisdiction over marriage against Jose in PasayRTC on the ground of psychological
the subject-matter. incapacity. They were married on January 13, 1984 and have one son,
John Paul. The petition alleged:
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine o She claimed Jose was incapacitated to comply with the
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong (C. essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity
J. S., p. 36) and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the was not then apparent and became manifest only after the
court and defines its powers (Banco Espafiol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go
921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216; Ng Si Chok vs. home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities,
Vera, G. R. No. 45674). mismanaging the CPG.
o To save what was left of their properties, she was forced to
Issue: The question, therefore, of whether a court has jurisdiction over the agree with Jose on the dissolution of their CPG and the
subject-matter, calls for interpretation and application of the law of separation of present and future properties. It was approved
jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power among the different courts in by the MakatiRTC in a Decision dated February 28, 1994.
the Philippines, and since the ruling on the matter is of far-reaching o They had long been separated in bed and board; they have
consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and structure of our judicial agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject
system, the law has deemed it wise to place the power and authority to act to Jose’s visitation rights.
thereon in the highest court of the land (which is the Supreme Court, guys) ?  Summons was duly served on Jose but no responsive pleading was
filed by him.
Ruling: In the instant case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as  The trial court issued an Order directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio
above described. Barrera to conduct an investigation to determine whether or not there

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 was collusion. His report stated that there seems to be no collusion i. Buce already had checks for P400 in which
between the parties Tiongco refused to accept.
 The lone witness was Adriana herself. She testified that her marriage 4) Filed for complaint asking to have P200 rental for period of
was arranged by her parents the traditional Chinese way. Jose very 15 years plus subject 10 year renewal.
seldom came home, never worked for a living and instead kept asking i. Tiongco said their actions are justified due to the
for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one Rent Control Law.
spending for all the expenses of their only child. No evidence was ii. Lease contract allowing renewal does not mean
presented regarding the amount of support needed for John Paul nor automatic renewal, just a mutual
the capacity of Jose to give support. agreement on both parties.
 Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open on the ground that she was 2 RTC declared lease contract automatically renewed for 10 years:
able to secure additional new evidence which were significant, material 1 Stipulations in contract giving right to Buce to contruct
and indispensable. Motion granted. buildings and improvements
 The court admitted as evidence a Marriage Contract dated May 25, 2 Filing of Buce one year before the expiration of 15-
1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another Marriage year term.
Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock. 3 Fixed monthly rent to P400, continuous increased
 The RTC declared the marriage between Adriana and Jose null and caused inevitable novation of their contract.
void for being bigamous. Jose Lam was ordered to give 20k monthly 3 CA reversed, ordered Buce to vacate the premises due to contract
support to his son John Paul. expiration and payment of P1000.
 Jose filed an MR only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support 1 Stipulation was unclear as to who can may exercise
since there was already a provision for support of the child in the option to renew.
agreement approved by the MakatiRTC wherein he and Adriana agreed 2 Without stipulation on option to renew must be upon
to contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the agreement of parties.
child. However the same is “to be increased as required, to be used 3 Since Tiongco were not agreeable to an extension,
solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son.” original term of lease should end. Their refusal to
 MR denied. The agreement approved by the Makati RTC before the accept checks was justifiable. Because even when
marriage was declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is of original specified only P200, tender and acceptance
no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the of increased rental novated contract of lease.
latter court. CA affirmed. Hence this petition for certiorari. 4 BUCE:
1 Order to vacate premises is beyond bounds of
ISSUES: WON the court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the authority because the case she filed was for “specific
performance” and not unlawful detainer.
nullity of the marriage? YES but Jose is estopped from questioning
2 Phrase of “renewal for another 10 years at option of
the same.
both parties” indicates intention of parties to renew
contract only upon mutal agreement.
3 Allowing her to put buildings and improvements,
RATIO:
Tiongco’s acceptance of increased rental signify
renewal of contract.
The provision on support under the approved compromise agreement cannot
5 TIONGCO:
be considered final and res judicata. Thus the court has authority to award
1 Subsequent acts do not automatically indicate
support in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
renewal of contracts
The Pasay RTC and the CA are both correct insofar as they ruled that the
amount of support is by no means permanent. Judgment for support does not
On the other hand, private respondents aver that even if the original petition
become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is
filed before the RTC was not for unlawful detainer, the order of the Court of
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is
Appeals requiring petitioner to vacate the premises is but a logical
entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in
consequence of its finding that the lease contract had expired. To require
accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of
another litigation would constitute multiplicity of suits; besides,
the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
petitioner has no other reason to stay in the premises. There is no basis why
Any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon
Fernandez should not be applied to the case at bar. Absent contrary
the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support.
stipulation in reciprocal contracts, the period of lease is deemed to be for the
benefit of both parties.
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially
amended or supplemental pleadings. Considering that in cases of declaration
ISSUES:
of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage, there can be no default
If “this lease shall be for a period of 15 years, subject to renewal for 10 years”
pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Article 48 of the Family
make stipulation automatic and subsequent to parties? NO.
Code, it is with more reason that Jose should be entitled to notice of all
proceedings.
HELD:
PETITION IS GRANTED. CA REVERSED
A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions
except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is
1 NOTHING IN THE CONTRACT THAT EXPRESSES
decided beyond them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore where a
AUTOMATIC RENEWAL.
court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the
1 Allowance on improvements and construction are not
complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not
indicative of extension of contract.
merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to
2 NOT INDICATED WHO MAY EXERCISE OPTION TO RENEW
collateral attack.
1 Thus, period of lease should be set for the benefit of
both parties upon mutal agreement.
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject
2 Since private respondents were not amenable to
within its general jurisdiction, but which is not brought before it by any
renewal, they cannot be compelled to execute new. It
statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for
is their prerogative to terminate lease at its expiration.
its determination, is a nullity.
3 Issue of possession was not among issued agreed by parties nor
raised by respondents.
Thus it is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered judgment
on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its
In this jurisdiction, a fine delineation exists between renewal of the
jurisdiction to do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect the new
contract and extension of its period. Generally, the renewal of a
issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as to
contract connotes the death of the old contract and the birth or
authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and
emergence of a new one. A clause in a lease providing for an
Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have
extension operates of its own force to create an additional term, but a
been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered
clause providing for a renewal merely creates an obligation to execute
judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served
a new lease contract for the additional term. As renewal of the contract
upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived
contemplates the cessation of the old contract, then it is necessary
petitioner Lam of due process.
that a new one be executed between the parties.[
However Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity since
Accordingly, as correctly contended by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals
he never questioned the same before the RTC or the CA.
went beyond the bounds of its authority[26] when after interpreting the
questioned provision of the lease contract in favor of the private
respondents it proceeded to order petitioner to vacate the subject premises.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED. The assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED insofar as it ordered the
petitioner to immediately vacate the leased premises, without prejudice,
however, to the filing by the private respondents of an action for the
recovery of possession of the subject property.
No costs.

SO ORDERED. DAVIDE, JR.

G) BUCE VS. COURT OF APPEALS (332 SCRA 151)

[G.R. No. 136913. May 12, 2000]

ANITA C. BUCE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPS. BERNARDO C. TIONGCO and ARACELI TIONGCO, SPS. DIONISIO
TIONGCO and LUCILA TIONGCO, and JOSE M. TIONGCO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Ncm

1. BUCE LEASED 56-METER LAND FOR PERIOD OF 15 YEARS AND

SUBJECT RENEWAL TO 10.
1) Constructed a building and monthly rental of P200.
2) Tiongco demanded increase upto P1000.
3) Tiongco gave letter to increase to P1500 pursuant to Rent
Control Law.
NATURE OF PROCEDURAL RULES

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A) SAMAHAN VS. HON. MAGSALIN (June 6, 2011)

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-

NUWHRAIN),
Petitioner,
- versus -

HON. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN and

HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents.

Facts:

• Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL is a

duly registered union and the certified bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a five-star hotel owned B) ALVERO VS. DELA ROSA (76 Phil. 428)
and operated by respondent Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc.
• On January 31, 2001, Hyatts General Manager, David C. Pacey, issued a FACTS:
Memorandum[5] informing all hotel employees that hotel security have • Respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the Court of First
been instructed to conduct a thorough bag inspection and body frisking in Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one
every entrance and exit of the hotel. Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action, to wit, (1) to declare in force
• On February 3, 2001, Angelito Caragdag, a waiter at the hotels Cafe Al the contract of sale, made on October 1, 1940, between said Jose R. Victoriano
Fresco restaurant and a director of the union, refused to be frisked by the and Margarita Villarica, of two (2) parcels of land in the Province of Rizal, which
security personnel. land was subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S.
• The following day, on February 6, 2001, Caragdag again refused to be Alvero, on December 31, 1944, for the sum of P100,000 in Japanese military
frisked by the security personnel. Thus, on February 8, 2001, the HRD
notes; and (2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void.
issued another Memorandum[7] requiring him to explain.
• Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly admitting having
• Because of the succession of infractions he committed, the HRD also
required Caragdag to explain on May 11, 2001 why the hotels OSDA 4.32 sold said land to Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for P100,000, in December, 1944, due to
(Committing offenses which are penalized with three [3] suspensions the imperative necessity of raising funds with which to provide for herself and
during a 12-month period) should not be enforced against him.[14] An family, and that she did not remember the previous sale; at the same time,
investigation board was formed after receipt of Caragdags written offering to repurchase said land from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in the sum of P5,000,
explanation, and the matter was set for hearing on May 19, 2001. but that the latter refused to accept the offer.
• However, despite notice of the scheduled hearing, both Caragdag and the • Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering said complaint, denied the allegations made
Union President failed to attend. Thereafter, the investigating board therein, and claimed exclusive ownership of the land in question
resolved on the said date to dismiss Caragdag for violation of OSDA • Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered his decision in favor of Jose
4.32.[15] Caragdag appealed but the investigating board affirmed its R. Victoriano
resolution after hearing on May 24, 2001. • Reason of the court:
• Caragdag’s dismissal was questioned by petitioner, and the dispute was • the two (2) parcels of land in question had been sold by Margarita Villarica to
referred to voluntary arbitration upon agreement of the parties. Victoriano, since October 1, 1940, for the sum of P6,000, on the condition
• In finding the three separate suspensions of Caragdag valid, the Voluntary that the purchaser should make a down payment of P1,700, and a monthly
Arbitrator reasoned that the union officers and members had no right to
payment of P76.86 in 120 equal monthly installments;
breach company rules and regulations on security and employee
discipline on the basis of certain suspicions against management and an • that Victoriano continued making said monthly payments until December,
1941, but that owing to the war-time conditions then existing, Villarica
ongoing CBA negotiation standoff.
agreed verbally to suspend such payments until the restoration of peace;
• The Voluntary Arbitrator also found that when Caragdag advised
Lacambacal and Alvaro not to give any statement, he threatened and • that immediately after said sale of said land to him, Victoriano took
intimidated his superior while the latter was performing his duties. possession thereof and made improvements thereon to the amount of P800,
• On August 1, 2003, petitioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary and continued occupying said property until December, 1944, when he
Arbitrator before the CA in a petition for certiorari which was docketed as abandoned the same to go to evacuation places, but returned thereto in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78364.[19] As mentioned at the outset, the CA dismissed February, 1945;
the petition outright for being the wrong remedy. • Villarica, having forgotten the sale of said land to Victoriano, sold the same
for P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on December 31, 1944, to Alvero,
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition for certiorari but afterwards offered to repurchase said property from him, for the sum of
filed before it on the ground that the same is an improper mode of appeal? P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, after liberation;
• Alvero presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of
RULING: Deeds of the City of Manila, on January 3, 1945, and took possession of said
• On the first issue, petitioner argues that because decisions rendered by property in December, 1944, but afterwards found Jose R. Victoriano in the
voluntary arbitrators are issued under Title VII-A of the Labor Code, they premises in February, 1945;
are not covered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, by express provision of Section 2 thereof. Section 2, petitioner • the contract of sale executed by Villarica, in favor of Victoriano, it was agreed
that, upon failure of the purchaser to make payments of three (3) successive
points out, expressly provides that Rule 43 shall not apply to judgments or
final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. mothly installments, the vendor would be free to sell the property again,
forfeiting the payments made, except in the case of force majeure; that there
• Hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy for
questioning the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator, and petitioner having was really a verbal agreement between Villarica and Victoriano, in February,
availed of such remedy, the CA erred in declaring that the petition was 1942, for the suspension of the payment of the monthly installments until the
filed out of time since the petition was filed within the sixty (60)-day restoration of peace;
reglementary period. • although Victoriano had presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to
• On the other hand, respondent maintains that the CA acted correctly in the Register of Deeds, in Pasig, Rizal, like Alvero, he had also failed to secure
dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong mode of appeal. It the transfer of title to his name.
stresses that Section 1 of Rule 43 clearly states that it is the governing • Considering that Victoriano's document was older than that of Fredesvindo S.
rule with regard to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or Alvero, and that he had taken possession of said property, since October 1,
resolutions of voluntary arbitrators. Respondent contends that the 1940
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law include the voluntary arbitrators • On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified of said decision
appointed and accredited under the Labor Code, as they are considered
• December 27, 1945, Alvero filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial,
as included in the term quasi-judicial instrumentalities. which was denied
• Petitioners arguments fail to persuade.
• On January 8, 1946, Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal
• Hence, upon receipt on May 26, 2003 of the Voluntary Arbitrators simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond.
Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, petitioner
should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary • On January 14, 1946, Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the
period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari. same time, asked for the execution of the judgment.
• Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no • On January 15, 1946, Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss,
cogent reason in this case to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60
procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal
guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946,
rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be and buried the following day.
ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the • On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of
effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal
administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.
complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice • On January 23, 1946, Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said
where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for
forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946.
conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.
• He filed petition for certiorari.
• Caragdags dismissal being due to serious misconduct, it follows that he
should not be entitled to financial assistance. To rule otherwise would be
SC RULING:
to reward him for the grave misconduct he committed. We must
emphasize that social justice is extended only to those who deserve its • Hence, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal commenced
from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment rendered
compassion.[33]
in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice
• WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are DENIED. The of appeal and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed out of
October 3, 2003 and August 13, 2004 Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-
time, and much more so his appeal bond, which was only filed on January
G.R. SP No. 78364, as well as the Court of Appeals December 16, 2005
15, 1946.
Decision and April 12, 2006 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 77478, are
AFFIRMED and UPHELD. • Alvero should have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and
(3) appeal bond. But the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15,
• With costs against the petitioner. 1946.
SO ORDERED.
REMEDIAL LAW CONCEPTS IN CONNECTION WITH RULES OF
COURT

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• Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of examination, to impose nes and other sanctions and to issue cease and
court, will cause the judgment to become final, and the certification of the desist order.
record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been • Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that
lost the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in determining
• The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-
perfected and filed may, however, be extended by order of the court, upon banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must
application made, prior to the expiration of the original period. conduct some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same.
• Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect • Thus, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over judgments,
of law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which certain acts orders, resolutions or awards of the BSP Monetary Board on
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely administrative complaints against banks and quasi-banks, which the
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and former acquires through the ling by the aggrieved party of a Petition for
speedy discharge of judicial business. Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory and
imperative, so that failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme Court, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari of
within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the United Coconut Planters Bank, Jeronimo U. Kilayko, Lorenzo V. Tan, are
appeal hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
• In the same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his
brief, within the time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the appellee
and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, the court may dismiss
the appeal.

QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES/AGENCIES

A) UCPB VS. E. GANZON, INC. (591 SCRA 321)

THIRD DIVISION
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, JERONIMO U. KILAYKO,
LORENZO V. TAN, ENRIQUE L. GANA, JAIME W. JACINTO and EMILY R.
LAZARO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
E. GANZON, INC.,
Respondent.

FACTS:
• From 1995 to 1998, EGI a corporation engaged in real estate construction
and development availed itself of credit facilities from UCPB to nance its
business expansion. To secure said credit facilities, EGI mortgaged to
UCPB its condominium unit inventories in EGI Ru no Plaza, located at the
intersection of Buendia and Taft Avenues, Manila.
• Initially, EGI was able to make periodic amortization payments of its loans
to UCPB, however after sometime it defaulted in its payment of
amortizations, thus, making all of its obligations due and demandable.
Thereafter, UCPB stopped sending EGI monthly statements of its
accounts.
• In their MOA it is amended that titles to the properties of EGI shall be
transferred to UCPB by the following modes: (1) foreclosure of mortgage;
(2) dacion en pago; (3) creation of a holding company; and (4) use of
other alternatives as may be deemed appropriate by UCPB.
• EGI President Engineer Eulalio Ganzon (Ganzon) and Senior Vice-
President Layug to review their les to verify the gures on the loan
obligations of EGI as computed by UCPB, they discovered the UCPB
Internal Memorandum dated 22 February 2001, signed by UCPB
corporate OFFIcers. The said Internal Memorandum presented two
columns, one with the heading ACTUAL and the other DISCLOSED TO
EGI.The gures in the two columns were con icting. The gures in the
DISCLOSED TO EGI column computed the unpaid balance of the loan
obligations of EGI to be P226,967,194.80, the amount which UCPB
actually made known to and demanded from EGI. The gures in the
ACTUAL column calculated the remaining loan obligations of EGI to be
only P146,849,412.58.
• Consequently, EGI wrote UCPB a letter dated 21 May 2001, which
included, among other demands, the refund by UCPB to EGI of the over
payment of P83,000,000.00;return to EGI of all the remaining Transfer
Certi cates of Title (TCTs)/Condominium Certi cates of Title (CCTs) in the
possession of UCPB; and cost of damage to EGI for the delay in the
release of its certi cates of title.
• On 5 November 2002, EGI, also on the basis of the UCPB Internal
Memorandum dated 22 February 2001, EGI led with the BSP an
administrative complaint against UCPB, et al., for violation of Sections 36
and 37, Article IV of Republic Act No. 7653, in relation to Section 55.1(a)
of Republic Act No. 8791;and for the commission of irregularities and
conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner.
• In a letter-decision dated 16 September 2003, the BSP Monetary Board
dismissed the administrative complaint of EGI, which was then submitted
to the appellate court.
• Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision granting the Petition for
Review of EGI, thus, setting aside the BSP letter-decision dated16
September 2003 and remanding the case to the BSP Monetary Board for
further proceedings.
• UCPB, et al., aver that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction
over decisions, orders and/or resolutions of the BSP Monetary Board on
administrative matters.
• These are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court has jurisdiction over the decisions of the
BSP Monetary Board.

RULING:
• Yes, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-
judicial powers or functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals,
the BSP Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority
and a body corporate with scal and administrative autonomy, mandated to
provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit.
• It has power to issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to
obey the subpoena without justi able reason,to administer oaths and
compel presentation of books, records and others, needed in its

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