Jamia Hamdard Institute of Legal
Jamia Hamdard Institute of Legal
Jamia Hamdard Institute of Legal
1st Semester
Roll No: 12
Section: B
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude towards my parents and friends who
guided me and helped me at every possible step.
SHAHNAWAZ
Roll. No. 12
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1) INTRODUCTION
1.1. Torts
1.2. General Defences
2) The Meaning Of Volenti Non Fit Injuria
2.1. Voluntary
2.2. Agreement
2.3. Knowledge
3) The origin and development of Volenti non fit injuria
3.1. Implied Consent
3.2. Knowing And Willingness
3.3. Exceptions To The Maxim
6) Conclusion
7) Bibliography
INTRODUCTION
TORTS
The word ‘tort’ is derived from the Latin term ‘tortum’ which means ‘twisted’.
Thus, a tort basically refers to an act which is wrong or twisted. Generally
speaking, it is an injury that one person or entity inflicts (accidentally or
intentionally) on another person.
Or
“a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated
damages, and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a
trust or other merely equitable obligation.”
Or
Tort law is mainly based on the legal maxim, ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’, which means,
that where a right exists, there lies a remedy too. “The primary function of the
Law of Torts is to provide remedies to claimants who have suffered harm, loss, or
an infringement of rights. The harm includes physical injury to persons or
property, damage to persons’ reputations or financial interests, and interference
with persons’ use and enjoyment of their land.” When this legal right of a person
is violated, the injured party can ask for remedy in the form of ‘damages’ or
compensation. Now, compensation can be of a few types- compensatory damages
and punitive damages. The former aims at compensating the injured (called
‘plaintiff’ in tort law) and the latter aims at punishing the wrong-doer (called the
‘defendant’ in tort law). Some tort cases seek something called an ‘injunctive
relief’. An injunctive relief refers to a court order that requires the defendant to
do something or prevents him from doing something.
“Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; this
duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redress able by an action for
unliquidated damages.”
“The origins of tort law can be found in old English procedural law. To file an
action in a court, one needed a writ, which could only be obtained from the head
of the judiciary, the Lord Chancellor. The law of torts is strongly influenced by its
history: the focus is not primarily on rules but on the right cause of action” . In
India, tort law has developed mainly as a part of the common law system that
influenced India after India was colonized by the British. However, tort law has
not developed much India. “The law of torts administered in India is the English
common law of torts so far as it is available to the Indian society and
circumstances.” Thus, the application of common law, more specifically tort law
in India has a selective application.
Every tort is a cause of action, which is simply a legally accepted reason for
bringing a suit” But, the law of torts also provides certain ‘defences’ to the
defendant by using which the defendant can escape liability. This is done mainly
to ensure the just application of the principles of tort law. The word defence “...is
sometimes used to refer to any argument that persuades the court to find that
the defendant is not liable.” These defences which apply to most of the torts in
general, are called the ‘general defences.’ The various types of general defences
include volenti non fit injuria, act of God, necessity, contributory negligence,
public policy etc. In this paper, we will specifically deal in detail with the defence
of ‘volenti non fit injuria.’
GENERAL DEFENCES
Some specific defences are available in a suit for tort. These defences are specific
and find application in relation to a fixed nature of tort. Other defences are
general in nature and can be classified as:
This defence is based on the principle of ‘Volenti non fit injuria’. A person, who
has voluntarily agreed to suffer harm, cannot claim damages for such harm. This
consent to suffer harm can be either express or even implied. How-ever, such
consent must be given freely and not obtained by fraud or any other illegal
means.
This defence is based on the maxim ‘Ex turpi causa non oritur actio’ which means
‘no action rises from an immoral cause’. So, when the action of the plaintiff is
unlawful itself, it might lead to a defence in general.
Inevitable Accident:
Inevitable accident is such where the injury could not have been avoided in spite
of reasonable care on part of the defendant. In a suit for tort it is always a good
defence if it can be shown that the defendant could not avoid the injury sustained
by the plaintiff in spite of his reasonable effort.
Act of God:
An Act of God is an inevitable accident arising out of the working of natural forces
which is beyond human control and unprecedented in nature and type. It must be
extraordinary and unanticipated as well. The Rule of Strict Liability (as in
Rylands v. Fletcher) has incorporated the concept of this defence.
In case of imminent threat to life or property, use of force for defence of the
same is justified. However, use of such force must be reasonable and should be in
proportion to the requirement.
Necessity:
Any damage arising out of an act that the law prescribes or the statute
authorises will never become actionable even though in absence of such
statutory authority it is an offence in tort.
THE MEANING OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
Volenti non fit injuria is a defence of limited application in tort law. A direct
translation of the latin phrase volenti non fit injuria is, 'to one who volunteers,
no harm is done'. Where the defence of volenti applies it operates as a complete
defence absolving the Defendant of all liability. It is often stated that the Claimant
consents to the the risk of harm, however, the defence of volenti is much more
limited in its application and should not be confused with the defence of consent
in relation to trespass. The defence of volenti non fit injuria requires a freely
entered and voluntary agreement by the Claimant, in full knowledge of the
circumstances, to absolve the Defendant of all legal consequences of their
actions. There is a considerable overlap with contributory negligence and since
the introduction of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the
courts have been less willing to make a finding of volenti preferring to apportion
loss between the parties rather than taking an all or nothing approach.
Voluntary :
The agreement must be voluntary and freely entered for the defence of volenti
non fit injuria to succeed. If the Claimant is not in a position to exercise free
choice, the defence will not succeed. This element is most commonly seen in
relation to employment relationships, rescuers and suicide.
AGREEMENT:
The second requirement for the defence of volenti non fit injuria is agreement.
The agreement may be express or implied. An example of an express agreement
would be where there exists a contractual term or notice. However, this would be
subject to the controls of s.2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. An implied
agreement may exist where the Claimant's action in the circumstances
demonstrates a willingness to accept not only the physical risks but also the legal
risks.
The Claimant sued his employers for injuries sustained while in the course of
working in their employment. He was employed to hold a drill in position whilst
two other workers took it in turns to hit the drill with a hammer. Next to where
he was working another set of workers were engaged in taking out stones and
putting them into a steam crane which swung over the place where the Claimant
was working. The Claimant was injured when a stone fell out of the crane and
struck him on the head. The Defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit
injuria in that the Claimant knew it was a dangerous practice and had
complained that it was dangerous but nevertheless continued. At trial the jury
found for the Claimant. The Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeal allowed
the appeal holding that the Claimant was precluded from recovering as he had
willingly accepted the risk. The Claimant appealed to the House of Lords.
The Decision
The appeal was allowed. The Claimant may have been aware of the danger of the
job, but had not consented to the lack of care. He was therefore entitled to
recover damages.
Lord Watson:
"In its application to questions between the employer and the employed, the
maxim as now used generally imports that the workman had either expressly or
by implication agreed to take upon himself the risks attendant upon the
particular work which he was engaged to perform, and from which he has
suffered injury. The question which has most frequently to be considered is not
whether he voluntarily and rashly exposed himself to injury, but whether he
agreed that, if injury should befall him, the risk was to be his and not his masters.
When, as is commonly the case, his acceptance or nonacceptance of the risk is left
to implication, the workman cannot reasonably be held to have undertaken it
unless he knew of its existence, and appreciated or had the means of appreciating
its danger. But assuming that he did so, I am unable to accede to the suggestion
that the mere fact of his continuing at his work, with such knowledge and
appreciation, will in every case necessarily imply his acceptance. Whether it will
have that effect or not depends, in my opinion, to a considerable extent upon the
nature of the risk, and the workman's connection with it, as well as upon other
considerations which must vary according to the circumstances of each case.”
KNOWLEDGE:
The Claimant must have knowledge of the full nature and extent of the risk that
they ran.
The claimant was a photographer at a horse show. He was situated within the
ring of the horse show and not behind the barriers where the spectators were
housed. He was on a bench with a Miss Smallwood who was a director of the
company which employed the Claimant. He had been taking little interest in the
proceedings and was not experienced in regard to horses. During the
competition, one of the horses, Work of Art owned by the Defendant, came
galloping at great speed towards the bench where they were sitting. The
Claimant took fright at the approach of the galloping horse and attempted
unsuccessfully to pull Miss Smallwood off the bench. He stepped or fell back into
the course of the horse which passed three or few feet behind the bench, and was
knocked down. The Claimant brought an action in negligence arguing the rider
had lost control of the horse and was going too fast. The defendant raised the
defence of volenti non fit injuria.
Held:
There was no breach of duty so the Claimant's action failed. On the issue of
volenti non fit injuria it was held that consent to the risk of injury was
insufficient. There must be consent to the breach of duty in full knowledge of the
nature and extent of the risk.
Diplock, LJ:
"The maxim in English law presupposes a tortious act by the defendant. The
consent that is relevant is not consent to the risk of injury but consent to the lack
of reasonable care that may produce that risk… and requires on the part of the
plaintiff at the time at which he gives his consent full knowledge of the nature
and extent of the risk that he ran"
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF VOLENTI
NON FIT INJURIA
The legal maxim, volenti non fit injuria, as we know, says that, if a person
voluntarily consents to a risk, no liability can arise against the defendant for the
same. However, there comes a need to clarify what exactly consent means.
“The essence of the volenti defence is that the claimant voluntarily assented to
the commission of the tort and therefore cannot complain about the damage.
Sometimes voluntary assent to a crucial element of the tort will appear to be
enough...but such assent only works if it is impossible to separate that element
from the damage suffered by the claimant.”
The controversy was whether acceptance of the risk can (or must) be inferred
from the mere fact that the man goes on working in full knowledge of the risk
involved. Then came up the case of, Thomas v. Quartermaine, in which the
judge ruled,
“Quite apart from the other requirements of the defence, knowing about a risk is
not the same as being willing to accept it.”
IMPLIED CONSENT
The case of Thomas v. Quartermine was referred to while deciding the case of
Smith v. Baker. In this case, thus, more precisely, the case lays down the rule of
‘implied consent’. This means that, when the plaintiff undertakes voluntarily to
do something that is intrinsically dangerous, he also automatically consents to
the harm and risks inevitably accompany the act. This holds true even if the
defendant has taken reasonable care to avoid the harm as much as possible.
Discussing the relation between negligence and the application of volenti non fit
injuria, it can be said that where a work is dangerous and the plaintiff has been
subjected to some kind of risk, whether he has been injured or not, if the risky
situation has been created or enhanced by the negligence of the defendant, then
the defendant will not be considered to have consented to the risk. However, the
defence of volenti non fit injuria does not work as a defence in rescue cases.
THE VARIOUS APPLICATIONS OF VOLENTI NON
FIT INJURIA
The defence of Volenti non fit injuria has a broad spectrum of applications.,
mostly in the tort of negligence where the plaintiff’s duty of care is violated. Some
of the popular applications are as follows:
As long ago as 1891, the House of Lords recognised that an employee who
complained of unsafe practice, but nevertheless continued to work could not
truly be said to have voluntarily agreed to waive their legal rights:
The claimants were brothers who were qualified shotfirers employed by the
defendant. They were injured as a result of an explosion at the defendant's
quarry caused by the brothers' negligence. They had insufficient wire to test a
circuit to allow them to test from a shelter. Another worker had gone to fetch
more wire but the brothers decided to go ahead and test with the shorter wire.
Each brother claimed against the defendant based on their employer's vicarious
liability for the negligence and breach of statutory duty of the other brother. The
defendant raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that the brothers had full
knowledge of the risk and were acting against express instructions. At trial the
judge held that the defence of volenti could not apply where there was breach of a
statutory duty. This was upheld in the Court of Appeal.
Held:
The appeal was allowed. The brothers had deliberately acted in defiance of the
employer's express instructions in full knowledge of the risks. The workers were
under the statutory duty not the employer. The employer had been instrumental
in bringing in the statutory regulations and ensured all workers were aware of
them. They had also previously dismissed a worker for flouting the regulations.
A rescuer is not regarded as having freely and voluntarily accepted the risk.
Mr Ward and Mr Wileman were employed by the defendant, Hopkins. They had
been called to clean out a well. The well was 50ft deep and 6ft wide. Hopkins
tested the atmosphere in the well by putting a lighted candle down the well. The
candle returned still lighted and thus he concluded the atmosphere was fine. He
and Ward then took a petrol motored pump down the well started it up and left
the well leaving the engine running on its own. The motor ran for 1 1/2 hours
before it stopped of its own accord. Before leaving the site Mr Hopkins told Mr
Ward and Mr Wileman not to go down the well until the fumes have cleared. The
following morning Hopkins again told the two not to go down the well until he
had arrived on the site. In breach of these orders Mr. Ward went down the well
and was overcome by fumes. Mr Wileman called for assistance and went down
the well after him. The claimant, Dr Baker, then arrived on the scene. He too went
into the well to seek to rescue the two. Unfortunately all three died of carbon
monoxide poisoning. The defendant contended that the act of the doctor acted as
a novus actus interveniens andsought to invoke volenti non fit injuria.
Held:
The doctors actions were not a novus actus interveniens. It was foreseeable that
if a defendant by his negligence places another in peril that someone may come
to his rescue and the doctor's actions were not unreasonable in the
circumstances. The Claimant's action was not defeated by volenti non fit injuria.
He was and as such his actions did not count as freely and voluntarily accepting
the risk.
Morris LJ:
It was said that Dr. Baker had been "unreasonably" brave. If a rescuer acts with a
wanton disregard of his own safety it might be that in some circumstances it
might be held that any injury to him was not the result of the negligence that
caused the situation of danger. Such a contention cannot be here asserted. Dr.
Baker tied a strong rope round his body and arranged for the rope to be held by
those on the surface, and arranged to maintain oral communication with them. It
must be remembered also that the chances of success of his attempt would
diminish moment by moment if he tarried. He in no way acted recklessly or
negligently. In my judgment, the learned Judge came to a correct conclusion in
regard to the claim made by his executors.
Where the Claimant commits suicide, originally it was held that they would be
treated as volens if they were of sound mind, but if they were of unsound mind
the defence of volenti non fit injuria would have no application:
Martin Lynch committed suicide whilst in a police cell. He had attempted suicide
earlier that day in the cells at the magistrates. He had also attempted suicide on
previous occasions. He had been seen by a doctor at the police station on arrival
who reported that he was not schizophrenic or depressed but was a suicide risk.
The custody officer checked him at 1.57 pm and left the hatch open. He was
found at 2.05 pm having used his shirt as a ligature secured by the open hatch. He
was unable to be resuscitated and died a week later. The defendant argued that
as Lynch was of sound mind his voluntary and informed act of suicide broke the
chain of causation.
Held:
The act of suicide was the very thing that the police were under a duty to prevent
to treat this as a novus actus interveniens would deprive the duty of any
substance. Therefore the defendant was liable, however damages were reduced
by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
The claimant was a photographer at a horse show. He was situated within the
ring of the horse show and not behind the barriers where the spectators were
housed. He was on a bench with a Miss Smallwood who was a director of the
company which employed the Claimant. He had been taking little interest in the
proceedings and was not experienced in regard to horses. During the
competition, one of the horses, Work of Art owned by the Defendant, came
galloping at great speed towards the bench where they were sitting. The
Claimant took fright at the approach of the galloping horse and attempted
unsuccessfully to pull Miss Smallwood off the bench. He stepped or fell back into
the course of the horse which passed three or few feet behind the bench, and was
knocked down. The Claimant brought an action in negligence arguing the rider
had lost control of the horse and was going too fast. The defendant raised the
defence of volenti non fit injuria.
Held:
There was no breach of duty so the Claimant's action failed. On the issue
of volenti non fit injuria it was held that consent to the risk of injury was
insufficient. There must be consent to the breach of duty in full knowledge of the
nature and extent of the risk.
Diplock LJ:
"The maxim in English law presupposes a tortious act by the defendant. The
consent that is relevant is not consent to the risk of injury but consent to the lack
of reasonable care that may produce that risk… and requires on the part of the
plaintiff at the time at which he gives his consent full knowledge of the nature
and extent of the risk that he ran"
In Dann v. Hamilton it was held that a person accepting a lift from a drunk driver
was not to be treated as volens unless the drunkenness was so extreme and so
glaring that accepting a lift would be equivalent of to intermeddling with an
unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff.
The Claimant was injured when she was a willing passenger in the car driven by
the Mr Hamilton. He had been drinking and the car was involved in a serious
crash which killed him. In a claim for damages the Defendant raised the defence
of volenti non fit injuria in that in accepting the lift knowing of his drunken
condition she had voluntarily accepted the risk.
Held:
Asquith J:
"There may be cases in which the drunkenness of the driver at the material time
is so extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like engaging in an
intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling with an
unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff. It is not necessary
to decide whether in such a case the maxim 'volenti non fit injuria' would apply,
for in the present case I find as a fact that the driver's degree of intoxication fell
short of this degree".
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA – OCCUPIERS LIABILITY
S. 2(5) Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 and s. 1(6) of the Occupiers' Liability Act
1984 provide that occupiers owe no duty in respect to risks willingly accepted by
that person as his. It appears that there is no need to establish an agreement.
The Claimant, a 15 year old girl, was out walking with her boyfriend who was 16.
They took a short cut across a railway line and they were both hit by a train. He
was killed and she was seriously injured. There was a gap in the fence at the
place where they crossed and there was a pathway leading to this gap which
suggested that there was repeated trespass. Also it was accepted that either the
Defendant was aware of the gap or would have been aware upon reasonable
inspection. The Defendant raised the defence of volenti under s.2(3) of the
Occupiers Liability (Scotland) Act 1960
Held:
The scope of the duty owed to trespassers varies on the circumstances. On the
facts of this case the Defendants did not owe a duty to a 15 year old trespasser
who was fully aware of the risks. Even if the Defendant did owe a duty of care the
defence of volenti under s.2(3) would succeed.
Lord Ross:
"In my view, the pursuer's own evidence referred to above, along with the other
evidence in the case, is, in my opinion, sufficient to establish the defence
of volenti non fit injuria. Such defence is open to the defenders under section 2 (3)
of the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, and no duty under section 2 (1) of
the Act is imposed upon an occupier to a person entering on the premises in
respect of risks which that person has willingly accepted as his. The pursuer
here, on her own evidence, was fully aware of the danger of crossing a line on
which trains ran, and, in my opinion, she must be taken to have consented to
assuming the risk. There is a passage in her cross-examination which proceeded
as follows:
"Q. And you knew that it would be dangerous to cross the line because of the
presence of these trains? A. Yes. Q. Well why did you do it if you knew it would be
dangerous? A. Because it was shorter to get to the brickworks. Q. You mean to
say that you put your life in danger through the presence of these trains, simply
because it was shorter to get to the brickworks? A. Well, before my accident I
never ever thought that it would happen to me, that I would never get hit by a
train, it was just a chance that I took."
Also, since the passing of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945
the defendant’s liability is based on the portion of his fault i.e. both the plaintiff
and the defendant, in the case of Contributory Negligence, are at fault. This is not
the same in the cases of Volenti Non Fit Injuria. Volenti Non Fit Injuria is an
absolute defence.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we can see from the above research, sources and cases that Volenti
Non Fit Injuria, even though just a defence of tort has a broad spectrum of
applications but, as we proposed in the hypothesis the scope of this defence is in
direct relation with duty of care and the commitment of a negligent act. The
application of the defence over time similarly depend on the what is a negligent
act in that period of time. As we have seen in the various cases discussed above
the application of this defence cannot be limited or fixed for a given situation.
Due to these variables, we can also conclude that with the changing times,
situations, society, law, country, etc., this concept can never stop developing.
Hence, it is safe to say that the defence of Volenti Non Fit Injuria will continue to
evolve, be interpreted and be applied in various ways over the course of time.
BOOKS:
WEBSITES:
http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Volenti-non-fit-injuria.php
http://notes-law.blogspot.in/2008/08/law-on-torts-part-1.html
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com