Analysis of A Cryptolocker: Francesco Schifilliti
Analysis of A Cryptolocker: Francesco Schifilliti
Analysis of A Cryptolocker: Francesco Schifilliti
F r a n c e s c o S c h i f i l l it i
Seminario IISFA
23 Ottobre 2015
ROMA
Agenda
Tutto quello che ho salvato prima che Cryptolocker mi abbia cifrato I file…
2
Introduction Malware Definition(s)
3
Malware Malware Classification
RANSOMWARE
4
Ransomware Timeline
Malicious Cryptography
Exposing Cryptovirology
Wiley, 2004
TeslaCrypt
5
Ransomware Stats (Global)
6
infrastructure. CTB Locker offers its victims a selection of to typical R
neatly in a single Gameover Zeus botnet, the infrastructure for which was also
language options to be extorted in and provides the option to deny access
ily a RAT but has used to distribute the CryptoLocker malware7. At the time
ks; many banking the botnet consisted of up to one million infected machines decrypt a “test” file for free. Although not as widespread as the capabili
Ransomware
her malware onto worldwide. The operation involved cooperation amongst CryptoLocker, CTB Locker was noted as a significant and growing “marketplac
multiple jurisdictions, the private sector and academia. Tools Stats (EU)
threat by a number of EU Member States. This is supported by Blackshades
to decrypt encrypted files are now also freely available from industry reporting which indicates that up to 35% of CTB Locker
Internet security companies8. victims reside within Europe 9
.
CTB-Locker In May 20
and Europ
Cryptlocker
orcement. Almost countries w
ing investigations of the Bla
omware accounts this, the m
nts, however this use is in de
ctim reporting or
ise and describe.
the ransomware
hically in Europe,
CRYPTOLOCKER CTB-LOCKER
6 Europol Press Release, International Action against Gameover Zeus Botnet KEY THREATS – REMOTE ACCESS TOOLS (RATS)
and Cryptolocker Ransomware, http://www.europol.europa.eu/content/
international-action-against-gameover-Zeus-botnet-and-cryptolocker-
ransomware, 2015 Remote Access Tools exist as legitimate tools used to access a third
7 Europol Press Release, International Action against Gameover Zeus Botnet
party system, typically for technical support or administrative
and Cryptolocker Ransomware, http://www.europol.europa.eu/content/
7
wnload/7/1/ international-action-against-gameover-Zeus-botnet-and-cryptolocker- reasons. These tools can give a user remote access and control
osoft_Security_ ransomware, 2015
8 Decryptolocker, https://www.decryptcryptolocker.com/, 2014 over a system, the level of which is usually determined by the
Ransomware Type of Ransomware
Scareware This type of virus looks like a bogus anti-virus message, but it
can also appear as a clean up tool. You’ll get a message that tells you
that this clean up tool has found hundreds if not thousands of issues on
your operating system. You could get alerted with pop-ups that ask you
for information or to download software to help you fix the issue. While
these are “scary”, these are quite easy to remove.
Ransomware
Lock-screen These viruses can have a bitter impact in that they literally
lock your screen. When they lock up your system they forbid you from
using your computer in any way. This spells trouble, and is a bit closer to
a more dangerous malware. This is a scary virus, and somewhat easy to
resolve.
Encrypting malware This type of malware is what first reared it’s ugly
head as CryptoLocker. This virus is what encrypts your files and locks
them until the given ransom has been paid. Most recently the uptick in
requests was for $300 in Bitcoin. This virus demands a ransom, but law
enforcement says that you shouldn’t pay it because there are no
guarantees that you’ll get your files back.
Handshake
C&C
Installation and Keys with Encryption Extortion
Contacting
C&C
After a computer is Before Ransomware can The Ransomware client With the cryptographic The Ransomware
infected, the attack the computer and server identify each keys established, the displays a screen giving
Ransomware installs victim, it contacts the other through a carefully Ransomware on your you a time limit to pay
C&C server operated by handshake, and the computer starts up before the criminals
itself, and sets keys
the criminal server generates encrypting every file it
and persistent destroy the key to
two cryptographic keys. finds with any of
mechanisms decrypt
One key is kept on dozens of common file
your files.
victim’s computer, the extensions
second key is stored
securely on the criminals’
server
Ransom Sent
Locked Files
C&C
Server
Unlocked Files
9
Ransomware Delivery/Installation Stage
Spear-Phishing
Attack
eMail-based Attack
Web-based Attack
Exploit Pack
10
Ransomware Delivery/Installation Stage
Spear-Phishing Attack
Phishing is a way of attempting to acquire information (and sometimes, indirectly, money) such as usernames, passwords,
and credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Communications purporting
to be from popular social web sites, auction sites, online payment processors or IT administrators are commonly used to lure the
unsuspecting public.
Phishing is typically carried out by e-mail spoofing or instant messaging, and it often directs users to enter details at a fake website
whose look and feel are almost identical to the legitimate one. Phishing is an example of social engineering techniques used to
deceive users, and exploits the poor usability of current web security technologies.
Attacker
Victims Malicious 5
• Deleting Shadow copy
Script • Set up registry Keys • Generating crypt Keys
• Grabbing many PC’s • Generating a list of
information of Victim and send file to infect
them by email to Attacker • File Encrypting
• Deleting Setup file created by
ransowmware
• …
• Displaying displaying ransom
note with Notepad
11
Ransomware Sample of attachment
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Ransomware Delivery/Installation Stage
Drive by Download
Attacker
1
3
C Browser calls “URLDownloadToFile”, which downloads and writes to disk some file from some URL
13
Ransomware Delivery/Installation Stage
Exploit Kit (EK) - 1/2
Exploit Kits are toolkits used to exploit security holes primarily to spread malware. These toolkits come packaged
with exploit codes. These exploit kits target software such as Adobe Flash, Java, Microsoft Silverlight, Internet
Explorer - software that are commonly installed and used in most PCs. Computers using outdated software/
applications are at high risk.
Attacker
1 Ransomware
Trojan Banking
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which were Fiesta, Nuclear, SweetOrange, Styx, FlashPack, Neutrino,
Magnitude, Angler, and Rig. [10–12]
iesta is the newer version of eo ploit identified in . uclear was
identified in but was upgraded to version with new e ploits in
Ransomware
. weet range, ty , and lash ac were first used in attac s in
. eutrino, agnitude, and Angler were identified in
first seen in April .
ig was
Delivery/Installation Stage
CURRENT TRENDS IN EXPLOIT KITS Exploit Kit (EK) - 2/2
15
Ransomware Delivery/Installation Stage
16
Ransomware Persistence
! It searches in all local and remote drives for files to encrypt. All files that are encrypted are also saved in the
following registry for record:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\CryptoLocker\Files
Titolo presentazione 17
Ransomware C&C Communication Stage
EK Server
Compromised
Website
Victim
Ransomware C&C
Ransomware
Proxy Server
18
Ransomware C&C Communication Stage
Network Traffic of Angler EK with CW3
Packets reader
Network Sec.
Monitoring
IP Address and Domain
Name used by the EK
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Ransomware C&C Communication Stage
20
Ransomware Encryption Stage
Cryptolocker performs the following tasks
B All files that are encrypted are also saved in the registry HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software
\CryptoLocker\Files
F Store this encrypted key to the header of the encrypted file using a schema rely on the version
G A final message to the C&C reports the amount of encrypted files to the server:
21
Ransomware Extortion Stage
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Sample 1/3
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Sample 2/3
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Sample 3/3
Contacted Hosts
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Methodology Proposition 1/2
Disk Acquisition
Memory Acquisition
Network Acquisition
Mobile Acquisition
Malware Intelligence
Reporting Examination
Malware Identification
Forensic Analysis
Malware Analysis
26
Methodology Proposition 2/2
Cyber Threat
Intelligence
Network Acquisition
Network
On-site
Forensics Analysis Malware Analysis
Disk Disk
Memory
Network
Mobile
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ANY QUESTIONS?
THANKS FOR WATCHING
See You Next Time
fschifi[email protected]