Rudolf Carnap

9. Fei~I, He!bert. "Confirmability and Confirmation," Revue Internationale de - - - - - B. .F. SKINNER - - -- -

Ph~Josophie, 5: 2?8-79 ( 1951 ) . Reprinted in P. P. Wiener (ed.), Readings in
Philosophy of Science, pp. 522-30. New York: Scribner's 1953.
10. !"eigl, Herbe~. "Principles and Problems o.f Theory Construction in Psychology,"
1~ W. DennJS (ed.) , Current Trends in Psychological Theory, pp. 179-213.
Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Pr., 1951.
11. Feigl, ~~bert. ''Phys~calism, Unity of Science, and the Foundations of Psy- Critique ofPsyclwanalytic Concepts and Theories
chology, m P. A. Sch1lpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. New York:
Tudor (forthcoming).
12. FeigJ, H., and M. Brodbeck (eds.). Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New
Y~rk: Appleton·Century-Crofts, 1953.
13. Feig!, H., and W. Sellars (eds.). Readings in Pliilosophical Analysis. New York:
Appleton-Centmy-Crofts, 1949.
14. Hempel, C. C. "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterio.n of Meaning" FREun's great contribution to Western thought has been described as
Revue Internationale de Philosophic, 4:41-63 (1950). Reprinted in L. Linsky
(ed.)~ S~mantics and the Philosophy of Language, pp. 163-85. Urbana: Univ. the application of the principle of cause and effect to human behavior.
of I1lino1s Pr., 1952. . . Freud demons.trated that many features of behavior hitherto unex·
15. Hempel~ C. G. "The C~ncept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration," plained-and often dismissed as hopelessly complex or obscure-could
Proceedings of the AmeIJcan Academy of Arts and Sciences, 80:61-77 (1951).
16. Hempel, C. G. Fundamentals ~i Concept Form~tion in the EmJ?irical Sciences, be shown to be the product of circumstances in the history of the indi-
Vo~. II, No. 7 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Chicago: vidual. Many of the causal relationships he so convincingly demon·
Unw. of Chicago Pr., 1952.
17. Hempel, C . C . "A Logical Appraisal of Operationism " Scientific Monthly 79 · strated had been wholly unsuspected-unsuspected, in particular, by the
215-20 ( 1954). , , .
very individuals whose behavior they controlled. Freud greatly reduced
18. ~empel, C. ~· "Implications of Carnap's Work for the Philosophy of Science,"
m P. A. ~ch1lpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. New Yori::: Tudor the sphere of accident and caprice in our considerations of human con-
(forthcommg). duct. His achievement in this respect appears all the more impressive
19. Mac::Corquodale, Kenneth, and ~· E. Meehl. "On a Distinction Between Hypo·
thebcal Constructs and Intervening Variables," Psychological Review 55: 95-107 when we recall that he was never able to appeal to the quantitative
(1948). Reprinted in H . Feig) and M. Brodbeck (eds.) Readings' in the Phi- proofs characteristic of other sciences. He carried the day with sheer
losophy of Science, pp. 596-611. New York: Appleton·C~tury-Crofts, 1953. persuasion-with the massing of instances and the delineation of Sur·
20. Margenau, Henry. The Nature of Physical Reality. New York· McGraw-Hill
195Q . , prising parallels and analogies among seemingly diverse materials.
21. Schilpp, P. A. (ed.). The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. New York: Tudor This was not, however, Freud's own view of the matter. At the age
(forthcoming).
22. Schlick, Mori~. "~eaning ~nd Verification," Philosophical Review, 45: 339-69 of seventy he summed up his achievement in this way: "My life has
(1936). Repnnted m H. Feig! and W. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical been aimed at one goal only: to infer or guess how the mental apparatus
Analysis, pp. 146-74. New York: Appleton.Century-Crofts, 1949.
is constructed and what forces interplay and counteract in it." (2) It
is difficult to describe the mental apparatus he refers to in noncontro-
versial terms, partly because Freud's conception changed from time· to
time and partly because its very nature encouraged misinterpretation
and misunderstanding. But it is perhaps not too wide of the mark to
indicate its principal features as follows: Freud conceived of some realm
of the mind, not necessarily having physical extent, but nevertheless
capable of topographic description and of subdivision into regions of
the conscious, co-conscious, and unconscious. Within this space, various
mental events-ideas, wishes, memories, emotions, instinctive tenden-
NOTE:This paper appeared, in somewhat different form, in The Scientific Monthly,
November 1954, and is reprinted by pennission of the editor and the author.

76 77
 B. F. Skinner CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

cies, and so on-interacted and combined in many complex ways. Sys- Freud was aware of the problems of scientific methodology and even
tems of these mental events came to be conceived of almost as sub- of the metaphorical nature of some of his own constructs. W hen this
sidiary personalities and were given proper names: the id, the ego, and was the case, he justified. the constructs as necessary or at least highly
the superego. TI1ese systems divided among themselves a limited store convenient. But awareness of the nature of the metaphor is no defense
of psychic energy. There were, of course, many other details. of it, and if modern science is still occasionally metaphorical, we must
No matter what logicians may eventually make of this mental appa- remember that, theorywise, it is also still in trouble. The point is not
ratus, there is little doubt that Freud accepted it as real rather than that metaphor or construct is objectionable but that particular meta-
as a scientific construct or theory. One docs not at the age of seventy phors and constructs have caused trouble and are continuing to do so.
define the goal of one's life as the exploration of an explanatory fiction. Freud recognized the damage worked by his own metaphorical think-
Freud did not use his "mental apparatus" as a postulate system from ing, but he felt that it could not be avoided and that the damage must
which he deduced theorems to be submitted to empirical check. If there be put up with. TI1ere is reasou to disagree with him on this point.
was any interaction between the mental apparatus and empirical observa- Freud's explanatory scheme followed a traditional pattern of looking
tions, such interaction took the form of modifying the apparatus to for a cause of human behavior inside the organism. His medical train-
account for newly discovered facts. To many followers of Freud the ing supplied him with powerful supporting analogies. The parallel be-
mental apparatus appears to be equally as real as the newly discovered tween the excision of a tumor, for example, and the release of a re·
facts, and the exploration of such an apparatus is similarly accepted as pressed wish from tJ1e unconscious is quite compelling and must have
the goal of a science of behavior. There is an alternative view, how- affected Freud's thinking. Now, the pattern of an inner explanation of
ever, which holds that Freud did n ot discover the mental apparatus but behavior is best exemplified hy doctrines of animism, which are pri·
rather invented it, borrowing part of its structure from a traditional marily concerned with explaining the spontaneity and evident capri-
philosophy of human conduct but adding many novel features of his ciousness of behavior. The living organism is an extremely complicated
own devising. system behaving in an extremely complicated way. Much of its behavior
There are those who will concede that Freud's mental apparatus was appears at first blush to be absolutely unpredictable. The traditional
a scientific construct rather than an observable empirical system but procedure has been to invent an inner determiner, a "demon," "spirit,"
who, nevertheless, attempt to justify it in the light of scientific method. "homunculus," or "personality" capable of spontaneous change of course
One may take the line that metaphorical devices arc inevitable in the or of origination of action. Such an inner detennincr offers only a
early stages of any science and that although we may look with amuse· momentary explanation of the behavior of the outer organism, because
ment today upon the "essences," "forces," "phlogistons," and "ethers," it must, of course, be accounted for also, l)Ut it is commonly used to
of the science of yesterday, these nevertheless were essential to the his- put the matter beyond further inquiry and to bring the study of a
torical process. It would be difficult to prove or disprove this. However, causal series of events to a dead end.
if we have learned anything about the nature of scientific thinking, if Freud, himself, however, did not appeal to the inner apparatus to
mathematical and logical researches have improved our capacity to rep- account for spontaneity or caprice because he was a thoroughgoing de-
resent and analyze empirical data, it is possible that we can avoid some terminist. He accepted the responsibility of explaining, in tum, the
of the mistakes of adolescence. vVhether Freud could have done so is behavior of the inner determiner. He did this by pointing to hitherto
past demonstrating, but whether we need similar constructs in the unnoticed external causes in the environmental and genetic history of
fntnre prosecution of a science of behavior is a question worth con- th e individual. Ile did not, therefore, need the traditional explanatory
siclcring. system for traditional purposes; but he was unable to eliminate the
CouslT11<.:l s arc convenient and perhaps even necessary in dc:1li11g wit·h pattern from his thinking. It led him to represent each of the causal
ccrlai11 <·0111plical·cd whjcct mal"l'crs. As Frc11kcl·Brn11swik shows ( l ), relationships he had discovered as a series of three events. Some environ-
78 79
 B. F. Skinner CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

mental condition, very often in the early life of the individual, leaves A second classical problem is how the mental life can be manipu-
an effect upon the inner mental apparatus, and this in turn produces lated. In the process of therapy, the analyst necessarily acts upon the
the behavioral manifestation or symptom. Environmental event, mental patient only through physical means. He manipulates variables occupy-
state or process, behavioral symptom-these are the three links in Freud's ing a position in the first link of Freud's causal chain. Nevertheless, it
causal chain. He made no appeal to the middle link to explain spon- is commonly assumed that the mental apparatus is being directly
taneity or caprice. Instead he used it to bridge the gap in space and manipulated. Sometimes it is argued that processes are initiated within
time between the events he had proved to be causally related. the individual himself, such as those of free association and transfer-
A possible alternative, which would have had no quarrel with estab- ence, and that these in tum act directly upon the mental apparatus. But
lished science, would have been to argue that the environmental vari- how are these mental processes initiated by physical means? The clarifi-
ables leave pl1ysiological effects that may be inferred from the behavior cation of such a causal connection places a heavy and often unwelcome
of the individual, perhaps at a much later date. In one sense, too little burden of proof upon the shoulders of the dualist.
is known at the moment of these physiological processes to make them The important disadvantages of Freud's conception of mental life
useful in a legitimate way for this purpose. On the other hand, too much can be described somewhat more specifically. The first of these con-
is known of them, at least in a negative way. Enough is known of the cerns the environmental variables to which Freud so convincingly
nervous system to place certain dimensional limits upon speculation pointed. The cogency of these variables was frequently missed because
and to clip the wings of explanatory fiction. Freud accepted, therefore, the variables were transformed and obscured in the course of being
the traditional fiction of a mental life, avoiding an out-and-out dualism represented in mental life. The physical world of the organism was
by arguing that eventually physiological counterparts would be discov- converted into conscious and unconscious experience, and these experi-
ered. Quite apart from the question of the existence of mental events,
ences were further transmuted as they combined and changed in mental
let us observe the damage tJrnt resulted from this maneuver.
processes. For example, early punishment of sexual behavior is an ob-
We may touch only briefly upon two classical problems that arise
servable fact that undoubtedly leaves behind a changed organism. But
once the conception of a mental life has been adopted. The first of
when this change is represented as a state of conscious or unconscious
these is to explain how such a life is to be observed. The introspective
anxiety or guilt, specific details of the punishment are lost. When, in
psychologists had already tried to solve this problem by arguing that
turn, some unusual characteristic of the sexual behavior of the adult
introspection is only a special case of the observation upon which all
individual is related to the supposed guilt, many specific features of
science rests and that man's experience necessarily stands between him
the relationship may be missed that would have been obvious if the
and the physical world with which science purports to deal. But it was
same features of behavior had been related to the punishing episode.
Freud himself who pointed out that not all of one's mental life was
Insofar as the mental life of the individual is used as Freud used it
accessible to direct observation-that many events in the mental appa·
to represent and to carry an environmental history, it is inadequate and
ratus were necessarily inferred. Great as this discovery was, it would
misleading.
have been still greater if Freud had taken tl1e next step, advocated a
Freud's theory of the mental apparatus had an equally damaging
little later by the American movement called Behaviorism, and insisted
effect upon his study of behavior as a dependent variable. Inevitably,
that conscious, as well as unconscious, events were inferences from the
it stole the show. Little attention was left to behavior per se. Behavior
facts. By arguing that the individual organism simply reacts to its en-
was relegated to the position of a mere mode of expression of the
vironment, rather than to some inner experience of that environment,
the hifurcation of nature into physical and psychic can he avoided.* experience is required if certain activities in t11e mental apparatus are to be comprc·
hended. Such a requirement is implied in the modem assertion that only those who
• Altho11gh it was Frc11cl himself who taught 11s to douht the fo<'e valnc of intro· have been i>sychoanalyzcd can fully understand the me<ming of transference or the
spc('liou, he :ipprars to have hcen responsible for the view thnl: another sort of 1lirc<t release of a repressed fear.

80 81
 B. F. Skinner CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

activities of the mental apparatus or the symptoms of an underlying to which tbe quantitative practices of science in general could not be
disturbance. Among the problems not specifically treated in the manner applied.
that was their due, we may note five. 3. Io his emphasis upon the genesis of behavior, Freud made exten-
I. The nature of the act as a unit of behavior was never clari- sive use of processes of learning. These were never treated operationally
fied. T he simple occurrence of behavior was never well represented. in terms of changes in behavior but rather as the acquisition of ideas,
"Though ts" could "occur" to an individual; he could "have" ideas feelings, and emotions later to be expressed by, or manifested in, be·
according to the traditional model; but he could "have" behavior only havior. Consider, for example, Freud's own suggestion that sibling
in giving expression to these inner events. We are much more likely rivalry in his own early history played an important part in his theo-
to say that "the thought occurred to me to ask ·him his name" than retical considerations as well as in his personal relationships as an adult.
that "the act of asking him his name occurred to me." It is in the An infant brother died when Freud himself was only one and a half
nature of thoughts and ideas that they occur to people., but we have years old, and as a young child Freud played with a boy somewhat older
never come to be at home in describing the emission of behavior in than himself and presumably more powerful, yet who was, stmngely
a comparable way. 111is is especially true of verbal behavior. In spite enough, in the nominally subordinate position of being his nephew.
of Freud's valuable analysis of verbal slips and of the techniques of T o classify such a set of circumstances as sibling rivalry obscures, as we
wit and verbal art, he rejected the possibility of an analysis of verbal have seen, tbe many specific properties of the circumstances themselves
behavior in its own right rather than as the expression of ideas, feel· regarded as independent variables in a science of behavior. T o argue
ings, or other inner events, and therefore missed the importance of that wliat was learned was the effect of these circumstances upon un·
this field for the analysis of units of behavior and the conditions of conscious or conscious aggressive tendencies or feelings of guilt works
their occurrence. a similar misrepresentation of the dependent variable. An emphasis upon
1be behavioral nature of perception was also slighted. To see an behavior would lead us to inquire into the specific acts plausibly assumed
object as an object is not mere passing sensing; it is an act, and some· to be engendered by these childhood episodes. In very specific terms,
thing very much like it occurs when we see an object although no object how was the behavior of the young Freud shaped by the special re-
is present. Fantasy and dreams were for Freud not the perceptual in forcing contingencies arising from the presence of a younger child
behavior of the individual but pictures painted by an inner artist in in the family, by the death of that child, and by later association with
some atelier of the mind which the individual then contemplated and an older playmate who nevertheless occupied a subordinate family posi·
perhaps then reported. This division of labor is not essential when the tion? What did the young Freud learn to do to achieve parental atten-
behavioral component of the act of seeing is emphasized. tion under these difficult circumstances? How <lid he avoid aversive con-
2. The dimensions of behavior, particularly its dynamic properties, sequences? Did he exaggerate any illness? Did he feign illness? Did he
were never adequately represented. We are all familiar with the fact make a conspicuous display of behavior that brought commendation?
that some of our acts are more likely to occur upon a given occasion \Vas such behavior to be found in the field of physical prowess or in-
than others. But this likelihood is hard to represent and harder to tellectual endeavor? Diel he learn to engage in behavior that would in
evaluate. TI1e dynamic changes in llehavior that are the first concern turn increase the repertoires available to him to achieve commcncl:1 l'io11?
of the psychoanalyst are primarily changes in probability of action. But Did he strike or otherwise injure young children? Did he learn lo i11jme
Frend chose to deal with this aspect of behavior in other terms-as a them verllally by teasing? Was he punished for this, and if so, did lie
question of " libido," "cathexis," "volume of excitation," "instinctive or discover other forms of behavior that had the same cfa111:1gi11g cffccl' 1>111
clllol io11al tendencies," "available quantities of psychic energy," a11d so were immune to punishment?
011 . T he delicate question of how probahility of action is to he q11:111t i· We cannot, of course, adequately answer qncstions of 1li is sot I al so
fin I was 11c.:vc:r a11swerc<l, hcc:1 11sc I hcse c-o11sl mets s11ggcs lc.:d di 111c11sio11s late a elate, bnt tl1cy suggest Ilic 'kind of inquiry that would he p1rn11plccl
82 81
 B. F. Skinner CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

by a concern for the explicit shaping ot behavioral repertoires under 5. Since Freud never developed a clear conception of the behavior
childhood circumstances. What has survived through the years is not of the organism and never approached many of the scientific problems
aggression and guilt, later to be manifested in behavior, but rather pat- peculiar to that subject matter, it is not surprising that he misinter-
terns of behavior themselves. It is not enough to say that this is "all preted the. nature of the observation of one's own behavior. This is
that is meant" by sibling rivalry or by its effects upon the mental appa- admittedly a delicate subject, which presents problems that no one,
ratus. Such an expression obscures, rath er than illuminates, the nature perhaps, has adequately solved. But the act of self.observation can be
of the behavioral changes taking place in the childhood learning process. represented within the framework of physical science. T his involves
A similar analysis could be made of processes in the fields of motivation questioning the reality of sensations, ideas, feelings, and other states of
and emotion. consciousness which many people regard as among the most immediate
4. An explicit trcabnent of behavior as a datum, of probability of re- experiences of their life. Freud himself prepared us for this change.
sponse as the principal quantifiable property of behavior, and of learning T here is, perhaps, no experience more powerful than that which the
and other processes in terms of changes of probability is usually enough mystic reports of his awareness of the presence of G oel. The psycho-
to avoid another pitfall into which Freud, in common with his con- analyst explains this in other ways. H e himself, however, may insist
temporaries, fell. There are many words in the layman's vocabulary that upon the realit y of certain experiences that others wish to question .
suggest the activity of an organism yet are not descriptive of behavior There are other ways of describing what is actually seen or felt under
in the narrower sense. Freud used many of these freely; for example, such circumstances.
the individual is said to discriminate, remember, infer, repress, decide, Each of us is in particularly close contact with a small part of the
and so 011. Such terms do not refer to specific acts. We say that a man universe enclosed within his own skin. Under certain limited circum-
discriminates between two objects when he behaves differently with stances, we may come to react to that part of the universe in unusual
respect to them; but discriminating is not itself behavior. We say that ways. But it does not follow that that particular part has any special
h e represses b ehavior which has been punished when he engages in physical or nonphysical properties or that our observations of it differ
other behavior ;ust because it displaces the punished behavior; but re- in any fundam ental respect from our observations of the rest of the
pressing is not action. 'Ne say that h e decides upon a course of conduct world. I have tried to show elsewhere ( 3) how self-knowledge of this
either when h e enters upon one course to the exclusion of another, or sort arises and why it is likely to be subject to limitations t hat arc
when he alters some of the variables affecting his own behavior in order trouble~ome from the point of view of physical science. Freud's repre-
to bring this about; but tl1ere is no other "act of deciding." The diffi- sentation of th ese events was a particular personal contribution inAu-
culty is that when one uses term s wh ich suggest an activity, one feels cncccl by his own cultural h istory. It is possible that science can now
it necessary to invent an actor, and the subordinate personalities in the move on to a different description of them. If it is impossible to be
Freudian mental apparatus do, indeed, participate in just th ese activi- wholly nonmetaphorical, at least we may improve upon our metaphors.
ties rather than in the more specific behavior of the observable organism. The crucial issue here is the Freudian distinction b etween tl1c con-
Among tl1ese activities are conspicuous instances involving tl1e process scious and unconscious mind. Freud's contribution has been widely mis-
of self.control- the so,called "Freudian mechanisms." These need not understood. Tito important point was not that the individual w~i s often
be regarded as activities of the individual or any subdivision thereof- unable to describe important aspects of his own behavior or identify
thcy are not, for example, what l1appens when a skillful wish evades important ca us;1l rclationsl1ips, but that his ability to describe them
a c:cn.~or-but simply as ways of representing relationships among re- was irrelevant to the occurrence of the b el1avior or to the effectiveness
sponses and controlling variables. I have elsewhere tried to demonstrate of the causes. We begin by attributing the behavior of the individual
I his hy rc:slat·iug tl1c Freudian mechanisms without rcfcrcucc to F rc11cl- lo events in his genetic and enviromnental history. We then note that
i1111 1li<"ory p) . because of certain cnltnral practices, the indiviclnal may come to describe
85
 B. F . Skinner CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

some of that behavior and some of tl1ose causal relationships. W e may a step he undertaken in an attempt to place psychoanalysis on a scien-
say that he is conscious of the parts he can describe and unconscious tific footing.
of the rest. But tl1e act of self-<lescription, as of self-observation, plays Before one attempts to work out units of transference, or scales of
no part in the determination of action. It is superimposed upon be- anxiety, or systems of mensuration appropriate to the regions of con·
havior. Freud's argument that we need not be aware of important causes sciousness, it is worth asking whether there is not an alternative pro-
of conduct leads naturally to the broader conclusion that awareness of gram for a rapprocl1ement with physical science that would make such
cause has nothing to do with causal effectiveness. a task unnecessary. Freud could hope for an eventual union with physics
In addition to these specific consequences of Freud's mental appa- or physiology only ilirough the discovery of neurological mechanisms
ratus in obscuring important details among the variables of which that would be the analogues of, or possibly only other aspects of, the
human behavior is a function and in leading to the neglect of impor- features of his mental apparatus. Since this depended upon the prose-
tant problems in the analysis of behavior as a primary datum, we have cution of a science of neurology far beyond its current state of knowl-
to note the most unfortunate effect of all. Freud's methodological edge, it was not an attractive future. Freud appears never to have con-
strategy has prevented the incorporation of psychoanalysis into the sidered the possibility of bringing the concepts and theories of a psy-
body of science proper. It was inherent in the nature of such an ex- chological science into contact with the rest of physical and biological
planatory system tJ1at its key entities would be unquantifiable in the science by the simple expedient of an operational definition of tenns.
sense in which entities in science are generally quantifiable, but the This would have placed the mental apparatus in jeopardy as a life goal,
spatial and temporal dimensions of these entities have caused other but it would have brought him back to the observable, manipulable,
kinds of trouble. and pre-eminently physical variables with which, in the last analysis, he
One can sense a certain embarrassment among psychoanalytic writers was dealing.
with respect to the primary entities of the mental apparatus. T here is
REFERENCES
a predilection for tenns that avoid tbe embarrassing question of the
1. Frenkcl-Brunswik, Else. "Meaning of Psychoonalytic Concepts and Confirmation
spatial dimensions, physical or otherwise, of terms at the primary level. of Psychoanalytic Theories," Scientific Mont/1Ty, 79:293-300 (1954).
Although it is occasionally necessary to refer to mental events and their 2. Jones, E. Life and W ork ol Sigmund .Prcud, Vol. 1. New York: Basic Bks., 1953.
3. Skinner, B. F. Science and Human Behavior. New Yorl: : Macmillan, 1953.
qualities and to states of consciousness, the analyst usually moves on
in some haste to less committal terms such as forces, processes, organiza-
tions, tensions, systems, and mechanisms. But aU these imply terms at
a lower level. The notion of a conscious or unconscious " force" may
be a useful metaphor, but if this is analogous to force in physics, what
is the analogous mass that is analogously accelerated? Human behavior
is in a state of flux and undergoing changes that we call "processes,"
but what is changing in what direction when we speak of, for example,
an affective process? Psychological "organizations," "mental systems,"
"motivational interaction"-thcse all imply arrangements or relat ion-
ships among things, but what arc the things so related or :11Taugcd?
Until this question 11as been answered tl1e problem of 1·hc di111rn~io11s
of t-hc mental apparntns c::in scarcely he approached. It is 1101 likdy lltat·
t lie prnhk111 can he solved hy working ont i11clcpc11dc11t 1111ils :tppro·
prial c lo lltc 111c11lal :tpp:1r:tl11s, :tltlto11gh ii ltas hcc11 prnpo~cd lhal ~111'11
86 87