Ocampos, AJ ET War Yazsine A.

(MC)

LEGAL MEDICINE
CASE DIGESTS COMPILATION

People v Malapo

Facts: This is a case upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party hereto attached,
hereby accuses one Nixon Malapo of Salvacion, Iriga City of the crime of Rape. That sometime
on the month of September, 1991, the said accused, entered the house of one Nenita I. No, aunt
of Complainant AMALIA TRINIDAD who was then and there alone, and by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of said Amalia Trinidad against her will and consent and as a result she has become
pregnant and delivered a baby at the Iriga City Puericulture Center.

Amalia is seemingly an example of a pseudoretardate. She might have been deprived of

intellectual stimulations which explains her lag in cognitive development. She is still categorized
within the normal classification of children.

Amalia did not tell Nenita No, as to what happened to her at that time for she was threatened by
the accused-appellant that he’ll kill her if she ever told anyone. However on May 18, 1992, as she
was about to give birth to her baby she told Bernardita Marquinez that she had been raped by the
accused-appellant.

The RTC convicted the accused-appellant Nixon Malapo of rape and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Amalia Trinidad the sum of P50,000.00 in
moral damages.

In the case at bar, it can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that accused-
appellant is alleged to have committed the crime, i.e., within 120 days from the commission of the
offense in September 1991. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can
overcome the presumption that Amalias child was begotten as a result of her having been raped
in September 1991 only if he can show either that it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse because of impotence or serious illness which absolutely prevents him from
having sexual intercourse or that Amalia had sexual intercourse with another man. However,
accused-appellant has not shown either of these.

Issue: Whether or not the victim was already pregnant when she was raped by the appellant.

Ruling: A textbook on pediatrics states that Infants delivered before the thirty-seventh week of
gestation with a birth weight of less than 2,500 grams (American) or 2,275 grams (Filipino) are
considered premature. An infant can therefore be considered a full-term baby if it weighs more
than 2,275 grams even if it is born before the thirty-seventh week which is less than 9.3
months. Since according to the medical certificate Amalias baby weighed 2.4 kilograms or 2,400
grams, it was a full-term baby even if it was born before the normal gestation period.

Article 166 of the Family Code provides:

Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because
of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been
that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164.
In the case at bar, it can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that accused-
appellant is alleged to have committed the crime, i.e., within 120 days from the commission of the
offense in September 1991. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can
overcome the presumption that Amalias child was begotten as a result of her having been raped
in September 1991 only if he can show either that it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse because of impotence or serious illness which absolutely prevents him from
having sexual intercourse or that Amalia had sexual intercourse with another man. However,
accused-appellant has not shown either of these.

The testimony of Amalia, as corroborated by Nenita No and Bernardita Marquinez, leaves no

doubt in our mind that accused-appellant is the father of the child. Therefore, in accordance with
Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant should be ordered to pay support.

In any event, the impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape. Proof that the child was
fathered by another man does not show that accused-appellant is not guilty, considering the
positive testimony of Amalia that accused-appellant had abused her.
 People v Medina

Facts: At around 11 pm on May 20, 1991, a party was held in the house of Sebastian and Delia
Aguila in Barangay Caingin, Balite, Batangas, to celebrate the awarding of a championship trophy
to the basketball team of Larry Andal. Among those present during the celebration were Andres
Dalisay, Edgardo Silang, Larry Andal, Norberto Biscocho, Bayani Dorado, Salustiano Aguila and
appellant Alberto Medina. After a while, Dalisay invited Andal to go home. The two left the house
of the Aguilas, with Dalisay walking ahead of Andal. While they were walking, Andal saw
appellant, who was waiting along the way, stab Dalisay with a "balisong" in the abdominal region.
Dalisay held the hand of appellant. While they were grappling, Dalisay was able to extricate
himself and started to run away. Appellant chased him. When appellant caught up with Dalisay,
appellant stabbed Dalisay once more at the back. Dalisay fell to the ground. He tried to get up
and run, but he again fell down. Appellant stabbed him [once more] on the chest. Then [a]ppellant
fled from the scene.

Appellant set up insanity as a defense in the killing of the victim saying that the latter was about
to pull something from his pocket that is why he immediately took his balisong and stab the victim.
He added that while he was stabbing the victim, the latter looked like a devil with horns. Dr.
Teresita Adigue, a Doctor of Psychology and a holder of a Master's Degree in Clinical and
Industrial Psychology and another Master's Degree in Guidance and Counselling, and an
accredited psychologist of the Philippine National Police testified that based on the evaluation of
accused-appellant, the latter has been shown to be suffering from depression and was exhibiting
homicidal tendencies, and that he did not know the difference between right and wrong. The trial
court rejected the appellant’s defense of insanity stating that the testimony of appellant's sister
that she had observed unusual behavior on the part of appellant did not constitute sufficient proof
of his insanity, "because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitute[s]
insanity." Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, appellant was attentive,
well-behaved and responsive to the questions propounded to him in English even without
translation. He appealed the decision of the trial court to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant indeed suffered insanity.

Ruling: No. Appellant insists that the trial court gravely erred in refusing to consider Dr. Adigue
as an expert witness. He argues that Dr. Adigue, being an accredited psychologist of the
Philippine National Police since 1979 and a holder of a doctorate in psychology from the University
of Calcutta, India, and a master's degree in clinical and industrial psychology, deserves credence.

Appellant misses the point. More than her academic qualifications as a psychologist, what really
matters is the failure of Dr. Adigue's testimony to establish legal insanity on the part of the
appellant. Verily, such results do not prove the alleged insanity of the appellant. Art. 12, par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act; i.e.,
that the accused be deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his
acts, or that there be complete absence of the power to discern. More relevantly, said report does
not support the claim that appellant could not distinguish right from wrong. Thus, the trial court
properly rejected appellant's defense of insanity. The presumption of law, per Art. 800 of the Civil
Code, always lies in favor of sanity, and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is
presumed to be of sound mind.

The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved, for there is a presumption that acts
penalized by law are voluntarily. Hence, in the absence of positive evidence that the accused
had previously lost his reason or was demented moments prior to or during the perpetration of
the crime, the courts will always presume that he was in a normal state of mind. However, care
must be taken to distinguish between lack of reason (insanity) and failure to use reason or good
judgment due to extreme anger (passion). ". . . [I]t is now well settled that mere mental depravity,
or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted
condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from
responsibility for crimes committed under its influence."

Thus, before the defense of insanity may be accepted as an exempting circumstance, Philippine
case law shows a common reliance on the test of cognition, which requires a complete deprivation
of intelligence — not only of the will — in committing the criminal act. In the present case, Dr.
Adigue's testimony did not establish complete deprivation of appellant's reason. Consequently,
appellant cannot claim exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code.

In the instant case, however, the defense miserably failed to establish the deprivation of the
appellant's will when he stabbed his victim. Appellant testified that he thought the victim was going
to pull out a weapon, thus he beat him to the draw and stabbed him with his balisong. This
statement shows that he did not suffer any deprivation of reason or discernment. While the victim
appeared to him as a "devil with horns," such perceptual distortion occurred only after he had
dealt the fatal blows on the victim. The Court cannot, therefore, appreciate this mitigating
circumstance in his favor.
 People v Bonoan

Facts: Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a
knife, which caused his death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then called, but the
defense objected on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time
confined at the Psychopatic Hospital. After several months of summons for doctors, production of
the defendant’s complete record of mental condition from the hospital and defendant’s admission
to the hospital for personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported to
the court that Bonoan may be discharged for being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court
found Bonoan guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan suffered
dementia only occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the
defense did not establish the defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was demented at the time of the commission of the crime.

Ruling: Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime, which
consequently exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in San Lazaro
Hospital or other hospital for the insane.

In the case at bar, however, the SC is not concerned with connecting two or more attacks of
insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the
continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and
ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act
complained of.

The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in
arriving at a conclusion different from that reached by the court below:
1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of San
Lazaro Hospital and diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the commission of the
offense and recurrence of ailments were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because they
have no control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic depression
psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four days prior
to act according to Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and arrest, indicating
the police’s doubt of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson
 People v Bascos

Facts: The accused Donato Bascos was charged in information filed in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan with the murder of Victoriano Romero. On arraignment, he entered a plea of not
guilty. The proof for the prosecution established that the accused was the one who had killed
Victoriano Romero, while the latter was sleeping. The defense was that of insanity.
Following the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty of the crime of homicide.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should be judge according to article 8 or article 100 of the
revised final code.

Ruling: In the Philippines, among the persons who are exempted from criminal liability by our
Penal Code, is the following: An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval. When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave
felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court. (Art. 8-1.)

Article 100 of the Penal Code applies when the convict shall become insane or an imbecile after
final sentence has been pronounced.

We are convinced that the accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felony described
in the record and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability, and should be confined in
an insane asylum.
 People v Formigones

Facts: From November to December 1946, defendant Abelardo Formigones together with his wife
Julia Agricola, and his five children lived in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones to
find employment as harvesters. One afternoon, the accused, without any previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife at the back,
the blade penetrating the right lung which latter caused her death. When she fall ont he ground
the defendant carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. He was convicted of parricide and was sentenced to prison. The defendant entered a
plea of not guilty. His counsel presented testimonies of two guards of the provincial jail where
defendant was confined. They said that he behaved like an insane person, that sometimes he
would remove his clothes in front of others, would not take a bath, and remained silent and
indifferent to his surroundings. His counsel claimed that he is an imbecile therefore exempt from
criminal liability. Dr. Francisco Gomez told that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile
so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant who is suffering from feeblemindedness is exempt from
liability.

Ruling: No. The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those
unfortunate beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully
developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead,
taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of
remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he
did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to
hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife,
and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the
government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.

In order that an exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived
of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. As to the strange behavior of the accused during his
confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to
his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at
having killed his wife. He could distinguish right from wrong.
 People v Mancao & Aguilar

Facts: This was an appeal by Crispino Mancao and Ciriaco Aguilar from a judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in convicting them of the crime of homicide, alleging that
the lower court erred in not holding that the accused Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally deficient and is,
therefore, not criminally liable. The issue ensued when Crispino Mancao, accompanied
by three men and several women, inquired to Graciano Sedimo, Roberto Villela’s
tenant, and ordered the persons with him to begin harvesting the corns. Roberto Villela
then asked the harvesters who ordered them to harvest the corn. Crispino Mancao, replied that
he was the one who ordered them to do so and started towards Roberto Villela. The latter then
asked the former if he had an order from the court to harvest the products. Crispino Mancao struck
him with a bamboo stick and said: "This is the order." Thus, Roberto Villela dodged the blow and
snatched the cane. Having been deprived of his bamboo stick, Crispino Mancao took hold
of his bolo and attempted to strike Roberto Villela which the latter warded off with a stick
he had in his hand.

Upon being attacked, Roberto Villela rushed at Crispino Mancao and a hand to hand fightensu
ed. A man dressed in khaki immediately appeared after Mancao had shouted for help
and struck RobertoVillela a blow on the thigh as a result of which he fell to his knees. Crispino
Mancao then took hold of RobertoVillela by the hands and while thus held, the accused Ciriaco
Aguilar struck him with his sickle in the back as aa result of which Roberto Villela fell to the ground
unconscious.

Issue: Whether or not Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally deficient and is, therefore, not criminally liable.

Ruling: No. A careful and detailed examination of the oral and documentary evidence presented
by both parties, and the consideration given the antecedents of the case and the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the criminal act, convince us that the accused Crispino Mancao
was the instigator and aggressor, Roberto Villela having done nothing but to defendant himself,
first disarming the former of his stick with which he was assaulted, and later of his bolo which he
used after having been assaulted, and later of his bolo which he used after having been deprived
of his stick. Roberto Villela might have had the advantage in the fight had not one of Crispino
Mancao's laborers, dressed in khaki, come to his rescue, upon his cry for help, and struck Roberto
Villela on the thigh; then, another man wearing an undershirt who stuck Roberto Villela several
times on the left knee; and, lastly, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar who struck Roberto Villela several
blows on the back with his sickle, one of which nearly severed his spine in the lumbar region
which later caused his death.

The defense of lack of free will of the accused Ciriaco Aguilar, who is an epileptic, cannot be
sustained. While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an epileptic, was susceptible to nervous attacks that may
momentarily deprive him of his mental faculties and lead him to unconsciously attempt to take his
own life and the lives of others, nevertheless, it has not been shown that he was under the
influence of an epileptic fit before, during, and immediately after the aggression.
 People v Taneo

Facts: Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his parent's house in Dolores, Ormoc. On January
16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and guests were entertained in the
house, among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano went
to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his
wife who tried to stop him, wounded her in the abdomen. He also attacked Fred and Luis and
tried to attack his father, after which, he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife, who was 7 months
pregnant at that time, died five days later as a result of the wound.

The trial court found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. It
appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime, the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him to come down and
fight.

When he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, had a severe
stomachache that's why he went to bed in the early afternoon. The defendant stated that when
he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadila held his
feet. That's why he got up and it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down;
he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say
to him that she was wounded. Then, he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation
wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that
came his way.

Issue: Whether or not defendant acted while in a dream.

Ruling: Yes. The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore, weren’t voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability.

The apparent lack of motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there
are none, but that simply they are not known to us. Although an extreme moral perversion may
lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. In the
case at hand, the court found not only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the
acts complained of, but also motives for not committing the acts. Dr. Serafica, an expert witness
in the case, stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind.

Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife.
He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that
the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was
coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending
himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he
stabbed himself.
 People v Gimena

The defendant Juan N. Gimena is charged with the crime of parricide. It appears from
the evidence that on the morning of April 9, 1930, in the municipality of Ronda, Province of Cebu,
the defendant helped his father-in-law, Gregorio Diana, in cleaning bamboo. After
having finished the cleaning he went home and upon arriving there he found his wife Crispina
Diana and a child 2 weeks of age sleeping together on the floor. Shortly afterwards Gregorio
Diana heard his daughter, the defendant's wife, cry for help. He went to the defendant's house
which was close to his own and there found the defendant attacking Crispina with a bolo. With
the assistance of Teodulo Gimena, a brother of the defendant, Gregorio succeeded in disarming
the defendant and tied him to a post of the house. The matter was then reported to the authorities
and the justice of the peace, the chief of police, a sanitary inspector and a policeman appeared
on the scene. The justice of the peace asked the defendant why he had attacked his wife and
received the answer that it was because she had given the sum of P2.70 to one Apolinar
Sereno whom he, the defendant, suspected of illicit relations with the wife. A few hours later on
the same day Crispina Diana died and the examination subsequently made disclosed. ten
wounds in different parts of her body.

After trial the court below found the defendant guilty of parricide and considering in his favor the
mitigating circumstances of obfuscation and lack of instruction, sentenced him to suffer fourteen
years and eight months and one day of cadena temporal with the accessory penalties prescribed
by law and to pay the costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.

The appellant's argument in his favor is that he was in a state of somnambulism when he attacked
his wife. We do not think that this theory can serve as a defense in the present case. By order
of the trial court the defendant was placed under observation for some time by Dr. Luis B. Gomez,
but the doctor apparently did not discover any somnambulism on the part of the defendant. A
defense of that character must be proven and such proof is lacking in this case.

"The defense that the offense charged was committed by the accused during the prevalence of
or in a state of somnambulism has been recognized; but the latest holding of courts is to the
effect that it does not constitute a defense other than that embraced in a plea of
insanity." (Wharton's Criminal Law, vol. 1, p. 574.)

We can find no error in the decision of the court below and the appealed judgment is therefore
affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
 People v Baid

Facts: That on or about the 22nd day of December 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
feloniously undressing one NIEVA GARCIA y SABAN, a mental patient suffering [from]
schizophrenia and put himself on top of her, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent.

When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon trial of the case on
the merits proceeded. The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, the complainant, Dr.
Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant’s attending psychiatrist, and Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the
medico-legal officer who examined the complainant. Complainant was brought later during the
day before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for medico-legal examination. She told him what happened. Dr.
Reyes reduced her narration of the incident into writing and then gave her a physical examination.
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He stated that he had been a nurse-aide of the Holy
Spirit Clinic since September 18, 1995.

He denied the allegations against him. He testified that, on the date and time referred to by the
complainant, he was asleep in the nurse-aide quarters located about ten meters from the room
where complainant was staying.

On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he knew it was prohibited to give

cigarettes to patients. He further admitted that, as a nurse-aide, he could enter the patients’ room
anytime to check their condition and see to it that the lights were turned off when they were not
needed. He further stated that he was not investigated by the police when he was invited to their
headquarters. The trial court rendered its decision finding the accused Eric Baid y Ominta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of rape. Dr. Herminigilda
Salangad, the complainant’s attending psychiatrist and consultant at the Medical Center in
Muntinlupa, the Perpetual Help Medical Center, the Philippine National Police, and the Holy Spirit
Clinic, was presented as an expert witness. According to her, complainant was, at the time of the
incident, suffering from an undifferentiated type of schizophrenia, described as having the
characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia but does not fit the profile for paranoid, disorganized,
or catatonic schizophrenia. Dr. Salangad stated that complainant seemed to shift from one type
of schizophrenia to another.

It is contended that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her testimony should not have been given
credence by the trial court. It is argued that: (1) there were serious inconsistencies between her
sworn statement and her testimony in court; (2) the prosecution failed to present witnesses to
corroborate her testimony; (3) complainant failed to identify accused-appellant; (4) the results of
the medico-legal examination were negative for spermatozoa; (5) the healed lacerations showed
that complainant had sexual intercourse seven days before the alleged incident; and (6) the
probability was that her allegations of rape were merely a product of her fantasy.

Issue: Whether or not the complainant, who is suffering from schizophrenia, can be qualified as
a witness?

Held: Yes. Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be
a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others
Her testimony indicates that she could understand questions particularly relating to the incident
and could give responsive answers to them. Though she may have exhibited emotions
inconsistent with that of a rape victim (“inappropriate affect”) during her testimony, such as by
smiling when answering questions, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person
suffering from schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid, straightforward, and coherent.

It has long been settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap
alone.

Whatever may be the inconsistencies in her testimony, they are minor and inconsequential. They
show that complainant’s testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than diminish the probative value
of her testimony, they reinforce it. In the case at bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a room
where other patients were sleeping. This circumstance, it is argued, is antithetical to the possibility
of the commission of rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of time and
place and the crime of rape can be consummated even when the malefactor and the victim are
not alone. The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend on the number of witnesses
presented during the trial, so much so that, if the testimonies so far presented clearly and credibly
established the commission of the crime, corroborative evidence would only be a
mere surplusage.27 In this case, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on the basis of which it adjudged accused-appellant guilty. In the absence
of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge, his findings as
to their credibility are entitled to utmost respect as he had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor on the witness stand.
 People v Lacena

Facts: About 3 o’clock in the morning of August 16, 1938, Marciano Dante awoke with a start
because his wife, the appellant defendant, who was sick with a fever, said, "Patay ka ngayon"
(You're going to die now), digging in the abdominal a pair of scissors. The wound was the cause
of acute peritonitis that the injured later died.

It has been proven that in the day of the event, the appellant was experiencing high fever and
delirium. She attacked anybody who lived with her in the house. In the analysis of his blood on
the October 12, 1938, she was found suffering from malaria plasmodium falciparum or malignant
disease that causes disturbance in the nervous system, causing complications including acute
mania, madness and outstanding melancholia sometimes because their common sequel is
neuralgia.

The circumstances in which the appellant struck and gave her husband cut reveals that such an
act was in moments of madness suffered as a result of its illness.

Issue: Whether or not the accused appellant can validly invoke insanity.

Ruling: The accused is acquitted because her action is of without criminal intent by reason of the
disease she suffered that affects her nervous system causing complications including acute
mania.
 Jimenez v Republic

Facts: Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that
Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already
existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel
but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion between the parties
notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was ordered to have
herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation.
Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The
marriage was later annulled.

Issue: Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.

Held: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment
of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to
have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until
the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be
examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of Joel that
his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband and wife.
 Salita v Magtolis

Facts: Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita,
Manila. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued
for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity which incapacity existed at the
time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the
allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted.
Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that at the time of their marriage, Joselita
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage
in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of
a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon his time and efforts so that she frequently
complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner
to lose his job.

Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the
Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point
out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and thus
render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She
rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the
corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on
evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently prepare
her answer to the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent
bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient.

Held: Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly from the basis of the
primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omission of the defendant.
It refers to acts which the evidence on trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required
to prove the existence of those facts. The Supreme Court ruled that on the basis of the allegations,
it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private
respondent has already alleged that petitioner was unable to understand and accept the demands
made by his profession. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information on
evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. The additional facts called
for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain
evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned
Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
 Chi Ming Tsoi v CA

Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their
wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse
between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort
to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with
them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk
during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989
they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because
of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General
Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the
husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the
reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country.
Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their
marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically
and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was
there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

Issue: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.

Held: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative
of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning
of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
 Aurelio v Aurelio

Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002,
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner
were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential
marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was
present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that
her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. On November 8,
2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the
petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court
for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally
argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards
set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion. On February 21,
2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an
Order dated December 17, 2003. A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements
in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There
is a cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for the declaration of nullity filed by the private respondent is
sufficient and has complied with the ruling of the Molina case.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in
respondent’s petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with
three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital
obligation must be stated in the petition.

First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent
that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as
the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist
clinically identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature
as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were
alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s
allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife
are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support."

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal
of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties
have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached
by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which
refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too
burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the
petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity.
 Te v Te

Facts: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which
happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and
Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward
was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and
her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s
parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a
separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they
then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

Issue: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Ruling: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be

personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this
case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and
has no goals and clear direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame
others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
 People v Cruz

Facts: On June 6, 1998, AAA, then a nine-year old, was at her house watching television with her
cousin Jady. It was past three in the afternoon when Jady left to go to her grandmother’s house.
Upon her departure, Cruz abruptly entered the house and turned off the television. He closed the
windows and told AAA to remove her shorts. She did as instructed. Cruz later kissed AAA and
touched her vagina. She felt pain as he inserted his penis into her vagina. She did not do anything,
however, as she was fearful of Cruz. To intimidate her further, Cruz threatened to kill her should
she report what had just happened. He then left in a hurry and closed the door of the house.

AAA tried her best to keep the rape a secret as she was terrified that Cruz would come back and
kill her. Nevertheless, she told her mother BBB what happened to her a few months later. BBB
subsequently told Cruz’s wife of what she had just discovered. Thereafter, BBB took her daughter
to the barangay hall and then to the police station to report the matter to the authorities.
A medical examination was conducted on AAA by Dr. Winston Tan. His report showed that AAA
had two hymenal lacerations. Accused Jesus Paragas Cruz was then found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by the RTC of Parañaque for the crime of Rape. In an appeal before the Court
of Appeals, RTC’s decision was affirmed, hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape?

Ruling: The appeal is DENIED. The CA’s Decision finding accused-appellant Jesus Paragas Cruz
guilty of statutory rape is affirmed with the modification that the award of exemplary damages is
increased to P30,000.

Courts use the following principles in deciding rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made
with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime, conviction for
rape may be solely based on the complainant’s testimony provided it is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
 Agustin v CA and Martin

Facts: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City
RTC. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into
an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite
Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The
baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-
natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite
his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
Arnel also denied having fathered the child. On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month
old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the
open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe
was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin
then sued Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause
of action. The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
thus this petition.

Issue:
1. Whether or Not, The respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD.
2. Whether or Not, the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and
was a form of unreasonable search.

Ruling:
1. NO. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private
respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the
petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the
defendant’s corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of
the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action
is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
2. NO. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said: In
no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the
common good. Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and
seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right
to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already
stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
 Lucas v Lucas

Facts: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that
he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila.
He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from
Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation
from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College
of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile,
Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient
in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated
in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing
was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the
instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show
that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

Issue: Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

Held: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

Ratio: Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The
statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant proceduralaspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this
case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the
parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has
been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that areaimed to safeguard
the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b)
The biologicalsample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;
or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the
scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case;
and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without
need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before
a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will
be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states,
a court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in
ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding
the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found
that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. Weagree, and find that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show
that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The
same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
 Perla v Baring and Perla

Facts: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly
neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio
allegedly assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support
Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio
supplied the information in the said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to
support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.

Issue: Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?

Held: Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation
to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
The Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to
establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there
is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while
a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with
respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same.

Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court.
However, this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts. As this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to
re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts.
 In Re De Villa

Facts: Aileen Mendoza, 12, was raped by her uncle, Reynaldo de Villa in her home in Pasig. Her
pregnancy prompted the filing of charges by her parents against de Villa.

De Villa:
1. sickness, old age of 67 rendered me incapable of erection
2. Mendozas bear a grudge against me
3. Alibi: in hometown of San Luis, Laguna at time of crime

RTC: de Villa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, sentenced to death.

Case automatically elevated to SC for automatic review due to penalty imposed.

SC: affirmed RTC decision, modified by awarding moral damages. SC found date of birth of
Aileen’s child, Leahlyn medically consistent with time of rape.

June de Villa, son of accused, alleged that defense counsel only learned of DNA testing to resolve
paternity issue at time of pendency of SC automatic review. His 2 MRs of the case praying for
DNA tests to be conducted were denied. DNA tests obtained from Billy de Villa, grandson of
Reynaldo, and Leahlyn showed that de Villa could not have sired the latter.

June thus filed petition for writ of habeas corpus for his father.

Issue: WON writ of habeas corpus a proper remedy in the instant case.

Held:
1. On the issue of writ of habeas corpus as proper remedy:
a. individual is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under
some form of illegal restraint
b. however, cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent
court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or
ousted of this jurisdiction
c. It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction due to said lack of
jurisdiction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through HC
d. Feria v. CA doctrine allowed HC as post-conviction remedy only when there
exists:
i. deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint
ii. court had no jurisdiction
iii. penalty being excessive, is voided
e. June did not allege any of the three conditions in Feria to avail of HC
2. Proper remedy should have been certiorari or appeal
3. *On the issue of denial of de Villa’s effective aid of counsel who left for the US in the
middle of appeal
a. SC did not find negligence amounting to denial of constitutional right
4. *On the issue of the relevance of the DNA test as to de Villa’s guilt
a. Pregnancy not an essential element of crime of rape
b. Results of DNA test could not conclusively determine de Villa’s guilt for the
crime of rape
5. *On the issue of remedy of motion for new trial
a. Rule 121 of Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
b. Requisites for motion for new trial:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
 (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment
c. Lack of knowledge of DNA testing attributable to negligence of counsel, and
the same is binding upon de Villa
d. Other means to determine paternity were previously available to de Villa
anyway.

Dispositive. Petition for habeas corpus and motion for new trial dismissed.
 Herrera v Alba

Facts: In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo
Herrera in order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera
denied Armi’s allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a
(deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological
father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that
DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be
admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-
incrimination.

Issue: Whether or not Herrera is correct

Ruling: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is
not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial
court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question
as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This
was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).

In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the
other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme
Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data:
1. how the samples were collected,
2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests,
6. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US
jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be
employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the
Daubert Test inquires:
1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be
had, the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person
is the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a
100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming
evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case
Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable
evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.

What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the
biological father? Then the evidence is merely corroborative. Anent the issue of self-incrimination,
submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against self-incrimination. The right against
self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from
his body when it may be material. There is no “testimonial compulsion” in the getting of DNA
sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.
 Estate of Ong v Diaz

Facts: The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne
Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court
formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong
with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio
died during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration
with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that
"DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective
method of settling the present paternity dispute."

Issue: Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.\

Ruling: Yes. The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for
as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA
Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material
originating from the person's body, ie., blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even
inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult
to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
 People v Umanito

Facts: AAA, then below 18 years of age, was accosted by Umanito. He dragged her into the Home
Economics Building of Daramuangan Elementary School and undressed her while holding a knife
against her. He set her down on a bench, put down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed
up and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. Six months later, AAA’ s mother noticed
the prominence on her stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her mother the alleged rape.
Her mother brought her to the police station. 5 years later, Umanito was caught. He pleaded not
guilty. Umanito’s defense was alibi. He admitted that he had courted AAA but she spurned him.
He conjectured, that AAA had a crush on him since she frequently visited him at his house. RTC
rendered judgment against Umanito and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. Umanito’s
appeal was transferred to the CA for intermediate review, and CA affirmed. Umanito seeks
acquittal on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing of the case and AAA’s questionable
credibility as grounds, given that there were several inconsistencies in her assertions regarding
the nature of their relationship, who took off her clothes, when he met appellant, and where the
kissing happened.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully met the level of proof needed to find the
appellant guilty of the crime of rape

Ruling: No. Given the slew of assertions and counter-assertions, the fact that AAA bore a child
as a result of the purported rape may provide the definitive key to the absolution of Umanito. With
the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child. If it can be conclusively
determined that Umanito did not sire the child, this may cast a shadow of reasonable doubt and
allow his acquittal on this basis. AAA and her child are directed to submit themselves to DNA
testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC), which took effect
on 15 Oct 2007 (a few days before promulgation of this case). DNA print/identification technology
is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one
erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. The groundwork for acknowledging
the strong weight of DNA testing was first laid out in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed DNA
analysis as evidence and traced the development of its admissibility in our jurisdiction. Tecson v.
COMELEC said that in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish, DNA
testing could be resorted to. The determination of whether or not Umanito is the father (through
DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct adjudication of his appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No.
06-11-5-SC, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motuproprio to order a DNA
testing. However, since SC is not a trier of facts, it would be more appropriate that the case be
remanded to RTC for reception of evidence. The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the
feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set. RTC should order the DNA testing
if it finds it to be feasible in this case. RTC shall determine the institution to undertake the testing,
and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice. After the DNA analysis is
obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results
in accordance with the rules of evidence, which shall be assessed by RTC in keeping with
Sections 7 (Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence) and 8 (Reliability of DNA testing
methodology). RTC is also enjoined to observe confidentiality and preservation of DNA evidence.
 People v Vallejo

Facts: On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her
neighbor’s house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor,
helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child
wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s
whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank.
Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he was one
of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police
that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the
clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were
submitted for processing. The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic
Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek
swabs) from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that
there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing – Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while
Vallejo’s Blood Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s
DNA profile. Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But
when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened
by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of
Daisy (including his clothing – which in effect is an admission placing him in the crime scene –
though not discussed in the case) were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated.
Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused
considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.
The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the
first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:
DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code.
Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is
committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the
suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the
reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to
ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. The
test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the
analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more
conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In
such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the Similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
 People v Lucero

Facts: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and
John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.

The prosecution: Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun,
blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing
along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold
necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat
gold ring, domino style; one solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR.
DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said
offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which resulted to the instantaneous death
of ALERIA. Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.

When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with
Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero.
Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice. When the
investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his
friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The
extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by
Lucero. The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged. Appellant Lucero's defense
is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City. He said he was surprised when
several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They chased
him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was blindfolded the whole
night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers. The next
day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed
of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the
complainant. Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in
this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made
to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the
services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual
custodial interrogation. After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient
evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct
participation of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant

Ruling: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.

Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect.
Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible. The records show that Atty.
Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice ofappellant. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received
no reaction fromappellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. More so, it
was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. Constitution requires
the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The
circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty.
Peralta.

Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.

 Tijing v CA

Facts: Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing have six kids of which the youngest
is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. Bienvenida was working as the private respondent’s laundrywoman. One
day, when Angelita Diamante dropped by the house of the spouses Tijing to fetch her laundry,
Bienvenida left her son, Edgardo Jr., under the custody of Angelita because she has something
to buy from the market place. When she returned, Angelita and Edgardo Jr. were gone. Despite
efforts on her own, she could not find her son. She even figured out that Angelita moved to another
place. When her estranged husband learned about the situation, it caused more problem on the
part of Bienvenida, but they eventually reconciled and pursued on looking for their child. On 1993,
Bienvenida had allegedly found her son in the person of John Thomas Lopez. The Spouses Tijing
filed a petition with the trial court for habeas corpus to recover their son which was supported by
testimony from two witnesses, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. Lourdez Vasquez, a
midwife and registered nurse, testified that Edgardo Jr. was born on April 27, 1989, at the her
clinic Lourdez Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila, as supported by clinical records. Benjamin Lopez,
the brother of Angelita’s common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, believes that Tomas could not
have fathered John Thomas since his brother was actually sterile and his brother also admitted
that he only adopted John Thomas. Angelita, however, claimed that John Tomas is her child, that
she gave birth to John Thomas on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban.
The trial court was convinced that Angelita and Tomas has the impossibility of having kids, and
that a strong facial similarity actually exists between Bienvenida and the minor, the trial court ruled
that John Tomas and Edgardo Jr. are the same person. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision
since they found no sufficient evidence to establish Bienvenida’s relation to the minor.

Issue: Whether Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas are one and the same person who is the natural
child of the Spouses Tijing.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the evidence presented by Spouses Tijing in the trial
court are sufficient enough to prove that Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas are one and the same.
The Court acknowledged the following evidences:
(1) Angelita’s incapacity to bear a child because she underwent ligation in 1970 at Martinez
Hospital after the birth of her second child, that is even before living with Tomas without
the benefit of marriage in 1974;
(2) Strong evidence pointing out that Tomas Lopez is not anymore capable of siring a child
because of the accident that made him bumped his private part against the edge of a
banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity;
(3) Unusual entries in the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopen since (a) there was a
substantial delay in its filing from the alleged date of birth, (b) it was Tomas Lopez, not the
midwife, who filed such certificate, and (c) the document stated that Tomas and Angelita
were legally married on October 31, 1974, which is false since Angelita admitted she was
only a common-law wife of Tomas.
(4) Strong similarities between Bienvenida and the minor; and
(5) The midwife who assisted Bienvenida in giving birth presented clinical records that would
support her testimony.

The SC made a remarks regarding the admissibility of DNA results as evidence but the Court did
not necessitate securing such evidence since the above evidences were sufficient to prove that
Edgardo Jr. is Bienvenida and Edgardo’s son.
 Lejano v People

Facts: On June 30, 1991, Estrelita Vizconde and her daughter Carmela nineteen and Jennifer
seven were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court
smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interest were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) announced that it had solved the crime. It presented
star witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed ghat she witnessed the crime. She
pointed to the accused Herbert Jeffrey Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura,
Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging Rodriguez, and Joey
Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer Gerardo Biong as an accessory after the fact.
Relying primarily on Alfaro’s testimony, on August 10, 1995, the public prosecutors filed an
information for rape with homicide against Webb etal. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its
main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer
who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guard of Pitong Daan subdivision, the former
laundry-woman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro
Vizconde, Estrelita’s husband.

Issue: Whether or not failure to conduct a DNA test on the semen specimen found on Carmela is
a ground for Webb’s acquittal.

Ruling: No. The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent
with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony,
as Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the
very least, there exist a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen
was taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of
reward or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA finger print, with the exception
of identical twins. If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb,
then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the court would have been able to determine
that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did. Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for failure
of the state to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady
vs Maryland that he cites his no longer long been overtaken by the decision in Arizona vs
Youngblood, where the US Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to
preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able
to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the state presented a medical
expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact, sought to have the same
subjected to DNA test.

For another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test and no Philippine precedent
had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
 People v Pascual

Facts: The conviction of accused-appellant stemmed from an Amended Information dated

February 23, 2001, filed with the RTC for the crime designated as Rape with Homicide and
Robbery. During trial, the defense presentedas witness, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, forensic chemist
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Said witness testified on the result of the DNA analysis which she conducted on the specimens
submitted by the trial court consisting of the victim's vaginal smear and panty. According to her,
no DNA sample from the suspect was present on the aforesaid specimens. On cross-examination,
she declared that based on DNA testing, she could not determine if a woman was raped or not.
She further declared that in this case, it was possible that the stained vaginal smear prevented a
complete and good result for the DNA profiling. Upon being questioned by the court, the forensic
chemist confirmed that DNA testing on the subject specimens was inconclusive and that the result
was not good, as the specimens submitted, i.e., the stained vaginal smear and the dirty white
panty, had already undergone serological analysis.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's decision. Hence, accused-
appellant seeks for a final review of his case and makes much of the result of the DNA analysis
conducted by the NBI that his profile was not in the victim's vaginal smear. As such, he argues
he is innocent of the crime charged.

Issue: Does the result of the DNA examination entitle the accused-appellant to an acquittal?

Ruling: In People v Yatar, the Supreme Court held that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, while the DNA analysis of the victim's vaginal smear showed no complete
profile of the accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive considering that said specimen was
already stained or contaminated which, according to the forensic chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc,
deters a complete and good result for DNA profiling. She explained in her testimony that generally,
with the vaginal smear, they could see if there is a male profile in the smear. However in this case,
when they received the vaginal smear on the stained slide, the same had already undergone
serological analysis. Hence, according to the chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the
specimen subject of this case was inconclusive. In light of this flawed procedure, we hold that the
result of the DNA examination does not entitle accused-appellant to an acquittal.
 Acosta v People

Facts: Reynaldo Lamera died due to alleged mauling by the accused namely, Uriarte and the two
Acostas. The prosecution witnesses alleged that they saw the three accused punch several times
the deceased and hit him with piece of wood one (1) meter length and three (3) meters in the
thigh and on the right side of his neck which caused his instantaneous death. Dr. Jocelyn Laurante
of the Provincial Hospital of Surigao del Sur examined the body of the deceased and concluded
that he died of “cardio-pulmonary arrest” secondary to CVA hemorrhage. However Laurante did
not conduct an actual autopsy and her examination was limited to a visual inspection of the body.
Subsequently, MarimaLamera, the widow requested to the NBI Regional Office that an autopsy
be performed to the deceased husband and Dr. Tammy Uy, medico-legal officer of the NBI
thereafter examined the body and found out that the cause of death of the Lamera was due to
“traumatic neck injury” because of the presence of “subcutaneous hematoma” and this findings
implies that the accused was hit by a thick object. The Trial court convicted the three accused of
a crime of Homicide for failure of the prosecution to prove qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The accused
appealed to the Supreme Court and alleged that cause of death of the deceased was “cardio-
pulmonary arrest” secondary to CVA hemorrhage and asserted that Dr. Laurante examined the
victim only a day after he died, her findings should have been given more weight than those of
Dr. Uy.

Issue: Whether or not the cause of death of the deceased was “cardio-pulmonary arrest”
secondary to CVA hemorrhage

Ruling: NO. Subcutaneous wounds are very deceptive on the surface. There may be a large
ecchymosis, a black and blue spot, and but little injury to deeper tissues, as there may be a very
extensive internal injury giving no evidence on the surface. It may even happen that, although no
marks of violence can be found externally, or, at least, none which will explain the person’s death,
internal injuries may be discovered upon dissection which will render it certain that the death was
violent.