Writing - Tajanco vs. CA

Today is Wednesday, July 27, 2016
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R)
revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No.
Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from
December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco,
courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that
"defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for
plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in
consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and
acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until
December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of
marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a
result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant
condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to
resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to
support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry
plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The
prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn
child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month
child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month
for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and
exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed

the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter
ultimately decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of
action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for
its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the

dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach
of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking
the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30,
1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and
De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under
Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted
from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the
Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code.
Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the
Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary,
in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"

seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is
above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of
promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot
bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and
her parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set
forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a
minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in
law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9
Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient

promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces
of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,

persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof
of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of

sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would
tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward
for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The

material allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E.

Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and
residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with
summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each
other sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the
defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due
time the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the
defendant as are wont of young people in love had frequent outings
and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and
sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises
of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's
earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959

except for a short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was
out of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love
and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started

conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff
informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his
promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and
righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing
the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to
all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his
promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult
age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated
acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had
the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of
the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would
have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to

whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the
defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no
pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
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Today is Wednesday, July 27, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the

We find this appeal meritorious.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of

Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The

I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E.

V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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