FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003.]

BENITO ASTORGA , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,

respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal
of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001, 1 as
well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the O ce of the Ombudsman led the following Information
against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his men for
Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime
subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public o cer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to o ce, conniving, confederating and
mutually helping with unidenti ed persons, who are herein referred to under
ctitious names JOHN DOES, who were armed with rearms of different calibers,
with deliberate intent, did then there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain
Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and
Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing
them to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby restraining
and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without
exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent
a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest
protection operations in line with the government's campaign against illegal logging. The
team was composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest
Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of
the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team leader. The team was
escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian. 3 aC SHDI

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they
saw two yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with the local barangay
o cials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael Figueroa. However,
since Figueroa was not around at the time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay. 4
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats
being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30–5:00
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 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked
from the DENR's service pump boat and proceeded to the site of the boat construction.
There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to their
boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor Astorga. 5
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian,
approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was
suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed, "puwede
ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa
baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can
make you swim back to Tacloban. Don't you know that I can box? I can box. Don't you
know that I can declare this a misencounter?) 6 Mayor Astorga then ordered someone to
fetch "reinforcements," and forty- ve (45) minutes later, or between 5:00–6:00 p.m., a
banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men
were armed with M-16 and M-14 ri es, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns
pointed at the team members. 7 At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of
his team's mission. 8 He then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going
to contact his people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the team's
whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simon's radio, saying, " Maupay
nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisiga kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka
aro hin Wig." (It's better if you have no radio so that your o ce would not know your
whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help). 9 Mayor Astorga again slapped the right
shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samara kay
diri kamo puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar
because I will not tolerate it here.) 1 0 Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to
go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they would not be allowed to go home and
that they would instead be brought to Daram. 1 1 Mayor Astorga then addressed the team,
saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga
dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon." (If you really
want to con scate anything, you start with the big-time. If you con scate the boats of
Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender mine.) 1 2 Simon then tried to reiterate his
request for permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily
said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro
istorya." (You cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many
things to discuss there.) 1 3
The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served
dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table, and the
meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m. 1 4 After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1
Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave the barangay. 1 5 On
the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team
was finally allowed to leave. 1 6
Complainants led a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor
Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not
guilty to the offenses charged. 1 7 At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint A davit. 1 8 However, the
presentation of Simon's testimony was not completed, and none of his fellow team
members came forward to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR
RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 1 9
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 On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered nding
accused BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 2 0

The accused led a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 2001 2 1 which was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001. 2 2 A Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 24, 2001 2 3 was also led, and this was
similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002. 2 4
Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in nding the accused guilty of
Arbitrary Detention as de ned and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised
Penal Code, based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse,
notwithstanding the A davit of Desistance executed by the ve (5) complaining
witnesses wherein the latter categorically declared petitioner's innocence of the
crime charged. 2 5

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, 2 6 especially in light of the fact that the private
complainants executed a Joint A davit of Desistance. 2 7 Petitioner asserts that nowhere
in the records of the case is there any competent evidence that could su ciently establish
the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons of the team members. 2 8
Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men at the scene does not qualify
as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of the team
members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. 2 9
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public o cer or employee who, without
legal grounds, detains a person. 3 0 The elements of the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee. DaAIHC

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds. 3 1
That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor
of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the rst element of Arbitrary Detention, that the
offender is a public officer or employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts
were spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were
motivated by his "instinct for self-preservation" and the feeling that he was being "singled
out." 3 2 The detention was thus without legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third element
enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.

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 In the case of People v. Acosta , 3 3 which involved the illegal detention of a child, we
found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to
show that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim. However, because the
victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to leave until his godmother, the
accused-appellant, had returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could not
leave because of his fear to violate such instruction. 3 4
In the case of People v. Cortez, 3 5 we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive
the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an
enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended
party in said case was found outside talking to the owner of the house where she had been
taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the
kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein
that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they had
earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight.
Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render people immobile and that appeals
to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to
the use of actual force or violence. 3 6
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the
curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's
person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the
victim su cient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his
own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim
is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas,
the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. 3 7 This
refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements,"
all armed with military-issue ri es, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed
at the complainants and the witnesses. 3 8 Given such circumstances, we give credence to
SPO1 Capoquian's statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga's orders. 3 9 It
was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had
on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the
team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The
intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus
clear.
Regarding the Joint A davit of Desistance executed by the private complainants,
su ce it to say that the principles governing the use of such instruments in the
adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare , it was held
that an a davit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the defenses of
the accused, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other
circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to
the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge.
Here, there are no such circumstances. 4 0 Indeed, the belated claims made in the Joint
A davit of Desistance, such as the allegations that the incident was the result of a
misunderstanding and that the team acceded to Mayor Astorga's orders "out of respect,"
are belied by petitioner's own admissions to the contrary. 4 1 The Joint A davit of
Desistance of the private complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material
points alleged in the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack
of interest of private complainants to pursue the case. This conclusion is supported by
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 one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
11. That this a davit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity
and improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive and
other o cial of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and project
can be effectively implemented through the support of the local
o cials for the betterment of the residence living conditions who are
facing difficulties and are much dependent on government support. 4 2
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing
out that the Sandiganbayan's reliance on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced,
for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in the case. 4 3
He also makes much of the fact that prosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly
"not exactly privy to, and knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein
accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged confrontation,'
until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2 September 1997." 4 4
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court's factual ndings are conclusive and
binding upon appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. 4 5 Nothing in the
case at bar prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1
Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal
law nor the rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively supplied by the
private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor Astorga's claim
that SPO1 Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to what transpired between Simon and
himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian testi ed that he accompanied Simon
when the latter went to talk to petitioner. 4 6 He heard all of Mayor Astorga's threatening
remarks. 4 7 He was with Simon when they were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues
and wielding M-16 and M-14 ri es. 4 8 In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the
circumstances which led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor
Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from
leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to "while away the time"
and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused. 4 9 On the contrary, SPO3
Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were simply "whiling away the time"
between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning.
5 0 SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they did not use the time between
their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early, the following morning to "enjoy
the place" and that, given a choice, they would have gone home. 5 1
Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge",
because the ponente of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate and advocate
when he propounded "very extensive clari catory questions" on the witnesses. Surely, the
Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during a trial. It can propound
clari catory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the
court cannot be assailed on the ground that clari catory questions were asked during the
trial. 5 2
Thus, we a rm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan nding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that, where the detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall be
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, which
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 has a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum term to be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. TSacCH

Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in his
concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso , wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by public
o cials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for the intensi cation of
efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by
government o cers form part of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect
during the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued
in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were
not repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and
sovereign Republic of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints
often heard of violations of said provisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions
under them have been instituted due to the fact that the erring individuals
happened to belong to the same government to which the prosecuting o cers
belong. It is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and
that prosecuting o cers should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders
the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125
of the Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such
wanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible
o cials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees' right to the
indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjusti ed violation of their
fundamental rights. 5 3

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 nding petitioner
BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Carpio, JJ ., concur.
Azcuna, J ., is on leave.

Footnotes
1. Records, p. 255; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by
Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

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 2. Records, p. 1 (italics and emphasis in the original).

3. TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 6; Exhibit B, p. 1.

4. Id., pp. 7–8; Exhibit B, p. 1.
5. Id., pp. 8–9; Exhibit B, p. 1.
6. Id., pp. 10–12; Exhibit B, p. 1; TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 6.
7. Id., pp. 14–16; Exhibit B, p. 1.
8. Exhibit B, p. 2.
9. TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 13; Exhibit B, p. 2.
10. Exhibit B, p. 2.
11. TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 19.

12. Exhibit B, p. 2.
13. Id.
14. TSN, August 15, 2000, pp. 7, 39.
15. Id., pp. 9, 22.
16. Id., pp. 25, 36.
17. Records, pp. 129, 135.
18. TSN, August 14–15, 2000; Exhibit B.
19. Records, p. 158.
20. Id., p. 265 (emphasis in the original).
21. Id., p. 271.
22. Id., p. 306; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by Associate
Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

23. Id., p. 315.

24. Id., p. 370; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by Associate
Justices Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
25. Rollo, p. 18.
26. Id., pp. 18–19.
27. Id., p. 35; Records, p. 158.
28. Id., pp. 25–26.
29. Id., p. 27.
30. REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 124.
31. II REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE 43 (14th ed. 1998) citing U.S. v. Braganza, 10
Phil. 79 [1908] and Milo v. Salanga, G.R. No. 37007, 20 July 1987, 152 SCRA 113
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 (emphasis in the original).
32. Rollo, pp. 30–31.
33. 107 Phil. 360 [1960].
34. Id., emphasis supplied.
35. 381 Phil. 345 [2000]; citing People v. Dela Cruz, 342 Phil. 854 [1997] and People v.
Ramos, 358 Phil. 261 [1998].
36. Id., citing People v. Hope, 177 N.E. 402, 257 N.Y. 147.
37. TSN, August 14, 2000, pp. 19–20; TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 17.
38. Id., pp. 14–16; Exhibit B, p. 1.
39. TSN, August 15, 2000, pp. 19–20.
40. People v. Ballabare, 332 Phil. 384 [1996].
41. Records, p. 158; Rollo, pp. 27, 30–31, 32–33, 41.
42. Id., p. 159.
43. Rollo, pp. 28–29.
44. Id., p. 20.
45. People v. Torellos, G.R. No. 143084, 1 April 2003; citing People v. Daramay, G.R. Nos.
140235 & 142748, 9 May 2002.
46. TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 10; Exhibit B, p. 1.
47. Id., pp. 10–14, Exhibit B, pp. 1–2.
48. Id., p. 15; Exhibit B, p. 1.
49. Rollo, pp. 24–25.
50. TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 36.
51. Id., p. 26.
52. People v. Pinuela, G.R. Nos. 140727-28, 31 January 2003.
53. Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983 [1947]; concurring opinion of Justice Perfecto.

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