Ampil vs Agrava

Facts:

Ampil was the counsel for Angela Perez in several cases. The principal cases handled by Ampil were filed in the CFI by Angela’s husband and son,
Antonio and Benigno Perez, asking that Angela be placed under guardianship and that a suitable person be appointed to administer her properties.
Later on, the parties submitted to court, which dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. This dismissal was affirmed by SC. A case was later filed by
Antonio and Benigno with the domestic court of Manila, seeking the court’s approval of the compromise agreement. The domestic court dismissed the
proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because the case which was to be settled amicably by the compromise agreement had already been
dismissed by CFI as affirmed by SC. Ampil asserts that Angela terminated his services as counsel without just cause and without paying him for his
profiessional services, for which he presented his bill and asserted his retaining lien over the three titles entrusted to him by Angela in the course of his
professional employment. Eventually, the compromise agreement mentioned above was approved by the Supreme Court. Benigno and Antonio thus
filed a case to obtain the titles held by Ampil. They claimed that the attorney’s lien must be exercised over the properties belonging to Angela, not over
the properties belonging to them in the compromise agreement. They also argued that the compromise agreement was entered into 8 years before
Ampil was discharged as Angela’s counsel, besides, Ampil took a position adverse to them by seeking to have the compromise agreement annulled.
They concluded that Ampil was therefore bound by the compromise agreement.

Issue: WON Ampil has a right to keep his retaining lien over the said titles until his services are paid for.

Ruling:

YES. Three elements of attorney’s retaining lien were met: 1) lawyer -client relationship; 2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents, and
papers; and 3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Ampil obtained possession of the titles when they still belonged to his client Angela. It was only
when Angela later on confirmed the compromise agreement that it became valid. The transfer of the properties to Antonio and Benigno could not
retroact to the time the compromise was originally executed.
G.R. No. L-27394 July 31, 1970 employment in his letter of February 16, 1967 to respondents'
counsel.3

ARMANDO V. AMPIL, petitioner,

vs. After petitioner's discharge as counsel, developments ensued which
THE HONORABLE JUDGE CORAZON JULIANO-AGRAVA, gave rise to the present action. In Case No. L-19711, the pending
ANTONIO M. PEREZ and BENIGNO PEREZ Y TUASON, appeal from the domestic court's order of dismissal of respondents
respondents. Perezes' action, the very same compromise agreement of May 2,
1958 was submitted anew to this Court which approved the same in
its Resolution of November 17, 1966 as follows:
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioner.

In L-19711 (Antonio M. Perez, et al. vs.

Alfonso Felix, Jr. for respondent Antonio M. Perez. Angela Tuason de Perez), the appearance of
A. Pison Jr. as counsel for respondent-
appellee in substitution of Attys. C. S.
Leonardo Abolo for respondent, Benigno Perez y Tuason.
Tanjuatco & Associates and Atty. Armando V.
Ampil, is NOTED; and considering the motion
filed by respondent Angela Tuason de Perez
by and through her daughter and attorney-in-
fact Angela Perez y Tuason de Staley and
TEEHANKEE, J.: assisted by new counsel for said respondent,
manifesting (1) that said daughter is her duly
authorized attorney-in-fact; (2) that said
An original action of certiorari to annul the lower court's questioned respondent now confirms the compromise
order requiring petitioner to surrender three certificates of title, agreement entered into by her husband and
notwithstanding his assertion of his right of an attorney's retaining lien her son on May 2, 1958, copy of which is
over them. attached to the motion as Annex 'B'; and (3)
that said respondent affirms that this
compromise agreement was right and proper,
Petitioner, for a considerable period of time, was the counsel for
THE COURT RESOLVED to approve said
Angela Tuason de Perez in several cases, The principal cases so
compromise agreement.4
handled successfully by petitioner for Angela were the following:

In the said compromise agreement,5 Angela inter alia, ceded in full

Civil Case No. 34626 of the Court of First Instance of Manila filed
ownership to her son, respondent Benigno Perez, the Sampaloc,
against Angela by herein respondents Antonio M. Perez and Benigno
Manila property covered by T.C.T. No. 34769 and to her husband,
Perez y Tuason, her husband and son, respectively, asking
respondent Antonio M. Perez, seven other properties6 all situated in
principally that Angela be placed under guardianship because of her
Sampaloc, Manila covered by seven separate titles, among them,
alleged prodigality and that a suitable person be appointed to
administer her properties. On May 2, 1958, the parties submitted to T.C.T. Nos. 24927 and 24928 — which three titles are the ones
involved herein. Angela likewise agreed to pay her husband the sum
the said court a compromise agreement, of the same date, which
of P63,000.00 in full settlement of his claim for damages. In turn,
shortly afterwards was denounced by Angela. On September 30,
respondents Perezes, (with Antonio signing on behalf of his son
1958, without passing on the validity of the compromise agreement,
the said court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.1 Benigno as guardian ad litem renounced any and all claims against
Angela and acknowledged that "defendant (Angela) owns in full
ownership the interests and properties presently in her name in J. M.
Case G.R. No. L-14874 was the appeal to the Supreme Court taken Tuason and Co. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc., acknowledge that she is
by respondents Perezes from the court of first instance's dismissal of fully entitled to administer and/or encumber and/or alienate the said
their action. This Court in its decision handed down on September 30, interests and properties as well as such other properties that she may
1960, affirmed the dismissal holding that jurisdiction properly acquire with the proceeds of the sale, exchange or encumbrance of
pertained to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. the same."

Special Proceedings No. 03123 of the domestic court of Manila was Thereafter, respondents Perezes having failed to obtain from
then filed on November 10, 1960 by respondents Perezes, whose petitioner the three titles to the properties ceded to them as above
objective was limited to seeking the said court's approval of the stated in the compromise agreement, as petitioner asserted his
above compromise agreement submitted on May 2, 1958 to the retaining lien over them, filed on February 22, 1967 with respondent
Manila court of first instance. Upon motion on behalf of Angela, the domestic court a so-called motion for partial execution disputing
domestic relations court dismissed the proceeding on the ground of petitioner's asserted lien of retention and asking the court to order
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, holding that "(T)he petitioner to surrender the three titles to them.
compromise agreement herein sought to be approved was allegedly
entered into during the pendency of Civil Case No. 34626 of the
Overruling petitioner's opposition asking the court to respect his right
Court of First Instance of Manila presumably to settle it amicably. But
to retain the titles until the value of the professional services rendered
the said case was dismiss by that Court for lack of jurisdiction, and as
by him to Angela shall have been paid in full by the latter, respondent
its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, there was no more
case to be settled by compromise because the three causes of action court ordered under date of March 8, 1967 petitioner to surrender the
involved therein had not been refiled in this Court."2 titles to respondents Perezes within five days from notice, holding
that "(A)s the Compromise Agreement has already been approved, it
is believed that the Court can have it enforced and, in connection
G.R. No. L-19711, the appeal to the Supreme Court taken in turn by therewith, can compel Atty. Ampil to deliver the owners duplicates of
respondents Perezes from the domestic court's dismissal of their T.C.T.'s Nos. 24927, 24928 and 34769 to the Perezes ... Any
second action. attorney's lien in favor Of Mr. Ampil, as attorney of Tuason should be
enforced against his client, and not against the Perezes."7

Petitioner asserts and it is not disputed, that sometime in November,

1966, Angela, acting through a new attorney-in-fact in the person of Petitioner thereupon, sought the present recourse and the Court in a
her daughter, Angela Perez y Tuason de Stanley, terminated his resolution of April 13, 1967 issued a writ of preliminary injunction
services as counsel without just and lawful cause and without paying against the enforcement of respondent court's questioned order.
him for his professional services, for which he presented his bill in Petitioner urges that respondent court acted with grave abuse of
due course, as well as asserted his retaining lien over ,the three titles discretion in having granted the motion to surrender the titles in his
entrusted to him by Angela in the course of his professional possession, notwithstanding the provisions of the first part of Rule
138, section 37 of the Rules of Court, expressly recognizing his right unstinted fidelity in upholding his client's cause and subject to
of retaining lien: appropriate disciplinary action if he should fail to live up to such
exacting standard, the attorney in return is given the assurance
through his liens — retaining and charging — that collection of his
SEC. 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall lawful fees and disbursements is not rendered difficult, if not
have a lien upon the funds, documents and altogether thwarted, by an unappreciative client. He is thereby given
papers of his client which have lawfully come an effective hold on his client to assure payment of his services in
into his possession and may retain the same keeping with his dignity as an officer of the Court.
until his lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. ... 4. The fact that the client Angela, in the compromise agreement,
undertook to transfer her properties covered by the titles in question
to respondents Perezes would not defeat petitioner's retaining lien
Petitioner must prevail. over the same. Petitioner's position is similar to that of a creditor who
holds an attachment lien over the properties and the client-debtor
must discharge the lien before he can dispose the properties to a
1. Full recognition of an attorney's retaining lien, present the elements
third person free of such lien. In enforcing his retaining lien over the
of lawyer-client relationship, lawful possession of the client's funds,
titles, petitioner was enforcing the same against Angela as his former
documents and papers and unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees, has
client who was admittedly the owner of the properties and not against
invariably been extended by the Court in view of the categorical term
her adversaries to whom the client had undertaken to transfer the
of the cited Rule.8 In the latest case of Matute vs. Matute,9 the Court
same under the compromise agreement, without first discharging the
again emphasized, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that a
attorney's lien by payment of the fees due to petitioner. What
counsel's right to retain muniments of title in his possession until
obviously was lost sight of by respondent court in ruling that
payment of his lawful fees and disbursements is effected "is
petitioner's lien "should be enforced against his client and not against
incontestable, and under the rule and section aforesaid, the attorney
the Perezes" was that petitioner obtained possession of the titles
can not be compelled to surrender the muniments of title mentioned
when they did appertain to his then client, Angela. As of that time,
without prior proof that his fees have been duly satisfied. The courts,
petitioner's retaining lien was fastened to the titles and respondent
in the exercise of their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers
court was bound to respect and protect the same.
of the court, are bound to respect and protect the attorneys' lien as a
necessary means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the
profession." The situation would be different where title to the properties is the
very subject in dispute in the case and the court adjudges the client's
adversary to be rightfully entitled thereto. In such a case, the titles to
2. The Court cited therein the late Justice Laurel's opinion in Rustia
the property could not be said to be properties of the client, over
vs. Abetolo, 1 0 with regard to the inconvenience that may accrue to
which the attorney may claim a retaining lien. The attorney may
the client, and to the client's adversary for that matter as in the case
enforce his lien only over properties of his client and not against
at bar, because of the retaining lien thus exercised by an attorney,
those of his client's adversary. 1 4 And the adversary's right as
that such inconvenience "is the reason and essence of the lien." But
prevailing party to enforce the judgment for the property adjudged to
as in Rustia, we pointed out that "if it be entirely indispensable for the
him should not depend on or be prejudiced by the client's ability or
court to gain possession of the documents that have come to the
refusal to pay the attorney. The Court, however, has seen no need to
attorney and are held by him in the course of his employment as
make any pronouncement on such a hypothetical situation that is not
counsel, it can require the surrender thereof by requiring the client or
involved in the issues of the present case.
claimant to first file proper and adequate security for the lawyers'
compensation." 1 1 This alternative was in fact availed of by
respondent Antonio M. Perez, who, upon motion filed on August 10, 5. The fact that the properties involved were exclusively paraphernal
1967 alleging that "the properties in question awarded to Antonio properties of Angela is undisputed. This fact is admitted in
Perez have a market value of easily a quarter of a million pesos and respondents' very petition in the proceedings below, (Annex A,
the property awarded to Benigno Perez easily has an equal value petition) where they alleged that Angela was squandering and
secured from the Court its resolution of October 13, 1967 lifting the liquidating her properties for the benefit of a third party with whom
preliminary injunction as to Titles Nos. 24927 and 24928 of Manila she had fallen in love and that the fruits of these properties belong to
upon his filing and the approval of bond in the sum of P25,000.00 her conjugal partnership of gains with respondent Antonio M. Perez
answerable for whatever damages may be suffered by petitioner. and are the main source of income of said partnership.

3. It should be underscored that the retaining lien of an attorney is 6. It is error for respondents to contend that petitioner has no right to
only a passive right and cannot be actively enforced. It amounts to a assert a lien over properties that no longer belong to his client Angela
mere right to retain the documents and papers as against the client, but to them. By virtue of the transfers as seemingly agreed to by
until the attorney is fully paid, the exception being that funds of the Angela in November, 1966, after petitioner's discharge as counsel,
client in the attorney's possession may be applied to the satisfaction the properties thenceforth may be deemed to have been validly
of his fees. An attorney's retaining or possessory lien is distinguished transferred to respondents, as stipulated by the contracting parties.
from his charging or special lien which is an attorney's specific lien for And petitioner is in no way interfering with their taking possession of
compensation oil the fund or judgment which he has recovered by the properties so transferred to them nor with their enjoyment of the
means of his professional services for his client in a particular case fruits thereof. All that petitioner asserts and exercises is his passive
and is provided in the second part of Rule 138, section 37. 1 2 Such lien of retaining the muniments of title thereto. Such retention
charging lien covers only the services rendered by an attorney in the impedes the corresponding registration and transfer of the titles to
action in which the judgment was obtained and takes effect under the respondents, it is true. But rather than enforcing execution of the
cited rule after the attorney shall have caused statement of his claim compromise agreement against petitioner, who is in no way
of such lien to be entered upon the records of the particular action respondents' adversary and disregarding petitioner's valid retaining
with written notice thereof to his client and to the adverse party. It lien, respondent court is vested with due authority to enforce the
presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money same against Angela as the actual adverse party in interest, by
judgment for his client and grants the attorney "the same right and requiring her to produce the titles to effect registration of the
power over such judgments and executions as his client would have covenanted transfers and thereby compelling her to satisfy
to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and petitioner's just fees or to file proper and adequate security for their
disbursements." On the other hand, the attorney's retaininng lien is a payment. (Matute, supra).
general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and
his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which
may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his 7. Respondents' argument that the compromise agreement was
employment. 1 3 The attorney's retaining lien attaches to the client's executed since May 2, 1958, over eight years before petitioner's
documents and funds in the attorney's possession regardless of the discharge as Angela's counsel and that petitioner as Angela's
outcome, favorable or adverse, of any cases he may have handled counsel pursued interests adverse to them and "sought to obtain the
for his client. Called upon at all times to exert utmost zeal with discharge of the compromise agreement" 1 5 (which, in fact, petitioner
successfully blocked until his discharge as counsel) — implying G.R. No. L-27394 October 13, 1967
thereby that petitioner should be held bound by said compromise
agreement — does not change the legal picture. It should be
remembered that the said compromise agreement was executed by ARMANDO V. AMPIL, petitioner,
one Roberto Della Rosa as Angela's attorney-in-fact to settle Civil vs.
Case 34626 in the Manila court of first instance; 1 6 that one of THE HONORABLE JUDGE CORAZON JULIANO-AGRAVA,
Angela's grounds in denouncing the same was that it was not freely ANTONIO M. PEREZ and BENIGNO PEREZ Y
or validly entered into by her representative 1 7 and that this Court, TUAZON, respondents.
speaking through Mr. Justice Reyes, rejected respondents'
contention that the Manila court should have held that Angela was in
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
estoppel, by the execution and submittal of the compromise
No apperance for the petioner.
agreement, to question the jurisdiction of said court. 1 8

RESOLUTION
Subsequently, when the same compromise agreement was sought to
be submitted by respondents in the proceedings below for the limited
objective of seeking respondent court's approval thereof, said court DIZON, J.:
dismissed the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter, since Civil Case No. 34626 of the Manila court
which was presumably to be settled amicably by the compromise In his petition for certiorari filed on March 31, 1967, petitioner prayed
agreement was dismissed by final decision of that court as affirmed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction temporarily
by this Court and "there was no more case to be settled by restraining the respondents from enforcing and/or executing the order
compromise." (supra.) marked as Annex D attached thereto, at any time during the
pendency of the present case. We granted the petition for the
issuance of the writ aforesaid upon the filing of a P1,000.00 bond.
The only question then appealed to this Court in the second case,
No. 19711, was the correctness of respondent court's order of
dismissal; if the same was set aside, the case would be remanded to We have now before Us a motion filed by respondent Antonio M.
respondent court for trial and hearing on the myriad built-in issues. Perez praying that said writ be lifted as against him and that petitioner
When pending said appeal and after petitioner's discharge, the same be ordered to deliver to him the properties covered by Transfer
compromise agreement (of dismissed Civil Case No. 34626) was Certificates of Title Nos. 24927 and 24928 of the City of Manila, said
submitted anew in November, 1966, to this Court by her new properties having been already awarded to him by virtue of a
attorney-in-fact, assisted by new counsel, manifesting inter alia that compromise agreement entered into between the parties in G. R. No.
Angela "now confirms the (said) compromise agreement," the picture L-19711 and approved by Us on November 17, 1966.
that clearly emerges is that in legal contemplation, Angela and
respondents Perezes had then executed a new agreement for the
transfer of her said properties to respondents. The transfer of said Our resolution of August 30, 1967 required petitioner to comment,
properties to respondents could in no way be deemed to retroact to within five days from notice, on the aforesaid motion, but the record
over 8 years back on May 2, 1958, when the compromise agreement shows that up to this time no such comment has been submitted by
was originally executed. presumably to settle Case No. 34626 which him.
was eventually dismissed in 1960 for lack of jurisdiction of the Manila
court. The transfer of the said properties as provided in the
It being a fact that the compromise agreement mentioned heretofore
compromise agreement as now confirmed in November, 1966 by
was approved by Us; that by virtue thereof the properties covered by
Angela and approved by this Court in its Resolution of November 17,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 24927 and 24928 of the City of
1966 was effective only as of this much later date.
Manila were awarded to respondent Antonio M. Perez, and that said
certificates of title are presently in the possession of petitioner,
There can be no question, then, that these properties petitioner is hereby ordered to deliver said certificates of title to
were exclusively Angela's prior to November, 1966 and that respondent Antonio M. Perez, upon the filing and approval of a bond
respondents could lay no claim thereto by virtue of the transfers in the sum of P25,000.00 answerable for whatever damages may be
provided in the compromise agreement until after its confirmation by suffered by him (petitioner) in connection with his claim for attorney's
Angela and approval in November 1966; and that respondents' fees against his former client, Angela Tuason de Perez, by reason of
contention that petitioner could not exercise his retaining lien over the the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction mentioned heretofore.
titles which had properly come into his possession during his
engagement as Angela's counsel long before November, 1966 is
untenable.

Even respondent court so understood it correctly, when in its

questioned order, it related that "(T)he case has been returned to this
Court with a resolution of the appellate tribunal approving the
Compromise Agreement. That is now the law of the case. It is as if,
after the petition herein had been filed, this Court, acceding to the
prayer of the Perezes, had by final order adjudged Tuason to be an
incompetent, had decided to dispense with the appointment of a
guardian by directly assuming the functions of one, and lastly had
approved the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the ward.
Questions of procedural propriety, or of jurisdiction are no longer
open because of the final action taken in the premises by the highest
tribunal of the land." 1 9

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of

respondent court of March 8, 1967 is hereby declared null and void
and set aside. With costs against private respondents. So ordered.