Greek Public Law 2016

Public law
Edward Stone
Eloise Ellis
This subject guide was prepared for the University of London International
Programmes by:
uu Edward G. Stone, MA (Oxon), Solicitor (non-practising), Editorial Manager, CILEx Law

School.
The 2015 and 2016 updates were prepared by:
uu Eloise E.C. Ellis, Lecturer in Law, University of East Anglia.
The authors would like to thank Dr Jo Murkens for his help in the preparation of this
subject guide.
This is one of a series of subject guides published by the University. We regret that
owing to pressure of work the authors are unable to enter into any correspondence
relating to, or arising from, the guide. If you have any comments on this subject guide,
favourable or unfavourable, please use the form at the back of this guide.
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Published by: University of London

© University of London 2016
The University of London asserts copyright over all material in this subject guide
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Public law Contents page i
Contents
Module descriptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Introducing public law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 How public law differs from other law subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Content of individual chapters of the subject guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Textbooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Journals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 Online study resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6 Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 The UK constitution and its core institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Key participants in the UK constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 The ‘Westminster model’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Reforming the Westminster model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Direct democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Parliamentary supremacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 The traditional view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 The enrolled Bill rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 Doctrine of implied repeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 The ‘manner and form’ argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5 Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.6 The Act of Union 1706 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.7 Parliamentary supremacy and the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.8 The Human Rights Act 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 The rule of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 Bingham’s eight ‘sub-rules’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2 ‘Content-free’ and ‘content-rich’ interpretations of the rule of law . . . . . 32
4.3 Dicey’s description of the rule of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4 Protection of the rule of law by the courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.5 Protection of the rule of law by Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.6 Protection of the rule of law by the Lord Chancellor . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5 Limited government and the separation of powers . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1 Montesquieu and L’esprit des lois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.2 Functions of the executive, legislature and judiciary in the United Kingdom . . 41
5.3 Reasons for the separation of powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.4 Separation of power between the Crown and Parliament . . . . . . . . . 44
page ii University of London International Programmes
5.5 The judicial approach to the separation of powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.6 Interactions between Parliament, the government and the judiciary . . . . 47
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6 Ministerial accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.1 Legitimacy and accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.2 The role of the monarch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.3 The role of the Prime Minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.4 The role of ministers and the cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.5 Ministerial accountability and the civil service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7 Crown and prerogative powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
7.1 Comparing sources of legal authority for public bodies . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.2 Categories of prerogative powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72
7.3 Definitions of prerogative powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.4 Relationship between prerogative and statutory powers . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.5 Judicial review of prerogative powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.6 Reforming ministerial prerogatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.7 Case study: deployment of British armed forces abroad . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
8 UK primary legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.1 The purpose of legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.2 Researching the meaning of an Act of Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.3 Policy making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.4 Drafting Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
8.5 Framework Bills and the interaction with delegated legislation . . . . . . . 90
8.6 Pre-legislative scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
8.7 The legislative process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
8.8 Bills of ‘first class constitutional importance’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
8.9 Bringing legislation into force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
8.10 Post-legislative scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8.11 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
9 UK delegated legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
9.1 Terminology of delegated legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
9.2 Uses of delegated legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
9.3 Drafting secondary legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
9.4 Parliament’s role in delegated legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
9.5 The role of the courts in scrutinising delegated legislation
– judicial review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
9.6 The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
9.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Public law Contents page iii
10 Constitutional conventions: case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
10.1 The Salisbury-Addison convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
10.2 The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
10.3 House of Commons and House of Lords in conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
10.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
11 EU legal and governmental order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.1 Background to the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
11.2 The European Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
11.3 The Council of the European Union/Council of Ministers . . . . . . . . . . 112
11.4 The European Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
11.5 Accountability of the EU institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
11.6 Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
11.7 UK ‘opt-outs’ from the Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
11.8 The treaty-making process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
11.9 European Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
11.10 The ‘ordinary legislative process’ – how the Commission and Parliament
create law jointly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
11.11 Types of EU legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
11.12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
12 EU law and UK constitutional law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
12.1 Key principles guiding national courts in relation to EU law . . . . . . . . 123
12.2 Contradictions between parliamentary sovereignty and EU law . . . . . . 123
12.3 Responses of UK courts to the conflict between parliamentary
supremacy and the doctrine of direct effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
12.4 European Union law – the ‘pick and mix’ approach . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
12.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
13 Devolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
13.1 Political geography of the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
13.2 Comparing federalism to devolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
13.3 Development of the United Kingdom into a nation state . . . . . . . . . 129
13.4 The Act of Union with Scotland 1706 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
13.5 The Scottish devolution settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
13.6 The Welsh devolution settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
13.7 Devolution in Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
13.8 The roles of the secretaries of state for Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
13.9 Intergovernmental relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
13.10 The English question – regional government within England? . . . . . . . 133
13.11 Local government functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
13.12 Local government – legislative powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
13.13 A Welsh legal system? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
13.14 Scottish independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
13.15 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
page iv University of London International Programmes
14 Judicial independence and accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
14.1 Judiciary – facts and figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
14.2 Judicial independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
14.3 Judicial accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
14.4 Judicial impartiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
14.5 Appointment of judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
14.6 Judges’ roles in chairing public inquiries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
14.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
15 Principles of judicial review I: illegality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
15.1 Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
15.2 Constitutional background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
15.3 Judicial review in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
15.4 Amenability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
15.5 Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
15.6 Remedies for judicial review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
15.7 Grounds for judicial review – illegality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
15.8 Reform of judicial review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
15.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
16 Principles of judicial review II: procedural fairness . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
16.1 Why is procedural fairness important? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
16.2 Legitimate expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
16.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
17 Principles of judicial review III: irrationality and proportionality . . . 157

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
17.1 Irrationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
17.2 Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
17.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
18 Human rights protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
18.1 International Bill of Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
18.2 The European Convention on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
18.3 Enforcement of human rights in the European Court of Human Rights . . 163
18.4 The Human Rights Act 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
18.5 Case study – prisoners’ voting rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
18.6 Criticism of the Human Rights Act 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
18.7 A British Bill of Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
18.8 Reform of the European Court of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
18.9 Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union . . . . . . . . 167
18.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
19 Human Rights Act 1998 jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
19.1 Duty to take into account decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
19.2 Can the UK courts extend Convention rights? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Public law Contents page v
19.3 The interpretative obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
19.4 Declarations of incompatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
19.5 Enforcement proceedings against ‘public authorities’ . . . . . . . . . . . 172
19.6 Case study – Denbigh High School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
19.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
20 Human Rights Act 1998 and terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
20.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
20.2 Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 . . . . . . . . . 178
20.3 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 . . . . . . . 178
20.4 Control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 . . . . . . . . 179
20.5 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011
– the TPIMs regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
20.6 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
20.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Feedback to activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Using feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Chapter 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Chapter 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Chapter 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Chapter 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Chapter 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Chapter 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Chapter 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Chapter 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Chapter 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Chapter 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Chapter 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Chapter 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Chapter 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
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Notes
Public law Module descriptor page 1
Module descriptor
Public law is one of the seven foundation subjects required for a qualifying law degree
in England and Wales and is a core requirement of the University of London LLB and
CertHE Common Law programmes. This module is concerned with the core features of
the UK constitution and examines the impact of both EU membership and Council of
Europe membership. Emphasis is placed throughout on the changing nature of the UK
constitution – in particular the move from a political to a more legal constitution – as
well as the case for further change.
Module aim
This module introduces students to the role of the main institutional actors (the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary) within the UK constitution and the
processes of constitutional change. Students will be able to analyse key issues
governing the relation between citizens and the state, including sovereignty and the
division of powers between legislature, executive and administration.
Learning outcomes: knowledge

Students are expected to have knowledge and understanding of the main concepts
and principles of Public law. In particular they should be able to:
1. explain the nature and purpose of constitutions including the ways in which
governmental powers are generally allocated amongst the institutions of the state,
and the way in which courts operate to review administrative action and protect
basic rights
2. describe the main institutions and legal characteristics of the EU and analyse the
implications for the UK constitution
3. assess the constitutional implications for the UK of the Human Rights Act 1998 and
the role of the European Court of Human Rights
4. understand the social and political context in which public law is situated
5. evaluate suggestions for constitutional reform in the United Kingdom and the
European Union.
Learning outcomes: skills

Students completing this module should be able to:
6. conduct straightforward legal research, retrieving information from a range of data

sources and including interpretation of textual and numerical data
7. distinguish relevant facts and issues presented in a range of legal material
8. interpret primary and secondary legal sources, including case law and statutes, to
answer questions
9. construct a coherent argument in response to oral or written stimuli.
Assessment
Learning is supported by means of a series of activities in the subject guide. Generic
feedback on each of the activities is provided at the end of the guide. The activities are
designed to test knowledge and understanding and also assist students to develop
skills listed in outcomes 6–8. There are additional online activities in the form of
multiple choice questions. The formative activities also prepare students to achieve
the module learning outcomes tested in the Summative assessment.
Summative assessment is through a three hour unseen examination. Students are

required to answer four essay questions out of eight. Summative assessment will
demonstrate achievement of outcomes 1–5 and 9.
page 2 University of London International Programmes
Permitted materials
Students are permitted to bring into the examination room the following specified
document:
¢¢ Blackstone’s statutes on public law and human rights. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
1 Introducing public law
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 How public law differs from other law subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Content of individual chapters of the subject guide . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Textbooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Journals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 Online study resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6 Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Introduction
Welcome to the Public law subject guide. Public law is a fascinating and challenging
subject area which will give you the chance to engage with fundamental issues
affecting how law works in the context of democratic government in the United
Kingdom. In this chapter we will consider how public law differs from other law
subjects as well as looking briefly at the structure and content of the chapters of the
subject guide.
Finally, we will briefly review study skills for public law and the structure of the
examination.
Essential reading
¢¢ Le Sueur, Sunkin and Murkens, Part 1: Constitutional fundamentals (see Section
1.3 ‘Textbooks’, below).
Public law 1 Introducing public law page 5
1.1 How public law differs from other law subjects

In the course of studying law modules students will normally approach their studies
on the basis of dealing with one topic at a time. After achieving some understanding of
a topic, they will move on to the next one, only returning to it at the revision stage.
When studying public law, however, it is very important to develop as soon as possible
a sense of how the different elements fit together. Topics such as the rule of law and
parliamentary supremacy will be relevant in a variety of different contexts as a wide
range of public law topics are studied.
The political dimension of public law will often be a challenge for students.
International students may feel that they lack an understanding of British politics and
political institutions but this can be remedied by making use of newspaper websites
such as the Guardian, The Times and the Daily Telegraph, as well as the BBC website.
Inevitably, students will find that their studies of public law make them more sceptical
of journalists’ interpretations of the legal implications of politicians’ actions.
1.2 Content of individual chapters of the subject guide

Each chapter will contain an introduction setting the scene. Brief descriptions of the
law will follow, accompanied by a variety of activities. The activities will usually require
you to follow links to a variety of different websites, including:
uu www.parliament.uk
uu www.legislation.gov.uk
uu www.judiciary.gov.uk
uu www.gov.uk/government/organisations/cabinet-office
In addition, reading case reports and other material on LexisLibrary or Westlaw will be
important.
In response to the material on the internet, a variety of questions will be given. Some
of them will be straightforward factual questions where there is only one correct
answer. Other questions will ask you to consider your own personal responses to
the material and the wider issues discussed. At the end of the subject guide, answers
are provided to the activities. In response to some questions, the answer will state
‘Students will form their own views’. The author may also include his own personal
views but the intention is to challenge you to respond ‘But I think…because…’.
Audio presentations are also referred to within the chapters and can be listened to on
the Virtual Learning Environment (VLE), or the scripts can be read instead.
The weblinks provided are subject to change. If a link is no longer working please use
the title or other information given to search for its new address.
1.3 Textbooks
Core textbook
¢¢ Le Sueur, A., M. Sunkin and J.E.K. Murkens Public law: text, cases and materials.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) third edition [ISBN 9780198735380].
Statute book
¢¢ Lee, R.G. (ed.) Blackstone’s statutes on public law and human rights. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press) published annually. Make sure you purchase the latest edition.
Further reading
¢¢ Bogdanor, V. The new British constitution. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009)
[ISBN 9781841136714].
¢¢ Brazier, R. Constitutional reform: reshaping the British political system. (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2008) third edition [ISBN 9780199233045].
¢¢ Jowell, J., D. Oliver and C. O’Cinneide (eds) The changing constitution. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015) eighth edition [ISBN 9780198709824]. This book
contains up-to-date essays on many of the topics covered on this module.
¢¢ King, A. The British constitution. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

[ISBN 9780199576982].
¢¢ Leyland, P. The constitution of the United Kingdom: a contextual analysis. (Oxford:

Hart Publishing, 2016) third edition [ISBN 9781849469074].
¢¢ Syrett, K. The foundations of public law. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

second edition [ISBN 9781137362674].
There are several introductory books, shorter than textbooks, which seek to give an
overview of constitutional law. These include:
¢¢ Loughlin, M. The British constitution: a very short introduction. (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2013) [ISBN 9780199697694].
¢¢ Tomkins, A. Public law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) [ISBN 9780199260775].
¢¢ Barendt, E. An introduction to constitutional law. (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1998) [ISBN 9780198762546] — a clear and succinct account of some of
the principles underlying the UK constitution. It does, however, precede the
substantial constitutional changes that have taken place over the last 12 years
or so.
For an introduction to the history of the UK constitution, try one of these:
¢¢ Lyon, A. Constitutional history of the United Kingdom. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016)

second edition [ISBN 9781138910676].
¢¢ Wicks, E. The evolution of a constitution: eight key moments in British constitutional

history. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) [ISBN 9781841134185].
There are also some references to texts not listed here in the Further reading.
Detailed reading references in this subject guide refer to the editions of the textbooks
listed above. New editions of one or more of these textbooks may have been
published by the time you study this module. You can use a more recent edition of any
of the books; use the detailed chapter and section headings and the index to identify
relevant readings. Also check the VLE regularly for updated guidance on readings.
1.4 Journals
You will often be referred to articles in journals. These are generally available online.
The main UK journal in the field is Public Law, published four times a year since 1956.
This is available electronically via Westlaw. The general UK academic law journals, such
as the Cambridge Law Journal, Law Quarterly Review, Modern Law Review and the Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies, also often have articles of interest. The journal Parliamentary
Affairs is also a useful source for some topics — though not written primarily by or for
lawyers (please note this journal is not available in the Online Library). There is also
a recently launched journal, the International Journal of Constitutional Law, devoted
to international and comparative constitutional law. Here you will find articles and
comments on developments pertaining to many different constitutional systems
including that of the European Union as well as its Member States (which of course
includes the UK). The leading specialist journals pertaining to EU law are the Common
Market Law Review, the European Law Review (not currently available in the Online
Library) and the European Law Journal.
Please note that as long as you read the Essential reading you are then free to read
around the subject area in any text, paper or online resource. You will need to support
Public law 1 Introducing public law page 7
your learning by reading as widely as possible and by thinking about how these
principles apply in the real world. To help you read extensively, you have the VLE,
Online Library and other legal resources.
1.5 Online study resources

In addition to the subject guide and the Essential reading, it is crucial that you take
advantage of the study resources that are available online for this module, including
the VLE and the Online Library.
1.6 Assessment
Important: the information and advice given here are based on the examination
structure for the session 2016/17. We strongly advise you to always check both the
current Regulations for relevant information about the examination, and the VLE. You
should also carefully check the rubric/instructions on the paper you actually sit and
follow those instructions.
The examination usually contains eight questions. Many of these are essay questions,
which require you to show knowledge of the law and a critical approach to the law.
Others are problem questions which require you to apply the law to a given factual
situation.
To cope with problem questions successfully, you must be able to see what issues
arise on the facts and advise on them accurately and succinctly, referring always
to the sources of law upon which you rely for your conclusions. The law may well
be uncertain. If so, you must explain why, and then choose what you believe to be
the decision most likely to be made by the court, giving reasons for your choice. In
general, you must be aware of major proposals for reform of the law. You must also
show a capacity for independent thought. It follows that during your studies you
should:
uu think for yourself about the persuasiveness of the arguments put forward in what
you read
uu ‘read around’ the topic
uu discuss problems with your tutor or lecturer
uu discuss problems with fellow students.

Notes
2 The UK constitution and its core institutions
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Key participants in the UK constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 The ‘Westminster model’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Reforming the Westminster model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Direct democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Introduction
‘What is the constitution?’ A US citizen might answer ‘It’s a document in Washington
DC guaranteeing our liberties.’ The importance of this physical document to the
history and current sense of identity of the USA is set out on the following website:
www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html
Most other nations also have a document labelled ‘the constitution’ which has some
kind of a special status over and above the respect owed to ordinary laws.
A British citizen, on the other hand, will not find it so easy to reply. Although the Magna
Carta of 1215 might be pointed to as one source of British liberties, there is no single
document labelled the ‘British Constitution’.
This does not mean, of course, that functions of a written ‘constitution’ do not need to
have equivalents in a modern Western democracy such as the United Kingdom. In fact,
these functions are described in a variety of sources, including ‘constitutional’ Acts of
Parliament and constitutional ‘conventions’.
In this chapter we will first look at some classifications of different types of

constitution. When reading around this area, it is important to bear in mind that some
of these classifications relate to the form that a constitution takes, rather than to its
content.
We will then start to examine features of the UK constitution, commonly referred to as

‘the Westminster model’ and the key participants.
Essential reading
¢¢ Le Sueur, Sunkin and Murkens, Chapter 1: The constitutional rulebook.
Further reading
¢¢ Bogdanor, V. The new British constitution, Chapter 1: A peculiar constitution.
¢¢ King, A. The British constitution, Chapter 1: What is a constitution?
¢¢ Leyland, P. The constitution of the United Kingdom, Chapter 1: UK constitution.
¢¢ Loughlin, M. The British constitution, Chapter 1: What constitution?
¢¢ Syrett, K. The foundations of public law, Chapter 1: An introduction to the study of

public law.
¢¢ Tomkins, A. Public law, Chapter 1: On constitutions.

Public law 2 The UK constitution and its core institutions page 11
2.1 Classifications
As we examine the traditional ways in which constitutions have been distinguished,
it is very important to remember that there is always a risk of over-simplification if
we do not recognise the complexity of the historically constructed and often untidy
institutions which they describe.
You might find it of interest to browse through a few different constitutions to gain
an overall impression of the similarities and differences. The following weblink to the
‘Constitute project’ provides an easy means to do so: www.constituteproject.org/
2.1.1 Written and unwritten

A written constitution represents an attempt by politicians and statesmen to
codify all the important laws and rules relating to the way in which the state will be
governed. The aspiration is usually to include everything which is important in a single
document. Although, historically, the writers of constitutions have derived ideas from
other constitutions, the French and US constitutions being particularly influential
internationally, there is no universal blueprint for what should be included. Inevitably,
differing decisions will be made by different statesmen as to what is sufficiently
‘constitutional’ to be included.
The lack of a single overarching constitutional document for the United Kingdom
perhaps reflects its unique history in which there was no single moment of national
political consensus when a serious attempt was made to set out all the constitutional
arrangements in a coherent framework. The nearest attempt was made in the
17th century after the civil wars between the Royalists and Parliament. During the
Protectorate when there was no king, Oliver Cromwell drafted his ‘Instrument of
Government’ which set out how England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland were to be ruled.
This document was abandoned and not replaced when King Charles II was ‘restored’ to
the throne after Cromwell’s death.
2.1.2 Rigid and flexible

The importance of the subject matter of a constitution means that most people
will see the value in its stability. Countries where there is constant conflict between
elected politicians and judges amid uncertainty about the rules governing their
relationships are not usually happy ones. Nonetheless, from time to time, political
and social changes may mean that the existing constitutional arrangements have to
change and adapt.
The process of changing the constitution may be very difficult in a rigid constitution,
such as the USA, or relatively straightforward in a flexible constitution such as the
United Kingdom. Consider the method by which the United Kingdom shared its
political sovereignty with other European states when it entered the European
Community (now the European Union) in 1972. A simple Act of Parliament was
passed (i.e. the European Communities Act 1972) and, although a referendum was
subsequently held to endorse the decision, there was no constitutional requirement
to hold one. By way of comparison, when the Irish government wished to change
the (written) Irish constitution to permit divorce in 1995, it was obliged to hold a
referendum. Remember, though, both constitutional changes were politically very
difficult for the Irish and British governments.
2.1.3 Republican and monarchical

The United Kingdom is often described as a constitutional monarchy. Its head of state
is an unelected king or queen who ‘reigns’ over his or her ‘subjects’. Although the
presence of the current monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, is still pervasive on coins, stamps
and letterboxes, the constitutional significance of her status is much diminished. Lord
Bingham has stated:
The political power of the monarch has diminished to vanishing point, since the personal
directions which remain are very limited, must be exercised according to clearly-
understood principles and cannot be regarded as an exercise of independent power in
any ordinary sense.
The formal powers of the monarch, referred to as prerogative powers, are now largely
exercised by the head of the government, the Prime Minister. We will discuss the
significance of the Crown, representing the government, and the prerogative powers
in more detail in Chapter 7.
There are a variety of republican constitutional models. One clear distinction is

between those states that give the elected head of state (usually known as the
president) significant political power, such as France and the USA, and those whose
presidents are meant to represent the nation as a whole and be above the political
fray, for example Germany.
2.1.4 Unitary and federal

The political and governmental arrangements of a nation reflect many factors,
including, of course, its history. The geography of the state is also often significant.
States which have a very large land mass with diffuse centres of population have been
compelled by reasons of practicality to adopt systems of government where many
aspects of decision making are divided among the legislatures of provincial or state
assemblies or parliaments. Governmental functions that are seen as truly national,
including foreign affairs, are exercised by a national legislature. Such systems of
government are known as federal, with Canada and the USA being obvious examples.
Political and constitutional conflict between federal legislatures and provincial or
state governments are very common in many federal countries.
In many (though not all) smaller countries, government from the centre is accepted
more readily, with much weaker local government. Such political systems are referred
to as unitary. Ireland is an example.
The United Kingdom has operated for centuries as a state with many features of a
unitary constitution. The UK Parliament in Westminster, London, has legislated for the
whole of the United Kingdom, although it has always recognised the distinctiveness
of Scotland, in particular, through various conventions. Following the introduction
of devolution, granting political power to elected assemblies in Wales and Northern
Ireland and an elected Scottish Parliament, the unitary aspects of the UK constitutional
model have been diminished. It is now more appropriate to describe it as a
‘multilayered’ form of government.
On 18 September 2014 a referendum was held in Scotland on the question of whether

Scotland should become an independent country. In this referendum the majority
voted against independence. However, had this resulted in a majority vote in favour
of independence, the structure of the UK would have been subject to fundamental
constitutional and structural change.
We will discuss devolution in more detail in Chapter 13.
Further reading on UK constitutional reform:
¢¢ Bogdanor, V., T. Khaitan and S. Vogenauer ‘Should Britain have a written

constitution?’ (2007) 78 The Political Quarterly 499–517.
¢¢ Gordon, R. Repairing British politics: a blueprint for constitutional change. (Oxford:

Hart Publishing, 2010) [ISBN 9781849460491].
2.2 Key participants in the UK constitution

Consider the following diagram:
Supreme Court House of Lords
Cabinet Special Civil

advisors Service
Prime Minister
Court of Appeal
House of Commons
Lower courts
Figure 2.1
The structure of the court system is fairly orthodox when compared to legal systems
in other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court is at the apex of the appeal system and the
progression of a case from the lower courts to the Supreme Court via the Court of
Appeal seems logical and coherent.
When we examine Parliament, however, we have some curious features. The head of
government, the Prime Minister, must (by constitutional convention) be a member of
the ‘lower’ House, the House of Commons. The cabinet is drawn from both the House
of Commons and the House of Lords (i.e. the upper House) and the Prime Minister’s
personal powers are derived largely from the historical prerogative powers given to
the monarch.
Alongside the cabinet and government in the diagram, we can see the civil service.
An important aspect of government is that the ministers who form the government
need help to achieve their objectives. Unlike in some countries, such as the USA, where
there is a convention that senior civil servants are replaced when a new government
is formed, the traditional approach in the United Kingdom has been for senior civil
servants to remain in post. The neutrality of the civil service has been questioned
in recent years in the light of the growing importance of politically partisan ‘special
advisers’ whose roles have sometimes brought them into conflict with professional
civil servants.
2.3 The ‘Westminster model’

There are a number of key features that have been identified in the system of
government of the United Kingdom.
uu The government is largely drawn from the ‘lower’ House of Parliament, the House
of Commons.
uu Parliament is the apex of the system of government and has supreme law-making
power unchecked by a constitutional court.
uu The ministers in the government are effectively held in check by systems of

‘accountability’ which apply not only during elections but in between them as well.
This simple description has, inevitably, been challenged on the grounds that it
describes an ideal that has never existed rather than the more fluid and untidy reality
of government in 21st century Britain. We will now consider some aspects of how the
constitution works in practice and compare them to the ideal.
2.3.1 Relationship between government and Parliament

In theory, the government is held in check by Parliament, in particular, the House of
Commons. There are various aspects by which the degree of control of government
by Parliament and of Parliament by government can be measured. One aspect is
the extent to which Acts of Parliament can be passed without the support of the
government. Parliamentary procedures provide limited opportunities for ‘backbench’
(i.e. non-ministers) MPs and members of the House of Lords to introduce Private
Members’ Bills on topics of their own choosing. In theory, this should be a great
opportunity for law making to be carried out in less fashionable areas of law with
greater consensus between politicians of all parties. Nonetheless, the hard reality is
that very few Private Members’ Bills actually become statutes. In relation to public
bills in the 2013–14 parliamentary session, for example, a mere five Private Members’
Bills completed the parliamentary legislative process, compared to a total of 30 Acts
of Parliament. In the 2014–15 parliamentary session, 10 Private Members’ Bills received
Royal Assent out of a total of 36 public bills which became statutes.
Activity 2.1
Watch the podcast about Private Members’ Bills at:
www.parliament.uk/about/podcasts/theworkofparliament/privatemembersbills/
and answer the following questions.
a. What day of the week are Private Members’ Bills considered by Parliament?
b. How many days are allocated in a parliamentary session to Private Members’ Bills?
c. How many Private Members’ Bills are selected in the ballot?
d. What was the subject matter of Cheryl Gillan’s Bill?
e. How can an opponent of a Private Member’s Bill ‘kill’ it?
f. Is there any method of preventing a Private Member’s Bill being ‘killed’?
g. How did David Mundell make his decision on what he should include in his
Private Member’s Bill?
h. Which government departments did he consult and what was their response?
i. Statistically, what proportion of Private Members’ Bills become law?
j. Do you think that the system of Private Members’ Bills should be improved and,
if so, how?
Activity 2.2
Find the ballot results for Private Members’ Bills for the 2015–16 Parliamentary
session via the Parliament website and answer the following questions:
a. What is the name of the MP who was drawn first in the ballot?
b. Find at least one of the Private Members’ ballot bills which became law in the
previous (i.e. 2014–15) parliamentary session.
Another method by which government departments and ministers can be held in

check by Parliament is the use of departmental select committees. Select committees
are made up of backbench MPs and are headed by a chair who is elected by a secret
ballot of the House of Commons. The importance of the secret ballot lies in the fact
that it prevents the government from using government whips to influence more MPs
to choose chairs who are more malleable.
Activity 2.3
Watch the film ‘Select committees in the House of Commons. Asking the questions
you want answered’, on the Parliament website: www.parliament.uk/about/
podcasts/theworkofparliament/select-committees-in-the-house-of-commons/
Compare this description to the blogpost ‘The House of Commons’ Select
Committees are now more independent of government. But are they any better
informed?’ (Dunleavy, P. and C. Gilson, 15 July 2010): http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/

politicsandpolicy/the-house-of-commons%E2%80%99-select-committees-are-now-
more-independent-of-government-but-are-they-any-better-informed/ and answer
the following questions.
a. What are the factors that influence the topics which select committees
investigate?
b. What reforms have been introduced to deal with the problem of MPs not
attending their select committees?
c. How valid do you think Dunleavy and Gilson’s criticisms of the methods of
information gathering by select committees are?
2.3.2 Lack of constraint by a constitutional court

Although the United Kingdom now has a Supreme Court, it is inaccurate to assume
that it has a similar function to the US Supreme Court which has an overt role as a
guardian of the US constitution. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court (and its predecessor,
the House of Lords) has made a number of important decisions that have caused
considerable frustration to government ministers and, arguably, imposed constraints
on the will of Parliament. The Court of Justice of the European Union has enforced EU
law in the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has made
a number of very controversial decisions concerning the civil liberties of suspected
terrorists. The decision in Hirst v United Kingdom (2005) by the ECtHR that s.3 of the
Representation of the People Act 1973, which imposes a complete ban on voting by
prisoners, breached the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has caused
particular controversy among MPs and government ministers.
2.3.3 Delegated legislation

Delegated legislation, usually in the form of rules, regulations and orders (collectively
described as ‘statutory instruments’), makes up an increasingly large proportion of UK
law. The scale of this law making can be seen at: www.legislation.gov.uk where the ‘UK
Statutory Instruments’ section indicates that 3,486 statutory instruments were created
in 2014. This compares with only 30 Public General Acts in 2014.
Although a large proportion of statutory instruments concern temporary road

traffic closures of minimal public interest to those not stuck in resulting traffic jams,
a significant number deal with important detailed areas of law such as welfare
benefits, environmental regulation, etc. Delegated legislation does not pass through
the parliamentary stages undergone by Acts of Parliament. Instead, most statutory
instruments are created by ministers (and usually drafted by their civil servants) who
have been given this law-making power by Acts of Parliament.
Parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation is, as a result, fairly minimal. Some

statutory instruments must be approved by both Houses under the affirmative
procedure and others may be annulled by a resolution of either House under the
negative procedure, but two-thirds are not examined by MPs or Lords at all. We will
examine UK delegated legislation in more detail in Chapter 9.
2.3.4 Prime ministerial government instead of cabinet government?

The focus of media discussion of politics in the United Kingdom tends to be on
personalities. The greatest attention is often on the Prime Minister and his or her
decisions about how the nation should be governed. Recent Prime Ministers, such as
Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, were such strong personalities that their personal
political power tended to overshadow that of their cabinet colleagues. Nonetheless,
both of them were constrained in important ways by the need to retain support from
the ministers in their cabinets.
Although the Prime Minister, David Cameron, is now leading a (single-party)

Conservative government, between 2010 and 2015 he was Prime Minister of the
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government and thus had to work with

cabinet colleagues who had significantly different politics from him. This meant that
a more consensual and collegiate approach was adopted, in which the Prime Minister
worked closely with the Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg. However,
as the 2015 general election drew closer, it arguably became politically advantageous
for David Cameron to emphasise the areas of policy in which he had different views
from his Liberal Democrat cabinet colleagues.
2.3.5 Membership of the European Union

Since the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (the
predecessor of the European Union) in 1973, there has been a series of treaties which
have contained measures integrating decision making and legislation into European
law. We will discuss EU law and its impact on UK constitutional law in Chapters 11
and 12, but it is worth noting at this stage that the introduction of majority voting by
member states in some areas of policy, rather than a requirement of unanimity, is a
particular challenge to the Westminster model.
2.4 Reforming the Westminster model

Despite the problems with the Westminster model, which we have outlined above,
many MPs, ministers and Lords continue to be intellectually and even emotionally
attached to it. A number of steps have been taken to improve the effectiveness of law
making and debate in and around Parliament. Ministers are increasingly expected to
be accountable for their decisions. Note the following innovations.
uu Debates on topics selected by backbench MPs: Debates may now be heard in

Westminster Hall, a building adjoining the Houses of Parliament, as well as in
Parliament itself. The Backbench Business Committee, which was created in 2010,
has the power to allocate a limited amount of parliamentary time for debates on
topics selected by backbench MPs. Such debates are usually on topical issues and
should reflect a reasonable amount of interest from MPs.
uu Draft Bills: In recent years judges and other commentators have criticised the
quality of the drafting of controversial Acts of Parliament. In order to identify
problems with legislation at an early stage, the government will now publish some
draft Bills to allow more time for comments and improvements. The draft Bills will
be examined by select committees from either the House of Commons or House of
Lords. See www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/draft/
2.5 Direct democracy

Underpinning the idea of direct democracy is the belief that law making will have
greater acceptability from the voters if they have a direct say in what laws will be
made and their content. This is clearly a significant challenge to the Westminster
model which rests on the assumption that law is best made by representatives of the
people, rather than by the people themselves. There are clearly difficulties with this
approach: is it realistic to expect most voters to engage with the complexity of many
legislative issues? Will populist campaign groups distort the debate and drown out
opposing arguments?
Several methods of direct democracy have been used in the United Kingdom.
2.5.1 Referendums
The ideal form of referendum is a straightforward question to which there are two
possible answers – ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Not all referendum questions are as succinct. Consider
the following examples:
‘Do you think the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community?’
uu The answer in 1975 was ‘yes’.
‘I agree/do not agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament’ and ‘I agree/do not
agree that the Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying powers’
uu The answer from Scottish voters in 1997 was agreement to both propositions.
More recently, the response of voters to referendum questions has often been
negative. Note the decisive rejection of the following question in 2011:
uu ‘At present, the UK uses the “first past the post” system to elect MPs to the House of
Commons. Should the “alternative vote” system be used instead?’
The most recent use of a referendum in the UK was not UK-wide (unlike the AV
referendum) but confined to voters in Scotland – on the question of Scottish
independence.
Activity 2.4
Read the House of Lords select committee 12th Report of session 2009–10
‘Referendums in the United Kingdom’ (HL paper 99) at: www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldconst/99/99.pdf and answer the following
questions.
a. Identify three suggested advantages of referendums. Which of your chosen
three advantages do you think is the strongest argument in favour and why?
b. Identify three suggested disadvantages of referendums. Which of your chosen

three disadvantages do you think is the strongest argument against and why?
2.5.2 Other methods of direct democracy

A number of other methods of engaging more directly with voters outside elections
have been used in the United Kingdom.
E-petitions
See www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/
backbench-business-committee/e-petitions-/ for a diagram showing how the House
of Commons Backbench Business Committee deals with e-petitions. Note how there is
a requirement that at least one MP is prepared to support a debate on the topic of an
e-petition.
Activity 2.5
Go to the e-petitions website at: https://petition.parliament.uk/ and identify which
e-petitions are currently trending. Do you think they are raising important and
neglected issues for Parliament to consider?
Social media
Parliament has started to engage with social media such as Twitter, Facebook, etc. See:
www.parliament.uk/get-involved/have-your-say/online-discussion-rules/
2.6 Summary
1. Constitutions can be classified in different ways, including federal or unitary,
republican or monarchical. They may be rigid or flexible.
2. In contrast to most democratic countries, the United Kingdom is often described

as having an unwritten constitution. There is no single document labelled the
‘UK Constitution’, but a better description is that it is uncodified, since most of
the rules and conventions are written down in various Acts of Parliament and
descriptions of conventions.
3. The ‘Westminster model’ of government is still considered by many

parliamentarians (though not by many legal commentators) to represent the
form of government of the United Kingdom. It features government drawn from
the majority party(ies) in the House of Commons and Lords. Parliament is the
unchallenged apex of the system of government, without any limitations imposed
by a constitutional court, and ministers are held accountable to Parliament.
4. The relationship between Parliament and the government can be viewed in various
ways, including the extent to which individual MPs and Lords can create law
through Private Members’ Bills.
5. Select committees have acquired greater powers to question and challenge

government ministers but their effectiveness is still limited.
6. The relationship between the courts and government has been strained in recent
years over various issues, including the effect of decisions of the Court of Justice of
the European Union and the ECtHR. The UK Supreme Court does not, however, fulfil
the functions of a constitutional court.
7. Control by Parliament over delegated legislation (statutory instruments) is very

limited, although the affirmative and negative procedures are sometimes used.
8. The ability of the Prime Minister to impose his or her will on the government varies
depending on the personalities involved and, occasionally, as in 2010–15, in the
light of the constraints of coalition government.
9. Incremental reforms to the Westminster model include providing a mechanism for

backbench MPs to instigate debates. The use of draft Bills enables earlier scrutiny
by MPs and other interested parties.
10. Direct democracy poses challenges to the Westminster model. Referendums, in

particular, detract from the representative approach to law making and may lead
to bad policy making when difficult decisions are considered in isolation.
11. Other methods of direct democracy include e-petitions and social media.
3 Parliamentary supremacy
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 The traditional view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 The enrolled Bill rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 Doctrine of implied repeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 The ‘manner and form’ argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5 Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.6 The Act of Union 1706 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.7 Parliamentary supremacy and the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.8 The Human Rights Act 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Introduction
In this chapter we consider a crucial, if controversial, feature of the UK constitution:
parliamentary supremacy. We will examine the traditional approach, favoured by
legal writers and politicians known as ‘political constitutionalists’, which treats the
political process and Parliament as having supreme power and legitimacy. Ultimately,
according to this view, the courts will follow the expressed will of Parliament
regardless of the content of the statute.
We will then consider the legal writers, including some senior judges, who are
described as ‘legal constitutionalists’. Their approach is to argue that the judiciary
should have and, indeed, does have residual powers to strike out Acts of Parliament
which are contrary to fundamental rights or constitutional principles. Issues which
are relevant to the arguments of the legal constitutionalists include the Parliament
Acts 1911 and 1949, the Act of Union with Scotland, the status of EU law in the United
Kingdom as well as the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).
Essential reading
¢¢ Le Sueur, Sunkin and Murkens, Chapter 2: The legislative supremacy of the UK
parliament.
Further reading
¢¢ Gordon, M. ‘The conceptual foundations of parliamentary sovereignty:
reconsidering Jennings and Wade’ (2009) Public Law 519.
¢¢ Jowell, J. ‘Parliamentary sovereignty under the new constitutional hypothesis’

(2006) Public Law 562.
¢¢ Laws, J. ‘Constitutional guarantees’ (2008) 29 Statute Law Review 1.
¢¢ Loughlin, M. The British constitution, Chapter 2: Writing the constitution.

Public law 3 Parliamentary supremacy page 21
3.1 The traditional view

The legal writer Dicey defined parliamentary supremacy as follows:
Neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the
English constitution, the right to make and unmake any law whatsoever; and, further, that
no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set
aside the legislation of Parliament.
(Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty
Fund, 1982) eighth revised edition [ISBN 9780865970038])
Parliament, as understood by Dicey, meant the House of Commons, the House of Lords
and the Queen collectively. His statement makes two propositions: first, all Acts of
Parliament, whatever their purpose, will be obeyed by the courts; and, secondly, no
person or body can override an Act of Parliament.
The obvious question which follows from Dicey’s assertion is: what is the legal basis of
this power of parliamentary supremacy, given that (as explained in Chapter 2) there is
no single document called ‘The English Constitution’? Wade has argued:
The rule is above and beyond the reach of statute...because it is itself the source of the
authority of statute...The rule of judicial obedience is in one sense a rule of common law,
but in another sense – which applies to no other rule of common law – it is the ultimate
political fact upon which the whole system of legislation hangs. Legislation owes its
authority to the rule: the rule does not owe its authority to legislation.
(Wade, H.W.R. ‘The basis of legal sovereignty’ (1955) 13 CLJ 172)
There are numerous instances of judicial decisions where the courts have affirmed
the supremacy of Acts of Parliament. In Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke (1969), where
the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 was considered following the unilateral declaration
of independence of the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe), the court held that the Act was still valid and Southern Rhodesia remained
a British colony. Lord Reid stated:
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom Parliament to do
certain things, meaning that the moral, political and other reasons against doing them
are so strong that most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament did these
things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the power of Parliament to do such things.
If Parliament chose to do any of them the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament
invalid.
3.2 The enrolled Bill rule

The courts’ reluctance to challenge the validity and authority of an Act of Parliament is
illustrated by their approach to arguments about defects or procedural irregularities
in particular Acts. In Edinburgh and Dalkeith Rly Co v Wauchope (1842), the House of
Lords rejected the argument that an Act was invalid because the claimant had not
been given notice of it in accordance with parliamentary Standing Orders. Lord
Campbell stated, obiter: * Each Act of Parliament is
All that a court of justice can look to is the parliamentary roll;* they see that an Act has printed on a ‘roll’ of vellum
passed both Houses of Parliament, and that it has received the Royal Assent, and no court (calfskin). An interesting
of justice can inquire into the manner in which it was introduced into Parliament, what debate has arisen recently
was done previously to it being introduced, or what passed in Parliament during the with regards the continued
various stages of its progress through both Houses of Parliament. printing of Acts of Parliament
on vellum. You might like
This statement was affirmed by Lord Reid in British Railways Board v Pickin (1974). to read about it here: www.
parliament.uk/business/
committees/committees-
3.3 Doctrine of implied repeal a-z/commons-select/
administration-committee/
As we have seen, one of the key features of the traditional approach to parliamentary news-parliament-2015/
supremacy is the potential for any Act of Parliament to be amended or repealed by a publication-of-first-report/
later Act. Parliamentary draftsmen take great pains to review the context of how a new
Bill is to fit into the framework of existing Acts. Often the Schedules of a Bill will list a
series of specific repeals and amendments of existing Acts.
Sometimes, however, an unanticipated inconsistency between two Acts of Parliament

becomes apparent. The courts are faced with the dilemma of deciding between the
two Acts. Under the doctrine of implied repeal, the later Act is deemed to impliedly
repeal the earlier Act to the extent that the two Acts are incompatible.
Activity 3.1
Find Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health (1934) in LexisLibrary or Westlaw and
answer the following questions.
a. Which two inconsistent Acts were considered in this case?
b. In what way were the two Acts in conflict?
c. State the wording of s.7(1) of the earlier Act.
d. What did Scrutton LJ consider the effect of s.7(1) on the conflicting provisions of
the later Act?
The doctrine of implied repeal was considered more widely in Thoburn v Sunderland
City Council (2002), when it was held that the European Communities Act 1972 could
not be impliedly repealed by the Weights and Measures Act 1985. Laws LJ identified
a class of ‘constitutional statutes’ which define fundamental rights. In his opinion a
constitutional statute:
(e) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and state in some general,
overarching manner, or
(f) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental
constitutional rights.
He listed examples of such Acts, including the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the
Acts of Union, the Reform Acts, the European Communities Act 1972, the Scotland Act
1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the HRA.
He argued that ‘constitutional statutes’ can only be repealed expressly and not
impliedly:
The court would apply this test: is it shown that the legislature’s actual – not imputed,
constructive or presumed – intention was to effect the repeal or abrogation?
Subsequently, he explained the implications in relation to parliamentary supremacy:

It would not mean the loss of sovereignty. It would merely specify the conditions in
which Parliament could change the constitutional law. And the conditions would be just
the same as those which presently apply if Parliament seeks to change constitutional
principles established by the common law.
There are problems with Laws LJ’s arguments, not least because they have not yet
been approved by the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court. There is also the difficulty of
identifying who decides whether a particular statute is a ‘constitutional’ statute – the
courts or Parliament? For further discussion, see Chapter 8.
Activity 3.2
Listen to the audio presentation on the VLE discussing the concept of
entrenchment.
No feedback provided.
3.4 The ‘manner and form’ argument

One of the ways in which the traditional approach to parliamentary supremacy has
been challenged has been the argument that, although Parliament has no limits on
the subject matter on which it legislates, the manner and form in which it legislates
can be limited. Under this argument, special procedures for making legislation, such
as requiring a referendum, can be imposed. If the set procedures are not followed, the
courts could, it is argued, prevent the subsequent Act from passing.
One of the cases which has been used to support this argument is Minister of the
Interior v Harris (1952). This South African case concerned a provision in the UK
Parliament’s South Africa Act 1909 which created the Union of South Africa from
the previous British colony. Under the South Africa Act 1909, an attempt was made
to preserve the existing voting rights of a mixed-race community known as ‘Cape
Coloureds’ by requiring a two-thirds majority of both Houses of the new Union
of South Africa parliament before these rights could be removed. As part of the
introduction of apartheid in 1948, the South African parliament removed the voting
rights under an Act which was passed without the two-thirds majority. The Supreme
Court of South Africa held that the requirements of the South Africa Act 1909 were
entrenched and the 1948 Act was therefore invalid.
Minister of the Interior v Harris (1952) is, of course, a Commonwealth case and not
binding in the United Kingdom. A more fundamental problem with relying on it in the
UK context is that it reflects a relationship between a legislature and a ‘higher’ law, in
this case imposed by the UK Parliament in 1909.
3.5 Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949

In the United Kingdom, there is no written documentary constitution setting out the
procedures for legislating. It is useful, nonetheless, to consider the Parliament Acts 1911
and 1949 under which special procedures can be applied, in specified circumstances
for passing Acts of Parliament without the consent of the House of Lords.
3.5.1 Historical background

The Parliament Act 1911 was passed following a constitutional struggle between the
Liberal government, which controlled the House of Commons, and a Conservative-
dominated House of Lords. When the Liberal government was not able to get its social
welfare legislation approved by the House of Lords, the Prime Minister threatened to
overturn the Conservative majority in the House of Lords by creating large numbers
of Liberal peers. Eventually, the House of Lords approved the Parliament Act 1911. The
Parliament Act 1949 subsequently shortened the required period of delay before the
procedures for obtaining the royal assent without the approval of the House of Lords
could be used.
3.5.2 Key provisions

uu Section 1: This provides that ‘money Bills’ (covering taxation and finance) approved
by the House of Commons must, so long as there is at least one month remaining
before the end of the parliamentary session, be approved without amendment
within one month by the House of Lords.
uu Section 2: A non-money Public Bill can be approved if the following timescale has
been met:
Parliamentary session 1* House of Commons 2nd Reading
House of Commons approval At least one year
House of Lords rejection
Parliamentary session 2* House of Commons approval
House of Lords rejection
Bill is sent for Royal Assent
* A parliamentary session usually lasts for one year starting in the spring.
Figure 3.1
Activity 3.3
Find s.2 of the Parliament Act 1911 (as amended) in LexisLibrary or Westlaw and
answer the following questions.
a. Consider the following fictitious Bill:
The Drainage (Miscellaneous Operations) Bill had its second reading approved
by the House of Commons on 1 July 2012 and was subsequently approved by the
House of Commons and rejected by the House of Lords. The minister proposing
the Bill is aware that there is implacable political hostility to the proposals
in the Bill by the House of Lords and no scope for compromise. She wishes to
reintroduce the unchanged Bill in the next parliamentary session using the
Parliament Acts procedure. What time limit must she ensure is observed?
b. Identify a type of Public Bill (in addition to a money Bill) for which the
Parliament Acts procedures are not available.
An unusual feature of Acts passed under the Parliament Acts procedures is the
‘enacting formula’ at the beginning of the Act which states:
Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent
of the Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, in accordance with the provisions
of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, and by the authority of the same, as follows.
The significance of this formula was considered by R. Ekins in ‘Acts of Parliament and
the Parliament Acts’ (2007) 123 LQR 91:
Parliament intended the 1911 Act to serve as a decision-making procedure, enabling

the Queen, Lords and Commons to legislate even when the Lords disagreed. If the Act
bypassed the Lords altogether, it would be a delegation of authority...Thus the Lords do
participate in legislative acts pursuant to the Parliament Acts. The authority they share is
exercised to enact legislation and the Lords should understand the resulting Act to be in
some sense their Act, in the same way that the minority in the House understands the vote
of the majority to settle how the House acts.
Besides the Parliament Act 1949, only a few Acts have been passed under the
Parliament Acts procedure. This reflects the normal deference of the House of Lords to
the democratic will of the people as expressed in the voting of the House of Commons,
as well as the willingness of both Houses to compromise. Acts which were passed
under these procedures include the Government of Ireland Act 1914, the War Crimes
Act 1991 and the Hunting Act 2004.
In Jackson v A-G (2005) the opponents of the Hunting Act 2004, which banned the
hunting of wild animals with dogs, argued that the Parliament Act 1949 was invalid
because, as delegated legislation, it was outside the powers of the Parliament Act 1911.
The House of Lords held that the Parliament Act 1949 was valid primary legislation
(see Ekins above) and was valid along with the Hunting Act 2004. The fact that only
two of the three constituent elements of Parliament had approved it did not make it
delegated legislation.
Activity 3.4
Look at the UK Parliament website to find out how many Acts have been passed
using the Parliament Acts procedure.
3.6 The Act of Union 1706

This Act provided for the union of Scotland and England ‘for ever after’. It contained
a number of provisions which were intended to be entrenched and bind the future
United Kingdom Parliament. Although there have subsequently been changes in
legislation affecting the Act of Union, some Scots lawyers have argued that restraints
have been recognised and complied with in practice.
In MacCormick v Lord Advocate (1953), objections were raised as to the designation of

the new Queen Elizabeth as ‘Queen Elizabeth the Second’ when Queen Elizabeth I had
only been queen of England and not Scotland (for a historical time line of the English
and Scottish monarchs, see: www.britroyals.com/rulers.htm). The claim failed but in
obiter comments Lord Cooper stated:
[t]he principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English principle
which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law.
The force of this statement has been undermined by the fact that no Scottish court
has held an Act of Parliament to be invalid on the basis of inconsistency with the Act of
Union.
3.7 Parliamentary supremacy and the European Union

We will examine the relationship between EU law and UK law in more detail in
Chapter 12. At this stage it is important to note the provisions of s.2 of the European
Communities Act 1972:
(1) All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time
created or arising by or under the Treaties...are without further enactment to be given
legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law...
(4) any enactment passed or to be passed, other than one contained in this part of this
Act, shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this
section…
Lord Hope in Jackson v A-G (2005) has argued that the net effect of these two
subsections:
[c]oncedes the last word in this matter to the courts. The doctrine of the supremacy of
Community law restricts the absolute authority of Parliament to legislate as it wants in
this area.
We should note, however, that Sir John Laws has interpreted s.2(4) more narrowly as
simply providing a rule of construction for later statutes.
Section 18 of the European Union Act 2011 attempts to clarify the status of the
European Communities Act 1972:
Directly applicable or directly effective EU law (that is, the rights, powers, liabilities,
obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures referred to in section 2(1) of the
European Communities Act 1972) falls to be recognised and available in law in the United
Kingdom only by virtue of that Act or where it is required to be recognised and available
in law by virtue of any other Act.
3.8 The Human Rights Act 1998

The HRA was passed under the normal procedures of Parliament for Public General
Acts. The broad effect of the Act was to enable UK courts to enforce rights created
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to which the United
Kingdom was a party in 1951. Until the HRA came into force, the rights of UK citizens
under the Convention could only be enforced by going to the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR).
We will review the HRA in more detail in Chapters 18–20, but it is important, in the
context of parliamentary supremacy, to be aware of the following key features.
1. A new interpretive duty is applied to all primary and secondary legislation.
2. So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must

be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with Convention rights: s.3(1).
3. Where it is not possible to read and give effect to subordinate legislation in a way
that is compatible with Convention rights, such legislation may be quashed except
where the parent Act prevents the removal of the incompatibility: s.3(2).
4. Where it is not possible to read and give effect to primary legislation (this includes
Acts but is not limited to them) in a way that is compatible with Convention rights,
the legislation remains in force but the High Court or appeal courts may make a
‘declaration of incompatibility’. The government can then use ‘fast-track’ measures
in Parliament to remove the incompatibility: s.10.
5. All public authorities, including courts and tribunals, must, when exercising public
functions, comply with Convention rights unless authorised otherwise by primary
legislation: s.6(1).
6. All courts and tribunals must comply with case law from the ECtHR.
7. Ministers promoting Public Bills must issue a statement to Parliament stating that
the Bill is compatible with the Convention or that it is not and the government still
wishes to proceed.
It is noticeable that the HRA does not distinguish between existing and former Acts.
The declaration of incompatibility is particularly significant in respect of parliamentary

supremacy. Although the form of parliamentary supremacy is preserved, since the
primary legislation remains valid, the ruling of the court has the practical effect that
others affected by it, if it remains unchanged, will take their claims to the ECtHR in
Strasbourg. Effectively, the courts may not have the power to strike down an Act of
Parliament, but will deliver a fatal wound to it, even if Parliament and not the courts
must switch off its life support.
3.9 Summary
1. The basic principle underlying the traditional view of parliamentary supremacy
as set out by Dicey is that Parliament has ‘the right to make and unmake any
law whatsoever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of
England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.’
2. The courts have been unwilling to challenge the validity of an Act of Parliament
by reference to arguments over procedural irregularities. This is known as the
‘enrolled Bill rule’ and is illustrated by Edinburgh and Dalkeith Rly Co v Wauchope
(1842) and British Railways Board v Pickin (1974).
3. The doctrine of implied repeal deals with the difficulties caused when a later Act
conflicts with an earlier but does not expressly repeal it. Under the traditional
approach, exemplified in Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health (1934), the later
Act is deemed to impliedly repeal the earlier Act in respect of the incompatibility.
In Thoburn v Sunderland City Council (2002) Laws LJ identified a new approach which
was to be applied to ‘constitutional statutes’. Under this approach constitutional

statutes could only be repealed expressly.
4. Under the ‘manner and form’ argument, while Parliament has no limits on the
subject matter on which it can legislate, the manner and form in which it legislates
can be limited. Special procedures, such as a requirement to hold a referendum,
can be laid down and enforced by the courts if they are not followed. Several
Commonwealth cases such as Minister of the Interior v Harris (1952) have been used
to justify this argument.
5. The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 set out procedures under which the House of
Lords is unable to prevent the passage of ‘money Bills’ and Bills which have been
approved by the House of Commons in two successive sessions. In Jackson v A-G
(2005), the validity of the Parliament Act 1949 and subsequent Acts passed under
the procedure as primary legislation was affirmed.
6. Some Scots lawyers have argued, following MacCormick v Lord Advocate (1953) that
the principle of parliamentary supremacy does not apply in Scots constitutional
law.
7. European Union Treaties and legislation under s.2 of the European Communities
Act 1972 are recognised under UK law and all Acts are to be construed accordingly.
In Jackson v A-G (2005), Lord Hope stated that the doctrine of the supremacy of
Community law restricts Parliament’s power to legislate.
8. The HRA enabled UK courts to enforce the ECHR. All primary and secondary
legislation must be interpreted in accordance with Convention rights. Subordinate
legislation may be quashed, if it is incompatible. Where an Act is held to be
incompatible, the court will issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ whose practical,
though not legal, effect will usually be for the government to amend the legislation
as soon as practical.
Notes
4 The rule of law
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 Bingham’s eight ‘sub-rules’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2 ‘Content-free’ and ‘content-rich’ interpretations of the rule of law . . . . 32
4.3 Dicey’s description of the rule of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4 Protection of the rule of law by the courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.5 Protection of the rule of law by Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.6 Protection of the rule of law by the Lord Chancellor . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Introduction
Section 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 states:
This Act does not adversely affect –
(a) the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law, or
(b) the Lord Chancellor’s existing constitutional role in relation to that principle.
This short section, which was the subject of learned debate in Parliament, leaves
the reader little the wiser as to the question – what is the rule of law? Clearly, it is a
principle which pre-dates the 2005 Act and was seen as sufficiently important for
the Lord Chancellor’s role in relation to it to be preserved. In fact, the absence of
any attempt in the Act to define the rule of law reflects the uncertainty which exists
around this rather nebulous concept.
In this chapter, we will look first at Lord Bingham’s eight sub-rules and then consider
briefly the distinction between ‘content free’ and ‘content rich’ interpretations of
the rule of law. Dicey’s influential, if flawed, description of the rule of law will then be
reviewed, together with criticisms of his approach.
Finally, we will discuss the practical ways in which the rule of law is protected in the
United Kingdom: through the courts, Parliament and the office of Lord Chancellor.
Essential reading
¢¢ Le Sueur, Sunkin and Murkens, Chapter 3: The rule of law.
Further reading
¢¢ Bingham, T. ‘The rule of law’ (2007) CLJ 67.
¢¢ Bingham, T. The rule of law. (London: Penguin, 2010) reprint edition

[ISBN 9780141034539].
¢¢ Craig, P. ‘Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical

framework’ (1997) Public Law 467–87.
¢¢ Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution. (Indianapolis,
IN: Liberty Fund, 1982) eighth revised edition [ISBN 9780865970038], Part II,
Chapter IV.
¢¢ Jowell, J. ‘The rule of law’, in J. Jowell, D. Oliver and C. O’Cinneide (eds) The
changing constitution.
Public law 4 The rule of law page 31
4.1 Bingham’s eight ‘sub-rules’

Lord Bingham grappled with the challenge of defining the rule of law by breaking it
up into eight ‘sub-rules’. His discussion of these sub-rules has been one of the most
influential modern discussions of the rule of law. The sub-rules are as follows.
1. The law must be accessible and, so far as possible, intelligible, clear and
predictable.
2. Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of

the law and not the exercise of discretion.
3. The laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective
differences require differentiation.
4. Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on
them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred,
without exceeding the limits of such powers and not unreasonably.
5. The law must afford adequate protection of fundamental rights.
6. Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or undue delay,
bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve.
7. Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair.
8. The rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in
international law as in national law.
Activity 4.1
On a preliminary reading of Bingham’s eight sub-rules, which, if any, do you think
might be viewed as somewhat controversial and why?
We will now consider a number of issues arising from these sub-rules in the light of the
UK constitution.
4.1.1 Accessibility, clarity and predictability

Why are these requirements important? Bingham gives three reasons: first, so that
we know what we might face a criminal penalty for; second, so we can claim our
rights and understand our obligations; third, because successful conduct of trade and
† A recent example of an
commerce depends on accessible rules.
attempt at consolidation
In recent years, considerable efforts have been made to enable British citizens to can be found in a current
have access to the ‘raw’ law through government websites such as www.legislation. Law Commission project
gov.uk as well as government department websites and the www.gov.uk portal. This which commenced with a
represents a significant advance in the accessibility of the law for those members of consultation in December
the public with access to the internet. Groups with little access to the internet lose out 2014 which proposed reform
based on the following
by comparison.
principles:
Clarity is always a difficult challenge for parliamentary draftsmen of statutes and • the laws governing
statutory instruments. Particular difficulties are generated when areas of law are elections should be
very controversial politically and subject to frequent legislative change. Criminal rationalised into a single,
justice has become more confusing in recent years, with Criminal Justice Acts every consistent legislative
year and changes introduced before the innovations in the previous Act have been framework governing all
implemented. Other areas of law have benefited from considered ‘consolidating’ Acts†, elections, and
often drafted or influenced by the Law Commission. In relation to the development of • electoral laws should be
case law, Bingham has highlighted the difficulties of interpretation caused for lawyers consistent across all types
and their clients in subsequent cases when the Court of Appeal judges or Supreme of election.
Court justices give separate individual judgments, rather than agreeing to a single See: www.lawcom.gov.
‘leading’ judgment. Lord Donaldson in Merkur Island Shipping Corpn v Laughton (1983) uk/project/electoral-
law/#electoral-law-
stated:
consultation-related-
Absence of clarity is destructive of the rule of law; it is unfair to those who wish to preserve
documents
the rule of law; it encourages those who wish to undermine it.
([1983] 1 All ER 334, p.351)
Predictability is a very important aspect of the rule of law. In dictatorships, citizens are
often left uncertain as to whether or not a particular action will be subject to criminal
punishment – the power of the state is enhanced by the unpredictability. Particular
difficulties arise when laws are made to apply retrospectively (to actions which have
already happened). This happened when the War Damage Act 1965 abolished the
right to compensation for damage done during war ‘before or after the passing of
this Act’. Following Article 7 of the ECHR, the courts will interpret legislation under a
presumption that it does not have retrospective effect.
4.1.2 Application of the law equally to all, subject to objective

distinctions
In the criminal law children and those without mental capacity are treated differently
in terms of procedures for investigation and trial as well as in sentencing. Children
under 10 are treated as doli incapax – legally incapable of committing a crime.
4.1.3 Ministers and public officials should act in good faith, fairly, within
their powers and not unreasonably
This is the core of administrative law, which is discussed in detail in Chapters 15–17. The
remedy of judicial review is available to challenge the actions of ministers (including
their role in creating secondary legislation) and other public bodies where they have
acted outside the powers which were given to them (usually by an Act of Parliament),
or acted unfairly or unreasonably. Decision making can be challenged if there is bias or
individuals are not given the right to a fair hearing.
4.1.4 Protection of human rights

The incorporation of the ECHR into UK law by the HRA has had major implications
for the protection of individual rights. We will examine this area in more detail in
Chapters 18–20.
4.1.5 Access to civil justice without excessive cost or delay

Although alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is increasingly popular and encouraged
by government, handling civil court cases is still a core function of the legal system.
In R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham (1998) an applicant in receipt of state benefits
successfully challenged, by way of judicial review, an order made by the Lord
Chancellor increasing the costs of writs (claim forms). Laws J stated:
Access to the courts is a constitutional right; it can only be denied by the government if it
persuades Parliament to pass legislation which specifically – in effect by express provision
– permits the executive to turn people away from the court door. That has not been done
in this case.
([1998] QB 575, p.586)
The costs of civil litigation are always controversial and the labour-intensive nature of
the adversarial court system has led to rapidly increasing civil legal aid costs. The Legal
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 has introduced ‘damages-based
agreements’, enabling claimants’ lawyers to be paid on the basis of a percentage share of
the damages and has weakened still further the availability of legal aid. The introduction
of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) has not led to the savings in costs that were originally
hoped for, although judicial case management under the CPR has reduced delays.
4.2 ‘Content-free’ and ‘content-rich’ interpretations of the rule

of law
The content-free interpretation of the rule of law focuses on the form of the law
and the procedures by which law is made. The legal writer Raz identified eight basic
principles which reflect this approach.
1. All law should be prospective, open and clear.
2. Laws should be relatively stable.
3. The making of laws should be guided by clear rules.
4. The judiciary should be independent.
5. The principles of natural justice should be observed (see the discussion of

administrative law at Section 4.1.3).
6. The courts should be able to review the implementation of other principles.
7. The courts should be easily accessible.
8. The discretion of the police and crime fighting agencies should not pervert the law.
Clearly most people would value these principles and accept that their absence would
damage confidence in the state. Are they enough for a good society? Supporters of the
‘content-free’ interpretation do not deny that the principles should be supplemented
by other values such as rights, justice and democracy but argue that these values
should not be attached to the concept of the rule of law:
The message is therefore that if you wish to argue about the justness of society do so by
all means. If you wish to defend a particular type of individual right then present your
argument...It is however on this view not necessary or desirable to cloak the conclusion
in the mantle of the rule of law, since this will merely reflect the conclusion which has
already been arrived at through reliance on a particular theory of rights or the just society.
(Craig, P. Sixth Report from the House of Commons Select Committee on the Constitution,
HL 151 of 2006–07)
The ‘content-rich’ interpretation is a more complex and, perhaps, idealistic view of the
rule of law. Ronald Dworkin summarised it as:
I shall call the second conception of the rule of law the ‘rights’ conception...It assumes
that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights
against the state as a whole. It insists that these moral and political rights be recognised in
positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens through
the courts and other judicial institutions of the familiar types, so far as this is practicable.
(A matter of principle. (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) [ISBN 9780674554610])
Activity 4.2
Match, so far as you can, Raz’s eight principles to Bingham’s sub-rules in the table
below:
In the light of this comparison, do you think that Bingham’s eight sub-rules are
‘content-rich’ or ‘content-free’ interpretations of the rule of law?
4.3 Dicey’s description of the rule of law

Traditionally, public law textbooks have started their chapters on the rule of law
with Dicey’s fairly succinct three-point description. The danger of this approach is
that students may fail to appreciate how much Dicey’s summary in Introduction to
the study of the law of the constitution reflects the political and legal reality of the late
19th century, rather than that of the United Kingdom of the 21st century. Nonetheless,
the description continues to influence constitutional writers and it is important to
understand the three elements as well as the criticisms of them. He described the rule
of law as follows.
No man is punishable or can be made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach
of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land.
Effectively, ‘regular’ law was to be applied and not the use of arbitrary or discretionary
powers.
No man is above the law...every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the
ordinary law of the realm…every official, from the Prime Minister down…is under the
same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen…
The general principles of the constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or
the right of public meeting) are...the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of
private persons.
In short, he was arguing that the constitution was ‘judge-made’.
4.3.1 Criticisms of Dicey

Sir Ivor Jennings, in The law and the constitution (London: University of London Press,
1933) has criticised Dicey’s assumption that the rule of law was inconsistent with
the use of discretionary powers by the executive. We will see in Chapter 9 how
the complexities of governing a technically sophisticated country, as well as other
constraints such as limited parliamentary time, have led to a great increase in the
use of delegated or secondary legislation, in the form of rules and regulations. The
importance of this legal framework in setting the ground rules for business and
industry, as well as fulfilling other social purposes, such as the protection of the
environment, must be understood.
Jennings also argued strongly that Dicey’s second point ignored the particular
responsibilities public officials held by virtue of their roles. In addition, he ignored the
special immunities certain categories of individuals have, for example children and
foreign diplomats with diplomatic immunity.
Finally, Dicey’s third point completely ignored the role of statute in the constitution.
Even in respect of the examples he gives – personal liberty and the right of public
meeting – there are many statutes giving vital protections and imposing significant
constraints. These include, of course, the HRA.
4.4 Protection of the rule of law by the courts

Before we examine some individual examples of how the courts have dealt with
arguments relating to the rule of law, it is worth recalling some of the basic constraints
under which the system of judge-made law (i.e. the ‘common law’) operate. These
constraints include the fact that the courts are unable to protect rights that have been
recognised previously as important to the rule of law if they are expressly abolished
by an Act of Parliament. An example is the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity)
Act 2008 which removed the common law right of a criminal defendant to know
who was bearing witness against them by replacing it with a regime in which witness
anonymity orders could be used in limited circumstances. The nature of case law is, in
a sense, always erratic and focused on responding to claims by particular individuals
for protection in their particular circumstances. Individual judges in different cases
may show undue deference to government or be unwilling to challenge political and

public pressure. J.A.G. Griffith (The politics of the judiciary) has argued that judges, by
virtue of their background are:
Necessarily conservative, not liberal and show tenderness towards private property and
dislike of trade unions, strong adherence to the maintenance of order, distaste for minority
opinions, demonstrations and protests and support for government secrecy.
Griffith was writing in 1977, in an era when conflict between trade unions, employers
and the government was widespread in the streets and in the courts. It is arguable
therefore that this sweeping criticism does not reflect the subsequent willingness of
at least some judges, regardless of their personal backgrounds, to risk political and
popular disapproval by protecting liberties in the name of the rule of law.
One of the earliest cases where the courts demonstrated a willingness to challenge the
power of government in this area was Entick v Carrington (1765). A ‘King’s Messenger’
(a government investigating officer) attempted to seize a suspect for seditious libel
under a warrant which gave him sweeping powers to seize papers and books. Lord
Camden highlighted the fact that these powers were not justified by any statute or
common law power.
Dicey’s second proposition, focusing on the personal responsibilities of public officials

was illustrated in M v Home Office (1994), where an asylum seeker was deported by
the Home Secretary before his application for judicial review had been completed.
Although the applicant was beyond the jurisdiction by this stage, the House of Lords
held that the Home Secretary, in his official capacity, had been guilty of contempt of
court for failing to comply with an order to return the applicant while he was still en
route. Lord Woolf stated that:
The object of the exercise is not so much to punish an individual as to vindicate the rule of
law by a finding of contempt.
Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the USA, one of the main areas
of conflict between the courts and government has been over a relentless tide of
legislation aimed at increasing the powers of the police and state with a view to
minimising the risks of terrorism. In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(2005), the powers of the state to detain non-UK nationals without trial under the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 were considered. This concerned individuals
who were considered to be a security threat in the United Kingdom, but could not
be deported to their home countries because of the risk that they would face torture
there. The 2001 Act was challenged under the HRA on the grounds of discrimination
under Article 14 of the ECHR, because it only applied to non-UK nationals. The House
of Lords accepted (by 8:1 – Lord Hoffmann dissenting) the right of the government
to conclude that the public emergency justified the detention, but ruled that it was
applied in a discriminatory manner.
The government responded by introducing a ‘control order’ regime under the

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which applied to UK nationals as well as non-UK
nationals. This regime has now been replaced by the Terrorism Prevention and
Investigation Measures Act 2011 which has replaced control orders with ‘terrorism
prevention and investigation measures’ (TPIMs) which are more limited in scope and,
in particular, have a two-year time limit.
Activity 4.3
Find in Westlaw or LexisLibrary R (on the application of Corner House Research) v
Director of the Serious Fraud Office (2008) and answer the following questions.
a. What reason did the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) give in his press
release for his decision to drop the investigation into alleged bribery?
b. Which two reasons did he state did not lead to the decision?
c. In Lord Bingham’s summary of the decision of the Divisional Court, why was the
alleged threat by Prince Bandar significant?
d. Why did Lord Bingham describe the Director as ‘courageous’ for not using the
reason of ‘evidential weakness’ for his decision?
e. The Director of the SFO did not consider whether a decision to drop the
prosecution would affect national security if other countries learned that the
United Kingdom had given in to the threat. Why did Lord Bingham not consider
this important?
f. Do you think that the decision of the House of Lords strengthened or

undermined the rule of law?
4.5 Protection of the rule of law by Parliament

It is important to view the role of Parliament in protecting the rule of law in the light of
our discussion of parliamentary supremacy in Chapter 3. The doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty gives Parliament the ultimate decision over whether or not an Act of
Parliament that conflicts with the rule of law should be passed. The courts have
only limited powers of constraint. The consequences of a clash between these two
principles were discussed obiter in Jackson v A-G (2005) by Lord Steyn:
In exceptional circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the

authority of the courts, [the courts] may have to consider whether this is a constitutional
fundamental which even a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.
Lord Hope, in the same case, stated:

It is no longer right to say that [Parliament’s] freedom to legislate admits of no
qualification...the rule of law enforced by the courts is the controlling principle upon
which our constitution is based.
The extreme circumstances suggested by Lord Steyn have not yet arisen and it is
difficult to envisage a government that would be able to win support in the House of
Commons and House of Lords for any attempt to abolish judicial review.
4.6 Protection of the rule of law by the Lord Chancellor

We saw at Section 4.1 that s.1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 explicitly
preserved the existing constitutional role of the Lord Chancellor. Unhelpfully, the Act
failed to spell out what that role was, although this omission perhaps reflected the
difficulty of defining it. During the debate on the Act, Lord Falconer commented:
We all agreed that we do not want to change the Lord Chancellor’s existing role in
relation to the rule of law. That role goes further than simply respecting the rule of law in
discharging his ministerial functions. It includes being obliged to speak up in Cabinet or as
a Cabinet Minister against proposals that he believes offend the rule of law. That role does
not require him proactively to police every act of government. The role is not one that is
enforceable in the courts. (Hansard, HL, Vol 667, col 1538 (20 December 2004))
Lord Bingham has argued instead that the Lord Chancellor’s role in protecting the rule
of law would no doubt be susceptible, in principle, to judicial review.
Given that meetings of the cabinet are held in private, the exact role in decision
making of individual Lord Chancellors has been hard to determine and, as a result, the
courts have had no opportunity to consider it.
Activity 4.4
Find s.2 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and list the factors that the Prime
Minister may take into account when appointing a Lord Chancellor.
Activity 4.5
If it were up to you to decide, would you view a legal background as an advantage
or disadvantage for a prospective Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State for Justice?
Explain your answer.
4.7 Summary
1. Lord Bingham described the rule of law by reference to eight ‘sub-rules’.
a. The law must be accessible, clear and predictable.
b. Questions of legal right and liability should normally be dealt with under the
law and not by discretion.
c. The laws of the land should apply equally to all, unless there are objective
differences.
d. Ministers and public officers must act in good faith, fairly, for the purpose
for which the powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such
powers and not unreasonably.
e. The law must protect human rights.
f. Genuine civil disputes must be resolved without undue cost or delay.
g. Adjudicative procedures should be fair.
h. International law must be complied with.
2. Accessibility is enhanced by greater public access to ‘raw’ law through websites

such as www.legislation.gov.uk Clarity of statute making is variable, with political
influence sometimes leading to hasty legislation. Predictability is enhanced by the
principle that legislation should not have a retrospective effect.
3. Objective distinctions, which justify the application of law being applied differently,
include the test for criminal responsibility for children and the treatment of
mentally disabled people under the law.
4. The remedy of judicial review is available where ministers fail to act in good faith,
fairly, within their powers or reasonably.
5. The HRA is a key tool for protecting human rights.
6. The Civil Procedure Rules have limited the problem of delay in the civil justice
system, but the withdrawal of civil legal aid is increasing the costs for ordinary
litigants.
7. The ‘content-free’ interpretation of the rule of law, described by Raz, emphasises

the importance of the form of law and its procedures. The ‘content-rich’
interpretation, favoured by Dworkin, attributes morals and values to the rule of
law. Lord Bingham’s eight sub-rules fit best into the ‘content-rich’ interpretation,
although they illustrate the fact that there is overlap between both interpretations.
8. Dicey’s three-part definition of the rule of law has been very influential, although it
is now challenged on a number of grounds. It is as follows:
a. No one is to be punished or suffer loss except for a distinct breach of law

established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land.
Arbitrary or discretionary powers are to be excluded.
b. No one is above the law. Everyone is subject to the ordinary law of the realm.
Every official, from the Prime Minister down, is under the same responsibility
for every act done without legal justification, as for any other citizen.
c. The general principles of the constitution are the result of judicial decisions
determining the rights of private persons.
9. Critics of Dicey, such as Jennings, have pointed to the widespread use of

discretionary powers in the modern UK constitution through which vital and
complex secondary legislation is passed. In addition, the fact that public officials
are subject to particular legal constraints due to their office has been highlighted.
Finally, the importance of statute (e.g. the HRA) in protecting the rights of
individuals is completely ignored in Dicey’s summary.
10. Protection of the rule of law by the courts has been erratic since, by its nature,
issues are only dealt with when an individual chooses to take them to court.
The social background of the judges has been felt by some critics (e.g. Griffith)
to encourage an excessively conservative and cautious approach. Cases such
as Entick v Carrington (1765) and M v Home Office (1994) have demonstrated the
courts’ willingness, in some circumstances, to challenge the power of government
in order to protect personal liberties. The clash between the protection of civil
liberties and the determination of the government to impose greater restrictions
in the name of preventing terrorism has led to many cases. In A v Secretary of State
for the Home Department (2005), the House of Lords accepted the use of control
orders but required discrimination against non-UK nationals suspected of offences
to be removed. Control orders have since been replaced by terrorism prevention
and investigation measures with a more limited scope. In R (on the application of
Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office (2008), the House of
Lords refused to grant judicial review where the DPP dropped a prosecution of
an arms company for corruption solely on the grounds that national security was
threatened.
11. Protection of the rule of law by Parliament must be considered in the light of the
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. In Jackson v A-G (2005), Lords Steyn and Hope
speculated obiter about potential (extreme) circumstances where the rule of law
would be seen by the courts as justified in striking down Acts of Parliament that
removed fundamental rights.
12. The role of the Lord Chancellor in protecting the rule of law was explicitly
preserved in s.1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Although not defined in
the 2005 Act, the role has been described as to speak up in cabinet and Parliament
against proposals that might damage the rule of law. The first non-lawyer Lord
Chancellor in recent times, Chris Grayling, was appointed in 2012. The current Lord
Chancellor, the Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, continues this as the second non-lawyer
to hold the position.

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Public law

uu Edward G. Stone, MA (Oxon), Solicitor (non-practising), Editorial Manager, CILEx Law

The 2015 and 2016 updates were prepared by:

uu Eloise E.C. Ellis, Lecturer in Law, University of East Anglia.

University of London International Programmes

Published by: University of London

1 Introducing public law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 The UK constitution and its core institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4 The rule of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

5 Limited government and the separation of powers . . . . . . . . . . . 39

7 Crown and prerogative powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

10 Constitutional conventions: case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

11 EU legal and governmental order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

12 EU law and UK constitutional law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

14 Judicial independence and accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

15 Principles of judicial review I: illegality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

16 Principles of judicial review II: procedural fairness . . . . . . . . . . . 153

17 Principles of judicial review III: irrationality and proportionality . . . 157

18 Human rights protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

19 Human Rights Act 1998 jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

20 Human Rights Act 1998 and terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Feedback to activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Learning outcomes: knowledge

Learning outcomes: skills

6. conduct straightforward legal research, retrieving information from a range of data

7. distinguish relevant facts and issues presented in a range of legal material

9. construct a coherent argument in response to oral or written stimuli.

Summative assessment is through a three hour unseen examination. Students are

1.1 How public law differs from other law subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.2 Content of individual chapters of the subject guide . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.5 Online study resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1.1 How public law differs from other law subjects

1.2 Content of individual chapters of the subject guide

¢¢ Brazier, R. Constitutional reform: reshaping the British political system. (Oxford:

¢¢ King, A. The British constitution. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

¢¢ Leyland, P. The constitution of the United Kingdom: a contextual analysis. (Oxford:

¢¢ Syrett, K. The foundations of public law. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

¢¢ Loughlin, M. The British constitution: a very short introduction. (Oxford: Oxford

¢¢ Tomkins, A. Public law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) [ISBN 9780199260775].

¢¢ Barendt, E. An introduction to constitutional law. (Oxford: Oxford University

For an introduction to the history of the UK constitution, try one of these:

¢¢ Lyon, A. Constitutional history of the United Kingdom. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016)

¢¢ Wicks, E. The evolution of a constitution: eight key moments in British constitutional

1.5 Online study resources

uu ‘read around’ the topic

uu discuss problems with your tutor or lecturer

uu discuss problems with fellow students.

2.2 Key participants in the UK constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.3 The ‘Westminster model’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.4 Reforming the Westminster model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2.5 Direct democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

In this chapter we will first look at some classifications of different types of

We will then start to examine features of the UK constitution, commonly referred to as

¢¢ King, A. The British constitution, Chapter 1: What is a constitution?

¢¢ Leyland, P. The constitution of the United Kingdom, Chapter 1: UK constitution.

¢¢ Loughlin, M. The British constitution, Chapter 1: What constitution?

¢¢ Syrett, K. The foundations of public law, Chapter 1: An introduction to the study of

¢¢ Tomkins, A. Public law, Chapter 1: On constitutions.

2.1.1 Written and unwritten

2.1.2 Rigid and flexible