Debt Capital in Indian Corporate Sector: A

Study with Reference to Selected Public

Limited Companies

By

Raveesh Krishnankutty
08AT0229009

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfilment

of the requirements for the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY

in

The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India University

Kamalghat, Sadar, West Tripura
2014
Dedicated to all my Beloved Teachers
 Debt Capital in Indian Corporate Sector: A
Study with Reference to Selected Public
Limited Companies
By

Raveesh Krishnankutty
08AT0229009

THES IS
Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY
in
The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India University, Tripura

Approved by:

____________________ _______________________
Dr. K.S.Chakraborty
(External Examiner) (Supervisor & Chairperson DAC)

Members of Doctoral Advisory Committee (DAC)

1. Dr. Haradhan Debnath ____________________________

2. Dr. Shruti Nagar ___________________________

 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Thesis titled “Debt Capital in Indian Corporate
Sector: A Study with Reference to Selected Public Limited Companies”
submitted b y Raveesh Krishnankutty IDNo. 08AT02290009 for the award of
the Ph.D Degree of the ICFAI University embodies original work done b y
him/her under m y supervision.

___________________________
Date: Signature of the Supervisor in full

Name in Capital Letters: Dr. K. S. CHAKRABORTY

Designation & Address :Regional Director,

Indira Gandhi National Open Universit y,
Kolkatta Regional Centre,
Bikash Bhavan, Salt Lake Cit y,
Kolkatta- 700091, India.
 Acknowledgement

Never let your memories be greater than your dreams." Douglas Ivester

I thank all those who encouraged me to dream big. First and foremost, I thank

the ICFAI University, Tripura and the ICFAI societ y Hyderabad for the

opportunit y given me to enter into the field of research with financial

assistance and scientific learning environment.

I would like to express m y sincere gratitude to Dr. K.S. Chakrabort y

for the generous guidance and constant encouragement at all stages of m y

research work. Without his inspiration, guidance and encouragement, this

dissertation would not have been possible. I am indebted to m y Doctoral

Advisory Committee members Dr. Haradhan Debnath and Dr. Shruti Nagar

for the patience, guidance and insightful comments.

I express m y appreciation to the Honourable Vice Chancellor of the

ICFAI Universit y Dr. Ajay Pathak, and Registrar of the Universit y Dr

Senhalatha Behura for all the support and encouragement. I appreciate th e

valuable suggestions, comments and support of Dr Prof. R. K Patnaik

Honourable Ex-Vice Chancellor of the ICFAI University, Tripura and

Register Dr. Prof. S.P. Gupta during the Ph.D thesis progress seminars. Dr.

Loupamudhara Haldar has given me all the administrative support along with

his valuable suggestions and guidance at all stages of m y research work. Her

enthusiasm and insights inspired me a lot.

I am indebted to all the teachers throughout m y educational life, who

have shaped m y life towards success at my earlier studies. Especiall y Prof. N

i|Page
K. Rao has great role in shaping m y research mind during my interactions

with him throughout my M. Phil days in Hyderabad and as well as in m y

doctoral period. His suggestions were always thought provoking and offered

me new direction at all stages of m y dissertation work. It was both an honour

and a pleasure to work with such a great mind!

I am indebted to all the teachers throughout m y educational life, who

have shaped m y life towards success at my earlier studies .

I owe m y warm thanks to all facult y members of ICFAI Universit y

Tripura especiall y Mamoni Kalita, Zigisha Pujari, Pri yangu Rana Borthakur,

Ranganath Aluva. I am grateful to all of m y friends, in particular, Aviral

Kumar Tiwari, Suresh K.G, Anindita Guha, Neeta Jain, Anto Joseph, Sreejesh

S, Abhilash P, Urvashi Varma and Supernova Chakarbort y for all the

academic and other supports.

Finall y, I would like to thank m y parents, brother, sister and other

famil y members. I am deepl y indebted to m y parents for giving me the

freedom to choose my career, the unconditional love and being there for me.

Without their support I would not have reached here.

Raveesh krishnankutty

ii | P a g e
 Abstract

In this stud y, we examined the status of debt capital among selected

listed companies in India. The major objectives of the stud y are 1) to review

the trend of debt structure in Indian companies during the stud y period. 2) To

examine the choice among the different kinds of debt used b y the Indian

companies. 3) To investigate the potential determinants of the debt maturit y

structure of sample companies. 4) To examine the relationship between the

growth of a company and its dependence on long -term debt. The stud y has

divided the debt capital into three major stage present status and determents

of debt capital, choice of debt capital and determinants of debt maturit y. And

stud y has looked into the growth of a firm and its dependence on long-term

debt. The financial data have been collected from Capital line database for a

period of ten years from 2002-2011. We have examined the objectives,

appl ying the various statistical tools like quantile regression, panel data fixed

and random effects and GMM 1991 and 1998. Moreover, simple percentages

and averages also have been used.

The result of a trend anal ysis shows that total debt capital has grown

up significantl y during the stud y period. However the growth in debt capital

in comparison to equit y capital is less. It confirms that Indian companies are

following pecking order theory. I.e., when there is a need for capital, first

they will prefer internal capital, and then if necessary will go to debt capital.

In other words, we can say that Indian companies are trying to keep debt as

minimum as possible.

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 The Indian companies are managing their debt capital keeping more

of unsecured debt in the total debt capital than secured debt. It confirms that

Indian companies managing their capital requirements using more short-term

debt than long-term debt. The sectors such as agriculture, capital goods,

chemical& petrochemicals, information technology, media & publishing, oil

& gas and transport equipment are using short-term more than long-term

debt. Moreover, total sample companies also show the same (see chapter IV

table 1-20). However, Indian companies are managing their debt structure,

keeping a trade off between secured and unsecured debt as well as short-term

and long-term debt.

The various factors determine the levels of debt capital in Indian

companies are size, creditworthiness, foreign direct investment and economic

growth are directl y influencing the level of debt capital. However, debt

capacit y and Non-debt tax shield negativel y determining the level of debt

capital in Indian companies.

The Indian companies are managing their debt requirements depending

on commercial banks. Commercial banks are the major contributor of debt

capital in various ways as long- term secured loan as well as short-term

unsecured loans. Debenture & bonds are the second major contributor. It

confirms that the Indian debt market is still untapped. The nature of Indian

banks may be a reason for companies to choose banks as their major choice.

Banks in India are governed and controlled b y central government. So in case

companies incurred loss or they are not repaying the loan amount there a

chance to write-off the loan amount.

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 The factors affecting the debt maturity of Indian companies are;

Previous year debt maturit y, firm size, leverage ratio and growth opportunit y

are the factors that directl y affect the debt maturit y of Indian companies. On

the other hand effective tax rate, liquidity and interest rate are the factors

inversel y affecting the debt maturit y of Indian companies. It confirms that

large companies will go for more long-term debt in the total debt, i.e., it

holds the liquidit y theory. Moreover, firms having a high growth opportunit y

will also go for long-term debt confirms the agency cost theory of

overinvestment.

Liquidit y, effective tax rate and prime lending rate are negativel y

determining the debt maturit y of Indian companies. The negative

relationship between liquidit y and debt maturit y in the Indian context has to

check further. It is not supporting the liquidit y theories. Effective tax rate

negativel y determining debt maturit y, it supports that in India the firms are

not getting the tax shield advantage. Or it may be due to high transaction and

issuance cost prevailing in the Indian debt market. The interest rate is

negativel y related to debt maturit y. It support that if the rate of interest is

low companies will prefer more long-term debt.

The dependence between long-term debt and growth shows that the

level of previous year long-term debt is directl y influencing the current year

long-term debt. However, previous two year long-term debt is inversel y

affected the current year long-term debt. Other variables case we are unable

to give a conclusion because of inconsistency in the results.

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 The discourse is divided into six chapters, including the Introduction

and Conclusion. The subject matter is and review of literature is introduced

in chapter-I. Statement of problem, objectives, methodology, scope, etc. also

discussed in chapter-I. The debt structure in Indian companies is discussed in

chapters II. The choice among the different kinds of debt used b y the Indian

companies is examined in chapter-III. The potential determinants of debt

maturit y of sample companies and, the relation between the growth of a

compan y and its dependents on long -term debt are reviewed in chapter-IV

and V respectivel y. Conclusion and suggestions are offered in chapter-VI.

Keywords: Debt management, debt maturity, debt structure, Growth, Panel data, Quantile

regression, GMM, Debt choice

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 Table of Contents
SL.No Contents Page. No
Acknowledgement i
Abstract iii
Chapter I Introduction 1-46
1.1 Background 1
1.1.1 Research question 4
1.2 Literature Survey and Identification of Research Gap 5
1.2.1 Debt structure and debt choice 5
1.2.2 Debt maturit y 16
1.2.3 Growth and long-term debt 22
1.3 Objective of the Stud y 25
1.4 Methodology and Sources of Data 25
1.4.1 Data collection 26
1.4.2 Tools and techniques 27
1.4.3 Stud y period 32
1.4.4 Scope and significance of the stud y 33
1.5 Contribution 34
1.6 Organisation of the Stud y 35
1.7 Chapter Summary 36
1.8 References 36
2 Chapter II Debt Structure of Indian Companies 47-147
2.1 Introduction 47
2.2 Debt to Equit y Ratio 49
2.3 Trend of Debt Structure 52
2.4 Determinants of Debt capital in Indian Companies 89
2.4.1 Variables and h ypothesis 89
2.4.2 Model 93
2.5 Result and Interpretations 99
2.6 Findings 137
2.7 Chapter Summary 145
2.8 References 146
3 Chapter III Debt Choice 149- 195
3.1 Introduction 147
3.2 Types of Debt Capital 153
3.3 The Proportion of Secured Debt and Unsecured Debt 157
3.4 Findings 185
3.5 Chapter Summary 192
3.6 References 193
4 Chapter IV Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure 196-256
4.1 Introduction 196
4.2 Variables and h ypothesis 198
4.3 Model 206
4.4 Result and Interpretations 213

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4.5 Findings 246
4.6 Chapter Summary 251
4.7 References 252
5 Chapter V Growth and Long-term Debt 257-303
5.1 Introduction 257
The Debt Capital to Total Assets and Debt Capital to
5.2 259
Equit y
5.3 Variables and Hypothesis 272
5.3.1 Internal factors 272
5.3.2 External factors 276
5.4 Model 276
5.5 Result and Interpretations 277
5.6 Findings 295
5.7 Chapter Summary 299
5.8 References 299
6 Chapter VI Conclusions 304-318
6.1 Conclusions 304

Bibliograph y 319
Appendices 336-345
I List of Sample Companies Choose for the Stud y 336
II List of Publications in Peer Reviewed Journal 344
III List of conference attended 345

viii | P a g e
 List of Tables
Table. Page.
Title of Tables
No No
The sector wise list of sample companies conceded for the
1.1 27
stud y
2.1 Status of debt to equit y ratio of various sectors 51
Descriptive statistics of the variables chosen for the
2.2 100
anal ysis, debt structure of sample companies
2.3 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of sample companies 101
2.4 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of agriculture sector 103
Result of quantile regression anal ysis of capital goods
2.5 105
sector
Result of quantile regression anal ysis of chemical and
2.6 107
petrochemicals Sector
Result of quantile regression anal ysis of consumer durable
2.7 109
sector
2.8 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of diversified sector 111
2.9 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of FMCG sector 113
2.10 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of healthcare sector 115
Result of quantile regression anal ysis of housing related
2.11 117
sector
Result of quantile regression anal ysis of information
2.12 119
technology sector
Result of quantile regression anal ys is of media and
2.13 121
publishing sector
Result of quantile regression anal ysis of metal, metal
2.14 123
products and mining sector
Result of quantile regression anal ysis of miscellaneous
2.15 125
sector
2.16 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of oil and gas sector 127
2.17 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of power sector 129
2.18 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of telecom sector 131
2.19 Result of quantile regression anal ysis of textile sector 133
Result of quantile regression analysis of transport
2.20 135
equipment sector
2.21 Determinants of debt capital: sector wise findings 141
Sector wise findings on proportions of secured debt in
3.1 186
Indian companies (percentage)
Sector wise findings on proportions of unsecured debt in
3.2 189
Indian companies (percentage)
4.1 Result of correlation anal ysis 213
Result of panel least squares with fix ed effects :sample
4.2 214
companies
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: agriculture
4.3 214
sector
Result of panel least squares with fix ed effects: capital
4.4 215
goods sector
4.5 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects for chemical 216

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 and petrochemicals sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: consumer
4.6 217
durables sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: diversified
4.7 217
sector
Result of panel least squares with fix ed effects: FMCG
4.8 218
Sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: healthcare
4.9 219
sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: housing
4.10 220
related
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: information
4.11 220
technology
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: media and
4.12 221
publishing
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: metal,
4.13 222
metal products and mining.
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects:
4.14 223
miscellaneous sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: oil and gas
4.15 224
sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: power
4.16 224
sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: telecom
4.17 225
sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: textile
4.18 226
sector
Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: transport
4.19 227
and equipments sector
4.20 Result of d ynamic panel data for the sample companies 228
4.21 Result of d ynamic panel data for agriculture sector 229
4.22 Result of d ynamic panel data for capital goods sector 230
Result of d ynamic panel data for chemical & petrochemical
4.23 231
sector
4.24 Result of d ynamic panel data for consumer durables sector 232
4.25 Result of d ynamic panel data for diversified sector 233
4.26 Result of d ynamic panel data for FMCG sector 234
4.27 Result of d ynamic panel data for healthcare sector 235
4.28 Result of d ynamic panel data for housing related sector 236
Result of d ynamic panel data for information technology
4.29 237
sector
4.30 Result of d ynamic panel data for media & publishing sector 238
Result of d ynamic panel data for metal, metal products and
4.31 239
mining sector
4.32 Result of d ynamic panel data for miscellaneous sector 240
4.33 Result of d ynamic panel data for oil and gas sector 241
4.34 Result of d ynamic panel data for power sector 242
4.35 Result of d ynamic panel data for telecom sector 243

x|Page
4.36 Result of d ynamic panel data for textile sector 244
4.37 Result of d ynamic panel data for transport equipment sector 245
4.38 determinants of debt maturit y in Indian companies 250
5.1 Result of d ynamic panel least squares for sample companies 279
5.2 Result of d ynamic panel least squares for agriculture sector 280
5.3 Result of d ynamic panel data for capital goods sector 281
Result of d ynamic panel least squares for chemicals &petro-
5.4 282
chemicals sector
5.5 Result of d ynamic panel least squares for diversified sector 283
5.6 Result of d ynamic panel data for FMCG sector 284
5.7 Result of d ynamic panel data for healthcare sector 285
5.8 Result of d ynamic panel data for housing related sector 286
Result of d ynamic panel data for information technology
5.9 287
sector
Result of d ynamic panel data for media & publications
5.10 288
sector
Result of d ynamic panel least squares for metal, metal
5.11 289
products & mining sector
5.12 Result of d ynamic panel data for miscellaneous sector 290
5.13 Result of d ynamic panel least squares for oil & gas sector 291
5.14 Result of d ynamic panel least squares for power sector 292
5.15 Result of d ynamic panel least squares for telecom sector 293
5.16 Result of d ynamic panel least squares for textile sector 294
Result of d ynamic panel least squares for transport
5.17 295
equipment sector
Summary findings of determinants of growth and long-term
5.18 298
debt capital

xi | P a g e
 List of Figures
Figure. Page.
Title of figure
No No
2.1 Debt structure of sample companies 53
2.2 Debt structure ratios of sample companies 53
2.3 Debt structure in agriculture sector 55
2.4 Debt structure ratios of agriculture sector 55
2.5 Debt structure of capital goods sector 57
2.6 Debt structure ratios of capital goods sector 57
2.7 Debt structure of chemicals & petrochemicals sector 59
2.8 Debt structure ratios of chemicals & petrochemicals sector 59
2.9 Debt structure of consumer durables sector 61
2.10 Debt structure ratios of consumer durables 61
2.11 Debt structure of diversified sector 63
2.12 Debt structure ratios of diversified sector 63
2.13 debt structure of FMCG sector 65
2.14 Debt structure ratios of FMCG sector 65
2.15 Debt structure of healthcare sector 67
2.16 Debt structure ratios of healthcare sector 67
2.17 Debt structure of housing related sector 69
2.18 Debt structure ratios of housing related sector 69
2.19 Debt structure of information technology sector 72
2.20 Debt structure ratios of information technology sector 72
2.21 Debt structure of media & publishing sector 74
2.22 Debt structure ratios of media & publishing sector 74
2.23 Debt structure of metal, metal products & mining sector 76
Debt structure ratios of metal, metal products & mining
2.24 76
sector
2.25 Debt structure of miscellaneous sector 78
2.26 Debt structure ratios of miscellaneous sector 78
2.27 Debt structure of oil & gas sector 80
2.28 Debt structure ratios of oil and gas sector 80
2.29 Debt structure of power sector 82
2.30 Debt structure ratios of Power sector 82
2.31 Debt structure of telecom sector 84
2.32 Debt structure ratios of telecom sector 84
2.33 Debt structure of tex tile sector 86
2.34 Debt structure ratios of textile sector 86
2.35 Debt structure of transport equipment sector 88
2.36 Debt structure ratios of transport equipment sector 88
3.1 The Proportions of secured debt in sample companies 158
3.2 The Proportions of unsecured debt in sample companies 158
3.3 The Proportions of secured debt in agriculture sector 160
3.4 The Proportions of unsecured debt in agriculture sector 160

xii | P a g e
3.5 The Proportions of secured debt in capital goods sector 161
3.6 The Proportions of unsecured debt in capital goods sector 161
The Proportions of secured debt in chemical &
3.7 163
petrochemicals sector
The Proportions of unsecured debt in chemical &
3.8 163
petrochemicals sector
The Proportions of secured debts in consumer durables
3.9 164
sector
The Proportions of unsecured debt in consumer durables
3.10 164
sector
3.11 The Proportions of secured debt in diversified sector 166
3.12 The Proportions of unsecured debts in diversified sector 166
3.13 The Proportions of secured debts in FMCG sector 167
3.14 The Proportions of unsecured debt in FMCG sector 167
3.15 The Proportions of secured debts in healthcare sector 169
3.16 The Proportions of unsecured debts in healthcare sector 169
3.17 The Proportions of secured debt in housing related sector 170
The Proportions of unsecured debts in housing related
3.18 170
sector
The Proportions of secured debt in information technology
3.19 172
sector
The Proportions of unsecured debts in information
3.20 172
technology sector
The Proportions of secured debt in media& publishing
3.21 173
sector
The Proportions of unsecured debt in media& publishing
3.22 173
sector
The Proportions of secured debt in metal, metal products &
3.23 175
mining sector
The Proportions of unsecured debt in metal, metal products
3.24 175
& mining sector
3.25 The Proportions of secured debts in miscellaneous sector 176
3.26 The Proportions of unsecured debts in miscellaneous sector 176
3.27 The Proportions of secured debts in oil &gas sector 178
3.28 The Proportions of unsecured debt in oil &gas sector 178
3.29 The Proportions of secured debt in power sector 179
3.30 The Proportions of unsecured debt in power sector 179
3.31 The Proportions of secured debts in telecom sector 181
3.32 The Proportions of unsecured debt in telecom sector 181
3.33 The Proportions of secured debt in textile sector 182
3.34 The Proportions of unsecured debt in textile sector 182
The Proportions of secured debt in transport equipment
3.35 184
sector
The Proportions of unsecured debt in transport equipment
3.36 184
sector
5.1 Sample companies 260
5.2 Agriculture sector 261

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5.3 Capital Goods sector 262
5.4 Chemical & petrochemical sector 262
5.5 Consumer durables sector 263
5.6 Diversified sector 264
5.7 FMCG sector 265
5.8 Healthcare sector 265
5.9 Housing related sector 266
5.10 Information technology sector 267
5.11 Media & publishing sector 267
5.12 Metal, metal products & mining sector 268
5.13 Miscellaneous sector 269
5.14 Oil & gas sector 270
5.15 Power sector 270
5.16 Telecom sector 271
5.17 Textile sector 272
5.18 Transport equipments sector 272

xiv | P a g e
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
1.1.1 Research questions
1.2 Literature Survey and Identification of Research Gap
1.2.1 Debt structure and debt choice
1.2.2 Debt maturity
1.2.3 Growth and long-term debt
1.3 Objective of the Study
1.4 Methodology and Sources of Data
1.4.1 Data collection
1.4.2 Tools and technique
1.4.3 Study period
1.4.4 Scope and significance of the study
1.5 Contribution
1.6 Organisation of the study
1.7 Chapter Summary
1.8 References

1.1 Background

There are two possible approaches to the concept of capital; fund

concept and assets concept. According to the fund concept, the capital of a

firm is the sum total of the funds that have been emplo yed in its running.

According to the assets concept, capital means capital invested in fixed

assets and current assets. In both the cases, the assets may comprise of

either tangible or intangible, including fictitious assets (Banerjee 2010).

Irrespective of whether the capital is approached in terms of fund concept

or assets concept, there are two major sources of capital, debt and equit y.

Equit y capital is called the owners’ capital and debt is called borrowed

1|Page
capital. In a broad way we can say that the firm’s mix of debt and equit y

is called its capital structure.

A number of theories like net income approach, net operating

income approach, traditional approach, MM approach, etc. explain the

significance of the proportion of debt and equit y in a firm’s capital

structure. According to net income approach, the firm is able to increase

its total valuation and lower its cost of capital as it increases the degree of

leverage. The significance of this theory is that a firm can lower its cost

of capital continually b y the use of debt capital. As per net operating

income approach the overall cost of capital does not vary with leverage.

Traditional approach says that the use of debt capital increases the value

of the firm and reduces the cost of capital up to a certain point. Beyond

that, the increase in equit y more than offsets the use of cheaper debt

capital in the capital structure, and the average cost of capital begins to

rise. The optimal capital structure is the point at which overall cost of

capital is the minimum or the value of the firm is maximized. Therefore,

incorporating debt in capital structure has its own sets of advantages as

well as risk also.

Companies require funds for investing in long-term assets and

working capital. Companies will generate funds mainl y from two sources -

internal and external. Depreciation and retained earnings are a major

internal source of income. Whereas common stocks, preferred stocks and

debt are the major external sources. Whenever firms require money for

investment in long-term assets and net working capital they face a gap

2|Page
between the cash that the compan y needs and the cash that may be

generated internally. This calls for two basic financing decisions: what

share of profit a firm should retain in the business and what proportion of

the deficit should be financed b y borrowing or b y issue of equit y.

Addressing these issues firms should require a payout policy and a debt

policy respectivel y. Payout policy and debt policy depend on various

factors such as cost of capital, leverage, tax policy, general

macroeconomic conditions etc. (Brealey et al 2008).

Generall y it is very difficult to decide how much a firm should

borrow or how much it should include debt in the capital structure.

Because the financing policy of the companies are varies from compan y to

compan y and industry to industry. A firm’s basic resource is the stream of

cash flows produced b y its assets. When the firm is financed entirel y b y

common stocks, all those cash flow belongs to the stockholders. When it

is issued both debt and equit y, it splits the cash flows into two streams,

relativel y safe streams that go to the debenture holders and a riskier

stream that goes to the stockholders

It is evident from the capital structure theories that if a compan y

includes debt instruments in their capital structure the risk will increase.

In this context, if a compan y includes debt in its capital structure how

efficientl y they are managing the debt is the vital question? In this

background the present stud y on debt capital in the Indian corporate sector

is proposed and planned.

3|Page
1.1.1 Research question

The resilience of emerging markets to an America growth slowdown

is a striking development and the associated strong and positive global

growth trends of the emerging ‘BR IC’ markets, led b y China and India,

represents a significant offsetting influence on global growth. But the

2008 economic recession caused b y Americas, sub-prime lending and the

accompan ying demand destruction have taken a heav y toll on India’s

corporate sector. The worst-hit are those that had launched aggressive

growth plans, largely funded through debt, believing the demand growth

in the years to come would be robust as predicted b y man y experts. Man y

of such firms now find themselves in a spiral of declining profitabilit y,

shrinking market capitalisation and rising liabilities. This raises a

question mark over their financial viability. In this background the present

stud y on debt capital in the Indian corporate sector is proposed and

planned to see how liquid the Indian companies are. What kind of debt

structure they are following and the major factors that determine debt

capital in India. What are the major sources of debt capital for Indian

companies? Which are sources of debt capital mainl y they prefer?

Moreover, the major determinants of debt maturit y structure and the

impact of growth in long term debt capital.

4|Page
1.2 Literature Survey and Identification of Research Gap

There are a number of studies found relevant for the present stud y. The

survey of literature pertaining to the stud y is categorised under three

sections and presented below.

1.2.1 Debt structure and debt choice

Bevan and Danbolt (2002) studied the difficulties of measuring

gearing, and the sensitivit y of Rajan and Zingales' results to variations in

gearing measures. Based on an anal ysis of the capital structure of 822 UK

companies, Rajan and Zingales' where results were found to be highl y

definitional-dependent. The determinants of gearing appeared to var y

significantl y, depending upon which component of debt was anal yzed. In

particular, significant differences have been found in the determinants of

long- and short-term forms of debt. Given that trade credit and equivalent,

on average, accounts for more than 62% of total debt, the results are

particularl y sensitive to whether such debt is included in the gearing

measure. Therefore, it was observed that anal ysis of capital structure is

incomplete without a detailed examination of all forms of corporate debt.

They have found that larger companies will have higher levels of

both long-term and short-term debt than do smaller firms; profitabilit y to

be negativel y correlated with the level of gearing, although profitable

firms tend to have more short-term bank borrowing than less profitable

firms, and tangibility to positivel y influence the level of short-term bank

borrowing, as well as all long-term debt elements. However, the level of

5|Page
growth opportunities appears to have little influence on the level of

gearing, other than short-term bank borrowing, where a significant

negative relationship is observed.

Colla et.at.al (2010) says that the debt structure of small and

unrated firms having either capital leases or bank debt. But in case of

large firms having high credit qualit y the authors observed that they use

multiple t ypes of debt in the debt structure. Moreover, they have

suggested that debt structure is an important part of capital structure

decisions. Arena and dewall y (2012) says that firms geographical location

influence the corporate debt. The authors find that rural firms face higher

debt yield spreads and attract smaller and less prestigious bank s yndicate

than urban firms. However the capital structure decision of the firm is

also influenced b y the environment at which it operates (Deesomsak,

Paud yal and Pescetto, 2009).

Titman and Wessel (1988) introduced a factor anal ytic technique for

estimating the impact of unobservable attributes on the choice of

corporate debt ratio. And they have found that debt level is negativel y

related to the uniqueness of a firm line of business. Leland (1994)

examines the corporate debt valuation and capital structure in a unified

anal ytical framework and derives closed form result to the value of long-

term debt, yield spread and optimum capital structure, when the value of

the firm’s assets follows a diffusion process with constant volatilit y. Lee

and Gentry (1995) develop a rationale that links a firm’s financial health

as measured b y its cash flow components while going for external

6|Page
financing. They have found that companies that are financiall y sound

offered straight debt while equities are offered b y financiall y weaker

companies for raising external capital. Graham (1996) studied the impact

of marginal tax rate on issue of corporate debt. The author provides the

information that the firms paying high tax issue more debt than their low

tax rate counterparts. El yasiani, Jia and Mao (2010) documents that the

stabilit y of institutional ownership in determining the cost of debt. The

stud y found that there is a robust negative relationship between the cost of

debt and institutional stabilit y. Institutional ownership stabilit y plays an

important role in determining the cost of debt. At least they have

mentioned that institutional ownership stabilit y affects the cost of debt to

a greater extent for firms that are subject to more severe information

as ymmetry and grater agency cost of debt. Jong, Verbeek and

Verwijimeren (2011) have tested the static trade-off theory against the

pecking order theory. They have focused on the important difference in

prediction: the static trade-off theory argues that a firm increases leverage

until it reaches its target debt ratio, while the pecking order yields debt

issuance until the debt capacit y is reached. The stud y finds that from the

selected sample of US firms the pecking order theory is a better descriptor

of firms’ issue decisions than the statistic trade-off theory. In contrast,

when they have focus on repurchase decisions they have find that static

trade-off theory is a stronger predictor of firms’ capital structure.

The second step or after deciding the proportion of debt in capital

structure the next issue is regarding through what t ype of debt compan y

needs to finance. Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggested that the level of

7|Page
gearing in UK companies is positivel y related to size and tangibility, and

negativel y correlated with profitabilit y and the level of growth

opportunities. However, Harris and Raviv (1991) argued that, ‘The

interpretation of the results must be tempered b y an awareness of the

difficulties involved in measuring both leverage and the explanatory

variables of interest’ dependent. Further Aydin Ozkan (2001) conducted

studies on the determinants of the capital structure of the selected UK

firms. He examined the empirical determinants of borrowing decisions of

firms and the role of the adjustment process. A partial adjustment model

was estimated b y GMM estimation procedure using data from an

unbalanced panel of 390 UK firms over the period of 1984–1996. Th e

results provided positive support for the positive impact of size, and

negative effects of growth opportunities, liquidit y, profitabilit y of firms

and non-debt tax shields on the borrowing decisions of the firms.

Huang and Song (2006) studied the determinants of the capital

structure of the selected firms in China, b y using a database containing

the market and accounting data (from 1994 to 2003) from more than 1200

Chinese-listed companies to document their capital structure

characteristics. As in other countries, leverage in Chinese firms increases

with firm size and fixed assets, and decreases with profitability, non-debt

tax shields, growth opportunit y, managerial shareholdings and correlates

with industries. It was found that state ownership or institutional

ownership has no significant impact on capital structure and Chinese

companies consider the tax effect on long-term debt financing. Different

8|Page
from those in other countries, Chinese firms tend to have much lower

long-term debt.

Delcoure (2007) investigated, whether capital structure

determinants in emerging Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries

support the traditional capital structure theory developed to explain

western economies. The determinants like Collateral value of assets, size,

risk, growth opportunities, profitabilit y and non debt tax shield were

studied. The empirical evidence suggested that some traditional capital

structure theories are portable to companies in CEE countries. However,

neither the trade-off, pecking order, nor agency costs theories explain the

capital structure choices. Companies do follow the modified “peckin g

order.” The factors that influence firms' leverage decisions are the

differences and financial constraints of banking s ystems, disparit y in legal

s ystems governing firms' operations, shareholders, and bondholders’ rights

protection, sophistication of equit y and bond markets, and corporate

governance.

Campello and Giambona (2010) studied the relation between

corporate asset structure and capital structure b y exploiting variation in

the saleabilit y of tangible assets. The theory suggests that tangibilit y

increases borrowing capacit y because it allows creditors to more easil y

repossess a firm's assets. Tangible assets, however, are often illiquid. It

has been shown that the redeplo y ability of tangible assets is a main

determinant of corporate leverage. To establish this link, the anal ysis used

an instrumental variables approach that incorporates measures of suppl y

9|Page
and demand for various t ypes of tangible assets (e.g., machines, land, and

buildings). Consistent with a credit suppl y-side view of capital structure,

they found that asset redeplo y abilit y is a particularl y important driver of

leverage for firms that are likel y to face credit frictions (small, unrated

firms). The tests have also shown that asset’s redeplo y abilit y facilitates

borrowing the most during periods of tight credit.

Noulas and Genimakis (2011) studied the determinants of the capital

structure of the firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange, using both

cross-sectional and nonparametric statistics. The data set is mainl y

composed of balance sheet data for 259 firms over a 9-year period from

1998 to 2006, excluding firms from the banking, finance, real estate and

insurance sectors. The stud y assessed the extent to which leverage

depends upon a broader set of capital structure determinants, got

evidences showing that the capital structure varies significantl y across a

series of firm classifications. The results document empirical regularities

with respect to alternative measures of debt that are consistent with

existing theories and, in particular, reasonabl y support the pecking order

h ypothesis

The empirical literature suggests a number of factors that may

influence the capital structure of firms. Bradley et al., (1984), Rajan and

Zingales (1995), Kremp et al., (1999) and Frank and Go yal (2002) find

leverage to be positivel y related to the level of tangibility. However,

Chittenden et al., (1996) and Bevan and Danbolt (2001) find the

relationship between tangibilit y and leverage to depend on the measure of

10 | P a g e
debt applied. Further, managers of highly levered firms will be less able

to consume excessive perquisites, since bondholders more closel y monitor

such firms. The monitoring costs of this agency relationship are higher for

firms with less collateralizable assets. Therefore, firms with less

collateralizable assets might voluntaril y choose higher debt levels to limit

consumption of perquisites (Drobetz and Fix, 2005). Hence, the agency

model predicts a negative relationship between tangibilit y of assets and

leverage. Firms with more tangible assets have a greater abilit y to secure

debt. Alternativel y, Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that the agency costs

of managers consuming more than the optimal level of perquisites is

higher for firms with lower levels of assets that can be used as collateral.

The monitoring costs of the agency relationship are higher for firms with

less collateralizable assets. Consequentl y, collateral value is found to be a

major determinant of the level of debt financing (Omet and Mashharance,

2002). From a pecking order theory perspective, firms with few tangible

assets are more sensitive to informational as ymmetries. These firms will

thus issue debt rather than equit y when they need external financing

(Harris and Raviv, 1991), leading to an expected negative relation between

the importance of intangible assets and leverage.

Titman and Wessels (1988), in their study mentioned that because of

bankruptcy risk, managers would not likel y to use debt choice. However,

since larger firms have a chance to be more diversified, they have

relativel y little bankruptcy risk. Warner (1977) suggests that bankruptcy

costs would be higher for smaller firms. Research evidences for this

variable are also ambiguous (Drobetz and Fix, 2005). For example, Friend

11 | P a g e
and Hasbrouck (1988), Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Berger et al.,

(1997) report a positive relationship between firm’s size and leverage,

whilst Feri and Jones (1979) suggest that firm’s size has a significant

impact on leverage even though the sectoral decisions have been observed

to vary among industries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argued that larger

firms tend to be more diversified and fail less often, so size may be an

inverse prox y for the probabilit y of bankruptcy. Large firms are also

expected to incur lower costs in issuing debt or equit y. Thus, large firms

are expected to hold more debt in their capital structure than small firms.

The measure of size used in this paper is the natural logarithm of net sales

similar to the approach followed b y Drobetz and Fix (2005). They discuss

the logarithm of total assets as an alternate; however, they accept the net

sales as a better proxy for the measure of size.

Titman and Wessles (1988) and Barclay and Smith (1996) find a

negative relationship between growth opportunities and the level of either

long-term or total debt. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1995) also find a

negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. The y

suggest that this may be due to firms issuing equit y when stock prices are

high. As mentioned b y Hovakimian et al. (2001), large stock price

increases are usually associated with improved growth opportunities,

leading to a lower debt ratio. However, Bevan and Danbolt (2001) find a

negative relationship between growth and long-term debt, but find total

leverage to be positivel y related to the level of growth opportunities. On

the other hand, Bevan and Danbolt (2001) find short-term debt to be

positivel y related to growth opportunities.

12 | P a g e
 To y et al., (1974), Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris

and Raviv (1991), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales

(1995), and Michaeles et al. (1999), Booth et al. (2001), Bevan and

Danbolt (2001) all find leverage to be negativel y related to the level of

profitabilit y (supporting the pecking-order theory). While Jensen et al.

(1992) find leverage to be positivel y related to the level of profitabilit y

(supporting the trade-off theory).

Morellec (2001) investigated the impact of asset liquidit y on the

valuation of corporate securities and the firm financing decision. The

author shows that asset liquidit y increases debt capacit y onl y when bound

covenants restrict the disposition of assets. Furthermore the author is

saying that with unsecured debt, greater liquidit y increases credit spreads

on corporate debt and reduces optimal leverage. Hooks (2003) examines

the determinants of the concentration of bank debt in total debt of US

firms. And his result was indicating that the determinant of the

concentration of debt will vary b y the size of the firm and its support the

view that the firm faces different debt choice as it grows. Denis and

Mihov (2003) examine the firm’s choice among the different sources of

debt financing. And they have found that the credit qualit y of the issuer is

the primary determinant will decide the selection of debt source. Firms

with the highest credit qualit y borrow from public sources, firms with

medium qualit y borrow from bank and firms with low credit qualit y

borrow from non bank private lenders. Antoniou, Guney and paud yal

(2008) investigated the choice between private (bank loan) and public debt

13 | P a g e
determinants of British and German listed companies using generalised

method of movements (GMM). They have found that the debt ownership

decision of listed firms is not onl y the result of their own characteristics,

but also the outcome of legal and financial environment and corporate

governance traditions in which they operate. Furthermore, the authors

mention that the factors such as liquidation and renegotiation, moral

hazard and adverse selection, flotation cost are found to be significantl y

relevant while deciding the mix of corporate debt.

The next most important aspects of debt capital management are

about the structure of the debt. How much a firm should finance its debts

through debenture and in debenture itself, whether firms should go for

convertible debenture, secured and unsecured debenture? Hosono (2003)

explores the determinants debt structure of Japanese machine

manufacturing firms. He found that firms that are having high growth and

less collateral security are likel y to borrow from the bank rather than to

issue bonds. Yaman (2004) did an anal ysis on how firms choose the t ype

and structure of debt issues in dual offerings of debt and equit y.

Furthermore, he has anal yzed the determinants of t ype and structure of

debt included in dual offerings of debt and equit y. The author finds that

the firms having higher asset substitution problems are more likel y to

issue convertible bonds along with common stock instead of straight bond

and common stock. Mo yen (2007) examines the debt overhanging problem

and he found that an investor will earn under invest in debt if the risk is

high and vice versa. Ojah and Pillay (2009) had made a first attempt for

gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure,

14 | P a g e
risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. Through this

stud y they have found the financial service firms, along with government

institutions are important earl y supporters of an organized public debt

market. Firms in this market use equit y, public debt and private debt funds

simultaneousl y as need be. Moreover the stud y reveals that public debt-

issuing firms experience significant reduction in both overall and

s ystematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than

non- public debt issuers.

Guha-Khasnobis and Kar (2006) says that firms in India have shown

a low preference towards debt capital despite its advantages. Using panel

data from 450 firms during 1992-93 and 2003-04, they have identified the

factors which could explain the pattern of financing of manufacturing

firms in India and the key determinants of their debt structure. And find

that age of the firm, long term borrowing and net sales in affecting its

debt structure.

All the studies reviewed in this section clearl y indicate the importance of

the need fullness of thorough stud y on debt capital. However, none of the

studies are not concentrated the specific to debt capital, and the various

choices of debt capital b y the companies. Moreover, these studies are not

specific to an y sector, size of the compan y and the level debt capital they

are having. So we are conducting the stud y on sector wise moreover using

quantile regression to get more accurate findings.

15 | P a g e
 1.2.2 Debt maturity

Stephan et al. (2011) investigate the determinants of corporate debt

maturit y choice in emerging markets. Their estimates confirms that the

importance of agency cost, liquidit y, signalling and tax theories in a

transition econom y for corporate debt maturit y structure. They find that

creditworthiness of the firm and access to long-term financing at bond

market are the key drivers of corporate debt structure. Moreover, they

confirm that financial constraints play an important role in explaining the

debt maturit y choice. Firms with restricted access to external financing

exhibit a higher sensitivit y to earnings volatilit y and tax charges when

choosing an optimal liabilities structure. While their unconstrained peers

are more susceptible to underinvestment and asset substitutions issues and

are also more prone to follow maturit y matching. Deesomask et al. (2009 )

examine the firm specific and country specific characteristics of the debt

maturit y structure of Asia pacific region. Their results indicate that firms

in this region have a target optimal debt maturit y structure. The maturit y

structure decision of a firm is driven b y both its own characteristics and

the economic environment. Cai et al. (2008) investigate the potential

determinants debt maturit y structure of Chinese listed firms. Their

empirical anal ysis reveals that firm size, asset maturit y and the liquidit y

factors tend to be significant in explaining debt maturit y mix, consistent

with predictions of maturit y theories.

Kirch and Terra (2012) try to anal yze, in a focus-country setting, how

firm characteristics, qualit y of national institutions, and country level of

16 | P a g e
financial development affect the debt maturit y of firms from a sample of

South American countries. Moreover, and more importantl y, they are able

to provide novel evidence on the question of whether financial

development or institutional qualit y (or both) have a first-order effect on

the corporate debt maturit y decision. They find that there is a substantial

d ynamic component in the determination of a firm's debt maturit y, and

firms face moderate adjustment frictions toward their optimal maturities.

More importantl y, the level of financial development does not influence

debt maturit y, whereas the institutional qualit y of a country has a

significant positive effect on the level of long-term debt in a firm's

financial structure. Our results support the h ypothesis that the qualit y of

national institutions is an important determinant of corporate financing in

general and of debt maturit y in particular. Schmukler and Vesperoni

(2006) stud y how financial globalization affects the debt structure in

emerging economies. They find that b y accessing international markets,

firms increase their long-term debt and extend their debt maturit y. In

contrast, with financial liberalization, long-term debt decreases and the

maturit y structure shift to the short-term for the average firm. These

effects are stronger in economies with less developed domestic financial

s ystems. The evidence is consistent with financial integration having

opposite effects on the firms that are able to integrate with world markets

and obtain financing globall y, relative to the firms that rel y on domestic

financing onl y. Aarstol (2000) proposes a new explanation for the inverse

relationship between inflation and the maturit y structure of business debt.

17 | P a g e
It rests on the empirical finding that the variabilit y of relative price

changes increases with inflation.

Demirguc-kunt and Maksimovic (1999) examines how differences in

financial and legal institutions affect the use of debt and especiall y the

choice of debt maturit y b y firms in a sample of 30 countries in the period

1980-1991. The sample includes both developed and developing countries

as well as countries with both common-law and civil-law legal s ystems.

They have found those s ystematic differences in the use of long-term debt

between developed and developing countries and small and large firms. In

developed countries, Firms have more long-term debt and a greater

proportion of their total debt is held as long-term debt. This is true

Regardless of Firm size across their sample of countries. Moreover, the y

find strong evidence that large firms in countries with effective legal

s ystems have more long-term debt relative to assets, and their debt is of

longer maturit y. Large firms in countries with effective legal s ystems have

lower short-term liabilities, suggesting that such firms are substituting

long-term debt for short-term debt. For small firms, evidence of a relation

between the effectiveness of the legal system and the ratio of long-term

debt to assets is weaker. They also do not find evidence of lower short-

term liabilities b y small firms in countries with more-effective legal

s ystems, perhaps because small firms tend to use less long-term debt than

do large firms. The authors also find that the magnitude of government

subsidies to industry is positivel y related to the use of long-term debt b y

both large and small firms.

18 | P a g e
 Qiu yan et al. (2012) emplo ys the financial engineering approach to test

the influencing factors of debt maturit y structure with the data of 2012

listed companies distributed in 11 industries of China, b y the simulation

of single equation models and simultaneous equation model, using

stepwise multiple regression anal ysis. The result of the paper conveys the

endogenous relationship between capital structure and debt maturit y

structure matters a lot. Therefore, when the companies consider this

relationship, the short-term debt maturity will not be an effective way to

solve the problem of insufficient investment. In contrast, growth

opportunit y and leverage rate are significant negative correlation. With

the role of leverage, growth opportunity will indirectl y affect the debt

maturit y structure .

Lopsz-Gracia and Mestre-Barbera (2011) anal yses the influence of the

tax effect on small and medium-sized (SME) enterprise debt maturit y

structure. This stud y builds a d ynamic adjustment model which

endogenous optimum structure and assumes the existence of adjustment

costs. Using Spanish data, the model is estimated using a system- GMM

regression to a complete panel 11,028 firms covering 1997–2004. The

main results indicate that the model fits the data well and that SMEs seem

to adopt an optimum debt maturit y structure, which they converge to

slowl y due to the high adjustment costs they face. Average adjustment

speed is estimated at around 37%, the equivalent of taking some 20

months to cover half the existing gap. The effective tax rate is highl y

19 | P a g e
significant and both the interest rate gap and interest rate volatilit y also

have a significant impact on debt maturit y.

Hajiha and Akhlaghi (2012) test the main theories of firm debt maturit y

structure in an emerging econom y, including agency conflict, signaling

and tax theories. The paper investigates the firm specific determinants of

debt maturit y structure for a sample of 140 Iranian manufacturing firms

listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2001-2009. They

have used random effect panel data analysis and multivariate regression

for the anal ysis. The stud y provides the empirical evidence that

profitabilit y, firm size, tangibilit y, growth opportunit y and financial

leverage have significant effects on debt maturit y choice. However, tax

effects and business risk are not significantl y related to the debt maturit y

structure.

El yasiani et al. (2002) examine the determinants of corporate debt

maturit y on the interdependent relation between maturit y and leverage.

They have used both single and simultaneous equations models on debt

maturit y and leverage for the estimation, and defined debt maturit y as

maturit y of bonds at issuance or the percentage of firms total debt that

mature in more than three years. The study finds that the firms with grater

growth opportunities have short-term debt as per single equation model,

however, under the simultaneous-equations model, the negative relation

between a firm's debt maturit y and its growth opportunities cease to hold.

Instead, it is the leverage decision that is influenced b y growth

20 | P a g e
opportunities. This suggests that existing models may overestimate the

effect of growth opportunities on debt maturit y.

The maturit y aspect of debt needs a significant attention from the

firm’s side because the firm has to arrange money for the redemption of

the debt capital there are some studies in this regards. Esho, Lam and

Sharpe (2002) studied the interrelationship between maturit y and debt

type decision that arises from agency and floatation cost h ypothesis.

Using a sample of international bounds and s yndicated loans of Australian

firms, the stud y finds the evidence that maturit y has a strong direct effect

on debt choice, but weak evidence that debt choice affects maturit y. Terra

(2009) tested the main theories of corporate debt maturit y in a multi-

country framework, for understanding the country specific constraints.

The stud y finds that the determinants of debt maturit y do not seem ver y

sensitive to a country’s business and financial environment. Majumdar

(2010) examines the debt maturit y structure decision in context of Indian

corporate. The author suggests that collateralizable assets and leverage are

the important determinants of debt maturit y choice. Thottekat and Vij

(2013) examine how the tax h ypothesis determines debt maturit y in the

Indian corporate sector using a panel data of 266 companies drawn from

BSE 500 for the period 2000-2010. They have found that the tax rate, term

structure and asset variance profoundly influence the debt maturit y

structure in the Indian corporate sector. Thottekat and Vij (2014) studied

the relation between signalling h ypothesis and debt maturity. And the y

have found that debt maturit y inversel y relates to firm qualit y and the debt

maturit y choice of a firm.

21 | P a g e
 The debt maturit y structure has not yet received much attention in

Indian context. Moreover, most of the existing studies of debt maturit y

structure predominantl y focussed on developed countries. As India is the

second biggest emerging econom y after China and having a stead y

economic growth during the stud y period. However the Indian debt market

still is not yet established as well as not getting much attention from the

corporate sector. Banks are the major sources of debt capital for Indian

companies. This would have a different implication on behalf of th e

rigorousness of agency theory, information as ymmetries, bankruptcy and

taxation. Moreover, India is a mix ed econom y having number of

government owned or controlling companies and private sector companies.

Consequentl y, it is exciting to see the debt maturit y theories were

designed especiall y with respect to developed economies to the companies

in the emerging economies.

1.2.3 Growth and long-term debt

The trade-off theory suggests that firms with more growth

opportunities have less leverage because they have stronger incentives to

avoid under investment and asset substitution that can arise from

stockholder-bondholder agency conflicts (Drobetz and Fix 2005).

Therefore, this theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage

and growth opportunities. In the similar line, Jensen (1986) free cash flow

theory suggests that firms with more investment opportunities have less

need for the disciplining effect of debt payments to control free cash

flows. Nevertheless, the pecking order theory supports a positive

22 | P a g e
relationship. According to the pecking order theory, debt t yp icall y grows

when investment exceeds retained earnings and falls when the investment

is less than retained earnings. The empirical evidence regarding the

relationship between leverage and growth opportunities are also mixed,

suggesting the operation of both theories. For example, Titman and

Wessles (1988), Barclay and Smith (1996) and Chen et al., (1997) find a

negative relationship between growth opportunities and the level of either

long-term or total debt. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1995) also find a

negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. The y

suggest that this may be due to firms issuing equit y when stock prices are

high. As mentioned b y Hovakimian et al., (2001), large stock price

increases are usually associated with improved growth opportunities,

leading to a lower debt ratio. However, Bevan and Danbolt (2001) find a

negative relationship between growth and long-term debt, but find total

leverage to be positivel y related to the level of growth opportunities.

Growth is likel y to place a greater demand on internall y generated funds

and push the firm into borrowing (Hall et al., 2004). According to Marsh

(1982), firms with high growth will capture relativel y higher debt ratios.

In the case of small firms with more concentrated ownership, it is

expected that high growth firms will require more external financing and

should display higher leverage (Heshmati, 2002). Aryeetey et al., (1994)

maintain that growing SMEs appear more likel y to use external finance –

although it is difficult to determine whether finance induces growth or the

opposite (or both). As enterprises grow through different stages, i.e.,

micro, small, medium and large scale, they are also expected to shift

23 | P a g e
financing sources. They are first expected to move from internal sources

to external sources (Aryeetey, 1998). Another issue is regarding the

growth opportunit y and its relation to the level of debt of a firm. Go yal,

lehn and Racic (2002) has studied whether growth opportunit y has an y

influence on level and structure of corporate debt in U.S defence industry.

This stud y supports from the evidence that defence industry face an abrupt

change in growth opportunities.

The studies in this area all are based on the growth opportunities

and not on the absolute growth. However, our stud y is focussing on the

absolute growth and its impact specific to long term debt on sector wise.

Moreover, we are measuring the impact using internal and external factors

of a firm in financial point of view.

The review of literature categorised under the issues mentioned above

reveals that there is no stud y as such particularl y concentrating on the

issues dealt with this stud y. Most of the studies have focused mainl y on

profitabilit y and the leverage issues. There are a few studies have been

conducted on choice of debt and equit y, debt equit y and profitabilit y, cost

of debt and risk and so on. But most of the studies are not in the context

of Indian corporate sector. In the era of better economic growth of our

country these issues are also not being examined. And no stud y is found

on evaluating the sector wide variation in debt choice. The present stud y

addresses the issues regarding the debt maturit y, choice of debt among:

bank, non bank, public and growth opportunit y and the debt policy. Th e

availabilit y and level of debt depend on several factors like nature of

24 | P a g e
business, the macroeconomic condition, the growth prospects and the risk

taking capacit y of the management. Most of the available studies have

also avoided these aspects while doing the anal ysis. The present stud y has

considered all these aspects for the anal ysis.

1.3 The Objectives of the Study

The objective of the stud y is to focus upon the issues associated with debt

capital in the Indian corporate sector. However, in specific terms the

following objectives are pursued through the study.

1. To review the trend of debt structure in Indian companies during the

period 2002- 2011.

2. To examine the choice among the different kinds of debt used by th e

Indian companies.

3. To investigate the potential determinants of the debt maturit y

structure of sample companies.

4. To examine the relationship between the growth of a compan y and

its dependence on long -term debt.

1.4 Methodology and the Sources of Data

The stud y is anal yt ical as well as an empirical one. Dealing with the

issues naturall y entails a thorough stud y of capital structure, financial

structure, financial planning, etc. in the context of corporate sector in

general and Indian corporate sector in particular. The secondary sources of

25 | P a g e
data such as research papers, articles, case studies & text books,

publications of RBI, SEBI, Capital Line database, Publications of stock

exchanges and other published & unpublished documents relating to the

stud y are considered for the study.

1.4.1 Data collection

The stud y is based on secondary data. The data have been collected from

Capital Line data base. The data is drawn from companies’ annual income

statement; balance sheet; cash flow statements and fund flow statements.

At present in India there are 1452 companies listed on the National Stock

Exchange as on 31st October 2011 and 4928 companies listed on Bombay

Stock Exchange as on 31st October 2011. Since Bombay Stock Exchange

500 index represents nearl y 93% of the total market capitalization on

Bombay Stock Exchange as well as it covers all 20 major industries of the

economy. The stud y considers Standard & Poor Bombay Stock Exchange

500 index as the population. A significant percent of the total population

is considered as a sample for the stud y. The anal ysis is made on the basis

of sector wise as per BSE sector classification as well as the sample taken

as a whole. Reserve Bank of India bulletin is used for collecting the

macroeconomic variables like Gross domestic product, wholesale price

index and prime lending rate, etc. The table 1.1 shows the sector wise

number of companies selected for the study.

26 | P a g e
 Table.1.1 The sector wise list of sample companies conceded for the
study
SL.NO Sector No. of. Com
1 Agriculture 18
2 Capital Goods 39
3 Chemical & Petrochemical 11
4 Consumer Durables 8
5 Diversified 8
6 FMCG 22
7 Healthcare 29
8 Housing Related 36
9 Information Technology 24
10 Media & Publishing 7
11 Metal, Metal Products & Mining 26
12 Miscellaneous 12
13 Oil & Gas 20
14 Power 17
15 Telecom 11
16 Textile 10
17 Transport Equipments 23
18 Total sample 321

1.4.2 Tools and techniques

The stud y used the balanced panel data for the anal ysis. A data set

contains observations on different objects studied over a period of time is

called panel data. It is the combination of cross-sectional data and time

series data. In balanced panel data same time period must be available for

all cross-sections.

To anal yze the various objectives the stud y proposes the panel least

squares with fixed and random effects. The most commonl y used ways of

assessing the relationship between debt and its determinants are the static

27 | P a g e
panel data models. There are three t ypes of panel data models: a pooled

Ordinary Least Squire (OLS) regression, panel model with random effects

and the panel model with fixed effects.

For testing the relevance of unobservable individual effects, we

used the LM test. This tests the null h ypothesis of irrelevance of

unobservable individual effects, against the alternative h ypothesis of the

relevance of unobservable individual effects. Not rejecting the null

h ypothesis, we conclude that unobservable individual effects are not

relevant, and so a pooled OLS regression would be an appropriate way of

carrying out an evaluation of debt determinants. On the contrary, if we

reject the null h yp othesis that unobservable individual effects are not

relevant, we can conclude that a pooled OLS regression is not the most

appropriate way of carrying out anal ysis of the relationship between debt

and its determinants.

However, there may be correlation between firms’ unobservable

individual effects and debt determinants. If there is no correlation

between firms’ unobservable individual effects and debt determinants, the

most appropriate way of carrying out evaluation is b y using a panel model

of random effects. If there is correlation between firms’ individual effects

and debt determinants, the most appropriate way of carrying out

evaluation is using a panel model admitting the existence of fixed effects.

For testing the possible existence of correlation, we use the Hausman test.

This tests the null h ypothesis of non-existence of correlation between

unobservable individual effects and the explanatory variables, in this

28 | P a g e
stud y, debt determinants, against the null h ypothesis of existence of a

correlation. By not rejecting the null hypothesis, we can conclude that

correlation is not relevant, and a panel model of random effects is the

most correct way of carrying out an evaluation of the relationship between

debt and its determinants. On the other hand, b y rejecting the null

h ypothesis, we conclude that the correlation is relevant, and so the most

appropriate way to carry out an evaluation of the relationship between

debt and its determinants is b y using a panel model of fixed effects. In

this study, we also present the evaluation of the most appropriate panel

model, according to the results of the LM and Hausman tests which is

consistent with the existence of first order autocorrelation. Further, unlike

other studies, we have also anal yzed the model of two-way effect in which

we assumed that compan y specific and period specific effects are random

as there is every possibilit y of the presence of both effects simultaneously.

As was alread y mentioned, static panel models do not allow us to

anal yze the possible d ynamism existing in compan y decisions when

choosing their capital structure. Next, we present the d ynamic panel

estimators, and their particular relevance, compared to static models, in

the stud y of choice of compan y capital structure. Besides the advantages

mentioned earlier, concerning the elimination of firms’ unobservable

individual effects, of greater control of endogenit y, use of dynamic panel

estimators also has the advantage of allowing us to determine the level of

adjustment of actual debt towards the optimal level of debt.

29 | P a g e
 However, Blundell and Bond (1998) conclude that when the

dependent variable is persistent, there being a high correlation between its

values in the current period and in the previous period, and the number of

periods is not very high, the GMM (1991) estimator is inefficient; the

instruments used to generall y being weak. In these circumstances,

Blundell and Bond (1998) extend the GMM (1991) estimator, considering

a s ystem with variables at level and first differences. For the variables at

the level in equation (6), the instruments are the variables lagged in first

differences. In the case of the variables in first differences in equation

(6), the instruments are those lagged variables at level. However the GMM

(1991) and GMM s ystem (1998) dynamic estimators can onl y be

considered robust on confirmation of two conditions: 1) if the restrictions

created, a consequence of using the instruments, are valid; and 2) there is

no second order autocorrelation. Therefore, to test the validit y of the

restrictions we use the Sargan test in the case of the GMM (1991)

estimator and the GMM s ystem (1998) estimator. The null h ypothesis in

the Sargan test indicates the restrictions imposed b y the use of the

instruments are valid against the alternative h ypothesis that the

restrictions are not valid. By rejecting the null h ypothesis, we conclude

that the estimators are not robust. Further, we also test for the existence of

first and second order autocorrelation through Arellano and Bond (1991)

test. The null h ypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation against the

alternative h ypothesis being the existence of autocorrelation. By rejecting

the null h ypothesis of the existence of second order autocorrelation, we

conclude that the estimators are not robust.

30 | P a g e
 Mover over we have used quantile regression too, because standard

least squares regression techniques provide summary point estimates that

calculate the average effect of the independent variables on the ‘average

compan y’. However, this focus on the average compan y may hide

important features of the underl ying relationship. As Mosteller and Tukey

(1977, pp266) correctl y argued, “What the regression curve gives a grand

summary for the averages of the distributions corresponding to the set of

x’s. We could go further and compute several regression curves

corresponding to the various percentage points of the distributions and

thus get a more complete picture of the set. Ordinaril y, this is not done,

and so regression often gives a rather incomplete picture. Just as the mean

gives an incomplete picture of a single distribution, so the regression

curve gives a correspondingl y incomplete picture for a set of

distributions”. Quantile regression techniques can therefore help us obtain

a more complete picture of the underl ying relationship between debt and

its determinants. In our case, estimation of linear models of quantile

regression may be preferable to the usual regression methods for a number

of reasons. First of all, we know that the standard least-squares

assumption of normall y distributed errors does not hold in our database

because the values of all variables in our case are not normal. While the

optimal properties of standard regression estimators are not robust to

modest departures from normalit y, quantile regression results are

characteristicall y robust to outliers and heav y tailed distributions. In fact,

the quantile regression solution

β̂ 0 is invariant to outliers of the

dependent variable that tend to ± ∞ (Buchinsky, 1994). Another advantage

31 | P a g e
is that, while conventional regressions focus on the mean, quantile

regressions is able to describe the entire conditional distribution of the

dependent variable. Finall y, a quantile regression approach avoids the

restrictive assumption that the error terms are identicall y distributed at all

points of the conditional distribution. Relaxing this assumption allows us

to acknowledge compan y heterogeneit y and consider the possibilit y that

estimated slope parameters vary at different quantiles of the conditional

distribution of all determents of debt.

The stud y has used STATA 11 and E-views 7 software’s for doing the

anal ysis. Tools used for different objectives have been explained in details

in the respective chapters.

1.4.3 Study period

The Indian economy started showing growth after introducing the new

economic policy in 1991. In true sense the economic growth of the countr y

was significant onl y in the 21 s t century. Therefore a period of 10 years,

2001-2002 to 2010-2011 is considered. The country’s Gross Domestic

Product started growing more than five percent every year during the

period 2001-2002 to 2010-2011. The same way the Foreign Direct

Investment was above 200 billion rupees in 2001-02, and touched 2198

Billion Rupee in 2010-11. Most importantl y Bombay Stock Exchange

Sensex was above 10,000 points and touched 20,000 points during the

stud y period.

32 | P a g e
1.4.4 Scope and significance of the study

The stud y is dealing with public limited companies listed in Bombay

Stock Exchange. The banking and finance companies are proposed to be

kept out of the scope of the stud y. Foreign companies also not considered

for the stud y. Companies incorporated in pursuance with the Indian

Companies Act and whose registered office is situated in India is onl y

considered. To anal yses the financial data of selected companies a period

of ten years from 2002-2011 is taken into consideration.

Studies relating to debt capital in the corporate sector are welcome

since it would amply enrich the empirical aspects of the subject. In

regards to the Indian corporate sector, a lot of advanced and

comprehensive studies have been undertaken b y different researchers and

institutions regarding the debt to equit y and capital structure.

Unfortunatel y, unlike the other problems, the debt capital has not been

able to draw the attention of researchers to an y noticeable extent. The

brief survey of the existing literature on different issues associated with

the Indian corporate sector indicates that there is no single comprehensive

stud y on the proposed issue. In specific terms, the present stud y occupies

significance, in view of the fact that no such stud y has ever been

attempted so far, with reference to debt capital in the Indian corporate

sector. More importantl y considerable expansion has taken place in the

Indian corporate sector in recent years. Therefore, the issues like the trend

of debt structure, composition of debt, determinants of debt maturit y, and

dependents on long -term debt, etc. cannot be ignored but requires special

attention through in depth stud y of the issues. A comprehensive stud y

33 | P a g e
incorporating the issues associated with debt capital in the Indian

corporate sector is the need of the hour.

1.5 Contribution

The present stud y gives a sketch of debt and liquidit y position of

Indian corporate sector in sector wise as well as sample companies taken

as a whole. The study may help the investors for making the right choice

of investment. It may provide them the basic idea about the debt level and

the leverage position of the Indian companies in sector wise. It may help

them to choose the safest sector in India to invest. This work will also

helpful for the rating agencies and international financial institutions to

rate the Indian corporate sector. The focus of the stud y will be helpful to

them to give signals to investors and the governments on the liquidit y

positions. The work may give clear indication to the financial institutions

mainl y corporate money lenders about the preference of various t ypes of

debt capital b y the companies in sector wise. The policy makers will get

an idea about the role of commercial banks pertaining to issue of

debentures, short-term and long-term loans etc, b y the Indian companies.

The stud y gives the status of the Indian debt market to the

Government of India, Indian debt market are more or less dependent on

the commercial banks. A small change in the banking sector will make a

significant change in Indian companies. To avoid that and make Indian

companies more independent. Government should take some policy

34 | P a g e
decision. Moreover, this stud y contributes to the various market regulators

of the country for rigid policy making to ensure safet y.

It contributes to the academic societ y by giving a nutshell of the

status of debt capital in Indian companies in sector wise. Moreover, this

stud y anal ysis the debt capital determinants in sector level with the help

of quantile regression. So it fills the research gap, giving deeper

determinants of debt capital of Indian companies. Moreover, it provides

the details of preference of debt capital of Indian companies in sector

wise, determinants of debt maturit y, the relationship between growth and

long-term debt.

1.6 Organization of the Study

The discourse is divided into six chapters, including the

Introduction and Conclusion. The subject matter is introduced in chapter-

I. Literature review, objectives, methodology, scope, etc. also discussed in

chapter-I. The debt structure in Indian companies is anal ysed in chapters

II. The choice among the different kinds of debt used by the Indian

companies is ex amined in chapter-III. The potential determinants of debt

maturit y of sample companies and, the relation between the growth of a

compan y and its dependents on long -term debt are reviewed in chapter-IV

and V respectivel y. Conclusion and suggestions are offered in chapter-VI.

35 | P a g e
1.7 Chapter Summary

The first chapter gives the brief introduction to the title followed b y

literature survey and research gap. The stud y has framed four objectives

based on the literature. Then gives a brief idea on the methodology used

for the anal ysis and the scope of the stud y.

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45 | P a g e
46 | P a g e
 CHPTER II

DEBT STRUCTURE OF INDIAN COMPANIES

2.1 Introduction
2.2 Debt to Equity Ratio
2.3 Trend of Debt Structure
2.4 Determinants of Debt capital in Indian companies
2.4.1 Variables and hypothesis
2.4.2 Model
2.5 Result and Interpretations
2.6 Findings
2.7 Chapter Summary
2.8 References

2.1 Introduction

Debt is a part of capital and it is a part of the capital structure of

every compan y. The level of debt in capital structure will vary from

Companies to compan y and industry to industry. As such there is no such

theory explaining the corporate debt structure. However, there are quite

number of stud y and theories of capital structure of corporations. Most of

the theories say that cost and benefit associated with the equit y and debt

will determine the capital structure. The various sources of debt capital

are banks, non bank financial institutions, public, government, group of

companies and foreign investors. And it is in man y forms as Bonds,

debenture, loans and deposits, etc. The most commonl y used debt capital

is bank loan followed b y debenture and bonds. The major theories that

explain the choice of capital structure are Trade-off theory and pecking

order theory the other theories like Net Income approach (NI), Net

47 | P a g e
Operating Income approach (NOI) and Modigliani & Miller (MM) theory

explains how the proportion of debt and equit y affect the total valuation

of the firm. According to trade off theory firms choose the level of debt -

equit y decision as trade-off between the interest Tax shield and cost of

financial distress. As per pecking order theory the firm uses first internal

capital to first, then move to debt fund and on final stage it will go for

equity.

Debt capital is the money borrowed from external sources having a

fixed rate of interest and maturit y period. Debt capital can be broadl y

divided on the basis of term of maturity and securit y offered On the

basis of maturity there is short-term and long-term debt. Short- term debts

are those which are having a maturit y period less than or up to one year. A

debt having a maturit y period more than one year is called long -term

debt. Security offered there is secured and unsecured debt. Secured debts

are those attached with an y collateral securit y or fixed assets of the firm.

And unsecured debts are those which do not offer an y security. In simple

word debt capital structure means the combination of various kinds of

debt used b y the firm in their capital structure as short- term and long-

term, secured and unsecured. Debt capital structure means the proportion

of secured and unsecured debt in the total debt capital of the compan y.

According to the nature of debt, it can be classified in two secured

debts and unsecured debt.

Secured debt: A secured loan is a loan in which the borrower

pledges some asset as collateral for the loan, which then becomes a

48 | P a g e
secured debt owed to the creditor who gives the loan. The debt is thus

secured against the collateral — in the event that the borrower defaults,

the creditor takes possession of the asset used as collateral and may sell it

to regain some or the entire amount originall y lent to the borrower.

Unsecured debt: it refers to an y t ype of loans or general obligation

that is not collateralised b y a lien on specific assets of the borrower in the

case of a bankruptcy or liquidation. In the event of the bankruptcy of the

borrower, the unsecured creditors will have a general claim on the assets

of the borrower after the specific pledged assets have been assigned to the

secured creditors, although the unsecured creditors will usuall y realize a

smaller proportion of their claims than the secured creditors. In other

words, it is a form of debt for money borrowed on which specific assets

have been pledged to guarantee payment. Unsecured debt: a form of debt

for money borrowed that is not backed b y the pledge of specific assets.

2. 2 Debt to Equity Ratio

The table 2.1 shows the level of debt in the capital structure of

companies in various sectors. FMCG, media& publishing and telecom

sectors shows the level of debt capital in the capital structure is

increasing. However the overall debt shows it declining. Consumer

durable and textile sectors are having debt equit y ratio more than 1. The

companies in this sector are highl y levered companies. Agriculture,

diversified and housing related sectors are having debt equity ratio more

than 0.8. These sectors are also having levered companies. The sectors

49 | P a g e
such as miscellaneous, oil & gas, power, telecom and transport equipment

having a debt equit y ratio more than 0.5. These sectors have more than

average debt in the capital structure. However, capital goods, chemical &

petrochemicals, FMCG, healthcare, information technology, media &

publishing and metal, metal products & mining sectors are having debt

equit y ratio less than 0.5. Moreover information technology sectors have

the lowest debt equity ratio 0.18. The overall capital structure of various

sectors confirms that most of the sectors are having low levered

companies. To get a better picture of the status of debt capital in Indian

companies we have checked the trend of debt structure of Indian

companies in sectors wise as well as overall sample.

50 | P a g e
 Table.2. 1 Debt to equity ratio of various sectors
SL.no Sector No. of. Com 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 Agriculture 18 1.11 1.15 0.89 0.68 0.65 0.82 0.85 0.92 0.84 0.90
2 Capital Goods 39 0.78 0.64 0.43 0.45 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.42 0.35 0.35
3 Chemical & Petrochemical 11 0.99 0.83 0.69 0.70 0.62 0.60 0.64 0.72 0.52 0.45
4 Consumer Durables 8 1.67 1.80 1.82 2.17 0.94 1.44 0.85 1.06 1.03 1.05
5 Diversified 8 0.73 0.59 0.57 0.76 0.90 1.24 0.75 1.05 1.10 0.84
6 FMCG 22 0.19 0.14 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.36
7 Healthcare 29 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.50 0.63 0.57 0.48 0.57 0.41 0.34
8 Housing Related 36 1.62 1.66 1.49 1.40 1.24 1.19 0.88 0.92 0.83 0.86
9 Information Technology 24 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.18
10 Media & Publishing 7 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.27 0.46 0.28 0.32 0.34 0.43 0.38
11 Metal,Metal Products & Mining 26 1.37 1.41 0.92 0.57 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.47
12 Miscellaneous 12 1.39 1.11 1.09 0.63 0.63 0.72 0.72 0.91 0.69 0.63
13 Oil & Gas 20 0.66 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.63 0.54 0.54
14 Power 18 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.53 0.64 0.63 0.69
15 Telecom 11 0.29 0.20 0.28 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.41 0.33 0.61
16 Textile 10 1.01 0.94 0.83 0.89 0.92 1.02 1.07 1.19 1.22 1.04
17 Transport Equipments 23 0.68 0.56 0.44 0.54 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.63 0.55 0.50
18 Total sample 321 0.70 0.61 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.61 0.55 0.55

51 | P a g e
 2.3 Trend of Debt Structure

Based on the collected data we have examined the trend of various

debt capitals with the help of a line chart. To see the trend of debt

capital in Indian firms during the last decade. We have calculated the

sector wise average first, and then prepared the line chart. The detailed

sector wise as well as sample companies, status of debt capital trends

is the following.

2.3.1 Sample companies:

Total debt capital is growing year b y year. From 640 cores in 2002,

it rises to 2562 cores in 2011. Secured debt rises from 385 cores in 2002

to 1311 cores in 2011. Unsecured debt increases from 254 cores in 2002 to

1247 cores in 2011. Long-term debt increases from 320 cores to 1221

cores in 2011 similarl y short-term debt increases from 315 cores in 2002

to 1340 cores in 2011. The figure 2.1 shows the ten year trend of debt

structure of sample companies taken as a whole.

The figure 2.2 shows the ten year trend of debt structure ratios of

sample companies taken as a whole. The debt equit y ratios had man y up

and downs. From 2002 – 2005 it showed a downward trend. From 1.08

times to equit y it comes down to 0.50 times. However, in the following

years, it showed an upward trend and again a downward movement in next

year finall y it's come down to 0.67 times to equit y. Long-term debt is

almost a straight line with minor fluctuations. From 0.43 times to total

debt in 2002 it reaches to 0.42 times to equit y in 2011. Short-term debt to

52 | P a g e
total debt shows
ws a similar trend as long-term
long term debt to total debt. From 0.49

times to total debt in 2002 it comes down to 0.46 times.

Figure 2.1 Debt

D ebt structures of sample companies

Secured debt to total debt also not showed much variation. From

0.63 times to total debt

deb t in 2002 it comes down to 0.53 times in 2011.

Unsecured debt to total debt is also almost a straight line. From 0.30 times

to total debt in 2002 it increases to 0.35 times in total debt.

Figure 2.2 Debt

D ebt structure ratios of sample companies

53 | P a g e
 2.3.2 Agriculture sector:

The figure 2.3 shows the ten year trend of debt structure of agriculture

sector. From 2002 – 2006 the total debt capital showing a slight decline

and it is in and around 400 cores. But from 2006 – 2011 it is showing a

sharp increase in the total debt capital. During this period the total debt

capital is increased from 400 to 1400 cores. In case of secured and

unsecured debt, a major part of debt capital is secured. In the initial

period secured debt is showing a Down ward and unsecured debt showing

an upward trend. And in 2007 both of them come closer. From 2007 -2008

in the one year period secured debt shows sharp increase and unsecured

debt a sharp decline. Both secured and unsecured debts showed a

proportionate increase in the level of debt capital between 2008-2010

periods

But in the financial year 2010-2011 secured once again showed a sharp

increase and unsecured debt showed a declined trend. In the initial

periods (2002- 2007) long-term debt was used more in the debt capital and

short-term debt less. However, from 2002 -2007 year b y year there a slight

increase in the long-term debt. At the same time short-term debt slight

decline from 2003-2005 and from 2005 on words it showed a sharp

increase. It crosses the long-term debt in between 2007- 2008 financial

year. From 200 cores total short-term debt increases to more than 800

cores over a period of 10 years, and the long-term debt from 300 to 600

cores.

54 | P a g e
 Figure 2.3 Debt
D ebt structures of agriculture sector

Figure 2.4 Debt

D structure ratios of agriculture
ure sector

The figure 2.4 shows the various debt structure ratios of agriculture

sector. The trend of debt to equit y shows that a sharp decline in level of

debt in proportion to equit y capital from 2003-

2003 2006 as 1.8 times to 0.8

times. However 2006-

2006 2011 it remains same in 0.8. Long
Long-term debt to

total debt is fluctuating in between 0.3 and 0.4 similar in the case of

short-term
term debt to total debt, it is fluctuating between 0.6 and 0.7 overall

55 | P a g e
both the ratio maintains 0.4 and 0.06 respectivel y. In case of secured debt

to total debt shows a slight decline from 0.7 to 0.6 over a period of ten

years from 2002 -2011. However the secured debt to total debt ratio is

fluctuating between 0.5 and 0.7. At the same time unsecured debt to total

debt is fluctuating between 0.3 and 0.4.

2.3.3 Capital Goods sector:

The figure 2.5 shows the ten year trend of debt structure of the

capital goods sector. The total debt capital showed a downward trend from

2002- 2004 as it comes down from 200 core to 150 core. But from 2004

onward the level of debt capital stated showing an upward trend up to

2011. It rises year by year from 150- 590 core. In case of secured debt, it

is declining in the initial periods 2002-2004 from150- 100 cores. 2004 –

2006 periods, it continues at 100 cores after that it started showing an

increasing trend till 2011 and the total secured debt touch 300 cores.

Similarl y unsecured debt also showing a slight decline after that it shows

an increasing trend. In capital goods sector more secured debt is emplo yed

than unsecured debt. In case long-term debt and short-term debt in the

initial periods, it is going hand to hand in 2002 short-term debt bit less

than 100 cores and long-term debt is a bit higher than 100 cores. At 2003

short- term debt goes up and reach slight 100 cores and long-term debt

come down around 80 cores. And in 2004 both come close to 70 cores;

however, in 2005 both lines touch each other and cross each other.

Moreover, in 2006- 2007 long-term debt become a bit higher than short-

term debt, but both shows an increasing trend

56 | P a g e
 Figure 2.5 Debt
D structures of capital goods sector

Again from 2007 long-term

long term debt declined and short-term
short debt

continues showing an increasing trend up to 2011 it raises as much as 304

cores from 73 cores. At the same time long-term

long term also started showing an

increasing trend from 2008 to 2011 period; it increases from 120 cores to

272 cores. This sector uses a more short-term

short term debt than long-term
long debt.

Figure 2.6 Debt

ebt structure ratios of capital goods sector

57 | P a g e
 The figure 2.6 shows the ten year trend of debt structure ratios of

capital goods sector. 2002 -2003 period the debt equit y ratio is almost 1.

From 2003- 2004 it sharpl y declined to 0.69 and remain unchanged for a

year. Again from 2005 on words, it started to decline sharply up to 2008

to 0.35. And for the next three years, it maintained the same level with

slight variations. Long-term debt to total debt is showing a slight increase

from 0.31to 0.39 periods between 2002 – 2006 after that it maintains the

same ratio up to 2008 then there again a slight decline to 0.36 through the

stud y period. Overall short-term debt to total debt is showing a decline

trend. It declined from 0.65 in 2002 to 0.45 in 2006. Then in shows a

slight upward trend and touched 0.51 in 2009 and again come down to

0.43 in 2011. Secured debt to total debt ratio is not shown much

fluctuation from 2002 to 2011. But it is showing a downward trend, as the

ratio come down from 0.65 to 0.51.

2.3.4 Chemicals & petrochemicals sector:

The figure 2.7 is describing the ten year trend of debt structure in

Chemicals & petrochemicals sector. From 2002-2004 total debt capital

showed a downward trend as it falls from 400 cores to 300 cores. But from

2004 – 2009 the debt capital showed an upward trend, it grows as man y as

687 cores. Then in 2010 it again reduced to 600 cores and maintains the

same level for the next period also. In the initial period of the stud y

secured debt is showing a downward trend at the same time unsecured debt

showing an upward trend and its cross each other in the year 2005.

Secured debt falls from 279 cores in 2002 to 164 cores in 2006 after that

58 | P a g e
in shows a slight upward trend and maintains the same level around 200

cores to the rest of the stud y period.

Figure 2.7 Debt

ebt structure of chemicals & petrochemicals sector

ebt structure ratios of chemicals & petrochemicals sector

Figure 2.8 Debt

From 2004 onwards unsecured debt started growing and there is a

sharp rise between 2007-2009

2007 2009 periods. It grows from 99 cores in 2004 to

481 cores in 2009 more than secured debt. Then 2010 fell down to 400

59 | P a g e
cores and then not much change. Long-term debt showed a minor

fluctuation in around 240 to 200 cores throughout the stud y period. At the

same time short-term debt shows not much variation up to the period

2007. In 2007- 2009 periods, it grows sharpl y from 145 cores to 467

cores, then fall down to 372 cores in 2010 then again a slight increase to

384 cores in 2011.

According to the figure 2.8 Debt to equit y ratio sharpl y declines

from 1.13 to 0.04 in 2002 2004 period. In 2004- 2005 it rises from 0.04 to

0.67 and maintain with a little fluctuation up to 2009. From 2009 on

words, it sated decline and reach 0.45 in 2011 overall the debt equit y ratio

showed a downward trend. Long-term debt to total debt overall, showed a

decline trend with some up and downs. It falls from 0.55 in 2002 to 0.33

in 2011. But short-term debt showed an upward trend, it grows from 0.44

to 0.56. Secured debt to total debt shows a decline trend. It declined from

0.61 in 2002 to 0.39 in 2011. Short-term debt to total debt showed an

upward trend, it rises from 0.38 in 2002 to 0.51 in 2011.

2.3.5 Consumer durables sector:

Total debt capital, secured and unsecured debt, long-term and short-

term debt all the debt capital shows a similar trend in the case of

consumer durable sectors. Total debt capital shows a sharp increase from

2005 on words, it rises to the extent that 198 cores from 2002 to 2111

cores in 2011. Secured debt increases from 120 cores in 2002 to 1290

cores in 2011. Unsecured debt increases from 78 cores to 871 cores. Long-

term debt increases from 110 cores to 916 cores and short-term debt

60 | P a g e
increases from 87 cores to 1195 cores in the stud y period. The figure 2.9

shows the graphical representation of ten year trend of debt structure in

the consumer durable sector

Figure 2.9 Debt

D ebt structure of consumer durables sector

Figure 2.10 Debt

ebt structure ratios of consumer durables sector

Debt to equit y ratio in 2002 – 2004 periods went to negative. It falls

from 2.86 to -13.48

13.48 in 2002 -2003
2003 and then increase to -0.38 in 2004.

From 2003 onwards it increases sharpl y up to 2007 as it reaches again 2.2

61 | P a g e
equit y capital. From 2007 onwards it shows downward trend and in 2011

the ratio comes down to 0.64 of equit y capital. Long-term debt to total

debt showed a downward trend, it comes down from 0.51 in 2002 to 0.24

in 2011. Short-term debt to total debt is showing an upward movement in

year b y year. As it increases from 0.48 in 2002 to 0.72 in 2009, then it is

declining to 0.62 in 2011. Secured debt to total debt fluctuate the entire

stud y period between 0.58- 0.69. Unsecured debt to total debt showing a

downward trend, it slips from 0.41 in 2002 to 0.24 in 2011. The figure

2.10 shows the graphical representation of ten year trend of debt structure

ratios in the consumer durable sector.

2.3.6 Diversified sector:

This sector also shows the similar trend like consumer durables.

Secured and unsecured debt, long-term and short-term debt all the debt

capital shows a proportionate flow along with total debt capital. From

2002- 2003 there is a slight decline in the total debt capital, secured and

unsecured debt, short-term and long-term debt. But 2003 in words up 2010

all the debt capital increases and in 2011 all started showing a downward

trend. Overall the total debt grown from 285 cores to 1313 cores, secured

debt raises 234 cores to 642 cores; unsecured debt rises from 50 cores to

670 cores, long-term debt increases from 164 cores to 668 cores and short-

term debt e rises from 121 cores to 644 cores during the stud y period.

The figure 2.11 shows the ten year trend of debt structure of the

diversified sector.

62 | P a g e
 Figure 2.11 Debt structure of diversified sector

Figure 2.12 Debt

D ebt structure ratios of diversified sector

Debt equit y ratio showed a declining trend in the initial period, it

falls from 0.76 in 2002 to 0.54 in 2004. After that it showed a sharp

increase, the ratio went up to 1.19 in 2007. Again, it comes down to 0.71

in 2011. At the end of the ten year period the ratio does not have much

change. Long-term
term debt to total debt maintained a same level with minor

63 | P a g e
fluctuations in the stud y period. However, it declined from 0.48 in 2002

to 0.35 in 2011. Short-term debt to total debt not fluctuate much between

the period 2002-2005 as it maintain 0.5 from 2005 onwards it started

declining slightl y and reach 0.44 in 2010. But in 2011 it sharpl y increases

to 0.64. Secured debt to total debt shows a downward trend from 2003 on

words. Unsecured debt to total debt shows an immediate downfall from

2002- 2003. From 2003 onwards shows an upward trend. It rises 0.19 in

2003 to 0.57 in 2011. The figure 2.12 shows the ten year trend of debt

structure ratios of the diversified sector.

2.3.7 FMCG sector:

The figure 2.13 represents the trend of the FMCG sector. With the

total debt capital all the categories of debt capital show a proportionate

increase over the stud y period. Total debt capital increase from 104 cores

to 681cores, secured debt rises from 60 cores to 446 cores, unsecured debt

increases from 36 cores to 223 cores, long-term debt grown from 42 cores

to 374 cores and short-term debt rises from 61 cores to 306 cores.

Debt to equit y ratio is showing a downward trend with fluctuations

in year b y year. But overall it declined from 1.06 in 2002 to 0.61 in 2011.

Long-term debt to total debt is fluctuating year b y year but not making

man y deviations Debt to equit y ratio is showing a downward trend with

fluctuations in year b y year. But overall it declined from 1.06 in 2002 to

0.61 in 2011. Long-term debt to total debt is fluctuating year b y year but

not making man y deviations.

64 | P a g e
 Figure 2.13 Debt
ebt structure of FMCG sector

Figure 2.14 Debt

D ebt structure ratios of FMCG sector

In 2002 it was 0.37 and at the end of the stud y period after a lot of

fluctuations it reaches 0.33. Short-term

Short term debt to total debt also in the

similar to long-term
term debt in 2002 it was around 0.53 and then it shows

downward trend in the following years and showed

s howed upward movement and

65 | P a g e
reaches again 0.53 in 2010. But after that it declined to 0.39 in 2011.

Secured debt to total debt shows an up word movement in the initial

periods of the stud y. From 0.48 in 2002 it rises to 0.64 in 2006. But from

2006 on word it started declining and reaches 0.36 in 2011. Unsecured

debt to total debt is not fluctuated much in the stud y period. During the

initial periods, it declined from 0.39 in 2002 to as much as 0.25 in 2005.

From 2005 on the word in started showing an upward movement till 2009

and the ratio reach 0.38 again. But then it fell down to 0.32 in 2011. The

figure 2.14 shows the ten year trend of debt structure rations in FMCG

sector.

2.3.8 Healthcare sector:

The figure 2.15 shows the graphical representation of ten year trend

of debt structure in the healthcare sector. The entire debt capital showed

an upward movement. Total debt has been increased from 123 cores in

2002 to 832 cores in 2011. Secured debt rises from 83 cores in 2002 to

402 in 2011. At the same time unsecured debt was 40 cores in 2002 less

than secured, but in 2011 it reaches to 429 cores more than secured debt.

Long-term debt showed an upward movement throughout the stud y period

except in 2010. In 2010 it showed a downward trend, but again went up in

2011. During the stud y period long-term debt rises from 69 cores to 450

cores. Short-term debt rises from 54 cores to 381 cores in a ten year

period

66 | P a g e
 Figure 2.15 Debt
ebt structure of healthcare sector

Figure 2.16 Debt

D ebt structure ratios of healthcare sector

Debt to equit y ratio shows a lot of fluctuations year b y year. In

2002 it was 0.65 times of equit y capital 2003 rises to 0.69 times. But in

2004 it reduced to 0.59 and in 2005 on word it started showing upward

movement
ovement till 2006 and it reaches to 0.86. However, from 2007 again went

up to 0.66 words. And overall at the end of the stud y period, it is 0.49

times of equit y capital. Long-term

Long term debt to total debt shows the similar

67 | P a g e
trend as a debt equity ratio. 2002 – 2004 period, it is showing a downward

trend, it falls from 0.44 to 0.33. But in following years, it shows an

upward movement and reaches 0.47 in 2006. However, after 2006 it

started showing downward trend and the ratio falls to 0.39 in 2011 after

lot of up and downs. Short-term debt to total debt fluctuates between 0.50

and 0.59. In 2002 short-term debt was 0.51 times to total debt and in 2011

it 0.53 times of total debt capital. Secured debt to total debt shows a

downward trend. From 0.57 to total debt in 2002 it is reduced to 0.37 in

2007. However, from 2007 on word it started showing a slight upward

movement. And the secured debt recovers to 0.45 to total debt in 2011.

Unsecured debt to total debt overall shows an upward trend. In 2002 it

was 0.38 times of total debt and increases year b y year and touched 0.59

times of total debt. Later in starting reducing and come down to 0.47

times of total debt in 2011. The figure 2.16 shows the graphical

representation of ten year trend of debt structure of the healthcare sector.

2.3.9 Housing related sector:

The figure 2.17 shows the ten year trend of debt structure in

housing related sector. The total debt capital with all sub categories shows

an upward movement. Total debt is having a slow growth up to 2006. But

from 2006 on words, it shows a rapid growth in year b y year. From 328

cores in 2002 it rose to 2560 in 2011. Secured debt and long-term debt

show the similar trend of total debt and it contributes more in total debt

capital. From 248 cores secured debt jump to 1931 cores in 2011 and the

long-term debt rose from 228 cores to 1831 cores during the stud y period.

68 | P a g e
Unsecured debt and short-term
shor term debt show a similar trend. Both are not

showing much growth. Unsecured debt increase from 76 cores in 2002 to

627in 2011. At the same time short-term

short term debt increases from 99 cores to

728 cores in the ten year period.

Figure 2.17 Debt structure of housing

ousing related sector

Figure 2.18 Debt

ebt structure ratios of housing related sector

Debt to equit y ratio has shown a decline trend throughout the stud y

period. It fell down from 1.87 to 0.88 to equit y capital during the stud y

period. Long-term
term debt to total debt shows a slight increase and not

69 | P a g e
showing man y fluctuations throughout the stud y period. From 0.45 in

2002 to total debt the ratio increases to 0.57 to total debt in 2011. Short-

term debt to total debt is almost stud y lined with minor fluctuations. In

2002 to the ratio is 0.45 in total debt and in 2011 it was 0.42 in total debt.

Secured debt to total debt showed a steady trend in the initial periods that

is 2002- 2005. From 2005 onwards started to decline slightl y up to 2008.

And from 2008 it started showing an upward movement till 2011. The

figure 2.18 represents the ten year trend of debt structure ratios of housin g

related sector.

Unsecured debt to total debt is showing the similar trend like

secured debt to total debt. The initial period of the study it shows a

straight line after that little bit upward movement after that come to the

same past level. 2002 the ratio was 0.21 in total debt and at the end of the

stud y period, it was 0.23 in total debt. The figure 16 shows the ten year

trend of debt structure of housing related sector.

2.3.10 Information technology sector:

The figure 2.19 shows the ten year trend of debt structure of

information technology sector. In the initial periods of the stud y this

sector holds a very low level of debt capital compared to other sector and

it continue up to 2006. But from 2006 on words there a rapid increase in

debt capital up to 2010 and in 2011 it showed a declining trend. The total

debt was 21.50 cores in 2002 and 48 cores in 2006 then it rises to 588

cores in 2011. Secured debt and long-term debt show the same trend.

70 | P a g e
Secured debt is i17. 7 cores in 2002 and in 2008 it becomes 28 cores,

reaches 187 cores in 2011. Same time long-term debt was 14 cores in 2002

and in 2006 it has grown to 23 cores and end up with 2011 as 173 cores.

Unsecured debt and short-term debt also show a similar trend like secured

and long-term debt. Like other debts the initial period, both are not

changed much. After 2006 it showed a sharp increase up to 2010 and in

2011 it showed a decline trend. But overall it rises. From 3.7 cores

unsecured debt increase to 25 cores in 2006 and rises to 444 cores to 2010

and then come down to 401 cores in 2011. Similarly, short-term debt was

7.4 cores in 2002 then increase to 25 cores in 2006 and then again grown

to 453 cores in 2010 and decline to 414 cores in 2011.

The figure 2.20 shows the trend of debt structure in the information

technology sector. Debt to equit y ratios shows a lot of fluctuations in this

sector. Overall, it shows an upward trend during the stud y period. In 2002

debt capital was 0.19 time of equit y capital, and then it went up in the

following years and again decline and reached 0.19 in 2006. Then from

2006 it started showing upward trend and touched the debt capital as 0.33

time of equit y capital in 2009. But from 2009 it started declining and

become 0.29 times of equit y capital. Long-term debt to total debt reaches

the same position where it started in 2002 after a lot of fluctuations. It

was 0.36 times to total debt in 2002 and increases to 0.53 times of total

debt in 2007 and then decline to 25 times to total debt in 2010, then

increases to 0.31 times in 2011. Short-term debt to total debt also shows a

similar trend. In 2002 it was 0.46 times to total debt and then increases to

71 | P a g e
0.48 in 2003. After that it declined in the following years and reduced to

0.34 times
mes total debt in 2007. From 2007 onward it started showing

upward movement at touched in 2009. Then again fell down to 0.43 times

to total debt in 2011. Short-term

Short term debt to total debt crosses the long-term
long

debt to total debt at 2006 and 2008.

Figure 2.19 Debt

ebt structure of information technology sector

Figure 2.20 Debt

ebt structure ratios of information technology sector

72 | P a g e
Secured debt to total debt shows a downward trend. It was 0.66 times to

total debt in 2002 become 0.42 times in 2011. Unsecured debt to total debt

shows an increasing trend form 0.17 times to total debt in 2002 it went up

to 0.32 times to total debt in 2011.

2.3.11 Media & publishing sector:

Total debt capital and all other subdivisions of debt capital show an

upward trend under media and publishing sector. Total debt was 71 cores

in 2002 rises to 422 cores in 2011. Secured debt from 47 cores in 2002

rises to 147 cores in 2011. Unsecured debt was 24 cores in 2002 and went

up to 275 cores in 2011. Long-term debt was 32.75 cores in 2002 and

grown to 160 cores in 2011. Short-term debt was 38 cores in 2002

increases to 262 cores in 2011. The figure 2.21 shows the ten year trend of

debt structure in media and publishing sector.

The figure 2.22 shows the ten year trend of debt structure ratios of

Media & publishing sector. The debt equit y ratio shows a stead y upward

trend. The debt capital from 0.23 times to equit y capital in 2002 rises to

1.78 times to equit y capital at 2011. Long-term debt shows an up and

down trend in 2002 it was 0.39 times to total debt and then fell down in

2003 and again rises in 2004- 2006 period to 0.51 times of total debt

capital. Again shown a decline trend from 2006 -2007 and remain same in

2008 as 0.31 times in total debt capital. In 2009 it rises after that decline

and finall y reaches in 2011 as 0.33 times to debt capital. Short-term debt

to total debt rises in the initial period from 0.32 times to debt capital in

73 | P a g e
2002 to 1.79 times in 2004. From 2004 -2005
2005 it fell down to 0.34 times.

And again increasess 0.59 in 2005 -2010

2010 period. From 0.59 times to total

debt it comes down to 0.38 times in 2011.

Figure 2.21 Debt

ebt structures in media & publishing sector

Figure 2.22 Debt

ebt structure ratios of media & publishing sector

74 | P a g e
 Secured debt to total debt shows also up and downs in year by year.

But overall it shows a downward trend. It comes down from 0.56 time’s to

total debt in 2002 to 0.42 times in 2011. Unsecured debt to total debt

shows man y fluctuations, but it shows an upward trend. From 0.14 times

to total debt in 2002 it went up to 0.28 times in 2011.

2.3.12 Metal, metal products & mining sector:

The total debt capital and all the subdivisions show an upward

trend. Total debt has been shows a declining trend in the initial periods

from 2002 – 2005 from 2005 on words, it sharpl y increases every year till

the end of the stud y period. From 1227 cores in 2002 it rises to 4591 cores

in 2011. Similarl y secured debt shows a downward trend between 2002-

2005 periods and then shows upward movement. It increases from 883

cores in 2002 to 2290 cores in 2011. Unsecured debt also showed an

upward trend as it increases from 343 cores in 2002 to 2301 cores in 2011.

Long-term debt shows a similar trend as secured debt. From 807 cores in

2002 to it rises to 2628 cores in 2011. Short-term debt is also rises hand

to hand with unsecured debt. From 420 cores in 2002 it increases to 1963

cores in 2011. The figure 2.23 shows the ten year trend of debt structure

in metal, metal products & mining sector.

Debt to equit y ratio is man y up and down year b y year. But overall

shows a downward trend. In 2002 it was 1.16 times to equity capital and

in 2003 rise to 1.44 times to equit y capital. Then onwards it shows a

downward trend and reaches to 0.80 times to equit y capital at 2011. Long-

75 | P a g e
term debt to total debt is showing a minor up and down. It was 0.57 times

to total debt in 2002 reduced to 0.43 times to total debt in 2011. Short-
Short

term debt to total debt shows an upward trend. From 0.34 times to total

debt in 2002 it rises to 0.48 times to total debt in 2011.

Figure 2.23 Debt

ebt structures in metal, metal products & mining sector

Figure 2.24 Debt

ebt structure ratios of metal, metal products & mining
sector

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 Secured debt to total debt shows an upward movement from2002 -

2004 period as it rises from 0.69 to 0.73 times to total debt. 2004- 2008 it

shows a downward trend, it fell down from 0.73 to 0.54 times to total

debt. Then again went up in 2009- 2010 periods at 0.58 and come down to

0.52 times to total debt in 2011. Unsecured debt to total debt showed an

upward movement without much up and downs. From 0.23 times to total

debt in 2002 it went up to 0.40 times to total debt in 2011. The figure

2.24 shows the ten year trend of debt structure ratios of metal, metal

products & mining sector.

2.3.13 Miscellaneous sector:

Total debt capital and secured debt showing a similar trend during

the stud y period. Total debt slight increase in 2002-2004 period from 257

cores to 292 cores. Then decline to 234 cores in 2005. From 2005 onwards

it showed an upward movement till 2009 and the total debt rises to 728

cores. After that in 2010 it decline to 676 cores, but in 2011 again rises to

732 cores. Secured debt showed an upward trend, from 220 cores in 2002

rises 515 cores in 2011. Unsecured debt shows a not much variation

between 2002 – 2005 periods. After that it shows an up word trend. In

2002 it was 37 cores and touched 217 cores in 2011. Lo ng-term debt

shows an upward trend. It increases from 121 cores in 2002 to 398 cores

in 2011. Short-term debt shows a downward trend from 2002 to 2005

period. This period the short-term debt comes down from 136 cores to 74

cores. From 2005 – 2011 it showed an up word trend and reaches the total

77 | P a g e
short-term
term debt to 333 cores in 2011. The figure 2.25 shows the ten year

trend of debt structure in miscellaneous

mi sector.

Figure 2.25 Debt

D ebt structure of miscellaneous sector

Figure 2.26 Debt

ebt structure ratios of miscellaneous sector

Debt to equit y ratio is having ups and downs; however, up to the

year 2009 it shows an upward trend. From 0.44 times to equit y the debt

78 | P a g e
capital rises to 1 times in equit y in 2009. Then the debt capital decline in

the following years and comes down to 0.72 times to equit y capital. Long-

term debt to total debt increases in initial periods and then started to

decline slightl y. Long-term debt was 0.34 times to total debt in 2002 and

increases to 0.59 in 2007 and then reduced to 0.46 times to total debt in

2011.

Short-term debt to total debt has shown a downward trend. It

reduced from 0.57 times to total debt in 2002 to 0.25 times to total debt in

2009, then rises to 0.37 times in 2011. Secured debt to total debt shows

several up and downs during the stud y period. However, it shows a

downward trend. From 0.70 times to total debt in 2002 to it is reduced to

0.55 times to total debt in 2011.unsecured debt to total debt also have up

and downs but the fluctuations are minor. But overall it shows an upward

trend. From 0.20 times to total in 2002 it increases to 0.27 times to total

debt in 2011. The figure 2.26 shows the ten year trend of debt structure

ratios of miscellaneous sector.

2.3.14 Oil & gas sector:

The total debt capital and all the subdivisions of it show an upward

trend under oil and gas sector. The total debt rises from 3172 cores in

2002 to 10720 cores in 2011. Secured debt and long-term debt show the

similar trend. Both showed an upward trend, but the growth is negligible.

Secured debt rises to 1677 cores in 2002 to 3064 cores in 2011. Long-term

79 | P a g e
debt rises from 1372 cores in 2002 to 2299 cores in 2011. Unsecured debt

and short-term
term debt grow significantl y. Unsecured debt was 1494 cores in

2002 went
ent up to 7656 cores in 2011. At the same time short-term
short debt

increases from 1800 cores in 2002 to 8421 cores in 2011. The figure 2.27

represents the ten year trend of restructuring in oil and gas sector.

Figure: 2.27 Debt

D ebt structure in oil & gas sector

Figure 2.28 Debt

ebt structure ratios of oil and gas sector

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 The figure 2.28 shows the ten year trend of debt structure ratios of

oil and gas sector debt to equit y ratio shows a straight downward trend

from 2002 to 2005. It falls from 1.3 to equit y capital to 0.67 times. Then

shows slight upward trend and maintain the same level. Finally, at the end

of 2011 it was 0.76 times to equit y capital. Long-term debt to total debt,

short-term debt to total debt shows almost a straight line without man y

fluctuations. It was 0.34 times to total debt in 2002 increases to 0.48

times to total debt. However, short-term debt to total debt reduces from

0.55 times to total debt in 2002 to 0.46 times in 2011. Secured debt total

debt and unsecured debt to total debt also shows a similar trend like short-

term and long-term debt to total debts. Secured debt was 0.50 times to

total debt in 2002 to reduce to 0.45 times to total debt in 2011. Unsecured

debt to total debt rises from 0.39 times to total debt in 2002 to 0.49 times

to total debt in 2011.

2.3.15 Power sector:

The table 2.29 shows the ten year trend of debt structure in power

sector. Total debt capital shows a straight upward trend without an y

fluctuations. Debt capital rises more than three times during the stud y

period. It rises from 2513 cores in 2002 to 8506 cores in 2011. Secured

debt and long-term debt also show a similar trend like total debt. Secured

debt increases from 1122 cores in 2002 to 5455 cores in 2011. Long-term

debt rises from 949 cores to 5534 cores in 2011. Unsecured debt and

short-term debt also showed an upward trend, however the growth level

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was low. From 1375 cores in 2002 it increases to 2996 cores in 2011 and

short-term
term debt from 1564 cores in 2002 to 2972 cores in 2011.

Figure 2.29 Debt structure of power sector

Figure 2.30 Debt

D ebt structure ratios of power sector

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 The figure 2.30 shows the ten year trend of the debt structure ratio

of power sector. Debt to equit y ratio bit falls from 1.03 times to equit y to

0.92 between 2002- 2004. Then the following year it sharpl y rises to 1.71

times to equit y. In 2006-2008 again come down to 0.49 times to equit y.

Finall y, in 2011 it touches 0.75 times to equit y capital. Long-term debt to

total debt shows some up and down, but it showed upward movement.

From 0.49 times to debut in 2002 it rises to 0.64 times to total debt in

2011. The level of Short-term debt to total debt reduces in 2002- 2004

periods from 0.38 to 0.30 times to total debt. Then increase to 0.44 times

in 2007. After then it is declining to 0.29 times to total debt of 2011.

Secured debt to total debt showed an overall upward trend. It rises from

0.57 times in 2002 to 0.64 times 2011. Unsecured debt to total debt is

almost a straight line with minor variations. It was 0.30 times to total debt

in 2002 finall y in 2011 it slightl y down to 0.28 times to equity.

2.3.16 Telecom sector:

The figure 2.31 shows the ten year trend of debt structure of

telecom sector. Total debt capital rises more than six times in between the

stud y period. From 526 cores in 2002 it rises to 2051 cores in 2009 and

then fell down to 1856 cores in 2010. But from 2010-2011 it showed a

sharp rise and reached 3799 cores in 2011. Secured debt and long-term

debt show a similar trend. Both showed an upward trend. Secured debt

increases from 204 cores in 2002 to 1355 cores in 2011. Long-term debt

rises from 324 cores in 2002 to 1443 cores in 2011. Unsecured debt and

short-term debt show same movement as total debt. From 321 cores in

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2002 unsecured debt went up to 2444 cores in 2011. Short-term
Short term debt rises

from 201 cores in 2002 to 2356 cores in 2011.

Figure 2.31 Debt

D structure of telecom sector

Figure 2.32 Debt

D ebt structure ratios of telecom sector

The figure 2.32 shows the ten year trend of debt structure ratios of

Telecom sector. Debt to equit y ratios shows up and downs during the

stud y period. From 2002-

2002 2004 it went up slightl y as 1.24-1.39
1.39 times to

84 | P a g e
equit y capital. In 2005 in fall down drasticall y to -3.34 times in equit y.

2006 again recovered and reached 0.33 times to equit y. But in 2008 it fell

down to -0.37. Finally, in 2011 it reaches to 0.16 times to equity. Long-

term debt to total debt also shows up and downs. In 2002 it was 0.48 times

to total debt and come down to 0.37 times to total debt in 2011. Short-

term debt to total debt shows a downward trend in initial periods then

recovered. In 2002 it was 0.42 times to total debt and then started

declining in the following years and touched 0.31 times to total debt in

2006. But from 2006 it showed an upward trend and rises to 0.44 times to

total debt. Secured debt rises little up in 2002-2003 periods after that it

showed a downward trend till 2011. Overall from 0.57 times to total debt

it comes down to 0.36 times. Unsecured debt to total debt also showed up

and downs. Form 0.33 times to total debt rises to 0.45 times in 2011.

2.3.17 Textile sector:

Total debt shows an upward movement without man y fluctuations.

From 677 cores in 2002 the total debt went up to 2465 cores in 2011.

Secured debt rises from 493 cores in 2002 to 2273 cores in 2011.

Unsecured debt is almost a straight line. From 183 cores in 2002 it moved

to 192 cores in 2011. Long-term debt rises from 266 cores in 2002 to 1659

cores in 2011. Similarl y, short-term debt increases from 281 cores to 791

cores in 2011. The figure 2.33 shows the ten year trend of debt structure

in Textile sector.

Debt to equit y ratio had man y fluctuations. From 1.24 times to

equit y in 2002 it went to the minis ratio in 2005 at -6.67 times to equit y.

85 | P a g e
Then recovered and rises at touched 2.04 times in equit y in 2010 then

again decline to 1.25 in equit y in 2011. Long-term

Long term debt to total debt

shows an upward movement. It rises from 0.378 times to total debt in 2002

to 0.53 times to total debt in 2011.

Figure 2.33 Debt structure of textile sector

Figure 2.34 Debt

D ebt structure ratios of textile sector

Short-term
term debt to total debt has several minor up and downs. From

0.49 times to total debt, it fell down to 0.37 times in 2011. Secured debt

86 | P a g e
to total debt has risen from 0.75 times to total debt in 2002 to 0.86 times

in 2011. Unsecured debt to total debt declined from 0.24 times to total

debt in 2002 to 0.13 times to total debt in 2011. The figure 2.34 shows the

ten year trend of debt structure of telecom sector.

2.3.18 Transport equipment sector.

The figure 2.35 shows the ten year trend of debt structure in the

transport equipment sector. Total debt is rising from 419 cores in 2002 to

1695 cores in 2011. Secured debt rises from 283 cores to 844 cores in

2011. Unsecured debt rises from 135 cores in 2002 to 851 cores in 2011.

Long-term debt rises from 258 cores in 2002 to 795 cores in 2011. Short-

term debt showed little up and downs, but overall it rises from 161 cores

in 2002 to 899 cores in 2011.

The figure 2.36 shows the Ten year trend of debt structure ratios of

the transport equipment sector. The debt equit y ratio is shown an upward

movement during 2002 – 2006 periods. It rises from 1.06 times in equit y

to 1.27 times. Then fell down to 0.79 in 2007 after that it again rises and

fell down finall y it reached 0.89 times to equit y in 2011. Long-term debt

shows a downward trend year b y year with minor fluctuations. 0.51 times

to total debt in 2002 to it come down to 0.34 times to total debt in 2011.

Short-term debt to total debt shows a slight upward trend. It increases

from 0.48 times to total debt in 2002 to 0.65 times to total debt in 2011.

Secured debt to total debt showed a bit downward trend during 2004- 2006

periods then almost a straight line. From 0.61 times to total debt in 2002

short-term debt to total debt comes down to 0.52 times to total debt.

87 | P a g e
Unsecured debt total debt showed an upward trend in 2004 – 2006 period,

then almost not showing much changes. The ratio rises from 0.38 times to

total debt in 2002 to 0.47 times to total debt in 2011.

Figure 2.35 Debt

ebt structure of transport equipment sector

Figure 2.36 Debt

ebt structure ratios of transport equipment sector

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2.4 Determinants of Debt Capital in Indian Companies

2.4.1 Variables and hypothesis

Based on the above anal yzed literature we have identified the possible

determinants of debt capital. Following are the elements of debt capital:

• Asset structure:

Agency theory suggests that firms with large fixed assets have

comparative advantage in obtaining long-term debt, whereas firms with

high sales relative to fixed assets have a comparative advantage in

borrowing over shorter periods. Harris and Raviv, (1991) indicate as per

the pecking order theory perspective, firms with less fixed assets are more

sensitive to informational as ymmetries. These firms will thus issue debt

rather than equit y when they need external financing leading to an

expected negative relation between the importance of asset structure and

debt capital. In this stud y, we are taking net fixed assets to total asset

(NFATA) as a prox y for Asset structure.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between asset structure and the

level of debt capital

H 0 : There is a negative relationship between asset structure and the level

of debt capital

• Profitability:

Pecking order theory suggests firms will use retained earnings first as

investment funds and then move to bonds and new equit y onl y if

necessary. Chang (1999) says profitable firms tend to use less debt. There

are some recent studies Wald (1999) for developed countries,

89 | P a g e
Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Booth et al. (2001) for developing

countries. Long and Maltiz (1985) find leverage to be positively related to

profitabilit y. In this stud y, profitabilit y is defined as earnings before

interest and tax divided b y sales (EBITSA). We are expecting a direct or

inverse relationship between profitabilit y and debt capital.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between profitability and the level

of debt capital

H 0 : There is significant relationship between profitability and the level of

debt capital

• Debt capacit y:

It measures the abilit y of a firm to pay interest on debt. In other

words the number of times the interest charges are covered by funds that

is ordinaril y available for their payments. We have taken interest

coverage ratio as a prox y for measuring the debt capacit y (INTCOVER).

The stud y expects a positive relationship between debt capacit y and the

level of debt capital.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between debt capacity and the

level of debt capital

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between debt capacity and the level of

debt capital

• Non-debt tax s hield:

According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), if interest payments on

debt are tax-deductible, firms with positive taxable income have an

incentive to issue more debt. That is, the main incentive for borrowing is

90 | P a g e
to take advantage of interest tax shields. In the framework of the trade-off

theory, one h ypothesizes a negative relationship between leverage and

non-debt tax shields. The ratio of depreciation to total assets (DEPTA) has

been taken as a measure of non-debt tax shield.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between non-debt tax shields and

the level of debt capital

H 0 : There is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and the

level of debt capital

• Credit worthiness:

It measures the firm’s abilit y to meet the occurrence and non-

occurrence of certain contingent liabilities. Net worth, i.e., equit y plus

reserve (NW) is taken to measure the credit worthiness. The stud y expects

a positive relationship between credit worthiness and debt capital.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between credit worthiness and the

level of debt capital

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between credit worthiness and the

level of debt capital

• Size:

From the theoretical point of view, the effect of size of leverage is

ambiguous. As Rajan and Zingales (1995) claim: “Larger firms tend to be

more diversified and fail less often, so size computed as the natural

logarithm of total sales (LNSA) may be an inverse prox y for the

probabilit y of bankruptcy. If so, size should have a positive impact on the

suppl y of debt.

91 | P a g e
H 1 : There is no significant relationship between size and the level of debt

capital

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between size and the level of debt

capital

The stud y has taken three macroeconomic variables such as economic

growth, interest rate and foreign direct investment

• Economic growth:

At what fast the econom y is growing. Gross Domestic Product at

constant price (GDP) has taken as a proxy for measuring economic growth

of debt capital. We are expecting a positive relationship between

economic growth and debt capital.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between economic growth and the

level of debt capital

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between economic growth and the

level of debt capital

• Interest rate:

Prime lending rates (PLR) are the prox y for measuring the impact of

interest rate on debt capital. We are expecting an inverse relation between

interest rate and debt capital.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between interest rate and the level

of debt capital

H 0 : There is a negative relationship between economic growth and the

level of debt capital

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 • Foreign direct invest ment (FDI):

Firm opts for external finance for their capital requirements. Indian

government allows FDI in several sectors with fixed proportions. A firm

or sectors started attracting FDI gives a strong signal of growth. Since the

firm that able to attract FDI could avail more debt capital. So we are

expecting a direct or inverse relationship between FDI and the level of

debt capital.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between FDI and the level of debt

capital

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between FDI and the level of debt

capital

2. 4.2 Model

In estimations process, firstl y, we introduce an estimation technique

of quantile regression in brief, and then appl y it to our dataset. Standard

least squares regression techniques provide summary point estimates that

calculate the average effect of the independent variables on the ‘average

compan y’. However, this focus on the average compan y may hide

important features of the underl ying relationship. As Mosteller and Tukey

(1977, pp. 266) correctl y argued, “What the regression curve gives a grand

summary for the averages of the distributions corresponding to the set of

x’s. We could go further and compute several regression curves

corresponding to the various percentage points of the distributions and

thus get a more complete picture of the set. Ordinaril y, this is not done,

93 | P a g e
and so regression often gives a rather incomplete picture. Just as the mean

gives an incomplete picture of a single distribution, so the regression

curve gives a correspondingl y incomplete picture for a set of

distributions”. Quantile regression techniques can therefore help us obtain

a more complete picture of the underl ying relationship between Liquid

ratios and its determinants. In our case, estimation of linear models of

quantile regression may be preferable to the usual regression methods for

a number of reasons. First of all, we know that the standard least-squares

assumption of normall y distributed errors does not hold in our database

because the values of all variables in our case are non-normal. asset

structure (NFATA), profitabilit y (EBITSA), non-debt tax shield (DEPTA),

debt capacit y (INCOVER) and credit worthiness (NW), follow a skewed as

well as leptokurtic distribution (see the evidence in Table 1). While the

optimal properties of standard regression estimators are not robust to

modest departures from normalit y, quantile regression results are

characteristicall y robust to outliers and heav y tailed distributions. In fact,

the quantile regression solution β̂ 0 is invariant to outliers of the

dependent variable that tend to ± ∞ (Buchinsky, 1994). Another advantage

is that, while conventional regressions focus on the mean, quantile

regressions is able to describe the entire conditional distribution of the

dependent variable. In the context of this stud y, all determinants of debt

capital are of interest in their own right, we don’t want to dismiss them as

outliers, but on the contrary we believe it would be worthwhile to stud y

them in detail. This can be done b y calculating coefficient estimates at

various quantiles of the conditional distribution. Finall y, a quantil e

94 | P a g e
regression approach avoids the restrictive assumption that the error terms

are identicall y distributed at all points of the conditional distribution.

Relaxing this assumption allows us to acknowledge compan y

heterogeneit y and consider the possibility that estimated slope parameters

vary at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of all determents

of debt capital.

The quantile regression model, first introduced b y Koenker and Bassett

(1978), can be written as:

yit = xit' β 0 + ε θit with Quantθ ( y it | xit ) = xit' β 0 (1)

yit
where i denotes compan y, t denotes time, is the dependent variable, xit

is a vector of regressors, β is the vector of parameters to be estimated,

Quantθ ( yit | xit )

and ε is a vector of residuals. denotes the θ conditional
th

quantile of
yit given xit . The θ th regression quantile 0 < θ < 1, solves the

following problem:

1   1 n
min  ∑ θ | y it − xit' β | + ∑ (1 − θ ) | y it − xit' β | = min ∑ ρ θ ε θit (2)
β n i ,t: y it ≥ xit' β β n
i , t : y it < xit' β  i =1

Where
ρθ (⋅) , which is known as the ‘check function’, is defined as”:

 θε θ it if θε θ it ≥ 0
ρ θ ( ε θ it ) =   (3)
 (θ − 1 ) ε θ it if θε θ it < 0

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 Equation (2) is then solved b y linear programming methods. As one

increases θ continuousl y from 0 to 1, one traces the entire conditional

yit xit
distribution of , conditional on (Buchinsky 1998).

Here the stud y assumes that LnDEBT is the function of LNSA, NW,

NFATA, EBITSA, DEPTA, INCOVER, GDP, FDI and P LR which can be, in

linear equation form, written as:

LnDEBTit = α + β 1LNSAit + β 2 NWit + β 3 EBITSAit + β 4 DEPTAit

(4)
+ β 5 NFATAit + β 6 INCOVERit + β 7GDPit + β 8 FDI it + β 9 PLRit + ε it

However, in this model compan y and time effects are ignored therefore, b y

incorporating unobserved compan y effect in the equation (4) we get

following equation:

LnDEBTit = α + β1 LNSAit + β 2 NWit + β 3 EBITSAit + β 4 DEPTAit

(5)
+ β 5 NFATAit + β 6 INCOVERit + β 7GDPit + β 8 FDI it + β 9 PLRit + ε it

µ
Where uit = µ i + ε it , with i being companies’ unobservable individual

effects. The difference between a polled OLS regression and a model

considering unobservable individual effects lies precisel y in

µi . When we

consider the random effect model the equations 6 and 7 will be same,

however, in that case

µi is presumed to be having the propert y of zero the

individual observation error term

ε it , has constant variances σ ε2 , and

independent of the explanatory variables.

Further, due to the advantages (as stated above) of quantile

regression estimation technique over OLS, fixed and random effect models

in the stud y, we examined at the 5 t h , 25 t h , 50 t h , 75 t h and 95 t h quantiles

96 | P a g e
respectivel y. To avoid high correlation between variables selected, we

have divided them into two different models

MODEL I

Q 25 ( LnDEBT it ) = α 25 + β .25 ,1 LNSA it + β .25 , 2 NFATA it + β .25 , 3 EBITSA it

+ β .25 , 4 INCOVER it + β .25 , 5 FDI it + β .25 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it

Q .50 ( LnDEBT it ) = α .50 + β .50 ,1 LNSA it + β .50 , 2 NFATA it + β .50 , 3 EBITSA it

+ β .50 , 4 INCOVER it + β .50 , 5 FDI it + β .50 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it

Q .75 ( LnDEBT it ) = α .75 + β .75 ,1 LNSAA it + β .75 , 2 NFATA it + β .75 , 3 EBITSA it

+ β .75 , 4 INCOVER it + β .75 , 5 FDI it + β .75 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it

Q .95 ( LnDEBT it ) = α .95 + β .95 ,1 LNSA it + β .95 , 2 NFATA it + β .95 , 3 EBITSA it

+ β .95 , 4 INCOVER it + β .95 , 5 FDI it + β .95 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it

MODEL II

Q .05 ( LnDEBT it ) = α .05 + β .05 ,1 NW it + β .05 , 2 DEPTA it + β .05 , 3 EBITSA it

+ β .05 , 4 INCOVER it + β .05 , 5 GDP it + β .05 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it

Q 25 ( LnDEBT it ) = α 25 + β .25 ,1 NW it + β .25 , 2 DEOPTA it + β .25 , 3 EBITSA it

+ β .25 , 4 INCOVER it + β .25 , 5 GDP it + β .25 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it

Q .50 ( LnDEBT it ) = α .50 + β .50 ,1 NW it + β .50 , 2 DEPTA it + β .50 , 3 EBITSA it

+ β .50 , 4 INCOVER it + β .50 , 5 GDP it + β .50 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it

Q .75 ( LnDEBT it ) = α .75 + β .75 ,1 LNSAA it + β .75 , 2 NFATA it + β .75 , 3 EBITSA it

+ β .75 , 4 INCOVER it + β .75 , 5 FDI it + β .75 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it
Q .95 ( LnDEBT it ) = α .95 + β .95 ,1 NW it + β .95 , 2 DEPTA it + β .95 , 3 EBITSA it
+ β .95 , 4 INCOVER it + β .95 , 5 GDP it + β .95 , 6 PLR it + ε .5 it

We used sqreg module of STATA 11 for simultaneous quantile

regression estimation and obtain an estimate of the entire variance-

covariance of the estimators by bootstrapping with 100 bootstrap

replications. Simultaneous quantile regression is a robust regression

97 | P a g e
technique that accounts for the non-normal distribution of error terms and

heteroskedasticit y (Koenker and Bassett 1978; Koenker and Hallock

2001). Unlike traditional linear models, such as OLS regression, that

assume that estimates have a constant effect, simultaneous quantile

regression can illustrate if independent variables have non-constant or

variable effects across the full distribution of the dependent variable. To

examine this, baseline OLS regression models were also executed.

In this chapter, we have attempted to identify the critical factors

determines the debt capital of Indian firms. For the purpose of anal ysis, a

panel model has been estimated for the years 2002 to 2011. Further, for

anal ysis, we used a quantile regression model which is relativel y new in

the present context. This is because b y having a complete picture of all

quantiles, it is possible to consider several different regression curves that

correspond to the various percentage points of the distributions and not

onl y the conditional mean distribution, which neglects the extreme

relationship between variables. Quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett

1978; Koenker and Hallock 2001) is a method for fitting a regression line

through the conditional quantiles of a distribution. It allows the

examination of the relationship between a set of independent variables and

the different parts of the distribution of the dependent variable. Quantile

regression overcomes some of the disadvantages of the conditional mean

framework built upon central tendencies, which tend to lose information

on phenomena whose tendencies are toward the tails of a given

distribution (Hao and Naiman 2007). The use of the quantile regression

approach is also chosen because of the skewed distribution of NFATA,

98 | P a g e
NW, EBITSA, DEPTA and INCOVER, since in such case the usual

assumption of normall y distributed error terms is not warranted and could

lead to unreliable estimates. Furthermore, companies anal yzed are

fundamentall y heterogeneous and it may make little sense to use

regression estimators that implicitl y focus on the ‘average effect for the

average compan y’ by giving summary point estimates of coefficients.

Instead, quantile regression techniques are robust to outliers and are able

to describe the influence of the regressors over the entire conditional

distribution of, NFATA, NW, EBITSA, DEPTA and INCOVER.

2.5 Result and Interpretations

At first we have checked the descriptive statistics of the variables

used for the anal ysis. The table 2.2 shows the detailed descriptive

statistics for the variable chosen for the anal ysis. From the result of

descriptive statics it is evident that except GDP and FDI all other

variables are either negativel y (LNDEBT, LNSA and P LR) or positivel y

(DEPTA, NW, NFATA, EBITSA and INCOVER) skewed. And most of the

variables are leptokurtic (NFATA, NW, EBITSA, DEPTA and INCOVER).

Moreover, none Jarque-Bera test confirms that none of the variables are

normall y distributed. In this regard, we have a relay on quantile

regression as the most appropriate tool for finding the determinants of

debt capital in the Indian corporate sector.

99 | P a g e
 Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables chosen for the analysis, debt structure of sample companies.
LnDEBT LNSA NW EBITSA NFATA DEPTA INCOVER GDP PLR FDI
Mean 4.953411 6.792395 2295.521 0.198202 0.431561 0.044928 116.6798 3778882 11.8125 86284.9
Median 5.550864 6.888669 533.09 0.15157 0.383013 0.034633 5.302444 3730500 11.3125 71054.5
Maximum 11.21053 12.70999 151541.7 10.50044 10.26195 1.419831 44718 5202514 14.125 190700
Minimum -4.60517 -3.21888 -744.52 -4.56386 -4.82143 -0.17857 -2740.32 2570690 8.875 19830
Std. Dev. 2.683264 1.818274 7604.279 0.357723 0.474174 0.065755 1065.688 859075.8 1.718051 62016.6
Skewness -0.67934 -0.81055 9.723289 12.7065 8.174177 9.777308 27.35988 0.19522 -0.01121 0.30574
Kurtosis 2.933264 5.98259 134.7535 361.9236 151.4834 145.5338 1011.758 1.754743 1.705535 1.485174

Jarque-Bera 247.5005 1541.31 2372346 17316873 2984577 2768393 1.37E+08 227.7909 224.1839 356.9259
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Sum 15900.45 21803.59 7368622 636.2277 1385.311 144.2191 374542.3 1.21E+10 37918.13 2.77E+08
Sum Sq. Dev. 23104.5 10609.34 1.86E+11 410.6423 721.5143 13.87493 3.64E+09 2.37E+15 9472.008 1.23E+13

Observations 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210

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 Table 2.3 Result of quantile regression analysis of sample companies
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.055 0.139 0.689 0.896 0.034 0.000 0.823 0.022 0.000 0.794 0.023 0.000 0.609 0.025 0.000
NFATA 0.010 0.077 0.901 0.122 0.245 0.618 0.123 0.203 0.543 0.208 0.146 0.155 0.072 0.148 0.626
EBITSA -0.026 0.253 0.918 0.135 0.324 0.676 1.270 0.383 0.001 1.707 0.239 0.000 0.845 0.230 0.000
INCOVER -7E-05 5E-04 0.887 -3E-03 1.1E-03 0.025 -0.001 5E-04 3E-02 -5E-04 3E-04 5E-02 -5E-05 2E-04 0.816
FDI -6E-07 1.7E-06 0.708 -6.8E-07 1.5E-06 0.652 1.7E-06 6.3E-07 0.007 2.8E-06 4.7E-07 0.000 2.4E-06 6.6E-07 0.000
PLR 0.007 0.019 0.712 0.012 0.042 0.770 -0.012 0.020 0.552 -0.037 0.015 0.016 -0.083 0.023 0.000
_cons -0.401 0.866 0.644 -1.874 0.490 0.000 -0.191 0.272 0.482 0.823 0.270 0.002 3.951 0.398 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0015 0.1891 0.2313 0.2655 0.2815
Model II
NW 1E-05 4E-05 8E-01 1E-04 1E-05 0E+00 1E-04 1E-05 0E+00 2E-04 2E-05 0E+00 2E-04 2E-05 0E+00
EBITSA -0.001 0.028 0.974 0.007 0.424 0.988 -0.175 0.149 0.239 -0.167 0.101 0.097 -0.158 0.143 0.270
DEPTA 0.009 0.060 0.876 -3.723 0.984 0.000 -3.627 1.038 0.000 -3.029 0.646 0.000 -0.459 1.616 0.777
INCOVER -6E-05 3E-04 8E-01 -2E-03 9E-04 3E-02 -1E-03 4E-04 2E-02 -5E-04 3E-04 8E-02 -4E-05 2E-04 9E-01
GDP -2.5E-09 1.2E-08 0.832 6.3E-07 1.0E-07 0.000 5.8E-07 4.0E-08 0.000 4.9E-07 4.2E-08 0.000 1.8E-07 4.3E-08 0.000
PLR 3.7E-04 0.004 0.930 0.060 0.049 0.225 0.041 0.023 0.078 0.029 0.017 0.086 -0.007 0.019 0.689
_cons 0.000 0.055 0.994 0.921 0.772 0.233 2.965 0.327 0.000 4.377 0.285 0.000 6.753 0.368 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0002 0.0793 0.1095 0.1573 0.2622

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2.5.1 Sample companies:

The stud y has used two different quantile regression models for the

anal ysis at five levels as 0.05 t h , 0.25 t h , 0.50 t h , 0.75 t h and 0.95 t h . Table 2.3

shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of sample companies.

The result shows that none of the variables are showing significance

at the lowest quantile 0.05 t h for both the model. The result of the 0.25 t h

low level of quantile confirms that LNSA, NW, GDP is positivel y

determines the low level of debt capital. However, INCOVER and DEPTA

is negativel y determined the low level of debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, EBITSA, NW,

GDP and FDI are directl y affecting the average level of debt capital in

Indian corporate sector. And INCOVER, DEPTA is negativel y determining

the average level of debt capital.

However, the high level of quantile results indicates that LNSA,

NW, FDI and GDP is positivel y affecting the high level of debt capital and

INCOVER and DEPTA is negativel y determine the high level of debt

capital.

The result of the highest quantile, 0.95 t h shows that LNSA, NW, FDI

and GDP are positively determine the very high level of debt capital.

PLR is showing an inconsistent result among the model. However,

NFATA is having a positive insignificant coefficient among varies the

quantiles.

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 Table 2.4 Result of quantile regression analysis of agriculture sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 1.442 0.180 0.000 1.152 0.103 0.000 0.975 0.092 0.000 0.753 0.132 0.000 0.569 0.131 0.000
NFATA -1.514 1.485 0.310 0.119 0.559 0.832 0.601 0.413 0.147 0.783 0.489 0.112 0.464 0.717 0.518
EBITSA 5.671 2.189 0.010 4.133 1.483 0.006 3.547 1.374 0.011 1.993 1.272 0.119 0.932 1.318 0.480
INCOVER -0.120 0.024 0.000 -0.106 0.010 0.000 -0.099 0.012 0.000 -0.077 0.013 0.000 -0.057 0.013 0.000
FDI -6E-06 3E-06 7E-02 1E-06 2E-06 5E-01 2E-06 1E-06 1E-01 5E-06 2E-06 1E-02 7E-06 2E-06 1E-03
PLR 0.031 0.098 0.753 -0.053 0.040 0.186 -0.028 0.030 0.353 -0.005 0.051 0.921 -4E-05 0.067 1.000
_cons -4.452 2.070 0.033 -2.017 0.810 0.014 -0.947 0.869 0.277 0.562 1.363 0.680 2.437 1.193 0.043
Pseudo R2 0.6839 0.6327 0.5597 0.4947 0.412
Model II
NW 2E-03 3E-04 0E+00 2E-03 2E-04 0E+00 1E-03 3E-04 0E+00 2E-03 3E-04 0E+00 2E-03 2E-04 0E+00
EBITSA 1.858 2.062 0.369 2.240 1.436 0.121 2.334 1.048 0.027 1.643 0.759 0.032 1.284 1.040 0.219
DEPTA 0.966 13.211 0.942 -0.432 8.312 0.959 2.703 6.488 0.677 2.810 5.656 0.620 2.062 5.354 0.701
INCOVER -0.096 0.016 0.000 -0.108 0.016 0.000 -0.100 0.013 0.000 -0.087 0.007 0.000 -0.083 0.008 0.000
GDP 5E-07 5E-07 3E-01 2E-07 2E-07 3E-01 1E-07 2E-07 5E-01 7E-08 1E-07 6E-01 3E-10 1E-07 1E+00
PLR 0.158 0.119 0.188 0.035 0.062 0.573 0.060 0.046 0.193 0.106 0.030 0.001 0.006 0.041 0.879
_cons -0.724 3.431 0.833 3.553 1.046 0.001 4.056 0.932 0.000 3.941 0.696 0.000 5.870 0.716 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.5606 0.5126 0.4923 0.4972 0.4882

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2.5.2 Agriculture sector:

The table 2.4 shows the result of quantile regression for agriculture sector.

The result of the agriculture sector shows that the lowest level quantile 0.05th

LNSA and NW is directly affecting the low level of debt capital. INCOVER and FDI are

negatively affecting the lowest level of debt capital.

However in case of low level of quantile 0.25th result indicates that LNSA and

NW are positively and INCOVER is negatively influencing the low level of debt capital

The median quantile 0.50th result shows that LNSA, EBITSA, NW and FDI are

directly affecting the average level of debt capital and INCOVER is negatively determine

the average level of debt capital.

The result of the high level of quantile 0.75th shows that LNSA, NW and FDI are

positively determine the high level of debt capital and INCOVER is negatively determine

the high level of debt capital in agriculture sector.

The very high level of quantile 0.95th indicates that LNSA, NW and FDI is

directly affect the very high level of debt capital and INCOVER is negatively determine

the level of debt capital

PLR and EBITSA are showing an inconsistent result among the model. However,

NFATA and DEPTA is having an insignificant among the various quantiles

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 Table 2.5 Result of quantile regression analysis of capital goods sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.053 0.281 0.851 0.324 0.145 0.026 0.654 0.131 0.000 0.769 0.057 0.000 0.608 0.080 0.000
NFATA 1.806 1.849 0.329 4.024 0.874 0.000 2.099 0.775 0.007 1.749 0.462 0.000 2.530 0.826 0.002
EBITSA 0.588 4.329 0.892 2.670 1.183 0.025 1.744 1.152 0.131 2.471 0.829 0.003 1.316 0.900 0.145
INCOVER -0.005 0.006 0.358 -0.005 0.006 0.424 -0.003 0.006 0.642 -0.001 0.003 0.781 -0.001 0.002 0.627
FDI -2E-06 5E-06 8E-01 -1E-05 4E-06 8E-03 7E-07 4E-06 9E-01 2E-06 1E-06 2E-01 4E-06 2E-06 1E-01
PLR -0.064 0.158 0.685 0.162 0.122 0.185 -0.088 0.114 0.442 -0.059 0.048 0.219 -0.086 0.066 0.191
_cons -0.194 3.249 0.952 -2.746 1.532 0.074 0.167 1.485 0.910 0.088 0.683 0.898 2.029 0.935 0.031
Pseudo R2 0.0513 0.13 0.1204 0.204 0.3182
Model II
NW 3E-04 3E-03 9E-01 4E-04 2E-04 7E-02 2E-04 2E-04 2E-01 6E-04 2E-04 1E-03 7E-04 8E-05 0E+00
EBITSA 0.066 2.464 0.979 -1.017 2.314 0.661 0.391 1.607 0.808 -0.593 0.518 0.253 -0.291 0.617 0.637
DEPTA 2.453 5.284 0.643 1.040 9.768 0.915 -2.504 6.570 0.703 -8.241 5.366 0.125 0.541 4.709 0.909
INCOVER -0.007 0.005 0.163 -0.001 0.005 0.783 -0.002 0.005 0.680 -0.001 0.003 0.750 -0.001 0.002 0.482
GDP -4E-08 5E-07 9E-01 -9E-07 3E-07 3E-03 1E-07 3E-07 7E-01 6E-08 1E-07 7E-01 2E-07 7E-08 5E-03
PLR -0.010 0.121 0.931 0.007 0.187 0.969 -0.143 0.138 0.300 -0.044 0.054 0.410 0.100 0.044 0.023
_cons 0.186 2.753 0.946 4.555 2.579 0.078 5.347 1.833 0.004 5.866 1.084 0.000 4.238 0.583 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0318 0.0664 0.0514 0.1126 0.2743

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2.5.3 Capital goods sector:

The table 2.5 shows the result of quantile regression for the capital goods

sector.

At the lowest quantile 0.5 t h none of the variables are showing

significant for the both the models. The result at low level of quantile 0.25 t h

shows that LNSA, NFATA, NW are positivel y determine the level of debt

capital and FDI and GDP is negatively determine the low level of debt

capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that the average level of debt

capital is directl y relate to LNSA and NFATA other variables are not showing

significance.

Quantile, 0.75 t h result indicates that high level of debt capital is

positivel y determined b y LNSA, NFATA and NW other variables don’t have

an y impact.

The highest level of quantile, 0.95 t h shows that variables LNSA,

NFATA, NW and GDP are directl y affect high level of debt capital. Other

variable has no significant impact.

The variables EBIT and PLR have inconsistent result among the models

and DEPTA is not showing significant result among the quantiles.

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 Table 2.6 Result of quantile regression analysis of chemical and petrochemicals sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 1.771 0.468 0.000 0.966 0.256 0.000 0.837 0.304 0.007 0.857 0.205 0.000 0.572 0.276 0.040
NFATA 1.212 1.379 0.381 1.172 0.729 0.111 0.176 0.871 0.840 -0.109 0.640 0.865 -0.940 0.724 0.197
EBITSA 8.415 2.900 0.005 4.020 1.572 0.012 3.560 1.727 0.042 0.018 1.278 0.989 0.457 1.171 0.697
INCOVER -0.076 0.025 0.002 -0.052 0.017 0.003 -0.050 0.018 0.008 -0.014 0.022 0.508 -0.011 0.019 0.564
FDI 2E-08 3E-06 1E+00 -2E-06 3E-06 4E-01 -2E-07 3E-06 9E-01 -5E-07 2E-06 8E-01 -6E-07 2E-06 8E-01
PLR -0.178 0.133 0.183 -0.028 0.073 0.699 -0.091 0.083 0.273 -0.026 0.055 0.634 0.033 0.064 0.610
_cons -7.206 3.885 0.066 -1.792 1.922 0.354 0.698 2.375 0.769 0.921 1.808 0.611 3.061 2.264 0.179
Pseudo R2 0.6035 0.4494 0.2906 0.235 0.3672
Model II
NW 7E-04 2E-04 3E-03 6E-04 2E-04 3E-03 7E-04 2E-04 0E+00 5E-04 2E-04 1E-03 2E-04 2E-04 2E-01
EBITSA 6.935 2.678 0.011 4.190 1.875 0.028 -0.058 1.483 0.969 -0.009 0.944 0.992 0.194 1.061 0.856
DEPTA -30.146 20.391 0.142 -0.516 7.556 0.946 -4.842 4.538 0.288 -12.346 5.655 0.031 -26.915 8.137 0.001
INCOVER -0.055 0.022 0.012 -0.061 0.016 0.000 -0.035 0.018 0.057 -0.017 0.016 0.290 -0.014 0.012 0.230
GDP -3E-07 4E-07 5E-01 1E-07 1E-07 5E-01 1E-08 1E-07 9E-01 -7E-09 1E-07 1E+00 -1E-07 1E-07 2E-01
PLR -0.269 0.215 0.212 -0.053 0.086 0.537 0.013 0.068 0.847 -0.067 0.061 0.271 -0.022 0.060 0.713
_cons 8.784 3.778 0.022 5.058 1.290 0.000 5.583 0.843 0.000 7.558 0.912 0.000 8.987 1.174 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.5763 0.4419 0.3438 0.2899 0.4027

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2.5.4 Chemical & petrochemical sector:

The table 2.6 shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of

chemical & petrochemical sector.

The very low level of debt capital, quantile 0.5 t h is directl y determined

b y LNSA, EBITSA and NW and inversel y determined b y INCOVER.

The low level of quantile 0.25 t h result also shows that LNSA, EBITSA

and NW positivel y and INCOVER is negativel y determine the low level of

debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA and NW positivel y

determine the average level of debt capital and INCOVER is negativel y

determine the average level of debt capital.

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h result shows that LNSA and NW

positivel y and DEPTA is negativel y determine the high level of debt capital.

The very high level of debt capital, quantile 0.95 t h is positivel y

determined b y LNSA and negativel y b y DEPTA.

Other variables are not showing significant impact on the level of debt

capital

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 Table 2.7 Result of quantile regression analysis of consumer durable sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.571 0.311 0.071 0.704 0.173 0.000 0.727 0.314 0.023 0.212 0.422 0.617 0.271 0.314 0.391
NFATA -1.866 2.100 0.377 -0.820 0.472 0.086 -0.821 0.639 0.203 -0.880 0.813 0.283 -0.115 1.603 0.943
EBITSA 2.899 5.269 0.584 2.536 3.963 0.524 2.467 4.797 0.609 0.341 4.720 0.943 4.526 6.201 0.468
INCOVER -0.256 0.091 0.006 -0.133 0.053 0.015 -0.113 0.036 0.002 -0.106 0.045 0.021 -0.062 0.050 0.225
FDI -5E-07 4E-06 9E-01 -3E-06 2E-06 2E-01 -1E-06 4E-06 8E-01 9E-06 6E-06 1E-01 3E-06 8E-06 7E-01
PLR 0.154 0.131 0.244 0.093 0.057 0.109 -0.046 0.085 0.588 -0.072 0.140 0.608 -0.058 0.147 0.693
_cons 0.233 2.225 0.917 -0.125 1.336 0.926 1.496 2.279 0.513 5.538 3.385 0.106 6.181 2.726 0.026
Pseudo R2 0.6335 0.465 0.6568 0.3024 0.3712
Model II
NW 6E-04 1E-04 0E+00 6E-04 8E-05 0E+00 5E-04 7E-05 0E+00 5E-04 1E-04 0E+00 5E-04 1E-04 2E-03
EBITSA -1.255 4.127 0.762 -0.413 3.720 0.912 -0.611 3.241 0.851 -0.969 3.536 0.785 -1.446 3.582 0.688
DEPTA -22.148 5.317 0.000 -19.830 4.837 0.000 -17.710 4.325 0.000 -18.368 5.588 0.002 -22.616 7.384 0.003
INCOVER -0.128 0.053 0.019 -0.084 0.040 0.038 -0.072 0.031 0.024 -0.046 0.028 0.109 -0.036 0.023 0.129
GDP -3E-08 3E-07 9E-01 7E-08 2E-07 7E-01 3E-07 2E-07 8E-02 2E-07 2E-07 4E-01 -1E-07 3E-07 7E-01
PLR 0.519 0.149 0.001 0.122 0.082 0.139 0.147 0.061 0.019 0.057 0.076 0.451 -0.014 0.087 0.868
_cons -0.785 1.464 0.593 4.111 0.907 0.000 3.268 0.711 0.000 5.206 1.426 0.000 7.906 1.495 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.6832 0.5347 0.538 0.5699 0.6364

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2.5.5 Consumer durables sector:

The table 2.7 shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of the

consumer durables sector.

The result of lowest quantile 0.05 t h shows that LNSA and NW are

directl y and INCOVER and DEPTA is inversel y affecting the very low level

of debt capital.

The quantile, 0.25 t h result confirms that LNSA and NW positivel y

determine the low level of debt capital and NFATA, DEPTA and INCOVER

are negativel y determine the low level of debt capital

The median quantile 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, NW and GDP

positivel y determine the average level of debt capital and INCOVER and

DEPTA is negativel y determine the level of debt capital.

The quantile 0.75 t h result shows that the high level of debt capital is

directl y affected b y NW and inversel y affected b y DEPTA.

The quantile 0.95 t h also show the same result as quantile 0.75 t h .NW is

directl y affecting the very high level of debt capital and DEPTA is inversel y

affecting the very high level of debt capital.

EBITSA, FDI doesn’t have an y significant impact on the various levels

of debt capital. PLR is not showing consistent result among the models

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 Table 2.8 Result of quantile regression analysis of diversified sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.720 0.327 0.031 0.720 0.327 0.031 0.646 0.146 0.000 0.555 0.089 0.000 0.487 0.232 0.039
NFATA -0.321 0.453 0.480 -0.102 0.348 0.769 -0.223 0.293 0.450 -0.240 0.201 0.236 -0.358 0.458 0.437
EBITSA 3.363 0.733 0.000 2.602 0.673 0.000 2.627 0.616 0.000 2.064 0.413 0.000 1.798 1.863 0.338
INCOVER -0.046 0.015 0.002 -0.027 0.018 0.143 -0.018 0.014 0.205 -0.018 0.009 0.059 -0.011 0.015 0.480
FDI 3E-06 4E-06 4E-01 7E-06 3E-06 3E-02 5E-06 2E-06 4E-02 8E-06 2E-06 0E+00 8E-06 5E-06 1E-01
PLR 0.071 0.134 0.600 0.015 0.130 0.909 -0.049 0.100 0.623 0.034 0.061 0.582 0.062 0.079 0.436
_cons -1.314 3.067 0.670 0.652 2.378 0.785 1.620 1.791 0.369 1.607 0.972 0.102 2.166 1.711 0.210
Pseudo R2 0.6482 0.534 0.5136 0.5438 0.4653
Model II
NW 1E-04 4E-04 8E-01 6E-04 2E-04 0E+00 6E-04 2E-04 0E+00 2E-04 1E-04 1E-01 1E-04 9E-05 2E-01
EBITSA 2.720 0.880 0.003 2.410 0.374 0.000 1.689 0.480 0.001 0.205 0.426 0.631 0.183 0.348 0.601
DEPTA -5.937 2.010 0.004 -3.189 2.805 0.259 -1.264 2.041 0.538 -2.170 2.709 0.426 -2.305 2.566 0.372
INCOVER -0.022 0.016 0.175 -0.018 0.011 0.104 -0.016 0.008 0.059 -0.019 0.011 0.082 -0.010 0.011 0.358
GDP 6E-08 5E-07 9E-01 1E-07 2E-07 6E-01 2E-07 2E-07 3E-01 6E-07 2E-07 1E-03 9E-07 1E-07 0E+00
PLR 0.130 0.156 0.407 -0.013 0.108 0.904 0.055 0.107 0.606 0.141 0.089 0.118 0.120 0.075 0.113
_cons 2.697 2.028 0.188 4.227 1.231 0.001 3.562 1.225 0.005 2.864 0.971 0.004 2.464 0.814 0.003
Pseudo R2 0.652 0.5439 0.4735 0.47 0.4602

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2.5.6 Diversified sector:

The table 2.8 shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of

Diversified sector.

The lowest quantile 0.05 t h result shows that LNSA and EBITSA

directl y affecting the lowest level of debt capital. Moreover, DEPTA is

inversel y affecting the lowest level of debt capital.

The low level quantile 0.25 t h result confirms that LNSA, EBITSA and

FDI are directl y determining the low level of debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, EBITSA, NW and

FDI are positivel y determine the average level of debt capital

The quantile 0.75 t h result shows that high level of debt capital is

directl y determined b y LNSA, FDI and GDP. Likewise INCOVER is inversel y

affecting the high level of debt capital.

The quantile 0.95 t h result shows that very high level of debt capital is

directl y relates to LNSA and GDP.

NFATA is having negative insignificant coefficient among the

quantiles. And PLR is having inconsistent result among the model.

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 Table 2.9 Result of quantile regression analysis of FMCG sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.559 0.187 0.003 0.912 0.106 0.000 1.033 0.096 0.000 0.793 0.083 0.000 0.788 0.128 0.000
NFATA -2.425 1.357 0.075 -3.445 0.682 0.000 -3.520 0.903 0.000 -2.029 0.386 0.000 -1.365 0.598 0.024
EBITSA -5.607 3.409 0.102 -11.038 2.221 0.000 -5.964 1.712 0.001 -1.588 1.084 0.144 -1.623 1.632 0.321
INCOVER -3E-05 6E-05 6E-01 -3E-04 8E-05 0E+00 -5E-04 9E-05 0E+00 -5E-04 1E-04 0E+00 -4E-04 7E-05 0E+00
FDI -8E-06 4E-06 6E-02 1E-06 3E-06 7E-01 -4E-06 3E-06 2E-01 2E-06 2E-06 3E-01 5E-06 3E-06 4E-02
PLR 0.118 0.126 0.352 0.013 0.104 0.902 -0.040 0.118 0.736 -0.011 0.074 0.884 0.116 0.075 0.123
_cons -2.498 1.881 0.186 -0.849 1.394 0.543 0.410 1.439 0.776 1.126 0.956 0.240 -0.006 1.463 0.997
Pseudo R2 0.0999 0.3206 0.2967 0.2835 0.341
Model II
NW 3E-04 1E-04 8E-03 3E-04 2E-04 6E-02 2E-04 2E-04 5E-01 4E-04 2E-04 9E-02 1E-04 3E-04 8E-01
EBITSA -0.911 4.082 0.824 -9.593 3.830 0.013 -3.581 4.121 0.386 -3.502 2.130 0.102 -0.425 2.146 0.843
DEPTA -1.801 5.477 0.743 -5.236 4.518 0.248 -9.586 2.670 0.000 -7.051 1.891 0.000 -3.194 2.282 0.163
INCOVER -1E-05 6E-05 8E-01 -3E-04 1E-04 1E-02 -4E-04 9E-05 0E+00 -5E-04 7E-05 0E+00 -5E-04 7E-05 0E+00
GDP -2E-07 4E-07 7E-01 4E-07 4E-07 3E-01 5E-07 2E-07 5E-03 5E-07 1E-07 0E+00 8E-07 4E-07 3E-02
PLR 0.108 0.174 0.534 0.112 0.147 0.447 -0.126 0.152 0.407 0.100 0.069 0.150 0.066 0.111 0.553
_cons -0.694 2.291 0.762 0.748 2.304 0.746 4.780 2.002 0.018 3.223 0.929 0.001 3.274 1.364 0.017
Pseudo R2 0.0323 0.1706 0.1727 0.1808 0.2177

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2.5.7 FMCG sector:

The table 2.9 shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of the

FMCG sector.

The lowest quantile 0.05 t h result shows that LNSA, NW and FDI are

directl y affecting the lowest level of debt capital. And NFATA is inversel y

affecting the lowest level of debt capital.

The low level quantile 0.25 t h result confirms that LNSA and NW are

directl y determining the low level of debt capital. However EBITSA, DEPTA

and INCOVER are inversel y affecting the low level of debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA and FDI are

positivel y determine the average level of debt capital. And NFATA, DEPTA

and INCOVER are negativel y determining the average level of debt capital.

The quantile 0.75 t h result shows that high level of debt capital is

directl y determined b y LNSA, NW and GDP. Likewise NFATA, INCOVER,

and DEPTA are inversel y affecting the high level of debt capital.

The quantile 0.95 t h result shows that very high level of debt capital is

positivel y relates to LNSA, FDI and GDP and negativel y relates to

INCOVER.

PLR is having inconsistent result among the model.

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 Table 2.10 Result of quantile regression analysis of healthcare sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.081 0.389 0.835 0.811 0.409 0.049 0.863 0.116 0.000 0.874 0.078 0.000 0.702 0.118 0.000
NFATA 1.172 0.373 0.002 0.258 0.409 0.529 -0.363 0.103 0.001 -0.628 0.089 0.000 -0.452 0.169 0.008
EBITSA -2.332 1.829 0.203 0.228 1.795 0.899 -0.023 0.932 0.981 -0.119 0.650 0.854 -0.181 0.472 0.702
INCOVER -2E-03 2E-03 3E-01 -5E-03 2E-03 3E-02 -2E-03 2E-03 1E-01 -1E-03 4E-04 0E+00 -1E-03 1E-04 0E+00
FDI -7E-07 4E-06 9E-01 1E-06 6E-06 8E-01 2E-06 2E-06 3E-01 3E-06 1E-06 4E-03 4E-06 2E-06 2E-02
PLR 0.265 0.113 0.020 0.185 0.193 0.338 0.020 0.048 0.686 0.052 0.045 0.252 0.038 0.047 0.425
_cons -2.624 2.860 0.360 -3.737 2.526 0.140 -0.418 0.860 0.627 -0.178 0.611 0.771 1.774 0.957 0.065
Pseudo R2 0.1315 0.1641 0.2207 0.2514 0.2838
Model II
NW 2E-04 3E-04 7E-01 7E-04 3E-04 2E-02 5E-04 2E-04 3E-03 4E-04 2E-04 2E-02 3E-04 1E-04 4E-02
EBITSA -2.408 1.718 0.162 -0.507 1.394 0.716 -0.586 1.201 0.626 -0.524 1.019 0.607 -0.465 0.646 0.472
DEPTA 8.763 2.977 0.004 -1.857 2.815 0.510 -4.753 1.950 0.015 -4.131 1.956 0.036 -2.495 1.484 0.094
INCOVER -2E-03 2E-03 4E-01 -5E-03 3E-03 7E-02 -2E-03 2E-03 1E-01 -1E-03 8E-04 7E-02 -1E-03 3E-04 0E+00
GDP -3E-09 3E-07 1E+00 1E-07 4E-07 8E-01 7E-07 2E-07 1E-03 5E-07 2E-07 6E-03 5E-07 1E-07 0E+00
PLR 0.267 0.104 0.011 0.099 0.164 0.547 0.123 0.061 0.047 0.077 0.056 0.169 0.139 0.040 0.001
_cons -2.316 1.722 0.180 1.898 2.285 0.407 1.366 1.186 0.251 3.568 0.963 0.000 3.614 0.712 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1235 0.1633 0.1864 0.1836 0.2433

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2.5.8 Healthcare sector:

The table 2.10 shows the result of quantile regression anal ys is of the

healthcare sector.

The quantile, 0.5 t h very low level of debt capital is directl y determined

b y NFATA, DEPTA and PLR.

The low level of quantile 0.25 t h result also shows that LNSA, and NW

positivel y and INCOVER is negatively determine the low level of debt

capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, GDP and NW

positivel y determine the average level of debt capital. NFATA and DEPTA are

negativel y determining the average level of debt capital.

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h result shows that LNSA, NW, FDI

and GDP are positivel y and DEPTA, NFATA and INCOVER is negativel y

determine the high level of debt capital.

The very high level of debt capital, quantile 0.95 t h is positivel y

determined b y LNSA, NW, FDI and GDP. Negativel y affected b y DEPTA,

NFATA, INCOVER

EBITSA is having a negative insignificant coefficient among the

quantiles.

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 Table 2.11 Result of quantile regression analysis of housing related sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 1.322 0.228 0.000 0.800 0.095 0.000 0.845 0.047 0.000 0.749 0.077 0.000 0.691 0.077 0.000
NFATA -0.133 0.771 0.863 0.394 0.297 0.185 0.326 0.165 0.050 -0.127 0.241 0.599 -1.345 0.436 0.002
EBITSA 0.277 1.610 0.863 1.441 0.677 0.034 1.882 0.413 0.000 1.267 0.506 0.013 0.433 0.568 0.447
INCOVER -0.023 0.028 0.414 -0.009 0.011 0.426 -0.006 0.005 0.211 -0.005 0.003 0.115 -0.002 0.003 0.524
FDI -8E-06 8E-06 3E-01 2E-06 2E-06 2E-01 1E-06 1E-06 4E-01 2E-06 1E-06 2E-01 2E-06 2E-06 5E-01
PLR 0.039 0.172 0.819 -0.006 0.038 0.868 -0.048 0.028 0.081 -0.066 0.030 0.027 -0.111 0.057 0.054
_cons -4.096 2.082 0.050 -0.201 0.681 0.768 0.509 0.445 0.253 2.078 0.714 0.004 4.548 0.934 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.4309 0.5278 0.5115 0.4548 0.4433
Model II
NW 5E-04 2E-04 4E-03 2E-04 4E-05 0E+00 3E-04 5E-05 0E+00 4E-04 1E-04 0E+00 5E-04 2E-04 1E-03
EBITSA 0.563 0.692 0.417 0.343 0.593 0.563 -0.498 0.493 0.313 -0.141 0.579 0.807 1.308 0.783 0.096
DEPTA 16.195 7.239 0.026 6.335 4.640 0.173 6.665 3.866 0.086 5.147 4.165 0.217 -0.900 2.564 0.726
INCOVER -0.009 0.012 0.457 -0.011 0.006 0.058 -0.007 0.003 0.045 -0.003 0.003 0.292 -0.004 0.002 0.068
GDP 1E-06 7E-07 2E-01 1E-06 1E-07 0E+00 8E-07 1E-07 0E+00 4E-07 2E-07 8E-03 3E-08 8E-08 7E-01
PLR -0.244 0.297 0.413 0.133 0.080 0.096 0.097 0.034 0.005 0.035 0.053 0.506 -0.010 0.032 0.748
_cons -0.051 3.836 0.989 -2.028 1.282 0.115 1.654 0.662 0.013 4.238 1.110 0.000 6.847 0.620 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1859 0.2347 0.2412 0.2451 0.3445

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2.5.9 Housing related sector:

The table 2.11 shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of the

housing related sector.

The quantile, 0.5 t h very low level of debt capital is directl y determined

b y LNSA, DEPTA and NW.

The quantile 0.25 t h result also shows that LNSA, GDP and NW

positivel y and determine the low level of debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, NFATA, DEPTA,

GDP and NW positivel y determine the average level of debt capital.

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h result shows that LNSA, NW and

GDP are positivel y determine the high level of debt capital.

The very high level of debt capital, quantile 0.95 t h is positivel y

determined b y LNSA and NW and negativel y affected b y NFATA.

EBITSA is having a positive insignificant coefficient among the

quantiles.

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 Table 2.12 Result of quantile regression analysis of information technology sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.262 0.166 0.115 0.065 0.154 0.674 0.525 0.110 0.000 0.466 0.133 0.001 0.469 0.076 0.000
NFATA 0.713 1.012 0.482 -0.307 1.274 0.810 -1.458 1.482 0.326 -0.993 1.510 0.511 0.742 1.272 0.561
EBITSA 0.845 0.804 0.294 0.481 1.137 0.673 0.330 0.952 0.729 0.416 1.109 0.708 1.956 1.068 0.068
INCOVER -2E-04 2E-04 5E-01 -4E-04 4E-04 4E-01 -3E-04 6E-04 7E-01 -1E-05 5E-04 1E+00 -7E-05 4E-04 9E-01
FDI -2E-06 3E-06 4E-01 1E-05 7E-06 4E-02 1E-05 5E-06 1E-02 1E-05 4E-06 0E+00 1E-05 4E-06 0E+00
PLR -0.119 0.112 0.290 0.019 0.208 0.928 -0.180 0.113 0.113 -0.185 0.127 0.147 -0.048 0.098 0.624
_cons -1.015 1.703 0.552 -0.886 2.241 0.693 1.414 1.356 0.298 2.880 1.748 0.101 1.810 1.618 0.265
Pseudo R2 0.0732 0.0277 0.1649 0.1849 0.3038
Model II
NW 2E-05 1E-04 8E-01 -4E-05 2E-04 8E-01 6E-05 2E-04 7E-01 1E-04 1E-04 1E-01 2E-04 8E-05 3E-02
EBITSA 0.674 0.516 0.193 0.572 1.248 0.647 0.180 1.257 0.886 0.031 0.431 0.943 2.031 1.042 0.052
DEPTA -9.333 5.731 0.105 -4.859 6.843 0.478 -15.328 7.993 0.056 -13.029 4.364 0.003 -6.068 4.476 0.177
INCOVER -5E-05 4E-04 9E-01 -7E-05 6E-04 9E-01 -3E-04 6E-04 6E-01 -1E-05 6E-04 1E+00 -8E-05 5E-04 9E-01
GDP 2E-07 2E-07 3E-01 5E-07 5E-07 4E-01 2E-06 3E-07 0E+00 9E-07 2E-07 0E+00 8E-07 2E-07 0E+00
PLR 0.031 0.110 0.778 0.028 0.200 0.887 0.069 0.135 0.611 -0.022 0.078 0.775 0.019 0.083 0.822
_cons -1.593 1.442 0.270 -1.485 2.329 0.524 -2.962 2.137 0.167 1.881 1.029 0.069 2.226 1.258 0.078
Pseudo R2 0.0699 0.0155 0.1283 0.1803 0.2988

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2.5.10 Information technology:

The table 2.12 shows the result of quantile regression anal ys is of the

information technology sector.

The result shows that none of the variables are showing significance at

the lowest quantile 0.05 t h for both the model. The result of the 0.25 t h low

level of quantile confirms that FDI is positivel y determines the level of debt

capital. However, other variables are not showing an y kind of significance.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, GDP and FDI are

directl y affecting the average level of debt capital. And DEPTA is negativel y

determining the average level of debt capital.

However, the high level of quantile, 0.75 t h results also indicates that

LNSA, GDP and FDI are directl y affecting the high level of debt capital. And

DEPTA is negativel y determining the high level of debt capital. .

The result of the highest quantile, 0.95 t h shows that LNSA, EBITSA,

NW, FDI and GDP are positivel y determine the very high level of debt

capital.

PLR is showing an inconsistent result among the model. However,

NFATA is having a positive insignificant coefficient among varies the

quantiles.

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 Table 2.13 Result of quantile regression analysis of media and publishing sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA -1.250 1.222 0.310 0.483 0.390 0.220 0.561 0.218 0.012 0.613 0.230 0.010 0.079 0.445 0.860
NFATA -7.932 4.825 0.105 -2.213 1.861 0.239 -1.425 1.363 0.300 -2.036 0.922 0.031 -4.286 1.670 0.013
EBITSA 0.749 2.769 0.788 0.709 1.383 0.610 0.301 0.765 0.695 0.374 1.009 0.712 -0.431 1.491 0.773
INCOVER -0.002 0.015 0.889 -0.008 0.012 0.514 -0.008 0.006 0.188 -0.009 0.004 0.042 -0.010 0.001 0.000
FDI 2E-05 2E-05 3E-01 -7E-07 6E-06 9E-01 4E-07 4E-06 9E-01 5E-06 4E-06 2E-01 1E-05 4E-06 2E-03
PLR -0.021 0.449 0.963 0.083 0.250 0.739 0.155 0.148 0.300 0.061 0.143 0.672 -0.103 0.167 0.537
_cons 7.960 7.300 0.280 0.760 3.164 0.811 -0.156 2.235 0.945 1.387 2.448 0.573 7.552 4.043 0.066
Pseudo R2 0.1013 0.3521 0.3386 0.3681 0.3566
Model II
NW -1E-03 9E-04 9E-02 -8E-05 6E-04 9E-01 5E-04 4E-04 2E-01 3E-04 2E-04 2E-01 2E-04 2E-04 3E-01
EBITSA 0.834 1.887 0.660 0.876 1.756 0.620 0.642 1.362 0.639 0.928 1.033 0.373 0.985 0.695 0.161
DEPTA -50.082 14.864 0.001 -23.631 17.307 0.177 -16.950 11.089 0.131 -2.969 9.828 0.764 -5.567 5.719 0.334
INCOVER -0.007 0.011 0.525 -0.007 0.010 0.477 -0.008 0.007 0.301 -0.009 0.006 0.121 -0.010 0.006 0.106
GDP 8E-07 6E-07 2E-01 9E-07 5E-07 1E-01 1E-06 5E-07 5E-02 7E-07 4E-07 6E-02 1E-06 2E-07 0E+00
PLR 0.491 0.301 0.108 0.138 0.166 0.410 0.086 0.133 0.520 0.022 0.162 0.892 0.065 0.109 0.553
_cons -4.184 4.487 0.355 -0.729 2.166 0.737 0.196 2.457 0.937 2.266 2.501 0.368 0.801 1.222 0.515
Pseudo R2 0.3158 0.3866 0.3236 0.3308 0.4147

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2.5.11 Media & publishing sector:

The table 2.13 shows the result of quantile regression anal ys is of the

media and publishing sector.

The result shows that at the lowest quantile 0.05 t h NW and DEPTA are

inversel y relates to the very low level of debt capital.

The result of the 0.25 t h low level of quantile confirms that variables

are not showing an y kind of significance for both the model.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA and GDP are

directl y affecting the average level of debt capital

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h results indicates that LNSA and GDP

are directl y affecting the high level of debt capital in Indian corporate sector.

And NFATA is negativel y determining the high level of debt capital. .

The result of the highest quantile, 0.95 t h shows that FDI and GDP are

positivel y determine the very high level of debt capital. NFATA is negativel y

determine the very high level of debt capital

INCOVER and EBITSA not showing any kind of significance for the

entire quantiles and PLR are result are inconsistent among the models.

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 Table 2.14 Result of quantile regression analysis of metal, metal products and mining sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.676 0.253 0.008 1.171 0.064 0.000 0.907 0.048 0.000 0.915 0.047 0.000 0.882 0.082 0.000
NFATA 1.819 1.516 0.231 0.491 0.485 0.313 0.724 0.361 0.046 0.651 0.349 0.063 0.079 0.744 0.915
EBITSA -10.280 2.354 0.000 -9.842 1.747 0.000 -2.187 1.093 0.046 -0.446 0.516 0.388 0.001 1.037 0.999
INCOVER -0.004 0.006 0.512 -0.007 0.005 0.103 -0.008 0.005 0.127 -0.002 0.004 0.704 0.001 0.003 0.819
FDI 3E-06 8E-06 7E-01 -8E-07 3E-06 8E-01 3E-06 1E-06 4E-02 2E-06 8E-07 2E-02 8E-07 3E-06 8E-01
PLR 0.377 0.257 0.144 0.010 0.067 0.884 -0.029 0.045 0.518 -0.020 0.032 0.536 -0.048 0.059 0.418
_cons -5.627 3.357 0.095 -1.646 0.943 0.082 0.197 0.585 0.736 0.166 0.423 0.696 1.772 0.984 0.073
Pseudo R2 0.275 0.3895 0.3685 0.4036 0.4145
Model II
NW 1E-04 2E-04 4E-01 1E-04 2E-05 0E+00 1E-04 2E-05 0E+00 1E-04 2E-05 0E+00 1E-04 3E-05 0E+00
EBITSA -9.352 2.703 0.001 -8.159 1.491 0.000 -5.494 1.933 0.005 -2.713 1.561 0.083 -1.767 1.198 0.142
DEPTA 7.636 28.192 0.787 48.173 15.873 0.003 33.319 9.000 0.000 31.366 8.134 0.000 31.460 9.080 0.001
INCOVER -7E-03 6E-03 3E-01 -8E-03 3E-03 8E-03 -5E-03 3E-03 1E-01 2E-05 3E-03 1E+00 6E-04 2E-03 7E-01
GDP 3E-07 8E-07 7E-01 1E-06 3E-07 5E-03 6E-07 2E-07 4E-03 4E-07 2E-07 3E-02 4E-07 3E-07 1E-01
PLR 0.445 0.373 0.234 0.204 0.096 0.034 0.144 0.077 0.063 0.081 0.061 0.190 -0.118 0.095 0.217
_cons -2.786 4.885 0.569 -1.183 1.889 0.532 1.909 1.393 0.172 3.809 1.583 0.017 7.052 1.440 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1733 0.2709 0.2216 0.2252 0.2425

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2.5.12 Metal, metal products and mining sector:

The table 2.14 shows the result of quantile regression analysis of the

metal, metal products and mining sector.

The quantile, 0.5 t h very low level of debt capital is directl y relates to

LNSA and inversel y relates to DEPTA

The quantile 0.25 t h result also shows that LNSA, DEPTA, GDP and NW

positivel y determine the low level of debt capital. EBITSA is negativel y

determining the low level of debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, NFATA, DEPTA,

GDP, FDI and NW positivel y determine the average level of debt capital. And

EBITSA is negatively determine the average level of debt capital

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h result shows that LNSA, NFATA, NW,

DEPTA, FDI and GDP are positivel y determine the high level of debt capital.

The very high level of debt capital, quantile 0.95 t h is positivel y

determined b y LNSA, DEPTA and NW.

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 Table 2.15 Result of quantile regression analysis of miscellaneous sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 1.373 0.337 0.000 1.152 0.155 0.000 0.965 0.101 0.000 0.890 0.102 0.000 0.908 0.114 0.000
NFATA 3.660 1.098 0.001 2.042 0.620 0.001 2.341 0.494 0.000 1.352 0.674 0.047 1.477 1.333 0.270
EBITSA 7.268 3.132 0.022 6.828 1.691 0.000 4.642 1.234 0.000 5.102 1.110 0.000 3.667 1.520 0.017
INCOVER -0.119 0.040 0.004 -0.055 0.024 0.023 -0.035 0.011 0.002 -0.037 0.007 0.000 -0.031 0.008 0.000
FDI 3E-07 8E-06 1E+00 3E-06 3E-06 3E-01 7E-06 2E-06 4E-03 5E-06 2E-06 4E-03 5E-06 3E-06 7E-02
PLR -0.082 0.243 0.735 0.077 0.099 0.437 0.022 0.043 0.618 -0.017 0.048 0.727 -0.012 0.053 0.827
_cons -6.684 3.596 0.066 -5.555 1.907 0.004 -3.361 1.147 0.004 -1.348 1.121 0.232 -1.051 0.917 0.254
Pseudo R2 0.4306 0.5514 0.5418 0.537 0.474
Model II
NW 2E-03 8E-04 2E-02 1E-03 3E-04 1E-03 1E-03 3E-04 0E+00 1E-03 3E-04 0E+00 4E-04 3E-04 3E-01
EBITSA 5.244 2.747 0.059 4.083 2.047 0.048 1.690 1.538 0.274 2.484 1.852 0.182 0.362 3.238 0.911
DEPTA 5.438 9.015 0.548 -17.575 11.394 0.126 -3.803 9.695 0.696 -4.177 11.028 0.706 4.726 11.310 0.677
INCOVER -0.078 0.053 0.140 -0.073 0.023 0.002 -0.040 0.019 0.037 -0.041 0.011 0.000 -0.031 0.008 0.000
GDP 1E-06 7E-07 1E-01 1E-07 4E-07 8E-01 5E-07 2E-07 3E-02 4E-07 2E-07 5E-02 3E-07 2E-07 1E-01
PLR 0.690 0.264 0.010 0.110 0.097 0.261 0.111 0.077 0.151 -0.049 0.089 0.582 -0.006 0.099 0.949
_cons -11.462 4.976 0.023 2.993 1.921 0.122 1.620 1.205 0.181 4.689 1.025 0.000 5.849 1.537 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3425 0.4523 0.3825 0.3368 0.2481

125 | P a g e
2.5.13 Miscellaneous sector:

. The table 2.15 shows the result of quantile regression analysis of th e

metal, metal products and mining sector.

The quantile, 0.5 t h very low level of debt capital is directl y relates to

LNSA, NFATA, EBITSA and NW.

The quantile 0.25 t h result also shows that LNSA, NFATA, EBITSA,

DEPTA and NW positivel y determine the low level of debt capital. INCOVER

is negativel y determining the low level of debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, NFATA, GDP, FDI

and NW positivel y determine the average level of debt capital. And

INCOVER is negativel y determine the average level of debt capital

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h result also shows that LNSA, NFATA,

GDP, FDI and NW positivel y determine the average level of debt capital. And

INCOVER is negativel y determine the average level of debt capital

The very high level of debt capital, quantile 0.95 t h is positivel y

determined b y LNSA and FDI, negativel y b y INCOVER.

126 | P a g e
 Table 2.16 Result of quantile regression analysis of oil and gas sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 1.547 0.184 0.000 0.977 0.093 0.000 0.955 0.080 0.000 0.732 0.083 0.000 0.530 0.048 0.000
NFATA 4.406 1.454 0.003 0.568 0.923 0.539 0.804 0.794 0.313 -0.464 0.903 0.607 -2.169 0.512 0.000
EBITSA 6.110 1.259 0.000 2.302 1.299 0.078 2.100 1.001 0.037 1.697 1.376 0.219 -0.993 0.637 0.121
INCOVER -5E-03 7E-03 4E-01 -7E-04 4E-03 9E-01 -6E-04 8E-04 5E-01 -1E-03 4E-04 1E-02 -1E-03 4E-04 1E-02
FDI -2E-06 4E-06 7E-01 -2E-06 3E-06 7E-01 4E-06 2E-06 4E-02 2E-06 2E-06 4E-01 2E-06 2E-06 2E-01
PLR 0.012 0.203 0.954 0.026 0.089 0.770 -0.021 0.047 0.655 0.002 0.068 0.972 -0.102 0.061 0.093
_cons -12.358 3.456 0.000 -3.062 1.775 0.086 -2.050 1.620 0.207 1.446 1.650 0.382 6.923 1.011 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.4048 0.4347 0.4704 0.4412 0.4203
Model II
NW 7E-05 2E-05 0E+00 6E-05 2E-05 1E-03 6E-05 1E-05 0E+00 6E-05 1E-05 0E+00 6E-05 9E-06 0E+00
EBITSA -0.411 2.192 0.852 -7.323 1.523 0.000 -6.064 0.956 0.000 -4.661 0.670 0.000 -2.879 0.458 0.000
DEPTA 5.939 13.622 0.663 -16.838 15.040 0.264 -10.419 6.185 0.094 -7.336 4.342 0.093 -8.804 3.066 0.005
INCOVER 1E-03 4E-03 8E-01 -8E-04 2E-03 7E-01 -2E-03 6E-04 9E-03 -2E-03 4E-04 0E+00 -2E-03 3E-04 0E+00
GDP 9E-09 7E-07 1E+00 7E-07 3E-07 4E-02 2E-07 3E-07 6E-01 3E-07 2E-07 1E-01 3E-07 1E-07 2E-02
PLR 0.235 0.271 0.387 0.153 0.162 0.345 -0.021 0.104 0.838 -0.028 0.083 0.736 -0.047 0.059 0.429
_cons -2.594 2.990 0.387 2.891 3.293 0.381 8.061 2.161 0.000 8.037 1.484 0.000 8.805 0.597 0.000
Pseudo R2 1724 0.2134 0.3043 0.3651 0.4185

127 | P a g e
2.5.14 Oil & gas sector:

The table 2.16 shows the result of quantile regression anal ys is of the

oil and gas sector.

The quantile, 0.5 t h very low level of debt capital is directl y relates to

LNSA, NFATA and NW.

The quantile 0.25 t h result also shows that LNSA, GDP and NW

positivel y determine the low level of debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, FDI and NW

positivel y determine the average level of debt capital. And DEPTA is

negativel y determine the average level of debt capital

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h result shows that LNSA and NW

positivel y determine the high level of debt capital. However, DEPTA and

INCOVER are negativel y determine the high level of debt capital

The very high level of debt capital, quantile 0.95 t h is positivel y

determined b y LNSA, NW and GDP, and negativel y b y INCOVER, NFATA

and DEPTA.

128 | P a g e
 Table 2.17 Result of quantile regression analysis of power sector

Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95

Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.780 0.369 0.036 1.039 0.132 0.000 0.794 0.114 0.000 0.741 0.085 0.000 0.209 0.101 0.039
NFATA 4.643 1.729 0.008 1.196 0.572 0.038 0.620 0.367 0.093 0.213 0.585 0.716 0.526 0.629 0.404
EBITSA 0.656 0.837 0.434 1.529 0.776 0.050 1.307 0.824 0.114 1.837 0.860 0.034 -0.532 0.734 0.469
INCOVER -0.101 0.057 0.078 -0.081 0.043 0.062 -0.016 0.025 0.534 -0.016 0.013 0.237 -0.012 0.008 0.163
FDI -2E-06 4E-06 6E-01 2E-06 2E-06 4E-01 1E-06 2E-06 5E-01 1E-06 2E-06 6E-01 4E-06 2E-06 9E-03
PLR -0.310 0.204 0.130 -0.005 0.058 0.931 -0.073 0.055 0.189 -0.049 0.064 0.451 -0.055 0.054 0.304
_cons 1.085 2.413 0.654 -1.519 1.521 0.319 1.731 1.395 0.217 2.376 1.496 0.114 8.388 1.182 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.4648 4160 0.365 0.3032 0.2568
Model II
NW 1E-04 1E-05 0E+00 1E-04 2E-05 0E+00 1E-04 4E-05 8E-03 2E-04 4E-05 0E+00 1E-04 5E-05 4E-03
EBITSA -0.03 0.80 0.97 0.66 0.98 0.50 0.03 0.86 0.98 -0.36 0.42 0.39 0.98 0.56 0.08
DEPTA 95.83 14.59 0.00 52.40 15.93 0.00 27.78 13.61 0.04 10.68 7.08 0.13 0.97 4.53 0.83
INCOVER -0.02 0.02 0.51 -0.04 0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.03 0.61 -0.01 0.02 0.58 -0.01 0.00 0.08
GDP 4E-07 3E-07 2E-01 4E-07 3E-07 2E-01 5E-07 3E-07 1E-01 9E-08 2E-07 7E-01 1E-08 1E-07 9E-01
PLR -0.106 0.160 0.508 0.017 0.141 0.902 -0.037 0.108 0.733 -0.043 0.066 0.512 -0.021 0.072 0.773
_cons 0.058 2.668 0.983 2.014 2.114 0.342 4.385 2.224 0.050 7.245 1.228 0.000 7.807 0.826 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.451 0.3412 0.2614 0.2906 0.3751

129 | P a g e
2.5.15 Power sector:

The table 2.17 shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of

power sector.

The result shows that at the lowest quantile 0.05 t h LNSA, NFATA, NW

and DEPTA are directl y relates to the very low level of debt capital.

The result of the 0.25 t h low level of quantile also confirms that

LNSA, NFATA, NW and DEPTA are directl y relates the low level of debt

capital

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result also shows that LNSA, NFATA, NW

and DEPTA are directl y affecting the average level of debt capital

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h results indicates that LNSA and NW

are directl y affecting the high level of debt capital

The result of the highest quantile, 0.95 t h shows that LNSA and FDI are

positivel y determine the very high level of debt capital.

INCOVER and EBITSA not showing any kind of significance for the

entire quantiles and PLR are result are inconsistent among the models.

130 | P a g e
 Table 2.18 Result of quantile regression analysis of telecom sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.000 0.188 1.000 1.222 0.363 0.001 0.945 0.124 0.000 0.817 0.203 0.000 0.397 0.214 0.067
NFATA 0.000 3.698 1.000 1.705 1.393 0.224 1.034 0.557 0.066 0.448 0.437 0.308 0.541 0.362 0.139
EBITSA 0.000 2.480 1.000 -2.219 1.797 0.220 -1.658 1.102 0.136 -1.131 0.615 0.069 -0.024 0.568 0.967
INCOVER 0.000 0.005 1.000 0.000 0.006 0.942 -0.001 0.004 0.790 -0.002 0.004 0.573 -0.003 0.004 0.367
FDI 0E+00 1E-05 1E+00 -1E-05 1E-05 3E-01 -1E-06 4E-06 7E-01 1E-06 4E-06 7E-01 3E-06 2E-06 1E-01
PLR 0.000 0.210 1.000 -0.102 0.328 0.755 -0.039 0.093 0.676 -0.024 0.087 0.785 -0.055 0.065 0.401
_cons 0.000 2.880 1.000 -2.307 3.821 0.547 -0.334 1.270 0.793 1.246 1.781 0.486 5.126 1.827 0.006
Pseudo R2 0.0000 0.2467 0.32 0.2997 0.2811
Model II
NW 1E-05 5E-05 8E-01 -1E-04 1E-04 3E-01 6E-05 7E-05 4E-01 9E-05 5E-05 5E-02 5E-05 4E-05 3E-01
EBITSA 0.036 1.609 0.982 -2.568 2.293 0.265 -0.706 1.171 0.548 -0.325 0.334 0.333 0.452 0.269 0.095
DEPTA -5.616 16.020 0.727 18.012 10.467 0.088 14.364 4.037 0.001 8.477 3.303 0.012 10.153 3.636 0.006
INCOVER -3E-04 1E-03 8E-01 -6E-05 6E-03 1E+00 -3E-03 6E-03 7E-01 -3E-03 6E-03 6E-01 -4E-03 6E-03 5E-01
GDP 4E-08 2E-07 9E-01 8E-07 1E-06 4E-01 8E-07 2E-07 1E-03 5E-07 3E-07 1E-01 4E-07 2E-07 2E-02
PLR 0.025 0.112 0.827 -0.062 0.544 0.909 0.109 0.135 0.421 0.016 0.096 0.867 -0.008 0.077 0.917
_cons -0.270 1.408 0.848 -0.403 6.838 0.953 0.517 2.082 0.804 4.474 1.985 0.026 5.849 0.913 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0007 0.1052 0.1592 0.1834 0.2352

131 | P a g e
2.5.16 Telecom sector:

The table 2.18 shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of the telecom

sector.

The result shows that none of the variables are showing significance at

the lowest quantile 0.05 t h for both the model. The result of the 0.25 t h low

level of quantile confirms that LNSA and DEPTA are positivel y determines

the level of debt capital. However, other variables are not showing an y kind

of significance.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result shows that LNSA, NFATA, DEPTA

and GDP are positively determine the average level of debt capital.

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h result shows that LNSA, DEPTA and

NW are positivel y determine the high level of debt capital.

The very high level of debt capital, quantile 0.95 t h is positivel y determined

b y LNSA,GDP, FDI and DEPTA.

132 | P a g e
 Table 2.19 Result of quantile regression analysis of textile sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 1.404 0.105 0.000 1.203 0.075 0.000 1.270 0.103 0.000 1.289 0.160 0.000 0.819 0.320 0.012
NFATA -1.152 0.298 0.000 -1.084 0.282 0.000 -1.279 0.313 0.000 -1.603 0.386 0.000 -1.685 1.256 0.183
EBITSA 2.581 1.399 0.068 2.181 1.399 0.122 2.440 1.412 0.087 2.364 1.212 0.054 3.716 1.878 0.051
INCOVER -0.128 0.022 0.000 -0.104 0.025 0.000 -0.105 0.023 0.000 -0.091 0.018 0.000 -0.077 0.023 0.001
FDI 1E-06 1E-06 3E-01 3E-06 1E-06 2E-02 2E-06 1E-06 1E-01 3E-07 1E-06 8E-01 1E-06 3E-06 7E-01
PLR 0.022 0.040 0.590 0.042 0.042 0.315 0.050 0.029 0.083 0.036 0.034 0.289 -0.028 0.061 0.649
_cons -3.601 0.857 0.000 -2.247 0.708 0.002 -2.405 0.775 0.003 -1.890 1.319 0.155 2.487 2.649 0.350
Pseudo R2 0.8310 0.7049 0.6415 5577 0.4928
Model II
NW 6E-04 2E-04 9E-03 4E-04 1E-04 2E-02 5E-04 8E-05 0E+00 5E-04 7E-05 0E+00 4E-04 8E-05 0E+00
EBITSA 14.949 5.098 0.004 2.320 2.088 0.269 3.535 1.263 0.006 3.858 1.416 0.008 1.747 0.999 0.084
DEPTA 8.691 11.413 0.448 -11.774 5.087 0.023 -9.147 4.113 0.029 -9.661 6.703 0.153 -16.395 4.097 0.000
INCOVER -0.335 0.073 0.000 -0.113 0.041 0.007 -0.130 0.025 0.000 -0.131 0.023 0.000 -0.104 0.016 0.000
GDP 1E-06 5E-07 1E-02 4E-07 9E-08 0E+00 3E-07 9E-08 1E-03 3E-07 1E-07 2E-02 4E-07 8E-08 0E+00
PLR 0.368 0.157 0.021 -0.011 0.054 0.845 0.038 0.036 0.297 0.018 0.060 0.763 0.034 0.037 0.349
_cons -5.605 3.683 0.131 5.477 1.040 0.000 5.110 0.687 0.000 5.767 1.121 0.000 6.258 0.612 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.4738 0.4108 0.4517 0.4179 0.5634

133 | P a g e
2.5.17 Textile sector:

The table 2.19 shows the result of quantile regression anal ysis of

textile sector.

The result shows that at the lowest quantile 0.05 t h LNSA, EBITSA, NW

and GDP are directl y relates to the very low level of debt capital. NFATA and

INCOVER are inversel y relates to the very low level of debt capital.

The result of the 0.25 t h low level of quantile also confirms that

LNSA, NW, FDI and GDP are directl y relates the low level of debt capital

NFATA, DEPTA and INCOVER are inversel y relates to the low level of debt

capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result also shows that LNSA, EBITSA, NW

and GDP are directly affecting the average level of debt capital. NFATA,

DEPTA and INCOVER are inversel y relates to the average level of debt

capital.

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h results indicates that LNSA, EBITSA,

GDP and NW are directl y affecting the high level of debt capital. NFATA and

INCOVER are inversel y relates to the average level of debt capital

The result of the highest quantile, 0.95 t h shows that LNSA, NW,

EBITSA and GDP are positivel y determine the very high level of debt capital.

INCOVER and DEPTA are negativel y determining the very high level of debt

capital.

134 | P a g e
 Table 2.20 Result of quantile regression analysis for transport equipment sector
Model I q05 q25 q50 q75 q95
Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
LNSA 0.854 0.176 0.000 0.662 0.114 0.000 0.635 0.075 0.000 0.568 0.088 0.000 0.560 0.063 0.000
NFATA 1.089 1.162 0.349 0.877 1.281 0.494 -0.463 0.794 0.560 -1.538 0.776 0.049 -0.973 0.359 0.007
EBITSA 5.188 4.142 0.212 3.071 2.210 0.166 2.928 1.368 0.033 1.743 1.248 0.164 1.907 0.762 0.013
INCOVER -0.013 0.005 0.015 -0.008 0.004 0.061 -0.004 0.002 0.015 -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000
FDI 7E-07 4E-06 9E-01 4E-06 2E-06 3E-02 3E-06 1E-06 7E-03 4E-06 2E-06 1E-02 6E-06 1E-06 0E+00
PLR 0.257 0.141 0.071 0.047 0.096 0.626 0.015 0.045 0.742 -0.130 0.068 0.056 -0.006 0.047 0.904
_cons -5.863 2.306 0.012 -1.070 2.157 0.621 0.876 1.275 0.493 4.238 1.407 0.003 3.071 0.867 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.3288 0.2569 0.2652 0.2515 0.4154
Model II
NW 2E-04 8E-05 3E-02 2E-04 5E-05 0E+00 2E-04 6E-05 1E-03 3E-04 5E-05 0E+00 2E-04 8E-05 2E-03
EBITSA 3.897 3.570 0.276 -0.632 1.395 0.651 -0.449 0.737 0.543 -0.095 0.454 0.835 -0.719 0.758 0.344
DEPTA 8.808 5.807 0.131 -7.955 3.187 0.013 -14.399 2.682 0.000 -9.536 3.136 0.003 -9.274 4.823 0.056
INCOVER -1E-02 3E-03 0E+00 -4E-03 4E-03 2E-01 -2E-03 1E-03 5E-02 -3E-03 4E-04 0E+00 -3E-03 2E-04 0E+00
GDP 8E-07 5E-07 1E-01 1E-07 2E-07 6E-01 2E-07 9E-08 6E-02 2E-07 9E-08 2E-02 3E-07 1E-07 5E-03
PLR 0.334 0.167 0.046 0.159 0.070 0.024 0.011 0.040 0.792 -0.008 0.032 0.790 -0.019 0.051 0.709
_cons -3.770 2.262 0.097 3.429 0.985 0.001 6.054 0.699 0.000 6.256 0.580 0.000 6.730 0.808 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.2168 0.2091 0.2547 0.3163 0.4577

135 | P a g e
2.5.18 Transport equipment sector:

The table 2.20 shows the result of quantile regression anal ys is of Transport

equipment sector.

The result shows that at the lowest quantile 0.05 t h LNSA, NW and PLR

are directl y relates to the very low level of debt capital. And INCOVER is

inversel y relates to the very low level of debt capital

The result of the 0.25 t h low level of quantile also confirms that

LNSA, FDI and NW are directl y relates the low level of debt capital. DEPTA

is inversel y relates to the low level of debt capital.

The median quantile, 0.50 t h result also shows that LNSA, FDI, NW and

GDP are directl y affecting the average level of debt capital. INCOVER and

DEPTA are inversel y affecting the average level of debt capital

The high level of quantile, 0.75 t h results indicates that LNSA, NW, FDI

and GDP are directl y affecting the high level of debt capital. NFATA,

INCOVER and DEPTA are inversel y affecting the high level of debt capital

The result of the highest quantile, 0.95 t h shows also that LNSA, NW,

FDI and GDP are directl y affecting the very high level of debt capital.

NFATA, INCOVER and DEPTA are inversel y affecting the very high level of

debt capital

136 | P a g e
2.6 Findings

The stud y has examined the trend of debt structure taking the average

total debt of sample companies as a whole as well as average total debt of a

particular sector in absolute terms. Similarl y for secured debt, unsecured

debt, long-term debt and short-term debt. The findings are summarised below.

The sectors such as agriculture, capital goods, consumer durables,

FMCG, healthcare, housing related, metal, metal products and mining,

miscellaneous, oil and gas, power, telecom, textile and transport equipment

shows that total debt has an upward trend. However media and publishing,

information technology, diversified and chemical and petrochemical sector

show a declining trend towards the end of the stud y period (after 2009). The

total sample indicates that total debt has an upward trend throughout the

stud y period.

Turning to secured debts, agriculture, capital goods, consumer

durables, FMCG, healthcare, housing related, information technology, media

and publishing, metal, metal products and mining, miscellaneous, power,

telecom, textile and transport equipment sectors indicates an upward trend.

However, chemical and petrochemicals sector shows a declining trend

straight from the beginning, but sectors like Diversified, miscellaneous, oil

and gas, diversified and a chemical and petrochemical sector shows a

declining trend towards the end of the stud y period (after 2009). Overall

samples indicate that secured has an upward trend throughout the stud y

period.

137 | P a g e
 The sectors such as capital goods, consumer durables, FMCG,

healthcare, housing related, metal, metal products and mining, miscellaneous,

oil and gas, power, telecom and transport equipment shows that unsecured

debt has an upward trend. However the textile sector shows a slight decline

trend straight from the beginning, but sectors, agriculture, chemical and

petrochemical, diversified, media and publishing, information technology,

and a sector show a declining trend towards the end of the stud y period (after

2009). Overall samples indicate that unsecured debt has an upward trend

throughout the stud y period.

Again the sectors such as agriculture, Capital goods, consumer

durables, FMCG, healthcare, housing related, information technology, metal,

metal products and mining, miscellaneous, oil and gas, power, telecom,

textile and transport equipment shows that long-term debt has an upward

trend. Overall samples indicate that long-term debt has an upward trend

throughout the stud y period.

It is interesting to note that the short-term debt of the sample taken as

a whole has an upward trend throughout the stud y period. The sectors such as

agriculture, Capital goods, consumer durables, FMCG, healthcare, housing

related, metal, metal products and mining, miscellaneous, oil and gas, power,

telecom, textile and transport equipment shows that short-term debt has an

upward trend. However media and publishing, diversified and chemical and

petrochemical, information technology sector show a declining trend towards

the end of the stud y period (after 2009).

138 | P a g e
 To understand the proportion of the various t ypes of debt we have

calculated the major debt ratios such as debt to equit y ratio, long-term debt

to total debt, short-term debt to total debt, secured debt to total debt and

unsecured debt to total debt.

The debt equit y ratio of the sectors like agriculture, capital goods,

chemical and petrochemicals, consumer durables, FMCG, housing related,

metal, metal products and mining, oil and gas, power and telecom shows a

declining trend during the stud y period. At the same time miscellaneous,

media and publishing and information technology, it shows an upward trend.

However diversified, healthcare, textile and transport equipment show

several up and downs in different period and the end of the period it shows a

decline trend. Overall the sample confirms a declining trend.

Long-term debt to total debt ratio of the sectors such as the chemical

and petrochemicals diversified, consumer durables, metal, metal products and

mining, and transport equipment shows a decline trend. At the same time

capital goods, housing related, miscellaneous, and it shows an upward trend.

However, agriculture, FMCG, healthcare, information technology, media and

publishing, oil and, gas, power textile and telecom shows not much change in

the ratio at different period. Overall the sample confirms that they're not

much movement for long-term debt to total debt. The ratio kept almost stable

throughout the stud y period.

Short-term debts to total debt of the sectors like capital goods, FMCG

and miscellaneous shows a declining trend. At the same time chemical and

139 | P a g e
petrochemicals, transport equipment and metal, metal products and mining

shows an upward trend. However, agriculture diversified, consumer durables,

healthcare, housing related, media & publishing, oil and gas, power, textile

and telecom shows the ratio is more or less stable at different period. But in

case of information technology the ratio shows up and downs. Overall the

sample confirms that there is not much movement for short-term debt to total

debt. The ratio kept almost stable throughout the stud y period.

Secured debt to total debt of the sectors such as capital goods,

chemical and petrochemicals, diversified, FMCG, information technology,

metal, metal products and mining, miscellaneous and transport equipment

show a declining trend. At the same time housing related and power it shows

a slight upward trend. However, agriculture, consumer durables, healthcare,

media and publishing, oil and gas, textile and telecom shows not much

change in the ratio at different period. Overall the sample confirms that the

ratio having a slight declining trend throughout the stud y period.

Sectors such as chemical and petrochemicals, diversified, information

technology, metal, metal products and mining, miscellaneous, transport

equipment and oil and gas shows an upward trend in the case of unsecured

debt to total debt. . However, agriculture, capital goods, consumer durables,

FMCG healthcare and media and publishing show up and downs in the ration

during the stud y period and towards the end it shows a declining trend. At the

same time housing related power, textile and telecom show the ratio is more

or less stable at different period. Overall the sample confirms that unsecured

debt to total debt shows an upward trend.

140 | P a g e
 Overall all t ypes of debt have been grown up significantl y during the

stud y period. However the proportion of growth in debt compared to equit y is

less. It shows the underdevelopment of the debt market in India. Or may be

managers are not willing to take risks. After anal ysing the trend the stud y

examines the determinants of debt capital using quantile regression

techniques. Table 2.21 shows the sector wise findings at all levels of

quantile.

Table 2.21 Determinants of debt capital: sector wise findings

S
Sectors/ i Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
Quantile g 0.05 0.25 Quantile 0.50 0.75 0.95
Size,
+ Size, Size, Size,
Size, Profitability,
v Creditworthine Creditworthine Creditworthine
Creditworthine Creditworthines
Agricultur e ss
ss s, FDI
ss,FDI ss, FDI
e _
Debt capacity,
v Debt capacity Debt capacity Debt capacity Debt capacity
FDI
e
Size, Size,
Size,
+ Asset structure Size, Asset structure
Asset structure
v NA Creditworthine Asset structure Creditworthine
Creditworthine
Capital e ss,
ss,
ss Economic
Goods growth,
_
Economic
v NA NA NA NA
growth
e
Size, Size,
+ Size, Size,
Creditworthine Profitability,
Chemical v Creditworthines Creditworthine Size,
ss, Profitability Creditworthine
e s, ss,
& ss,
Petrochem _
ical NA Non debt tax Non debt tax
v Debt capacity Debt capacity
shield shield
e
, Size,
+ Size, Size, , ,
Creditworthines
v Creditworthine Creditworthine Creditworthine Creditworthine
s, Economic
e ss ss ss, ss ,
Consumer growth
Durables Asset structure
_ Non debt tax
Non debt tax Non debt tax Non debt tax Non debt tax
v shield ,
shield shield shield shield
e Debt capacity
Debt capacity
+ Size, FDI, Size, FDI,
Size, Size, FDI, Size ,Economic
v Creditworthines Economic
Diversified Profitability, Profitability growth
e s, Profitability growth
_ Non debt tax NA, NA Debt capacity NA

141 | P a g e
 v shield
e
Size
+ Size, Size, Size
Size Creditworthine
v Creditworthine Creditworthine FDI, Economic
FDI ss, Economic
e ss , FDI ss, growth
growth
FMCG Profitability Asset structure, Asset structure,
_
Asset structure Non debt tax Debt capacity, Debt capacity, Debt capacity
v
shield, Debt Non debt tax Non debt tax
e
capacity shield shield
Asset structure, Size, Size, Size, FDI, Size, FDI,
+
Non debt tax Creditworthine Creditworthines Creditworthine Creditworthine
v
shield, Interest ss, s, Economic ss, Economic ss, Economic
e
rate growth growth growth
Healthcare Asset structure, Asset structure,
_ Asset structure,
Non debt tax Debt capacity Non debt tax Non debt tax
v Non debt tax
shield shield, shield,
e shield
Debt capacity Debt capacity
Size, Asset
structure Size,
Size, Size, Size,
+ Creditworthines Creditworthine
Creditworthine Creditworthine Creditworthine
v s, Non debt tax ss,
ss, Non debt ss, Economic ss,
Housing e
tax shield, growth
shield, Economic
Related Economic growth
growth, FDI,
_
v NA NA NA NA Asset structure,
e
Size, FDI,
+ Size, FDI, Size, FDI, Creditworthine
Informatio v NA FDI Economic Economic ss, Economic
n e growth growth growth,
Technolog Profitability,
y _
Non debt tax Non debt tax
v NA NA NA
shield shield
e
+ Size, Size,
Media & Economic
v NA NA Economic Economic
growth, FDI
publishing e growth growth
_ Creditworthine
Asset structure,
v ss, Non debt NA NA Asset structure,
e tax shield
Size, Non debt
Size, , Non Size, Economic
tax shield,
debt tax shield, growth ,Non Size, Non debt
+ Economic
Metal, Economic debt tax shield, tax shield,
v growth , Asset
Size growth Asset structure, Creditworthine
Metal e
Creditworthine Creditworthines
structure,
ss,
Products Creditworthine
ss s,
& Mining ss, FDI
_
Non debt tax
v Profitability Profitability NA Asset structure
shield
e
Size, Asset Size, Asset
Size, Asset
Size, Asset structure, structure,
+ structure, FDI,
Miscellane structure, Profitability, Creditworthines
v Creditworthine Size, FDI
ous Profitability, Creditworthine s, FDI,
e ss, Economic
Creditworthine ss, Non debt Economic
growth
ss tax shield, growth

142 | P a g e
 _
v NA Debt capacity Debt capacity Debt capacity Debt capacity
e
Size , Size , Size , Size ,
+ Size ,
Creditworthine Creditworthine Creditworthines Creditworthine
v Creditworthine
ss, Asset ss, Economic s, Economic ss, Economic
e ss,
structure growth growth growth
Oil & Gas Non debt tax
_ Non debt tax
Non debt tax shield, Debt
v NA NA shield, Debt
shield capacity Asset
e capacity
structure,
Size , Asset Size , Asset Size , Asset
Size
+ structure Non structure Non structure Non
Creditworthine Size , FDI
v debt tax shield, debt tax shield, debt tax shield,
ss,
e Creditworthine Creditworthine Creditworthines
Power ss, ss,, s
_
v
e NA NA NA NA
NA
Size, Asset
Size, Size, Non debt
+ structure, Non
Size, Non debt Creditworthine tax shield,
v NA debt tax shield,
tax shield, ss , Non debt Economic
e Economic
Telecom growth
tax shield growth, FDI
_
NA
v NA NA NA NA
e
Size, Economic Size, Size, Size,
Size,
+ growth Profitability, Creditworthine Creditworthine
Creditworthine
v Profitability , Creditworthines ss, Profitability, ss, Profitability,
ss, Economic
e Creditworthine s, Economic Economic Economic
growth , FDI
Textile ss, growth growth growth
Asset structure, Asset structure,
_
Asset structure, Debt capacity, Debt capacity, Asset structure, Asset structure,
v
Debt capacity Non debt tax Non debt tax Debt capacity Debt capacity
e
shield, shield,
Size , FDI, Size , FDI, Size , FDI,
+ Size, Size , FDI,
Creditworthines Creditworthine Creditworthine
v Creditworthine Creditworthine
Transport s, Economic ss, Economic ss, Economic
e ss, Interest rate ss,
growth growth growth
Equipmen Asset structure, Asset structure,
ts _ Debt capacity,
Non debt tax Non debt tax Non debt tax
v Debt capacity Non debt tax
shield shield, Debt shield, Debt
e shield
capacity capacity

From the overall analysis we can say that the quantile 0.05 t h the lowest

quantile doesn’t explained an y significant relation. However, in the sector

wise anal ysis lowest quantile explained the significant relationship among

the independent and depended variable for most of the sectors.

143 | P a g e
 The firms which are having low level (quantile 0.25 t h ) of debt capital

is directl y related to size, creditworthiness, economic growth and inversel y

related to non-debt tax shield, debt capacit y. Thus we can conclude that for

this quantile Indian firms are following pecking order theory. According to

the pecking order theory profitable firms generall y borrow less; not because

they have low target debt ratios but they don’t need outside money. Less

profitable firms issue debt because they do not have internal fund sufficient

for their capital investment.

From the result of median quantile, 0.50 t h the stud y conclude that the

average level of debt capital is directly relates to size, creditworthiness,

economic growth and FDI. However, it is inversel y relates to debt capacit y

and non-debt tax shield.

The firm, which has a high level (quantile 0.75) of debt capital is also

directl y related to size, creditworthiness, FDI, economic growth and

inversel y related to debt capacit y and non-debt tax shield. So we can

conclude firms having good amount of sales and has sufficient internal cash

flow and retained earnings will go for high amount of debt capital.

The firm, which has a very high level (quantile 0.95) of debt capital, is

directl y related to size, creditworthiness, FDI and economic growth. Thus,

the firm having high amount of sales and sufficient retained earnings will go

for very high debt. So in general the level of debt capital is directl y related

to size, creditworthiness and inversel y related to Debt capacit y and non-debt

144 | P a g e
tax shield. Moreover, it is direl y related to the macroeconomic variable like

FDI and economic growth.

All the results show expected sign for the variables. However, the

variable debt capacity is having negative sign which not predicted b y the

stud y. In this context we conclude that firms which are having enough debt

capacit y are not going for debt and vice versa.

2. 7 Chapter Summary

This chapter examines the debt capital structure, and its trend in

overall sample as well as in sector wise from the year 2002- 2011. It also

verifies the various determines of debt capital in Indian companies. From the

collected data we have defined the debt structure as the proportion of secured

and unsecured in the total debt or the proportion long-term or short-term

debt. For the anal ysing the trend of debt structure the stud y has used simple

line charts. The line charts strongl y indicates that the total debt, secured

debt, unsecured debt, long-term and short-term debt has been increased

significantl y during the stud y period for the sector as well as for the total

sample collected. For knowing the various determinants of debt capital the

stud y has firstl y identify the variables from the past literature, then uses

quantile regression tool for identifying the variables. size, creditworthiness,

foreign direct investment and economic growth are directl y determining the

level of debt capital in Indian companies. And debt capacit y and non-debt tax

shield is negativel y affecting the level of debt capital. However, these

145 | P a g e
determinants are varying significantl y depending on the quantile and sectors

(see table 2.23).

2.8 Reference

Booth, Laurence., Varouj Aivazian., Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislaw

Maksimovic. 2001. Capital structures in developing countries.

Journal of Finance, 56(1), 87–130.

Buchinsk y, Moshe. 1994. Changes in the U.S. wage structure 1963-1987:

Application of quantile regression. Econometrica, 62(2), 405-

458.

____________. 1998. Recent advances in quantile regression models: A

practical guide for empirical research. Journal of Human

Resources, 33(1), 88-126.

Chang, Chun. 1999. Capital structure as optimal contracts. North American

Journal of Economics and Finance, 10(2), 363-85.

Hao, L and Daniel Q. Naiman. 2007. Quantile regression, Thousand Oaks,

Calif: Sage Publications.

Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv. 1991. The theory of the capital structure.

Journal of Finance, 46(1), 297-355.

Koenker, Roger and Gilbert Bassett. 1978. Regression quantiles.

Econometrica, 46(1), 33–50.

______________, and Kevin F. Hallock. 2001. Quantile regression. Journal

of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 143–156.

146 | P a g e
Long, Michael and Lleen Maltiz. 1985. The investment-financing nexus:

Some empirical Evidence. Midland Corporate Finance Journal,

3(3), 53-59.

Modigliani, Franco and Miller, Merton H. 1958. The cost of capital,

corporate finance, and the theory of investment. American

Economic Review, 48(3), 261–97.

Mosteller, Frederick and John Wilder Tukey. 1977 P.266. Data Analysis and

Regression, Addison-Wesley Pub Co, Reading, MA.

Rajan, Raghuram G. and Luigi Zingales. 1995. What do we know about

capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of

Finance, 50(5), 1421–1460.

Wald John K. 1999. How firm characteristics affect capital structure: an

international comparison. Journal of Financial Research, 22(2),

161-187.

Wiwattanakantang, Yupana. 1999. An empirical stud y on the determinants of

the capital structure of Thai firms. Pacific-Basin Finance

Journal, 7 (3-4), 371-403.

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148 | P a g e
 CHAPTER III

DEBT CHOICE

3.1 Introduction
3.2 Types of Debt Capital
3.3 The proportion of Secured and Unsecured Debts
3.4 Findings
3.5 Chapter Summary
3.6 References

3.1 Introduction

Debt capital is the capital borrowed from external sources. Accordin g

to the requirements, firms used to borrow money from various external

sources such as banks, public, government, companies or other financial

institutions. Choosing a specific source of debt capital depends

predominantl y on the cost of debt capital. Ownership structure of a firm (Lin.

Chen et al. 2013), as well as the discretion of the Management (Denis and

Mihov, 2003) also has an influence on the selection debt capital.

Creditworthiness of a firm has also determents choice of debt capital. Firms

with high credit qualit y will opt from public sources; medium credit qualit y

will opt from banks and lowest credit qualit y firms will go for non-bank

private lenders (Denis and Mihov, 2003), (Shirasu and Xu, 2007). Moreover

the kind of economic exposure will also influence the long-term debt

financing choice of the firms (Goswami-Shrikhande, 2001).

149 | P a g e
 Because of under-developed equit y markets, the corporate debt market

in India has been important. In India, firms borrow using five t ypes of debt

instruments. These are: (1) short- term borrowings from commercial

banks;(2) long-term borrowings from term-lending institutions, which we will

call institutional borrowings; (3) borrowings in the form of debentures which

are corporate bonds that in some (not in all) cases are converted to shares

after a specific lock-in period; (4) fixed deposits, which are deposits that

yield a specified rate of interest over a given period of time from the market;

and finall y (5) a residual category called ‘other borrowing’ which includes

trade credit and other funds accessed from the inter-corporate market

(Majumdar and Sen, 2007).

The four major t ypes of debt can be classified according to whether the

debt is monitored or arm’s length. Bank borrowings and institutional

borrowings can be classified as monitored debt and debentures and fixed

deposits can be classified as arm’s-length debt (Majumdar and Sen, 2007).

Both credit and bond markets have existed in India for a long time. Modern

banking began in In dia in the eighteenth century with the founding of the

English Agency House in Calcutta and Bombay, followed in quick succession

b y the establishment of three Presidency banks (Banerjee et al., 2004).

With the introduction of limited liabilit y in 1860, private banks began

to appear. Joint stock banks came into being in the beginning of the twentieth

century. Commercial banking grew very rapidl y in the colonial period (Roy,

2000). After a period of social control of banking between 1969 and 1991,

there were extensive reforms in the Indian financial sector, allowing banks to

150 | P a g e
set interest rates on their own and to lend to firms and households without

significant restrictions on whom they lend to (Sen and Vaid ya, 1997). 4

With respect to institutional borrowing, these are essentiall y provided

b y term-lending institutions and are mainl y long-term loans that are secured

on the assets bought with these loans. Term-lending institutions were

established, de-novo, b y the government after independence. For example,

the Industrial Finance Corporation of India was set up in 1948, and the

Industrial Development Bank of India in 1964. These are the two major

suppliers of long-term loans to Indian industry.

There are a number of government owned long-term lenders, such as

the Industrial Investment Bank of India, the Small Industries Development

Bank of India and the Shipping Credit and Investment Corporation of India.

For the agriculture sector, two institutions, the Agricultural Finance

Corporation and Agricultural Refinance Corporation were set up. They were

merged to form the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development.

Similarl y, a National Housing Bank was set up as was an Export-Import Bank

of India. Also, the state owned Life Insurance Corporation of India and the

operating subsidiaries of the state owned General Insurance Compan y possess

substantial surplus liquidit y with which they provide funds to companies.

A major quasi private-sector financial institution, the Industrial Credit

and Investment Corporation of India; was established in 1955. In establishing

this unit, the government’s support was paramount. Eventuall y, the

government holdings in this financial institution were over eight y percent

151 | P a g e
through a variet y of indirect means. Thus, as in the case with commercial

banks, government-owned term-lending institutions have a long history of

lending to the Indian corporate sector, dating back to the late 1940s.

The Indian capital market also dates back to the colonial period to the

establishment of the first stock market in India in Bombay in 1857. During

the colonial period, man y Indian firms tried to popularize debentures as a

source of financing successfull y (Ro y, 2000). Since independence, in line

with the Indian government’s policies, there was strict control on the pricing

and new issues of capital, including corporate bonds. This was done via the

office of the Controller of Capital Issues, a unit in the Department of

Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance. The Controller of Capital Issues

controlled the quantit y and price of both debt and equit y that companies

could issue (Marathe, 1989).

In 1991, the pricing of new issues was freed along with a relaxation of

the restrictions on firms to approach the capital market for funds. In 1992,

the government allowed Indian firms with good track records to issue

debentures in foreign capital markets. In the post-1991 period, there was a

strong growth in the bond market with the introduction of man y new and

innovative t ypes of bonds (Sen and Vaidya, 1997). The issuance of bonds and

fixed deposits became an important mechanism for raising external funds for

man y Indian firms during this period, with the share of capital market-based

instruments in total funds, increasing from 17.3 per cent in the period 1985-

86 to 1990-91 to 22.3 per cent in the period 1991-92 to 2000-01 (Reserve

Bank of India, 2003). There are two important features of the Indian equit y

152 | P a g e
ownership structure. First, foreign ownership is important in India. Even

though foreign firms account for a handful of the number of firms in the

corporate demograph y of India, they account for almost a third of India’s

industrial output in value (Athreye and Kapur, 2001).

The second feature of equit y ownership in India relevant to the

empirical anal ysis is the state’s important role as sole or part owner of firms

in India. Similar to commercial banks and other financial intermediaries,

there is extensive government ownership of industrial firms in India. Firms

with government ownership, engage in a m yriad range of activities either

simpl y because of mandates or because the availabilit y of soft funds from the

state allowing them to experiment in a variet y of businesses.

3.2 Types of Debt Capital

Term loans: a business loan repayab le according to a specified

schedule is a term loan. It is generall y repayable more than one year and less

than ten years. Usuall y term loans are availed from banks or an y other

financial institutions. All term loans are secured more over the term loans

have to be amortized according to a predetermined schedule.

Debenture: a debenture is a marketable legal contract whereb y the

compan y promises to pay its owner, a specified rate of interest for a defined

period of time and to repay the principal at the specific date of maturit y.

Debentures are usuall y secured b y a charge on the immovable properties of

the compan y. Debentures can be classified as: non- convertible debenture-

153 | P a g e
the debenture which cannot be converted into o equit y shares and will be

redeemed at the end of the maturit y period. Fully-convertible debenture-

these debentures can be converted into equit y shares over a specified period

of time. Partly convertible debenture- a portion of these debentures can be

converted into equity shares over a specified period of time.

Hire purchase: it is a mode of financing the price of the goods to be

sold at a future date. In a hire purchase transaction, the goods are let on hire,

the purchase price is to be paid in instalments and the hirer is allowed for an

option to purchase the goods b y paying all the instalments.

Deferred credit: Income that is received in advance of it being earned,

but not immediatel y reported as income. Typicall y, this is done on income

that is not full y earned and, consequently, has yet to be matched with a

related expense. Such items include consulting fees, subscription fees and

an y other revenue stream that is intricatel y tied to future promises. For

example, a book club might defer income from a two-year membership plan

until all the costs of procurement and shipping are assessed. Also known as

deferred revenue or deferred income.

Cash credit: Under the cash credit agreement, the customer is permitted

to borrow up to a pre-fixed limit called the cash credit limit. The customer is

charged interest onl y on the amount actuall y utilized.

Packing credit: it is a loan or advance granted or an y other credit

provided b y a bank to an exporter for financing the purchase, processing,

manufacturing or packing of goods prior to shipment, on the basis of letter of

154 | P a g e
credit opened in his favour or in favour of some other person, b y an overseas

bu yer or a confirmed and irrevocable order for the export of goods from the

producing country or an y other evidence of an order for export from that

country having been placed on the ex porter or some other person, unless

lodgement of export orders or letter of credit with the bank has been waived

Bills discounted: under this arrangement, the bank provides financing

to the customers either b y outright purchase or discounting the bills arising

out of the sale of finished goods.

Public deposits: this refers to an y deposits of money from the public

with a firm at a specified rate of interest for a stipulated period with the

provision for renewal.

Bonds: a bond is a certificate promising to pay its holder a specified

sum of money at a stated date, called the maturit y date, and interest at a

stated rate until the maturit y date.

Commercial paper: it is a short-term unsecured promissory note,

generall y issued b y large companies. It can be issued for maturities between

a minimum of 15 days to a maximum of one year and in denominations of Rs

5 lakh or multiples thereof.

Accrued interest: A term used to describe an accrual accounting method

when the interest that is either payable or receivable has been recognized, but

not yet paid or received. Accrued interest occurs as a result of the difference

in timing of cash flows and the measurement of these cash flows.

155 | P a g e
 Deferred liabilities: deferred liabilit y is money that a compan y

receives from a customer as prepayment for some good or service. A deferred

liabilit y is listed on a balance sheet as a liabilit y until the good or service is

delivered. This is because the compan y would have to return the money if it

does not keep its end of the bargain as promised. A deferred liabilit y is also

called a deferred credit or deferred revenue.

Deferred tax: An account on a compan y's balance sheet that is a result

of temporary differences between the compan y's accounting and tax carrying

values, the anticipated and enacted income tax rate, and estimated taxes

payable for the current year. This liability may or may not be realized during

an y given year, which makes the deferred status appropriate.

The stud y broadl y classified the debt into two parts secured and

unsecured debt. The majorit y of the sample companies selected in India is

having both secured as well as unsecured debt. The various components under

secured debt are Conver tible debenture, Non- convertible Debenture, Term

loan from institutions, Term loan from bank, Loans from others, deferred

credit /hire purchase, Browning from GOV, Cash Credit /Packing Credit /

Bills Discounted, Working capital advance, Interest accrued and due and

other Secured debt. The various components under unsecured debt are loan

from group of companies, debentures / bonds, accrued interest, loan from the

bank, loan from institutions, advances, loans from GOI and PSU, deferred

liabilities, deferred tax, commercial paper, other unsecured loans, and

deposits etc.

156 | P a g e
 3.3 The proportions of Secured and Unsecured debts

With the help of pie chat we are examining the various sources from

which Indian firm borrowing capital under secured and unsecured debt. The

detailed proportion of various debt capital chosen b y different firms under

different sectors are discussed below

3.3.1 Sample companies:

The table 3.1 shows the secured debt of sample companies. A total of

321 listed companies were selected for the stud y. 78% of the total secured

debts are financed through long-term sources. They are: term loan from banks

35%, non-convertible debentures 25%, term loan from institutions 9%,

deferred credit/ hire purchase 5%, term loan from others 3%, convertible

debenture 1%. The contribution from short-term debts are working capital

advance 13%, cash credit/packing credit/ bills discounted 6%, secured loan

from others 3%.

157 | P a g e
 Figure 3.1 The
he proportions of secured debts in sample companies

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.2 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in sample companies

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

The table 3.2 shows the distribution of unsecured debt of sample

companies. Under the unsecured debt 15% are long-term

long term in nature. Those are

debenture/ bonds, 12% and deposits 3%. The rest is short-term

short term in nature. The

various short-term
term debts are loans from bank 57%, an unsecured loan from

158 | P a g e
others 18%. Commercial paper, loan from institutions and deferred tax are

2% each. Deferred liabilit y, loan from GPI/PSU and advances are 1% each.

3.3.2 Agriculture sector:

Agriculture sector consists of 18 companies. From the figure 3.3 shows

the distribution of different long-term as well as short-term secured debt used

b y the firm in agriculture sector. 46% of the total secured debt consists of

short-term debt. Cash credit /packing credit / bills discounted accounted for

20%, working capital advance is 17%, secured loans from others 8% and

borrowing from the government of India 1% of the total secured debt. 54% o f

the total secured debt stands for long-term debt. 33% of the total long-term

debts are term loans from banks. 8% of the total secured accounts for

debenture. Term loans from institutions are 7%, deferred credit/ hire purchase

is 4% and term loan from others is 2%.

26% of the total unsecured debt financed through long-term sources

such as Debenture/ bonds 21% and deposits 5%. The rest accounts for short-

term sources.46% of the total unsecured debt consists of loan from bank,

unsecured loan from others 12%, advances 3%, commercial paper and

deferred liabilit y 2% each, loan from institutions and deferred tax 1% each.

The figure 3.4 shows the distribution of unsecured debt in the agriculture

sector.

159 | P a g e
 Figure 3.3 The
he proportions of secured debt in agriculture sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.4 The

he proportions
proportion s of unsecured debts in agriculture sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

3. 3.3 Capital goods sector:

This sector consists of 39 companies. 58% of the total unsecured debts

are long-term
term debt and the remaining unsecured debt is short-term
short in nature.

160 | P a g e
The long-term
term sources used b y the sectors are Term loan from bank is

accounted for 26%, non-convertible

non debenture
enture 20% and term loan from

institutions is 5%, deferred credit/hire purchase 5% and term loan from

others 2%.

Figure 3.5 The

he proportions secured debt in capital goods sector

Note:

the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.6 The

he proportions of unsecured debt in capital goods sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

161 | P a g e
 The short-term sources are working capital advance 23%, cash

credit/packing credit/ bills discounted contribute 15% and secured loans from

other is 4% of the total secured debt. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of

secured debt in the capital goods sector.

The figure 3.6 shows the distribution of unsecured debt under the

capital goods sector. 26% of the unsecured debt accounts for long-term debt.

The long-term debts are debenture / bonds, 23% and deposits 3%. 74 % of the

unsecured debt financed through short-term sources. The short-term sources

used b y the sectors are Loans from bank accounts for the 58%, unsecured

loans from others 6%, deferred tax 4%, commercial paper 3%, loans from

group of companies, deferred liabilities and advances 1% each.

3.3.4 Chemical and petrochemicals sector:

This sector consists of 11 companies. The figure 3.7 shows the detailed

distribution of secured debt of Chemical & petrochemicals sector. 74 % of

the secured debts are long-term. The long-term loan consists of term loan

from bank is 33%, term loan from institutions is 21% and non-convertible

debenture is 20%. Short-term debt accounts 26% of the total secured debt.

The Working capital advance is 15%, cash credit/ packing credit/bills

discounted is 9% and other secured loans 2%.

Under unsecured debt 22% accounts for long-term debt. The long-term

debts are debenture/ bonds, 18% and deposits 4%. Short-term debt accounts

78% of the total unsecured debt. Loan from banks accounts for 63%,

162 | P a g e
unsecured loans 6%. Commercial paper, deferred
deferr ed tax, and advances contribute

3% each. The figure 3.8 shows the distribution of unsecured debt in chemical

& petrochemical sector.

he proportions of secured debt in chemical & petrochemicals

Figure 3.7 The
sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten

te n year average (2002-2011)
(2002

Figure 3.8 The

he proportions of unsecured debt in chemical &
petrochemicals sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

163 | P a g e
3.3.5
3.5 Consumer Durables sector:
sector

Figure 3.9 The proportions of secured debts in consumer durables sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.10 The

he proportion of unsecured debt in consumer durables
sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average

ave rage (2002-2011)
(2002

164 | P a g e
 This sector consists of onl y 8 companies. 53% of the total secured debt

accounts for long-term debt. Under this term loan from bank stands for 47%,

debenture 5% and term loan from institutions 1%. The short-term debts are

working capital advance 38%. Secured loans from others 5% and cash

credit/packing credit/bills discounted 4%. The figure 3.9 shows the detailed

list of distributions of secured debt.

The figure 3.10 shows the subdivision of unsecured debt among the

consumer durable sector. 41% of the total unsecured debt holds b y long-term

sources. Out of this debenture/ bonds, accounts for 37% and deposit 3%.

Short-term debt consists of 59% of the total unsecured debt. They are term

loan from bank 52%. Loans from group of companies hold 4%. Commercial

paper, unsecured loan from others and deferred tax 1% each.

3.3.6 Diversified sector:

A total of 8 companies are there in the diversified sector. 71% of the

total secured debt consists of long-term debt under this term loan from bank

accounts for 56 %, term loan from others 6%, non-convertible debenture 5%,

term loan from institutions and deferred credit/ hire purchase 2% each..

Short- term debt consists of 29% of the total secured debt. The working

capital advance is 20%, cash, credit/packing credit/ bills discounted consists

of 8% and secured loans from others 1%. The Figure 3.11 shows the

distribution of secured debt of diversified sector.

165 | P a g e
 Figure 3.11 The
he proportions of secured debts in diversified sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.12 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in diversified sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Under the unsecured debt 31% is covered b y long-term

long term debt, they are

debenture/ bonds 26% and deposits 5%. Under short-term

short term debt loan from

bank is 52%, commercial paper 6%, advances 4% and unsecured loan from

others 3%. The figure 3.12 displays the distribution of unsecured debt in the

diversified sector.

166 | P a g e
3.3.7 FMCG sector:

he proportions of secured debts in FMCG sector

Figure 3.13 The

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.14 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in FMCG sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Under FMCG sector, there are 22 companies. The figure 3.13 shows the

distribution of secured debt in FMCG sector. 68% of the total secured debt

167 | P a g e
under FMCG sector is financed through long-term sources such as Term loan

from bank 50%, Non- convertible debenture 13%, term loan from institutions

and term loan from others 2% each, deferred credit/ higher purchase is 1%.

Short- term sources, mainl y financed through; working capital advances 22%,

cash credit/packing credit/bills discounted 8% and secured loans from others

2%.

The figure 3.14 shows the distribution of unsecured debt in FMCG

sector. 23% of the total unsecured debt is financed through long-term debt.

They are Debenture/ bonds 15%. And deposits are 8%. Under short-term

debt; loan from bank 62%, unsecured loan others is 5%, and deferred tax is

4%, commercial paper 2%, loan from group of companies 2% and advances

1%.

3.3.8 Healthcare sector:

Healthcare sector consists of 29 companies. 60% of the total secured

debts are long-term in nature. Under the long-term debt; term loan from bank

accounts for 43%, term loan from institutions 7%, non-convertible debenture

6%, term loan from others 3% and deferred credit/ higher purchase 1%.

Under short-term debt; working capital advances stand 24%, cash credit/

packing credit/ bills discounted is 16%. The figure 3.15 shows the

distribution of secured debt in the healthcare sector.

Under unsecured debt 57% are long –term in nature and rest is short-

term. Under long-term debenture/ bonds is 56% and deposits 1%. Under

short- term debt; loan from banks 36%, unsecured loan from others 3%,

168 | P a g e
deferred tax 2%, and deferred liabilit y 1% and loan from group of companies

1%. The figure 3.16 shows the distribution of total unsecured debt under

healthcare sector.

he proportions of secured debts in healthcare sector

Figure 3.15 The

Note:the
the percentage is calculated using
usi ten year average (2002-2011)
(2002

Figure 3.16 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in healthcare sector

Note:the
the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)
(2002

169 | P a g e
3.3.9
3.9 Housing related sector:

Figure 3.17 The proportions of secured debt in housing related sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.18 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in housing related sector

Note:the
the percentage is calculated using ten year average
averag e (2002-2011)
(2002

This sector consists of 36 companies. Total 81% of the secured debt is

covered b y long-term
term debt. And rest short-
short term debt. Under long-term
long debt

45% consists of term loan from bank, non-

non convertible debenture 13%, term

170 | P a g e
loan from institutions 11%, term loan from others 6% convertible debenture

and deferred credit/ higher purchase 3% each. Under short- term sources

they have opted working capital advances 13%, cash credit/ packing credit/

bills discounted 5%, and secured loan from others 1%. The figure 3.17 shows

the distribution of secured debt under housing related sector.

Under unsecured debt 34% are long-term debt and the rest 66% consists

of short- term debt. Under long-term debt debenture / bonds, accounts 24%

and deposits 10%. Under short-term debt; loans from bank 29%, deferred tax

11%, commercial paper 9%. Unsecured loan from others and advances 5%

each, deferred liability 4% and loan from group of companies 3%. The figure

3.18 shows the distribution of unsecured debt in housing related sector.

3.3.10 Information Technology:

This sector consists of 24 companies. 57% of the total secured debt is

financed through long-term sources and the rest is through short-term

sources. The various long-term sources’ contribution is term loan from bank

26%, non-convertible debenture 27%, and term loan from other and deferred

credit / hire purchase 2% each. The various short-term sources used are

secured loan from others 21%, cash credit /packing credit/ bills discounted

13% working capital advance 9%, and The figure 3.19 shows the distribution

of information technology sector.

171 | P a g e
 Figure 3.19 the proportions of secured debt in information technology
sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.20 The proportions

tions of unsecured debts in information technology
sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

19% of the total unsecured debt is debenture/ bonds that are long-term
long

in nature. 51% of the unsecured debt is loans from bank, 20% are unsecured

loan from others, commercial paper and deferred liabilities 4% each,

advances and loan from group companies 1% each are short-

short -term in nature.

172 | P a g e
The figure 3.20 shows
ws the distribution of unsecured debt under the

information technology sector.

sector

3.3.11
3.11 Media & publishing sector:

Figure 3.21 The

he proportions of secured debts in media& publishing sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.22 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in media& publishing
sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

173 | P a g e
 This sector represents eight companies. 70% of the total unsecured debt

is financed through long-term sources. Such as term loan from bank 61%,

term loan from others 5%, non-convertible debenture 2%, partl y convertible

debenture and term loan from institution 1% each. 30% of the total unsecured

debts are short-term in nature, it consists of working capital advance 14%,

cash credit/ packing credit/ bills discounted 12% and secured loan from

others is 4%. The table 3.21 shows the distribution of secured debt in media

& publishing sector.

25% of the total unsecured debts are long-term in nature. Long-term

debt consists of debenture/ bonds 20% and deposits 5%. 75% of the total

unsecured debt accounts for short-term in nature. The various short–term

debts are; commercial paper and loan from bank 24% each and loan from

institutions 22%. Unsecured loan from others and loan from group of

companies 2% each and advances 1%. The figure 3.22 shows that the

distribution of unsecured debt under media and publishing sector.

3.3.12 Metal, metal products & mining sector:

A total of 26 companies are representing this sector. 85% of the total

secured debts are financed through long-term sources. The various long-term

source and contribution to the total secured debt are term loan 47%, non-

convertible debenture 20%, and term loan from institutions 10%, term loan

from others 6% deferred credit/ higher purchase and convertible debenture

1% each. Onl y 15% of the total secured consists of short-term debt. the

major short- term debt are working capital advances 11% , cash credit/

174 | P a g e
packing credit/ bills discounted 3% and secured loan from others 1% .The

figure 3.23 shows the distribution of secured debt in metal, metal products
produc &

mining sector.

he proportions of secured debt in metal, metal products &

Figure 3.23 The
mining sector

Note:the
the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)
(2002

Figure 3.24 The

he proportions of unsecured debt in metal, metal products &
mining sector

Note:the
the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)
(2002

175 | P a g e
The figure 3.24 shows the distribution of unsecured debt in metal, metal

products & mining sector. 25 % of the total unsecured debts are long-term in

nature. It consists of debenture/ bonds,

bonds 22% and deposits 3%. Under the

short-term debt; loann from bank contributes 46%, unsecured

un secured loan from others

23%, advance 4%. Commercial

ommercial paper, deferred tax stands 1% each.

3.3.13 Miscellaneous sector:

Figure 3.25 The

he proportions of secured debts in miscellaneous sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.26 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in miscellaneous sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

176 | P a g e
 This sector consists of 12 companies the figure 3.25 shows the

distribution of secured debt in miscellaneous sector. 60% of the secured debts

are covered b y long-term debt. They are; term loan from bank 35%, non-

convertible debenture 13%, term loan from institutions 10% term loan from

others and deferred credit/ higher purchase each accounts 1%. Under short-

term debt; cash credit/ packing credit/bills discounted 24%, working capital

advance 11%, interest accrued & due 4% and secured loan from others 1%.

43% of the total unsecured debts are financed through long-term

sources. The long-term sources are debenture/bonds 34% and deposits 9%.

57% of the unsecured debts are short- term in nature. The various short-term

sources are loans from bank 50%, unsecured loans from others 5%, and

commercial paper 1%. The figure 3.26 shows the distribution of total

unsecured debt in miscellaneous sector.

3.3.14 Oil & gas sector:

A total of 20 companies are representing this sector. The figure 3.27

shows the distribution of secured debt in oil & gas sector. 69% of the total

secured debt consists of long-term debt such as term loan from bank 23%,

non-convertible debenture 36% term loan from institutions 9% and deferred

credit/ higher purchase 1%. The various short-term sources statistics are

working capital advance 21%, secured loan from others 8% and cash credit/

packing credit/bills discounted is 2%.

177 | P a g e
 Figure 3.27 The
he proportions of secured debts in oil &gas sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.28 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in oil &gas sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

The figure 3.28 shows the distribution of unsecured debt under Oil &

gas sector. Long- term debts represent onl y 2% of the total unsecured debt.

Debenture/ bonds and deposits contribute 1% each. The rest

est 98% represents

b y short-term sources. The various short-term

term sources contribution are loans

178 | P a g e
from banks 71%, unsecured loan from others 22% and loan from institutions,

commercial paper and loan from GOI/PSU each contribute 1%.

3.3.15 Power sector:

he proportions of secured debt in power sector

Figure 3.29 The

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

he proportions of unsecured debt in power sector

Figure 3.30 The

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

179 | P a g e
 There are 18 companies’ represents this sector. The figure 3.29 shows

the total secured debt in power sector. Under secured debt long-term debt

constitutes 94% and the remaining short-term debt. Non-convertible

debenture 47%, term loan from bank 19% , deferred credit/ higher purchase

13%, term loan from institutions 14% and term loan from others 1% are the

contribution from long-term debt. Short-term debts are working capital

advance 3% and secured loan from others 3%. 15% of the unsecured debts are

long-term in nature. Debenture/ bonds 12% and deposits 3% are the long-

term sources used b y the sector.

The major short-term debts used b y the companies in this sector are

loans from bank 59%, un secured loans from others 14%, loans from

institutions 7% and loan from GOI/PSU 5%. The figure 3.30 shows the

distribution of unsecured loan in power sector.

3.3.16 Telecom sector:

This sector comprises of 11 companies. 87 % of the secured debt is

financed using long-term sources. It consists of term loan from bank 59%,

term loan from institutions 15%, term loan others 6%, non-convertible

debenture 5%, and deferred credit / higher purchase and convertible

debenture 1% each. The short-term sources used are working capital advance,

secured loan from others 6% each and cash credit/packing credit/ bills

discounted 1%. The figure 3.31 shows the distribution of secured debt under

telecom sector. 88% of the unsecured debts are financed through short-term

sources. The various short-term sources and it contribution in total unsecured

180 | P a g e
debt are loan from bank 61%, unsecured loan from others 21%,
2 1%, advances 4%

and loan from institutions and commercial paper 1% each. Long-term

Long source

consist of debenture/bonds holds 12%. The figure 3.32 shows the distribution

unsecured debt in telecom sector.

sector

Figure 3.31 The

he proportions of secured debts in telecom sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.32 The

he proportions unsecured debt in telecom sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

181 | P a g e
3 3.17 Textile sector:

he proportions of secured debts in textile sector

Figure 3.33 The

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.34 The

he proportions of unsecured debts in textile sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

This sector consists of 10 companies. 75 % of the total secured debt

comprises of long-term debt and rest short-term

short term debt. Term loans from banks

54%, Non-convertible
convertible debenture 9%, Term loan from institutions and

182 | P a g e
Deferred credit/higher purchase 5% each and term loan from others 1%. The

short-term debt used b y the companies in this sectors are working capital

advances and cash credit/packing credit/ bills discounted 12% each and

secured loan from others 1%.. The figure 3.33 shows the distribution of

secured debt under textiles sector.

15% of the total unsecured debt is covered b y long-term debt, they are

debenture bonds 13 % and deposits 2%. 85% of the total unsecured debt is

covered b y short-term debt. The major short-term debts used b y the

companies in this sector are loan from banks 58%, deferred tax 15%,

commercial paper 5%, and unsecured loan from others 4%, loans from group

of companies, advances and loans from institutions 1% each. The figure 3.34

shows the distribution of unsecured debt under textile sector.

3. 3.18 Transport equipment sector:

This sector consists of 23 companies. 66% of the total debts are long-

term in nature. the long-term debts are term loan from banks 24% non-

convertible debenture 31%, deferred credit/ higher purchase 6%, term loan

from institutions 3% and term loans from others 2%. The statuses of various

short-term debts are cash credit/packing credit/bills discounted 24% and

working capital advances 10%. The figure 3.35 shows the distribution of

secured debt in transport equipments sector.

Under Unsecured long-term debt holds 27%. Debenture bonds 15 % and

deposits 12%. Rest are holds b y short- term debts. The short-term debts are:

unsecured loan from others 32%, loans from bank 22%. Deferred tax is 6%,

183 | P a g e
commercial paper is 5%, loan from institutions is 4%, deferred liabilit y 2%,

advances and loan from GOI/PSU is 1% each. The figure 3.36 shows the

distribution of unsecured debt in transport equipment sector.

Figure 3.35 The

he proportions of secured debt in transport
ransport equipment
sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011)

(2002

Figure 3.36 The

he proportions of unsecured debt in transport equipment
sector

Note: the percentage is calculated using ten year average (2002-2011

(2002

184 | P a g e
3.4 Findings

After ex amining the proportion of different debt choice made b y th e

Indian firms, we can conclude that under secured debt all the sectors hav e

taken term loan from bank. Moreover, term loan from bank contribute the

major percentage share except sectors such as information technology and oil

& gas, in these sectors term loan from bank is the second major source of

secured debt. And in transport equipment it is having the third major

percentage share. However the overall sample shows that term loan from the

bank has highest (34.77) percentage share in the total secured debt.

Next to the term loan from bank non-convertible debenture holds the

second major percentage share (25%) in total secured debt. All the sectors

have issued non-convertible debenture. However the sectors such as power,

oil & gas, transport equipment and information technology non-convertible

debenture having the major percentage share in the total secured debt.

Moreover the sectors like capital goods, metal, metal products & mining non-

convertible debenture hold the second major percentage share in the total

secured debt. Some of the Indian firms are issued partl y convertible

debenture and convertible debentures. Housing related, media & publishing

and power sector are having partl y convertible debenture. However the total

percentage share of partiall y convertible debenture in total secured debt is

less than 1.5 percentages. Moreover the overall sample also shows the

percentage share in partl y convertible debenture in total secured debt is onl y

0.01 percentages. The sectors such as capital goods, chemicals &

185 | P a g e
petrochemicals, diversified, healthcare, housing related, information

technology, metal, metal products & mining, oil & gas, telecom, textile and

transport equipment are issued convertible debenture. However the overall

sample shows the percentage share in a convertible debenture in total secured

debt is onl y 0.50 percentages.

Table.3.1shows the detailed percentage share of each component

secured of Indian companies.

Table 3.1 Sector wise findings on proportions of secured debt in Indian

companies (percentage)
Sectors Defe Cash Borro
Ter rred Credit Work Inter wings Secur
Partly Non m Cred /Packing ing est from ed
Conve Conve Converti Term Loa it / Credit / Capit Accu Gover Loan
rtible rtible ble Loans Term ns Hire Bills al red nment s
Debent Debent Debentu Institu Loans Othe Purc Discoun Adva & of Other
ures ures res tions Banks rs hase ted nces Due India s

Agriculture 0.00 0.00 8.04 6.39 33.11 2.34 3.39 20.10 17.13 0.17 1.17 8.17
Capital
Goods 0.00 0.31 19.85 4.62 25.65 1.79 5.50 15.24 22.71 0.18 0.19 3.96
Chemical &
Petrochemic
al 0.00 0.38 19.94 20.65 32.61 0.42 0.31 8.76 14.76 0.09 0.00 2.07
Consumer
Durables 0.00 0.00 5.08 0.47 46.89 0.04 0.20 4.14 37.85 0.00 0.00 5.32

Diversified 0.00 0.14 4.58 2.13 55.91 6.43 1.60 8.57 19.85 0.04 0.00 0.73

FMCG 0.00 0.00 13.07 1.66 50.46 2.45 0.79 8.19 21.47 0.08 0.00 1.83

Healthcare 0.00 0.09 5.67 6.74 42.60 3.04 0.90 15.96 24.48 0.00 0.00 0.51
Housing
Related 0.01 2.60 12.58 11.02 44.99 6.26 3.36 4.47 13.45 0.04 0.26 0.95
Information
Technology 0.00 0.45 27.15 0.04 26.23 1.59 2.01 13.25 8.68 0.03 0.01 20.57
Media &
Publishing 1.15 0.00 1.58 0.99 60.62 5.08 0.50 11.71 14.57 0.00 0.00 3.79
Metal,Metal
Products &
Mining 0.00 0.56 19.88 10.01 47.12 6.01 1.32 3.02 10.83 0.20 0.00 1.05
Miscellaneo
us 0.00 0.00 12.65 10.38 35.36 1.07 1.07 23.81 10.77 3.76 0.00 1.13

Oil & Gas 0.00 0.07 36.11 8.40 22.89 0.29 1.23 2.18 20.42 0.02 0.00 8.40
12.4
Power 0.03 0.00 46.83 14.48 18.78 1.41 9 0.33 3.08 0.05 0.00 2.52

Telecom 0.00 1.21 5.46 14.63 59.28 5.94 0.62 0.93 5.79 0.43 0.00 5.70

Textile 0.00 0.08 9.56 5.02 53.92 1.62 4.99 11.96 12.28 0.00 0.00 0.57
Transport
Equipments 0.00 0.19 31.09 3.10 23.77 1.73 5.84 24.13 9.96 0.00 0.19 0.00

Total sample 0.01 0.50 25.00 9.40 34.77 2.85 4.40 6.17 13.28 0.16 0.09 3.37
No t e: fi r st st ep fo r ea c h se cto r a v era g es h a ve b een ca lcu la ted fo r th e stu d y p e rio d . Th en
th e seco n d s tep p ercen ta g e o f ea ch co mp o n en t o b ta in ed

186 | P a g e
 Coming to the Term loans from institutions, all the sectors have taken

term loan from institutions. However the chemical & petrochemicals having a

second major percentage share in the total secured debt. The overall sample

shows term loan from institution has 9.40 percent share in the total secured

debt. But in case of Term loans from others, all the sectors have taken term

loan from others. However the overall sample shows term loan from others

has onl y 2.85 percent share in the total secured debt.

Some of the companies have borrowed from Government of India.

From the sectors like agriculture, capital goods, housing related, and

information technology and transport equipment firms borrowed money from

the government. However the overall sample shows borrowings from the

government of India have onl y 0.09 percent share in secured debt. Moreover,

secured loans from other than this source also have been taken b y the firms.

Except transport equipment all the other sectors went for a secured loan from

other sources. Agriculture, oil & gas and information technology are having

more percentage share among the other sectors. But the overall sector shows

secured loan from others has onl y 3.37 percent share in secured debt.

If we look at the short-term secured loans, all the sectors have taken

deferred credit/ hire purchase. However the power sector (12.54%) has the

major percentage share of deferred credit/ hire purchase in comparison to

other sectors. The overall sample shows deferred credit/ hire purchase has

onl y 4.40 percent share in the secured debt.

187 | P a g e
 In case of cash credit /packing credit / bills discounted all the sectors

have taken cash credit /packing credit / bills discounted. However,

agriculture (20.10%), miscellaneous (23.18%) and transport equipment

(24.13%) sectors it is having the second major percentage share in the

secured debt. Moreover the sectors such as capital goods, healthcare,

information technology and textile having more than ten percentage share in

the secured debt. The overall sample shows cash credit /packing credit / bills

discounted have 6.17 percent share in the secured debt.

Approaching to working capital advance it is having the major share in

short term secured debt. All the sectors have taken working capital advances.

The consumer durables sector is having the major percentage share in

comparison to other sectors. Moreover the sectors such as capital goods,

consumer durables, diversified, FMCG, healthcare, housing related, media &

publishing and textile working capital advance having the second major share

in total secured debt. However the overall sample shows working capital

advance have 13.28 percent share in the secured debt, this is the third major

percentage share in total secured debt.

Looking into the interest accrued & due, the sectors such as consumer

durables, healthcare, media & publishing, textile and transport equipment are

not having interest accrued & due in secured debt. All the reaming sectors are

having interest accrued & due. However the percentage share of interest

accrued & due is only 0.16.

188 | P a g e
 Table.3.2 shows the detailed percentage share of each component

unsecured of Indian companies.

Table 3.2 Sector wise findings on proportion of unsecured debt in Indian

companies (parentage)
Loa
ns
Sectors from Loans Loans Defer Accr Unsecu
Debent Gro Loans from from red ued Defer Comme red
ures / up from Instit GOI / Advan Liabil Inter red rcial Depos Loans
Bonds Cos Banks utions PSUs ces ities est Tax Paper its Others

Agriculture 21.25 7.20 45.79 0.53 0.46 2.79 1.90 0.02 0.49 2.15 5.35 12.07
Capital
Goods 22.99 0.99 57.80 0.16 0.00 1.22 0.95 0.06 4.10 2.53 3.00 6.19
Chemical &
Petrochemic
al 17.94 0.01 63.03 0.21 0.00 3.49 0.12 0.04 2.56 2.62 4.39 5.58
Consumer
Durables 36.59 3.59 52.57 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.46 0.64 3.85 1.22

Diversified 25.73 3.89 51.68 0.09 0.00 4.11 0.07 0.14 0.02 5.87 5.29 3.12

FMCG 14.78 2.36 62.18 0.04 0.00 0.46 0.11 0.03 4.24 2.19 8.44 5.18

Healthcare 55.71 0.60 35.76 0.28 0.00 0.26 0.47 0.00 2.37 0.24 1.28 3.04
Housing
Related 23.69 2.79 29.24 0.50 0.00 4.70 3.99 0.01 10.76 9.27 9.81 5.24
Information
Technology 19.34 0.57 50.81 0.03 0.20 0.88 3.89 0.00 0.03 4.42 0.33 19.51
Media &
Publishing 19.85 2.14 23.88 21.88 0.00 0.49 0.23 0.14 0.00 23.96 4.98 2.46
Metal,Metal
Products &
Mining 22.51 0.03 45.98 0.00 0.05 3.64 0.25 0.00 1.13 0.62 2.90 22.88

Miscellenous 33.87 0.14 49.67 0.04 0.00 1.32 0.00 0.08 0.27 1.30 8.45 4.86

Oil & Gas 0.95 1.54 70.71 1.14 0.77 0.35 0.03 0.00 0.28 1.28 1.14 21.80

Power 11.50 0.02 58.72 6.51 5.24 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.35 0.39 3.09 14.06

Telecom 12.24 0.03 60.63 0.43 0.00 3.90 0.35 0.09 0.31 0.77 0.03 21.24

Textile 13.46 1.38 57.57 0.94 0.00 1.23 0.48 0.03 15.11 4.54 1.78 3.48
Transport
Equipments 15.36 0.00 21.71 4.04 0.94 1.35 1.88 0.18 5.79 5.01 12.34 31.40
Sample as a
total 12.53 1.14 56.98 1.93 1.23 1.33 0.54 0.02 1.64 1.98 3.07 17.62
No t e: fi r st st ep fo r ea c h se cto r a v era g es h a ve b een ca lcu la ted fo r th e stu d y p e rio d . Th en
th e seco n d s tep p ercen ta g e o f ea ch co mp o n en t o b ta in ed .

However the percentage shares of various sources of unsecured debt in

Indian firms are. The entire the sectors have issued debenture/bonds. While,

the healthcare sector debenture/ bonds hold the major percentage share in the

unsecured debt. Capital goods, consumer durables, diversified, FMCG,

housing related, miscellaneous and textile in these sector debenture/ bonds

189 | P a g e
has the second major percentage share in unsecured debt. Moreover

information technology, metal, metal products & mining, transport equipment

have a third major percentage share in unsecured debt. However the overall

sample shows debenture/ bonds having a 12.53 percent share in unsecured

debt.

There are firms which go for loans from group companies. Except

transport equipment all other sectors have opted for loans from group

companies. The percentage shares b y loans from group companies are

negligible. The overall sample shows loan from group companies has onl y

1.14 percent share in the unsecured debt.

The overall sample shows loan from the bank is having a 56.98 percent

share in unsecured debt, it holds highest percentage share in unsecured debt.

All the sectors have taken loan from bank. It holds the major percentage

share in unsecured debt among sectors such as agriculture, capital goods,

chemical & petrochemicals consumer durables, diversified, FMCG, housing

related, information technology, metal, metal products & mining,

miscellaneous, oil & gas, power, telecom and textile. However the sectors

such as healthcare, media & publishing and transport equipment it has a

second major percentage share in unsecured debt.

At the same time all other sectors except metal, metal products & mining

took loan from institutions. Media & publishing (21.88) sector are having

highest percentage share of loans from institutions among the other sectors.

All other sectors have a very less percentage share. The overall sample shows

loan from the institution is having onl y 1.93 percent share in unsecured debt.

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 Coming to loan from the Government of India / public sector

undertakings (GOI/PSU) the sectors like agriculture, information technology,

metal, metal products & mining, oil & gas, power and transport equipment

are taken. However the overall sample shows loan from GOI/PSU is onl y 1.23

percent of unsecured debt. Moving to deposits, every sector has taken

deposits. The transport equipment sector has the highest (12.34) percent

share among other sectors. However the overall sample shows deposits have

onl y 3.07 percent share in unsecured debt.

The entire the sectors have gone for an unsecured loan from others.

The transport equipment sector has the highest (31.40) percent share among

other sectors followed b y metal, metal products & mining (22.88), oil &gas

(21.80) telecom (21.24), information technology (19.51) and agriculture

(12.54) percent share in unsecured debt. However the overall sample shows

that unsecured loan from others is 17.62 percent of unsecured debt, holds the

second major contributor to unsecured debt.

If come across into short-term unsecured debt all the sectors are having

advances. But the percentage share in unsecured debt is less than 5 percent

in all sectors. The overall sector shows advances contribute only 1.33 percent

of unsecured debt. In case of deferred liabilities except consumer durables

and miscellaneous sector all the sectors have deferred liabilities. However

the overall sample shows deferred liabilities are onl y 0.54 percent of

unsecured debts. Moreover, accrued interest is chosen except consumer

durables, healthcare, information technology, metal, metal products &

mining, oil & gas and power sectors all the other sectors have accrued

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interest. However the overall sample shows accrued interest is onl y 0.02

percent of unsecured debt.

Moving to Deferred tax except media & publishing all the other

sectors having deferred tax. The textile sector has the highest (15.11) percent

share in unsecured debt, among other sectors. However the overall sample

shows deferred tax onl y 1.64 percent of unsecured debt. In case of

commercial paper every sector issue commercial paper. However media &

publishing sector has the highest (23.96) percent share among other sectors.

Moreover, in media & publishing sector commercial paper holds the major

percent share in unsecured debt. The overall sample shows commercial paper

has onl y 1.98 percent of unsecured debt.

3.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter looks into the various sources of debt capital available for

the Indian companies. Among the available sources which are the sources

they are mainl y opted in their debt capital structure. With the collected data

for the anal ysis we have used simple percentage and pie chart for displayin g

the results. The study identifies that during the stud y period on an average

loan from bank has been chosen b y the companies as major sources in all

most all sectors and the overall sample under secured debt, followed b y non-

convertible debenture, working capital advances, loan from institutions rest

of the components has less contribution. However the sectors such as oil & l,

192 | P a g e
power and transport equipment non-convertible debenture holds the major

share under secured debt. Moreover, loan from banks has more than 50

percent share in total unsecured debt for overall and majority of the sectors.

Debenture/bonds hold second position followed by loan from others

remaining components has negligible contribution.

Overall commercial banks are the major sources of debt capital for

Indian companies. For both secured as well as unsecured debt they are mostl y

depending on commercial banks.

3.6 Reference

Athreye, Suma., and Sandeep Kapur. 2001. Private foreign investment in

India: pain or panacea?. The World Economy, 24(3). 399-424.

Banerjee, Abhiit Vinayak., Shawn Cole and Esther Duflo. 2004. Banking

reform in India. S. Bery, B. Bosworth and A. Panagari ya (eds.), India

Policy Forum 2004 Volume 1. India: Brookings Institution Press and

National Council of Applied Economic Research.

Denis, David J and Vassil T. Mihov. 2003. The choice among bank debt, non-

bank private debt, and public debt: evidence from new corporate

borrowings. Journal of Financial Economics, 70(1), 3-28.

Goswami, Gautam and Milind M. Shrikhande. 2001. Economic exposure and

debt financing choice. Journal of Multinational Financial Management.

11(1), 39-58.

193 | P a g e
Lin, Chen., Yue Ma., Paul malatesta and Yuhai Xuan. 2013. Corporate

ownership structure and the choice between bank debt and public debt.

Journal of Financial Economics, 109(2), 517-534.

Majumdar, Sumit K and Kunal. Sen 2007. The debt wish: rent seeking b y

business groups and the structure of corporate borrowing in India.

Public Choice, 131(1), 209-223.

Marathe, S. S. 1989. Regulation and Development: India’s Policy Experience

of Controls over Industry. 2 n d Edition. New Delhi. Sage Publications.

Reserve Bank of India. 2003. Report on Currency and Finance 2001-02,

Bombay, India.

Roy, Tirthankar. 2000. The Economic History of India, 1857-1947. 1 s t Edition.

New Delhi: Oxford Universit y Press.

Sen, Kunal and Rajendra. R. Vaid ya 1997: The Process of Financial

Liberalization in India. New Delhi: Oxford Universit y Press.

Shirasu, Yoko and Peng Xu. 2007. The choice of financing with public debt

versus private debt: new evidence from Japan after critical binding

regulations were removed. Japan and the World Economy, 19(4), 393-

424.

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 CHAPTER IV

DETERMINANTS OF DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE

4.1 Introduction
4.2 Variables and Hypothesis
4.3 Model
4.4 Result and Interpretation
4.5 Findings
4.6 Chapter Summary
4.7 References

4.1 Introduction

Mangers choose a debt maturit y structure to maximise the value of the

firm (Stephan et al., 2011). The maturity structure of debt capital is one of

the vital elements of the capital structure decision. Debt capital has three

major elements: duration (maturit y period), fixed rate of interest and

repayment of the principal. Cai et al. (2008) says firm might choose debt

maturit y policy to address agency problems. Furthermore, firms can signal

the qualit y of their earnings b y choosing a specific maturit y mix. Moreover,

the corporate debt maturit y matters if firms happen to consider flexibilit y in

financing, cost of financing, and refunding risk. Diamond and Rajan (2001)

also emphasize its importance with reference to credit availabilit y and

financial crises. The theories of corporate debt maturit y structure were first

designed during the 1980s and earl y 1990s (Barnea et al., 1980; Brick and

Ravid, 1985; Flannery, 1986; Lewis, 1990; Diamond, 1991). The theories

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based on signalling (Flannery, 1986; Kale and Noe, 1990) and agency costs

(M yers, 1977; Barnea et al., 1980) favour the use of short-term debt. The tax-

based theories show the benefit of long-term debt (Brick and Ravid, 1991).

The empirical tests of debt maturit y structure of US firms started during the

mid 1990s (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs and

Mauer, 1996) and the research continues (Johnson, 2003; Berger et al., 2005;

Datta et al., 2005; Billett et al., 2007). Recentl y, researchers have focused on

the determinants of corporate debt maturit y structure in Western Europe

(Ozkan, 2000; Antoniou et al., 2006) and in Japan (Cai et al., 1999).

The debt maturit y s tructure has not yet received much attention in

Indian context. Moreover, most of the existing studies of debt maturit y

structure predominantl y focussed on developed countries. To contribute to the

existing literature in Indian context, this paper has been formulated. The

objective of the study is to investigate the potential determinants of the debt

maturit y structure of Bombay Stock exchange (BSE) 500 index listed

companies during the period 2002-2011.

The Bombay Stock exchange is the oldest, Asia largest stock exchange

and world’s third biggest stock exchange in terms of volume of transactions.

As India is the second biggest emerging econom y after China and having a

stead y economic growth during the stud y period. However the Indian debt

market still is not yet established as well as not getting much attention from

the corporate sector. Banks are the major sources of debt capital for Indian

companies. This would have a different implication on behalf of the

rigorousness of agency theory, information as ymmetries, bankruptcy and

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taxation. Moreover, India is a mixed econom y having number of government

owned or controlling companies and private sector companies. Consequentl y,

it is exciting to see the debt maturit y theories were designed especiall y with

respect to developed economies to the companies in the emerging economies.

The debt maturit y may be defined as the composition of short-term and

long-term debt in the debt capital structure of firms. The proportionate

relation between debt instruments with varying maturities in the debt capital

is called debt maturit y. The definition of debt maturit y is the most

controversial issue in the debt maturit y literature because there are

significant differences among the researchers over the measurement of debt

maturit y. However, the balance sheet approach is the preferred method for

measuring debt maturit y among finance researchers. The debt maturit y

(DEBTMAT) is defined as the ratio of long-term debt (LTD) to total debt

(TD). The long-term debt (LTD) is defined as that part of the total debt,

which matures in more than one year, excluding the portion of long-term debt

that matures in the current year.

4.2 Variable and Hypothesis

The debt maturit y theories and their proxies for the stud y: The stud y

considers the available debt maturit y theories in order to derive the

dependent and independent variables in the anal ysis.

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4. 2.1 Dependent variables:

In our study, the dependent variables are debt maturit y, LTDTD. The

ratio of long-term debt to total debt to measure debt maturit y (Stephan et al.

2011, Cai et al. 2008, Antonious et al. 2006, Barclay and Smith. 1995).

4.2.2 Independent variables:

Antoniou et al. (2006) and Stohs and Mauer (1996), has divided the

main debt maturit y theories into four categories: agency costs, signalling and

liquidit y risks, matching and tax effect theories. Under each theory, we

discuss the corresponding proxies and define their measurement to test the

theories.

4.2.2.1 Agency theory:

Underinvestment problem. M yers (1977) argues that if a firm is

financed b y risk y debt, managers who act in equit yholders' interests may

refuse to take projects with a positive net present value because they want to

reduce the higher probabilit y of default on risk y debt. He argues that this

underinvestment incentive can be controlled b y issuing short-term debt which

matures before the investment option is exercised. Barnea et al. (1980) agree

with the M yers' approach to eliminate underinvestment b y short-term debt.

Furthermore, they argue that both shortening debt maturit y and issuing long-

term debt with a call provision have identical effects in eliminating this

agency cost. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (2000) examine a sample of US bond-

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IPOs from 1971 to 1994 and find a negative relation between debt maturit y

and future growth opportunities.

Overinvestment problem: Hart and Moore (1995) argue that long-term

debt can control management's overinvestment problem when firms have

future growth opportunities. They argue that if firms have little or no long-

term debt, managers have more incentives to invest in negative NPV projects

to get more perquisites. They conclude that the optimal debt maturit y may b e

derived from the trade-off between costs and benefits of short-term debt.

Proxies for agency theory:

Growth opportunit y: we measure the growth opportunit y b y using the

variable GROWTH which is the sales growth to total asset growth. If growth

opportunities are high, a firm should use more short-term debt, in the

overinvestment theory, long-term debt can help to control the overinvestment

behavior of management, which means the sign of GROWTH should be

positive. Our empirical h ypothesis, therefore, is that debt maturit y is

directl y related to the GROWTH

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between growth opportunity and debt

maturity

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between growth opportunity and debt

maturity

Firm’s size: Warner (1977) finds that the ratio of bankruptcy costs to

firm value tends to decrease as the firm size increases. Titman and Wessel

(1988) suggest that small firms tend to be financed b y short-term debt

200 | P a g e
because they may face high transaction costs when they issue long-term debt

or equit y. We measure a firm's size (LNSA) b y the natural logarithm of its

total sales. We assume that debt maturity is directl y related to firm size.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between size and debt maturity

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between size and debt maturity

4.2.2.2 Signaling and liquidit y risk theory

Separating equilibrium. Flannery (1986) argues that if the market

cannot distinguish between good firms and bad firms, good firms may choose

to issue short-term debt to signal their qualit y. This happens if long-term debt

faces higher credit deterioration than short-term debt, and onl y good firms

can afford the positive transaction costs of rollover of short-term debt.

Extending Flannery's work, Kale and Noe (1990) indicate that even without

the transaction costs in choosing debt maturit y, the Flannery's separating

equilibrium may still exist. They argue that if the changes in firm value are

positivel y correlated, good firms will issue short-term debt and bad firms

will issue long-term debt.

Titman (1992) also extends Flannery's separating equilibrium.

Departing from Flannery's work, he includes interest rate uncertaint y and

financial distress costs. He argues that firms with a favorable future ma y

borrow short-term debt and swap the floating-rate obligation for the fixed

rate obligation in order to achieve the optimal financing structure.

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 Control rents and liquidit y risk. Diamond (1991) indicates the optimal

debt maturit y is attained b y trading off between the benefit of short-term debt

and liquidit y risk. He argues that if control rents are very high, borrowers

may issue long-term debt to avoid high liquidation costs. Short-term debt is

used to address the information sensitivity. Furthermore, he proposes that

there is a non-monotonic relationship between debt maturit y and th e

borrower's credit rating. Firms with very high and very low credit ratings

choose short-term debt, and firms with medium credit rating tend to choose

long-term debt.

Proxies for signaling and liquidity risk theories:

Firm’s qualit y: Diamond (1991) proposition that debt maturit y and

credit ratings are non-monotonicall y related. Due to the lack data relating to

the credit rating of the companies We measure firm’s qualit y as earnings

before interest and tax to net sales (PROFIT). The stud y expects debt

maturit y to be inversel y related to firm’s qualit y.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between firms quality and debt

maturity

H 0 : There is a negative relationship between firms quality and debt maturity

Liquidit y: M yers and Rajan (1998) introduced a paradox theory of

liquid assets. Intuitivel y, highl y liquid firms should have ample cash flows to

repay their debt. Thus, a firm with a large amount of liquid assets should

easil y obtain external financing. Morris (1992) argues that firms with longer

maturit y hold greater liquidit y in case they cannot meet the fixed payments of

202 | P a g e
long-term debt during economic recessions. We measure liquidit y (CR) b y

current assets to current liabilities ratio. The stud y predicts debt maturit y

will be directl y related to liquidit y.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between liquidity and debt maturity

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between liquidity and debt maturity

Leverage ratio: Morris (1992) argues that long-term debt may help

firms to postpone the exposure to bankruptcy risk; therefore, high leverage

firms tend to use long-term debt. Stohs and Mauer (1996) indicate that a

large proportion of long-term debt inevitabl y produces a higher value for

average debt maturity. Leland and Toft (1996) conclude that the leverage

level relies on the debt maturit y, and firms with lower leverage level tend to

be financed b y short-term debt. On the contrary, Dennis et al. (2000) show

that the leverage is inversel y related to debt maturit y. They argue that this

happens because agency costs of underinvestment may be limited b y reducing

leverage and shortening debt maturit y. We measure leverage (TDTA) b y the

ratio of the book value of total debt divided b y the book value of total assets.

Debt maturit y may be positivel y or inversel y related to leverage.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between leverage and debt maturity

H 0 : There is significant relationship between growth opportunity and debt

maturity

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4.2.2.3 Matching principles:

M yers (1977) argues that the diversification of assets may increase the

amount of debt the firm can borrow. Furthermore, he indicates that assets

may be regarded as the protection for the repayment of debt. In order to

match assets with debt, he suggests that the exposure of debt should be

reduced in parallel with the decline in the value of assets. Hart and Moore

(1994) argue that assets should be matched with debt because debt should be

matched either with the return streams or with the rate of depreciation of the

collateral. The return streams and the collaterals can be both regarded as

assets.

Proxies for matching principles:

Asset maturit y: Stohs and Mauer's (1996) was measured the asset maturit y

(NFADEP) b y the sum of the weighted maturit y of current assets and the

weighted maturit y of fixed assets. We calculate the un-weighted maturit y of

fixed assets b y the ratio of net fixed assets to the depreciation (NFADEP),

which shows the speed of consuming fix ed assets. We expect asset maturit y

will be positivel y related to debt maturit y.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between asset maturity and debt

maturity

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity

4.2.2.4 Tax theories:

Brick and Ravid (1985) test the tax effects with the existence o f

default risks, agency costs, and a non-flat term structure of interest rates.

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They argue that if the term structure of interest rates is increasing, the

optimal financing approach is to issue long-term debt, because the interest

tax shield on debt is accelerated with interest rates, which increase the value

of the firm. On the other hand, if the term structure of interest rates is

decreasing, it is better to issue short-term debt at present.

Proxies for tax theories:

Effective tax rate (EFTAX): We measure the effective tax rate (EFTAX)

with the ratio of tax expense to pre-tax profit. Kane et al. (1985) indicate that

the tax shield advantage is inversel y related to debt maturit y. In other words,

if the effective tax rate is low, then firms prefer to issue long-term debt.Thus,

we expect to find a negative relationship between debt maturit y and the

effective tax rate.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between effective tax rate and debt

maturity

H 0 : There is a negative relationship between effective tax rate and debt

maturity

4.2.2.5 Macro economic variables:

We have used two macroeconomic variable to test its dependence on

debt maturit y. The proxies for macroeconomic variables are;

Interest rate (PLR): Prime lending rate used to measure interest rate. Banks

are the major contributor of debt capital in Indian corporates. So we assumes

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PLR will be an important factor that determine the debt maturity. We predict

a positive relation between debt maturit y and prime lending rate.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between interest rate and debt

maturity

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between interest rate and debt maturity

Inflation (WPI): We have measured inflation as the whole sales price

prevailing in the country. Wholesale price is having a major role in deciding

the sales growths. So it directl y influences the compan y growth. We predict a

negative relation between WPI and debt maturit y.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between inflation and debt maturity

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between inflation and debt maturity

4.3 Model

This stud y uses the balanced panel data for the anal ysis. A data set

contains observations on different objects studied over a period of time is

called panel data. It is the combination of cross-sectional data and time series

data. In balanced panel data same time period is available for all cross-

sections. Panel data allow us to control for variables we cannot observe o r

measure like cultural factors or difference in business practices across

companies; or variables that change over time, but not across entities (i.e.,

national policies, federal regulations, international agreements, etc.). This is,

it accounts for individual heterogeneity. With panel data, we can include

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variables at different levels of anal ysis (i.e. Countries, states, companies,

industries, and sectors) suitable for multilevel or hierarchical modelling.

Debt maturit y is affected b y so man y other variable that are not

included in this study such as the location of the firm managerial efficiency,

marketing strategy, accounting policies, etc. the presence of these other

variables may create inconsistent estimates so for minimizing the effects of

these omitted variables the stud y is using firm specific control variables.

There are two t ypes of control variables: fixed effects and random effects.

Fixed effects explore the relationship between predictor and outcome

variables within an entit y (country, person, compan y, etc.). Each entit y has

its own individual characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor

variables. When using fixed effects we assume that something within the

individual may impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables and we need

to control for this. This is the rationale behind the assumption of the

correlation between entit y’s error term and predictor variables. Fixed effects

remove the effect of those time-invariant characteristics of the predictor

variables so we can assess the predictors’ net effect. Another important

assumption of the fixed effects model is that those time-invariant

characteristics are unique to the individual and should not be correlated with

other individual characteristics. Each entity is different, therefore the entit y’s

error term and the constant (which captures individual characteristics) should

not be correlated with the others. If the error terms are correlated, then fixed

effects is not suitable since inferences may not be correct and we need to

model that relationship using random-effects

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 The rationale behind the random effects model is that, unlike the fixed

effects model, the variation across entities is assumed to be random and

uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the

model. The crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is whether

the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with

the regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not

(Green, 2008, p.183)

If there is a reason to believe that differences across entities have some

influence on the dependent variable then we should use random effects. An

advantage of random effects is that we can include time invariant variables.

In the fixed effects model these variables are absorbed b y the intercept.

Random effects assume that the entit y’s error term is not correlated

with the predictors which allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as

explanatory variables. At random-effects we need to specify those individual

characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables. Th e

problem with this is that some variables may not be available therefore

leading to omitted variable bias in the model. Random effects allow

generalizing the inferences beyond the sample used in the model.

To decide between fixed or random effects we have to run a Hausman

test where the null h ypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects

vs. the alternative the fixed effects (see Green, 2008, chapter 9). It basicall y

tests whether the unique errors (µ i ) are correlated with the regressors; the

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null h ypothesis is they are not. We have used the E-views7 software for the

anal ysis.

4. 3.1 Panel least squares with fixed effects:

Debt maturity (LTDTD) i t = α + CF i + β 1 firm size (LNSA) i t + β 2 asset maturity

(NFADEP) i t + β 3 leverage ratio (TDTA) i t + β 4 growth (GROWTH) i t + β 5

profitability (PROFIT) i t + β 6 liquidity (CR) i t + β 7 effective tax rate (EFTAX) i t

+β 8 interest rate (PLR) i t + β 9 inflation (WPI) i t + µ i t ................(1)

4. 3.2 Panel least squares with random effect 1

Debt maturity (LTDTD) i t = α + RE i + β 1 firms Size (LNSA) i t + β 2 asset

maturity (NFADEP) i t + β 3 leverage ratio (TDTA) i t + β 4 growth (GROWTH) i t +

β 5 profitability (PROFIT) i t + β 6 liquidity (CR) i t + β 7 effective tax rate

(EFTAX) i t +β 8 interest rate (PLR) i t + β9 inflation (WPI) i t + µit

.....................(2)

Here i is representing the firm and t is the time. CF i is the firm specific fixed

effects for firm i. RE i the firm specific random effect for firm i. β1, β2,

β3.......... β9 are the coefficients of firms size (LNSA), asset maturit y

(NFADEP), leverage ratio (TDTA), growth (GROWTH), profitability

(PROFIT), liquidity (CR), effective tax rate (EFTAX), interest rate (PLR) and

inflation (WPI) respectivel y. µ i t indicate the error term for the observations

of the firm i in the year t.

1 It should be kept notice that our all estimation is limited to only fixed effect models. This is because there was
all most zero difference between the co-efficient obtained from the fixed effect and random effect models. Thus
the Hausman test statistic value becomes zero leading to invalid test. Therefore we decided to keep the result
obtained from fixed effect model. Another reason to keep fixed effect model is our time period of analysis is
relatively short (T<N) which may also render to insignificant time effect. Thus we avoided random effect result.

209 | P a g e
4.3.3 Dynamic panel estimators (GMM)

It would be worth y to mention that static panel models do not allow us

to anal yze the possible d ynamism existing in firm decisions when choosing

their debt maturit y structure. This allows us to evaluate the d ynamic panel

estimators. Further, these models have greater power to control endogenit y

and allow us to determine the level of adjustment of actual debt maturit y

towards the optimal level of debt maturity. We can describe that adjustment

process as follows:

LTDTD i ,t − LTDTD i ,t −1 = α ( LTDTD i*,t − LTDTD i ,t −1 )

……….(3)

LTDTD i ,t
where is the actual debt maturit y of the compan y i in period t,

LTDTD i ,t −1
is the actual debt maturit y of the compan y i in period t-1 and,

LTDTDi*,t
is the optimal debt of the compan y i in period t. Regrouping the

LTDTD i ,t
terms and solving to the order of , we have:

LTDTD i ,t = α LTDTD *
i ,t + (1 − α ) LTDTD i , t −1 )
………………(4)

LTDTDi ,t = αLTDTDi*,t
If α = 1 we have , the actual level of debt maturit y

being equal to the optimal level of debt maturit y forcing firms to manage an

optimal debt maturit y structure. On the contrary, if, α = 0 we have

LTDTD i ,t = LTDTD i ,t −1
i.e., there is no adjustment of the level of actual debt

maturit y towards the optimal level of debt maturit y. Therefore, a high values

of α , means a close proximity of the level of actual debt maturity to optimal

210 | P a g e
level of debt maturit y, whereas a low values of α , means less proximit y

between the actual level of debt maturit y and optimal level of debt maturit y.

It is important to mention that the optimal level of debt maturit y depends on

firms’ specific characteristics that are on the determinants considered

relevant in explaining debt maturit y as pointed out b y Stephan et al. (2011),

Cai et al. (2008) Therefore, the optimal level of debt maturit y is given b y:

LTDTDi*,t = λ0 + λ1 ( LNSAit ) + λ2 ( NFADEPit ) + λ3 (TDTAit ) + λ4 (GROWTHit ) + λ5 ( PROFITit )

+ λ6 ( EFTAX it ) + λ7 (CRit ) + λ8 ( PLRit ) + λ9 (WPI it ) + u it ,.........(5)

LTDTD i ,t
Substituting (5) in (4), and solving to the order of , we have:

LTDTDi*,t = β 0 + δ ( LTDTDi.t −1 ) + β1 ( LNSAit ) + β 2 ( NFADEPit ) + β 3 (TDTAit ) + β 4 (GROWTHit )

+ β 5 ( PROFITit ) + β 6 ( EFTAX it ) + β 7(CRit ) + β 8( PLRit ) + β 9(WPI it ) + η i + eit ,...............(6)

β = αλ0 , β1 = αλ1 , β 2 = αλ2 β 3 = αλ3 β 4 = αλ4 , β 5 = αλ5 , β 6 = αλ6

Where, δ = (1 − α ) , 0

η = αµi and eit = αε it s

, β 7 = αλ 7 , β 8 = αλ 8 , β 9 = αλ 9 i

To control the correlation between

ηi and LTDTD i ,t −1 between eit and

LTDTD i ,t −1
in estimating equation (6) using static panel models which can give

biased and inconsistent of the evaluated parameters, Arellano and Bond

(1991) proposes evaluation of the equation (6) with the variables in first

differences, and the use of debt maturit y lags and its determinants at a level

as instruments. However, Blundell and Bond (1998) concluded that when the

dependent variable is persistent, there being a high correlation between its

values in the current period and in the previous period, and the number of

periods is not very high, the GMM (1991) estimator is inefficient. The

211 | P a g e
instruments used to generall y being weak in such cases by considering a

s ystem with variables at level and first differences Blundell and Bond (1998)

extend the GMM (1991) estimator. For the variables at the level in equation

(6), the instruments are the variables lagged in first differences. In the case

of the variables in first differences in equation (6), the instruments are those

lagged variables at level.

However the GMM (1991) and GMM s ystem (1998) d ynamic estimators

can onl y be considered robust on confirmation of two conditions: 1) if the

restrictions created, a consequence of using the instruments, are valid; and 2)

there is no second order autocorrelation. Therefore, to test the validit y of the

restrictions we use the Sargan test in the case of the GMM (1991) estimator

and the GMM s ystem (1998) estimator. The null h ypothesis in the Sargan test

indicates the restrictions imposed b y the use of the instruments are valid

against the alternative h ypothesis that the restrictions are not valid. Rejection

of the null h ypothesis leads us to conclude that the estimators are not robust.

Further, we also test for the existence of first and second order

autocorrelation through Arellano and Bond (1991) test. The null h ypothesis is

that there is no autocorrelation against the alternative h ypothesis being the

existence of autocorrelation. Rejection of the null h ypothesis of the existence

of second order autocorrelation leads us to conclude that the estimators are

not robust.

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 4.4 Results and Interpretations

The first step of our anal ysis we have checked the correlation between

independent variables. The table 4.1 shows the result of correlation anal ysis.

The correlation among the independent variables is narrow. Same as the case

for depended variable too.

Table 4.1 Result of correlation analysis

LTDTD LNSA NFADEP GROWTH PROFIT EFTAX CR PLR WPI
LTDTD 1.00 -0.03 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00

LNSA -0.03 1.00 -0.07 0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.18 0.03 0.33

NFADEP 0.08 -0.07 1.00 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02

TDTA 0.24 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07

GROWTH 0.02 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01

PROFIT 0.08 -0.09 0.06 0.00 1.00 -0.01 0.14 0.05 0.08

EFTAX 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.00

CR 0.02 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 -0.01 0.00

PLR 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.01 1.00 -0.14

WPI 0.00 0.33 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.14 1.00

4.4.1 Panel least squares with fixed effects:

4.4.1.1 Sample companies

The table 4.2 show that the result of panel least squares with fixed

effects. The result of F- statistics shows that the model is fit and it is

significant at the one percent. The values of R-squares and Adjusted R-

squares are more than 0.5. It indicates that the independent variables could

explain more than 50 percent variation in the depended variable. Significant

Cross- section F-statistics indicates the presence of firm specific fixed

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effects in the model. LNSA, TDTA, CR and constant is positive and WP I is

negativel y significant at the one percent. Other variables are not showing an y

kind of significance.

Table 4.2 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects of Sample
companies
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.05727 0.00705 8.12606 0.00000
NFADEP 0.00000 0.00009 0.05509 0.95610
TDTA 0.06885 0.01582 4.35282 0.00000
GROWTH 0.00001 0.00001 0.73365 0.46320
PROFIT 0.02287 0.01466 1.56034 0.11880
EFTAX 0.00238 0.00145 1.63696 0.10180
CR 0.00085 0.00020 4.18646 0.00000
PLR 0.00065 0.00248 0.26214 0.79320
WPI -0.00071 0.00014 -5.14910 0.00000
Constant 0.16306 0.04528 3.60109 0.00030
R-squared 0.613186 Adjusted R-squared 0.563455
F-statistic 12.33006*** Cross-section F- statistics 11.17798***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

4.4.1.2 Agriculture sector:

Table 4.3 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: agriculture
sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.05657 0.04263 1.32699 0.18680
NFADEP 0.00347 0.00551 0.62962 0.53000
TDTA 0.06577 0.13128 0.50099 0.61720
GROWTH 0.00024 0.00036 0.66343 0.50820
PROFIT 0.15522 0.16583 0.93601 0.35090
EFTAX -0.28827 0.17649 -1.63335 0.10470
CR 0.01028 0.01415 0.72648 0.46880
PLR -0.00641 0.00933 -0.68730 0.49310
WPI -0.00036 0.00060 -0.59814 0.55070
Constant 0.04732 0.24857 0.19036 0.84930
R-squared 0.600355 Adjusted R-squared 0.523387
F-statistic 7.800001*** Cross-section F- statistic 7.393157***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

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 The table 4.3 shows the result of panel least squares with fixed effects

of agriculture sector. None of the variable is showing significance in case of

agriculture sector. The values of R-squares and Adjusted R-squared are

satisfactory and the significance of F-statistic indicates the model is fit.

Significant Cross section f-statistic prove Firm specific fixed is present in

the model.

4.4.1.3 Capital goods sector:

According to the table 4.4 Significance of F-statistic and cross section

F-statistic specify that the model fit and the presence of firm specific fixed

effects. Both the R- squares are satisfactory. LNSA is positivel y significant

at the one percent. WPI is negativel y significant at the one percent. The rest

of the variable is not determining the debt maturit y in case of capital goods

sector.

Table 4.4 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: capital goods
sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.13336 0.02475 5.38727 0.00000
NFADEP 0.00003 0.00009 0.28519 0.77570
TDTA -0.10262 0.11048 -0.92889 0.35370
GROWTH -0.00001 0.00035 -0.02447 0.98050
PROFIT -0.11447 0.16045 -0.71339 0.47620
EFTAX -0.07889 0.08033 -0.98201 0.32690
CR -0.00553 0.00455 -1.21516 0.22530
PLR -0.00446 0.00752 -0.59259 0.55390
WPI -0.00156 0.00048 -3.22310 0.00140
Constant 0.00527 0.14042 0.03755 0.97010
R-squared 0.653578 Adjusted R-squared 0.599843
F-statistic 12.1629*** Cross-section F- statistic 12.17691***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

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4. 4.1.4 Chemical and petrochemicals sector:

As per the table 4.5 NFADEP, TDTA and PROFIT are positivel y

significant at 5 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. GROWTH is

negativel y significant at 1 percent. Other variables are not significant. The

values of R- squares are satisfactory. F-statistic and Cross section F- statistic

are showing significant at 1 percent.

Table 4.5 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects of chemical and
Petrochemicals sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA -0.00052 0.13878 -0.00375 0.99700
NFADEP 0.02332 0.01041 2.23949 0.02790
TDTA 0.70951 0.26876 2.63997 0.01000
GROWTH -0.01848 0.00650 -2.84330 0.00570
PROFIT 0.49301 0.27313 1.80503 0.07490
EFTAX -0.18888 0.25801 -0.73207 0.46630
CR 0.01642 0.02848 0.57646 0.56590
PLR -0.01338 0.01300 -1.02937 0.30640
WPI -0.00071 0.00130 -0.54762 0.58550
Constant 0.22032 0.70627 0.31195 0.75590
R-squared 0.593394 Adjusted R-squared 0.495603
F-statistic 6.067965*** Cross-section F- statistic 3.688099***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

4. 4.1.5 Consumer durables sector:

Table 4.6 illustrates the result of panel least squares with fix ed effects

of the consumer durable sector. The result shows that EFTAX is negativel y

significant at 5 percent. The constant is positivel y significant at 1 percent.

The reaming variables are not showing significance. Both the R-squares are

explaining more than 50 percent of the variance. Significance of F-statistics

shows that the model is fit. Significance of cross section F-statistic confirms

the presence of firm specific fixed effects in the model.

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 Table 4.6 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: consumer
durables sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA -0.01447 0.03469 -0.41715 0.67820
NFADEP -0.00535 0.00728 -0.73517 0.46540
TDTA -0.06041 0.18476 -0.32695 0.74500
SGGTA 0.00046 0.00302 0.15177 0.87990
PROFIT 0.11546 0.15729 0.73409 0.46600
EFTAX -0.43863 0.21263 -2.06284 0.04390
CR -0.01951 0.01215 -1.60588 0.11400
PLR -0.01453 0.01469 -0.98929 0.32690
WPI -0.00088 0.00088 -1.00237 0.32060
Constant 1.07796 0.34214 3.15064 0.00260
R-squared 0.644974 Adjusted R-squared 0.541694
F-statistic 6.244886*** Cross-section F- statistics 10.20195***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

3. 4.1.6 Di versified sector:

Table 4.7 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: diversified
sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.27058 0.06170 4.38515 0.00010
NFADEP -0.00043 0.00140 -0.30671 0.76020
TDTA 0.03679 0.04244 0.86682 0.38980
GROWTH -0.00375 0.00148 -2.53256 0.01420
PROFIT -0.30392 0.20119 -1.51060 0.13660
EFTAX -0.21740 0.23083 -0.94180 0.35040
CR 0.04585 0.01799 2.54821 0.01370
PLR -0.00835 0.01062 -0.78601 0.43520
WPI -0.00350 0.00077 -4.57887 0.00000
Constant -0.62975 0.30807 -2.04418 0.04570
R-squared 0.755038 Adjusted R-squared 0.683777
F-statistic 10.59531*** Cross-section F- statistic 9.396541***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

The table 7 display the result of panel least squares with fix ed effects

of diversified sector. The result of the F-statistic and cross section F-statistic

shows that the model is fit and presence of firm specific fixed effects in the

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model. The R- squares is explaining more than 65% variation in the model.

LNSA and CR are positivel y significant at 1 percent, 5 percent respectivel y.

GROWTH, WP I and constant are negativel y significant at 5 percent, 1

percent and 5 percent respectivel y. The rest of the variables are not showing

an y kind of significance.

4. 4.1.7 FMCG sector:

Table 4.8 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: FMCG Sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.04620 0.02872 1.60880 0.10960
NFADEP 0.00025 0.00105 0.24210 0.80900
TDTA 0.13716 0.13669 1.00342 0.31710
GROWTH 0.00199 0.00117 1.70168 0.09070
PROFIT -0.10273 0.36011 -0.28528 0.77580
EFTAX -0.18422 0.18559 -0.99262 0.32230
CR 0.00849 0.00302 2.81294 0.00550
PLR -0.00818 0.00929 -0.88111 0.37950
WPI -0.00060 0.00051 -1.17778 0.24060
Constant 0.18214 0.17748 1.02623 0.30630
R-squared 0.588171 Adjusted R-squared 0.514189
F-statistic 7.950261*** Cross-section F 5.997399***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

The table 4.8 shows the result of panel least squares with fixed effects

of the FMCG sector. R-squares and Adjusted R-squares is explaining more

than 50 percent variation is the model. Significant F-statistic and cross

section F-statistic confirms that the model is fit and firm specific fixed

effects are present in the model. GROWTH and CR are positivel y significant

at 10 percent, 1 percent respectivel y. None of the other variables are

significant.

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4.4.1.8 Healthcare sector:

The table 4.9 shows the result of panel least squares with fixed effects

of health care sector. TDTA is positivel y determining the debt maturity.

GROWTH and EFTAX are negativel y determining the debt maturit y. The

remaining variables are not showing significance. The values of R- Squares

and Adjusted R-squares are more than 0.6. Significant F-statistics and cross

section F-statistic confirms the model is fit, presence of firm specific fixed

effects.

Table 4.9 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: healthcare
sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.00010 0.06545 0.00156 0.99880
NFADEP -0.00067 0.00615 -0.10964 0.91280
TDTA 0.18312 0.06384 2.86843 0.00450
GROWTH -0.00246 0.00126 -1.94821 0.05260
PROFIT 0.03108 0.02395 1.29752 0.19580
EFTAX -0.41224 0.20981 -1.96487 0.05070
CR 0.00774 0.00548 1.41149 0.15950
PLR 0.00798 0.00831 0.96116 0.33750
WPI -0.00034 0.00069 -0.49306 0.62250
Constant 0.34401 0.30289 1.13576 0.25730
R-squared 0.687647 Adjusted R-squared 0.635822
F-statistic 0.635822*** Cross-section F 13.71328***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

4. 4.1.9 Housing related sector:

The table 4.10 indicates the result of panel least squares with fixed

effects of housing related sector. LNSA and TDTA is positively significant at

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1 percent, the rest of the variables are not significant. The values of R-

squares are more than 0.5. Both the F-statistics are significant at 1 percent.

Table 4.10 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: housing
related
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.06102 0.01442 4.23296 0.00000
NFADEP -0.00057 0.00070 -0.80777 0.41990
TDTA 0.19849 0.05006 3.96486 0.00010
GROWTH -0.00035 0.00034 -1.04050 0.29900
PROFIT -0.04098 0.03617 -1.13298 0.25820
EFTAX -0.11757 0.09299 -1.26438 0.20710
CR -0.00078 0.00073 -1.06291 0.28870
PLR 0.00470 0.00736 0.63925 0.52320
WPI -0.00024 0.00044 -0.55627 0.57850
Constant 0.13346 0.12548 1.06360 0.28840
R-squared 0.571525 Adjusted R-squared 0.503952
F-statistic 8.457875 Cross-section F 7.524837
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

4.4.1.10 Information technology:

Table 4.11 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: information
technology
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.13740 0.04655 2.95189 0.00360
NFADEP 0.00060 0.00267 0.22408 0.82290
TDTA 0.03113 0.02947 1.05636 0.29220
GROWTH -0.00028 0.00018 -1.58176 0.11540
PROFIT 0.06405 0.03593 1.78267 0.07630
EFTAX -0.34210 0.20424 -1.67495 0.09570
CR 0.00886 0.00602 1.47145 0.14290
PLR 0.02225 0.01190 1.86972 0.06310
WPI -0.00250 0.00083 -3.01420 0.00290
Constant -0.21830 0.19632 -1.11193 0.26760
R-squared 0.569173 Adjusted R-squared 0.493837
F-statistic 7.555148*** Cross-section F 7.83552***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

220 | P a g e
 The table 4.11 specify the result of panel least squares with fixed

effects of information technology sector. The values of R-squares are around

0.5. Both the F-statistics are significant at 1 percent. LNSA, PROFIT and

PLR are positivel y significant at 1 percent, 10 percent and 10 percent

respectivel y. EFTAX and WPI are negativel y significant at 10 percent and 1

percent correspondingl y. All the other variables are not significant.

4.4.1.11 Media & publishing sector:

Table 4.12 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: media and
publishing
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA -0.27787 0.13437 -2.06792 0.04420
NFADEP -0.01272 0.01035 -1.22860 0.22530
TDTA -0.20464 0.20188 -1.01368 0.31590
GROWTH 0.00002 0.00001 1.36856 0.17760
PROFIT 0.14729 0.12479 1.18024 0.24380
EFTAX -0.09775 0.07208 -1.35615 0.18150
CR 0.00420 0.01609 0.26100 0.79520
PLR 0.03925 0.01664 2.35945 0.02250
WPI 0.00348 0.00178 1.95484 0.05660
Constant 0.77327 0.43558 1.77525 0.08230
R-squared 0.719912 Adjusted R-squared 0.630523
F-statistic 8.053637*** Cross-section F 13.94693***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

The table 4.12 illustrates the result of panel least squares with fixed

effects of media and publishing sector. LNSA is negativel y significant at 5

percent. PLR, WPI and constant is positivel y at 5 percent, 10 percent and 10

percent respectivel y. The rest of the variables are not significant. The values

of R- squares are explaining more than 60 percent of the variation in the

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model. Significant F-statistic and cross section F-statistic indicates that the

model is fit as well as the presence of firm specific fixed effects.

4. 4.1.12 Metal, metal products and mining sector:

Table 4.13 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: metal, metal
products and mining.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.06382 0.03147 2.02785 0.04390
NFADEP 0.00265 0.00228 1.16258 0.24640
TDTA 0.15452 0.08147 1.89659 0.05930
GROWTH -0.00042 0.00040 -1.05017 0.29490
PROFIT 0.03587 0.16286 0.22025 0.82590
EFTAX -0.60469 0.16957 -3.56610 0.00050
CR 0.00929 0.00626 1.48319 0.13960
PLR -0.01715 0.00997 -1.72045 0.08690
WPI -0.00188 0.00063 -2.98923 0.00310
Constant 0.63581 0.17568 3.61920 0.00040
R-squared 0.575942 Adjusted R-squared 0.503489
F-statistic 7.949262*** Cross-section F 4.835519***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

The table 4.13 explains the result of panel least squares with fixed

effects of metal, metal products and mining. LNSA, TDTA and Constant are

positivel y significant at 5 percent, 10 percent and 1 percent correspondingly.

EFTAX, P LR and WPI are negativel y significant at 1 percent, 10 percent and

1 percent respectively. Significance of F-statistics confirms that the model is

fit as well as the presence of firm specific fixed effects in the model.

4. 4.1.13 Miscellaneous sector:

The table 4.14 indicates the result of panel least squares with effect of

miscellaneous sector. LNSA is positivel y significant at 1 percent. The

222 | P a g e
constant is negatively significant at 5 percent. The rest of the variables are

not showing significance. The values of R- squares are explaining more than

50 percent of the variation in the model. Significant F-statistic and cross

section F-statistic indicates that the model is fit as well as the presence of

firm specific fixed effects.

Table 4.14 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: miscellaneous
sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.21531 0.06257 3.44101 0.00090
NFADEP 0.00883 0.00724 1.21873 0.22620
TDTA -0.08105 0.11399 -0.71103 0.47900
GROWTH 0.00015 0.00014 1.08362 0.28150
PROFIT -0.03282 0.36857 -0.08904 0.92930
EFTAX -0.17947 0.22800 -0.78712 0.43330
CR 0.00550 0.01129 0.48695 0.62750
PLR 0.01661 0.01555 1.06846 0.28830
WPI -0.00154 0.00097 -1.58855 0.11580
Constant -0.85207 0.34416 -2.47582 0.01520
R-squared 0.602925 Adjusted R-squared 0.511643
F-statistic 6.605103*** Cross-section F 6.867382***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

4. 4.1.14 Oil & gas sector:

The table 4.15 stays the result of panel least squares with effect of oil

and gas sector. The values of R- Squares and Adjusted R-squares are more

than 0.7. Significant F-statistics and cross section F-statistic confirms the

model is fit, presence of firm specific fixed effects. PROFIT and EFTAX is

positivel y significant at 1 percent. The remaining variables are not showing

significance.

223 | P a g e
 Table 4.15 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: oil and gas
sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.00732 0.04037 0.18131 0.85640
NFADEP -0.00058 0.00135 -0.42809 0.66920
TDTA 0.06735 0.15891 0.42384 0.67230
GROWTH -0.00001 0.00007 -0.20897 0.83480
PROFIT 0.77439 0.19075 4.05978 0.00010
EFTAX 0.00452 0.00152 2.98004 0.00340
CR -0.00934 0.00571 -1.63546 0.10400
PLR 0.00801 0.00951 0.84217 0.40100
WPI -0.00020 0.00065 -0.30327 0.76210
Constant 0.19598 0.25062 0.78200 0.43540
R-squared 0.777859 Adjusted R-squared 0.736667
F-statistic 18.88382*** Cross-section F 12.15553***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

4.4.1.15 Power sector:

Table 4.16 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: power sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.01079 0.02377 0.45406 0.65060
NFADEP -0.00027 0.00263 -0.10339 0.91780
TDTA 0.43497 0.14226 3.05765 0.00270
GROWTH 0.00010 0.00051 0.19533 0.84540
PROFIT 0.02467 0.05393 0.45753 0.64810
EFTAX -0.35885 0.17300 -2.07432 0.04010
CR 0.00022 0.00035 0.61867 0.53720
PLR -0.01810 0.00942 -1.92100 0.05700
WPI 0.00130 0.00048 2.71086 0.00760
Constant 0.26260 0.19301 1.36060 0.17610
R-squared 0.680417 Adjusted R-squared 0.617507
F-statistic 10.8157*** Cross-section F 7.446219***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

Table 4.16 illustrates the result of panel least squares with fix ed effects

of power sector. The result shows that EFTAX and PLR are negativel y

significant at 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. TDTA and WPI is

224 | P a g e
positivel y significant at 1 percent and 5 percent correspondingl y. The

reaming variables are not showing significance. Both the R-squares are

explaining more than 60 percent of the variance. Significance of F-statistics

shows that the model is fit. Significance of cross section F-statistic confirms

the presence of firm specific fixed effects in the model

4.4.1.16 Telecom sector:

Table 4.17 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: telecom sector

Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.

LNSA 0.06329 0.03139 2.01641 0.0472
NFADEP 0.01169 0.01028 1.13759 0.2587
TDTA 0.21538 0.19049 1.13065 0.2616
GROWTH 0.00053 0.00116 0.45827 0.648
PROFIT -0.1017 0.08553 -1.1888 0.2381
EFTAX -0.0483 0.21805 -0.2214 0.8253
CR 0.00147 0.00041 3.55382 0.0006
PLR -0.0107 0.01521 -0.7063 0.4821
WPI -0.0007 0.00079 -0.8676 0.3882
Constant 0.04751 0.27463 0.17299 0.8631
R-squared 0.64339 Adjusted R-squared 0.55763
F-statistic 7.501721*** Cross-section F 7.318377***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

The table 4.17 shows the result of panel least squares with fixed effects

of telecom sector. LNSA and CR positivel y determine the debt maturit y. The

remaining variables are not showing significance. The values of R- Squares

and Adjusted R-squares are more than 0.5. Significant F-statistics and cross

section F-statistic confirms the model is fit, presence of firm specific fixed

effects.

225 | P a g e
4.4.1.17 Textile sector:

The table 4.18 explains the result of panel least squares with fixed effects of

textile sector. R-squares and Adjusted R-squares is explaining more than 7 5

percent variation is the model. Significant F-statistic and cross section F-

statistic confirms that the model is fit and firm specific fixed effects are

present in the model. EFTAX is positively significant at 1percent. PLR and

WPI are negativel y significant at 10 percent and 5 percent respectivel y. None

of the other variables are significant.

Table 4.18 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: textile sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.02281 0.03957 0.57637 0.56620
NFADEP 0.00090 0.00385 0.23398 0.81570
TDTA 0.09139 0.15574 0.58680 0.55920
GROWTH 0.00023 0.00203 0.11523 0.90860
PROFIT 0.06564 0.25094 0.26157 0.79440
EFTAX -0.36783 0.13542 -2.71628 0.00830
CR 0.01375 0.00928 1.48162 0.14290
PLR 0.01340 0.00759 1.76394 0.08200
WPI 0.00115 0.00044 2.60444 0.01120
Constant -0.14102 0.21681 -0.65044 0.51750
R-squared 0.805071 Adjusted R-squared 0.755653
F-statistic 16.29088*** Cross-section F 23.0222***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

4. 4.1.18 Transport equipment sector:

Table 4.19 illustrates the result of panel least squares with fix ed effects

of the transport equipment sector. The result shows that TDTA and CR are

positivel y significant at 1 percent and 5 percent respectivel y. WPI and P LR

are negativel y significant at 5 percent and 10 percent respectivel y. The

226 | P a g e
reaming variables are not showing significance. Both the R-squares are

explaining more than 60 percent of the variance. Significance of F-statistics

shows that the model is fit. Significance of cross section F-statistic confirms

the presence of firm specific fixed effects in the model

Table 4.19 Result of panel least squares with fixed effects: Transport and
equipments sector
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LNSA 0.01913 0.05232 0.36567 0.71510
NFADEP 0.00312 0.00248 1.25666 0.21060
TDTA 0.50779 0.13225 3.83954 0.00020
GROWTH -0.00145 0.00093 -1.55600 0.12150
PROFIT 0.03345 0.16948 0.19739 0.84380
EFTAX -0.08831 0.06474 -1.36398 0.17430
CR 0.02906 0.01230 2.36228 0.01930
PLR -0.01576 0.00792 -1.99037 0.04810
WPI -0.00104 0.00061 -1.71138 0.08880
Constant 0.42973 0.26717 1.60846 0.10950
R-squared 0.665134 Adjusted R-squared 0.605815
F-statistic 11.2128*** Cross-section F 8.976373***
Note: ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level of significance respectively

4. 4.2 Result of dynamic panel least squares

4. 4.2.1 Sample companies:

The table 4.20 explains the result of d yn amic panel data for the sample

companies taken as a whole. From the results of the Sargan tests, we can

conclude that we can reject the null h ypothesis of instrument validit y, and

consequent restrictions generated, from use of the GMM (1991) and GMM

s ystem (1998) d ynamic estimators respectivel y.

227 | P a g e
 Table 4.20 Result of dynamic panel data for the sample companies
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.73456 0.03107 0.00000 0.66308 0.04675 0.00000
LNSA 0.02148 0.01283 0.09400 0.02840 0.01526 0.06300
NFADEP 0.00005 0.00006 0.45000 0.00005 0.00006 0.44600
TDTA 0.18099 0.05468 0.00100 0.15300 0.05580 0.00600
GROWTH 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000
PROFIT -0.01070 0.01022 0.29500 -0.01007 0.01063 0.34400
EFTAX -0.00031 0.00018 0.08900 -0.00038 0.00018 0.03000
CR -0.00177 0.00041 0.00000 -0.00151 0.00046 0.00100
PLR -0.00531 0.00226 0.01900 -0.00532 0.00245 0.03000
WPI -0.00017 0.00018 0.35500 -0.00034 0.00023 0.13200
_CONS 0.01465 0.07439 0.84400 0.04846 0.07796 0.53400
Wald Chi 735.3*** 353.49***
Sargan test 42.85498 34.60435
AB Test Order 1 -8.4141*** -8.1737***
AB Test Order 2 1.1528 1.0667
Number of observations = 2568 Number of observations = 2247
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTD ,∑ Z ),
in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
n

i ,t − 2 k ,i ,t − 2
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n in the first difference equations, and n in the level
( LTDTD i ,t − 2 , ∑
K =1
Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), ( ∆ LTDTD i ,t − 2 , ∑
K =1
∆ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ),

equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

However, the results of the second order autocorrelation tests

concerning respectivel y the GMM (1991) and GMM s ystem (1998) d ynamic

estimators, allow us to conclude that we cannot reject the null h ypothesis of

absence of second order autocorrelation. Therefore, given the validit y of the

absence of second order autocorrelation, but instruments invalidit y we cannot

conclude that the GMM (1991) and GMM s ystem (1998) d ynamic estimators

are efficient and robust. L1.LTDTD, LNSA, TDTA and GROWTH is

positivel y significant for both GMM (1991) and GMM (1998). EFTAX, CR
228 | P a g e
and P LR are negativel y significant for both GMM (1991) and GMM (1998).

The remaining variables are not showing significance .

4. 4.2.2 Agriculture sector:

Table 4.21 Result of dynamic panel data for agriculture sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.54686 0.29721 0.06600 0.62544 0.32756 0.05600
LNSA -0.05471 0.05886 0.35300 -0.10895 0.07520 0.14700
NFADEP -0.00149 0.00516 0.77300 0.00310 0.00390 0.42700
TDTA 0.15387 0.14656 0.29400 0.01491 0.14446 0.91800
GROWTH 0.00053 0.00036 0.13600 0.00053 0.00031 0.08700
PROFIT 0.06539 0.11222 0.56000 0.06363 0.13449 0.63600
EFTAX -0.31538 0.16558 0.05700 -0.38517 0.18284 0.03500
CR 0.00804 0.01214 0.50800 0.00507 0.01223 0.67900
PLR -0.00790 0.00572 0.16700 -0.00981 0.00602 0.10300
WPI 0.00046 0.00065 0.48500 0.00102 0.00080 0.20300
_CONS 0.53412 0.46944 0.25500 0.79842 0.50009 0.11000
Wald Chi 36.91*** 44.21***
Sargan test 14.13656 12.61266
AB Test Order 1 -1.5773** -1.7054***
AB Test Order 2 0.96414 1.064
Number of observations = 144 Number of observations = 126
n
in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
i , t − 2 , ∑ Z k , i , t − 2 ),
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTD
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTD i ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k , i , t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆ LTDTD i ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆ Z k , i , t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.21 indicates the result of d ynamic panel data for

agriculture sector. L1.LTDTD is positive and EFTAX is negativel y

significant at 10 percent for GMM (1191). L1. LTDTD and GROWTH are

229 | P a g e
positive and EFTAX is negativel y significant at 10 percent, 10 percent and

5% respectivel y. The rest of the variables are not showing significance.

4.4.2.3 Capital goods sector:

Table 4.22 Result of dynamic panel data for capital goods sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.74533 0.01495 0.00000 0.47994 0.01662 0.00000
LNSA 0.05771 0.00862 0.00000 0.05773 0.00888 0.00000
NFADEP 0.00007 0.00010 0.47600 -0.00001 0.00007 0.85300
TDTA -0.01456 0.05461 0.79000 0.03349 0.03994 0.40200
GROWTH -0.00003 0.00006 0.67400 -0.00003 0.00011 0.76700
PROFIT -0.15598 0.04439 0.00000 -0.10625 0.04961 0.03200
EFTAX -0.15365 0.03880 0.00000 -0.16524 0.05634 0.00300
CR 0.00228 0.00085 0.00700 0.00314 0.00092 0.00100
PLR -0.00996 0.00174 0.00000 -0.00666 0.00105 0.00000
WPI -0.00080 0.00007 0.00000 -0.00076 0.00009 0.00000
_CONS 0.09973 0.04635 0.03100 0.08765 0.04889 0.07300
Wald Chi 257138.93*** 15212.46***
Sargan test 30.2683 26.58512
AB Test Order 1 -3.1064*** -2.9915**
AB Test Order 2 0.29768 -0.06812
Number of observations = 312 Number of observations = 273
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.22 shows the result of d yna mic panel data of the capital

goods sector. L1.LT DTD, LNSA and CR is positivel y significant at 1% for

both GMM (1991), GMM (1998). PROFIT, EFTAX, PLR and WPI are

230 | P a g e
negativel y significant at 5 percent, 1 percent, 1 percent, 1 percent and 1

percent respectivel y for both GMM (1991), GMM (1998). The constant is

also positivel y significant 5 percent for GMM (1991) ant 10 percent for

GMM (1998). Other variables are not significant.

4. 4.2.4 Chemical and petrochemicals sector:

Table 4. 23 Result of dynamic panel data for chemical & petrochemical

sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD -0.0589 0.2898 0.8390 -0.0502 0.2328 0.8290
LNSA -0.2966 0.0998 0.0030 -0.2924 0.1101 0.0080
NFADEP -0.0058 0.0121 0.6310 -0.0079 0.0102 0.4410
GROWTH -0.0112 0.0074 0.1290 -0.0105 0.0063 0.0950
PROFIT -1.5567 0.9634 0.1060 -1.8980 0.8611 0.0280
CR 0.0329 0.0349 0.3470 0.0464 0.0300 0.1220
PLR -0.0046 0.0050 0.3540 -0.0057 0.0049 0.2410
_CONS 2.7558 0.7560 0.0000 2.7579 0.8187 0.0010
Wald chi 151.31*** 65.49***
Sargan test 2.770598 2.916762
AB Test Order 1 -0.05347*** -3.1064***
AB Test Order 2 1.0108 0.99572
Number of observations = 88 Number of observations = 77
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

231 | P a g e
 The table 4.23 explains the result of d yn amic panel data for chemical

and petrochemical sector 2. LNSA is negativel y significant at 1 percent for

GMM (1991) and the rest of the variables are not significant. LNSA,

GROWTH and PROFIT are negativel y significant at 1 percent, 10 percent and

5 percent respectively for GMM (1998). The rest of the variables are not

significant.

4. 4.2.5 Consumer durables sector:

Table 4.24 Result of dynamic panel data for consumer durable sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD -0.2644 0.5337 0.6200 -2.1522 1.3525 0.1120
LNSA -0.4976 0.2847 0.0810 -0.4921 0.2784 0.0770
NFADEP -0.0275 0.0196 0.1610 -0.0370 0.0235 0.1150
GROWTH -0.0009 0.0032 0.7840 -0.0027 0.0041 0.5130
PROFIT -2.5773 1.6077 0.1090 -2.5098 1.5303 0.1010
CR -0.0175 0.0220 0.4270 -0.0288 0.0199 0.1470
PLR -0.0239 0.0326 0.4630 -0.0023 0.0322 0.9420
_CONS 5.1041 2.7816 0.0670 5.6674 3.0151 0.0600
Wald Chi 27.49*** 30.12***
Sargan test 1.35E-18 1.44E-18
AB Test Order 1 -0.76436*** -0.35904***
AB Test Order 2 0.53732 -0.91663
Number of observations = 64 Number of observations = 56
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

2 In Tables 4.23, 4.24, 4.25, 4.30, 4.32, 4.35 we omitted( TDTA, EFTAX, WPI) variables because of high
degree of multicollinearity among independent variables

232 | P a g e
The table 4.24 illustrates the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

consumer durables sector. LNSA is negative and constant is positivel y

significant at 10 percent for both GMM (1991) and GMM (1998). All the

other variables are not showing significance.

4. 4.2.6 Diversified sector:

Table 4.25 Result of dynamic panel data for diversified sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD -0.2009 0.7309 0.7830 -0.4471 0.3751 0.2330
LNSA 0.3039 0.5811 0.6010 0.0264 0.1325 0.8420
NFADEP 0.0001 0.0010 0.9290 0.0006 0.0006 0.3740
GROWTH -0.0010 0.0036 0.7750 -0.0017 0.0028 0.5480
PROFIT 0.8265 0.8655 0.3400 1.2376 1.6956 0.4650
CR 0.0041 0.0367 0.9120 -0.0181 0.0291 0.5350
PLR -0.0043 0.0132 0.7430 -0.0029 0.0144 0.8400
_CONS -1.7932 4.6244 0.6980 0.2475 0.6910 0.7200
Wald Chi 9.47*** 19.81***
Sargan test 9.95E-21 1.21E-23
AB Test Order 1 -0.07037*** 0.42966***
AB Test Order 2 0.07291 -0.06717
Number of observations = 64 Number of observations = 56
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.25 shows the result of dynamic panel least squares for the

diversified sector. None of the variables are significant for both the model.

233 | P a g e
4. 4.2.7 FMCG sector:

The table 4.26 illustrates the result of d ynamic panel data for the

FMCG sector. L1.LTDTD, LNSA, TDTA and CR are positive, WP I is

negativel y significant at 1 percent, 1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent

respectivel y for GMM (1991). L1.LTDTD, LNSA, GROWTH and CR are

positivel y significant at 1 percent, 1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent

respectivel y for GMM (1998).

Table 4.26 Result of dynamic panel data for FMCG Sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.410977 0.141725 0.004000 0.354553 0.058962 0.000000
LNSA 0.065470 0.023395 0.005000 0.049653 0.018629 0.008000
NFADEP 0.000166 0.000570 0.771000 -0.000585 0.000595 0.326000
TDTA 0.255587 0.119693 0.033000 0.279050 0.179442 0.120000
GROWTH 0.001813 0.001248 0.146000 0.002086 0.000968 0.031000
PROFIT 0.024501 0.783153 0.975000 0.011519 0.278800 0.967000
EFTAX -0.025872 0.145960 0.859000 -0.149998 0.141228 0.288000
CR 0.005674 0.001506 0.000000 0.003889 0.000698 0.000000
PLR -0.000656 0.004538 0.885000 -0.005166 0.004487 0.250000
WPI -0.000529 0.000229 0.021000 -0.000352 0.000342 0.303000
_CONS -0.251764 0.156708 0.108000 -0.084993 0.118933 0.475000
Wald Chi 39773.59*** 93118.67***
Sargan test 1.46E+01 11.74222
AB Test Order 1 -1.9433*** -1.9252***
AB Test Order 2 1.059 1.052
Number of observations = 176 Number of observations = 154
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

234 | P a g e
4. 4.2.8 Healthcare sector:

The table 4.27 shows the result of d ynamic panel data for the healthcare

sector. L1.LTDTD, TDTA, GROWTH and CR are positivel y significant at 1

percent for both GMM (1991), GMM (1998). P LR and EFTAX are negativel y

significant at 5 percent and 1 percent respectivel y for GMM (1991). PROFIT,

EFTAX and PLR are negativel y significant at 1 percent for GMM (1998). All

the other variables are not showing significance.

Table 4.27 Result of dynamic panel data for healthcare sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.560936 0.046958 0.000000 0.520381 0.066486 0.000000
LNSA -0.003637 0.033356 0.913000 -0.027578 0.049631 0.578000
NFADEP 0.000373 0.002206 0.866000 -0.001807 0.002385 0.449000
TDTA 0.179249 0.037924 0.000000 0.128695 0.044105 0.004000
GROWTH 0.002511 0.000816 0.002000 0.002982 0.000833 0.000000
PROFIT 0.002291 0.013370 0.864000 -0.020731 0.005804 0.000000
EFTAX -0.899070 0.119597 0.000000 -0.833286 0.061747 0.000000
CR 0.018514 0.001541 0.000000 0.019407 0.001741 0.000000
PLR -0.005594 0.002536 0.027000 -0.004416 0.001318 0.001000
WPI 0.000095 0.000399 0.813000 0.000323 0.000482 0.503000
_CONS 0.160783 0.160799 0.317000 0.265606 0.281792 0.346000
Wald Chi 1785.63*** 73398.32***
Sargan test 2.01E+01 21.2708
AB Test Order 1 -2.7535*** -2.6127**
AB Test Order 2 0.75786 0.78496
Number of observations = 232 Number of observations = 203
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

235 | P a g e
4.4.2.9 Housing related sector:

Table 4.28 Result of dynamic panel data for housing related sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.532299 0.038196 0.000000 0.380084 0.070710 0.000000
LNSA 0.043669 0.011366 0.000000 0.033144 0.003967 0.000000
NFADEP -0.000575 0.000449 0.200000 -0.000138 0.000478 0.772000
TDTA 0.108434 0.044516 0.015000 0.108047 0.033351 0.001000
GROWTH 0.000561 0.000363 0.122000 0.000665 0.000273 0.015000
PROFIT -0.005096 0.009854 0.605000 -0.000650 0.004738 0.891000
EFTAX 0.074741 0.038679 0.053000 0.085769 0.026282 0.001000
CR -0.002205 0.000392 0.000000 -0.002538 0.000158 0.000000
PLR -0.004822 0.002309 0.037000 -0.005085 0.002959 0.086000
WPI -0.000686 0.000222 0.002000 -0.000582 0.000164 0.000000
_CONS 0.175904 0.093031 0.059000 0.300505 0.086588 0.001000
Wald Chi 5677.99*** 123330.83***
Sargan test 3.00E+01 29.03378
AB Test Order 1 -2.8036*** -2.7669***
AB Test Order 2 -0.4237 -0.73741
Number of observations = 288 Number of observations = 252
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.28 indicates the result of d ynamic panel data for housing

related sector. L1.LTDTD, LNSA, TDTA, EFTAX and constant are positivel y

significant 1 percent, 1 percent, 5 percent, 5 percent and10 percent

respectivel y for GMM (1991). CR, PLR and WP I are negativel y significant at

1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectivel y for GMM (1991). L1.LTDTD,

LNSA, TDTA, EFTAX, GROWTH and constant are positivel y significant at 1

236 | P a g e
percent, 1 percent, 1 percent, 1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectivel y

for GMM (1998). CR, PLR and WPI are negativel y significant at 1 percent, 5

percent and 1 percent correspondingl y for GMM (1998).

4. 4.2.10 Information technology sector:

Table 4.29 Result of dynamic panel data for information technology

sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.463662 0.053524 0.000000 0.486539 0.084887 0.000000
LNSA -0.006965 0.024706 0.778000 0.031588 0.026491 0.233000
NFADEP 0.001431 0.000836 0.087000 0.001928 0.000780 0.013000
TDTA 0.749980 0.145303 0.000000 0.829363 0.153871 0.000000
GROWTH -0.000085 0.000086 0.321000 -0.000059 0.000073 0.415000
PROFIT -0.009435 0.013337 0.479000 -0.005056 0.007987 0.527000
EFTAX -0.121921 0.138838 0.380000 -0.061886 0.115337 0.592000
CR 0.012538 0.002314 0.000000 0.013459 0.002206 0.000000
PLR 0.004829 0.007291 0.508000 0.002475 0.003791 0.514000
WPI -0.000606 0.000406 0.136000 -0.001095 0.000521 0.036000
_CONS 0.112851 0.118080 0.339000 -0.024447 0.097775 0.803000
Wald Chi 2640.8*** 576.94***
Sargan test 1.14E+01 11.71578
AB Test Order 1 -2.3399** -2.3409***
AB Test Order 2 -0.32066 -0.32213
Number of observations = 192 Number of observations = 168
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.29 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

information technology sector. L1.LTDTD, NFADEP, TDTA and CR are

237 | P a g e
positivel y significant at 1 percent, 10 percent, 1 percent and 1 percent for

both GMM (1991), GMM (1998). WPI is negativel y significant at 5 percent

for GMM (1998). The rest of the variables are not significant

4. 4.2.11 Media and publishing sector:

Table 4.30 Result of dynamic panel data for media & publishing sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDD 0.08194 0.98140 0.93300 0.06656 0.89477 0.94100
NFADEP -0.02230 0.14069 0.87400 -0.01953 0.13582 0.88600
GROWTH 0.00002 0.00002 0.11200 0.00002 0.00001 0.10000
PROFIT 0.77552 7.41545 0.91700 0.60659 7.08971 0.93200
CR -0.01459 0.04875 0.76500 -0.01318 0.04438 0.76600
PLR 0.02331 0.03656 0.52400 0.02406 0.03735 0.52000
_CONS 0.12854 0.27565 0.64100 0.13958 0.23995 0.56100
Wald Chi 1.12E+06*** 2965.88***
Sargan test 1.39E-14 1.44E-19
AB Test Order 1 -0.21946*** -0.23886***
AB Test Order 2 -0.38022 -0.38029
Number of observations = 56 Number of observations = 49
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.30 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

media and publishing sector. None of the variables are significant for both

GMM (1991) and GMM (1998).

238 | P a g e
4.4.2.12 Metal, metal products and mining sector:

Table 4.31 Result of dynamic panel data for metal, metal products and
mining sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.660973 0.063203 0.000000 0.610801 0.052393 0.000000
LNSA 0.058887 0.024063 0.014000 0.024431 0.015641 0.118000
NFADEP -0.001663 0.000435 0.000000 -0.000682 0.000606 0.260000
TDTA 0.147635 0.064157 0.021000 0.108096 0.073112 0.139000
GROWTH -0.000461 0.001734 0.790000 -0.002165 0.001707 0.205000
PROFIT -0.016660 0.079227 0.833000 0.019119 0.066329 0.773000
EFTAX -0.923333 0.078446 0.000000 -0.813258 0.056281 0.000000
CR 0.005537 0.002563 0.031000 0.005365 0.004254 0.207000
PLR -0.023552 0.005932 0.000000 -0.016643 0.006147 0.007000
WPI -0.000958 0.000385 0.013000 -0.000603 0.000346 0.081000
_CONS 0.342497 0.155257 0.027000 0.426019 0.105995 0.000000
Wald Chi 944.82*** 3392.5***
Sargan test 1.32E+01 14.91667
AB Test Order 1 -2.6549** -2.7693**
AB Test Order 2 1.7568 1.6477
Number of observations = 208 Number of observations = 182
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.31 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for

metal, metal products and mining sector. L1.LTDTD, LNSA, TDTA, CR and

constant is positively significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent, 5 percent

and 5 percent respectivel y for GMM (1991). NFADEP, EFTAX, PLR and WPI

are negativel y significant at 1 percent, 1 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent and 5

percent correspondingl y for GMM (1191). The remaining variables are not

239 | P a g e
showing significance. L1.LTDTD and constant are positivel y significant at 1

percent for GMM (1998). EFTAX, P LR and WPI are negatively significant at

1 percent, 1 percent and 10 percent respectivel y for GMM (1998) and the rest

of the variables are not significant.

4. 4.2.13 Miscellaneous sector:

Table 4.32 Result of dynamic panel data for miscellaneous sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDD 0.84866 0.32894 0.01000 0.97567 0.60699 0.10800
NFADEP -0.00115 0.00796 0.88500 -0.00339 0.00652 0.60300
GROWTH 0.00002 0.00003 0.43800 0.00004 0.00003 0.30900
PROFIT -0.09058 1.33370 0.94600 -0.42876 1.26071 0.73400
CR -0.00756 0.01469 0.60700 -0.01518 0.01661 0.36100
PLR 0.00931 0.00614 0.13000 0.01026 0.00598 0.08600
_CONS 0.02081 0.22012 0.92500 0.07088 0.13517 0.60000
Wald Chi 5.56E+01*** 18.5***
Sargan test 6.20E+00 5.02E+00
AB Test Order 1 -1.6714*** -1.4015***
AB Test Order 2 0.32665 0.28483
Number of observations = 96 Number of observations = 84
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.32 explains the result of dynamic panel least squares for

miscellaneous sector. L1.LTDTD is positivel y significant at 5 percent for

240 | P a g e
GMM (1991). P LR is positivel y significant at 10 percent for GMM (1998).All

the other variables are not showing significance.

4.3.2.14 Oil and gas sector:

Table 4.33 Result of dynamic panel data for oil and gas sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.732445 0.183171 0.000000 0.386480 0.226244 0.088000
LNSA 0.029978 0.024969 0.230000 0.032380 0.020936 0.122000
NFADEP 0.000705 0.000336 0.036000 0.000558 0.000314 0.075000
TDTA -0.121032 0.150329 0.421000 0.080681 0.107389 0.452000
GROWTH -0.000001 0.000006 0.830000 -0.000002 0.000005 0.661000
PROFIT 0.949704 0.154395 0.000000 0.817050 0.104072 0.000000
EFTAX 0.003196 0.000209 0.000000 0.003131 0.000229 0.000000
CR -0.006718 0.004959 0.176000 -0.005225 0.003895 0.180000
PLR -0.000074 0.002967 0.980000 -0.004775 0.003399 0.160000
WPI -0.001163 0.000601 0.053000 -0.001156 0.000541 0.033000
_CONS -0.022844 0.265533 0.931000 0.153100 0.256192 0.550000
Wald Chi 8089.84*** 13238.15***
Sargan test 1.25E+01 8.48251
AB Test Order 1 -2.0462** -1.6276***
AB Test Order 2 0.15093 -0.07043
Number of observations = 160 Number of observations = 140
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.33 explains the result of dynamic panel data for Oil and

Gas sector. L1. LTDTD, NFADEP, PROFIT and EFTAX are positivel y

significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent and 1 percent respectivel y for

241 | P a g e
GMM (1991). WP I is negativel y significant at 10 percent GMM (1998). Other

variables are not showing significance. L1.LTDTD, NFADEP, PROFIT and

EFTAX are positively significant at 10 percent, 10 percent, 1 percent and 1

percent respectivel y for GMM (1998). WPI is negativel y significant at 5

percent GMM (1998).

4.4.2.15 Power sector:

Table 4.34 Result of dynamic panel data for power sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD -0.086642 0.212527 0.684000 0.020236 0.101590 0.842000
LNSA 0.103586 0.048216 0.032000 0.040043 0.038350 0.296000
NFADEP -0.000736 0.002941 0.802000 0.000662 0.002198 0.763000
TDTA 0.238546 0.237437 0.315000 0.365429 0.198310 0.065000
GROWTH 0.000685 0.000614 0.265000 0.000256 0.000267 0.339000
PROFIT -0.000579 0.054212 0.991000 -0.179863 0.147671 0.223000
EFTAX -0.190325 0.103128 0.065000 -0.155731 0.119638 0.193000
CR 0.000280 0.000248 0.258000 -0.000018 0.000182 0.923000
PLR -0.007727 0.006035 0.200000 -0.006682 0.006628 0.313000
WPI 0.000096 0.000580 0.868000 0.000170 0.000628 0.787000
_CONS -0.129525 0.159792 0.418000 0.244191 0.159746 0.126000
Wald Chi 405.15*** 143.09***
Sargan test 8.31E+00 8.546071
AB Test Order 1 -1.0379** -1.1838***
AB Test Order 2 -1.1835 -1.6109
Number of observations = 136 Number of observations = 119
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

242 | P a g e
 The table 4.34 illustrates the result of dynamic panel data for power

sector. LNSA is positive and EFTAX is negativel y significant at 5 percent

and 10 percent respectivel y for GMM (1991). TDTA is positivel y significant

at 10 percent for GMM (1998). The rest of the variables are not significant

for both of the models.

4. 4.2.16 Telecom sector:

Table 4.35 Result of dynamic panel data for telecom sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD -0.0867 0.3033 0.7750 0.3072 0.1584 0.0520
NFADEP 0.0050 0.0077 0.5210 0.0070 0.0038 0.0630
GROWTH 0.0003 0.0003 0.2220 -0.0001 0.0004 0.7920
PROFIT -0.0315 0.0473 0.5050 -0.0304 0.0368 0.4080
CR -0.0039 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0039 0.0009 0.0000
PLR -0.0146 0.0063 0.0210 -0.0119 0.0055 0.0300
_CONS 0.5787 0.2077 0.0050 0.3554 0.1543 0.0210
Wald Chi 126.93*** 7.00E+01***
Sargan test 2.084435 3.18E+00
AB Test Order 1 0.09701*** -1.1865***
AB Test Order 2 0.80138 0.72024
Number of observations = 88 Number of observations = 77
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.35 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for

telecom sector. In case of GMM (1991) CR and PLR are negativel y

243 | P a g e
significant at 1 percent and 5 percent respectivel y. The constant is positivel y

significant at 1 percent other variables are not significant. For the model

GMM (1998) L1.LTDTD, CR and PLR are negativel y significant at 5 percent,

1 percent and 5 percent respectivel y. Constant and NFADEP are positivel y

significant at 5 percent and 10 percent respectivel y. Other variables are not

showing significance.

4. 4.2.17 Textile sector:

Table 4.36 Result of dynamic panel data for textile sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD -1.06526 0.578053 0.065 -1.13143 0.540536 0.036
NFADEP 0.006589 0.004563 0.149 0.00724 0.004694 0.123
GROWTH 0.001332 0.001948 0.494 0.0011 0.001537 0.474
PROFIT 0.663901 0.38694 0.086 0.621031 0.332829 0.062
CR 0.01839 0.006853 0.007 0.019529 0.006808 0.004
PLR 0.006624 0.006275 0.291 0.007256 0.006046 0.23
_CONS 0.735628 0.228854 0.001 0.750452 0.223987 0.001
Wald Chi 29.86 23.59
Sargan test 1.908423 1.718165
AB Test Order 1 1.0977 1.1865
AB Test Order 2 -0.49162 -0.56596
Number of observations = 80 Number of observation = 70
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

The table 4.36 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for

textile sector. PROFIT, CR and constant are positivel y significant at 10

244 | P a g e
percent, 1 percent and 1 percent respectivel y for Both GMM (1991) and

GMM (1998). However L1.LTDTD is negativel y significant at 10 percent for

GMM (1991) and at 5 percent for GMM (1998). Other variables are not

significant.

4.4.2.18 Transport equipment sector:

Table 4.37 Result of dynamic panel data for transport and equipment
sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTDTD 0.713027 0.096790 0.000000 0.509730 0.094244 0.000000
LNSA -0.015262 0.023727 0.520000 -0.036699 0.029829 0.219000
NFADEP 0.006324 0.001618 0.000000 0.004235 0.001564 0.007000
TDTA 0.169302 0.116251 0.145000 0.161750 0.128659 0.209000
GROWTH -0.001392 0.000224 0.000000 -0.001433 0.000294 0.000000
PROFIT -0.607747 0.380629 0.110000 -0.189848 0.461858 0.681000
EFTAX -0.049928 0.036451 0.171000 -0.051069 0.017664 0.004000
CR 0.015135 0.004304 0.000000 0.016140 0.006430 0.012000
PLR -0.013388 0.005701 0.019000 -0.012211 0.006551 0.062000
WPI -0.000863 0.000362 0.017000 -0.000598 0.000466 0.199000
_CONS 0.514090 0.181613 0.005000 0.661378 0.178158 0.000000
Wald Chi 3027.71*** 6543.08***
Sargan test 1.31E+01 13.84393
AB Test Order 1 -2.372** -2.1388***
AB Test Order 2 0.46444 0.14632
Number of observations = 184 Number of observations = 161
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the
K =1
debt maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level
K =1 K =1
equations. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4.
The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against
the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal distribution N(0,1)
and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first
order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of
second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard
deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance.

245 | P a g e
 The Table 4.37 shows the result of d ynamic panel data for Transport

equipment sector. L1.LTDTD, NFADEP, CR and constant are positivel y

significant at 1 percent for each of the variable in the case of GMM (1991).

GROWTH, P LR and WPI are negativel y significant at 1 percent, 5 percent

and 5 percent. L1.LTDTD, NFADEP, CR and constant are positivel y

significant at 1 percent, 1 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectivel y for

GMM (1998). GROWTH, EFTAX and PLR are negativel y significant at 1

percent, 5 percent and 10 percent correspondingl y for GMM (1998). The rest

of the variables are not significant.

4.5 Findings

The stud y has examined the determinants of debt maturit y based o n

agency costs, signalling and liquidit y risks, matching and tax effect theories.

The major findings from the anal ysis are following.

As we have used GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) techniques

we could provide evidence of the past year proportion of long-term debt to

total debts effect on the current year. The result of previous year debt

maturit y (L1.LTDTD) is positivel y determined the sectors like agriculture,

capital goods, FMCG, healthcare, housing related, information technology,

metal, metal products & mining, miscellaneous, oil & gas and transport

equipment. However, the textile sector, it negativel y determined the debt

maturit y. The overall sample also shows previous year debt maturit y is

positivel y determining the level of debt maturit y. It indicates that if a firm

246 | P a g e
has a more long term debt to total debt in the previous year will keep same

level in the current year too or vice versa. But in case of textile sector if

previous year long term debt to total debt ratio is less current year it will be

more or vice versa.

The result of Firm size shows that the sectors such as capital goods,

FMCG and housing related firm size positivel y determines debt maturit y.

However, the chemical & petrochemicals and consumer durables sector, it

negativel y determines the debt maturit y. The overall sample also shows firm

size is positivel y determining the level of debt maturity. Large companies

have more tangible assets makes them to attract more debt. Generall y large

companies keep more debt in their capital. But here sectors like chemical &

petrochemicals and the consumer durables sector is negatively affecting the

size indicates that the sectors more depending on the internal capital in other

words this sector have sufficient internal cash flow to meet their capital

requirements.

At the same time the result of growth opportunit y (GROWTH) says that

healthcare and transport equipment sector positivel y determines debt

maturit y. This is impl ying that the overinvestment issues are important in

these sectors. The overall sample also shows growth opportunity is positivel y

determining the level of debt maturit y. Growth is always leads to capital

requirements. The firms which are having huge internal fund use the internal

capital and if it is not sufficient they have to go for debt.

247 | P a g e
 Coming to the outcome of Liquidit y (CR) the sectors such as capital

goods, FMCG, healthcare, information technology, metal products & mining,

oil & gas, textile and transport equipment liquidit y positivel y determines

debt maturit y. The results impl y that a firm with less current liabilities

emplo yees more long-term debt in its capital structure. It may be that lenders

are concerned about the long-term borrowers when lending for the long term

and thus put high liquidit y requirements in such case. However, the housing

related and telecom sector, it negatively determines the debt maturit y. The

overall sample shows liquidit y is negativel y determining the level of debt

maturit y. This results says that these sectors and overall in India companies

need not require high liquidit y to access long-term debt. It may be due the

high growth opportunit y prevailing in the market.

From the result of Firm’s qualit y (PROFIT) we can say that the sectors

such as oil & gas and textile firm’s qualit y are positivel y determining the

debt maturit y. Therefore, low profit margin leads to more long-term debt and

vice versa in the total debt for these sectors. However, the capital goods

sector, it is negatively determines the debt maturit y. As a result, it confirms

that the capital goods sector attracts high profit margin leads to low level of

long-term debt in the capital structure. The overall sample doesn’t show an y

influence of a firm’s qualit y on debt maturit y.

The result of Leverage ratio says that health care, housing related and

information technology sectors have positivel y determined debt maturit y. Th e

overall sample also shows the leverage ratio is positivel y determining the

level of debt maturity. It is a common factor that leverage is positivel y

248 | P a g e
determining the debt maturit y. It indicates clearl y that firms which are having

a huge amount of assets will go for more long term debt. The positive

significance of leverage and information technology sector is contrary.

Moving asset maturity (NFADEP) the result indicates that sectors such

as information technology, oil & gas, and transport equipment asset maturit y

is positivel y determining debt maturit y. The overall sample overall sample

doesn’t show an y significant influence of asset maturit y on debt maturity. As

a result, we can say that, the sector which shows the positive significance

will have firms with long-term asset maturit y tend to have long-term debt.

Meanwhile the result of effective tax rate (EFTAX) shows agriculture,

capital goods, healthcare, metal, metal products & mining and power

effective tax rate is positivel y determining debt maturit y. On the other hand

housing related and oil & gas it negatively determines the debt maturit y. The

overall sample also shows firm size is negativel y determining the level of

debt maturity. It indicates that the tax shield advantage is inversel y related to

issues of long term debt. In other words, in India the debt market is still

under progress

Moreover Interest rate (P LR) also negativel y determining the debt

maturit y for capital goods, housing related, metal, metal products & mining,

telecom and transport equipment sectors. The overall sample also shows

interest rate is negativel y determining the level of debt maturit y. Therefore,

we conclude that a higher rate of interest leads to low level of debt capital.

249 | P a g e
 Furthermore Inflation (WPI) as well negativel y determining the debt

maturit y for the sector, such as capital goods, housing related, metal, metal

products & mining and oil & gas. The overall sample doesn’t show an y

influence of inflation on debt maturit y. Therefore, high inflation leads to low

leverage. The table 4.38 shows the summary of determinants debt maturit y of

Indian companies.

Table 4.38 Determinants of debt maturity in Indian companies

GMM(1991) GMM(1998)
Negatively Negatively
Positively affecting Positively affecting
Sectors affecting affecting
Previous year debt
Previous year debt
Agriculture Effective tax rate maturity, Growth Effective tax rate
maturity
opportunity
Firm’s quality, Firm’s quality,
Previous year debt Previous year debt
Capital Effective tax rate, Effective tax
maturity, maturity,
Goods Interest rate, rate, Interest
Firm size, Liquidity Firm size, Liquidity
Inflation rate, Inflation
Firm size,
Chemical &
Growth
Petrochemi NA Firm size, NA
opportunity,
cal
Liquidity
Consumer
NA Firm size, NA Firm size,
Durables
Diversified NA NA NA NA
Previous year debt Previous year debt
maturity, Firm size, maturity, Firm size,
FMCG Inflation NA
Leverage ratio, Growth opportunity,
Liquidity Liquidity
Previous year debt
Previous year debt
maturity, Leverage Firm’s quality,
Effective tax rate, maturity, Leverage ratio,
Healthcare ratio, Effective tax
Inflation Growth opportunity,
Growth opportunity, rate, Interest rate
Liquidity
Liquidity
Previous year debt
Previous year debt
maturity, Firm size, Liquidity,
Housing maturity, Firm size, Liquidity, Interest
Leverage ratio ,Effective Interest rate,
Related Leverage ratio rate, Inflation
tax rate, Growth Inflation
,Effective tax rate
opportunity
Previous year debt
Previous year debt
Information maturity Leverage ratio,
NA maturity Leverage ratio, Inflation
Technology Asset maturity,
Asset maturity, Liquidity
Liquidity
Media &
NA NA NA NA
Publishing
Metal, Previous year debt Asset maturity ,
Effective tax
Metal maturity, Firm size, Effective tax rate, Previous year debt
rate, Interest
Products & Leverage ratio, Interest rate, maturity
rate, Inflation
Mining Liquidity Inflation

250 | P a g e
Miscellaneo Previous year debt
NA Interest rate
us maturity
Previous year debt Previous year debt
maturity ,Asset maturity, maturity ,Asset maturity,
Oil & Gas Inflation Inflation
Firm’s quality, Liquidity, Firm’s quality, Liquidity,
Effective tax rate Effective tax rate
Power Firm size Effective tax rate Leverage ratio
Liquidity, Interest Previous year debt Liquidity,
Telecom NA
rate maturity ,Asset maturity Interest rate
Previous year debt Previous year
Textile Firm’s quality, Liquidity Firm’s quality, Liquidity
maturity debt maturity
Previous year debt Previous year debt
Transport maturity ,Asset maturity, Interest rate, maturity ,Asset maturity, Effective tax rate
Equipments Growth opportunity, inflation Growth opportunity, , Interest rate
Liquidity Liquidity

4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter examines the various factors affecting debt maturit y in Indian

companies. With the help of past literature the stud y identified variables

regarding the determinants of debt maturity. The identified variables are the

proxies of the theories such as agency costs, signalling and liquidit y risks,

matching and tax effect theories. GMM 1991 and 1998 tool have been used

as the appropriate technique to measure the debt maturit y in Indian

companies. Overall all sample results show that previous year debt maturit y,

firm size, leverage ratio and growth opportunit y are the factors that directl y

affect the debt maturit y of Indian companies. On the other hand effective tax

rate, liquidit y and interest rate are the factors inversel y affecting the debt

maturit y of Indian companies. The results are having a significant difference

among different sectors (see table 4.38).

251 | P a g e
4.7 Reference

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Datta, Sudip. and Mai Iskandar-Datta. 2000. Debt structure adjustments and

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____________., _________________ and Kartik Raman. 2005. Managerial

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256 | P a g e
 CHAPTER V

GROWTH AND LONG-TERM DEBT

5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Debt Capital to Total Assets and Debt capital to Equity
5.3 Variables and Hypothesis
5.4 Model
5.5 Result and Interpretation
5.6 Findings
5.7 Chapter Summary
5.8 References

5.1 Introduction

Determining the value of the firm is the major factors in financial

decision making. The values of firm grow onl y if there is an element of

growth is present. Growth is the inevitable element in an y investment.

Capital structure theories are developed based on growth aspects of th e

company. During our stud y period (2002-2011) in India almost all sectors

show an extraordinary growth. According to the underinvestment theory, if

growth opportunities are high, a firm should go for more short-term debt. As

per the overinvestment theory long-term debt can help to control the

overinvestment behaviour of management.

There is also a relationship between the degree of previous growth and

future growth. Michaelas et al. (1999) argue that future opportunities will b e

positivel y related to leverage, in particular short term leverage. They argue

that the agency problem and consequentl y the cost of financing are reduced if

the firm issues short-term debt rather than long-term debt. M yers (1977),

257 | P a g e
however, holds the view that firms with growth opportunities will have a

smaller proportion of debt in their capital structure. This is because conflicts

of interest between debt and equit y holders are especiall y serious for assets

that give the firm the option to undertake such growth opportunities in the

future. He argues further that growth opportunities can produce moral hazard

situations and small-scale entrepreneurs have an incentive to take risks to

grow. The benefits of this growth, if realized, will not be enjo yed b y lenders

who will onl y recover the amount of their loans, resulting in a clear agency

problem. This will be reflected in increased costs of long-term debt that can

be mitigated b y the use of short-term debt.

The empirical evidence seems inconclusive. Some researchers found

positive relationships between sales growth and leverage (see Kester, 1986;

Titman and Wessels, 1988; Barton et al., 1989). Other evidence suggests that

higher growth firms use less debt (see Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990;

Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Roden and Lewellen, 1995; Al-Sakran, 2001).

Michaelas et al. (1999) found future growth to be positivel y related to

leverage and long-term debt. Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Hall et al. (2004)

showed positive associations between growth and both long-term debt and

short-term debt ratios, while Chittenden et al. (1996), Jordan et al. (1998),

and Esperança et al. (2003) found mixed evidence. Most of the past literature

is studied the growth opportunit y rather the absolute percentage growth. In

this regard, we have defined the growth as the total percentage growth in

total assets. So the main purpose of the stud y is to examine growth of a

compan y and its dependence on long-term debt.

258 | P a g e
5. 2 The Debt Capital to Total Assets and Debt capital to Equity

To know whether growth in total asset is financed b y debt capital or

equit y capital (equity plus reserve) we have checked

check the absolute value of

total assets in comparison to equit y and debt capital. The detail anal ysis has

been discussed below.

5.2.1
2.1 Sample companies:

Figure 5.1 Sample

S companies

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

The figure 5.1 illustrates the growth in total assets and major capitals

for the sample companies taken as a whole. During the stud y period
perio the total

assets are grown-up

up b y 4.58 times. At the same time the total debt capital

increases b y 3.99 times and the share holder ’s equit y rises b y 4.98 times. Out

of total debt, long-term

term debt is increases b y 3.80 times and short-term
short debt

b y 4.24 times.

259 | P a g e
5.2.2 Agriculture sector:

Figure 5.2 Agriculture sector

Note:the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders’ equity

The figure 5.2 shows the status of growth in total assets, total debt,

long-term debt, short-term

term debt and shareholders’ equit y for the stud y period

of agriculture sector. During the stud y period, total assets are grown-up
grown 3.72

times, total debt capital increases b y 3.35 times and shareholder ’s equit y b y

4.13 times. Out of total debt, long-term

long term debt rises b y 2.60 times and short-
short

term debt grown-up

up b y 4.14 times.

5.2.3
2.3 Capital goods sector:

The figure 5.3 explains the growth in the total assets in comparison to

total debt, shareholders equit y, long-term

long debt and short-term
term debt for capital

goods sector. During the stud y period the total assets are grown as much as

4.84 times. Total debt capital

capit al is increased b y 2.81 times and shareholders’

260 | P a g e
equit y is increased b y 6.30 times. Out of total debt capital long-
long term debt

grown-up
up b y 2.46 times and the short-term
short term debt grown b y 3.27 times.

Figure 5.3 Capital goods sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity..

5.2.4
2.4 Chemical and petrochemicals sector:

Figure 5.4 Chemicals

C & petrochemicals sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

The figure 5.4 shows the growth in total assets and various capitals used to

finance the assets in the chemicals and petrochemicals sector. During the

261 | P a g e
stud y period, total assets are increased b y 2.49 times. Meanwhile the total

debt is raised b y 1.57 times and shareholders’ equit y is increased b y 3.41

times. Out of total debt, long-term

long term debt declined to 0.93 times and short-term
short

debt increases b y 2.62 times.

5.2.5
2.5 Consumer durables sector:

The table 5.5 indicates the comparison of total assets with the various

capitals used to finance the assets for consumer durable sector. During the

stud y period the total assets are grown up b y 12.99 times. However the total

debt is increased b y 10.66 times and shareholders’ equit y b y 16.92 times. Out

of the total debt capital long-term

long term debt capital rises b y 8.29 times and short-
short

term debt capital rises b y 13.60 times.

Figure 5.5 Consumer

C durables sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

262 | P a g e
5. 2.6 Diversified sector:

Figure 5.6 Diversified

D sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

The figure 5.6 shows the growth in total assets and various capitals

used to finance the assets in the diversified sector. During the stud y period,

total assets are increased b y 4.36 times. Meanwhile the total debt is raised b y

4.59 times and shareholders’ equit y is increased b y 4 times. Out of total debt,

long-term
term debt rises b y 4 times and short-term
short term debt increases by 5.32 times.

5.2.7 FMCG sector:

The table 5.7 indicates the comparison of total assets with the various

capitals used to finance the assets for the FMCG sector. During the stud y

period the total assets are grown up b y 3.96 times. However the total debt is

increased b y 6.51 times and shareholders’ equit y b y 3.44 times. Out of the

total debt capital long-term

term debt capital rises b y 8.79 times and short-
short term

debt capital rises b y 4.95 times.

263 | P a g e
 Figure 5.7 FMCG sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

5.2.8 Healthcare sector:

Figure 5.8 Healthcare

H sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

The figure 5.8 explains the growth in total assets and various capitals

used to finance the assets in the healthcare sector. During the stud y period,

total assets are increased b y 6.92 times. Meanwhile the total debt is raised b y

264 | P a g e
6.73 times and shareholders’
shareholder s’ equit y is increased b y 7.32 times. Under the

total debt, the long-term

term debt raised by 6.50 times and short-term
short debt

increased b y 7.02 times.

5 2.9 Housing related sector:

The figure 5.9 indicates the comparison of total assets with the various

capitals
ls used to finance the assets for housing related sector. During the

stud y period the total assets are grown up b y 10.65 times. However the total

debt is increased b y 7.79 times and shareholders’ equit y b y 14.76 times. Out

of the total debt capital long-term

long rm debt capital rises b y 8 times and short-
short

term debt capital rises b y 7.29 times.

Figure 5.9 Housing

H related sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

5. 2.10 Information technology sector:

sector

The figure 5.10 shows the growth in total assets and various capitals

used to finance the assets in the information technology sector. During the

265 | P a g e
stud y period, total assets
ssets are increased b y 8.08 times. Meanwhile the total

debt is raised b y 27.34 times and shareholders’ equit y is increased b y 7.18

times. Out of total debt, long-term

long term debt rises b y 12.34 times and short-term
short

debt increases b y 55.55 times

Figure 5.10 Information

I technology sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

5 .2.11 Media and publishing sector:

sector

Figure 5.11 Media & publishing sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

266 | P a g e
 The table 5.11 indicates the comparison of total assets with the various

capitals used to finance the assets for housing related sector. During the

stud y period the total assets are grown up b y 2.11 times. However the total

debt is increased b y 5.89 times and shareholders’ equit y b y 1.70

1 .70 times. Out of

the total debt capital long-term

long term debt capital rises b y 5.89 times and short-
short

term debt capital rises b y 6.73 times

5.2.12
2.12 Metal, metal products and mining sector:

The figure 5.12 explains the growth in the total assets in comparison to

total
tal debt, shareholders equit y, long-term
long debt and short-term
term debt for metal,

metal products and mining sector. During the stud y period the total assets are

grown as much as 6.79 times. Total debt capital is raised b y 3.74 times and

shareholders’ equit y is increased b y 10.98 times. Out of total debt capital

long- term debt grown-up

up b y 3.25 times and the short-term
short term debt grown b y

4.67 times

Figure 5.12 Metal,

M etal, metal products and mining sector

267 | P a g e
Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

5.2.13
2.13 Miscellaneous sector:
sector

The table 5.13 indicates the comparison of total assets with the various

capitals used to finance the assets for miscellaneous sector. During the stud y

period the total assets are grown up b y 4.28 times. However the total debt is

increased b y 2.84 times and shareholders’ equit y b y 6.27 times. Out of the

total debt capital long-term

term debt capital rises b y 3.27 times
time s and short-
short term

debt capital rises b y 2.45 times.

Figure 5.13 Miscellaneous

M sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

5. 2.14 Oil & gas sector:

The figure 5.14 shows the growth in the total assets in comparison to

total debt, shareholders equit y, long-term

long debt and short-term
term debt for oil and

gas sector. During the stud y period the total assets are grown as much as 3.81

times. Total debt capital is

i s raised b y 3.38 times and shareholders’ equit y is

268 | P a g e
increased b y 4.09 times. Out of total debt capital long-
long term debt grown-up
grown

b y 1.67 times and the short-term

short debt grown b y 4.67 times.

Figure 5.14 Oil

O & gas sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

5. 2.15 Power sector:

Figure 5.15 Power sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

269 | P a g e
The figure 5.15 indicates the comparison of total assets with the various

capitals used to finance the assets for power sector. During the stud y period

the total assets are grown up b y 3.23 times. However the total debt is

increased b y 3.38 times and shareholders’ equit y b y 3.13 times. Out of the

total debt capital long-term

term debt capital rises b y 5.82 times and short-
short term

debt capital
ital rises b y 1.90 times.

5. 2.16 Telecom sector:

Figure 5.16 Telecom sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

The figure 5.16 shows the comparison of total assets with the various

capitals used to finance the assets for telecom sector. During the stud y period

the total assets are grown as much as 4.25 times. Total debt capital is raised

b y 7.22 times and shareholders’

hareholders’ equit y is increased b y 3.39 times. Out of

total debt capital long- term debt grown-up

grown up b y 4.44 times and the short-term
short

debt grown b y 11.68 times.

270 | P a g e
5. 2.17 Textile sector:

The figure 5.17 indicates the comparison of total assets with the various
variou

capitals used to finance the assets for textile sector. During the stud y period

the total assets are grown up b y 3.58 times. However the total debt is

increased b y 3.64 times and shareholders’ equit y b y 3.52 times. Out of the

total debt capital long-term

term debt capital rises b y 6.22 times and short-
short term

debt capital rises b y 2.81 times.

Figure 5.17 Textile sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

5. 2.18 Tr ansport equipment sector:

The figure 5.18 indicates the comparison of total assets with the

various capitals used to finance the assets in the transport equipment

sector. During the stud y period the total assets are grown up b y 4.92

times. However the total debt is increased b y 4.04

4.0 4 times and shareholders’

271 | P a g e
 equit y b y 5.52 times. Out of the total debt capital long-term
long term debt capital

rises b y 3.08 times and short-

short term debt capital rises b y 3.48 times.

Figure 5.18 Transport equipment sector

Note: the figure is a yearly average of the total value. Where TD indicates: total debt, LTD is long-term
debt, STD short-term debt, TA is total assets and SHF is shareholders equity.

5. 3 Variables and Hypothesis

Long-term
term debt (LTD) is taken as depended variable and for examining the

growth and its dependence on long-term

term debt. We have taken the major

internal and external factors affecting growth of a firm in financial point of

view as independent variable.

5.3.1 Internal factors

Firm Size (GTA): Titman and Wessles (1988) indicates that most of the

capital structure theories argue that the t ype of assets owned b y a firm in

some way affects its capital structure choice. Moreover, they said firms with

more tangible assets that can be used as collateral may be expected to issue

272 | P a g e
more debt. Larger firms are more diversified and hence have lower variance

of earnings, making them able to tolerate high debt ratios larger firms are

more diversified and hence have lower variance of earnings, making them

able to tolerate high debt ratios (Castanias, 1983; Wald, 1999). Smaller firms,

on the other hand, may find it relatively more costl y to resolve information

as ymmetries with lenders, thus, may present lower debt ratios (Castanias,

1983). Lenders to larger firms are more likel y to get repaid than lenders to

smaller firms, reducing the agency costs associated with debt. Therefore,

larger firms will have higher debts. Empirical evidence on the relationship

between size and capital structure supports a positive relationship. Several

works show a positive relationship between firm size and leverage (see

Barclay and Smith, 1996; Friend and Lang, 1988; Barton et al., 1989;

Mackie-Mason, 1990; Kim et al., 1998; Al-Sakran, 2001, Hovakimian et al.,

2004). Their results suggest that smaller firms are more likely to use equit y

finance, while larger firms are more likel y to issue debt rather than stock.

Their results showed that the success rate for large firms appl ying for bank

loans was higher than that of smaller firms. We measure the firm size as

growth in total assets (current year total assets subtracted by last year total

assets divided b y the last year total assets). The stud y predicts a positive

relationship between GTA and the issue of long-term debt.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between firm size and long term debt

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between firm size and long term debt

273 | P a g e
Non-debt tax shields (GNDTX): Numerous empirical studies have explored

the impact of taxation on corporate financing decisions in the major

industrial countries. Some are concerned directl y with tax policy, for

example: MacKie-Mason (1990), Shum (1996) and Graham (1999). MacKie-

Mason (1990) studied the tax effect on corporate financing decisions and

provided evidence of substantial tax effect on the choice between debt and

equity. He concluded that changes in the marginal tax rate for an y firm

should affect financing decisions. Titman and Wessles (1988) says that firms

with large non-debt tax shields relative to their expected cash flow include

less debt in their capital structures. We measure the non- debt tax shield as

growth in depreciation to total assets (current year depreciation to total

assets subtracted b y last year depreciation to total assets divided b y the last

year depreciation to total assets). And we are expecting a negative

relationship between GNDTX and the issue of long-term debt.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between non-debt tax shield and long

term debt

H 0 : There is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and long

term debt

Profitabilit y (GROE): The relationship between firm profitabilit y and capital

structure can be explained b y the pecking order theory which holds that firms

prefer internal sources of finance to external sources. The order of the

preference is from the one that is least sensitive (and less risk y) to the one

that is most sensitive (and most risk y) that arise because of as ymmetric

274 | P a g e
information between corporate insiders and less well informed market

participants (M yers, 1984). By this token, profitable firms with access to

retained profits can rel y on them as opposed to depending on outside sources

(debt). Murinde et al. (2004) observe that retentions are the principal source

of finance. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Barton et al. (1989) agree that

firms with high profit rates, all things being equal, would maintain relativel y

lower debt ratios since they are able to generate such funds from internal

sources. We measure the profitabilit y as growth in return on equit y (current

year return on equity subtracted from last year return on equit y divided b y

the last year return on equit y). And we are expecting a negative relationship

between GROE and the issue of long-term debt.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between profitability and long term

debt

H 0 : There is a negative relationship between profitability and long term debt

Firm’s qualit y (GRE): the credit quality of the firm is having a direct

relationship between the debt capitals. We are unable to get the credit rating

of the sample companies so instead of credit rating we have measured firm’s

qualit y b y growth the general reserve (current year reserve subtracted from

the last year reserve divided b y the last year reserve) of the compan y. We are

predicting a negative relation shipment between firm’s quality and issue of

long-term debt.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between firm’s quality and long term

debt

275 | P a g e
H 0 : There is a negative relationship between firm’s quality and long term

debt

5.3.2 External factors:

Under external factors we are considering the economic growth of the

country during the stud y period. The studies measure the economic growth of

the country using the growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at

constant price (current year GDP subtracted b y last year GDP divided b y the

last year GDP). We are predicting a positive relationship between GGDP and

the issue of long-term debt.

H 1 : There is no significant relationship between economic growth and long

term debt

H 0 : There is a positive relationship between economic growth and long term

debt

5. 4 Model:

For the anal ysis GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) has been used. More details

of the models are mentioned in chapter IV. The proposed model for the

anal ysis is given

LTDi*,t = β 0 + δ ( LTDi.t −1 ) + β1 (GTAit ) + β 2 (GROEit ) + β 3 (GREit ) + β 4 (GNDTX it )

+ β 5 (GGDPit ) + η i + eit ,.

Where LTD i*,t is the current year long-term debt?

276 | P a g e
5. 5 Result and Interpretations 3

5.5.1 Sample companies:

The table 5.1 shows the result of d ynamic panel data for the sample

companies taken as a whole. From the results of the Sargan tests, we can

conclude that we can reject the null h ypothesis of instrument validit y, and

consequent restrictions generated, from use of the GMM (1991) and GMM

s ystem (1998) d ynamic estimators respectivel y. However, the results of the

second order autocorrelation tests concerning respectivel y the GMM (1991 )

and GMM s ystem (1998) d ynamic estimators, allow us to conclude that we

cannot reject the null h ypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation.

Therefore, given the validit y of the absence of second order autocorrelation,

but instruments invalidit y we cannot conclude that the GMM (1991) and

GMM s ystem (1998) d ynamic estimators are efficient and robust. In case of

GMM (1991) L1.LTD, L3.LTD, GTA and GGDP is positively significant at 1

percent. L2.LTD and constant are negativel y significant at 1 percent. GRE

and GNDTX are having a negative insignificant coefficient. However GROE

has a positive insignificant coefficient. For the GMM (1998) L1.LTD, GROE,

GRE and GGDP are positivel y significant at 1 percent. But the constant is

negativel y significant at 1 percent. GTA and GNDTX having a positive

insignificant coefficient.

3 In the sector wise analysis we have omitted Consumer durables sector due to the significance of Sargan test.

Significance of Sargan test indicates that the GMM model is not the correct specification for consumer durable
sector.

277 | P a g e
 Table 5.1 Result of dynamic panel least squares for sample companies
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.30381 0.02353 0.00000 1.30445 0.02596 0.00000
L2.LTD -0.24199 0.02515 0.00000 -0.16935 0.02131 0.00000
L3.LTD 0.09627 0.02163 0.00000
GTA 21.23297 4.30972 0.00000 0.00024 0.00146 0.86700
GROE 2.04362 3.26169 0.53100 1.58006 0.03745 0.00000
GRE -4.95565 3.80629 0.19300 0.06895 0.01983 0.00100
GNDTX -1.07019 0.84369 0.20500 0.13389 0.47886 0.78000
GGDP 2067.6220 521.62950 0.00000 2441.49400 608.68220 0.00000
_CONS -152.80610 42.06297 0.00000 -198.38720 54.25940 0.00000
Wald Chi 41978.49*** 6301.49***
Sargan test 36.97419 33.6868
AB Test Order 1 -3.5654*** -3.6713***
AB Test Order 2 0.0534 -0.61171
Number of observations = 1926 Number of observations = 1926
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

5.5.2 Agriculture sector:

The table 5.2 explains the result of d ynamic panel least squares for

agriculture sector. The result of GMM (1991) shows that L1. LTD, GTA,

GROE and GGDP having a positive significant coefficient of 1 percent, 1

percent, 5 percent and 1 percent respectivel y. However, GRE has a negative

coefficient significant at 1 percent. GNDTX and constant are having a

negative insignificant coefficient. The result of GMM (1998) indicates that

278 | P a g e
LI. LTD, GGDEP and constant are positivel y significant at 1 percent. The

GRE is negativel y significant at 1 percent. GTA and GROE are having a

positive insignificant coefficient likewise GNDTX has a negative

insignificant coefficient.

Table 5.2 Result of dynamic panel least squares for agriculture sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 0.878082 0.030040 0.000000 0.494692 0.011069 0.000000
GTA 123.84220 33.047370 0.000000 1.305270 42.888650 0.976000
GROE 5.717627 2.640863 0.030000 0.710572 3.867517 0.854000
GRE -32.44844 14.403660 0.024000 -54.645550 18.278970 0.003000
GNDTX -63.13029 59.705810 0.290000 -62.416110 92.678620 0.501000
GGDP 628.54080 171.34340 0.000000 -930.61740 201.526600 0.000000
_CONS -8.002734 29.592170 0.787000 233.095800 35.170510 0.000000
Wald Chi 56251.02*** 34336.88***
Sargan test 12.7936 9.623704
AB Test Order 1 -1.8209* -1.7664*
AB Test Order 2 1.5652 1.4664
Number of observations = 144 Number of observations = 126
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

5. 5. 3 Capital goods sector:

The table 5.3 indicates the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

capital goods sector. The GMM (1991) result shows that L1 .LTD, GTA and

279 | P a g e
GGDP are having a positive significant coefficient of 1 percent. However

GROE, GRE, GNDTX and constant are having a negative coefficient

significant at 1 percent. The result of GMM (1998) illustrates that LI. LTD,

GTA, GGDEP and constant are positively significant at 1 percent. GROE

and GRE are negativel y significant at 1 percent. GNDTX has a negative

insignificant coefficient.

Table 5.3 Result of dynamic panel data for capital goods sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.06651 0.00008 0.00000 0.80815 0.00016 0.00000
GTA 4.01806 0.05374 0.00000 1.72209 0.18617 0.00000
GROE -8.18920 0.05066 0.00000 -10.09599 0.03738 0.00000
GRE -0.60925 0.03774 0.00000 -0.13088 0.04722 0.00600
GNDTX -0.31149 0.01754 0.00000 -0.02338 0.01921 0.22400
GGDP 965.95690 6.66914 0.00000 35.67802 12.43094 0.00400
_CONS -60.11447 0.65443 0.00000 38.99338 3.70758 0.00000
Wald Chi 3.05E+09*** 1.18E+09***
Sargan test 38.77069 32.26484
AB Test Order 1 -1.7579* -1.7334*
AB Test Order 2 -0.92664 -0.84303
Number of observations = 312 Number of observations = 273
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

280 | P a g e
5. 5.4 Chemical and petrochemical sector:

Table 5.4 Result of dynamic panel least squares for chemicals & petro-
chemicals sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 0.83345 0.23892 0.00000 0.20228 0.12999 0.12000
GTA 162.88050 194.57170 0.40300 -194.69430 277.43970 0.48300
GROE 9.04053 12.08870 0.45500 31.61658 27.32811 0.24700
GRE -7.66135 13.31095 0.56500 -1.75930 2.78430 0.52700
GNDTX 152.82440 163.12940 0.34900 -33.58377 150.78550 0.82400
GGDP 1509.4740 1026.2050 0.14100 1451.21400 616.21740 0.01900
_CONS -122.38560 137.97560 0.37500 16.08626 45.94237 0.72600
Wald Chi 8.17E+02*** 5.92E+02***
Sargan test 3.293482 3.369738
AB Test Order 1 -1.4162 -0.69964
AB Test Order 2 -1.0378 -1.0889
Number of observations = 88 Number of observations = 77
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.4 explains the result of d ynamic panel least squares for

chemical and petrochemical sector. The GMM (1991) result shows that

L1.LTD positivel y significant coefficient at 1 percent. However, in case of

GMM (1998) GGDP is positivel y significant at 5 percent. The rest of the

variables of both the models are insignificant.

281 | P a g e
5. 5.5 Diversified sector:

Table 5.5 Result of dynamic panel least squares for diversified sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 0.91479 0.24920 0.00000 1.09570 0.27439 0.00000
GTA 754.78100 285.63790 0.00800 887.86290 401.10490 0.02700
GROE -11.51953 64.64894 0.85900 -32.99600 93.07626 0.72300
GRE -320.94070 94.20437 0.00100 -224.77290 68.56180 0.00100
GNDTX 170.75790 229.89570 0.45800 125.18530 190.84550 0.51200
GGDP 2252.8300 9153.2160 0.80600 3938.08800 8292.53100 0.63500
_CONS 91.37493 1103.8430 0.93400 -388.81400 871.67410 0.65600
Wald Chi 1.23E+03*** 7.25E+03***
Sargan test 1.609783 1.761829
AB Test Order 1 -3.7814*** -2.3982**
AB Test Order 2 1.3772 1.1629
Number of observations = 64 Number of observations = 56
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.5 indicates the result of dynamic panel least squares of

diversified sector. L1.LTD and GTA are positivel y significant and GRE is

negativel y significant at 1 percent for both GMM (1991) and (1998).

However, other variables are not showing significance.

282 | P a g e
5.5.6 FMCG sector:

The table 5.6 indicates the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

FMCG sector. L1 .LTD and constant are having a positive significant

coefficient at 1 percent for both GMM (1991) and GMM (1998). And GTA,

GROE, GRE and GNDTX are having a significant negative coefficient for

both the model. However GGDP has a negative insignificant coefficient at 1

percent for GMM (1991) and having a negative significant coefficient in case

of GMM (1998) at 1 percent.

Table 5.6 Result of dynamic panel data for FMCG sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 0.97108 0.00329 0.00000 0.69341 0.00293 0.00000
GTA -0.08753 0.01297 0.00000 -0.05898 0.01684 0.00000
GROE -17.25652 3.33677 0.00000 -12.91407 1.84543 0.00000
GRE -4.93609 0.70762 0.00000 -3.42438 0.91374 0.00000
GNDTX -120.21580 4.30087 0.00000 -92.96684 3.36436 0.00000
GGDP -85.22951 135.10960 0.52800 -1798.97900 24.97840 0.00000
_CONS 37.25824 12.72977 0.00300 234.68620 4.75629 0.00000
Wald Chi 2.70E+07*** 5.16E+06***
Sargan test 14.56088 20.76522
AB Test Order 1 -1.4292 -1.435
AB Test Order 2 -0.00346 0.03741
Number of observations = 176 Number of observations = 154
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

283 | P a g e
5.5.7 Healthcare sector:

Table 5.7 Result of dynamic panel data for healthcare sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 0.87532 0.00189 0.00000 0.80779 0.00249 0.00000
GTA 79.73412 11.32903 0.00000 68.58002 4.12771 0.00000
GROE 32.89873 1.45210 0.00000 19.76769 0.95971 0.00000
GRE -120.11690 4.14794 0.00000 -97.99736 4.40407 0.00000
GNDTX -91.49858 8.14117 0.00000 -89.82479 2.52745 0.00000
GGDP 1041.77600 73.09055 0.00000 1222.90100 60.23182 0.00000
_CONS 5.62609 7.07658 0.42700 -20.02831 8.15390 0.01400
Wald Chi 1.21E+07*** 1.19E+07***
Sargan test 28.90168 20.59359
AB Test Order 1 -2.3107** -2.299**
AB Test Order 2 1.6152 1.5946
Number of observations = 232 Number of observations = 203
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.7 explains the result of d ynamic panel least squares for th e

healthcare sector. The GMM (1991) result shows that L1.LTD, GTA, GROE

and GGDP are having a positive significant coefficient at 1 percent for both

GMM (1991) and (1998). However, GRE and GNDTX are having a negative

coefficient significant at 1 percent for both the model. Moreover, constant

has a positive insignificant coefficient for GMM (1991) and a negative

significant coefficient for GMM (1998).

284 | P a g e
5.5.8 Housing related sector:

Table 5.8 Result of dynamic panel data for housing related sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.2829 0.0004 0.0000 1.1988 0.0017 0.0000
GTA 0.9241 0.0090 0.0000 0.5930 0.0083 0.0000
GROE -2.7930 0.0875 0.0000 -1.4978 0.0385 0.0000
GRE 0.0741 0.0004 0.0000 0.0665 0.0003 0.0000
GNDTX 3.7890 0.1463 0.0000 2.7438 0.3462 0.0000
GGDP 7027.8050 156.3472 0.0000 1515.9820 132.5507 0.0000
_CONS -587.9220 11.4418 0.0000 -85.6509 15.1945 0.0000
Wald Chi 8.32E+08*** 7.36E+07***
Sargan test 28.46145 26.80341
AB Test Order 1 -2.0172** -1.9864**
AB Test Order 2 -1.1979 -1.1389
Number of observations = 288 Number of observations = 252
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.8 indicates the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

housing related sector. L1. LTD, GTA, GRE, GNDTX and GGDP are having a

positive significant coefficient of 1 percent. However GROE and constant are

having a negative coefficient significant at 1 percent for both GMM (1991)

and (1998).

285 | P a g e
5.5.9 Information technology sector:

Table 5.9 Result of dynamic panel data for information technology sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 0.697505 0.001352 0.000000 0.640129 0.000828 0.000000
GTA 53.468890 0.995227 0.000000 62.384580 0.603991 0.000000
GROE 0.314967 0.066452 0.000000 0.745131 0.046148 0.000000
GRE 0.282613 0.109781 0.010000 1.229636 0.077687 0.000000
GNDTX -3.317095 0.980432 0.001000 -4.605008 0.444144 0.000000
GGDP 4.579386 20.53701 0.824000 -338.013300 8.220112 0.000000
_CONS 10.282030 2.159732 0.000000 34.346080 1.844303 0.000000
Wald Chi 1.10E+07*** 1.70E+08***
Sargan test 23.22158 20.73522
AB Test Order 1 -1.8303* -1.8197*
AB Test Order 2 1.178 1.1933
Number of observations = 192 Number of observations = 168
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.9 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

information technology sector. L1.LTD, GTA, GRE and constant are having a

positive significant coefficient of 1 percent. However GNDTX has a negative

coefficient significant at 1 percent for both GMM (1991) and (1998).

Moreover GGDP has a positive insignificant coefficient for GMM (1991) and

negative significant coefficient for GMM (1998).

286 | P a g e
5.5.10 Media & publishing sector:

The table 5.10 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

media and publication sector. Except GGDP for GMM (1998) has a positive

significant coefficient at 10 percent, none of the other variables have

significant effect for both models.

Table 5.10 Result of dynamic panel data for media& publications sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.4972 0.9953 0.1330 2.9446 2.7799 0.2890
GTA -3127.7340 4806.5100 0.5150 100.9102 70.6270 0.1530
GROE -23.6506 82.2192 0.7740 11.1537 22.2340 0.6160
GRE 1765.0000 2103.6670 0.4010 199.8564 221.0225 0.3660
GNDTX -125.4852 193.6185 0.5170 145.8190 136.1284 0.2840
GGDP 9698.5360 11340.240 0.3920 4256.7370 2510.6230 0.0900
_CONS 12.1571 528.2145 0.9820 -669.5051 523.0259 0.2010
Wald Chi 3.49E+03*** 2.58E+02***
Sargan test 5.70E-18 8.88E-22
AB Test Order 1 -0.22015 -1.1971
AB Test Order 2 0.13821 -0.76312
Number of observations = 56 Number of observations = 49
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

287 | P a g e
5.5.11 Metal, metal products & mining sector:

Table 5.11 Result of dynamic panel least squares for metal, metal
products & mining sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.27677 0.00708 0.00000 1.15916 0.00473 0.00000
GTA 142.70520 42.78347 0.00100 114.72030 11.58863 0.00000
GROE 6.96523 7.11606 0.32800 3.11562 5.44412 0.56700
GRE 99.36267 7.60235 0.00000 64.98439 2.34220 0.00000
GNDTX 13.45497 9.90668 0.17400 -4.27419 4.18228 0.30700
GGDP 6905.5140 530.1256 0.00000 6651.63300 268.37970 0.00000
_CONS -742.10270 64.52154 0.00000 -591.06910 26.78939 0.00000
Wald Chi 9.86E+06*** 3.20E+07***
Sargan test 2.18E+01 1.99E+01
AB Test Order 1 -2.0785** -1.9352*
AB Test Order 2 -0.04309 0.33846
Number of observations = 208 Number of observations = 182
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.11 shows the result of d yna mic panel least squares for the

metal, metal products and mining sector. L1.LTD, GTA, GRE and GGDP are

having a positive significant coefficient of 1 percent. However, constant has

a negative coefficient significant at 1 percent for both GMM (1991) and

(1998). The rest of the variables are not showing significance.

288 | P a g e
5. 5.12 Miscellaneous sector:

Table 5.12 Result of dynamic panel data for miscellaneous sector

GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 0.73116 0.10489 0.0000 0.28235 0.02117 0.00000
GTA 124.12130 137.77150 0.3680 245.64820 205.92520 0.23300
GROE -9.32465 35.72787 0.7940 125.79990 161.38080 0.43600
GRE -78.71354 39.97805 0.0490 -216.05020 166.96140 0.19600
GNDTX 22.74308 18.03418 0.2070 -81.19038 100.04260 0.41700
GGDP 276.14960 801.89360 0.7310 1062.29500 1597.18500 0.50600
_CONS 31.08898 23.64584 0.1890 70.74780 92.25527 0.44300
Wald Chi 1.39E+04*** 9.07E+03***
Sargan test 4.97E+00 5.46E+00
AB Test Order 1 -1.2528 -0.91425
AB Test Order 2 0.51317 -0.36672
Number of observations = 96 Number of observations = 84
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.12 shows the result of dynamic panel least squares for the

miscellaneous sector. L1.LTD has a positive significant coefficient for both

GMM models. However, GRE has a negative significant coefficient at 5

percent level for GMM (1991) and has a negative insignificant coefficient for

GMM (1998). The remaining variables are not showing significance.

289 | P a g e
5. 5.13 Oil & gas sector:

Table 5.13 Result of dynamic panel least squares for oil & gas sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 0.89666 0.00202 0.00000 0.59670 0.00204 0.00000
GTA 895.75500 130.26670 0.00000 595.49500 31.36334 0.00000
GROE 102.19320 1.00651 0.00000 143.85880 0.60231 0.00000
GRE -58.89724 11.62822 0.00000 -103.50560 10.99268 0.00000
GNDTX -10.89008 0.15929 0.00000 -4.80552 0.08088 0.00000
GGDP 636.63550 501.42910 0.20400 -4701.7730 154.50530 0.00000
_CONS 10.22551 76.60378 0.89400 762.75150 56.08099 0.00000
Wald Chi 1.04E+07*** 5.25E+07***
Sargan test 1.83E+01 1.49E+01
AB Test Order 1 -1.7227* -1.6591*
AB Test Order 2 -0.64742 -0.79702
Number of observations = 160 Number of observations = 140
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.13 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

Oil and gas sector. L1.LTD, GTA and GROE are having a positive significant

coefficient of 1 percent. GRE and GNDTX have a negative coefficient

significant at 1 percent for both GMM (1991) and (1998). However GGDP

has a positive insignificant coefficient for GMM (1991) and a negative

significant coefficient at 1 percent level for GMM (1998). Similarl y, constant

290 | P a g e
is not significant at GMM (1991) but showing positive significant at 1

percent for GMM (1998).

5. 5.14 Power sector:

Table 5.14 Result of dynamic panel least squares for power sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.1979 0.0030 0.0000 1.119 0.002 0.000
GTA 11.9531 7.7065 0.1210 25.734 49.892 0.606
GNDTX 21.7031 40.4940 0.5920 108.008 20.839 0.000
GGDP -8680.1690 207.4292 0.0000 -5608.509 250.676 0.000
_CONS 637.8854 59.3839 0.0000 585.169 61.072 0.000
Wald Chi 1.03E+07*** 1.84E+06***
Sargan test 9.72E+00 1.17E+01
AB Test Order 1 -1.6255 -1.5246
AB Test Order 2 -0.18966 -0.20548
Number of observations = 136 Number of observations = 119
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.14 explains the result of dynamic panel least squares for

the power sector. L1.LTD and constant are having a positive significant

coefficient of 1 percent. GGDP have a negative coefficient significant at 1

percent for both GMM (1991) and (1998). However GNDTX has a positive

insignificant coefficient for GMM (1991) and a positive significant

coefficient at 1 percent level for GMM (1998)

291 | P a g e
5 5.15 Telecom sector:

Table 5.15 Result of dynamic panel least squares for telecom sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.036 0.031 0.000 0.835 0.021 0.000
L2.LTD -0.120 0.117 0.305 -0.044 0.011 0.000
GTA 30.902 19.893 0.120 20.371 19.432 0.294
GNDTX 31.117 0.574 0.000 29.317 0.647 0.000
GGDP -14098.650 3934.073 0.000 -13159.290 1938.121 0.000
_CONS 1075.289 775.711 0.166 1297.011 163.394 0.000
Wald Chi 3.63E+03 3.24E+03
Sargan test 4.81E+00 6.80E+00
AB Test Order 1 -1.9884** -2.022**
AB Test Order 2 -1.4167 -1.2974
Number of observations = 77 Number of observations = 66
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.15 indicates the result of d ynamic panel least squares for

the telecom sector. To avoid the significance of Sargan test for telecom

sector, we have used two lags. Similarl y, it shows the presence of

autocorrelation, we have omitted two variables as GROE and GRE. L1.LTD

and GNDTX are having a positive significant coefficient of 1 percent. And

GGDP have a negative coefficient significant at 1 percent for both GMM

(1991) and (1998). However L2.LTD has a negative insignificant coefficient

for GMM (1991) and a negative significant coefficient at 1 percent level for

292 | P a g e
GMM (1998). Similarl y, constant is not significant for GMM (1991) but it is

positivel y significant 1 percent for GMM (1998). Other variables are not

showing significance.

5.5.16 Textile sector:

Table 5.16 Result of dynamic panel least squares for textile sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.1737 0.0644 0.0000 1.0120 0.0393 0.0000
GTA 1062.7000 525.3810 0.0430 284.9373 608.0392 0.6390
GROE -48.8862 38.4375 0.2030 -25.5274 16.7661 0.1280
GRE -255.9894 101.6558 0.0120 -101.9201 95.7993 0.2870
GNDTX 188.1311 279.1447 0.5000 -19.0815 266.3058 0.9430
GGDP 1068.0180 2278.0870 0.6390 1213.8850 1557.2350 0.4360
_CONS -355.5528 208.8153 0.0890 -26.60814 576.3842 0.963
Wald Chi 1.24E+04*** 11719.5900***
Sargan test 3.27E+00 4.354045
AB Test Order 1 -1.7105* -1.615*
AB Test Order 2 1.5384 1.6054
Number of observations = 80 Number of observations = 77
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.16 explains the result of dynamic panel least squares for

textile sector. The result of GMM (1991) shows L1. LTD and GTA have a

positive significant coefficient of 1 percent and 5 percent respectivel y.

However, GRE and constant are having a negative coefficient significant at 5

293 | P a g e
percent and 10 percent respectivel y. The result of GMM (1998) indicates that

LI. LTD is positivel y significant at 1 percent. The remaining variables are not

showing significance.

5. 5.17 Transport Equipment:

Table 5.17 Result of dynamic panel least squares for transport equipment
sector
GMM 1991 GMM1998
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Prob. Coefficient Std. Error Prob.
L1.LTD 1.0749 0.0009 0.0000 0.8151 0.0128 0.0000
GTA 414.1197 32.7596 0.0000 373.3251 23.1129 0.0000
GROE 6.9530 1.9429 0.0000 7.1986 0.8165 0.0000
GRE -235.1975 32.6433 0.0000 -253.8758 22.0983 0.0000
GNDTX -12.3998 6.4550 0.0550 -6.8523 7.6173 0.3680
GGDP 2177.6090 168.8918 0.0000 -460.7188 129.4133 0.0000
_CONS -179.5196 15.2309 0.0000 113.9532 16.6929 0.0000
Wald Chi 5.71E+06*** 7.59E+06***
Sargan test 1.95E+01 1.63E+01
AB Test Order 1 -1.3186 -1.3338
AB Test Order 2 -0.87381 -1.0032
Number of observations = 184 Number of observations = 161
n
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in which Z k ,i ,t − 2 are the debt
K =1
maturity determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are
n n
( LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the first difference equations, and ( ∆LTDi ,t − 2 , ∑ ∆Z k ,i ,t − 2 ), in the level equations. 3.
K =1 K =1
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the
explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory
variables. 4. The Sargan test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments
used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The AB Test Order 1 test has normal
distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of
existence of first order autocorrelation. 6. The AB Test Order 2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null
hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order
autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; *
significant at 10% significance.

The table 5.17 shows the result of d ynamic panel least squares for the

transport equipment sector. L1.LTD, GTA, GROE and GDP are having a

positive significant coefficient of 1 percent. At the same time GRE and

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constant has a negative coefficient significant at 1 percent for both GMM

(1991) and (1998). However GNDTX has negative significant coefficient for

GMM (1991) and negative insignificant coefficient for GMM (1998).

5.6 Findings

The Stud y has investigated the growth and its dependence on long-term

debt capital using the internal and external factors affects growth. From the

result of the anal ysis we are concluding that firm size (GTA) is positivel y

determining the long-term debt for capital goods, consumer durables,

diversified, healthcare, housing related, information technology, metal, metal

products & mining, oil & gas and transport equipment sectors. However the

FMCG sector, it is negativel y determined the long-term debt. The overall

sample is not showing significance. It is evident from the past studies that

the firms which are having huge amount of fixed assets will go for more

long-term debt. Generall y FMCG sector will have sufficient internal cash

flow, therefore, depend more or internal fund for capital investment purpose.

That may be the reason for negative significance.

At the same time the variable profitabilit y (GROE) is positivel y

determining the long-term debt in sectors such as healthcare, information

technology, oil & gas and transport equipment. These are the very sensitive

sectors in Indian scenario. Still, there is expecting a huge growth. Therefore,

growth in return on equit y will directl y influence these sectors to go for more

long–term debt. Because the internal cash flow may not be sufficient to cover

the growth. However the capital goods, FMCG and housing related sectors it

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negativel y determines the long-term debt. Because these sectors depend more

on internal cash flow. The overall sample is not showing significance.

The result of a firm’s qualit y (GRE) specifies that the sectors like

housing related, information technology and metal, metal products & mining

firm’s qualit y is positivel y determining the long-term debt. The firms in

these sectors have enormous internal reserve so they can easil y avail long

term debt. However, agriculture, capital goods, diversified, FMCG,

healthcare, oil & gas and transport equipment sectors it negativel y

determines the long-term debt. Because of massive growth potential in these

sectors in the country makes these firms to avail long-term debt without

much credibilit y. The overall sample is not showing significance.

The result of non- debt tax shield (GDEPTA) indicates that the sector,

such as housing related, power and telecom, non-debt tax shield is positivel y

determining the long-term debt. These are the sectors usuall y charge a high

percentage of depreciation. Therefore, this depreciation contributes the

credibilit y of the firms and makes them to attract more long- term debt.

Moreover, these sectors usuall y have more tangible fixed assets help them to

attract more long-term debt. However, FMCG, healthcare, information

technology oil & gas and transport equipment sectors it negativel y

determines the long-term debt. As a result, these sectors are using the

internal cash flow for their capital requirements. The overall sample is not

showing significance.

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Table 5.18 Findings of determinants of growth and long-term debt capital
GMM(1991) GMM(1998)
Sectors
Positively affecting Negatively affecting Positively affecting Negatively affecting
Previous year long
Agricult term debt, firm size, Previous year long Firms quality ,
Firms quality
ure profitability and term debt economic growth
economic growth
Previous year long Firms quality Previous year long
Capital Firms quality,
term debt, firm size ,profitability, non-debt term debt, firm size
Goods Profitability
and economic growth tax shield and economic growth
Chemica
l& Previous year long
NA Economic growth NA
Petroche term debt
mical
Consum Previous year long
Previous year long Profitability
er NA term debt, firm size
term debt, firm size
Durables and economic growth
Diversifi Previous year long Previous year long
Firms quality Firms quality
ed term debt, firm size term debt, firm size
Firm size, firms
Firm size, firms quality
Previous year long Previous year long quality ,profitability,
FMCG ,profitability, non-debt
term debt term debt non-debt tax shield,
tax shield
economic growth
Previous year long Previous year long
Healthca term debt, Firm size, Firms quality, non-debt term debt, Firm size, Firms quality, non-
re profitability, tax shield profitability, debt tax shield
economic growth economic growth
Previous year long Previous year long
term debt, term debt,
Housing firm size, firms firm size, firms
Profitability Profitability
Related quality, non-debt tax quality, non-debt tax
shield, economic shield, economic
growth growth
Previous year long
Informat Previous year long
term debt, firm size,
ion term debt,
Non-debt tax shield profitability, firms Non-debt tax shield,
Technolo firm size, firms
quality, economic
gy quality, profitability
growth
Metal, Previous year long Previous year long
Metal term debt, term debt,
Products firm size, firms NA firm size, firms
& quality, profitability, quality, economic NA
Mining economic growth growth
Miscella Previous year long Previous year long
Firms quality,
neous term debt term debt
Previous year long Previous year long Firms quality, non-
Oil & Firms quality,
term debt, firm size, term debt, debt tax shield,
Gas non-debt tax shield,
profitability firm size, profitability economic growth
Previous year long Previous year long
Power term debt, Economic growth term debt, Economic growth
non-debt tax shield non-debt tax shield
Previous two year
Previous year long Previous year long
long term debt,
Telecom term debt, Economic growth term debt,
Economic growth
non-debt tax shield non-debt tax shield
Previous year long Previous year long
Textile Firms quality NA
term debt, term debt,

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 firm size
Previous year long
Transport Previous year long
term debt, Firms quality, non-debt Firms quality,
Equipme term debt,
firm size, profitability, tax shield, economic growth
nts firm size, profitability
economic growth

The outcome of the external factors, economic growth (GGDP) specify

that agriculture, capital goods, healthcare, housing related, metal, metal

products & mining and transport equipment are positivel y determining the

long-term debt. However power and textile sectors it negativel y determines

the long-term debt. The overall sample is showing positive significance.

Economic growth contributes to all the sectors and makes the firms in the

particular sectors able get external finance. Moreover, countries’ economic

growth induces the growth of the financial sector too.

However, the previous year long-term debt state that the sectors such

as agriculture, capital goods, consumer durables, diversified, FMCG,

healthcare, housing related, information technology, metal, metal products &

mining, miscellaneous, oil & gas, power, telecom, textile and transport

equipment previous year long-term debt is positivel y determining the current

year long-term debt. The overall sample showing previous year long-term

debt is positivel y determined the current year long-term debt. Hence we

conclude that the firms take long-term debt based on the debt capital at

present they have.

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5.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter evaluates the growth and its dependents on long-term debt. For

that the stud y identified the internal (firm size, profitabilit y, firms qualit y,

non-debt tax shield) and external factors (growth in Gross domestic products)

that affect the growth. GMM 1991 and GMM 1998 techniques have been used

for the anal ysis. The level of previous year long-term debt is directl y

influencing the current year long-term debt. However, previous two year

long-term debt is inversel y affected the current year long-term debt. The

result of overall sample is not similar among the models GMM 1991 and

GMM 1998. But among the sectors there are some common factors (see table

5.18).

5.8 Reference

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corporate tax s ystem: the case of non-financial publicly traded

corporation in Saudi Arabia, Managerial Finance, 27(10-11), 58-86.

Barclay, Michael J and Clifford W. Smith. 1996. On financial architecture:

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Castanias, Richard. 1983. Bankruptcy risk and optimal capital structure.

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Esperança, Jose Paulo., Ana Paula Matias Gama and Mohamed Azzim

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decisions?. Journal of Public Economics, 73(2), 41–73.

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policy in U.K. small firms. Journal of Business Finance and

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 CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

6.1 Conclusion

In this stud y, we examined the issues associated with debt capital

among the selected listed companies in India. The major focus of the stud y is

to examine how does Indian companies are appl ying various theories to

manage their debt capital. The stud y has dealt four major issues, namel y debt

structure, choice of debt capital, determinants of debt maturit y and the

relation between growth and long term debt. The financial data for the stud y

have been collected from a Capital line database for a period of ten years

from March 2002-2011March. We have examined the objectives, appl ying the

various statistical tools like quantile regression, panel data fixed and random

effects and GMM 1991 and 1998. Moreover, simple percentage and average

also have been used for anal ysis.

For the first step of our anal ysis was on the trend line of debt capital

structure. The result of a trend anal ysis shows that the total debt capital of

Indian companies has grown up significantl y during the stud y period.

However the growth in debt capital in comparison to equit y capital is less. It

confirms that Indian companies are following pecking order theory. i.e., when

there is a need for capital, first they will prefer internal capital, and then if

necessary will choose debt capital. In other words, we can say that Indian

companies are trying to keep debt as minimum as possible. However, there is

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a slight change over the period that Indian companies also moving towards

debt capital.

After examining the trend we moved to find the major factors affecting

debt capital using quantile regression anal ysis. From the overall anal ysis we

can say that the firms which are having low level (quantile 0.25) of debt

capital are directl y related to size, creditworthiness and economic growth. It

is inversel y related to non-debt tax shield and debt capacity. Thus we can

conclude that for this quantile Indian firms are following pecking order

theory. According to the pecking order theory profitable firms generall y

borrow less; not because they have low target debt ratios but they don’t need

outside money. Less profitable firms issue debt because they do not have

internal fund sufficient for their capital investment. The relationship between

tangible fixed assets and debt financing is related to the maturit y structure of

the debt. In such a situation, the level of tangible fixed assets may help firms

to obtain more long-term debt, but the agency problems may become more

severe with the more tangible fixed assets, because the information revealed

about future profit is less in these firms. If this is the case, then it is likel y to

find a negative relationship between tangible fixed assets and debt ratio.

The firm, which are having average level (quantile 0.50) of debt

capital as well as high level (quantile 0.75) of debt capital is directl y related

to size, creditworthiness, FDI, economic growth and inversel y related to non-

debt tax shield and debt capacity. The cost of issuing debt and equit y is

negativel y related to firm size. In addition, larger firms are often diversified

and have more stable cash flows, and so the probabilit y of bankruptcy for

305 | P a g e
larger firms is less, relative to smaller firms. This suggests that size could be

positivel y related with leverage. The positive relationship between size and

leverage is also viewed as support of as ymmetric information. Larger size

firms enjo y economies of scale and creditworthiness in issuing long term debt

and have bargaining power over creditors. The tax trade-off model predicts

that profitable firms will emplo y more debt since they are more likel y to have

a high tax burden and low bankruptcy risk. Also, profitable firms are more

capable of tolerating more debt since they may be in a position to service

their debt easil y and on time. Profitable firms are more attractive to financial

institutions as lending prospects; therefore they can always take on more debt

capital. So we can conclude firms having good amount of sales and has

sufficient internal cash flow and retained earnings will go for high amount of

debt capital.

The firm, which has a very high level (quantile 0.95) of debt capital, is

directl y related to size, creditworthiness, FDI and economic growth. Thus,

the firm having high amount of sales and sufficient retained earnings will go

for very high debt.

So in general the level of debt capital is directl y related to leverage, size,

credit worthiness and inversel y related to asset structure and non-debt tax

shield. Moreover, it is direl y related to the macroeconomic variable like FDI

and economic growth.

After understanding which are the major factors affecting the debt

capital we moved to examine the choice of different debt capital b y the

306 | P a g e
Indian firms. The result indicates that the Indian companies are managing

their debt capital keeping more of unsecured debt in the total debt capital

than secured debt. It confirms that Indian companies managing their capital

requirements using more short-term debt than long-term debt. The sectors

such as agriculture, capital goods, chemical& petrochemicals, information

technology, media & publishing, oil & gas and transport equipment are using

short-term debt more than long-term debt. Moreover, total sample companies

also show the same (see chapter IV table 1-20). However, Indian companies

are managing their debt structure, keeping a trade off between secured and

unsecured debt as well as short-term and long-term debt.

It is also observed that the Indian corporate sector is managing their

debt requirements depending on commercial banks. Commercial banks are the

major contributor of debt capital in various ways as long- term secured loan

as well as short-term unsecured loans. Debenture and bonds are the second

major contributor. It is found that leverage, size, creditworthiness,

profitabilit y, foreign direct investment and economic growth, directl y

determines the level of debt capital. However, asset structure, debt capacit y

and non-debt tax shield negativel y determines the level of debt capital in

Indian companies.

It confirms that the Indian debt market is still untapped. The nature of

Indian banks may be a reason for companies to choose banks as their major

choice. Banks in India are governed and controlled b y central government. So

in case companies incurred loss or they are not repaying the loan amount

there a chance to write-off the loan amount.

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 The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) highlighted the need to reduce

the dominance of the banking s ystem in financing, corporate sector b y

developing a good corporate bond market. India’s infrastructure funding

requirements (estimated at around 10 per cent of GDP annually) need a robust

corporate bond market for diversifying risk, enhancing financial stabilit y, and

for better matching of risk-return preferences of the borrowers. Historically,

India’s financial s ystem has been bank-dominated, supplemented b y the

Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). However, the financial s ystem has

undergone several changes during the recent years and DFIs have been

converted into banks. Commercial banks, b y nature, are not able to fill the

gap in long-term finance, given the asset-liabilit y management issues.

A well-developed corporate bond market is critical for the Indian

econom y as it (i) enables efficient allocation of funds, (ii) facilitates

infrastructure financing, (iii) improves the health of the corporate balance

sheets, (iv) promotes financial inclusion for the Small and Medium

Enterprises (SMEs) and the retail investors, (v) safeguards financial stabilit y

and (vi) enables development of the municipal bond market. Accordingl y,

development of the corporate bond market has been high on the agenda for

the regulators.

A well-developed corporate bond market provides additional avenues to

corporate for raising funds in a cost effective manner and reduces reliance of

corporate on bank finance. A deep and liquid debt market augments financial

savings and helps match the savers to the borrowers in an efficient manner.

308 | P a g e
By enlarging the financial sector, capital markets promote innovation in

financial instruments. In addition, it instils discipline in behaviour of firms

leading to increased efficiency of the system. The existence of a well-

functioning bond market can lead to the efficient pricing of credit risk as

expectations of all bond market participants are incorporated into bond

prices. In order to achieve the objective, it is desirable to have diversified

issuer and investor base. Issuer profile in India, however, is concentrated

among a few categories of market participants dominated b y financial sector

firms, including banks, Non-Banking, Financial Companies (NBFCs),

financial institutions, housing finance companies (HFCs) and Primary

Dealers (PDs) (81 per cent) while other non-finance corporate account for

onl y 19 per cent of total issuances made in 2011-12. Similarl y, on the demand

side, the majorit y of investment are made b y banks and institutions, including

Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) with very little or negligible part played

b y retail investors. Thus, there is an urgent need to further develop the Indian

corporate debt market.

The Committee on Infrastructure Financing (Chairman: Shri Deepak

Parekh) has estimated that 51.46 trillion would be required for infrastructure

development during the 12th Five Year Plan (2012-17) and that 47 per cent of

the funds could come through the public private partnership route. If we add

the potential financing needs for upgrading our railways, urban and rural

infrastructure, the financing needs could be much larger. As much as the

government security market development has provided a boost to the

development of the corporate bond market, the municipal bond market could

309 | P a g e
derive similar benefits from a well-developed corporate bond market. This

would provide a boost in financing the urban infrastructure in an assured and

sustainable manner. In this context, it is important to note that government of

India’s capital expenditure remained stagnant during the last two years at

around 13 per cent. Hence, the role of private sector assumes greater

importance in the context of infrastructure development.

Corporate debt can provide our Small and medium enterprises (SMEs)

with an avenue for sourcing funds. Since this would require rating and would

result in greater external scrutin y, it would help SMEs become more

transparent and follow proper accounting, governance and disclosure

practices. It would also increase their understanding of this important market

for sourcing funds in addition to banks and other alternative funding options.

It is expected that Chambers of Commerce and SME associations would tak e

this up on a priorit y basis so that our SMEs too could access the corporate

debt market in the coming years as has been the experience in the US, Europe

and some Asian countries. This would also go a long way in fulfilling our

financial inclusion objectives for the SMEs, most of whom, as we know, do

not have access to the formal financial sector. Corporate debt can also

provide an excellent long term investment avenue for retail investors, who

lack knowledge and understanding of this important asset class. One hopes

that, market bodies, such as, the Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives

Association of India (FIMMDA), the Primary Dealer Association of India

(PDAI), etc. together with the stock exchanges take up the task of spreading

awareness with all sincerit y that it deserves. This is very relevant as Indian

310 | P a g e
households have one of the highest savings rate in the world, but the

household wealth in India is generall y parked in bank deposits, gold and real

estate with almost negligible investment in corporate bonds. If retail

investors prefer to invest in shares of certain companies, there should be no

reason wh y they should be hesitant to also consider investing in its debt.

Various financial crises have highlighted that even well regulated,

supervised, capitalized and managed banking s ystems may have limitations in

mitigating financial vulnerabilities. The crises have underscored that the

banking s ystems cannot be the predominant source of long-term investment

capital without making an econom y vulnerable to external shocks. Alan

Greenspan had argued that bond markets could act like a “spare t yre”,

substituting for bank lending as a source of corporate funding at times when

banks’ balance sheets are weak and banks are rationing credit. The capital

inflows to the country through ECBs, while helping the country fund the

current account deficits and corporate to raise resources at a lower cost,

could become a source of the transmission of severe external shocks to the

domestic econom y. Therefore, it is important to develop the domestic

corporate bond market to enable corporates to meet a substantial part of their

funds requirement domesticall y. Further, credit flow to infrastructure sector

b y banks has grown manifold in the last few years. There is, however, a risk

of exposure attached to banks with such long term financing considering

ALM mismatch. Moreover, the banks’ abilit y to withstand stress is critical,

especiall y in the context of the recent increase in banks’ non-performing

assets on account of their exposure to the infrastructure sector. Bond markets

also aids financial stabilit y b y spreading credit risks across the econom y and

311 | P a g e
thereb y shielding the banking sectors in times of stress. Further, a well-

developed bond market can also help banks raise funds to strengthen their

balance-sheets. Viewed in the above context, a vibrant debt market is critical

to meet the funding requirement for the infrastructure sector. Hence, going

forward, there is a need to increase the reliance on the corporate bond

financing so as to reduce macro-economic vulnerabilit y to shocks and

mitigate s ystemic risks.

After anal ysing the debt choice we moved to examine the determinants

of the debt maturit y structure of Indian companies. Using GMM 1991 and

GMM 1998 we have examined the debt maturit y. The debt maturit y literature

has established that the corporate debt maturit y decisions are determined b y

agency cost h ypothesis, signalling h ypothesis, liquidit y risk h ypothesis

matching h ypothesis and tax h ypothesis. The major factors affecting the debt

maturit y of Indian companies are; previous year debt maturity, firm’s size,

leverage ratio and growth opportunit y. On the other hand effective tax rate,

liquidit y and interest rate are the factors inversel y affecting the debt maturit y

of Indian companies. The results say that previous year debt maturit y is

positivel y determining the level of debt maturit y. It indicates that if a firm

has more long term debt to total debt in the previous year will keep same

level in the current year too or vice versa. But in case of textile sector if

previous year long term debt to total debt ratio is less current year it will be

more or vice versa. The positive significance of firm’s size confirms that

Large companies have more tangible assets makes them to attract more debt.

Therefore, generall y large companies keep more debt in their capital. But

312 | P a g e
here sectors like chemical & petrochemicals and the consumer durables sector

is negativel y affecting the size indicates that the sectors more depending on

the internal capital in other words, this sector has sufficient internal cash

flow to meet their capital requirements It confirms that large companies will

go for more long-term debt in the total debt, i.e., it holds the liquidit y theory.

Moreover, firms having a high growth opportunit y will also go for long-term

debt, confirms the agency cost theory of overinvestment. Growth opportunit y

is positivel y determined debt maturit y impl y that the overinvestment issues

are important in Indian companies. Growth is always leads to capital

requirements. The firms which are having huge internal fund use the internal

capital and if it is not sufficient they have to go for debt. The positive

significances of leverage ratio are a common factor, that leverage is

positivel y determining the debt maturit y. It indicates clearl y that firms which

are having a huge amount of assets will go for more long term debt. The

positive significance of leverage and information technology sector is

contrary.

Liquidit y, effective tax rate and interest rate are negativel y

determining the debt maturit y of Indian companies. The negative

relationship between liquidit y and debt maturit y in the Indian context has to

check further. It is not supporting the liquidit y theories. The results of

liquidit y impl y that a firm with less current liabilities employees more long-

term debt in its capital structure. It may be that lenders are concerned about

the long-term borrowers when lending for the long term and thus put high

liquidit y requirements in such case. However, the housing related and

313 | P a g e
telecom sector, it negativel y determines the debt maturit y. The overall sample

shows liquidit y is negativel y determining the level of debt maturit y. This

results says that these sectors and overall in India companies need not require

high liquidit y to access long-term debt. It may be due the high growth

opportunit y prevailing in the market. The statisticall y significant and

negative coefficient on effective tax rate strongl y supports the tax h ypothesis

that debt maturit y inversel y relates to the tax rate. The upward trend in the

corporate tax rate and high volatilit y in tax rate across the firms reveal that

there exists a complex tax regime and the Indian corporates are subject to

high rates of taxation. However, the high corporate tax rate offers immense

options to increase interest tax shield and maximize the market value of the

firms b y recapitalize with appropriate debt maturity. The interest rate is

negativel y related to debt maturit y. It support that if the rate of interest is

low companies will prefer more long-term debt.

At the last step of our anal ysis, we have examined the dependence

between long-term debt and growth with the help of GMM 1991 and GMM

1998. The result shows that the level of previous year long-term debt is

directl y influencing the current year long-term debt. However, previous two

year long-term debt is inversel y affected the current year long-term debt.

Therefore, we can conclude that the Indian companies are not going long-

term debt year b y year. It may also point out that the existence of trade-off

theory in the Indian corporate sector. Because Indian firms having a specific

target debt ratio. Other variables case we are unable to give a conclusion

because of inconsistency in the results. But sector wise there is consistency.

314 | P a g e
The variable Firm size is positivel y determining the long-term debt in the

sectors such as capital goods, consumer durables, diversified, healthcare,

housing related, information technology, metal, metal products & mining, oil

& gas and transport equipment. However the FMCG sector, it is negativel y

determined the long-term debt. The overall sample is not showing

significance. It is evident from the past studies that the firms which are

having huge amount of fixed assets will go for more long-term debt.

Generall y FMCG sector will have sufficient internal cash flow, therefore,

depend more or internal fund for capital investment purpose. That may be the

reason for negative significance.

The variable Profitabilit y is directl y influencing the long-term debt for

sectors such as healthcare, information technology, oil & gas and transport

equipment. That means growth in return make the firm capable of attracting

more long-term debt. Moreover, these sectors had shown huge growth in the

stud y period. However the capital goods, FMCG and housing related sectors

it negativel y determines the long-term debt. It confirms that these sectors

may be using the earnings for their future investment rather debt capital.

In case of Firm’s qualit y the sectors such as housing related, information

technology and metal, metal products & mining firm’s quality is positivel y

determining the long-term debt. This indicates that these sectors are using

their retained earnings to attract more long term debt rather for capital

investment. However, agriculture, capital goods, diversified, FMCG,

healthcare, oil & gas and transport equipment sectors it negativel y

determines the long-term debt.

315 | P a g e
 The variable non- debt tax shield is positivel y determining the long-

term debt in the sector, such as housing related, power and telecom. These

sectors generall y will have a high amount of non-debt tax shield income.

Therefore, it can attract long-term debt. However, FMCG, healthcare,

information technology oil & gas and transport equipment sectors it

negativel y determines the long-term debt. It may be the reason that this

sector may be having a low rate of depreciation.

At last the variable Economic growth is positivel y determining the

long-term debt in the sectors such as agriculture, capital goods, healthcare,

housing related, metal, metal products & mining and transport equipment.

However power and textile sectors it negativel y determines the long-term

debt. The overall sample is showing positive significance. Economic growth

will accelerate growth in all sectors and it directl y influences the debt

capital.

Overall we can conclude that the debt capitals in the Indian companies

are rising. The firms are deplo ying more short-term unsecured debt in th e

total debt capital than long-term debt. Still commercial banks are the major

source of debt capital followed b y debenture. But the proportion debenture is

less. The debt capital trend, structure and choice have not shown much

variation among different sectors during the period of the stud y. But the

factors that affect debt capital, debt maturit y, growth in long-term debt are

varied among sectors. All though the level of total debt capital has increased

significantl y in all the sectors, still In dian companies are liquid, because

shareholders’ equit y of companies increased more than the debt capital. But

316 | P a g e
there are some companies which are unable to raise equit y capital from the

market are deepl y depending on debt capital. So the investor has to ensure its

liquidit y before investing in such companies. Moreover, there are certain

companies which are having an excellent brand value in the market are

planning to start a new venture may depend more on debt capital because it is

the cheapest capital. Investing in such companies also should be taken care.

It has been observed that commercial banks are the major provider of

debt capital for the companies in India. RBI has to insist restrictions in

giving unsecured loans to companies for avoiding non-performing assets.

Moreover, even if it is offering the secured loan it has to ensure the market

value of the securit y given is 50 percent more than the loan amount. RBI has

to strictl y restrict the commercial banks giving loans onl y on the base of

brand value of the companies.

From the stud y it is evident that debt market in India is still untapped.

India companies are still dependent on commercial banks as the major

sources. One of the reasons for this may be most of the commercial banks in

India are under the central government, in case of default in the loan payment

the companies can influence government for closing the loan. Government

should not entertain such things for the growth of the debt market in the

country.

Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has to promote usage

of debentures and bills among companies for the growth of the debt market.

It is found from the studies that the Indian companies financing their

317 | P a g e
investment requirements mostl y from the internal capital, if it is not enough

then onl y going to debt capital. It indicates that Indian financial manager ’s

risk averse. They are not utilizing the advantages of debt capital.

The stud y can be extended using the primary data, as well as sectors

defined according to industrial classification. It can be further extended to

understanding wh y the Indian debt market is still untapped. Through

conducting a primary survey need to anal yse the financial risk bearing

capacit y of Indian companies. Moreover, the inverse relationship between

liquidit y and the level of debt need further anal ysis. The reason behind the

growth of un-secured debt has to explore. The reason behind the dependence

of Indian companies on short-term debt has to be anal ysed further

318 | P a g e
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 APPENDIX

Appendix I
List of sample companies choose for the study
Compan y Sector
Advanta India Ltd Agriculture
Bajaj Hindusthan Ltd Agriculture
Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd Agriculture
Bayer CropScience Ltd Agriculture
Chambal Fertilisers & Chemicals Ltd Agriculture
Coromandel International Ltd Agriculture
Deepak Fertilizers & Petrochemicals
Corp Ltd Agriculture
EID Parry (India) Ltd Agriculture
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilisers
Compan y Ltd Agriculture
Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd Agriculture
Jain Irrigation S ystems Ltd Agriculture
K S Oils Ltd Agriculture
Monsanto India Ltd Agriculture
National Fertilizer Ltd Agriculture
Rallis India Ltd Agriculture
Rashtri ya Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd Agriculture
Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd Agriculture
United Phosphorus Ltd Agriculture
Zuari Industries Ltd Agriculture
ABB Ltd Capital Goods
AIA Engineering Ltd Capital Goods
Alstom Projects India Ltd Capital Goods
Arshi ya International Ltd Capital Goods
BEML Ltd Capital Goods
Bharat Bijlee Ltd Capital Goods
Bharat Electronics Ltd Capital Goods
Carborundum Universal Ltd Capital Goods
Crompton Greaves Ltd Capital Goods
Dredging Corporation of India Ltd Capital Goods
Elecon Engineering Compan y Ltd Capital Goods
EMCO Ltd Capital Goods
Everest Kanto C ylinder Ltd Capital Goods
Gammon India Ltd Capital Goods
Gammon Infrastructure Projects Ltd Capital Goods
Graphite India Ltd Capital Goods
Greaves Cotton Ltd Capital Goods
Havells India Ltd Capital Goods

336 | P a g e
HEG Ltd Capital Goods
Ingersoll-Rand (India) Ltd Capital Goods
JSL Industries Ltd Capital Goods
J yoti Structures Ltd Capital Goods
Kirloskar Brothers Ltd Capital Goods
Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd Capital Goods
Larsen & Toubro Ltd Capital Goods
McNall y Bharat Engineering Compan y
Ltd Capital Goods
Noida Toll Bridge Compan y Ltd Capital Goods
Praj Industries Ltd Capital Goods
Punj Llo yd Ltd Capital Goods
Reliance Industrial Infrastructure Ltd Capital Goods
Sadbhav Engineering Ltd Capital Goods
Siemens Ltd Capital Goods
SKF India Ltd Capital Goods
Thermax Ltd Capital Goods
Titagarh Wagons Ltd Capital Goods
Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd Capital Goods
Voltamp Transformers Ltd Capital Goods
Walchandnagar Industries Ltd Capital Goods
Welspun Corp Ltd Capital Goods
Asian Paints Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
BASF India Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
Berger Paints India Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
Finolex Industries Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
Godrej Industries Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
Gujarat Alkalies & Chemicals Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
NOC IL Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
Pidilite Industries Lt d Chemical & Petrochemical
Supreme Industries Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
Tata Chemicals Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
Uflex Ltd Chemical & Petrochemical
Bajaj Electricals Ltd Consumer Durables
Blue Star Ltd Consumer Durables
Gitanjali Gems Ltd Consumer Durables
Rajesh Exports Ltd Consumer Durables
Titan Industries Ltd Consumer Durables
V I P Industries Ltd Consumer Durables
Videocon Industries Ltd Consumer Durables
Whirlpool of India Ltd Consumer Durables
3M India Ltd Diversified
Adani Enterprises Ltd Diversified
Adit ya Birla Nuvo Ltd Diversified
DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd Diversified

337 | P a g e
Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd Diversified
Kesoram Industries Ltd Diversified
Max India Ltd Diversified
Voltas Ltd Diversified
Bata India Ltd FMCG
Britannia Industries Ltd FMCG
Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd FMCG
Dabur India Ltd FMCG
Emami Ltd FMCG
Gillette India Ltd FMCG
GlaxoSmithkline Consumer Healthcare
Ltd FMCG
Godrej Consumer Products Ltd FMCG
Hindustan Unilever Ltd FMCG
ITC Ltd FMCG
Kwalit y Dairy (India) Ltd FMCG
Marico Ltd FMCG
Mcleod Russel India Ltd FMCG
Nestle India Ltd FMCG
Procter & Gamble Hygiene and Health
Care Ltd FMCG
REI Agro Ltd FMCG
Ruchi Infrastructure Ltd FMCG
Ruchi So ya Industries Ltd FMCG
Tata Global Beverages Ltd FMCG
United Breweries Ltd FMCG
United Spirits Ltd FMCG
Zydus Wellness Ltd FMCG
Abbott India Ltd Healthcare
Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Ltd Healthcare
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd Healthcare
Bilcare Ltd Healthcare
Biocon Ltd Healthcare
Cadila Healthcare Ltd Healthcare
Cipla Ltd Healthcare
Divis Laboratories Ltd Healthcare
Dr Redd ys Laboratories Ltd Healthcare
FDC Ltd Healthcare
Fortis Healthcare (India) Ltd Healthcare
Glaxosmithkline Pharma Ltd Healthcare
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd Healthcare
Ipca Laboratories Ltd Healthcare
Jubilant Life Sciences Ltd Healthcare
Lupin Ltd Healthcare
Novartis India Ltd Healthcare

338 | P a g e
Opto Circuits (India) Ltd Healthcare
Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd Healthcare
Panacea Biotec Ltd Healthcare
Pfizer Ltd Healthcare
Piramal Healthcare Ltd Healthcare
Ranbax y Laboratories Ltd Healthcare
Strides Arcolab Ltd Healthcare
Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd Healthcare
Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd Healthcare
Unichem Laboratories Ltd Healthcare
Wockhardt Ltd Healthcare
Wyeth Ltd Healthcare
ACC Ltd Housing Related
Ahluwalia Contracts (India) Ltd Housing Related
Ambuja Cements Ltd Housing Related
Birla Corporation Ltd Housing Related
Century Textiles & Industries Ltd Housing Related
DLF Ltd Housing Related
Era Infra Engineering Ltd Housing Related
Godrej Properties Ltd Housing Related
Hindustan Construction Compan y Ltd Housing Related
Housing Development & Infrastructure
Ltd Housing Related
India Cements Ltd Housing Related
IVRC L Ltd Housing Related
J K Cements Ltd Housing Related
Jaiprakash Associates Ltd Housing Related
JK Lakshmi Cement Ltd Housing Related
Madras Cements Ltd Housing Related
Mahindra Lifespace Developers Ltd Housing Related
Marg Ltd Housing Related
NCC Ltd Housing Related
Omaxe Ltd Housing Related
Orbit Corporation Ltd Housing Related
Orient Paper & Industries Ltd Housing Related
Patel Engineering Ltd Housing Related
Peninsula Land Ltd Housing Related
Phoenix Mills Ltd Housing Related
Prism Cement Ltd Housing Related
Puravankara Projects Ltd Housing Related
Rain Commodities Ltd Housing Related
Shree Cement Ltd Housing Related
Simplex Infrastructures Ltd Housing Related
Sintex Industries Ltd Housing Related
Sobha Developers Ltd Housing Related

339 | P a g e
Sunteck Realt y Ltd Housing Related
UltraTech Cement Ltd Housing Related
Unitech Ltd Housing Related
Unit y Infraprojects Ltd Housing Related
3i Infotech Ltd Information Technology
Allied Digital Services Ltd Information Technology
Aptech Ltd Information Technology
CMC Ltd Information Technology
CORE Education & Technologies Ltd Information Technology
Financial Technologies (India) Ltd Information Technology
Glod yne Technoserve Ltd Information Technology
HCL Infos ystems Lt d Information Technology
HCL Technologies Ltd Information Technology
Infos ys Ltd Information Technology
Infotech Enterprises Ltd Information Technology
Karuturi Global Ltd Information Technology
KPIT Cummins Infosystems Ltd Information Technology
Mastek Ltd Information Technology
Mindtree Ltd Information Technology
MphasiS Ltd Information Technology
NIIT Ltd Information Technology
Oracle Financial Services Software Ltd Information Technology
Polaris Financial Technology Ltd Information Technology
Redington India Ltd Information Technology
Rolta India Ltd Information Technology
Tata Elxsi Ltd Information Technology
Tech Mahindra Ltd Information Technology
Wipro Ltd Information Technology
Entertainment Network (India) Ltd Media & publications
Jagran Prakashan Ltd Media & publications
Navneet Publications (India) Ltd Media & publications
Reliance MediaWorks Ltd Media & publications
Sun TV Network Ltd Media & publications
Television Eighteen India Ltd (Merged) Media & publications
Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd Media & publications
Adhunik Metaliks Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Bhushan Steel Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Electrosteel Castings Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Gujarat Mineral Development
Corporation Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Hindalco Industries Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Hindustan Copper Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Hindustan Zinc Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Indian Metals & Ferro Allo ys Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining

340 | P a g e
ISMT Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Jai Balaji Industries Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Jai Corp Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Jindal Saw Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Jindal Steel & Power Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
JSW Steel Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Maharashtra Seamless Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
National Aluminium Compan y Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
NMDC Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
PSL Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Sesa Goa Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Steel Authorit y of India Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Tata Steel Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Texmaco Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Uttam Galva Steels Ltd Metal,Metal Products & Mining
Ballarpur Industries Ltd Miscellaneous
Balmer Lawrie & Compan y Ltd Miscellaneous
Educomp Solutions Ltd Miscellaneous
Engineers India Ltd Miscellaneous
Gati Ltd Miscellaneous
Pantaloon Retail (India) Ltd Miscellaneous
Prakash Industries Ltd Miscellaneous
Shoppers Stop Ltd Miscellaneous
State Trading Corporation of India Ltd Miscellaneous
Tamil Nadu Newsprint & Papers Ltd Miscellaneous
Time Technoplast Ltd Miscellaneous
Trent Ltd Miscellaneous
Aban Offshore Ltd Oil & Gas
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd Oil & Gas
BOC India Ltd Oil & Gas
Castrol India Ltd Oil & Gas
Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd Oil & Gas
Essar Oil Ltd Oil & Gas
GAIL (India) Ltd Oil & Gas
Gujarat Fluorochemicals Ltd Oil & Gas
Gujarat Gas Company Ltd Oil & Gas
Gujarat State Petronet Ltd Oil & Gas
Hindustan Oil Exploration Compan y Ltd Oil & Gas
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd Oil & Gas
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd Oil & Gas
Indraprastha Gas Ltd Oil & Gas
Mangalore Refinery And Petrochemicals
Ltd Oil & Gas

341 | P a g e
Oil & Natural Gas Corpn Ltd Oil & Gas
Oil India Ltd Oil & Gas
Reliance Industries Ltd Oil & Gas
Selan Explorations Technology Ltd Oil & Gas
Shiv-Vani Oil & Gas Exploration
Services Ltd Oil & Gas
BF Utilities Ltd Power
CESC Ltd Power
GMR Infrastructure Ltd Power
Gujarat Industries Power Co Ltd Power
GVK Power & Infrastructure Ltd Power
Jaiprakash Power Ventures Ltd Power
JSW Energy Ltd Power
Lanco Infratech Ltd Power
Nava Bharat Ventures Ltd Power
Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd Power
NHPC Ltd Power
NTPC Ltd Power
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd Power
PTC India Ltd Power
Reliance Infrastructure Ltd Power
Reliance Power Ltd Power
SJVN Ltd Power
Tata Power Compan y Ltd Power
Bharti Airtel Ltd Telicom
Finolex Cables Ltd Telicom
GTL Ltd Telicom
Himachal Futuristic Communications Ltd Telicom
Idea Cellular Ltd Telicom
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd Telicom
Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd Telicom
Sterlite Technologies Ltd Telicom
Tanla Solutions Ltd Telicom
Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd Telicom
Tulip Telecom Ltd Telicom
Alok Industries Ltd Textile
Arvind Ltd Textile
Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing
Compan y Ltd Textile
Bombay Rayon Fashions Ltd Textile
Century Enka Ltd Textile
Grasim Industries Ltd Textile
Raymond Ltd Textile
S.Kumars Nationwide Ltd Textile
SRF Ltd Textile

342 | P a g e
Vardhman Textiles Ltd Textile
Amara Raja Batteries Ltd Transport Equipments
Amtek Auto Ltd Transport Equipments
Amtek India Ltd Transport Equipments
Apollo Tyres Ltd Transport Equipments
Asahi India Glass Lt d Transport Equipments
Ashok Leyland Ltd Transport Equipments
Balkrishna Industries Ltd Transport Equipments
Bosch Ltd Transport Equipments
Cummins India Ltd Transport Equipments
Eicher Motors Ltd Transport Equipments
Escorts Ltd Transport Equipments
Exide Industries Ltd Transport Equipments
Hero MotoCorp Ltd Transport Equipments
HMT Ltd Transport Equipments
JK Tyre & Industries Ltd Transport Equipments
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd Transport Equipments
Maruti Suzuki India Ltd Transport Equipments
Motherson Sumi S ystems Ltd Transport Equipments
MRF Ltd Transport Equipments
Sundram Fasteners Ltd Transport Equipments
Tata Motors Ltd Transport Equipments
Tube Investments of India Ltd Transport Equipments
TVS Motor Compan y Ltd Transport Equipments

343 | P a g e
 Appendix II

List of Publications in Peer Reviewed Journal

1. Raveesh Krishankutty and Kiran Sankar Chakrabort y. 2014. The

Determinants of Corporate debt maturit y: a stud y on listed companies

of Bombay Stock Exchange 500 index. Romanian Economic Journal,

Vol. 51(1), PP 67-90.

2. Kiran Sankar Chakrabort y, and Raveesh Krishnakutty. 2013.

Determinants of current ratio: a stud y with reference to large listed

companies in India. Journal of International Business Management &

Research (jibmr), Vol.4(12).

3. K.S.Chakrabort y, Raveesh Krishnankutty and Bhushan Chandra Das,

2012. Liquidit y aspects of large corporate business: a stud y with

reference to listed companies in India, AFBE journal Special Issue of

Selected Papers from AFBE UNITEN Conference, 2012. Vol. 5 (3), PP

319-334.

Paper Communicated for Publications

1. Raveesh Krishankutty and Kiran Sankar Chakrabort y. 2014.

Deter minants of debt capital in Indian corporate sector: a sectoral

analysis.

2. Raveesh Krishankutty and Kiran Sankar Chakrabort y. 2014. The

deter minants of growt h and its dependence on long-ter m debt capi tal: A

Stud y with Reference to Indian Companies.

344 | P a g e
 Appendix III

List of Conference Attended

1. Presented a paper titled determinants of debt capital in Indian

corporate sector: a quantile regression anal ysis in the in the 6th

Doctoral Theses Conference”, held in the IBS Hyderabad, organized b y

the IBS Hyderabad in collaboration with Broad College of Business,

Michigan State Universit y, East Lansing, USA, during April 26-27,

2013

2. Presented a paper titled liquidit y aspects of large corporate business: a

stud y with reference to listed companies in India in the Asian Forum of

Business Education (AFBE) Conference 2012 at Malaysia Kuala -

Lumpur.

3. Presented a paper titled, Determinants of Current Ratio: A Stud y with

Reference to Companies listed with Bombay Stock Ex change in the 9 t h

International Conference on Business and Finance (ICBF), January

2012, at IBS Hyderabad.

345 | P a g e