PEOPLE VS PADILLA

G.R. No. 137648. March 30, 2001

FACTS:
Eula Padilla, the 10 year old daughter of the accused-appellant filed a complaint for rape
against her father, who was then found guilty. The latter however, denied such crime and faults
the prosecution in the way it conducted its direct examination of the complainant and argued that
a rape case is not prosecuted by merely referring to the sworn statement executed by the
complainant and asking her to confirm such statements; on the contrary, all the material
allegations sufficient to prove the crime complained of should be established by the clear
testimony of the complainant on the witness stand.
ISSUE: WON accised-appellant’s contention is correct?
HELD: NO.
It is not correct to say that the direct examination of the complainant consisted merely of
her oral confirmation of the contents of the sworn statement she executed before the police.
Indeed, in the direct examination of the complainant, the prosecutor read to her certain portions
of her sworn statement and asked her if she made them and to confirm the truth thereof. The trial
court allowed the procedure without any objection from the defense. Moreover, in the hearing of
February 12, 1997, where the prosecution made its offer of documentary evidence, the counsel
for the accused-appellant admitted the sworn statement as part of the testimony of the
complainant Eula Padilla:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Antonano:
Your Honor, please, by way of comments and objections to the offer of exhibits, the defense
admits the existence of Exhibit "A" -the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Eula Padilla is offered
as part of her testimony but this cannot prove sexual abuse by the accused in the person
of the complainant Eula Padilla.
Moreover, the testimony of complainant was buttressed by the declaration of her mother to
whom the victim related the dastardly acts committed by accused-appellant on her. The medico-
legal officer found fresh hymenal lacerations on her organ and concluded that his "findings are
compatible with (her) recent loss of virginity Ineluctably, the bare denial of herein accused-
appellant cannot overcome the clear and positive evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove
the commission of the crime charged.
PP VS DUMANON
G.R. No. 123096. December 18, 2000

FACTS:

Dominga Anib filed a complaint for rape against MARIO and RICARDO on behalf of her
mentally retarded daughter ANACURIT. Submitted in support of the complaint was a medical
certificate issued by the Surigao Provincial Hospital and the affidavits of Dominga Anib,
Eduardo Diaz and Anita Lisondra.
MARIO and RICARDO underscore the fact that the complaint filed with the court below
alleges that the rape was committed with the use of force and intimidation and hence they cannot
be held guilty of rape committed on a mental retardate since this circumstance was never alleged
in the Complaint. Neither can they be liable for rape committed with the use of force and
intimidation since the same was not sufficiently proven by the evidence for the prosecution.
ISSUE: WON the use of force and intimidation was not sufficiently proven by the evidence for
the prosecution.
HELD: NO.
The hematoma found on the victims left thigh as shown by the medical certificate issued by
the examining physician is a physical evidence of the use of force in the consummation of the
beastly act.
It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the
parties. In the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception
and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. When
the victim is a retardate the force required to overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used
against a normal adult. Thus, the degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is a
normal person, may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile.
As correctly assessed by the OSG, the conviction for rape decreed by the trial court was not
based on the fact that ANACURITA is a mental retardate, but on the use of force and
intimidation. The mental retardation of ANACURITA was only a circumstance which the trial
court considered in evaluating the degree and extent of the force and intimidation.
Alabang Development Corp. v. Valenzuela
G.R. No. L-54094 August 30, l982

FACTS:

The respondents alleged that they are the owners of the land, which is now “Alabang
Hills Village Subdivision”. Alabang Development Corporation (ADC) filed in the court below a
belated intervention and motion for new trial which were denied by respondent judge. The trial
court granted the petition of the respondents ordering the issuance of TCTs in favor of them. This
led to the filing of this petition for Certiorari and Prohibition by ADC.

ISSUE: WON the respondents should be issued TCTs?

HELD: NO.

It was ascertained during the verification survey that the lands known as Lots I and 3,
plan II-4374 claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal does not
actually exist on the ground;

As the Court accepted and approved in the Bernal case the above final report on the relocation-
verification survey of the regional officer of the Bureau of Lands and admitted it as evidence of the falsity of the
survey plan in question, there is no reason for this Court not to use it likewise as basis for reaching. The conclusion
that Lots 2 and 4 supposedly covered by the same Survey Plan II-4374 are purely imaginary and "do not actually
exist on the ground."

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC. vs. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA
CUARESMA, WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ
GR No. 182978-79

FACTS:

On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA),
for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month. Over a year later, she
died allegedly of poisoning. Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was
found dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming and smelling
of poison.

Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital,
who conducted an autopsy of Jasmin’s body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning.

Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health
Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin died under
violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining physician. The toxicology
report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.
 Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin’s parents and her surviving heirs, received from
the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits;
P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.

On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the KSA,
Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary
damages for Jasmin’s death, Jasmin’s death was work-related, having occurred at the employer’s premises; that
under Jasmin’s contract with Becmen, she is entitled to “iqama insurance” coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to
compensatory damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of
US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her
productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60).

In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior
unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining
physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death
and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA.

ISSUE: WON Jasmin commit suicide, thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal
aggression?

HELD: NO.

It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in the prime of her life and working abroad
with a chance at making a decent living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country,
would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason.

The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or apparent victim of poisoning
are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence.

On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the exhumation report of
the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained external and internal injuries, specifically
abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds
and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular
hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured rib; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the
vaginal area. The NBI toxicology report came up negative on the presence of poison.

All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her death.

Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin was poisoned to
death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was poisoned, the assailants who beat her up and
possibly raped her are certainly responsible therefor.
JANICE MARIE JAO VS CA
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28 1987

FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against
Perico V. Jao. Jao denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which
was in due course conducted by the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could
not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for
reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared the child the
offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood grouping test could
have been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was
no showing of irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's
contention and reversed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to
prove paternity.

RULING:
Yes. SC denied the petition for review.

Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test.
Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping
tests has been recognized as early as the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity
was dealt with in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests
stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father
of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that the child must have
been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert
cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his
opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and
circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is
the father of the child."

Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three
decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity
— that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and
alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if
the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that
of the alleged father.
In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-
paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. The positive results of blood
tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were
drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the question of
paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result of blood
grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with
the mother within the period of gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the
competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject
such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.
PIGAO vs RABANILLO

ESTRELLA PIGAO, et. al.

vs.
SAMUEL RABANILLOG.R. No. 150712 May 2, 2006

FACTS:

In 1947, the late Eusebio Pigao and his family, settled on a government lot owned by
the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). A contract to sell was entered
into by Eusebio and PHHC. In 1959, Eusebio executed a deed of assignment of rights
over one-half of the property in favor of respondent who proceeded to occupy the front
half portion. In 1970, Eusebio executed a deed of mortgage over the same half-portion
of the property in favor of respondent. In 1973, title was issued in Eusebio’s name over
the entire property. In 1978, respondent executed an affidavit of adverse claim over the
front half portion of the lot registered in Eusebio’s name. This affidavit was duly
annotated on said title. On June 17, 1979, Eusebio died.and was survived by his
children, herein petitioners. In 1988, after the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City was gutted by fire, petitioners were issued a reconstituted title in the name of
Eusebio which no longer carried the annotation of theadverse claim of respondent. In
1992, the subject lot was included in the extrajudicial settlement of Eusebio’s estate and
a new title was issued for the entire lot in the name of petitioners. Respondent
continued to occupy the front half portion through his tenant, Gil Ymata. On January 29,
1996,petitioners filed a case in the RTC of Quezon City against respondent and Ymata
wherein they sought to quiet their title over the entire lot and to recover possession of
the front half portion. They averred that Eusebio’s deed of assignment and deed of
mortgage were clouds on their title which should be nullified.The RTC ruled in favor of
petitioners: CA reversed the RTC decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners contend
that when the final deed of sale was issued by PHHC in favor of Eusebio in1973, this
deed contained a prohibition against the alienation of the lot that the applicant agree -
(d) not to sell, assign, encumber, mortgage, lease, sublet or in any other manner affect
his right under this contract, at any time, in any manner whatsoever, in whole or in part,
without first obtaining the written consent of the Corporation." To support their claim,
they request this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the pro-forma conditional
contracts-to- sell between PHHC and applicants. Petitioners failed to present during the
trial the conditional contract to sell between Eusebio and PHHC which they claimed that
they did not have a copy thereof.

What they submitted to this Court was a copy of a conditional contract to sell between a
certain Armando Bernabe and the PHHC pertaining to a lot located at 94 K-5th St.,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prove the existence of the aforementioned condition.
Respondent objects to this attempt of petitioners to seek admission of evidence which
was presented neither during trial nor on appeal.

ISSUES: WON the said conditional contract to sell between Armando Bernabe and
PHHC may be given judicial notice
HELD: NO. We cannot take cognizance of this document - the conditional contract to
sell between Bernabe and the PHHC alleged to be the pro-forma contract used by
PHHC with its applicants – which petitioners are presenting for the first time. This
document is not among the matters the law mandatorily requires us to take judicial
notice of. Neither can we consider it of public knowledge nor capable of unquestionable
demonstration nor ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. We
have held that:
Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The power of
taking judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution. Care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.21 (emphasis supplied)

Consequently, for this document to be properly considered by us, it should have been
presented during trial and formally offered as evidence. Otherwise, we would be
denying due process of law to respondent:

It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally
offered. xxx If [petitioners] neglected to offer [any document] in evidence, however vital
[it] may be, [they] only have themselves to blame, not respondent who was not even
given a chance to object as the documents were never offered in evidence.

A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity
to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal
offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment
only — and strictly — upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a
party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as
evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of
his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court
will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of
documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such
pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the case.

Besides, this document does not even pertain to the lot and parties involved here.
Accordingly, it is neither relevant nor material evidence. But even assuming that it were,
then it would substantially affect the outcome of the case so respondent should have
been given the chance to scrutinize the document and object to it during the trial of the
case. It is too late to present it now when nothing prevented petitioners from introducing
it before.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION V. MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORPORATION
GR 153535, JULY 28, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondents herein secured a loan to the petitioner bank under the name of the
respondent corporation.In the course of the corporations operation, it was not able to pay its
obligation to the petitioner and has to stop its operation. Petitioner bank filed an action against
the corporation together with its principal officers for the collection of the loan they acquired.
The RTC ruled in favor of the bank petitioner and ordering the respondent corporation to pay the
amount of loan plus interest. On appeal, the CA held the decision of the RTC and ruled also that
the private respondents were not solidary liable to the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not principal officers can be held personally liable upon signing the contract of
loan under the name of the corporation?
Ruling: Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from that of each person composing or representing it. Equally fundamental is the
general rule that corporate officers cannot be held personally liable for the consequences of their
acts, for as long as these are for and on behalf of the corporation, within the scope of their
authority and in good faith. The separate corporate personality is a shield against the personal
liability of corporate officers, whose acts are properly attributed to the corporation. Moreover, it
is axiomatic that solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred. Since solidary liability is not clearly
expressed in the Promissory Note and is not required by law or the nature of the obligation in this
case, no conclusion of solidary liability can be made. Furthermore, nothing supports the alleged
joint liability of the individual petitioners because, as correctly pointed out by the two lower
courts, the evidence shows that there is only one debtor: the corporation.