Arroyo vs. de Venecia

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA,

WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners,
vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic
Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer
and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16,
1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after
which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco
objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the
ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of
the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In
the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What
happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21,
1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues
of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what
is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for
approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses
of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel
V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this
portion of Rep. Arroyos interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the
proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators
of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November
21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00
p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription
Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published
version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to
wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word approved, which appears on line 13 in the
three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996
the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three
times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare
for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum, which appears in the other
versions.
Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no
need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the
resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts
relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the
word approved appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240
is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these
rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a
violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII,
103 of the rules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report
to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion
in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in
violation of Rule XIX, 112,[3] the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What
is that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albanos motion to approve or ratify; (3)
in violation of Rule XVI, 97,[4] the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead
proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos motion and afterward declared the report approved;
and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, [5] the Chair
suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is
a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should have
been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of
the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner
Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the
House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Courts power under Art.
VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6]which
affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the
Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,
respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents defense is
anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They
argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House
and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the
Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of
proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as
they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in
passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as
parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion,
were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of
H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the
judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of
Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that On
Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198.[7] This Journal was approved on December 2,
1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This
case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in
the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners
do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in
violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings [9] and that for this
reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle
on its head. In the decided cases,[10] the constitutional provision that each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business
free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation
of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun,[11] it
was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open
to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of
time.The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: The provision that each House shall determine
the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of
standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the
absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a
constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and
effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power,
in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by
the Constitution.
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated: The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore
entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be
regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been
decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme
Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules.
In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself
as follows: The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own
proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free
and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject
to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter
clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the
legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think
that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.
In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that an
act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have
or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill,
intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they
have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or the respective branches thereof,
and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications,
we decline to follow them.
Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of
Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by
each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house
concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed
contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because
the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-
thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in
any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either
in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any
rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the
direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire
force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of
the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the
legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule
which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for
the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each
branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare
an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W.
185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E.
641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its
rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural.Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative
body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved. [18]
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court.We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its
separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance
on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline
the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship
in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving abuse
of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.[19] Implicit in this statement of the former Chief
Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the
case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a
justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide,
such as those relating to national security,[20] it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already
held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Courts function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . .
It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. [21]
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that
such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of our
Art.VIII, 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
railroaded. They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the
latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification
of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion.Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair
was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The
Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its
banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos
motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by
the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They
say that the method used in this case is a legislators nightmare because it suggests
unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair
must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as
the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which
became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on
the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The
point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the
ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since
I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes
in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder
what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe
that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one
that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to
my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying Is there any
objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair announces The bill is approved on
second reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would
have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House
approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if

anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can
announce how many are in favor and how many are against. [22]
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate and even more just.[23] The advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration.[24] In the
words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court cannot provide a second opinion on
what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage
its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.[25]
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members
be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the
last and third readings of a bill,[26] at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,[27] and
in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as
a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. [29] It
would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the
problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say
anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4
p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if
there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal
of November 21, 1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four oclock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval
except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted
on the pendency of Rep. Arroyos question as an obstacle to the passage of the
bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a
question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyos question were
so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end
to any further consideration of the question.[31]
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing
the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with
grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion
himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1
extends to cases where a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[32]
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House
with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was
no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had
already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.[33] Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum.[34]
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be
present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning
the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on
that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which
the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral
conference committee proceedings.[35] Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the
report[36] but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. [37]
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno,
joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either
here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the
enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we went behind an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.Under
this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to
pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,because a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. [39] This
Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if
old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at
any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for
this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But
they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal
principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves
with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. [40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference
committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not
been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. [41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed. [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise
than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with
approval by text writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an

enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution. [45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule,
except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members
may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually,
not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court
since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new
members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus
simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed
by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that
day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by
the Constitution to be recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus,
in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for
regarding the Journals as public memorials of the most permanent character, thus: They
should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent,
that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory
of individuals. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
___________________
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for
this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately
be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or
amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of
that body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Romero, J., has a separate opinion.
Puno, J., has a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., joined the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Puno.
Vitug, J., has a separate concurring opinion.
Regalado, J., in the result.
Bellosillo, J., took no part due to relationship with parties.
Panganiban, J., took no part. Former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave during the deliberations.
[1]
Journal No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of November 21, 1996 session, pp. 39-52;Rollo,
pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6, par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.
Rule VIII, 35. Voting. Every member present in the session shall vote on every question put unless he
[2]
inhibits himself on account of personal pecuniary interest therein.

Rule XVII, 103. Manner of Voting. The Speaker shall rise to put a question saying As many as are in favor
of (as the question may be), say Aye and, after the affirmative vote is counted, As many as are
opposed, say Nay ....
[3]
Rule XIX, 112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions. The Speaker shall state the motion or, if in writing,
shall cause it to be read by the Secretary General before being debated. A motion may be
withdrawn any time before its approval.
[4]
Rule XVI, 97. Recognition of Member. When two or more members rise at the same time, the Speaker
shall recognize the Member who is to speak first.
Rule XX, 121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties, conduct, rights, privileges,
[5]
dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.

122. Precedence. Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege shall have precedence over all other
questions, except a motion to adjourn and a point of order.
Rule XXI, 123. Definition and Precedence. A privileged motion pertains to a subject matter which, under
the rules, takes precedence over others.
The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case by the rules.
Rule XVIII, 109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions. When a bill, report or motion is adopted or lost, a
member who voted with the majority may move for its reconsideration on the same or succeeding
session day. The motion shall take precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn,
a question of privilege, and a point of order.
[6]
235 SCRA 630 (1994).
[7]
Rollo, p. 228.
[8]
Id., p. 229.
[9]
Art. VI, 16(3).
[10]
E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1862); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589
F.2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F.2d 14 (1982); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comn, 675 F.2d 1282 (1982). See also Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
[11]
109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630.
[12]
144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
[13]
64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).
[14]
124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).
[15]
79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).
[16]
80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).
[17]
5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).
[18]
Enrique M. Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines Annotated 188-189 (1977); Pacete v. Secretary
ofthe Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
[19]
Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, chairman
of the Committee on Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, in 1 Records of the Constitutional
Commission 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).
[20]
Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 695 (1989);
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
[21]
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692,701 (1991); Llamas v. Orbos,
202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA at 480-481 (emphasis added).
[22]
4 Cong. Rec. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).
[23]
United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25; State v. Lewis, 186 S.E. 625,
630 (1936).
[24]
United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).
[25]
Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).
[26]
Art. VI, 26(2).
[27]
Id., 16(4).
[28]
Id., 27(1).
[29]
Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.
[30]
Inocencio Pareja, Rules of the House of Representatives Commented and Annotated 331 (1963);
Reynaldo Fajardo, Principles of Parliamentary Procedure 157-158, 172-173 (1963).
[31]
Rule XIX, 13.
[32]
1 Records of the Constitutional Commission 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).
[33]
Alice Sturgis, Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure, 17 (1950).
[34]
Paul Mason, Manual of Legislative Procedure 335 (1953).
[35]
Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
[36]
Ibid.
[37]
Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
[38]
Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
[39]
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).
[40]
Id. at 17, quoting 4 John Wigmore, Treatise on the Law on Evidence 1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is
preserved in the Chadbourne edition of this locus classicus. See 4 Wigmore on Evidence 1350 at
834 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972).
[41]
EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf. Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA
131(1969).
[42]
Philippine Judges Assn v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131.
[43]
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General,
25 SCRA 754 (1968).
[44]
4 Wigmore on Evidence 1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6 Manuel V. Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court 115 (1980); 7 Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court (Pt. II) 454 (1973).
[45]
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303 (1891).
[46]
The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and nays on the third and final
reading of a bill (Art. VI, 26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays on any question, at the request of one-fifth
of the members present (Id., 16(4)); (3) the yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the Presidents
veto (Id., 27(1); and (4) the Presidents objection to a bill which he has vetoed. (Id.)
[47]
34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348 (1886).
[48]
Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.
[49]
Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comn, 675 F.2d 1282.
1. This case is about RA 8240 which amended the Tax Code by imposing so-called “sin
taxes” on cigarettes and beers.
2. It originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. The bill was approved on
3rd reading and transmitted to the Senate w/c approved it w/ certain amendments.
3. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions.

The committee submitted its report.
4. After the sponsorship speech came the interpellation. Rep. Joker Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But a quorum was subsequently declared.
5. Majority Leader Albano moved to approve and ratify the committee report. Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza then asked if there were any objections. Rep. Arroyo said “what was
that?” But he was seemingly ignored and the Deputy Speaker Raul declared that there
being no objections, the report was approved.
6. On the same day the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House and Senate President.
The bill was then signed into law by then Pres. FVR.
7. Petitioners now come before the Court to have RA 8240 declared null and void as it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House, which is constitutionally mandated. And
thus is in itself a violation of the constitution.
8. Respondents interpose the defense of

a. separation of powers
b. Enrolled Bill Doctrine
c. Enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts
d. Journal entry rule – De Venecia
ISSUE: W/N RA 8240 is valid in view of the alleged violation of the internal House rules. - YES.
1¶ What is alleged to have been violated is merely the internal rules of procedure of the
House rather than constitutional requirements.
a. They didn’t allege that there was no quorum but that Rep. Arroyo was
PREVENTED from QUESTIONING the lack of quorum.
2¶ Osmena vs. Pendatum – rules adopted by deliberative bodies are waivable or can be
disregarded. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
3¶ This involves internal matters which the Court shouldn’t be concerned about.
4¶ Under the Enrolled Bill doctrine, the signing of the H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses are
conclusive of its due enactment.
REMEDY: Seek enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of RA 8240.
1. A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240 which amends the Tax Code by
imposing so-called sin taxes on beer and cigarettes.
2. Herein petitioners, members of the House of Representatives, brought this suit against
Speaker of the House De Venecia, Majority Leader Albano, among others.
3. Petitioners charge that respondents violated the rules of the House, which according to
the petitioners is constitutionally mandated.
1. This case is about RA 8240 which amends the Tax Code by imposing so-called sin taxes
on beers and cigarettes.
a. It originated in the House of Representatives. This bill is approved on 3rd
reading and transmitted to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading.
b. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The committee submitted its report.
Shortly after a Representative delivered a sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated.
Interpellation - to question formally concerning an official action or policy or personal conduct
2. Representative Joker Arroyo interrupted and moved to adjourn for lack f quorum. Rep.
Cuenco objected and asked for head count.
a. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair but his motion was defeated.
3. In the course of Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation, he announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
4. Majority Leader Albano moved to approve and ratify the conference committee report.
a. The Deputy Speaker asked if there would be any objection, Rep. Arroyo asked
the Speaker about what he said but the former did not respond and declared that there was
none, thereby approving the report.
b. Rep. Arroyo said that he wanted to object which is why he stood up. Deputy
Speaker Daza held that the session was suspended for one minute.
5. On the same day the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress.
6. The Enrolled Bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on Nov. 22, 1996.
7. Petitioners’ principal argument is that RA No. 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House.
a. These rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16 (3) that each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings.
b. Consequently a violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution
itself.
c. Speaker De Venecia’s certification that the law was proper passed is false and
spurious.
8. Violations:
1. The Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House did not call for
the yeays and nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent Arroyo from
questioning the presence of the quorum —> Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103
2. The Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo’s question and did not repeat Rep. Albano’s
motion to approve or ratify —> Rule XIX, 112
3. The Chair refused to recognise Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep.
Albano’s motion and afterward declared the report approved —> Rule XVI, 97
4. The Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo’s question which, it
is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. —> Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123 and
Rule XVIII, 109
9. Petitioners charge that the session was hastily adjourned and the bill certified by
Speaker De Venecia to prevent Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a
quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
10. Petitioner’s urge the Court:
1. To not feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House, that the law had
been properly passed, considering Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (power to pass on claims of grave abuse of
discretion by the other departments of the government)
2. To reexamine Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
Enrolled Bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
11. Respondents’ defense:
1. Principle of separation of powers
2. Enrolled Bill doctrine
3. “Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of
its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar
as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed.”
12. Respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious
and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is
barred.
ISSUE: W/N RA 8240 is valid in view of the alleged violation of the internal House rules.
Alternatively, whether or not Congress committed a grave abuse of disruption in enacting RA
8240. - NO.
HELD: No.
1. What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of RA 8240 are merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of
the a law (i.e., Art. VI, 26-27)
a. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some manoeuvre
allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented form
questioning the presence of a quorum.
b. Osmena vs. Pendatum - courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
2. Based on Justice Concepcion’s sponsorship statement in the Constitutional Commission:

The jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5.
The scope of judicial inquiry has not altogether done away with political questions.
3. No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that
the Chair (in cases as such) must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
Nor does the Constitution require that the years and nays of the Members be taken every time
a House has to vote, except: last and third readings of a bill, requires of 1/5 of Members
present, reposing a bill over the veto of the President.
a. Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the

House with which the Court shouldn’t be concerned.
4. Under the Enrolled Bill doctrine, the singing of the H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses are
conclusive of its due enactment.
5. The Enrolled Bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It’s based on the
following considerations:
a. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Sec. of State, and having the attestations of the Speaker of
the House and Senate President, carries, on its fact, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws.
b. To overrule the doctrine now is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and
overthrow an established rule of evidence. [DISSENTS] —> petitioners can’t simply bank on the
change of membership of the Court.
6. Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same. Each House shall keep a Record of its proceedings. The Journal is regarded as conclusive
with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein.
a. The bill which became RA 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due
enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the probative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative cation as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated int he political arena to seek
a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department
itself.
Petitioners’ remedy now: Seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of RA
8240.
Presumption of good faith.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
LOREN B. LEGARDA, P.E.T. Case No. 003

Protestant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
NOLI L. DE CASTRO, Promulgated:

Protestee.
January 18, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On June 23, 2004, Congress sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
proclaimed[1] protestee Noli L. de Castro the duly elected Vice-President of the
Republic of the Philippines. The official count of the votes cast for Vice-President in
the May 10, 2004 elections showed that the protestee obtained the highest number
of votes, garnering 15,100,431 votes as against the 14,218,709 votes garnered by the
protestant Loren B. Legarda, who placed second, in a field consisting of four
candidates for Vice-President.
On July 23, 2004, the protestant filed this protest with this Tribunal praying
for the annulment of the protestees proclamation as the duly elected Vice-
President of the Republic of the Philippines.[2]
The protest has two main parts. The First Aspect originally covered all the
erroneous, if not manipulated, and falsified results as reflected in the final canvass
documents for 9,007 precincts in six provinces, one city and five
municipalities.[3] Protestant avers that the correct results appearing in the election
returns were not properly transferred and reflected in the subsequent election
documents and ultimately, in the final canvass of documents used as basis for
protestees proclamation. Protestant seeks the recomputation, recanvass and
retabulation of the election returns to determine the true result.
The Second Aspect required revision of ballots in 124,404 precincts specified

in the protest.[4]
The Tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest and denied the
motion of protestee for its outright dismissal. Protestee filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing in the main that the Tribunal erred in ruling that the
protest alleged a cause of action sufficient to contest protestees victory in the May
2004 elections.[5]
On March 31, 2005, the Tribunal ruled that:

On the matter of sufficiency of the protest, protestee failed to adduce new
substantial arguments to reverse our ruling. We hold that while Pea v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal on requisites of sufficiency of election protest is
still good law, it is inapplicable in this case. We dismissed the petition in Pea because
it failed to specify the contested precincts. In the instant protest, protestant
enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where she questions all the
results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and
substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to protestees title to his
office. In our view, the instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not mere
conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time.
Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must
again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the
allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the
protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules.
Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the
Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the
Tribunals rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
On a related matter, the protestant in her reiterating motion prays for

ocular inspection and inventory-taking of ballot boxes, and appointment of
watchers. However, the Tribunal has already ordered the protection and
safeguarding of the subject ballot boxes; and it has issued also the appropriate
directives to officials concerned. At this point, we find no showing of an imperative
need for the relief prayed for, since protective and safeguard measures are already
being undertaken by the custodians of the subject ballot boxes.
WHEREFORE, protestees motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED

WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. Protestants reiterating motion for ocular
inspection and inventory-taking with very urgent prayer for the appointment of
watchers is also DENIED for lack of showing as to its actual necessity.
Further, the protestant LOREN B. LEGARDA is ORDERED to specify,

within ten (10) days from notice, the three (3) provinces best exemplifying the
manifest errors alleged in the first part of her protest, and three (3) provinces best
exemplifying the frauds and irregularities alleged in the second part of her protest,
for the purpose herein elucidated.
Lastly, the Tribunal hereby ORDERS the Commission on Elections

to SUBMIT, within 30 days hereof, the official project of precincts of the May
2004 Elections.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On April 11, 2005, protestant identified three (3) provinces as pilot areas best
exemplifying her grounds for the First Aspect of the protest. She chose the
provinces of Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur with the following
number of protested precincts: 1,607, 2,346 and 350, respectively, or a total of

4,303 out of the original 9,007 precincts.[7]
On June 21, 2005, the Tribunal ascertained[8] the number of ballot boxes
subject of the protest, to wit:
The Tribunal Resolved to NOTE the Letter dated 30 May 2005 filed by
Executive Director Pio Jose S. Joson, COMELEC, in compliance with the Letter
dated 14 April 2005 of Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, Acting Clerk of the Tribunal,
informing the Tribunal that one thousand four hundred fifty-four (1,454) ballot
boxes are involved in the precincts of the province of Surigao del Sur which the
protestant has identified to the Tribunal as best exemplifying the irregularities in
connection with the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections.
Accordingly, without prejudice to its recomputation, the number of ballot

boxes involved in the precincts of the provinces which the protestant has
identified to the Tribunal as best exemplifying the irregularities in connection with
the said elections are as follows:
Lanao del Sur - 1,568

Lanao del Norte - 2,317
Surigao del Sur - 1,454
Cebu City - 10,127
Pampanga - 5,458
Maguindanao - 1,755
Total - 22,679 ballot boxes
involved in the
precincts
x P500.00
P11,339,500.00
On November 2, 2005 protestant moved to withdraw and abandon almost

all pilot precincts in the First Aspect except those in the province of Lanao del
Sur.[9] On November 22, 2005, the Tribunal granted the said motion withdrawing
and abandoning the protest involving the manifest errors in the municipalities of
Lanao del Norte and Surigao del Sur.[10]
Thereafter, proceedings duly ensued concerning both the First and Second
Aspects. Former Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo as Hearing
Commissioner[11] heard the presentation of evidence of both parties for the First
Aspect. Subpoenas were issued to the witnesses of the protestant, e.g.
the President/General Manager of Ernest Printing Corporation[12] and then

Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos.[13] On August 28, 2006, a
preliminary conference was called by Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo to
schedule the presentation of evidence. The latter then ordered as follows:
Pursuant to the Resolution of the Tribunal dated 22 August 2006, setting the
preliminary conference of the parties with the Hearing Commissioner today, the
designated Hearing Commissioner called the preliminary conference in order to
consider the order of hearing and presentation of evidence of the parties
according to the procedure prescribed in the Resolution of the Tribunal of 1
August 2006, under paragraph B (1 and 2).
The following are the appearances:
1) Protestant Loren B. Legarda, in person;
2) Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Atty. Jesus P. Casila, for the protestant;
3) Protestee Noli L. de Castro did not appear;
4) Atty. Armando M. Marcelo and Atty. Carlo Vistan, for the protestee.
Atty. Brillantes manifested that the protestant is ready to adduce testimonial
and documentary evidence on a date to be scheduled and agreed upon by the
parties; they have about seven witnesses to testify on the first aspect as indicated
in the Tribunals Resolution of 1 August 2006. He suggested 6 September 2006 as
the initial date of the hearing. Atty. Marcelo stated that he was leaving for abroad
on 6 September 2006 for one month and suggested a hearing after his return in
October 2006. At any rate, protestee has a pending motion for reconsideration of
the Tribunals Resolution of 22 August 2006designating a retired Justice of the
Supreme Court as Hearing Commissioner. They wanted an incumbent Justice of
the Supreme Court or an official of the Tribunal who is a member of the Bar to be
the designated Hearing Commissioner.
The undersigned Hearing Commissioner suggested that the initial hearing be
held on 4 September 2006, at 10:00 a.m., when protestees counsel will still be in
town, without prejudice to the resolution of the Tribunal on his motion for
reconsideration.
The undersigned Hearing Commissioner suggested to protestants counsel to
submit by this afternoon the list of the names of the proposed witnesses and
documents to be produced so that the proper process may be issued to them.
The undersigned Hearing Commissioner set the initial hearing tentatively on

Monday, 4 September 2006, at 10:00 a.m., at the same venue, subject to the
Tribunals ruling on protestees motion for reconsideration of the person of the
Hearing Commissioner, and protestant to submit by this afternoon the list of
witnesses and documents to be produced at the hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[14]
Several hearings on the First Aspect were held wherein the protestant
adduced evidence and the protestee interposed his continuing objection to such in
the form of motions and comments. Months of continuous trial took place until the
Hearing Commissioner made his final report of the proceedings for detailed
consideration by the Tribunal.
On January 31, 2006, while the case was sub judice, the Tribunal ordered
both parties to refrain from sensationalizing the case in the media. Its extended
resolution on the matter reads as follows:
On December 12, 2005, the re-tabulation of election returns (ERs) from the
ten (10) protested municipalities of Lanao del Sur commenced. According to the
report submitted by the Acting Clerk of the Tribunal, Atty. Maria Luisa D.
Villarama, the correction team was able to re-tabulate only the ERs from four (4)
of the ten (10) protested municipalities of Lanao del Sur, namely, Balindong,
Masiu, Mulondo and Taraka. The ERs of the other six (6) protested municipalities
were not found inside the ballot boxes collected from the House of Representatives,
but found were the ERs from municipalities not subject of the protest.
Therefore, acting on the aforementioned report of the Acting Clerk, the

Tribunal resolves to REQUIRE Hon. Roberto Nazareno, Secretary General of the
House of Representatives and Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General
for Operation, of the House of Representatives, within a non-extendible period of
five (5) days from notice, to
(a) DELIVER to the Tribunal the election returns and other election
documents/paraphernalia used in the May 2004 National/Local elections for the
remaining six (6) protested municipalities of Lanao del Sur, namely (1) Bacolod-
Kalawi; (2) Ganassi; (3) Kapai; (4) Sultan Gumander; (5) Tamparan; and (6)
Wao;
(b) EXPLAIN why the election returns and other election documents and
paraphernalia which were turned over to the PET Retrieval Team are incomplete
when compared to the COMELECs total number of clustered precincts for

Lanao del Sur; and
(c) SUBMIT to the Tribunal the complete list of all the election returns,
Provincial/District Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes and other
election documents and paraphernalia used in the May 2004 National and Local
Elections for the province of Lanao del Sur which were in its official custody.
In the resolution dated December 6, 2005, the Tribunal granted protestants

motion to suspend the remittance of additional cash deposit amounting
to P3,882,000 as required in the resolution of November 22, 2005. Protestant also
manifested in said motion that she will make the required cash deposit sometime in
the year 2006. Thus, the Tribunal resolves to REQUIRE protestant to comply with
the resolution of November 22, 2005 requiring her to make additional cash deposit
of P3,882,000 within ten (10) days.
On another matter, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal notes the following

news reports:
(1) In an article entitled Recount shows fraud, says Legarda appearing in

the December 13, 2005 issue of The Manila Times, protestant Legarda said that
the election returns from Congress had been tampered after initial retabulation of
votes by the Tribunal showed that the lead of protestee De Castro over her has
widened. She added that this discovery confirmed her claim of massive poll
fraud in favor of protestee in the 2004 election.
(2) In an article entitled Intel feelers offer proof of poll fraud to Loren published in
the December 13, 2005 issue of The Daily Tribune, sources from protestants
legal team said that feelers from the militarys intelligence service arm have
reached their camp offering videotapes of cheating in the 2004 elections for a
price they cannot afford.
(3) In another article entitled Election returns altered inside CongressLoren

published in the December 15, 2005 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, protestant
claimed that the altering of election returns from Lanao del Sur occurred right
inside Congress as borne out by the spurious returns being retabulated by the
Tribunal. She said the crime could have been perpetrated by the operatives of
protestee.
(4) In a news article entitled Cebu recount shows Noli, Loren votes tally with NBC
appearing in the January 6, 2006 issue of The Manila Times, Atty. Romulo
Macalintal, counsel of protestee, stated that the initial recount in Lapu-lapu
showed that there was no tampering of the ballot boxes in the city, and further
noted that the four (4) out of the 40 ballot boxes contained tampered or spurious
ballots, but these are not connected to the protest of Senator Legarda but on local
protests.
(5) In an article entitled Noli condemns tampering of ballots appearing in the January
6, 2006 issue of Manila Standard Today, Atty. Armando Marcelo said that their
revisors at the PET discovered that several ballots of Legarda had been
substituted with fake and spurious ballots. Atty. Macalintal added that the
substitution of ballots was so clear, that the security markings of the substitute
ballots were not reflected or visible or that the ultraviolet markings of the
COMELEC seal do not appear or are not present, and that these ultraviolet
markings are readily visible in a genuine ballot once lighted with an ultraviolet
light.
(6) In an article entitled No cheating in Cebu, Noli's lawyer insists, published in the
January 19, 2006 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, Atty. Macalintal said that
the results of the actual count of the ballots for Legarda and De Castro from the
cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu tallied with the results as reflected in the
election returns and tally boards. There was no sign of any tampering of the
results of the ballot count as well as the votes reflected on the returns and tally
boards. He also said that protestant Legarda is already estopped from questioning
the results of the election in these cities since she failed to object to the returns.
(7) In an article entitled GMA-Noli poll win in Cebu affirmed, published in the
January 19, 2006 issue of The Philippine Star, it was reported that Atty.
Macalintal, in his speech before the Rotary Club of Pasay City, denied
protestants claim that 90 percent of the ballots from two major cities of the
province were found to be spurious by the Tribunal. He added that if a candidate
would allow himself to be cheated by 90 percent, then he or she has no business
to be in politics.
(8) In an article entitled Why Noli is unacceptable appearing in the January 20,
2006 issue of The Daily Tribune, protestant told the media that the real ballots
from Mandaue City and Lapu-lapu City were clearly substituted with fakes so
that they would correspond with the similarly spurious results reflected in the
election returns (ERs).
Surely, the parties do not harbor the idea that the re-tabulation of election
returns and revision of ballots is the end of the election protest. They are merely the
first phase of the process and must still pass closer scrutiny by the Tribunal.
The great public interest at stake behooves the Tribunal to exercise its power
and render judgment free from public pressure and uninterrupted by the parties
penchant for media mileage. Therefore, in view of the foregoing reports where
press statements of both parties appeared as an attempt to influence the proceedings,
convince the public of their version of facts, and create bias, prejudice and
sympathies, the Tribunal resolves to WARN both parties and counsels from
making public comments on all matters that are sub judice.
Finally, acting on the pleadings filed in this electoral protest case, the
Tribunal further Resolves to
(a) NOTE the Comment on Protestees Motion to Allow Revisors to Examine All
Ballots dated January 24, 2006, filed by counsel for protestant Legarda, in
compliance with the resolution of January 17, 2006, informing the Tribunal that
she interposes no objection and opposition to the motion and GRANT the
aforesaid motion of the protestee;
(b) DIRECT all Head Revisors to ALLOW the parties to examine the ballots
within a reasonable time;
(c) NOTE the Manifestation dated January 24, 2006, filed by counsel for
protestant relative to the Motion to Intervene filed by Intervenor/Movant
Amytis D. Batao, informing the Tribunal that she is not waiving the revision
of the thirty-five (35) ballot boxes subject of the electoral protest for the
mayoralty post of Carmen, Cebu, and proposing that priority be given and
extended to the same so that upon completion of the revision by the
Tribunal, said ballot boxes can be returned to the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, at the earliest time possible; and
(d) DENY the above Motion to Intervene of Intervenor/Movant Amytis D.
Batao, with regard to the return of the ballot boxes considering that the
Tribunal has priority in their possession and examination. Ynares Santiago,
J., no part.[15]
Revision of ballots was also conducted for the Second Aspect in the Tribunals
premises by the duly designated officials and trained personnel with both parties
duly represented. After ten months of continuous work by twenty-four revision
teams, under the supervision of Atty. Orlando Cario as the designated Consultant,
the revision of the ballots from the pilot province of Cebu was completed. Revision
also started for the second pilot province of Pampanga, but was suspended after
the Tribunal granted the protestees Motion for Partial Determination of Election
Protest Based on the Results of the Revision of Ballots of the Province of Cebu and
the Recanvass of Election Returns from Lanao Del Sur and to Hold in Abeyance
Revision of Ballots from Pampanga.[16]
On May 3, 2007, the protestant was required to deposit P3,914,500 for

expenses necessary for the continuation of the revision of ballots.[17] But protestant
failed to pay on the due date. Thus, protestee moved to dismiss the protest. The
Tribunal extended the period for protestant to make the necessary deposit. Even
with this extension, she still failed to pay. Thus, in a Resolution dated June 5, 2007,
the Tribunal partially granted the protestees motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
33[18] of PET rules, and ordered the dismissal of the Second Aspect of the protest as
follows:
PET Case No. 003 (Loren B. Legarda vs. Noli L. de Castro). Acting on the
protestees Motion to Dismiss dated May 9, 2007, the Tribunal Resolved to
(a) PARTIALLY GRANT the aforesaid motion pursuant to Rule 33 of the
2005 PET Rules; and
(b) DISMISS the second aspect of the protest (revision of ballots), for
protestants failure to make the required deposit.
The Tribunal further Resolved to DENY the request of Atty. Eric C.
Reginaldo in his letter dated May 29, 2007 that he be furnished with a copy of the
petition in this case for case study, as he is neither a party nor a counsel of any
party in this protest.[19]
On June 13, 2007, Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo submitted to the

Tribunal a Report of the Proceedings of the First Aspect.[20]
On June 18 2007, protestant filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve First Aspect

of the Protest, stating that she formally moved for the immediate resolution of the
submitted portion of the First Aspect of the protest.[21] Protestee did not interpose
any objection to this motion.
On July 10, 2007, the Tribunal resolved to note the report of the Hearing
Commissioner. In response to the motion filed by the protestant, the Tribunal
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within twenty days
from notice, pursuant to Rule 61[22] of the PET Rules.[23]
On August 2, 2007, by counsel protestant submitted her

memorandum.[24] On August 16, 2007, also by counsel protestee filed his
memorandum.[25]
On October 1, 2007, Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo submitted his

Final Report of the Proceedings on the First Aspect. After a thorough analysis of the
parties memoranda and the results of the proceedings on the protest, he
recommended the dismissal of the First Aspect.[26]
For her part, protestant filed a memorandum stating that based on the
pieces of evidence she presented, both documentary and testimonial, she has
shown that electoral fraud or cheating was committed through the so-
called dagdag-bawas strategy in the elections for President and Vice-President
held last May 14, 2004. Protestant in particular submitted that electoral fraud was
perpetuated as follows:
1. That the correct votes of the parties were properly recorded and
tabulated in the election returns (ERs), wherein she garnered a higher
number of votes over protestee De Castro;[27]
2. That when the ERs were canvassed at the municipal level, the ER results
were wrongly and erroneously transposed and transferred to the
Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOV-P), such that the protestee was given
a higher number of votes;[28]
3. That the inaccurate results shown in the SOV-P were totaled and
transferred to the Municipal Certificate of Canvass (MCOC), with
protestee prevailing over protestant;[29]
4. That the MCOC, with incorrect totals, was transmitted to the Provincial
Board of Canvassers, wherein the inaccurate MCOC totals were
transposed to the Statement of Votes by Municipalities (SOV-M);[30]
5. That the numbers reflected in the individual SOV-Ms were totaled, and
the sum for the whole province was indicated in the Provincial Certificate
of Canvass (PCOC);[31]
6. That the PCOCs, with the erroneously transposed totals stemming from
the incorrect SOV-Ps, were the ones canvassed by Congress, acting as the
National Board of Canvassers for the presidential and vice-presidential
positions;[32] and
7. That Congress, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, merely noted

and denied protestants request to view the precinct-source ERs, and
proceeded to canvass the already-manipulated/dagdag-bawas PCOCs,

resulting in the flawed and farcical victory of protestee De Castro.[33]
Protestant avers that fraud, by means of the anomalous election practices, was
sufficiently proven by using her sample-pilot precincts in two municipalities in Lanao
del Sur, particularly Balindong and Taraka. She likewise alleges that the dagdag-
bawas scheme, which was perpetrated through the deliberate and erroneous
transposition of results from the authentic ERs to the SOV-Ps, was further aggravated
by an alleged cover-up operation to hide the same. According to protestant, the
Congress-retrieved copies of the ERs which tally with the SOV-Ps, were fake and
spurious; they were intended to cover-up the electoral fraud committed. Protestant
submits that the correct voting results are those reflected in the COMELEC and
NAMFRELs copies of the ERs, not those in the copies retrieved from Congress.
Protestant further claims that while she presented pieces of evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, in only two municipalities of Lanao del
Sur, i.e., Balindong and Taraka, to prove the electoral fraud perpetrated through
the dagdag-bawas strategy, she could have shown that such
fraudulent machination was replicated in several other municipalities of Lanao del
Sur and other provinces, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Lanao del Sur if she had enough time.
Protestee, for his part, argues that the Congress-retrieved ERs are public
documents as defined under Section 19 (a),[34] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, and
thus, they enjoy the presumption of regularity accorded thereto, and they are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. He avers that there is prima
facie presumption that the Congress-retrieved copies of the ERs are genuine,
authentic and duly executed. Protestee submits that protestant has failed to rebut
such presumption with clear and convincing evidence.
Protestee adds that a blank or unused ER form duly authenticated by the

COMELEC, with the correct and complete set of security features and markings,
should have been marked and offered as evidence, to serve as basis for comparison
with the various sets of ERs presented to prove the genuiness of the security
features and markings in the ER forms. On this score, according to protestee, the
protestants counsel has failed in his task. At any rate, protestee points out that the
witnesses presented by protestant, i.e., COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos
and Mr. Robert Payongayong of the Ernest Printing Corporation, testified that they
were able to discern security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved
copies of the ERs.Protestee also claims that when Mr. Payongayong testified about
the security features on the Congress copies, he was shown only a sample set
thereof, and was not able to examine all Congress copies being
contested. Protestee thus concludes that the Tribunal cannot rely on the
testimonies of the protestants witnesses debunking the authenticity of the
Congress-retrieved copies vis--vis the other sets of ER copies.
Protestee further contends that, assuming arguendo that the results

reflected in the COMELEC, NAMFREL and MBOCs[35] copies of the ERs are re-
tabulated, in lieu of the results in the Congress-retrieved copies, or even if all the
votes in the 497 precincts included in the pilot areas, as well as in the remaining
protested precincts in the First Aspect, are counted in favor of protestant, said
votes would be insufficient to overcome the lead of the protestee totaling 881,722
votes. Hence, in view of the failure of the protestant to make out her case for
the First Aspect of the protest, the same and ultimately the protest in its entirety,
must be dismissed without consideration of the other provinces mentioned.
The Hearing Commissioner further recommended, following the precedent

set in Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,[36] that the protest be dismissed for being moot
and academic due to abandonment and withdrawal resulting from protestants
election and assumption of office as senator. He also emphasized that
assuming that dagdag-bawas had indeed occurred and that the results in the
COMELECs ER copies indicated in Annex A were to be used for re-tabulation,
protestant would be entitled to an additional 4,912 votes for the municipality of
Taraka and 5,019 votes for Balindong, or a total of 9,931 votes, which is not
adequate to surpass protestees lead of 881,722 votes over protestant.
On protestants charges of electoral fraud allegedly aggravated by a cover-up

operation that switched or exchanged the Congress ER copies with spurious ones,
the Hearing Commissioner stressed that the Congress-retrieved ERs are public
documents which enjoy the presumption of regularity and are prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein. He concluded that the protestant failed to adequately
and convincingly rebut the presumption. The Hearing Commissioner also
emphasized that protestant failed to substantiate sufficiently her claim that the
Congress-retrieved ERs are spurious and were switched with the authentic copies
during an alleged break-in at the storage area of the House of Representatives as
no evidence was presented to prove such break-in. Hence, the alleged
discrepancies found in NAMFREL, MBOC and COMELECs copies of the ERs are
insufficient to exclude the Congress-retrieved ER copies from the re-tabulation. The
Hearing Commissioner also observed that in 11 out of the 51 precincts in Balindong,
Lanao del Sur, there are similar entries in the Congress-retrieved ERs and in the
COMELECs copies of the ERs, where protestant garnered a higher number of votes
over protestee, while the entries in the respective SOV-Ms are different in that the
protestee received more votes, belying protestants assertion that the Congress-
retrieved ERs should all be disregarded since the results therein differ from those
in the COMELECs copies of ERs and that they have been manipulated to favor
protestee. Consequently, according to the Hearing Commissioners report,
protestant failed to make out her case.
Thus, the Hearing Commissioner recommended that the protestants Motion

to Resolve the First Aspect of the Protest under consideration should be denied,
and consequently, the protest itself, be dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis,
as the pilot-tested revision of ballots or re-tabulation of the certificates of canvass
would not affect the winning margin of the protestee in the final canvass of the
returns, in addition to the ground of abandonment or withdrawal by reason of her
candidacy for, election and assumption of office as Senator of the Philippines.[37]
After thorough deliberation and consideration of the issues in this case, this
Tribunal finds the abovestated recommendations of its Hearing Commissioner well-
taken, and adopts them for its own.
Further, we are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office
of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice
of,[38] has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her
determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of
who is the real choice of the electorate. The most relevant precedent on this issue
is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,[39] a decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held

that:
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six
years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the
President elected in the 11 May 1992synchronized elections. The latter would be
Protestant Santiagos term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that
she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator
then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the
very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect
and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant
protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it
would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential
election, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial political stability of the nation
during this period of national recovery.
It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public
policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15
hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10
days after the filing of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the
Tribunal are not clearly legible.
Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of
Court which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion,
hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an election protest may be
dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason,
if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.[40]
In the case at bar, protestants tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of
the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest. In Defensor-Santiago
v. Ramos, the protestants tenure in the Senate also coincided with the term of the
Presidency she was vying for. Like the protestant in the aforementioned case, the
protestant in the case at bar filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate,
campaigned for the office, assumed office after election, and discharged the duties
and functions of said office. Thus, we agree concerning the applicability of
the Defensor-Santiagocase as a precedent in the resolution of the present protest,
though they differ in that Defensor-Santiagos case involves the Presidency while
Legardas protest concerns only the Vice-Presidency.
On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the

protestee that the protestant had not adequately and convincingly rebutted the
presumption that as public documents, the Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for
the proclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are authentic and duly executed in
the regular course of official business. The evidence adduced by protestee to show
that the supposed security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs and
the COMELEC/NAMFRELs copies are different, did not categorically establish that the
Congress-retrieved ERs are fake and spurious. To overcome the presumption of
regularity, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. Absent such convincing evidence, the presumption must be
upheld.[41] In fact, the records show that even the witnesses presented by the
protestant testified that they were able to discern security features and markings in
the Congress-retrieved ERs. The records also show that witnesses were not made to
examine all Congress-retrieved ERs in making observations relative to security
features and markings, but only a sample set thereof was utilized, resulting in grave
insufficiency in the evidence presented by protestant.
As to the alleged break-in in Congress, which allegedly facilitated the

switching of ERs, no conclusive evidence has been given. One of the protestants
own witnesses, Atty. Artemio Adasa, Deputy General for Legislative Operations of
the House of Representatives, categorically denied that a break-in and a switching
of ERs had occurred in Congress.[42]
At any rate, as pointed out by protestee, even assuming arguendo that all the
votes in the 497 precincts included in the pilot areas for the First Aspect with
approximately 99,400 votes are considered in favor of protestant, still the protestant
would not be able to overcome the lead of the protestee. The margin in favor of
protestee adds up to a total of 881,722 votes, and it would take much more than a
hundred thousand votes to overcome this lead. This is what the protestant had set
out to do in her protest before the Tribunal, but unfortunately she failed to make out
her case.[43] In fact, Taraka and Balindong, the only two municipalities on which
protestant anchors her arguments for the First Aspect, would only yield an additional
9,931 votes (4,912 votes for Taraka and 5,019 votes for Balindong), a mere fraction
of the lead of protestee over protestant. To say that she could have shown that such
fraudulent machination was replicated in several other municipalities of Lanao del
Sur and other provinces, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Lanao del Sur if she had enough time, is mere conjecture and can not
be considered convincing by this Tribunal. It is the protestant herself who admits that
she was able to adduce evidence only in Taraka and Balindong, for lack of time. But
this Tribunal has been liberal in granting her plea for time extension. To say that the
protestant had shown enough evidence to prove that the whole or even half
(440,862)[44] of the lead of the protestee over the protestant is spurious, would go
against the grain of the evidence on hand. One cannot say that half a million votes
were illegally obtained based on unclear evidence of cheating in less than ten
thousand. The protestant has been afforded ample opportunity to adduce evidence
in her behalf for the First Aspect of the protest but the evidence presented is simply
insufficient to convince the Tribunal to render invalid all or even half of the 881,722
votes that protestee had over her in the last elections for Vice-President.
WHEREFORE, the First Aspect of the protest is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
legal and factual basis, as the pilot-tested revision of ballots or re-tabulation of the
certificates of canvass would not affect the winning margin of the protestee in the final
canvass of the returns, in addition to the ground of abandonment or withdrawal by
reason of protestants candidacy for, election to and assumption of the office of
Senator of the Philippines. The Second Aspect, having been already DISMISSED
on June 5, 2007, pursuant to Rule 33 of this Tribunal, the entire Protest is now
deemed DISMISSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

(On official leave) (On leave)

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA RUBEN T. REYES

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

On official leave.

On leave.
[1]
PET rollo, Vol. I, pp. 39-41.
[2]
Id. at 3-36.
[3]
Id. at 9-11.
[4]
Id. at 11-13.
[5]
Id. at 511.
[6]
Id. at 514-516.
[7]
Id. at 10; 527.
[8]
Id. at 660.
[9]
PET rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1007-1010.
[10]
Id. at 1059-1061.
[11]
Id. at 1753, August 1, 2006 PET Resolution.
xxxx
A. Hearing Commissioner
1. Designation.-The Tribunal may delegate the reception of evidence to a Hearing Commissioner who may be a
Member of the Tribunal or an official of the Tribunal who is a member of the Philippine Bar or a retired Justice
of the Supreme Court who is willing to accept the designation.
xxxx
[12]
PET rollo, Vol. III, pp. 2135-2140.
SUBPOENAE AD TESTIFICANDUM ET DUCES TECUM
TO: The President/General Manager
Ernest Printing Corporation
29 M.H. Del Pilar Street
Between 3rd and 4th Avenues, Grace Park
Caloocan City
GREETINGS:
You are hereby commanded:
(1) to appear in person before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal and its duly designated Hearing
Commissioner Ret. Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, during the scheduled hearing/proceedings of the above-
entitled case on November 3, 2006, Friday, at ten o'clock in the morning at the Division Session Hall,
Ground Floor, New SC Building and then and there to testify under oath on the following matters
and/or subjects -
The DETAILS on the aspect and on the matter of the PRINTING of the Comelec-contracted and ordered
copies of the ELECTION RETURNS and other election documents, if any, as prepared and printed by the
Ernest Printing Corporation, which printed documents were used in the May 10, 2004 elections, and in
particular, on matters respecting the placing and/or incorporating in the said election documents, of
some or several secret marks or any other security feature/s, if any including some other details
material and relevant to and/or related to or connected with the AUTHORITY of Ernest Printing
Corporation to undertake such actual printing of the said election returns and other election
documents.
(2) to bring with you the following -
Any and all documents such as CONTRACTS, AGREEMENTS and/or AWARDS between Ernest Printing Corp.
and COMELEC that would show and prove the scope of the AUTHORITY of Ernest Printing Corporation
to undertake the PRINTING of the election returns and other election documents, as extended or
granted unto it by the Commission on Elections; as well as any and all other documents on any
pertinent matter/s and subject/s relative to and/or connected with, the contracted or awarded
PRINTING of election returns and other election documents to the said Ernest Printing Corporation.
FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
WITNESS the Honorable Bernardo P. Pardo, Ret. Associate Justice, this 25 th day of October 2006.
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of the Tribunal
[13]
SUBPOENAE AD TESTIFICANDUM ET DUCES TECUM
TO: Chairman Benjamin Abalos
Commission on Elections
Main Office, Aduana
Intramuros, Manila
GREETINGS:
You are hereby commanded:
(1) to appear in person before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal and its designated Honorable Hearing
Commissioner Ret. Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, during the scheduled hearing/proceedings of the above-
entitled case at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of Monday, September 18, 2006, Division Session Hall, Ground
Floor, New SC Building and then and there to testify on the originals of the COMELEC copies of the various
election documents herein below enumerated, described and specified, and also to further testify on other
matters related to the said various election documents in the possession and custody of the Commission on
Elections, coming from and/or pertaining to, the Municipalities of Balindong and Taraka, Lanao del Sur as
well as the Province of Lanao del Sur;
(2) bring with you to the Tribunal the following documents, therein below specified:
[a] The ORIGINALS of the ELECTION RETURNS-copies for the COMELEC, for the
Municipalities of Balindong and Taraka, Lanao del Sur used in the May 10, 2004 elections;
[b] The Originals of the COMELEC COPIES of the Municipal Certificate of Canvass for the
Municipalities of Balindong and Taraka, Lanao del Sur, and their accompanying Originals-
Comelec copies of the STATEMENT OF VOTES BY PRECINCT for the same Municipalities
of Balindong and Taraka, Lanao del Sur, used in the May 10, 2004 election; and
[c] The Originals of the COMELEC COPIES of the Provincial CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS for
the Province of Lanao Del Sur used by COMELEC in senatorial canvass for the May 10,
2004 elections, including their accompanying Originals of the COMELEC COPIES of
the STATEMENT OF VOTES BY MUNICIPALITY for the Province of Lanao del Sur.
You shall also testify on the various election documents above enumerated in respect to their printing,
their genuineness and authenticity, and on the presence of SECURITY FEATURES contained, placed and/or
embedded therein, should there be any.
FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
WITNESS the Honorable Bernardo P. Pardo, Ret. Associate Justice, this 13 th day of September 2006.
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of the Tribunal
[14]
[15]
[16]
Id. at 1592-1600.
[17]
PET rollo, Vol. III, p. 2500.
[18]
RULES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (2005), Rule 33.
RULE 33. Effect of failure to make cash deposit. If a party fails to make the cash deposits or additional deposits herein
required within the prescribed time limit, the Tribunal may dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or take such
action as it may deem equitable under the circumstances.
[19]
[20]
Id. at 2564-2576.
[21]
Id. at 2615-2618.
[22]
RULES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (2005), Rule 61.
RULE 61. When submitted; contents. Within twenty days from receipt of the Tribunals ruling on the last offer of
evidence by the protestee, the parties shall simultaneously submit their respective memoranda setting forth briefly:
(a) The facts of the case;
(b) A complete statement of all the arguments submitted in support of their respective views of the case;
(c) Objections to the ballots adjudicated to or claimed by the other party in the revision of ballots;
(d) Refutation of the objections of the other party to the ballots adjudicated to or claimed in the revision of
ballots;
(e) Objections to the tallying of election returns and certificates of canvass raised by the other party in the
correction of manifest error; and
(f) Refutation of the objections raised by the other party to the tallying of election returns and certificates of
canvass in the correction of manifest error.
All evidence, as well as objections to evidence presented by the other party, shall be either referred to or contained in
the memorandum or in an appendix thereto.
[23]
[24]
Id. at 2661-2684.
[25]
Id. at 2712-2733.
[26]
Id. at 2834-2844.
[27]
Id. at 2671-2673.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Id.
[30]
Id.
[31]
Id.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id.
[34]
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
xxxx
[35]
Municipal Board of Canvassers.
[36]
P.E.T. Case No. 001, February 13, 1996, 253 SCRA 559.
[37]
[38]
Saludo, Jr. v. American Express International, Inc., G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 462, 483, held that courts
are allowed to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
[39]
Supra note 36.
[40]
Id. at 574-575.
[41]
Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476.
[42]
TSN, November 6, 2006, pp. 89-96.
[43]
RULES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (2005), Rule 63. Dismissal; when proper. - The Tribunal may require the
protestant or counter-protestant to indicate, within a fixed period, the province or provinces numbering not more than
three, best exemplifying the frauds or irregularities alleged in his petition; and the revision of ballots and reception of
evidence will begin with such provinces. If upon examination of such ballots and proof, and after making reasonable
allowances, the Tribunal is convinced that, taking all circumstances into account, the protestant or counter-protestant will
most probably fail to make out his case, the protest may forthwith be dismissed, without further consideration of the other
provinces mentioned in the protest.
The preceding paragraph shall also apply when the election protest involves correction of manifest errors.
[44]
Computed as follows: 881,722 + 1 = 440,862.
2
Legarda vs. De Castro
4. In 2004, the National Board of Canvassers Noli de Castro (15,100,431) was proclaimed
as Vice-Presidential-elect, with Loren Legarda coming in second the the VP race (14,218,709).
2. Legarda filed an election protest against De Castro before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) alleging election fraud .
- It has 2 main parts:
i. First Aspect - correct results appearing in the election returns were not properly
transferred and reflected in the final canvass.
- Legarda seeks the recomputation, recanvass, and retabulation of
the election returns.
ii. Second Aspect - revision of ballots in 124,404 precincts specified in the protest.
a. De Castro filed a motion for outright dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. - denied; PET
confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest; the protest is sufficient in form and substance,
Legarda having enumerated all the provinces, municipalities, and cities where she questions the
returns.
b. De Castro filed an MR assailing the PET Resolution, arguing that:
i. Where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots.
ii. The process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is
a function of the canvassing bodies.
iii. Once the canvassing bodies had done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest
errors can be made
iv. Since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the
facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts, it cannot perform the
ministerial function of canvassing election returns
v. The averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are inadequate to
form a valid cause of action.
vi. The allegations are not supported by the facts.
v. The Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statement of votes and certificate of
canvass.
ISSUE: Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the statement of votes and certificate of
canvass? No.
1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is
expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the
duty to correct manifest errors in the (statement of votes) SOVs and COCs.
2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election contest
where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved. However, we do not
find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of the protest, considering that the protestant
concedes the correctness of the ballot results, concerning the number of votes obtained by both
protestant and protestee, and reflected in the election returns. Protestant merely seeks the
correction of manifest errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and
addition of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these circumstances, might
only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.
Doctrine:
The justices of the Supreme Court are triers of facts when they participate in the conduct of an
election contest involving candidates for president and vice president. This allows the party in
the election contest to raise any other issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court because in this case, the Court now exercises its power of judicial review.
Issues that may be resolved by the PET in an election contest:
3. 1. election
4. 2. returns
5. 3. qualifications
5. In 2004, Noli de Castro was proclaimed as VP-elect, with Loren Legarda coming in
second.
6. Legarda filed an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) alleging
electoral fraud more commonly known as “dagdag bawas”
It has two main parts:
a. First Aspect - where she sought recomputation, recanvass, and retabulation of
election returns.
b. Second Aspect - where she sought a revision of ballots in 124,404 precincts
specified in the protest
3. De Castro filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction stating that:
- The Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statement of votes and
certificate of canvass, since the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power.
6. The PET denied his motion and confirmed its jurisdiction.
Issue: W/N the PET can correct the manifest errors in the statement of votes and certificate of
votes. - YES.
5. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is
expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the
duty to correct manifest errors in the statement of votes (SOVs) and certificates of canvass
(COCs).
6. Nevertheless, the PET did not grant Legarda’s protest for the ff, reasons:
A. She failed to prove using her sample-precincts; one cannot say that half a million votes were
illegally obtained based on unclear evidence of cheating in less than 10,000.
B. She is deemed to have abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public
interested involved in her protest in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties.
C. Even if the pilot areas for the First Aspect are considered in her favor, still the protestatnt
would not be able to ocvercome the lead of the protestee.

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The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA,

approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

inhibits himself on account of personal pecuniary interest therein.

dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.

3. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions.

8. Respondents interpose the defense of

REMEDY: Seek enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of RA 8240.

Interpellation - to question formally concerning an official action or policy or personal conduct

2. Based on Justice Concepcion’s sponsorship statement in the Constitutional Commission:

a. Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the

Presumption of good faith.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

LOREN B. LEGARDA, P.E.T. Case No. 003

NOLI L. DE CASTRO, Promulgated:

The Second Aspect required revision of ballots in 124,404 precincts specified

On March 31, 2005, the Tribunal ruled that:

On a related matter, the protestant in her reiterating motion prays for

WHEREFORE, protestees motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED

Further, the protestant LOREN B. LEGARDA is ORDERED to specify,

Lastly, the Tribunal hereby ORDERS the Commission on Elections

number of protested precincts: 1,607, 2,346 and 350, respectively, or a total of

Accordingly, without prejudice to its recomputation, the number of ballot

Lanao del Sur - 1,568

On November 2, 2005 protestant moved to withdraw and abandon almost

the President/General Manager of Ernest Printing Corporation[12] and then

The undersigned Hearing Commissioner set the initial hearing tentatively on

Therefore, acting on the aforementioned report of the Acting Clerk, the

when compared to the COMELECs total number of clustered precincts for

In the resolution dated December 6, 2005, the Tribunal granted protestants

On another matter, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal notes the following

(1) In an article entitled Recount shows fraud, says Legarda appearing in

(3) In another article entitled Election returns altered inside CongressLoren

On May 3, 2007, the protestant was required to deposit P3,914,500 for

On June 13, 2007, Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo submitted to the

On June 18 2007, protestant filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve First Aspect

On August 2, 2007, by counsel protestant submitted her

On October 1, 2007, Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo submitted his

7. That Congress, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, merely noted

proceeded to canvass the already-manipulated/dagdag-bawas PCOCs,

Protestee adds that a blank or unused ER form duly authenticated by the

Protestee further contends that, assuming arguendo that the results

The Hearing Commissioner further recommended, following the precedent

On protestants charges of electoral fraud allegedly aggravated by a cover-up

Thus, the Hearing Commissioner recommended that the protestants Motion

is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,[39] a decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held

(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;

On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the

As to the alleged break-in in Congress, which allegedly facilitated the

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

(On official leave) (On leave)

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA RUBEN T. REYES

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO