2-15-19 US Manafort Sentencing Memo

Case 1:18-cr-00083-TSE Document 314 Filed 02/15/19 Page 1 of 27 PageID# 6856
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., Crim. No. 1:18-cr-83 (TSE)
Defendant.
THE GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
The United States of America, by and through Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III,
files this submission to address the sentencing of defendant Paul J. Manafort, Jr.
As an initial matter, the government agrees with the guidelines analysis in the
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and its calculation of the defendant’s Total Offense
Level as 38 with a corresponding range of imprisonment of 235 to 293 months, a fine range of
$50,000 to $24,371,497.74, a term of supervised release of up to five years, restitution in the
amount of $24,815,108.74, and forfeiture in the amount of $4,412,500.
Second, while the government does not take a position as to the specific sentence to be
imposed here, the government sets forth below its assessment of the nature of the offenses and
the characteristics of the defendant under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). The
defendant stands convicted of the serious crimes of tax fraud, bank fraud, and failing to file a
foreign bank account report. Manafort was the lead perpetrator and a direct beneficiary of each
offense. And while some of these offenses are commonly prosecuted, there was nothing
ordinary about the millions of dollars involved in the defendant’s crimes, the duration of his
criminal conduct, or the sophistication of his schemes.1 Together with the relevant criminal
conduct, Manafort’s misconduct involved more than $16 million in unreported income resulting
in more than $6 million in federal taxes owed, more than $55 million hidden in foreign bank
accounts, and more than $25 million secured from financial institutions through lies resulting in
a fraud loss of more than $6 million. Manafort committed these crimes over an extended period
of time, from at least 2010 to 2016. His criminal decisions were not momentary or limited in
time; they were routine. And Manafort’s repeated misrepresentations to financial institutions
were brazen, at least some of which were made at a time when he was the subject of significant
national attention.
Neither the Probation Department nor the government is aware of any mitigating factors.
Manafort did not commit these crimes out of necessity or hardship. He was well educated,
professionally successful, and financially well off. He nonetheless cheated the United States
Treasury and the public out of more than $6 million in taxes at a time when he had substantial
resources. Manafort committed bank fraud to supplement his liquidity because his lavish
spending exhausted his substantial cash resources when his overseas income dwindled.
Finally, Manafort pled guilty in September 2018 in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia to others crimes committed over an even longer period. The
government references those crimes below principally as they pertain to the Section 3553(a)
factors and, in particular, because they demonstrate the defendant’s concerted criminality,
including the conduct to which he pled guilty, from as early as 2005 and continuing up until the
1
Manafort was being investigated prior to the May 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel by
prosecutors in this district and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. See Motion Hearing
Tr., May 4, 2018, at 4.
2
defendant’s involvement in an obstruction of justice conspiracy between February 23, 2018 and
April 2018—a crime Manafort committed while under indictment in two jurisdictions and
subject to court-ordered bail conditions in each. The District of Columbia offenses are also
relevant to the application of § 2S1.3(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines to the FBAR offenses
and to the issue of acceptance of responsibility, as discussed below.
In the end, Manafort acted for more than a decade as if he were above the law, and
deprived the federal government and various financial institutions of millions of dollars. The
sentence here should reflect the seriousness of these crimes, and serve to both deter Manafort and
others from engaging in such conduct.
I. Procedural History
On February 22, 2018, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia returned a
32-count Superseding Indictment charging Manafort and co-defendant Richard Gates with a
series of crimes involving tax fraud, failure to file foreign bank account reports, and bank fraud.
Superseding Indictment, Feb. 2, 2019, Doc. 9.
The defendant proceeded to trial on July 31, 2018 and, on August 21, the jury convicted
the defendant on eight counts: Counts 1 through 5 (filing false income tax returns for the years
2010 to 2014); Count 12 (failing to file a report of foreign bank and financial accounts (FBAR)
in 2012), and Counts 25 and 27 (bank fraud relating to a Citizens Bank loan for the Howard
Street property in New York, and a Banc of California commercial loan, respectively). The jury
did not reach a verdict on the remaining ten counts.2
2
The Jury Verdict Form indicated that the jury voted eleven to one in favor of guilt on all ten counts for
which it did not reach a verdict. See Jury Verdict Form, Aug. 21, 2018, Doc. 280.
3
II. Trial Evidence
Given the Court’s familiarity with the trial evidence, the government only briefly outlines
it below.
A. Tax Charges
Manafort’s tax returns were false as to the stated income and the fact that in each year
Manafort failed to report the existence of his overseas bank accounts. The government proved
Manafort’s unreported income through a series of payments from his overseas accounts to
vendors for various goods and services and for the purchase and improvement of real estate in
New York and Virginia.3 FBI Forensic Accountant Morgan Magionos traced each wire transfer,
detailing the banks and accounts over the period from 2010 to 2014, and calculated the total
3
The evidence supporting the false returns included both testimony and documentary evidence. Eight
vendors testified about receiving payments from overseas accounts for goods, services, or real estate
purchased by the defendant in the United States. See Trial Tr. at 285-312 (Testimony of Maximillian
Katzman from Alan Couture); id. at 312-29 (Testimony of Ronald Wall from House of Bijan); id. at 339-
49 (Testimony of Daniel Opsut from American Service Center/Mercedes-Benz of Alexandria); id. at 349-
59 (Testimony of Wayne Holland from McEnearney Associates); id. at 361-91 (Testimony of Stephen
Jacobson from SP&C Home Improvement); id. at 393-410 (Testimony of Doug DeLuca from Federal
Stone and Brick); id. at 435-461 (Testimony of Joel Maxwell from Big Picture Solutions); id. at 469-91
(Testimony of Michael Regolizio from New Leaf Landscape). This testimony was corroborated by
invoices, banks statements, emails, and other documentary evidence. See, e.g., Government Exhibit 94A
(SP&C Home Improvement Invoices 2010-2014); Government Exhibit 95A (SP&C Home Improvement
Bank Records); Government Exhibit 97A (Alan Couture Invoices 2010-2014); Government Exhibit 98
(Alan Couture Bank Records); Government Exhibit 99 (March 21, 2011 Email from Manafort to M.
Katzman). Evidence with respect to six additional vendors and three real estate purchases, and supporting
documentation, was admitted by stipulation. See e.g., Government Exhibit 327 (Stipulation Regarding
Aegis Holdings, LLC); Government Exhibit 329 (Stipulation Regarding J&J Oriental Rug Gallery);
Government Exhibit 332 (Stipulation Regarding Don Beyer Motors, Inc.); Government Exhibit 334
(Stipulation Regarding Sabatello Construction of Florida, Inc.); Government Exhibit 335 (Stipulation
Regarding Scott L. Wilson Landscaping & Tree Specialists, Inc.); Government Exhibit 336 (Stipulation
Regarding Sensoryphile, Inc.); Government Exhibit 328 (Stipulation Relating to the Purchase of 377
Union Street, Brooklyn, New York); Government Exhibit 330 (Stipulation Relating to the Purchase of 29
Howard Street #4, New York, New York); Government Exhibit 331 (Stipulation Relating to the Purchase
of 1046 N. Edgewood Street, Arlington, Virginia).
4
amount to be $15,571,046, as reflected on Government Exhibit 72 (attached as Exhibit A).4
Additionally, the government proved that Manafort further misrepresented his income by falsely
characterizing certain income as loans.5
IRS Revenue Agent Michael Welch testified that Manafort failed to report more than $16
million in income on line 22 of his tax returns during tax years 2010 through 2014, as
documented in Government Exhibit 77 (attached as Exhibit B).6 Welch also testified that
Manafort failed to identify any of his foreign bank accounts on Schedule B, Line 7A for the
years from 2010 to 2014.7 The IRS has determined that Manafort owed $6,164,032 in taxes for
his unreported income. See PSR, ¶ 36.
B. FBAR Charges
Manafort was found guilty of the Count 12 FBAR charge relating to 2012. Under the
Sentencing Guidelines the FBAR charges in Counts 11, 13 and 14, for the years 2011, 2013, and
2014, respectively, constitute relevant conduct. See PSR, ¶ 75. FBI Forensic Accountant
Magionos, using a series of charts, testified that Manafort maintained 31 overseas accounts in
three countries and listed the aggregate maximum value in those accounts in each year from
2011 to 2014 as reflected on the following exhibits:8
 Government Exhibit 73B documented the aggregate maximum value of foreign bank
accounts controlled by Manafort in 2011 that totaled approximately $8.3 million;
4
See Trial Tr. at 1617-20 (Testimony of Morgan Magionos).
5
See Trial Tr. at 903-06 (Cindy LaPorta testified that Gates proposed changing the amount of Manafort’s
alleged loans to reduce his total taxable income); see id. at 1107-09 (Gates testified that at Manafort’s
direction he instructed Manafort’s bookkeeper and tax preparers to treat certain income as loans to avoid
paying taxes on the income).
6
See Trial Tr. at 1679-82 (Testimony of Michael Welch).
7
Id. at 1695-97.
8
See Trial Tr. at 1620-24 (Testimony of Morgan Magionos).
5
 Government Exhibit 73C documented the aggregate maximum value of foreign bank
 Government Exhibit 73D documented the aggregate maximum value of foreign bank
 Government Exhibit 73E documented the aggregate maximum value of foreign bank
accounts in 2014 that totaled approximately $2.7 million.9
Copies of Government Exhibits 73B, 73C, 73D and 73E are attached as Exhibit C.
C. Bank Frauds
The jury convicted Manafort of the two bank fraud schemes charged in Counts 25 and 27.
Manafort sought both loans at a time when he was no longer receiving income from Ukraine.
Count 25 charged Manafort with defrauding Citizens Bank of $3.4 million relating to a
loan for property on Howard Street in New York, New York. As part of that fraud, the
government proved at trial that the defendant made, or caused to be made, the following three
material false statements between December 2015 and March 2016: (1) that the Howard Street
residence was his second home; (2) that a $1.5 million dollar loan from a Cyprus entity named
Peranova had been forgiven in the prior year; and (3) that there was no mortgage on Manafort’s
Union Street property in Brooklyn, New York.10 Two bank witnesses, Manafort’s tax preparer
and bookkeeper, and Rick Gates testified to the details of the charged scheme. Their testimony
9
Special Agent Paula Liss from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network testified that no FBAR
reports were filed by Manafort or his related entities in the relevant time period. See Trial Tr. at 1080-81;
2293-94.
10
See Trial Tr. at 2409 (government summation identifying false statements relating to the Counts 24 and
25 Citizens Bank fraud/conspiracy charges involving the Howard Street property).
6
was corroborated by a series of emails, tax returns, and insurance documents, among other
documentary evidence.11
Manafort was also convicted, in Count 27, of defrauding the Banc of California with
respect to a $1 million dollar commercial loan. The government proved at trial that the
defendant made, or caused to be made, the following material false statements: (1) omitting to
report his Howard Street mortgage on his loan application; and (2) submitting a materially false
2015 DMP Profit and Loss Statement.12 Among other evidence, Washkuhn and Gates testified
about the false DMP Profit and Loss Statements submitted to the bank, with Gates explaining the
various emails in which Manafort directed him to manipulate the relevant financial statement.13
11
Melinda James (née Francis) from Citizens Bank testified that Manafort represented the Howard Street
property to be a second home and that Manafort represented that there was no mortgage on the Union
Street property. See Trial Tr. at 1747, 1755. Tax preparer Cindy LaPorta testified about her
representations relating to the Peranova loan to Citizens Bank, nothwithstanding the fact that she had
concerns it was never a loan at all, see Trial Tr. at 944-59, as did Gates, who also noted that money from
Peranova was income and was never a loan, see Trial Tr. at 1297-1308. Bookkeeper Heather Washkuhn
testified that at the time of the Howard Street loan, there was a mortgage on the Union Street property.
See Trial Tr. at 596-601. The supporting documentary evidence included the following: Government
Exhibit 227 (Manafort’s bank application identifying the Howard Street property as a second residence);
Government Exhibit 337L (2015 MC Soho Tax Return reporting $115,987 in rental income for Howard
Street apartment); Government Exhibit 337M (2016 MC Soho Tax Return reporting $108,000 in rental
income for Howard Street apartment); Government Exhibit 127 (February 5, 2015 email relating to rental
income from the Howard Street apartment); Government Exhibit 503 (March 12, 2016 email relating to
rental earnings generated from the Howard Street property); Government Exhibit 422 (January 26, 2016
email from Manafort to his son-in-law reminding him that the appraiser is coming to the Howard Street
apartment, who believes that the son-in-law and his wife live in the apartment); Government Exhibit 118
(Airbnb records relating to the rental of the Howard Street apartment); Government Exhibit 500
(Stipulation regarding Genesis Capital mortgage on Union Street Property).
12
See Trial Tr. at 2418-21 (government summation identifying false statements relating to the Counts 26
and 27 Banc of California commercial loan fraud/conspiracy).
13
Gates testified that at Manafort’s direction he altered the 2015 DMP Profit and Loss Statement that was
ultimately sent to the Banc of California. See Trial Tr. at 1317-26. Washkuhn testified to the falsity of
the submitted 2015 DMP Profit and Loss Statement. See Trial Tr. at 601-19. The supporting
documentary evidence included among other evidence: Government Exhibit 140 (March 16, 2016 emails
between Gates and Washkuhn involving the 2015 DMP Profit and Loss Statement); Government Exhibit
392 (March 16, 2016 email between Manafort and Gates involving the 2015 DMP Profit and Loss
Statement); and Government Exhibit 298 (March 16, 2016 email from Manafort to Perris Kaufman
7
With respect to the three other bank frauds for which the jury failed to reach a verdict,
one involving a $5.5 million loan from Citizens Bank (charged only as a conspiracy) and two
involving loans from The Federal Savings Bank, one for $9.5 million and the other for $6.5
million, respectively, the defendant admitted to his involvement in each of these bank frauds as
part of his guilty plea in the District of Columbia.14 The evidence at trial established those same
facts through witness testimony and documentary evidence.15
With respect to the Union Street loan conspiracy involving Citizens Bank, charged in
Count 28, Manafort pledged his property at 377 Union Street in Brooklyn, New York. At the
attaching false 2015 DMP Profit and Loss Statement). Gary Seferian, Senior Vice President of the
Managed Assets Group at the Banc of California, testified about the loan process and the materiality of
Manafort’s false statements. See Trial Tr. at 1958-88.
Plea Agreement, United States v. Manafort, 1:17-cr-201 (ABJ) (D.D.C. Sept.14, 2018), Doc 422 (“D.C.
14
Plea Agreement”); Statement of the Offenses and Other Acts, United States v. Manafort, 1:17-cr-201
(ABJ) (D.D.C. Sept.14, 2018), Doc 423 (“D.C. Statement of the Offense”) (collectively attached as
Exhibit D).
15
With respect to the Citizens Bank Union Street loan, Manafort made, or caused to be made, the
following misrepresentations: (a) he caused to be submitted a false 2016 DMP Profit and Loss Statement;
and (b) he falsely claimed the Peranova loan was forgiven and made false statements about his income.
See Trial Tr. at 2418-21 (government summation identifying false statements relating to Counts 28
Citizens Bank Union Street loan conspiracy). Taryn Rodriguez from Citizens Bank testified about the
loans process, see Trial Tr. at 1906-37, LaPorta testified about the Peranova loan issues, see id., at 947-
59, as did Gates, see id. at 1326-30, and Washkuhn testified about the false DMP Profit and Loss
Statement comparing it to the original she prepared, see id. at 631-32. With respect to The Federal
Savings Bank loans, Manafort made, or caused to be made, the following misrepresentations as to both
loans: (a) he caused to be submitted a false 2015 DMP Profit and Loss Statement; (b) he caused to be
submitted a false 2016 DMP Profit and Loss Statement; (c) he falsely claimed that the $300,000
delinquency on his American Express Card resulted from lending that credit card to Rick Gates to buy
New York Yankees tickets; and (d) he made false statements about his mortgage on the Howard Street
property. See Trial Tr. at 2423-24 (government summation identifying false statements relating to the
Counts 29, 30, 31 and 32 bank fraud/conspiracies relating to two loans from The Federal Savings Bank).
Three bank witnesses testified about The Federal Savings Bank Loans: Dennis Raico, see Trial Tr. at
2008-77; James Brennan, id. at 2164-2199; and Andrew Chojnowski, see id. at 2129-43. Among other
testimony, Washkuhn identified the various submitted DMP Profit and Loss Statements as false. See
Trial Tr. at 620-32. Gates testified that he never sought to borrow Manafort’s American Express card and
that he did not incur the $300,000 delinquency for Yankees tickets, but rather that those tickets were for
Manafort. See Trial Tr. at 1352-54.
8
time of his application, the Union Street property was encumbered by a $5.3 million dollar loan
from Genesis Capital. Manafort failed to disclose this mortgage to Citizens Bank at the time of
the Count 28 conspiracy, nor previously as part of the $3.4 million Citizens Howard Street loan
application (charged in Counts 24 and 25). Taryn Rodriguez from Citizens Bank testified to this
fact, noting that she later found the loan on her own.16 At trial, Manafort never disputed the
existence of the Genesis Capital loan and in fact agreed to the underlying details in Government
Exhibit 500, a stipulation between the parties relating to the Genesis Capital loan on Union Street
property.
III. Standards Governing Sentencing
The Fourth Circuit has held that a sentencing court must: “(1) properly calculate the
[Sentencing] Guidelines range; (2) allow the parties to argue for the sentence they deem
appropriate and determine whether the § 3553(a) factors support the sentence[s] requested by the
parties; and (3) explain its reasons for selecting a sentence.” United States v. Simmons, 269 Fed.
Appx. 272, 273 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir.
2007)). Although the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 246 (2005), “district courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain
cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.
6 (2007); see Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904 (2018) (“[E]ven in an
advisory capacity the Guidelines serve as ‘a meaningful benchmark’ in the initial determination
of a sentence and ‘through the process of appellate review.’”) (citation omitted).
16 See Trial Tr. at 1911-1917.

9
IV. The Advisory Guidelines Range
The government agrees with the Probation Department’s guidelines calculations in the
PSR and addresses that analysis below together with the defendant’s challenges. See Defense
Objections to the PSR (dated January 21, 2019).
A. Tax and FBAR Guidelines (Group 1)
1. Section 2S1.3 is the Relevant Guideline Provision
As noted in the PSR, the base offense level for the Group 1 tax and FBAR counts is level
6, pursuant to § 2S1.3(b)(2), with 22 levels added based on the value of the funds held—here,
more than $55 million, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L). See PSR ¶¶ 73-74.17
The defendant argues that the tax guidelines, and not § 2S1.3, is the appropriate starting
point for the Group 1 FBAR and tax offenses, citing United States v. Kim, 1:17-cr-00248
(TSE/LMB) (E.D. Va. 2018). See Defense Objections to the PSR, at 1-2. As detailed in the PSR
Addendum, the defendant’s arguments lack merit. See PSR Addendum, 52-53.
First, the Guidelines explicitly distinguish between the various reporting crimes at issue
here (covered by § 2S1.3) and tax offenses (covered by Part T). For example, the commentary to
§ 2S1.3, under the title “Statutory Provisions,” explicitly lists 31 U.S.C. § 5313—the statute of
which Manafort was convicted in Count 12. Further, § 2S1.3(c)(1) addresses a reporting
violation committed for the purposes of evading taxes, and specifically calls for use of the tax
guidelines only if the resulting offense level is greater than the one determined under § 2S1.3.18
17
The base offense level is 6 pursuant to § 2S1.3(b)(2) because the offense at issue is not enumerated in §
2S1.3(b)(1).
18
Section 2S1.3(c)(1), entitled “Cross Reference,” reading as follows: “If the offense was committed for
the purposes of violating the Internal Revenue laws, apply the most appropriate guideline from Chapter
10
That criterion is not satisfied here: “the resulting offense level” under Chapter 2T of the
guidelines is less than the Chapter 2S calculation. See United States v. Hill, 171 Fed. Appx. 815,
821-22 (11th Cir. 2006) (“§ 2S1.3(c)(1) was not applicable because the offense level of 16 that
would have resulted from the court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(a)(1), would have been less
than 17—the offense level that resulted from the court’s application of § 2S1.3(a) & (b)(1)”)
(footnote omitted).
Moreover, Manafort’s FBAR offense was not committed solely for allowing him to
violate the tax laws. Rather, his use of and access to unreported overseas accounts also
facilitated the money laundering and unregistered-foreign-agent (FARA) schemes to which he
pled guilty in Count One of a superseding information in the District of Columbia.19
Accordingly, the tax guidelines are not appropriate here, both because the tax guidelines are not
higher, as required by § 2S1.3(c)(1), and because the gravamen of the crime here was not solely
tax avoidance.
As part of his plea in the District of Columbia, Manafort pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to
transfer funds from outside the United States to the United States with the intent to promote the
felony FARA violations.20 Manafort’s scheme involved more than $6.5 million dollars in
transfers from the very overseas accounts that Manafort failed to report on his tax returns and
under the FBAR process.21
Two, Part T (Offenses Involving Taxation) if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined
above.”
19
See D.C. Plea Agreement; D.C. Statement of the Offense ¶ 36-37.
20
Id.
21
Notably, in his objections to the PSR, the defendant falsely characterized his guilty plea in the District
of Columbia as involving only a “general conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act,”
11
Finally, Manafort argues that the Part T guidelines are appropriate because they were
used in older cases, such as United States v. Kim, supra, and thus should continue to be used to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities for similar defendants. The government disagrees for
two reasons. First, in late 2017, the Department of Justice’s Tax Division clarified its
interpretation as to the appropriate guidelines applicable to FBAR violations, and its current
position is consistent with that of the Probation Office in this matter; and second, the facts at
issue here differ from those of the Kim prosecution.
The Tax Division changed its position on the appropriate guideline provision in FBAR
cases sometime in late 2017. Manafort was aware of the government’s position prior to this trial,
at the very least because the Special Counsel’s Office made clear its view that the relevant
guideline is § 2S1.3. Further, in Kim itself, the Tax Division and Probation Office took the
position that the appropriate guideline was § 2S1.3. See Kim Plea Agreement, at 3-4 (attached
as Government Exhibit E) (“The Government contends that the applicable Guideline in this
matter should be U.S.S.G § 2S1.3(a)(2), § 2B1.1 and § 2S1.3(b)(2) because the defendant filed
two false FBARs and a false U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1020, within a 12-month
period. However, at the time that the defendant agreed to plead guilty, the Government
consistently took the position with similarly situated defendants that the applicable Guideline
was U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 and § 2T1.4 due to the cross reference in § 2S1.3(c)(1). Therefore, in
order to ensure that the defendant receives equitable treatment, and in accordance with Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B), the United States and the defendant will recommend to
Def. Obj. to PSR, at 3, without any mention to the fact that his plea also included a money laundering
conspiracy, among other offenses. See D.C. Plea Agreement; D.C. Statement of the Offense ¶ 36-37.
12
the Court that the following provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines apply: [the Tax
Guidelines].”); Government Sentencing Brief, at 6 (attached as Government Exhibit F) (“The
defendant pled guilty to the willful failure to file an FBAR, in violation of 31 U.S.C. Sections
5314 and 5322. The offense of conviction in this case falls under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3. The
Probation Office calculated the Guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3(a)(2)”).
Further, as noted, the circumstances of the Kim and Manafort prosecutions and the
conduct at issue are easily distinguished. In Kim, the defendant entered into a negotiated plea
agreement which involved his cooperation, and the plea was entered into pursuant to Rule
11(c)(1)(B). Manafort’s FBAR offenses, in contrast, served to facilitate his tax offenses and his
FARA and money laundering offenses. Further, the Kim prosecution was part of a series of
prosecutions involving the use of overseas accounts to hide tax offenses, and thus the concern
over parity with similarly situated defendants prosecuted at the same time was at its height.
Calculating Manafort’s advisory Guidelines range under § 2S1.3 for an FBAR offense, even if he
is one of the first defendants to be sentenced in that manner, would not constitute disparate
treatment because his conduct, and the circumstances at issue, were different than in Kim.
2. A Role Enhancement is Appropriate
The PSR concluded that Manafort should receive a four-level role enhancement for the
Group 1 offenses, pursuant § 3B1.1(a), on the basis that “the defendant was an organizer or
leader of a criminal activity that was otherwise extensive.” PSR, ¶ 78. The relevant test is the
number of persons involved in the offenses, whether they were witting or unwitting. See United
States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 338 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1
explains that, in determining if a criminal activity is ‘otherwise extensive,’ all persons involved
13
during the course of the entire offense are to be considered, including outsiders who provided
unwitting services and thus do not qualify as ‘participants.’”); United States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d
580, 585 (4th Cir. 1991) (role enhancement based on “otherwise extensive” prong based on “‘all
persons involved during the course of the entire offense,’ even the ‘unknowing services of many
outsiders’”).
Manafort’s criminal conduct meets this standard. Manafort controlled the money at
issue, he recruited others to facilitate these crimes, and he claimed a larger share of the proceeds.
Further, Manafort was plainly the leader. He involved numerous individuals who were both
knowing and unknowing participants in the criminal scheme. These included Gates and
Konstantin Kilimnik, Manafort’s tax preparers (Ayliff, LaPorta, Naji Lakkis, Dan Walters, and
Conor O’Brien) and bookkeepers (Hesham Ali and Washkuhn), and others in Cyprus who were
involved in originating and maintaining the defendant’s overseas accounts.22 Under the factors
set forth in the Guidelines application notes and applied by the Fourth Circuit, application of the
leadership enhancement is warranted. See United States v. Jones, 495 F. App’x 371, 373 (4th
Cir. 2012) (“In determining a defendant’s leadership and organizational role, sentencing courts
must consider seven factors: [T]he exercise of decision making authority, the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right
to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing
the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority
22
The corporate entity and bank account documents relating to the overseas accounts listed a variety of
individuals associated with Dr. Kypros Chrysostomides firm’s, including Eleni Chrysostomides,
Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris, Myrianthi Christou, Evelina Georgiades, and Georgoula Mavrides. See e.g.,
Government Exhibit 63 (chart of foreign entities); Government Exhibit 73B (chart listing bank accounts).
14
exercised over others. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4.”).23 Further, even to the extent that Gates
profited from this scheme, including by stealing from Manafort, his profits from these crimes
paled in comparison to Manafort’s gain.
B. Bank Fraud Guidelines (Group 2)
1. The PSR Correctly Calculated the Fraud Loss
The Probation Department assessed the fraud loss to be approximately $6 million for the
counts of conviction for bank fraud together with the relevant conduct. See PSR, at ¶ 87.
Manafort contends that the assessed fraud loss is overstated because the Citizens Bank loan
conspiracy relating to Union Street property charged in Count 28 never closed and, had it closed,
Manafort speculates that he would have fully collateralized the loan, resulting in no loss. See
Defense Objections to PSR, at 4. That argument ignores the trial evidence that the defendant did
not intend the property he pledged as collateral to be used as such since he lied to the bank about
the collateral, hiding the fact that the Union Street property had a mortgage. At trial, the
government proved that the Union Street property Manafort now claims he would have pledged
as part of the loan charged in Count 28 was encumbered by a $5.3 million loan from Genesis
23
In arguing against the application of a role enhancement, Manafort relies principally on the Guidelines’
use of the phrase “criminal organization” and contends that role enhancements in § 3B1.1 are meant to be
applied only “to leaders or managers of organizations that have a primary purpose of engaging in crime,
such as foreign cartels that smuggle narcotics into the United States, or motorcycle gangs that unlawfully
transport and distribute firearms.” Def. Obj. to PSR, at 5. Manafort cites no case law endorsing his “not-
in-white-collar-cases” reading of § 3B1.1, which cannot be reconciled with Fourth Circuit decisions such
as Ellis and Harvey, supra. The dog-track owner who bribed state legislators in Ellis, for example, may
have done it for “the primary purpose of” helping his business, not “engaging in crime,” see Def. Obj. to
PSR, at 5, yet the Fourth Circuit affirmed application of the leadership enhancement to his scheme. Ellis,
951 F.2d at 585; accord Harvey, 532 F.3d at 338 (defendant sentenced for honest-services fraud involving
bribery in awarding Army contracts was assessed a role enhancement). The defendant’s argument, in
short, lacks merit.
15
Capital at the time.24 Previously, the defendant applied for a loan from Citizens Bank on the
Howard Street property (Counts 24 & 25), and also failed to disclose the Genesis loan on the
Union Street property, which was one of several misrepresentations charged in the indictment
and proven at trial.25
Because Manafort concealed the Genesis loan and intended to continue to do so, he is not
entitled to credit based on the happenstance that the bank, through its own due diligence,
eventually discovered the Genesis loan. See United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 490-91 (8th
Cir. 2005) (“We do not mean that the value of the collateral necessarily must be deducted from
the intended loss; the defendant’s intent is the touchstone. For example, if a car were collateral in
a fraudulent loan procurement case, and the defendant were to hide the car, then the court should
not deduct the value of the collateral from the intended loss because under those circumstances
the defendant intended the loss to encompass the value of the collateral.”) (emphasis added).
2. The Sophisticated Means Enhancement Is Appropriate
The Probation Department assessed a two-level enhancement on the Group 2 offenses for
the use of sophisticated means pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(c). PSR ¶ 88. The defendant
24
See Government Exhibit 500 (Stipulation relating to Genesis Capital); Trial Tr, at 1911-17 (Taryn
Rodriguez from Citizens Bank testified that Manafort did not list the mortgage from Genesis Capital for
377 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York on his application for the Union Street loan and that she later
identified the mortgage during a records check); Government Exhibit 255 (377 Union Street Uniform
Residential Loan Application).
See Trial Tr. at 1743-44 (Melinda James (née Francis) from Citizens Bank testified that on Manafort’s
25
Howard Street loan application, it indicated that there was no mortgage on the property at 377 Union
Street, Brooklyn, New York); Government Exhibit 224 (email attaching schedule of Manafort’s real
estate owned and reflecting there is no mortgage on Union Street property); Trial Tr. at 1284-85 (Rick
Gates testified that he understood that Manafort had a mortgage on the property at 377 Union Street,
Brooklyn, New York during the time of the loan application at Citizens Bank for the Howard Street
property).
16
objects on the grounds that “there was nothing complex about simply lying to the banks,” and
that the falsified documents were “simple or ham-handed.” See Defense Objections to PSR, at 4.
Manafort is wrong; even if some of Manafort’s conduct may have been ham-handed not all of it
was.
The Guidelines affords an enhancement when “the offense otherwise involved
sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct
constituting sophisticated means,” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(c). Application Note 9 defines
“sophisticated means” as:
especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the

execution or concealment of an offense. For example, in a telemarketing
scheme, locating the main office of the scheme in one jurisdiction but
locating soliciting operations in another jurisdiction ordinarily indicates
sophisticated means. Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or
both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore
financial accounts also ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.
Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 9.
Here, the defendant’s conduct qualifies for the enhancement, as he routinely hid relevant
transactions, falsified documentation, and made misrepresentations relating to an offshore
transaction (and the existence of those assets). For example, for the two Citizens Bank loans,
Manafort hid the true nature of his foreign Peranova “loan”. Manafort had first claimed the $1.5
million from Peranova, an offshore entity that he controlled, as a “loan” on his tax returns (to
avoid paying taxes on the money), and when the bank needed to see less debt and more income
for 2015, Manafort claimed the loan was forgiven, created a back-dated letter purporting to
document the forgiveness, and instructed his tax preparer to forward that letter to the bank.26
26
See Trial Tr. at 944-69 (Testimony of Cindy LaPorta).
17
Further, for four of the five loans, Manafort materially misstated the Profit and Loss Statement
from his business for the years 2015 and 2016, hiding his true income, requested those
documents from his bookkeeper, altered them, and then submitted them to the bank.27
With respect to the Citizens Bank loan charged in Count 24, Manafort hid the mortgage
on the Union Street property, and went to great lengths to do so including having Gates contact
the mortgage broker (Donna Duggan) and having her forward an older version of the mortgage
binder for the property.28 On the Banc of California fraud charged in Counts 27 and 28,
Manafort hid the Howard Street mortgage. For The Federal Savings Bank loans charged in
Counts 29 through 32, Manafort hid outstanding American Express debt and delinquency, falsely
claiming that debt to be a loan to Gates and sending a letter to that effect to the bank. See United
States v. Davis, No. 18-4080, 2018 WL 5096070, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 2018) (unpublished)
(affirming application of the sophisticated means enhancement applies where the defendant
created a “multilayered scheme” and “used numerous means to conceal the fraud, including
forgery, altering documentation, transferring money between accounts, and omitting property
from certain accountings”).
27
See Trial Tr. at 601-30 (Testimony of Heather Washkuhn).
See Trial Tr. at 1284-86 (Gates testified that at Manafort’s direction he contacted Manafort’s insurance
28
broker and requested an old copy of the insurance binder with respect to the Union Street property, which
did not reflect the current mortgage, and that he was aware that the older version was then sent to the
bank to hide the fact that there was currently a mortgage on the Union Street property).
18
3. A Role Enhancement is Appropriate For the Group 2 Crimes
The Group 2 criminal conduct involved multiple parties, individuals who were both
knowing and unknowing with respect to the scheme, including co-conspirators Gates and Jeffrey
Yohai, and more than a dozen bankers, accountants, and Manafort’s bookkeepers and tax
preparers.29 Manafort, moreover, was the primary beneficiary of the frauds. Based on the
criteria in the application note and the case law cited above, the role enhancement is equally
appropriate for the Group 2 bank fraud offenses.
C. The Defendant Did Not Accept Responsibility
Finally, the PSR properly denied Manafort any reduction for acceptance of responsibility
pursuant to § 3E1.1. PSR ¶ 96. Manafort proceeded to trial and vigorously denied his guilt.
Although a trial alone does not necessarily preclude an acceptance reduction, it almost always
does in circumstances like those here. Application Note 2 to § 3E1.1 suggests that the situations
where a defendant proceeds to trial and qualifies for an acceptance reduction are rare, and are
often limited to circumstances where the defendant proceeds to trial to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute, or some other legal issue, and not the facts. See § 3E1.1,
Application Note 2. That was not the case here. See e.g., United States v. Redding, 422 F.
App’x 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“Because Redding put the government to its
burden of proof and went to trial challenging his factual guilt, the district court was correct in
finding the two-level reduction was inappropriate.”). Manafort cites no authority for the
29
For example, from Citizens Bank at least the following individuals were involved: David Fallarino,
Melinda James (née Francis), Taryn Rodriguez, and Peggy Miceli; from the Banc of California, Perris
Kaufman and Gary Seferian; and from The Federal Savings Bank: Anna Ivakhnik, Dennis Raico, Thomas
Horn, James Brennan, and Steve Calk; from Nigro Karlin (the bookkeeper): Heather Washkuhn; and from
KWC: Cindy LaPorta and Philip Ayliff.
19
proposition that a later plea in another prosecution—even one involving some of the same
facts—negates the fact that he put the government to its proof in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Further, the defendant has now conceded that he breached his plea agreement in the
District of Columbia, and on February 13, 2019, in a ruling from the bench, Judge Jackson found
by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort intentionally lied to the government as to three
subject areas, and had not with respect to two others. The DC Court also issued an order
documenting those findings. United States v. Manafort, 1:17-cr-201 (ABJ) (D.D.C. February 13,
2019), Doc 509 (attached as Exhibit G).
Finally, the defendant’s failure to file the required financial information with the
Probation Department, in either district, is further evidence of his failure to accept responsibility,
particularly here, where the defendant was convicted of financial crimes, including hiding his
income and assets.
V. Statutory Sentencing Factors Pursuant

To Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a)
The government addresses the Section 3553(a) factors below.
A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense
Manafort’s criminal conduct was serious, longstanding, and bold. He failed to pay taxes
in five successive years involving more than $16 million in unreported income—and failed to
identify his overseas accounts in those same returns—resulting in more than $6 million in unpaid
taxes. In four successive years from 2011 to 2014, Manafort failed to report his overseas
accounts to the Treasury Department, and over that period he maintained 31 accounts in three
20
foreign countries collectively holding more than $55 million in multiple currencies.30 As for his
bank fraud offenses, Manafort defrauded not one financial institution but three, and sought five
loans from those banks, seeking more than $25 million.
Tax fraud is a serious crime and violates the most basic covenant between citizens and
the government. See United States v. Zukerman, 897 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[t]ax crimes
represent an especially damaging category of criminal offense” which “strike[] at the foundation
of a functioning government’”) (citation omitted), pet. for cert. filed, No. 18-642 (Nov. 19,
2018). The defendant benefited from the protections and privileges of the law and the services
of his government, while cheating it and his fellow citizens. See United State v. Trupin, 475
F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2007) (tax evader effectively “[steals] from his fellow taxpayers through his
deceptions.”).
The defendant’s failure to file foreign bank account reports is also significant. FBAR
regulations facilitate the identification of “persons who may be using foreign financial accounts
to circumvent United States law,” whether those funds are used for “illicit purposes or to identify
income maintained or generated abroad.” See IRS FBAR Reference Guide, at 2
(https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irsfbarreferenceguide.pdf). Here, Manafort’s FBAR offenses
were more serious than that of a defendant who simply hides his income, like the defendant in
Kim. Manafort used his foreign accounts not only to hide his income, but to launder funds,
including by engaging in transactions that promoted his FARA scheme.
30
See Government Exhibit 73B (FBAR Chart for 2011), Government Exhibit 73C (FBAR Chart for
2012), Government Exhibit 73D (FBAR Chart for 2013), Government Exhibit 73E (FBAR Chart for
2014); Government Exhibit 74 (“Deposit Analysis – Foreign Source of Funds Received by Foreign
Accounts,” listing total as $65,860,502.50).
21
Finally, the defendant’s bank fraud offenses are also serious, both for the number and
amount of the loans and the conduct involved. Bank fraud undermines the stability of our
financial system and the federally insured financial institutions that citizens rely upon that those
statutes seek to protect. See United States v. Koh, 199 F.3d 632, 638 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing
that Congress, in part through passage of the bank fraud statute, “clearly intended to protect ‘the
financial integrity’ of institutions in which it had a strong federal interest, including those that are
‘federally created, controlled or insured’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 98–225, at 377 (1983)).
Manafort sought five loans totaling more than $25 million and secured funding in the amount of
more than $19 million. Those facts set him far afield from the ordinary bank fraud defendant.
As noted, these were not short-lived schemes. Manafort’s crimes were the product of his
planning and premeditation over many years, and a result of his direct and willful conduct.
Manafort’s tax crimes by any account were serious, and more serious than most given the
amount of money at issue and the fact that his failure to pay the taxes owed was not caused by
any necessity but simple greed. Manafort had ample funds to cover these tax payments. He
simply chose not to comply with laws that would reduce his wealth. And along the way, each
year, in order to successfully implement the tax scheme the defendant involved numerous other
people, including both witting and unwitting participants. In every scheme, Manafort was
always the principal, and almost always the exclusive beneficiary.
B. History and Characteristics of the Defendant
Manafort’s history and characteristics are aggravating factors. Manafort has had every
opportunity to succeed. He is well educated and a member of the legal profession, attending
22
Georgetown University for college and law school. He was a successful political consultant both
in the United States and abroad.31
Further, while the defendant is 69 years old and has suffered reputational harm as a result
of his conviction, neither is a mitigating factor. Part H of Chapter 5 of the Sentencing
Guidelines addresses age, and in effect provides that age can be considered “individually or in
combination with other offender characteristics,” when “present to an unusual degree and
distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1.
Nothing about the defendant’s age is unusual. Tax offenders are often older and often, like the
defendant, wealthy, but they nonetheless receive substantial terms of incarceration
notwithstanding age and health issues. See, e.g., United States v. Dibbi, 413 Fed. Appx 618, 620
(4th Cir. 2011) (affirming sentence of 30 months for tax fraud and decision not to grant a
downward variance based on the defendant’s health and age); United States v. Gilmartin, 12-cr-
287 (MGC) (SDNY) (defendant, age 70, sentenced to 48 months imprisonment for evading taxes
and failing to file federal and state tax returns for over 20 years, where the tax loss was
approximately $1.7 million).32
31
See Trial Tr. at 2436 (defense closing argument citing witness testimony of Tad Devine and Dan Rabin
describing Manafort as a talented political consultant and citing documents detailing Manafort’s work for
the presidential campaigns of Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bob Dole, and Donald
Trump); see Trial Tr. at 1133-34 (Rick Gates testified that Manafort was “probably one of the most, you
know, politically brilliant strategists I've ever worked with.”).
32
See also United States v. Jackson, 10-cr-298 (CM) (SDNY) (defendant, age 57, sentenced to 63 months
imprisonment for his work as a tax preparer who used a variety of deceptive practices—including
claiming deceased children as dependents—as part of a scheme to prepare false tax returns and where the
tax loss was approximately $1 million); United States v. Catlett, 10-CR-101 (D. Md) (defendant, age 64,
sentenced to 210 months imprisonment, related to filing 275 fraudulent tax returns reporting over $22
million in false Schedule E losses, resulting in a federal tax loss of $3.8 million).
23
Manafort’s age does not eliminate the risk of recidivism he poses—particularly given that
his pattern of criminal activity has occurred over more than a decade and that the most recent
crimes he pled guilty to occurred from February to April 2018, when he conspired to tamper with
witnesses at a time when he was under indictment in two separate districts. Further as Judge
Jackson found, Manafort’s misconduct continued as recently as October 2018 when he
repeatedly and intentionally lied to the government during proffer sessions and the grand jury.
Courts also have rejected the premise that the reputational harm incident to every
criminal conviction is a valid basis for reducing the term of imprisonment imposed on a white-
collar offender such as Manafort. Nothing about that harm, or the collateral consequences that
Manafort faces, was unforeseeable at the time that he chose to engage in the charged conduct.
Manafort chose to commit multiple bank frauds, even when the subject of national attention in
2016. See, e.g., United States v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 47 (1st Cir. 2012) (“It is impermissible
for a court to impose a lighter sentence on a white-collar defendant than on blue-collar
defendants because it reasons that white-collar defendants suffer greater reputational harm or
have more to lose by conviction.”).
C. The Need to Promote Respect for the Law and to Afford

Adequate Deterrence to Criminal Conduct
The sentence should serve to promote respect for the law and to afford both adequate
specific and general deterrence as intended by Congress. With respect to general deterrence, the
sentence should send a clear message that repeated choices to commit serious economic crimes
have serious consequences, particularly in a matter that received national attention.
The Fourth Circuit has stressed the heightened importance of general deterrence in tax
cases, and in particular the need for incarceration, given the prevalence of tax offenses and the
24
comparatively few prosecutions. See United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 502 (4th Cir. 2010)
(“Given the nature and number of tax evasion offenses as compared to the relatively infrequent
prosecution of those offenses, we believe that the [Sentencing] Commission’s focus on
incarceration as a means of third-party deterrence is wise. The vast majority of such crimes go
unpunished, if not undetected. Without a real possibility of imprisonment, there would be little
incentive for a wavering would-be evader to choose the straight-and-narrow over the wayward
path.”). Courts have recognized that tax prosecutions are difficult and time consuming to
investigate and prosecute, and require substantial resources. See Zukerman, 897 F.3d at 429
(general deterrence has an important role in tax cases “due to the significant resources required
to monitor and prosecute tax cases,” which cost the government hundreds of billions of dollars
annually) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S.S.G Ch. 2, Part T, intro. cmt.
(explaining that, in light of “the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions relative to the
estimated incidence of such violations, deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary
consideration underlying these guidelines,” and that “[r]ecognition that the sentence for a
criminal tax case will be commensurate with the gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent
to would-be violators”).
Tax evasion through the use of offshore entities and bank accounts is among the most
lucrative offenses and often the most difficult to investigate, which increases the need for strong
deterrence and a meaningful sentence. See United States v. Hefferman, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th
Cir. 1994) (“Considerations of (general) deterrence argue for punishing more heavily those
offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult to detect and punish, since both attributes go to
increase the expected benefits of a crime and hence the punishment required to deter it.”). Bank
25
fraud, while more common, is equally serious and the need for deterrence is also strong in light
of the need to protect the integrity of the nation’s banking system.
D. The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities
Section 3553(a) also requires a sentence that is generally consistent with others imposed
on similar offenders for similar offenses; courts are instructed “to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). First, in this case, there are no similarly situated charged
defendants, as Manafort’s co-defendant, Gates, was subservient to Manafort, and he accepted
responsibility, pled guilty, and cooperated early in this investigation. The crimes at issue
involved Manafort’s taxes and overseas accounts, not Gates’. With respect to the bank loans,
Manafort, not Gates, principally received the proceeds. Second, given the breadth of Manafort’s
criminal activity, the government has not located a comparable case with the unique array of
crimes and aggravating factors.
VI. Conclusion
For a decade, Manafort repeatedly violated the law. Considering only the crimes charged
in this district, they make plain that Manafort chose to engage in a sophisticated scheme to hide
millions of dollars from United States authorities. And when his foreign income stream
dissipated in 2015, he chose to engage in a series of bank frauds in the United States to maintain
his extravagant lifestyle, at the expense of various financial institutions. Manafort chose to do
this for no other reason than greed, evidencing his belief that the law does not apply to him.
Manafort solicited numerous professionals and others to reap his ill-gotten gains. The sentence
26
in this case must take into account the gravity of this conduct, and serve to both specifically deter
Manafort and those who would commit a similar series of crimes.
Dated: February 15, 2018 /s/

Andrew Weissmann
Uzo Asonye Greg D. Andres
Assistant United States Attorney Brandon L. Van Grack
Eastern District of Virginia Senior Assistant Special Counsels
Special Counsel’s Office
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 616-0800
Attorneys for United States of America
27
Case 1:18-cr-00083-TSE Document 314-1 Filed 02/15/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID# 6883
EXHIBIT A
VENDOR AND PROPERTY PAYMENTS FROM FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS
Vendor Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total

SP&C Home Improvement Inc. $ 626,760 $ 716,200 $ 1,015,960 $ 1,099,000 $ 90,953 $ 3,548,873
Big Picture Solutions, Inc. $ 102,006 $ 456,800 $ 939,475 $ 162,920 $ 1,661,201
Alan Couture $ 103,000 $ 191,800 $ 137,850 $ 230,700 $ 85,115 $ 748,465
Scott L. Wilson Landscape & Tree Specialists, Inc. $ 237,700 $ 265,800 $ 503,500
Aegis Holdings LLC $ 500,000 $ 500,000
J&J Oriental Rug Gallery $ 390,000 $ 100,000 $ 490,000
Sabatello Construction of Florida, Inc. $ 39,237 $ 362,950 $ 30,300 $ 432,487
House of Bijan $ 213,280 $ 112,000 $ 7,500 $ 332,780
New Leaf Landscape Maintenance LLC $ 4,115 $ 134,600 $ 26,025 $ 90,945 $ 255,685
Don Beyer Motors, Inc. aka Land Rover of Alexandria $ 163,705 $ 163,705
Federal Stone and Brick LLC $ 87,000 $ 38,650 $ 125,650
American Service Center Associates of Alexandria, LLC $ 62,750 $ 62,750
aka Mercedes-Benz of Alexandria
Sensoryphile, Inc. $ 46,450 $ 46,450
Total $ 1,617,190 $ 1,431,158 $ 2,529,115 $ 2,864,150 $ 429,933 $ 8,871,546
Purchase of Property 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total

Howard Street Condominium $ 1,500,000
Arlington House $ 1,900,000
Union Street Brownstone $ 3,299,500
Total $ - $ - $ 6,699,500 $ - $ - $ 6,699,500
Grand Total $ 1,617,190 $ 1,431,158 $ 9,228,615 $ 2,864,150 $ 429,933 $ 15,571,046
GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
U.S. v. MANAFORT, 1:18-cr-83 (T.S.E.)
72
EXHIBIT B
Paul Manafort
Summary of Personal Tax Return Items and Unreported Income
Tax Years 2010 to 2014
Foreign Account Total Income

Approx. Filing Reported Reported Total Unreported
Tax Year Date (Sch. B, Line 7a} (Line 22) Income
2010 October 14, 2011 None $504,744 $1,617,190
2011 October 15, 2012 None $3,071,409 $1,431,158
2012 October 7, 2013 None $5,361,007 $9,228,615
2013 October 6, 2014 None $1,910,928 $2,864,150
2014 October 14, 2015 None $2,984,210 $1,329,933
EXHIBIT
I 77
EXHIBIT C
GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
73B
AGGREGATE MAXIMUM VALUE OF FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS IN 2011
Beneficial Owner Authorized Signers
Account Name, Financial Institution Maximum Listed on Bank Account Listed on Bank Account
Item and Account Number Account Value Application Application
7 Peranova Holdings Limited $ 4,436,680.04 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides
Bank of Cyprus Konstantin Kilimnik (As of 1/15/08) Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris
Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
8 Peranova Holdings Limited* $ 23.84 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
9 Serangon Holdings Limited $ 2,831.57 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
10 Yiakora Ventures Limited $ 504,807.56 Paul Manafort Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
AGGREGATE MAXIMUM VALUE: $ 8,381,798.75
*The maximum account value was converted from Euro to USD on the date of occurrence per the bank statement using the website https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/.
1 Actinet Trading Limited $ 999,987.00 Paul Manafort Paul Manafort
Bank of Cyprus Konstantin Kilimnik (As of 1/21/13) Richard Gates
Eleni Chrysostomides
Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
2 Actinet Trading Limited* $ 3,416,880.00 Paul Manafort Paul Manafort

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
3 Black Sea View Limited $ 2,519,316.94 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
4 Black Sea View Limited* $ 1,927,720.00 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
73C
5 Bletilla Ventures Limited $ 5,000,000.00 Paul Manafort Eleni Chrysostomides
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
6 Bletilla Ventures Limited* $ 1,849,860.00 Paul Manafort Eleni Chrysostomides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
7 Global Highway Limited $ 531,852.76 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
8 Leviathan Advisors Limited $ 738.45 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
9 Leviathan Advisors Limited* $ 66,053.30 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
10 LOAV Advisors Limited $ 5,679.02 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Bank of Cyprus Paul Manafort Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris
Konstantin Kilimnik (As of 1/21/13) Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
11 Lucicle Consultants Limited $ 1,530,903.16 Richard Gates Paul Manafort
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
12 Lucicle Consultants Limited* $ 4,183,590.00 Richard Gates Paul Manafort

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
13 Olivenia Trading Limited* $ 3.28 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
14 Olivenia Trading Limited $ 740,362.98 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
1 Actinet Trading Limited $ 87,728.03 Paul Manafort Paul Manafort
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
2 Actinet Trading Limited* $ 196,511.00 Paul Manafort Paul Manafort

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
3 Actinet Trading Limited $ 87,458.48 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Hellenic Bank Konstantin Kilimnik (As of 1/21/13) Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
4 Actinet Trading Limited* $ 202,277.00 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
73D
*The maximum account value was converted from Euro and GBP to USD on the date of occurrence per the bank statement using the website https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/.
5 Bletilla Ventures Limited $ 1,568,530.54 Paul Manafort Eleni Chrysostomides
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
6 Bletilla Ventures Limited* $ 276,703.00 Paul Manafort Eleni Chrysostomides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
7 Bletilla Ventures Limited $ 833,349.39 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Hellenic Bank Konstantin Kilimnik Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
8 Bletilla Ventures Limited* $ 278,614.00 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Hellenic Bank Konstantin Kilimnik Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
9 LOAV Advisors Limited $ 5,292.42 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Bank of Cyprus Paul Manafort Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris
Konstantin Kilimnik (As of 1/21/13) Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
10 Lucicle Consultants Limited $ 167,664.80 Richard Gates Paul Manafort
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
11 Lucicle Consultants Limited* $ 288,410.00 Richard Gates Paul Manafort

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
12 Lucicle Consultants Limited $ 603,131.79 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Hellenic Bank Chrystalla Pitsilli Dekatris
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
13 Lucicle Consultants Limited* $ 1,427,810.00 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
14 Marziola Holdings Limited $ 2,000,000.00 Konstantin Kilimnik Eleni Chrysostomides
Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
15 Olivenia Trading Limited* $ 0.64 Richard Gates Eleni Chrysostomides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides

Myrianthi Christou
Evelina Georgiades
Georgoula Mavrides
18 Yiakora Ventures Limited $ 11,943.28 Paul Manafort Eleni Chrysostomides

Georgoula Mavrides
Myrianthi Christou
19 Pompolo Limited* $ 1,838,260.00 Richard Gates
HSBC UK
20 Global Endeavour Inc. $ 2,999,950.00 Konstantin Kilimnik Myrianthi Christou

Loyal Bank Ltd. Chrystalla Dekatris
Georgoula Mavrides
Evelina Georgiades
21 Global Endeavour Inc.* $ 2,036,960.00 Konstantin Kilimnik Myrianthi Christou

Georgoula Mavrides
Evelina Georgiades
22 Jeunet Ltd.* $ 2,675,340.00 Konstantin Kilimnik Myrianthi Christou

Loyal Bank Ltd Chrystalla Dekatris
Georgoula Mavrides
Evelina Georgiades
1 Global Endeavour Inc. $ 259,797.56 Konstantin Kilimnik Myrianthi Christou
Georgoula Mavrides
Evelina Georgiades
2 Global Endeavour Inc.* $ 1,622,660.00 Konstantin Kilimnik Myrianthi Christou

Georgoula Mavrides
Evelina Georgiades
3 Jeunet Ltd.* $ 860,846.00 Konstantin Kilimnik Myrianthi Christou

Georgoula Mavrides
Evelina Georgiades
GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
73E
EXHIBIT D
Case 1:18-cr-00083-TSE
Case 1:17-cr-00201-ABJ
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U.S. Department of Justice

The Special Counsel's Office
Washington, D.C. 20530

September 13, 2018
Kevin M. Downing, Esq.

Law Office of Kevin M. Downing
601 New Jersey Avenue NW
Suite 620
E
Washington, DC 20001 SEP 14 20\8
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
Thomas E. Zehnle, Esq. courts for the District of Columbia
Law Office of Thomas E. Zehnle
601 New Jersey Avenue NW
Suite 620
Washington, DC 20001
Richard W. Westling, Esq

Epstein Becker Green
1227 25 th Street NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20037
I
Re: United States v. Paul .J. Manafort, Jr.. ,
rim. No. 17-201-/ (ABJ)
Dear Counsel:
This letter sets forth the full and complete plea offer to your client Paul J. Manafort, Jr.
(hereinafter referred to as "your client" or "defendant") from the Special Counsel's Office
(hereinafter also referred to as "the Government" or "this Office"). If your client accepts the
terms and conditions of this offer, please have your client execute this document in the space
provided below. Upon receipt of the executed document, this letter will become the Plea
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement"). The terms of the offer are as follows.
1. Charges and Statutory Penalties
Your client agrees to plead guilty in the above-captioned case to all elements of all
objects of all the charges in a Superseding Criminal Information, which will encompass the
charges in Counts One and Two of a Superseding Criminal Information, charging your client
with:
A. conspiracy against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (which includes a
conspiracy to: (a) money launder (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956); (b) commit tax fraud
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(in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)); (c) fail to file Foreign Bank Account Reports (in
violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(b)); (d) violate the Foreign Agents Registration
Act (in violation of22 U.S.C. §§ 612, 618(a)(l), and 618(a)(2)); and (e) to lie to the
Department of Justice (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § l00l(a) and 22 U.S.C. §§ 612 and
618(a)(2)); and
B. conspiracy against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to wit: conspiracy
to obstruct justice by tampering with witnesses while on pre-trial release (in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1512).
The defendant also agrees not to appeal any trial or pre-trial issue in the Eastern District of
Virginia, or to challenge in the district court any such issue, and admits in the attached
"Statement of the Offense" his guilt of the remaining counts against him in United States v. Paul
J. Manafort, Jr., Crim. No. 1:18-cr-83 (TSE) (hereafter "Eastern District of Virginia.") A copy
of the Superseding Criminal Information and Statement of the Offense are attached.
Your client understands that each violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 carries a maximum
sentence of 5 years' imprisonment; a fine of not more than $250,000, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3571(b)(3); a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3583(b)(2); and an obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines and restitution
not timely made, and forfeiture.
In addition, your client agrees to pay a mandatory special assessment of $200 to the Clerk
of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Your client also understands
that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and§ 5El.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
Guidelines Manual (2016) (hereinafter "Sentencing Guidelines," "Guidelines," or "U.S.S.G."),
the Court may also impose a fine that is sufficient to pay the federal government the costs of any
imprisonment, term of supervised release, and period of probation.
2. Factual Stipulations
Your client agrees that the attached Statement of the Offense fairly and accurately
describes and summarizes your client's actions and involvement in the offenses to which your
client is pleading guilty, as well as crimes charged in the Eastern District of Virginia that remain
outstanding, as well as additional acts taken by him. Please have your client sign and return the
Statement of the Offense, along with this Agreement.
3. Additional Cbar·ges
In consideration of your client's guilty plea to the above offenses, and upon the
completion of full cooperation as described herein and fulfillment of all the other obligations
herein, no additional criminal charges will be brought against the defendant for his heretofore
disclosed participation in criminal activity, including money laundering, false statements,
personal and corporate tax and FBAR offenses, bank fraud, Foreign Agents Registration Act
violations for his work in Ukraine, and obstruction of justice. In addition, subject to the terms of
this Agreement, at the time of sentence or at the completion of his successful cooperation,
whichever is later, the Government will move to dismiss the remaining counts of the Indictment
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in this matter and in the Eastern District of Virginia and your client waives venue as to such
charges in the event he breaches this Agreement. Your client also waives all rights under the
Speedy Trial act as to any outstanding charges.
4. Sentencing Guidelines Analysis
Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court,
pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the
applicable guidelines and policies set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (c)(1 )(B), and to assist the Court in determining the appropriate
sentence, the Office estimates the Guidelines as follows:
A. Estimated Offense Level Under the Guidelines
Base offense level +8 2S1.l(a) Base Offense Level:

(1) The offense level for the underlying offense
from which the laundered funds were derived, if
(A) the defendant committed the underlying
offense (or would be accountable for the underlying
offense under subsection (a)(l)(A) of §lBl.3
(Relevant Conduct)); and (B) the offense level for
that offense can be determined; or
(2) 8 plus the number of offense levels from the
table in §2Bl.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and
Fraud) corresponding to the value of the laundered
funds, otherwise.
+22 Using more than $25 million threshold under
2Bl.1
Enhancement +2 2S1.l(b)(2)(B) permits enhancement for 2 points if
the conviction is pursuant to ~ 1956.
Enhancement +2 2S1. l(b)(3) adds two points for sophisticated
laundering (which the guidelines lists as involving
shell corporations and offshore financial accounts.
Enhancement: +4 3Bl.l(a) aggravating role - 5 or more participants
or otherwise extensive
Enhancement: +2 3Cl.1 obstruction
Combined Offense +0 3D1.4
level
Acceptance: -3 3El.l(b) acceptance of responsibility
Total for Counts One 37 Advisory guidelines range of 210-262
and Two:
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The defendant agrees that all of the Sentencing Guidelines for money laundering applicable to
charges brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 apply to Count One of the Superseding Criminal
Information brought under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
For the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines analysis, the government calculates the highest
guideline range among the offenses, namely the object of the conspiracy to violate Title 18
U.S.C. § 1956. The defendant's estimated guideline range for Count Two, the conspiracy to
obstruct justice, is 30 (before any reduction for acceptance of responsibility), and would be
grouped with Count One pursuant to §3D1.2(c).
B. Acceptance of Responsibility
The Government agrees that a 2-level reduction will be appropriate, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3E 1.1, provided that your client clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the
satisfaction of the Government, through your client's allocution, adherence to every provision of
this Agreement, and conduct between entry of the plea and imposition of sentence. If the
defendant has accepted responsibility as described above, and if the defendant pleads guilty on or
before September 14, 2018, subject to the availability of the Court, an additional one-level
reduction will be warranted, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b).
Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the
adjustment for acceptance ofresponsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l, and/or imposition of
an adjustment for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Cl.l, regardless of any
agreement set forth herein, should your client move to withdraw his guilty plea after it is entered,
or should it be determined by the Government that your client has either (a) engaged in conduct,
unknown to the Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes
obstruction of justice, or (b) engaged in additional criminal conduct after signing this Agreement.
In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 37.
C. Estimated Criminal History Category
Based upon the information now available to this Office, your client has no criminal
convictions, other than in the Eastern District of Virginia. Your client acknowledges that
depending on when he is sentenced here and how the Guidelines are interpreted, he may have a
criminal history. If additional convictions are discovered during the pre-sentence investigation
by the United States Probation Office, your client's criminal history points may increase.
D. Estimated Applicable Guidelines Range
Based upon the total offense level and the estimated criminal history category set forth
above, the Office calculates your client's estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is 210 months
to 262 months' imprisonment (the "Estimated Guidelin~s Range"). In addition, the Office
calculates that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5El.2, should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level
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37, the estimated applicable fine range is $40,000 to $400,000. Your client reserves the right to
ask the Court not to impose any applicable fine.
Your client agrees that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under
the Sentencing Guidelines, a downward departure from the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth
above is not warranted, subject to the paragraphs regarding cooperation below. Accordingly,
you will not seek any departure or adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above,
nor suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adjustment for any other reason other
than those specified above. Your client also reserves the right to disagree with the Estimated
Guideline Range calculated by the Office with respect to role in the offense. However, your
client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the
Office is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court. Should the Court or Probation Office
determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to
withdraw his guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by
this Agreement.
Your client understands and acknowledges that the terms of this section apply only to
conduct that occurred before the execution of this Agreement. Should your client engage in any
conduct after the execution of this Agreement that would form the basis for an increase in your
client's base offense level or justify an upward departure (examples of which include, but are not
limited to, obstruction of justice, failure to appear for a court proceeding, criminal conduct while
pending sentencing, and false statements to law enforcement agents, the probation officer, or the
Court), the Government is free under this Agreement to seek an increase in the base offense level
based on that post-agreement conduct.
5. Agreement as to Sentencing Allocution
Based upon the information known to the Government at the time of the signing of this
Agreement, the parties further agree that a sentence within the Estimated Guidelines Range (or
below) would constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), should such a sentence be subject to appellate review notwithstanding the appeal
waiver provided below.
6. Reservation of Allocution
The Government and your client reserve the right to describe fully, both orally and in
writing, to the sentencing judge, the nature and seriousness of your client's misconduct,
including any misconduct not described in the charge to which your client is pleading guilty.
The parties also reserve the right to inform the presentence report writer and the Courts of
any relevant facts, to dispute any factual inaccuracies in the presentence report, and to contest
any matters not provided for in this Agreement. In the event that the Courts considers any
Sentencing Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from any agreements
contained in this Agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon
the general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to
answer any related inquiries from the Courts. In addition, your client acknowledges that the
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Government is not obligated to file any post-sentence downward departure motion in this case
pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7. Court Not Bound by this Agreement or the Sentencing Guidelines
Your client understands that the sentence in this case will be imposed in accordance with
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), upon consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client further
understands that the sentence to be imposed is a matter solely within the discretion of the Courts.
Your client acknowledges that the Courts are not obligated to follow any recommendation of the
Government at the time of sentencing or to grant a downward departure based on your client's
substantial assistance to the Government, even if the Government files a motion pursuant to
Section SK 1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Your client understands that neither the
Government's recommendation nor the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the Courts.
Your client acknowledges that your client's entry of a guilty plea to the charged offenses
authorizes the Court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum
sentence, which may be greater than the applicable Guidelines range determined by the Court.
Although the parties agree that the sentences here and in the Eastern District of Virginia should
run concurrently to the extent there is factual overlap (i.e. the tax and foreign bank account
charges), that recommendation is not binding on either Court. The Government cannot, and does
not, make any promise or representation as to what sentences your client will receive. Moreover,
your client acknowledges that your client will have no right to withdraw your client's plea of
guilty should the Courts impose sentences that are outside the Guidelines range or if the Courts
do not follow the Government's sentencing recommendation. The Government and your client
will be bound by this Agreement, regardless of the sentence imposed by the Courts. Any effort
by your client to withdraw the guilty plea because of the length of the sentence shall constitute a
breach of this Agreement.
8. Cooperation
Your client shall cooperate fully, truthfully, completely, and forthrightly with the Government
and other law enforcement authorities identified by the Government in any and all matters as to
which the Government deems the cooperation relevant. This cooperation will include, but is not
limited to, the following:
(a) The defendant agrees to be fully debriefed and to attend all meetings at which his
presence is requested, concerning his participation in and knowledge of all criminal
activities.
(b) The defendant agrees to furnish to the Government all documents and other material
that may be relevant to the investigation and that are in the defendant's possession or
control and to participate in undercover activities pursuant to the specific instructions
of law enforcement agents or the Government.
(c) The defendant agrees to testify at any proceeding in the District of Colombia or
elsewhere as requested by the Government.
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(d) The defendant consents to adjournments of his sentences as requested by the

Government.
(e) The defendant agrees that all of the defendant's obligations under this agreement
continue after the defendant is sentenced here and in the Eastern District of Virginia;
and
(f) The defendant must at all times give complete, truthful, and accurate information and
testimony, and must not commit, or attempt to commit, any further crimes.
Your client acknowledges and understands that, during the course of the cooperation
outlined in this Agreement, your client will be interviewed by law enforcement agents and/or
Government attorneys. Your client waives any right to have counsel present during these
interviews and agrees to meet with law enforcement agents and Government attorneys outside of
the presence of counsel. If, at some future point, you or your client desire to have counsel
present during interviews by law enforcement agents and/or Government attorneys, and you
communicate this decision in writing to this Office, this Office will honor this request, and this
change will have no effect on any other terms and conditions of this Agreement.
Your client shall testify fully, completely and truthfully before any and all Grand Juries
in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, and at any and all trials of cases or other court
proceedings in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, at which your client's testimony may be
deemed relevant by the Government.
Your client understands and acknowledges that nothing in this Agreement allows your
client to commit any criminal violation of local, state or federal law during the period of your
client's cooperation with law enforcement authorities or at any time prior to the sentencing in
this case. The commission of a criminal offense during the period of your client's cooperation or
at any time prior to sentencing will constitute a breach of this Agreement and will relieve the
Government of all of its obligations under this Agreement, including, but not limited to, its
obligation to inform this Court of any assistance your client has provided. However, your client
acknowledges and agrees that such a breach of this Agreement will not entitle your client to
withdraw your client's plea of guilty or relieve your client of the obligations under this
Agreement.
Your client agrees that the sentencing in this case and in the Eastern District of Virginia
may be delayed until your client's efforts to cooperate have been completed, as determined by
the Government, so that the Courts will have the benefit of all relevant information before a
sentence is imposed.
9. Government's Obligations
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The Government will bring to the Courts' attention at the time of sentencing the nature
and extent of your client's cooperation or lack of cooperation. The Government will evaluate the
full nature and extent of your client's cooperation to determine whether your client has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense. If this Office determines that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
form of truthful information and, where applicable, testimony, the Office will file motions
pursuant to Section 5Kl.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant will then be
free to argue for any sentence below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range calculated by the
Probation Office, including probation.
10. Waivers
A. Venue
Your client waives any challenge to venue in the District of Columbia.
B. Statute of Limitations
Your client agrees that, should any plea or conviction following your client's pleas of
guilty pursuant to this Agreement, or the guilty verdicts in the Eastern District of Virginia, be
vacated, set aside, or dismissed for any reason (other than by government motion as set forth
herein), any prosecution based on the conduct set forth in the attached Statement of the Offense,
as well as any crimes that the Government has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss pursuant to
this Agreement, that is not time-barred by the applicable statute oflimitations on the date of the
signing of this Agreement, may be commenced or reinstated against your client, notwithstanding
the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the
commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive
all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution of conduct set
forth in the attached Statement of the Offense, or any other crimes that the Government has
agreed not to prosecute, that are not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed. The
Office and any other party will be free to use against your client, directly and indirectly, in any
criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by your client, including the Statement of the
Offense, and any of the information or materials provided by your client, including such
statements, information, and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement or during the course
of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of, this Agreement, whether or not
the debriefings were previously a part of proffer-protected debriefings, and your client's
statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
C. Trial and Other Rights
Your client understands that by pleading guilty in this case your client agrees to waive
certain rights afforded by the Constitution of the United States and/or by statute or rule. Your
client agrees to forgo the right to any further discovery or disclosures of information not already
provided at the time of the entry of your client's guilty plea. Your client also agrees to waive,
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among other rights, the right to be indicted by a Grand Jury, the right to plead not guilty, and the
right to a jury trial. If there were a jury trial, your client would have the right to be represented
by counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses against your client, to challenge the
admissibility of evidence offered against your client, to compel witnesses to appear for the
purpose of testifying and presenting other evidence on your client's behalf, and to choose
whether to testify. If there were a jury trial and your client chose not to testify at that trial, your
client would have the right to have the jury instructed that your client's failure to testify could
not be held against your client. Your client would further have the right to have the jury
instructed that your client is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden would be
on the United States to prove your client's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If your client were
found guilty after a trial, your client would have the right to appeal your client's conviction.
Your client understands that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
protects your client from the use of compelled self-incriminating statements in a criminal
prosecution. By entering a plea of guilty, your client knowingly and voluntarily waives or gives
up your client's right against compelled self-incrimination.
Your client acknowledges discussing with you Rule l l(f) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ordinarily limit the
admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the course of plea discussions or plea
proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. Your client knowingly and voluntarily hereby
waives the rights that arise under these rules to object to the use of all such statements by him on
and after September 10, 2018, in the event your client breaches this agreement, withdraws his
guilty plea, or seeks to withdraw from this Agreement after signing it. This Agreement
supersedes the proffer agreement between the Government and the client.
Your client also agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy
sentence and agrees that the pleas of guilty pursuant to this Agreement will be entered at a time
decided upon by the parties with the concurrence of the Court. Your client understands that the
date for sentencing will be set by the Courts.
Your client agrees not to accept remuneration or compensation of any sort, directly or
indirectly, for the dissemination through any means, including but not limited to books, articles,
speeches, biogs, podcasts, and interviews, however disseminated, regarding the conduct
encompassed by the Statement of the Offense, or the investigation by the Office or prosecution
of any criminal or civil cases against him.
D. Appeal Rights
Your client understands that federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3742, affords
defendants the right to appeal their sentences in certain circumstances. Your client agrees to
waive the right to appeal the sentences in this case and the Eastern District of Virginia, including
but not limited to any term of imprisonment, fine, forfeiture, award of restitution, term or
condition of supervised release, authority of the Courts to set conditions of release, and the
manner in which the sentences were determined, except to the extent the Courts sentence your
client above the statutory maximum or guidelines range determined by the Courts or your client
claims that your client received ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case your client would
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have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or above-guidelines sentence or raise on appeal a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but not to raise on appeal other issues regarding the
sentencings. In agreeing to this waiver, your client is aware that your client's sentences have yet
to be determined by the Courts. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentences the
Courts ultimately will impose, your client knowingly and willingly waives your client's right to
appeal the sentence, to the extent noted above, in exchange for the concessions made by the
Government in this Agreement.
E. Collateral Attack
Your client also waives any right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed
under this Agreement or in the Eastern District of Virginia or otherwise attempt to modify or
change the sentences or the manner in which they were determined in any collateral attack,
including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), except to the extent such a motion is based on a claim that your client received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Your client agrees that with respect to all charges referred to herein he is not a
"prevailing party" within the meaning of the "Hyde Amendment," 18 U.S.C. § 3006A note, and
will not file any claim under that law.
F. Privacy Act and FOIA Rights
Your client also agrees to waive all rights, whether asserted directly or by a
representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any
records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including and without
limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom oflnformation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552,
or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, for the duration of the Special Counsel's investigation.
11. Restitution
Your client understands that the Court has an obligation to determine whether, and in
what amount, mandatory restitution applies in this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The
Government and your client agree that mandatory restitution does not apply in this case.
12. Forfeiture
a) Your client agrees to the forfeiture set forth in the Forfeiture Allegations in the
Superseding Criminal Information to which your client is pleading guilty. Your client further
agrees to forfeit criminally and civilly the following properties (collectively, the "Forfeited
Assets") to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 981(a)(l)(A),
981(a)(l)(C), 982(a)(l), 982(a)(2); Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), and Title 28
U.S.C. § 2461(c), and further agrees to waive all interest in such assets in any administrative or
judicial forfeiture proceeding, whether criminal or civil, state or federal:
1) The real property and premises commonly known as 377 Union Street, Brooklyn, New
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York 11231 (Block 429, Lot 65), including all appurtenances, improvements, and
attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;
2) The real property and premises commonly known as 29 Howard Street, #4D, New York,
New York 10013 (Block 209, Lot 1104), including all appurtenances, improvements, and
attachments thereon, and any property traceable thereto;
3) The real property and premises commonly known as 174 Jobs Lane, Water Mill, New York
11976, including all appurtenances, improvements, and attachments thereon, and any
property traceable thereto;
4) All funds held in account number 0969 at The Federal Savings Bank, and any
5) All funds seized from account number 1388 at Capital One N.A., and any
6) All funds seized from account number 9952 at The Federal Savings Bank, and any
7) Northwestern Mutual Universal Life Insurance Policy and any property
traceable thereto;
8) The real property and premises commonly known as 123 Baxter Street, #5D, New York,
New York 10016 in lieu of 1046 N. Edgewood Street; and
9) The real property and premises commonly known as 721 Fifth Avenue, #43G, New York,
New York 10022 in lieu of all funds from account number ~ at Charles Schwab &
Co. Inc., and any property traceable thereto.
Your client agrees that his consent to forfeiture is final and irrevocable as to his interests in the
Forfeited Assets.
b) Your client agrees that the facts set forth in the Statement of Facts and admitted to
by your client establish that the Forfeited Assets are forfeitable to the United States pursuant to
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 981 and 982, Title 21, United States Code, Section 853,
and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461. Your client admits that the Forfeited Assets
numbered 1 through 7, above, represent property that constitutes or is derived from proceeds of,
and property involved in, the criminal offenses in the Superseding Criminal Information to which
. your client is pleading guilty. Your client further agrees that all the Forfeited Assets (numbered
1 through 9) can additionally be considered substitute assets for the purpose of forfeiture to the
United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b); Title 21, United States
Code, Section 853(p); and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c).
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c) Your client agrees that the Court may enter a preliminary order of forfeiture for
the Forfeited Assets at the time of your client's guilty plea or at any time before sentencing, and
consents thereto. Your client agrees that the Court can enter a Final Order of Forfeiture for the
Forfeited Assets, and could do so as part of his sentence.
d) Your client further agrees that the government may choose in its sole discretion
how it wishes to accomplish forfeiture of the property whose forfeiture your client has consented
to in this plea agreement, whether by criminal or civil forfeiture, using judicial or non-judicial
forfeiture processes. If the government chooses to effect the forfeiture provisions of this plea
agreement through the criminal forfeiture process, your client agrees to the entry of orders of
forfeiture for such property and waives the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
1 l(b)(l)(J) and 32.2 regarding notice of the forfeiture in the charging instrument, advice
regarding the forfeiture at the change-of-plea hearing, announcement of the forfeiture at
sentencing, and incorporation of the forfeiture in the judgment.
e) Your client understands that the United States may institute civil or administrative
forfeiture proceedings against all forfeitable property in which your client has an interest,
including the Forfeited Assets, without regard to the status of his criminal conviction. Your
client further consents to the civil forfeiture of the Forfeited Assets to the United States, without
regard to the status of his criminal conviction. In connection therewith, your client specifically
agrees to waive all right, title, and interest in the Forfeited Assets, both individually and on
behalf of DMP International, Summerbreeze LLC, or any other entity of which he is an officer,
member, or has any ownership interest. Your client waives all defenses based on statute of
limitations and venue with respect to any administrative or civil forfeiture proceeding related to
the Forfeited Assets.
f) Your client represents that with respect to each of the Forfeited Assets, he is
either the sole and rightful owner and that no other person or entity has any claim or interest, or
that he has secured the consent from any other individuals or entities having an interest in the
Forfeited Assets to convey their interests in the Forfeited Assets to him prior to entry of the
Order of Forfeiture (with the exception of previously disclosed mortgage holders). Your client
warrants that he has accurately represented to the Government all those individuals and entities
having an interest in the Forfeited Assets and the nature and extent of those interests, including
any mortgages or liens on the Forfeited Assets. Your client agrees to take all steps to pass clear
title to the Forfeited Assets to the United States (with the exception of previously disclosed
mortgage liens). Your client further agrees to testify truthfully in any judicial forfeiture
proceeding, and to take all steps to effectuate the same as requested by the Government. Your
client agrees to take all steps requested by the Government to obtain from any other parties by
any lawful means any records of assets owned at any time by your client, including but not
limited to the Forfeited Assets, and to otherwise facilitate the effectuation of forfeiture and the
maximization of the value of Forfeited Assets for the United States.
g) Your client agrees that, to the extent that he does not convey to the United States
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clear title to each of the Forfeited Assets, the United States is entitled, in its sole discretion, either
to vacatur of the plea agreement or to forfeiture to the United States of a sum of money equal to
the value of that asset at the time this agreement was executed. Your client consents to
modification of any Order of Forfeiture at any point to add such sum of money as a forfeiture
judgment in substitution for Forfeited Assets.
h) Your client hereby abandons any interest he has in all forfeitable property and
consents to any disposition of the property by the government without further notice or
obligation whatsoever owning to your client.
i) Your client agrees not to interpose any claim, or to assist others to file or
interpose any claim, to the Forfeited Assets in any proceeding, including but not limited to any
civil or administrative forfeiture proceedings and any ancillary proceedings related to criminal
forfeiture. Your client agrees that he shall not file any petitions for remission, restoration, or any
other assertion of ownership or request for return relating to the Forfeited Assets, or any other
action or motion seeking to collaterally attack the seizure, restraint, forfeiture, or conveyance of
the Forfeited Assets, nor shall your client assist any other in filing any such claims, petitions,
actions, or motion. Contesting or assisting others in contesting forfeiture shall constitute a
material breach of the Agreement, relieving the United States of all its obligations under the
Agreement. Your client agrees not to seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or
indemnification from any source with regard to the assets forfeited pursuant to this Agreement.
j) In the event your client fails to deliver the assets forfeited pursuant to this
agreement, or in any way fails to adhere to the forfeiture provisions of this agreement, the United
States reserves all remedies available to it, including but not limited to vacating the Agreement
based on a breach of the Agreement by your client.
k) Your client agrees that the forfeiture provisions of this plea agreement are
intended to, and will, survive him notwithstanding the abatement of any underlying criminal
conviction after the execution of this Agreement.
1) Your client agrees that he will not claim, assert, or apply for, directly or
indirectly, any tax deduction, tax credit, or any other taxable offset with regard to any federal,
state, or local tax or taxable income for payments of any assets forfeited pursuant to this
Agreement.
m) Your client agrees to waive all constitutional and statutory challenges in any
manner (including, but not limited to, direct appeal) to any forfeiture carried out in accordance
with this Agreement on any grounds, including that the forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine or
punishment.
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13. Breach of Agreement
Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this Agreement, your client fails
specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of your client's obligations
under this Agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing or during his
cooperation (whichever is later), your client will have breached this Agreement. Should it be
judged by the Government in its sole discretion that the defendant has failed to cooperate fully,
has intentionally given false, misleading or incomplete information or testimony, has committed
or attempted to commit any further crimes, or has otherwise violated any provision of this
agreement, the defendant will not be released from his pleas of guilty but the Government will be
released from its obligations under this agreement, including (a) not to oppose a downward
adjustment of two levels for acceptance of responsibility described above, and to make the
motion for an additional one-level reduction described above and (b) to file the motion for a
downward departure for cooperation described above. Moreover, the Government may
withdraw the motion described above, if such motion has been filed prior to sentencing. In the
event that it is judged by the Government that there has been a breach: (a) your client will be
fully subject to criminal prosecution, in addition to the charges contained in the Superseding
Criminal Information, for any crimes to which he has not pled guilty, including perjury and
obstruction of justice; and (b) the Government and any other party will be free to use against
your client, directly and indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by
your client, including the Statement of the Offense, and any of the information or materials
provided by your client, including such statements, information, and materials provided pursuant
to this Agreement or during the course of any debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after
entry of, this Agreement, whether or not the debriefings were previously a part of proffer-
protected debriefings, and your client's statements made during proceedings before the Court
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Your client understands and agrees that the Government shall be required to prove a
breach of this Agreement only by good faith.
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to protect your client from prosecution for
any crimes not included within this Agreement or committed by your client after the execution of
this Agreement. Your client understands and agrees that the Government reserves the right to
prosecute your client for any such offenses. Your client further understands that any perjury,
false statements or declarations, or obstruction of justice relating to your client's obligations
under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. In the event of such a breach,
your client will not be allowed to withdraw your client's guilty plea.
14. Complete Ag1·eement
Apart from the written proffer agreement initially dated September 11, 2018, which this
Agreement supersedes, no agreements, promises, understandings, or representations have been
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made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing herein, nor will any
such agreements, promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to
writing and signed by your client, defense counsel, and the Office.
Your client further understands that this Agreement is binding only upon the Office. This
Agreement does not bind any United States Attorney's Office, nor does it bind any other state,
local, or federal prosecutor. It also does not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative
claim pending or that may be made against your client.
If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, your client may so indicate by
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signing this Agreement and the Statement of the Offense, and returning both to the Office no
later than September 14, 2018.
Sincerely yours,
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

Special Counsel
By: d /.. b/_

~~
Andrew Weissmann
Jeannie S. Rhee
Greg D. Andres
Kyle R. Freeny
Senior/Assistant Special Counsels
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DEFENDANT'S ACCEPTANCE
I have read every page of this Agreement and have discussed it with my attorneys Kevin
Downing, Thomas Zehnle, and Richard Westling. I am fully satisfied with the legal
representation by them, who I have chosen to represent me herein. Nothing about the quality of
the representation of other counsel is affecting my decision herein to plead guilty. I fully
understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of my
own free will, intending to be legally bound. No threats have been made to me nor am I under
the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Agreement fully. I am
pleading guilty because I am in fact guilty of the offense identified in this Agreement.
I reaffirm that absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or conditions have

been made or entered into in connection with my decision to plead guilty except those set forth
in this Agreement. I am satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorneys in connection
with this Agreement and matters related to it.
Date: __9_-_1_1_-~tf_ _ _
Defendant
ATTORNEYS'ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I have read every page of this Agreement, reviewed this Agreement with my client, Paul
J. Manafort, and fully discussed the provisions of this Agreement with my client. These pages
accurately and completely set forth the entire Agreement. I concur in my client's desire to plead
guilty as set forth in this Agreement.
Date: - - - - - -- -
Ke in M. Downing
1chard W. Westling
Thomas E. Zehnle
Attorneys for Defendant
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EXHIBIT E
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IN THE UN ITED STATES DISTR ICT COURT FOi

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VTRGIN IJ\
Alexandria Division
UN ITED STATES OF AME RICA )

)
V. ) Criminal No. I: I 7-CR-248
)
) Hon. T. S. Ellis, IIT
HYUNG KWON KIM, )
)
Defendant. )
PLEA AG REEMENT
Dana J. Boente. United States Attorney fo r the Eastern District of Virginia; Mark D.
Lytle. Assistant Uni ted States Attorney: Stuart M. Goldberg. Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for the Tax Division. U.S. Department of Justice; Mark F. Daly. Senior Litigation
Counsel and Robert J. Boudreau, Trial Attorney; the defe ndant, 1-lyung Kwon Kim; and the
defendant's counsel have entered into an agreement pursuant to Rule 11 of the federal Rules of
Crim inal Procedure. The terms of the agreement arc as fo llows:
1. Offense and Maximum Penalties
The defendant agrees lo waive ind ictment and plead guilty to a single count criminal
information charging the defendant with will f'u l fai lure to file a Report of Foreign Bank and
Financial Accounts, FinCEN Report 11 4 (formerly TD F 90.22-1 ) (as applicable, "FBAR") with
the Department ol"the Treasury, in violation of' Ti tle 31, United States Code, Sections 53 14 and
5322(a), and Title 3 1, Code or Federal Regulations, Section IOI 0.350.
The maximum pcnnltics lo r thi s offense arc: a max imum term of imprisonment of fi ve
years of imprisonment; a max imum fine of the grea ter o f $250.000 or twice the gross gai n or
loss; a spec ial assessment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 30 13 and 3014: and three years of
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supervised release. The defendant understands that this supervised release term is in addition to
any prison term the defendant may receive, and that a violation of a term of supervised release
could result in the defendant being returned to prison for the full term of supervised release.
2. Factual Basis fo r the Pica
The defendant wil l plead guilty because the defendant is in fact guilty of the charged
offense. The defendant admits the facts set forth in the Statement of Facts filed with this plea
agreement and agrees that those facts establish guilt of the offense charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Statement of !'acts, which is hereby incorporated into this plea agreement,
constitutes a stipulation of facts for purposes of Section I Bl .2(a) of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("Sentencing Guidelines").
3. Assistance and Advice of Counsel
The defendant is satisfied that his attorneys have rendered effective assistance. The
defendant understands that by entering into this plea agreement, he surrenders certain rights as
provided in this plea agreement. The defendant understands that the rights of criminal
defendants include the following:
a. the right to plead not guilty and to persist in that plea;
b. the right to a jury trial;
c. the right to be represented by counsel - and, if necessary, have the Court
appoint counsel - at trial and at every other stage of the proceedings; and
d. the right al trial to confront and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. to be
protected from compel led self-incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to compel the
attendance of witnesses.
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4. Role of the Court and th e Probation Office
The defendant understands that the Court has jurisdiction and authority to impose any
sentence within the statutory max imum described above but that the Court will determine hi s
actual sentence in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The defendant understands that the
Court has not yet dete1111ined a sentence and that any estimate of the advisory sentencing range
under the Sentencing Guideli nes be may have received from his counsel, the United States, or
the Probation Office, is a prediction, not a promise, and is not binding on the United States, the
Probation Office, or the Court. Addi tionally, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Court, af1er considering the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), may impose a sentence above or below the Sentencing Guidelines ' advisory
sentencing range, subject only to review by higher courts for reasonableness. The United States
makes no promise or representation concerning what sentence the defendant will receive, and he
cannot withdraw a guilty plea based upon the actual sentence.
5. Sentencing G uidelines
The Government contends that the applicable Guideline in thi s matter should be U.S.S.G.
§ 2S l .3(a)(2), § 28 I. I, and § 2S1.3(b)(2) because the defendant fi led two fa lse FBARs and a
fa lse U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, Form 1040, within a 12-month period. However, at
the time that the defendant agreed to plead guilty, the Government consistently took the position
with similarly situated defendants that the applicable Gu ideline vvas U.S.S.G. § 2TI .1 and
§ 2Tl .4 due to the cross reference in 2S 1.3(c)(l).
Therefore. in order to ensure that the defendant receives equitable treatment, and in
accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (c)( I)(B), the United States and the
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defendant will reconunend to the Court that the following provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines apply:
a. The base offense level for this offense is 16 pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2Tl.1 (a)(l) and § 2T4. I (F), because the tax loss exceeded $100,000;
b. The base offense level is increased by 2 levels pursuant to U.S .S.G.
§ 2T 1.1 (b)(2) because the offense involved sophisticated means; and
c. the parties agree that they are free to argue other provisions of the
Sentencing Guidelines not referenced herein or the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The United States and the defendant also agree that he has assisted the government in the
investigation and prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his
intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial
and permitting the government and the Court to allocate their resources efficiently. If the
defendant qualifies for a two-level decrease in offense level pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines
§ 3E 1.1 (a) and the offense level prior to the operation of that section is 16 or greater, the
government agrees to file, pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines § 3El .1 (b), a motion prior to, or at
the time of, sentencing for an additional one-level decrease in the defendant's offense level.
6. Waiver of Appeal, FOIA, Privacy Act Rights, Venue and Statute of
Limitations
The defendant also understands that 18 U.S .C. § 3742 affords him the right to appeal the
sentence imposed. Nonetheless, the defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal the
conviction and any sentence within the statutory maximum described above (or tbe maimer in
which that sentence was detennined) on the grounds set forth in 18 U.S .C. § 3742 or on any
ground whatsoever other than an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that is cognizable on
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direct appeal, in exchange fo r the concessions made by the United States in this plea agreement.
This pica agreement does not affect the rights or obligations of the United States as set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).
The defendant hereby ,,vaives all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representati ve,
to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining
to the investigation or prosecution of th is case, including without limitation any records that may
be sought under the Freedom ofln fo nnation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a.
The defendant knowingly wa ives all rights to the venue requirement fo r Count One of the
Information due to the fac t that venue for the crimes committed lies in any other Federal j udicial
district. and the defendant further agrees to be prosecuted for this charge in the Eastern District
of Virginia.
The defendant knowingly wa ives all rights to raise any defense based on the fai lure of a
federal grand jury or the United States to charge him with the offense described in paragraph I of
this agreement within any applicable statute of limitat ions.
7. Special Assessment
Before sentencing in th is case, the defendant agrees to pay a mandatory spec ial
assessment of one hundred dollars ($ 100.00).
8. Pay ment of Monetary Penalties
The defendant understands and agrees that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3613, whatever
monetary penalties are imposed by the Court will be due immediately and subject to immediate
enforcement by the United States as provided fo r in Section 3613, Furthermore, wi thin 14 days
o f a request, the de fendant agrees to provide all of the defendant's financial information to the
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United States and the Probation Office and, if requested, to participate in a pre-sentencing
debtor's examination and/or complete a financial statement under penalty of pe1ju1y . lf the Court
imposes a schedule of payments, the defendant understands that the schedule of payments is
merely a minimum schedule of payments and not the only method. nor a limitation on the
methods, available to the United States to enforce the judgment. If the defendant is incarcerated,
he agrees voluntarily to participate in the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibi lity
Program, regardless of whether the Court specifically directs participation or imposes a schedule
of payments.
9. Res titution
The defendant agrees to the ent1y of a Restitution Order for the ful l amount of the
victim's losses pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). Victims of the conduct, as defined by
18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) and described in the charging instrument or Statement of Facts or any
other document describing the defendant's conduct, shall be entitled to restitution. Without
limiting the amount of restitution that the Court must impose, the parties agree that, at a
minimum, the fo llowing victims have suffered the following losses:
Victim Name/ Address Amount of Restitut ion

lRS- RACS TBD
Attn.: Mai l Stop 6261 , Restitution
333 West Pershing Avenue
Kansas City, MO 64108
The parties acknowledge that determination of the loss amounts for all victims in this
matter is a complicated and time consuming process. To that end. the defendant agrees, pursuant
to I 8 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), that the Court may defer the imposition of restitution unti l after the
sentencing; however, the defendant specifically waives the 90 day provision found at 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3664(d)(5) and consents to the en try o f any orders pertaining to restitution arter sentencing
without limitation.
If the Court orders the defendant to pay restitut ion to the IRS fo r the fai lure to pay tax,
either directly as part of the sentence or as a condition of supervised release, the IRS will use the
restitution order as the basis for a civil assessment. See 26 U.S.C. § 620 1(a)(4). The defendant
does not have the right to chall enge the amount o f this assessment. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6201 (a)(4)(C). Neither the existence of a restitution payment schedule nor the defendant's
timely payment of restitution according to that schedul e wi ll preclude the IRS from
administrative collection of the rest itution-based assessment, including levy and distraint under
26 U.S.C. § 633 I.
10. rmm unity from Further Prosecution in this District
The United States will not further criminally prosecute the defendant in the Eastern
District of Virginia fo r the specific conduct described in the in format ion or Statement of Facts.
11. Waiver of Protections of Proffer Agreement
The defendant agrees that all protections set fo rth in any proffer letter executed in relation
to this case are hereby waived. The defendant further agrees that the government may use all
statements provided by him, without limitation. in any proceeding brought by the government,
including the Internal Revenue Service, against the defendant.
12. Defendant's Cooperation
The defendant agrees to cooperate full y and truthfully with the Uni ted States, and provide
all information known to him regarding any criminal activity as requested by the govern ment. Ln
that regard:
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a. The defendan t agrees to appear for and testify truthfully and completely at
any grand juries. trials or other proceedi ngs.
b. The defendant agrees to be reasonably available for deb1iefings, meetings,
and pre-trial confe rences as the United States may require.
c. The defendant agrees to provide all documents, records, writings, or
materials of any kind in the defendant's possession or under his care, custody, or control relating
directly or indirectly to all areas of inqui ry and investigation. Nothing in this plea agreement
requii-es the defendant to waive any valid asserti on of the attorney client privilege as to counsel
advising him in connection with this invest igation or any related proceeding.
d. The defendant agrees that, at the request of the United States, he will
voluntarily submit to polygraph examinations, and that the United States will choose the
polygraph exami ner and spec ify the procedures for the examinations.
e. The defendant agrees that the Statement of FacL<, is limited to information
necessary to support the plea. The defendant will provide more detailed facts relating to this
case during ensuing debriefi ngs.
f. The defendant agrees to execute any and all instructions and
authorizations to direct inclivicluals, entities, or financial institutions to provide account
documents and information as well as to repatriate funds held by foreign financial institutions in
order to accomplish the terms and conditions of this pi ca agreement.
g. The defendant acknowledges that he is hereby on notice that he may not
violate any federa l. state, or local criminal law while cooperating with the govenunent, and that
the government will. in its discretion. cons ider any such violation in evaluating whether to fi le a
motion fo r a downward departure or reduction of sentence.
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h. Noth ing in this plea agreement places any obligation on the government to
seek the defendant's cooperation or assistance.
13. Use oflnformation Provided by the Defendant under this Plea Agreement.
The United States will not use any truthful in fo rmation provided pursuant to this plea
agreement in any criminal prosecution aga inst the defendant in the Eastern District of Virginia,
except in any prosecution for a crime of violence or conspiracy to commit, or aiding and
abetting, a crime of violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16). Pursuant to Sentencing Gu idelines
§ I B 1.8, no truthful infom1ation that the defendant provides under tl1is plea agreement wil l be
used in determining the applicable Sentencing Gu idelines advisory sentencing range, except as
provided in § I BI .8(b). Nothing in this plea agreement, however. restricts the Court's or
Probat ion Officer's access to information and records in the possession of the United States.
ru,ihermore, nothing in this plea agreement prevents the government in any way from
prosecuting the defendant should he knowingly provide false, untruthful , or pe1jurious
information or testimony, or from using information prov ided by the defendant in furtherance of
any forfe iture action, whether criminal or civil, ad mini strative or judicial. The United States will
bring this plea agreement and the full extent of the defendant's cooperation to the attention of
other prosecuting offices if requested.
14. Defendant Must P rovide Full, Complete and T ruthful Cooperation
This plea agreement is not conditioned upon charges being brought against any other
indi vidual. This pica agreement is not cond itioned upon any outcome in any pending
investigation. This plea agreement is not conditioned upon any result in any future prosecution
which may occur because of the defendant's cooperation. This plea agreement is not
conditi oned upon any result in any future grand jury presentation or trial involving charges
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resulting from this investigation. This pica agreement is cond itioned upon the defendant
providing full. complete and truth ful cooperation.
15. Motion for a Downward D eparture
The parties agree that the United States reserves the right to seek any departure from the
applicable Sentencing Guidelines advisory sentencing range, pursuant to§ 5K 1.1 of the
Sentencing Guideli nes and Policy Statements, or any reducti on of sentence pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), if, in its sole discretion, Lhe United States determi nes that such
a departure or reduction of sentence is appropriate.
J6. Pay ment of Taxes and Filing of T ax Returns
The defendant consents to any motion by the United States, under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(J)(E), to disclose grand jury material to the Internal Revenue Service
(" IRS") fo r use in computing and co llecting his taxes, interest and penalties, and to the civil and
fo rfeiture sections or the United States Attorney"s Office for use in identi fy ing assets and
collecting fi nes and restit11ti on. The defendant also agrees to file true and correct Amended U.S.
Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms I040X, for the years 2003 through 20 10 and to pay all
taxes, interest and penalties for the years 2003 through 20 I0, prior to sentencing, as will be
agreed upon between him and the IRS, or as otherwise imposed or assessed by the TRS. The
defendant also admi ts that he willfully failed to file a tr ue and accurate FBAR fo r each required
year 2003 through 2010, and agrees not to object to the assessment of fraud penalties pursuant to
26 U.S.C. § 6663 . The defendant forther agrees to make all books, records and documents
available to the lRS fo r use in computing his taxes, interest and penalties for the years 1999
through 20 10.
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17. Penalty Related to filing False and Frau dulent FBARs
The defendant agrees that in order to resolve hi s civ il liability for both willfully failing to
file FBARs and fo r willfully fi ling false and fraudul ent fBARs for years 1999 through 20 I 0, he
will pay a civil penalty in the amount of $ 14,075,862 (fourteen million, seventy-five thousand,
eight hundred and sixty-two dollars), equaling 50% of the total assets that the Defendant held in
his undeclared accounts in Switzerl and on December 3 1, 2004. no later than ten (10) days after
the entry of Judgment in this case. The defendant further agrees to cause the transfer of the
funds by electronic funds transfer pursuant to written instructions to be provided by the Financial
Litigation Unit of the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. The
defendant further agrees to cooperate with the United States. and make best efforts to transfer
and remit the funds, including taking all steps requested by any financial institution or the United
States, including the execution o f all documents, orders, and/or instructions directing persons or
entities acting on his behalf or in the name o f nominee holders of accounts on his behalf,
providing any informat ion requested to facilitate the transfer, and granting access to infom1ation
to facilitate the transfer. The defendant understands and agrees that nothing in paragraphs 15 and
16 o[, or otherwise in, this pica agreement shall prec lude or limit the IRS in its civil
determination, assessment, or collect ion of any taxes, interest and/or penalties that he may owe.
The defendant agrees to rile with the Financial Crimes Enfo rcement Network of the
Department of the Treasury true and correct f7BARs, including amended fBARs as needed, for
1999 through 20 10.
18. Breach of this Pica Agreement and Remedies
This plea agreement is effective when signed by the clele nclant, his attorney, and an
attorney for the United States. The defendant agrees to entry of this plea agreement at the date
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and time scheduled with the Cou11 by the Uni ted States (in consultation with his attorney). If Lhe
defendant withdrav.rs from this plea agreement. or commits or attempts to commit any additional
federal, state or local crimes, or intentionally gives materially false, incomplete, or mi sleading
testimony or information, or otherwise violates any provision of this plea agreement, then:
a. The United States will be released from its obligations under this plea
agreement, including any obligation to seek a downward departure or a reduction in sentence.
The defendant, however, may not withdraw the guilty plea entered pursuant to th is plea
agreement.
b. The defenda111 will be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal
violation, including, but not limited to, pc1jury and obstruction of justice, that is not time-barred
by the applicable statute of limitations on the date this plea agreement is signed.
Notwithstanding the subsequent expiration of the statute of limitations, in any such prosecution,
the defendant agrees to waive any statute-of-limitations defense.
c. Any prosecution, including the prosecution that is the subject of this plea
agreement, may be premised upon any in formation provided, or statements made. by the
defendant, and al l such information, statements, and leads derived therefrom may be used agai nst
the defendant. The defendant waives any ri ght to claim that statements made before or after the
date of this plea agreement, including the statement of facts accompanying this plea agreement
or adopted by the defendant and any other statements made pursuant to this or any other
agreement with the United States. should be exc luded or suppressed under Federal Rule of
Evidence 4 I0, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (1), the Sentencing Guidelines or any other
provision of the Constitution or federal law.
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Any alleged breach of this plea agreement by either party shall be determ ined by the
Court in an appropriate proceeding at which the defendant's di sclosures and documentary
evidence shall be admissible and at which the moving party shall be required to establish a
breach of the pica agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. The proceeding established by
this paragraph does not apply, however, to the decision o r the Uni ted States whether lo file a
motion based on "substantial assistance" as that phrase is used in Federal Rule of Crim ina l
Procedure 35(b) and Section 5Kl . 1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements. The
defendant agrees that the decision whether to file such a motion rests in the so le discretion of the
United States.
19. Nature of this Plea Agreement and Modifications
This wri tten plea agreement constitutes the complete plea agreement between the United
States, the defendant, and his counsel. The defendant and hi s at1orney acknowledge that no
threats, promises, or representations have been made. nor agreements reached, other than those
set forth in writing in this plea agreement, to cause him to plead guilty. Any mod ifications of
this plea agreement shall be va lid only as set fort h in wri ting in a supplemental or revised plea
agreement signed by all parties.
Dana J. Boente Stuart M. Goldberg

United States Attorney Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Genera l
Eastern District of Virginia Department of Justice, Tax Di vision
By .~~~
J\'1ark D. Lytl~
By:
Markf.l ~
Assistant United States Attorney Senior Litigation Counsel
Robert J. Boudreau
Trial Attorney
Date : ID iz(, h..o, ?-,

- -----f~- -7i--=-- - - - --
Date: f.,/ci ( -z ~ ( ";?,-v~7
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Defendants Signature: I hereby agree that I have consulted wi th my attorney and full y
understand all rights with respect to the pending criminal informa tion. r urther, I fully
understand all rights with respect to Titl e 18, United States Code, Section 3553 and the
provisions of the Sentencing Guidel ines that may apply in my case. l have read this plea
agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I understand this plea
agreement and voluntarily agree to it.
V~ -li _\t?rz
Hyung Kwon Kim
Date: Ovfo~O' 2 6 2-0 j 1
Defendant
Defense Counsel Si1:mature: I am counsel for the defendant in this case. I have fully
explained the defendant's rights to him with respect to the pending in formation. Funher, I have
reviewed Title 18, United States Code. Section 3553 and the Sentenci ng Guidelines, and I have
fully explained to the defe ndant the provisions that may apply in this case. I have carefully
reviewed every part of this plea agreement with the defendant. To my knowledge, the
defendant's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and vo luntary one.
u~-+-t--::::-.:, Date:
Mark E. Matthews
Charles Myungsik Yoon
Counsel for the Defendant
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EXHIBIT F
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)
v. ) Case No. 1:17-CR-00248
)
HYUNG KWON KIM, ) Honorable T. S. Ellis III
)
Defendant. ) Sentencing: January 25, 2018
) 4:00 p.m.
POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO SENTENCING
The United States hereby submits its position on the sentencing of the defendant
Hyung Kwon Kim (“defendant” or “Kim”) in accordance with U.S.S.G. §6A1.2 and the policy
of this Court. As explained below, while the government agrees with the Probation Office’s
calculation of the sentencing range the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, the government
nevertheless believes that the appropriate Guidelines range that should be applied in this case is
that agreed upon by the parties, as set forth in the plea agreement. Taking into account the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the government’s filing under seal, the government
makes a final sentencing recommendation of nine (9) months of imprisonment, three (3) years of
supervised release, an appropriate fine, and a $100 special assessment.
I. Background
A. Offense Conduct
Hyung Kim is a highly educated and sophisticated executive. Born into affluence, he had
the good fortune to inherit staggering sums. The vast sums Kim secreted in a series of secret
Swiss accounts are of import here. At one point, in 2004, the windfall stashed in Switzerland
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swelled to over $28 million. Kim engaged in a series of schemes and ruses to conceal the funds
from the IRS, violate reporting requirements, and evade taxes.
Kim first opened an account in his own name at Credit Suisse AG in Switzerland in
October 1998. He funded that account, as well as other additional accounts that he opened at
Credit Suisse, its wholly owned subsidiaries (including Bank Leu, Bank Hofmann, and
Clariden Leu), and UBS AG, with funds inherited from a foreign relative.
In November 2000, Kim took the first of many steps to mask his ownership and control
of the offshore funds. At the advice and with the assistance of his co-conspirator Edgar Paltzer,
an attorney practicing in Switzerland, Kim opened an account at Bank Leu in the name of a sham
entity called Daroka Overseas. In February 2002, he opened a second account, at Bank
Hofmann, in the name of the same entity. By placing his assets in accounts held in the name of
a nominee, Kim made it appear that the offshore funds belonged to a corporate entity, not him.
Kim controlled the assets in the account by meeting with the bankers and his attorney in
in Switzerland and the United States as well as communicating with them via email, fax, and
phone. Further, he hosted one of his Swiss bankers at his homes in the U.S. where the banker
vacationed with his family and used Kim’s residence as a base to travel to meet with his other
clients.
Wires from afar flowed into these accounts. By the close of 2004, the balance of his
accounts exceeded $28 million. Kim did not expend these funds on necessities. Instead, Kim
used assets in the accounts to fund a lavish lifestyle. The Statement of Facts and PSR discuss
Kim’s expenditures in detail. However, a summary of the spending is helpful to understand the
magnitude of the wealth that Kim concealed:
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 Between 2003 and 2007, Kim spent over $3 million from his Swiss accounts to
purchase his residence in Greenwich, Connecticut. Kim and Paltzer took efforts
to conceal that Kim controlled the funds in the Swiss accounts. When Kim
communicated with Paltzer, he used coded language. In turn, Paltzer directed
Credit Suisse to issue a check for $1.76 million from Credit Suisse First Boston,
its U.S. bank, so that it appeared that Kim tapped a domestic source of funds.
 In 2005, Kim spent almost $5 million from his Swiss accounts to purchase a
summer home on Cape Cod. While the price was significant, what is most
relevant are the machinations undertaken by Kim and Paltzer to conceal Kim’s
ownership of the Swiss accounts and the summer home itself. Paltzer formed a
new sham entity, Edraith Invest & Finance, to hold title to the home as well as a
Swiss account. Paltzer and Kim pretended that Kim merely leased the home in an
arms-length transaction from a third party. They drafted and executed fake leases.
They exchanged emails in which they discussed the wishes of the “owners.”
 Between 2003 and 2008, Kim used over $5 million from his Swiss accounts to
purchase jewels and jewelry, including the following items: a 11.6 carat diamond
ring; a 10.5 carat yellow diamond ring and jewelry setting; a 8.6 carat ruby ring; a
8.4 carat emerald ring; a 7.15 carat diamond ring; and pearls.
 Between 2000 and 2008, Kim withdrew over $500,000 when traveling in
Switzerland to fund his personal expenses.
Kim had the opportunity to bring his remaining assets to the United States in 2008, in the
midst of the Department of Justice’s investigation of UBS AG for aiding and assisting U.S.
taxpayers to evade their taxes. At that time, Credit Suisse had advised Paltzer and Kim that it
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intended to close the Daroka Overseas and Edraith accounts as part of its initiative to minimize
the bank’s exposure by closing accounts held by U.S. residents in the names of nominee entities.
Fully aware that Kim’s undeclared assets could not stay at Credit Suisse, Paltzer and Kim
reviewed Kim’s options: to report his previously undeclared assets and income to the IRS; to
end his crimes by spending the assets; or to continue the concealment by transferring his assets to
another bank. Kim chose to keep the money offshore, albeit at Bank Frey, a smaller Swiss bank
that considered itself immune from U.S. law enforcement as it deliberately maintained no
physical presence in the United States.1
With the assistance of Paltzer, Kim opened accounts at Bank Frey in the names of
Daroka Overseas and Edraith in December 2008. He deposited into those accounts the
remaining assets from his accounts at Credit Suisse’s subsidiaries. Paltzer advised Kim to take
further precautions to prevent detection, by limiting emails and phone communications from the
U.S. and meeting in third countries, such as France or Italy.
Kim maintained the accounts at Bank Frey until 2011. At that time, he elected not to
report the funds, but to bring the assets to the United States in a covert manner by paying a
1
In September 2008, as corroborated by the Internet Wayback Machine, Bank Frey’s web site contained the
following statements:
“An important reason for founding Bank Frey was to provide our clients with the services of a
Bank that is - and always will remain - truly Swiss,” Dr. Markus A. Frey says.
As a result, Bank Frey follows a strict policy to never open any branch or other representation
outside the reach of the Swiss laws and jurisdiction. We strongly believe that only by remaining a
true Swiss banking institution, we can guarantee to act in accordance with the Swiss standards of
political stability, acting in good faith and an unbroken sense for independent neutrality.
Dr. Markus A. Frey continues, “Bank Frey is and will remain truly Swiss. Only that way can we
be certain to maintain our values - and assure that no foreign authority will ever 'bully' us into
giving them up”.
See “A True Swiss Bank”, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20080915012232/http://www.bank-

frey.com:80/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=55. Bank Frey announced that it would
cease operations in October 2013.
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jeweler in Switzerland for jewels and jewelry purchased in the United States. Kim arranged the
sales by mailing packages of gifts to the children of his former banker. Kim hid handwritten
transfer instructions within those packages. Between March and August 2011, Kim spent a total
of $3.6 million in two separate transactions to purchase a ring with a sapphire weighing 13.9
carats and three loose diamonds weighing 5.02, 4.03 and 4.17 carats.
Kim concealed his offshore assets from his accountants. Indeed, although the defendant
filed FBARs in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 (for calendar years 2004 through 2007) on which he
reported accounts that he owned in South Korea, he never once reported his Swiss accounts.
Further, Kim also filed false income tax returns on which he underreported his income and failed
to report his ownership of the Swiss accounts.
Kim did not earn substantial amounts of taxable income from the assets in the Swiss
accounts. From 2001 through 2010, the combined federal and state income tax loss amounted to
$243,542. Indeed, the millions of dollars in capital losses that Kim incurred as a product of his
ill-advised investing swamped his investment gains.
II. Sentencing Argument
Although the Supreme Court rendered the federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), “a sentencing court is still required to ‘consult
[the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.’” United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d
684, 685 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 264). The Supreme Court has directed
district courts to “begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable
Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). The sentencing court,
however, “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.” Nelson v. United States,
555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009). The “Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial
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benchmark,” but the sentencing court must also “consider all of the § 3553(a) factors” in
determining the appropriate sentence. Id.; see also Clark, 434 F.3d at 685. Ultimately, the
sentence imposed must meet a standard of reasonableness. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61.
A. Guidelines Range
1. The Applicable Guidelines Provisions
The defendant pled guilty to the willful failure to file an FBAR, in violation of 31 U.S.C.
Sections 5314 and 5322. The offense of conviction in this case falls under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3.
The Probation Office calculated the Guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3(a)(2) (the “Part-S
Guidelines”). See Presentence Investigation Report, ¶ ¶ 76-85. That provision includes a cross-
reference to the theft and fraud Guidelines, and sets the base offense level as follows:
6 plus the number of offense levels from the table in § 2B1.1

(Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the
value of the funds, if subsection (a)(1) does not apply.
Probation calculated the base offense level as 28. Probation added 22 levels as it placed the
“value of funds” at $28,151,724, the year-end value of the assets in the unreported accounts in
2004 (the highest year-end balance). See PSR, ¶¶ 65(j), 76; U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L) (more
than $25 million).
The government contends, as does Probation, that two levels should be added as the
defendant “committed the offense as part of a pattern of unlawful activity involving more than
$100,000 in a 12-month period.” See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3(b)(2). The Application Note to § 2S1.3
defines a pattern of illegal activity as “at least two separate occasions of unlawful activity
involving a total amount of more than $100,000 in a 12-month period, without regard to whether
any such occasion occurred during the course of the offense or resulted in a conviction for the
conduct that occurred on that occasion.” Kim filed false FBARs on October 14, 2007 (for 2006)
and again on March 27, 2008 (for 2008). On each FBAR, Kim failed to report that he owned and
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controlled any of the financial accounts in Switzerland. Kim also filed a false 2007 Individual
Income Tax Return, Form 1040, on March 3, 2008, which omitted any income that Kim earned
from the assets in his undeclared accounts in Switzerland. Kim’s attorneys calculated that Kim
omitted $104,699 in ordinary income on the 2007 return. The filing of two false FBARs and a
false return within a 12-month period qualifies as a “pattern of unlawful activity” sufficient to
trigger the two-level enhancement.
While 2S1.3 may be the proper Guideline, the government respectfully requests that the
Court sentence the defendant under U.S.S.G. § 2T, the Tax Guidelines. As stated in the Plea
Agreement, “at the time that the defendant agreed to plead guilty, the Government consistently
took the position with similarly situated defendants that the applicable Guideline was U.S.S.G.
§ 2T1.1 and § 2T1.4 due to the cross reference in § 2S1.3(c)(1).”2 Plea Agreement, Dkt. # 10,
pp. 3-4.
In 2012, Kim and the government commenced plea negotiations with the defendant’s
counsel. At that time, the government had entered into plea agreements with a number of several
other legal permanent residents that required those individuals to plead guilty to FBAR charges,
and not tax charges. In each of those cases, the plea agreements specifically set forth a
Guidelines calculation using the Tax Guidelines and not § 2S1.3. After Kim and the government
had reached an agreement in principle, the government continued to employ the Tax Guidelines
in virtually every other FBAR case. In order to ensure that this defendant receives equitable
treatment, the government believes that the appropriate Guidelines which should be applied in
this case are the alternative calculation under § 2S1.3(c)(1).
2
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3 states as follows: “If the offense was committed for the purposes of violating the
Internal Revenue laws, apply the most appropriate guideline from Chapter Two, Part T (Offenses Involving
Taxation) if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.”
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The base offense level for this offense is 16 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2Tl.l(a)(1) and
§ 2T4.1(F), because the tax loss exceeded $100,000. The base offense level is increased by 2
levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2), because the offense involved sophisticated means.
The defendant should receive a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility resulting in a
total offense level of 15. The advisory range is 18 to 24 months of imprisonment and the fine
range is $4,000 to $40,000.
B. Section 3553(a) Factors
1. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense, History and Characteristics of the

Defendant, and the Need for Just Punishment
Tax evasion is a serious crime, and the use of offshore accounts by U.S. taxpayers to
evade their income tax obligations directly affects the ability of the Treasury to raise funds for
government expenditures. In April 2016, the IRS estimated that for the years 2008-2010, the
U.S. tax gap, which represented the total amount of U.S. taxes owed but not paid on time, was
$458 billion, despite an overall tax compliance rate among American taxpayers of 81.7%. See
“Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008–2010,” report by the IRS, available at:
https://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202
010.pdf. The IRS found that these updated “estimates suggest that compliance is substantially
unchanged since last estimated for [tax year] 2006.” Id. at 2.
What sets Hyung Kim apart from many other seemingly similarly situated defendants, is
the level and duration of the deception he employed to hide his assets from the IRS. For over a
dozen years, the defendant employed a series of ever more aggressive schemes to conceal the
windfall that he inherited. Kim utilized nine different accounts at five Swiss banks to hide his
assets. For four of those accounts, the defendant used nominee entities, formed in Caribbean tax-
haven countries, to add a further layer of protection. The defendant and his co-conspirator,
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Paltzer, used one of those entities, Edraith Invest & Finance, to deceive a realtor and other third
parties involved in the purchase of his home on Cape Cod. They went so far as to concoct a ruse
whereby Kim and Paltzer exchanged emails wherein they pretended that Kim was renting the
home from another family.
Kim had numerous opportunities to report his accounts and come into compliance. Each
time, he chose to continue his criminal conduct. From 2004 through 2008, Kim filed FBARs on
which he reported his ownership of certain accounts in South Korea. In each of those years, he
had the opportunity to come clean about his Swiss accounts. He could have informed his U.S.
return preparers about the Swiss accounts and sought their advice for properly reporting the
ownership of the accounts and the income that he received, and pay the tax due and owing. Kim
stayed silent.
In the same year that he filed his last, false FBAR, Paltzer, Kim’s Swiss attorney,
presented to him the option to close the accounts and bring the money to the United States.
Instead, Kim chose to burrow deeper into the darkness of offshore evasion. He moved his assets
to a bank that touted itself as refusing to be “bullied” by a “foreign authority,” such as U.S. law
enforcement.
Kim kept the funds in Switzerland for almost three more years. He continued to conceal
his accounts from his return preparer and never filed FBARs during those years. In 2011, Kim
again had the option to come clean and report his offshore assets. Instead, he elected to spend
down the assets. Through a series of messages hidden in packages mailed from the U.S. to his
former banker in Switzerland, Kim arranged to close his account by using the remaining fund to
buy yet more high-end jewelry.
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Given the duration of the offense, the amounts involved, the defendant’s knowledge of
his duty to report his foreign financial accounts, and the myriad of schemes and lies that the
defendant perpetrated, a sentence of incarceration is required in order to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.
2. The Need for Deterrence
Over the past decade, the government endeavored to crack down on the use of foreign
financial accounts by U.S. citizens seeking to evade the payment of their taxes. The foreign
banks and institutions are more likely to aid and assist the ultra-high net worth individuals, like
the defendant, to evade their taxes. Such foreign institutional assistance makes these crimes
more difficult to detect, investigate and prosecute. Further, prosecutions involving offshore
accounts such as this one require the government to commit significant investigative and
prosecutorial resources, and the IRS typically detects the criminal conduct well after the offenses
have been committed. A sentence of incarceration and a strong message of general deterrence in
this case is necessary to ensure that U.S. taxpayers do not use foreign financial accounts to evade
their taxes.
The government concedes that the defendant will pay a great financial price for his
crimes. He has already remitted over $14 million to the government as a civil penalty for his
willful failure to report his foreign banks accounts. Nevertheless, the defendant should receive
no mercy for paying over what amounts to slightly more than 7% of his current net worth. He
had numerous opportunities to report his accounts, had access to seasoned professionals who
knew how to do such reporting, and chose not do so. He has no one to blame but himself.
Further, Kim would have owed the same civil penalty had he been audited, not prosecuted.
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C. Fine
The Guidelines instruct that “[t]he court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the
defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). The Presentence Report states that Kim’s assets exceed $200 million and
he receives monthly cash flow of more than $450,000. As such, the government recommends
that the Court impose a substantial fine.
III. Restitution
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is mandatory in this case, and the parties have
agreed that the defendant should pay full restitution to the IRS. The government expects that by
the time of sentencing the defendant will have filed amended federal and state income tax returns
and directly paid over the tax due and owing as well as interest.
Nonetheless, the government respectfully requests that the Court order restitution to the
IRS for the following years in the following amounts: 2003 – $93,223; and 2009 – $63,828.
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IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and for the reasons stated in the United States’ sealed filing, the
United States submits that a final sentence should be imposed of nine (9) months of
imprisonment, three (3) years of supervised release, an appropriate fine, and a $100.00 special
assessment.
Respectfully submitted,
Dana J. Boente
United States Attorney
By: /s/
Mark D. Lytle
Assistant United States Attorney
Eastern District of Virginia
Counsel for the United States of America
United States Attorney’s Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Tel.: (703) 299-3700
Fax: (703) 299-3981
Email: [email protected]
By: /s/
Mark F. Daly
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Tel.: (202) 616-2245 (phone)
Fax: (202) 616-1786 (fax)
E-mail: [email protected]
Robert J. Boudreau
Tel.: (202) 616-3336 (phone)
Fax: (202) 514-0962 (fax)
E-mail: [email protected]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of January, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing
Position of the United States With Respect to Sentencing with the Clerk of Court using the
CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.
A copy has also been sent via email to:
Karen Riffle
Supervising United States Probation Officer
[email protected]
/s/
Mark F. Daly
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
v. ) Crim. Action No. 17-0201-01 (ABJ)
)
PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., )
)
Defendant. )
____________________________________)
ORDER
Defendant Paul J. Manafort, Jr. entered a plea of guilty in this case on September 14, 2018.
The plea agreement [Dkt. # 422] provides:
Your client shall cooperate fully, truthfully, completely, and

forthrightly with the Government . . . .
Plea Agreement ¶ 8.
Defendant agreed in paragraph 8(a) of the agreement to be debriefed; in paragraph 8(c) to

testify at any proceedings, and in paragraph 8(f) that he “must at all times give complete, truthful,
and accurate information and testimony, and must not commit, or attempt to commit, any further
crimes.” Paragraph 8 goes on to provide that defendant “shall testify fully, completely and
truthfully before any and all Grand Juries” in the District of Columbia or elsewhere.
Paragraph 13 – “Breach of Agreement” provides:
Your client understands and agrees that, if after entering this

Agreement, [he] fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely
each and every one of [his] obligations under this Agreement, or
engages in any criminal activity prior to sentencing or during his
cooperation . . . , [he] will have breached this Agreement.
Should it be judged by the Government in its sole discretion that the

defendant has failed to cooperate fully, has intentionally given false,
misleading or incomplete information or testimony, has committed
or attempted to commit any further crimes, or has otherwise
violated any provision of this agreement, the defendant will not be
released from his pleas of guilty but the Government will be released
from its obligations under the agreement, including (a) not to oppose
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the downward adjustment [to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

calculation] for acceptance of responsibility . . . .
Your client understands that the Government shall be required to

prove a breach of this Agreement only by good faith.
The defendant accepted the plea agreement; the signed acceptance on last page states,
“I fully understand this Agreement and agree to it without reservation. I do this voluntarily and of
my own free will, intending to be legally bound.” After the plea was entered, sentencing was
deferred while the defendant’s cooperation was ongoing.
On November 26, 2018, the parties informed the Court in a joint status report [Dkt. # 455]
that it was the government’s position that the defendant had breached the plea agreement by
making false statements to the FBI and Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) and that it was time to
set a sentencing date. The defendant disputed the government’s characterization of the information
he had provided and denied that he had breached the agreement, but he agreed that in light of the
dispute, it was time to proceed to sentencing. Thereafter, the government was ordered to provide
the Court with information concerning the alleged breach, a schedule was established for the
defense to respond, and the following submissions were made a part of the record in the case:
December 7, 2018 Government’s Submission in Support of its Breach Determination

[Dkt. # 461] (Sealed); [Dkt. # 460] (Public)
January 8, 2019 Defendant’s Response to the Government’s Submission in Support

of its Breach Determination [Dkt. # 470] (Sealed); [Dkt. # 472]
(Public)
January 15, 2019 FBI Declaration in Support of the Government’s Breach

Determination with accompanying exhibits [Dkt # 477] (Sealed);
[Dkt. # 476] (Public)
January 23, 2019 Defendant’s Reply to the Declaration [Dkt. # 481] (Sealed);
[Dkt. # 482] (Public)
The Court held a sealed hearing on February 4, 2019, and the parties each filed post-hearing
submissions. See Def.’s Post-Hearing Mem. [Dkt. # 502] (Sealed), [Dkt. # 505] (Public);
Government’s Suppl. [Dkt. # 507] (Sealed).
It is a matter of public record that the Office of Special Counsel has alleged that the
defendant made intentionally false statements to the FBI, the OSC, and/or the grand jury in
connection with five matters: a payment made by Firm A to a law firm to pay a debt owed to the
law firm by defendant Manafort; co-defendant Konstantin Kilimnik’s role in the obstruction of
justice conspiracy; the defendant’s interactions and communications with Kilimnik; another
Department of Justice investigation; and the defendant’s contacts with the current administration
after the election. The parties are agreed that it is the government’s burden to show that there has
been a breach of the plea agreement, but to be relieved of its obligations under the agreement, it
must simply demonstrate that its determination was made in good faith. Plea Agreement ¶ 13.
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In its January 8, 2019 response to the breach allegations, the defense stated that “given the
highly deferential standard that applies to the Government’s determination,” Def.’s Resp. [Dkt.
# 472] at 2, it was not challenging the assertion that the determination was made in good faith.
And, in response to a question posed by the Court at a status hearing held on January 25, 2019, the
defendant conceded that that the determination was made in good faith. Tr. of Hearing (Jan. 25,
2019) [Dkt. # 500] at 13.
In light of the defendant’s concession, and based upon the Court’s independent review of
entire record, including: all of the pleadings listed above and the supporting exhibits; the facts and
arguments placed on the record at the hearing held on February 4, 2019; and the post-hearing
submissions, the Court ruled at the hearing held on February 13, 2019 that the Office of Special
Counsel made its determination that the defendant made false statements and thereby breached the
plea agreement in good faith. Therefore, the Office of Special Counsel is no longer bound by its
obligations under the plea agreement, including its promise to support a reduction of the offense
level in the calculation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility.
But that is not the only question before the Court to decide. The question remains whether
the defendant made intentionally false statements in connection with the five matters that have
been identified by the Office of Special Counsel. The answer bears upon the applicability of
certain provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, in particular, the adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility, and it bears more generally on the Court’s assessment of the factors set forth in the
sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The parties are agreed that the government is bound to
prove facts that bear on the application of the Guidelines by a preponderance of the evidence.
Based upon its consideration of the entire record and the arguments of counsel at the
hearing of February 4, 2019, for the reasons stated on the record at the continuation of the sealed
hearing on February 13, 2019, the Court made the following additional findings:
I. OSC has established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant

intentionally made false statements to the FBI, the OSC, and the grand jury
concerning the payment by Firm A to the law firm, a matter that was material to
the investigation. See United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
II. OSC has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that on October 16,
2018, defendant intentionally made false statements concerning Kilimnik’s role in
the obstruction of justice conspiracy.
III. OSC has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the OSC, and the grand
jury concerning matters that were material to the investigation: his interactions and
communications with Kilimnik.
IV. OSC has established by a preponderance of the evidence that on October 5, 2018,
the defendant intentionally made false statements that were material to another DOJ
investigation.
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V. OSC has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that on October 16,
2018, defendant intentionally made a false statement concerning his contacts with
the administration.
This order does not address the question of whether the defendant will receive credit for his
acceptance of responsibility in connection with the calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines or
how any other Guideline provision will apply to this case. Those issues, which depend on the
consideration of a number of additional factors, will be determined at sentencing, after the
Presentence Investigation Report has been completed, the parties have filed their memoranda in
aid of sentencing, and the Court has heard argument.
The Court reporter is hereby ORDERED to provide a copy of the sealed transcript of
today’s hearing to the parties by 12:00 noon on February 14, 2019, and the parties must inform the
Court of any redactions that must to be made before the transcript can be released no later than
11:00 a.m. on February 15, 2019.
SO ORDERED.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON

United States District Judge
DATE: February 13, 2019

2-15-19 US Manafort Sentencing Memo

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Case 1:18-cr-00083-TSE Document 314 Filed 02/15/19 Page 1 of 27 PageID# 6856

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR., Crim. No. 1:18-cr-83 (TSE)

THE GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

$50,000 to $24,371,497.74, a term of supervised release of up to five years, restitution in the

amount of $24,815,108.74, and forfeiture in the amount of $4,412,500.

and to the issue of acceptance of responsibility, as discussed below.

others from engaging in such conduct.

Superseding Indictment, Feb. 2, 2019, Doc. 9.

did not reach a verdict on the remaining ten counts.2

II. Trial Evidence

amount to be $15,571,046, as reflected on Government Exhibit 72 (attached as Exhibit A).4

characterizing certain income as loans.5

his unreported income. See PSR, ¶ 36.

2011 to 2014 as reflected on the following exhibits:8

facts through witness testimony and documentary evidence.15

III. Standards Governing Sentencing

of a sentence and ‘through the process of appellate review.’”) (citation omitted).

16 See Trial Tr. at 1911-1917.

IV. The Advisory Guidelines Range

Objections to the PSR (dated January 21, 2019).

A. Tax and FBAR Guidelines (Group 1)

1. Section 2S1.3 is the Relevant Guideline Provision

more than $55 million, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L). See PSR ¶¶ 73-74.17

facilitated the money laundering and unregistered-foreign-agent (FARA) schemes to which he

pled guilty in Count One of a superseding information in the District of Columbia.19

under the FBAR process.21

issue here differ from those of the Kim prosecution.

Guidelines].”); Government Sentencing Brief, at 6 (attached as Government Exhibit F) (“The

Probation Office calculated the Guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3(a)(2)”).

2. A Role Enhancement is Appropriate

paled in comparison to Manafort’s gain.

B. Bank Fraud Guidelines (Group 2)

1. The PSR Correctly Calculated the Fraud Loss

and proven at trial.25

2. The Sophisticated Means Enhancement Is Appropriate

The Guidelines affords an enhancement when “the offense otherwise involved

constituting sophisticated means,” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(c). Application Note 9 defines

“sophisticated means” as:

especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the

Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 9.

transactions, falsified documentation, and made misrepresentations relating to an offshore

from certain accountings”).

3. A Role Enhancement is Appropriate For the Group 2 Crimes

appropriate for the Group 2 bank fraud offenses.

C. The Defendant Did Not Accept Responsibility

2019), Doc 509 (attached as Exhibit G).

income and assets.

V. Statutory Sentencing Factors Pursuant

The government addresses the Section 3553(a) factors below.

A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

loans from those banks, seeking more than $25 million.

income maintained or generated abroad.” See IRS FBAR Reference Guide, at 2

(https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irsfbarreferenceguide.pdf). Here, Manafort’s FBAR offenses

including by engaging in transactions that promoted his FARA scheme.

always the principal, and almost always the exclusive beneficiary.

B. History and Characteristics of the Defendant

in the United States and abroad.31

of his conviction, neither is a mitigating factor. Part H of Chapter 5 of the Sentencing

defendant, wealthy, but they nonetheless receive substantial terms of incarceration

approximately $1.7 million).32

Jackson found, Manafort’s misconduct continued as recently as October 2018 when he