G.R. No.

L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen
who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then
suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE

GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION.

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED

PENAL CODE.

HELD:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the unending allegiance
owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a person who owes permanent
allegiance to a state is called a national.) of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated (repealed) or severed by
the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government. (Article II,
section 1, of the Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.")

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The
political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation.

The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government
does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an
offense to the same government and same sovereign people. (Art. 114. Treason. — Any
person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the Philippine
Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving
them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion
temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.)
People vs Camerino
GR-No. L-13484

Facts:
The accused, Dominador Camerino together with the other 86 were being charged of the crime o=f sedition in
the cout of first instance. They said that it was committed during the period comprised by between Ocotber 1953 to
Novemeber 1953 wherein thet have been allegedly perpetrated the political and social ends, insistent, repeated and
continuously done the acts of terrorism and revenge against private person,leader, members and sympatahizers of the
nacionalista party in the town of cavite.

Before the arraignment, Dominador Camerino and the other 86 accused filed a motion to quash the information
on the ground of double jeopardy claiming that they have been previously convicted in the same nature of the court.
However, the asst, provincial fiscal filed a written opposition saying that although they have been charged with various
crimes under different and separate information, it would not be called double jeopardy.

Issue.
1. Whether or not Dominador camerino and the other 86 accused is guilty of sedition?
2. Whether or not it could be considered as double jeopardy?

Rulings:

On March 14, 1956, the trial court issued an order sustaining the reasons of the motion to quash and dismissing
the information on the grounds:(1) that the information charged more than one offense, (2) that it was vague, ambiguous
and uncertain, (3) that it described crimes for which some of the accused had either been convicted or acquitted, and (4)
some violation of the election law described in the specification had already prescribed. A motion for reconsideration filed
by the Fiscal was denied. The Government is appealing from that order of dismissal, as well as the order denying the
motion for reconsideration.

People v. Acosta
California Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate District
284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1991)

Facts
Police officers Salceda and Francis approached Acosta (defendant) who was
sitting in a stolen vehicle parked on the street. After the officers identified
themselves, Acosta sped away, leading the officers and others on a reckless
48-mile chase throughout Orange County, California. Acosta ran stop signs
and red lights and drove the wrong way on streets. Police helicopters from
Anaheim, Costa Mesa, Huntington Beach, and Newport Beach assisted the
ground chase by tracking Acosta’s movements from the air. After some
improper maneuvering from the Costa Mesa helicopter and the Newport
Beach helicopter, the two collided and fell to the ground killing three
occupants in the Costa Mesa helicopter. Acosta was indicted on three counts
of second-degree murder of the helicopter occupants. At trial, Menzies
Turner, a retired FAA investigator, testified as an expert and concluded that
the Costa Mesa helicopter pilot violated several Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulations. Additionally, Turner could not explain the
erratic movement exhibited by the Costa Mesa helicopter and testified that he
had never heard of a midair collision between two police helicopters involved
in tracking a ground pursuit. Acosta was convicted on three counts of second-
degree murder and he appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence
that his conduct was the proximate cause of the deaths and insufficient
evidence of malice.
G.R. No. 134503. July 2, 1999]JASPER AGBAY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO NATIVIDAD,
JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M. SOLOMON,respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner, together with one SHERWIN Jugalbot, was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police
Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610. The following day, a Complaint for
violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu. Subsequently, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan
demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had failed to deliver the
petitioner to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from his detention. September 7,
1997, this was not acted upon. When petitioner was able to post bond and was released, he filed a
complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein private respondents. By virtue of
Memorandum Circular No. 14 of the Office of the Ombudsman, [11] the case for delay in delivery filed by
petitioner against herein private respondents was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its proper
disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on the complaint, andissued the Resolution recommending its dismissal
against herein private respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution but it was denied. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.

Held:

No, there was not, the petition is thus dismissed. The filing of the complaint with
the Municipal Trial Court
constitutes delivery to a proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code punishes public officials or employees who shall detain
any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities
within the periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the
expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered to the
corresponding judicial authorities. The words judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 mean the
courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or
confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court
and other such inferior courts as may be established by law.In contrast with a city fiscal, it is
undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct preliminary
investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment[32]. Furthermore, upon the
filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied
considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and,
upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying
Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC.

Punzalan vs. Dela Peña

G.R. No. 158543
July 21, 2004
Power of the Secretary of Justice over Prosecutors

FACTS

Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted
Homicide and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn,
Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges for grave oral
defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical
injuries against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela
Peña against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others and one for
Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against Alex "Toto" Ofrin.

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation,
docketed as, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier,

On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed
the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan. The charge
of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also dismissed
by the Assistant Prosecutor.

On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution
modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by
ordering, among others – (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the
charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be
downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats
against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats.

On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000
Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the movants..

ISSUES

(1) Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed GAD? No.

HELD
Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of
direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.
“Supervision and control” includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of
duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.
In the case of People v. Peralta, we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute
vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether,
what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v.
Court of Appeals, we declared that:
A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal
justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor
prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.

We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause

during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as
an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating
prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is
not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to
support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty
not to prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are
convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be
prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with
discretion in the discharge of this function.
4. People vs. Alipit, et al.
44 Phil. 910
FACTS: The election of the municipal president was contested on the ground of minority. He yielded the chair to
the vice-president. The meeting of the municipal council presided over by the vice-president was stopped by the
chief of police and the municipal president by arresting the vice-president and threatening the councilors with
arrest if they would continue holding the meeting.
The councilors then dispersed, leaving the premises.
ISSUE:Whether or not the chief of police and municipal president are liable under Article 143 for preventing the
meeting of the municipal council.
HELD: Any stranger, even if he be the municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal police, must
respect the meeting of the municipal council presided over by the vice-president and he has no right to dissolve
it through violence under the pretext of lack of notice to some members of the council, which was not apparent,
but required an investigation before it could be determined.

2. People vs. Reyes, et al.

C.A.-G.R. No. 13633-R, July 27, 1955

FACTS: The Iglesiani Cristo held a meeting at a public plaza after securing a permit to do so from the mayor.
The meeting started with some singing, after which the minister (Sanidad) of the sect read from the Bible and
then delivered a sermon, in the course of which he attacked the Catholic and Aglipayan churches, as well as the
women of San Esteban, Ilocos Sur. The Chief of Police ordered his policemen to stop the minister. When the
minister refused, the Chief of Police fired two shots in the air which dispersed the crowd and stopped the
meeting.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief of Police is liable under Article 132 (Interruption of religious worship) of the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD: The act of the Chief of Police is not a violation of Article 132 (Interruption of religious worship), but of
Article 131 (Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings).
Article 131, RPC:
Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings. – The penalty of prisioncorreccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, without legal ground, shall prohibit
or interrupt the holding of a peaceful meeting, or shall dissolve the same.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall hinder any person from
joining any lawful association or from attending any of its meetings.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall prohibit or hinder any person
from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses
or redress of grievances.
Article 132, RPC:
Interruption of religious worship. – The penalty of prisioncorreccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who shall prevent or disturb the ceremonies or manifestations of any
religion.
If the crime shall have been committed with violence or threats, the penalty shall be prisioncorreccional in its
medium and maximum periods.