Coltan, Congo & Conflict: Polinares Case Study

Coltan, Congo
& Conflict
POLINARES CASE STUDY
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies No 20 | 03 | 13
HCSS helps governments, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector to understand the fast-changing environment and
seeks to anticipate the challenges of the future with practical policy
solutions and advice.
Coltan, Congo & Conflict
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)
Rapport No 21 | 05 |13
ISBN/EAN: 978-94-91040-81-8
Project leader:
Marjolein de Ridder
Authors:
HCSS Fraunhofer ISI Raw Materials Group BGR
Artur Usanov Luis Tercero Espinoza Magnus Ericsson Henrike Sievers
Marjolein de Ridder Masuma Farooki Maren Liedtke
Willem Auping
Stephanie Lingemann
This research has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7/2007- 2013) under grant agreement n° 244516 (POLINARES project).
© 2013 The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved. No part of this report
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to the licenses of their respective owners.
Graphic Design: Studio Maartje de Sonnaville, The Hague
The Hague Centre Lange Voorhout 16 [email protected]

for Strategic Studies 2514 EE The Hague www.hcss.nl
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Coltan, Congo & Conflict
POLINARES CASE STUDY
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies No 21 | 05 | 13
TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S
Table of contents

Executive Summary 9
Introduction 11
1 Key facts and figures about coltan and tantalum 15

1.1 Properties and uses of tantalum 15
1.2 The tantalum supply chain from mine to metal 18
1.3 Price developments 26
1.4 Environmental impact 28
2 The Democratic Republic of Congo 29

2.1 Background information 29
2.2 Brief history of conflict in the DRC 34
3 Coltan mining in the DRC 43

3.1 Coltan and tantalum resources in the DRC 43
3.2 Tantalum mining before the First Congo War 44
3.3 The first coltan mining boom 45
3.4 The second coltan boom 47
3.5 Organization of coltan mining and trading during the booms 49
4 Coltan’s connections to the conflict in the DRC 55

4.1 Coltan as a conflict mineral 55
4.2 The use of conflict minerals by armed groups 57
4.3 Motivations of armed groups 61
5 Policy initiatives 67
5.1 Brief review of policy initiatives 67
5.2 Main challenges facing coltan initiatives 71
6 Conclusion 85
HCSS Report 5
TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S
Appendix A: Tantalum mining 89

Overview of operating or suspended industrial mines 89
Operational status of some major tantalum mines in 2012 91
Tantalum mining projects in the pipeline 92
Appendix B: Actors involved in DRC conflict 93
List of figures
Figure 1 Percentage share of category in tantalum processors’ shipments 17
Figure 2 The tantalum supply chain 19
Figure 3 Regional distribution of the most likely tantalum resources, 2010 20
Figure 4 Major tantalum mining sites 21
Figure 5 Global tantalum production, 1990-2011 (in tonnes of tantalum content) 22
Figure 6 The average year-end nominal tantalite spot price
(in US$ per kg of tantalum content) 26
Figure 7 GNI per capita in DR Congo as a percentage of GNI per capita
in Sub-Saharan Africa 31
Figure 8 Mineral deposits in the DRC 32
Figure 9 Political map of the DRC 34
Figure 10 Armed groups in the eastern DRC 39
Figure 11 Tantalum production in the DRC (in tonnes of tantalum content) 45
Figure 12 Tantalum price and production in the DRC, 2001-2010 (in tonnes) 48
Figure 13 Geographic distribution of tantalum production, 2007-2011 49
Figure 14 Share of the DRC and Rwanda in global production of tantalum 51
Figure 15 Distribution of armed groups’ estimated profits from trade
in 4 major minerals, 2008 56
List of tables
Table 1 Major uses of tantalum by industry 16
Table 2 Distribution of coltan revenues, c. 2000 52
Table 3 Major armed groups and sources of mineral revenue,1998-2003,
(Source: Nest, 2011) 60
Table 4 Major armed groups and sources of mineral revenue 2006-2008 61
Table 5 Exports of conflict minerals from North and South Kivus, in US$’000s 81
Table 6 Major mines for tantalum by state of operations 91
Table 7 Overview of actors involved in DRC conflict 93
HCSS Report 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary
In the early 2000s, tantalum – a rare metal with some unique properties that
make it an important raw material for information and communication
technologies – suddenly moved from obscure geological publications into a
wide public spotlight. Effective NGO campaigns using catchy slogans, such as
‘No blood on my mobile’, emphasized that consumer demand in the West for
mobile phones, computers, game consoles and other electronic devices, all
of which contain small amounts of tantalum, fueled mass atrocities in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The strong public attention on tantalum and coltan is somewhat puzzling.

Coltan is far from being the most important mineral that is mined in the DRC,
and the DRC has never been the main tantalum supplier to the global market.
This report therefore seeks to redress the largely mediatic coverage of the role
of coltan mining in the DRC conflict, contributing to a more informed analysis
of the relationship between the two.
The report was prepared as part of the POLINARES project, which aims to
examine the main global challenges surrounding access to fossil fuels and
mineral resources. First, it provides the main facts and data on tantalum,
such as its properties and uses, the supply chain from mine to metal, and price
developments. Next, the report gives a short historic overview of conflict in the
DRC which is followed by an overview of coltan and tantalum resources and
coltan mining in the country. Then, the report focuses on the specific role of
coltan in the present conflict in the DRC. It analyzes the involvement of armed
groups in the mining and mineral trade and touches upon the debate on greed
and grievances when assessing the motivations of armed groups. Finally, the
report gives an overview of the policy measures that were adopted or proposed
to mitigate the negative effects of coltan mining and trade on the conflict in
the DRC, and analyzes their effectiveness and efficiency.
HCSS Report 9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The report concludes that the importance of coltan as a source of revenue for
armed groups is often exaggerated. With the exception of a short-lived coltan
boom in 2000-2001, it was never a substantial source of funding for armed
groups. Although armed groups have profited from the DRC’s mineral wealth,
coltan was not the main instigator of the conflict in the DRC and was at most a
contributing factor.
Many policy initiatives aimed at breaking the link between mining, mineral trade
and conflict, including Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S., suffer
from problems related to both effectiveness and efficiency. First of all, there is
little convincing evidence that initiatives focusing on limiting the mineral reve-
nue of armed groups are likely to lead to a significant reduction of violence in the
DRC. We believe this is because many conflict mineral policy initiatives assume
that mineral revenues are the main reason behind the continued fighting in
eastern DRC. However, reducing the mineral revenue of armed groups primarily
addresses symptoms of a deeper problem. As long as the underlying reasons for
conflict continue to exist and the right governance structures to address griev-
ances are lacking, rebels will simply shift from trade in minerals to other sources
of revenue, such as taxing agriculture or foreign aid. There are obviously moral
reasons for reducing the mineral revenues of armed groups. However, even in
this case it is important to understand that challenges such as weak governance,
corruption and large compliance costs, might easily undermine their successful
implementation.
The main problem in the DRC is the weakness of governance and the inability
of the state to fulfill its basic functions. In such a context, ending the violence
requires a long-term and comprehensive approach that combines miltary,
political, and economic efforts, with a particular emphasis on building capable
and legitimate institutions, restoring the state’s monopoly on violence, and
promoting economic development that is not based on illegal activities.
10 Coltan, Congo & Conflict

INTRODUCTION
Introduction
In the early 2000s, tantalum – a rare metal with some unique properties –
suddenly moved from being the subject of specialized geological and engineering
publications into a wide public spotlight. Effective NGO campaigns using catchy
slogans, such as ‘No blood on my mobile’, claimed that consumer demand in the
West for mobile phones, computers, game consoles and other electronic devices,
all of which contain small amounts of tantalum, fueled mass scale atrocities in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the eyes of the general public,
tantalum and coltan, a tantalum-bearing ore that is mined in the DRC, became
the most visible symbol of the link between the deadly conflict in the DRC and
the exploitation of mineral resources.
This case study on the link between coltan mining and armed conflict in DRC
was prepared as part of the POLINARES project funded by the European
Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007- 2013). The overall goal
of the project was to examine the main global challenges surrounding access to
fossil fuels and mineral resources. This study illustrates one particular aspect
of this broader problem; self-imposed constraints on access to certain minerals
in response to public and policy-maker sensitivity to potential links between
mining and human suffering or conflict. This moves away from the more
familiar problem, which was the main focus of past POLINARES projects,
namely when access to minerals is limited by actions of external actors. In the
future, self-imposed constraints on access to minerals may become a more
common instrument to ensure international compliance with basic standards of
environmental stewardship or labor conditions at mining sites. The question of
whether the use of such constraints is appropriate highlights the difficulty of
balancing the mutual economic benefits offered by mining to mineral producing
and consuming countries against the protection of core values concerning the
unacceptability of violence or forced labor.
HCSS Report 11
INTRODUCTION
While this report does not offer any definitive answers to this question, it does
provide an illustration of the difficult trade-offs to be made between economic
and normative concerns through a case study of coltan mining in the DRC and its
connection with the ongoing civil conflict. It also demonstrates that there can be
unintended consequences of policy measures aimed at breaking the links
between coltan mining and conflict.
More specifically this report aims to answer the following research questions:
• What is the role of coltan mining in the conflict in the DRC?
• What are the main policy initiatives either proposed or put in place and what
are their (potential) impacts?
Tantalum and coltan were selected as the focus of this case study due to the large
amount of public attention that they have received. The fact that they became
the target of highly mediatized NGO campaigns is in itself somewhat puzzling.
Coltan is far from being the most important mineral that is mined in the DRC,
and the DRC has never been the main tantalum supplier to the global market.
This report therefore seeks to redress the largely mediatic coverage of the role
of coltan mining in the DRC conflict, contributing to a more informed analysis
of the relationship between the two.
It should be noted that publicly available data on reserves, production and

exports in the DRC are very unreliable. Figures from different sources often
show significant discrepancies. This is not particularly surprising given that
the country has been engulfed in one of the most devastating conflicts since the
end of the WWII. The tantalum market itself is not particularly transparent.
Therefore, one should interpret most figures in this chapter more as educated
estimates rather than precise measurements.1
The report is structured in the following way. Chapter 1 provides the main facts
and data on tantalum. It gives an overview of its properties and uses, discusses
1 For example, one the most prominent sources of data on the minerals market, U.S. Geological
Survey, notes in the ‘Mineral Yearbook 2002’ that ‘data on production [in the DRC] are
speculative and unreliable for estimating’.

INTRODUCTION
the tantalum supply chain from mine to metal, including artisanal mining of
coltan in the DRC. Finally, this chapter touches upon developments in tantalum
prices which were an important trigger for coltan mining in the DRC and had
significant impact on the conflict. Chapter 2 includes background information
on the DRC and a short historic overview of conflict there. Chapter 3 then looks
specifically at coltan mining in the DRC. This chapter gives an overview of coltan
and tantalum resources in the country and it discusses the organization of coltan
mining during the first and second mining booms. Chapter 4 focuses on the
specific role of coltan in the present conflict in the DRC. It analyzes the
involvement of armed groups in mining and mineral trade, exploring the greed
and grievances model of assessing the motivations of armed groups. Chapter 5
gives an overview of the policy measures that were adopted or proposed to
mitigate the negative effects of coltan mining and trade on the conflict in the
DRC, and analyzes their effectiveness and efficiency. Finally, this report greatly
benefited from the expertise and multidisciplinary nature of the POLINARES
research consortium. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) worked
together with the Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR),
Raw Materials Group (RMG) and Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation
Research (ISI) on this report.
HCSS Report 13
K ey facts and figures about coltan and tantalum
1 Key facts and figures

about coltan and
tantalum
Coltan is short for columbite–tantalite, a mineral containing the elements
tantalum and niobium. Niobium was formerly known as columbium, hence
the name columbite-tantalite. The commercial value of mined coltan is mainly
determined by its tantalum content. The chapter starts with an overview of
the properties and uses of tantalum, followed by a discussion of the tantalum
supply chain from mine to metal. The analysis pays special attention to artisanal
mining, as this is how coltan is mined in the DRC. The chapter closes with a
section on the developments in tantalum pricing.
1.1 Properties and uses of tantalum2

Tantalum is a rare metal with unique properties. Thanks to its high strength,
resistance to high temperatures and corrosion, ductility, inertness to the human
body and other properties, tantalum is used in many metal alloys and has
applications in numerous industries. Tantalum joined the group of commercially
useful elements in the last century. Despite the comparatively short history of its
technological use, tantalum is now a key enabler of our information and
communication-intensive society.
Since the 1960s the leading use of tantalum was as a powder or wire for capacitors
within the electronics industry. Capacitators are electrical components that are
used to store energy in an electric field. They are used in the electrical circuits
of many common electronic devices. The tantalum capacitor has a high
capacitance, which is the ability to store an electrical charge, per volume and
weight. This makes tantalum capacitors smaller and lighter than their
alternatives (for example, made from aluminum). Despite their higher price,
tantalum capacitors are widely used in mobile phones, computers and
automotive electronics, where saving on weight and space is important. An
average mobile phone, for example, contains around 40 milligrams of tantalum.
2 See also Luis A. Tercero Espinoza, Case Study: Tantalum in the World Economy: History, Uses and
Demand, POLINARES Working Paper N. 28 (Polinares, March 2012), http://www.polinares.eu/
docs/d2-1/polinares_wp2_chapter16.pdf.
HCSS Report 15
Besides capacitors, tantalum is used in many alloys thanks to its high melting
point and resistance to corrosion. It is an essential component of many nickel-
based super alloys, which are used for highly stressed parts, such as the turbine
blades in aircraft engines and land-based gas turbines. Others uses of tantalum
include mill products for sputtering targets and chemicals for audio and video
components. Tantalum is also being used in the medical industry. Its chemical
inertness and non-irritant reaction to living tissue make tantalum ideally suited
for surgical instruments, pacemakers, implants and joint replacements. Table 1
gives an overview of the major uses of tantalum by industry.
INDUSTRY USAGE CHARACTERISTICS PRODUCT
Automotive Anti-lock brake systems, airbag High strength, Tantalum powder

activation systems and engine resistance to high
management modules temperatures
Ceramics & surface Ceramic capacitors, glass coating, High strength Tantalum oxide and
coatings camera lenses and X- ray films yttrium tantalate
Chemicals Chemical processing Ductile, resistance to Tantalum metal

corrosion
Construction Cathode protection systems for large High strength, Tantalum metal
steel structures such as oil platforms resistance to corrosion
and corrosion resistant fasteners such
as screws, nuts and bolts
Engineering Cutting tools Resistance to high Tantalum carbide

temperatures (carbides)
Electronics Capacitors, surface acoustic wave High and temperature Lithium tantalate,
filters for sensors and touch screen insensitive volumetric tantalum powder,
technologies, hard disk drivers and led capacitance, tantalum ingots and
lights thermodynamic stability tantalum nitride
Medicine Pacemakers, hearing aids and Bio-inertness Tantalum metal

prosthetic devices such as hip joints
Metallurgical Furnace parts, super alloys for jet Resistance to high Tantalum metal and
engines and rocket engine nozzles temperatures ingots
Military Missile parts, night vision goggles, Resistance to high Tantalum ingots and
and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) temperatures, High and oxide
temperature insensitive
volumetric capacitance
TABLE 1: MAJOR USES OF TANTALUM BY INDUSTRY 3
3 British Geological Survey (BGS), Niobium-Tantalum Commodity Profile, Commodity Profiles

(Nottingham: British Geological Survey (BGS), 2011).

The fabrication of tantalum capacitors is reported to account for more than 60%
of tantalum demand in the United States (US) today.4 Other sources suggest that
globally the share of tantalum use for capacitors has decreased since 2004 from
42% to 24% while use of tantalum chemicals has increased from 14% to 36 %.5
The share of other categories has remained largely unchanged over the years (see
Figure 1).6
2005 2011
Tantalum
Chemicals
14% mill other
products 11%
other
of
mill 12% tantalum Tantalum
tantalum
products Carbide Chemicals
16%
of 9% 36%
tantalum
17% Capacitor tantalum
Capacitor
-grade ingot
-grade
tantalum 6%
tantalum tantalum
ingot powder
powder tantalum
7% 41%
24% Carbide
7%
Figure 1: Percentage share of category in tantalum processors’ shipments
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF CATEGORY IN TANTALUM PROCESSORS’ SHIPMENTS 7
Miners
Substitution
Traders
There are substitutes available for most applications of tantalum and its
compounds. The range of capacitance provided by tantalum capacitors, for
example, can be largely but not completely covered by aluminum-, ceramic-
Processors
or niobium-based capacitors. In particular ceramic and niobium capacitors
are replacing tantalum capacitors in many applications. The use of tantalum
Capacitor Sputtering target Alloy
Producers manufacturers producers
4 US Geological Survey, ‘Mineral Commodity Summaries 2012' (US Geological Survey (USGS),
January 24, 2012).
Circuit board Semi-conductor Component
assemblers manufacturers manufacturers
5 Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center and José Isildo de Vargas, Bulletin No 149, ISSN
1019-2026, March 2012, http://tanb.org/webfm_send/166.
6 Figure 1 is based on tantalum processors’ shipment data. Since the tantalum market is
OEM OEM
a relatively small and high-value market, stocks (e.g. of electronic companies) can be
significant. Therefore shipment data must be understood as a proxy for end-use statistics.
Figure 2 The tantalum supply
7 Tantalum-Niobium chain
International Study Center and José Isildo de Vargas, Bulletin No 149.
(Adapted from Global Advanced Metals)
HCSS Report 17
in cemented carbides is in long-term decline.8 There are also substitutes available

for mill products (e.g. glass, titanium, niobium) and high-temperature
applications (e.g. niobium, tungsten, hafnium).
However, the use of substitutes is often coupled with reduced performance or

lower versatility. Tantalum capacitors offer the advantage of high reliability,
resistance to high temperatures and a broad range of capacitance. It is therefore
expected that tantalum capacitors will remain first choice for applications
requiring high reliability and resistance to elevated temperature and for which
cost is not a primary consideration.
Because of the strong competition from other materials for capacitors and
microelectronic applications it is expected that the consumption of tantalum
will not increase substantially in the future. This is supported by data from the
Niobium-Tantalum International Study Center (TIC) on tantalum processors’
shipments, which were at the same level in early 2010 as in 2004.9 This
development is also supported by the global production data of the United States
Geological Survey (USGS), which show that global production in 2010 was more
than 50% less than in 2004 (see Figure 5).
1.2 The tantalum supply chain from mine to metal

The supply chain for tantalum can be relatively lengthy and complex (see Figure
2), including multiple distributors and traders as well as miners and smelters.
This complexity can lead to issues in tracking the raw material back to the source
of supply. Insight into the tantalum supply chain is becoming increasingly
important in light of legislation and guidelines aimed at preventing the use
of conflict minerals.
8 US Geological Survey, ’Mineral Commodity Summaries 2012’; Volker Wischnat and Bettina
Renz, ’Wo Keramik Vorsprung Schaff t,’ E&E-Kompendium 2007/2008 (2007): 90–92; Roskill
Information Services, The economics of tantalum. (London: Roskill Information Services, 2009),
10.
9 Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center and José Isildo de Vargas, Bulletin No 149.

products 11%
other
of
mill 12% tantalum Tantalum
tantalum
products Carbide Chemicals
16%
of 9% 36%
tantalum K ey facts and figures about coltan and tantalum
17% Capacitor tantalum
Capacitor
-grade ingot
-grade
tantalum 6%
tantalum tantalum
ingot powder
powder tantalum
7% 41%
24% Carbide
7%
Figure 1: Percentage share of category in tantalum processors’ shipments
Miners
Traders
Processors
Capacitor Sputtering target Alloy

Producers manufacturers producers
Circuit board Semi-conductor Component

assemblers manufacturers manufacturers
OEM OEM
Figure 2 The tantalum supply chain
(Adapted from Global Advanced Metals)

FIGURE 2: THE TANTALUM SUPPLY CHAIN
(ADAPTED FROM GLOBAL ADVANCED METALS)
Resources and reserves

Tantalum is a metallic element that is present in the Earth’s crust in a vast array
of minerals. Tantalum often occurs with the element niobium (previously known
as columbium). The most important tantalum-niobium containing mineral
concentrates are tantalite and niobite (also known as columbite). These mineral
concentrates are chemically similar but contain respectively more tantalum or
niobium. Coltan is an abbreviation for columbite-tantalite that is only used in
parts of Africa or as a nickname for this specific mineral. Other minerals in
which tantalum occurs are microlite, tapiolite, wodginite, struverite and
pyrochlore.
Tantalum resources and reserves are geographically widespread. According to

R. Burt, the former president of the TIC, the most likely tantalum resources are
estimated at 260,000 t.10
10 Burt, R, ’Tantalum - a Rare Metal in Abundance?,’ T.I.C. Bulletin, 2010.
HCSS Report 19
Other Africa North America Europe

Central Africa 7% 2% 0,7%
9%
South America
41%
Russia & Middle

East
10%
China & South-East

Asia
10%
Australia
21%
Figure 3: Regional distribution of estimated tantalum resources, 2010
(Source:
FIGURE Burt, 2010)DISTRIBUTION OF THE MOST LIKELY TANTALUM RESOURCES, 2010
3: REGIONAL
(SOURCE: BURT, 2010)

Lovozero
Orlovka
Tanco
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the most likely tantalum resources by
Ma Ar Kan Yichun
geographic region. The largest indicated and measured (or known) tantalum Nanping
resources in the world are found in South America (106,000), mainly in Brazil;
and in Australia (53,900). Kenticha
Thailand
Malaysia
Pitinga
Reserves are the part of the resources that can be economically extracted using
Mibra
Wodgina
existing technologies at the time of determination. Tantalum reserves are quite

Marropino Greenbushes
significant and do not suggest Areaany geological

with artisanal production constraints on tantalum
production at least in the medium-term perspective. Global tantalum reserves

(Semi-) industrial producer
Suspended / care & maintenance
amounted to 120,000t in 2012 according to the USGS.11 One metric that can be
Figure
used to 4:compare
Major tantalum mining sites availability of different minerals is the reserves
the geological
to(Source:
production ratio. For tantalum this ratio suggests that there are more than
BGR, 2010)
130 years of available supply (using the average primary production of tantalum
in 2007-2011 of circa 910 tonnes). This is much more than for many other
minerals.
11 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2012: Tantalum, Mineral Commodity Summaries (USGS,
2012), http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/niobium/mcs-2012-tanta.pdf.

China & South-East K ey facts and figures about coltan and tantalum
Asia
10%
Australia
21%
Figure 3: Regional distribution of estimated tantalum resources, 2010
(Source: Burt, 2010)
Lovozero
Orlovka
Tanco
Ma Ar Kan Yichun
Nanping
Thailand
Kenticha Malaysia
Pitinga
Wodgina
Mibra
Marropino Greenbushes
Area with artisanal production

(Semi-) industrial producer
Suspended / care & maintenance
Figure 4: Major tantalum mining sites

FIGURE 4: MAJOR TANTALUM MINING SITES
(Source: BGR,
(SOURCE: BGR,2010)
2010)
Tantalum mining
The tantalum supply chain starts with the mining of tantalum-containing ores.
Conventional and artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) takes place around
the world. Figure 4 shows where tantalum mining takes place globally. The Great
Lakes region is the center of tantalum mining in Africa with the DRC being the
largest African producer. Most of tantalum mining in Africa is artisanal and
small-scale. The major exeptions are the Marropino mine in Mozambique and
the Kenticha mine in Ethiopia.
HCSS Report 21
1600
1400
1200
Rest of the
1000 World
Africa
800
Brazil
600
Australia
400
200
0
2007
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2008
2009
2010
2011
Figure 5 Global tantalum production, 1990-2011 (in tonnes of tantalum content)
FIGURE 5: GLOBAL TANTALUM PRODUCTION, 1990-2011 (IN TONNES OF TANTALUM CONTENT)
(Source:
(SOURCE:USGS data)
USGS DATA)
700
600
Figure 5 shows the fluctuations in global production over time from 1990 to 2010
and
500
the relative contributions of Australia, Brazil, and Africa. Existing mining
operations respond relatively quickly to changing market conditions (see
400
Appendix A for an overview of past, present and planned mining projects). When
demand
300
and prices are low, mines are closed only to be reopened again when
demand picks up and prices rise. The global economic crisis slowed demand for
200
tantalum and led to the temporary closure of some of the largest tantalum mines.
100
In the fall of 2008 as the global financial crisis reached its apogee, the demand for
0
tantalum from electronic industries started to fall. Consequently this led to the
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
closure of several mines in Mozambique, Canada and Australia. Talison Minerals
Pty (now
Figure 6: Theknown as Global
average year-end Advanced
nominal tantalite Metals), theUS$
spot price (in largest
per kg global producer
of tantalum content) of
1
tantalum, for example,

(Based on USGS data) decided to close down production at the two largest
Australian tantalum mines, Wodgina and Greenbushes, in December 2008.12 In
2009, after the closure, Australia’s share of global tantalum production fell to
10%. Next year, in 2010, no tantalum at all was produced in Australia.13 In 2009,
the Tanco mine in Canada and the Marropino mine in Mozambique were also
12 Swiss Metal Assets, ’Dodd-Frank, Australian Cuts Threaten Tantalum,’ Swiss Metal Assets,
February 14, 2012, http://www.swissmetalassets.com.
13 Raw Materials Group, ’Raw Materials Data - Tantalum,’ Raw Materials Data (RMD) - Metals, Iron
Ore and Coal Database, 2012, http://www.rmg.se/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=89.
1
Price of tantalite ore is typically reported by trade journals in US dollars per pound of tantalum pentoxide content. It was converted by the
USGS into US dollars per tonne of contained tantalum. These, however, are not prices for refined tantalum, which are obviously significantly
higher.

temporarily closed.14 As a result, global production of tantalum dropped by 40%

from 1270 tonnes in 2008 to 764 tonnes in 2009. Most mines re-opened in the
course of 2010 and 2011. In 2011, an estimated 790 tonnes of tantalum ore were
mined.
Artisanal mining
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is done by individuals, family units,
worker cooperatives or small companies with minimal or no mechanization,
often informally or illegally.15 Not every mineral is suitable for artisanal mining.
Geological factors that support economies of scale and mechanization
(uniformity of deposit, width of ore bodies, depth, overburden) tend to render
ASM unprofitable. On the other hand, small deposits and irregular ore bodies
create economic opportunities for ASM.
The most important factor for the economic competitiveness of artisanal mining
is a high value per unit of weight of the ore mined. Coltan is a quite valuable
material in this respect with prices having exceeded US$100 per kg of tantalum
content. It is therefore no coincidence that artisanal mining accounted for more
than a quarter of total global production of tantalum in 2009, which is one of the
highest percentages compared to other metals.16 Since ASM is based on extensive
use of labor, low wages are also essential for its economic competitiveness.
Finally, the factors that make large mining investment more expensive or risky
also make ASM comparatively more attractive. Such factors might include
remote location of deposits, difficult terrain, absence of infrastructure (roads,
electricity, water), and high political risk including lack of rule of law.
Compared to industrial mining artisanal mining is a less capital-intensive

method of mining. Other featuress of ASM include flexibility and a fast response
time. For a large industrial mine it typically takes many years to bring the mine
into production, while mines developed by artisanal miners can often start
producing in a few days. The ability of artisanal mining to react quickly to
14 Globe Metals & Mining, ’Globe Metals & Mining - Tantalum,’ Globe Metals & Mining, 2012,
http://www.globemetalsandmining.com.au/Commodities/Tantalum.aspx#.UIhivVFqCxV.
15 Dorner, U., G.Franken, M.Liedtke and H.Sievers, Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM),
POLINARES working paper n.19, March 2012., p.1
16 Dorner, U., G.Franken, M.Liedtke and H.Sievers, Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM),
POLINARES working paper n.19, March 2012., Figure 3.
HCSS Report 23
changes in the market comes from the fact that artisanal miners typically do not
have labor contracts with fixed wages but are paid or a fixed percentage of their
production. Economically it means that these entrepreneurs bear all market risks
themselves. If mineral prices drop significantly some of them will abandon
mining because it becomes less attractive and switch to other economic
activities. Thus the supply side of the coltan market in the DRC is close to what
economists call ‘perfect competition’ with many small price-taking producers.
Primary and secondary production

In addition to specialized tantalum mining, tantalum is also produced from tin
slag and scrap. Tin slag is a by-product of tin smelting. Over the last decade tin
slag has accounted for up to 20% of total tantalum supply.17 Tantalum, and other
metals, can be produced from different sources of scrap metal. There is scrap
from manufacturing (i.e. new scrap) and scrap from products at the end-of-life
(i.e. old scrap). New scrap is the most widely available and most tantalum scrap is
generated during the manufacturing of electronic components, cemented
carbides and superalloys.18 The recycling efficiency, and ultimately also the share
of recycled tantalum in the total tantalum consumption, is determined by the
amout of tantalum in scrap; tantalum prices; previous industrial experience; and
available technologies for processing scrap. 19
The economic crisis and the shutting down of major mines has had a significant
impact on the relative shares of primary and secondary production. Before 2008,
60% of tantalum supply came from primary concentrates, a further 10% each
from secondary concentrates and from tin slag. The final 20% of global
production was accounted for by scrap recycling. Post-2008, the share of
production coming from primary concentrates dropped sharply to 10% in 2010,
recovering to 27% by 2011. To compensate for the gap, tantalum production from
tin slag and scrap increased.
17 Roskill Information Services Ltd, The Economics of Tantalum.

18 USGS, Tantalum; TIC, ’Critical raw materials for the EU - Report of the Ad-hoc Working
Group on defining critical raw materials,’ 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
raw-materials/files/pc-contributions/org-050-tantalum-niobium-international-study-center-
tic_en.pdf.
19 TIC, ’Critical raw materials for the EU - Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on defining
critical raw materials’; Larry D. Cunningham, Tantalum Recycling in the United States in 1998
(USGS, 1999), http://infohouse.p2ric.org/ref/45/44147.pdf.

Concentration
After mining, tantalum-containing ores are concentrated at or near the mine site
to increase the share of tantalum oxide (Ta2O5) in the concentrate. Tantalum ore
traded on international markets should contain a minimum of 30% of Ta2O5. Ores
with lower grades of a minimum 20% Ta2O5 may be acceptable to some buyers.
Trading and processing

The next step in the supply chain after mining is the trading and processing
of tantalum. Tantalum is usually traded in three forms: as ore concentrate, as
tantalum oxides and salt, or as capacitor-grade tantalum. Tantalum is not traded
on an open exchange, such as the London Metal Exchange. Instead, negotiations
take place on a bilateral basis between buyers and sellers around the world.
Prices are privately discussed and purchase contracts between buyer and seller
are confidential. Large shares of tantalum are sold through long-term contracts
with fixed prices. The Advanced Metallurgical Group (AMG), for example, is
one of the largest producers of tantalum concentrate. By March 2011, AMG had
already sold all its tantalum production until the end of 2012 by entering into
supply agreements at fixed prices with its traditional customers. Price data for
tantalum are only availale through subscriptions to mineral price data firms
(such as Asian Metal, Metal Pages, Platts and Ryan’s Notes) which construct
market prices based on reporting by firms and industry sources.
Traders subsequently ship the tantalum concentrates to processers. The

processors extract the tantalum from the concentrates and then sell the refined
material to producers of capacitors, sputtering targets and alloys, who in turn
supply circuit board assemblers, and manufacturers of semi-conductors and
components. They subsequently sell their products to original equipment
manufactures (OEMs), which constitute the end of the global tantalum supply
chain.
Previously, many processors and other buyers of tantalum products relied on

inventories built up by the industry and the US Defense National Stockpile
Center (DNSC). For a long time, the DNSC was a significant supplier – and
between 2001 and 2007 even the second largest supplier – of tantalum ore to the
processing industry. By 2009 the strategic stockpile of tantalum of the US was
exhausted and sales have stopped. The remaining quantity of tantalum ore is no
HCSS Report 25
1600
1400
1200
Rest of the
1000 World
Africa
800
longer of any significance.20 Before the early 2000s, the tantalum industry also Brazil
600
held substantial inventories of tantalum ore. Most of these inventories, however,
Australia
have
400now also been exhausted, such as the Global Advanced Metals inventory. 21
200
1.3 Price
0
developments
Like the prices of other minerals, prices for tantalum ore are mainly influenced
2007
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2008
2009
2010
2011
by developments in the supply of and demand for products in which it is used.
Published spot prices for tantalite ore have shown long-term stability
Figure 5 Global tantalum production, 1990-2011 (in tonnes of tantalum content)
interrupted by very sharp price jumps (see Figure 7).
(Source: USGS data)
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
1
Figure 6: The average year-end nominal tantalite spot price (in US$ per kg of tantalum content)
FIGURE 6: THE AVERAGE YEAR-END NOMINAL TANTALITE SPOT PRICE (IN US$ PER KG OF TANTALUM
(Based on22USGS data)

CONTENT)
(BASED ON USGS DATA)
20 Papp, J.F., ’Niobium (columbium) and Tantalum - 2008.,’ in U. S. Geological Survey Minerals
Yearbook - 2008. (U. S. Geological Survey, 2010), 52.1–52.14.; Roskill Information Services Ltd,
The Economics of Tantalum.
21 Papp, J.F., ’Niobium (columbium) and Tantalum - 2008.’; Roskill Information Services Ltd, The
Economics of Tantalum.
22 Price of tantalite ore is typically reported by trade journals in US dollars per pound of
tantalum pentoxide content. It was converted by the USGS into US dollars per tonne of
contained tantalum. These, however, are not prices for refined tantalum, which are obviously
significantly higher.
1
Price of tantalite ore is typically reported by trade journals in US dollars per pound of tantalum pentoxide content. It was converted by the
USGS into US dollars per tonne of contained tantalum. These, however, are not prices for refined tantalum, which are obviously significantly
higher.

The first price surge occurred from 1978 to 1980 when average prices rose from
about 66 US$/kg in 1977 to over 284 US$/kg in 1980 (these are nominal average
prices at the end of the year as reported by the USGS). This price hike was largely
brought about by panic buying influenced by shortages of supply and expected
increases in tantalum demand for electronic components. Large tantalum
inventories were built up during this period. The tantalum surplus in
inventories, substitution and recycling of electronic components resulted in
decreasing prices in 1982.23
The second rapid escalation in tantalite prices occured in 1988 when tantalum
prices almost doubled from about 70 US$/kg in 1987 to 135 US$/kg in 1988. This
price peak was due to increased tantalum demand and depleted tantalum
inventories.
The third price boom led to record tantalite price levels in 2000. From 1999 to
2000, prices rose more than six-fold – from 91 to 590 US$/kg due to expectations
of high demand in the electronic industry, over-ordering and apparent shortage.
Again, the price peak was short-lived and prices crashed in 2001, as a result of
excess stocks combined with a downturn in demand from the electronics sector,
due in part to substitution of tantalum capacitors in some applications. As
during the previous coltan boom, large inventories were built up again.
Finally, after the period of quite stable prices in 2001-2010, in 2011 tantalite prices
surged to 340 US$/kg, more than the double level of 2010 or triple of 2009. It is
probably too early to single out specific factors driving the current price surge
but most likely that significant cuts in mine production (see Figure 5) have
played a substantial role.
Price fluctuations have played a major role in the development of coltan mining
in the Congo. The price spike of 2000 had especially significant effect on coltan
mining in the DRC, and the closure of industrial mines in 2008 due to the
economic downturn enabled artisanal mining in the DRC to florish.
23 Cunningham, Tantalum Recycling in the United States in 1998.
HCSS Report 27
1.4 Environmental impact

Mining of coltan can cause environmental damage through the deterioration of
landscapes. In the DRC, one of the concerns has been large-scale deforestation:
miners are chopping down forests to make land available for mining and living-
space. Wood is also needed to build mining sctructures and camps near the mine
sites, and as firewoord for cooking and heating. Deforestation has had several
negative effects on plant and wildlife. The rapid development of mines has
put rare plant species at risk and destroyed the natural habitat of the gorilla.
Deforestation has also contributed to soil erosion and subsequently to silting
in rivers.
Further down the supply chain, the transportation of tantalum-containing

minerals requires care, as these minerals often contain somewhat elevated levels
of naturally occurring thorium and uranium, usually high enough for them to be
classified as radioactive for handling and transport. It is the responsibility of the
producer or trader to assess the presence of such materials and to certify whether
the material is radioactive or not.
In solid form, tantalum poses no particular environmental problems. The US

Center for Disease Control (CDC) classifies tantalum dust as a material with a low
order of toxicity. If the smelting and refining, cutting, grinding, metaling or any
other operation generates dust or fumes, exposure to airborne material should be
monitored. Metal powder or dust may have a significant impact on air and water
quality. Emissions, spills and releases into the environment should be controlled
immediately.

T he D emocratic R epublic of C ongo
2 The Democratic Republic

of Congo
This chapter provides background information on the Democratic Republic

of Congo (in this report it is abbreviated as the DRC but can also be referred
to as DR Congo or the Congo). First, it briefly describes the demographic and
economic situation in the DRC, which is relevant for understanding the causes
and context of conflict in the country. Next, it provides a short historic overview
of recent conflict in the DRC and the various contributing factors. Appendix B
contains a list of the key people and groups involved.
2.1 Background information

The DRC is a country located in Central Africa. It covers an area of 2.3 million km2
which makes it the second largest country in Africa (after Algeria) and the largest
country in Sub-Saharan Africa.24 In terms of territory, the DRC is as large as the
five largest member states of the EU put together (France, Spain, Sweden,
Germany and Finland).
Population
The DRC’s population – the third largest in Africa – is estimated at 73.6 million
and is growing rapidly. The population has more than doubled since the last
census of 1985 when it was only 34.7 million. The total fertility rate in the DRC
(i.e. the average number of children that will be born to a woman in her lifetime)
has been falling rapidly but was still six in 2008. 25 The DRC’s population is
ethnically diverse, containing more than 200 distinct ethnic groups. In addition
to French, which is the official language, there are four recognized national
languages – Lingala, Kikongo, Kiswahili, Tshiluba – and various local languages
24 Unless specifically noted otherwise general data on the DRC in this sub-section are from
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators
25 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
cg.html
HCSS Report 29
and dialects.26 Many Congolese have a strong sense of identity based on a their
ethnic (and often sub-ethnic) group.27 Such groups exist in every province of the
DRC. Rivalry between different ethnic groups was at the origin of multiple
rebellions that took place in the early 1960s.
Economic performance
The economic performance of the DRC has been disastrous and the current
standard of living is extremely low. Figure 7 shows the development of gross
national income (GNI) per capita in the DRC as a percentage of GNI per capita in
Sub-Saharan Africa. It shows that in 1963, at the outset of its independence, the
DRC had a GNI per capita that was almost twice as high as the average level for
Sub-Saharan Africa (or more exactly 188%).28 In 2011 had it dropped to just 15%.
200%
180%
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
FIGURE7.7:GNI
Figure GNIper
PERcapita
CAPITA IN DRC
in DR CONGO
Congo as aAS A PERCENTAGE
percentage of GNIOF
perGNI PERin
capita CAPITA IN SUB-SAHARAN
Sub-Saharan Africa
AFRICA (BASED ON WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND AUTHORS’ CALCULATIONS)
(Based on World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations)
26 Ibid
27 Gambino, Tony, Democratic Republic of Congo. Background Case Study for the World
Development Report 2011, March 2, 2011,
28 It should be noted that GNI per capita is a limited measure of living standards. Although in
1960s GNI per capita in DR Congo was relatively high compared to other Sub-Saharan African
countries other development indicators, such as life expectancy or child mortality, indicated
that living standards for most of population in the DRC were not markedly better than in
neighboring countries. A very high concentration of wealth and income in the hands of small
elite is the most obvious explanation for this discrepancy.

It should be noted that Sub-Saharan Africa has been growing significantly

slower than the rest of the world over this period. When the DRC is compared
to countries that performed better in terms of GNI per capita growth than the
Sub-Sahara African countries, it becomes even more clear that the DRC has been
falling into an economic abyss. In the early 1960s, per capita GNI in the DRC was
double of that in South Korea and three times as high as in Botswana. In 2011, this
indicator was 110 and 40 times higher in South Korea and Botswana respectively
than in the DRC. In the period from 1989 till 2001, the DRC’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) declined every year, except in 1995. All these figures indicate that
Congo’s formal economy had practically collapsed even before the recent wave of
conflicts, which started in 1994-1996.
The DRC is at the very bottom of various global development rankings. For
example, the DRC had the lowest value of the Human Development Index
published by the United Nations Development Program, which combines
measures of life expectancy, educational attainment, and income.29 Congo’s
infant mortality rate (110.6 per 1,000 of live births in 2011) is the third highest
in the world (only Somalia and Mali have a higher rate). Physical infrastructure
in the DRC remains rudimentary. Poor road systems and large distances make
transport between Congo’s eastern provinces, where coltan is mined, and the
rest of the country difficult and expensive.
Natural resources
At the same time, some observers consider the DRC as a wealthy country because
it has large deposits of various minerals including diamonds, gold, copper,
cobalt, zinc and coltan (see Figure 8).
29 UNDP, Human Development Report 2011. Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All,
2011, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf.
HCSS Report 31
T h e D e m o c r at i c R e p u b l i c o f C o n g o
FIGURE 8: MINERAL DEPOSITS IN THE DRC
(SOURCE: UN)
The mining industry has been a cornerstone of the Congolese economy since the
colonial times. Historically, the mining industry accounted for 25% of Congo’s
GDP and about three-quarters of total export revenue. Uranium from the DRC
was used at the Manhattan Project in the US to build the first nuclear bomb. In
the late 1980s (and in recent years) the country was the largest global producer
of cobalt and one of the largest of industrial diamonds and copper. However,
economic mismanagement and the degradation of Congolese state institutions
affected the mining sector as well. In 2000, despite the mineral riches of the
DRC, the sector’s share of the GDP dropped to an estimated 6%. 30
30 Coakley, George J. ’The Mineral Industry of Congo (Kinshasa).’ In U.S. Geological Survey
Minerals Yearbook -2002. USGS, 2002.

An explosive mix
Many factors that substantially increase the risk of civil war or violence are
present in the DRC. A comprehensive review of empirical political science
literature by J. Dixon (2009) shows that factors such as a large population, large
territory, ethnic heterogeneity and declining living standards closely correlate
with an increased likelihood of civil war. 31 High infant mortality rate has also
been found to be a reliable proxy for a higher risk of conflict.32
A large number of conflicts in neighboring states is another factor contributing

to a higher chance of violence. Some examples of recent conflicts in states that
border the DRC include the civil war and genocide in Rwanda, the Lord’s
Resistance Army rebellion in Uganda, the long-lasting civil war in Angola
between MPLA and UNITA. Conflicts in neighboring states often have a tendency
to spill over the borders and, as a result, to increase the risk of civil war in
contingent states. Conflict in the DRC has invariably had a strong international
dimension.
The abundance of natural resources may be an additional factor that increases

likelihood of conflict in the DRC. Whereas natural resources such as fertile land
are generally considered beneficial for economic development, so called ‘point-
source’ non-renewable resources, such as minerals, oil and gas, often make
countries vulnerable to conflict.33 It is not possible to definitively conclude that
all minerals resources increase the probability of civil war (such a link was
repeatedly confirmed only for oil). However, statistical analyses indicate that
some minerals may lengthen pre-existing wars. In the case of the DRC, there are
indications that coltan along with other minerals was one of the factors that
prolonged the recent conflicts in the Congo (although its contribution was never
decisive, see chapter 3).
31 Dixon, Jeffery, ’What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings’,
International Studies Review (2009) 11,p. 707-735.
32 Goldstone, Jack A., Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik,
Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. ’A Global Model for Forecasting
Political Instability.’ American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 190–208.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x.
33 World Bank. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development.
Washington DC: World Bank, 2011, table 2.1, p. 81
HCSS Report 33
Disentangling various factors that contributed to economic decline and violence

in the Congo may be next to impossible, but it is obvious that, due to an
explosive mix of factors, the risk of conflict in the DRC would be high even
without taking into account its mineral wealth.
2.2 Brief history of conflict in the DRC

The modern history of the Congo has been marred by numerous conflicts since
its independence from Belgian colonial rule. The first national elections were
held in May 1960 and independence was declared on June 30, 1960. The turbulent
period between 1960 and 1966 was marked by several conflicts and rebellions and
is now known as the Congo Crisis. The newly independent state was quickly
overwhelmed by political instability and chaos. In September 1960, Joseph
Mobutu, then Chief of Staff of the Army, seized power in a military coup,
temporally suspended parliament and arrested the first prime minister of the
country, Patrice Lumumba, who was executed in January 1961. The country faced
secessionist movements in the provinces of southern Kasai and Katanga (see
Figure 9), and an insurrection of the Conseil National de Libération (CNL). The CNL
set up a short-lived revolutionary government in the eastern part of the country.
In November 1965, Mobutu seized power again through a military coup d’état
backed by Belgium and the US.
FIGURE 9: POLITICAL MAP OF THE DRC
(SOURCE: CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL VOL. 11, NO. 3, 2011)

Mobutu remained in power for 32 years and renamed the country Zaire in 1971.
During his rule the intensity of conflicts declined but the country was never
really stable. Several rebellions aimed at ousting the dictator from power
emerged at the end of the 1970s. The ‘Shaba rebellions’ out of neighboring Angola
and Zambia in 1977-78, found their origin in the prior secessionist struggle in
Katanga. However, they did not mobilize popular support and were ultimately
defeated by the national army, the Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ), assisted by
Western allies.
Overall, Mobuto’s thirty-two-year long rule was characterized by a single-party

political system, a culture of corruption and economic mismanagement.
As a result le mal Zaïrois (the Zairian Sickness) became synonymous with the
country.34 The country essentially became a failed state. For example, in 1991 and
1993, unpaid army soldiers pillaged the capital, Kinshasa.35 Yet, the most deadly
conflict in the Congo began at the very end of Mobutu’s rule. The events leading
up to the overthrow of Mobutu are known as the First Congo War.
First Congo War (1996-1997)

A downward spiral encapsulating the whole Great Lakes region was set in motion
in the spring of 1994 when over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed
in Rwanda. The genocide ended when the Tutsi-based Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) defeated the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the Interahamwe militia,
which led to a large number of the Rwandan Hutus crossing the border into the
Congo. Approximately a million refugees were grouped in camps on Congolese
territory. Members of FAR and Interahamwe often used these camps as a staging
ground for cross-border raids to Rwanda.36 This influx of refugees changed not
only the regional dynamic, but altered the local ethnic balance and political
administration in eastern Congo.
In the summer of 1996, a crisis erupted when Kivu politicians threatened to expel
a Congolese Tutsi group, the Banyamulenge, from Congo. Locally, Tutsis were
34 Mobutu renamed the country Zaire in 1971.

35 Stearns, J., Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, Public Affairs, New York, 2011
36 ‘The Refugee Crisis In The Great Lakes Region: Background Information.’ Amnesty
International, 1996.
HCSS Report 35
increasingly becoming targeted by other groups.37 The Rwandan government’s

repeated calls to disarm the armed groups of ex-FARs clustered throughout the
refugee camps did not receive any response. These two matters served as pretext
for Rwanda to invade the Congo, which marked the start of the First Congo War.
Rwanda was supported by Uganda, Angola and Burundi. Other African states,
such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, provided limited military or financial
support to the invasion.
In October 1996, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo
(AFDL) was formed in Kigali, Rwanda. This armed group was primarily organized
by Rwanda and Uganda, which provided it with training, equipment and bases,
and was commanded by Laurent Kabila.38 As his march across the Congo towards
Kinshasa proceeded, AFDL’s popular support grew. The weakened and
disorganized Zairian army was unable to prevent the invasion. Following AFDL’s
swift advance, Mobuto fled Kinshasa in May 1997 and Laurent Kabila declared
himself the president of the country that was renamed the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC).
Second Congo War (1998-2003)

As soon as the First Congo War officially ended, regional actors were already on
the verge of a new confrontation. In fact, violence against and mass displacement
of civilians never ended. Neither did claims from neighboring states that Congo
harbored armed groups opposing their respective governments. Moreover, Kabila
refused to share power with Mobuto’s longtime opponents. The Congolese
popular support for the presence and activity of Rwandan troops in the DRC’s
capital was increasingly eroding and the army started to be perceived as an
occupying force. Kabila ordered all Rwandan troops to leave the country in July
1998. The shift severely damaged bilateral relations between the DRC and
Rwanda. Protesting the measure, two units of Congolese Tutsi soldiers mutinied
and army infighting followed on August 2, 1998, provoking Rwandan military
units to cross the border into the DRC to support the insubordination.
37 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). ’Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 1993 - 2003,’
38 Rwanda, Uganda and Angola provided training, equipment and bases to the ADFL. Schatzberg,
Michael G. ’Beyond Mobuto: Kabila and the Congo.’ Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (October,
1997): 70-84.

Under the banner of a new movement, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la

Démocratie (RCD), Rwanda along with Uganda and (later) Burundi aimed to
overthrow Kabila and to secure their borders.39 This alliance, in its makeshift
composition, was a pluralistic assemblage of actors, ranging from former
Mobutists to former Mobutu opponents. During the first few weeks of its
offensive, the RCD managed to take control of the main towns in North and
South Kivu, Orientale Province and North Katanga and broke into the province
of Équateur (see Figure 9). The Kabila regime, anticipating military defeat given
the poor state of the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), mobilized support among
other African nations. Angola was the first to intervene militarily on behalf of
Kabila in August 1998, fighting the Rwandese-Ugandan forces in western Congo.
Subsequently, troops from Chad, Sudan, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened to
support Kabila.
Over the course of this interstate warfare a stalemate emerged. The DRC was de
facto partitioned. The eastern zone was controlled by the RCD. Kabila controlled
the western provinces. He also incorporated Interahamwe/ex-FAR Rwandan
forces into his army and forged an alliance with Congolese guerillas, the Mai-
Mai. The Mai-Mai, in turn, extended the alliance to Rwandan and Burundian
insurgency groups, who were consequently provided with arms and political
support from Kinshasa.40 On the other end, the Rwanda-Uganda cooperation
faltered, causing the RCD to split violently into factions with rivaling spheres
of influence. Additionally, another rebel movement was created over the course
of 2003, the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.
With support from Uganda it was soon gaining prominence in northern Congo.41
The unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in the country, the lack of military

breakthroughs, and the growing external pressure led to several conciliatory
efforts, initiated by Libya and South Africa. In July 1999, six states involved in
39 The RCD was a convolution based on ex-Mobutoists, Banyamulenge and intelligentsia.

Rwanda sent troops in support numbering into thousands of soldiers. Diverging interests
prevented a common agenda to be articulated, resulting in the fractioning of the movement.
’Congo's hidden war.’ The Economist, June 2000.
40 Weiss, Herbert F., and Carayannis, Tatiana. ’Reconstructing The Congo.’ Journal of International
Affairs vol. 58, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 115 - 141.
41 ‘BBC News | AFRICA | How Uganda and Rwanda fell out.’ BBC NEWS, June 2000. http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/781810.stm.
HCSS Report 37
the conflict signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.42 A comprehensive agenda

for disarmament, withdrawal of foreign forces and a process of ‘Inter-Congolese
Dialogue’ was articulated. However, the progress in implementing the peace
agreement over the next 18 months was very limited, with all parties violating
the terms.
Upon Kabila’s assassination on January 16, 2001, his son Joseph Kabila became
president of the DRC. He caused a breakthrough by actively engaging in the
national dialogue for a new institutional framework. Separate peace treaties were
signed with Rwanda and Uganda. From September 2002 onwards, Zimbabwean,
Angolan, Namibian, Rwandan and Ugandan troops began to pull out from
Congolese territory. This development was welcomed by the international
community, but it also left the eastern provinces in a power vacuum filled by
militias, criminal networks and proxies of foreign state actors.43
In December 2002, in Sun City, South Africa, the Global and Inclusive Agreement
on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo was signed by the
government, MLC, RCD and most of the opposition parties. Based on the
Agreement, a new transitional government, composed of representatives from
armed and unarmed opposition parties would construct the steps towards
general elections. The new constitution was promulgated subsequently on
February 18, 2006. Notwithstanding the fragility of the state of affairs, the
transitional authorities did succeed in organizing the first democratic
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006, largely funded by donor
nations. Kabila was elected in a second-round vote, judged by international
observers as relatively free and fair, even though some violent clashes occurred.
Kivu Conflict in Eastern Congo (2004-present)

Most of the challenges that Kabila had to face during his first five-year term in
office stemmed from the eastern provinces: North and South Kivu, as well as
Ituri, where earlier wars originated and low-intensity conflict continues to linger.
42 Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe were signatories to the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement.
43 ‘Report of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms
of wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo.’ United Nations, October 2003, and: ’Interim
report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.’ United Nations,
January 2007.

The local dynamics from 2006 onwards were shaped by a hostile residue of
warring groups (see Figure 10), ethnic tensions, and complete lack of state
services. Defected general Laurent Nkunda and his militia CNDP44 continued to
battle the Congolese army. The Hutu army FDLR45 staged attacks on the civilian
population. Additionally, the Mai-Mai guerilla groups, excluded from the
transition process, did not disarm and also contributed to local instability.
Figure 10 Armed groups in the eastern DRC

FIGURE 10: ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN DRC
160
140
44 CNDP is the acronym for Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, an armed group
dominated by Congolese Tutsis and backed by Rwanda, which was established in 2006.
120
45 FDLR is the acronym of Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, a militia which is
composed of ex-FAR and Interahamwe fighters.
100
80
60 HCSS Report 39
40
DRC President Kabila devised informal bilateral deals with Rwanda’s President
Kagame and their Ugandan counterpart Museveni to open a joint-assault on
specific faction-controlled areas.46 In early 2009, Rwandan forces and the FARDC
launched a joint operation against the FDLR in the Kivu provinces. The operation
only dispersed rebel groups temporarily rather than defeated them. However,
Rwanda put pressure on the CNDP to disarm and arrested its leader Laurent
Nkunda in January 2009. Concurrently, the DRC signed a peace agreement with
the CNDP, which declared the intention to be integrated into the FARDC and to
fight the FDLR.
In April 2012 former CNDP soldiers in the FARDC mutinied and formed a new
armed group, the March 23 Movement (M23), under leadership Bosco Ntaganda.
The group claimed that the Congolese government failed to keep its side of the
agreement on the integration of former CNDP soldiers into the FARDC signed
on March 23, 2009. In November 2012, M23 took over Goma, the provincial capital
of North Kivu. According to the UN expert groups, Rwanda and Uganda have
supported the M23 group with weapons financed by minerals (tungsten and
tantalum), smuggled across the border from mines in the eastern DRC.47 Since
the beginning of the rebellion 500,000 people have been displaced. 48
In May 2013, Ntaganda entered Rwanda and surrendered to the US embassy in

Kigali. Ntaganda requested to be transferred to the International Criminal Court
(ICC) in The Hague, which had issued a warrant for his arrest in 2006. Ntaganda
surrendered after losing control over M23 to a rival faction.
To sum up, the modern history of the DRC is characterized by repeated outbreaks
of violence and lingering conflict between numerous stakeholders, ranging from
the state and the national army, to various ethnic groups, rival militias and
neighboring countries. The lack of national cohesion at the time that the DRC
46 This idea was made public in the Nairobi Communiqué, a DRC-Rwanda statement on joint
military engagement in the event hostilities fail to cease.
47 Agshin Mehdiyev, ’Letter Dated 26 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic
Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ June 26, 2012,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/348/Add.1.
48 BBC, ’UN to Target DR Congo Rebel Group,’ BBC, October 19, 2012, sec. Africa, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20013725.

gained independence from Belgium and the thirty-two-year rule of Mobutu

contributed to the decline of the nation-state. Degradation of transport and
communication infrastructure and the effective disappearance of a conventional
administration and justice system rendered the DRC in essence a failed state.
The cross-border impact of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda ignited the conflict in
the DRC (then Zaire), which became highly internationalized. The Second Congo
War was the deadliest war in modern African history and directly involved eight
African nations, as well as about 25 armed groups.
The conflict still continues today and the end of violence in the DRC is not in
sight, with militias and soldiers being regularly involved in massive human
rights abuses against civilians, including sexual violence. The ongoing instability
hampers economic development. The human cost of the conflict has been
unprecedented. For these reasons, the crisis in the DRC has been one of the worst
humanitarian crises in history.
HCSS Report 41
C oltan mining in the D R C
3 Coltan mining in the DRC
This chapter gives an overview of coltan mining in the DRC. It starts with a
discussion of tantalum resources in the DRC and tantalum mining in the period
before the First Congo War. Next, it discusses the first coltan boom of the early
2000s, and the second coltan boom of 2006-2010. It then focuses on the practical
organization of coltan mining and trading in the DRC.
3.1 Coltan and tantalum resources in the DRC

Tantalite was first discovered in the Congo in 1910.49 The country has substantial
resources of tantalum-bearing ores, of which coltan is the most common. The
main coltan deposits are located in the eastern part of the country, in particular
in North and South Kivu provinces (see Figure 8). These are typically in easily-
mined alluvial or soft-rock deposits, which makes them suitable for artisanal
mining. In 2009 there were 23 coltan mining sites in the eastern DRC: 14 in the
North Kivu province and 9 in the South Kivu province.50 The other important
source of tantalum in the DRC are the hard-rock tin-tantalum deposits in the
Katanga province.51
Precise data on artisanal mining employment in the DRC are not available but it
was estimated that coltan mining and trade employed around 300,000 in the DRC
in 2009. More generally, it has been estimated that artisanal mining (including
that of other minerals) supports up to 16% of DRC’s population.52
Some studies claim that the DRC’s tantalum resources account for more than
60% of global resources. While this claim was effective in drawing public
attention to coltan and its role in the conflict in the DRC, it does not stand up to
49 Nest, Michael, Coltan, Polity Press, 2011, p.36.

50 Nest, Michael, Coltan, Polity Press, 2011, p.36
51 Ibid., p.4
HCSS Report 43
scrutiny. Based on the results of earlier geological exploration, Burt estimated the
most likely resources of tantalum in the DRC at 55 million pounds of Ta2O5.53 This
translates into 8% of the world’s resource base. While this number indicates the
presence of significant resources in the DRC, these are far behind the tantalum
resources of Brazil and Australia, which together account for about 60% of the
most likely resources (see Chapter 1).
3.2 Tantalum mining before the First Congo War

Before 1990s, tantalum was extracted mainly as a by-product of tin mining. Tin is
extracted from cassiterite (tin oxide mineral) which is often found along coltan
deposits. The principal producer was the Belgian-Zairian company Société Minière
et Industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI), which was formed in 1976 by Belgian mining
firms and the Government of Zaire. It owned extensive mining concessions in
eastern Congo and was a large producer of gold and tin.54 As tantalum was
extracted mainly as a by-product, the country’s tantalum production was
limited. The share of coltan in SOMNIKI’s total output by value was negligible
compared with gold and cassiterite mining.55
The troubles in Zaire in the 1980s caused economic difficulties for the company
and the crash of tin prices in 1985 led SOMINKI to close some of its industrial
mines in eastern Congo. In response, SOMNIKI decided to let individual miners
engage in artisanal mining on its concessions. Some of the laid-off workers
became artisanal miners.56 In 1991, Congo’s production reached 57 tonnes of
coltan concentrate or 16 tonnes of tantalum content.57 However, the decline of
state institutions and the deterioration of infrastructure under the rule of
Mobutu led to a sharp fall in production. In 1995 it dropped to just 1 tonne. In the
same year, the Belgian shareholders of SOMINKI sold their shares to a Canadian
53 Burt, Richard, Tantalum – a rare metal in abundance? T.I.C. Bulletin, No.141, March 2010. This
estimate exclude the Manono mine in Katanga province.
54 Tegera, A., M. Sofia and D.Johnson, ’The Coltan Phenomenon: How a rare mineral has
changed the life of the population of war-torn North Kivu province in the East of the
Democratic Republic of Congo’, Pole Institute, 2002
55 Ibid, p.6
56 Pourtier, Roland. The Mining Economy in the Kivu and Its Regional Implications: Report
Following a Mission to North Kivu, South Kivu and Rwanda 17 April-9 May 2004. INICA, 2004.
http://archive.niza.nl/docs/200603061614031069.pdf.
57 USGS

company, Barno.58 With the beginning of the First Congo war in 1996 industrial
mining of tantalum ceased completely (see Figure 11).
3.3 The first coltan mining boom

After having completely ceased during the First Congo War, coltan mining in the
DRC suddenly boomed in 2000. The tantalum price spike of 2000-2001 acted as
an adrenalin shot for coltan mining in the DRC. Prices started to rise rapidly in
June 2000 and reached a peak in early 2001; over this short period of time they
increased by more than a factor of six (see Figure 6). The price surge caused a
massive expansion of artisanal mining in the DRC. Figure 11 shows how tantalum
production in the DRC increased from practically nothing between 1996-1999 to
130 tonnes in 2000. In that year, the DRC accounted for 12% of world’s primary
production of tantalum.
Figure 10 Armed groups in the eastern DRC
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Figure 11 Tantalum production in the DRC (in tonnes of tantalum content)

FIGURE 11: TANTALUM PRODUCTION IN THE DRC (IN TONNES OF TANTALUM CONTENT)
(Based on USGS data)
(BASED ON USGS DATA)
58 Willum, B., Foreign Aid to Rwanda: Purely Beneficial or Contributing to War? Dissertation,
University of Copenhagen, 2001, p.41
HCSS Report 45
Coltan caught the imagination of the Congolese people. Thousands of Congolese

were drawn to coltan mines by stories of miners rapidly getting rich. In short,
eastern DRC developed ‘coltan fever’.59 This fever had striking resemblances to
various gold rushes of the 19th century and had a significant impact on the
functioning of society.
Interviews with miners conducted by the Pole Institute in the early 2000s show
that despite the high risks (low physical safety in mines due to landslides and
collapsing mine walls; insecurity created by armed rebel groups and criminals),
coltan mining was viewed as a more attractive activity than agriculture.60 Coltan
mining also became more profitable than mining other minerals, such as gold or
diamonds. As a result there was a mass exodus of people to coltan mining sites.
The enormous expansion of coltan mining also brought substantial money to
eastern Congo. A local chief commented:
‘Coltan has at least solved the unemployment problem. That has

significantly reduced theft. Also many young fighters have turned
into coltan miners. That also reduces their number and that of
murders. Having said this, there is more money and so the price
of foodstuffs has risen.’ 61
Even children were caught in this fever. Many of them saw coltan mining as
much more promising use of their time then schooling. Thousands of children,
sometimes barely older than twelve, worked in mines. A teacher interviewed in
2000 lamented:
‘We are witnessing the emptying of schools. More than 30% of our
children drop out of school to mine coltan. Teachers also leave
school to mine coltan.’ 62

60 Tegera, A., M. Sofia and D.Johnson, ’The Coltan Phenomenon: How a rare mineral has
changed the life of the population of war-torn North Kivu province in the East of the
Democratic Republic of Congo’, Pole Institute, 2002
61 Ibid., p.14
62 Ibid.,p.15

It is remarkable how quickly coltan production in the DRC reacted to the

tantalum price boom. This increase in mining took place in a country ravaged by
war and lacking essential infrastructure, without any centralized government
decision-making and coordination. Congolese people were able to increase
production manyfold in an extremely short period of time63 despite being located
thousand kilometers away from main processors of tantalum and often not
knowing much about the metal and its various applications. While this fact tends
to be underappreciated in the literature, it shows the large power of market
signals under even the most difficult circumstances.
The boom was very short-lived, however. Prices started to fall rapidly in early
2001 and by August 2001 they crashed to approximately the same level as in 1999
and early 2000, i.e. to their pre-boom level.64 The price collapse had a direct
impact on profitability and attractiveness of artisanal mining of coltan in the
DRC. Many miners went back to agriculture or moved to other sites to mine
cassiterite and other minerals. Others started to treat coltan mining as a seasonal
activity, which they would do during the months of low agricultural
production.65 In 2002, the total coltan production in the DRC dropped by more
than 50% compared to the previous year. The total revenue from coltan mining
and trading activities declined by at least a factor of 10.
3.4 The second coltan boom

Coltan production in the DRC continued to decline for several years after the
end of the first coltan boom in 2001. In 2006 it accounted for just 1.6% of global
primary tantalum production. 2007, however, marked the beginning of the
second coltan boom in the DRC (see Figure 11). In that year tantalum production
in the DRC jumped close to levels seen during the first boom in 2000. The second
production boom lasted longer than the first one. In 2010 the DRC’s share of
global tantalum production rose to approximately 20%, much more than in the
first boom of 2000-2001. In 2009-2010, the DRC was believed to be the second
largest producer of tantalum after Brazil.
63 It typically takes several years to bring a known mineral deposit into production for industrial
mining companies.
64 Willum, B., Foreign Aid to Rwanda: Purely Beneficial or Contributing to War? Dissertation,
University of Copenhagen, 2001, p.47
65 The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict.
HCSS Report 47
The second coltan boom in the DRC was, to a large extent, driven by increasing
prices for tantalum. Although these price increases were more modest than
during the 2000 boom, they were still substantial enough to stimulate artisanal
production. As was mentioned before, artisanal mining is very flexible and can
react quickly to price incentives, typically much faster than industrial mining.
Figure 12 illustrates that tantalum production in the DRC has positively
correlated with tantalum prices over the last decade.
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
$50 $75 $100 $125 $150 $175
Tantalum Price, US$ per kg
FIGURE 12: TANTALUM PRICE AND PRODUCTION (IN TONNES) IN THE DRC, 2001-2010
Figure 12.USGS
(BASED ON Tantalum
DATA) price and production in the DRC, 2001-2010 (in tonnes)

Figure 13 shows how Africa’s share in global production increased while
Australia’s share decreased. It can be concluded that coltan mining in the DRC
100%
substituted a large part of Australian tantalum mining. Indeed, Talison Minerals
Pty (now known as Global Advanced Minerals) blamed cheap coltan from Central
90%
Africa for having to shut down its mines.66 Talison finally decided to resume
production
80% in 2011, only after tantalum prices strengthened substantially again.67
70%
67 Global Advanced Metals, ‘World’s largest tantalum producer resumes operations’, Rest of the World
60%
January 17, 2011 http://globaladvancedmetals.com/news/announcements/2011/january/
Other Africa
world%E2%80%99s-largest-tantalum-producer-resumes-operations.aspx, accessed
50%
December 17, 2012. DRC
40% Brasil
30% Australia
20%
60
40
20
0 C oltan mining in the D R C
$50 $75 $100 $125 $150 $175
Figure 12. Tantalum price and production in the DRC, 2001-2010 (in tonnes)
100%
90%
80%
70%
Rest of the World
60%
Other Africa
50%
DRC
40% Brasil
30% Australia
20%
10%
0%
2007 2009 2011
Figure
FIGURE1313:
Geographic distribution
GEOGRAPHIC of tantalum
DISTRIBUTION production,
OF TANTALUM 2007-2011 2007-2011
PRODUCTION,
18,0%
16,0%
3.5 Organization of coltan mining and trading during the booms
14,0%
Coltan mining in the eastern DRC in the early 2000s was done exclusively on an
12,0%
artisanal basis. Artisanal mining refers to mining by individuals and groups with
10,0%
minimal or no mechanization, often informally or illegallyDRC(see Chapter 1).
8,0%
Artisanal mining is often assumed to be synonymous withRwanda
small-scale mining.
6,0%
However, this does not always have to be case. The Basie mine in North Kivu
4,0%
employed at one point no less than 13,000 workers and was the largest cassiterite
mine
2,0% in the DRC, accounting for around 70% of all cassiterite exports from North
Kivu
0,0% and also some coltan.68
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Mining
Despite its informal nature, artisanal mining in the DRC ‘is often meticulously
organized on the micro-level, governed by multiple rule systems transcending
statutory and customary spheres.’69 The first step in the mining process is
selecting a mining site (prospecting). This step requires some expertise and
68 Zingg Wimmer, S. and F Hilgert, ’Bisie. A one-year snapshot of the DRC’s principal cassiterite
mine’, IPIS, November 2011, http://www.ipisresearch.be/att/20111128__Bisie_FHilgert_
SZingg.pdf
69 Garrett, Nicholas. ’Observations from the DRC.’ African Analyst, 1/2008. http://www.
resourceglobal.co.uk/documents/Garrett_Af_An_Feb_2008.pdf.
HCSS Report 49
experience, and is often done by former employees of industrial mining

companies, in particular SOMINKI. If the site looks promising, the digger-
prospector tries to get permission from landowner and the local chief, who
has customary rights to the land, in exchange of an agreed share of production.
If the negotiations are successful, the prospector puts together a team of diggers
and development can start.70
Diggers, known in Congolese French as creuseurs, work in teams of three to six,

and they typically split their proceeds equally. In large mines with hundreds of
miners there is more specialization of labor, with workers specializing in
constructing the woodwork supports, clearing the mining sites of soil and rocks,
supervisors, etc. The access to a mine and the production process is controlled by
a mine manager often known as chef de coline, who represents the owner of the
mine or an armed group controlling it.71
A few publications reported that some mines use forced labor. This has
apparently taken place occasionally but it is unlikely to have been a widespread
practice since there is a sufficient supply of artisanal miners. Mining is still
considered as more attractive than many other occupations in the DRC and
therefore there is little need to coerce people to work in mines.
Trading
Small traders, or petits negociants in Congolese French, visit mines, buy coltan
and transport it using porters to a nearby village. Porters carry the ore in bags
over tens of kilometers, in difficult terrain and in hot and humid climate. Bigger
traders, or gros negociants, consolidate coltan bought from petits negociants and
organize its transportation to main trading centers in eastern DRC – the cities
of Goma and Bukavu. This transportation is often done by small aircraft.
In Goma and Bukavu ore is bought by a comptoir, a mineral trading firm.

Comptoirs use electronic scales and analyzing equipment to determine tantalum
content in the ore and hence its appropriate price. Sometimes they also conduct
preliminary processing to increase the concentration of tantalite by removing
70 Garrett, Nicholas. Walikale. Artisanal Cassiterite Mining and Trade in North Kivu - Implications
for Poverty Reduction and Security. Washington D.C.: Communities and Small-Scale Mining,
2008, p.37

80
60
40
20 C oltan mining in the D R C
0
$50 $75 $100 $125 $150 $175
Figure 12. Tantalum price and production in the DRC, 2001-2010 (in tonnes)

impurities. Most comptoirs are foreign owned and typically have close ties with
100% processors of tantalite such as H.C. Starck and Cabot. Comptoirs often
major
provide
90% financing to negociants or acquire mining concessions directly. At the
next
80%
step, they organize exports of coltan and other minerals from the DRC.
70%
Rwanda is the preferred trade route for exporting coltan from eastern Congo for
Rest of the World
60% reasons. Exports of tantalum concentrates are taxed by the DRC but are
several
Other Africa
not taxed by Rwanda. Therefore, there is a clear economic incentive to smuggle
50%
DRC
coltan
40%
to Rwanda rather than export it legally from the DRC. Imported minerals
Brasil
can be declared as minerals produced in Rwanda if they undergo further
30% Australia
processing that adds 30% to their value.72 Rwanda also has the best transport
20%
connection with eastern Congo. As a result, a significant amount of coltan
exported
10% from Rwanda is likely to be of Congolese origin.73 Figure 14 illustrates
that
0%
since 1999 reported production numbers in DR Congo and Rwanda moved
very closely together.
2007 This might be an indirect indication
2009 2011 of ‘leakage’ of
Congolese coltan to Rwanda.
Figure 13 Geographic distribution of tantalum production, 2007-2011
18,0%
16,0%
14,0%
12,0%
10,0%
DRC
8,0%
Rwanda
6,0%
4,0%
2,0%
0,0%
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Figure 14: Share of the DRC and Rwanda in global production of tantalum
72 Bleischwitz, Raimund, Monika Dittrich, and Chiara Pierdicca. ’Coltan from Central Africa,
International Trade and Implications for Any Certification.’ Resources Policy 37, no. 1 (March
2012): 19–29. This is quite common rule in many countries.
HCSS Report 51
Revenue across the supply chain

Table 2 show the distribution of revenue from coltan exports among different
actors across the supply chain in the DRC. The activities of miners and chiefs of
mines account only for 27% of the total export value.74 The remaining revenue is
distributed between traders and various armed groups.
STAGES IN THE SUPPLY ACTORS IN THE SUPPLY SHARE OF REVENUE, %

CHAIN CHAIN
Mining Miners (team of creuseurs) 17
Chief of mine 10
Trading Petits negociants 10
Gros negociants 13
Comptoir 10
Taxes to RCD-Goma 7
Other licenses and fees 22
Armed groups 11
Export price in the DRC 100%
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF COLTAN REVENUE, C. 2000
(BASED ON NEST, 2011, TABLE 2.1)
Many mines operate as a barter economy, where workers retain a fixed percentage
of the coltan they produce. At these mines coltan replaces money in most
transactions including the purchasing of food supplies, tools and services, i.e. it
serves as a medium of exchange. Porters, like miners are also often paid in coltan.
In some mines, creuseurs are getting paid per kilogram of coltan they produce.
Annual income of artisanal coltan and cassiterite miners in North and South
Kivu provinces has been estimated at US$800. This is relatively low, especially
compared to an income of circa US$2,500 per year in the diamond fields of Kasaï
Occidental and Kasaï Oriental provinces and of US$2,200 per year in the copper
74 Similar share – slightly more than 30% - was obtained for cassiterite mining in eastern DRC.
See Garrett, Nicholas. ’Observations from the DRC.’ African Analyst, 1/2008

belt of Katanga Province.75 These estimates, however, are very approximate. For
example, it was reported that the cassiterite creusers can earn up US$100 on a
productive day. However, when adjusted for the high cost of food at mining sites
(since all food has to be delivered by foot over large distances), it rarely exceeds
on average US$5 per day in real terms.76
75 de Koning, Ruben. Artisanal Mining and Post-conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, SIPRI Background Paper. October 2009. http://books.sipri.org/files/
misc/SIPRIBP0910b.pdf .
76 Garrett, Nicholas. Walikale. Artisanal Cassiterite Mining and Trade in North Kivu - Implications
for Poverty Reduction and Security. Washington D.C.: Communities and Small-Scale Mining,
2008, p.42
HCSS Report 53
C oltan ’ s connections to the conflict in the D R C
4 Coltan’s connections to
the conflict in the DRC
The goal of this chapter is to examine the connection between coltan mining and
violence in the DRC. A better understanding of the role of coltan in the Congo
conflicts is essential to assess the effectiveness of policy initiatives aimed at
reducing the violence associated with conflict minerals (see chapter 5). The
chapter analyzes the role of coltan during the First and Second Congo Wars and
the Kivu Conflict in Eastern Congo. It describes how armed groups use the
mining and trading of coltan to finance their activities. This chapter also
discusses some issues related to the motivation of armed groups engaged in
coltan mining and in particular the debate on causes of civil conflict – ‘greed
versus grievances’. The analysis underlines some important nuances to the
widely held views that coltan is the root cause of conflict in the DRC.
4.1 Coltan as a conflict mineral

In the minds of many people the importance of coltan is mostly related to its
contribution to devastating conflict in the DRC, where it often thought to have
provided the motivation and means for numerous armed groups to engage in
violence. This connection has made coltan almost a household name. It was listed
as one of the DRC’s conflict minerals along with tin, tungsten and gold. However,
the connection between coltan and the conflict in the DRC is not as simple and
straightforward as it is sometimes presented. This relationship has not been
static but has developed alongside the broader evolution of the conflict.
It should be stated from the outset that, overall, coltan has been of minor
importance during the conflict, except for brief periods during the tantalum
price booms. Other minerals mined in eastern Congo have generated
substantially higher revenues than coltan. After the end of the first coltan boom
in 2001, many artisanal miners abandoned coltan mining and coltan production
and exports dropped sharply. The main result was that coltan mining and trading
HCSS Report 55
Figure 14. Share of the DRC and Rwanda in global production of tantalum
Stages in the supply chain Actors in the supply chain Share of revenue, %
Mining Miners (team of creuseurs) 17
have become onlyChiefofofmarginal
mine importance as a10 source of revenue for armed
Trading groups compared other
Petits minerals and especially
negociants 10to cassiterite.
77
Gros negociants 13
Evidence fromComptoir
the Enough Project, which mainly 10 relied on data from official
Taxesbut
Congolese sources to RCD-Goma 7
adjusted them for underreporting, shows that in 2008
Other licenses and fees 22
coltan accounted only for 6% of estimated profits captured by armed groups
Armed groups 11
from trade in conflict minerals originating in the Kivu provinces (see Figure 15).
Export price in the DRC 100%
Our focus on coltan is related more to the notoriety that coltan received in the
public
Table 2 Distribution debaterevenue,
of coltan rather than on its economic importance. In addition, most
c. 2000
considerations related to the role of coltan in the conflict have direct relevance
(Based on Nest, 2011, Table 2.1)
for other conflict minerals.
Gold
28%
Cassiterite
Wolframite 62%
4%
Coltan
6%
FIGURE 15: DISTRIBUTION OF ARMED GROUPS’ ESTIMATED PROFITS FROM TRADE IN 4 MAJOR
Figure 15. Distribution of armed groups’ estimated profits from trade in 4 major minerals, 2008
MINERALS, 2008
(Source: Enough Project, A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals, April 2009)
(SOURCE: ENOUGH PROJECT, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CONGO’S CONFLICT MINERALS,
APRIL 2009)
Armed group Minerals

Coltan Gold Tin Tungsten Diamonds Copper Cobalt
Pro-government forces
DRC army √ √ √
Zimbabwean army √
Angolan army √
Mai Mai √ √ √ √
Anti-government
77 forces
"Faced With a Gun, What Can You Do?" War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo.
Rwandan army (Global Witness,
√ July√ 2009), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-report-
√ √ √
Ugandan army faced-gun-what-can-you-do.
√ √ √ √ √
RCD-Goma √ √ √ √ √
RCD-ML √ √ √ √ √
MLC √ √ √
Table 3. Major armed groups and sources of mineral revenue,1998-2003
4.2 The use of conflict minerals by armed groups

Armed groups have used a variety of methods to profit from minerals, including
coltan. Some methods rely on the use of force or the threat of force to gain access
to mineral deposits and to mine the ore. Other methods rely on free exchange,
typically through control of mines or trade intermediaries (the obvious question
with regard to the situation in eastern DRC is whether control of assets is itself
legal). Most of the time, force has been an essential element in capturing
economic benefits from minerals. Forced labor, pillaging, various taxes,
obligatory fees and protection payments, monopoly on exports – all these
methods have been used by one or various armed groups. An important point
is that these methods cover all steps within the Congolese value chain – from
a mine to exports. The prolonged conflict in the DRC increased the need for
funding.
First Congo War

There is a general consensus that the First Congo War was driven by security
and political concerns, in particular by the inability and unwillingness of
Mobutu to deal with various armed groups based on the Congolese territory that
were attacking targets in neighboring countries. At that time coltan production
in the DRC was close to zero (Figure 11) and coltan was not a material source of
finance for any side.
Although coltan was clearly not the main cause of the outbreak of the First Congo
War, this does not mean that the role of other minerals can be ruled out as an
influence. Even before the AFDL took power in Kinshasa, it started to award
lucrative mineral deals (not involving coltan) to foreign companies in exchange
for cash down payments amounting to an estimated US$70 million.78 This cash
proved to be very important in funding the AFDL’s military efforts especially at
the final stages of the First Congo war. This type of conflict financing, the sale of
‘booty futures’, i.e. exploitation rights to natural resources that combatants only
hope to capture in battle, has unfortunately been quite common in Africa.79 In
the subsequent stages of the conflict in the DRC the reliance on minerals as
source of funding has only increased.
78 Stearns, Jason. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of
Africa. New York: Public Affairs, 2012., p.287
79 Ross, Michael. ’Booty Futures,’ May 2005. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/
bootyfutures.pdf.
HCSS Report 57
Second Congo War

Since the beginning of the Second Congo War, the power in the Kivu provinces
had been in the hands of the Rassamblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD),
the Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebel group. This group and its Rwandan
sponsors became the most significant actors in coltan mining and trading in
eastern Congo. In the initial stage of the Second Congo War, between November
1998 and April 1999, the RCD and the Rwandan army looted 1,000 – 1,500 tonnes
of coltan from stockpiles in eastern DRC that belonged to SOMINKI and moved
them to the Rwandan capital, Kigali.80 The armed groups also generated revenues
from setting up illegal taxes and fees and from ‘gate keeping’ at mining locations.
For example, the RCD made every trading house (comptoir) pay US$ 15,000 for a
yearly license, and collected taxes on mineral exports, estimated at 8% of the total
export value.
As the prices of tantalum started to raise in the year 2000, the RCD tried to
exploit the boom by creating a new trading company, SOMIGL (Société Minière
des Grands Lacs), and granting it an export monopoly on all coltan produced in
RCD-controlled territory. Additionally, a new tax of US$ 10 per kilogram of coltan
exported from RCD territory was imposed. 81 The tantalum price boom helped
to increase the financial means available to the RCD. According to interviews,
in 2000, the RCD rebel government raised up to US$ 1 million per month for
exporting 100-150 tonnes of coltan vs. US$ 200,000 per month for exporting
diamonds.82
The period when coltan brought substantial revenues to armed groups was short-
lived, however. Many negociants refused to accept the lower prices offered by
SOMIGL. It led to the establishment of a black market in coltan and the
smuggling of coltan out of the DRC, which eventually undermined the purpose
for which the SOMIGL was created. Then, in early 2001, tantalite prices started
to collapse. The price drop meant the end of SOMIGL, which was abolished in
March 2001.
80 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations, April 2001), http://
www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm.
81 Jeroen Cuvelier and Tim Raeymaekers, Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European
companies and the coltan trade.
82 Karen Hayes and Richard Burge, Coltan Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo: How
tantalum-using industries can commit to the reconstruction of the DRC.

In addition to backing the RCD rebels, Rwanda also played a more direct role in
coltan exploitation, especially through the activities undertaken by the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA). The army provided protection to the miners and
companies extracting coltan in exchange for sharing their profits. During the
coltan boom, Rwanda even moved prisoners to the Congo, and used them for
mining coltan in exchange for reduced sentences and small cash allowances.
According to the UN Group of Experts, the Rwandan government set up a ‘Congo
Desk’ within the RPA’s External Relations Department, which was tasked with
overseeing the mining of Congolese resources and facilitating trade with Western
companies. Coltan mined in the DRC was often transported to Rwanda’s capital
Kigali with RPA helicopters. The RPA was closely involved in the operations of
companies that were buying and exporting coltan, such as Rwanda Metals and
Grands Lacs Metals.83 It was estimated that the RCD and Rwandan army together
pocketed approximately US$ 10 million of profit from coltan mining.84
Other armed groups besides the RCD and the Rwandan and Ugandan armies also
benefited or tried to benefit from mineral resources. In the early 2000s, coltan
mines in the provinces of North and South Kivu were also controlled by
Congolese Mai-Mai groups and Rwandan Hutu rebel groups (see Table 3).85
Table 3 also shows that coltan was only of one the various sources of mineral
revenue for the armed groups.
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations, April 2001), http://
www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm.
84 Nest, Michael, Coltan, Polity Press, 2011, Table 3.3, p.94
HCSS Report 59
ARMED GROUP MINERALS
Coltan Gold Tin Tungsten Diamonds Copper Cobalt
Pro-government forces
DRC army √ √ √
Zimbabwean army √
Angolan army √
Anti-government forces
Rwandan army √ √ √ √ √
Ugandan army √ √ √ √ √
RCD-Goma √ √ √ √ √
RCD-ML √ √ √ √ √
MLC √ √ √
TABLE 3: MAJOR ARMED GROUPS AND SOURCES OF MINERAL REVENUE,1998-2003

(SOURCE: NEST, 2011)
Competition over the control of the coltan mines often led to violent
confrontations between the different armed actors. The number of clashes
between the Rwandan army and the Mai-Mai intensified during the coltan boom
between May and December 2000. Some of Rwanda’s attacks directly targeted
coltan mines with the aim of capturing stocks of mined coltan.86 Clashes over
coltan and gold also took place between the Mai-Mai, the Ugandan army and the
MLC rebel group in the Ituri district of Province Orientale.87
86 Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(United Nations, November 2001), http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.
nsf/%28Symbol%29/S.2001.1072.En?Opendocument.
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Kivu Conflict
Studies show that armed groups continue to profit from minerals in eastern DRC
during the current stage of the conflict. Table 4 shows that coltan remained one
of various sources of mineral revenue of the armed groups between 2006 and
2008. According to a study in 2009 by IPIS, a Belgian research center, slightly
more than 50% of mining sites in North and South Kivus were controlled by
armed groups.88 The Congolese army, FARDC, is also involved in the illegal
exploitation of natural resources.
ARMED GROUP MINERALS
Coltan Gold Tin Tungsten Manganese Diamonds Copper Cobalt
DRC army (FARDC) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
PARECO √ √ √
FDLR √ √ √ √
CNDP √ √ √ √
TABLE 4: MAJOR ARMED GROUPS AND SOURCES OF MINERAL REVENUE 2006-2008
(SOURCE: NEST, 2011)
Additional information on the recent involvement of armed groups in mineral

exploitation and trading in eastern Congo is given in the next Chapter.
4.3 Motivations of armed groups

There is substantial debate in the literature over the role of minerals, including
coltan, in the conflict in eastern Congo. Several organizations and authors view
the exploitation of natural resources as a structural cause of the conflict in the
DRC and the main motivation for armed groups.89 For example, a report by
Global Witness states that ‘greed, and the desire to control eastern DRC’s rich
88 Spittaels, Steven and Filip Hilger. Accompanying Note on the Interactive Map of Militarised
Mining Areas in the Kivus. Antwerp, Belgium: IPIS, August 2009.
89 These include advocacy groups such as ‘Global Witness’ and ‘Enough’
HCSS Report 61
mineral deposits’ is the primary motivation behind the war there.90 However,
many analysts disagree with the notion that the exploitation of natural resources
is the root cause of the conflict. Rather, it is argued that armed groups use trade
in minerals to finance their activities, which enables the groups to survive, and
thus minerals fuel and protract the conflict.91
In the case of such a complex and prolonged conflict as in the DRC, it is not easy
to determine whether trade in minerals serves merely as an instrument to reach
political objectives or whether profiteering is a dominant goal on its own. The
motivations of different armed groups cannot be observed directly. There is
always a large number of interrelated and dynamic factors that affect the
decision-making of such groups. Disentangling and weighting the relative
importance of such factors is an intricate task. A related academic debate on
‘greed versus grievance’ as causes of conflict has not been settled either.
90 "Faced With a Gun, What Can You Do?" War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo.
(Global Witness, July 2009),p.15, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-report-
faced-gun-what-can-you-do.
91 This stream is represented for instance in the following publications: Steven Spittaels and
Filip Hilgert, ’Are Congo’s mines the main target of the armed groups on its soil?’; Harrison
Mitchell and Nicholas Garrett, Beyond Conflict: Reconfiguring approaches to the regional trade
in minerals from Eastern DRC; Louise Anten, Strengthening governance in a post-conflict district
of the Democratic Republic of Congo: a study of Ituri; Dominic Johnson, Who's In Charge? Putting
the Mineral Trade in Eastern DRC under International Control: An Overview (Pole Institute, August
2010), http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/pole-mines-En%5B1%5D.pdf; Ruben de
Koning, Artisanal mining and postconflict reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
SIPRI Background Paper (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 2009),
http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP0910b.pdf; Ruben de Koning, Controlling Conflict
Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, SIPRI Policy Brief (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, July 2010), http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIPB1007.pdf.

Greed versus grievance debate

The debate on ‘greed versus grievance’ refers to two contending theories on
the causes of civil wars and rebellions. The ‘greed’ theory suggests that
combatants in civil wars are motivated by economic considerations, i.e. by
opportunities for looting, making them indistinguishable from bandits and
criminals. The ‘grievance’ theory assumes that issues of identity, e.g. ethnicity,
religion, social class, etc., and discrimination are the main motivators for
armed conflict.
The debate was initiated by a series of influential studies by Paul Collier and
Anke Hoeffler that statistically examined the relationship between civil war
and quantitative indicators of grievance. They found that indicators of
grievance, such as inequality, political oppression, and ethnic and religious
divisions, were not closely associated with a higher risk of civil war. At the
same time, primary commodity exports and other economic variables were
found to have stronger explanatory power. They concluded that ‘factors which
determine the financial and military viability of a rebellion are more
important than objective grounds for grievance.’92
This conclusion, which contradicted most of the existing political science

literature, proved to be controversial, and led to many critical responses.93
Other researchers using different datasets have found that oil dependence
indeed increased the risk of conflict but failed to establish such a relationship
for primary commodities in general. Other lootable resources, such as
gemstones and drugs, have been found to lengthen existing conflict rather
than make conflict more likely to begin.94 These studies do not address the
issue of causality. It may be that causality runs in the opposite direction:
higher risk of conflict or political instability drives out manufacturing firms,
which are less tied to a specific location than mining firms, therefore
increasing a country’s dependence on natural resources. Another option is
92 Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars.” Oxford Economic Papers,
56 (2004): 563–595.
93 For example: Nathan, Laurie. The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics: A Critique of
Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War. Discussion Paper No.11. Crisis States Research
Centre, September 2005. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28337/1/dp11.pdf.
94 Ross, Michae L. “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of Peace
Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 337–356.
HCSS Report 63
that both civil war and resource dependence may be independently caused by
some unaccounted third variable, such as weak institutions.
However, in recent years there has been some convergence between these two
theories. Proponents of each agree that both ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ factors
play a role in conflict. Having conducted a thorough review of existing
literature on conflict and security, the World Bank, which is often associated
with the ‘greed’ theory,95 recently concluded in its World Development Report:
‘explanations for conflict based purely on economic motives are inadequate.’96
The report continued:
‘The attention in recent years to quantitative correlations between

economic factors and conflict has led some to argue that
economics is all that counts. Not only is this facile – it
misrepresents the state of research. It is much more difficult to
test the importance of identity, ideology, injustice, and political
motivation using statistical methods, but current research
suggests that these are very important in explaining violence and
conflict.’97
Interestingly, the expert groups on the DRC assembled by the UN, whose reports
were instrumental in raising awareness on the role of minerals in Congo’s
conflict, came to differing conclusions with regard to the motivation of armed
groups in eastern DRC in recent years. In 2001 the Panel of Experts stated that ‘[t]
he conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has become mainly about
access, control and trade of five key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper,
cobalt and gold.’98 However, in 2010 the Group of Experts concluded that
95 This is due to the fact that Paul Collier worked for the World Bank when he put forward the
‘greed’ theory.
96 World Bank. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development.
Washington DC: World Bank, 2011.,p.81
97 Ibid., p.81
98 ‘Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.’ United Nations, April 2001.

‘exploitation of natural resources merely enables armed movements to sustain

their efforts towards political objectives.’99
We tend to agree with the latter conclusion and believe that in most cases armed
groups’ involvement in mineral mining and trading in eastern DRC is a symptom
rather than the root cause of the problem. First, it is difficult to deny that various
grievances (access to land, citizenship issues, security threats in neighboring
states, etc.) and consequently political and security goals were at the origin of
the initial outbreak of conflict. Second, such a protracted and deadly conflict as
the one in the DRC, which has been characterized by numerous mass atrocities,
generates its own grievances, and revenge and score setting become driving
forces in their own right. Third, if the presence of mineral resources is the
main motivation for violence in the Kivu provinces, then why in other mineral-
rich provinces in the DRC, such as Katanga or Maniema, has it been
comparatively peaceful?
The geographical patterns of conflict in eastern DRC in recent years do not

indicate that mineral revenue represented an all-encompassing motivation for
armed groups. The Pole Institute, for instance, points out that ‘If natural resource
control lay at the heart of war in the DRC, the theatres of war would be those
where natural resources are most lucrative, but this is not the case.’ 100 IPIS also
states that the armed group M23 has neither taken control over mining areas nor
launched operations targeting mining sites, suggesting that gaining control over
minerals has not been a priority for this armed group.101
Finally, for some armed groups minerals were not the largest source of revenues.
For example, the CNDP (Tutsi-based group backed by the Rwanda; it was
99 Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/596: Final Report 2010 of
the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations, 2010), 78, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/596. However, it also added that "economic motivations are
increasingly driving a significant portion of armed actors", p. 75
100 Dominic Johnson, ’Minerals and Conflict in Eastern DRC,’ July 2009, http://www.pole-institute.
org/site%20web/echos/echo114.htm.
101 IPIS, Mapping Conflict Motives: M23 (Antwerp, Belgium: IPIS, November 2012), http://www.
ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=390.
HCSS Report 65
integrated into the Congolese army in 2009), derived less than 15% of its revenue
from the mineral trade.102
This illustrates the point that armed groups ‘have no organic link with minerals’
and will switch to exploit agriculture or other natural resources to finance their
activities.103 The 2010 UN report confirms that minerals are not the only source of
revenue used by the armed groups. Other natural resources such as timber, land,
fishing, poaching and charcoal are also used to fund activities of these groups,
diminishing the relative importance of the mineral trade for the armed groups’
survival. 104
At the same time, minerals have been a major (and often the main) source of
revenues for many armed groups. For example, the FLDR (ethnic Hutu militia led
by organizers of the 1994 Rwandan genocide) derived up to 75% of its revenues
from minerals, mostly from gold, and the 85th brigade of the FARDC up to
95%.105 This is because mining, and especially artisanal mining, is a war-resilient
economic activity. Minerals are among the few products that can be produced in
a war-ravaged country without any significant investment or sophisticated
equipment. Mining is more war-resilient especially compared to manufacturing
or technology-intensive services, which are easily disrupted in times of war.
Mining is also more war-resilient compared to another primary economic
activity – agriculture. It is more difficult to cause permanent damage to artisanal
mines than to permanently destroy crops and animals. Minerals can also easily be
sold on the global market for hard currency and are often easy to smuggle across
borders. Furthermore, mining is also geographically concentrated, which makes
it much easier to control. Taxing minerals or controlling mineral production
directly were typically the easiest and the most lucrative ways for armed groups
to raise revenue.
102 Nicholas Garrett and Harrison Mitchell, Trading Conflict for Development. Utilising the Trade in
Minerals in Eastern DR Cong for Development, April 2009, 6.
103 Johnson, ’Minerals and Conflict in Eastern DRC.’
104 United Nations News Centre, ’UN News - DR Congo: UN Experts Outline Sources of Funding
for Armed Rebels,’ UN News Service Section, December 30, 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?Cr1=congo&NewsID=40865&Cr=democratic#.UIhgJ1FqCxV.
105 Garrett, Nicholas, and Harrison Mitchell. Trading Conflict for Development. Utilising the Trade
in Minerals in Eastern DR Cong for Development, April 2009, p.6

P olicy initiatives
5 Policy initiatives
The importance of mineral resources, including coltan, in financing various

armed groups in eastern DRC has led to many proposals aimed at breaking the
link between minerals and the conflict. These initiatives have been advanced by
NGOs, multilateral organizations, trade associations, national governments and
industry. The goal of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive listing of
such initiatives or their detailed description (such information can be found
elsewhere, for example in publications by the International Peace Information
Service,106 M.Nest,107 GAO108and Resolve109), but rather to highlight some of the
most prominent initiatives and analyze the main challenges for their
implementation. In particular, we pay close attention to the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Section 1502) as it is probably one
the most consequential and controversial policy initiative in this field.
5.1 Brief review of policy initiatives

There is a significant number of policy initiatives that have been proposed or put
in place that have direct relevance to the coltan mining and trade in eastern DRC.
The common denominator of these initiatives is the broad goal of reducing the
connection between minerals and conflict. Most of the initiatives aim to
diminish the opportunities for the armed groups to profit from the minerals by
increasing the accountability of companies sourcing minerals from eastern DRC.
106 Didier Verbruggen, Evie Francq, and Jeroen Cuvelier. 2011. Guide to Current Mining Reform
Initiatives in Eastern DRC. Antwerp: International Peace Information Service. http://www.
ipisresearch.be/att/20110412_Guide_Mining_Reform_EDRC.pdf.
107 Michael, Nest. 2011. Coltan. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press
108 Conflict Minerals Disclosure Rule. SEC’s Actions and Stakeholder-Developed Initiatives.
2012. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office. http://www.gao.gov/
assets/600/592458.pdf.
109 Summary of In-Region Initiatives That Support Conflict-Free Minerals Sourcing. 2012. Public-
Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade. http://www.resolv.org/site-ppa/files/2012/06/
Summary-of-In-region-Initiatives-09.21.12.pdf.
HCSS Report 67
P olicy initiatives
Nonetheless, there are also substantial differences between them. Some of them
are focused specifically on eastern DRC and coltan, while others are global in
nature and cover all conflict minerals or even all extractive industries. Some of
them have been put forward by international organizations or governments,
while others have been developed by the industry.
Initiatives focusing specifically on coltan or on conflict minerals

Coltan became notorious for its connection to violence in eastern Congo when
the 2000-2001 price boom briefly made it the most important source of revenue
for some rebel groups. Since then, the importance of coltan declined
substantially and now it is just one of several ‘conflict minerals’ that are used by
armed groups in eastern DRC to finance their activities (see chapters 3 and 4).110
Similar tools and approaches can be used for various minerals, and therefore
many initiaves cover various conflict minerals rather than coltan only. An
exception to this rule is the German government-sponsored Analytical
Fingerprint (AFP) method, which draws on collaborative analytical research with
the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR).
Devised in 2006, it specifically targeted coltan production from different mines
in the DRC to improve the ore’s traceability. The majority of the initiatives,
however, have a broader focus than coltan alone.
An initiative that was specifically proposed to address the issue of conflict

minerals is the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas developed by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).111 It is
probably the most comprehensive of all sourcing initiatives. The Guidance was
produced in close consultation with various stakeholders, including industry
and Congolese authorities, and was adopted at the end of 2010. It covers all
stages of the value chain and proposes a five-step approach to due diligence
implementation. It also includes a special supplement with more specific
110 Gold stands out among other conflict minerals. Gold is at least two orders of magnitude more
expensive per unit of weight than the other three conflict minerals. Very high price makes
gold much easier to conceal and smuggle. Therefore gold might deserve a special attention in
efforts to break the connection between minerals and conflict in eastern DRC.
111 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2011. OECD Due Diligence
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas. Paris: OECD Publishing.

P olicy initiatives
guidelines for risk mitigation in the supply chain of tin, tantalum and tungsten.
The Guidance received broad support from international organizations,
governments, the private sector and NGOs. Although the Guidance is not legally
binding, it is an important tool for ‘naming and shaming’ companies that do not
follow its requirements. It also provides a basis for other initiatives aimed at the
supply chain of conflict minerals. The Guidance was endorsed, among others,
by the UN Group of Experts on the DRC in its 2010 report,112 as well as by the
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region in the Lusaca Declaration in
December 2010.
Global initiatives covering all extractive industries

Many initiatives have a global character as they draw on approaches that could
be used in any conflict-affected area. One example of such a global scheme is the
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) that was established in 2002. It
aims to increase transparency over payments made by oil and mining companies
to governments. It brings together governments, companies and civil society
organizations, and involves independent verification and certification. The DRC
is a candidate country in the EITI. The significance of this initiative for eastern
Congo is constrained by the limited activity of industrial mining companies in
the area. However, foreign investment into the mining sector is expected to
increase substantially once the security situation improves, and in this case the
EITI will become a very important tool to improve standards of governance in
eastern DRC.
In 2008 the World Bank launched the EITI++ initiative. Whereas the EITI focuses
mainly on revenue transparency, EITI++ goes beyond that to cover all the stages
in the natural resource value chain: from extraction to processing, managing
revenue, and efficient utilization of wealth derived from natural resources. The
main tool of the EITI++ is technical assistance to participating countries on such
issues such as improving the quality of contracts with multinational companies,
monitoring mining operations and the collection of related taxes and royalties,
managing price volatility, and investing revenues effectively for national
development.
112 Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC, Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of
Security Council Resolution 1896 (2009). 2010. UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/596, p.86
HCSS Report 69
P olicy initiatives
Industry initiatives
Responding to pressure from the UN, NGOs, and public opinion, industry has
also developed several initiatives. The International Tin Research Institute (ITRI),
a UK-based trade association, proposed the Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCI)
in 2009 to improve the traceability of cassiterite sourced in eastern DRC. Its
practical implementation started in summer of 2010 in South Kivu. It involves
documenting the flow of minerals from mines to exporters (comptoirs), tagging
bags with minerals at mines and keeping a data recording system. After the
Congolese government introduced the mining ban in 2010, the main focus of
the iTSCI moved to Rwanda, where it has achieved some success.113 More recently
it started to re-engage with DRC in particular in the Katanga province.
Another industry initiative has emerged as a result of collaboration between the

Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and the Global e-Sustainability
Initiative (GESI). These two industry associations established a Conflict-Free
Smelter Program in which smelters and refiners (for gold) are evaluated by an
independent third party to determine whether they source minerals only from
conflict-free sources. Smelters that are passed the assessment process are then
certified as conflict-free.
Other categories
Other initiatives have a supporting and enabling role – they aim to develop tools
and instruments that would facilitate the traceability of minerals. Such tools
should help to improve effectiveness of the implementation of other sourcing
initiatives.
The German Federal Institute for Geoscience and Natural Resource (BGR)
developed a system called Certified Trading Chains (CTC) which draws on the
results of their Analytical Fingerprint (AFP) analysis (see above) which has been
expanded from coltan alone to cover tin and tungsten ore concentrates. Feedback
from these projects has been used to inform the development of a regional
certification system under the International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region (ICGLR). Certification forms an integral part of their Regional Initiative
against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (RINR) which aims to foster
113 De Koning, Ruben. 2011. Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Aligning
Trade and Security Interventions. SIPRI. http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP27.pdf.

P olicy initiatives
good governance in the mining sector across the DRC and its neighboring
countries.114
Other group initiatives focus on improving the capacity and effectiveness of

state institutions especially those dealing with the mining sector. PROMINES,
supported by the World Bank, is one of such initiatives as it tries to help
Congolese mining authorities.
Some other initiatives will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section.
5.2 Main challenges facing coltan initiatives

Most policy initiatives aim to break the link between minerals and conflict
primarily by denying armed groups the opportunity to sell minerals from the
mines they control. This is the result of the well documented fact that trade in
minerals has played a substantial role in financing numerous armed groups in
eastern DRC. Constraining the opportunities for armed groups to raise revenues
from minerals therefore seems to be a logical and moral objective. However,
the normative value of this objective does not mean that decision-makers should
not carefully analyze the likely intended or unintended consequences of their
actions, their costs and their effectiveness in reaching the stated goals.
In this sub-section we look at some of these issues.
We look at the policy initiatives from two perspectives:
1) The first perspective deals with the question: How important are conflict
minerals to the continuation of violence in eastern Congo? Or, in other words,
if the initiatives are implemented perfectly, will they stop the violence or, at
least, significantly reduce it? This is the question of effectiveness.
2) The second perspective looks at the practical challenges surrounding the

implementation of the initiatives. It addresses the following question: How
likely is it that the proposed initiatives will be implemented as intended?
And, what are their costs? Who is going to bear these costs? This is essentially
about efficiency (understood in a broad sense) of the proposed initiatives.
114 German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), ’Mineral Certification
at the BGR,’ BGR, accessed November 12, 2012, http://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Min_
rohstoffe/CTC/Home/CTC_node_en.html.
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Effectiveness
The thesis that minerals have been vital for financing at least some of the armed
groups operating in eastern DRC is not contentious. Consequently, many
observers argue that interventions that will stop (or substantially decrease) the
flow of revenues to armed groups from the mineral trade should also undermine
either their motivation to engage in violence or their means to do so (or both). As
a result, the level of violence is expected to decline. This, however, is much more
disputable and suggests that the driving factors behind the conflict are more
complex than can be captured by a sole causal motive.
Issues relating to effectiveness largely boil down to the ‘Greed vs. Grievance’
question that was discussed in the previous chapter. Briefly recapping that
discussion we can say that most experts do not see minerals (i.e. ‘greed’) as the
root cause of the conflict in eastern DRC.115 Even many active advocates of conflict
minerals initiatives in the NGO community tend to agree that minerals are just
one of several drivers of the conflict.116
Armed groups need financial resources to sustain themselves, and this remains
true whether profit is their primary motive or not. The most observable methods
that armed groups use to profit from minerals are controlling the sites where
minerals are mined and levying taxes and fees on mineral production and
miners.117 If armed groups can no longer bring coltan and other minerals from
those mines to the international market (as proposed in many initiatives) it
would automatically have a negative effect on the financial resources available
to armed groups. In practice, however, armed groups seem more likely to change
the tactics they use to profit from minerals rather than to cease violence.
115 For example, De Koning, Ruben. 2011. Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: Aligning Trade and Security Interventions. SIPRI, and Nest, Michael. 2011. Coltan.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
116 A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals. 2009. Washington D.C.: The Enough
Project. http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Comprehensive-Approach.pdf.
117 IPIS estimates that armed groups directly controlled slightly above 50% of all mines they
identified and mapped. See: Spittaels, Steven , and Filip Hilger. 2009. Accompanying Note on
the Interactive Map of Militarised Mining Areas in the Kivus. Antwerp, Belgium: IPIS. https://
docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://ipisresearch.eu/download.php?id%3D267.

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If armed groups continue to control trade routes they can shift the burden of
taxation to the mineral trade rather than production. They can also tax supplies
to miners. This has been happening already in several areas of eastern DRC. For
example, a report by the IPIS mentions that the FDLR supplied the Misisi gold
mines in the Fizi district of South Kivu with goods and foodstuffs, trading them
for gold, which they sell in Tanzania.118 An off-site taxation by ex-CNDP soldiers
that controlled some of the major roads to Goma and taxed all passing transports
is another example of situations where rebels do not have to control mines
directly to benefit from mineral trade.119 Organized looting could also become
more attractive for armed groups. After the FARDC (the Congolese armed forces)
conducted several military operations against the FDLR and certain Mai-Mai
militia and managed to take control over some mining areas from these groups
in 2009-2010, there was a reported increase in looting attacks on mines and
villages that these groups previously controlled.120 In these looting attacks the
resident population is often brutalized and inventories of minerals and other
goods are taken. FARDC elements sometimes are also involved in looting, hiding
their identity by pretending to be rebels.121
Even if the conflict mineral initiatives are successful in reforming the mineral
trade in eastern DRC it is likely that armed groups will simply try to switch from
minerals to other sources of funding. Examples from countries (often from
Africa) affected by internal conflict suggest that there are numerous potential
opportunities to raise revenues besides minerals, ranging from timber and
agricultural products to kidnapping and piracy.122 In Sudan’s civil war it was food
aid that sometimes sustained fighting.123 Remittances from diaspora and other
types of transfers from abroad might also become a more important source of
118 Ibid, p.11

119 Ibid, p.11
120 De Koning, Ruben. 2009. Artisanal Mining and Post-conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. SIPRI Background Paper. SIPRI. http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/
SIPRIBP0910b.pdf, p.24
121 Ibid, p.23
122 Forum: War, Money and Survival . 2000. Geneva: ICRC, pp.22-27. Interestingly, this report
notes that guerrilla movements resorted to self-financing including through mineral
resources after their external support from the opposing Cold War blocks dried up following
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
123 ‘Scraps in Sudan.’ 2000. The Economist, March 2. http://www.economist.com/node/288025.
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revenue.124 Arguably, under current conditions in eastern DRC minerals are the
most profitable way for armed groups to raise funds, but other money-making
opportunities may become more attractive if conditions change.
The impact of a shift in the financing sources of armed groups on the level of
violence is uncertain but the possibility that violence increases instead of
decreases cannot be excluded. It should be noted that the continuation of conflict
does not require substantial funds, especially if immediate profits are not the
main motivation for armed groups. The most widely employed weapons in the
Rwandan Genocide in 1994 were very cheap machetes.
Efficiency
The discussion over effectiveness assumed that policy initiatives would be
implemented successfully, work as intended and reach their objectives. However,
in the real world implementation issues often undermine the effectiveness of
policy initiatives. It is therefore useful to look at the most notable challenges to
their successful implementation.
The most profound challenge for any policy initiative in the DRC is the fact that
government effectiveness in the DRC is very low while the level of corruption is
very high. According to the World Bank’s governance indicators, the DRC’s scores
on both of these indicators were among the worst in the world: the DRC was in
the bottom 3% of all countries in 2011.125 Neighboring countries – with the
exception of Rwanda - are not doing much better. Under these conditions the
ability of the Congolese state to implement any significant reform is severely
limited. This is extremely problematic since the involvement of Congolese public
institutions and agencies is essential for implementing a scheme for conflict-free
minerals. Weak institutions and corruption undermine the integrity of any such
scheme. Without international effort and assistance to improve government
effectiveness and to fight corruption, it is unlikely that interventions aimed at
banning conflict minerals will work well. To assess how likely it is that proposed
initiatives will be implemented as intended in a context of weak governance and
corruption, it is it is instructive to look at two examples, the mining ban and the
Kimberly Process.
124 Rwanda has played a significant part in supporting some of the rebel groups in eastern Congo.
125 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/
c248.pdf

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The mining ban

The mining ban was announced by president Kabila in September 2010. It
suspended all artisanal mining activities and exports of minerals in the provinces
of North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema. Industrial mining companies were
exempt from the ban. The main stated aims of the ban were cutting the financing
of non-state armed groups and reestablishing state control. Although the
artisanal mining activities did not stop completely after the ban was introduced,
the volumes of minerals production dropped precipitously. Reliable estimates are
hard to come by, but some observers suggested that, for example, gold
production fell by about 80%.126
One visible outcome of the ban was closer involvement and control over mineral
production and trade by the FARDC and its individual officers. FARDC managed
to take control of some mines that were previously under the control of other
armed groups. This, however, did not lead to the cessation of mining activity.
FARDC and police officers were sometimes paid to turn a blind eye to continued
activity in the mines under their control. Mines in remote areas that were under
control of other armed groups, such as the FDLR, also often continued
production. The output of the illegal mines was smuggled to neighboring
countries.
At the same time, the mining ban had a negative economic impact on artisanal
miners. It also affected many people and businesses who supplied miners with
goods and services, including farmers, traders, transport companies, etc. Around
mining sites instances of malnutrition, diseases, school drop-outs increased as
well as the number of thefts, robberies, armed attacks and murders.127 Given the
importance of artisanal mining in eastern DRC, these outcomes could have been
easily anticipated.
The mining ban was lifted on March 10, 2011, six months after it was introduced.
It had brought little if any improvements in security. The results of the ban can
126 Description of the impact of the mining ban is largely based on: Geenen, Sara. 2012. ’A
Dangerous Bet: The Challenges of Formalizing Artisanal Mining in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.’ Resources Policy 37 (3) (September): 322–330. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x.
127 Geenen, Sara. 2012. ’A Dangerous Bet: The Challenges of Formalizing Artisanal Mining in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.’ Resources Policy 37 (3) (September): 322–330.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x.
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be summarized as follows: miners, their families and people dependent on the

mining activity were negatively affected, while many army and police officers
became illegally involved in continued mining and benefited financially from
the ban. The Enough Project concluded that the ban ‘has created more problems
than it has solved.’128
The experience with the mining ban has at least two important implications for
other initiatives related to conflict minerals. First, the mining ban was relatively
easy to implement as it was a blunt instrument affecting all mining sites (not just
rebel-held) and all exports. As a consequence, the mining ban was far more easy
to administer than any other more selective conflict mineral initiative where
administrative discretion is going to be higher and less visible, hence creating
more opportunities for corruption. Despite this fact, the enforcement of the ban
was patchy and the level of corruption among officers and state officials involved
in mineral trade increased, according to many sources. Second, following the
logic that minerals are at heart of the conflicts in eastern Congo, the mining ban
should have drastically reduced violence by stopping the flow of funding to
armed groups. In reality, this did not happen.
The Kimberly process

Another example that illustrates some of the challenges related to the
implementation of policy initiatives on conflict minerals and that offers some
useful lessons for any certification scheme for minerals from the DRC is the
Kimberley process (KP). The process was initiated and got its name at the
meeting of diamond-producing African states in May 2000 in Kimberley, South
Africa. Its main goal is ‘to stop the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’ and to ensure
that diamond purchases were not financing violence by rebel movements and
their allies seeking to undermine legitimate governments.’129
The KP was a response to mounting pressure from NGOs (including Amnesty

International, Global Witness and Partnership Canada Africa) to stop the trade
in ‘blood diamonds’ which were used to finance rebel groups perpetrating mass
killings and other human rights abuses. Two rebel groups in particular, UNITA
128 http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/congo-lift-mining-ban-eastern-region (accessed

February 8, 2013).
129 The Kimberley Process’ web site: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-process/
kp-basics (accessed January 25, 2012)

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in Angola and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, hugely
benefited from the trade in blood diamonds.
The main element of the KP is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme which
was created in 2003. Only participants in the scheme can legally trade diamonds
with each other. Rough diamonds crossing international borders should be
transported in tamper-resistant containers and accompanied by a government
validated KP certificate. Although participation in the scheme is voluntary, it
became de facto mandatory for any diamond-producing country that wishes to
export its rough diamonds to the international market, since all major importers
of diamonds are members of the KP.
How successful was the KP in achieving its goal? Its official web site claims the
following:
The joint efforts of governments, industry leaders and civil society representatives
have enabled the Kimberley Process (KP) to curb successfully the flow of conflict
diamonds in a very short period of time. Diamond experts estimate that conflict
diamonds now represent a fraction of one percent of the international trade in
diamonds, compared to estimates of up to 15% in the 1990s. That has been the KP’s
most remarkable contribution to a peaceful world…130
Indeed, conflict diamonds currently represent only a small part of the total trade.
This however, seems more a coincidence rather than a direct result of the KP. Two
main conflicts where blood diamonds played a very substantial role ended before
the KP Certification Scheme came into force. And in both cases it seems that
military actions were more instrumental than economic sanctions directed at
conflict diamonds:
• In Sierra Leone the decisive point was the British military intervention in 2000
and the capture of the RUF’s leader, Foday Sankoh, by Sierra Leonean forces
that left the RUF in disarray. In January 2002, Sierra Leonean President Kabbah
declared the eleven-year long Civil War officially over.
130 http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-process/kp-basics
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• In Angola the civil war ended soon after government troops killed Jonas
Savimbi, founder and leader of UNITA, on February 22, 2002. Less than a
month later the government announced suspension of all military operations
and UNITA rebels agreed to a cease-fire. UNITA officially demobilized its
armed forces in August 2002 and became a political party.
Despite the self-acclaimed success of the KP, many of its participants express a
general feeling of dissatisfaction with the scheme. 131 Interviews with
representatives of the diamond industry, NGOs and government officials indicate
that the perceived lack of enforcement is considered the most prominent
weakness.132 The issue of corruption was also mentioned as one the main
problems in the KP. In 2004 it was exposed that diamonds from the DRC were
being smuggled to the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) where they were
falsely certified by government officials as being produced in that country.133
Fake certificates from DRC, Angola, Ghana and other countries continue to
surface and plague the enforcement of the KP.134
In December 2011 Global Witness, a London-based NGO and a founding member

of the KP, left the process citing that ‘the KP has failed to deal with the trade in
conflict diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire, breaches of the rules by Venezuela and
diamonds fuelling corruption and state-sponsored violence in Zimbabwe.’135
The current debates around the KP raise a very important question: what if
human rights violations are conducted by the state authorities? This is not an
abstract question for eastern DRC. The Congolese armed forces are closely
involved in the mineral mining and trade, especially after the mining ban.
This involvement has often been accompanied by illegal taxation of miners,
corruption, and in some cases human right abuses. Banning the trade in minerals
131 Holger , Meyer. 2010. ’Business, Boycott and Bureaucracy: The Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme and the Global Quest for Conflict-Free Diamonds .’ http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/
SGIR%20Holger%20Meyer%20Kimberley%20Process.pdf.
132 Ibid, p. 69
133 Nest, Michael. 2011. Coltan. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, p.134
134 http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-process/enforcement
135 ‘Why We Are Leaving the Kimberley Process - A Message from Global Witness Founding
Director Chairman Gooch.’ 2011. Global Witness. http://www.globalwitness.org/library/why-
we-are-leaving-kimberley-process-message-global-witness-founding-director-charmian-
gooch.

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from such mines may make the Congolese government reluctant to cooperate
with any such an initiative.
Establishing a certification scheme similar to the KP for conflict minerals mined

in eastern DRC will face additional difficulties. First, it will have to include at
least four minerals currently listed as conflict minerals, being tin, tantalum
and tungsten (also known as the 3Ts) and gold. This would generate significant
compliance costs, which is problematic since participation in schemes such
as the KP places a substantial burden on poorer countries.136 Second, conflict
minerals are less susceptible to consumer boycotts than diamonds. Diamonds
are luxury items that are highly visible and have high emotional value. This
makes the diamond industry very sensitive to consumer boycotts. Conflict
minerals (with the exception of gold) are used in industrial applications. Their
value in a final product is often insignificant. Third, the value chain of conflict
minerals is more complex and involves many intermediaries on the way to a final
user, making verification and enforcement more difficult as well. In addition,
the diamond mining industry is heavily concentrated with one large company
dominating the market – De Beers, while the coltan industry is much less
concentrated. This significantly increases the coordination costs for adopting
a similar initiative for conflict minerals.
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

Another set of challenges is related to the costs associated with the
implementation of policy initiatives. In this respect it is interesting to look at
what is one of the most important and probably consequential policy initiatives
in this field: the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
which was signed into law by US president Barack Obama in July 2010. Section
1502 of this Act (we will refer to it as Dodd-Frank 1502) requires companies that
offer their securities (as in tradable assets) for sale to the general public in the US
to report on the use of minerals from the DRC or neighboring countries (called
‘covered countries’ in the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) rule) in their
products. After a long delay, the SEC in a narrow 3-2 vote approved a detailed rule
for the implementation of the Section 1502 on August 22, 2012.137 If a company
136 Elving, Alexander. 2012. The Kimberley Process. POLINARES Working Paper n.64. http://www.
polinares.eu/docs/d4-1/polinares_wp4_chapter14.pdf.
137 Security and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing Use of Conflict Minerals,
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-163.htm
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uses minerals from the DRC or adjoining countries, it has to submit a report to
the SEC describing the due diligence it exercises to prevent sourcing conflict
minerals. The report has to be audited by an independent external party.
Seemingly, Dodd-Frank 1502 is just a disclosure requirement and does not

directly ban companies from using conflict minerals; it is essentially ‘name and
shame law’. Therefore one could think that its impact is going to be limited.
However, this is not likely. Few companies will want to risk being the target of an
NGO campaign for using conflict minerals. The SEC estimates that Dodd-Frank
1502 will directly affect approximately 6,000 companies, including the largest US
consumer electronics, IT and retail companies. Companies that are not listed on
the US exchanges but form part of the supply chain of the US listed companies
will have to bear many of the compliance costs as well.138
The compliance costs of Dodd-Frank 1502 are going to be significant. The SEC
estimated that the initial cost will be approximately $3 billion to $4 billion, and
the annual cost of ongoing compliance between $207 million and $609 million.
One natural benchmark to compare these costs is the revenue from conflict
minerals in eastern DRC. The total exports of the 3Ts from eastern DRC in 2008
(peak year) were approximately US$170 million, which is below the SEC’s lowest
estimate of the annual compliance cost. Adding gold exports, which are mainly
informal and not well captured in official data, will increase the total revenue
from exports. However, it does not change the conclusion that all exports of 3Ts
and gold from eastern DRC (this includes exports from areas that are under
government control and relatively peaceful) are less than the average estimate
of the annual compliance costs. It should be also kept in mind that armed
groups’profits from mineral trade are significantly smaller than the export
revenues from eastern DRC. Thus, even ignoring the much larger initial cost of
compliance, Dodd-Frank 1502 does not offer a very compelling proposition in
terms of cost-effectiveness.
138 Securities and Exchange Commission. 2012. ’Final Rule: Conflict Minerals’. Securities and
Exchange Commission. http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf, p.299

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2007 2008 2009 2010
Cassiterite $44,228 $159,765 $111,144 $95,525
Coltan $4,234 $7,431 $7,441 $3,734
Wolframite $4,462 $5,018 $2,870 $328
Export Total $52,924 $172,214 $121,454 $99,586
TABLE 5 EXPORTS OF CONFLICT MINERALS FROM NORTH AND SOUTH KIVUS, IN US$’000S
This raises the question: who is going to bear the cost of compliance? Most likely
the costs will be split between different stakeholders – consumers (through
higher prices for final products), companies (through additional cost of
compliance and, as a result, lower profits), etc. More importantly, a substantial
part of the costs will be incurred by Congolese miners as well as miners from
neighboring countries. This will happen primarily in the form of lower prices
paid by buyers of minerals from these countries (since buying from the DRC and
its neighbors will mean that a company has to produce and submit to the SEC a
Conflict Minerals Report). Imposing costs on the people who are the least able to
bear them is one unfair potential outcome of Dodd-Frank 1502.
The issues of costs and fairness would be more easily acceptable if Dodd-Frank
1502 would substantially reduce violence in eastern DRC. This, however, is far
from certain and leaves the opposite effect, an increase in violence, as just as
plausible. It is interesting to note that the SEC does not tackle this central
question: how likely is it that the legislation is going to solve the root problem?
It is unclear how Dodd-Frank 1502, even if it were successful in fulfilling its
immediate goal – excluding conflict minerals from legal trade (and it is far from
obvious that it would), will end the conflict in the DRC. Two SEC commissioners
who voted against the rule raised the same issue. One of them, Troy Paredes,
stated ‘there is a failure to assess whether and, if so, the extent to which the final
rule will in fact advance its humanitarian goal as opposed to unintentionally
making matters worse.’139
139 ‘Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt a Final Rule Regarding Conflict Minerals Pursuant to
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act by Commissioner Troy A. Paredes.’ U.S. Security and
Exchange Commission. http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212tap-minerals.htm.
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The most likely outcome of the SEC rule will be a defacto ban on coltan and other
conflict minerals from the DRC by companies listed on US exchanges.
Companies that are not subjected to Dodd-Frank 1502 will still be able to buy
coltan and other minerals from eastern DRC and their negotiating power will
have increased. As a consequence, the price for coltan from Central Africa will be
lower, other things being equal. The price differential between coltan from the
DRC (and neighboring countries) and tantalum-bearing ores sourced elsewhere
will be one manifestation of the Dodd-Frank 1502 compliance costs. The lower
price will decrease the flow of mineral revenues to armed groups, but Dodd-
Frank 1502 is unlikely to fully stop it.
No ‘quick fix’ solution

The above discussion suggests that focusing on limiting the revenues of armed
groups from minerals in general and coltan specifically may be neither an
effective nor efficient approach. Proponents of the initiatives have not put
forward a convincing case of why and how their initiatives will lead to a
significant reduction in violence in eastern DRC. In addition, there are many
barriers to their implementation, such as weakness of governance, corruption
and large implementation costs.
It seems that many initiatives are looking for an easy (although definitely not
cheap) way around the difficult problems present in eastern DRC rather than
trying to address their root causes directly. It should not be assumed that security
in eastern DRC can be established just by banning conflict minerals. Banning
conflict minerals should be, in the best case, a useful instrument to put
additional pressure on armed groups rather than the primary objective of policy
interventions. Armed groups can still operate at will in eastern DRC not because
they have access to profits from the mineral trade but because government forces
are unable to provide law and order. Congolese armed forces remain weak (as was
vividly illustrated by the M23 rebellion at the end of 2012) and corrupt (the cases
of their active involvement in illicit profiting from the mineral trade are abound
and well documented).
Dealing with armed groups requires a mix of military and political approaches,
which should take the centre stage in efforts to bring security to eastern DRC.
One important element in this respect is to improve the capabilities of the
Congolese armed forces (at least some of the units). Without more capable and
law-abiding armed forces in the DRC, hopes for peace and security are likely to

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remain wishful dreams. This is why helping the DRC government to train its
armed forces may be necessary.
The main problems in eastern DRC are deep-seated. Unfortunately, there is no

readily available quick-fix that could easily solve them. Building capable and
legitimate institutions and promoting economic development will take time
and resources but these are necessary conditions for long-term security.
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6 Conclusion
The DRC has been called a ‘geological scandal’ because the country is endowed
with enormous mineral riches. These mineral riches could have driven the
country’s economic development and contributed to rising living standards for
its population. However, decades of mismanagement, corruption and conflict
has made the DRC a country with some of the lowest human development
indicators worldwide. The link between mining and conflict in the DRC makes
the country probably the most extreme example of the ‘resource curse’. This
report aimed to contribute to a better understanding of the role of minerals in
the conflict in the DRC. The report focuses on one mineral in particular, namely
coltan, which has become the most widely known symbol of the link between
deadly conflict in the DRC and the exploitation of mineral resources by armed
groups. Coltan is mined to produce tantalum, a rare metal with unique
properties that has become a key enabler of information and communication
technologies.
This case study has been conducted as part of the POLINARES project, an
EU-funded research project exploring global challenges in the competition for
access to natural resources an proposing new collaborative solutions. This report
looks at the general aim of the POLINARES project from different angles. The
first angle is to look at competition over resources in the DRC as potential cause
of armed conflict, the most extreme case of competition. The second perspective
illustrates that access to minerals is not an absolute goal and can be constrained
by self-imposed actions if it conflicts with other objectives. Finally, the report
analyzed several policy approaches and solutions that have been proposed by the
international community in order to ease the problems surrounding coltan
mining in eastern DRC. The analyses included an assessment of their (potential)
impact, both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness
Regarding competition and conflict, this report concludes that mineral resources
have not been the main cause of the Congo conflict. However, they became
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C onclusion
essential at later stages of conflict as a source of finance for armed groups.

Armed groups have profited from Congo’s mineral wealth by establishing
various ‘taxes’ and fees, through extortion and theft, as well as via direct control
of mines or trade middlemen. However, the importance of coltan as a source of
revenue for armed groups is often exaggerated. With an exception of a very short-
lived coltan boom in 2000-2001, it was never the substantial source of funding for
the conflict. In short, coltan was never the main instigator of the conflict in the
DRC and was at most a contributing factor.
Regarding access to natural resources, the report reviewed several policy

initiatives that aim to curb the conflict in the DRC by focusing on revenues from
minerals in general and coltan specifically. These initiatives show that the
economic need to secure access to minerals can conflict with other more
normative values, such as acting against human rights violations. Western
democracies can and have shown some signs of adopting policies to curb such
access based on normative concerns. These policies, however, are not cheap –
they often involve substantial costs (through higher mineral prices and/or firm
compliance costs). We evaluated these policy initiatives on their effectiveness
and efficiency, and we identify problems for both dimensions.
First of all, our analysis finds obstacles to the effectiveness of the policy
initiatives. Armed groups are opportunistic in terms of sources of funding.
Minerals have so far been the easiest and most available source of revenue.
Rebels rely on the territory they control to extract the means to sustain
themselves. If trade in minerals is banned and will no longer provide enough
income to finance their activities, rebels will shift to other (probably less
profitable) sources of revenue, e.g. by taxing agriculture or foreign aid. As a
consequence, there is little convincing evidence that initiatives focusing on
limiting mineral revenue will lead to a significant reduction of violence in the
DRC. Second, even under the assumption that the proposed initiatives would
be effective, i.e. if they would cease the conflict by reducing the mineral
revenues of armed groups if implemented perfectly, there are issues related
to the efficiency of the proposed initiatives. Our analysis shows several
challenges that undermine the implementation of the initiatives, including
weak governance, corruption and compliance costs.
We conclude that the limited results offered by existing policy initiatives are due
to the fact that that they are merely addressing symptoms of a deeper problem.

C onclusion
As long as the underlying reasons for conflict continue to exist and the right
governance structures to address grievances are lacking, the envisaged effects
of the policy measures remain limited.
The main problem in the Congo is the Congolese state itself, especially its armed
forces. The DRC government lacks control over large parts of its territory; it
cannot ensure security and protection of its population. Furthermore, the
Congolese army has conducted war crimes and been involved in illegal
exploitation of mineral resource including coltan. Unless the DRC state
institutions can fulfill their basic functions, including security provision,
attempts to solve conflict through measures aimed at minerals only are unlikely
to succeed. The weakness of governance in the DRC is the main barrier to the
efficient implementation of policy initiatives.
Ending the violence of armed groups requires a long-lasting and comprehensive

approach, which combines military, political and economic efforts. As long as
policy responses focus merely on reducing mineral trade, armed groups will
continue to move to other sources of revenue to finance their activities. A
priority should be to ensure that the Congolese state regains its monopoly on
means of violence. Targeting individual steps of the tantalum supply chain will
not guarantee that armed groups will not shift the burden of illegal fees to
different steps. The comprehensive answer to the problems in the DRC consists
of building capable and legitimate institutions, restoring the state’s monopoly
on violence and promoting economic development that is not based on illegal
activities.
HCSS Report 87
A ppendix A : Tantalum mining
Appendix A: Tantalum
mining
Overview of operating or suspended industrial mines140

• By known reserves, the Wodgina and Greenbushes mines in Australia, both
owned by Global Advanced Metals, are the largest reserve of tantalum.
However production at the mines has been sporadic over the past few years,
with Wodgina closing in December 2008, resuming operations for a 7 month
period in 2011 and being shuttered again by 2012. The Greenbushes mining
operations were halted in December 2008 and, while the mine has remained
shuttered, its processing facilities have been appropriated to refine ore from
Wodgina and from other mines in Australia. Wodgina’s mine capacity is
estimated at 635 tonnes of tantalum pentoxide, while Greenbushes’ estimated
capacity is 453 tonnes. Global Advanced Metals has indicated that the mines
will be reopened when conditions are ‘appropriate’.
• The current largest operating tantalum mine is the Mibra, run by Companhia
Industrial Fluminense, a part of the Advanced Metallurgical Group (AMG) in
Brazil. Its operations suffered significant disruptions in 2011 due to heavy
rains in Brazil. In 2011 the company announced plans to expand its tantalum
capacity to 181 tonnes per year, with $7.2 million expenditure to expand it
processing facilities. The mine accounts for nearly 20% of the current global
primary production of tantalum, an increase its share of 5 to 10 % in 2007-
2008.
• The Marropino mine, owned by Noventa, is the only industrial-scale tantalum
mine in operation in Mozambique. The mine was shut down in 2009 to
complete an electrification program and was restarted in April 2010. A new
processing plant is near completion at Marropino, with an expected capacity
of 272 tonnes of tantalum. A full production schedule is expected to be
achieved by the end of 2012.
140 Raw Materials Group, 2012.
HCSS Report 89
• The Kenticha mine in Ethiopia is operated by Ethiopia Mineral Development

Enterprise. The company is currently working to expand mining at Kenticha
from 200 tonnes per year of tantalite to 350 tonnes per year, and it is planned
that a beneficiation plant will be built in Ethiopia to upgrade the ore to 30
percent concentrate and to remove radioactive elements. In a bid to ensure that
reserves are available for the envisioned processing facilities, the government
announced a ban on exports and mining of tantalum in mid-2012, until
production facilities were complete. The state-owned company expects to
export 1,000 tonnes of tantalum concentrate over 15 years (the expected
national reserves).
• Of the other known mines, there is the Yichun mine in China operating under
the jurisdiction of Jiangxi group and claiming to account for 44% of the
verified reserves of tantalum and niobium in China. The Lovozero mine in Russia
is operated by LGOK, (part of the Solikamsk Magnesium Works group) and
produces 54 tonnes per year of tantalum pentoxide. The Tanco mine on Lake
Bernic in Manitoba, Canada, with a capacity of 68 tonnes per year, has been
shut down since 2009 and has not resumed operations.
• As a by-product of tin smelting, tantalum is produced in Malaysia and
Thailand. In Southeast Asia, the tin industry still provides tantalum as a
by-product of the smelting of cassiterite ore concentrates for tin production.
Struverite concentrates (a Ti-Nb-Ta mineral) have historically also been
available from northern Malaysia containing 9-12% tantalum oxide.
• The Pitinga (Paranapanema) mine in Brazil , operated by Mineração Taboca,
(part of Minsur SA) has the potential to produce 91 tonnes per year of tantalum
peroxide, as a by-product of tin mining and smelting, but mining has been on
hold during equipment refurbishment and instead production has come from
old tailings. Table 2 below lists the major mining operations for tantalum ore
by state of operations.

Operational status of some major tantalum mines in 2012

Mines in the DRC are not included because most of the mining there is artisanal
and small-scale in nature.
NAME COUNTRY STATUS
Mutala Tantalum Deposit Mozambique Project, no spec
Brockman Tantalum Deposit Australia Conceptual
Cattlin Creek Tantalite Deposit Australia Conceptual
Upper Fir Tantalum/Niobium Deposit Canada Conceptual
Abu Dabbab Tantalum-Tin Deposit Egypt Feasibility
Morrua Tantalum Deposit Mozambique Feasibility
Arthur River/Beryl Hill Tantalite Mine Australia Operating
Kenticha Tantalum Mine Ethiopia Operating
Mibra (Nazareno) Tantalum Mine Brazil Operating
Bald Hill Tantalite Mine Australia Operating
Marropino Tantalum Mine Mozambique Operating
Greenbushes Tantalum Mine Australia Suspended
Dalgaranga Tantalum Mine Australia Suspended
Wodgina Pan West Australia Suspended
Etykinskoye Tantalum Mine Russia Closed
Mount Cassiterite Tantalum Mine Australia Closed
Mount Farmer Tantalum Mine Australia Closed
Pilgangoora Tantalum Mine Australia Closed
TABLE 6 MAJOR MINES FOR TANTALUM BY STATE OF OPERATIONS 141
HCSS Report 91
Tantalum mining projects in the pipeline142

The following tantalum projects are in the pipeline, ranging between
pre-feasibility and under construction:
• Commerce Resources Corp. has completed a preliminary economic assessment

for its Upper Fir tantalum-niobium deposit, indicating that the project can be
developed economically as an underground mine and recommending further
studies to support a pre-feasibility level assessment of the project.
• Crevier Minerals Inc. is working on a feasibility study at its niobium-tantalum
property in Quebec’s Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean region, including a HF leaching
program that has been underway since November 2011. The leaching aims to
recover the niobium and tantalum oxides contained in a concentrate produced
by pilot-plant flotation testing done in 2011.
• Eramet SA continues laboratory and pilot testing of a process tailored for the
ore from the Mabounié deposit in Gabon, which constitutes a major potential
source of various elements including tantalum. Once process development is
complete, Eramet is planning to build a pilot plant in Gabon in 2014-2015.
• Globe Metals & Mining Ltd is developing the Kanyika niobium-tantalum
deposit in Malawi and in 2011 entered into a strategic partnership with East
China Mineral Exploration & Development Bureau (ECE). It is currently
carrying out a definitive feasibility study, which is planned for completion
in December 2012.
• Australia based Gippsland Ltd is developing a huge tantalum-tin resource
in Egypt. The project includes a 44.5 million tonne Abu Dabbab deposit,
scheduled for production by 2012, and the 98 million tonne Nuweibi project.
The company plans to produce about 300 tonnes of tantalum peroxide a year
from its Abu Dabbab project.
• An Australian company, Ram Resources ltd, has acquired 51 percent of the
Motzfeldt poly-metallic deposit in southern Greenland. Motzfeldt has the
potential to be a giant niobium-tantalum deposit with a possible by-product
rare earth element. The overall resource could be in the region of 500 million
tonnes although further work is required to define a JORC compliant estimate.

A ppendix B : A ctors involved in D R C conflict
Appendix B: Actors involved in

DRC conflict
A overview of the key people and parties involved in the conflicts in the DR Congo
ACTOR ABBRE- ORIGIN BACKGROUND INFORMATION

VIATION
Alliance of the Democractic Forces AFDL DRC AFDL was a coalition of Congolese dissidents supporting president Kabila
for the Liberation of Congo
Allied Democratic Forces ADF Foreign: Ugandan Islamist rebel force whose presence has been reported in the
Uganda Beni territory of North Kivu Province since 1995; the overall objective of
ADF is to overthrow the Government of Uganda and to place a Muslim in
power
Mouvement de Liberation du Congo MLC Foreign: Ugandan-backed militia force fighting against the Congolese government;
Uganda today it is the largest opposition party in the DRC
Rassamblement Congolais pour la RCD Foreign: Rwandan and Ugandan backed rebel group aiming at overthrowing
Democratie Uganda, president Kabila
Rwanda
Forces de Résistance Patriotique FRPI DRC Beni-based armed militia in the Ituri Province; fighting for the rights of the
d'Ituri Ngiti ethnic group; counterweight to the UPC in the Ituri conflict
Union des Patriotes Congolais UPC DRC Political and militia group in Ituri; fighting for the rights of the Hema ethnic
group
March 23 Movement M23 DRC Rebel military group based in eastern areas of the DRC, it aims at
establishing a parallel administration in the DRC
National Congress for the Defense of CNDP DRC CNDP is a Congo-based rebel group that was one of the most destructive
the People groups in eastern Congo; since 2009 it is officially integrated in the FADRC
Democratic Forces for the Liberation FDLR Foreign: The most politically significant and militarily
of Rwanda Rwanda
powerful armed group in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo; it
consists mostly of Hutus fighting against Tutsi for more influence in the
region
Mai–Mai rebellion DRC Several armed sub-groups operate under the name Mayi-Mayi; rebels
resist to be integrated in the FADRC and aim to defend their territory
against other armed groups
Lord's Resistance Army LRA Foreign: Ugandan rebel group led by Joseph Kony; its political agenda is unclear; it
Uganda attacks civilians in the border area of Uganda, the DRC, South Sudan and
the Central African Republic
Congolese Army, led by President FADRC DRC
Kabila
Ugandan Army, led by President UPDF Foreign:
Museveni Uganda
Rwandan Army, led by President RDF Foreign:

Kagame Rwanda
UN peacekeeping mission MONUC UN
TABLE 7 OVERVIEW OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN DRC CONFLICT 143
143 Insight on Conflict, “DR Congo: Key People and Parties,” Insight on Conflict, accessed October 30, 2012, http://
www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/dr-congo/conflict-profile/key-people-and-parties/; Group of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2011/738: Final Report 2011 of the Security Council Committee Established
Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations, 2011),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/738.
HCSS Report 93
The Hague Centre Lange Voorhout 16 [email protected]
for Strategic Studies 2514 EE The Hague www.hcss.nl
The Netherlands

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Coltan, Congo

Graphic Design: Studio Maartje de Sonnaville, The Hague

The Hague Centre Lange Voorhout 16 [email protected]

1 Key facts and figures about coltan and tantalum 15

2 The Democratic Republic of Congo 29

3 Coltan mining in the DRC 43

4 Coltan’s connections to the conflict in the DRC 55

Appendix A: Tantalum mining 89

Appendix B: Actors involved in DRC conflict 93

The strong public attention on tantalum and coltan is somewhat puzzling.

10 Coltan, Congo & Conflict

• What is the role of coltan mining in the conflict in the DRC?

It should be noted that publicly available data on reserves, production and

12 Coltan, Congo & Conflict

1 Key facts and figures

1.1 Properties and uses of tantalum2

INDUSTRY USAGE CHARACTERISTICS PRODUCT

Automotive Anti-lock brake systems, airbag High strength, Tantalum powder

Chemicals Chemical processing Ductile, resistance to Tantalum metal

Engineering Cutting tools Resistance to high Tantalum carbide

Medicine Pacemakers, hearing aids and Bio-inertness Tantalum metal

TABLE 1: MAJOR USES OF TANTALUM BY INDUSTRY 3

3 British Geological Survey (BGS), Niobium-Tantalum Commodity Profile, Commodity Profiles

16 Coltan, Congo & Conflict

Figure 1: Percentage share of category in tantalum processors’ shipments

FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF CATEGORY IN TANTALUM PROCESSORS’ SHIPMENTS 7

in cemented carbides is in long-term decline.8 There are also substitutes available

However, the use of substitutes is often coupled with reduced performance or

1.2 The tantalum supply chain from mine to metal

18 Coltan, Congo & Conflict

Figure 1: Percentage share of category in tantalum processors’ shipments

Capacitor Sputtering target Alloy

Circuit board Semi-conductor Component

Figure 2 The tantalum supply chain

(Adapted from Global Advanced Metals)

(ADAPTED FROM GLOBAL ADVANCED METALS)

Resources and reserves

Tantalum resources and reserves are geographically widespread. According to

10 Burt, R, ’Tantalum - a Rare Metal in Abundance?,’ T.I.C. Bulletin, 2010.

Other Africa North America Europe

Russia & Middle

China & South-East

Figure 3: Regional distribution of estimated tantalum resources, 2010

(SOURCE: BURT, 2010)

existing technologies at the time of determination. Tantalum reserves are quite

significant and do not suggest Areaany geological

production at least in the medium-term perspective. Global tantalum reserves

20 Coltan, Congo & Conflict

Figure 3: Regional distribution of estimated tantalum resources, 2010

(Source: Burt, 2010)

Area with artisanal production

Figure 4: Major tantalum mining sites

tantalum, for example,

22 Coltan, Congo & Conflict

temporarily closed.14 As a result, global production of tantalum dropped by 40%

Compared to industrial mining artisanal mining is a less capital-intensive

Primary and secondary production

17 Roskill Information Services Ltd, The Economics of Tantalum.

24 Coltan, Congo & Conflict