Electoral Politics in The Philippines

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Electoral Politics in the Philippines
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Philippines: Julio Teehankee
Electoral Politics in the

Philippines
Julio Teehankee
Introduction
Elections are integral to democratic governance. Through the mechanism of
elections, politicians are held accountable for their actions, and are compelled
to introduce policies that are reflective of and responsive to public opinion.
Ideally, elections serve as a ‘major source of political recruitment, a means of
making government, and of transferring government power, a guarantee of
representation, and a major determinant of government policy’ (Heywood, 2000:
200). These do not, however, prevent the distortion of the will of the electorate
in a ‘flawed democracy’.
In the Philippines, the plurality system has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973,
and 1987 constitutions. Under the 1987 constitution, all elective officials –
president, vice-president, senators, members of the House of Representatives,
local chief executives and local legislators – are chosen by a direct vote of the
people through a ‘first-past-the-post system’ (Agra, 1997b: 1). The Philippine
electoral system has generally been consistent throughout history.1
The Philippine experience with electoral politics is instructive in the process of

democratic development in the Asia-Pacific region. Nearly a century since
American colonial authorities introduced electoral and party politics, the quality
of democratic representation as an outcome of elections has always been held
in doubt. Clientelism, nepotism, fraud and violence, among others, have
reinforced the elitist nature of Philippine electoral politics. This was exacerbated
during the period of Marcos’ authoritarian rule as democratic elections were
briefly replaced by ‘demonstration elections’ held under duress. The ouster of
the Marcos dictatorship in February 1986 has ushered in a period of
redemocratization. Nonetheless, the election and subsequent removal of
President Joseph Estrada in January 2001 remains a constant reminder of the
continuing ‘defects’ of Philippine democracy.
This chapter will investigate the relationship between elections and democratic
development in the Philippines. It will trace the emergence and
1. However, the mode of electing members of the legislature in its several historical incarnations has had some
variations in terms of constituency (from single to medium to large) and voting (write-in single to multiple
to block voting). The 1987 constitution also introduced a party-list system for electing 20 per cent of the lower
house.
149
Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia
institutionalization of electoral politics at various junctures in Philippine

history. Essentially, it will determine the degree of proportionality in which
votes are translated into political mandates. Lastly, it will explore the modalities
of reforming the electoral system in order to enrich the democratization process.
Historical Development
Elections and other democratic institutions were primarily imported into the
Philippines from Western models. The emergence of institutions such as
constitutional law, the secret ballot, the referendum, political parties and
legislature in the Philippines was a product of American colonialism. Hence,
colonialism became the defining force in the emergence of democracy in the
Philippine nation-state. The Philippines as a conquest colony underwent
political development predicated on the interest, influence and power of the
colonial authorities (Paredes, 1989: 2-4).
After establishing total control of the Philippines by 1901, the American

colonizers governed their newly acquired territory through the appointive
Philippine Commission under the supervision of the United States governor
general. The commission performed both executive and legislative functions,
with token Filipino participation, until 1907. Soon after, the Americans
introduced elections to allow greater participation of the Filipino elite in colonial
governance (Caoli, 1989; McCoy, 1994; Franco, 2000). Taking a cue from the
elite experience at limited municipal elections during the last days of Spanish
colonial rule, the American colonial government proceeded to lay down the
foundation for municipal, provincial and national elections (Paredes, 1989).
Initially, the Americans conducted municipal elections in areas pacified under

military rule. The first election in the country was held in Baliwag, Bulacan on
May 1898 under American supervision. This was followed by four Cavite
municipalities, in compliance with General Order No. 40, Series of 1900, issued
by the military governor, for establishing municipalities in the Philippine
Islands. The military government first granted wide rights of suffrage but later
limited the franchise (Maambong, 1992; Hutchcroft, 2000).
Upon the establishment of civilian government in 1901, the Philippine

Commission passed Act No. 60 to serve as the organic law for all municipal
governments in the country. The Act required voters to be:
1. Male, aged 23 and above;

2. A resident of the municipality where they were to vote for a period of six
months immediately preceding the elections; and
3. Any of the following three classes: individuals who speak, read and write
English/Spanish, own real property worth at least P500, or have held local
150
government positions prior to the occupation of the country in 1898

(Tancangco, 1988: 81).
These provisions effectively restricted participation in the early electoral exercise

to the educated and landowning members of the traditional elite. As a result,
factional rivalries and personality issues among the local influential families
marked these elections (Caoli, 1989).
Nonetheless, the Philippine Commission continued to place the legal framework

for a more systematic organization of local governments. It enacted Acts No. 82
and No. 83, providing for the organization of municipal and provincial local
governments. A limited electorate was given the right to elect the municipal
president (mayor), vice-president and the council. Provinces were governed by
a three-member board, headed by a governor who was indirectly elected by the
municipal councillors in the province. Thus, the provincial elections of 1902,
1904 and 1906 were reflections of municipal politics (De Guzman, Reforma
and Panganiban, 1988; Franco, 2000; Hutchcroft, 2000). Consequently, ‘from
local elections in 1901, to legislative elections in 1907, and presidential elections
in 1935, the Americans built electoral politics from the municipality upwards,
thereby entrenching provincial families in both local and national offices’
(McCoy, 1994: 12).
Colonial Elections
The first legislative election was held on 30 July 1907 and was administered
under the first General Election Law of the Philippines (Act No. 1532), enacted
on 9 January 1907. It provided for the election of members of the unicameral
Philippine Assembly, elective provincial officials, and all municipal officials,
by direct vote of qualified electors. The law created a Board of Election Inspectors
to direct, administer and supervise elections in the polling places to prevent
fraud. A system characterized by strict secrecy in balloting was also adopted
(Tancangco, 1988: 82). The total number of registered voters was 104,966 or
only 1.15 per cent of the total population at that time. From this number, a turn-
out of 98,251 went to the polls and cast their ballots (Liang, 1970: 67).
Philippine party politics, at that period, was characterized by clientelist

interactions between the Filipino politicians and their American colonial
patrons. Characteristic of most colonial regimes, the Americans implemented a
system of indirect administration utilizing dependable native clients. The
measure of success for an American colonial official was their ability to cultivate
and manipulate effective local clients in implementing American policies. Thus,
electoral campaigns were neither venues for the discussion of social issues nor
mass appeals for voters, but negotiations between national political
personalities and the provincial landowning elites (Grossholtz, 1964;
Tancangco, 1988; Paredes, 1989).
151
There were two major parties – the Partido Nacionalista and the Partido
Nacional Progresista. The Nacionalista Party (NP) was formed on 12 March
1907 as a merger of several nationalist movements and organizations pushing
for Philippine independence. The Progresista Party was formerly the Partido
Federalista – the country’s first political party organized in 1900 by a group of
prominent, mostly Manila-based ilustrados2 to push for the annexation to and
statehood within the United States (Liang, 1970; Tancangco, 1988; Lande, 1996).
The Federalistas were the original recipients of American colonial patronage
who initially gravitated around the clientelist ties between Governor General
William Howard Taft and party founder Commissioner T.H. Pardo de Tavera.
However, this support shifted to the younger, provincially based political
leaders of the Nacionalistas – Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Quezon – despite
their nationalist posturing. Ironically, the Partido Progresista would later merge
with a nationalist party to form the Partido Democrata in 1917 (Liang, 1970).
Table 1: One Party Dominance in the American Colonial Regime and the
Philippine Commonwealth
Year Nacionalista Party Others/Independent Total Seats
House Senate House Senate House Senate
1907 32 - 48 - 80 -
1909 62 - 19 - 81 -
1912 62 - 19 - 81 -
1916 75 22 15 2 90 24
1919 83 21 7 3 90 24
1922 35 (Quezon) 12 (Osmeña) 29 9 93 24
29 (Osmeña) 3 (Quezon)
1925 64 14 28 10 92 24
1928 71 24 23 0 94 24
1931 66 6 20 6
1934 70 (Quezon) 6 (Osmeña) 3 17 92 24
19 (Osmeña) 1 (Quezon)
1935 83 - 6 - 89 -
1938 98 N/A 0 N/A 98 -
1941 95 24 3 0 98 24
Sources: Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001; Liang, 1970.
Between 1907 and 1934, ten legislatures were elected at three-year intervals
during the American colonial period. The Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy
Act) of 1916 transformed the unicameral Philippine legislature into a bicameral
legislature composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Membership to both chambers was by way of a plurality vote: in single-member
2. The ilustrados were the educated sons of landed and wealthy natives (Wurfel, 1988: 5).
152
constituencies (78 in 1907 to 94 in 1934) for the House, and in 12 two-member

constituencies for the Senate. Each voter had two votes for the Senate (Hartmann,
Hassall and Santos, 2001).
The Nacionalistas, or one of its factions, since it was divided between the
Quezon and Osmeña camps in 1922 and 1933, dominated electoral politics
throughout the pre-war period (see Table 1). It continued its dominance from
the inauguration of the Commonwealth government3 in 1935 until the
establishment of the Third Philippine Republic in 1946.4 However, the party’s
structure followed the elitist electoral process, and was, therefore, elitist in
nature. Both the leadership and membership of the party were composed of a
small elite group of wealthy landowners. Since disagreement among party
members on issues of policy was unlikely, the party contributed to the
preservation of the semi-feudal economic set-up under the American regime.
Hence, the ‘strength of a party like the NP was largely dependent on a network
of relationships that were based on patronage which its leaders and members
established with local elites, interest groups, party supporters, and the masses’
(Tancangco, 1988: 89).
Table 2: Average Representativeness and Majoritarian Effects of the

Electoral System, 1907-1925
Year Erep Erep1 Erep1- Erep
1907 87.5 97.6 10.1
1909 70.7 85.9 15.2
1912 70.8 87.6 16.8
1919 62.0 81.0 19.1
1922 62.4 96.3 34.0
1925 92.6 97.6 5.1
Average 74.3 91.0 16.7
Sources: Author’s calculations based on information in Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001; Liang, 1970.
The limitations of the electoral system under the American colonial period
were highlighted by its relatively high degree of disproportionality. The index
Erep (ELECTION representativeness) measures the over-representation of the strongest
party in the context of the general proportionality of the electoral system.5 The
3. The Tydings-McDuffie Law, also known as the Philippine Independence Act, was passed in 1934. It allowed
the Philippine legislature to convene a Constitutional Convention to draft a government for the Common-
wealth of the Philippines – an interim period in preparation for eventual ‘independence’ from the United
States (Brillantes, 1988: 115).
4. The leaders of the Revolutionary Movement against Spain inaugurated the First Philippine Republic on 23
January 1899. The Second Philippine Republic was established in 1943, under the auspices of the Japanese
Occupation Forces. The Third Philippine Republic marked the end of American colonial rule and the rebirth
of Philippine independence on 4 July 1946.
5. The proportionality of the electoral system is measured by the sum of the difference between the proportion
of seats and votes of each party. This sum is divided by the factor 2 (to balance over- and under-representation)
and subtracted from 100. For details, see the final chapter by Aurel Croissant.
153
indicator ranges from 0 to 100. The closer the indicator is to 100, the more
proportional the electoral system is. The average indicator for legislative
elections in the Philippines held during colonial times is 74.3. On the other
hand, the same period registered very high on the Erep1 (ELECTION representativeness
+ 1st Strongest Party
) index6 with an average of 97.6. This clearly shows the positive
effect of the dominance of the Nacionalista Party on integration and the
formation of government majorities. The average Erep1- Erep index at 19.1
indicates a high seat bonus of the strongest party (see Table 2).
Elections in the Commonwealth

The 1935 constitution that established the Philippine Commonwealth provided
for a presidential form of government patterned on the United States model.
The constitution originally introduced a unicameral National Assembly, but
an amendment in 1940 re-established the bicameral legislature, which remained
until 1972 (Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001). The right of suffrage was
granted to all Filipinos who were: (1) 21 years and above; (2) able to read and
write English or Spanish; and (3) residents of the Philippines for at least one
year and of the municipality in which they proposed to vote for at least six
months prior to the date of the elections. It also provided for the extension of the
right of suffrage to women. By 1939, all existing election laws were consolidated
into an Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357) that empowered the
secretary of the interior to supervise all types of election. However, in order to
insulate the electoral process from partisan politics, a constitutional amendment
was passed and approved in a plebiscite to create an independent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) (Tancangco, 1988: 82-83). Five elections were held in
the Commonwealth period: the presidential and legislative elections of 1935;
the local elections of 1937; the legislative elections of 1938; the local elections of
1940; and the presidential and legislative elections of 1941.
The initial development and growth of electoral politics and party politics in
the Philippines remained a lasting legacy of American colonialism. However,
the fusion of wealth and power brought about by political connections and
patronage, instead of productivity, has undermined the post-colonial state’s
capacity to realize broad national goals for social and economic development.
Thus, ‘elections as the defining feature of democracy were not always
competitive because of the schemes of oligarchic interests to manipulate and
control electoral outcomes (such as control of the media, oligarchic parties and
personalized campaigning, and electoral fraud)’ (Velasco, 1997: 83).
American colonial rule left the country with a weak central state during the
Commonwealth era. It had to contend with dispersed local centres of power
that possessed varying degrees of autonomy all over the archipelago. At the
6. The indicator Erep1 measures the over-representation of the strongest party, whereas the difference Erep1- Erep
indicates the seat bonus of the strongest party in Parliament offered by the electoral system. For details, see the
final chapter by Aurel Croissant.
154
heart of these power centres were the landed elites who had the uncanny ability
to survive both war and peasant rebellion. The introduction of an electoral
system for electing public officials provided the landed elite with a venue to
consolidate and expand their power. The landed elites or ‘oligarchs’, through
their control of the Congress, transformed themselves into a national oligarchy
that successfully repulsed the government’s attempts at land reform. Thus,
democratization of economic resources in the country was prevented (Rivera,
1994: 112-114).
Elections after Independence

The Philippines have had relatively extensive experience in electoral politics.
From 1946 to 1971, 16 national and local elections were conducted. This
translates into an average of one national election every 16 months, aside from
the equally frequent local elections for governors, mayors and other local officials
(Velasco, 1989; COMELEC, 2001c). In 1947, a constitutional amendment
extended the term of the House of Representatives to four years, and the term of
the Senate to six years. One third or eight members of the Senate are renewed
every two years by plurality in a national eight-member constituency. Each
voter is given eight votes (Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001).
Philippine post-war politics was characterized by an ‘indistinct two party

system’ with intense competition between the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the
Liberal Party (LP).7 The LP was formerly the ‘liberal wing’ of the NP that formally
split off after an intense leadership struggle in 1946. The United States-backed
LP became the ruling party in 1946 after it won the presidency and vice-
presidency, as well as the majority of the seats in the bicameral Congress and
most of the local positions (Liang, 1970; Tancangco, 1988; Lande, 1996).
Elections in the First Philippine Democracy

The rivalry between the two parties dominated Philippine politics from 1946
until 1971. Both took turns to capture the presidency and controlling both
chambers of Congress (see Table 3). The Liberals won the presidential elections
of 1946, 1949 and 1961. The Nacionalistas won them in 1953, 1957, 1965 and
1969 (see Table 4). However, despite their regular political intramurals,8 the
two parties were identical in their elitist structures, social make-up, and policies
(Lande, 1996). Both the NP and the LP can be classified as ‘cadre parties’ since
they did not seek mass membership, only mass support on election day, and
were administered by a small group of incumbent and non-incumbent public
officials, and professional politicians (Wurfel, 1988).
7. Tancangco (1988) utilized the term ‘indistinct two-party system’. From 1946 to 1971, the NP and LP were ‘for
all practical purposes, identical in their structures, social make-up, and policies. Both the Liberals and
Nacionalistas had, in every province, congressional district, municipality and in many barrios as well, local
leaders who competed with similar leaders of the opposing party for elective offices. They did this by building
personal political followings, and then seeking additional votes from uncommitted voters by using their
government connections to bring public works projects and other concrete benefits to their localities’ (Lande,
1996: 120).
8. In Philippine journalistic parlance, ‘political intramurals’ refer to political contests or competitions.
155
Table 3: Two-Party System in the Philippine Congress, 1946-1969

Year Nacionalista Liberal Others Total Seats
HoR S HoR S HoR S HoR S
1946 35 7 49 8 14 1 98 16
1947 - 1 - 7 - 0 - 8
1949 33 0 66 8 1 0 100 8
1951 - 0 - 8 - 0 - 8
1953 31 5 59 0 12 3 102 8
1955 - 8 - 0 - 0 - 8
1957 82 6 19 2 1 0 102 8
1959 - 5 - 2 - 1 - 8
1961 74 2 29 6 1 0 104 8
1963 - 4 - 4 - 0 - 8
1965 38 5 61 2 5 1 104 8
1967 - 7 - 1 - 0 - 8
1969 88 7 18 1 4 0 110 8
1971 - 2 - 6 - 0 - 8
HoR - House of Representatives; S - Senate
Source: Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001.
Table 4: Philippine Presidents, 1946-1986

President Party Term
Manuel Roxas* Liberal 1946-1948
Elpidio Quirino Liberal 1949-1953
Ramon Magsaysay# Nacionalista 1953-1957
Carlos Garcia Nacionalista 1957-1961
Diosdado Macapagal Liberal 1961-1965
Ferdinand Marcos^ Nacionalista 1965-1986
* Died in office. Succeeded by Vice-president Elpidio Quirino.
# Died in office. Succeeded by Vice-president Carlos Garcia.
^ Re-elected in 1969. Declared martial law in 1972. Ousted in 1986.
There were 14 senatorial elections in the post-war period. These included the
regular and mid-term elections between 1946 and 1971. The LP dominated the
first three (1946, 1947 and 1949), while the NP continuously won the most
number of seats in the succeeding five elections (1951, 1953, 1955, 1957 and
1959). Interestingly, the party that captured the presidency also won the most
senatorial seats. Hence, the LP managed to regain its dominance in 1961 when
it won the presidency. The election of 1963 was the only time that both parties
split the seats equally at four each. Again, the NP captured the most seats in
156
1965, 1967 and 1969 under the Marcos administration.9 After the notorious
Plaza Miranda bombing,10 the LP nearly swept the senatorial race of 1971. The
mid-term senatorial election of 1971 was the last free elections in the Philippines
as Marcos declared martial law the following year and abolished Congress.
The magnitude of constituencies or district size affects the degree of

proportionality (percentage of votes needed to share in allocation of seats) of an
electoral system. Ideally, disproportionality decreases in medium-sized to large
constituencies as the share of votes and seats approximate each other (Nohlen,
1984: 69-70). The pre-martial law Senate was unique given its national
constituency in which eight members were elected every two years by plurality.
The system benefited the two largest parties and discouraged the emergence of
effective third parties. It encouraged competition among candidates within the
same party. There was also a wide gap between the percentage shares of votes
and seats gained by the parties. This is reflected in the average Erep index for the
Senate between 1946 and 1971 at 73.9. The relatively high Erep1 index of 88.1
indicates a strong effect on integration (see Table 5).

Electoral System (Senate, 1946-1971)
1946 85.5 95.8 10.3

1947 67.2 83.5 16.3
1949 52.5 76.3 23.8
1951 59.1 79.6 20.5
1953 64.0 88.7 24.7
1955 67.6 83.8 16.2
1957 72.2 86.1 13.9
1959 81.2 94.6 13.4
1961 79.5 89.8 10.3
1963 99.8 99.9 0.2
1965 75.0 90.7 15.7
1967 75.4 87.7 12.3
1969 73.3 86.7 13.4
1971 82.4 91.2 8.8
Average 73.9 88.1 14.2
Source: See Table 2.
9. Ferdinand Marcos was elected first to the House and later to the Senate as a staunch member of the Liberal
Party. He became president of the LP and the Senate, but switched to the Nacionalista Party to become its
presidential candidate in 1965. He won that year and made history in 1969 by being the only president ever
to be re-elected.
10. Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, Manila was the Hyde Park of the Philippines, where political gatherings and rallies
were common in the pre-martial law period. On 21 August 1971, grenades exploded at the LP political rally
injuring candidates and party leaders, and killing some innocent by-standers. The opposition accused Marcos,
who in turn pointed to communist insurgents as the culprit.
157
The single-member district in the lower house and popular election of a powerful
president served as significant legal reinforcements for the maintenance of the
two-party system (Wurfel, 1988). In addition, the introduction of the ‘write-in
system’ of voting, together with the distribution of sample ballots, have
strengthened local political leaders in their interaction with national elective
officials. The ‘write-in system’ was originally intended to replace the earlier
‘block voting system’ and makes it difficult and costly for politicians to influence
voters.11 However, it has affected the political process in other ways. As Carl
Lande (1996: 101) observes,
[w]ithout the goodwill and help of [local] leaders, and their willingness to
distribute sample ballots containing the names of particular aspirants for higher
offices, candidates running in the intensely competitive setting of Philippine
politics cannot hope to win. This enables local leaders to extract benefits for
their localities, their followers, and for themselves, from those whom they
have helped win higher offices. The inter-personal alliances and obligations
created by the upward delivery of votes in return for the downward flow of
rewards give substance to the personalistic political patron-client ties that help
to structure Philippine politics.
Electoral laws that provided for publicly funded election inspectors to the two
largest political parties further reinforced the two-party system. In this system,
the two largest parties are provided with funds for an election inspector each in
all the precincts nation-wide. The main task of these inspectors is to guard their
party’s votes and represent their party in the counting of votes. The inspectors
provided the NP and the LP with the advantage of a built-in party apparatus
and organization throughout the country, and made it virtually impossible for
alternative third parties to emerge (Caoli, 1989).
Electoral systems anchored on a plurality formula often promote party

concentration, given their inherent tendency towards the formation of a two-
party system (Nohlen, 1984: 48). Hence, the NP and the LP alternated their
control of the House of Representatives in seven elections between 1946 and
1969. These elections approximated the same pattern in the Senate. The party
of the incumbent or the winning presidential candidate often captured the
majority of house seats. Thus, the LP captured the House in 1946 and 1949,
while the NP won it in 1957 and 1969. In 1953, 1961 and 1965, the incumbent
parties retained their control of the lower chamber, despite losing the
presidency.12
11. Under the ‘write-in system’, a voter is given a ballot that lists only the offices to be filled, followed by blank
spaces. Since no names of candidates are indicated, the voter must write the names of the individuals they
will vote for in the empty spaces provided. On the other hand, ‘block voting’ voters may cast straight party
ballots by simply writing the name of a political party. Given the fact that most voters cannot possibly be
expected to remember the multitude of names of candidates for local and national offices, voters are often
given ‘sample ballots’ which they may bring with them to the polling booth. Thus, candidates make extra
efforts to distribute ‘sample ballots’ on which their names appear (Lande, 1996: 99-100).
12. However, members of these parties usually transferred to the new administration party to have access to
public works or ‘pork barrel’ funds.
158

Electoral System (House, 1946-1969)
1946 87.3 94.4 7.2

1949 93.1 96.5 3.5
1953 79.6 91.0 11.4
1957 80.8 90.4 9.6
1961 89.9 97.1 7.2
1965 92.6 97.6 5.0
1969 79.0 89.5 10.5
Average 86.0 93.8 7.8
Source: See Table 2.
The congressional elections between 1946 and 1969 registered a high average
of 86 in the Erep index. The share of votes was fairly proportional to the share of
seats obtained by political parties. This was rare in plurality electoral systems
in single-seat constituencies. Theoretically, plurality systems often reflect a
wide gap between the percentage share of votes and seats gained by the parties
(Nohlen, 1984: 35). The two-party system entrenched the NP and the LP such
that the considerable difference between their share of votes and share of seats
was at the expense of minor parties or independent candidates. In most
instances, only the two parties received the majority of the votes cast in the
elections. Party concentration was promoted as shown by the high Erep1 average
index at 93.8. There was also a low rate of over-representation at 7.8 (see Table 6).
Elections in the Authoritarian Regime

The declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos in September
1972 halted all party activities and intra-elite competition. Elections were
cancelled for the first six years of martial law. Martial law was declared amid
the efforts of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to draft a new constitution.
Although the process was already mired with gross presidential interference,
martial law hastened the completion of a charter that was tailored to the needs
of the authoritarian regime. Despite protests and controversies, barangay (village)
citizen assemblies13 were convened and ratified the 1973 constitution (Wurfel,
1988). Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the Marcos Constitution provided
for the replacement of the Philippine Congress with an Interim National
Assembly. However, the Interim National Assembly never saw the light of day
as amendments to the charter were made in 1976 replacing the Interim National
Assembly with an Interim National Legislature (Interim Batasang Pambansa,
IBP) (Catilo and Tapales, 1988: 151-152).
13. Instead of having the constitution ratified by a referendum, Marcos convened the ad hoc and loosely
structured barangay (village) citizen assemblies where people were publicly asked to raise their hands in
support of the Marcos Constitution.
159
The 1978 election for members of the IBP reactivated traditional political forces.
The election was held under a system of region-wide voting districts in lieu of
the single-member district system originally provided by the 1973 constitution
(Kimura, 1997). However, the revival of electoral politics under the Marcos
authoritarian regime greatly restricted genuine party competition (see Table 7).
Marcos began to institutionalize one-party dominance with the organization
of the New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, KBL) in 1978
(Tancangco, 1988). The KBL was originally established as a coalition movement
of members of the pre-martial law NP, LP and other political personalities who
were supportive of Marcos’ ‘New Society’.14 However, it simply revived the old
clientelistic network that distributed patronage through local governments.
On the other hand, various opposition groups in the country established new
parties. However, most of these parties were organized as regional parties that
fielded candidates for specific regions instead of a national constituency. The
emergence of regional parties was an indication of the consolidation of the
dictatorial regime and the splintering of opposition forces (Wurfel, 1988).
Table 7: Result of the 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Election

Region KBL Others Total Assembly Seats
National Capital Region 21 - 21
I. Ilocos 14 - 14
II. Cagayan Valley 8 - 8
III. Central Luzon 16 - 16
IV. Southern Tagalog 21 - 21
V. Bicol 12 - 12
VI. Western Visayas 15 - 15
VII. Central Visayas - 13 (Pusyon Bisaya) 13
VIII.Eastern Visayas 10 - 10
IX. Western Mindanao 8 - 8
X. Northern Mindanao 8 1 (Mindanao Alliance) 9
XI. Southern Mindanao 10 - 10
XII. Central Mindanao 7 1 (Konsensiya ng Bayan) 8
TOTAL 150 15 165
Source: COMELEC, 1978.
The KBL continued to dominate succeeding electoral exercises such as the

1980 local elections, the 1981 presidential election and the 1984 Regular
Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature) elections.15 The Marcos regime also
14. Marcos referred to his martial law regime as the ‘New Society’.
15. Marcos terminated martial law on 17 January 1981 with Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. This was
followed by the election of members to the Regular Batasang Pambansa on 2 May 1984, in accordance with
the 1973 constitution, as amended. Unlike the Interim Batasang Pambansa whose existence was transitory,
the Regular Batasang Pambansa was envisaged as serving as the institutional national legislature.
160
introduced barangay elections in 1982 to replace the pre-martial law barrio as

the basic unit of local governance. In addition, elections were held in 1979 and
1982 for members of the autonomous Regional Assembly in Mindanao (Regions
IX and XII) in an attempt to placate the separatist movement led by the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF).
The Marcos regime allowed these electoral exercises to give itself a semblance
of political legitimacy. However, it utilized its authoritarian powers to
manipulate the electoral rules and institutions. For example, Presidential Decree
No. 1296 (the election code that governed the conduct of the 1978 elections)
allowed the block voting system which counts the vote for a party as a vote for
all the individual candidates in the official ticket. The system gave the KBL
undue advantage since it was the only party capable of mounting a nation-
wide campaign. In addition, the system was prone to electoral fraud since it
was easier to stuff ballot boxes with pre-filled ballots (Tancangco, 1988: 96).
In the wake of the massive outpouring of protest and discontent following the
assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. in August 1983, the
leading opposition parties participated and performed relatively better in the
May 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections (see Table 8). The opposition was led
by the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and the Partido
Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (Philippine Democratic Party-People’s
Power, PDP-Laban). The 1984 Batasang Pambansa election was conducted
under a multi-member, multiple-vote system in which district allocation of
representation ranged from one to six representatives, depending on the number
of registered voters in a given district. Each voter was given as many votes as
there were members of parliament to be elected in the district. This system gave
some room for the anti-Marcos segment of the elites to reconstruct their grass-
roots machinery.
In an effort to again demonstrate his political legitimacy, Marcos called for a

snap presidential election in 1985. Corazon C. Aquino, widow of the
assassinated opposition leader, was the presidential candidate of the united
opposition. Massive cheating by the administration triggered a failed military
coup that led to a people’s uprising at EDSA.16 The ouster of the Marcos
dictatorship in February 1986, and the subsequent dismantling of its
authoritarian infrastructure have resulted in the restoration of formal democratic
institutions that include the pre-martial law presidential form of government
with a bicameral legislature.
16. Epifanio de los Santos or EDSA is the name of the major highway that cuts across metropolitan Manila.
Two major camps are situated at the centre of this thoroughfare; Camp Aguinaldo, the headquarters of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Camp Crame, the headquarters of the Philippine National Police
(formerly the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police). These two camps were the primary
location of the military-backed people’s uprising that ousted the Marcos dictatorship in February 1986.
161
Table 8: Results of the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election

Administration Seats
KBL 110
KBL-Independents 4
Total 114
Opposition Seats
United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) 35
Coalitions* 17
Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) 6
Mindanao Alliance (MA) 1
Partido Panaghiusa 1
CCA 1
Total 61
Others Seats
NP 2
Independent 6
Total 8
GRAND TOTAL 183
Source: COMELEC, undated c.
* Alliance among two or more national and/or local political parties.
The Current System

Under the 1987 constitution, the president and the vice-president are separately
elected by a direct vote of the people through simple plurality nationwide. Both
serve a term of six years. The president is not eligible for any re-election while
the vice-president sits one term out after serving for two successive terms. Since
1935, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has administered all electoral
exercises in the Philippines.
The Philippine Congress consists of the Senate and the House of

Representatives. Half of the 24 senators are nationally elected at large17 every
six years through simple plurality. At least one term out is imposed on senators
who have served two consecutive terms. On the other hand, members of the
House of Representatives are elected from single-member districts every three
years. This electoral system, combined with a personalist party system, grossly
over-represents the largest parties and excludes minor parties. The inclusion of
proportional representation (implemented through a party-list ballot) for a small
portion of the lower chamber is an attempt to shift the focus from personalities
to political parties (Wurfel, 1997).
17. In Philippine legal jargon, ‘at large’ refers to election by plurality formula instead of proportional representation.
162
The 1991 Local Government Code provides for the election of local government
officials. The governor, vice-governor, city mayor, city vice-mayor, municipal
mayor, municipal vice-mayor and punong barangay (village head) are elected at
large in their respective areas. Elections are conducted through simple plurality
every three years. Likewise, members of the local legislative assemblies such as
the provincial board, city and municipal councils are elected by district and
plurality vote. However, members of the village assembly are elected at large in
their respective areas. Representatives and local government officials are
allowed a maximum of three consecutive terms before they can again seek re-
election.
The constitution drafted under the Aquino administration provides for the
development of a multi-party system under a presidential form of government.
However, in spite of the emergence of several political parties in the post-Marcos
era, these parties have been unable to transcend traditional modes of political
contestation. Thus, they continue to be ineffectual in addressing the
fundamental socio-economic issues plaguing Philippine society.
The 1987 Congress Elections

The 1987 congressional election was the first free election in the Philippines
since 1971. Eighty-four candidates vied for the Senate, while 1,899 contested
the House seats. The majority consisted of an ‘undecipherable mixture of pro-
Aquino candidates endorsed by the coalition, by major parties … or by several
other minor parties or a combination thereof’ (Wurfel, 1988: 319). There was a
preponderance of ‘fusion candidacy’ or ‘cross-endorsement’ in which
candidates received their nomination from more than one party. In other
instances, political parties nominated more than one candidate in the same
district (Kasuya, 2001b).
Since President Corazon C. Aquino refused to form her own political party, an
assorted array of political parties who supported her candidacy in 1986 formed
a coalition to carry the administration banner. The Lakas ng Bayan (People’s
Power) coalition was composed of the PDP-Laban, the LP, Lakas ng Bansa
(Nation’s Power, Lakas), UNIDO, National Union of Christian Democrats
(NUCD) and the Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (Nation United in
Spirit and Objective, BANDILA). The various personalities, ambitions and
political dispositions that comprised the ruling coalition manifested themselves
in internecine conflicts that underscored its fragility. The power struggle
intensified as most politicians from UNIDO and other parties started shifting
their allegiance to PDP-Laban, then perceived as the administration party.
There were three distinct opposition groups. The Grand Alliance for Democracy
(GAD), led by former Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, former Marcos cabinet
men, KBL legislators and conservative pre-1986 opposition members who turned
163
against Aquino. The Union for Peace and Progress-Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
(UPP-KBL), mostly composed of die-hard Marcos loyalists occupying the shell
of the former monolithic party. Lastly, the Alliance for New Politics (ANP) was
composed of the left-leaning Partido ng Bayan (Party of the Nation, PnB),
Volunteers for Popular Democracy (VPD) and the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (New Nationalist Alliance, Bayan).
The 1987 constitution revived the pre-martial law Senate. The electoral system
for the Senate consists of plurality votes for one national constituency of 12
members elected every three years.18 For the first election of a new batch of
senators in 1987, each voter was given 24 votes. Both the Lakas ng Bayan
coalition and GAD fielded complete slates of senatorial candidates. The pro-
Marcos UPP-KBL had 17, while the left-leaning ANP supported seven
candidates. The Lakas ng Bayan nearly swept the elections with 22 seats and
captured 229,542,457 (61 per cent) of the 375,004,620 valid votes. The
opposition GAD only managed to win 2 seats with 15,542,457 (4 per cent) of
the votes (see Table 9).
Table 9: Representativeness (Senate)

Political Party Votes Seats
Total Share (%) Seats Share (%)
Lakas ng Bayan 243,431,395 64.9 22 92.0
GAD 99,754,162 26.6 2 8.0
KBL 16,356,441 4.4 0 0.0
PnB 8,532,855 2.3 0 0.0
Others 55,519 0.0 0 0.0
Independents 6,874,428 1.8 0 0.0
Grand Total 375,004,800 100 24 100
Source: COMELEC, undated d.
Most of the local politicians identified with the former dictator opted to run as
independents or angled their way into one of the pro-Aquino parties. Seventy
former members and associates of the KBL ran and won in the elections: 23 ran
under administration parties, 28 under the opposition banner and 19 as
independents (Soriano, 1987). The election saw an overwhelming victory for
the ruling coalition, with an almost clean sweep in the upper house and a clear
majority in the lower house. It also registered a high rate of turn-out with
22,739,284 (85.59 per cent) voters participating in the polls. Nonetheless, the
total votes garnered by the entire membership of the 200-seat House of
Representatives constitute a mere 34 per cent of the total votes cast. The fluidity
18. As provided for in the 1987 constitution, the 24 senators elected in 1987 served a term of five years. By 1992,
the first 12 winners were given a term of six years, while the next 12 in ranking were given three years. Since
1995, 12 senators are elected every three years with a term of six years.
164
and transitional nature of the 1987 elections can be deemed from the large
number of candidates (49 or 25 per cent) who won under multiple coalitional
permutations (see Table 10).
One hundred and thirty-three representatives (66.5 per cent) elected in the
Eighth House had previous electoral experience. Of this number, 43 (22 per
cent) were former members of parliament elected in the 1984 Batasang Pambansa
elections, and 29 (15 per cent) were candidates who ran and lost in the 1984
elections. Fifteen (7.5 per cent) were former members of the 1978 Interim Batasang
Pambansa, and five had been candidates but had lost in the 1978 election.
Thirty five (17.5 per cent) had been elected either as national legislators or local
officials since 1971, and 30 (15 per cent) were elected in the 1980 local elections.
In addition, 31 newly elected representatives in 1987 were relatives of traditional
political families. Overall, 166 representatives (or 83 per cent of the total) were
drawn from the ranks of the elite in Philippine society. In addition, the
remaining 17 per cent of new entrants were not exactly non-elites since they
also controlled significant economic interests (Gutierrez, Torrente and Narca,
1992).
Table 10: Representativeness (House)

Coalitions/ Others* 2,648,719 13.2 55 27.5
PDP-Laban# 3,477,958 17.3 43 21.5
Lakas ng Bansa 3,510,638 17.5 24 12.0
Independent 2,660,894 13.2 23 12.0
UNIDO 2,570,876 12.8 19 10.0
LP 2,101,575 10.5 16 8.0
KBL 823,676 4.1 11 6.0
NP 1,444,399 7.2 4 2.0
GAD 268,156 1.3 2 1.0
PnB 328,215 1.6 2 0.0
Lakas ng Bayan 248,489 1.2 1 0.0
Grand Total 20,083,595 100 200 100
Source: COMELEC, undated d.
* Includes 49 seats that ran under various coalitions and six minor parties.
# Includes 21 seats under the PDP-Laban/Lakas ng Bansa alliance.
Seeing the need to simplify the political equation in the House, and in preparation
for the 1992 elections, pro-administration politicians led by Speaker Ramon
Mitra Jr. pushed a plan to merge all political parties and groups supporting the
Aquino administration into a single party similar to the KBL (Lustre, 1991: 12).
To pave the way for this merger, an alliance for the 1988 local elections was
165
forged between the two parties headed by presidential relatives – the PDP-
Laban and LnB. The alliance fielded a common slate in 53 out of 75 provinces.
These included politicians formerly affiliated with the KBL. The machinery
built around the traditional leadership networks in the provinces and regions
by the former dictator may have been dismantled, but the Marcos political
leaders have preserved their enormous influence at the local level.
The 1988 Local Elections

The 1988 local election was considered to be another step towards the
consolidation of state powers by the Aquino administration. Out of 20.5 million
registered voters, 80 per cent participated in the election. A total of 150,000
candidates vied for 15,946 local seats that included provincial governorship,
city and municipal mayoralty, and membership in provincial, city and municipal
legislative assemblies (Patricio, 1988; de Jesus 1988a). The exercise, however,
reinforced the traditional nature of politics in the Philippines. Voters in the
urban areas elected candidates with familiar names, while those in the rural
areas supported their relatives and friends. The election also saw the emergence
of ‘show business’ candidates as a force to be reckoned with in the electoral
arena (de Jesus, 1988b: 1, 9).
According to COMELEC records, pro-administration candidates won a total

of 9,630 seats, broken down into Lakas ng Bansa 2,134; PDP-Laban 2,959; LP
1,259; UNIDO 591; and coalitions 2,634. The opposition parties won a total of
1,061 seats composed of NP 583; KBL 151; GAD 1; Partido ng Bayan 17; and
coalitions 309. Those who ran as independents or under local and regional
parties won a total of 5,255 seats. The lack of discipline among various political
parties was evident in the declaration of ‘open zones’ in which members
supported candidates that were independent or belonging to another party.
One example is the alliance between the PDP-Laban and the Lakas ng Bansa
which fielded a common ticket in 53 out of 75 provinces.19 The alliance became
the core of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized in 1988 as a merger

of all political parties and groups supporting the Aquino administration.
Between 1988 and 1991, its membership in the lower house grew to 154. Out of
the 147 representatives who ran under several pro-administration parties,
alliances and coalitions, the LDP was able to recruit 123. And 17 out of 30
elected opposition members affiliated themselves with the new party. Ironically,
these included the two congressional representatives elected under the banner
of the left-leaning PnB. Seventeen independent solons20 also joined the LDP.
19. Relatives of President Aquino headed both parties at that time. Her brother, Representative Jose Cojuangco,
headed the PDP-Laban, while her brother-in-law, Paul Aquino, headed the LnB.
20. In Philippine journalistic parlance, ‘solons’ are legislators/politicians, a name derived from the ancient
Greek legislator Solon.
166
The party also recruited four sectoral representatives appointed to Congress,

bringing its total strength to 158.21
The 1992 Synchronized Elections

The 1992 election was the first synchronized election under the 1987
constitution. Thus presidential, congressional and local elections were held
simultaneously. There were 87,770 national and local candidates for 17,282
positions. The election again registered a high turn-out as 24,254,954 (75.46
per cent) out of a total 32,141,079 went to the polls. The 1992 election was also
the first free and open presidential election since 1969. There were seven
presidential contenders; relatively new political parties supported all except
for three. The NP, after breaking up into three factions, supported Vice-president
Salvador Laurel. The LP, after suffering from mass defections and financial
troubles, allied itself with the remnants of Senator Aquilino Pimentel’s PDP-
Laban and fielded Senator Jovito Salonga. The moribund KBL fielded former
First Lady Imelda Marcos. The LDP supported Speaker Ramon Mitra. The
Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), composed of various defectors from other
parties, teamed-up with Senator Joseph Estrada’s Partido ng Masang Pilipino
(Party of the Philippine Masses, PMP) and fielded former Ambassador Eduardo
Cojuangco. The Lakas-NUCD-UMDP coalition became the final vehicle for
former Defence Secretary Ramos. The People’s Reform Party (PRP), heavily
supported by student volunteers, fielded former Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Miriam Defensor-Santiago. With the endorsement of President Aquino and
support of government resources, Ramos emerged as the winner, albeit with a
slim plurality (see Table 11).
Table 11: Result of the 1992 Presidential Election

Candidate Party Votes %
Fidel V. Ramos Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 5,342,521 23.6
Miriam Defensor Santiago PRP 4,468,173 19.7
Eduardo Cojuangco NPC 4,116,376 18.2
Ramon Mitra LDP 3,316,661 14.6
Imelda Romualdez Marcos KBL 2,338,294 10.3
Jovito Salonga LP 2,302,124 10.2
Salvador H. Laurel NP 770,046 3.4
21. Section 7 of article XVIII of the 1987 constitution states, ‘the President may fill by appointment from a list
of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for the sectoral representatives’. Section 5 (2) of
article VI of the constitution refers to sectors as ‘labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector’. Before 1998,
half of the seats (25) allocated for the party-list system could be filled-up by the president according to
sectoral representation (Agra, 1997b).
167
The simultaneous election of presidential, congressional and local officials

has introduced new variables in Philippine party politics. The election saw the
emergence of new parties, alliances and coalitions that fielded a multitude of
candidates for various governmental positions. There were 152 candidates for
the Senate in 1992. All the major parties fielded complete slates of 24 candidates,
except the NP with 23 and the PRP with 16. The election resulted in the LDP
winning 16 seats, the NPC five, Lakas-NUCD two and LP-PDP-Laban one.22
Table 12: Representation Performance Senate (1992)

LDP 124,399,291 45.0 16 66.7
NPC 48,956,459 17.7 5 20.8
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 48,658,631 17.6 2 8.3
LP-PDP-Laban 19,158,013 6.9 1 4.2
NP 14,499,923 5.2 0 0.0
KBL 12,691,686 4.6 0 0.0
PRP 6,141,565 2.2 0 0.0
PMP 1,423,994 0.5 0 0.0
Independents 515,927 0.2 0 0.0
Grand Total 276,445,489 100 24 100
The total votes garnered by the winning candidates for the lower house translates
to 39 per cent of the total votes cast. The strongest legislative party was the LDP
with 86 elected members, followed by the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP with 40 seats,
and the NPC with 30 seats (see Table 13). These three parties emerged as the
most dominant in succeeding elections in the post-Marcos period.
The Lakas-NUCD-UMDP party was hastily organized for the 1992 election,
after Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos lost the LDP presidential nomination to
House Speaker Mitra. It was a merger of the newly formed Lakas ng EDSA (not
to be confused with the Lakas ng Bansa) and the older National Union of
Christian Democrats-Union of Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (NUCD-
UMDP) founded in 1984. From an original 40 elected members, it was able to
expand to 119 after Ramos won the presidency. Out of the 104 re-elected
members of the House, 88 were former LDP members in the Eighth House. After
the 1992 election, the LDP lost 58 more members to Lakas, which successfully
elected party stalwart Jose de Venecia Jr. (a former LDP member) as speaker of
22. While the Commission of Elections reported the total number of registered voters at 32,105,782, it did not
provide the number of valid votes for the 1992 senatorial election. Hence, it is difficult to compute the indica-
tors employed in the chapter’s first section. For a detailed discussion of the pitfalls of utilizing COMELEC
records and statistics, see Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001.
168
the house. Thus, from being the party with the most number of elected members,
it slipped to third place with 25 remaining members. Formerly the major
administration party under the Aquino administration, the LDP found itself as
the opposition in the Ramos administration, deprived of access to patronage.

Political Party Votes Seats Difference
Total Share (%) Seats Share (%) (%)
LDP 6,286,922 33.7 86 43.2 9.5
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 3,951,144 21.2 40 20.1 1.1
NPC 3,478,780 18.7 30 15.1 3.6
Coalitions* 679,411 3.6 14 7.0 3.4
LP-PDP-Laban# 1,644,568 8.8 11 5.5 3.3
NP 730,696 3.9 7 3.5 0.4
Independents 938,558 5.0 6 3.0 2.0
KBL 438,577 2.4 3 1.5 0.9
Others 491,970 2.6 2 1.0 1.6
Grand Total 18,640,626 100 199 100 25.8
* Alliance among two or more national and/or local political parties.
# LP and PDP-Laban formed a national coalition in support of a common presidential and senatorial slate.
The NPC was organized as a vehicle for the presidential candidacy of close
Marcos ally Ambassador Eduardo Cojuangco. It was composed of a splinter
of the NP, remnants of the KBL and defectors from other parties. After the
election, the NPC entered into a coalition with the ruling Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
in the House of Representatives to support Speaker De Venecia.
Of the representatives who were elected in 1992 to the Ninth House, 145 belonged
to political families. Out of these, 30 (15 per cent) were third- or fourth-generation
politicians. At least 64 representatives (32 per cent) were children of prominent
political figures. In addition, 23 representatives had spouses who occupied,
once occupied or contested important government positions; and 46 members
(23 per cent) had brothers and/or sisters active in politics. The dominance of
political clans was expanded with 58 representatives having uncles, nieces,
nephews and cousins who held or once held public office, and 33 who had
married into political families or who had in-laws in public office. Altogether,
only 54 representatives (27 per cent) had no close relatives in politics (Gutierrez,
1994: 17-24).

In preparation for the next round of elections, an alliance between the
administration and opposition parties was formalized with the formation of
169
the Lakas-Laban coalition. The coalition fielded a common slate of 12

candidates. The NPC supported a token slate of ten candidates. The PRP had
two candidates. Overall, there were 28 candidates. The Lakas-Laban coalition
won ten seats with 97,920,251 (54 per cent) out of the 180,361,231 valid votes
counted. The PRP got two seats with 18,435,847 (10 per cent), and the NPC
secured one seat with 8,700,278 (5 per cent).

Lakas-Laban coalition* 123,678,255 68.6 10 83.0
PRP 19,619,923 10.9 2 16.0
NPC 28,452,737 15.8 1 1.0
KBL 8,168,768 4.5 0 0.0
Others 441,548 0.2 0 0.0
Grand total 180,361,231 100 13 100
Sources: COMELEC, undated f; Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001.
* The Lakas-NUCD-UMDP and the LDP formed a national coalition.

Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 7,811,625 40.7 100 49.0
Lakas-Laban coalition* 1,998,810 10.4 25 12.3
NPC 2,342,378 12.2 22 10.8
LDP 2,079,611 10.8 17 8.3
Government coalition 923,731 4.8 9 4.4
LP 358,245 1.9 5 2.5
PDP-Laban 130,365 0.7 1 0.5
NP 153,088 0.8 1 0.5
KBL 183,256 1.0 1 0.5
PMP 171,454 0.9 1 0.5
Opposition coalition 306,064 1.6 1 0.5
People’s Reform Party 171,454 0.9 0 0.0
Hybrid Coalitions 989,723 5.2 0 0.0
Others 274,845 1.4 14 6.9
Independents 1,386,007 7.2 7 3.4
Grand Total 19,280,656 100 204 100
Sources: COMELEC, undated f; Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001.
* The Lakas NUCD-UMDP and the LDP formed a national coalition.
# Alliance between two or more national and/or local political parties.
170
By the time the Tenth House was convened after the 1995 election, Lakas had
completely consolidated its hold over the lower chamber (see Table 15).
The turn-out for the mid-term election was 25,736,505 (70.66 per cent). One
hundred and fifty-one House members were successfully re-elected, 82 of whom
were on their third term. Eighty seven of those re-elected won in 1992 and 1995
under different political parties and of those 80 had transferred to the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP. Fifty-one of the 80 who converted to the administration party
were former members of the LDP (Querijero, 1997).
The 1998 Synchronized Elections

The second synchronized election was held in 1998. The exercise registered the
highest turn-out since 1987, with 29,285,775 (86.46 per cent) out of 33,873,665
voting at the polls. A large number of politicians filed their candidacies under
the ruling Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. In some areas, two or more Lakas candidates
competed against each other. However, most of them affiliated themselves with
Lakas to gain campaign financing, while secretly supporting the presidential
candidacy of Vice-president Joseph Estrada of the opposition Laban ng
Makabayang Masang Pilipino (Struggle of the Nationalist Pilipino Masses,
LAMMP). This largely contributed to the defeat of Lakas presidential candidate
Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr. LAMMP was a coalition of the LDP, PMP and NPC.
The election also saw the emergence of three minor parties: the Partido para sa
Demokratikong Reporma-Lapiang Manggagawa (Party for Democratic
Reforms-Worker’s Party, Reporma-LM), Probinsya Muna Development
Initiatives (Provinces First Development Initiative, PROMDI), and Aksyon
Demokratiko (Democratic Action).23 It is also worth noting that aside from the
LAMMP coalition, no other multiple alliances were forged as in previous
electoral exercises.
The election saw an unprecedented number of presidential candidates.

Established and newly formed political parties fielded ten candidates. These
included Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP), Vice-president
Joseph Estrada (LAMMP), Senator Raul Roco (Aksyon Demokratiko), former
Governor Emilio Osmeña (PROMDI), Mayor Alfredo Lim (LP), Defence Secretary
Renato de Villa (Reporma-LM), Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago (PRP),
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Independent), Santiago Dumlao (Kilusan Para sa
Pambansang Pagbabago [National Renewal Movement, KPP]) and Manuel
Morato (Partido ng Bansang Marangal [Party for a Dignified Nation]). The
election resulted in the victory of Vice-president Joseph Estrada with 10,722,295
(39.9 per cent) of the votes (see Table 16).24
23. Another new party, the KPP, fielded a presidential ticket (see next paragraph) and five candidates for the
Senate.
24. Joseph E. Estrada was a popular movie actor who served as town mayor and senator before being elected as
vice-president in 1992.
171
Table 16: Results of the 1998 Presidential Election

Presidential Candidate Party Votes %
Joseph E. Estrada LAMMP* 10,722,295 39.9
Jose C. de Venecia Jr. Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 4,268,483 15.9
Raul S. Roco Aksyon Demokratiko 3,720,212 13.8
Emilio R. Osmeña PROMDI 3,347,631 12.4
Alfredo S. Lim LP 2,344,362 8.7
Renato S. de Villa Reporma-LM 1,308,352 4.9
Miriam Defensor Santiago PRP 797,206 3.0
Juan Ponce Enrile Independent 343,139 1.3
Santiago F. Dumlao KPP 32,212 0.1
Manuel L. Morato Partido ng Bansang Marangal 18,644 0.1
Sources: COMELEC, undated g.
* LAMMP was a coalition of the LDP, NPC and PMP.
Forty candidates contested the 1998 senatorial election. Among the candidates
were four incumbent senators running for re-election, three former senators,
ten incumbent representatives, seven former cabinet members, one former
governor, one former city mayor and 14 prominent personalities. The two major
parties, Lakas and LAMMP, fielded complete slates of 12 candidates. The LP
supported only two candidates. Among the new parties, only Reporma-LM
fielded a senatorial slate with eight candidates. The LAMMP coalition won
seven seats, while Lakas-NUCD-UMDP captured five (see Table 17).

LAMMP 91,473,870 44.3 7 58.3
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 93,847,018 45.5 5 41.7
Reporma-LM 13,313,669 6.5 0 0.0
Liberal Party 5,454,146 2.6 0 0.0
KPP 1,805,270 0.9 0 0.0
Others 354,561 0.2 0 0.0
Grand Total 206,248,534 100 12 100
Sources: COMELEC, undated g; Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001.
Nonetheless, the 1998 electoral competition was more defined between two
major political groups – the administration Lakas and the opposition coalition
LAMMP. The votes cast for the winning legislative candidates of both parties
constituted 43 per cent of the total votes cast. Both parties captured 85 per cent
of the total house seats, with Lakas winning 110 and LAMMP gaining 67 (see
Table 16). The Liberal Party performed as a minor third party with 15 seats.
172

Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 11,981,024 49.0 111 53.9
LAMMP 6,520,744 26.7 55 27.0
LP 1,773,124 7.3 15 7.3
NPC 998,239 4.1 9 4.4
Reporma-LM 966,653 4.0 4 2.0
PROMDI 586,954 2.3 4 2.0
Aksyon Demokratiko 106,843 0.4 1 0.5
PDP-Laban 134,331 0.5 0 0.0
OMPIA 46,462 0.2 1 0.5
Others 495,090 2.0 4 2.0
Independents 834,934 3.4 2 0.1
Grand Total 24,444,398 100 206 100
Source: COMELEC, undated g.
* LAMMP was a coalition of the LDP, NPC and PMP.
After the election, LAMMP was reorganized into Laban ng Masang Pilipino
(LAMP) and emerged as the new dominant party after the presidential victory
of its candidate Joseph Estrada. Lakas suffered the same fate as its predecessor,
the LDP, in the lower house. In spite of capturing the most house seats, its
numbers quickly dwindled as members defected to the new administration
party. The membership of LAMP swelled and the party was able to elect Manuel
Villar (a former Lakas member) as the new speaker. Other political parties
suffered defections as well.
Eighty-two members of the Tenth House were on their third term. Close relatives
replaced 34 of them in the Eleventh House. Of this number, 17 were replaced by
their children, nine by their wives, three by their brothers, three by their nephews,
one by his cousin, and one by his father. An additional 30 of the first term
representatives were related to legislators who had served in the various
incarnations of Congress. Thus, a total of 64 (48 per cent) of the 130 first-term
representatives were members of political families. Ten candidates who stood
for election in a relative’s district lost in their bid. These included four sons,
three wives, one brother, one niece and one brother-in-law.
In a reflection of the weak governance of the Estrada administration, LAMP

failed to consolidate itself into an administration party. Meanwhile, the Estrada
administration was plagued by scandals and controversies that resulted in an
erosion of public confidence. The loose coalition was shattered after the ouster
173
of President Estrada in a People Power uprising in 2001.25

The 2001 mid-term election was held in a highly charged political atmosphere
after the sudden fall of the Estrada administration. The Arroyo administration
fielded a coalition of all the parties and personalities that had participated in
the struggle against President Estrada. The People Power Coalition (PPC) was
composed of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, Reporma-LM, Aksyon Demokratiko,
PROMDI, LP and the PDP-Laban. The PPC fielded a senatorial slate of 13
candidates, and supported a number of congressional and local candidates.26
The PPC senatorial slate was composed of key players in the impeachment trial
and ouster of President Estrada. It comprised four senators who had been re-
elected, including the former Senate president, four representatives, including
the former house speaker, one provincial governor and four representatives
from civil society organizations.
On the other hand, LAMP was dissolved when the NPC distanced itself from
the fallen president. Thus, the LDP together with remnants of the PMP formed
the core of a loose opposition alliance called the Pwersa ng Masa (PnM or Force
of the Masses). The opposition fielded a slate composed of former First Lady
Luisa Estrada, three re-elected candidates, three former senators, the former
chief of the Philippine National Police, two local politicians, a talk show host
and a socialite. The opposition also adopted the independent candidacy of
popular newscaster Noli de Castro.27
The election campaign was marred by violence as supporters of former President

Estrada rioted on 1 May 2001 in their own version of a people power uprising.
The upheaval was triggered by the arrest of the former president. Estrada’s
strong and continuing support from the poor masses was translated into the
victory of five PnM candidates, including the former first lady. The
administration PPC captured eight seats (see Table 19).
For the lower house elections, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP reasserted itself as the
country’s dominant political group with 73 seats. The NPC did not field a
candidate for the Senate, and concentrated on local contests, thus winning 40
25. President Estrada was the first Philippine president to be impeached by Congress after allegations were
made that he had amassed billions of pesos from an illegal numbers game. The Senate, with the supreme
court chief justice presiding, conducted the trial in December 2000. On 16 January 2001, the majority of pro-
administration senators voted to prevent the opening of bank records that would implicate the president.
The impeachment trial was scuttled as scores of people massed in protest at the historic EDSA shrine. On
19 January, the military and national police withdrew their support from Estrada and Vice-president
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was installed as president.
26. The thirteenth senatorial slot was intended to continue the unfinished term (three years) of Senator Teofisto
Guingona, who was selected as vice-president.
27. Although he barely campaigned with the opposition, he topped the senatorial elections with 16,237,386
votes. He accomplished this without the support of an established political party or national machinery,
relying instead on his popularity and the powerful radio and television network ABS-CBN. Upon assuming
his Senate seat, he joined the majority coalition.
174
seats. The LDP won 21 seats, while the LP got 19 seats (see Table 20). Upon the
opening of the Twelfth Congress, the NPC entered into an alliance with the Lakas-
led administration majority to re-elect Jose de Venecia as speaker of the house.

PPC* 123,479,617 50.8 8 61.5
PnM# 111,309,500 45.8 5 38.5
Others 2,147,390 0.9 0 0.0
Independents 6,081,446 2.5 0 0.0
Grand Total 243,017,953 100 13 100
Source: COMELEC, 2001c.
* Government coalition composed of Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, LP, Reporma-LM, Aksyon Demokratiko, PROMDI
and PDP-Laban.
# Opposition coalition largely composed of LDP and remnants of LAMMP.
Ninety of the 205 elected representatives are serving their first term. However,
26 of these first-term legislators return to the House after having served the
one-term constitutional ban on three-term legislators. In effect ‘105 of the current
representatives are holdovers from the last one. Altogether, 135 or two of very
three House members have held a seat in past Congresses’ (Datinguinoo and
Olarte, 2001: 19).

Total Share Seats Share (%)
Lakas NUCD-UMDP N/A* - 73 35.6
NPC - 40 19.5
LDP - 21 10.2
LP - 19 9.2
Reporma-LM - 3 1.5
PROMDI - 3 1.5
Aksyon Demokratiko - 2 1.0
PMP - 2 1.0
PDP-Laban - 1 0.5
Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas - 1 0.5
Not indicated - 20 9.8
Others - 12 5.9
Independents - 8 3.9
Grand Total - 205 100
Source: COMELEC, 2001c.
* At the time of writing, the Commission of Elections had not yet released the Official Report of the 2001
Congressional Elections.
175
Performance of the Current Electoral System

Elections perform two central functions in a political system: (1) they represent
the political will of the voters; and (2) they integrate the people through the
formation of political parties that bring about majorities. The representativeness
of an electoral system can be determined by the degree of proportionality in
which votes are translated into parliamentary seats. On the other hand, the
integration effect of an electoral system can be estimated by how much it promotes
the efficient formation of government.28 These effects of an electoral system can
be empirically documented by the ratio between votes and seats. Consequently,
the ramifications of the electoral system on votes/seat ratio ‘leads to the
formulation of certain assumptions about the political consequences of electoral
systems which have a bearing on the process of formation of political intent,
the party system, and the political process in general’ (Nohlen, 1984).
Overall, the representation performance of the post-Marcos electoral system, as

reflected by the Erep (ELECTION representativeness) index, has indicated a rising level
of proportionality and representativeness. In the House of Representatives,
this is largely a result of the ‘first-past-the-post’ competition of multiple parties
in single-seat districts, such that less than half the total votes cast for the
membership of the lower house is translated into political mandates. Among
the advantages traditionally attributed to the ‘first-past-the-post’ system is the
promotion of political integration and party concentration, given its inherent
tendency towards the formation of a two-party system. However, this
characteristic is obscured by the hybrid of a multi-party system and
presidentialism under the 1987 constitution. Nonetheless, there has been a
gradual increase in the Erep index from 79.7 in 1987 to 94.0 in 1998, reflecting
the stabilization of the party system around four political parties (Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP, NPC, LDP and LP). As party affiliation becomes more defined, the total
share of votes translated into mandates increases. The total Erep average for four
elections (excluding 2001) is 86.2. The trend is replicated in the multi-member
national Senate in which each voter is given as many votes as there are seats to
be filled in the upper chamber. The Erep index for the Senate increased from 78.2
in 1987 to 89.3 in 2001. The average for four elections (excluding 1992) is 83.5
(see Table 21).
As regards the formation of majorities, the indicator Erep1 (ELECTION representativeness

+ 1st Strongest Party
) measures the over-representation of the strongest party (for the
first or only legislative chamber) within the context of the general proportionality
of an electoral system’ (see the final chapter by Aurel Croissant). Post-Marcos
elections have scored high in the Erep1 index, except in 1987 when numerous
permutations of loose alliances and coalitions outnumbered the votes and seats
won by the strongest party (PDP-Laban). The strongest party in 1992 was the
LDP, while Lakas-NUCD-UMDP dominated the 1995, 1998 and 2001
28. See the chapter on South Korea by Aurel Croissant (also Croissant, 2002).
176
congressional elections. A substantial disproportion can be observed in the

ratio between votes and seats obtained by the strongest parties in these elections.
Thus the LDP with a mere 33.7 per cent of the total votes cast in 1992 managed
to capture 43.2 per cent of the House seats. The index Erep1- Erep indicates the
reward of mandates that is given to the strongest party. However, the over-
representation of these parties did not contribute much to integration or majority-
building in the House of Representatives.29
Table 21: Average Representation Performance, 1987-2001

House Senate House Senate House Senate
1987 79.7 78.2 92.9 84.5 13.2 6.3
1992 87.1 71.1 95.3 89.2 8.2 18.1
1995 84.0 80.5 96.0 92.8 12.0 12.3
1998 94.0 86.0 98.0 93.0 4.0 7.0
2001 No data 89.3 No data 94.7 No data 5.4
Average 86.2 81.02 97.05 90.84 10.6 9.8
Under the presidential form of government, legislative elections do not have a

direct effect on the formation of government. The Philippines has a tradition of
strong presidential influence over the House of Representatives that encourages
party switching and political turncoatism. There are two types of political
party that most Filipino politicos affiliate with: one during the electoral period
and another when serving their term of office.
This is most evident in the membership of the House of Representatives, where

the LDP was dominant during the Eighth Congress (1987-1992). In spite of
winning the most number of seats in the Ninth Congress (1992-1995), its failure
to capture the presidency resulted in its rank being raided by the new
administration party – the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By the Tenth Congress (1995-
1998), the Lakas had transformed itself into a behemoth, not unlike its
predecessors, the KBL and LDP. Lakas suffered the same fate as its predecessor,
the LDP, in the Eleventh Congress (1998-2001). In spite of capturing the most
house seats, its numbers quickly dwindled as members defected to LAMP.
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP has regained its dominant status in the Twelfth Congress,
particularly in the House of Representatives, since the May 2001 elections.
29. The situation is much more complicated in the Senate in which party affiliation and loyalty are extremely fluid.
Political parties are usually temporary vehicles for getting elected. Given their national mandate, senators often
act as ‘little presidents’ totally independent from their political parties. The Senate is often organized around
multi-party alliances revolving around the Senate president and committee chairmanships.
177
The Electoral System and Democratic

Development
Essentially, ‘an election is a procedure by which members of communities
and/or organizations choose persons to hold an office’ (Nohlen, 1984). It is a
technique of rendering authority and/or creating representative bodies.
Elections are often linked to the idea of democratic representation. Therefore,
‘an election is a device for filling an office or posts through choices made by a
designated body of people, the electorate’ (Heywood, 2000: 199). This does not,
however, discount the holding of semi-competitive or non-competitive elections.
In the Philippines, elections have historically served to legitimize the

government and perpetuate elite rule. As de Quiros (1992:12) notes, ‘elections
were the “equilibrating” mechanism, although their ability to equilibrate society
under the combined weight of mass restiveness and competing claims to power
by various power blocs would diminish in time’. Consequently, the quality of
democratic representation has suffered from this anomaly.
The standard approach to analysing Filipino electoral and party politics has
been to view power relations within the context of the patron-client factional
(PCF) framework. Popularized by Carl Lande (1965), the PCF posited that social
relations in the Philippines are not structured by organized interest groups or
individuals who perceive themselves to be part of a specific social class as in
Western democracies. What exists is a network of mutual aid relationships
between pairs of individuals that he called ‘dyadic ties’. The dyadic ties present
in Philippine politics are vertical and unequal, binding prosperous patrons
who dispense material goods and services to dependent clients who
recompense with their support and loyalty.
Through the years, the PCF framework has been heavily criticized since it
tends to reify if not valorize reciprocity, smooth interpersonal relationships,
kinship and fictive kinship bonds (Kerkvliet, 1995). Modifications of the PCF
thesis were manifested in the concept of political machines. Machado (1974)
and Kimura (1997) posited that the potency of the kinship system as an
instrument of patronage had diminished and has been replaced with the
emergence of machine politics.
An opposite view of reciprocity of the PCF underscores the concept of conflict,

command, coercion and even violence. Various scholars have applied various
terms, such as ‘caciquism’ (Anderson, 1988), ‘sultanism’ (Snyder, 1998),
‘neopatrimonialism’ (Snyder, 1992) and ‘bossism’ (Sidel, 1999). This view of
Philippine politics is widely known as ‘warlordism’. While warlordism and
political violence have been both integral and recurring characteristics of local
politics in the Philippines, these are not necessarily representative of the nature
of local politics in the country. There are still some warlords firmly secured in
178
their fiefdoms, but many have also been dislodged both peacefully and
violently.30
Most literature on Philippine elections tends to portray the electorate as passive

spectators malleable to the machinations of elite politicians. Even a recent study
that claims to view the ‘lifeworld’ of a local community treats elections as a
‘political ritual’ such that the ordinary voter ‘remains the unthinking dupe of
the ideology of patronage and clientelism’ (Alejo et al., 1996: 66). However,
despite the identified flaws in the electoral system, empirical data tends to
show that ‘the typical Filipino voter, although cognisant of the stresses caused
by poverty, is idealistic, conscientious, and responsible’ (Mangahas, 1994:18).
Based on surveys of public opinion taken by the Social Weathers Station (SWS)
since 1985, this gives a strong basis to conclude that Filipinos have a sustained
preference for democracy and have internalized democratic values amid
occasional challenges by anti-democratic forces. Thus, there is a firm belief
among leaders and the electorate that political leaders should be chosen through
regular, fair and honest elections (Abueva, 1997: 23).
The Party System

Section 6, article IX C of the 1987 constitution states that ‘[a] free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article’. This provision provides the
constitutional basis for the shift from a two-party system to a multi-party system
under a presidential form of government. Under the previous and long-standing
election rule, only two individuals, each representing the two major parties
were allowed to be members of the precinct Board of Election Inspectors.
Currently, all registered political parties may appoint poll-watchers, albeit with
reduced powers, with the new procedures following the multi-party provision
of the constitution (Lande, 1996).
Some political scientists have traditionally viewed the two-party system as an

outgrowth of local factionalism that constitutes the organizational base for
national parties. Factions consist of vertical and unequal ties that bind
prosperous patrons, who dispense material goods and services, with dependent
clients who recompense with their support and loyalty. The pre-martial law
two-party system was anchored on the preponderance of bifactionalism in
local areas, which allowed for only two national parties (Lande, 1965: 156). A
30. There has been renewed interest in the study of the role of the family in Philippine politics. The Institute for
Popular Democracy (IPD) initiated this trend in a series of publications (Gutierrez, Torrente and Narca, 1992;
Gutierrez, 1994). Recognizing the inherent limitations of pure class analysis and party politics in accounting
for the continued dominance of the country’s political elites, these works assert the central role of the clans as
building blocks for both local and national politics. The objective is to understand the major obstacle to
democratization and eventually formulate a strategy for progressive forces in engaging such an obstacle. The
volume edited by Alfred McCoy (1994) is the first major academic compilation on political clans outside the
IPD series. Culling innovative research works by Filipino, American and Australian scholars, the volume
aims to fill in the wide gap in Filipino family historiography.
179
more recent study posits that elite-dominated factions and their bifurcated
inter-familial rivalries have been replaced by local political machines geared
towards multifactionalism and characterized by the alliance of factions into
temporary blocs. This trend is further reinforced by the breakdown of the two-
party system and the emergence of a multi-party system (Kimura, 1997).
The inherent weakness of the state forces it to rely on the support of local
politicians for governance. Unlike in the pre-martial law period when local
politicians were largely independent and influential in determining the outcome
of national contests, the erosion of kinship and personalistic relations in rural
areas and the rise of urbanized, contractual and machine-based politics have
made it difficult for local politicos to maintain their predominant role.
Multifactionalism and the multi-party system have made local politics more
intense, thus local politicos must have access to state resources to accumulate
private funds, surplus and pork barrel funds. Access to state resources has
become a way of funding electoral campaigns. Thus, local politicians find it
necessary to affiliate with the administration party.
The pre-war NP was able maintain its dominance except for two interludes in
1922 and 1934, when its leaders Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña struggled
for pre-eminence. Ferdinand Marcos’ experiment with authoritarianism was
facilitated by the use of his extraordinary powers to coax local politicians into
his KBL. The emergence of the LDP, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP and the LAMP in
the post-Marcos period is but a continuation of this trend. While turncoatism
encourages the emergence of dominant parties, it is also the major factor
responsible for its eventual decline. However, questions have been raised
regarding the emergence of new parties formed by leaders with no local factional
links (i.e. Lakas-NUCD-UMDP by former Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos and
Reporma-LM by former Defence Secretary Renato de Villa). In addition, most of
these new parties were formed to contest the presidency. This was the case
with the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, LDP and NPC in 1992; and the Reporma-LM,
PROMDI and Aksyon Demokratiko in 1998. These observations give rise to the
assertion that there is a connection between the increase of legislative parties
with the rise of viable presidential candidates (Kasuya, 2001a).
Cognisant of the elitist nature of Philippine democracy, the framers of the 1987
constitution introduced provisions designed to widen the democratic space
and allow for greater participation of other sectors in Philippine society. These
provisions include the banning of political dynasties, the introduction of term
limits and recall elections, and the institutionalization of a party-list system for
marginalized sectors. Yet, the political elites have managed to masterfully work
around these provisions through adaptation and the effective use of their
political resources.
180
Political Dynasties and Recall Elections

Philippine history has long been characterized by the durability and resilience
of political clans and dynasties. Section 26, article II of the constitution asserts:
‘The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as defined by law’. Political dynasties refer to clans
and families who hold multiple elective and/or appointive positions in
government. It is also used primarily to describe politically active clans and
families that have bequeathed power from one generation to another.
Unfortunately, the clan-dominated Congress has failed to enact the anti-dynasty
provision of the constitution.
Recognizing the need to widen the narrow avenue for political representation
in the Philippines, the framers of the 1987 constitution introduced provisions
for term limits. Term limits seek to eliminate the prospects of re-election to
prevent the accumulation and concentration of power in the hands of a few
politicians. Under the constitution, the president is prevented from running for
any re-election. At least one term out is imposed on the vice-president and
senators who have served for two consecutive terms. Representatives and local
government officials are allowed a maximum of three consecutive terms before
they can again seek re-election.
In consonance with Section 3, article X of the constitution, the Local Government

Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) introduced recall elections. Accordingly,
recall refers to ‘the power of registered voters to remove from office any local
official for loss of confidence. The process is initiated either by a resolution
adopted by a preparatory assembly composed of local officials or a petition
signed by at least 25 per cent of the registered voters and culminated in a
special recall election’ (Agra, 1997a: 72). There were 29 local recall elections
between 1993 and 1997.
The Party-list System

The constitution introduced a party-list proportional representation scheme of
electing one fifth of the members of the House of Representatives. Section 5 of
article VI provides that:
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two

hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this constitution, one-half
181
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided

by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The Ninth Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7941 or ‘The Party-list System
Act’ in 1995. Section 3 of the law defines the party-list system as a ‘mechanism
of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)’
(Agra, 1997b: 6).31 The system provides for the election of 50 seats in the House
of Representatives. A qualified party or organization must obtain 2 per cent of
the total votes for the system in order to get one seat. Each party or organization
is entitled to a maximum of three seats.
Table 22: Result of Party-List Election (1998)

ABA 321,646 3.5 1 7.1
Abanse! Pinay 235,548 2.6 1 7.1
AKO 239,042 2.6 1 7.1
ALAGAD 312,500 3.4 1 7.1
APEC 503,487 5.5 2 14.4
AKBAYAN 232,376 2.5 1 7.1
Aksyon Demokratiko 132,913 1.5 0 0.0
BUTIL 215,643 2.4 1 7.1
COOP-NATCO 189,802 2.1 1 7.1
COCOFED 186,388 2.0 1 7.1
PDP-Laban 134,331 0.7 0 0.0
PROMDI 255,184 2.8 1 7.1
SANLAKAS 194,617 2.1 1 7.1
SCFO 238,303 2.6 1 7.1
Veterans’ Federation Party 304,902 3.3 1 7.1
Others 5,218,140 60.0 0 0.0
Grand Total 8,914,822 100 14 100
31. However, for the May 1998 elections, the top five major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the lower house at the beginning of the Tenth Congress were banned from participating in the party-list
elections. These included Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, LP, LDP, NPC and the KBL. The ban was automatically lifted
in 2001 (Agra, 1997b: 12).
182
The first party-list election was held in May 1998. Given the novelty of the
system and the deficiency of information dissemination by COMELEC, the
overall turn-out was low at 9,155,309 (33.5 per cent) out of 27,330,772. Of the
123 groups that participated, only 13 were able to garner 2 per cent of the total
votes. From this number, only one party, the Association of Philippine Electronic
Cooperatives (APEC), won two seats with half a million votes. Hence, out of the
total 50 seats available, only 14 were filled (see Table 23). A large number of the
total votes cast for the party list (60 per cent) was dispersed among many
parties that never had any capacity to campaign nationwide. Thus, only ‘67
parties were able to garner more than 50,000 votes. Only 27 of them broke the
100,000 mark’ (Rodriguez and Velasco, 1998: 9).
The result of the first party-list elections was below expectations given its low
turn-out and the high number of ‘lost votes’ due to the technical inadequacy of
the system. The need to further educate and inform the public on the party-list
system was underscored. Sectoral groups were urged to consolidate their
organizations in order to reach the minimum number of votes. The law itself
was subject to post-election controversies concerning the formula for the
allocation of party-list seats and the filling of additional seats (Rodriguez and
Velasco, 1998). The central issue concerned the interpretation and application
of the modified List PR-Neimeyer formula as prescribed by the Party-list System
Act.32 A group of 38 losing parties and organizations argued for the scrapping
of the 2 per cent threshold and the award of a seat each. On the other hand, the
14 winning parties argued that they should be awarded additional seats before
distributing the unfilled slots to the losing parties or organizations. After a
period of legal struggle, no additional seats were granted to any parties.
The second party-list election was held on May 2001. A total of 162 political
parties and sectoral organizations participated in the election. The total number
of votes cast for the party-list election was higher than in 1998 at 15,096,261.
Ten parties and organizations got over the 2 per cent threshold (see Table 24).
Half of these had won seats in 1998, such as Akbayan, APEC, Butil, PROMDI
and the Veterans’ Federation Party. APEC retained its two seats, while the
others kept one seat each. The new entrants included the two major political
parties that were banned from participating in 1998. Lakas-NUCD-UMDP and
NPC managed to win one seat each. Another winning party, the Citizens Battle
against Corruption (CIBAC) was organized by a religious Christian sect.
Significantly, the legal Left participated in the party-list election marking its
first entry into the mainstream parliamentary struggle since the participation
of the PnB in the 1987 elections. The Left reconstituted itself into a new political
32. Under the formula ‘introduced by Professor Neimeyer of Germany, the number of seats a party (or organization)
is entitled to is calculated on the basis of the proportion by dividing the votes obtained by a party or organization
over the total number of all votes cast for all qualified parties and organizations’ (Agra, 1997b: 3). However,
the formula was modified in the Philippines to include a maximum of three seats per party or organization.
183
party – Bayan Muna (Nation First).33 Learning from the lessons of 1987, Bayan
Muna made full use of its allied grass-roots organizations. It topped the party-
list elections with 1,708,252 votes, earning them a maximum three seats in the
House of Representatives. Elected were former journalist and social activist
Satur Ocampo, veteran trade unionist Crispin Beltran, and feminist Liza Maza.
Table 23: Result of Party-List Election (2001)

AKBAYAN 377,850 2.5 1 6.7
APEC 801,921 5.3 2 13.3
Bayan Muna 1,708,252 11.3 3 20.0
BUTIL 330,282 2.2 1 6.7
CIBAC 323,810 2.2 1 6.7
Lakas NUCD-UMDP 329,093 2.2 1 6.7
MAD 1,515,682 10.0 3 20.0
NPC 385,151 2.6 1 6.7
PROMDI 422,430 2.8 1 6.7
Veterans’ Federation Party 580,771 3.8 1 6.7
Others 8,321,019 55.1 0 0.0
Grand Total 15,096,261 100 15 100
Source: COMELEC Records, 2001.
Another organization that garnered more than a million votes was

Mamamayang Ayaw sa Droga (Citizens Against Drugs, MAD). MAD was an
anti-drug movement organized by the Estrada administration. It benefited
largely from an executive order issued by President Estrada allocating 5 per
cent of the local governments’ 28 billion Peso internal revenue allotment funds
for development of anti-drug abuse programmes (Bagayaua, 2001: 9). It fielded
popular actor and former presidential assistant on youth and sports Richard
Gomez as its top nominee, followed by former police general Jewel Canson.
Various sectors of society protested to COMELEC about the participation of

MAD, the major political parties and organizations that do not represent the
marginalized and under-represented sectors of Philippine society. The
confusion can be traced to the 1987 Constitutional Commission that drafted
the constitution. Two different systems – party-list and sectoral representation
– were proposed by members of the Commission, and actually merged into a
33. The Philippine Left historically consisted of an underground component waging a revolutionary struggle
against the state, and a multitude of legal organizations. While the traditional Left participated in the 1947
elections, it subsequently shunned elections as arenas for elite politics. In 1987, the Left organized the PnB
to participate in the 1987 elections. However, unfamiliarity with the electoral terrain and internal debates
on the strategic importance of electoral politics resulted in a dismal performance for the PnB.
184
single constitutional provision (Wurfel, 1997: 20-21).34 Some members of the

Commission argued for more representation for political parties following the
spirit of proportional systems. Others insisted on representation for the basic
sectors that were marginalized and under-represented. Former Constitutional
Commissioner and COMELEC Chair Christian Monsod noted that the basic
concept of the party-list system was to introduce proportional representation.
However, the underlying objective was to strengthen the marginalized sectors
so that they could compete in the electoral arena (Maglipon, 2001: 21-22).
It took the supreme court to clarify the legal controversies of the party-list law.
In a historic decision on 26 July 2001, the supreme court stressed that the party-
list encourages ‘proportional representation’ by allowing the election of under-
represented groups, and persons with no defined constituencies but who can
help draft meaningful laws. Stating that the COMELEC committed a ‘grave
abuse of discretion’ in accrediting certain groups, the supreme court issued the
conditions (as cited by Maglipon, 2001: 20-21) that political parties and
organizations must meet in order to be able to run under the party-list system:
1. They must represent and seek to uplift the marginalized and under-
represented sectors.
2. Major political parties may nominate party-list representatives provided
they are able to show they represent the interests of the marginalized and
under-represented.
3. Political parties formed by religious sects that seek to go around the
prohibition against the religious sector are covered by the ban.
4. A party must not be an adjunct of a project organized, or an entity funded or
assisted by the government.
5. A party, organization and its nominees must represent the marginalized.
An industrialist, for example, cannot represent the urban poor or the working
class.
6. A party’s nominee does not represent a particular district only. He or she
must be able to contribute to the enactment of laws that will benefit the
entire nation.
Because of the supreme court decision, only seven parties and organizations
have qualified, 17 have been disqualified and the COMELEC is still reviewing
the status of 130 parties and organizations. Thus far, only five representatives
have taken up their seats in Congress. This number consists of the three
representatives from Bayan Muna, and two returning representatives from
Akbayan and Butil. Nonetheless, the great flaw of the Philippine party-list
system is reflected in its extremely low Erep average of 41.2 (see Table 24).
34. The former, implemented through a party-list ballot, is designed to make the number of seats in the legislature
proportional to the votes cast. The latter is feasible only through corporatism, in which sectoral organizations
have a separate official voters’ list.
185

Party-List System (1988-2001)
1998 37.5 95.6 58.1

2001 44.8 95.0 50.2
AVERAGE 41.2 95.3 54.1
The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

The constitution mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.35 Section 15, article X states ‘[t]here shall be
created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines’. On 8 June 1989, Congress passed ‘An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao’
(Republic Act No. 6734). The Act provided for the holding of a plebiscite in 13
provinces and nine cities in Mindanao. In a plebiscite held on 19 November
1989, four provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-tawi) voted
to be a part of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).36
The first election for the ARMM governor and members of the Regional Assembly
was held on 17 February 1990. Five candidates contested the governorship,
while seven competed for the position of vice-governor. One hundred and thirty
candidates participated in the election for members of the Regional Assembly.
Former Maguindanao Governor Zacaria Candao (LDP) was elected regional
governor and Benjamin T. Loong (LDP) vice-governor. The 1990 Regional
Assembly election resulted in the LDP capturing nine seats; Independents seven;
LDP-LP three; KBL one; and the Islamic Party of the Philippines (IPP) one.
35. The southern island of Mindanao has been the centre of struggle of the ‘Bangsa Moro’ people consisting of
Muslim communities and indigenous people who have resisted Spanish, American and Filipino colonizers.
The indigenous tribes of the Cordilleran region in the northern part of the Philippines have waged a similar
centuries-old struggle. A plebiscite was conducted in the Cordilleran region on 30 January 1990 to ratify
Republic Act No. 6766 (an Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordilleran Region). Only one out of
six provinces and cities acceded to the autonomous region. Several attempts at expanding the Cordillera
Administrative Region have failed because of deficiencies in the enactment of the organic law.
36. Under the Organic Act, the ARRM ‘shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance
and development of all the constituent units within the Autonomous Region consistent with the constitutional
policy on regional and local autonomy and decentralization … The ARMM shall have an executive
department to be headed by a Regional Governor. The Regional Legislative Assembly shall perform the
legislative function. The Governor is to be elected by direct vote of the people of ARRM, while the members
of the Regional Assembly are to be chosen by popular vote, with three members elected from each of the
congressional districts’.
186
Governor Candao and vice-governor Loong sought re-election on 25 March

1993. However, former Ambassador Liningding Pangandaman and Nabil Tan
of the administration party Lakas-NUCD-UMDP defeated them. Seventy-one
candidates contested for Regional Assembly seats. The result was Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP ten, IPP-LDP four, Lakas-Ompia two, Independents two, LDP one, NPC
one, and PDP-Laban one.
By 1996, the peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)37
was signed, leading to the election of MNLF Chair Nur Misuari as ARMM
governor, and the creation of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and
Development (SPCPD). The SPCPD was created to oversee major development
projects in Mindanao.38 Voter turn-out for the 1996 ARMM election was at
75.96 per cent of the 905,165 registered voters in the autonomous region. Ninety
candidates contested for 23 positions, narrowing the gubernatorial race to only
one aspirant after two other candidates withdrew their candidacies. Supported
by the administration party Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, Misuari and vice-
gubernatorial candidate Guimid Matalam ran unopposed. The Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP won the majority of the Regional Assembly seats with eleven. The rest
was distributed accordingly: Independents five, LDP three, OMPIA one, and
PDP-Laban one.
Five years later, internal conflicts and disenchantment within the MNLF and
followers of Misuari resulted in his ouster as chair of the MNLF. Despite his
protestations, the government conducted a plebiscite on 14 April 2001 on the
expansion of the area of the autonomous region. Among the proposed areas,
only the province of Basilan (excluding Isabela City) and the City of Marawi
voted to be included into ARMM. In a last ditch effort to stop the 2001 ARMM
elections, followers of Misuari staged an armed uprising in his home province
of Sulu. At least 113 people were killed in a three-day gunfight between
government troops and pro-Misuari members of the MNLF (Conde, 2001: 5).
Despite efforts to address the centuries-old problem of underdevelopment in

Mindanao through democratic methods, elections remain marred by massive
fraud and violence. Mindanao has a long history of electoral anomalies. The
past four elections were no exception. In the 2001 ARMM election, at least four
incidents of fraud were reported in some mountain villages. In these areas,
37. The MNLF evolved from the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) established in 1968. Rejecting the
leadership of the traditional Muslim elite politicians, the younger MIM members organized the MNLF in
1971. In 1974, the MNLF Central Committee issued a manifesto in Tripoli, Libya declaring the goal of
establishing an independent Bangsa Moro homeland. The separatist struggle of the MNLF resulted in the
outbreak of the Mindanao war in the 1970s. Several factions would later break away from the MNLF on
the issues of leadership, ideology and autonomy.
38. It ‘was created to help formally integrate Mindanao Muslims into the Filipino nation following the 2
September 1996 peace agreement between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Government of the
Philippines. The SPCPD is a transitory administrative arm under the supervision of the Philippine President
that works with local officials to promote peace and order and to monitor, coordinate and, in some cases,
implement development projects in Southern Mindanao’. See http://www.mindanao.org/mindanao/
overview/muslim3.htm
187
ballot boxes were found to have been filled with forms even before the voting
started. Incidents of bribery were also reported as local officials were paid as
much as 200,000 Pesos each just to support the administration candidates
(Mogato, 2001: 6). Consequently, another administration-supported candidate
won the gubernatorial election. There were 16 candidates who contested the
governorship and 13 for the vice-governorship. Dr Parouk Hussin, former
MNLF vice-chair for international affairs, won the election over closest rival,
Datu Ibrahim Paglas III. Hussin, a medical director, was one of the leaders of
those who had ousted Nur Misuari as MNLF chair.
Proposals for Institutional Reforms

Philippine elections are governed by a multitude of laws aimed at safeguarding
the entire electoral process from beginning to end. Aside from the Omnibus
Election Code of 1985 (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881), Philippine electoral law is
contained in more than ten separate election laws and related legislation that
include the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160).
Nonetheless, elections in the country are encumbered by several problems such
as massive fraud, political violence, patronage and money politics. Election
laws have proven to be ineffective in addressing offences because of the
preponderance of ‘dead-letter’ provisions that have proven unrealistic or
difficult to enforce. Electoral reforms are aimed at addressing these issues.
However, reforming the electoral system also requires a rethinking of the

established political institutions in the Philippines. These institutions have
long served entrenched interests that have blocked efforts at widening the
democratic space. The introduction of elections in the Philippines during the
American colonial period provided an institutional avenue for fostering national
linkages among local political clans and elites in the country. Through the
years, a weak, albeit highly centralized, state has constantly been raided by
particularistic and rent-seeking interests. The weak party system has
encouraged presidents to rely on the support of the local elites entrenched in
Congress in exchange for pork barrel inducements. This, in turn, has encouraged
party switching and the rise of KBL-type monoliths. The legislature, in its
various incarnations, has been the bastion of elite upper- to middle-class
interests. Marginalized sectors such as labour, small farmers, fisherfolk,
indigenous peoples and women remain under-represented. Geographically,
political power and economic resources continue to be concentrated in the
nation’s capital – Manila. This has served to fuel secessionist impulses in
Cordillera and Mindanao. Hence, there is a need to review three areas of political
reform: (1) the highly centralized unitary state and the presidential form of
government; (2) the party system; (3) the electoral system itself.
188
Constitutional Reform
The 1987 constitution was a product of the post-authoritarian transition. As a
reaction to the excesses of the Marcos dictatorship, the framers of the constitution
revived the pre-martial law institutions patterned after the United States
presidential form of government. Several attempts have been made to revise the
constitution. The Ramos administration attempted to revise it in 1996-1997,
and the Estrada administration in 1999-2000. However, the debate on
constitutional reform is sharply divided between those wanting constitutional
change citing the flaws of the 1987 constitution as the primary reason for the
need to push for constitutional reforms and those opposing it citing conjunctural
concerns in terms of the ill-timing of the constitutional change initiative as
their primary reason.
Under the Macapagal-Arroyo government, the issue of constitutional reform

has been revived. Proponents of change argue that President Arroyo is eligible
to seek another term, since she is currently completing the unfinished term of
ousted President Estrada. Hence, she will not be suspected of tinkering with
the constitution to extend her term of office. Proponents of change point to the
following as possible areas of reform:
1. A shift in the form of government, from the current presidential to a

parliamentary system;
2. Changes in electoral rules such as the extension or the lifting of the term of
office of the president, legislators and/or local government officials, the
election of senators according to region (regional senate), ‘first-past-the-
post’ or proportional representation;
3. Changes in the party system, mainly in the reversal to a two-party system
from the current multi-party system;
4. A shift from a unitary system of government to a federal one; and
5. A review of the nationalistic economic principles supposed to make the
country competitive vis-à-vis the world economy.
Party Reforms
The 1987 constitution combines a multi-party system with a presidential form
of government to encourage a free and open party system. However, the
emergence of new party formations in the post-authoritarian period has failed
to emphasize programmatic differences, given the focus on traditional modes
of electoral contestation (i.e. personal and clientelistic). This has resulted in the
re-emergence of pre-martial law style politics and the consolidation of ‘elite
democracy’. Moreover, most of the new parties have emerged around
presidential candidates. The party system is further complicated by the constant
resurrection of a KBL-type of party monolith: first as the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) during the Aquino administration, then as Lakas-
189
NUCD-UMDP under the Ramos administration, and then as the Laban ng

Masang Pilipino (LAMP) in the Estrada administration. These behemoths have
encouraged greater political turncoatism through the indiscriminate use of
political patronage and access to state resources, thus further hampering the
maturation of the Philippine party system. It is indeed unfortunate that while
the institutionalization of the party system remains weak, the traditional
politicians have virtually institutionalized the practice of political turncoatism.
The development of a mature and responsible party system is an important

ingredient for political development in the Philippines. Strengthening
institutional capabilities necessitates the enhancement of legitimacy through
the mobilization of popular support for particular policy choices. The vehicle
for this political action is the establishment of a well-defined and differentiated
political party system that contributes to the formation of government and the
forging of legislative majorities.
Critics of the current multi-party system argue for a return to a two-party system.
However, ‘the prevalence of local multifactionalism provides organizational
materials for more than two national political parties … The pressure of political
competition such as presidential elections may create two major blocs, but at
least one of the two will tend to be composed of two or more lesser blocs which
have become parties’ (Kimura, 1997: 268).39 Between 1992 and 1998, there was
been an increase in the number of presidential candidates supported by regional
electoral bases. Consequently, legislative candidates had a tendency to ally
with the parties of presidential candidates who were strong in their districts
(Kasuya, 2001b). While it is unlikely that there will be a return to a two-party
system, the number of competitive parties will not make a difference as long as
the major parties or blocs are identical (Kimura, 1997).
Proponents of constitutional reforms argue that programmatic and ideological

political parties tend to flourish under a parliamentary form of government.
Generally, a ‘presidential system appears to hinder the development of stable,
well-institutionalized, programmatic, weakly polarized party systems, while a
parliamentary system seems to favor them’ (Croissant and Merkel, 2001: 17).
Presidentialism in the Philippines (and in Latin America) tends to favour a
weak party system in order for presidencies to function. Juan Linz (1994: 35)
observed that a ‘president without clear majority in a multiparty situation with
ideological and disciplined parties would find it difficult to govern, and even
more difficult with an opposition majority in the congress. It is the possibility of
convincing individual legislators, of producing schisms within the parties, of
39. Following Lande, Kimura (1997: 255) argues that local factions are the organizational base for national
parties. Factions are an ‘amorphous cluster of political leaders or families and their respective followers,
bound together by dyadic ties of leader-follower relations and by alliances among leaders’. However, there
has been a shift from bifactionalism to multifactionalism, underscoring the shift from a two-party to a multi-
party system.
190
distributing pork barrels and forming local clientelistic alliances that enables a
president to govern and enact his [or her] program’.
Given the Philippine experience with presidentialism, it is but logical to

advocate a shift to a parliamentary form of government in order to induce
programmatic, responsive and responsible political parties. However, Croissant
and Merkel (2001: 14) caution institutional engineers and reformers in
democratizing polities that establishing ‘a parliamentary system without
simultaneously creating the corresponding parties is likely to intensify rather
than attenuate phenomena like cronyism, short-term policy planning, the
management of ad hoc coalitions by the government, and the deficient
orientation to the collective good. The obstacles to efficient and responsible
government are thereby further exarcerbated’. They argue, in turn, for an
incremental approach that begins with the micro-level (legislative reforms)
and meso-level (electoral reforms) before embarking on macro-level
(constitutional) reforms.
Electoral Reforms
The 1993 Proposed Election Code of the Philippines attempted to codify the
various laws on election, and introduce much needed reforms. Specifically, the
Code attempted to address the following electoral issues:
1. Modernization of the Electoral Process: The Code provided for ‘the authorization
of the Commission on Elections to adopt new systems, forms, technological
devices and safeguards for voting, counting and canvassing’ (section 15,
paragraph 10). It also aimed to cleanse the voters’ list by computerization
(section 184).
2. Candidacies: Several provisions were introduced by the Code to plug some of

the legal loopholes usually abused by candidates. This included the expansion
of the definition of a ‘candidate’ to anyone who has manifested their desire to
seek elective office, whether or not they had filed a certificate of candidacy. The
objective is to prevent advance campaigning by most candidates. Following
the spirit of transparency, the Code required the submission by candidates, of
certified true copies of their income tax returns (section 111). More importantly,
the Code addressed two perennial electoral problems in the Philippines:
turncoatism and political dynasties. Section 101 of the Code disqualifies ‘from
running for, or assuming, public office any elective public officer or candidate
who changes his political party affiliation within six (6) months immediately
preceding an election, after due notice and hearing’. In addition, it sought to
eliminate the concentration of power in a few political families or clans. Section
116 prohibits ‘political dynasties or the simultaneous or successive candidacies
of persons related within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity’.
191
3. Improvement of Election Process: To enrich the electoral process of the

Philippines, the Code provided for recall elections (sections 61 to 73); a system
of initiatives or referendum (sections 74 to 88); absentee voting (sections 89 to
95); and continuous registration of voters (section 154). A number of provisions
were also included to rationalize the archaic rules and procedures of previous
electoral laws. In addition, the Code promoted continuing election education.
4. Innovations included the election of local sectoral representatives and a party-

list system of representation. The Local Government Code of 1991 already
provided for local sectoral representation. Under the proposed Code, ‘election
of sectoral representatives shall be conducted simultaneously with the regular
elections for members of the sanggunians [provincial boards]’ (section 39).
Following the constitution, the Code outlined the election of political parties,
organizations, or coalitions with national, regional or sectoral constituencies
in the House of Representatives under a party-list system. The party-list system
follows a mechanism of proportional representation for 20 per cent of the total
seats in the House of Representatives (sections 49 and 50).
5. Safeguards: A number of safeguards were included in the proposed Code,

such as the application of indelible ink before the ballot is issued to voters,
stricter rules on the use of public transportation during elections to prevent
herding of voters, the elimination of the use of emergency ballots and the disposal
of unused ballots. The Code upheld the ban on political advertisement in the
media and required any media personality involved in election campaigns as
a candidate, campaign employee or volunteer to take a leave of absence (section
131).
The proposed Code would have penalized those who coerce election officials
and employees (section 314, paragraph 5). This was not previously punishable
by law. In anticipation of the modernization of the electoral process, the Code
also made computer fraud punishable ‘whether or not it changes the results of
the election or impairs the electoral processes’ (section 314, paragraph 23).
Section 126 prohibited undue ecclesiastical influence. The provision reiterated
the constitutional principle of separation between church and state. Hence, the
Code ‘prohibits the heads of any church hierarchy or religious sect,
denomination, or indirectly, the members of their flock, parish or congregation
to vote for or against any candidate or political party by any form of election
propaganda’.
Unfortunately, the Code failed to pass into law. The non-passage of the Code
was a result of several factors. Agra (1997a: 74-77) identified them to include
the following:
1. A lack of political will among the executive and legislative branches;

2. Controversial provisions such as the ban on political dynasties, the provision
of absentee voting and computerization;
192
3. Constitutional provisions (i.e. party-list system, local sectoral

representatives, etc.) that were left for Congress to define;
4. Tradition and a desire to maintain the status quo among politicians who
dare not alter the system that placed them in office;
5. The non-acceptability of some independent-minded COMELEC
personalities to the executive and legislative leadership;
6. A lack of organized popular support among civil society organizations;
and
7. The episodic nature of elections, which dampens enthusiasm for continuous
lobby.
In lieu of the Code, the Ninth Congress enacted four election-related laws.
These included measures concerning the party-list system, computerization of
elections, election of local legislative council members and the sample ballot
(Agra, 1997a: 67). However, one of these, the party-list law, is seriously flawed,
bringing about much confusion in its implementation. The rest still awaits full
implementation (computerization of elections, local legislative council
members).
There is a need to refocus the debate on electoral reforms in the Philippines.

Aside from reviewing which electoral system can best bring about democratic
representation in the country, the issues of access and the integrity of the entire
process should be addressed. At the heart of the issue of electoral access is the
issue of campaign finance reform. Through the years, large amounts of money
have become a primary determinant in waging an electoral campaign. This has
effectively limited the participation of political players and has tainted the
entire democratic process.
External Support for Reforms

Through the years, external support for electoral reforms has been offered to
and actively sought by civil society organizations (CSOs) in the Philippines.
Many of the initiatives for reforms have emanated not only from the progressive
elements of non-government organizations, but also from political parties. In
addition, multi-lateral donor agencies, such as the World Bank and the United
Nations Development Program, have identified electoral and campaign finance
reforms as important components of their support for good governance
programmes in the country. The Philippine Congress and the Commission on
Elections are recipients of such overseas development assistance.
The broadest network of local CSOs advocating electoral and political reform
in the Philippines is the Kilusng Mamamayan Para sa Repormang Elektoral
(Citizens’ Movement for Electoral Reforms, KUMARE-KUMPARE). The network
is composed of 17 organizations. Among the organizations included in the
193
network are the Philippine Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV),
the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), the Caucus for
Development NGO Networks (Code-NGO), the National Consultative Council
for Local Governance, the Trade Union Council of the Philippines (TUCP), the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW), the National Movement for Young Legislators
(NMYL), the Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies (PHILSSA),
the National Peace Conference and the Democratic Socialist Women of the
Philippines (DSWP) (Agra, 1997a: 73). The Institute for Electoral Reforms (IPER)
organized another network, the Consortium for Electoral Reform.
Other local think tanks and foundations have been active in electoral reform
advocacy. Some are identified with political parties. The Institute for Popular
Democracy (IPD) and Institute for Politics and Governance (IPG), for example,
are identified with the centre left party Akbayan! (Citizen’s Action Party). The
National Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS) has supported organizations that
espouse a liberal ideology, including the LP. Its regional counterpart is the
Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD). The defunct Institute for
Development Research and Studies (IDRS) was one of the think tanks supporting
the cause of Christian democracy and its party – the Lakas NUCD-UMDP.
United States-based foundations and quasi-governmental agencies have been

very active in supporting reform initiatives by local CSOs and think tanks.
NAMFREL has a long working relationship with the Asia Foundation and
Ford Foundation. It has also received some support from the United States
Agency for International Development (US-AID). The Ford Foundation and the
Asia Foundation have also supported some of the projects of the IPD and the
IPG. The Washington D.C.-based National Democratic Institute has worked
with the IPD and the CALD.
Outside the United States some European-based organizations have also

supported reform initiatives in the country. Scandinavian countries have
provided funding for IPER. The UK-based Westminster Foundation for
Democracy has a project with NIPS. However, the most active are the German-
based foundations. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung has closely assisted labour
unions and other people’s organizations. It has also co-operated with the IPD,
the IPG and the Bukluran ng Sosysalistang Isip at Gawa (Solidarity of Socialist
Thought and Practice, BISIG). The Christian democratic Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung (KAS) has worked closely with Ateneo de Manila University, De La
Salle University and the Asian Institute of Management in various activities
promoting good government. KAS has also provided support to the defunct
IDRS and Lakas-NUCD-UMDP party institute. Lastly, the liberal Friedrich
Naumann Stiftung has been a long time partner of NIPS and CALD.
194
Conclusion
Elections have played an integral role in the development of representative
democracy in the Philippines. However, the conduct and performance of
elections through the years has fallen short of achieving the two central functions
of electoral systems: representation and integration. With regard to
representation, the electoral system largely favours the major parties and grossly
over-represents them in Congress. While this has reinforced integration or the
formation of majorities, the inherent weakness of the party system has resulted
in the constant emergence of dominant ad hoc coalitions. In the post-
authoritarian period, these KBL-type party monoliths are created through party
switching, pork-barrel inducements, machine politics and forming local
alliances.
In terms of the quality and social inclusiveness of elections, the major institutions
in the national and local political arena are still dominated by the economic
and political elites. A segment of these elites, the political clans and dynasties,
have successfully maintained their dominance in national and local politics
by adapting to the changing contours of the social, economic and political
terrains. They extend their dominance by bequeathing power to their next of
kin. Thus the interests of the marginalized sectors that include labour, small
farmers, fisherfolk, the urban poor and women are hardly represented in the
national legislature. Congress remains the nexus of local and national elite
interests. Be that as it may, some scholars have argued that there is an observable
shift in representation from elite landed interests to that of the more professional
urban middle class. However, the shift is gradual and tenuous as these new
professional politicians tend to establish their own political dynasties.
Electoral politics in the Philippines suffer from institutional and procedural

defects that prevent it from becoming meaningful to effective and efficient
governance. While Philippine elections are relatively open, there is the issue of
the lack of real political alternatives or competitive candidatures. Candidates
must either be rich or popular to win elections. The high cost of getting elected
serves as a disincentive for popular participation and an incentive for
corruption. Oftentimes competitiveness is prevented by the use of political
violence. Efforts to address the issue of access have yet to bear fruit.
From a procedural perspective, the electoral process is riddled with opportunities

for committing fraud, from voters’ registration to ballot box stuffing and
wholesale cheating through vote shaving and tampering with electoral records.
The Commission on Elections has been ineffective in preventing fraud, thus
straining its credibility as the institution tasked with managing the country’s
election. Modernization and computerization of the electoral process remains
stalled due to disagreements from within the COMELEC.
195
These problems of electoral democracy in the country have resulted in initiatives

to review the institutional form and structure of the political system. Some
advocates of constitutional reform are taking a second look at alternatives to
the current presidential, centralized state. However, institutional re-engineering
rests upon a set of historical, socio-cultural factors that do not necessarily
translate into immediate solutions to the deficiencies of Philippine democracy.
Hence, a more incremental approach focusing on electoral reforms and
legislative development is the most appropriate option.
List of Abbreviations
ANP - Alliance for New Politics
ARMM - Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
APEC - Association of Philippine Electronic Cooperatives
BANDILA - Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (Nation United in Spirit
and Objective)
Bayan - Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (New Nationalist Alliance)
BISIG - Bukluran ng Sosysalistang Isip at Gawa (Solidarity of Socialist Thought
and Practice)
BP - Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature)
CALD - Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats
CIBAC - Citizens Battle against Corruption
Code-NGO - Caucus for Development NGO Networks
COMELEC- Commission on Elections
CSO - Civil Society Organization
DSWP - Democratic Socialist Women of the Philippines
EDSA - Epifanio de los Santos
FFW - Federation of Free Workers
GAD - Grand Alliance for Democracy
IDRS - Institute for Development Research and Studies
IBP - Interim Batasang Pambansa (Interim National Legislature)
IPD - Institute for Popular Democracy
IPER - Institute for Electoral Reforms
IPG - Institute for Politics and Governance
IPP - Islamic Party of the Philippines
KAS - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
KBL - New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan)
KPP - Kilusan Para sa Pambansang Pagbabago (National Renewal Movement)
KUMARE-KUMPARE - Kilusng Mamamayan Para sa Repormang Elektoral
(Citizens’ Movement for Electoral Reforms)
Lakas - Lakas ng Bansa (Nation’s Power)
LAMP - Laban ng Masang Pilipino
LAMMP - Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (Struggle of the Nationalist
Pilipino Masses)
196
LDP - Labang ng Demokratikong Pilipino

LP - Liberal Party
MA - Mindanao Alliance
MAD - Mamamayang Ayaw sa Droga (Citizens Against Drugs)
MIM - Mindanao Independence Movement
MNLF - Moro National Liberation Front
NAMFREL - National Movement for Free Elections
NIPS - Natinal Institute for Policy Studies
NMYL - National Movement for Young Legislators
NP - Nacionalista Party
NPC - Nationalist People’s Coalition
NUCD - National Union of Christian Democrats
PCF - Patron-client factional (framework)
PDP-Laban - Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (Philippine
Democratic Party-People’s Power)
PHILSSA - Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies
PMP - Partido ng Masang Pilipino (Party of the Philippine Masses)
PnB - Party of the Nation (Partido ng Bayan)
PnM - Pwersa ng Masa (Force of the Masses)
PPC- People Power Coalition
PPCRV - Philippine Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting
PROMDI - Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives (Provinces First
Development Initiative)
PRP - People’s Reform Party
Reporma-LM - Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma-Lapiang Manggagawa
(Party for Democratic Reforms-Worker’s Party)
SPCPD - Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
SWS - Social Weathers Station
TUCP - Trade Union Council of the Philippines
UMDP - Union of Muslim Democrats of the Philippines
UNIDO - United Nationalist Democratic Organization
UPP-KBL - Union for Peace and Progress-Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
US-AID - United States Agency for International Development
VPD - Volunteers for Popular Democracy
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Electoral Politics in the Philippines

Chapter · January 2002

Digital Campaigning, Parties, and Elections View project

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Electoral Politics in the

The Philippine experience with electoral politics is instructive in the process of

institutionalization of electoral politics at various junctures in Philippine

After establishing total control of the Philippines by 1901, the American

Initially, the Americans conducted municipal elections in areas pacified under

Upon the establishment of civilian government in 1901, the Philippine

1. Male, aged 23 and above;

government positions prior to the occupation of the country in 1898

These provisions effectively restricted participation in the early electoral exercise

Nonetheless, the Philippine Commission continued to place the legal framework

Philippine party politics, at that period, was characterized by clientelist

constituencies (78 in 1907 to 94 in 1934) for the House, and in 12 two-member

Table 2: Average Representativeness and Majoritarian Effects of the

Elections in the Commonwealth

Elections after Independence

Philippine post-war politics was characterized by an ‘indistinct two party

Elections in the First Philippine Democracy

Table 3: Two-Party System in the Philippine Congress, 1946-1969

Table 4: Philippine Presidents, 1946-1986

The magnitude of constituencies or district size affects the degree of

Table 5: Average Representativeness and Majoritarian Effects of the

1946 85.5 95.8 10.3

Electoral systems anchored on a plurality formula often promote party

Table 6: Average Representativeness and Majoritarian Effects of the

1946 87.3 94.4 7.2

Elections in the Authoritarian Regime

Table 7: Result of the 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Election

The KBL continued to dominate succeeding electoral exercises such as the

introduced barangay elections in 1982 to replace the pre-martial law barrio as

In an effort to again demonstrate his political legitimacy, Marcos called for a

Table 8: Results of the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election

The Current System

The Philippine Congress consists of the Senate and the House of

The 1987 Congress Elections

Table 9: Representativeness (Senate)

Table 10: Representativeness (House)

The 1988 Local Elections

According to COMELEC records, pro-administration candidates won a total

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized in 1988 as a merger

The party also recruited four sectoral representatives appointed to Congress,

The 1992 Synchronized Elections

Table 11: Result of the 1992 Presidential Election

The simultaneous election of presidential, congressional and local officials

Table 12: Representation Performance Senate (1992)

Table 13: Representativeness (House)

The 1995 Congress Elections

the Lakas-Laban coalition. The coalition fielded a common slate of 12

Table 14: Representativeness (Senate)

Table 15: Representativeness (House)

The 1998 Synchronized Elections

The election saw an unprecedented number of presidential candidates.

Table 16: Results of the 1998 Presidential Election

Table 17: Representativeness (Senate)

Table 18: Representativeness (House)

In a reflection of the weak governance of the Estrada administration, LAMP

of President Estrada in a People Power uprising in 2001.25

The 2001 Congress Elections