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An Introductory Guide
to the Identification
of Small Arms, Light
Weapons, and Associated
Ammunition
Edited by N.R. Jenzen-Jones and Matt Schroeder
A publication of the Small Arms Survey with support

from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of
the US Department of State
Copyright
A Guide to the Identification of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Published in Switzerland by the Fact-checking: Lisa Bjork, Timothy Jolin, and

Small Arms Survey Natasia Kalajdziovski
© Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of Copy-editing: Fiona O’Brien

International and Development Studies,
Geneva 2018 Design: Rick Jones ([email protected])
First published in November 2018 Layout: Julian Knott (www.julianknott.com)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication Infographics and illustrations: Daly Design
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Handbook
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2
About the Small Arms Survey
About the Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to gen-
erate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of
small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise,
information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as
a resource for governments, policymakers, researchers, and civil society. It is
located in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a project of the Graduate Institute of Inter-
national and Development Studies.
The Survey has an international staff with expertise in security studies, political
science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, and criminology, and
collaborates with a network of researchers, partner institutions, non-governmental
organizations, and governments in more than 50 countries.
For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org.
Small Arms Survey

Maison de la Paix
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
p +41 22 908 5777

f +41 22 732 2738
e [email protected]
w www.smallarmssurvey.org
3
About the authors
N.R. Jenzen-Jones is a military arms and munitions specialist and intelligence

analyst focusing on current and recent conflicts and emergent technologies. He
is the director of Armament Research Services (ARES). He has produced extensive
research and analysis on a range of small arms and light weapons and small- and
medium-calibre ammunition issues as well as on conventional arms proliferation.
He has also produced numerous technical assessments of other types of weapons,
including incendiary weapons, cluster munitions, and indirect-fire artillery weap-
ons. Mr Jenzen-Jones’ other research fields include the exploitation of technical
intelligence to support counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, and the use of explosive
weapons in populated areas (EWPA). He is a certified armourer and ammunition
collector, and a member of several international professional associations and
societies including the International Ammunition Association, the European Car-
tridge Research Association, the International Ballistics Society, the Society for
Libyan Studies, and the Ordnance Society.
Handbook
Matt Schroeder is a senior researcher at the Small Arms Survey where he studies
the arms trade, arms export controls, and the illicit proliferation of small arms
and light weapons. He previously served as the director of the Arms Sales Mon-
itoring Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Mr Schroeder is the author
of The MANPADS Threat and International Efforts to Address it (Washington, DC:
FAS, 2013), and co-author of The Small Arms Trade (Oxford: Oneworld Publica-
tions, 2007). He has also written for Arms Control Today, Defense News, Defense
Technology International, Disarmament Forum, Foreign Policy, and Jane’s Intelligence
Review, among other publications. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from
Wittenberg University and a master’s degree in international security policy from
Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.
4
Jonathan Ferguson is a technical specialist with ARES, and the Keeper of Firearms
About the authors

and Artillery at the National Firearms Centre of the Royal Armouries in Leeds,
United Kingdom. He is a specialist in the identification of small arms and light
weapons, and routinely advises academic, military, and law enforcement clients.
Mr Ferguson has published numerous articles and reports, and is working on
two books for publication in 2018. His research interests include the use and ef-
fects of firearms, including historical wound ballistics, the depiction of firearms
in folklore and popular culture, and legacy small arms in contemporary conflict.
Nicolas Florquin is the research coordinator and a senior researcher at the Small
Arms Survey. He coordinates projects on armed actors and illicit flows of arms
and ammunition in a variety of settings. He previously worked for Geneva Call,
an organization specializing in engaging with non-state armed groups on human-
itarian issues, and for the United Nations Group of Experts on Liberia. He holds
a master’s of public administration from the Middlebury Institute of Internation-
al Studies at Monterey.
Anthony G. Williams was the long-time editor of IHS Jane’s Weapons: Ammunition,
the international reference guide to military and law enforcement ammunition,
and is a contributing technical specialist with ARES. He has been collecting and
researching ammunition for more than four decades, with a particular interest in
small arms and automatic cannon ammunition, the guns that fire it, and how they
are employed. He has written or co-authored several books on arms and ammu-
nition as well as numerous magazine articles, and is editor of The Cartridge Re-
searcher, the monthly bulletin of the European Cartridge Research Association.
Mr Williams continues to produce substantial original research with ARES.
5
Acknowledgements
The authors and editors would like to extend their sincerest thanks to the many
people who assisted with this project over several years. These individuals include
Tom Peter Beris (World Customs Organization), Kevin Billinghurst, Peter Bouck-
aert (Human Rights Watch), Brian Castner (Amnesty International), C.J. Chivers
(The New York Times), Alexander Diehl, Oykun Eren, Jim Geibel, Federico Gra-
ziano, Paul Holtom (Small Arms Survey), John Ismay (Amnesty International),
G. Hays (Armament Research Services—ARES), Richard Jones, Benjamin King
(Small Arms Survey), Shelly Kittleson, Ivan Kochin, Yuri Lyamin (ARES), Nicolas
Marsh, Ian McCollum (ARES), Glenn McDonald (Small Arms Survey), Hans Mi-
gielski (ARES), Kristóf Nagy, Vadim Naninets, Magnus Palmér (Saab), Steven
Pavlovich (Western Australia Police Force), Maxim Popenker, Adam Rawnsley
(The Daily Beast), Graeme Rice (ARES), Natalie Sambhi, Jim Schatz, Michael
Smallwood (ARES), Jerry Smith (ARES), Kurt Stancl (Bear Arms), Robert Stott
(AK-47 Catalog book series), Drake Watkins, Michael Weber (ARES), and Galen
Handbook
Wright (ARES). Whether by contributing images, information, or technical exper-

tise, or by assisting in the informal or formal review processes, each of these in-
dividuals has shared their knowledge and insights. Several others, who have
declined to be named for reasons of privacy or security, also provided assistance.
The authors and editors would also like to extend special thanks to the staff at
the National Firearms Centre of the Royal Armouries in Leeds, United Kingdom,
for providing first-hand access to its substantial and impressive collection of mod-
ern and historical firearms for research, reference, and photographic purposes.
Publication of this Handbook was made possible thanks to financial support from
the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the US Department of State.
6
Using this Handbook
Using this handbook

It is important to note that arms and ammunition identification is a very broad
field, filled with many unknowns, errors, and disinformation. Arms and ammu-
nition identification is also a very dynamic field, with new information frequent-
ly coming to light. This Handbook is intended only as an introduction to the
practice and techniques of arms and ammunition identification. It is not a com-
prehensive list of identification techniques, or types or characteristics of specific
arms and ammunition.
Most organisations and individuals do not need to identify weapons on sight; the
real task of identification can often be undertaken by specialists later. What is
important is to provide those specialists with relevant information, such as clear
photographs and detailed records of the item’s characteristics. To this end, this
Handbook is intended to enable the reader to recognize important information
and record it accurately, and also to classify and identify small arms, light weap-
ons, and their ammunition according to their physical features and markings. The
identification of a particular item using this guide should be considered tentative
until a specialist has confirmed the identification.
7
Disclaimer
The information in this Handbook is provided for informational purposes only.

Arms or munitions of any variety should not be handled without the correct
training, and then only in a manner consistent with such training. Subject matter
experts, such as armourers, ammunition technical officers, and explosive ordnance
disposal specialists should be consulted before interacting with arms or muni-
tions. Individuals must also make a full and informed appraisal of the local se-
curity situation before conducting any research related to arms or munitions.
The Small Arms Survey (including its employees and consultants) shall not be
held responsible for any damage, of whatever nature, arising from the direct or
indirect use of this Handbook, including any damage, of whatever nature, that
may be incurred by third parties.
Handbook
8
Table of contents
Table of contents
List of boxes, figures, maps, and tables ................................................ 14
Abbreviations and acronyms ................................................................ 18

Arms-related abbreviations and acronyms 18
Munitions-related abbreviations and acronyms 20
Other abbreviations and acronyms 22
Chapter 1: Small Arms Identification: An Introduction ........................ 25

Introduction 26
Terms and definitions 27
Classifying and identifying arms and ammunition 30
Level 1: Class 31
Level 2: Group 33
Level 3: Type 34
Level 4: Make, manufacturer, model, and variant 35
Level 5: Additional information 36
Identifying weapons and analysing arms flows: an overview 36
Identifying the make, model, and variant of weapons and ammunition 36
Mapping the chain of custody 38
Chapter 2: Understanding the Trade in Small Arms: Key Concepts ....... 45

Introduction 46
The authorized trade 46
Types of transfers 46
The transfer chain 47
Authorized but illicit 48
The illicit trade in small arms 48
Diversion of legal holdings 50
Illicit production of small arms 55
Recirculation of illicit weapons 57
Conclusion 58
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Chapter 3: Weapons Identification: Small Arms ................................... 61
Introduction 62
History and technical development 62
Firearms: a brief description 62
Handguns 67
Sub-machine guns 67
Shotguns 70
Rifles 72
Machine guns 78
Physical features 82
Stocks, butt-stocks, and fore-ends 83
Barrels and muzzle attachments 86
Magazines, drums, belts, and clips 91
Finishes 96
Weapon markings 100
Make, manufacturer, factory, arsenal, and country markings 103
Model and calibre designations 107
Serial numbers and date markings 110
Selector, sight, and safety markings 116
Proof, inspection, and acceptance marks 119
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Import and other markings 121

Feed devices 123
Packaging and documentation 125
Ancillaries and accessories 127
Chapter 4: Weapons Identification: Small-calibre Ammunition ......... 131

Introduction 132
Small-calibre ammunition: an overview 132
Describing and identifying small-calibre ammunition 137
Cartridge designation 138
Calibre 138
Country of origin, make, manufacturer, and year of production 140
Functional type 141
Physical characteristics 143
Cartridge case type and shape 143
Case composition 146
Projectile shape, weight, and jacket 149
Crimping, cannelures, and fluting 151
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Markings 153
Table of contents
Headstamps and primers 153
Case markings (other) 157
Projectile colouration and markings 158
Sealants 161
Packaging 161
Chapter 5: Weapons Identification: Light Weapons and their

Ammunition ....................................................................................... 167
Introduction 168
History and technical development 168
Heavy machine guns 168
Light cannon 170
Shoulder-fired grenade launchers 171
Auxiliary grenade launchers 173
Crew-served grenade launchers 175
Light and medium mortars 177
Recoilless weapons 179
Rocket launchers 181
Anti-tank guided missile systems 182
Man-portable air defence systems 184
Physical features 186
Bodies and receivers 186
Baseplates 188
Barrels and launch tubes 189
Feed devices 189
Accessories 190
Markings 190
Ammunition for light weapons 195
Cartridges for HMGs, anti-tank rifles, and AMRs (20 mm or less) 195
Light cannon cartridges (20 mm – <57 mm) 197
Grenade launcher cartridges 201
Light and medium mortar projectiles 209
Recoilless weapon projectiles 214
Unguided rockets 219
Guided missiles 221
Packaging and documentation 224
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Chapter 6: Weapons Identification: Other Small Arms and Light
Weapons ............................................................................................ 231

Introduction 232
Improvised and craft-produced weapons 232
Types of improvised and craft-produced small arms and light weapons 234
Identifying improvised and craft-produced firearms 247
Converted and ‘reactivated’ weapons 249
Overview of converted weapons 249
Identifying converted weapons 252
Overview of reactivated weapons 252
Identifying reactivated weapons 253
Improvised and craft-produced ammunition 256
Muzzle-loading firearms 260
Overview of muzzle-loading firearms 260
Identifying muzzle-loading firearms 261
Chapter 7: Gathering Arms and Ammunition Data in the Field: Advice

for Researchers .................................................................................. 263
Introduction 264
Safety considerations 265
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Small arms and light weapons 266

Explosive ordnance 267
Cartridge-based ammunition 269
Principal tools and practices for field research on small arms and light
weapons 270
Fieldwork techniques 270
Site exploitation 271
Potential sensitivities regarding arms and ammunition information gathering 276
Photographic considerations 277
Case study: AK-103 and F2000 self-loading rifles in Gaza 281
1. Lead generated from open-source intelligence 281
2. Preliminary identification 281
3. Achieving positive identification 283
4. Identifying the variant of the AK-103, and the source of the rifles 284
5. Mapping the chain of custody 286
6. Assessing further proliferation and providing context 286
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Chapter 8: Analysing Arms Flows: Authorized Transfers .................... 291
Table of contents
Introduction 292
Sources of data on authorized small arms transfers 292
Analysing national reports 294
Analysing UN Comtrade and other customs data 297
Analysing the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) 308
Analysing social media 313
Analysing tenders and contract award notices 316
Conclusion 318
Chapter 9: Analysing Arms Flows: Illicit weapons ............................. 321

Introduction 322
Analysing data on border seizures 322
Analysing data on local seizures 323
Other sources of government data 329
Shipping and storage documents 330
Analysing social media 331
Conclusion 336
Bibliography ....................................................................................... 339
13
List of boxes, figures, maps, and tables
Boxes
1.1 Developing arms and ammunition baseline assessments 37
1.2 Arms tracing 38
2.1 International efforts to curb illicit arms flows 49
2.2 Diversion of arms and ammunition in peace operations 52
2.3 Firearms used in elephant and rhino poaching in Africa 54
3.1 Myths and misconceptions: ‘AK-47’ 77
3.2 Myths and misconceptions: ‘assault weapon’ 81
3.3 Myths and misconceptions: ‘silencers’ 90
3.4 Myths and misconceptions: ‘clip’ or ‘magazine’? 96
3.5 Myths and misconceptions: ‘golden guns’ 99
3.6 Counterfeit and reproduction firearms 101
3.7 State participation in the small arms and light weapons supply
chain 107
4.1 Unmarked, mismarked, and counterfeit headstamps 156
Handbook
4.2 Myths and misconceptions: ‘poisoned bullets’ 162

5.1 FCSs and airburst munitions for AGLs 176
5.2 Myths and misconceptions: ‘rocket launchers’ versus ‘recoilless
weapons’ 182
5.3 Common types of explosive warheads used in light weapons
ammunition 205
5.4 US ammunition marking colour scheme 213
5.5 RPG-7 projectile designations 219
6.1 3D printing and improvised firearms 239
6.2 ‘Artisan’ production 242
6.3 Counterfeit weapons 246
6.4 Capability 255
7.1 Unload and clear procedures 267
8.1 Tips for researchers: analysing data on authorized arms flows 318
9.1 MANPADS and social media 333
9.2 Tips for analysing data on illicit small arms and light weapons 335
14
Figures

1.1 The different levels of ARCS classification fidelity 31
1.2 Description of a weapon using ARCS 32
1.3 Selected markings on a Heckler & Koch HK417 self-loading rifle 39
2.1 Example of an arms transfer chain 48
2.2 Points of potential diversion in a typical transfer chain 50
3.1 Typical features of a modern military rifle 63
3.2 Typical features of a modern handgun 64
3.3 The build-up of gas pressure behind a projectile during the firing
sequence of a firearm 65
3.4 Rifled and smooth-bore barrels 65
3.5 Conventional grooved rifling (left) and octagonal polygonal rifling
(right) 65
3.6 Typical arrangement of a modern self-loading pistol, showing some
internal components 68
3.7 Typical features of a break-action shotgun 71
3.8 Typical features of a pump-action shotgun 71
3.9 Typical features of a modern military rifle 82
4.1 Cross-section of a 7.62 × 51 mm cartridge 133
4.2 Basic composition of a 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge 138
4.3 Distance measured between the lands (X) or grooves (Y) of a rifled
barrel 139
4.4 Examples of common projectile jacket configurations 150
4.6 Selected NATO and associated military projectile colour codes 160
4.7 Examples of the different colours, types, and application locations
of sealants 161
4.8 Typical marking format on Eastern Bloc inner packaging
(metal tin) containing Soviet 7.62 × 54R mm light ball cartridges 164
5.1 Some of the key physical features of grenade launcher ammunition 206
5.2 Sample markings on a Bulgarian Arsenal RLV-HEF-1 40 × 46SR mm
HE-FRAG cartridge 208
5.3 Arrangement of a typical mortar projectile 209
5.4 Arrangement of a typical fin-stabilized rocket 220
5.5 Markings on a Russian 9M113 Konkurs ATGM 223
5.6 Markings on outer packaging for a Russian 9M113 Konkurs ATGM 225
5.7 Delivery documentation (packing list) for 9P135M-1 ATGW
launchers delivered to Libya in the late 1980s 229
7.1 Markings on AK-type rifles 280
15
8.1 Excerpt from Albania’s national report on exports of military
goods, 2014 295

8.2 Excerpt from the EU’s annual report on imports and exports of
military goods and technologies, 2015 (exports to Iraq) 296
8.3 Global trends in small arms imports by region, as reported to UN
Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 301
8.4 Data on small arms exports reported by China (top) and by four
trade partners in Africa (bottom), 2010–14 306
8.5 Excerpts from the Russian Federation’s submission to the UN
Register regarding conventional arms exported in 2009 (top) and
2012 (bottom) 309
8.6 Excerpt from the Czech Republic’s submission to the UN Register
regarding small arms exported in 2010 310
8.7 US Defense Department contract award notice regarding the
procurement of 40 mm grenade launchers for Iraq, 2016 317
Maps
7.1 Mapping the proliferation of AK-103 type rifles connected to Libya 289
Tables
Handbook
1.1 Common small arms groups and sub-groups 33

1.2 Common munitions groups and sub-groups (land) 34
1.3 Using this Handbook to identify arms and track arms flows 41
4.1 Dominant rifle and machine gun cartridges in global military
service 134
4.2 Selected common pistol cartridges worldwide 136
4.3 Purposes and users of ammunition by functional type 142
4.4 Selected Warsaw Pact projectile colour codes 159
4.5 Selected NATO and associated military projectile colour codes 160
5.1 Selected HMG cartridges in military service 195
5.2 Dominant light cannon cartridges in global military service 197
5.3 Selected grenade launcher cartridges in global military service 203
5.4 Selected marking colours on US ammunition 213
8.1 Sources of data on authorized transfers 293
8.2 EU Common Military List, categories 1 to 4 296
8.3 Strengths and limitations of national reports 297
16
8.4 Select Harmonized system (HS) commodity categories that include

small arms, light weapons, ammunition, parts, and accessories 298
8.5 Value of small arms supplied to the Americas, by sub-region, as
reported to UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14 302
8.6 Exports of military firearms and other items from the United States
as recorded under HS code 930190, 2006–15 303
8.7 Data on weapon sights imported by Chile, Peru, and Uruguay,
2007–10 304
8.8 Strengths and limitations of UN Comtrade 307
8.9 Strengths and limitations of the UN Register of Conventional Arms 311
8.10 Strengths and limitations of using social media to research arms
flows 315
9.1 Small arms taken into custody by US CBP, 2009–11 324
9.2 Firearms taken into custody by the LAPD, 2009 328
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Abbreviations and acronyms
Arms-related abbreviations and acronyms

AGL Automatic grenade launcher
AK Avtomat Kalashnikova (‘Kalashnikov automatic rifle’)
AKM Avtomat Kalashnikova Modernizirovannyy (‘Kalashnikov au-
tomatic rifle, modernised’)
AK-74 Avtomat Kalashnikova obraztsa 1974 (‘Kalashnikov automatic
rifle, model of 1974’)
AK-74M Avtomat Kalashnikova obraztsa 1974 Modernizirovannyy (‘Kal-
ashnikov automatic rifle, model of 1974, modernised’)
AMR Anti-materiel rifle
ATGM Anti-tank guided missile
ATGW Anti-tank guided weapon
ATR Anti-tank rifle
Handbook
CZ Česká Zbrojovka Uherský Brod (‘Czech Arms Factory, Uher-

skýBrod’)
DA Double-action*
DA/SA Double-action / single-action*
DGI Direct gas impingement*
DShK Degtyareva-Shpagina Krupnokalibernyy (‘Degtyareva-Shpagi-
na large calibre’)
DShKM Degtyareva-Shpagina Krupnokalibernyy Modernizirovannyy
(‘Degtyareva-Shpagina large calibre, modernised’)
FAL Fusil automatique léger (‘light automatic rifle’)
FCS Fire control system
FN Herstal Fabrique Nationale de Herstal (‘National Factory, Herstal’)
GMG Grenade machine gun
GPMG General-purpose machine gun (also ‘MMG’)
HMG Heavy machine gun
HK Heckler & Koch
18
IZHMASH ИЖМАШ; Izhevskiy Mashinostroite lnyy Zavod (‘Izhevsk Ma-

chine-Building Plant’)
KPV Krupnokalibernyy Pulemet Vladimirova (‘Vladimirova large
calibre machine gun’)
LMG Light machine gun
LSW Light support weapon
MAG Mitrailleuse d’appui général (‘general-purpose machine gun’)
MANPADS Man-portable air defence systems
MANPATS Man-portable anti-tank systems (also known as ‘MPATS’)
MBRL Multiple-barrel rocket launcher
MMG Medium machine gun
NSV Nikitina-Sokolova-Volkova (these are the names of the weapon’s
primary designers)
NSVT Nikitina-Sokolova-Volkova Tankovyy (‘NSV tank machine
gun’)*
PDW Personal defence weapon
PK Pulemet Kalashnikova (‘Kalashnikov machine gun’)
PKM Pulemet Kalashnikova Modernizirovannyy (‘Kalashnikov ma-
chine gun, modernised’)
PKT Pulemet Kalashnikova Tankovyy (‘Kalashnikov tank machine
gun’)*
PM Pistolet Makarova
PSL Puşcă Semiautomată cu Lunetă (‘semi-automatic sniper rifle’)*
RPD Ruchnoy Pulemyot Degtyaryova (‘Degtyarev light machine gun’)
RPG Ruchnoy Protivotankovyy Granatomyot (‘hand-held anti-tank
grenade launcher’) or Reaktivnaya Protivotankovaya Granata
(‘anti-tank rocket launcher’)
SA Single-action*
SACLOS Semi-automatic command to line-of-sight
SAM Surface-to-air missile (when man-portable, known as MAN-
PADS)
SAW Squad automatic weapon
SKS Samozaryadnyy Karabinsistemy Simonova (‘Simonov self-load-
ing carbine’)
SMAW Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon
19
SMG Sub-machine gun
SPG Stankovyy Protivotankovyy Granatomyot (‘heavy anti-tank

grenade launcher’)
SVD Snayperskaya Vintovka Dragunova (‘Dragunov sniper rifle’)
TT Tokarev-Tula
ZPU Zenitnaya Pulemetnaya Ustanovka (‘anti-aircraft machine gun
system’)*
Munitions-related abbreviations and acronyms

ABM Airburst munitions
ACP Automatic Colt Pistol
AP Armour-piercing
APCR Armour-piercing composite, rigid
APDS Armour-piercing discarding sabot
APHC Armour-piercing hard core
APT Armour-piercing tracer*
API Armour-piercing incendiary
API-T Armour-piercing incendiary tracer
API-DT Armour-piercing incendiary dim tracer
Handbook
ASM Anti-structure munitions

ATGM Anti-tank guided missile
AXO Abandoned explosive ordnance
B Belted (when used as suffix in cartridge calibre designation)
B-32 Broneboynozazhigatelnyy (‘armour-piercing incendiary’)
BMG Browning machine gun
BZT Broneboyno Zazhigatelno Trassiruyushchiy (‘armour-piercing
incendiary tracer’)*
CCS Copper-clad steel
CHS Cartridge headspace
EOD Explosive ordnance disposal
ERW Explosive remnants of war
FMJ Full metal jacket
FN Herstal Fabrique Nationale de Herstal (‘National Factory, Herstal’)
GMCS Gilding metal-clad steel
20
HE High-explosive

HE-FRAG High-explosive fragmentation
HEAB High-explosive airburst
HEAT High-explosive anti-tank
HEAT-T High-explosive anti-tank tracer*
HEDP High-explosive dual-purpose
HEI High-explosive incendiary
HP Hollow-point
IED Improvised explosive device
JHP Jacketed hollow-point
JSP Jacketed soft-point
MDZ Mnogovennogo Deystviya Zazhigatelnyy (‘instantaneous incen-
diary’; HEI)
MP Multipurpose (ammunition)
OTM Open-tipped match
PPHE Programmable pre-fragmented high-explosive
R Rimmed (when used as suffix in cartridge calibre designation)
RAP Rocket-assisted projectile
RCA Riot control agent
SAA Small arms ammunition
SAPHE Semi-armour-piercing high-explosive
SAPHEI Semi-armour-piercing high-explosive incendiary
SAPHEI-T Semi-armour-piercing incendiary tracer*
SCHV Small-calibre, high-velocity
SR Semi-rimmed (when used as suffix in cartridge calibre
designation)
TOW Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
TP Training/practice (ammunition)
TPT Training/practice-tracer
UXO Unexploded ordnance
21
Other abbreviations and acronyms
ARES Armament Research Services

ATO Ammunition technical officer
ATT Arms Trade Treaty
CBP Customs and Border Protection
dB Decibel
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
GPS Global Positioning System
HS Harmonized system
HTS Harmonized Tariff Schedule
IMP Information, materiel, and persons
ITI International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace,
in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light
Weapons (‘International Tracing Instrument’)
IR Infrared
KNP Kruger National Park
IATG International Ammunition Technical Guidelines*
ISACS International Small Arms Control Standards*
LAPD Los Angeles Police Department
Handbook
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-governmental organization
PID Positive identification
PoA Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Il-
licit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
(‘Programme of Action’)
PSSM Physical security and stockpile management*
RF Radio frequency
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SE Site exploitation
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSE Sensitive site exploitation
TSE Tactical site exploitation
UID Unique identification (or unique identifier)
UN United Nations
22
UN Comtrade United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database

UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNROCA United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
UNSD United Nations Statistics Division
USD United States dollar
* These abbreviations and acronyms are not used in this Handbook. They have
been included here for informative and educational purposes.
23
Handbook A Guide to the Identification of Small Arms and Light Weapons
24
CHAPTER 1
Small Arms Identification:

An Introduction
Introduction
Arms and ammunition are evidence. Many weapons carry marks that, combined
with their physical characteristics, reveal important information about them,
including their manufacturer, age, and origin. This information, in turn, provides
vital clues about the sources and flows of weapons in the area in which they
were found.
Why is it important to accurately identify weapons and track arms flows? The
illicit acquisition and use of small arms, light weapons, and their ammunition fuels
conflict and, in post-conflict situations, allows ex-combatants to rearm for war or
engage in criminal activity. Outside of conflict zones, illicit small arms enable vio-
lence and crimes, ranging from domestic violence to wildlife poaching and drug
trafficking. While the type and level of violence committed with small arms and
light weapons varies, no region of the world is entirely immune. The accurate
identification of the types and sources of weapons used by criminals and com-
batants provides important insights into the dynamics and underlying causes of
conflict and crime.
Knowledge of arms and ammunition also protects the reputation of journalists
by preventing errors that reduce the credibility of their articles, and distract from
Handbook
their main message. For reporters who are working in the field, accurate identi-
fication of weapons and ammunition can be a matter of life and death: the im-
proper handling of these items can lead to serious injury or worse.
Policy-makers and legislators also benefit from understanding how arms and
ammunition function and are employed. Crafting and implementing effective
policies for combatting terrorism, reducing crime, and preventing conflict require
a nuanced understanding of weapons and their role in these and other societal
problems. The ability to precisely and credibly discuss arms and ammunition
also increases the credibility of policy-makers and the persuasiveness of their pol-
icy proposals.
The goal of this Handbook is to provide the reader with a basic understanding
of how to identify and analyse small arms and light weapons, and to track their
proliferation. The process of identifying arms is complex, and no single guide can
provide all of the information required to identify every weapon or round of
ammunition that may be encountered at crime scenes or in conflict zones. Instead,
this guide explains the process by which weapons and ammunition are identi-
26
fied and arms flows are tracked. Reference material on specific small arms, light
Small Arms Identification: An Introduction

weapons, and ammunition is included throughout the guide. This material will
help readers to take the steps necessary to identify the make and model of the
most commonly encountered weapons and ammunition.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of key terms and definitions, includ-
ing terms that are often used incorrectly. The chapter then presents and explains
a system for classifying weapons and ammunition. The chapter concludes with
an overview of the processes through which arms are identified and arms flows
are mapped. Of particular importance is Table 1.3, which lists the tools and
techniques for identifying and tracking weapons, and where to find descriptions
of them in the Handbook.
Terms and definitions

The precise and consistent use of terminology is essential to the accurate identi-
fication and analysis of arms and ammunition. This applies not only to text but
also to the use of images, video, and audio communications. The latter medium
is especially imprecise and prone to error; it is possible for the listener to form a
confident picture of the object being described, only to discover (when presented
with an image) that it is something else entirely. The use of correct and consistent
descriptors can mitigate this problem, and help ensure all correspondents are on
the same proverbial page in subsequent discussions. It also allows for precise,
concise, and meaningful reporting, which is as important in articles intended for
lay readers as it is in publications for technical specialists.
Despite the many benefits of precise and accurate terminology, the erroneous
use of terms related to weapons and ammunition is common. Some errors are so
frequent that they have become colloquially ‘correct’ by virtue of popular usage.
However, they remain technically incorrect and should be avoided. These errors
include the misuse of terms such as ‘AK-47’, ‘assault weapon’, ‘clip’, and ‘rocket-pro-
pelled grenade’ (see Boxes 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 5.2), ‘high-powered’ (a wholly relative
term), and ‘dum dum bullet’. Often, the term ‘semi-automatic’ is incorrectly used
as a synonym for ‘automatic’. Similarly, many people use the term ‘bullet’ when
referring to a cartridge. There are also several terms whose specific legal defini-
tions are very different from popular usage. A good example is the US government’s
27
definition of ‘machine gun’, which includes all automatic weapons, even automatic
pistols and shotguns, along with key components for these weapons.1
Government publications, technical manuals, national legislation, and multi-
lateral instruments define ‘small arms and light weapons’ in various ways. The
development of definitions in these different contexts, for different purposes, means
that there is often inconsistency between them. In part to address this issue, some
internationally-agreed definitions of ‘small arms and light weapons’ have been
developed. Within the framework of the UN small arms process, the International
Tracing Instrument (ITI) provides an authoritative definition of the term, applica-
ble to all UN member states:
For the purposes of this instrument, ‘small arms and light weapons’ will mean
any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel
or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or
projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light
weapons or their replicas. Antique small arms and light weapons and their
replicas will be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case will antique
small arms and light weapons include those manufactured after 1899:
(a) ‘Small arms’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use.
Handbook
They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and car-
bines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns;
(b) ‘Light weapons’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two
or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used
by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-
held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft
guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-
tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile
systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres. (UNGA,
2005, para. 4)
For its more technical definitions, in particular those for specific small arm
and light weapon types, this Handbook relies on definitions developed by Arma-
ment Research Services (ARES).2
1 See GPO (n.d., para. 5845(b)).

2 See ARES (2017) and ARES (forthcoming).
28
For the purposes of this Handbook, a ‘small arm’ is defined as a firearm of

less than 20 mm in calibre that, with its ammunition, may be transported and op-
erated by a single individual on foot (ARES, 2017).
The calibre limit of 20 mm is a useful cut-off for ‘small arms’ since it includes
most modern firearms. It includes, for example, firearms that are chambered for
common 12.7 mm rifle cartridges, as well as common 12 gauge (18.5 mm) and 10
gauge (19.7 mm) shotgun calibres. While there are some historical and contem-
porary examples of rifles and shotguns chambered for calibres larger than 20 mm,
their numbers are limited and they are unlikely to be encountered in the field.3
The Handbook also covers some types of small arms not listed in sub-paragraph
4 (a) of the ITI definition, such as shotguns.
For the purposes of this Handbook, a ‘light weapon’ is defined as a lethal
weapon or weapons system which may be transported (with its ammunition and
any essential components) and operated by a crew of as many as five individ-
uals on foot.4 The Handbook also limits light weapons to systems weighing
300 kg or less when in firing configuration (not including ammunition weight)
(ARES, 2017).
Unlike the category of ‘small arms’, which consists entirely of firearms, the
term ‘light weapons’ covers a variety of weapon systems employing different oper-
ating principles. Definitions for these weapons are typically based on the calibre,
diameter, or length of the relevant system—or its ammunition (ARES, 2017). It is
also important to note that improvised and craft-produced light weapons some-
times differ significantly from their industrially-produced equivalents (Hays and
Jenzen-Jones, 2018). The definitions provided above nevertheless attempt to ac-
count for such differences, when possible.
3 These include large-bore rifles used to hunt dangerous game, particularly in the late 19th century,
such as 4-bore (26.7 mm) and even 2-bore (33.7 mm) designs (Brander, 1988). While largely obso-
lete, limited numbers of modern guns are produced in these calibres. See, for example, Schroeder
and Hetzendorfer (n.d.).
4 While there is no readily-accepted understanding of how much ammunition must be carried, it
is understood that even a light combat load for some weapon systems will constitute a substan-
tial burden in terms of volume and weight. At a minimum, this figure should include a full weap-
on load of ammunition (for example, an entire magazine, complement of rockets, etc.) and, in the
case of weapons typically reloaded under combat conditions, one full reload of the same num-
ber of rounds. ‘Essential components’ means those components that are required for the weapon
to function.
29
Classifying and identifying arms and ammunition
Accurate classification and identification of arms and ammunition is the cornerstone

of researching and reporting on illicit small arms and light weapons. Individual
items of interest are identified on the basis of their physical characteristics—such
as barrel length—and the markings present on the item. The amount and type of
available information and the skill level of the researcher will determine the detail
and accuracy of a classification or identification.
The ARES Arms & Munitions Classification System (ARCS) allows for the
classification of arms and ammunition at various levels, as described below and
outlined in Figure 1.1 (ARES, forthcoming).5 Some researchers may have as their
primary goal the classification of arms and ammunition: that is, determining the
class, group or sub-group, and type of the item in question. Other research re-
quires the precise identification of the item: that is, positively determining, at a
minimum, the item’s make and/or its model. It is important to note that the iden-
tification process does not necessarily proceed according to the hierarchy of
classification. It is not always necessary to know the operating system, for example,
to identify a weapon’s manufacturer or model. Sometimes the fastest way to iden-
tify a weapon is by looking at distinctive features or markings, such as markings
Handbook
that denote the make and model (which are sometimes very clear). Once the make
and model are confirmed, the weapon’s group, type, and other information are
often easily identified.
The identification process for a practitioner with access to the weapon in ques-
tion—or detailed photographs—would assess the physical features and markings
on the item and may proceed as follows:
1. Determine the class.

2. Determine the make and model (and variant, if applicable) if possible.
3. Determine the type if make and model cannot be determined.
4. Determine the group if type cannot be determined.
5. Continue to refine as necessary until the make and model is identified (or the
item has been uniquely identified) or no further progress is possible.
5 The definitions used in ARCS were developed by an ARES team consisting of Jonathan Ferguson,
N.R. Jenzen-Jones, Ian McCollum, and Anthony G. Williams, and were reviewed by numerous
external specialists.
30
Figure 1.1 The different levels of ARCS classification fidelity
1. Class
Classifying
2. Group (sub-group)
Detail increases
3. Type
4. Make/model/variant
Identifying
5. Additional information
Source: ARES (forthcoming)
Figure 1.2 provides a sample description of a weapon following the ARCS

methodology.
Level 1: Class
Conventional arms are typically divided into three classes: small arms, light
weapons, and heavy weapons. The first two classes are the focus of this guide.
Munitions (including ammunition for small arms and light weapons) are often
classified based on the domain from which they are employed: land, air, and sea
or sub-sea.6 Distinctions at this level for ammunition are less useful than for arms,
with the primary distinctions for small arms and light weapons ammunition oc-
curring at the group level (ARES, forthcoming).
6 In the context of this Handbook, the term ‘munition’ is used in the US military sense to mean ‘a
complete device charged with explosives; propellants; pyrotechnics; initiating composition; or
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material for use in operations including demolitions’
and includes all small arms and light weapons ammunition (US DoD, 2018, p.158).
31
Figure 1.2 Description of a weapon using ARCS
Class Small arms
Group Long guns (self-loading rifles)

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Type Self-loading (automatic) [short-stroke gas-operated

piston]
Make/Manufacturer FN Herstal
Model SCAR-L
Variant CQC
Calibre 5.56 × 45 mm
Additional Information
Year of manufacture 2004
Serial number L014466
Country of manufacture Belgium
PID (positive identification by Belgian FN Herstal SCAR-L CQC 5.56 × 45 mm self-

make and model) loading rifle
UID (unique identifier) L014466 (serial number)
Image source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
32
Table 1.1 Common small arms groups and sub-groups

Hand guns
Rifled Smooth-bore
Self-loading pistols Revolvers Other manually- Smooth-bore

operated handguns handguns
Long guns
Rifled Smooth-bore
Sub- Machine Self- Manually- Self- Manually- Other

machine guns loading operated loading operated smooth-
guns rifles rifles shotguns shotguns bore long
guns
Level 2: Group
Within each class, arms are separated into broad groups. Categorization by group
is often possible through a simple visual examination of the item’s physical charac-
teristics. To aid in the identification and classification process, small arms are first
grouped into ‘long guns’ and ‘hand guns’. For small arms, another key distinction
at the group level is whether the weapon is rifled. Researchers often correctly
assume the weapon is rifled during this step, as most modern firearms are rifles
and most unrifled (‘smooth-bore’) firearms in circulation are distinctive (ARES,
forthcoming). Weapons may also be classified into smaller sub-groups. Classi-
fication at the sub-group level includes an assessment of the general type of oper-
ating system of a weapon, but not the specific mechanical action, which is relevant
at the next level (see Table 1.1). A close inspection of smaller physical details and
markings is usually not necessary at this level. The equivalent grouping for light
weapons is their separation into ‘hand-held’ and ‘crew-served’ weapons.
Munitions are also divided into broad groups based upon general physical
and mechanical characteristics (see Table 1.2). According to this system, almost
all small arms ammunition—that is, projectile ammunition of less than 20 mm in
calibre—is classified in the same sub-group: ‘small-calibre ammunition’, under the
‘projectiles’ group.7 Light weapons, using a variety of operating systems and
7 The exceptions to this are very few, and consist mostly of novel designs such as miniature rockets.
These types are almost never encountered in the field.
33
Table 1.2 Common munitions groups and sub-groups (land)
Projectiles Powered munitions Thrown munitions
Ammunition Other Rockets Guided Other Hand Other

(calibre) missiles grenades
Small Medium Large
Emplaced munitions Submunitions
Landmines Improvised Other Unpowered Powered

explosive (free-fall)
devices
ammunition types, are somewhat more complicated, but all light weapons am-
munition will fall under the ‘projectiles’ and ‘powered munitions’ groups shown
in Table 1.2.8 Most cartridge-based ammunition for light weapons will be classified
under the ‘medium-calibre cartridges’ sub-group (at least 20 mm, but less than 57
mm in diameter) or the ‘large-calibre ammunition’ sub-group (57 mm or greater
in calibre) (ARES, 2017; forthcoming). Light cannon and grenade launchers, for
example, generally use medium-calibre ammunition, while recoilless weapons and
mortars generally use large-calibre ammunition. Guided missiles and rockets of
Handbook
any size have their own sub-groups, under the ‘powered munitions’ group. The
groups ‘thrown munitions’, ‘emplaced munitions’, and ‘submunitions’ are not rel-
evant to small arms or light weapons, but are shown in Table 1.2 for context (ARES,
forthcoming).
Level 3: Type
The third level of classification for small arms and light weapons is based on the
weapon’s operating system. The operating system, or ‘action’, of a weapon de-
scribes how it performs its firing functions. Operating systems, which may be
implicitly or explicitly given at the sub-group level,9 are refined and formalized
8 There are a small number of light weapons capable of firing ammunition which contains submuni-
tions. Submunitions are classified separately to the ‘parent’ munition(s) under ARCS (ARES, forth-
coming).
9 An example of an implicitly given operating system is ‘machine guns’, as these weapons, by defini-
tion, make use of an automatic, self-loading action. The sub-group name may at other times explic-
itly include an operating system descriptor, for example ‘self-loading rifles’.
34
at the type level into both generalized categories (for example, ‘manually-operated’,

‘self-loading’) and more specific sub-types (‘bolt-action’, ‘automatic’), as well as
mechanical action descriptors (‘blowback’, ‘long-stroke gas-operated piston’).
Ammunition is distinguished by functional type—that is, a short description of
the effect and often, by extension, the intended role of a given item (for example,
‘high-explosive fragmentation’ or ‘armour-piercing’). Functional types may also be
categorized according to broad meta-types (for example, ‘anti-armour’) and nar-
rower sub-types (for example, ‘armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot’).
Level 4: Make, manufacturer, model, and variant

Determining the model of an item is perhaps the most common goal for those
engaged in the identification of small arms and light weapons. An item’s model
is sometimes described in general terms (for example, ‘an AK-type self-loading
rifle’, denoting weapons using an Avtomat Kalashnikova-type operating mecha-
nism and general configuration), or in more specific terms (‘AKM-pattern self-
loading rifle’, which may apply to weapons that are close copies of a specific
model, the Avtomat Kalashnikova Modernizirovannyy). Ideally, researchers will
determine the precise model of the weapon; to do so they need to identify the
weapon’s make (‘IZHMASH AKM self-loading rifle’). A simple way to conceive
of a weapon’s ‘make’ is to think of it like a brand. It is often marked on a weapon.10
When make (and/or manufacturer) and model are known, the researcher will
have achieved a positive identification of the item. Once they have a positive iden-
tification, they will also know the calibre.11
The identification of a particular model may be further narrowed by the iden-
tification of a variant, if applicable. For example, the AK-103 self-loading rifle that
will be discussed in Chapter 7 was identified as an AK-103-2 variant based on the
weapon’s action and specific markings on the firearm (Jenzen-Jones, 2016c).
10 The make is distinct from the manufacturer, in that some manufacturers may produce more than
one brand of weapon at the same factory. Other makes of weapons will be produced in different
factories, despite sharing a ‘brand’ (ARES, forthcoming). See Chapter 3 for more details.
11 While some manufacturers may consider weapons of the same model in different calibres to be
‘variants’, ARCS considers calibre to be integral to the model of the weapon. Some weapons may
be multi-calibre types (for example, modular weapons; see Ferguson, Jenzen-Jones and McCol-
lum (2014); Persi Paoli (2015)), but should generally be documented in the configuration in which
they are recovered or observed (ARES, forthcoming).
35
Level 5: Additional information
Some types of investigations demand additional information. For example, trac-

ing operations frequently require the unique identifying mark on a particular
item.12 This mark may be unique to a particular item (such as a serial number), or
to a group of items (for example, a ‘lot’ or ‘batch’ number). Unique identification
(UID) has been achieved once a researcher has correctly identified and recorded
such markings. Other data, such as explosive fill, fuse type, year or date of produc-
tion, is also often useful. Researchers sometimes gather even more detailed data,
including forensic evidence, in the course of investigations.
Identifying weapons and analysing arms flows: an overview

This section provides a step-by-step overview of the processes by which weapons
are identified and arms flows are tracked. The process consists of two distinct but
interconnected tasks: identifying individual weapons and tracking their move-
ment through the transfer chain.
Identifying the make, model, and variant of weapons and ammunition

The first step in the classification and identification process, which is summarized
Handbook
in Figure 1.1, is to determine whether the item in question is a small arm, light
weapon, or related item (component, accessory, or ammunition). This Handbook
contains detailed descriptions of small arms (Chapter 3), light weapons (Chapter
5), and their ammunition (Chapters 4 and 5), and includes numerous photographs
of each class of items. These chapters also identify and describe some of the com-
ponents of—and major accessories for—small arms and light weapons. Chapter 6
discusses improvised weapons, which are often very different—in form and func-
tion—from their factory-produced counterparts.
The next step is to identify the group of small arms, light weapons, or ammuni-
tion to which the item belongs. Grouping light weapons is sometimes easier than
small arms because light weapons are more distinctive in appearance. Chapter 5
provides detailed descriptions of the main sub-categories of light weapons and includes
several photographs of weapons from each category. Chapters 4 and 5 provide sim-
ilar descriptions of ammunition for small arms and light weapons respectively.
12 This may be unique to a particular item, or to a group (most commonly a ‘lot’ or ‘batch’) of items.
36
Box 1.1 Developing arms and ammunition baseline assessments
Research on arms and ammunition, regardless of the context in which it is applied, frequently ben-
efits from identifying the types of weapons in use (whether legally or illegally) in a given location,
along with the time period or context in which the weapons are acquired and used. The resulting
‘baseline’ is useful for detecting the appearance of new makes or models of weapons in a given region,
or the influx of large numbers of weapon types or models already present in the region. Analysis
of this kind often provides the basis for more detailed investigations, including tracing operations
(see Box 1.2). In Syria in 2012, for example, the sudden appearance of distinctive Swiss-made hand
grenades not known to be present in the country suggested the possible diversion of these items
from a legitimate state-to-state export. An examination of the grenades’ markings by specialists
resulted in the identification of several items from the same lot, and inquiries directed to relevant
states confirmed that the items were diverted from an authorized export to a regional government
(ARES, 2016c).13 These weapons stood out against the other hand grenades common in the region;
additional examples of the diversion of the same models were later documented in Libya and Turkey.
Baseline assessments can often be accurately produced through desk-based research. Useful sources
of information include images and data on the markings, packaging, and shipping documents of arms
and ammunition in the region in question, along with the various reports, databases, and notifications
examined in Chapters 8 and 9. Fieldwork is an important supplement to these data sources and may
be the only source of data in some cases. Nonetheless, fieldwork is most useful when supplemented
by data drawn from other sources. Fieldwork takes many forms, which range from taking a photo of
a fired cartridge case encountered during unrelated research to compiling detailed inventories of arms
captured from rebel groups on the frontlines. More information on fieldwork is available in Chapter 7.
The final step is to identify the make, model, and variant of the item. This is often
the most difficult part of the identification process and usually requires a careful
analysis of the physical features of the item and the markings on key components.
Available imagery is often too blurry or off-centre to read the markings on weap-
ons and ammunition, precluding the use of markings as a tool for identifying the
items. Even in these cases, however, it is often possible to identify the weapon by
carefully inspecting key physical characteristics, reviewing data on arms transfers
to and within the region where the item was encountered, and interviewing indi-
viduals with first-hand knowledge of regional arms flows. Use of these analytical
techniques is illustrated and explained in the case study in Chapter 7.
This Handbook provides a thorough overview of how to analyse the physical
characteristics of, and markings on, weapons and ammunition, but it does not—
and cannot—provide all of the information required to definitively identify each
of the many thousands of different makes and models of small arms, light weap-
ons, and ammunition in circulation today. No such compilation of information
exists and, even if it did, it would be too voluminous to include in a Handbook
13 See also Holtom, Pavesi, and Rigual (2014, p. 119).
37
Box 1.2 Arms tracing

With enough information, government authorities and some specialized organizations can trace arms
and ammunition to the last known authorized end user. Tracing operations often provide insights
into an item’s ownership history, including, at times, the point at which it was diverted into the illicit
sphere. Tracing operations usually involve ‘tracing requests’, which are issued to authorities, organi-
zations, or individuals who may hold relevant data regarding the item in question. Ammunition is
also traced but generally not with the same precision as a weapon, since individual cartridges are
typically marked with a batch or lot number rather than a unique serial number. Arms tracing is en-
abled by the accurate identification of arms or ammunition. It is, conversely, hindered or rendered
impossible by the inaccurate identification of these items.
of this type. There are numerous reference guides from a variety of sources, some
of which are freely available. It should be noted that even the best reference ma-
terials contain errors and thus information from these and other guides should
be corroborated with other sources whenever possible. As a rule, researchers
should first seek out information from manufacturers and original users (such as
armed forces) of the items in question, followed by authoritative publications that
cite these primary sources.
Mapping the chain of custody

Identifying the sources and trafficking patterns of illicit weapons often requires
Handbook
more than just an analysis of the physical characteristics of the weapons and their
markings. Mapping arms flows requires careful analysis of other data sources,
including reports on international arms transfers, baseline assessments of arms
within a given country (see Box 1.1), shipping documents, and the packaging in
which weapons are stored and shipped. These sources often contain important
clues regarding the chain of custody of small arms and light weapons, and the
point at which weapons are diverted to terrorists, criminals, and insurgents.
As defined in Chapter 2, the chain of custody (or ‘transfer chain’) is the series
of transfers and retransfers that starts with the manufacturer and concludes with
the delivery of the transferred item to its current owner or operator, or ‘end user’.
The chain of custody can be relatively short—the current end user receives the item
directly from the manufacturer—or it can be long and circuitous, and may involve
theft, loss, or diversion. Chapter 2 provides a more in-depth explanation of chains
of custody and the many different types of transfers they comprise.
Mapping chains of custody is usually less straightforward than identifying
the make, model and variant of a weapon. Often, the point in the transfer chain at
38
Figure 1.3 Selected markings on a Heckler & Koch HK417 self-loading rifle

6 5
4
7
1
2
3
1 Make/manufacturer Heckler & Koch (HK) logo
2 Model name HK417
3 Calibre Cal. 7.62 mm x 51
4 Serial number (lower receiver) 89-001914
5 Serial number (upper receiver) 89-001914
6 Quality control and proof marks HK quality control mark, German

national proof mark (letter ‘N’), German
year of proof code, Ulm proof house
proof mark
7 Fire selector markings Pictographic markings
Positive identification Heckler & Koch HK417 self-loading rifle
Image source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
39
which one starts the mapping process depends on the information at hand.
For example, if the only available data source is the markings on the weapon in
question and the most recent end user is unknown, the most logical place to start
mapping the weapon’s chain of custody would be the country of origin (unless
the markings identify the importer). In other cases, the end user may be known
but not the country of origin (because the markings on the weapon in question
are not visible). In that case, the researcher would start their investigation at the
other end of the transfer chain, that is, with the most recent end user.
Many of the sources of data on the transfer chain are the same sources used in
the weapons identification process. Markings on weapons and ammunition often
identify the country of origin or manufacturer, the date of manufacture, and, in
some cases, importers or importing countries.14 Similarly, distinctive physical char-
acteristics of weapons and ammunition sometimes provide clues regarding the
date or country of manufacture. Techniques for analysing and interpreting these
clues are provided in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
Figure 1.3 shows a readily identifiable weapon, marked with clear and well-
known make and model markings. However, even if those particular marks were
obscured or removed, the other markings on the weapon would provide valuable
information. The calibre marking would help researchers to narrow down the
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possible models, for example, and the pictographic fire selector (with symbols for
safe, semi-automatic, and automatic functions) would aid in this process. But
there is other, less obvious, information to be gleaned from the markings. The
two-digit serial number prefix ‘89’ indicates the model of the weapon under HK’s
marking scheme; the letters ‘AK’ alongside the proof marks indicate the weapon
was proofed (and likely manufactured) in 2009; and the ‘antler’ proof mark indi-
cates the weapon underwent proof testing at the Ulm proof house (Beschussamt
Ulm), where German-made HK weapons are proofed.
The documentation accompanying arms shipments and the packaging in which
these items are shipped also contain valuable information about exporters, import-
ers, export dates, and the quantity of weapons shipped. Examples of documen-
tation and packaging for weapons and ammunition—and a sample of the insights
that these materials provide—are included throughout the Handbook.
Official and unofficial data on international arms transfers is another rich source
of information on arms flows. Governments and international organizations have
14 Less commonly, exporters or exporting countries.
40
Table 1.3 Using this Handbook to identify arms and track arms flows
Identifying the weapon
Determining class
Small arms Light weapons Heavy weapons
Determining group
Hand guns Long guns
Rifled Smooth-bore Rifled Smooth-bore
Other smooth-bore
Sub-machine guns
operated shotguns
Self-loading rifles
operated fifles
Machine guns
Smooth-bore
Self-loading
Self loading
handguns
long guns
Revolvers
Manually
Manually
shotguns
pistols
Determining make, model, and variant
Small arms Small arms ammunition Light weapons Light weapons ammunition
Physical features Physical features Physical features Physical features
Markings Markings Markings Markings
Packaging and Packaging and Packaging and Packaging and

documentation documentation documentation documentation
41
Packaging and Markings

Key Data on Data on Markings Small arms
Item Item documentation on the item
information illicit authorized on the
documentation packaging
interviews arms flows transfers item
Small arms
Packaging and Markings Small arms
documentation on the item ammunition
Key Data on Data on Markings
Item Item
information illicit authorized on the Packaging and Markings
documentation packaging Light weapons
interviews arms flows transfers item documentation on the item
Small arms
ammunition
facility (manufacturer)
Identifying the production
Packaging and Markings Light weapons

Item Item documentation on the item ammunition
Light
Importing country(ies)
weapons
Small arms
documentation on the item
information authorized Item Item on the
illicit Packaging and Markings Small arms
Light
interviews arms flows transfers documentation packaging item
weapons
ammunition
42
Key Data on Data on Markings Light weapons
of manufacture
Item Item
Identifying the country
Small arms
Packaging and Markings Light weapons
Mapping the chain of custody
Identifying the previous importers/owners

Item Item
information illicit authorized on the Packaging and Markings
Identifying the manufacturer and/or country of origin
interviews arms flows transfers item Small arms

Small arms
ammunition
Packaging and Markings Small arms
Recipient(s)

Item Item documentation on the item ammunition
Light
weapons

of production
Light weapons
Identifying the date

Item Item
information illicit authorized on the Packaging and Markings Light weapons
interviews arms flows transfers item documentation on the item ammunition
ammunition
Light weapons
published thousands of records on imports and exports of small arms and light

weapons. The specificity and completeness of these records vary, but many contain
important information about the sources and recipients of exported weapons and,
to a lesser extent, ammunition. Social media is an increasingly important (primar-
ily unofficial) source of information on arms flows. Using social media to system-
atically map chains of custody is difficult, but it is often a valuable supplement to
official reporting. Chapter 8 provides a thorough overview of these data sources,
their strengths and limitations, and strategies for analysing and interpreting them.
Mapping the transfer chain after a weapon is diverted to an illicit user is often
significantly more challenging than tracking the item’s movement through authorized
channels (which itself is no small feat). Data on illicit arms flows includes court
documents, declassified intelligence reports, media articles, and reports from
research organizations such as the Small Arms Survey and ARES. Data on seized
weapons is also used to study illicit arms flows.15 Individual summaries of weap-
ons seizures rarely reveal the sources or trafficking routes of illicit weapons but,
when aggregated and combined with other data sources, they can shed light on
the type and quantities of illicit weapons, and changes in illicit arms flows over
time. Chapter 9 identifies key sources of data on illicit weapons and explains how
to analyse them.
Table 1.3 shows the processes through which arms are identified and arms
flows are tracked. It is important to note that not all of the details listed in the
table are required for every type of analysis, and key details are often not availa-
ble at all. At the same time, all information is potentially relevant, and seemingly
unrelated data can be used to fill information gaps. These and other analytical
strategies, tips, and techniques are explained in greater detail in the rest of the
Handbook.
―― Authors: N.R. Jenzen-Jones and Matt Schroeder
15 See, for example, Schroeder (2013a; 2014b) and Schroeder and King (2012).
43
44
CHAPTER 2
Understanding the Trade in

Small Arms: Key Concepts
Introduction
The trade in small arms, light weapons, and their parts, accessories, and ammu-
nition involves every country in the world.16 It includes transfers that are author-
ized by states and illicit flows of arms that violate national or international law.
This chapter provides readers with the background knowledge and key concepts
required to understand both aspects of the trade, and the linkages between them.
The authorized trade

The authorized trade in small arms is diverse and dynamic. It includes both new
and surplus arms, and affects every geographical region, and every level of soci-
ety. Military and law-enforcement agencies worldwide buy millions of imported
weapons each year. In addition, hunters, recreational shooters, and other indi-
viduals privately buy millions of firearms and hundreds of millions of rounds of
ammunition. In 2012, the Small Arms Survey estimated the annual value of inter-
national small arms transfers at more than USD 8.5 billion (Grzybowski, Marsh,
and Schroeder, 2012, p. 241). More recent data suggests that the value of this trade
has increased significantly since then (Pavesi, 2016, p. 14).
Handbook
Despite its size, the authorized international trade in small arms and light
weapons remains to a large extent opaque. Only a fraction of the trade is repre-
sented in publicly available data, and much of that data is incomplete or vague.
Every year, thousands of small arms and light weapons transfers are therefore
either inadequately documented or not documented at all, making it difficult to
monitor arms transfers to problematic recipients or to identify the accumulation
of excessively large weapons stockpiles (Grzybowski, Marsh, and Schroeder, 2012,
p. 241).
Types of transfers
Authorized small arms transfers take many forms. From shipments of thousands
of weapons purchased by foreign governments to individual rifles packed in the
checked luggage of participants in international shooting competitions, these
16 The term ‘small arms’ is used in this chapter to refer to small arms, light weapons, and their am-
munition (as in ‘the small arms industry’) unless the context indicates otherwise, whereas the
terms ‘light weapons’ and ‘ammunition’ refer specifically to those items.
46
transfers are much more diverse than commonly assumed. The Small Arms Survey
Understanding the Trade in Small Arms: Key Concepts

has identified the following types of transfers, which can be grouped into three
main categories:
Sales are the most common type of transfer and consist of exchanges of
weapons for money or other commodities.17 Sales can be further divided into
commercial exports and government-to-government exports.18
Exports of weapons to governments as part of foreign aid programmes or for
use in military training exercises are a second important category of transfers.
Arms and ammunition exported as part of foreign aid programmes are often
provided at little or no charge. Weapons used in foreign military training ex-
ercises are sometimes given to the host country after the exercise.
Other categories of authorized transfers include:
– shipping weapons from troop-contributing countries to their peacekeeping
forces deployed abroad;
– sending weapons abroad for repair, demilitarization, or at the end of a lease;
– transporting surplus or obsolete weapons to a foreign country for disposal;
– temporarily exporting firearms for sporting and hunting purposes.
The transfer chain

Common to all categories of imports and exports is the transfer chain, a series of
transfers and retransfers of small arms that starts with the manufacturer and
concludes with the delivery of the transferred item to its new owner or operator,
often referred to as an ‘end user’. The first link in this chain is the transfer of a
newly-produced weapon from the manufacturer to the original recipient. This
transfer can be private, commercial, or governmental, and can be foreign or do-
mestic. Any subsequent change of ownership is referred to as a retransfer. Re-
transfers to international recipients are often referred to as re-exports (if there is
a change in ownership), while retransfers to entities in the same country are ‘do-
mestic retransfers’.
The transfer chain is often long and circuitous, with exported weapons being
transferred and retransferred to several end users over the course of years or
decades. Figure 2.1 shows a hypothetical transfer chain.
17 Manufacturers also often ship small quantities of sample weapons to potential buyers as part of marketing
efforts. See Dreyfus, Marsh, and Schroeder (2009, p. 9).
18 For more information, see Dreyfus, Marsh, and Schroeder (2009, p. 9, Box 1.1).
47
Authorized but illicit
Figure 2.1 Example of an arms

transfer chain Most authorized transfers are made in
Country of origin/manufacturer accordance with national and inter-
national laws. Yet some transfers may
be permitted by the government of the
Export
exporting country, but viewed as a vio-
lation of international law by other
Importer countries and actors. The UN Panel of
Experts on Libya and The New York
Re-export
Times, for instance, documented trans-
fers of arms from the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) to forces in Libya be-
Importer
tween 2013 and 2015, which the UAE
Domestic government organized without notify-
retransfer ing the UN Sanctions Committee, and
which therefore violated the arms em-
Retransfer recipient bargo. The items shipped included pis-
tols that later resurfaced in Libyan
Re-export black markets (Kirkpatrick, 2015; UNSC,
Handbook
2015, paras. 125–31). Such examples

illustrate the grey areas that exist be-
Importer/End user
tween the authorized and illicit trade
in small arms.
The illicit trade in small arms

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons occurs in all parts of the globe
but tends to be concentrated in areas afflicted by armed conflict, violence, and
organized crime, where the demand for illicit weapons is often highest. Illicit arms
fuel civil wars and regional conflicts; stock the arsenals of designated terrorist
organizations, drug cartels, and other armed groups; and contribute to violent
crime and the proliferation of sensitive technology.
The Small Arms Survey defines illicit small arms as ‘weapons that are pro-
duced, transferred, held, or used in violation of national or international law’
(Schroeder, 2013a, p. 284). This definition acknowledges the many different forms
48
illicit arms flows can take (de Tessières, 2017, pp. 4–5). Three broad categories are

reviewed here: the diversion of legal holdings of small arms, the illicit production
of firearms, and the recirculation of existing stocks of illicit weapons.
Box 2.1 International efforts to curb illicit arms flows

The problem of illicit arms flows gained increased international attention following UN member states’
adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Agenda stresses the connection
between sustainable development and ‘peaceful and inclusive societies’ in Sustainable Develop-
ment Goal (SDG) 16, and calls for a significant reduction in illicit arms flows by 2030 in SDG Tar-
get 16.4 (UNGA, 2015). How to achieve such a reduction? Above all, by implementing the arms
control instruments adopted since the late 1990s at the sub-regional, regional, and global levels,
and given practical effect in the national laws and regulations of participating governments (Mc-
Donald, Alvazzi del Frate, and Ben Hamo Yeger, 2017).
To varying degrees, these instruments cover the small arms and light weapons life cycle from man-
ufacture to final disposal or destruction. They aim, first and foremost, to strengthen control over legal
weapons throughout their life cycle to prevent them from being diverted into the illicit market; such
diversion is the primary source of illicit weapons worldwide. Instruments such as the UN Firearms
Protocol (UNGA, 2001a), the UN Small Arms Programme of Action (UNGA, 2001b), and the Arms
Trade Treaty (UNGA, 2013a) thus require governments to assess and reduce diversion risks before
authorizing an international arms transfer, employing measures such as end-user certification and
brokering controls. At the same time, instruments such as the Programme of Action address the po-
tential diversion of weapons and ammunition from state security force stockpiles, another major
source of illicit material, through stockpile management and security measures.
As this chapter notes, a small but still significant portion of the illicit weapons market derives from
illicit production. For this reason, the UN Firearms Protocol and Programme of Action require states
to regulate arms manufacture and criminalize unauthorized weapons production. A related type of
illicit arms flow mentioned in this chapter, the recirculation within illicit markets of weapons that
were already illicit, is addressed through counter-trafficking measures that include the identification
and interception of illicit arms shipments at border crossings.
The multilateral arms control instruments typically recommend that seized illicit weapons be des-
troyed in order to prevent them being diverted back into the illicit market, as sometimes occurs.
Whatever form of disposal is selected, however, seized weapons need to be uniquely marked—
if they do not already possess such markings—and recorded to reduce diversion risks and detect
cases of diversion when they occur.
The International Tracing Instrument (UNGA, 2005), another global arms control instrument, establishes
common international rules for weapons marking, record-keeping, and international cooperation.
These aim to allow law enforcement officials to follow a recovered weapon’s history from the time
of its manufacture (or of its last legal importation) to the point at which it was diverted into the il-
licit market. Law enforcement agencies can then identify and disrupt sources of illicit arms supply.
A critical diagnostic tool, weapons tracing rounds out the international arms control arsenal out-
lined in this box, which, if effectively implemented, will allow governments to reduce illicit arms
flows over time.
Author: Glenn McDonald
49
Diversion of legal holdings
Most illicit small arms are legally-produced weapons that are diverted to armed
groups, criminals, and other unauthorized users at some point during their (often
lengthy) life span. Yet the term ‘diversion’ is not clearly defined in international
legal instruments. Experts generally refer to diversion not simply as the move-
ment of arms from the legal to the illicit sphere, but rather as the unauthorized
change in possession or use of these weapons (Parker, 2016, p. 118). Three main
patterns of diversion are presented below.
Transfer diversion
A transfer diversion occurs when weapons are lost, stolen, or deliberately retrans-
ferred to a recipient who is not officially authorized to receive the weapons, or
when the recipient violates end use agreements. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, trans-
fer diversion can take place at most points along the transfer chain: in the country
of origin (point of embarkation); en route to the intended end user (in transit); at
the time of or shortly after delivery to the declared recipient (point of delivery);
or some time after importation (post-delivery) (Schroeder, Close, and Stevenson,
2008, p. 115).
Handbook
Figure 2.2 Points of potential diversion in a typical transfer chain
Country of origin/
Point-of-embarkation diversion manufacturer
In-transit diversion Export
Point-of-delivery diversion Importer
Domestic
Post-delivery diversion retransfer
• From the national stockpile
• From the civilian stockpile
End-user
50
Some transfer diversions are planned and executed across several stages of

the transfer chain. This is particularly true of diversions that occur in-transit or
at the point of delivery. The measures necessary to divert weapons while they are
in transit are often taken long before the ship or aircraft carrying the weapons
leaves the port or airport of origin. Most in-transit and point-of-delivery diver-
sions involve transportation by air or sea. Aircraft and ships that are used in
major in-transit and point-of-delivery diversions are typically registered under
flags of convenience, meaning they are registered in a state other than that of their
owner, often in order to reduce operating costs or avoid regulations in the owner’s
own state. Such vessels tend to be owned by offshore shell companies that fre-
quently change their names and shift their locations and assets from country to
country (Schroeder, Close, and Stevenson, 2008, p. 115).
Another key feature of transfer diversion is the use—or misuse—of documen-
tation. Traffickers may forge transfer documents, such as end-user certificates,
bills of lading, and flight plans, to include false information about the shipment
or the parties involved. Alternatively, diversion may involve corrupt government
officials who sign authentic transfer documents (Schroeder, Close, and Stevenson,
2008, p. 118).
Other transfer diversion techniques that are commonly used by arms traffick-
ers in some parts of the world include:
falsifying shipping documents, including commodity descriptions and per-

sonal information about the shipper and recipient;
undervaluing illicit shipments of small arms to minimize scrutiny by customs
officials;
using circuitous routing and multiple transhipment points to conceal the des-
tination of illicit shipments bound for countries of concern;
scratching off, or painting over, serial numbers and other identifying markings
on weapons and ammunition;
disassembling weapons, mislabelling storage containers, and concealing illicit
items within or behind household goods, building materials, and machinery;
and
using shell companies and straw purchasers to hide the identities of traffickers
and their links to the illicit shipment.
51
Diversion from the national stockpile
Arms and ammunition can also be diverted from a stockpile under the control of
a state’s defence and security forces (called the ‘national stockpile’). Weak over-
sight and poor physical security measures facilitate several forms of diversion of
national stockpiles, including theft by personnel and by external actors as well as
battlefield loss and capture.
National stockpiles are not usually held permanently in any one place. They
are often relocated from one military base to another in response to patterns of
deployment, changing demand, and the need for repairs or alterations (Parker,
2016, pp. 120–21). As a result, the possible points of diversion are numerous and
include storage sites, convoys transporting equipment, and security personnel
carrying the weapons on duty. Diversion affects all national and security forces,
including those operating abroad in the context of peace operations (see Box 2.2).
Box 2.2 Diversion of arms and ammunition in peace operations

Around 110,000 police and military personnel are currently deployed as United Nations peace-
keepers (known as Blue Helmets) in 14 UN peacekeeping operations (UNDPKO, 2018). Between
2004 and 2014 there were at least 35 notable incidents of diversion or loss of weapons and ammu-
nition during peacekeeping operations in these countries. The Small Arms Survey estimates that
Handbook
losses during these incidents totalled more than 750 weapons and 1.2 million rounds of ammuni-
tion (Small Arms Survey, n.d.a). These incidents, each of which involved the loss of more than ten
weapons or more than 500 rounds of ammunition, have occurred during patrols, during attacks on
convoys, and on fixed sites.
In the notable incidents documented in South Sudan and Sudan alone, a total of more than 500
weapons and more than 750,000 rounds of ammunition were seized. These items include hand-
guns, self-loading rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons, and mortars, as well
as the ammunition for these weapons. A single such incident resulted in the loss of more than
500,000 rounds of ammunition. Four others probably involved losses of at least 10,000 cartridges.
Very little equipment lost during these attacks has been recovered.
Accurate information is difficult to obtain, as there is imperfect reporting and record-keeping, and a
noticeable reluctance to share bad news. Additionally, when weapons are recovered by peace-
keepers in cordon and search operations, engagements with hostile forces, or raids on arms caches,
there is rarely any systematic record-keeping. Some items are returned to the armed group from
which they were taken, some are redistributed to local authorities, and others are destroyed or
retained for safekeeping. The diversion of such weapons often goes unreported. Future diversions
could be prevented by improved record-keeping, reporting, and oversight.
Sources: Based on Berman and Racovita (2015) and Berman, Racovita, and Schroeder (2017),
with updated data from Small Arms Survey Peace Operations Data Set (PODS) (Small Arms Survey,
n.d.a) and UNDPKO (2018)
52
The volume of diverted equipment can vary greatly depending on the type of

incident. At the lower end of the spectrum is the theft of relatively minor quanti-
ties of weapons and ammunition by individuals and small groups of people. It
may occur at all levels of the national stockpile, but is generally characterized by
its links to localized illicit trade rather than to regional or international transfers.
The problem is largely a result of local demand factors combined with poor stock-
pile management. It is often facilitated by the concealability and portability of
small arms (Bevan, 2008, p. 47).
National stockpile diversion can also involve the theft of larger volumes of
arms and ammunition, sometimes consisting of many hundreds of tonnes of
weaponry. It is often facilitated by poor stockpile management practices, but in
many cases it results from factors that are much broader than the management
of arms and ammunition per se. Weak state structures, a lack of accountability
within political and military administrations, and associated loopholes in transfer
regulations sometimes combine to provide some highly placed individuals with
the opportunity to divert weapons (Bevan, 2008, p. 56). However, in many signif-
icant cases of loss, such as Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, it is primarily conflict
and the ensuing collapse of state institutions that leads to mass looting of the
national stockpile.
Diversion from the civilian stockpile

The ‘civilian stockpile’ comprises arms and ammunition acquired and held by a
broad array of individuals and organizations, ranging from firearm manufactur-
ers and wholesalers to gun shops and hunters. Diversion from any one of these
locales has the potential to contribute to unlawful use, armed crime, and violence
(Bevan, 2008, p. 62). In particular, the diversion of civilian-owned weapons and
ammunition can be a significant source of weapons that are used in crime, includ-
ing in the poaching of protected wildlife (see Box 2.3).
At one end of the spectrum are arms and ammunition that are inadequately
stored in homes and vehicles. Weapons diverted from these sources often enter
the illicit market as a by-product of other illegal activity, such as residential bur-
glaries and theft from automobiles. At the other end of the spectrum are the rel-
atively large quantities of weapons held in gun shops and wholesale warehouses,
which are often attractive targets for organized crime. These cases can in some
instances be a source of arms and ammunition for insurgent groups (Bevan, 2008,
pp. 62–63).
53
Box 2.3 Firearms used in elephant and rhino poaching in Africa
Military-style firearms and relatively powerful hunting rifles are commonly used to poach ele-
phants and rhinos in Africa (Carlson, Wright, and Dönges, 2015), and the impact of poaching on
wildlife populations is considerable. Findings from a 2016 continent-wide census indicate that Af-
rican elephant populations are decreasing at a rate of eight per cent, roughly 27,000 per year
(Steyn, 2016). In 2015, more than 1,330 rhinos were killed by poachers—about five per cent of
Africa’s total rhino population—marking the sixth consecutive increase in annual rhino poaching
rates (IUCN, 2016).
An investigation of rhino poaching in Southern Africa highlights the potential benefits of tracing
firearms to mitigate their illicit use. In South Africa, Kruger National Park (KNP) has the highest rhi-
no poaching rate in the world; among the weapons seized from poachers in KNP are Mauser, Win-
chester, and Brno brand hunting rifles. Poaching groups in KNP typically operate in small teams of
five or six people, and records of poaching arrests infer that roughly 80 per cent of poachers there
are Mozambican nationals (Serino, 2015). Poaching rates in KNP increased from 50 incidents in
2009 to 827 recorded rhino kills in 2014 (Poaching Facts, 2018).
Strikingly, imports of hunting rifles to Mozambique increased at nearly an identical rate over the
same four-year period. United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) data
reveals that the Czech Republic is among the major exporters of hunting rifles to Mozambique, and
that it is also the place where the CZ Brno 550 rifle—increasingly popular with Mozambican
poachers—is manufactured (UNSD, n.d.c). While the implications of a direct link between Mo-
zambican hunting rifle imports and KNP rhino kill rates would be significant, more needs to be
learned of possible correlations by matching seized weapons’ serial numbers with registration re-
cords in Mozambique and, potentially, with import and export records.
In some poaching areas, it is more difficult to identify and trace weapons used to kill wildlife. In
Handbook
Central Africa, for example, where armed groups including militias, rebel groups, and state security
forces have conducted large scale elephant poaching, weapons seizures are less frequent than in
places such as KNP, where poaching teams are smaller. However, an analysis of the headstamps of
cartridge cases found at elephant kill sites can provide clues to which armed groups are poaching,
or where they are sourcing their ammunition. Past investigations into fired cartridge cases recov-
ered from kill sites in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) have uncovered links to Sudanese government stores (Vira and Ewing, 2014),
suggesting the possibility of access to common ammunition supply channels by poachers operating
across a broad geographic region.
Many anti-poaching units are ill-equipped to confront the increasingly advanced firepower wielded
by poachers in their pursuit of ivory and rhino horn. Unfortunately, systems to trace ammunition
found at elephant kill sites often do not exist or are underutilized. When data on seized firearms is
collected, it often contains little more than the total number of seized weapons, missing useful in-
formation about the types of weapons or their markings. These data gaps hinder efforts to improve
understanding of supply chains and emergent patterns of poachers’ weapons and ammunition
usage. More and better data—such as data collected by applying the principles outlined in this
Handbook—would improve anti-poaching policies and assist governments to better equip and pre-
pare wildlife rangers and other front-line defenders to fight the scourge of poaching.
Author: Khristopher Carlson, based on Carlson, Wright, and Dönges (2015)
54
Illicit production of small arms

While most small arms and light weapons are legally produced, there are notable
exceptions to the rule. Weapons produced by individuals or small groups, typi-
cally operating outside of state control, as well as replica and deactivated firearms
that are modified to function as real firearms, represent additional sources of il-
licit arms flows.
Craft production19
The term ‘craft production’ refers mainly to weapons and ammunition that are
fabricated primarily by hand, and in relatively small quantities. Improvised and
craft-produced weapons are addressed in Chapter 6 of this Handbook. This type
of production may sometimes be overseen and regulated by government author-
ities; an example of this is the production of high-end sporting firearms by skilled
artisans. Most weaponry of this type, however, is made outside state control, or
with limited oversight. These weapons may subsequently be used against govern-
ment targets or in other criminal activity.
Improvised and craft-produced small arms and light weapons vary in quality
from crude, improvised single-shot guns to semi-professionally manufactured
copies of conventional firearms. Improvised and craft-produced weapons are
made in sizeable quantities in states with significant authorized small arms man-
ufacturing capabilities as well as in countries without significant domestic pro-
duction capabilities.
The craft production of firearms has a long tradition in several parts of the
world. In West Africa, for example, the practice is widespread, with blacksmiths
producing a range of small arms. So-called ‘Daneguns’ (see Chapter 6), which are
especially popular in Nigeria and Ghana, are based on 19th century European
designs. In Pakistan, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province is home to numerous
workshops that craft produce small arms. In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) have produced copies of Italian semi-automatic pistols
and US sub-machine guns.
Ammunition for small arms and light weapons is also improvised and craft
produced (see Chapter 6). Reloading ammunition—that is, reusing cartridge cases to
19 This section is adapted from Berman (2011) and Hays and Jenzen-Jones (2018).
55
produce finished cartridges—is a popular pastime for hobbyists, who are sometimes
known as handloaders. Reloading is usually practised on a small scale, with the

ammunition intended for personal use. Evidence suggests that reloading ammuni-
tion is conducted on a much bigger scale in parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, how-
ever, where it is often intended for retail sale.
Several armed groups have developed the capacity to make light weapons.
Mortars seem to be the most commonly produced type, as they are relatively easy
to produce and store, and can often be fabricated from readily available materials.
The Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example, manufactured numerous mortar
designs, often featuring delay or remote-control mechanisms (Oppenheimer,
2008). More sophisticated light weapons are also craft produced, including gre-
nade launchers and recoilless weapons. Various Palestinian armed groups, for
example, produce large quantities of light weapons such as single-launch rockets,
while in the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has made copies of
the Soviet RPG-2 recoilless weapon and the US M79 grenade launcher. In the
Iraqi city of Mosul, non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) developed the pro-
duction of mortars and rockets on an industrial scale (Conflict Armament
Research, 2016, p. 7).
One of the most common craft-produced weapons is the improvised explosive
Handbook
device (IED). These are often made from commercially available and relatively
inexpensive materials such as ammonium nitrate, acetone, hydrogen peroxide,
and potassium chlorate. The charge and booster are often taken from artillery
shells, mortar bombs, or other conventional ammunition. IEDs are not generally
considered light weapons and are not covered in this Handbook.
Converted and ‘reactivated’ weapons20

Firearms conversion involves modifying an imitation or deactivated firearm to
fire live ammunition.21 Converted firearms may be based on blank-firing firearms
(sometimes called ‘alarm guns’), air guns, or even toy guns. Deactivated fire-
arms—genuine firearms that have been rendered inoperable (that is, incapable
of expelling a projectile)—may also be converted in a similar fashion.
The conversion changes the nature of the device so that it functions as—and
meets the definition of—a real firearm. Converting a replica or deactivated firearm
20 Section authored by Benjamin King, based on King (2015) and Florquin and King (2018).
21 Converted and ‘reactivated’ firearms are addressed in Chapter 6 of this Handbook.
56
essentially involves removing the barriers to normal firearm functionality put in

place by manufacturers or deactivating authorities.
Those who purchase converted firearms do so to use them for self-defence,
but also for criminal purposes (Jenzen-Jones and McCollum, 2017, p. 29). Con-
verted firearms are relatively easy to find and are affordable: even after their
conversion, they can cost as little as ten per cent of the price of real pistols and
revolvers (King, 2015, p. 8). Moreover, converted firearms carry the added value
of being generally less traceable than real guns, as some countries do not subject
readily convertible imitation and deactivated firearms to the same registration
and licensing restrictions as real firearms. As a result, smugglers typically pur-
chase readily convertible weapons legally in countries where they are sold with
few restrictions, before smuggling and converting them for illicit use in locations
where firearm laws are stricter.
These characteristics have contributed to the worldwide proliferation of con-
verted firearms in recent years. European states were the first to report the prob-
lem in the late 1990s. The use of converted firearms in criminal incidents appears
to be particularly high in countries that ban, or heavily restrict, civilian possession
of real pistols and revolvers, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
(de Vries, 2011, p. 214; Hales, Lewis, and Silverstone, 2006, p. 7). Overall, at least
19 European states have reported confiscating converted blank-firing firearms.
Reactivated firearms have also been used in some high-profile attacks, including
the January 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.
The proliferation of converted imitation firearms in particular is also signifi-
cant in the Middle East and North Africa. Turkey is a major manufacturer of
blank-firing firearms, including several popular brands: Atak Zoraki, Ekol/Vol-
tran, Blow, and Target Technologies (King, 2015, p. 4). Over the past six years,
authorities in several countries have seized multiple large shipments of Turk-
ish-made replica firearms en route to Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (King, 2015, p. 8).
Recirculation of illicit weapons

In addition to diverted legal holdings and illicitly produced firearms, existing
stockpiles of illicit weapons represent another source of illicit arms flows. In fact,
in a number of conflict zones, weapons and ammunition designed, manufactured,
57
and distributed decades earlier—specifically in the context of cold war proxy
arming—are still in use (Florquin, 2014, pp. 2–3).

A review of arms caches recovered in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2011, Iraq in
2008 and 2009, and Somalia from 2004 to 2011 revealed that the vast majority of
seized small arms were AK-type rifles—the same patterns of rifles that have been
used by governments and armed groups in these countries for decades (Schroed-
er and King, 2012, p. 314). These older models of firearms are also commonly
available for sale at local open-air and undercover illicit markets, such as those
documented by the Small Arms Survey in Lebanon, Pakistan, and Somalia
(Florquin, 2013).
Perhaps more surprising, given its consumable nature, small-calibre ammu-
nition produced during the cold war is still circulating widely in conflict areas. A
review of 560 varieties of such ammunition documented since 2010 in seven con-
flict zones in Africa and Syria found that more than half of the identified types of
ammunition had been produced before 1990 (Florquin and Leff, 2014, p. 189).
Moreover, the age of small-calibre ammunition does not appear to greatly affect
its price on the illicit markets of Lebanon, Pakistan, and Somalia (Florquin, 2013, p.
263).
While some ageing weapons and ammunition used in conflicts may have been
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diverted recently from legal, old surplus stockpiles, there is also evidence of the
recirculation of illicit weapons between armed groups, sometimes spanning dec-
ades. This is the case in the conflict in the eastern DRC, where enduring armed
groups such as the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) have
acquired weapons from a variety of state and non-state armed forces, both forcibly
and through alliances, since the 1990s (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, pp. 199–204).
Conclusion
While the arms shipments arranged by high-profile arms brokers generally cap-
ture the headlines, the arms trade is an immensely complex and multi-faceted
phenomenon that is often far less sensational in nature. Authorized international
transfers take many forms, ranging from temporary exports of a single firearm
for use in shooting competitions to the permanent transfer of thousands of weap-
ons to militaries and police forces. The legal domestic trade is equally diverse.
58
Government arms depots in countries with large and active armed forces often

contain a broad array of small arms and light weapons, while armouries in small-
er countries that only have constabulary forces may contain few if any light weap-
ons. Civilian markets tend to be more limited since most governments ban (or
severely limit) the possession of light weapons by civilians. The types of firearms
that can be legally purchased for hunting, sport-shooting, and self-defence vary
significantly from country to country, however.
The illicit arms trade mirrors the authorized trade: the vast majority of small
arms and light weapons on the black market were legally produced and owned
before they were diverted to unauthorized recipients. There are exceptions, of
course, such as those weapons which are improvised, craft produced, or convert-
ed. But even most craft-produced small arms and light weapons are assembled
from components that are acquired from legal markets. Like the authorized trade,
illicit arms flows vary significantly over time and from region to region. The types
and sources of illicit weapons in one country are often completely different from
those in another country, and there are sometimes even differences from region
to region. These differences are explained by numerous factors, including—but
not limited to—the types of weapons and ammunition available from local and
regional sources, and the resources and objectives of illicit end users. Accurately
researching and reporting on arms and ammunition therefore requires a nuanced
understanding of the weapons identification process and the sources of data on
authorized and illicit arms flows.
―― Author: Nicolas Florquin

Contributors: Khristopher Carlson, Benjamin King, Glenn McDonald,
Mihaela Racovita, and Matt Schroeder
59
60
CHAPTER 3
Weapons Identification:
Small Arms
Introduction
When most people think of ‘guns’, they are thinking of small arms. Broadly speak-
ing, small arms are firearms intended for use by individuals. Small arms are the
primary weapons issued to military, law enforcement, and other armed security
personnel, and are widely owned and used by civilians for hunting, sport shoot-
ing, and other pursuits. The key characteristics of firearms considered to be small
arms are their portability (they may be transported and operated by a single in-
dividual on foot), and their calibre (less than 20 mm) (ARES, 2017; forthcoming).
This chapter begins with a brief presentation of key types of small arms, ad-
dressing their history and technical development. The chapter then provides an
overview of the most important physical features and markings by which these
arms are identified. It also briefly examines feed devices (such as magazines),
accessories, packaging, and shipping documentation, which can provide valuable
information about the provenance of firearms. Ammunition for small arms is ad-
dressed in Chapter 4.
History and technical development

Today’s small arms have their roots in the Victorian era. Some manually-operat-
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ed rifles, in particular, have changed little since the late 19th century. The revolv-
er predates the invention of modern cartridges, and the archetypal self-loading
pistol created in 1911 as the Colt ‘Government Model’ is still in military use today.
Even the automatic machine gun was being sold to authorities around the world
by 1897. By the end of the First World War, all of the categories of small arms now
in use had been invented, if not finalized in their design or application (ARES, 2017).
Firearms: a brief description

Modern firearms take many different forms, but they all have the following com-
ponents: a ‘stock’ (and/or pistol grip), a ‘barrel’, and the ‘action’, which refers to
the operating components of a weapon.22 One of the main parts of a stock (and,
in some guns, the only part) is the ‘butt-stock’. This is the portion of a long gun
22 The word ‘firearm’ was originally coined in the medieval period and referred to any weapon mak-
ing use of fire for destructive effect. Though it became, and remains for most English speakers,
synonymous with ‘gun’, a ‘firearm’ can more properly be considered to be a man-portable gun
(ARES, 2016a).
62
(such as a rifle or shotgun) which is braced against the shoulder when firing. In
Weapons Identification: Small Arms

the case of handguns, the pistol grip is used to secure the weapon when firing. In
the years following the Second World War, many long gun designs also came to
feature a pistol grip. The barrel is the tube through which the projectile (‘bullet’)
travels after a cartridge is discharged. The group of components that comprise
the action varies depending on the type of firearm, but includes the components
that load and fire ammunition, and that extract and eject fired cartridge cases
(ARES, 2017). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the general arrangement and key physical
features of a self-loading rifle and self-loading pistol—in this case, a self-loading
rifle with a detachable box magazine and a self-loading pistol, respectively.
Figure 3.1 Typical features of a modern military rifle
The ammunition used in most modern firearms is called a ‘cartridge’.

Cartridges consist of:
a projectile, or bullet, which is fired from the gun;
a propellant, which, when ignited by a primer (below), generates the gas
pressure that propels the projectile out of the barrel;
a primer, which consists of chemicals designed to be ignited by a firing pin in
the weapon; and
a cartridge case, which contains the components of a complete round of am-
munition and, when the weapon is fired, blocks the escape of gases in a way
that causes pressure to build up behind the projectile (Goad and Halsey, 1982;
Jenzen-Jones, 2016a, p. 13).23
23 With the exception of caseless ammunition. There are various types of ammunition, many of
which are discussed in Chapter 4.
63
Figure 3.2 Typical features of a modern handgun
Slide serrations
Accessory rail
Magazine release (reverse)
Magazine well
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Nearly all firearms function in the same basic manner. The operator pulls the
trigger, causing an internal mechanism to allow the weapon’s firing pin to strike
the primer, located in the base of the cartridge. The primer ignites the propellant,
which generates rapidly-expanding gases as it burns. The build-up of pressure
from the expanding gas within a sealed chamber (the ‘breech’) pushes the pro-
jectile down the barrel, out of the muzzle, and towards the target (see Figure 3.3).
The discharge of a firearm is accompanied by a flash and blast at the muzzle, and
by recoil that is typically perceived by the user (ARES, 2017).24
Modern firearms—with the notable exception of shotguns—primarily feature
rifled barrels (see Figure 3.4). Rifling refers to the internal geometry, typically
either spiral grooves or polygonal faces inside the bore which engage the projec-
tile and cause it to rotate as it is accelerated up the barrel (see Figure 3.5). This
24 This is properly known as ‘perceived recoil’ or ‘felt recoil’, but is often referred to simply as ‘re-
coil’ (ARES, 2017).
64
rotation imparts gyroscopic stability to the projectile, ensuring that it flies accu-

rately and point first (ARES, 2016a).
Firearms make use of a variety of operating systems (‘actions’). At their most
basic, firearms allow the user to load and chamber a cartridge, fire the weapon,
and then extract and eject the fired cartridge case. More complex operating sys-
tems allow for semi-automatic and automatic fire, in which the firearm is
(re)cocked for the next shot when it is discharged (ARES, 2017).25
Figure 3.3 The build-up of gas pressure behind a projectile during the firing sequence
of a firearm
Note: The cartridge case and bolt face provide a gas seal.
Adapted from: Chinn (1955, p. 4)
Figure 3.4 Rifled and smooth-bore barrels Figure 3.5 Conventional grooved rifling
(left) and octagonal polygonal rifling (right)
Adapted from: ATF (2018) Source: Wikimedia Commons
25 Automatic firearms are sometimes described as having ‘fully-automatic’, ‘full automatic’, or ‘full
auto’ operation. While these terms are commonplace in civilian, military, and occasionally even
technical use, the term ‘automatic’ is sufficient.
65
In general terms, firearms are either manually-operated or self-loading.
Manually-operated firearm: a firearm which relies on the user, rather than

the potential energy stored within a cartridge, to cycle the weapon (ARES,
2017).
Self-loading firearm: a firearm which uses the energy stored in a cartridge to
cycle the weapon’s action, extracting and ejecting the cartridge case immedi-
ately after firing, and chambering a new cartridge from the weapon’s maga-
zine (ARES, 2017).
Whether operated by manual or purely mechanical means, each cartridge in

a repeating weapon26 is subjected to a similar operating cycle: it is loaded from
the feed device (or manually loaded) into the gun’s chamber, the bolt is locked
to the rear of the breech, the cartridge is fired, the bolt is unlocked, and the car-
tridge is then extracted from the chamber and ejected. The vast majority of fire-
arms in existence today are repeating firearms.
The most common types of operating system for manually-operated firearms
are break-action, bolt-action, pump-action, and lever-action.27 All of these systems
rely on the shooter to physically manipulate one or more components of the fire-
arm to unlock the action, extract (and generally eject) the fired cartridge case,
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chamber a new cartridge, and lock the action (ARES, 2017). These systems are
most common among rifles and shotguns.
Self-loading firearms include a wide variety of operating mechanisms. Weap-
ons firing low-powered ammunition typically utilize a simple blowback action.28
More powerful ammunition requires a locked breech mechanism. This may be
recoil-operated or gas-operated, or use some form of retarded blowback.29
26 Generally speaking, a ‘repeating’ firearm is one in which the number of cartridges held in the
weapon is greater than the number of barrels, where one or more cartridges are held elsewhere
than the firing chamber, and where more than one shot can be fired before the weapon needs to
be reloaded (ARES, 2017). Note that not all weapons make use of a locked breech design.
27 Break-action weapons are not repeating firearms, whereas bolt-, pump-, and lever-
action types are (ARES, 2017).
28 A simple blowback action is one in which the bolt is not locked to the breech on firing, being held
in place only by its own inertia and the return spring. This is only suitable for relatively low-
pressure ammunition, such as handgun cartridges or some cartridges for automatic grenade
launchers (ARES, 2017).
29 For explanations of these actions, see ARES (2017).
66
The key distinction within self-loading firearms is between semi-automatic

and automatic firearms.
Semi-automatic firearm: a self-loading firearm which is capable of firing

only one shot with each trigger pull (ARES, 2017).
Automatic firearm: a self-loading firearm which is capable of firing multiple
shots with a single trigger pull (ARES, 2017).
Most rifles in military service today are self-loading designs capable of auto-
matic fire. Semi-automatic versions are available for many of these rifles, which
are used for civilian self-defence, law enforcement, and sporting and hunting
applications in some countries (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d). It can often be difficult to
visually differentiate automatic from semi-automatic variants of the same basic
design, and so the term ‘self-loading’ is preferred in these cases. Self-loading
pistols are the dominant class of handgun today, in widespread global use by
armed forces, law enforcement and, in many countries, civilians. They are also
known as ‘semi-automatic pistols’ (ARES, 2017).
Handguns
The modern term ‘handgun’ came into use in the early 20th century as an um-
brella term for non-repeating pistols, self-loading pistols (see Image 3.1), and
revolvers (see Image 3.2).30 Today the self-loading pistol dominates (see Figure
3.6); revolvers, though still frequently encountered in the civilian world, are less
commonly used by militaries or law enforcement personnel. In militaries, pistols
are primarily used as weapons for personal defence only. Pistols are still widely
used by law enforcement agencies, civilians, and criminals, however, primarily
because they are highly portable and concealable (ARES, 2017).
Sub-machine guns
The sub-machine gun (SMG) was conceived as a fully portable automatic weap-
on that could be employed at close range by an individual user. SMGs have
shorter barrels than most machine guns and rifles, and typically fire pistol-calibre
30 Following their introduction in the 19th century, revolvers were commonly known as ‘revolver
pistols’. This label is uncommon today, but remains technically accurate.
67
Image 3.1 A Soviet Baikal PM 9 × 18 Image 3.2 A Belgian C.F. Galand 12 ×
mm self-loading pistol 15.5 mm revolver
Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
Figure 3.6 Typical arrangement of a modern self-loading pistol, showing some internal
components
Slide
Firing Pin Chamber

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Recoil Muzzle
spring
Magazine spring
Frame
Adapted from: ATF (2018)
68
Image 3.3 An Italian Beretta Model 12S 9 × 19 mm SMG

Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
ammunition from high-capacity magazines (see Image 3.3).31 Handgun ammuni-

tion is significantly less powerful than typical rifle ammunition and requires a
shorter barrel to achieve its optimum performance. As a result, SMGs have a
shorter effective range (typically around 100 m) compared to rifles and machine
guns (ARES, 2017). Their blowback system of operation is very simple to manu-
facture and maintain, and is the dominant operating mechanism for this catego-
ry of firearm (ARES, 2016a).
The term ‘SMG’ also includes most firearms described as ‘personal defence
weapons’ (PDWs) (see Image 3.4). The latter term is primarily a description of a
weapon’s intended role rather than a useful technical distinction, although it may
also imply a use of high velocity ammunition intended to penetrate body ar-
mour.32 Generally, SMGs are compact and lightweight.
31 Both the common 9 × 19 mm Parabellum cartridge and a high-capacity drum magazine originally
designed for the Luger pistol (1902) were incorporated into the first deployed SMG in 1918, the
German Bergmann MP.18,1 (Forgotten Weapons, 2017b; Popenker and Williams, 2012).
32 Two relatively common rounds in service are the 4.6 × 30 mm HK and 5.7 × 28 mm FN (ARES,
2016a).
69
Image 3.4 A German Heckler & Koch MP7 4.6 × 30 mm SMG
Note: This type of SMG is regarded by some as a ‘personal defence weapon’. There is a void at the base of the pistol grip;
the box magazine is absent in this image. There is also a muzzle protector covering the flash hider.
In recent years, the short-range SMG has fallen from favour among militaries
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and law enforcement agencies, which increasingly use compact variants of

self-loading rifles instead (ARES, 2017; Jenzen-Jones, 2017d).33
Shotguns
The simplest common modern shotgun design, the break-open breech-loading
type, was fully developed by the 1870s (Greener, 1910; Taylor, 2016). Figure 3.7
shows the typical features of a break-action shotgun, in both single-barrel and
double-barrel configurations. While break-action shotguns are rarely seen in law
enforcement or military service, they remain popular with civilian shooters and
criminals, and are sometimes encountered with shortened (‘sawed-off’) barrels
and/or stocks to enhance their concealability.
33 The short-range SMG’s fall from favour largely coincided with the introduction and proliferation
of assault rifles, especially compact variants such as the Colt XM177 (first introduced in 1966)
(ARES, 2016a). Even semi-automatic pistol-calibre carbines used by law enforcement personnel
have been largely supplanted by intermediate calibre equivalents.
70
Figure 3.7 Typical features of a break-action shotgun

The first successful pump-action shotguns were introduced by Winchester in

1897 (Taylor, 2016). These types of shotguns are now in common civilian and law
enforcement use (see, for example, Images 3.5, 3.6). Their typical features are
shown in Figure 3.8. Bolt and lever-action shotguns of a design introduced in the
late 19th century are in limited use, almost entirely by civilians. Self-loading
shotguns, using systems of operation developed for machine guns and rifles, did
not become popular until the mid-20th century (ARES, 2016a).34 While self-load-
ing shotguns are widely used by sport shooters and law enforcement agencies,
Figure 3.8 Typical features of a pump-action shotgun
34 An example of this type of weapon is the recoil-operated Browning Automatic 5.
71
Image 3.5 An American Remington Model 870 Wingmaster 12-gauge pump-action

shotgun
Source: Bear Arms Firearms Reference Collection via ARES
Image 3.6 An Italian Benelli M1 Super 90 12-gauge self-loading shotgun

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true automatic shotguns have never achieved mainstream usage.35 Shotguns have
only ever filled very specific niches in military service, but are frequently encoun-
tered in conflict zones due to their ready availability on the civilian market and
their widespread use by law enforcement personnel (ARES, 2017).
Rifles
In the 1860s, breech-loading rifles and carbines were introduced to take advantage
of new self-contained cartridges.36 The definitive manually-operated mechanisms
35 As is the case with rifles, semi-automatic shotguns are sometimes erroneously referred to as ‘au-
tomatic shotguns’. They are also referred to as ‘auto-loading shotguns’ or ‘autoloaders’ which
may also generate confusion (see, for example, Remington, n.d.).
36 Early rifles were expensive niche weapons, primarily produced for sporting purposes. Military
interest was limited to specialist rifle units until the mid-19th century, when rifled muskets firing
the Minié-type bullet became common (ARES, 2017).
72
Image 3.7 A Turkish conversion of a French Berthier Modèle 1907-15 8 × 50R mm

bolt-action rifle
Note: Despite being a very old design, similar rifles are still encountered in limited numbers in conflict zones.
still used today emerged from this period of innovation, including the bolt, lever,
and pump actions (ARES, 2017; see Image 3.7). Bolt-action rifles remain in limit-
ed military service today, often as dedicated sniper rifles with an effective range
of more than 1,000 m for individual targets (Jenzen-Jones, 2017c; 2017d; see Image
3.8). Lever- and pump-action rifles, however, have fallen out of favour for military
and law enforcement purposes (ARES, 2016a). The French invention of smokeless
powder in the 1880s allowed for increased velocities and reduced fouling, result-
ing in the first self-loading and automatic rifle designs (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d).
Self-loading rifles were first widely adopted during and after the Second World
War. They are the primary weapon for most infantry, and are in widespread use
among non-state armed groups (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d). Self-loading rifles also
Image 3.8 A Canadian PGW Defence Technologies Timberwolf .338 Lapua Magnum
(8.6 × 70 mm) bolt-action rifle
Note: In this case, the bolt-action rifle is fitted with a telescopic sight and suppressor. This type of rifle is representative of
a dedicated sniper rifle in modern military service.
Source: Chloe Tousignant/ARES
73
Image 3.9 A French Manufacture d’armes de Châtellerault Carabine de Cuirassier
Modèle 1890 8 × 50R mm bolt-action rifle
Note: This type of bolt-action rifle was historically considered to be a ‘carbine’.

dominate law enforcement and civilian markets. Semi-automatic variants of as-

sault rifles, which are often referred to as ‘modern sporting rifles’ and are
popular among civilians in some countries, should not be confused with true (i.e.
automatic) assault rifles, nor labelled as such (ARES, 2016a; Jenzen-Jones, 2017b).37
The term ‘carbine’ is widely used, but it is too imprecise to meaningfully define
any particular group of small arms in modern usage and often causes confusion.
It originated as a reference to a specific military rifle of reduced size, weight, and
smaller calibre issued primarily to cavalry and other units which did not require
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a full-sized rifle (see Image 3.9). Since then, the term carbine has devolved into a
colloquial or marketing term for any relatively short-barrelled shoulder arm, and,
as such, has little descriptive value and should be avoided (ARES, 2016a; 2017).
Anti-tank rifles and anti-materiel rifles

Anti-tank rifles (ATR) originated in the First World War as a response to the de-
ployment of the tank in 1916 (see Image 3.10). Typical examples include
manually-operated and semi-automatic rifles firing either very high-velocity 7.92
mm ammunition, or larger calibres of 12.7–20 mm, all of which fired solid, ar-
mour-piercing projectiles.38 During the Second World War, tank armour became
37 Recent combat experience has resulted in a limited return to more powerful, medium-range, self-
loading and automatic infantry rifles (often called Designated Marksman Rifles or DMR) to plug
a ‘capability gap’ and operate out to 800 m (Jenzen-Jones, 2016a).
38 The concept was first embodied in the Mauser M1918 Tankgewehr, functionally a scaled-up bolt-
action rifle, and further developed by the Soviets with their PTRS-41, an adaptation of self-loading
rifle technology to a much larger 14.5 × 114 mm cartridge (ARES, 2017).
74
Image 3.10 An Imperial German Mauser Tankgewehr 18 13 × 92SR mm anti-tank rifle

Source: Rock Island Auctions
essentially impervious even to comparatively powerful small- and medium-cal-

ibre cartridges, and ATRs fell out of use. Today, the task of defeating tanks has
been taken over by combatants armed with recoilless weapons and portable rock-
et and missile launchers. However, militaries repurposed ATRs for use against
other targets, and rifles in similar calibres are now known as ‘anti-materiel rifles’
(AMRs) (ARES, 2017).39
The US Barrett M82 (1982) was specifically developed for the anti-materiel role
(see Image 3.11), and its derivatives and similar designs are now in widespread
use alongside very limited numbers of older ATRs. AMRs are employed against
a variety of targets, including soft-skinned vehicles (vehicles with no armour),
Image 3.11 An American Barrett M82A1 .50 BMG (12.7 × 99 mm) anti-materiel rifle
Source: Wikimedia Commons/Heavennearth
39 Both ‘anti-tank rifles’ and ‘anti-materiel rifles’ are role-based terms, and these weapons should
still be described by their technical characteristics and calibre (for example, manually-operated
rifle chambered for 12.7 × 99 mm). Several weapons widely considered to be AMRs are technical-
ly light cannon (ARES, 2017).
75
light armoured vehicles, aircraft on the ground, and personnel at long range (up
to 2,000 m), and for explosive ordnance disposal (ARES, 2016a; 2017). To maximize
effectiveness, these rifles often use ammunition with incendiary and explosive as
well as armour-piercing characteristics (see Chapter 4).40
‘Assault rifles’
Assault rifles are a specific subset of self-loading rifles. The term ‘assault rifle’
was coined in Germany during the Second World War to describe the Sturmgewehr
StG 44, a compact automatic rifle firing shortened ammunition that was more
powerful than ammunition used in SMGs but less powerful than ammunition
used in military rifles and machine guns (ARES, 2016a; Clapham et al., 2016).41
The purpose of these weapons was to provide greater effective range than a SMG
while also allowing for controllable automatic fire from the shoulder (Jen-
zen-Jones, 2017d). The definitive assault rifle still in common use globally remains
Image 3.12 A British Imperial Defence Services MG4A5 5.56 × 45 mm self-loading rifle
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Note: This type of self-loading rifle is considered by some to be an ‘assault rifle’ and/or a ‘carbine’. It is difficult to visual-
ly distinguish this British example from US-made AR-15 and M16/M4 series rifles.
40 A modern, in-service example is the Nammo 12.7 × 99 mm NM140F2 multipurpose cartridge

(Nammo, 2014, p. 57).
41 The ammunition used in SMGs has a muzzle energy of approximately 500–800 J, while ammuni-
tion used in military rifles and machine guns has approximately 3,000–4,000 J muzzle energy
(ARES, 2016a).
76
the Russian AK type, and its 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge is similarly ubiquitous (see

Box 3.1). Assault rifles developed and deployed by Western countries are cham-
bered for lighter cartridges.42 The 5.56 × 45 mm cartridges fired by some of these
rifles (such as that in Image 3.12), which were inspired by the Armalite AR15,
remain a NATO standard and are common in many parts of the world.43 Assault
rifles have supplanted both SMGs and other rifles as the new standard infantry
weapon (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d; Popenker and Williams, 2004). While the term ‘as-
sault rifle’ can be defined, it is relatively difficult to assess and does not add value
to most reports (see Box 3.2).44 Its use is therefore not recommended, except in
specific circumstances; ‘self-loading rifle’ or ‘automatic rifle’ is generally preferred
(ARES, 2017).
Box 3.1 Myths and misconceptions: ‘AK-47’

Strictly speaking, there are no Soviet or Russian AK-47 rifles to be found in the field, as this desig-
nation refers to a small number of prototype weapons that were never issued. The original mass-
produced rifle based on the AK-47 prototype was designated simply AK (Avtomat Kalashnikova) in
1948, and was followed by the modernized AKM (Avtomat Kalashnikova Modernizirovannyy) in
1959.45 Similarly, despite persistent accounts in Western publications, there was never a Soviet rifle
designated the ‘AK-49’. The first Soviet Kalashnikov to be named for its year of introduction was the
AK-74 (Avtomat Kalashnikova obraztsa 1974). There are now nearly 200 variants, derivatives, and
copies of AK rifles (both licensed and unlicensed), which are produced throughout the world
(Ferguson and Jenzen-Jones, 2014b; Jenzen-Jones, 2018). At least 70 million AK-type rifles have
been produced since 1949, making it the most common self-loading military rifle in existence
(Jenzen-Jones, 2017d).
The name ‘AK-47’ is often incorrectly applied to any Kalashnikov-derived rifle, regardless of type or
country of origin. Even weapons specialists and the original manufacturer (now known as Concern
Kalashnikov) have incorrectly used the term AK-47 to refer to AK variants chambered for 7.62 ×
39 mm (for example see Image 3.13).46 As a result of this indiscriminate usage, most firearms 
42 So-called ‘small-calibre, high-velocity’ (SCHV) cartridges.

43 The 5.56 × 45 mm NATO cartridge was joined in the 1970s and 1980s by the Russian 5.45 × 39 mm
and the Chinese 5.8 × 42 mm (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d).
44 The term is generally defined partly as a function of muzzle energy, being a rifle capable of auto-
matic fire and chambered for an intermediate-power cartridge typically producing 1,300 J to 2,600
J of muzzle energy (ARES, 2017).
45 The very first production AK (sometimes called the ‘Type 1’) featured a largely stamped receiver
before the ‘Type 2’ was introduced with a milled receiver in 1951 (followed by the ‘Type 3’, which
also had a milled receiver) (Ferguson and Jenzen-Jones, 2014b; Jenzen-Jones, 2018). These early
AK types may still be encountered in the field; however, even these feature a visibly machined
trunnion block and are sufficiently rare that they may be conflated with the more common pre-
AKM variants (the ‘Type 2’ and ‘Type 3’).
46 See, for example, Concern Kalashnikov (2014).
77
 identified in the news media as AK-47 rifles are not Soviet/Russian AK models. Most are AKM
rifles or other derivatives of the original AK, which appear similar to the untrained eye. It is there-
fore recommended that the term AK-47 be avoided. When the specific model of a particular rifle
cannot be identified, the catch-all term ‘AK-type’ should be used instead.47 If the weapon bears the
physical features of a known model, more specific terms, such as ‘AK-pattern’ or ‘AKM-pattern’
may be used.
Image 3.13 An Egyptian Maadi Company for Engineering Industries Misr 7.62 × 39
mm self-loading rifle
Note: This is a copy of the Soviet AKMS. Such weapons are often misidentified as visually-similar Soviet/Russian rifles.
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Machine guns
Machine guns operate in a similar fashion to contemporary self-loading and au-
tomatic rifles (see above). Early machine guns were large and heavy weapons that
were mounted on vehicles or semi-mobile mounts, such as heavy tripods. The
first light machine guns (LMGs) were fielded in the early 1910s, resulting in the
redesignation of the heavier counterparts as ‘medium’ or ‘heavy’ machine guns
(Gander, 1993; Popenker and Williams, 2008).48 Modern LMGs are chambered for
rifle ammunition and are usually operated by a single individual but, unlike as-
sault rifles, they are designed for sustained automatic fire (typically in short
bursts). They therefore tend to feature heavier barrels and a bipod. Many machine
47 ‘Kalashnikov-type’ is also used, although the weapon in question may be confused with other
weapons designed by Kalashnikov and bearing his name, such as the Pulemet Kalashnikova (‘Ka-
lashnikov machine gun’), or PK, and the later PKM (Pulemet Kalashnikova Modernizirovannyy).
48 Indeed, the M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle was directly adapted as a LMG, primarily by the
addition of a bipod (Ballou, 2010).
78
Image 3.14 A Belgian FN Herstal Minimi Para 5.56 × 45 mm LMG

Note: This type of LMG is referred to in US military service as a ‘squad automatic weapon’.
Image 3.15 A British L86A2 5.56 × 45 mm LMG
Note: This type of LMG is referred to in British military service as a ‘light support weapon’.
79
guns are belt-fed and/or feature interchangeable barrels, although some have
fixed barrels and box magazines. LMGs are also sometimes referred to as ‘squad
automatic weapons’ (SAW) or ‘light support weapons’ (LSW) (ARES, 2017; see
Images 3.14, 3.15).
The general-purpose machine gun (GPMG) is a belt-fed weapon that can be
used by dismounted infantry (soldiers operating on foot) or attached to a heavi-
er mount or vehicle for sustained fire applications (Popenker and Williams, 2008;
see Image 3.16).49 The more flexible GPMG supplanted both the dedicated me-
dium machine gun and so-called ‘heavy’ machine guns chambered for smaller
calibres (such as the Maxim gun) (ARES, 2017).50 The subcategory is probably best
defined by the Belgian FN MAG 58 (1958) and the Russian PK (1961) types.
Image 3.16 A Hungarian copy of the Soviet PKM 7.62 × 54R mm GPMG
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Source: Kristóf Nagy/ARES
49 Early examples include the German MG 34 and MG 42.

50 The modern HMG is a larger-calibre weapon typically operated by a crew and classified as a light
weapon (see Chapter 5).
80
Box 3.2 Myths and misconceptions: ‘assault weapon’
The term ‘assault weapon’ is essentially meaningless outside of specific legal usage in the United
States, where it has been defined by a range of primarily cosmetic features to be found on various
designs of military rifles (typically, but not exclusively, assault rifles), rather than the operating char-
acteristics of the weapon itself (ARES, 2017). These definitions, largely introduced in the 1994
Assault Weapons Ban, actually covered civilian-owned, semi-automatic rifles, albeit those closely
based upon their selective-fire military counterparts (ATF, 2015; ARES, 2016a).51 Beyond this, politi-
cians, the popular media, and the general public have adopted the term essentially as a synonym
for ‘assault rifle’.
The term ‘assault weapon’ has never been used in specialist circles except when referring to certain
types of light weapon, including the M47 Dragon anti-tank guided weapon (US Army, 1982). With-
out qualifying language, however, the term is so imprecise as to apply to almost any offensive
weapon, and it is highly recommended that it should not be used except when referring to a partic-
ular model of weapon by name, such as the MK 153 Mod 0 shoulder-launched multipurpose
assault weapon (SMAW) (USMC, 2005; see Image 3.17).
Image 3.17 A US Marine test-firing an American Nammo-Talley MK 153 Mod 2

83 mm shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon, 2013
Note: This shoulder-fired rocket launcher is categorized as a light weapon.

Source: United States Marine Corps
51 To confuse matters even further, these ‘semi-automatic assault weapons’—a clear contradiction in
terms—were sometimes referred to as ‘SAWs’, leading to confusion with the term ‘squad auto-
matic weapon’, described above (ATF, 2015).
81
Physical features
The following section identifies the key physical features of most small arms and
explains how to use these features to identify and analyse individual weapons.
The ideal outcome of any analysis of a particular weapon is to identify its type,
model, make and/or manufacturer, country of origin, and serial number. This is
not always possible for a variety of reasons, but even a more limited analysis can
reveal important insights into regional arms flows, and the type and possible
sources of weapons acquired by specific government agencies, non-state armed
groups, and criminal organizations.
When attempting to identify a weapon, the first step is to examine the whole
item in profile. Examining the whole item often allows for the recognition of a
distinctive combination of features before each feature is examined individually.
As explained above, many small arms share several common features. Each of
these features reveals important information about the weapon under examina-
tion. Figure 3.9 shows the main parts of a typical rifle, in this case a Soviet AKM
self-loading rifle.
Figure 3.9 Typical features of a modern military rifle

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Rear sight Front sight
Receiver
Fire selector/safety
Fore-end Barrel
(handguard)
Butt-stock
Trigger Magazine Muzzle
Pistol grip
Note: With handguns, what might be termed the ‘receiver’ is typically referred to as a ‘frame’. The slide of a self-loading
pistol is similar to the ‘upper’ receiver of a rifle. Pistols by definition lack a butt-stock (ARES, 2017).
Source: Chloe Tousignant/ARES
82
Image 3.18 A German Mauser Kar98K bolt-action rifle (top) and its component parts

(bottom)
Note: The bottom image shows the wooden stock with all of the rifle’s other components, including stock fittings, removed.
Source: Othais McCarthy
Stocks, butt-stocks, and fore-ends

Stocks were originally one of three primary components of primitive firearms
(hence the expression ‘lock, stock, and barrel’ ; see Image 3.18 for an example of
a weapon and its components). The stock contained and protected the two other
parts; it also offered surfaces for the user to grasp and shoulder the weapon. Many
recent designs have moved away from this concept, relying instead on the receiv-
er to serve these functions, in concert with separate butt-stocks, fore-ends, and
pistol grips (see below). Nonetheless, the stock remains a key component of many
designs.
Butt-stocks (also ‘buttstocks’) are the portion of a weapon designed to be
braced against the shoulder. Butt-stocks promote accuracy and, where relevant,
control automatic fire. They may be integral to the stock itself or a separate
component. In many modern designs, the butt-stock is the only ‘stock’ on the
weapon (hence the terms ‘stock’ and ‘butt-stock’ are frequently used interchange-
ably). Most butt-stocks are either fixed (see Images 3.19a, d) or collapsible.
83
Image 3.19 Examples of butt-stocks Collapsible butt-stocks are typically
top-folding, under-folding (3.19c),

side-folding (3.19b, f), or telescoping or
‘collapsible’ (3.19e). Some folding
a stocks are also telescoping (3.19f).
Modern butt-stocks, especially those
fitted to precision rifles, often incorpo-
rate other adjustable components, such
as cheek pieces.
b Fore-ends, or handguards, are the
portion of the weapon designed to be
grasped with the support hand, that is,
the hand that is not used to pull the
trigger. Handguards often cover por-
c
tions of the barrel that would quickly
become too hot to handle, particularly
during automatic fire. Collectively,
fore-ends and butt-stocks (along with
other non-critical, ergonomic compo-
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d nents of the weapon, such as a pistol

grip) are often referred to as ‘furniture’.
These individual components are most
often made of wood (Images 3.20a, b,
c, d), polymer (3.20e, f), or metal
e
(3.20g). In some weapons, such as
pump-action shotguns, the fore-end
may serve a mechanical purpose.
Note: (a) A fixed wooden butt-stock on a Chinese Type 81

self-loading rifle; (b) A side-folding metal and polymer butt-
stock on a Chinese Type 81-1 self-loading rifle; (c) An un-
der-folding metal butt-stock on a Yugoslavian Zastava
f M70AB2 self-loading rifle; (d) A fixed wooden ‘skeletonized’
thumb-hole stock on a Russian SVD self-loading rifle; (e) A
telescoping (‘collapsible’) multi-position polymer butt-stock
on a British Imperial Defence Services MG4A5 self-loading
rifle; (f) A side-folding, telescoping polymer butt-stock on a
Belgian FN Herstal SCAR-H self-loading rifle.
Sources: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES; Robert Stott; Small Arms
Survey
84
Image 3.20 Examples of fore-ends

a
Note: (a) A wooden ‘full-stock’ fore-end on a Turkish conversion of a French Berthier Modèle 1907-15 bolt-action rifle;
(b) A wooden handguard on a Serbian Zastava M76 self-loading rifle (note gas tube above barrel); (c) A wooden laminate
handguard on a Russian SVD self-loading rifle (note gas tube above barrel); (d) A wooden ‘slab-style’ handguard on an
Israeli IMI Galil ARM self-loading rifle (note gas tube above barrel, and stowed carrying handle and bipod); (e) A polymer
fore-end on a Russian AN-94 self-loading rifle (note gas tube below barrel and unusual muzzle device); (f) A polymer
fore-end and metal ‘outrigger’ barrel support on a British L86A1 LMG (note the stowed bipod); (g) A metal ‘quad-rail’
fore-end (featuring accessory rails at the 12, 3, 6, and 9 o’clock positions) on a German Heckler & Koch HK416D
self-loading rifle.
Sources: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES; Small Arms Survey
85
Fore-ends may also feature bipods, bayonet lugs, rail interface systems, or leaf
sights for launching grenades. Rail interface systems are increasingly common
(see Image 3.20g). Rail systems provide attachment points for a range of accesso-
ries, but are primarily intended for mounting optical sights. Such rails are also
sometimes attached, either permanently or as an accessory, to the receiver of a
firearm. The most popular rail system is the US standard M1913 (‘Picatinny’) rail,
from which the standard NATO rail was derived (see Images 3.20g and 3.21).52
Image 3.21 A US military M4 self-loading rifle with various upgrades

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Note: The fore-end features accessory rails (in this case MIL-STD-1913 ‘Picatinny’ rail) at the 12, 3, 6, and 9 o’clock
positions, as well as a length of accessory rail on the upper receiver surface. An optical sight is mounted to the receiver
accessory rail and a combined forward-grip/bipod is mounted to the 9 o’clock position of the fore-end ‘quad-rail’.
Source: US Army
Barrels and muzzle attachments

As explained above, the barrel of a firearm is a critical pressure-bearing compo-
nent through which the projectile is accelerated before it leaves the weapon
(through the muzzle) and flies towards the target. Many models and variants of
firearms are most easily differentiated by their barrel length, and several ‘families’
or ‘series’ of firearms include a number of models that are essentially the same
except for their barrel length (see Image 3.22). It is important to be aware that
52 For further information, see Arvidsson (2009).
86
barrels and muzzle attachments are occasionally swapped out for barrels of dif-

ferent lengths or fitted with different attachments, either permanently or tempo-
rarily. For example, the barrel of the Beretta ARX series of rifles can be removed
and replaced with a different barrel in seconds (Ferguson, Jenzen-Jones, and Mc-
Collum, 2014). Such cases highlight the importance of precisely documenting and
reporting on weapons exactly as they are encountered.
Muzzle attachments include a range of devices affixed to a weapon’s barrel to
achieve a desired effect. These are most commonly flash suppressors (often called
‘flash hiders’), compensators, and/or muzzle brakes. Flash suppressors reduce
the visibility of muzzle flash to observers by dispersing flammable waste gases
as they emerge from the barrel, and preventing them from reigniting.53
Image 3.22 Barrels of different lengths on Israeli IMI Galil family weapons
Source: Small Arms Survey
53 It is important to note that the spectacular muzzle flashes featured in movies and video games are
most often artificially produced, and are not representative of actual flashes, particularly not of
muzzle flashes observed during daylight.
87
Flash suppressors vary in size, shape, and design, from the simple cone seen on
the Russian RP46 machine gun, to the enclosed ‘bird cage’ of the M16A2 or SIG
540 and 550 series (Image 3.23e), and ‘prong’ designs on the FN SCAR series of
rifles (Image 3.23g). Various muzzle devices may be fitted to different models of
firearms within the same family of weapons.
Compensators literally ‘compensate’ for the effects of recoil that cause the
muzzle of a firearm to rise when fired. To this end, they redirect muzzle gases to
counteract the recoil forces (see the distinctive AKM-pattern ‘slant brake’ in Image
3.23d). They are typically highly effective, but actively increase sound signature
and generate significant lateral muzzle blast.
Other common attachments include bayonet lugs, ‘stand-off’ breaching de-
vices (Image 3.23h), rifle grenade launching spigots, which are typically found
on military rifles (Image 3.23i), and sound suppressors (see Box 3.3).
Image 3.23 Examples of muzzle attachments
a
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
Note: (a) A bare muzzle on a US Guide Lamp M3 SMG; (b) A threaded muzzle on an Italian Beretta Model 12S SMG;
(c) A thread protector or ‘muzzle nut’ on a Chinese Type 56-1 self-loading rifle (note also the under-folding integral bayonet).
88
Image 3.23 Examples of muzzle attachments (continued)

d
Note: (d) A compensator/flash suppressor on a Soviet AKM self-loading rifle; (e) A ‘bird cage’ style flash suppressor on a
Swiss SIG SG 540 series self-loading rifle; (f) A ‘modified bird cage’ flash suppressor on a Spanish CETME AMELI LMG
(note also folding bipod); (g) A ‘three-prong’ type flash suppressor fitted to a Belgian FN Herstal SCAR-H; (h) A ‘stand-off’
muzzle brake/breaching device on a Russian Saiga-12 series self-loading shotgun; (i) An integral grenade-
launching spigot muzzle on a Chinese Type 81 self-loading rifle.
Sources: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES; Small Arms Survey
89
Box 3.3 Myths and misconceptions: ‘silencers’

So-called ‘silencers’, also known as suppressors or moderators, are muzzle devices or barrel de-
signs intended to reduce the noise of firing a weapon.54 Suppressors are most commonly found on
rifles (see Image 3.24), SMGs, and handguns. However, suppressor designs have also been pro-
duced for many other firearms. The most common modern designs comprise a combination of one
or more expansion chambers and a series of ‘baffles’, which reduce the velocity of muzzle gases
and, consequently, the noise signature of the firearm. In many cases, suppressors also reduce muz-
zle flash and lead to increased accuracy (Paulson, 1996).
The term ‘silencer’ is misleading, as weapons fitted with these devices are not rendered silent. In
most cases, suppressors reduce the decibel (dB) level of gunshots to a ‘hearing safe’ level (Paulson,
1996). The degree of sound suppression varies by weapon and suppressor design, calibre, car-
tridge, projectile, propellant type, and other factors. Suppressors are commonly portrayed as tools
of assassins and hitmen but, in reality, they have a wide range of applications. In some jurisdic-
tions, using suppressors is explicitly understood as an appropriate way to reduce hearing damage
to the shooter, to reduce noise disturbance during hunting or sports shooting near residential areas,
to avoid panicking livestock, and to enhance safety on firing ranges by allowing for clearer com-
munication (BASC, 2009; Home Office, 2016).
Image 3.24 A Finnish Ase Utra suppressor fitted to an early model Australian
Thales EF88 5.56 × 45 mm self-loading rifle
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A Finnish Ase Utra CQBS-BL model suppressor

and its ‘quick-detach’ muzzle device.
Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES/Ase Utra
54 While ad hoc solutions for suppressing the audible signature of a weapon have been used irregu-
larly since the advent of firearms, the first commercially successful design was produced by Hi-
ram Percy Maxim in the early 1900s, and patented in 1909 (McCollum, 2012). It was referred to in
early advertising as the ‘Maxim Silencer’ and the patent title is ‘Silent firearm’ (Greener, 1910;
Maxim, 1909).
90
Magazines, drums, belts, and clips

Arms are commonly encountered with ammunition, often found loaded into box
magazines, drum magazines, belts, and clips (see Box 3.4). Collectively, these
items are known as ‘feed devices’.55 The most commonly encountered feed de-
vices are detachable box magazines (see Image 3.25). These items are traditional-
ly made of stamped and often ribbed metal, but may also be plastic, and are
sometimes translucent. Crucially, they include a spring and a follower to permit
feeding of cartridges. Magazines often have a distinctive shape, which makes
them useful for identifying the weapons to which they are attached. AKM-pattern
weapons, for example, are often noted for their distinctive banana-shaped mag-
azines. The shape of these magazines is markedly different from AK-74 maga-
zines, which are straighter in appearance.
‘Drum’ magazines are higher capacity derivatives of the detachable box mag-
azine. In drum magazines, cartridges are stored in a circular (rather than linear)
arrangement.56 Common drum magazines hold between 40 and 100 cartridges
(see Images 3.26 and 3.27).
Image 3.25 Examples of detachable box magazines
a b c d e
Note: (a) A metal detachable box magazine with a slight curve to its profile, fitted to a German Heckler & Koch HK416D
self-loading rifle; (b) A metal detachable box magazine with a pronounced curve to its profile, fitted to a Serbian Zastava
M70B1 self-loading rifle; (c) A metal detachable box magazine with a painted finish and polymer butt-plate, fitted to a Belgian
FN Herstal SCAR-H self-loading rifle; (d) A metal detachable box magazine fitted to an Italian Beretta Model 12S SMG;
(e) A translucent polymer detachable box magazine fitted to a German Heckler & Koch HK417 self-loading rifle.
55 Note that although ammunition boxes (including drum-type examples) are often installed into
fixtures on a machine gun mount for convenience and to increase the reliability of feed, they do
not themselves constitute a feed device.
56 Some arrangements are helical (see Image 3.26).
91
Image 3.26 Detachable drum (left) and helical drum (right) magazines
Sources: Lposka/Wikimedia Commons; Vitaly V. Kuzmin
The highest capacity feed devices Image 3.27 A non-disintegrating belt of

are generally machine gun belts, which 7.62 × 39 mm cartridges contained
within the external drum-type container
include disintegrating and non-disin-
of an RPD LMG
tegrating varieties. Disintegrating belts
feature links that are separated during
the firing cycle and are thrown clear of
the weapon in a similar fashion to emp-
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ty cartridge cases (see Image 3.28b). In

most cases, they may be collected and
reused. Non-disintegrating belts
(sometimes called ‘continuous belts’)
are older, but are still in widespread
use (see Image 3.28a). Belts and links
are often useful for identification, as
are the belt feed mechanisms of ma-
chine guns (see Image 3.29). For exam-
ple, the visually-similar DShK and
DShKM heavy machine guns have dif-
ferent feed mechanisms (see Image
3.30).57 Source: Kristóf Nagy/ARES
57 While heavy machine guns are technically light weapons, Image 3.30 provides an excellent ex-
ample of differentiating otherwise similar looking guns.
92
Image 3.28 Non-disintegrating and disintegrating machine gun belts

a b
Note: (a) Non-disintegrating belt (7.62 × 39 mm cartridges in a belt used by the Soviet RPD LMG); (b) Disintegrating belt
and links (7.62 × 51 mm cartridges in M13 links, as used by the American M240 general-purpose machine gun, for example).
Source: Jack Dutschke/ARES
Image 3.29 Left- and right-side views of a typical belt feed mechanism, including top
cover, in this case an FN Herstal Minimi LMG
93
Image 3.30 The belt feed mechanisms of DShK (left) and DShKM (right) HMGs
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Note: These mechanisms exhibit distinctive differences in geometry, which is an important differential identification feature
for distinguishing these otherwise similar guns.
The presence (or absence) of a certain type of feed device sometimes provides
clues regarding sources of weapons and other items, the level of weapons knowl-
edge of the user, or other logistical considerations. Criminals sometimes remove
a weapon from a crime scene but abandon used magazines or drums, which may
allow for partial identification of the weapon system. For example, magazines
such as those for AKM- or FN Herstal FAL-pattern weapons, which are designed
to be ‘rocked’ into place and retained by means of a pivoting ‘paddle’, have lugs
at the front and rear that can be easily identified. Magazines designed to be sim-
ply pushed into place will have a slot into which the magazine catch locates, such
as the push-button found on AR15-pattern rifles (see Image 3.31). Belts and links
provide similar clues. Links, in particular, are rarely recovered by combatants.
94
Typically, ‘Western’ machine guns employ disintegrating links, while equivalents

from former-Warsaw Pact countries use non-disintegrating belts. There are excep-
tions, of course. Some Warsaw Pact models have been redesigned (or converted)
to use disintegrating belts and some ‘Western’ machine guns use non-disintegrat-
ing belts. The FN Herstal MAG, for example, has been offered to customers in
both configurations (FN, c.1990).
Feed devices may also feature their own markings, which are described under
the ‘Weapon markings’ section, below. However, as magazines are the single most
interchangeable component of a firearm, these markings may reveal little about
the weapon with which they are used.
Image 3.31 AR-15-type (left) and AK-type (right) magazines
Note: Identifying characteristics include the slot into which the magazine catch locates on the AR-15-type (M16) magazine,
and the pronounced lugs at the top of the AK magazine, the rear of which is retained by means of a pivoting ‘paddle’-type
magazine release.
Source: Kristóf Nagy/ARES
95
Box 3.4 Myths and misconceptions: ‘clip’ or ‘magazine’?

The word ‘clip’ is frequently misused in place of ‘magazine’. In fact, clips are a completely differ-
ent type of feeding device. Unlike magazines, clips generally lack a significant spring or follower,
relying upon the feed mechanism of the firearm and/or the user to feed the clip and/or its ammuni-
tion into the weapon (see Image 3.32). There are several types of clips. ‘En bloc’ clips are retained
within the receiver until empty and then, typically, automatically ejected by the firearm (Ferguson,
2016). ‘Chargers’ or ‘stripper clips’, which are not generally loaded into the firearm, are simple
strips, typically made of metal, shaped to hold several cartridges and store them conveniently for
rapid loading into a magazine (Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2012).58 A final form of clip is the ‘moon’
(circular) or ‘half-moon’ (semi-circular) clip used to hold revolver cartridges in groups for faster re-
loading. Unlike common use of the charger clip or the en bloc clip, the moon clip is retained with-
in the weapon until manually expelled along with the empty cartridges (ARES, 2017).
Image 3.32 Clips versus magazines
a b
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Note: (a) Examples of en bloc (left) and charger/stripper clips (right). (b) A (transparent polymer) removable box
magazine for comparison.
Source: Wikimedia Commons/Amenhtp/Rama
Finishes
The finish of certain components of a weapon can serve as an important identi-
fying characteristic (see examples in Image 3.33). ‘Finish’ is the catch-all term used
to describe a variety of processes which protect a firearm from handling, wear,
58 Chargers or stripper clips are sometimes made of other materials, including plastic and card-
board.
96
Image 3.33 Examples of firearm finishes and the elements. Unfinished metal

components are typically at risk of
rusting, especially in field conditions.59
Wooden components are also finished,
generally with various oils, waxes, and
sealants. In some cases, firearms may
be finished to a high standard. These
weapons are sometimes known as ‘lux-
ury’, ‘premium’, or ‘presentation’ guns,
or by their make or manufacturer’s
grading system.60 They often feature
nickel, silver, or gold metal finishes
(see Box 3.5), wooden components that
are carved or have distinctive patterns,
inlaid precious materials, and engrav-
ing.61
Finished items come in a wide ar-
ray of colours, but the most common
finish formulation is ‘bluing’ (some-
times ‘blueing’), named for its distinc-
tive blue to blue-black colouration. The
term ‘bluing’ is sometimes used to re-
fer more generally to a wide range of
oxidation processes, including ‘hot’
and ‘cold’ bluing, browning, and phos-
phatizing (known commercially as
Note: These finishes are offered by a US company selling
‘Parkerizing’ or ‘Bonderizing’) (Muel-
reproduction ‘Old West’ firearms.
Source: Cimarron Firearms Co ler and Olson, 1968). Additionally,
59 Unfinished firearms and metallic firearms components—that is, those which remain bare metal—
are often referred to as being ‘in the white’.
60 Different manufacturers may use a range of terms such as ‘presidential grade’, ‘double fine’,
‘AAA’, etc.
61 These distinctive patterns, which result from various grain orientations, are the ‘figure’ of the
wood (Wood Magazine, n.d.). Distinctive wood figure, along with scratches, dents, and other
marks, may help to distinguish a particular weapon.
97
Image 3.34 A range of firearms-specific paint finishes
Source: Cerakote
metal plating has long been a common method of preventing corrosion on fire-
arms and other metal products.62 The most common plating consists of silver-
coloured finishes, such as silver, nickel, or chrome.
While bluing remains the dominant traditional method of firearms finishing,
paint coatings are becoming more popular (see Image 3.34). Some paints have
Handbook
improved in quality to the point that they are as resilient as bluing, while remain-
ing simpler and cheaper to apply (Cerakote, 2017a; 2018). They range in quality
and complexity from a single coat of commercial spray paint to more complex
and professional systems involving multiple priming layers and oven curing at
specific temperatures (Cerakote, 2017b). In some cases, both oxidation processes
and paint are applied to give a maximum amount of protection to a firearm.63
62 Most plating methods are electrolytic (‘electroplating’), involving the submersion of the part to be
plated in an electrolyte solution containing dissolved ions of the desired metal compound. An
electric current is used to deposit these ions on to the surface of the part being plated. Electroless
plating is also used for some applications, and relies on an autocatalytic reaction instead of elec-
tricity (SPC, n.d.). Modern arms now often incorporate aluminium components, which cannot be
blued chemically, and these components are typically anodized—a type of electrolytic metal
plating. Plating is also used on steel components, generally to apply a silver or nickel finish for
decorative purposes or a chrome finish to resist corrosion more effectively than bluing. Various
vacuum deposition methods, most often physical vapour deposition (PVD) or chemical vapour
deposition (CVD), are also sometimes used to produce thin films and coatings on various compo-
nents (Mueller and Olson, 1968; SPC, n.d.).
63 See, for example, Forgotten Weapons (2017c).
98
Box 3.5 Myths and misconceptions: ‘golden guns’
When expensive or ornate guns are found in conflict zones, they often become the basis of exag-
gerated claims and tall stories. Weapons of this type, many of which are finished in gold or gold-
coloured plating, are often attributed to overthrown dictators and other high-ranking former regime
officials. Such stories are notoriously difficult to verify. In Libya, for example, Western media were
fascinated by tales of a ‘golden gun’ captured from Colonel Qaddafi himself.43
Contrary to some media claims, there is no single ‘golden gun’ of this type in Libya. In fact, 50
‘golden’ Belgian-made ‘Renaissance’ grade pistols were exported to Libya as part of a 2009 arms
deal. The weapons were intended for a brigade commanded by one of Qaddafi’s sons (Jenzen-
Jones, 2016c). They are all engraved with custom details, including the name of the brigade, and
feature customized hardwood grip panels inlaid with the Libyan seal (see Image 3.35).
Image 3.35 An FN Herstal High-Power ‘Renaissance’ grade handgun, documented

in Misrata, Libya, July 2016
Source: Stanislav Krupařvia ARES
These handguns have now been documented in several locations in Libya, including on illicit arms
markets operating via social media, with the sellers often claiming the weapon in question be-
longed to Qaddafi. Other guns reportedly belonging to Qaddafi include a Smith & Wesson revolver
and an FN Herstal Five-seveN self-loading pistol (ARES, n.d.; Krupař, 2016).
While high-ranking military and government personnel in conflict zones may own presentation
grade guns, researchers should thoroughly investigate third-party claims regarding the provenance
of these weapons. Some guns of this type may be visually unique and easily tied to a particular in-
dividual or incident. Many others, however, are produced in quantity and require a close examina-
tion of both the individual weapon’s physical features, and unique identifying markings such as its
serial number. Weapons of this type may have very interesting stories attached to them, but will fre-
quently become a target for exaggeration and deception.
64 See, for example, Gatehouse (2011; 2016).
99
Weapon markings
Markings are words, letters, numbers, and symbols intended to convey informa-
tion about the weapon, such as its make and/or manufacturer, country of origin,
model, calibre, modes of operation, exporting or importing company or country,
serial number, etc. The markings on small arms and light weapons are often one
of the best sources of identifying information. The vast majority of arms are
marked by the manufacturer, and many are also marked by parties that transfer,
import, export, or assemble the weapons (Jenzen-Jones and McCollum, 2016).
Markings were traditionally engraved or stamped by hand. Most markings
were either machine stamped, often pressed deep into the metal by a powerful
roller tool (‘roll-marked’), or cast in place (in which case they may sometimes be
raised rather than depressed). Modern markings are often engraved, etched with
Image 3.36 Factory markings reflecting manufacture prior to and after November–
December 1971
a
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Note: (a) Factory marking reflecting manufacture prior to November–December 1971, marked: ‘FABRIQUE NATIONALE
D’ARMES DE GUERRE–HERSTAL–BELGIQUE’. (b) Factory marking reflecting manufacture after November–December
1971, marked: ‘FABRIQUE NATIONALE HERSTAL BELGIQUE’.
Source: Jenzen-Jones and Spleeters (2015)
100
lasers, or, in the case of polymer components, applied using heat. Weapons are

marked during and, in some cases, after production (Jenzen-Jones and McCollum,
2016).
Changes in the location, style (including font), content, and other aspects of
markings often provide important clues regarding the provenance and date of
manufacture of a particular weapon. For example, between November and De-
cember 1971, FN Herstal amended its factory marking from ‘Fabrique Nationale
d’Armes de Guerre Herstal Belgique’ to ‘Fabrique Nationale Herstal Belgique’
(see Image 3.36). The former factory name marked on a rifle thus indicates that it
was made before November 1971 (Jenzen-Jones and Spleeters, 2015). This is one
way of determining the age of weapons even when production dates are absent
or not visible.65 Investigators should also be aware of counterfeit and reproduction
firearms, which may be marked in a misleading or confusing manner (see Box 3.6).
Box 3.6 Counterfeit and reproduction firearms

Counterfeit or copy weapons are produced in certain parts of the world, particularly in the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan and in the Philippines (see Chapter 6). These weapons are some-
times marked in a way that does not reflect their true origin, model, or other properties. The spuri-
ous markings, which often mimic the markings on authentic firearms, are used to increase the mar-
ket value and/or obscure the point of origin of the counterfeit weapon (Hays and Jenzen-Jones,
2018) (see Images 3.37 and 3.38). Reproductions of historical arms are produced both for and by
consumers interested in weapons which may not otherwise be readily available, including civilian
‘copies’ of military weapons. These firearms are often produced by legitimate manufacturers and
marketed as reproductions (see Image 3.39).66 Nonetheless, the physical features and markings on
such weapons may confuse some investigators, especially if not closely scrutinized. Similarly, some
weapons are refurbished or refinished in ways that are not consistent with their original purpose or
design. For these reasons, markings should always be assessed in combination with the physical
characteristics of a weapon.
Image 3.37 Markings on a Chinese-made counterfeit pistol, purporting to have

been produced by FN Herstal in Belgium
Note: The markings that the producer attempted to replicate should have read: ‘FABRIQUE NATIONALE D’ARMES
DE GUERRE HERSTAL’.
Source: McCollum (2014b) 
65 See, for example, Jenzen-Jones and Elliott (2015).

66 See, for example, Reed (2016).
101
 Image 3.38 Spurious markings on a self-loading rifle falsely claimed to be an

AK-103
Note: This self-loading rifle was offered for sale on the black market in Yemen. It featured black polymer furniture
and an AK-74-type muzzle brake, making it physically similar to an AK-103.
Source: ARES (n.d.)
Handbook
Image 3.39 The Troy Industries GAU-5/A/A, a modern reproduction of the Vietnam
War-era GAU-5A/A self-loading rifle
Note: This self-loading rifle was adopted by the US Air Force and famously used by US special operations forces (the
so-called ‘Sơn Tay Raiders’) during Operation Ivory Coast in 1970. An inspection of the reproduction markings may
fool a non-specialist, and it is difficult to distinguish the fact that it is a reproduction by an assessment of its physical
features without close inspection.
Source: Troy Industries
102
Make, manufacturer, factory, arsenal, and country markings

Small arms usually have markings that denote the make and/or manufacturer,
country of origin, and, less frequently, the production facility and/or storage ar-
senal. These markings are often useful in identifying and tracking weapons.
Factory, arsenal, and country markings can dramatically reduce the number
of potential countries of origin and manufacturers of a particular weapon, which,
in turn, aids in the identification of the model or variant of the weapon. Manu-
facturer and factory markings consist of the name of the manufacturer or factory,
an alphabetical or alphanumeric code, a symbol, or a combination thereof. Mili-
tary firearms, particularly those which have traditionally been produced at state
facilities, are rarely marked with a country of origin, but are likely to feature the
name (or factory code or logo) of the factory where the weapon was produced
(see Image 3.40).
Civilian and law enforcement weapons typically display the commercial name
of the manufacturer, but sometimes are marked with only country of origin, or
even country of import markings. However, with the shift later in the 20th cen-
tury towards commercial procurement of military weapons, combined with the
Image 3.40 Examples of factory markings

a b
Factory symbol:
‘Łucznik’ (Poland)
Factory symbol: ‘IZHMASH’ (USSR)
Note: (a) Factory marking (11 in oval; FB “Łucznik” factory code) on a Polish Zakłady Metalowe “Predom-Łucznik” kbk
AKMS self-loading rifle. Note also the production date (1975) and serial number (SW03042), the latter stamped in part
on the bolt assembly (visible as the top cover has been removed). (b) Factory marking (arrow in triangle; IZHMASH fac-
tory code)46 on a Soviet AKMS self-loading rifle. Note also the year of production (1972) and serial number (ИР2530), the
latter stamped in part on the top cover (530).
Source: ARES (n.d.)
67 Now marketed under the ‘Kalashnikov’ brand of Concern Kalashnikov.
103
Image 3.41 Make, manufacturer, and country of origin markings on a German Heckler
& Koch USP self-loading pistol
Make (also manufacturer)
Country of origin
Note: This image also shows the stylized ‘HK’ logo, calibre marking (.45 Auto), and serial number (25-024604).
introduction of various legal controls on markings in many states, most recently-

produced weapons feature make and/or manufacturer markings as well as a
country of origin marking (see Image 3.41). In either case, the originating town,
city, or even full postal address of the manufacturer is sometimes listed. In some
Handbook
cases, manufacturing-related markings may be difficult to distinguish from re-

tailer or importer markings.
The ‘make’ of the weapon is generally analogous to a weapon’s ‘brand’, and
is typically marked on the weapon. In some cases, the weapon will be marked
with the ‘make’ rather than ‘manufacturer’.68 Image 3.42 shows a Russian Baikal
self-loading shotgun marked with the make (Baikal). The manufacturer of this
weapon is Concern Kalashnikov (not marked), which produces three brands of
weapons at two major manufacturing plants. The ‘manufacturer’ of a weapon is
the entity that actually produces that weapon. Make and manufacturer are often
confused. A simple rule to remember is that what is marked on the weapon can
generally be considered its make. This may also be the manufacturer (see Image
3.43). If a manufacturer or ‘make’ marking is consistent with the overall physical
features of a weapon, a tentative identification is relatively easy to establish.
68 This is sometimes the case when weapons are produced under a ‘white label’ approach, where
subsequent sellers will mark the weapon as if they produced it.
104
Image 3.42 Make marking on a Russian MP-155 self-loading shotgun

Note: The make, ‘Baikal’, is marked clearly on the gun.
Source: Concern Kalashnikov
Image 3.43 Make and manufacturer Country markings take the form of
markings on a Belgian FN Herstal the name of the country of origin, a na-
SCAR-H self-loading rifle
tional coat of arms, a crest, or other
symbol (see Image 3.44). Typically,
these markings appear in an indige-
nous or official language of the country
in which the weapons are manufac-
tured, but in some cases the language
is that of the country of service (for
example, for foreign contracts) (see Im-
age 3.45; Box 3.7). In some cases, coun-
try markings may narrow the possible
years of production. For example,
weapons marked ‘Yugoslavia’ were
produced when Yugoslavia was a rec-
ognized state (between 1929 and 2003).
Note: See the FN Herstal logo at bottom, and ‘FN HERSTAL
Country of origin may also be indicat-
BELGIUM’ at top.
Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES ed by proof marks (see below).
105
Image 3.44 Country marking on a Yugoslavian Zastava Arms M48A bolt-action rifle
Note: The marking shows the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia crest.
Handbook
Image 3.45 A Russian Mosin Nagant rifle marked on the top of the receiver in Russian
(Cyrillic script), but manufactured in Châtellerault, France
Source: McCollum (2014b)
106
Box 3.7 State participation in the small arms and light weapons supply chain
State facilities (also known as ‘arsenals’ or ‘armouries’) are often involved in the small arms and
light weapons supply chain. Some only manufacture weapons or only store them, while others per-
form both functions, occasionally leading to confusion over the actual place of manufacture. These
facilities may also repair, refurbish, maintain, or issue weapons. Some facilities assemble weapons
from prefabricated parts, even when they have the capability to build from scratch different models
of firearms, while other facilities manufacture some components and import others (for example,
facilities in Saudi Arabia and Egypt) (Gaub and Stanley-Lockman, 2017). Increasingly, manufactur-
ers of small arms and light weapons are international corporations with subsidiaries and facilities in
more than one country. Weapon designs may also be licensed for production by other companies
around the world (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d).69 Because of this range of possibilities, it is important to
document all markings wherever possible, and as accurately as possible, to allow for the potential
revision of an identification in light of new information.
Model and calibre designations

Model designations are another important source of information. Many small
arms, whether military or commercial, are marked with a model and iterative
variant designation. For example, the designation ‘L85A2’ refers to an updated
‘A2’ variant of the British L85 rifle (Ferguson, 2017c). This is not always the case
and varies by country and/or manufacturer; Russian AK- and AKM-pattern rifles,
for example, are generally not marked in this way. While some variants of a
weapon bear the same model designations, other close or exact copies are marked
very differently. Some militaries assign their own designations to weapons, some
of which differ significantly from the designation assigned by the designer or
manufacturer. For example, the Barrett M82A1M anti-materiel rifle was adopted
by the US Army as the M107. Barrett later produced a product called the M107A1,
to position the rifle as the successor to the M107 (Choat, 2012; Vining, 2016).
Some companies also assign different designations to the same model of weap-
on. For example, the Heckler & Koch pistol marked as the VP9 in the United States
is marked ‘SFP9’ in Europe.70 Furthermore, model and calibre designations may
be added by importers, assemblers, and other parties after manufacture. In some
cases, the importer’s or assembler’s markings are not technically correct. For ex-
ample, many of the AK-type rifles imported into the United States are erroneous-
69 For a more detailed discussion of the licensed and unlicensed production of small arms, see Jen-
zen-Jones (2017d, pp. 33–38).
70 As seen on Heckler & Koch’s US and European websites in late 2017.
107
Image 3.46 Model and calibre markings ly marked as ‘AK-47’ rifles. Not only
on a German Heckler & Koch HK416D are these rifles not technically ‘AK-47’
self-loading rifle
models, but most were not even made
in Russia or Bulgaria.71
Manufacturer While somewhat less useful than
other markings, calibre designations
can also help distinguish many similar
Model models of firearms. Many weapons are
offered by manufacturers in a range of
calibres. For example, the Remington
Model 700 bolt-action rifle has been
Calibre produced in more than 15 calibres and
has been converted by independent
Note: The model reads ‘HK416D’ and the calibre is marked gunsmiths to other calibres (Lacy, 1989;
as ‘Cal. 5.56 mm × 45’.
van Zwoll, 2014). Calibre designations
may be rendered in imperial or metric
units, and may use either the decimal point or decimal comma. Of course, they
may also be marked using non-English scripts or conventions. Ideally the full
calibre (for example, 7.62 × 39 mm) will appear, but it is also common to find the
Handbook
less helpful bore/bullet diameter only (for example, 7.62 mm). Model and calibre
designations often appear together (see Images 3.46 and 3.47).
In the case of shotguns and muzzle-loading weapons, the gauge or ‘bore’ of
the gun will typically appear, often along with proof marks, on the underside of
the barrel. Viewing these markings may require the disassembly of the weapon.
It is important to note that sometimes the calibre of the weapon and the calibre
designation do not match. When gunsmiths change the calibre of a weapon, they
should also re-mark it with the new calibre designation, but this does not always
happen. Therefore, it may be necessary to test-fit a cartridge (or fired cartridge
case) into a weapon or obtain a chamber cast to determine the correct calibre (see
Image 3.48).72
71 See, for example, Images 3.47c and 3.60.

72 See, for example, Ferguson (2017a). The test-fitted cartridge should ideally be a dummy cartridge
(see Chapter 4). You should not place a live cartridge into the action of any firearm if you do not
have the appropriate safety and handling training.
108
Image 3.47 Examples of model and calibre markings

a
b c
Note: (a) Markings (‘Tabuk’ and ‘Cal. 7.62×39mm’) on the right side of the rear sight block of an Iraqi Tabuk self-loading
rifle. (b) Markings (‘CQ’ and ‘CAL. 5.56MM’) on a Chinese CQ self-loading rifle. (c) Markings (‘WASR 10/63’ and ‘Cal.
7.62x39mm’) on a Romanian GP WASR 10/63 semi-automatic rifle, rebuilt to Pistol Mitralieră md. 1963 standard. These
are post-production markings engraved by an importer.
Sources: C.J. Chivers/The New York Times; Bradley E. Owen/Osprey Security Services via ARES; N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
109
Image 3.48 A rifle with a calibre marking on the top surface of the receiver
Note: The marking reads simply ‘7 M M’. After a chamber cast and test-fitting of a dummy cartridge, it was determined to
be chambered for 7 mm Mauser (7 × 57 mm).
Source: Ferguson (2017a)
Serial numbers and date markings

Serial numbers have been in use for at least 150 years, and were first marked by
manufacturers for their own accounting and marketing purposes (ARES, 2017).
Handbook
Today most serial numbers are engraved, cast, or stamped onto firearms by pro-
ducers as a way of tracing, dating, and identifying the weapon (see Images 3.49–
3.53). They are most often an alphanumeric code, and sometimes incorporate
factory, model, or year designations. Manufacture dates are routinely stamped
adjacent to the true serial number on some firearms, such as certain AK-type rifles
(see below).
Serial numbers are useful for tracing weapons when they are recorded in
documentation pertaining to manufacture, import, export, licensing, or in-coun-
try transfer. Due to national and international legal requirements, a primary se-
rial number is usually marked on a firearm or light weapon’s main assembly
(nearly always the receiver/frame), though the precise location of the number
varies between weapons (Ferguson, Jenzen-Jones, and McCollum, 2014; Jen-
zen-Jones and McCollum, 2016). The simplest serial numbers are single, ‘rolling’
numbers for a given model or variant. Serial numbers for mass-produced arms
run into the millions. However, manufacturers frequently use more than one
range of serial numbers in certain cases, including when:
110
serial numbers become excessively long;

weapons are exported to a particular country or customer;
a new variant of the weapon is introduced; or
a new factory is brought online.
Typically, a prefix and/or suffix will be applied to the serial number to dif-
ferentiate a new range of serial numbers from the old range. Some firearms are
assigned multiple serial numbers by the same factory. Generally, one of these
numbers can be conceived of as the ‘master’ number, used by the factory to
uniquely identify the weapon, and track overall production. One or more other
serial numbers may also be applied, commonly representing other metrics, such
as the number of the weapon within a production run. This practice is uncommon
but awareness of it is essential when tracing some firearms, such as the Belgian-
made FN Herstal FAL self-loading rifle (Jenzen-Jones and Spleeters, 2015). Fire-
arms may also receive an alternative or additional serial number as part of the
importation process, when a weapon has been rebuilt or built from parts by a
party other than the original parts’ manufacturer(s), or when national or region-
al marking practices are applied. Other circumstances in which weapons receive
new serial numbers include when the original serial number is illegible due to
wear or defacement, or when the manufacturer used foreign alphabets or numerals.
Image 3.49 Serial number marking on a Russian AK-103-2 self-loading rifle
Note: The serial number is ‘071464557’. This self-loading rifle was produced by IZHMASH.
Source: ARES (n.d.)
111
Image 3.50 Part-serial number (3042) stamped on a recoil spring guide assembly from
a Polish kbk AKMS self-loading rifle
Note: This is the same weapon as shown in Image 3.40a; note the repetition of the last digits of the serial number.
Source: ARES (n.d.)
Handbook
The serial number is usually duplicated on the bolt and/or bolt carrier carrier
and the barrel, partly because these components may themselves be subject to
legal control, but also to keep the originally manufactured parts together for best
fit and function. In addition, serial numbers are often partially or fully stamped
on other components of the weapon, including, in rare cases, on individual pins,
screws, and springs. Small parts are often marked with only the last few digits of
the full serial number (see Image 3.50).
Given that most small arms have interchangeable parts, serial numbers on
different parts of a weapon sometimes do not correspond, especially when the
weapon has seen extensive use. The weapon may have been initially assembled
from a collection of parts of different provenance, or it may contain replacement
parts. In the case of AK-type weapons, for example, it is often so easy to inter-
change parts that a weapon may include components made in a different country,
for a wholly different model or variant. Parts may even have been produced
decades before or after the host weapon was manufactured. It is also possible that
112
Image 3.51 Serial number (88-003391) Image 3.52 Serial number (BI1229) and

on a German Heckler & Koch HK416D year marking (1956) on a Romanian TTC
self-loading rifle self-loading pistol
Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
markings on various components may not in fact be serial numbers at all: com-
ponents in some vintage firearms are marked with assembly numbers, for ex-
ample (ARES, 2017; Ferguson, Jenzen-Jones, and McCollum, 2014).
In some cases, replacement or interchangeable components issued with a
weapon (such as spare machine gun barrels, or calibre-change kits for so-called
modular weapons) may feature partial or complete serial numbers, which may
confuse investigators in the field. Beretta ARX-160 self-loading rifles, for example,
sometimes feature multiple barrels marked with the full serial number of the
‘parent’ weapon. This makes it difficult to determine whether a given barrel is a
primary or secondary configuration, and also presents cataloguing and tracing
problems. On the other hand, both Heckler & Koch (HK) and FN Herstal (FNH)
‘sub-number’ additional components, featuring the serial number as marked on
the parent weapon followed by either a forward slash (HK) or hyphen (FNH),
then a sequential number. Two barrels for hypothetical gun number 12345 might
thus be marked ‘12345/1’ or ‘12345-1’ and ‘12345/2’ or ‘12345-2’ (Ferguson, Jenzen-
Jones, and McCollum, 2014).
Some criminals and armed groups deliberately attempt to remove serial num-
bers with the goal of preventing authorities from tracing weapons to their source.
It may be possible to recover markings that are ground or filed off (Rowe, 2015).
113
Image 3.53 Post-production serial number (B-252) on a German Heckler & Koch
G36V self-loading rifle
Note: The original serial number has been abraded and a new marking engraved.
Source: Damien Spleeters
Handbook
It is also important to note that while removing serial numbers and other key
markings may impede a tracing attempt, it does not mean that the firearms can-
not be uniquely identified. Experts use different forensic and close inspection
techniques to identify a specific weapon, even in the absence of serial numbers.
Marks which appear similar to serial numbers are sometimes applied by im-
porters, assemblers, or other parties after the weapon is manufactured. Military,
law enforcement, and armed groups often apply ‘rack numbers’ (a basic form of
registration) to weapons (see ‘Import and other markings , below). These numbers
are often mistaken for serial numbers or other markings. For these reasons, se-
rial numbers should be interpreted in conjunction with an analysis of the type
and make or manufacturer of the weapon in question.
Serial numbers are also frequently useful in identifying the manufacture date
of a firearm. Some firearm serial numbers incorporate an alphanumeric code that
can be translated into a date (most commonly a year) of manufacture. For ex-
ample, a Browning Hi Power pistol made in 1969 would have the serial number
114
Image 3.54 Examples of date markings

a b
Note: (a) German Walther PPS self-loading pistol marked (left to right) DE for Germany; eagle over ‘N’ for definitive
smokeless proof (repeated along with manufacturer and calibre marks on the barrel); date code ‘AI’ for 08 (proof year
2008); and the deer antler proof mark of the Beschussamt Ulm C.I.P. accredited Proof House. Note also the safety warn-
ing. (b) Year marking (‘1954’) on a Russian Tula APS automatic pistol. Note also the safety/selector markings (ПР, ОД,
АВТ) and manufacturer marking (star-in-shield for Tula). (c) Date markings on an American Colt Model 1911A1 self-load-
ing pistol. Various date markings have been stamped into the slide, but none of these markings indicate the year of
manufacture of this example.
Sources: Wikimedia Commons/Praiyachat; N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES; Bear Arms Firearms Reference Collection via ARES
115
69C1000, denoting the one thousandth Hi Power pistol (indicated by the letter C)
produced in 1969 (Browning, n.d.). Not all cases are this straightforward. Often,
identifying and deciphering dates in serial numbers requires the assistance of
specialists. In other cases, a simple methodology relying on known cumulative
production data for a given period can be developed.73
Date markings often reflect the year of manufacture, but this is not always the
case, particularly on older military firearms. In some cases, these markings instead
indicate:
the date of factory repair or refurbishment;

the date of adoption by an armed force;
the official or unofficial model designation;
the import date; or
the patent date.
For example, different models and variants of the Colt M1911 pistol feature
both a model number that represents a year of military adoption (1911) and sev-
eral dates in which the manufacturer received patents (for example 1897, 1902,
1905, etc.) (see Image 3.54c) (Lisker, 2018). Dates may appear numerically in two-
or four-digit form (‘85’ or ‘1985’), or as an alphabetical or alphanumeric code, in
Handbook
which case dating the weapon is often difficult or impossible without the manu-
facturer’s cooperation or authoritative reference material. The location of date
markings also varies. Some are placed in a separate location from other markings,
while others are applied next to the serial number, or are an actual component of
the serial number.
Selector, sight, and safety markings

Markings on fire selectors, safety ‘catches’, and sights also provide clues regard-
ing the origin and model of some firearms. For example, many semi-automatic
models of a given weapon can be quickly distinguished from their selective-fire
counterparts by examining the fire selector. Lettering or symbols used to mark
fire selector and safety positions and sight increments, particularly the default
setting on many weapons (often called the ‘zero’ or ‘battle sight’ position), are
sometimes indicative of a specific country of origin, or make or manufacturer.
73 For an example of such a methodology and how it can be applied to arms tracing, see Jenzen-Jones
and Elliott (2015).
116
Image 3.55 Examples of safety/selector markings

a b
c d
Note: (a) Markings (S, 1, A) on a Belgian FN Herstal SCAR-L self-loading rifle. (b) Pictographic markings on a German
Heckler & Koch MP7 SMG. (c) Markings (D, E) on an East German MPi-KM self-loading rifle. (d) Markings (SAFE, SEMI,
AUTO) on a British LANTAC LA-M4 self-loading rifle.
Sources: ARES (n.d.); N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
Selector markings consist of some combination of words, letters, numbers, or

symbols representing different settings for firearms. These settings are ‘safety’,
‘semi-automatic’, ‘automatic’, and sometimes ‘burst fire’.74 The use of English is
common, and some variation on either the US ‘safe, semi-automatic, automatic’
(sometimes acronymized as ‘S,S,A’ or ‘S,1,A’; see Images 3.55a, d), or the British
‘automatic, repetition, safe’ (‘A,R,S’), is often encountered. Markings may direct-
ly represent English words, foreign language words (for example ‘E’ and ‘D’ for
74 The term ‘burst fire’ refers to a firing cycle that restricts an automatic weapon to firing a fixed
number of rounds (typically two or three) for each press of the trigger (ARES, 2017).
117
‘Einzelfeuer’ and ’Dauerfeuer’ on some German weapons, as shown in Image
3.55c) or, as in the case of some Chinese Type 56 rifles, transliterated words (‘L’
and ‘D’ for ‘Liàn’ and ‘Dán’) (Andrew, 2015; McCollum, Stott and Vickers, 2018).
Pictographic fire selector/safety markings are increasingly common (see Image
3.55b).
Some weapons may have special sights for launching rifle grenades, which
are often referred to as auxiliary folding leaf sights, or simply ‘leaf sights’ (Image
3.56b). Markings on these sights are often informative and should be recorded,
when possible.
Although selector markings may be altered, and sights may be replaced en-
tirely, experience in the field suggests that this is rarely done. However, as in all
aspects, care must be taken to assess all physical features and markings, both
individually and together.
Image 3.56 Examples of sight markings

a b
Handbook
Note: (a) Rear sight markings on the adjustable rear sight of a Romanian Pistol Mitralieră md. 1963 self-loading rifle. A ‘P’
appears in place of zero, in bottom left position. (b) Markings on a folding rifle grenade leaf sight on a French MAS Modèle
1936-51 bolt-action rifle.
118
Proof, inspection, and acceptance marks

Proof marks and inspection marks are applied to firearms and parts to show that
they comply with safety standards and meet national expectations regarding
quality (see Image 3.57).75 Not all countries require a weapon to undergo proof;
it is not a legal requirement for sale in the United States, for example. Today, proof
marks from one country are often recognized by other countries and therefore
firearms are less likely to be proofed by multiple government agencies. Where
multiple sets of marks from different jurisdictions are present, however, the marks
provide useful historical information about the firearm in question (McCollum,
2014b; Wirnsberger, 1985).
Proof marks can be used to trace weapons or components to certain countries,
and may also assist in narrowing down a production timeframe. Markings that
include a date code allow for precise dating, but changes to the form and method
of application of other marks may also provide clues regarding the manufacture
date. For example, slight variations in symbols, letters, and placement may indi-
cate the period in which a weapon was proofed. In some cases, especially with
marks applied by certain manufacturers in the United States, proof marks can
Image 3.57 Examples of proof and inspection markings

a b
Note: (a) Proof marks on the bolt head of a Russian Mosin-Nagant Model 1891/30 bolt-action rifle. (b) Proof and inspec-
tion marks on a German Heckler & Koch grenade machine gun.
75 These inspections often consist of firing special proof cartridges, which generate substantially in-
creased peak chamber pressure, to ensure that a barrel and bolt will sustain repeated firings under
conditions of normal use. Proof marks are generally underwritten by government entities in coun-
tries with a history of proofing, including many in Europe (Wirnsberger, 1985).
119
Image 3.58 Inspection marking on an M16 barrel
Note: The ‘C’ indicates the barrel was produced by Colt, ‘MP’ shows the barrel underwent a magnetic particle inspection,
‘5.56 NATO’ indicates the barrel calibre, and ‘1/7’ indicates the twist rate of the barrel’s rifling.
even indicate the manufacturer or factory of production. Some proof marks are
self-explanatory, but interpreting others requires the assistance of a specialist.76
Inspection marks are often confused with proof marks, and indeed some are
applied by a proof house.77 However, most inspection marks are applied at the
factory where the weapon is manufactured, and relate to standards of fit, finish,
and overall quality (hence ‘inspection’). Each inspector is typically assigned a
coded mark, which allows for the identification of the factory and responsible
Handbook
inspector of any weapons with quality or safety issues. Inspection marks are some-
times useful in identifying or confirming the manufacture date of components
that are either detached or part of a rebuilt weapon. They are also occasionally
used to identify weapons with obscured or obliterated make or model marks,
serial numbers, etc.
Military organizations may subject their arms to tests that result in addition-
al inspection markings, such as the ‘MP’ found on US military small arms bar-
rels.78 This indicates the barrel underwent magnetic particle inspection, a test of
the barrel’s integrity distinct from—and additional to—the traditional proof test
(see Image 3.58) (ARDC, 1968).
Finally, acceptance marks and ownership marks are sometimes found on in-
dividual small arms and denote official government ownership of the item. The
76 See, for example, Wirnsberger (1985).

77 Examples include the coded inspector’s marks used at the Belgian proof house in Liège (Wirns-
berger, 1985).
78 These tests are now also performed on some commercial barrels.
120
Image 3.59 Examples of government property and arsenal markings

a b
Note: (a) Government property markings on American Hydra-Matic M16A1. Note also the make/manufacturer, country
of origin, calibre, and serial number markings. (b) Arsenal mark on an Iraqi Tabuk self-loading rifle.
Sources: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES; C.J. Chivers/The New York Times
US military, for example, initially used an image of a flaming bomb, which was
the symbol of the Ordnance Department. This symbol was eventually replaced
by the straightforward ‘PROPERTY OF U.S. GOVT.’ (see Image 3.59a).
Import and other markings

Many other types of markings are applied to small arms and light weapons, in
various locations. They are applied by manufacturers, importers, end users, and
other parties in the chain of custody.
Import markings are applied by exporters or importers, usually to comply
with legislation in the destination country. US regulations for marking imported
firearms are among the most influential. Because of the United States’ position as
the largest commercial market for modern small arms, many manufacturers have
aligned their marking practices to US standards (Jenzen-Jones and McCollum,
2016). The US government requires that the following elements be conspicuous-
ly marked on any firearms imported into the United States (ATF, 2016):79
Serial number
Name of manufacturer
Country of origin
Model designation
Calibre or gauge
Name of importer
City and state of importer
79 Specifically, ‘conspicuously engraved, cast or stamped (impressed)’ (ATF, 2016).
121
Image 3.60 Import markings on a Polish kbk AKM self-loading rifle imported into the
United States
Handbook
Note: The markings are located below the serial number (‘KW10184’) and incorrectly identify the rifle model as an ‘AK47’.
Many national laws and multilateral instruments require that manufacturers

of small arms adhere to stringent marking practices at the time a weapon is pro-
duced. Import marks are often applied in a different fashion to original markings,
sometimes resulting in tell-tale bright metal markings. Image 3.60 shows the mark-
ings on a rifle destined for a US importer (Jenzen-Jones and McCollum, 2016).
Military arms may feature unit markings, or ‘rack numbers’, generally as-
signed for inventory control and auditing purposes. Traditionally these markings
were inscribed into the weapon, and may easily be mistaken for serial numbers
at first glance. Today, many unit markings are often much easier to distinguish
from serial numbers. They are often printed on barcode stickers or QR-style decals
(see Image 3.61a). Some markings are simply painted on to the butt-stock (Image
3.61b).
122
Image 3.61 Examples of inventory markings

a b
Note: (a) Inventory markings and QR code on a US military M4A1 self-loading rifle. (b) Painted ‘rack number’ markings
on US Navy Mossberg 500 series pump-action shotguns.
Sources: US Army; Brendan Mooney
Other markings sometimes found Image 3.62 Patent markings on German

on firearms include safety warnings Heckler & Koch USP
and patent markings, which may prove

useful identifiers (Image 3.62).80 When
documenting arms, a thorough visual
inspection should be conducted to en-
sure that such markings are not over-
looked.
Feed devices
Feed devices are often found in the
field or at crime scenes, either attached
to a weapon or in isolation. Feed devic- Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
es, in this context, include removable
magazines, drums, belts (and individual belt links), and chargers (stripper clips).
These items should be examined for markings, such as those seen in Images
3.63–3.65. It is important to record whether feed devices were found loaded into
a weapon, alongside it, or in isolation. If feed devices are loaded, the cartridges
should be documented if possible.81
80 See an example of a safety warning in Image 3.54a.

81 See Chapter 4 for information on recording small-calibre ammunition characteristics.
123
Image 3.63 Manufacturer markings on magazines
a b
Note: (a) IZHMASH and (b) Arsenal JSCo markings on Russian and Bulgarian AK-pattern 7.62 × 39 mm magazines,
respectively.
Source: Holger Anders
Image 3.64 Partial serial number Image 3.65 Different manufacturer

stamped on the bottom of a Romanian markings on three detachable box
TTC 7.62 × 25 mm magazine magazines for the Danish Hovea m/49
Handbook
SMG
Source: N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES Note: These magazines show different construction tech-
niques, metal finishes, and fonts used for the marking ’36’.
124
Packaging and documentation

Many small arms are observed in the field with packaging and, less frequently,
documentation. There are two types of packaging: outer packaging and inner
packaging. Outer packaging most often consists of wooden shipping crates. Inner
packaging includes weapon cases, plastic packaging, moulded foams, and some
form of paper. Packaging can provide valuable clues as to the origin, place of
production, age, type, and destination of the arms in question. It may also reveal
information regarding ports of transit, dates of transfer, and other important
details (see Images 3.66, 3.67).
Some packaging is marked in a misleading or covert fashion. Crates of weap-
ons exported from North Korea, for example, are often intentionally mislabelled
with phrases such as ‘Parts of rock drill’ and ‘Parts of tractor’ (Jenzen-Jones and
Noakes, forthcoming; see Image 3.68).
Image 3.66 Markings on an external packaging
Note: While the model(s) contained within are not listed on this face of the shipping crate, there is a lot of very valuable
information contained in the image.
Source: Confidential/ARES
125
Image 3.67 Packaging crate from Belgian weapons documented in Libya
Image 3.68 Markings on a crate delivered to Qaddafi-era Libya from North Korea
Handbook
Note: Markings in the top right-hand image indicate that the crate contained ‘Parts of bulldozer’, when it in fact contained
a 122 mm high-explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) artillery rocket. Small arms are also sometimes packaged in a similar
fashion.
126
Documentation can be one of the best sources of information about individ-

ual weapons and arms flows (see Chapters 8 and 9). Documentation on exports,
imports, and in-country transfers often sheds more light on the scale, nature, and
timing of shipments than the arms themselves. These documents often include
contract dates, order quantities, ports of transfer, and the country of origin (see
Image 3.69). Such documents may also contain the names and signatures of indi-
viduals involved in arms transfers—key evidence in certain types of investiga-
tions. Documents are often found inside packaging, but are also sometimes en-
countered in other locations, such as when filed in armouries or depots. Wherever
possible, the authenticity of the documents should be confirmed by comparing
them to verified originals of the same types of documents.
Ancillaries and accessories

Small arms are often found with ancillaries and accessories. Ancillaries are items
commonly provided with a weapon, including slings, cleaning kits, and oil bottles.
Accessories, which are sometimes called ‘auxiliary’ items or ‘attachments’, are
devices that increase the effectiveness or usefulness of a weapon but, generally
speaking, are not essential for its basic, intended use (Grzybowski, Marsh, and
Schroeder, 2012, p. 245). Some accessories, such as under-barrel grenade launch-
ers, are themselves weapons. Other examples include:
sound suppressors;82
optical sights (‘optics’);
fore-grips; and
flashlights.
Accessories are increasingly found outside military and law enforcement

spheres due to the proliferation of—and apparent prestige afforded by—the rails
on which many accessories are mounted.
Ancillaries and accessories sometimes provide clues as to the origins of the
weapons to which they are attached. Some of these items are also indicators of
state or government support. Accessories generally have their own markings,
similar to those found on arms (see Image 3.70). These markings should be care-
fully documented.
82 Sound suppressors are distinct from muzzle attachments by virtue of being typically readily
detachable and not usually supplied with a firearm.
127
Image 3.69 Delivery documentation (packing list) for Russian AK-103-2 self-loading
rifles delivered to Libya
Packing list
Exporter Contract number
number
Consignee and date
Order
number
and date
Serial
numbers
of rifles
Exported Quantity
Handbook
items of exported
items
Signatures and
Date of packing list inspectors’ stamps
Packaging markings
Source: Jenzen-Jones (2016c)
128
Image 3.70 Markings on a German Heckler & Koch AG SA 80 (L17A2) 40 × 46 SR

mm under-barrel grenade launcher attached to an L85 series self-loading rifle
―― Authors: N.R. Jenzen-Jones with Jonathan Ferguson
129
130
CHAPTER 4
Weapons Identification:
Small-calibre Ammunition
Introduction
Ammunition for small arms is frequently encountered in conflict zones, but is

often overlooked despite its importance to the arms and ammunition identifica-
tion process. While firearms are durable goods, and can last for decades, ammu-
nition is a consumable, and supplies must be periodically replenished. As such,
ammunition plays a decisive role in escalating, prolonging, and intensifying armed
conflict (Greene, 2006).
Small-calibre ammunition (less than 20 mm) is used primarily with small arms,
although it is also in use with some light weapons (most notably heavy machine
guns). This chapter provides an overview of small-calibre ammunition and how
to identify it by looking at its physical characteristics, markings, and packaging.
Small-calibre ammunition: an overview

The vast majority of modern small arms use cartridges as ammunition. In the field
of small-calibre ammunition, the terms ‘cartridge’ and ‘round’ are synonymous:
both refer to a single complete unit of ammunition. Modern small-calibre car-
tridges are generally comprised of:
Handbook
1. A projectile, or bullet, which is fired from the gun. It typically consists of a

‘core’ and ‘jacket’.
2. Propellant, which, when ignited, generates the gas pressure that propels the
projectile out of the barrel.
3. A primer, which contains chemical compounds designed to be ignited by a
firing pin. The primer then, in turn, ignites the propellant.
4. A cartridge case, which contains the components of a complete round of am-
munition and, when the weapon is fired, blocks the escape of gases in a way
that causes pressure to build up behind the projectile (Goad and Halsey, 1982;
Jenzen-Jones, 2016a, p. 13).83
Figure 4.1 shows the component parts of a typical small-calibre cartridge.

During the first half of the 20th century, most global militaries had a single
cartridge, typically a so-called ‘full-power’ round in the 7.5 to 8 mm range.84 These
83 An exception is caseless ammunition.

84 Some nations, however, adopted cartridges in the 6.5 mm range. These nations later adopted
supplementary cartridges in the range of 7.7 to 8 mm (Williams, 2015).
132
Figure 4.1 Cross-section of a 7.62 × 51 mm cartridge
Weapons Identification: Small-calibre Ammunition

Cartridge case Core Jacket
Primer Propellant Projectile
Source: Anthony G. Williams/ARES
rounds were used both in the standard bolt-action rifles of the time and in ma-
chine guns. During the Second World War, the German military introduced the
first of a series of so-called ‘intermediate-calibre’ cartridges; that is, cartridges that
are intermediate in size, weight, and power, between those fired by handguns
and SMGs, and those fired by ‘full-power’ rifles. The most influential intermedi-
ate-calibre round is the 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge, which was adopted in 1943 and
widely used in the ubiquitous SKS and AK series of self-loading rifles (Jenzen-
Jones, 2016a; Ponomarev, 2004).
In the early 1960s, the United States adopted the 5.56 × 45 mm cartridge, which
was the first small-calibre, high-velocity (SCHV) round to be widely issued for
military service. SCHV rounds have a longer effective range and weigh less than
previous small-calibre rounds. The cartridge was adopted in conjunction with
the AR-15 (designated as the M16 in US military service), and was a commercial
and military success; at least 16 million AR-15-type rifles had been produced by
late 2015 (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d; Williams, 2015).
In 1980, NATO accepted the 5.56 × 45 mm cartridge as a standard cartridge,
alongside the 7.62 × 51 mm round. Today, the 5.56 × 45 mm cartridge is in service
with numerous NATO and non-NATO states (Johnston and Nelson, 2010; Rott-
man, 2011). In the mid-1970s, the Soviet military also adopted a SCHV round, the
5.45 × 39 mm cartridge, which became standard issue. Nonetheless, the 5.56 × 45
mm and 7.62 × 39 mm cartridges remain the predominant military rifle cartridg-
es in service globally (ARES, 2015a).
133
Despite the widespread adoption of intermediate and SCHV cartridges, full-

power rifle cartridges remain in military service (ARES, 2016a). Most of the
world’s armies now employ a two-calibre system for primary infantry arms (gen-
erally rifles and machine guns). A full-power rifle cartridge is generally employed
with general-purpose machine guns and specialized precision rifles, while an
intermediate or SCHV cartridge is employed with standard service rifles and light
machine guns (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d).
In NATO and allied nations, these two calibres are the 5.56 × 45 mm and 7.62
× 51 mm cartridges. Former Warsaw Pact states have a history of employing the
7.62 × 39 mm and 7.62 × 54R mm cartridges, although some countries have since
replaced or supplemented the former with the 5.45 × 39 mm cartridge. China
relied on the standard Warsaw Pact cartridges before supplementing these with
their own 5.8 × 42 mm cartridge in 1995 (Andrew, 2015; Williams, 2015). These
calibres are described in Table 4.1 and illustrated in Image 4.1.
Recent trends in design and development reveal increasing interest in a so-
called ‘general-purpose’ calibre, which is intended as a single calibre to replace
the current two-calibre system. To date, however, no major military has transi-
tioned to a general-purpose calibre (Jenzen-Jones, 2017d).
Handgun-calibre cartridges are significantly less powerful than rifle-calibre
Handbook
ammunition and require a shorter barrel to achieve their optimum performance.
Table 4.1 Dominant rifle and machine gun cartridges in global military service
Cartridge Country of origin Total Bullet Muzzle Muzzle

designation weight weight velocity energy (J)*
(g)* (g)* (m/s)*
7.62 × 54R mm Russian Empire 24.0 9.5 845 3,400
7.62 × 51 mm United States 24.0 9.5 838 3,340
7.62 × 39 mm Soviet Union 16.5 7.9 715 2,020
5.8 × 42 mm China (PRC) 12.8 4.6 790–970 1,920
5.56 × 45 mm United States 12.0 4.0 875–950 1,530–1,800
5.45 × 39 mm Soviet Union 10.5 3.4 900 1,417
Note: All figures are approximations and vary according to barrel length, cartridge type and loading, and other factors.
* ‘g’: grams; ‘m/s’: metres per second; ‘J’: joule.
Source: Ness and Williams (2015)
134
Image 4.1 Common rifle and machine gun cartridges

a b c d e f
Note: (a) 5.56 × 45 mm; (b) 7.62 × 51 mm; (c) 7.62 × 39 mm; (d) 5.45 × 39 mm; (e) 7.62 × 54R mm; and (f)5.8 × 42 mm.
The cartridges in this image are represented in their actual real-life dimensions.
Consequently, handgun ammunition generally has a shorter effective range than

rifle ammunition (typically of up to 100 m).85 Due to the design imperative to fit
ammunition inside a pistol’s handgrip, these cartridges are limited in size. It is
worth noting, however, that some ammunition used in rifles (notably .22 LR) also
has a short case length (ARES, 2017).
Compared to rifle-calibre cartridges, which were largely standardized by most
countries in the 20th century, different nations adopted a wide variety of hand-
gun-calibre cartridges. Later in the 20th century, NATO and other Western coun-
85 Some of the newer SCHV cartridges used by personal defence weapon (PDW)-type weapons can
be effective up to 150 m or further in longer-barrel SMGs (ARES, 2017). When used in a SMG or
carbine, the ammunition is sometimes loaded to higher pressures which, in conjunction with the
longer barrel, may deliver increased performance (Popenker and Williams, 2012).
135
tries widely adopted the 9 × 19 mm and .45 ACP, while former Warsaw Pact
nations largely standardized on the 9 × 18 mm cartridge. Some handguns and SMGs

are chambered for other ammunition, such as the 5.7 × 28 mm FN round (ARES,
2016a). Table 4.2 and Image 4.2 show some common pistol-calibre cartridges.
Table 4.2 Selected common pistol cartridges worldwide
Cartridge Country of origin Bullet Muzzle Muzzle

designation weight (g)* velocity energy
(m/s)* (J)*
.45 ACP United States 14.9 280 584
9 × 19 mm Germany 8.0 440 774
9 × 18 mm Soviet Union 6.1 310 348
.38 Special United States 9.7 270 366
7.62 × 25 mm Soviet Union 5.5 540 802
5.7 × 28 mm Belgium 2.0 715 511
4.6 × 30 mm Germany 2.0 720 520
Note: All figures are approximations and vary according to barrel length, cartridge type and loading, and other factors.
* ‘g’: grams; ‘m/s’: metres per second; ‘J’: joule.
Handbook
Sources: Barnes and Woodard, 2016; Ness and Williams (2015)
Image 4.2 Common pistol cartridges
a b c d e f g
Note: (a) 9 × 19 mm; (b) 9 × 18 mm; (c) 7.62 × 25 mm; (d) .38 Special; (e) .45 ACP; (f) 5.7 × 28 mm; and (g) 4.6 × 30 mm.
The cartridges in this image are represented in their actual real-life dimensions.
136
Common cartridges for civilian applications vary significantly by country. In

many countries, the cartridges in widespread civilian use reflect those in service
with militaries and law enforcement agencies. In other countries, military car-
tridges are restricted or proscribed by law. In France, for example, any weapons
chambered for common military calibres are subject to more stringent ownership
requirements (France, n.d.). As a result, weapons originally chambered for car-
tridges in ‘military’ calibres are sometimes modified to fire ammunition not re-
stricted under state law (McCollum, 2014a; Yasin, 2013).
Describing and identifying small-calibre ammunition

All small-calibre ammunition is of the same class (munitions (land)), group (pro-
jectiles), and subgroup (small-calibre ammunition) (ARES, forthcoming).86 In
order to determine the type, model, make, manufacturer, and other information,
three steps should be taken:
1. Determine the cartridge designation.

2. Determine the country of origin, make and/or manufacturer, and/or year of
production.
3. Determine the functional type.
While these steps are presented here in a logical order, it is often the case that
information regarding, for example, a cartridge’s functional type may be estab-
lished before, or in the absence of, a positive identification of the make or manu-
facturer.
Figure 4.2 shows one example of the thousands of cartridge configurations,
which vary widely in terms of case composition, projectile and powder type, and
case design. All of these characteristics are important for the identification process.
Markings, including headstamps, also vary substantially, and the top and bottom
codes do not necessarily correspond to ‘factory’ and ‘year’, as is the case in Figure
4.2. Many different types of cartridges are found in conflict zones. In general
terms, the current norm in military small arms ammunition is centrefire ammuni-
tion (see below) with metal cases and jacketed projectiles.
86 There are a very limited number of examples of small arms ammunition—mostly of novel designs
such as miniature rockets—that do not fit into this group and subgroup (ARES, forthcoming).
These types are almost never encountered in the field.
137
Figure 4.2 Basic composition of a 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge
Extractor groove
Rim Case shoulder Sealant
Case Bullet
Factory code
Case Primer Case mouth
head Annulus
Year code Propellant Case neck
Cartridge designation
The term ‘cartridge designation’ often refers to the cartridge’s calibre and case
length (for example, 5.56 × 45 mm). In some cases, a descriptive term may also be
included (for example, 5.56 NATO, or 5.56 × 45 mm NATO). The term ‘calibre’ is
sometimes used as a stand-in for cartridge designation, but has its own definition
Handbook
(see below). The cartridge designation can generally be determined by taking

physical measurements of the cartridge or cartridge case. This Handbook uses
standard metric designations to describe cartridges, measured in millimetres. The
calibre of the projectile is provided first (for example, 7.62), followed by the car-
tridge case length (for example, 39 mm). In this example, the cartridge designation
would be 7.62 × 39 mm. For cartridges that are usually described using imperial
measurements, the imperial measurement should be listed first, followed, if nec-
essary, by the metric measurement in parentheses. An example would be: .303
British (7.7 × 56R mm). The calibre designation of a cartridge reflects the nominal
projectile diameter (see next section). However, this is not necessarily a precise
reflection of the projectile’s actual diameter. The case type may also be reflected
in a cartridge’s designation (see ‘Cartridge case type and shape’ section).
Calibre
The first step in determining a cartridge designation is to identify the calibre of
the cartridge. The calibre designation of a cartridge originates from the nominal
138
projectile diameter. The nominal projectile diameter is typically based on the bore

of a weapon, as measured across the features of the weapon’s rifling.87 The calibre
can be determined by measuring the diameter of the lands (X), the diameter of
the grooves (Y), or the average diameter of both (X+Y divided by two) (see Figure
4.3).88 In some cases, the nominal calibre—the calibre typically associated with
the weapon—is an arbitrary figure, which is provided by the cartridge or weap-
on designer, or another party. For example, when the M40 recoilless rifle, a 105
mm calibre weapon, was adopted into US military service, it was described as
106 mm in order to avoid potential confusion with ammunition from the earlier
105 mm M27 (Jenzen-Jones, 2015c). Recovered projectiles can also be measured
for calibre, and may bear rifling impressions that can help to determine the type
of weapon from which they were fired (see Image 4.3).
Figure 4.3 Distance measured between Image 4.3 A fired projectile, showing
the lands (X) or grooves (Y) of a rifled characteristic impressions left by a
barrel weapon’s rifling (lands)
Source: ARES Source: Diehl and Jenzen-Jones (2012)
87 See Chapter 3 for a description of rifling.

88 Some calibres (typically those using imperial measurements) are commonly measured between
the grooves, instead of being based on the diameter of the lands of the barrel’s rifling, although
this is not always the case. The .303 British cartridge, for example, actually uses a .311 inch bullet
when measured across the lands (7.70 mm vs. 7.90 mm) (Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2012).
139
Country of origin, make, manufacturer, and year of production
The country of origin, make and/or manufacturer, and year of production are
typically identified by examining both the physical characteristics and markings.
The cartridge’s headstamp is generally the most important source of information
on the manufacturer and production year. In Image 4.4, for example, ‘60’ is the
factory (and, in this case, manufacturer) code, while ‘75’ indicates the year of
production. It is worth noting that headstamp configurations are highly variable
(see ‘Headstamps and primers’ section), and this represents a very simple-to-in-
terpret example.
Image 4.4 Headstamp markings on a 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge case

Handbook
Note: The markings show a factory code (60) and year of production (75).
140
Once a country of origin and rough period of production have been ascer-

tained, determining the cartridge’s functional type is typically a straightforward
task. It is most often indicated by projectile colouration, especially markings on
the tip of a bullet, and/or by the physical features of a projectile or additional
markings on the cartridge case.
Functional type
Different types of cartridges are produced to fulfil different roles. A wide range
of functional types are produced, but which types are available varies by calibre.
Common calibres favoured by both military and civilian users—such as 5.56 × 45
mm (and similar .223 Remington) or 7.62 × 51 mm (and similar .308 Winchester)—
often have the widest variety of available types (see Image 4.5, for example). In
modern military usage, ball projectiles, which feature an inert metal core, often
made of lead or a combination of mild steel and lead, are the most common.89
These cartridges are designed to engage personnel under most circumstances,
and are typically cheaper to produce than other types.
Other common types of ammunition in military use include tracer, incendiary,
armour-piercing (AP), and combination types. Many types of ammunition have
combined effects, essentially combining two or more functional types (for ex-
ample, armour-piercing incendiary (API); see Table 4.3). In civilian and law en-
forcement use, soft-point and hollow-point (HP) ammunition is common. These
types of rounds are most often used for hunting and against human targets that
are not wearing body armour, respectively.
A cartridge without a projectile is referred to as a ‘blank’, while inert car-
tridges are generally ‘drill’ or ‘dummy’ rounds.90 Drill rounds are visually iden-
tifiable as inert cartridges by their lack of a primer, colour, and/or the shape of
the case. Dummy rounds, on the other hand, are intended to look like live rounds,
but have had their propellant removed and their primer fired (or otherwise ren-
dered inert).
89 Ball ammunition is the most common type in military service due, in part, to a legal prohibition
against the use of expanding bullets, which is outlined in the Declaration of Saint Petersburg of
1869, and the Hague Declaration of 1899 (IMC, 1868; IPC, 1899; Jenzen-Jones and Williams, 2016).
90 Grenade propelling cartridges, a type of blank, are used in conjunction with rifle grenades or
grenade adapters to propel munitions from the rifle muzzle. They are sometimes known as ‘gre-
nade blanks’.
141
Table 4.3 outlines some common functional types of ammunition, their pri-
mary purpose, and typical users. It is worth noting that there are numerous ex-
ceptions to the examples provided here, and that there are other specialized types
of ammunition that are not included in the table.
The important information to record and analyse when attempting to iden-
tify small-calibre cartridges by their physical characteristics and markings is ad-
dressed in the following sections.
Table 4.3 Purposes and users of ammunition by functional type
Functional type Primary purpose Typical users
Ball (full metal jacket; FMJ) Anti-personnel Military; law enforcement;

civilians
Soft-point Anti-personnel; hunting Civilians
Hollow-point Anti-personnel Law enforcement; civilians
Tracer Anti-personnel; aiming Military

correction
Incendiary Anti-materiel; anti-armour Military

Handbook
(light vehicles)
High-explosive (HE) and Anti-armour (light vehicles); Military

high-explosive incendiary anti-materiel
(HEI)
Armour-piercing (AP) Anti-personnel; anti-armour Military

(light vehicles)
Subsonic Anti-personnel; suppressed Military; law enforcement

fire
Blank Training; movies/TV Law enforcement; civilians
Grenade propelling Firing rifle grenades Military; law enforcement
Training Training Military; law enforcement
Inert (e.g. dummy and drill) Training; collecting Military; law enforcement;
civilians
142
Image 4.5 Various types of 7.62 × 51 mm cartridges

Note: These include ball, blank, tracer, dim tracer, API, short-range training, and other types of cartridges.
Source: Drake Watkins/ARES
Physical characteristics
Cartridge case type and shape

In addition to the case length, cartridge cases are described by two additional
primary physical characteristics: the type of case rim and the shape of the case
walls. These characteristics are very useful when trying to determine cartridge
designation. The case rim, where present, generally serves to aid in the extraction
of fired cartridge cases from the weapon.91
Cartridges are produced with a number of distinct case rim designs. While
most rims are simple enough to visually identify, it is somewhat more difficult to
tell the difference between the various semi-rimmed and rimless ammunition in
circulation. The most common cartridge case rims, examples of which are shown
in Image 4.6, are as follows:
91 The presence, or absence, of a case rim and the design of a case’s rim and walls also influence a
weapon’s headspace. Headspace, sometimes termed ‘cartridge headspace’ (CHS), is the distance
from the face of the closed breech of a firearm to the surface in the chamber on which the cartridge
case seats. Due to the high pressures involved, precise measurement and setting of CHS is crucial
to the safe and reliable operation of a firearm. For a further discussion on CHS, see Ferguson
(2015).
143
Image 4.6 Typical cartridge case rim configurations
a b c d e f
Note: (a) Rimmed; (b) semi-rimmed; (c) rimless; (d) rebated rim; (e) rimless/grooveless; and (f) belted.
Source: Diehl and Jenzen-Jones (2012)
Rimmed cartridge cases feature a case rim with a diameter that is greater than
the diameter of the case body. The calibre designation of rimmed cartridges
often includes the suffix ‘R’, for example, 7.62 × 54R. Some rimmed cartridges
may use a rimfire priming system (see ‘Headstamps and primers’ section).
Semi-rimmed cartridge cases have a case rim diameter which is slightly larg-
er than the case body diameter. The calibre designation of these cartridges
Handbook
often ends in ‘SR’, for example, 7.65 × 15SR (.32 ACP).

Rimless cartridge cases feature a case rim diameter which is approximately
the same as the case body diameter. Many modern military cartridges are
rimless (including 9 × 19, 5.56 × 45, etc.).
Rebated rim cartridge cases, sometimes known as ‘reduced rim’ cases, have
a case rim diameter which is less than the diameter of the case body. The
calibre designation of rebated cartridges sometimes includes the suffix ‘RB’,
for example, 20 × 110RB. Rebated rim cartridges are most often encountered
in relatively large bore rifle cartridges and cannon cartridges.
Belted cartridge cases feature a raised portion on the case body (the ‘belt’),
typically located just above the extractor groove.92 The calibre designation of
belted cartridges often includes the suffix ‘B’, for example 23 × 152B. Small-cal-
ibre examples are uncommon, but include several long-range rifle rounds.
Several medium-calibre cartridges use belted cases (Goad and Halsey, 1982;
Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2012).
92 Not strictly a rim characteristic, but a similar identifier.
144
Caseless ammunition also exists, but is very rare.93

Cartridge case shape is often described as either straight-walled (straight) or
tapered, either of which may also be bottle-necked (necked) (Barnes and Woodard,
2016; Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2012) (see Image 4.7).
Image 4.7 Common cartridge case configurations
a b c d
Note: (a) Tapered (8 × 58R mm Sauer); (b) straight-walled (.40-72 WCF); (c) tapered bottle-necked (.280 Ross); and
(d) straight-walled bottle-necked (.378 Weatherby).
Sources: Drake Watkins/ARES
93 For more information on caseless ammunition, see Jenzen-Jones (2016a). Similarly, rimless/
grooveless cartridge cases are very unusual, and rarely encountered in the field. These cartridges
have no rim at all; they exist with and without a bevel.
145
Straight-walled cartridge cases are the simplest of case designs. Their case
walls appear to be parallel or near-to-parallel when examined in profile. It

should be noted that many cartridge cases typically considered to be ‘straight’
do, in fact, have a slight taper. Straight-walled cases are most commonly used
in pistol-calibre cartridges.
Tapered cartridge cases feature a noticeable taper in diameter along the length
of the cartridge case, designed to aid in the extraction of the case after the
cartridge is fired. The taper generally runs from the base of the cartridge to
either the mouth or the shoulder.
Bottle-necked (or simply ‘necked’) cartridge cases feature a relatively abrupt
reduction in diameter toward the mouth (top) of the case. The vast majority
of modern rifle and machine gun cartridges use necked cartridge case designs.
Necked cartridge cases may be straight-walled or tapered in design.
The type and shape of a cartridge case are very useful distinguishing features
for small-calibre cartridges, and are generally straightforward to assess. Physical
features such as case rim type can often be assessed from images, assuming pho-
tographs taken in profile are available.
Case composition
Handbook
Cartridge cases are made of a variety of materials, but the most common are brass,
copper-clad steel, and coated (often ‘lacquered’) steel. The material type is often
a good indicator of the factory or country of production. Some key materials are
as follows (Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2012; Jenzen-Jones, 2016a):
Brass is the most common cartridge case material. It is used primarily for its
optimal elasticity, which allows for a consistently good case-bore seal when a
weapon is fired. Most ‘cartridge brass’ is so-called ‘yellow brass’ (for example,
Copper Alloy 260, C260), with a composition of roughly 70 per cent copper and
30 per cent zinc. Minor variations in brass composition are sometimes referred to
as ‘brass alloy’ to distinguish them; however, this term is technically redundant.
Copper-clad steel,94 sometimes abbreviated CCS, is frequently and incorrect-
ly referred to as ‘copper washed steel’. This case material is commonly used
in cartridges from former Eastern Bloc countries.
94 The cladding is typically composed of 90–95 per cent copper + zinc.
146
Coated steel is a common cartridge case composition, with various coatings

having been applied over time. Two cartridges in Image 4.8—one in greenish
translucent lacquer typical of Eastern Bloc military production (c), and one in
light grey polymer (d) as seen in more recent Eastern Bloc commercial pro-
duction and elsewhere—are typical examples.95
Aluminium is primarily used because it weighs less than other materials. It
is most commonly encountered in certain practice ammunition, but is also
available in various pistol calibres for regular use.96 Aluminium cases may also
be coated.
Image 4.8 Cartridges with cases made of various materials
a b c d e f g h
Note: (a) Brass; (b) CCS; (c) and (d) two different lacquered steel examples; (e) aluminium; (f) polymer;
(g) nickel-plated brass; (h) blackened.
95 Other lacquers in various shades of green, brown, grey, and other colours also exist.
Various ‘washes’ and light coatings may also be used in the cartridge production process, regard-
less of cartridge case composition. These typically include acids, detergents, and anti-tarnish com-
pounds.
96 Aluminium is easier to extrude than brass, but aluminium cartridge cases are not suitable for re-
loading.
147
Polymer (plastic) cartridge cases are most often used in dummy or training
rounds, as well as shotgun cartridges. Polymer cartridge cases are not yet
widely used because of ongoing performance issues. Nonetheless, a number
of countries are exploring polymer cases, which weigh significantly less than
conventional (metal) cases. Limited examples are now in service with some
armed forces. The vast majority of polymer cased cartridges currently being
produced use metal case heads to ensure reliable function (see Image 4.9).97
Nickel-plated brass cartridge cases are used mainly as an identification fea-
ture for special types of ammunition, such as high-pressure test rounds. Some-
times this finish is also encountered on blank and dummy/drill ammunition.
Image 4.9 Two cartridges of the same calibre (.264 USA)

Handbook
a b
Note: (a) Conventional (all brass) construction; (b) polymer construction with a brass case head. Due to material differ-
ences, the internal dimensions of the cartridge case may be different.
Source: Rebekah Ehrich
97 For more information on ammunition using polymer cartridge cases and other emergent ammu-
nition technologies, see Jenzen-Jones (2016a).
148
Unusually-coloured cartridge cases, including blackened cases, generally serve

as a marking feature for special purpose ammunition, such as high-pressure test
rounds, dummy/drill cartridges, or other types (Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2012).
Some cartridge cases, most commonly those made of brass, may be suitable
for ‘reloading’—reuse after being fired. While reloading, or handloading, is most
common in the civilian shooting world, some armed forces, law enforcement
agencies, and armed groups also reload their ammunition. The latter, in particu-
lar, may resort to reloading ammunition when there is an insufficient quantity of
industrially-produced cartridges or when their quality is poor. Cartridges may
be reloaded to different specifications or purposes than the original round, and
reloaded cartridges are often difficult for non-specialists to identify.
Projectile shape, weight, and jacket

The shape, weight, and jacket characteristics of a projectile can all help to identi-
fy ammunition. Projectile shape can vary significantly between calibres, and even
among different types of ammunition in the same calibre. Several different ‘load-
ings’ of the same calibre and type may be produced, featuring different bullet
dimensions and weights, differing amounts or types of propellant, and other
changes. Image 4.10 shows four different projectiles for the 5.56 × 45 mm cartridge,
of different functional types and projectile shapes. Three of these are the same
weight (62 grains), despite clear differences in dimensions (i.e. shape).
The weight of a projectile is generally measured in grains (United States,
United Kingdom) or grams (Europe). While it would be difficult for a layperson
to determine a projectile’s weight as part of an assembled cartridge, bullet weight
is often marked on packaging—and even sometimes indicated directly or indi-
rectly in a headstamp. Recovered projectiles may also be weighed. Bullet weight
can sometimes, depending on the cartridge, help to determine the loading or
functional type of a cartridge.
Most modern cartridges feature projectiles covered by a thin envelope of met-
al known as a jacket. Projectile jackets vary with the purpose of the cartridge (see
Figure 4.4). Jackets are most commonly made from gilding metal (an alloy of cop-
per and zinc), steel, or gilding metal-clad steel (GMCS). The latter is particularly
common in Eastern Bloc ammunition (Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2012). Cartridges
with so-called ‘full metal jacket’ (FMJ) projectiles are by far the most common, and
ball ammunition, the most common type in military usage, features an FMJ.
149
Image 4.10 Different projectiles for the 5.56 × 45 mm cartridge
a b c d
Handbook
Note: (a) 55 grain jacketed soft point; (b) 62 grain M855 ball; (c) 62 grain M856 tracer; (d) early 62 grain M855A1 ball.98
Figure 4.4 Examples of common projectile jacket configurations
Full metal jacket Soft point Hollow point Capped/tipped
Source: ARES
98 Some consider the M855A1 to be ‘semi-armour-piercing’, a term with no precise, established

meaning.
150
For law enforcement and civilian applications, including hunting, expanding

projectiles are often employed. These bullets generally fall into two broad catego-
ries: jacketed bullets in which the jacket does not cover the tip, leaving the lead
core exposed (known as jacketed soft-point, or JSP); and bullets that have a deep
cavity in the tip to encourage them to deform (known as jacketed-hollow point,
or JHP).99 These are distinct from precision target bullets that also have a reverse-
drawn jacket that wraps around the base of the bullet, but leave only small hole
in the tip (most often known as open-tipped match, or OTM). Some hollow point
projectiles may be capped, or ‘tipped’, to increase aerodynamic stability (Jenzen-
Jones and Williams, 2016).
Crimping, cannelures, and fluting

Primer crimping is intended to hold the primer in place during transport, han-
dling, and firing of the weapon (especially in automatic weapons). Primers are
often secured to cartridge cases using a variety of crimping and ‘staking’ methods,
which appear as a ‘stab’, ‘ring’, ‘box’, or other types of indented markings on the
case head (see Image 4.11c, d). Primer crimping may prove useful in distinguish-
ing cartridges from different manufacturers, batches, lots, or periods of production.
Cannelures are used as crimping rings for the case neck, ensuring the projec-
tile is securely seated at the correct depth in the cartridge case (see Image 4.11a).
Cannelures may also help mate the core and jacket of a bullet together, and
prevent the latter from ‘shedding’ once fired. When applied above the case mouth,
cannelures and knurling of the projectile jacket are sometimes used for identifi-
cation purposes (particularly on military cartridges) (see Image 4.11e). Cartridges
may feature multiple cannelures.
Fluting is a term used to refer to a groove or series of grooves decorating the
surface of a cartridge case. Fluting is most often seen on drill rounds, generally
oriented longitudinally along the case (see Image 4.11b). This serves as a visual
and tactile indicator to distinguish dummy from live cartridges.
99 There are non-jacketed versions of both types, as well.
151
Image 4.11 Examples of various crimping, fluting, and cannelures
c
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152
Markings

Headstamps and primers
Cartridges typically feature alphanumeric characters and/or symbols applied to
the base of cartridge cases, known as headstamps. Headstamps often provide
valuable information about the country of origin, producer, year of production,
calibre, or type of cartridge in question. Some headstamps also include the lot or
batch number of the cartridge. The headstamp is most commonly applied to the
cartridge case during the manufacturing process.
When documenting headstamps, it is customary to refer to the location of the
markings as they would appear on a clock face. Image 4.12d is a typical Eastern
Bloc headstamp, with the factory (manufacturer) code in the 12 o’clock (top) po-
sition, and the last two digits of the year of production in the 6 o’clock (bottom)
position. It is important to note that headstamp configurations vary widely, as
illustrated by the other examples in Images 4.12 and 4.13.
Two common priming methods are used with modern cartridges. Most small-
calibre cartridges make use of a separate primer, a small metallic cup containing
an impact-sensitive chemical compound that is struck by the firing pin of a weap-
on, releases energy quickly, and ignites the propellant in a cartridge. The primer
is located centrally in the head of the cartridge case, and cartridges using this
method of priming are known as centrefire cartridges.100 Primers can be a useful
identification feature based on their colour, and method of securing (including
stakes and crimping; see Images 4.12 and 4.13). Some rimmed cartridges, referred
to as rimfire cartridges, contain primer compound within the rim of the cartridge
instead of a separate primer (see Image 4.12c). Rimfire cartridges are now uncom-
mon in military and law enforcement services.
100 The two most common small-calibre centrefire priming systems are known as the Berdan and
Boxer types, after their inventors. Historically, cartridges using Berdan primers are more common
in Europe (including widely-proliferated Eastern Bloc production from the Soviet Union, Russian
Federation, and China), while those using Boxer primers are more common in the United States
and Canada (Wallace, 2008). When primers have been ruptured or are absent from a fired car-
tridge case, images of the space left and the interior geometry of the case as viewed from the base
of the cartridge can prove a useful identification feature.
153
Image 4.12 Sample headstamps
a b
c d
Handbook
e f
a. German 5.56 × 45 mm cartridge produced by Dynamit AG with 3-stab primer crimp. The lot number is required by
law on German military ammunition.
b. Russian 9 × 18 mm Makarov cartridge with unusual bi-script headstamp in Latin and Cyrillic. Manufactured by Novo-
sibirsk Low Voltage Equipment Plant in 2007.
c. British .22 LR rimfire cartridge produced by Imperial Chemical Industries.
d. Russian/Soviet 5.45 × 39 mm cartridge made by what is now Tula Cartridge Works with standard Eastern Bloc headstamp
configuration, giving the factory at the 12 o’clock position and the year of manufacture at the six o’clock position.
e. Russian (commercial) headstamp of Tula Cartridge Works, with primer missing and Berdan priming system exposed,
seen on a 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge.
f. Unmarked 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge with ring-crimped primer.
154
Image 4.13 Further sample headstamps

a b
c d
e f
a. Danish 5.56 × 45 mm cartridge with three-stab primer crimp produced in 2009. The NATO Symbol of Interchange-
ability (‘cross in circle’) is at the 12 o’clock position.
b. German .300 Winchester Magnum (7.62 × 67B mm) cartridge manufactured by Metallwerk Elisenhütte for export to
the Slovakian Police.
c. Saudi Arabian 7.62 × 51 mm cartridge with three-stab primer crimp, manufactured in Islamic Year 1425 (21 February
2004–9 February 2005). Note the palm tree and crossed swords, Saudi national symbols.
d. British .303 cartridge made by Royal Laboratories in 1937 with a ring-crimped primer.
e. Ukrainian .45 Rubber less-lethal cartridge made by Tekhkrim.
f. Yugoslavian (now Macedonian) 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge with convex primer and distinct primer annulus sealant,
produced by Suvenir AD.
155
Box 4.1 Unmarked, mismarked, and counterfeit headstamps

As with other arms and ammunition, cartridges can be copied or counterfeited. False markings may
be intended to increase the commercial value of a cartridge, or simply to obscure its origins. An ex-
ample of a counterfeit headstamp is shown in Image 4.14. The markings on this cartridge case indi-
cate it was produced at the Royal Ordnance Factory Radway Green, in the United Kingdom, in
1960. However, an examination of the physical features of the cartridge (including the calibre and
case composition), as well as a detailed assessment of the quality and nature of the markings, re-
veal that the cartridge in question was almost certainly produced in China (Diehl and Jenzen-Jones,
2012).
Image 4.14 A counterfeit 7.62 × 51 mm cartridge produced in China, marked so

as to appear to have been produced in the United Kingdom
Handbook
Cartridges are also found with unmarked or blank headstamps, or with errors and omissions in
headstamps.101 For example, the cartridges shown in Image 4.15 are of Sudanese origin, produced
by the Military Industry Corporation (Jenzen-Jones, 2014c). Recently-produced Sudanese cartridges
typically feature a three-position headstamp (see Image 4.15b) that includes a calibre identifier (in
this case, 39, indicating a 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge), a two- or three-digit code representing the year
of manufacture (in this case 12, indicating production in 2012), and a single digit believed to rep-
resent the batch number or production line. The headstamp in Image 4.15a lacks this third mark-
ing. It is unclear whether this omission was deliberate, or a production error.
101 Errors and omissions may be introduced during the production process, or subsequently.
156
Image 4.15 Sudanese 7.62 × 39 mm cartridges
a b
Note: (a) Cartridge produced in 2009 by Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation, with just two markings, rather than
the usual three. (b) A typically-configured cartridge of this period (produced in 2012) and calibre, which includes all
three markings.
Source: C.J. Chivers/The New York Times
Finally, reloaded cartridge cases may bear headstamps that do not accurately reflect the type and
nature of the cartridge in question.
It is also important to note that shotgun cartridges are particularly difficult to identify from head-
stamps alone.102 A range of third-party producers supply cases (and, less commonly, their compo-
nents (hulls and brass heads)) to the manufacturers of complete cartridges. It is these third-party
producers who often apply the markings to shotshell components, and sell the marked parts to a
number of cartridge producers for assembly. Many shotgun cartridges supplied on military con-
tracts also follow commercial marking practices, making them difficult to distinguish from cart-
ridges manufactured and/or used for civilian purposes (Jenzen-Jones, 2014b).
Case markings (other)

Cartridge cases are sometimes marked in locations other than the case head (that
is, feature markings other than headstamps). Markings on cartridge case walls
often indicate special-purpose functional types, such as grenade blanks and train-
ing rounds, but are also present on shotshells.
102 Shotgun cartridges are sometimes called ‘shotshells’, a term which has been applied to various
cartridges containing shot, not just those fired from shotguns.
157
Projectile colouration and markings
Projectiles are variously marked and coloured, generally to indicate their type or
purpose. Markings on certain commercial cartridges are for branding or market-
ing purposes. A wide range of different projectiles with different marking schemes
are available in common calibres. Image 4.16 shows several projectiles from
7.62 × 39 mm cartridges. It is worth noting the tip colours, as well as the variations
in cannelures, sealants, jacket materials, and projectile shapes.
Various coloured paints and sealants may be applied, sometimes in more than
one colour. It is not uncommon, for example, for a projectile tip to have two
colours (often indicating functional type). The tip marking is often in addition to
a sealant, which may be a different colour. Ammunition commonly documented
in conflict zones will often follow either Warsaw Pact or NATO markings schemes,
which are generally as shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
Image 4.16 Various 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge projectiles from a range of countries and
manufacturers
Handbook
a b c d e f g h i j
Note: (a) Tracer (Soviet Union); (b) tracer (Soviet Union); (c) tracer (Yugoslavia); (d) tracer (Finland); (e) armour-piercing
(Czechoslovakia); (f) armour-piercing (Yugoslavia); (g) ball with mild steel core (Czechoslovakia); (h) ball with mild steel
core (Albania); (i) ball with lead core (Finland); and (j) h
igh-pressure test projectile (German Democratic Republic).
158
Table 4.4 Selected Warsaw Pact projectile colour codes

Projectile colour Cartridge type
No colour Ball
White (tip) Ballistic reference ball
Silver (tip) Light ball with steel core
Yellow (tip) Heavy ball
Green (tip) Tracer
Green (entire projectile) or black (tip) with Subsonic

green band
Black (tip) Armour-piercing (AP)
Black (tip) with red band or red (entire Armour-piercing incendiary (API)

projectile) with black tip
Violet (tip) with red band Armour-piercing incendiary tracer (API-T)
Red (tip) Incendiary
Red (entire projectile) High-explosive incendiary (HEI)
Note: This is a non-exhaustive list; several exceptions and contradictions exist.

Sources: Koll (2009); USSR (1946)
Figure 4.5 Selected Warsaw Pact projectile colour codes
a b c d e f g h i j k l
Note: (a) Ball (FMJ); (b) ballistic reference; (c) light ball; (d) heavy ball; (e) tracer; (f) subsonic; (g) subsonic; (h) AP; (i)
API; (j) API-T; (k) incendiary; (l) HEI.
Source: ARES
159
Table 4.5 Selected NATO and associated military projectile colour codes
Projectile colour Cartridge type
No colour Ball
Green (tip) Ball
Red (tip) or orange (tip) Tracer
Black (tip) Armour-piercing (AP)
Blue (entire projectile) or blue (tip) Short-range training
Blue (entire projectile) with red tip or red Short-range tracer training
(tip) with blue band
Violet (tip) Dim tracer
Red (tip) with yellow band Observation
Silver (tip) or green (tip) with silver band Armour-piercing incendiary (API)
Red (tip) with silver band Armour-piercing incendiary tracer (API-T)
Violet (tip) with silver band Armour-piercing incendiary dim tracer (API-DT)

Handbook
Note: This is a non-exhaustive list; several exceptions and contradictions exist.

Sources: US DoD (2009); Williams (n.d.)
Figure 4.6 Selected NATO and associated military projectile colour codes
a b c d e f g h i j k l m
Note: (a) Ball (FMJ); (b) ball (FMJ); (c) tracer; (d) tracer; (e) AP; (f) short-range training; (g) short-range tracer training;
(h) dim tracer; (i) observation; (j) API; (k) API; (l) API-T; (m) API-DT.
Source: ARES
160
Figure 4.7 Examples of the different colours, types, and application locations of

sealants
a b
Sealant Sealant
Sealant
c d e f
Sources: Diehl and Jenzen-Jones (2012); Damien Spleeters; N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
Sealants
Sealants, which are commonly used to protect the round from moisture, are oc-
casionally useful for identifying the type or production batch of a particular car-
tridge. Some cartridges feature primers or projectiles that are entirely coated in a
sealant. The cartridge in Figure 4.7e, a Romanian made 14.5 × 114 mm MDZ high-
explosive incendiary cartridge, features a sealant-coated projectile and case mouth
sealant. Figure 4.7f, a Vietnamese 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge, shows case mouth
sealant. In some instances, sealants are made from a rubberized polymer or have
an opaque finish (see Figure 4.7d).
Packaging
Packaging for small-calibre ammunition is another valuable source of information.
Such packaging often consists of several layers. Individual rounds for rifles and
handguns are typically packaged in paper and/or card wrappers and cardboard
161
Box 4.2 Myths and misconceptions: ‘poisoned bullets’

Reports of ‘poisoned bullets’ are sometimes encountered in conflict areas, including Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In Libya in 2011, rebel fighters reported to ARES researchers that
they had recovered ‘poison-tipped ammunition’ from regime forces. These cartridges, photos of
which were shared with ARES, feature a green tip colouration. One fighter said: ‘The green is to
indicate the bullet is poisoned. When shot at someone venom is injected and he dies instantly.’103
In fact, the 7.62 × 39 mm cartridges in question were tracer cartridges. While some limited exam-
ples of small-calibre projectiles containing biological or chemical agents have been produced by
governments, they are nearly unheard of in conflict zones. Some non-state actors have experiment-
ed with cartridges containing noxious substances, including the Islamic State group in Syria.104
These rounds are extremely rare, however, even in regions where governments or armed groups
have reportedly developed—or attempted to develop—ammunition containing biological or chem-
ical agents.
boxes (see Image 4.20), usually in multiples of five or ten. A ‘card wrapper’ is a
single piece of card wrapped around some or all of the cartridges in a container.
Some ammunition, particularly pistol-calibre ammunition, may be packaged in
plastic trays, which are sleeved inside a cardboard box (see Image 4.19). Even
seemingly mundane pieces of packaging such as card wrappers may contain
markings or physical features which can be interpreted by specialists. The next
layer of packaging for military-issued ammunition typically consists of a metal
storage container, or ‘tin’. Belted ammunition is typically placed directly into the
Handbook
containers (that is, without additional inner packaging). The metal containers are
then packed into shipping crates (see Image 4.17). The markings on all layers of
packaging contain important information about the age, country of origin, make,
model, and/or purpose of their contents. Examples of this packaging, and the
information conveyed by their markings, are provided below. The paperwork
found inside of, or accompanying, boxes and crates often contains additional
information.
All markings on packaging for small arms ammunition should be recorded, as
should the contents of documents found inside of ammunition crates and boxes.
Image 4.17 shows an example of the markings on the outer packaging of some
small-calibre cartridges. The box marking indicates the calibre (7.62); cartridge
103 ARES interviews with confidential sources.

104 ARES interviews with confidential sources. A Norwegian right-wing extremist also reportedly
planned to incorporate chemical agents into small-calibre ammunition (Diethelm and McKee,
2011).
162
type (Б-32; B-32, an API designation; this also makes it possible to determine the

complete cartridge designation, in this case 7.62 × 54R); case type (ГЖ; GZh, ‘bi-
metallic’ also known as copper-clad steel); number of cartridges (880 ШТ; 880 sht,
or pieces); cartridge lot number (04); year of manufacture (1977); and factory code
(17; factory code for Barnaul Machine Tool Plant JSC, in what was then the So-
viet Union).105 The crate also contains information relating to the propellant type,
lot, year of manufacture, and source. Image 4.18 shows a representative 7.62 ×
54R mm B-32 cartridge such as would be contained within this packaging. The
copper-clad steel cartridge case and tip colour code (black over red, indicating an
API projectile) matches the information on the box in Image 4.17.
Image 4.17 Common markings on Eastern Bloc outer packaging (wooden crate)
Note: This crate contains Soviet 7.62 × 54R mm API cartridges.

105 Now Barnaul Cartridge Plant CJSC.
163
Image 4.18 A representative Soviet 7.62 × 54R mm B-32 cartridge
Source: 7.62x54r.net
Figure 4.8 Typical marking format on Eastern Bloc inner packaging (metal tin)
containing Soviet 7.62 × 54R mm light ball cartridges
Cartridge type Case composition
Calibre
Propellant type
Propellant lot number

Propellant source
Factory
code
Handbook
Propellant
production year
Cartridge Quantity of Projectile tip
Lot series and lot number production cartridges colour code
year
Source: Bulkammo.com
Image 4.19 American Armscor USA .22 TCM cartridges in cardboard packaging with
an inner plastic tray, common to modern commercial ammunition
164
Image 4.20 Examples of cardboard inner packaging associated with cartridge-based

ammunition (especially small arms ammunition)
Note: These are examples of Eastern Bloc

packaging. In the centre column (and one
example in the left-hand row), the coloured
stripes indicate the tip colour code—and
hence cartridge type—of the ammunition.
―― Author: N.R. Jenzen-Jones
165
166
CHAPTER 5
Weapons Identification: Light

Weapons and their Ammunition
Introduction
Light weapons as a class of arms offer far more firepower than small arms but
retain a degree of portability, making them a potent threat in any conflict zone.
These weapons are often mounted to vehicles for rapid and flexible deployment.
Different types of light weapons are designed for engaging different types of
targets, from personnel to aircraft. As such, light weapons range from extraordi-
narily simple to highly complex weapon systems, and make use of a variety of
operating principles and ammunition types.
Light weapons are often described as either ‘direct-fire’ or ‘indirect-fire’ weap-
ons.106 Direct-fire weapons are aimed directly at the target and are generally
employed when a target is visible. Direct-fire weapons include small arms, heavy
machine guns, light cannon, recoilless weapons, some rocket and missile launch-
ers, and some grenade launchers. Direct-fire weapons are often more accurate
than indirect-fire weapons, but generally have shorter ranges and projectiles with
smaller payloads (Cross et al., 2016, p. 43).
Indirect-fire weapons are typically employed when the target cannot be ob-
served, is protected by geographic or structural features, or is located a significant
distance away. These weapons include mortars, some grenade launchers, some
rocket and missile launchers, and larger artillery (Dullum et al., 2017, p. 12).
Handbook
This chapter begins with a brief overview of key types of light weapons, their
physical characteristics, and their markings. A similar analysis of ammunition for
light weapons is then provided. The chapter concludes with a brief section on the
packaging and documentation often encountered with light weapons and their
ammunition.
History and technical development
Heavy machine guns

Heavy machine guns (HMGs) are crew-served automatic firearms, chambered
for a cartridge of more than 8 mm but less than 20 mm in calibre (ARES, 2017).
One of the earliest and most influential examples of these weapons is the US
106 A small number of light weapons are capable of both direct and indirect fire.
168
Browning M2 (1936), which was designed for use against armoured vehicles and
Weapons Identification: Light Weapons and their Ammunition

was chambered for the 12.7 × 99 mm cartridge (see Image 5.1). The M2 was soon
rivalled by the Russian DShK (1938), which is chambered for a comparably large
cartridge (12.7 × 108 mm) (see Image 5.2). Both guns are belt-fed and typically
mounted on vehicles or large, heavy tripods. They were generally used against
targets located between 300 and more than 1,000 metres away. Both weapons have
been updated since their inception and remain in widespread use alongside more
modern models (ARES, 2016a; 2017).
A typical infantry HMG crew consists of a minimum of three operators: one
to carry the gun, one the mount, and one or more to carry and load ammunition.
HMGs are often used to deliver sustained fire in situations where small arms
would be prone to overheating. Some early HMGs featured water cooling systems,
but most now have very heavy and/or interchangeable barrels to deal with the
Image 5.1 A Russian DShKM HMG
Image 5.2 An American Browning M2 HB HMG
Source: US Department of Defense
169
high temperatures generated by automatic fire. So-called ‘quick-change’ barrels
are increasingly common, allowing operators to replace overheated or worn bar-

rels rapidly (ARES, 2017).
Light cannon
The term ‘light cannon’ encompasses several types of rifled firearms chambered
for medium-calibre cartridges (20 mm – <57 mm) that meet the criteria of light
weapons (ARES, 2017). Most of the weapons in this category are considered to be
‘anti-materiel rifles’ (AMRs) (see Image 5.3; Chapter 3), but the category also in-
cludes a smaller number of semi-automatic and automatic weapons designed to
be employed from a mount or vehicle. These latter weapon systems are common-
ly referred to as ‘autocannon’ and are often, although not exclusively, employed
in an anti-aircraft role (see Image 5.4). Most of these weapons are too heavy to be
considered ‘light weapons’; however, a handful meet the light weapons’ weight
and crew criteria. The cut-off between medium- and large-calibre ammunition is
Image 5.3 A South African Denel NTW20 20 × 82 mm2 light cannon, considered by
many to be an anti-materiel rifle
Handbook
170
Image 5.4 A Solothurn S18-1100 20 × generally understood to be 57 mm; this

138B mm autocannon, in an anti-aircraft therefore provides the theoretical up-
mount
per limit for this class. In practice, the
clear majority of weapons in this cate-
gory are chambered for 20 mm car-
tridges (ARES, 2016a; 2017). Exceptions
include craft-produced AMRs cham-
bered for the powerful 23 × 152B mm
cartridge, which have been employed
by a range of non-state actors in Iraq,
Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and elsewhere
(Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). Several
weapon systems commonly and erro-
neously considered to be light cannon
do not meet the definition of light
weapons because of their total system
weight, and so are excluded from this
category. The excluded weapons are
generally considered ‘medium can-
non’. An example is the Soviet ZU-23-2
Source: Wikimedia Commons/Hmaag (ARES, 2017).
Shoulder-fired grenade launchers

Hand-held grenade launchers are weapons that fire specially-designed subsonic
cartridges or semi-caseless ammunition of 20 mm to 40+ mm calibre, typically to
a maximum range of 400–1,000 m (see, for example, Images 5.5 and 5.6). Grenade
launchers generally fire projectiles containing high-explosive (HE) warheads, but
most launchers also fire other projectiles, such as inert training, less-lethal, and
illumination ammunition (ARES, 2017).107 In military use, grenade launchers are
generally issued at the infantry section or squad level. Recent developments
107 Illumination rounds are designed to provide supplemental visible spectrum and/or infrared (IR)
light to aid in operations. This is usually achieved by ignition of a pyrotechnic candle or flare (US
Army, 1991). The increased use of night vision devices in combat has resulted in the development
of IR spectrum candles that do not emit any appreciable visible light. See, for example, Bacon
(2011).
171
Image 5.5 An American M79 break-action 40 × 46SR mm grenade launcher
Image 5.6 A Bulgarian Arsenal MSGL revolver-type 40 × 46SR mm grenade launcher

Handbook
Source: Wikimedia Commons/MarinaJord
include computer-controlled sighting and fuzing systems that allow for the det-
onation of ammunition over targets hiding behind low walls, earth berms, hills,
and other uneven terrain (‘airburst’) (Jenzen-Jones, 2015a). Several modern gre-
nade launchers are designed for standalone use or as under-barrel launchers
(ARES, 2017).108
Broadly speaking, launchers in 40 mm calibres are multipurpose (that is, able
to fire different ammunition types), and almost invariably have rifled barrels
(ARES, 2017). While outwardly similar in appearance, so-called ‘riot guns’, com-
monly chambered for 37/38 mm projectiles, are specifically designed for non-lethal
and less-lethal applications including the launching of flares, and predominantly
have smooth-bore barrels (ARES, 2017).
108 Examples include the German Heckler & Koch GLM (M320 in US military service) and Belgian
FN Herstal FN40GL.
172
Auxiliary grenade launchers

Auxiliary grenade launchers, most commonly under-barrel grenade launchers,
were first deployed experimentally by the United States in the Vietnam War. The
first widely issued model was the US-designed Colt M203 (1969), a breech-load-
ing weapon chambered for the 40 × 46SR mm cartridge. Russia followed a differ-
ent development path and introduced the muzzle-loading GP-25 in 1978, firing
a semi-caseless 40 mm projectile (see Image 5.7). Both models were designed to
be mounted on an existing weapon (the ‘host weapon’), typically an infantry rifle
(ARES, 2017). Auxiliary grenade launchers usually consist of a barrel, a trigger
mechanism, some sort of mounting system, and a special sight (typically a ‘ladder
sight’) that is fitted to the host weapon (see Images 5.8 and 5.9). Most designs are
manually operated, with some form of sliding or pivoting barrel to provide access
for loading. Grips and butt-stocks are typically not included, but recent designs
allow for the addition of a gripstock, effectively converting the weapon into a
hand-held launcher (ARES, 2017). Some modern launchers also feature electron-
ic aiming aids or sensor fuzing (see Box 5.1).
Image 5.7 A Serbian Zastava Arms BGP40 semi-caseless 40 mm under-barrel grenade

launcher, a close copy of the Soviet GP-25 design
173
Image 5.8 A US M203A2 manually-operated 40 × 46SR mm under-barrel grenade
launcher mounted to an M4A1 self-loading rifle
Source: US Air Force
Image 5.9 A Belgian FN Herstal FN40GL manually-operated 40 × 46SR mm under-

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barrel grenade launcher mounted to a FN Herstal SCAR-L self-loading rifle
174
Crew-served grenade launchers

Crew-served grenade launchers are self-loading guns that fire medium-calibre
explosive projectiles at relatively low velocities and at a relatively slow rate of
automatic fire (ARES, 2017; Jenzen-Jones, 2015a, pp. 1–2). Sometimes called
automatic grenade launchers (AGL) or grenade machine guns (GMG), these weap-
ons are typically belt-fed and are operated by a small crew (see, for example,
Image 5.10). The first widely issued crew-served grenade launcher was the US-
designed Hughes MK 19 (1968), which was quickly followed by the Russian
AGS-17 in 1971. Crew-served grenade launchers are generally intended for de-
fending static positions and supporting infantry, but are often adapted for use on
vehicles, including aircraft. Recent development trends include longer-range am-
munition, and the increased use of sophisticated fire control systems (FCS) to
enhance accuracy and achieve specific effects such as airburst (Jenzen-Jones,
2015a, p. 2; ARES, 2017; see Box 5.1 and Image 5.11).
Image 5.10 A Russian AGS-30 AGL with a simple optical sight
Source: Wikimedia Commons/Vitaly V. Kuzmin
175
Image 5.11 A US General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems MK 47 Mod 0
STRIKER AGL with a Raytheon Lightweight Video Sight fire control system
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Source: Australian Department of Defense
Box 5.1 FCSs and airburst munitions for AGLs

There has been a limited trend towards lightweight AGLs fitted with advanced FCSs (see Image
5.11), often paired with an airburst munitions (ABMs) capability (see Image 5.12). Use of these
control systems increases the probability of hitting the target with the first round, allowing opera-
tors to surprise adversaries, rapidly engage multiple targets, and reduce ammunition consumption.
The increased accuracy provided by these systems also has the potential to reduce collateral dam-
age. Using FCSs with ABMs allows operators to reliably engage targets hidden behind hills or other
features of the terrain for cover (targets ‘in defilade’) (Jenzen-Jones, 2015a, p. 2).
ABMs use information provided by the FCS to program the projectile to detonate at a precise point
in space above or next to the target. The rounds are typically programmed either through contact
with the barrel of the weapon, or through radio frequency (RF) or infrared (IR) signals (Jenzen-
Jones, 2015a, pp. 2–3). Some FCS are integral to the weapon system, while others can be added to
existing guns.
176
Image 5.12 Nammo MK 285
programmable pre-fragmented
high-explosive (PPHE)
40 × 53SR mm ABM
Light and medium mortars

Light and medium mortars are portable, indirect-fire infantry support weapons.
Modern mortar designs date back to the early 20th century and consist of a sim-
ple smooth-bore barrel (sometimes called a ‘tube’) with a fixed firing pin at the
base that fires the round when it is dropped into the tube. The tube is generally
attached to a baseplate and supported by a bipod (see Image 5.13). This light-
weight, tactically flexible design has proved useful, and weapons of the same
basic type have been in use ever since (Bull, 2004, pp. 181–82; ARES, 2017).109
109 There are a few rare exceptions, such as breech-loading mortars which can be employed in the
direct-fire role. Alternative propulsion systems have also been developed, notably the German
Rheinmetall ‘FLY-K’ system and its copies, which effectively suppress both sound and infrared
signatures (Jones and Ness, 2013).
177
Image 5.13 A British Stokes 3-inch ‘light The main advances in mortar tech-
trench mortar’ nology since 1918 have been in projec-

tile and propellant design. Recent-
ly-produced mortar rounds have an
aerodynamically shaped warhead with
an additional finned propulsion tail
section, which together increase range,
accuracy, and precision.
Like machine guns, mortars are
commonly classified by their intended
role, which correlates with calibre and
portability. Generally, the larger the
projectile, the longer its range. ‘Light
mortars’ (50–60 mm) have typical rang-
es of one to three kilometres; a 60 mm
mortar is the upper practical limit in
Source: Imperial War Museums
size for a crew of three, largely due to
Image 5.14 Serbian M69 82 mm mortar the weight of the ammunition. NATO
(foreground) and M57 60 mm mortar and other ‘Western’ military forces
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(background) generally use 81 mm calibre weapons

for ‘medium mortars’, while former
Warsaw Pact countries primarily em-
ploy 82 mm equivalents (ARES, 2017;
Jones and Ness, 2013; see Image 5.14).
Generally speaking, these systems
have effective ranges of three to six
kilometres and require a crew of four
or five to carry and operate. ‘Heavy
mortars’ are similar in function and
capabilities to larger towed mortars
and other artillery pieces; several com-
mon heavy mortars have ranges in ex-
cess of seven kilometres, with very
large systems reaching as far as ten
Source: Wikimedia Commons kilometres (Jones and Ness, 2013).
178
When firing a typical mortar, the range of the projectile and the point of impact

can be adjusted both by angling the tube and, generally, by using different sizes
or quantities of auxiliary propellant charges, which increase the range of the
mortar round (Hogg, 2001). Firing in a very high, arcing trajectory, mortars re-
quire specific sighting and laying systems. Conventional mortars do not have
recoil mechanisms, with the main recoil force being transmitted directly to the
ground via the baseplate. Most mortars are only capable of firing at high-angle
trajectories (above 45 degrees), precluding their use as direct-fire weapons. There
are exceptions, including rifled mortars, direct-fire mortars, and self-loading mor-
tars (Dullum et al., 2017, pp. 27, 30), but these systems are limited in number.
It is now possible to employ Global Positioning System (GPS) and laser-guid-
ed projectiles from existing mortar systems. These guided mortars are now pro-
duced and employed by several states, and offer significant advantages over
traditional systems, most notably greatly enhanced precision. Often, no modifi-
cations are necessary to the mortar itself, since the guidance system is located
within the projectile or is part of a bolt-on upgrade kit for existing rounds (see
Image 5.44) (Jenzen-Jones, 2015b, pp. 1–2).
Recoilless weapons
Recoilless weapons are generally sorted into two subcategories: crew-served re-
coilless weapons and shoulder-fired recoilless weapons (alternatively called hand-
held recoilless weapons; see Image 5.15).110 Common crew-served recoilless weap-
ons include the American 106 mm M40, and the Soviet-designed 82 mm B-10
(1954) and SPG-9 (1962) (Tucker, 2015; see Image 5.16). The second subcategory
of recoilless weapons includes the widely proliferated RPG-7-pattern launchers
(1961) (see Box 5.2) and the Swedish 84 mm Carl-Gustaf (1946). These weapons
are usually carried and fired from the shoulder of a single operator. Even though
these weapons were developed decades ago, many are still in use, and despite
numerous upgrade programmes, key operating principles have changed very
110 The first recoilless weapon adopted for military service used an operating principle which em-
ployed a counter-mass of lead balls to equalize the otherwise high recoil generated on firing a
large and heavy projectile. Later designers realized that it was possible to utilize less hazardous
counter-mass materials such as powders or liquids, or even to rely upon the propellant gases
alone (Jenzen-Jones, 2015c, pp. 1, 3–4). Some recoilless weapons feature an auxiliary co-axial gun
(often termed a ‘spotting rifle’) to facilitate aiming (ARES, 2017).
179
little since they were first introduced. Manufacturers, however, have introduced
several new types of ammunition, including rounds with tandem charges to de-
feat reactive and bar armour, multipurpose (‘bunker-buster’) rounds, along with
anti-personnel, illumination, smoke, and training/practice (TP) rounds (ARES,
2017; Jenzen-Jones, 2015c).111
Image 5.15 A Swedish Saab AT4 shoulder-fired recoilless weapon
Source: Saab
Image 5.16 A Russian SPG-9 crew-served recoilless gun

Handbook
111 Smoke is primarily used as an obscurant to mask the location or movement of military units, but
also for signalling and diversion purposes. Different smoke compounds and release mechanisms
are designed to provide smokescreens of specific size, duration, and effect (US Army, 1991, p. 12).
Some smoke compositions (for example, white phosphorous) can have an incendiary effect.
180
Rocket launchers

The first anti-tank rocket launcher to be widely fielded was the US M1 Bazooka
(1942). The Bazooka and its successors are sometimes referred to as ‘man-portable
anti-tank systems’ (MANPATS or MPATS). However, they are also frequently
used to engage other types of vehicles, infantry, structures, and occasionally even
aircraft.112 The rocket launch tube may be reloadable, or disposable, in which case
only one round is fired and the tube is then discarded (see Image 5.17). Rocket
launchers should not be confused with recoilless weapons (see Box 5.2) despite
their overlapping role and some similar operational characteristics (ARES, 2017).
As with recoilless weapons, rocket launchers are divided into two broad cat-
egories: crew-served and shoulder-fired (or ‘hand-held’) (ARES, 2017). Crew-
served rocket launchers are almost invariably reloadable. Some shoulder-fired
launchers are reloadable while others are disposable.
Image 5.17 American Talley Defense Systems M72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW)
series shoulder-fired disposable single-shot 66 mm rocket launchers
Note: (a) M72A3 in extended (ready-to-fire) position; (b) M72 in stowed position.
112 Some variants of rocket launchers designed for use against structures are known as ‘anti-structure
munitions’ or ‘ASM’ (ARES, 2017).
181
Box 5.2 Myths and misconceptions: ‘rocket launchers’ versus ‘recoilless weapons’
The difference between rocket launchers and recoilless weapons is a consistent source of confu-
sion. The confusion stems in part from the fact that rocket launchers such as the M72 LAW are
sometimes described as recoilless, in the sense that the operator perceives very little recoil. The key
difference, however, is that rocket launchers do not propel rockets, which incorporate their own
source of propulsion and would still fire successfully if ignited outside their launch tube (New-
house, 2011). In contrast, recoilless weapons have a functional barrel that contributes directly to
the acceleration of the fired projectile, which is propelled out of the barrel by the expanding gases
generated by burning propellant.
Several common light weapons employ a combination of recoilless and rocket propulsion princi-
ples. Typically, these systems use an expelling charge to launch a projectile a short distance from
the weapon, at which point a rocket motor ignites and propels the projectile towards the target. A
well-known example of such a system is the RPG-7 (see Image 5.18). A typical RPG-7 round, such
as the PG-7V, uses an expelling charge—often erroneously referred to as a ‘booster section’—to
launch the projectile several metres from the barrel before the rocket motor engages and provides
most of the required acceleration (US Army TRADOC, 1976). This ‘two-stage’ launch protects the
operator from the rocket’s back blast. The most common ammunition fired from RPG-7-pattern
launchers employ a combination of recoilless and rocket propulsion principles, while some projec-
tile types, including the widely proliferated OG-7V anti-personnel round, operate purely on the
recoilless principle. Other hybrid systems include the German Panzerfaust 3 and the Swedish AT4
(Jenzen-Jones, 2015c, p. 2; see Image 5.15).
Image 5.18 A Russian RPG-7V shoulder-fired recoilless weapon

Handbook
Anti-tank guided missile systems

As the name implies, man-portable anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems are
distinguished from unguided anti-tank systems such as the RPG-7 or Carl-Gustaf
by the incorporation of targeting and guidance systems. ATGMs, which are also
referred to as anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs), were originally designed to
182
disable armoured vehicles, but are frequently employed against other targets,

such as personnel, light vehicles, and hardened structures (Jenzen-Jones, 2017a,
p. 1).113
First-generation ATGM systems, including the widely proliferated Russian
9K11 Malyutka, operate on the ‘manual command to line-of-sight’ (MCLOS) prin-
ciple, requiring an operator to manually guide the missile onto the target. The
operator uses a joystick-like control that sends signals to the missile through thin
wires trailing behind it (Fulmer, Jenzen-Jones, and Lyamin, 2016; Jenzen-Jones,
2017a, p. 1). This guidance system requires a high degree of skill to operate (Jen-
zen-Jones, 2017a). Many first-generation missiles were fired from rails or boxy
metal housings.
Second-generation missiles, such as the US-designed BGM-71 TOW (adopted
in 1970), typically feature reusable launchers and missiles in self-contained launch
tubes. These missiles are much easier to use than their predecessors due to the
introduction of semi-automatic command to line-of-sight (SACLOS) guidance
systems (see Image 5.19). The operator simply has to keep the target in the cross-
hairs of the weapon’s sight, and the missile does the rest (Fulmer, Jenzen-Jones,
and Lyamin, 2016). Some second-generation missiles are wire-guided while oth-
ers have radio, laser, and optical guidance systems. These missiles often have
effective ranges of between 2,500 and 5,500 m with warhead armour penetration
of up to 900 mm—almost twice the range and effectiveness of first-generation
models (Ness and Williams, 2007, pp. 445–509; Jenzen-Jones, 2017a, pp. 1–2).114
Because the operator of most first- and second-generation ATGMs stays in one
location while guiding the missile to the target, they are vulnerable to counter-
attack. Some later systems, such as the US-designed FGM-148 Javelin (1996),115
are ‘fire and forget’ weapons, using an advanced suite of electro-optical sensors
to store the designated target location and automatically steer the missile to it.
Fire and forget systems are often lighter and capable of being broken down into
smaller component parts for transportability (Jenzen-Jones, 2017a, p. 2).
113 The term ‘anti-tank guided weapons’ also includes other guided anti-tank systems, such as guid-
ed artillery projectiles, guided mortar projectiles, and others (ARES, 2017).
114 Armour penetration is often measured in ‘rolled homogeneous armour equivalency’ (RHAe),
which is not directly equivalent to the thickness of a given vehicle’s armour.
115 Currently manufactured by Raytheon/Lockheed Martin. The Javelin was originally developed by
a joint venture of Texas Instruments and Martin Marietta (Chait, Long, and Lyons, 2006).
183
Image 5.19 A Russian 9K135 Kornet-E The latest generation of ATGMs
SACLOS ATGM with 9M133 series also tend to employ a top-attack profile
missile
in which the missile executes a ‘pop-
up’ manoeuvre just prior to impact,
targeting the top of the vehicle, which
is often its weakest point (Jones and
Ness, 2013).116 Such systems are capa-
ble of hitting targets from long distanc-
es; some modern ATGMs have ranges
of eight kilometres or more. Recent
warhead designs include multipurpose
and anti-personnel warheads, and tan-
dem charges to defeat modern vehicle
armour (ARES, 2017; Jenzen-Jones,
Source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin 2017a, pp. 2–3).
Man-portable air defence systems

Man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) are a class of relatively light-
weight, short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems designed to engage
Handbook
low-flying aircraft (ARES, 2017; Jenzen-Jones, 2017b, p. 1; see Image 5.20).117 They
are derived from earlier and larger SAM systems conceived during the Second
World War. When operated by a crew rather than an individual, these systems
are sometimes referred to as crew-portable air defence systems (CREWPADS)
(ARES, 2017).
The first MANPADS to be fielded was the US FIM-43 ‘Redeye’, introduced
during the Vietnam War (1967). The Redeye was the predecessor of the FIM-92
Stinger, which is famous for its use in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Phillips, 2011).
A year later, in 1968, Russia issued the 9K32 Strela-2, known to NATO as the
SA-7a Grail. This system and the updated 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-7b) proliferated
across the globe in the decades that followed (see Image 5.20) (ARES, 2017).
116 A top-attack profile is sometimes called overfly top-attack (OTA) capability. Top-attack profiles
are sometimes used against targets other than vehicles.
117 MANPADS and other short-range SAMs generally have maximum ranges of less than 10,000 m.
Medium- and long-range SAMs have maximum ranges more than ten times those of short-range
models (Jenzen-Jones, 2017b, p. 3).
184
Image 5.20 A 9K32M Strela-2M MANPADS and its 9M32M SAM

Most MANPADS consist of four main components: a missile in a disposable

launch tube, a gripstock, and a battery (see ‘Barrels and launch tubes’ section).
The vast majority of these systems are ‘fire and forget’ weapons, meaning that,
after the missile is launched, it guides itself to the target with no input from the
operator. In most cases, the missile’s seeker detects the infrared energy emitted
by the targeted aircraft. Early systems were only effective when fired from behind
the aircraft, when the target’s hot engines and airframe are easiest to detect and
track. So-called second- and third-generation systems such as the Russian 9K38
Igla (SA-18) are capable of ‘all-aspect’ tracking, meaning that the missile can
engage the target from the front, sides, or rear. Some of these systems are able to
differentiate between the target and simple countermeasures, such as flares. Lat-
er-generation MANPADS are also faster and more manoeuvrable, and have longer
ranges and more effective warheads than the older systems (ARES, 2017).
A small number of MANPADS employ other types of guidance systems. These
weapons are guided by either radio signals, such as the British Javelin,118 or laser
beams, such as the Swedish Bofors RBS 70 (Jenzen-Jones, 2017b).119 MANPADS
with infrared seekers are by far the most common, however (PM/WRA, n.d.).
Some of the newer models of these systems feature ‘all-target’ warheads, which
have a limited capability to engage ground vehicles (Saab, 2016; see Image 5.21).
118 The British Javelin MANPADS is not to be confused with the ATGM of the same name, described
in the previous section.
119 Bofors is now part of Saab.
185
Image 5.21 A Swedish Saab RBS 70 NG CREWPADS firing BOLIDE ‘all-target’ SAM
Source: Saab
Physical features
The physical features of light weapons are much more varied than small arms.
Some types of light weapons, such as HMGs and cannon, share many features
with small arms, whereas other weapons, including recoilless weapons and mor-
Handbook
tars, follow wholly different design philosophies and architecture. Broadly speak-
ing, many of the same physical characteristics and markings present on small
arms are also present on light weapons. There are some additional considerations,
however, which are outlined below.
Bodies and receivers

HMGs and cannon feature what are essentially scaled-up machine gun receivers
(ARES, 2017). HMG receivers are unmistakeably larger and more robust than
their smaller counterparts (see Image 5.22). In many cases, substantial rivets, bolts,
and welds are visible (see Image 5.23). The patterns of rivets and welds may prove
a useful feature for differentiating between visually similar light weapons, such
as the NSV and Kord HMGs.120 Most mortars, rocket and missile launchers, and
some recoilless weapons do not have a receiver in the conventional sense.
120 See, for example, Ferguson (2014c).
186
Image 5.22 A Browning

M2 HMG and its close
relative and small arms
a
equivalent, the
M1919A6
b
Note: The M1919A6 (b) is smaller but similar to the Browning M2 (a) in appearance.
Source: Jonathan Ferguson/ARES
Image 5.23 The rear of the receiver of a Romanian copy of a KPV HMG
Note: The receiver has a substantial weld and large rivets.

187
Baseplates
As noted above, most mortar systems consist of a stabilizing baseplate, a barrel,

and a bipod. The baseplate transmits recoil forces to the ground or other support-
ing surface, reducing their effects on the aim of the weapon (see Image 5.24). It is
possible that a mortar baseplate might be found in isolation, if the intent is that
a position will be reused, or if a mortar team has been disrupted or killed in action.
It is worth noting that baseplates may themselves be affixed to concrete floors or
vehicle flatbeds.
Image 5.24 The circular baseplate of a British L16 81 mm mortar

Handbook
Note: The large bipod is used to support and adjust the angle of the barrel, and to provide a mount for the optical sight
bracket.
Source: Wikimedia Commons/Hisamikabunomura
188
Barrels and launch tubes

Although similar in some respects, barrels and launch tubes are distinct compo-
nents. A barrel is designed to bear significant internal pressures and is sealed at
one end to prevent the escape of gas. Launch tubes are not subject to substantial
pressures, and act primarily as a guide. Barrels may be rifled or smooth-bore, and
light weapons with barrels may be breech- or muzzle-loading (though muz-
zle-loading is now rare, aside from mortars).
HMGs and cannon generally employ medium-calibre (12.7 mm to >57 mm)
rifled barrels that are noticeably larger and heavier than small arms. Barrels for
HMGs are likely to be readily detachable, but cannon barrels are not (due to their
significant mass and slower rate of fire). Automatic grenade launcher barrels are
most often larger in calibre but shorter in length and may be rifled or smooth-bore.
Most are not quickly detachable. Barrels for recoilless weapons and mortars are
typically more robust than rocket or missile launch tubes, as they are pres-
sure-bearing parts more akin to the barrel of a firearm or artillery piece.
Feed devices
Feed devices for HMGs and cannon are often similar to the feed devices of small
arms. Most commonly, these devices consist of a belt-feed system of cartridges
in disintegrating or non-disintegrating links that are stored and fed from metal
ammunition boxes (see Image 5.25). In some cases, light weapons firing conven-
tional cartridge-based ammunition—including AMRs, light cannon, and grenade
Image 5.25 Examples of belted ammunition

a b
Note: (a) Belted ammunition loaded into a Browning M2 HMG from a metal storage or transit box attached to the weap-
on’s soft-mount. (b) A 30 × 29B cartridge for AGS-17 type grenade launchers loaded into a belt, with two empty links.
Sources: US Department of Defense; N.R. Jenzen-Jones/ARES
189
launchers—feed from oversized box magazines. Recoilless weapons and rocket
launchers are either disposable or reloadable, as described above. Generally

speaking, reloadable recoilless weapons and rocket launchers do not feed from
external feed devices, although there are exceptions.
Accessories
The range of optional accessories for light weapons is significantly smaller than
that for small arms. Some are encountered with optical sights (see Image 5.26),
and HMGs and cannon are often found with spare barrels, parts kits, and spe-
cialized load-bearing and/or storage equipment for the weapon and its ammuni-
tion. These items sometimes help with the identification of an absent weapon.
Image 5.26 An M2 type HMG fitted with various optical sight systems
Handbook
Source: NIOA
Markings
The patterns and formats of light weapons markings are similar to those on small
arms (see Chapter 3), but their format, size, and location are more varied. Like
small arms, the markings on most light weapons are stamped or engraved on the
receiver and other key components. The information conveyed by the markings
often includes the make, model, calibre, production year, and serial number (see
Images 5.27–5.30).
190
Image 5.27 Markings on a Polish DShKM

a b
Note: (a) Factory marking, serial number, and inspection mark on a Polish DShKM. (b) Partial serial number (907) repro-
duced on the muzzle device of the same weapon.
Image 5.28 Markings on a Russian RPG-7V launcher
Model: RPG-7V
Serial number: VP-418
Factory marking: IZHMASH
Production date: 1984g
191
Image 5.29 Markings on the rear of an M40A1-pattern recoilless gun
Handbook
Note: The markings reveal several key details such as the type of weapon (CAÑON S/R; for cañon sin retroceso, or ‘re-
coilless gun’), calibre (106MM), model (M40A1), and year of production (AÑO 1973).
Source: Peter Bouckaert/HRW
Image 5.30 A safety/

operation warning marked
on a Serbian Zastava M93
self-loading crew-served
grenade launcher
Note: The warning reads ‘ПРВИ

ЧЛАНАК НА РЕДЕНИКУ МОРА
БИТИ ПРАЗАН’, which means ‘first
link in belt must be empty’.
192
Some markings are stencilled or hand-painted onto light weapons. This prac-

tice is particularly common with regards to MANPADS and ATGW missile tubes,
as well as various rocket launchers and recoilless weapons. These items often have
additional markings that are stamped or engraved.
Markings on some light weapons are stamped or printed onto a metal plate
(see Image 5.31).121 Such plates, which are riveted or screwed onto a key compo-
nent, are often easily and untraceably removed. Image 5.32 shows a markings
plate on a sighting unit for a US-designed TOW ATGM system.
Image 5.31 Marking plate

on a 9P58 gripstock for the
9K32M Strela-2M MANPADS
Source: ARES (n.d.)
Image 5.32 Marking plate on an American Hughes Aircraft Co. TOW ATGM launch unit
121 Sometimes called a ‘marking plate’ or ‘data plate’.
193
Mortar barrels, baseplates, and mounts are sometimes marked, but may also
be unmarked, or only have a serial number (see Images 5.33 and 5.34). Addition-
ally, the serial number on the baseplate may not match the number on the barrel.
Some marking indicating the model of weapon to which a baseplate or mount
belongs is likely, but not present in all cases.
Image 5.33 Markings on the muzzle end of a British L16A2 81 mm mortar barrel
Handbook
Note: These markings show the calibre (81MM), model/military designation (L16A2), and registration number (‘REG №…’
partially obscured). The complete markings also include the year of manufacture and other details.
Image 5.34 Fire selector

markings (S, F) on a
Vektor Y3 crew-served
40 × 53SR mm automatic
grenade launcher
Note: The Vektor Y3 is now marketed

as the Denel GLI-40.
194
Ammunition for light weapons

Cartridges for HMGs, anti-tank rifles, and AMRs (20 mm or less)
Ammunition for HMGs is, by definition, small-calibre ammunition (see Chapter
4). Among the most common cartridges in this category are the American 12.7 ×
99 mm, also known as the .50 BMG (Browning Machine Gun), and the Soviet 12.7
× 108 mm, both of which were fielded prior to the Second World War and remain
in widespread service today (Williams, 2000; see Table 5.1 and Image 5.35). While
intended primarily for use against armoured vehicles such as tanks, as well as
aircraft and other targets, it quickly became apparent that the rapidly increasing
thickness of tank armour rendered these rounds ineffective in the anti-armour
role. Ammunition for anti-tank rifles (ATRs) and AMRs is often interchangeable
with that used by HMGs.122 As a result, these weapon systems were subsequent-
ly fielded for use against personnel, light structures, unarmoured vehicles, heli-
copters, and other materiel. HMGs are still widely used against these targets today
(ARES, 2017).
Table 5.1 Selected HMG cartridges in military service
Cartridge Country of origin Projectile type Projectile weight (g)

designation
12.7 × 99 mm United States API 43
12.7 × 108 mm Soviet Union API 52
14.5 × 114 mm Soviet Union API 64
Note: All figures are approximations and vary according to cartridge type and loading, and other factors.
Sources: Koll (2009); Williams (n.d.; 2000)
122 The final generation of ATRs adopted special ammunition. The German and Polish armies chose
a small-calibre projectile fired at very high velocity, enabled by a large cartridge case (the 7.9 × 94
mm Panzerbuchse and 7.92 × 107 mm Maroszek cartridges, respectively) (Williams, 2000). Other
nations developed bigger and much more powerful rounds, particularly the Soviet 14.5 × 114 mm
cartridge as used in the PTRD and PTRS rifles, which towards the end of the Second World War
was adopted for use in a large HMG, the KPV, variants and derivatives of which remain in wide-
spread service worldwide (ARES, 2017).
195
Image 5.35 Some sample cartridges used with HMGs, ATRs, and/or AMRs
Handbook
a b c d e f
Note: (a) 7.62 × 51 mm (for scale); (b) 13 × 92SR mm TuF; (c) 7.9 × 94 mm Panzerbuchse; (d) 12.7 × 99 mm (.50 BMG);
(e) 12.7 × 108 mm; and (f) 14.5 × 114 mm.
Physical features
Most ammunition for HMGs closely resembles the small-calibre cartridges used
in standard infantry rifles and light and general-purpose machine guns, albeit
scaled-up considerably (see Chapter 4). These cartridges are commonly produced
from drawn brass or steel cartridge cases and typically employ full metal jacket
(‘ball’) bullets, with cores that are usually made of steel. Other commonly encoun-
tered functional types includes armour-piercing incendiary (API) rounds and
semi-armour-piercing high-explosive incendiary (SAPHEI) rounds. API bullets
196
normally have hardened steel cores with a small quantity of incendiary material

in the jacket tip. Multipurpose SAPHEI bullets have a more complex internal
structure, including tungsten alloy penetrators, HE composition, and a jacket nose
filled with incendiary material (ARES, 2017; Williams, 2000).
Markings
Ammunition for HMGs and AMRs is typically marked in a manner consistent
with other small-calibre ammunition, including the headstamp and tip colour
code (see Chapter 4).
Light cannon cartridges (20 mm – <57 mm)

Light cannon fire medium-calibre cartridges. As noted above, these are, in practice,
largely restricted to cartridges of 20 mm in calibre (see Table 5.2 and Image 5.36).
Table 5.2 Dominant light cannon cartridges in global military service
Projectile
Cartridge Country of Sample ‘AMR’ Sample Projectile weight
designation origin light cannon autocannon type (g)
20 × 82 mm / Germany / Denel NTW20 Denel GA-1 HE 115

20 × 83.5 mm South Africa
20 × 102 mm United States Anzio Nexter HE 101

Ironworks 20M621
models
20 × 110 mm France H Alaan RT-20 Hispano- HE 130

Suiza
HS.404
20 × 128 mm Switzerland None known Oerlikon HE 120

KAA
20 × 138B mm Switzerland Solothurn S18- Breda Model HE 119

1000 35
20 × 139 mm Spain None known Rheinmetall HE 120

Rh 202
23 × 152B mm Soviet Union Craft-produced ZU-23-2 HEI 184

AMRs
Notes: All figures are approximations and vary according to cartridge type and loading, and other factors. Several of the
example autocannon given would not be classified as light weapons, and are provided only for context.
Sources: Hays and Jenzen-Jones (2018); Koll (2009); Williams (2000; 2007)
197
Image 5.36 Examples of cartridges used with light cannon
a b c d e f g h
Handbook
Note: (a) 12.7 × 99 mm (for scale); (b) 20 × 83.5 mm (near copy of 20 × 82 mm); (c) 20 × 110 mm; (d) 20 × 102 mm; (e)
20 × 128 mm; (f) 20 × 139 mm; (g) 20 × 138B mm; and (h) 23 × 152B mm.
The first issued light cannon, the 20 mm Becker, was introduced by Germany
during the First World War. During the Second World War, combatants used a
wide range of cannon in different calibres from many manufacturers. Principally,
these weapons were employed by or against aircraft, but they were also used in
ground fighting roles, particularly when mounted on vehicles (Williams, 2000).
In recent decades, there has been a gradual increase in the size and power of light
cannon mounted on armoured vehicles, but 20 mm guns remain popular for many
purposes (ARES, 2017). As noted above, most cannon are not categorized as light
weapons because of their weight.
Traditional light cannon cartridge types include:
High explosive (HE) and high explosive incendiary (HEI): these cartridges
feature a hollow steel projectile filled with high-explosive and, in some cases,
incendiary composition (see Image 5.37a).
198
Semi-armour-piercing high-explosive (SAPHE) or SAPHEI: these cartridges

feature a stronger projectile with a hard point, generally employing a base
fuse (see Image 5.37a).
Armour-piercing (AP, a hardened projectile) and APHC/APCR (armour-
piercing hard core (US) or armour-piercing composite, rigid (UK)): a hard-
ened, often tungsten, penetrator within a light alloy body.
HE and HEI types are employed against a range of targets including personnel,
light vehicles, structures, and materiel. SAPHE and SAPHEI types are similarly
multipurpose in nature, with improved effectiveness against light armoured
vehicles and structures. AP and APHC are specifically used against armoured
targets, primarily vehicles (ARES, 2017; Williams, 2000).
Light cannon cartridges fielded more recently include armour-piercing
discarding sabot (APDS) rounds, which feature hardened, typically tungsten,
penetrators, with discarding plastic sabots (see Image 5.37b); frangible armour-
Image 5.37 Selected light cannon ammunition
a b
Note: (a) Two sectioned 20 × 128 mm cartridges showing the typical arrangement of SAPHE/SAPHEI (left) and HE/HEI
(right) projectiles; (b) A sectioned APDS projectile, with an additional penetrator at left for comparison.
199
piercing (FAP), which have tungsten penetrators designed to break up into high-
velocity fragments after penetration; and penetrator with enhanced lateral effect
(PELE), also lacking high-explosive contents, and designed to fragment after
penetration. These projectiles are typically available in 20 mm cartridges. Larger
calibre ammunition features additional types of projectiles (ARES, 2017; Ness and
Williams, 2007; Williams, 2000).
Physical features
Most light cannon ammunition is similar to small-calibre ammunition, only larg-
er; however, there are a number of key differences. Cannon projectiles rarely
feature a jacket as they have separate driving or rotating bands which engage the
barrel rifling to spin the projectile. These bands vary in number, location, material,
crimping, and colour, and thus are often useful identification features. Typically,
the bands are made of iron, plastic, or copper, and most commonly one or two
such bands are present. The number of crimps at the mouth of the cartridge case
is another useful diagnostic feature (see Image 5.38) (ARES, 2017; Williams, 2007).
Image 5.38 A Soviet 23 × 152B mm cannon cartridge

Handbook
Note: This cartridge has double crimping at the case mouth, a copper driving band, and a silver-coloured nose fuse with
pink tip marking.
200
Another notable difference between small-calibre cartridges and many medi-

um-calibre cartridges is the presence of a fuse. In some light cannon ammunition,
the fuse will be integral to the projectile and will not be externally visible. In
other cases, however, the fuse will be externally visible and may be one of sever-
al types available for a given projectile. Fuses will have their own physical char-
acteristics, including their composition, shape, and location. Fuses are generally
fitted to the nose of the projectile, but some are located in the base or midsection.123
Most are simple impact fuses, but time and proximity fuses are also in limited
use (ARES, 2017; Williams, 2000).
Markings
Light cannon ammunition is typically marked in a similar way to small-calibre
ammunition, but often features additional elements. Light cannon cartridges of-
ten feature a headstamp and/or case wall marking, as well as a tip colour code.
NATO cannon projectiles are painted to reflect their nature. Standard NATO
colours include yellow (HE), black (AP), and blue (TP—training/practice), with
red bands or lettering to indicate a tracer or incendiary content. Externally visible
fuses may also be marked. Russian projectiles are often not painted, and are
usually differentiated by physical features (ARES, 2017).
Grenade launcher cartridges124

As noted above, grenade launchers fire a variety of relatively low-velocity pro-
jectiles that are sometimes referred to as ‘projected grenades’ (see Image 5.39).125
Early models were of the simple high-explosive type, but high-explosive dual-
purpose (HEDP) rounds have become much more common because their shaped-
charge warheads are effective against some lightly armoured vehicles while
retaining the ability to engage personnel.
123 For more information on types of fuses used with cannon ammunition, see also Dullum et al.
(2017).
124 This section does not address cartridges developed primarily for riot control weapons, such as
those in 37/38 mm calibre.
125 Grenade launchers typically use a high/low pressure system. The primer in the cartridge ignites
the propellant contained within a small high-pressure compartment, from which gas is bled into
a low-pressure compartment, accelerating the grenade gradually up the barrel. In some designs,
both compartments are contained within the cartridge case; in other, semi-caseless designs the
high-pressure compartment is in the base of the projectile, and the low-pressure compartment is
essentially the chamber of the launcher (ARES, 2016a; Williams, 2017).
201
Image 5.39 Some sample cartridges used with grenade launchers
a b c d e f
Note: (a) 40 × 46SR mm (40 mm NATO LV); (b) 35 mm DFS10 semi-caseless; (c) 40 mm VOG-25 semi-caseless; (d) 30 ×
29B mm; (e) 35 × 32SR mm; and (f) 40 × 53SR mm (40 mm NATO HV).
Handbook
The militaries of NATO member states (and, increasingly, other states) typi-
cally employ 40 mm calibre ammunition (see Table 5.3). These rounds are gener-
ally divided into two common types: low-velocity (LV) and high-velocity (HV)
cartridges. LV cartridges are generally used with under-barrel and shoulder-fired
systems, which typically have a range of up to 400 metres. HV cartridges are
generally used in belt-fed automatic launchers and have a range of up to 2,200 m
(Williams, n.d.). Several companies offer additional types of ‘uprated’ ammuni-
tion, including:
low-velocity extended-range (LV-ER) rounds, which have a range of about

600 metres; and
medium-velocity (MV) rounds, which fire heavier and higher velocity projec-
tiles out to some 800 metres (Williams, 2017).
LV extended range rounds can generally be fired from under-barrel launchers,

while the more powerful MV rounds require a more substantial launcher, such
as some six-shot revolver-type grenade launchers (ARES, 2017).
202
Table 5.3 Selected grenade launcher cartridges in global military service

Cartridge designation Country of origin Projectile type Projectile weight (g)
43 × 30 mm Russian Federation Thermobaric 250
40 × 46SR mm United States HE 170
40 × 53SR mm United States HE 245
40 mm VOG-25 Soviet Union HE 250
35 × 32SR mm China (PRC) HE 240
35 mm DFS10 China (PRC) HE 170
30 × 29B mm Soviet Union HE 280
20 × 42B mm South Africa HEI 110
20 × 30B mm South Korea HEABi 110
Note: All figures are approximations and vary according to cartridge type and loading, and other factors.
i
HEAB stands for ‘high-explosive airburst’.
Sources: Jenzen-Jones and Popenker (2015); Poongsan (2016); Yan (2015); Williams (n.d.; 2016; 2017)
In former Warsaw Pact countries, other calibres dominate (see Table 5.3).
Low-velocity cartridges for the Soviet/Russian 40 mm VOG-25 and Chinese 35
mm DFS10 are similar in performance to their NATO equivalents, but they are
semi-caseless projectiles which are loaded from the muzzle. Both nations use
conventional cased rounds for their longer-range HV systems (the Soviet/Russian
30 mm VOG-17 and Chinese 35 mm DF87) (ARES, 2017; Williams, 2017).
Several manufacturers have recently fielded grenade launcher rounds in new
calibres and with new capabilities (see Image 5.40). Among the most notable are
the programmable airburst rounds for the US XM25 (25 mm) and the Korean K11
(20 mm) weapons (see Box 5.1). Another round worth mentioning is the 43 × 30
mm thermobaric (see Box 5.3) cartridge for the Russian GM-94 grenade launcher.
The cartridge is made almost entirely of polymer, which minimizes fragmentation
and allows for use at very short ranges during combat in enclosed areas (Jen-
zen-Jones and Popenker, 2015, p. 7). The South African Denel PM iNkunzi PAW
and Strike systems fire 20 × 42B ammunition that consists of standard 20 mm
cannon projectiles fired from shorter cases at a subsonic velocity (ARES, 2017;
Williams, 2017).
203
Perhaps the most significant development in ammunition for grenade launch-
ers is the advent of small missiles that can be fired from standard under-barrel
40 × 46SR mm launchers. An example is the laser-guided Raytheon Pike, which
has a range of 2,000 m, and was the first guided missile designed to be fired from
an under-barrel grenade launcher (Raytheon, 2018; see Image 5.41).
Image 5.40 Examples of recent grenade launcher cartridges

Handbook
a b c d e
Note: (a) 40 × 46SR mm (40 mm NATO LV; for comparison); (b) 20 × 30B K-11; (c) 20 × 42B iNkunzi; (d) 25 × 40B XM25;
and (e) 40 mm Balkan semi-caseless.
Image 5.41 The Raytheon Pike 40 mm guided missile
204
Box 5.3 Common types of explosive warheads used in light weapons ammunition
At their most basic, explosive warheads are comprised of a fuse, an explosive fill, and a warhead
case. Some of the key types of warheads are described below; there are many other more special-
ized types.126
Many light weapons make use of explosive warheads to deliver the desired effects on target. There
are three primary ways an explosive weapon can cause damage: through blast, fragmentation, and
heat (thermal effects).
High-explosive
High-explosive (HE) warheads are the most common type of warhead for most light weapons am-
munition. HE warheads cause damage primarily through the blast wave that they generate, but also
through fragmentation and, to a lesser extent, thermal effects. When fragmentation is desired, HE
warheads may be constructed with a relatively heavy casing. When the warhead detonates, the
casing breaks apart into small pieces, or fragments, which travel at high speeds away from the
blast, causing kinetic (impact) damage to whatever they strike. HE warheads are used to engage
targets of all types (Cross et al., 2016).
High-explosive fragmentation
High-explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) warheads primarily cause damage by generating high-
velocity fragments and are employed against personnel and unarmoured vehicles. HE-FRAG war-
heads may rely on ‘natural’ fragmentation of warhead materials (which are sometimes brittle, such
as cast iron or steel) or include pre-formed fragmentation (for example, steel spheres or cubes). In
some cases, a ‘fragmentation sleeve’ (often a pre-scored piece of metal or a polymer matrix con-
taining pre-formed fragmentation) is attached to the outside of a munition’s body (Dullum et al.,
2017, pp. 79, 83). Typically, fragmentation warheads use some 30 per cent of the energy from a
detonation to disperse fragmentation, with the rest of the energy causing blast effects as described
above (NSWC, n.d., p. 8). It is not always readily apparent whether a munition is an HE or HE-
FRAG type; different users may classify similar rounds differently.
High-explosive anti-tank
High-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) type ammunition is designed to penetrate armour. Most HEAT
warheads are ‘shaped charges’, meaning they feature a cone-shaped cavity that is lined with a thin
metal sheet (typically copper). When the warhead functions, the metal liner collapses into a thin jet
that travels at an extremely high velocity. The metal jet ‘punches through’ armour and penetrates
into the target vehicle, causing injury to personnel and damage to the interior of the vehicle. HEAT
ammunition is not particularly useful against personnel outside of vehicles since their casings are
usually thin and fragmentation is comparatively minimal (Cross et al., 2016, pp. 22–23).
High-explosive dual-purpose
High-explosive dual-purpose (HEDP; sometimes called ‘HEAT-FRAG’) warheads are designed to
provide both anti-armour and anti-personnel effects. Generally, this is achieved by pairing a HEAT
warhead with a pre-fragmented (scored) casing or fragmentation sleeve.
Thermobaric
Thermobaric warheads contain certain explosive compositions that exploit oxygen in the air to
generate blast effects that last longer than those of conventional explosives; they increase in dura-
tion from a few milliseconds to tens of milliseconds. The characteristics of these weapons make
them suitable for use against targets in enclosed spaces, such as buildings, caves, or tunnel sys-
tems. Thermobaric weapons may be used to ensure sufficient blast effects for lethal use while
minimizing or obviating fragmentation (Cross et al., 2016, p. 25).
126 For a basic overview of explosive munitions, see Cross et al. (2016).
205
Physical features
Ammunition for grenade launchers is designed for low chamber pressures and,
as such, has certain distinctive characteristics. The rounds have thin walls and a
relatively large explosive capacity, and are often made out of lightweight alloys,
such as aluminium. Semi-rimmed (SR) and rimless designs are common. These
rounds are generally fed into the grenade launcher via box or drum magazines,
or belts. Belted cartridge cases are used with several grenade launchers. Belt-fed
cartridges frequently feature projectiles that are larger than their cases, typically
with rounded noses (see Figure 5.1).
Fuses are typically located inside the projectile but some impact fuses are
fitted to the nose of a projectile. When the fuse is externally visible, its physical
characteristics, including its material composition, shape, and where it is located,
should be noted.
Figure 5.1 Some of the key physical features of grenade launcher ammunition
Handbook
Ogive
Point-detonating
Projectile impact fuse (internal)
Case mouth
Cartridge case
Extractor groove
Case rim
Note: In this case, the ammunition is a US 40 × 46SR mm M406 HE model.

Source: Jim Geibel via ARES
206
Some grenade launcher projectiles feature driving or rotating bands, which

can serve as a useful identification feature, based on their location, material,
crimping, and colour (see Image 5.42).
Other types of ammunition for grenade launchers include illumination and
signal flares, smoke, anti-personnel, thermobaric, and less-lethal impact and riot
control agent (RCA) rounds. Many are distinguishable by their physical features.
Less-lethal impact rounds, for example, often have a spongy projectile, while most
illumination cartridges have a substantially greater overall length than high-
explosive rounds. Similarly, anti-personnel rounds often look like large metal-
cased shotgun cartridges (ARES, 2017; Williams, n.d.).
Image 5.42 Two US M385 40 × 53SR mm practice cartridges in links, as used with
belt-fed grenade launchers such as the MK 19 series
Rotating bands
Note: This image shows the copper driving bands, different coloured metal finishes, and markings.
Markings
Markings on grenade launcher ammunition, which are often stencilled, typically
identify the manufacturer, functional type, year of production, and/or the lot or
batch number (see Figure 5.2). While projectiles are frequently marked with an
identifying colour scheme, manufacturers and users use a number of different
formats. Some rounds have headstamps and/or additional markings on the car-
tridge case. Fuses also usually feature their own markings.
207
Figure 5.2 Sample markings on a Bulgarian Arsenal RLV-HEF-1 40 × 46SR mm
HE-FRAG cartridge
Projectile model designation
Projectile manufacturer code Projectile production year
Projectile lot number
Calibre
Cartridge designation
Cartridge manufacturer code Cartridge production year
Cartridge lot number

Handbook
Bulgarian GLV-HEF
GLV-HEF Projectile model designation

[‘double-circle-ten’ symbol]-01-12 Manufacturer code (Arsenal JSCo.,
Bulgaria) – lot number – year of
production (2012) (for projectile)
40×46 mm Calibre (40 × 46SR mm)
RLV-HEF Cartridge model designation
[‘double-circle-ten’ symbol]-01-12 Manufacturer code (Arsenal JSCo.,
Bulgaria) – lot number – year of
production (2012) (for completed
cartridge)
Source: Arsenal JSCo via ARES (n.d.)
208
Light and medium mortar projectiles

Mortar projectiles are traditionally simple designs that are very cheap to manu-
facture. They typically consist of a projectile, ignition cartridge, and (optionally)
one or more auxiliary charges (see Figure 5.3). Most high-explosive rounds have
cast iron or cast steel bodies, high-explosive fillings, and simple impact fuses
(Jenzen-Jones and Paunila, 2017).127 Other commonly available mortar projectile
types include smoke (including white phosphorus), illumination, TP, incendi-
ary,128 guided, and cluster munitions. Guided projectiles are usually readily iden-
tified by complex, movable control surface assemblies and advanced fuses (see
Image 5.43) (Dullum et al., 2017; ARES, 2017).
The typical mortar projectile is fitted with an ignition cartridge (sometimes
known as a ‘base charge’ or ‘propelling cartridge’) that is either integral to the
round or removable. The ignition charge features a primer similar to those used
in small-calibre cartridges. The primer is located inside the tail of the round.
When the round is dropped down the mortar tube, the firing pin at the bottom
Figure 5.3 Arrangement of a typical mortar projectile
Adapted from: US Department of Defense (2007)
127 In some cases, forged steel bodies are used; however, cast metals tend to produce more effective
fragmentation for anti-personnel purposes (Jenzen-Jones and Paunila, 2017).
128 Incendiary weapons cause primary and secondary fires to destroy materiel. Incendiary ammuni-
tion for light weapons typically use solid incendiary compositions such as thermite, magnesium,
and/or white phosphorus. Traditional liquid incendiary fills such as napalm or kerosene are gen-
erally not used in light weapons ammunition.
209
Image 5.43 XM395 precision guided of the tube impacts the ignition car-
mortar projectile tridge, detonating the primer, which

ignites the propellant (Dullum et al.,
2017). The expanding gases generated
by the burning propellant push the
projectile out of the tube and towards
the target.
In some designs, the ignition charge
alone can propel the projectile at a low
velocity and is suitable for engaging
targets at very close ranges. For longer
range targets, the operator affixes a
number of ring-shaped propellant
charges to the projectile (Dullum et al.,
2017, p. 28). These charges, which are
called ‘increments’, ‘propelling charg-
es’, ‘auxiliary charges’, or ‘augmenting
charges’, are commonly attached to the
tail of modern mortar projectiles, and
Handbook
to the fins of older rounds.

Recent improvements to mortar
rounds include better materials, more
aerodynamic designs (to achieve
longer ranges), and more sophisticated
fuses.129 GPS conversion kits for 120
mm rounds are now available, and kits
for light and medium mortar calibres
are likely to follow. Purpose-designed
guided mortar bombs have also been
developed in 81 mm, with 60 mm like-
ly to be fielded in the near future (Jen-
Source: Anthony G. Williams/ARES zen-Jones, 2015b; Williams, 2016).
129 The improvements to materials include bodies designed for more efficient fragmentation, the ad-
dition of pre-formed fragments, and the use of insensitive explosive fillings. See, for example,
Williams (2016).
210
Physical features Image 5.44 A range of 60 mm, 81 mm,

and 120 mm mortar projectiles
The typical mortar projectile is widest
behind the shoulder of the body and at
the tail. Mortar projectiles must be
slightly narrower in diameter than the
bore of the weapon from which they
are fired. They, however, also need to
block some of the gas produced by the
propelling charge, because if this es-
capes past the body of the projectile it
reduces its range (ARES, 2017). The
most common way of preventing these
gases from escaping is to employ a se-
ries of ‘gas check’ bands that are cast or
machined into the body. Some mortar
projectiles are fitted with an obturator
band (or obturating ring) instead of gas
check bands. Obturator bands are often
made of hard nylon (Jenzen-Jones and
Paunila, 2017, p. 28). The number, loca- Note: 60 mm projectiles (L-R: smoke, HE, illumination) at
left; 81 mm (L-R: illumination, smoke, HE) in foreground
tion, and character of gas check or ob- (all sectioned); and 120 mm projectiles (L-R: HE, smoke,
turator bands are a key physical iden- illumination) at rear. Increment charges are present on all
examples.
tification feature. Source: Anthony G. Williams/ARES
The functional type of a mortar pro-
jectile can often be determined from its physical features. For example, many
cargo (carrier) projectiles, such as certain smoke and illumination types, have a
greater overall length, and a more cylindrical shape than conventional HE types
(see Image 5.44). Mortar projectiles are almost invariably fitted with a nose fuse.130
Fuses have their own physical characteristics, including distinctive shapes and
components. Increment charges should also be documented since their compo-
sition, shape, type, and colour are often useful for identification purposes.
130 Most mortar rounds have impact fuses, but some have time or proximity fuses. Increasingly,
multifunction fuses are being employed.
211
Markings
Mortar projectiles, like many other types of large-calibre ammunition, are typi-
cally painted in accordance with a specific colour marking scheme, often to indi-
cate different functional types. Different armed forces and manufacturers use
different colour schemes. The US colour marking scheme, which is similar to the
scheme used by many NATO states and other allies, is presented in Box 5.4 (ARES,
n.d.). Information about the functional type of the projectile is normally stencilled
on the body. Other markings that indicate the manufacturer, year of production,
and lot or batch number may also be present (see Image 5.45). Ignition cartridges,
fuses, and increment charges may also be marked. Ignition cartridges (see Image
5.46) often have a headstamp visible at the base of the projectile. Fuses are gen-
erally marked to indicate model or type, and often bear other markings as well.
Image 5.45 Markings on a British Image 5.46 Markings on various ignition

L19A2 white phosphorous (WP) cartridges
smoke 81 mm mortar projectile
Handbook
a b c
Note: There is a colour-coded body, obturating

band, and differing stamped and stenciled (painted) Note: (a) Plastic body; (b and c) sealant-impregnated cardboard/
markings. paper bodies.
Source: Peter Bouckaert/HRW Source: Diehl and Jenzen-Jones (2012)
212
Box 5.4 US ammunition marking colour scheme
Munitions are painted primarily to inhibit the formation of rust, identify the functional type of the
ammunition, serve as camouflage, or identify hazardous fillers. Some of the more common mark-
ing colours are presented in Table 5.4 (US DoD, 2009). It is important to note that schemes may be
combined with a camouflage colour (typically olive drab) or other marking colours to indicate ad-
ditional effects (for example, incendiary).131
Generally speaking, the US colour marking scheme outlined in Table 5.4 applies to ammunition in
US service which is larger than 20 mm in calibre. US allies often use the same or similar marking
schemes. While marking colour schemes provide important information about the round, it is im-
portant to identify ammunition by assessing physical features and markings as well.
Table 5.4 Selected marking colours on US ammunition
Colour Ammunition type
Olive drab No significance (camouflage purposes)
Yellow High explosive
Brown Low explosive
Grey Chemical
Light green Smoke
Light red Incendiary
White Illuminating (pyrotechnic)
Black Armour-defeating
Aluminium (silver) Countermeasure
Source: US DoD (2009)
131 For an expanded list, including details regarding the specific colouration of markings on the
body, text, coloured bands, etc., see US DoD (2009).
213
Recoilless weapon projectiles
Projectiles for recoilless weapons vary significantly. This variation reflects:
differences in the design and operation of reloadable versus disposable re-

coilless weapons;
their many and varied battlefield roles; and
developments in technology.
While the most common projectile types are high explosive (HE) and high
explosive anti-tank (HEAT), a wide range are produced (ARES, 2017).
Recoilless weapons were primarily intended for use against tanks and other
heavily armoured vehicles; rounds with warheads designed to penetrate armour
(HEAT types) are therefore most common. Other projectiles are designed for use
against personnel (HE/HE-FRAG), and buildings and other concrete structures
(often known as anti-structure munition (ASM), and multipurpose (MP) war-
heads) (ARES, 2017).132 Several ASM/MP warheads are able to penetrate walls
before detonating inside a building. More advanced variants of both HEAT and
ASM rounds have tandem warheads: the initial warhead blows a hole in the wall
or armour, through which a second warhead enters the target before detonating.133
Some recoilless weapons are able to fire a wide variety of ammunition types (see
Handbook
Image 5.47).
Some recoilless weapons fire conventional cartridge-based ammunition, while
others use ammunition more similar in form to mortar projectiles or rockets.
Rocket-assisted projectiles (RAPs), particularly those fired from disposable shoul-
der-fired systems, are sometimes readily confused with ‘true’ rockets, for exam-
ple. Some recoilless projectiles feature an ignition cartridge and auxiliary charg-
es similar to those used in mortar projectiles (ARES, 2017). Other types,
particularly RAPs such as those fired from the RPG-7 series of weapons, are fitted
with a type of propellant charge known as an expelling charge. This charge, which
is fitted to the munition before it is fired (see Image 5.48), expels the projectile
from the barrel of the weapon. When the projectile is a safe distance from the
operator, a sustainer rocket motor ignites and propels the projectile towards the
target (Jenzen-Jones, 2015c).
132 Multipurpose types are sometimes known as ‘multi-target’ (MT).

133 See, for example, Warwick (2008).
214
Image 5.47 A range of cartridges produced for use with the Carl-Gustaf shoulder-fired

84 mm recoilless weapon
a b c d e f g h i j k l
Note: (a) HEDP; (b) ASM; (c) multi-target (MT–a term sometimes used instead of multipurpose); (d) HEAT; (e) tandem HEAT;
(f) HEAT; (g) TP; (h) smoke; (i) illumination; (j) anti-personnel (APERS); (k) HE; and (l) training/practice–tracer (TPT). Some
cases are marked to indicate RAPs.
Image 5.48 Bulgarian PG-7 projectiles in the process of being assembled
Note: The image shows the expelling charge cases (see also Image 5.53), thread protectors, and other packaging.
215
When a recoilless weapon is fired, high-velocity exhaust gases exit the weap-
on from the rear of the gun. The energy generated by these gases must be released
in order to counteract the recoil of firing the weapon. The gases, which are often
readily observable by the enemy as they kick up dust and debris, can injure per-
sonnel and damage objects behind the weapon; such weapons cannot therefore
be fired from inside enclosed spaces. To overcome this issue, some recoilless
weapons expel a liquid, shredded material, or powder instead of high-pressure
gas. These weapons are generally known as confined space (CS) variants because
they can be used in confined spaces (the user can fire the weapon out of a window
from inside a room, for example) (ARES, 2017; Jenzen-Jones, 2015c). Some of these
systems may leave evidence of their firing on the battlefield in the form of the
expelled material.
Physical features
Some recoilless weapons fire cartridge-based ammunition similar in form to oth-
er cartridges, including small-calibre ammunition. These rounds often comprise
a cartridge case, projectile, primer, and other features seen on other car-
tridge-based ammunition. Case type, case shape, and case and projectile compo-
sition should all be noted.
Handbook
A careful examination of a recoilless projectile’s physical features can often

reveal much about the projectile. Certain projectiles with tandem warheads, for
example, are readily distinguishable from conventional high-explosive types by
their distinctive profile (see Image 5.49). Driving and rotating bands on some
recoilless projectiles also serve as useful identification features. The location, ma-
terial, crimping, and colour of these bands varies from model to model. Most
commonly these bands are made of copper, iron, or plastic.
Propellant charges, including expelling charges, may also be encountered and
can often be used to identify a model of weapon in the absence of other evidence.
For example, the propelling charge in Image 5.50 would suggest the RPO series
of recoilless projectiles, which is commonly encountered in certain conflict zones.
Recoilless projectiles are frequently fitted with an externally-visible fuse in the
nose of the projectile, most commonly an impact fuse, but occasionally a time or
proximity fuse. Fuses have their own distinctive physical characteristics, includ-
ing where they are located on the weapon, their material composition, and their
shape.
216
Some types of recoilless projectiles are difficult to distinguish from other types

of ammunition, such as mortar projectiles and rockets. Certain Eastern Bloc re-
coilless projectiles, for example, closely resemble mortar projectiles (see Image
5.49). Similarly, some recoilless projectiles fired from disposable, shoulder-fired
weapons share physical characteristics with rockets fired from similar weapons
(see Image 5.50). Finally, certain recoilless projectiles can be fired from vehi-
cle-mounted launchers, with only minor modifications.134
Image 5.49 Soviet BK-881M type 82 mm recoilless HEAT projectile
Image 5.50 An early Soviet RPO-A shoulder-fired 93 mm recoilless weapon showing

the projectile and distinctive propelling charge below the gun
Source: Wikimedia Commons/Magapixie
134 For example, some recoilless projectiles fired from light weapons such as the SPG-9 are identical
or nearly identical in form and function to those fired from smooth-bore 73 mm guns fitted to ar-
moured vehicles, such as the 2A28 Grom. In some cases, the same projectile may be fitted with
different expelling charges depending on the weapon it is being fired from (IDA, 1995).
217
Markings
Markings on recoilless projectiles often reveal the functional type, manufacturer,

year of production, and the lot or batch number (see Image 5.51 and 5.52). The
markings on the body of the projectile are often stencilled. The colour of these
markings often indicates the functional type of the projectile. Fuses are generally
marked in a similar way to indicate mode or type. Expelling charges, ignition
cartridges, and increment charges may also feature markings indicating their
model, type, propellant, year of production, and other details (see Box 5.5).
Image 5.51 Markings on a Bulgarian PG-7M projectile for the RPG-7 series of
shoulder-fired recoilless weapons
a b
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Note: (a) Markings in this case include the designation (‘PG-7M’), factory code (‘double-circle 11’), lot number (‘3’), year
of production (‘86’), and composition of the explosive fill (‘A-IX-1’). (b) Further markings on the same projectile with in-
formation about the projectile and the rocket motor which assists in accelerating it. Markings are also visible on the
PG-7P expelling charge (left), in a similar format.
Source: C.J. Chivers/The New York Times
Image 5.52 Markings on the base of a 106 mm

HESH cartridge case
Note: There are three distinct sets of markings: a ‘conventional’ head-

stamp, stamped into the material of the cartridge case itself; painted
markings giving the most critical data; and markings stamped onto the
primer.
218
Box 5.5 RPG-7 projectile designations
Projectiles designed by producers in the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, and many other for-
mer Eastern Bloc countries typically have a ‘V’ in the designation (for example, PG-7V, PG-7VR,
etc.); this stands for vystrel, or ‘round’, which refers to the combination of the projectile and the
expelling charge.135 The expelling charge, sometimes referred to as a ‘booster section’, launches the
projectile out of the barrel. When the projectile is at a safe distance from the operator, the rocket
sustainer motor kicks in, accelerating the projectile towards its maximum velocity. Hence ‘PG-7,′
refers specifically to the projectile alone, while ‘PG-7V’ refers to the round in its entirety including
the expelling charge (in this case, PG-7P, see Image 5.53), whether assembled or not (Jenzen-Jones,
2012b).
Image 5.53 PG-7P expelling charges for the RPG-7 shoulder-fired recoilless weapon
Note: Markings indicate manufacturer, date of production, lot number, and other details.
Unguided rockets
Rockets vary significantly in size, range, technological sophistication, and role.
In its simplest form, a rocket consists of a tube in which fuel is burned, with an
opening at one end. The escaping gases cause an equal and opposite reaction on
the closed end of the tube, propelling the rocket forwards (Ryan, 1982).
Rockets in common usage are either spin-stabilized or fin-stabilized. Spin-
stabilized rockets are generally of a shorter overall length than their fin-stabilized
counterparts. Spin is achieved through a series of obliquely-mounted nozzles
placed off-centre at the rear end of the rocket. Fin-stabilized rockets also rotate
135 In other ammunition types, components of a ‘round’ may also include propellant, cases, wadding,
and/or other items.
219
Figure 5.4 Arrangement of a typical fin-stabilized rocket
Adapted from: Dullum (2009)
but at a much slower rate (only a few revolutions per second). Most fin-stabilized
rocket designs feature wrap-around or fold-out (‘pop-out’) fins which deploy a
few metres after launch (Dullum et al., 2017, p. 31; see Figure 5.4). Unguided rock-
ets are sometimes known as free-flight rockets (FFR). There are a wide variety of
warheads for rockets, although HEAT, HE, and cargo types are most common.136
Physical features
For identification purposes, the key features of rockets include the following:
Handbook
The general dimensions, especially the diameter at the widest point of the
body.
Visible seams between the warhead and motor sections.
Size, type, and number of fins.
Rivets, bolts, welds, or other joining features.
General profile of nose ogive.
Visible exhaust ports (venturi) and other protrusions.
All of these features should be examined and recorded.

Externally-visible fuses are another important feature. Rockets have impact,
time, or proximity fuses depending on their functional type and purpose. Some
multifunction fuses are in service. Fuses have their own physical characteristics,
including their composition and shape, and location.
136 Cargo munitions carry their payload to the target location and then control its dispersal. Cargo
warheads may carry submunitions (which can themselves be HE, HEI, HEDP, etc. types), illumi-
nation candles, smoke units, propaganda leaflets, or other payloads. Cargo munitions most often
use a time fuse.
220
Markings

Markings on rockets are often stencilled on the side of the body. The markings
often identify the make, model, and type of rocket, as well as the year of produc-
tion, lot or batch number, and safety information (see Image 5.54). Some rockets
are marked in a certain colour to indicate functional type. Fuses, where present,
will generally be marked to indicate model or type, and often bear other markings
as well.
Guided missiles
As noted above, there are two primary and very different families of guided
missiles fired from light weapons, which are employed for different battlefield
roles: anti-armour or anti-aircraft. Anti-aircraft missiles (known as MANPADS
when light weapons) have a much harder task, needing to accelerate to super-
Image 5.54 Markings on an Iranian 107 mm rocket and another rocket’s inner packaging
Note: The markings identify the type of round (HEI), diameter (107 mm), date of production (2007), lot number (6), net
weight (19.250 kg), and registration numbers (0185 and 186). Note also the distinctive colour markings, including the red
band signalling an incendiary fill.
Source: Israel Defense Forces
221
sonic velocity quickly in order to hit very fast-moving targets. Wire guidance is
not an option. Manual radio guidance has been tried but proved unsatisfactory
in combat. Most MANPADS rely on infrared seekers.
The earliest ATGMs were low-speed rockets guided manually through wires
which unwound from the missile as it flew. Since then, ATGMs have become
significantly more sophisticated, with guidance systems that only require the
operator to keep the sights trained on the target (the missile automatically follows
the line of sight). Increasingly, ATGMs use wireless communication to transmit
guidance commands. Some missiles are designed to fly a couple of metres above
the line of sight and fire their warheads at a downwards angle to penetrate the
much thinner top armour of armoured fighting vehicles. ATGMs most common-
ly feature HEAT warheads; however, so-called anti-structure munition (ASM)
and multipurpose (MP) warheads are increasingly being introduced (ARES, 2017).
Physical features
Guided missiles are typically rather easy to identify. There are a relatively small
number of systems in existence and most have a distinctive appearance. While
the specific make and model are not always readily apparent, the pattern and
capability of a weapon can usually be easily determined. Many ATGMs and
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MANPADS are readily distinguishable from other types of light weapons and
from other guided missiles, due to their particular shapes and sizes, and frequent-
ly clear markings. Most portable guided missiles are contained within launch
tubes which protect them while in transit and storage. ATGMs and their launch
tubes tend to be comparatively short and fat, whereas MANPADS need to have
a small (aerodynamic) frontal area to achieve high speeds, and so are relatively
long and slim. Fins, most of which either fold out or wrap around the missile
body, vary substantially from model to model; this makes them useful for iden-
tification purposes.
Markings
Markings on missiles for MANPADS and ATGMs are often stencilled on the side
of both the missile and the launch tube. Markings usually indicate the make,
model, and type of missile, as well as the year of production and lot or batch
number (see Image 5.55 and Figure 5.5). Many missiles are also marked with a
unique serial number, which can be particularly useful for tracing purposes.
222
Image 5.55 Examples of

a b
markings on ATGMs
Note: (a) Russian 9M131 missile for the

9K115 Metis (AT-7) ATGW. (b) Markings on
a 9M14M Malyutka ATGM.
Figure 5.5 Markings on a Russian 9M113 Konkurs ATGM
9H131M K
Designation of ype of warhead
T
warhead (9N131M) (abbreviation for
kumulyativnyy zaryad,
or ‘shaped charge’—
12-85-80
i.e. HEAT)
Batch number, year of
production, and factory
code for warhead ОКФОЛ (OKFOL)
Primary explosive
composition
02-86-536
Batch number, year of
9M113
Designation of missile
code for missile
51-86-22 2478
Batch number, year of Serial number
code for missile
assembly in tube
Source: Fulmer, Jenzen-Jones, and Lyamin (2016)
223
Packaging and documentation
As with small arms, many light weapons are encountered in the field with pack-
aging and, to a lesser extent, documentation. There are two types of packaging:
outer packaging and inner packaging. Outer packaging typically consists of
wooden or plastic shipping crates (see Image 5.56) or plastic or metal storage
containers. Inner packaging includes storage tubes, plastic packaging, and grease-
proof paper.
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Image 5.56 External

packaging crates and
internal packaging tins
containing Russian 14.5
× 114 mm B-32 API
cartridges produced in
1989
Source: ARES (n.d.)
224
Packaging often provides valuable clues as to the origin, date and place of

production, and type of the arms in question (see Figure 5.6).
Packaging may also reveal the destination, ports of transit, dates of transfer,
and other important information about the transfer and chain of custody of the
weapon. Image 5.57, for example, shows a crate with markings indicating the
intended port of delivery (‘Tripoli, L.A.R.’), unique case number (‘Case No. 695’),
and total number of cases (‘No of Cases: 16667’).
Figure 5.6 Markings on outer packaging for a Russian 9M113 Konkurs ATGM
07-88-536 K
Batch number, year of Type of warhead (abbreviation
production, and 9M113 for kumulyativnyy zaryad, or
factory code for missile Designation of missile ‘shaped charge’—i.e. HEAT)
71-88-22 ОК СНАР 1 ШТ БРУТТО 40 КГ 1999

Batch number, year of ‘Fully equipped’ Quantity (‘1 unit’) Serial number
production, and and gross weight of
factory code for missile crate (40 kg)
assembly in tube
Source: Fulmer, Jenzen-Jones, and Lyamin (2016)
225
Image 5.57 External packaging containing Yugoslavian M72 81 mm mortar projectiles
with fuses
Image 5.58 Packing list attached to the inside of a wooden crate containing Russian
Handbook
PG-7 projectiles and PG-7P expelling charges
226
Image 5.59 Deliberately mislabelled crate marked ‘Parts of bulldozer’, actually

containing an artillery rocket manufactured in North Korea
Crates of illicitly-exported weapons are sometimes deliberately mislabelled

to conceal their actual contents. Image 5.59 shows a packaging crate labelled ‘Parts
of bulldozer’ that actually contained a rocket. The crate was exported to Libya in
violation of a UN embargo on arms transfers from North Korea. Mislabelling
weapons crates is a common practice among traffickers of North Korean weapons
and arms exporters located in other embargoed countries (Jenzen-Jones and
Noakes, forthcoming).
Packaging for light weapons ammunition is often very useful for identification
purposes, particularly when the ammunition (or the corresponding weapon) is
no longer present. Most packaging follows the pattern established for small arms
ammunition, though due to the size and robust nature of most light weapons
ammunition, these items are often packaged in sturdier crates. Some more expen-
sive, comparatively delicate types of ammunition, such as missiles, are packaged
in containers with padding or other protective material.
Some types of ammunition are frequently found belted or otherwise ready for
immediate use. For example, 40 × 53SR mm projectiles are almost exclusively fired
from belt-fed AGLs and so typically come linked together. Many guided missiles
are similarly provided ready to fire, and packaging containing such ammunition
may be marked with ‘fully equipped’, ‘completely loaded’, or similar wording
(see Figure 5.6 and Image 5.60). Projectiles and expelling charges for the RPG-7
227
Image 5.60 Wooden outer packaging (shipping crate) containing two 9M32M type
MANPADS
Image 5.61 Markings on a Bulgarian and similar weapons are frequently

PG-9P expelling charge for projectiles unpacked, assembled, and carried as
fired from the SPG-9 recoilless gun complete rounds, and thus the poten-
tially useful packaging is often left else-
where (see Image 5.48 and 5.61).
It is also important to note that
smaller, seemingly inconsequential
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items, such as expelling charge cases

and warhead thread protectors for
RPG-7 rounds, may be left behind by
operators who systematically collect
other evidence. These operators may
be unaware of the potential utility of
these items for identifying weapons
and ammunition. Such items are par-
ticularly important where light weap-
ons are uncommon, for example in a
domestic law enforcement environ-
ment; in conflict zones they may be so
numerous that they are of compara-
tively limited use.
Documentation is one of the finest
Source: Peter Bouckaert/HRW sources of information uncovered in
228
the field. Import, export, or in-country transfer documentation often reveals key

information not only about individual weapons but also about the shipments of
which they were a part. This information includes contract dates, order quantities,
ports of transfer, and country of origin (see Figure 5.7 and Image 5.58).
Figure 5.7 Delivery documentation (packing list) for 9P135M-1 ATGW launchers
delivered to Libya in the late 1980s
Exporter
Contract
number
and date
(blank)
Order
number
Consignee and date
Packing list
number
Model
Quantity
Exported of exported
items and items
markings
Packaging
Signatures and
markings
inspector’s
stamps
Date of packing list (undated)
Note: The authors of the document have used deliberately vague details.
Source: Confidential via ARES

and Anthony G. Williams
229
230
CHAPTER 6
Weapons Identification: Other

Small Arms and Light Weapons
Introduction
This chapter examines various types of small arms and light weapons that differ
from conventional, modern examples. It begins with an overview of improvised
and craft-produced small arms and light weapons, including the various sub-
categories of these weapons. The chapter then examines the capabilities of
improvised and craft-produced weapons and explores various means of identi-
fication. It goes on to present an overview of converted and reactivated arms, and
of improvised and craft-produced ammunition. Finally, the chapter sets out the
main characteristics of muzzle-loading firearms.
Improvised and craft-produced weapons137

Improvised and craft-produced small arms and light weapons comprise a sizable
percentage of weapons seized in domestic law enforcement operations in many
countries, and have appeared in numerous conflict zones. Consequently, it is
important for journalists and researchers to have a solid understanding of these
weapons and how to identify and track them. They are commonly acquired and
used by individuals, criminal gangs, and insurgent groups when commercial
Handbook
alternatives are not available. They vary in sophistication and quality from crude,
improvised, single-shot guns to semi-professionally manufactured copies of con-
ventional firearms. While craft producers are not manufacturing advanced guid-
ed light weapons, such as man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) or
anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW), other types of light weapons are produced
with some regularity. These weapons include mortars, anti-materiel rifles, recoil-
less guns, and grenade launchers.
Many craft-produced and improvised weapons offer illicit users the added
advantage of being difficult to trace. A lack of registration, misleading or absent
markings, and an unusual forensic profile impede or obviate the various methods
for tracing illicit small arms and light weapons commonly employed by author-
ities. Most improvised weapons have no serial numbers or other markings used
to identify and trace their factory-built counterparts, and few, if any, are registered
137 This section draws extensively upon the Small Arms Survey report Beyond State Control: A Guide
to Improvised and Craft-produced Small Arms and Light Weapons (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Please refer to this publication for more information.
232
Image 6.1 A crude improvised ‘zip gun’ with a barrel fashioned from a length of car
Weapons Identification: Other Small Arms and Light Weapons

antenna
Source: Paul Bernius/New York Daily News archive via Getty Images
with authorities. Others are marked with false serial numbers; this and the unu-
sual forensic profile of many improvised and craft-produced weapons complicate
criminal investigations.
The barrels of many improvised weapons lack rifling, or have internal diam-
eters that are too large to reliably leave firing marks on discharged projectiles.
This makes it difficult or impossible to establish that bullets or pieces of shot re-
covered at a crime scene were fired from a specific weapon. Indeed, given the
challenges in producing rifled barrels with limited tooling or expertise, many
such firearms are constructed using readily available household products instead
of purpose-built firearms barrels. Gas piping, motor vehicle aerials (antennae),
and bicycle frame tubing are all regularly used as barrels for improvised firearms
(see Image 6.1). Well-connected groups may be able to obtain barrel blanks with
pre-cut rifling (see Box 6.4), but for many criminal purposes, rifling is unneces-
sary.138 Shotguns are generally smooth-bore weapons by design, and even pistol
138 Barrel blanks are unfinished barrels which are already rifled, allowing a craft producer to avoid a
difficult part of the manufacturing process.
233
barrels, which are routinely rifled by commercial manufacturers, do not actually
require rifling for effective use at very short ranges. Producers of improvised
weapons may not consider the additional accuracy afforded by rifling worth the
time, effort, and additional cost.
The use of so-called ‘ghost guns’ is now perceived by some as an effective
method of evading law enforcement, even that of developed nations (CBS Sacra-
mento, 2016). Detecting manufacturing or conversion activity is also difficult.
Since essentially anyone can produce components or even complete improvised
or converted firearms in their home, using innocuous materials and common
machinery that lack a ‘paper trail’, they often remain undetected until long after
their products reach their prospective users. While conventional tracing requests
are almost never successful for these types of weapons, there are alternative means
of identifying and tracking such weapons. Identifying distinctive characteristics
shared by craft-produced weapons can help to identify particular illicit gunsmiths
or manufacturing operations, for example (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
It should be noted that not all users of improvised weapons are criminals. For
example, in the United States, unlicensed ‘backyard gunsmith’ hobbyists operate
within the law (provided they do not transfer their products); engaging in the
same activity in the United Kingdom, however, would be a criminal offence.139
Handbook
There is little direct crossover between licit and illicit users other than the poten-
tial sharing of designs via the Internet or print publications. However, the most
viable methods for designing and building improvised firearms tend to prevail
in both spheres, giving rise to a degree of commonality across user groups (Hays
and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Types of improvised and craft-produced small arms and light weapons

Broadly speaking, these weapons can be broken down into three sub-categories.
In ascending order of sophistication, these sub-categories of small arms and light
weapons are: improvised and homemade; craft-produced; and semi-professional-
ly produced (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
139 This is, of course, a matter of context and politics. Improvised and craft-produced firearms were
extensively produced and used by resistance groups in Nazi-occupied Europe in the Second
World War, but also by terrorist groups operating in Northern Ireland in the late 20th century.
See, for example Hays and Jenzen-Jones (2018).
234
Improvised and homemade small arms and light weapons

This sub-category is defined primarily by the scale of production and the limited
expertise and resources available to the maker. These are the simplest weapons
that expel a projectile that an investigator is likely to encounter, and will be
visibly crude and mechanically simple (see Image 6.2 for a particularly crude
example). Improvised weapons are typically conceived and fabricated at home
or under field conditions, and without access to modern machine tools. As a result,
they are much less capable than their factory-built counterparts. Generally speak-
ing, improvised and homemade small arms and light weapons are limited to
single-shot firearms, and simple mortars, grenade launchers, and recoilless
weapons (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
A firearm can be reduced to two critical components: a barrel and a firing
mechanism. At its most basic level, a barrel is simply a tube that is able to accept
a projectile or cartridge of a particular size and is capable of withstanding the
pressure of the expanding gases that are generated when the weapon is fired.140
Some improvised firearms are very crude. For example, a ‘slam-fire gun’ consists
of two metal pipes (a ‘barrel’ piece and a ‘breech’ piece), one of which slides
within the other, and a fixed firing pin at the rear of the breech piece (see Image
6.3).141 When the user pulls the barrel piece sharply back against the breech, the
cartridge inside is fired. In this case, the crude weapon is simply the host for the
more advanced technology embodied in the ammunition. Ammunition needs to
be of a sufficient quality to repeatedly, reliably, and safely discharge shots. Many
of these simple weapons fire shotgun cartridges because they are cheap and wide-
ly available. They are also relatively safe, as they generate relatively low gas
pressures (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
140 The first hand-held firearms were forged or cast metal tubes with a sealed rear end (‘breech’) and
a drilled vent (‘touch-hole’) to permit ignition of the black powder charge inside. The propellant
was muzzle-loaded along with a spherical lead ball, and a hand-held piece of slow-match was
used to ignite the charge. Some improvised firearms continue to follow this antiquated pattern
(ARES, 2017; Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
141 The fixed firing pin is equivalent to the firing pin or striker found in a conventional firearm. This
is normally ‘cocked’ to the rear against a spring and released by pulling the trigger to fire the
cartridge. In the mechanically simple slam gun, the whole rear portion of the weapon is manually
slid back and then quickly forward to achieve the same effect.
235
Image 6.2 An especially crude improvised muzzle-loading handgun, featuring a barrel
crafted from a heavy machine gun cartridge case
Note: The weapon is fired by touching a match to a hole toward the top rear of the case. This weapon was seized by
British forces during the Cyprus Emergency in the 1950s.
Handbook
Image 6.3 Slam-fire shotguns seized from a makeshift workshop used by a gang in
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Source: Minutouno.com/Buenos Aires Police
236
Image 6.4 A crude

hand-made percussion
lock mechanism fitted to
a muzzleloading ‘Dane
gun’ produced in Plateau
State, Nigeria
Other improvised weapons are somewhat more sophisticated and effective.

Producers in Nigeria and Ghana combine smooth-bore barrels with various breech
mechanisms to make break-open cartridge shotguns. Such weapons are often
referred to as ‘Dane guns’, although this term is applied to a range of similar
weapons. The barrels on some of these weapons are made from repurposed met-
al tubing, such as motorcycle suspension forks. A skilled craftsman is often able
to make multiple weapons a day from readily available, locally-sourced material.
Many ‘Dane guns’ straddle the ‘improvised’ and ‘craft-produced’ categories.
Some are simple, comparatively ineffective muzzle-loading percussion weapons
(see Image 6.4) while other weapons identified as ‘Dane guns’ are higher-quality
firearms that more closely resemble factory-produced shotguns (CAST et al., 2003;
Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Identifying the origins of improvised firearms is often difficult. As illustrated
by numerous images in this chapter, some superficially resemble their convention-
ally-produced counterparts, while others look nothing like firearms. A cursory
inspection of their components, which often include pieces of pipe, lumps of met-
al, and a variety of found objects such as tools or toys, is often sufficient to reveal
their improvised origin, but tracing them to a particular producer can be challeng-
ing. Most lack markings of any kind, and spotting distinctive production patterns
often requires technical expertise and familiarity with the materials and production
practices used by local improvised firearms makers. It is best to engage the servic-
es of a specialist when in doubt (ARES, n.d.; Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
237
Craft-produced small arms and light weapons
Some individuals and small groups produce weapons that are more advanced
than the improvised weapons described above. These craft-produced weapons
require a higher level of skill and access to specialized tools and equipment. They
are closer approximations of their commercial counterparts than improvised weap-
ons, but are still visibly crude. They are likely to be roughly made, with sharp
edges and crude means of construction including large nuts, bolts, rivets, welds,
etc. (see, for example, Image 6.5). These features are occasionally found on facto-
Image 6.5 A conventionally-produced M3 sub-machine gun (top) and a Luty style

sub-machine gun (bottom)
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Note: The Luty style sub-machine gun was produced without the use of any original-purpose firearm components. Note
the comparative similarity of many of the features of these two sub-machine guns.
238
ry-made firearms, notably wartime expedient designs such as the British Sten, or

on ‘last-ditch’ military weapons produced by factions with limited or dwindling
access to critical resources (for example, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan). How-
ever, such weapons are relatively rare and well known, and thus are readily
distinguishable from ‘true’ craft-produced weapons (Hays and Jenzen-Jones,
2018). Many craft-produced weapons are cruder even than the most basic military
firearm mass-produced in a properly-equipped factory. Even with access to basic
machine tools, edges of craft-produced weapons are likely to remain indistinct,
with uneven angles and undulating surfaces where they ought to be flat. Mark-
ings, when they are actually applied, are often roughly stamped to unequal depths
using individual letter stamps (see, for example, Image 6.10).
In recent years, craft producers have gained access to relatively high-quality
materials and equipment that were formerly the preserve of the commercial fire-
arms industry or other specialized sectors. These items include high-strength steel
tubing, bar, and sheet metal stock; computer numerical control (CNC) machining
tools; and additive manufacturing (3D printing) technologies (see Box 6.1) (Hays
and Jenzen-Jones, 2018; Jenzen-Jones, 2015d). As a result, individuals and groups
with basic online research skills and access to basic tools are able to manufacture
viable homemade small arms. These weapons range from single-shot firearms to
shotguns, sub-machine guns, and rifles. Some light weapons, such as mortars, are
also relatively easy to craft produce since they are based on relatively simple op-
erational principles (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Box 6.1 3D printing and improvised firearms

Although still a relatively new technology, 3D printing—also known as additive manufacturing—
has opened up new possibilities for craft-produced firearms. It is now possible to produce a viable,
multi-shot firearm using polymer (plastic) 3D printing alone, though most homemade 3D-printed
firearms are still bulky and inferior to their conventionally-made counterparts (Hodgkins, 2015).
More promising firearms designs combine 3D-printed components and assemblies with traditionally-
made metal components. This approach minimizes the number of complex components that need
to be machined while retaining strength and durability where these attributes are needed most.142
In the future it may be possible to completely bypass traditional manufacturing, producing viable
firearms entirely from metal components made on 3D printers. While additive manufacturing tech-
nology for ‘printing’ metals exists, prices are currently prohibitively expensive and the firearms pro-
duced via this method to date offer no substantial practical advantage over conventional firearms
(see Image 6.6) (Jenzen-Jones, 2015d).

142 That is, in pressure and/or load-bearing parts such as the barrel, bolt, and upper receiver.
239
 Image 6.6 A copy of the 1911A1 self-loading pistol produced using the direct
metal laser sintering (DMLS) method of 3D printing
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Note: While a perfectly functional handgun, it costs substantially more than a conventionally-produced equivalent.
Source: Solid Concepts
There are several ways to distinguish 3D-printed firearms and components. Weapons and other ob-
jects produced from polymers using additive manufacture are light in weight by comparison with
the very robust glass-reinforced plastics used in commercial firearms production. Firearms which
are 3D-printed come in a wide array of colours, but pure white and black are the most common.
Depending on the printing process used, some 3D-printed firearms have tell-tale lines where the
layers of polymer are laid down by the printer, although the lines will be hard to detect in properly
finished weapons.143
Low-level craft production is widely employed by non-state actors and criminals.

Sub-machine guns are an example of craft-produced firearms that are frequent-
ly encountered in many parts of the world. These guns are frequently seized by
police and military forces throughout Latin America and Africa, and in Australia,
Israel, and elsewhere (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). Some craft-produced
sub-machine guns are semi-professionally produced
143 Examples include 3D-printed firearms in which the exterior surface has been heat-treated in order
to strengthen the otherwise weak and brittle plastic.
240
Image 6.7 A still from an Islamic State propaganda video showing a craft-produced

light cannon chambered for 23 × 152B mm being used against Shia militia targets144
Image 6.8 A Soviet S-5 rocket (top) and an improvised shoulder-fired rocket launcher
(bottom)
Note: A PGO-7V type optical sight from an RPG-7-pattern shoulder-fired recoilless weapon has been added.
Source: US Army, National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)
144 Source withheld.
241
(see Box 6.2) and are standardized to some degree, while others are made by
individuals or small groups in residential properties and are consequently of
lower quality. In Brazil, the proliferation of these weapons has been substantial.
In a 2011 study of weapons seized in São Paulo, 48 per cent of recovered sub-ma-
chine guns were homemade rather than commercially manufactured (Hays and
Jenzen-Jones, 2018; Instituto Sou da Paz, 2014, p. 27).
Box 6.2 ‘Artisan’ production

The term ‘artisan production’ may be thought of as a useful modifier in describing particularly
high-quality firearms which are produced outside of regular industrial manufacturing. The lack of
skill and quality control evident in craft-produced weapons found in the field distinguishes them
from high-quality weapons made by professional artisans and firms specializing in producing
made-to-order firearms in small quantities for commercial sale (which would otherwise be consid-
ered ‘craft produced’).145
The distinction is not always clear-cut, however. In less economically developed countries, ‘artisan’
gunsmiths produce arms of many kinds, some high quality, but others indistinguishable from the
‘craft-produced’ weapons described in this chapter. The reason for the overlap is that firearm pro-
duction is still—despite advances in mass production and materials—essentially based on 19th
century engineering techniques. These weapons can be replicated or approximated by anyone with
access to a small machine shop, or even in some cases by hand.
The relative ease of production means that artisan craftsmen in developing and newly-industrial-
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ized nations often make firearms which resemble craft-produced arms, for profit and/or as part of
local historical and cultural heritage (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). Manufacture of such arms typ-
ically takes place in areas without local or national regulations governing the production and sale
of firearms, or where regulations are difficult to enforce.
Individual gunsmiths may be skilled local blacksmiths and engineers, or may be brought up
manufacturing firearms as a family trade. They typically work from a dedicated manufacturing
workshop which may be equipped with common workshop equipment capable of producing simple
craft-produced firearms chambered for modern cartridges. In the case of traditional black powder
weapons, primitive forge facilities may instead be found (ARES, 2017; Hays and Jenzen-Jones,
2018).
Individual craftsmen of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region in Pakistan, famous today for their copies
of modern designs, have been copying and hybridizing firearms of all types for nearly 200 years,
and still sell copies of obsolete weapons (Ahmad, 2012; Jenzen-Jones and McCollum, 2015).
These workers produce a wide variety of firearms, from crude weapons akin to those described
above, to well-finished handmade examples, to close copies of commercial self-loading arms (see
Image 6.9).
145 These commercially-made craft-produced weapons are also distinguished by being subject to le-
gal registration and tax requirements, strict marking practices, and proof testing (or at least some
form of corporate accountability for quality and safety assurance) (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
As such, these weapons are not considered in this chapter.
242
At the more prolific and skilled end of the spectrum, workers in regions such as the Khyber Pakh-
tunkhwa and Danao, in the Philippines, represent part of a larger scale semi-professional activity
(Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). Many artisan makers produce weapons for illicit purposes as well
as for licit (or at least legally tolerated) ones.
It thus becomes clear that the difference between ‘artisan-made’ and other craft-produced weapons
is, in many respects, contextual. While the term is not particularly useful for classifying weapons, it
remains a useful descriptor.
Image 6.9 A Pakistani craft-produced bolt-action rifle chambered for the 7 × 57 mm

cartridge, which superficially resembles an AK-type rifle
Semi-professional production
Semi-professional manufacturing operations are defined by their ambition as
much as by any technical sophistication. Semi-professionally produced weapons
are sometimes considered a subset of craft-produced examples, representing the
higher end of the complexity spectrum, and blurring the lines between craft-pro-
duced and industrially-produced weapons. Some of the end products may be
similar or even identical to craft-made equivalents, but the production process is
more complex, the pace of production faster, and the scale larger. The range of
semi-professionally produced weapons is also often broader and the quality su-
perior to that of other improvised and craft-produced weapons.
Semi-professional production operations typically employ multiple skilled
workers capable of producing relatively modern firearms, including high-quali-
ty copies of commercial weapons. Some larger operations make use of standard
industry techniques and equipment, while smaller workshops do most work by
hand using relatively primitive equipment. Both types of operation produce a
large number of firearms which are usually supplied in bulk to one or more
243
distributors, often for profit. One exception, noted in a number of conflict zones,
is non-state actors who manufacture light weapons: these are typically intended
for use in combat, and profit is rarely a primary motive.
While there is no sharp distinction between traditional commercial manufac-
turing and semi-professional production, the latter is usually not licensed by local
and national authorities and is thus generally considered illicit. Weapons made
by semi-professional producers are not often registered with national authorities
and sales of these items are not usually reflected in government records (Hays
and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). Such weapons end up on both illicit and legitimate local
markets.
Commercial finishing techniques such as bluing or Parkerizing, hardening of
components, and the presence of (often falsified or counterfeit) markings are
typical of weapons in this category. Barrels may also be rifled, or, as with arti-
san-level production, may be cut from commercial barrel stock. Many of these
Image 6.10 Markings on an AK-type self-loading rifle craft produced in Pakistan

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Note: The general fit and finish is quite good, and a superficial inspection would suggest that most toolmarks are fairly
typical. A closer inspection, however, reveals questionable markings, including poor alignment and spacing of characters
(a common sign of hand-stamped markings), unusual phrasing (PAKMADE), and a calibre marking (‘CAL222’) not nor-
mally associated with AK-type rifles.
244
Image 6.11 An AK-type self-loading rifle craft produced in Pakistan, without the

typical fire selector markings
weapons are effectively high-quality copies of their commercial counterparts,

produced without a licence, registration, or other requirements. As a result, it
may be difficult or impossible for inexperienced researchers to identify these
weapons as craft-produced. It is best to contact specialists if the weapons bear
any signs of craft production. Such evidence includes rough finish, unusual mark-
ings, crude furniture, lack of rifling, an irregular shape, and proportions that
differ from factory-built weapons of the same type. Other signs of craft production
include short barrels, strangely shaped handguards, and non-standard selector
markings.
The provenance of most semi-professionally produced firearms is also much
more difficult to establish. As noted above, their production and sale are not
typically recorded in a way that is accessible to authorities, and they are not like-
ly to be licensed. Conventional markings are likely to be absent, false, or mislead-
ing, and the significance (if any) of other locally-applied markings may be difficult
or impossible to establish (see Box 6.3).
245
Box 6.3 Counterfeit weapons

Many semi-professionally-produced craft weapons are counterfeits of commercial arms, intended
either to pass as real and dupe the unwary, or simply to provide a more readily available or afford-
able alternative to factory-built firearms. In either case, these weapons are frequently marked with
false or misleading manufacturer and model markings (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Semi-professional production, including the production of counterfeit weapons, is commonplace
in and near the Pakistani town of Darra Adam Khel. Weapons produced in the region include cop-
ies of modern self-loading service rifles, many of which are said to be useful in combat. Darra-
made weapons have been used by Taliban insurgents as well as by private militias and government
personnel in both Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2012; ARES, n.d.).
Aside from Darra, the Philippine city of Danao is perhaps the best-known hub for counterfeit fire-
arms. These weapons are sufficiently well made to deceive local law enforcement, and to attract
buyers on the international market (Pavlovich, 2016, p. 8; see Image 6.12). The illicit industry in
Croatia is similarly prolific, though its products are far from direct copies (ARES, 2015b; ARES,
n.d.). Croatian weapons such as the Zagi M91, and the spuriously-marked ‘TEC9’ derived from it,
are nonetheless made to an extremely high standard, equivalent to that of many commercial facto-
ries (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). Many of the gunmakers in these regions might also be regarded
as artisan makers (see Box 6.2). The scale of their operations also likely varies, from hand manufac-
ture to organized low-level mass production.146
Image 6.12 Exposed slide portion of a craft-produced copy of the Colt 1911
produced in Danao, the Philippines (right), displaying characteristic toolmarks
compared with a genuine factory-made example (left)
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Factory-made Craft-produced
version version
Hand-tooled characteristics such as

coarse and uneven toolmark stripe,
and poor overall finish
Source: Steven Pavlovich
146 Interviews with confidential law enforcement and intelligence sources.
246
Image 6.13 An example of the illicit Croatian design typically marked ‘Intratec
TEC9’, seized in the United Kingdom
Identifying improvised and craft-produced firearms

Designers and producers of improvised and craft-produced small arms and light
weapons (such as producers of converted weapons, see below) make use of a wide
variety of original-purpose (factory-produced) firearm components (both lethal
and less-lethal in nature). They also convert non-firearm components such as
lengths of pipe and other plumbing supplies into parts for firearms. Many parts
and even complete weapons are fabricated from supplies that are readily availa-
ble at hardware stores or other commercial and domestic suppliers (Ferguson and
William, 2014; Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).147 As with ‘real’ firearms, the most
important components are the pressure-bearing parts, primarily the barrel and
bolt. It is imperative that these items be sufficiently robust to prevent the weapon
147 As seen in the designs of Philip A. Luty, which have proliferated across the globe for nearly 30
years (Ferguson, 2017b). Luty described his designs as ‘expedient’, but this should not be taken to
imply ease of manufacture or status as an ‘improvised’ weapon. They are sufficiently sophisticated
to require considerable skill to produce, and are definitively ‘craft-produced’ weapons.
247
from failing catastrophically and potentially injuring the user (Ferguson and Jen-
zen-Jones, 2014a; Ferguson, 2017b). This may be an issue with host weapons made
from alloys and plastics not intended for use in firearms. Zinc alloy and ABS
plastics are commonly used in blank-firing weapons due to their lower cost. When
live ammunition is used, breech pressures increase dramatically, and the compo-
nent parts may fail—often critically—after only a few shots (King, 2015, p. 3).
For use with sufficiently low-pressure ammunition, barrels and bolts are also
adapted from commercially available tubing, typically steel or even copper alloy.
Loyalists in Northern Ireland made improvised sub-machine guns out of square-
shaped steel tubing commonly used in the furniture industry.148 The use of un-
marked furniture tubing made it difficult for authorities to identify and dismantle
the facilities at which these and other weapons were manufactured. Less com-
monly, makers and especially converters obtain pre-rifled barrel blanks from the
commercial trade. Barrel blanks require a certain level of skill to install, even in
a simple blowback-operated pistol, as a chamber must be precisely machined and
hand-finished (Ferguson and Jenzen-Jones, 2014a; Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Rarely, designers may also devise accessories that are similar to commercially-
manufactured items. As previously noted, accessories are items that are attached
to small arms or light weapons and increase the weapon’s effectiveness or use-
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fulness, but they are not essential for the basic, intended use of the weapon (Grzy-
bowski, Marsh, and Schroeder, 2012, p. 245). The most common improvised ac-
cessories are simple sound suppressors (see Image 6.14), which often comprise
only a single expansion chamber, unlike more complex commercial designs. Like
the improvised weapons to which they are attached, these items are relatively
ineffective and arguably mainly for ‘show’ (Ferguson and Jenzen-Jones, 2014a).
Prominent examples of improvised sound suppressors are those supplied with
so-called ‘assassination kits’ that European authorities have seized with convert-
ed Baikal pistols. The kits consist of a pistol with a threaded barrel, a sealed sound
suppressor, and ammunition, often all contained in a plastic carrying case
(Linning, 2016).
148 They also created hybrid firearms from genuine Sterling sub-machine gun parts that were stolen
from British authorities (Shea, 2007).
248
Image 6.14 A 6P42 series traumatic pistol, itself a design originally based on the

lethal-purpose Makarov PM, illegally converted to fire 9 × 18 mm lethal-purpose
ammunition and fitted with a sound suppressor
Source: Maxim Popenker
Converted and ‘reactivated’ weapons
Overview of converted weapons

In most cases, converted weapons are lethal-purpose weapons which have been
made by modifying a replica firearm, a non-lethal firearm, or a less-lethal firearm
(King, 2015, pp. 8–9). Converted weapons include those based on: blank-firing
firearms; less-lethal weapons including ‘traumatic’ weapons and less-lethal
launchers;149 and flare guns, which have been modified to fire lethal-purpose
(‘live’) ammunition. The term also includes some types of modification to deac-
tivated weapons (see below) (Ferguson and Jenzen-Jones, 2014a). There is signif-
icant overlap between improvisation, craft-production, and conversion.
Blank-firing firearms include alarm guns and starter pistols, which are typi-
cally noise- and flash-producing replicas of real firearms. So-called ‘traumatic’
handguns are a type of less-lethal weapon that are designed for self-defence pur-
poses and fire ammunition containing rubber balls or irritants, such as ‘pepper
149 For example, 37 and 38 mm less-lethal launchers have been converted by several non-state actors
to fire lethal-purpose 40 × 46 mm ammunition, such as high-explosive rounds (ARES, n.d.; ATF,
2010).
249
spray’ (oleoresin capsicum) (Ferguson and William, 2014).150 Traumatic handguns
are, broadly speaking, the most suitable for conversion since they have barrels
that permit the passage of a projectile (unlike many alarm guns and starter pis-
tols). Gas alarm guns without barrel occlusions are also highly prized for conver-
sion. For this reason, the Baikal IZH-79-8 and IZH-79-T handguns which have
historically been readily available in the UK—where their sale or possession is in
fact illegal—are commonly recovered there (Ferguson and William, 2014; King,
2015, p. 9).151
Traumatic pistols are functionally identical to the broader category of
‘front-venting’ blank-firing handguns, in which propellant gases are vented for-
ward, out of the barrel of the device. Front-venting blank-firing types may prove
more difficult to convert, as they are only required to vent propellant gases and
often feature deliberate barrel occlusions to prevent the passage of solid projec-
tiles. Generally speaking, top- or side-venting types, which typically feature a
substantial metal occlusion permanently integrated into the barrel and extending
back into the chamber area, are substantially more difficult to convert. There are
other methods used to impede the conversion process (Florquin and King, 2018).
These reflect a concerted effort to prevent illicit conversion (Ferguson and Wil-
liam, 2014; Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
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It should be noted that given sufficient will and expertise, essentially any non-
lethal or replica firearm can be converted to fire live ammunition. Whether crim-
inals will go to the trouble of converting an item depends on the level of skill
required to achieve the conversion, and the cost and risk of converting weapons
versus acquiring conventional firearms. In the UK, for example, most converted
blank-firing handguns used in crimes are traumatic and front-venting types (typ-
ically illegal there); the corresponding rarity of legal top-venting types shows
these models are seriously challenging for criminals to convert (Hays and Jen-
zen-Jones, 2018).
It is also important to note that a very basic conversion can be effected simply
by cutting the existing barrel off at the chamber, and relying upon the chamber
itself to generate sufficient pressure to project the bullet (Ferguson and William,
2014). While traumatic guns altered in this way are wildly inaccurate and less
150 Most are also capable of firing blank cartridges.

151 The Baikal IZH-79-8 and IZH-79-T are also known as the 6P42 series.
250
powerful than a conventional pistol firing a commercial bullet, they can cause

severe injuries at short range.152
Many of the technical requirements and manufacturing techniques used in
the production of improvised and craft-produced small arms and light weapons
also apply to the conversion of non-lethal and less-lethal weapons. However,
converting blank-firing and traumatic pistols is often more attractive to criminals
because the converted weapon, made largely of conventionally-manufactured
components, may be of higher quality than available improvised and craft-pro-
duced weapons which have been built from scratch (Ferguson and William, 2014;
Ferguson and Jenzen-Jones, 2014a). Blank-firing and traumatic pistols are also
significantly less expensive than lethal-purpose weapons, in some cases costing
ten per cent of the cost of a ‘real’ pistol (King, 2015, p. 8). Indeed, converted
blank-firing and traumatic pistols are, worldwide, the most commonly recovered
sub-category of converted or reactivated firearms (ARES, n.d.).
Globally, blank-firing weapons made in Turkey represent a substantial num-
ber of recovered converted firearms. Researchers have documented sales of con-
verted Turkish-made blank-firing handguns, sub-machine guns, and rifles on
illicit physical and online markets in six countries, and they have been used by
criminal elements in dozens more, primarily in Europe and North Africa (ARES,
n.d.; Jenzen-Jones and McCollum, 2017; Florquin and King, 2018). Blank-firing
weapons produced in Croatia, Russia, Germany, and elsewhere are also still cir-
culating globally, but in substantially lower numbers (ARES, n.d.).
In summary, the choice of conversion over improvisation or craft production
is likely to be based upon the time and effort required to convert a given weapon,
and the availability (licit or illicit) of the ‘weapon’ to be converted versus a con-
ventional firearm. It is also contingent upon national laws, which may restrict the
type of weapons available for conversion (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). There is
also considerable psychological and prestige value attached to functioning weap-
ons that closely resemble original purpose firearms. Not only do such weapons
more easily pass as ‘real’ firearms to other criminals and potential victims, but
they may better fit users’ image of a firearm.153
152 A bullet fired from a traumatic gun without a barrel can penetrate several inches of ten per cent
ballistic gelatine at contact distance (Channel 4, 2016).
153 Author interviews with senior UK intelligence and law enforcement personnel, April 2016.
251
Identifying converted weapons
Generally speaking, blank-firing weapons, whether converted or not, are identi-

fied by the same types of physical characteristics and markings as conventional
firearms. Most less-lethal and non-lethal weapons have markings that identify
the make and model of the weapon, and often include a serial number as well.
Other markings, such as a calibre designation, may also be present. It should be
noted that some blank-firing weapons have ‘faux’ serial, batch, or lot numbers—
that is, numbers that appear to be unique identifying marks, but that are actually
identical across a batch, lot, or model of weapon (ARES, n.d.). It may be difficult
for a non-specialist to determine whether a given example has been converted;
possible indicators include visible toolmarks, ill-fitting or distinct barrels or bar-
rel assemblies, welding or brazing, and the presence of lethal-purpose ammunition.154
Overview of reactivated weapons

Reactivated weapons are deactivated weapons that have been wholly or partly
returned to an operational state. Deactivated weapons are original-purpose (typ-
ically lethal) firearms that have been rendered ‘permanently’ inoperable, that is,
incapable of discharging a projectile.155 These weapons are often sold to collectors
Handbook
(EU, 2017; Jenzen-Jones, 2015f).156 Deactivated weapons are frequently drawn

from surplus stocks and are often old, incomplete, worn-out, or otherwise unsafe
to fire, making it especially important to prevent a live round being easily cham-
bered. The process of adapting properly deactivated weapons to lethal-purpose
use is often called reactivation or conversion. The term ‘conversion’ is sometimes
used to indicate that a weapon may not be ‘reactivated’ to its full, original capa-
bilities, but may still pose a lethal threat (for example, when a deactivated rifled
barrel is replaced with a functional, smooth-bore barrel. The weapon is no longer
a ‘rifle’ and is therefore less accurate at longer ranges, but it is still potentially
lethal) (Jenzen-Jones, 2015f).
154 Brazing is a form of high-temperature soldering.

155 Such weapons may be described with terms such as ‘inert’, ‘drill-purpose’, ‘innocuous’, among
others.
156 It is important to note that various armed forces retain weapons that have been rendered non-func-
tional but that may not qualify in legal sense as ‘deactivated’. Typically, the intent here is to pre-
vent soldiers from attempting to fire—or accidentally firing—live rounds in a training environ-
ment where live ammunition is not used for safety reasons.
252
There are also other types of weapons which are sometimes thought to fall

into this category, including lethal-purpose weapons converted to fire only blank
ammunition (so-called ‘acoustic expansion weapons’) and those converted to fire
very small, low-power cartridges (often known as ‘Flobert’ calibres).157
Deactivation standards vary significantly, both by country and by type of
deactivated firearm. Some national standards are much more rigorous than oth-
ers. Prior to 2015, deactivation standards in Slovakia were lower than in other
European countries (Jenzen-Jones, 2015f; Samuel, 2015).158 The Slovakian govern-
ment raised its standards after terrorists used deactivated Czech Sa vz. 58
self-loading rifles acquired in Slovakia in the 2015 Paris attacks, which also
prompted changes in deactivation standards in other European countries (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016).159
Identifying reactivated weapons

Non-specialists may readily confuse deactivated and ‘reactivated’ firearms with
their original lethal-purpose equivalents (see Image 6.15). Signs that a weapon
may have been deactivated include:
the absence or modification of critical components, such as the bolt or barrel;

working parts that are immobile;
proof marks or other marking indicating that the item is a legally-compliant
deactivated weapon; and
welding or brazing.
Deactivated weapons that have been reactivated may be identifiable in a sim-

ilar manner to converted blank-firing weapons. Signs of reactivation include vis-
ible toolmarks, welding or brazing, and the presence of lethal-purpose ammuni-
tion. In most cases, inspection by specialists is advisable.
Image 6.15 shows three PM model self-loading handguns. No. 1 is a fully
functional factory-produced pistol. No. 2 was deactivated before being converted
to fire lethal-purpose cartridges. No. 3 is a craft-produced copy, made by skilled
gunsmiths in Pakistan. At first glance, the weapons appear identical.
157 For more details, see Florquin and King (2018).

158 See, for example, HMSO (2010).
159 For further details, see Florquin and King (2018).
253
Image 6.15 Three versions of a PM-type self-loading handgun
2
Handbook
Note irregularities in serrations on the hammer and

safety/selector and difference in marking style
compared to No. 1 and No. 2.
254
A closer examination of the physical features of the first and second handguns

reveals key differences, especially when the two are disassembled. The most note-
worthy difference is the barrel, which had been replaced with an unfinished copy.
The third weapon can be differentiated from the other two by both its physical
features and its markings, including irregularities in serrations on the hammer
and safety/selector, differences in marking style and quality, looser tolerances,
and inconsistent finish.
Box 6.4 Capability

All of these weapons are, by their very nature, less capable than their factory-made counterparts.
Both craft-produced and improvised firearms are often unreliable, inaccurate, and unsafe. Accurate
rifled firearms are rarely within the production capabilities of those producing improvised or craft-
produced small arms and light weapons, and so the majority of these weapons feature smooth-bore
barrels (though they are often incorrectly dubbed ‘rifles’) (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Improvised weapons and converted blank-firing weapons are often of particularly poor quality. In
many cases, the metals used in these weapons are insufficiently strong for their intended purpose.
Their weak construction obliges makers to employ low-pressure cartridges.160 Use of these cartridges
drastically affects the range, accuracy, and terminal effect of these weapons, though of course at
close range these characteristics are less important. Even when carefully manufactured, the struc-
tural integrity of many improvised weapons remains a serious issue. Some remain intact for only a
few rounds (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Image 6.16 A typical pen-type zip gun
Source: Stills from a YouTube video161
However, some craft-produced weapons approach modern factory standards. Traumatic or blank-
firing pistols converted using genuine barrel blanks compare favourably with lethal purpose
equivalents, provided they are equipped with sights and thoroughly tested for function and accuracy 
160 Examples of low-pressure cartridges include 12 bore shotgun, .32 ACP, and .22 LR.
161 Video details withheld on security grounds.
255
 (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018; Forgotten Weapons, 2017a). Their barrels are inherently far stronger
than improvised barrels, since they are made for use in factory-made guns. Producers of converted
firearms that use these materials are also likely to chamber the weapon for commercially available
ammunition rather than improvised ammunition. The end result is a relatively potent, long-lasting
weapon (Ferguson and William, 2014; Ferguson, 2014a). In other words, improvised, craft-pro-
duced, and converted weapons range in capability from practically useless to near parity with
commercially available types. They should therefore be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
One significant complication of reliance on handmade components is a total lack of the inter-
changeability of parts, which makes it difficult for most users to carry out repairs. If a major com-
ponent fails, the user is obliged to seek a craft-produced replacement, or to replace their weapon
with a new one. This also affects the practice of disassembling a weapon before it is smuggled,
which is a common technique employed by arms traffickers (Pavlovich, 2016, p. 11). When multi-
ple weapons are disassembled and their parts become mixed in transit, a user may find themselves
with a poorly functioning, non-functional, or even unsafe weapon when the parts are reassembled.
Firing improvised ammunition can be particularly dangerous to the user, especially as it may be
used with factory-made weapons that are otherwise considered safe. While some hand-loaded car-
tridges are safe and reliable, others are outright dangerous. Out-of-specification cases and projec-
tiles are likely to cause feeding issues, especially in self-loading firearms. The use of match heads
and other unconventional propellants may result in the weapons not firing or other malfunctions.162
An improperly loaded and/or chambered round may destroy a weapon and injure or even kill the
operator. The combination of improvised ammunition and an improvised or craft-produced firearm
is particularly dangerous, compounding the problems inherent in both (Ferguson and Jenzen-Jones,
2014a; Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
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Improvised and craft-produced ammunition

The greatest activity in the area of ammunition improvisation or craft production
is with light weapons. Non-state armed groups, which expend large quantities
of ammunition for grenade launchers, mortars, recoilless guns, and rocket launch-
ers in a typical conflict, are particularly likely to turn to craft production (Hays
and Jenzen-Jones, 2018; see Image 6.17). Improvised mortar projectiles are fairly
common in the Middle East and North Africa, and are manufactured and em-
ployed by a variety of groups (ARES, n.d.). Notably, the Islamic State has manu-
factured ammunition for mortars and other weapons on a quasi-industrial scale.
Colombian militant groups (especially the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia (FARC)) are also known for their activities in this area, which were direct-
ly influenced and facilitated by members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA) (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
162 An example is ‘hang fire’, which is when there is an unexpected delay between the functioning of
the trigger mechanism of a gun and the ignition of the propellant.
256
Image 6.17 Improvised mortar projectiles converted from gas cylinders, Syria, 2013

Source: Molhem Barakat/Reuters
Given the wide range of improvised and craft-produced light weapons, the
forms and natures of improvised light weapons ammunition are vast. Cartridges
for cannon are rarely improvised due to their complex production requirements.
Larger ammunition, including projectiles for grenade launchers, mortars, and
recoilless weapons, are often crudely improvised, as are rockets. The accuracy of
improvised ammunition produced for all types of light weapons is generally
limited, and securing the required materials can be difficult. Producers of impro-
vised light weapons ammunition often have to be able to produce or repurpose
both high-explosives (either from commercial or bulk explosives, or from ‘har-
vesting’ explosives from military munitions or other sources) and low-explosive
propellants (for use in propellant charges, rocket motors, etc.) (Ferguson and
Jenzen-Jones, 2014a; Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). More specialized functional
types of ammunition are sometimes also improvised, including smoke, incendi-
ary, and chemical weapons (ARES, n.d.).
In the case of small arms, there is a clear criminal preference for factory-made
or reloaded ammunition, even where the street value for such ammunition is very
257
high (sometimes many times higher than commercial pricing).163 Improvised fire-
arms are typically designed around readily available cartridge types, due to the
substantial difficulties inherent in producing functional cartridge cases, projec-
tiles, and primers from scratch (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).164 One alternative
to lethal-purpose ammunition is converted non-lethal and less-lethal ammunition.
Ammunition used in blank-firing and traumatic firearms, as well as in some nail
guns, is sometimes modified with the addition of a projectile.165 In many coun-
tries, blank cartridges are readily available (and often unlicensed), and contain
charged and primed cases that require only the addition of a viable projectile for
lethal applications. However, most available blank ammunition is made for pur-
pose-built blank-firing weapons and is deliberately manufactured to different
specifications than lethal-purpose ammunition. Generally speaking, this ammu-
nition requires specific modifications to be fired from weapons other than con-
verted blank-firing firearms (Ferguson, 2014a). Similarly, some blank ammunition
for lethal-purpose firearms, including the blanks used in film and television, will
not chamber in a blank-firing weapon without extensive modifications to the
weapon.
For these reasons, craft production of ammunition and the modification of
existing cartridges is often a last resort. Instead, local users may employ various
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crude methods to reload fired cartridge cases.166 Reloading ammunition is rela-

tively straightforward. The reloader simply punches out the expended primer
cup from a cartridge case and reloads it with an improvised composition made
from match heads, small percussion caps from a child’s toy, or another impact-sen-
sitive mixture. These improvised primers are reasonably reliable ignition sources.
The reloader then makes a projectile and an improvised propellant charge from
materials such as match heads or black powder extracted from fireworks (Hays
and Jenzen-Jones, 2018). Projectiles are improvised in different ways, including
163 Author interviews with confidential UK and European law enforcement sources, 2015–17.
164 Common calibres used globally include 12 gauge or .410 bore shotgun cartridges, .22 rimfire rifle
cartridges, and centrefire calibres in the .38/9 mm range (Hays and Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
165 Powder-actuated tools make use of controlled chemical combustion in much the same way as a
firearm, employing specially-designed blank cartridges to act on either the head of a fastener
(such as a nail) or a piston (which, in turn, strikes the head of a fastener), driving the fastener into
the target material at very close range (Frank et al., 2012).
166 This is especially the case where certain calibres or types are in short supply, such as suitable big
game hunting ammunition (Y-Man, 2013a; 2013b).
258
Image 6.18 Improvised ammunition the traditional methods of casting in a

made by modifying conventional two-piece mould, or drop-forming
cartridge cases, signal blanks, and
from lead (Carman, 1955, pp. 173–74).
charges used by powder-actuated tool
cartridges Alternatively, they may be formed
from metal, primarily steel, brass, or
copper alloy, and may exhibit tell-tale
toolmarks.167 Projectiles are also made
from, among other items, ball bearings,
air rifle pellets, and steel reinforcement
bar for concrete (‘rebar’) (see Image
6.18). The presence of these items may
assist in identifying improvised ammu-
nition (Ferguson, 2014a; Hays and
Jenzen- Jones, 2018).
Source: EkoCzao
In developing nations, fired shot-
gun cartridges, which are designed to be disposable, are commonly reloaded with
lead shot produced locally. The shot is typically made from existing sources, in-
cluding discarded household items such as battery cells, and is sometimes poured
into moulds or drop-formed using trees as substitute shot towers (Hays and
Jenzen-Jones, 2018).
Improvised ammunition is often crude. Small-calibre improvised ammunition
may feature:
projectile types which do not match the case;

cases or projectiles made from industrial or household materiel (for example,
nail gun cartridge cases; ball bearings);
crudely cast or machined projectiles;
obvious signs of reloading or modification (cuts, solder, adhesives, etc.).
Improvised ammunition for light weapons also often appears crudely finished.
Visibly hand-applied welding or brazing; extensive use of non-specialized external
fasteners such as common bolts and nuts; low-quality or absent paintwork; repur-
posed industrial or household items (for example gas cylinders or industrial piping);
and other rough and ready measures are signs that ammunition may be improvised.
167 Some commercial hunting projectiles are also turned from copper alloy and other metals (Per-
egrine, 2015a; 2015b).
259
Muzzle-loading firearms
Overview of muzzle-loading firearms

Until the 19th century, the most common firearms were single-shot muzzle-load-
ing weapons. Strictly speaking, ‘muzzle-loading’ simply refers to any gun that is
loaded from the muzzle (front) of the barrel, or in the case of revolvers, the cyl-
inder.168 This category of weapons includes those that are loaded with rounds of
ammunition other than self-contained cartridges, such as propellant powder and
a bullet wrapped in paper or other combustible material (ARES, 2017). However,
it also includes modern arms such as the Russian GP-series grenade launcher,
which uses semi-caseless ammunition but is loaded at the muzzle, and ‘in-line’
muzzleloaders (see Image 6.19). Practically speaking, the term ‘muzzle-loading
firearm’ is most often used to describe weapons that may be lethal, but are obso-
lete and rarely encountered in the field, such as muskets.
Muzzle-loading firearms remained common for decades—in economically
less-developed countries—until the mid-20th century. Gunflints for flintlock arms
(a type of muzzle-loading firearm) were exported from Britain to African nations
until the 1960s (Whittaker, 2001). Even today, muzzle-loading firearms are still
sometimes encountered in the field (ARES, n.d.). These weapons are typically
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craft-produced (see above) and used for hunting (including poaching), self-defence,
and militia activity in economically less-developed countries (Hays and Jen-
zen-Jones, 2018).
Image 6.19 An American Michigan Arms Wolverine in-line muzzle-loading rifle
Source: Chuck Madurski via ARES
168 Muzzle-loading firearms are often colloquially referred to as ‘muzzle-loaders’ or ‘muzzleloaders’.
260
Elsewhere, antique muzzle-loading firearms and replicas are rarely used be-

yond recreational shooting by collectors and by hunters. In-line muzzle-loading
guns were pioneered in the United States in the 1980s and targeted at the recre-
ational hunting market (Sigler, n.d.).169
Identifying muzzle-loading firearms

Muzzle-loading firearms may be either rifled or smooth-bore weapons, using
various initiation methods including flintlock and percussion lock designs.170 Fun-
damentally, they consist of the archetypal ‘lock, stock, and barrel’. The ‘stock’ and
‘barrel’ are similar to those found on modern firearms. The ‘lock’ is the function-
al equivalent of the receiver in contemporary firearms, acting as a baseplate and
housing for the mechanical parts of the weapon (see inset in Figure 6.1). In muz-
zle-loading designs the flint or percussion cap is separately located on the lock.
While most muzzle-loading small arms make use of black powder, some modern
commercial muzzle-loaders use smokeless propellant (Fadala, 2004).
Figure 6.1 The parts of a muzzle-loading flintlock rifle
Note: The inset shows parts of a percussion lock.

Source: ATF (2018)
169 In-line muzzle-loading guns superficially resemble single-shot centrefire firearms, as they typical-
ly break open for priming, but not for loading of the main charge or projectile (these being loaded
from the front of the barrel). They also employ a striker mechanism in line with the barrel of the
weapon, rather than the traditional external lock (Sigler, n.d.).
170 For a discussion of early firearms designs see also Butler (1971).
261
Image 6.20 A producer’s workshop with selected hand tools, Nigeria
Source: Gsell and Nowak (2018)

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262
CHAPTER 7
Gathering Arms and Ammunition

Data in the Field: Advice for
Researchers
Introduction
Gathering data on arms and ammunition in the field is an important element of

some types of investigation. Material proof of specific types of arms and ammu-
nition can provide compelling evidence that specific stakeholders have (or have
not) been involved in activities of interest, such as illicit arms trading, arms diver-
sion, human rights abuses, or criminal acts. It can also help investigators under-
stand what led to the events under investigation. Frequently, the collection of
such evidence also provides insight into the military capabilities of belligerents.
Successful—and even, sometimes, unsuccessful—field investigations are rich
sources of data. For journalists, field investigations often generate entirely new
stories and support existing ones. Such work can capture the public imagination,
bring attention to violations of international law, and highlight cases of arms
diversion.171
Gathering data in the field has a number of inherent risks. The weapons them-
selves may pose a hazard. They may be loaded and ready to fire, in poor physical
condition, or even booby-trapped. Additionally, the environment in which weap-
ons of interest are encountered may be littered with explosive remnants of war
(ERW), such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned or poorly stored muni-
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tions, landmines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These hazards are
often hidden, compounding the risk to field researchers. In some cases, journalists
and other researchers may be subject to harassment, detention, or imprisonment
by local authorities, who sometimes view the gathering of data on arms and am-
munition as a threat to the state or to their own interests.
Thorough planning—particularly, developing a risk management plan—is
therefore essential prior to deploying to a conflict-affected area. This planning
includes becoming familiar with the groups involved in the fighting, the types of
weapons and ammunition that are likely to be encountered, the orientation of the
confrontation lines, and the acquisition and proper use of personal protective
equipment (such as body armour) and communications devices. Therefore, ver-
ifiable consent and permission should be gained from the relevant persons prior
to any data-gathering fieldwork.
171 See, for example, Chivers (2012a; 2012b).
264
Given the challenges of researching and reporting on arms and ammunition
Gathering Arms and Ammunition Data in the Field: Advice for Researchers
in the field, some organizations choose to deploy specialized teams, engage outside
organizations or contractors, or train specialist personnel within existing teams.
While the ideal standard of evidence may be the physical retrieval of samples
of arms and ammunition, this is often beyond the capabilities of many research-
ers, and of limited benefit to some organizations, such as news media. Moreover,
there are often barriers to physically gathering samples, from simple safety mat-
ters, to national and international legislation, to the attitude of local authorities.
Consequently, for many arms and munitions investigations (AMIs), it is essential
to correctly record evidence in-situ.
Safety considerations
Journalists and researchers should, in general, avoid handling arms and ammu-
nition wherever possible. Nevertheless, those involved in fieldwork should en-
deavour to learn the mechanical and handling characteristics of weapons likely
to be encountered. Key safety considerations are:
Treat all firearms as if they are loaded, and all ammunition as if they are live,
until you have personally confirmed otherwise.
Do not rely on a weapon’s safety mechanism to prevent it from firing.
Never assume that arms or ammunition are safe to handle until they have
been inspected by a subject matter specialist such as an armourer, ammunition
technical officer (ATO), or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician. Ar-
mourers and other weapons specialists are generally best placed to advise on
the safety of small arms and light weapons, as well as unfired ammunition.
With live (fired or unfired) ordnance, EOD technicians and ATOs are often the
best qualified people to advise.
Anyone intending to handle arms or ammunition must receive appropriate
safety training.
In addition to the safety considerations specific to arms and ammunition out-

lined below, there may be site-specific considerations. Journalists and researchers
should conduct a full and informed appraisal of the local security situation before
doing any field research related to arms. Factors to consider include:
265
the presence of hostile state or non-state forces, criminals, or local populace;
structural dangers (such as damaged buildings and engineering flaws);

hazardous materials (such as chemical and radiological materials and devices,
and toxic industrial chemicals and materials); and
biohazards (such as toxins, decaying corpses and carcasses, and local diseas-
es) (US Army, 2010).
Avoid handling arms unless absolutely necessary.
Small arms and light weapons

When possible:
ensure that the ammunition source (magazine, clip, belt, or individual

rounds) is removed from a weapon before handling it,
ask the weapon’s owner to unload the weapon for you, and confirm it is un-
loaded; and
always ensure that the weapon is pointed in a safe direction (away from
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yourself and others) during all unload and clear procedures (see Box 7.1).
When handling firearms, remember, at a minimum, the four ‘golden rules’ of

firearms safety:172
1. Always treat the weapon as if it were loaded.

2. Always keep the muzzle of the weapon pointed in a safe direction.
3. Always keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to fire the weapon
or perform a required function check.
4. Always keep the weapon unloaded unless you intend to fire it. If you need to
check the function of the weapon with ammunition, use drill or dummy rounds
instead of live ammunition.173
172 There are two key risks to handling a firearm of unknown provenance: (1) Risk of accidental dis-
charge. Solution: Know how to make safe and/or unload weapon safely. (2) Risk of catastrophic
event during firing due to poor build quality, damage, storage, condition, etc. Solution: Do not fire
a firearm unless absolutely essential.
173 The primer and propellant should be visibly absent or inert in drill and dummy rounds. They should
consist of factory rounds with a fluted case, or inert rounds with a drilled case (see Chapter 4).
266
Box 7.1 Unload and clear procedures
The basic unload and clear procedure for unloading firearms and rendering them safe to handle is
outlined below. It is important to note that this explanation is provided as a guide only: wherever
practicable, unload and clear procedures should only be attempted by properly trained personnel.
Unload and clear procedures for light weapons are not included in the text below, as they are often
more complicated than comparable procedures for small arms and, in some cases, pose a consid-
erably higher risk.
When possible, you should ask the owner of a weapon to unload it for you, and then confirm the
weapon is unloaded before handling it. If it is necessary to unload a weapon yourself, ask the own-
er’s permission before doing so. Always remember to make a visual and tactile inspection of the
weapon to confirm it is safe to handle.
If you must unload and clear a weapon, and you do not have the correct, step-by-step instructions
from the manufacturer or another credible source, remember these three basic steps:
1. R
emove the ammunition source from the weapon. The ammunition source may be a magazine,
clip, belt, or individual rounds.
2. C
ycle the weapon’s action (by using the cocking handle(s), bolt handle, or similar weapon fea-
ture) and, where possible, hold the action open.
3. Visually inspect the weapon’s chamber, magazine housing, feed ramps, and other areas that feed
live ammunition to ensure that they are clear.
If possible, these three steps should be followed with a weapon’s safety mechanism(s) engaged.
Wherever possible, avoid handling arms unless properly trained.
Explosive ordnance
Munitions that contain a high-explosive (HE) fill are considered to be ‘explosive
ordnance’. Explosive ordnance includes many types of ammunition for light
weapons (see Chapter 5). When in doubt, treat suspect ammunition as explosive
ordnance, and act accordingly. Explosive ordnance is most commonly encoun-
tered in the form of projectiles (fired from a weapon system that has a barrel),
rockets or missiles (that use a rocket motor for propulsion), or manually-employed
ordnance such as hand grenades or landmines. In a conflict-affected environment,
you may encounter ERW. ERW refers to both abandoned explosive ordnance and
unexploded ordnance (IMAS, 2003). Other types of ordnance may be encountered,
including emplaced landmines, booby traps, and IEDs.
267
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been
used during armed conflict, has been left behind, and is no longer under the
control of the party that abandoned it. Such ordnance may or may not have
been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use (UN, 1980; IMAS,
2003).
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to ordnance (rockets, projectiles, hand
grenades, and others) that have been used but failed to detonate as intended
(IMAS, 2003). Failure rates may be as low as one or two per cent, or as high
as 30 to 40 per cent, depending on a range of factors, such as the quality of
original manufacture, the age of the weapon, storage conditions, the method
of employment, and environmental conditions.
Landmines and booby traps are munitions that have been placed, buried,
dropped, thrown, or otherwise deployed with the intention of harming or
hindering personnel or vehicles near the device. Many landmines and booby
traps are unintentionally triggered (or initiated) by the victim(s) (UN, 1980).
Submunitions are smaller explosive munitions that are scattered from larger
carrier/cargo rounds. The majority of cargo rounds are either fired from the
ground or dropped from the air. Many submunitions have unreliable fusing
systems and can remain hazardous for extended periods of time.
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Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are ordnance items made in an impro-

vised manner that incorporate explosive, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary
chemicals and are designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. They
may incorporate factory-produced ordnance but often include non-military
components (NATO, 2018, 4.3).
Untrained and inexperienced persons should never touch or handle explosive

ordnance. If the aim is to gather data that requires the handling of ordnance, the
researcher should seek appropriate training or be accompanied by a suitably
trained person or team.
Should you encounter ERW, remember the ARMS acronym:
AVOID the area.

RECORD all relevant information from a safe distance.
MARK the area to warn others.
SEEK assistance from the relevant authorities.
268
Ordnance and, in particular unexploded ordnance, is dangerous. Where pos-
sible, follow these rules:
First and foremost, do not touch arms and ammunition unless absolutely
necessary. Never handle unexploded ordnance.
Try to avoid approaching ordnance encountered in the field wherever possi-
ble. Use optics to examine a suspected unexploded item from a distance. Cam-
era zoom lenses, binoculars, and spotting scopes are all excellent tools for
examining these items from a safe distance.
If you must approach ordnance, do so at a 45 degree angle from the rear of
the item.
If you notice submunitions or landmines, assume that there are more in the
area around you.
If an item is fused and has been armed, fired, or damaged, it may be particu-
larly hazardous. Many ordnance items include firing delays and sensors that
could cause the item to detonate if approached.
Do not be the first to open boxes or handle arms and ammunition found in
combat zones, and beware of boxes and ordnance that appear to be altered,
as they may have been placed as booby traps.
Submunitions are particularly dangerous when encountered outside of pack-
aging or their cargo munition. Do not approach or handle submunitions.
Cartridge-based ammunition
While small arms ammunition generally poses a lower risk than many other items
you may encounter in the field, larger cartridge-based ammunition can be par-
ticularly dangerous. Do not approach or handle these items if:
the cartridge has an overall length of more than 160 mm;

the cartridge is larger than 14.5 mm in calibre;174 or
the projectile is completely painted (ARES, 2018).
174 It is important to note that there are limited examples of smaller calibre ammunition containing
high explosives, either as part of the projectile, or in a booby-trapped condition. See, for example,
Jenzen-Jones (2014b). All ammunition should be handled with caution.
269
Principal tools and practices for field research on small arms
and light weapons

Fieldwork takes place under a variety of conditions, from crime scenes to active
conflict zones. While these circumstances all pose different challenges to an in-
vestigator, there are some general techniques that may prove useful under most
conditions.
Fieldwork techniques
Depending on the area in which you are working, your affiliation, and the secu-
rity situation, attempting to document arms may pose a security risk. You should
make an informed assessment of the security situation before approaching com-
batants and seeking to document weapons. In many cases, such work is better
conducted indoors, away from passers-by and civilians. However, you should
not handle or move explosive remnants of war under any circumstances.
If you rely on the permission and assistance of combatants in order to conduct
your work (as many journalists or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) con-
ducting fieldwork do), you may need to convince these individuals of the impor-
tance of your work and of their assistance. If you record their name and details,
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or take a photo of them, you should clearly indicate how you intend to use the
information or images. In most cases, there is no need to link information about
arms or ammunition to their owners and it is thus possible to protect the identity
of these individuals. This should be explained to anyone whose arms or ammu-
nition you intend to record (photographically or otherwise).
If you are looking for particular arms or ammunition in a given area, you may
find it useful to carry a ‘scrapbook’ (hard copy and/or electronic) of images of
these items to show to people in the area who are less familiar with arms. Ahead
of time, it is also a good idea to research local names and terminology for certain
arms, and to familiarize yourself with the identification characteristics of weapons
in the region. Several organizations produce reports and maintain blogs identi-
fying arms and ammunition documented in current conflict zones, including the
Small Arms Survey and Armament Research Services (ARES).
When documenting weapons, a good rule of thumb is to take twice as many
photos as you need. This holds particularly true if you are under time pressure,
as some images may be out of frame or focus. In the age of digital cameras and
270
the ready availability of storage media for them, there is rarely a need to limit the
number of photos taken. If you see markings—any markings—photograph and
write all of them down. Even seemingly insignificant markings often prove use-
ful. Similarly, even if you are looking for specific arms or ammunition, you should
document others you encounter, when practicable. These items may be significant
for reasons that are not immediately evident.
Documenting the prices of arms and ammunition is another important facet
of fieldwork. When possible, collect price data over an extended period of time
(at least a few months, and preferably before the outbreak of hostilities or other
key events). Data on pricing is often useful for analysing the availability and
demand for various weapons. Where possible, collect price data for the same
make, model, or type of items from multiple sources. Data on the unit cost of the
items when sold in varying quantities, and the prices charged by different types
of suppliers (individuals, professional arms dealers, businesses or groups, etc.),
is also useful.
Remember to account for local idiosyncrasies in language, including how arms
are classified and described. For example, the lack of a ‘p’ in the Arabic alphabet
can result in ‘RPG’ becoming ‘RBG’, or ‘PKM’ becoming ‘BKM’, etc. Additionally,
local fighters frequently give arms nicknames for one reason or another. For ex-
ample, Syrian rebels referred to the Steyr AUG as the ‘B44’, a reference to
keystrokes used to purchase this weapon in a popular computer game. In Libya
in 2012, the AK-103-2 that was seen in service with both sides of the conflict was
referred to as the ‘Israeli AK’, due to a mistaken belief that Israel had supplied or
produced the weapons.175
Site exploitation
Site exploitation (SE) is a systematic search and collection effort designed to gath-
er primary intelligence based on information, material, and persons found at a
designated location (US Army, 2010).176 Site exploitation is conducted to produce
a news article or intelligence report, facilitate customs or law enforcement seizures
175 Interviews with ARES personnel.

176 Sometimes differentiated as ‘tactical site exploitation’ (TSE) and ‘sensitive site exploitation’ (SSE)
in military and law enforcement usage. TSE is sometimes considered to be a field expedient, rapid
approach in comparison to the more nuanced procedures followed under SSE (Dawson, 2009).
271
of arms and ammunition, or support criminal prosecutions, among other reasons
(ARES, 2016d).
There are a number of site exploitation and field investigation training cours-
es that are provided to investigators within professional and governmental or-
ganizations, or from private companies. Even a short three-day course can great-
ly enhance investigative skills by introducing the participants to key evidence,
privacy, and safety considerations; and by bolstering personal or institutional
credibility.
The procedures applied during site exploitation will vary with the purpose of
the field research. Chain of custody standards relating to the transfer of possession
of evidence (along with other legal considerations), for example, are much strict-
er for criminal prosecutions than for most intelligence outputs, or for general
research and reporting purposes.177 The timeline for exploitation may also change
substantially, depending on circumstances. Law enforcement often has several
days to process a crime scene, whereas the time available for site exploitation in
conflict areas may be limited to hours or minutes. While site exploitation is best
conducted by a team of investigators, individuals may sometimes need to collect
evidence on their own. As noted above, researchers should obtain appropriate
training from their organization or elsewhere before engaging in site exploitation.
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Researchers should be aware of the possible ramifications of contaminating a

crime scene or disturbing evidence. Anyone engaging in these activities will ul-
timately need to take personal and, as relevant, organizational responsibility for
the decision to access crime or conflict areas and document arms and ammunition.
If items are moved—either to allow for better photography, or for evidentiary or
other purposes—additional factors must be considered.
The following basic principles of site exploitation are adapted from an ARES
training module, and are presented as an introductory overview only.
Searching the site

Site exploitation provides access to three broad categories of primary intelligence:
information gathered from physical documents, books and manuals, computer

hard drives, external storage devices, and other media;
177 See, for example, van Ginkel (2012); Roach (2009).
272
materiel, including weapons, ammunition, equipment, chemicals, and sup-
plies; and
persons including witnesses, victims, and others.
These primary sources are known by the acronym IMP (information, materiel,
and persons) (US Army, 2010).178
Basic site searches consist of the following steps:
Conduct a risk assessment.

Identify safety hazards.
Search the area to locate primary intelligence sources (IMP).
Document the site and evidence.
Question human intelligence sources.
Conduct further forensic collection, if applicable (ARES, 2016d).
Before applying invasive search techniques, investigators should thoroughly

document the site. The purpose, sensitivity, and significance of the site should be
assessed. In addition to extensive photography of the site and the gathering of
relevant intelligence, the following four practices may also be helpful.
A sketch of the area under investigation can prove very useful when attempt-
ing to recreate the scene from photographs at a later date, and for recording im-
portant dimensions (see Image 7.1). Sketches are used to assist in recalling the
layout of a scene. The sketch should support the photographs, with items drawn
appropriately sized, but not necessarily exactly to scale. A sketch should show
where evidence was found in relation to the area of investigation, including the
physical address and GPS coordinates of the area. The researcher may also con-
sider drawing a grid, so as to quickly identify areas of the scene in question.
Reference landmarks may also be included. Sketches should always be digitized
(scanned or photographed in high resolution) in case the original is lost or dam-
aged. Under field conditions, even a quick photograph of a site sketch is better
than none at all. Alternatively, some mobile devices have softwares that can be
178 Other specialists with experience in technical intelligence (TECHINT) exploitation, post-blast
analysis, EOD, human intelligence collection/interrogation, or forensic collection may be present
or available in some circumstances, and this may expand the scope and goals of the collections
effort accordingly.
273
Image 7.1 A hand-drawn site exploitation sketch
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Source: Bethany Granton/ARES
used for this purpose, although sketching on phone or computer screens is often
more time consuming and less accurate than a quick, hand-drawn sketch.179
In Image 7.1, an investigator has sketched a site where two bodies and relevant
intelligence sources (firearms, a magazine, fired cartridge cases, passports, cash,
and a laptop computer) were recovered. The sketch is quite good, including a
cardinal direction (north), reference walls (walls of known/measured length),
doors and windows, locations of recovered evidence (including the distance from
nearest reference wall), distance to landmarks (road), and references to photos of
the evidence items. The redacted (blacked-out) portion at bottom right also con-
tained information on location, including GPS coordinates, and identified the
179 For further information on data recording during site exploitation, see ARES (2016d).
274
author of the sketch (ARES, 2016d). The sketch could be improved by linking it
more closely to photographs of the scene. For example, if photographs were tak-
en from each corner of the rooms, the photograph numbers could be labelled on
the sketch, and photographs of all evidence items and bodies could be listed.
In addition to a sketch, taking a digital video of the scene is an excellent way
to show the relationship between evidence items, and serves as a backup inven-
tory of the items. The video does not need to be overly long or attempt to identi-
fy the weapons in a single cut, but should capture all items present. A digital
video also helps to show that investigators have sought to preserve the scene.
Generally, the same principles apply to videography as to photography: items
should be clear, in focus, and well lit where possible. Ideally, video should be
shot in landscape format.
Interviews with relevant persons (‘human intelligence sources’) are another
important source of information about arms and ammunition. Interviews are
often conducted through an interpreter, who may need to be briefed on relevant
arms-related terminology, if they are not already familiar with it.
Context is essential when documenting arms and ammunition. Some relevant
information can be inferred by examining your surroundings, but it is often use-
ful to ask the possessor or owner of a weapon for details about the weapons (as-
suming it is safe to do so). Possible questions include the following:
How, where, and when did the possessor/owner obtain their weapon?
How, where, and when was the weapon used?
How common are arms of this type?
How common are magazines or ammunition for the weapon?
What are weapons like this worth in the conflict zone? Are they available for
purchase?
Do they know of weapons being supplied from or sent to other countries?
What kinds of weapons are popular, and why?
Legal and forensic considerations

In addition to the safety and intelligence gathering considerations outlined in this
chapter, there are often legal and forensic considerations which must be taken
into account before documenting arms and ammunition under field conditions.
Researchers are advised to make a full and informed appraisal of the local secu-
275
rity situation—including potential legal or administrative restrictions—before
conducting any research related to arms or ammunition. These considerations

will vary with the nature of the research and the area in which it is being con-
ducted. In many jurisdictions, entering any crime scene without permission, for
example, may be prohibited and carries a hefty penalty. In certain conflict situa-
tions, however, field researchers may be the only way that investigators can doc-
ument particular items or events. In all cases, researchers should follow the pol-
icies and procedures established by their organization, and adhere to applicable
local, national, and international laws and regulations.
As a general rule, refrain from touching or removing items. If items must be
moved, wear non-porous gloves (latex or nitrile are commonly available; nitrile
is less prone to causing allergic reactions). Evidence should be placed in sealed
bags, and steps should be taken to preserve it. If items are to be used as evidence,
then chain of custody and evidence storage procedures should be established and
followed. While these procedures are largely beyond the scope of this Handbook,
the following information should at least be collected:
time, date, and location where evidence was gathered;

reason evidence was collected (case file number, etc.);
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other administrative data (item number, investigator ID, etc.);

description of the item in question;
information on the chain of custody (ARES, 2016d).
At any point, one individual will have control (custody) of a given piece of
evidence. When any change in custody occurs, the individual in control of the
evidence at that time should note the change in custody on a form accompanying
the item and, ideally, on a master chain of custody record sheet. Acknowledging
the change with the signatures of both parties is good practice. Evidence should
also be stored in a secure location. Under field conditions, this may include a
hotel safe, locked vehicle, or a similarly expedient solution.
Potential sensitivities regarding arms and ammunition information

gathering
Gathering information about arms and ammunition can be a sensitive and poten-
tially perilous undertaking. Of particular concern are situations in which:
276
parties in possession of the items in question assume that a researcher is act-
ing as an intelligence gatherer for opposing forces or other hostile parties;
the item in question is part of a covert nation state programme to arm the
recipients, making the possessor reluctant to allow documentation of the item;
possession of the item in question is a violation of ceasefire terms or arms
limitations negotiated between the parties in question;
subgroups of an armed party to the conflict have access to limited stocks of
more effective or prestigious items than the parent organization, potentially
causing friction between the groups if the parent organization learns of these
stocks;
the item in question is related to activities that the possessor wishes to conceal,
such as criminal acts or covert operations;
the quality or lack of certain arms and ammunition is interpreted as a lack of
resourcing and causes a group to lose a tactical advantage, prestige, or nego-
tiating position.
In such cases, investigators should carefully consider whether interviewing

the source in question is advisable.
Photographic considerations
In broad terms, most modern digital cameras will suffice for taking images of
arms and ammunition. Photographs should:
be clear, sharp, and free of distortion;

be taken from a stable position;
include the date, time, and location when photographs were taken (digital cam-
eras should be correctly programmed for the date and time) (ARES, 2016d).
At the most basic level, you should attempt to photograph items in areas where
the light is even throughout, so as not to render part of your composition too light
or too dark. Direct sunlight should be avoided, where possible. You should be
familiar with the macro function, where present, for taking images of small details
such as cartridge headstamps.
Where necessary, you may want to use a tripod, or, when a tripod is unavail-
able, brace your camera against a suitable item to steady it. Steadying the camera
is particularly helpful in low light situations. Your camera’s flash may be useful
277
in some circumstances but may wash out items if improperly employed. When
in doubt, take several photos both with and without the flash. If using a digital
camera, always check your images after taking them to ensure they are clear and
in focus.
Photographic record checklist

Below is a checklist for photographing small arms and light weapons for the
purposes of identification. This list is not in order of priority, nor is it exhaustive
or specific to certain weapons. If you have limited time or opportunity to photo-
graph a particular weapon, the most important photos to take are a profile shot,
and a photograph of markings on both sides of the main body (receiver, frame,
or housing) of the weapon (see Figure 7.1).
Profile shot (left side)

Profile shot (right side)
Magazine(s)
Muzzle and barrel (especially muzzle attachments)
Weapon model/type markings
Factory markings
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Serial number markings

Selector markings
Sight markings
Proof marks
Any additional markings on the weapon
Any accessories or mounts
Any markings on accessories or mounts
Packaging
Contextual photos of the user, storage facility, or surroundings
When photographing ammunition, the most essential photo to take is of the

headstamp. An image of the profile is the next most useful, followed by photo-
graphs of other markings, packaging, and contextual photos of the user, storage
facility, or surroundings. Photographs of ordnance should include a profile shot,
as well as any markings (including coloured bands or symbols) or obvious phys-
278
ical characteristics (fins, fuses, etc.). Photos of packaging should include the inte-
rior and exterior, with particular attention paid to markings. When items of in-
terest are located in a container, hiding place, or vehicle, images should be taken
to provide proper context (CALL, 2007, pp.63–68; ARES, 2016d).
To document scale, a photographic point of reference such as a small ruler
with high-contrast markings is ideal.180 Other household items that are useful for
this purpose include, but are not limited to, common cigarette lighter designs,
packs of cigarettes, and CDs. Regardless of which item is used, the photographer
should record the measurements of the item. It is best to take several photos both
with and without the points of reference.
In addition to photographing the arms, ammunition, and other items identified
above, take photos of:
the entire area or room containing evidence (when possible, take a 360-
degree exposure of the four corners of the room);
each piece of suspected evidence, with and without the point of reference
(small ruler etc.);
a reference point for calculating the physical dimensions of the site, building,
and any items collected;181 and
a broad point of view that establishes the location of arms and ammunition
by including landmarks or reference points (ARES, 2016d; CALL, 2007, pp.
63–68).182
Storing your images

It is essential that you keep a backup copy of your images to ensure that valuable
data collected in the field is not lost because of misplaced storage devices or hard
disk failure. Three copies of important information is generally a good standard—
one saved on your primary computer or device, a second on a portable hard drive
or similar device, and a third on resilient media such as a DVD or ruggedized
180 This is sometimes known as a ‘photographic fiduciary’ or ‘forensic reference’.

181 Such images may prove useful for photogrammetry and other purposes. See, for example, Jes-
persen (forthcoming).
182 In certain circumstances you may also want to take photographs of people; however, this comes
with attendant privacy protection and legal considerations. Your organization should provide
guidance in this matter.
279
Figure 7.1 Markings on AK-type rifles
FACTORY MARKS
LEFT SIDE
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RIGHT SIDE
FIRE SELECTOR MARKS REAR SIGHT MARKS
Source: ARES
280
USB drive. Data can also be backed up to the Cloud, but doing so may pose se-
curity concerns that should be carefully assessed. If you are working with digital
images, make as few changes as possible. Changes to colour and perspective, for
example, can impede the identification process. In any case, you should always
keep copies of the original, unmodified images for data verification purposes.
Case study: AK-103 and F2000 self-loading rifles in Gaza183
1. Lead generated from open-source intelligence

On 2 October 2012, the al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, held its annual military parade in Southern Gaza to mark the 17th anniver-
sary of the assassination of the group’s founder, Fathi al-Shaqaqi. The group often
uses these parades to display its latest arms and ammunition acquisitions. In 2012,
among the usual assortment of Soviet- and Chinese-designed rifles and machine
guns were two self-loading rifles not previously documented in Gaza: the Belgian
F2000 (see Image 7.2) and the Russian AK-103. These two rifles, which are rela-
tively modern and had rarely been seen together in the hands of a single fighting
force, constituted significant ‘flag items’—items that are likely to provide ready
indicators of diversion or other illicit activity.
2. Preliminary identification
Analysts from ARES became aware of these rifles shortly after the parade and
conducted a preliminary analysis. The F2000, being visually distinct from other
self-loading rifles, proved easy to identify. While there are airsoft and non-firing
replicas of these weapons, physical characteristics of the F2000 rifles—and the
group displaying them—made it likely that these were lethal-purpose weapons.
The AK-103 required additional analysis. The rifle is one of the so-called ‘AK-100’
series of rifles, designed and introduced by the Russian company IZHMASH
(now Kalashnikov Concern) in the early 1990s.184 Its mechanical design—and
183 This case study is adapted from Jenzen-Jones (2015e) and Jenzen-Jones (2016c).
184 The so-called AK-100 series is generally considered to be comprised of the AK-74M, AK-101, AK-
102, AK-103, AK-104, and AK-105. There is no rifle designated the ‘AK-100’ (Ferguson and Jen-
zen-Jones, 2014b). Further developments include rifles such as the AK-9, chambered for 9 x 39 mm
(Jenzen-Jones, 2012a).
281
Image 7.2 Palestinian Islamic Jihad al-Quds Brigades member with Belgian FN Herstal
F2000 self-loading rifle, fitted with LG1 under-barrel grenade launcher, in Gaza,
2 October 2012
Source: Palestinian Islamic Jihad al-Quds Brigades

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general appearance—is very similar to the AKM, an updated AK series rifle in-
troduced in 1959, and other AK-type rifles (Jenzen-Jones, 2012a; Ferguson and
Jenzen-Jones, 2014b).
None of the markings on the AK-103s were visible in the early images from
Gaza, so analysts had to identify the rifles by their physical characteristics alone.
The AK-100 series rifles are visually distinctive from earlier models of AK-type
rifles, allowing analysts to rule out all but six models: the AK-74M, AK-101, AK-
102, AK-103, AK-104, and AK-105. These models share several key physical char-
acteristics, including the same black synthetic furniture and magazines, and black
phosphate finish on metal parts. Analysts then compared the barrel length and
muzzle devices of the six rifles, which shortened the list of possible matches to
three models: the AK-74M, AK-101, and AK-103. These models have barrels that
are roughly 100 mm longer than the AK-102, AK-104, and AK-105, which also
have distinctive muzzle devices (Jenzen-Jones, 2012a).
Distinguishing between the three remaining models was more difficult. All
are full-length rifles in the AK-100 series and are fitted with the same muzzle
282
brake, side-folding solid polymer stock, and left-hand side optical sight rail (Fer-
guson and Jenzen-Jones, 2014b). A feature-by-feature comparison was required
to identify the model of the rifle.
3. Achieving positive identification

The key feature that readily distinguishes the AK-103 from other AK-100 series
rifles is the distinctive profile of its magazines (see Image 7.3). Unlike the AK-101
(top) and AK-74M (centre) which are chambered for cartridges with minimal-
ly-tapered cases, the AK-103 (bottom) is chambered for the 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge,
which are held in a magazine with a much more curved profile. Note the relative
proximity of the blue and green lines, compared to the pink, and the distinctive
‘banana’ shape of the AK-103 box magazine.
Image 7.3 Comparative study of AK-101 (top) with magazine profile marked in purple,
AK-74M (centre) with magazine profile marked in yellow, and AK-103 (bottom) with
magazine profile marked in grey185
Sources: Rob Stott; Concern Kalashnikov
185 There is minor image distortion and perspective difference between the three source images, so
this image should not be considered perfectly precise. Nonetheless, it remains indicative of the
difference in magazine profiles between the three rifles.
283
Available images did not allow analysts to determine whether the rifles were
the more common AK-103 model, or AK-103-2 variants. Distinguishing an AK-103

from an AK-103-2 requires an examination of a rifle’s markings or internal com-
ponents, which were not visible in the earliest available images from Gaza (ARES,
n.d.). The analysts needed more information about the rifles but there was no
guarantee that Gazan militants would post additional photos, let alone photos of
the markings. With limited resources to reach out to sources in Gaza, the analysts
had to look elsewhere. The most likely source of the additional information was
Libya, where both the AK-103-2 and the F2000 had recently been documented.
4. Identifying the variant of the AK-103, and the source of the rifles
Analysts then sought to conclusively determine whether the F2000 and AK-103
rifles in Gaza had been trafficked out of Libya. To that end, ARES attempted to:
(1) confirm the variant of the AK-103 rifles in Libya; (2) determine whether Libya
was the source of the AK-103 and F2000 rifles spotted in Gaza; and (3) identify
the point at which the rifles were diverted into the illicit sphere.
Analysts, including a native Libyan Arabic speaker, sought more information
regarding these weapons from well-placed individuals in Libya. They conducted
numerous interviews with these and other sources, including international spe-
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cialists, and obtained images of AK-103 and F2000 rifles from individuals con-
nected to the black market arms trade, including the online black market. Sever-
al of these images showed detailed markings and serial numbers (ARES, n.d.).
The markings revealed that the AK-103 rifles in Libya were the AK-103-2 variant.
The serial numbers were then compared to existing photographic and docu-
mentary evidence held by ARES. This allowed analysts to confirm that the pho-
tographed examples were part of the original contracts and shipments known to
ARES. In the case of both rifle models, the weapons in question were part of au-
thorized exports to the Libyan government (Jenzen-Jones, 2016c).
Analysts then attempted to determine whether the rifles in Gaza came from
Libya and, if so, how they ended up in the hands of Gazan militants. Interviews
with individuals in Libya were a key part of this process. Ali,186 a former student
who joined the rebel movement during the 2011 Civil War, told ARES how he
and a group of young fighters he led came across a large, strange-looking rifle
186 All names used in this case study are pseudonymous, to protect sources in Libya.
284
Image 7.4 Ali and his fellow fighters during the 2011 Libyan Civil War
Note: Left and centre: F2000 self-loading rifles; second from right: AK-103-2.
Source: ARES/confidential source
known to them as ‘the French FN’ (see Image 7.4). They had seized two of them
from retreating loyalist forces on the southern outskirts of Sabha in September
2011. Ali explained:
We had a checkpoint just outside of Sabha. A car came up and the window rolled down.
The man told us he was an officer from the 32nd Brigade and we were to let them past.
We didn’t have any revolutionary flags at the time, so maybe they thought we were
with Gaddafi’s forces.
In total, Ali’s unit seized two F2000 and two AK-103-2 rifles.
At the end of the 2011 Civil War, some of the captured AK-103-2 and F2000
rifles found their way north, to the port city of Misrata. Ali handed over his F2000
to the new government, and another fighter named Marwan turned over two
AK-103-2 rifles. However, many combatants kept their weapons, while others
sold them or traded them for more concealable weapons such as handguns.
Khaled, another individual interviewed by ARES, operated a successful black
market arms business in Misrata. Khaled told ARES that he was directly respon-
sible for the shipment of AK-103-2 and F2000 rifles to Gaza. ‘We sent them to help
the people of Gaza,’ he said. The weapons in question were not sold, but gifted
to a contact in Gaza to demonstrate solidarity against Israel. Just as the Belgian
FN Herstal F2000 had been widely misidentified by Libyan rebels as the ‘French
FN’, the AK-103-2 was widely known in 2012 as the ‘Israeli Kalashnikov’. The
analysts had their answer: the rifles spotted in Gaza had indeed come from Libya.
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5. Mapping the chain of custody
Earlier investigations into the presence of these weapons in Libya had turned up
multiple images of packaging crates from different sources, including newspaper
accounts, social media, and confidential sources in Libya. These images showed
contract numbers and shipping information for the AK-103 rifles, which, in turn,
allowed analysts to more fully map the chain of custody of the weapons.
Of particular interest were Russian and Belgian shipping documents obtained
by Human Rights Watch in 2011 and provided to ARES in 2012. The contract
numbers on the Russian shipping documents matched those on the packaging
crates for AK-103 rifles. These sources reveal that the AK-103 rifles were part of
a sizeable arms deal between Russia and Libya concluded in late 2003 or early
2004. The rifles were delivered from 2004 onwards. The F2000 rifles formed part
of a smaller, but still significant, arms deal between Belgium and Libya, which
was signed in May 2008 and completed in 2009. The shipping documents and
images of the packing crates were the final pieces of the puzzle. Starting with a
few photos of unusual rifles displayed during a military parade, the analysts were
able to not only identify the make and model of the weapons but also trace their
circuitous, multi-year journey from factories in the Russian Federation and
Belgium to the streets of Gaza (see Map 7.1).
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6. Assessing further proliferation and providing context

At the same time that analysts were conducting interviews to determine traffick-
ing routes of the rifles displayed by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, ARES was also
gathering additional information about the proliferation of these rifles in Gaza
and other parts of the Middle East and North Africa (see Map 7.1). This research
revealed further proliferation of both the AK-103 and F2000 rifles.187 Fighters from
the armed wings of Hamas, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP), and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) have also been pictured
with AK-103 type rifles on numerous occasions (see Images 7.5 and 7.6). Several
of the rifles were also identified in the hands of members of the Preventive Secu-
rity Force of the Palestinian National Authority. In a small number of cases, AK-
103-2 variant rifles were identified (ARES, n.d.).
187 The Palestinanian Islamic Jihad’s al-Quds Brigade have continued to parade these weapons; both
the AK-103 and F2000 were concurrently documented in their possession during a parade in
August 2015, for example.
286
Image 7.5 An AK-103 rifle in the hands of a militant from the National Resistance
Brigades of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Gaza, 2014
Source: DFLP
Image 7.6 The same model of rifle with militants from the ‘naval commando’ unit of
the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas in Gaza, 2014
Source: Mahmud Hams/AFP Photo
287
Image 7.7 AK-103 rifles in the hands of Islamic State fighters in Libya, 2015188
Image 7.8 AK-103-2 rifle documented for sale via social media in Iraq, 2016
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Source: ARES/confidential source
188 Source withheld
288
Map 7.1 Mapping the proliferation of AK-103 type rifles connected to Libya
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
UKRAINE
Mykolaiv
TUNISIA
LEBANON
Tripoli Misrata IRAQ
Gaza
LIBYA
ALGERIA
Sabha Sinai Primary path:
EGYPT route known
Primary transfer:
route unknown
Secondary transfer:
route unknown
MALI NIGER CHAD Start of route
Transhipment
NIGERIA Destination
Source: Jenzen-Jones (2016c); ARES (n.d.)
Reports from the UN Panel of Experts on Libya indicate that AK-103 rifles
have also been documented in Mali, Tunisia, and Niger (see Map 7.1). Islamic
State forces in Libya have also made use of the AK-103; several were visible in a
video showing the execution of Ethiopian Christians in Libya in 2015 (Image 7.7).
Subsequent ARES investigations have turned up AK-103 type rifles, including
AK-103-2 models, in Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria,
and Tunisia (ARES, 2016a; 2016b; Jenzen-Jones, 2016b; see Image 7.8). F2000 rifles
were documented in the hands of militants in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in 2015. As
with the F2000 rifles documented in Gaza, they were fitted with 40 × 46SR mm
LG1 under-barrel grenade launchers. Given their distinctive physical appearance
and relative scarcity in many areas, these rifles will continue to constitute flag
items for investigators examining current and future conflicts.
―― Author: N.R. Jenzen-Jones
289
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CHAPTER 8
Analysing Arms Flows:

Authorized Transfers
Introduction
Never before has there been so much data on arms flows. The rapid expansion of
camera-equipped smartphones, Internet connectivity, and digital file-sharing
platforms has exponentially increased the amount of publicly available data on
arms transfers and illicit weapons. Postings on social media provide near real-
time information on weapons acquired by a wide array of armed actors, from
elite military units to violent extremists. A concurrent expansion in field research
by the UN and NGOs has yielded complementary data on small arms in conflict
zones, including in areas where social media postings are less frequent.188 When
analysed alongside traditional sources of information on the arms trade, this new
data provides unprecedented insight into the movement of weapons across bor-
ders and between regions.
Journalists and researchers play an indispensable role in gathering, interpret-
ing, and disseminating this data. By linking it to broader geopolitical and security
issues, they can convert this data and analysis into meaningful information for
lay audiences.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of sources, strategies,
and techniques for analysing authorized arms flows throughout the transfer chain.189
The chapter begins with a brief assessment of several key data sources on small
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arms transfers, including their strengths and limitations. Guidance on how to

interpret this data is also provided. The chapter concludes with suggestions for
corroborating initial findings and confirming individual data points.
Sources of data on authorized small arms transfers

As defined by the Small Arms Survey, the term ‘authorized arms transfers’ refers to
‘international transfers that are authorized by the importing, exporting, or transit
states’ (Dreyfus, Marsh, and Schroeder, 2009, p. 9). The main categories of data
sources on authorized arms transfers are: government agencies, UN institutions,
field research, industry literature, and social media (see Table 8.1). Data from
these sources is disseminated through various online databases, reports, and web-
sites. This chapter focuses on five of the most important sources: national reports
on arms transfers, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
188 See, for example, UNSC (2016) and Anders (2015).

189 Chapter 9 looks at illicit (non-authorized) arms flows.
292
(UN Comtrade) and other sources of customs data, the UN Register of Conven-
Analysing Authorized Arms Flows

tional Arms (‘the UN Register’, or UNROCA), social media, and tenders and con-
tract award notices.
Data on authorized transfers in these sources is vast. Customs data submitted
to the UN Statistics Division includes records on millions of weapons transferred
to and from dozens of countries worldwide. Thousands of additional records are
published each year in the UN Register, national reports, and annual reports
required by the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Table 8.1 lists these sources and the
availability of data for each link of the transfer chain
Before unpacking these data sources, a brief overview of key terms is required.
The term ‘government data’ refers to country-specific data generated and made
available by government entities, including customs and export control agencies.
Table 8.1 Sources of data on authorized transfers

Domestic
Data source Exports Re-exports retransfers End user§
Government National reports   
agencies
Parliamentary reports   
Tenders/contract  
award notices
Multilateral Regional reports   
instruments
ATT annual reports   
UN Comtrade  
UNROCA   
UN Panel of Experts    
reports
Other Commercial trade   
data aggregators
Field research*    
Industry literature** 
Social media    
Notes:
 Indicates that the data source frequently provides usable information in this category.
 Indicates that the data source occasionally provides usable information in this category.
§ For the purposes of this table, ‘end user’ refers to the specific private, commercial, or government agency that is the
intended recipient of the transferred items.
* This sub-category includes field research by NGOs and inter-governmental organizations other than the UN Panel
of Experts, which are categorized separately.
** Industry literature includes annual corporate reports, company websites, press releases, etc.
293
It consists of data on: (1) potential transfers; and (2) actual transfers. Potential
transfers are proposed imports or exports that have been approved by the relevant
government agencies but have not been shipped to the recipient. Arms export li-
cences are examples of sources of data on potential transfers. Actual transfers are
those in which the exported items have been delivered—or are en route—to the
recipient. Records of arms shipments passing through the ports of entry or exit
(customs data) are examples of data on actual transfers.
Another term that is frequently used in the literature on arms transfers is
‘mirror data’, which consists of records on arms exports published by importing
governments (and records on arms imports published by exporting governments).190
Nigerian records of imports of arms from China are an example of mirror data
on Chinese exports (see Figure 8.4). Mirror data is useful for studying arms transfers
to and from countries with non-transparent governments. In theory, this data
could also be used to corroborate data from trade partners but, in practice, records
from exporters and importers rarely align, even for transfers between countries
with transparent governments. This curious (and often vexing) quirk of arms
trade data is explained by several factors, including differences in data gathering
and reporting methodologies, selective reporting, and erroneous data (Holtom,
2008). Without access to bills of lading and other commercial and official export
Handbook
documentation, determining the reason for a specific discrepancy and reconciling

the data is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Analysing national reports

Annual reports on arms transfers published by individual governments—often
referred to as ‘national reports’—have been a mainstay of arms trade research for
many years.191 Several dozen governments publish national reports, which vary
in scope, specificity, and completeness. The data in some reports is clear and de-
tailed while data in others is over-aggregated or reported under ill-defined com-
modity categories.192 Figure 8.1 is an excerpt from Albania’s 2014 annual report,
190 See UNSD (n.d.a).

191 Some countries, such as the Netherlands, publish data on their arms transfers on a monthly basis
(Netherlands MFA, n.d.).
192 The Small Arms Survey’s annual Transparency Barometer includes a list of major exporting states
that publish national reports (Small Arms Survey, n.d.b).
294
Figure 8.1 Excerpt from Albania’s national report on exports of military goods, 2014

26
STATE EXPORT CONTROL AUTHORITY
Annual Report on Export Control for 2014
Annex 1
LICENSED AND COMPLETED EXPORTS OF MILITARY GOODS IN 2014
Valued
Control Value
End User Realization
NR List Type of good based on
State for 2014 -
Code license
2015
ML 1 SKS Rifle M-56 918.400 $ 119.720 $
Austria 1 ML 3 Ammunition Cal 7.62x39 mm 171.000 $ 170.964 $
ML 3 Ammunition Cal 7.62x54 mm 165.000 $ 69.854 $
Total 1 1.254.400 $ 360.538 $
ML 3 Mortar Shells 120 mm 900.000 $ 300.000 $
ML 3 Mortar Shells 80 mm 300.000 $ 0$
Bulgaria
1 ML 3 Projectile 122 mm Howitzer 4.000 $ 0$
ML 3 Fuse M-12 14.292 $ 0$
Total 1 1.218.292 $ 300.000 $
Republic
1 ML3 Ammunition Cal 9 x 19 mm 23.000 $ 23.000 $
of Kosovo
Total 1 23.000 $ 23.000 $
1 ML 3 Ammunition Cal 7.62x39 mm 1.500.000 $ 920.160 $
1 ML 3 Ammunition Cal 7.62x39 mm 600.000 $ 599.997 $
Czech 1 ML4 TNT demolition Charges 990.000 $ 0$

Republic Ammunition Cal 12.7 x 108
ML 3 600.000 $ 600.000 $
mm
1 Ammunition Cal 14.5x114
ML 3 75.000 $ 75.000 $
mm
ML 3 Ammunition Cal 7.62x54 mm 160.000 $ 160.000 $
Total 4 3.925.000 $ 2.355.157 $

ML 3 Ammunition Cal 7.62x56 mm
ML 3 Hand Grenades
1 ML 3 Mortar Shells 60, 82, 120 mm 0$ Total
ML 3 Shells 40 mm GHLKT
Iraq
ML 1 Automatic Rifle
ML 2 GHLKT 40 mm
1 ML 2 Mortars 60 mm 0$ Total
ML 2 Hand Machine Guns
Total 2 0$ Total
Source: Albanian MOD (2014, p. 26)
295
which is one of the more detailed reports published in recent years. It provides
data on importing countries, values of issued licences and deliveries, and descrip-
tions of the exported items, including the type, model, and/or calibre.
Table 8.2 EU Common Military List, categories 1 to 4
ML 1 Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic
weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories,
and specially-designed components therefor.
ML 2 Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament

with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches), projectors and accessories,
and specially-designed components therefor.
ML 3 Ammunition and fuse setting devices, and specially-designed components therefor.
ML 4 Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices and charges and related
equipment and accessories, and specially-designed components therefor.
Source: EU (2017, p. 6)
Figure 8.2 Excerpt from the EU’s annual report on imports and exports of military
goods and technologies, 2015 (exports to Iraq)
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Note: In this table, ‘ML’ refers to the categories of the EU’s Common Military List, ‘a’ refers to the number of licences issued,
‘b’ refers to the value of licences issued in Euros, and ‘c’ refers to the value of arms exports in Euros.
Source: EU (2017, p. 158)
296
Table 8.3 Strengths and limitations of national reports

Best for: Less useful for: Caveats:
Researching arms exports Monitoring and measuring Some reports only include
from Europe, North global and regional trends. data on potential transfers
America, and some Studying arms transfers and not actual transfers
countries in the Pacific. between most countries in (deliveries).
Identifying and tracking Africa, Asia, the Middle Some reports are published
potential (authorized) arms East, and Central and only in the official language
transfers. South America. of the reporting country.
Identifying end users of Researchers have discov-
exported arms. ered significant errors in
Researching shipping some reports.
methods and modes of National reports may not
transport. include data on all transfers.
Commodity category
descriptions may be mis-
leading or poorly defined.
There are often significant
lags between transfers tak-
ing place and publication
of corresponding data in
national reports.
Source: Dreyfus, Marsh, and Schroeder (2009, p. 27)
Many states, including most European states, report on export data using cat-
egories corresponding to the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Munitions List and/or the
EU’s Common Military List (ML) (see Table 8.2 and Figure 8.2). The most relevant
categories for small arms and light weapons are ML 1 to ML 4.
Analysing UN Comtrade and other customs data

Records of small arms shipments generated by customs agencies are another impor-
tant source of government data on arms transfers. Customs data is typically col-
lected when an arms shipment passes through the ports of exit (exports) and
entry (imports).193 The largest source of customs data is the UN Commodity Trade
Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), a repository of nearly one billion records on
imports and exports of various items submitted to the UN Statistics Division since
1962 (UNSD, n.d.b). The data is aggregated and displayed under standardized,
193 In a 2006 survey of 132 governments conducted by the UN Statistics Division, approximately 88
per cent indicated that customs declarations were the main source of data used in the compilation
of trade statistics (UNSD, 2008, para. 1.5).
297
Table 8.4 Selected Harmonized system (HS) commodity categories that include small arms, light weapons, ammunition, parts, and
accessories
Item type HS code HS description* Comments*
Small arms 930190 Military weapons, other Includes:

than revolvers, pistols and machine guns; military rifles; military shotguns; sub-machine guns; and other
arms of heading 93.07 arms ‘capable of continuous and very rapid fire’;
Other weapon sights mounted on or presented with the firearm at the time of export;
firearms that are designed to form part of vehicles but are exported separately
from the vehicles.
Excludes:
collectors’ pieces and antiques.
Note: This is a catch-all sub-category and includes items other than small arms and light
weapons.
930200 Revolvers and pistols, Includes:
298
other than those of revolvers and pistols of any calibre;
heading 93.03 or 93.04 hand-held firearms designed to look like other objects (e.g. pencils, pocket knives,
cigarette cases).
Excludes:
captive-bolt type humane killers; sub-machine guns (‘continuous fire weapons’);
flare guns; starter pistols and other blank-fire weapons; muzzle-loading and black
powder pistols that do not fire cartridges; and spring, air, and gas pistols.
930310 Muzzle-loading firearms Includes:

muzzle-loading (‘black powder’) firearms that are ‘neither designed for nor
capable of firing a cartridge’.
930320 Other sporting, hunting or Includes:

target-shooting shotguns, single-shot and semi-automatic sporting and hunting shotguns of all calibres,
including combination including those with one smooth-bore and one rifled barrel;
shotgun-rifles weapon sights presented with the firearm at the time of export.

Small arms 930330 Other sporting, hunting or Includes:

(continued) target-shooting rifles single-shot and semi-automatic sporting and hunting rifles of all calibres;
weapon sights mounted on or presented with the firearm at the time of export.
Light 930120 Military weapons, other Includes:

weapons than revolvers, pistols and rocket launchers; flame-throwers; grenade launchers; torpedo tubes; and other
the arms of heading 93.07 ‘specialized military projectors’;
Rocket launchers; weapons that are designed to form part of vehicles that are exported separately
flame-throwers; from the vehicles.
grenade launchers; Excludes:
torpedo tubes and flame guns ‘specialized for destroying weeds’.
similar projectors
Ammunition 930621i Shotgun cartridges and Includes:
299
parts thereof shotgun cartridges;
some parts for shotgun cartridges.
Excludes:
propellants; certain fuses; percussion and detonating caps; igniters; electronic
detonators, including primers.ii
930630i Other cartridges and Includes:

parts thereof all types of cartridges for pistols and rifles;
some parts for pistol and rifle cartridges.
May include:
cartridges for riveting tools and for starting engines.
Excludes:
propellants; certain fuses; percussion and detonating caps; igniters; electronic
detonators, including primers.



Parts and 930510 Parts and accessories of Includes:iii

accessories 930520 articles of headings 93.01 parts and some accessories for revolvers and pistols;
930521 to 93.04 parts and some accessories for sporting and hunting shotguns and rifles.
930529 Of revolvers or pistols Excludes:iv
Of shotguns or rifles of ‘parts for general use’ (e.g. rivets, screws, springs);
heading 93.03 gun cases;
Other gun cameras for aircraft;
weapons sights;
other accessories covered by other headings.
Notes:
* HS descriptions are reproduced verbatim from documents published by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Descriptions of the items included and excluded from each
category also closely reflect WCO wording. The WCO is also the source for all direct quotes in the ‘Notes’ column of this table. See WCO (2012). The WCO’s terminology for small
arms often differs from the categories and definitions for small arms used in the rest of this Handbook.
300
i
The full title of HS 93.06 is ‘Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles and similar munitions of war and parts thereof; cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts
thereof, including shot and cartridge wads’ (WCO, 2012).
ii
The exact wording of the WCO explanatory note for these items is ‘propellant powders and prepared explosives, even if put up in forms ready for incorporation in munitions (headings
36.01 and 36.02); safety fuses, detonating fuses, percussion and detonating caps, igniters and electric detonators, including primers for shells (heading 36.03) (WCO, 2012).
iii
The WCO explanatory notes identify the following parts and accessories for, inter alia, pistols, revolvers, and the rifles and shotguns categorized in 930320 and 930330: ‘Metal
castings, stampings and forgings, for … sporting and target shooting guns, etc., revolvers and pistols, e.g., barrels, breeches, locks, trigger guards, tumblers, levers, percussion
hammers, cocking pieces, triggers, sears, extractors, ejectors, frames (of pistols), plates, butt plates, safety catches, cylinders (for revolvers), front and back sights, magazines …
Protective covers and protective cases, for butts, sights, barrels or breeches … Morris tubes, etc. (small bore tubes for insertion in heavier calibre guns and rifles for practice on
miniature ranges) … Butt stocks and other wooden parts for guns, rifles or carbines and butts and plates (of wood, metal, ebonite, etc.) for revolvers and pistols … Slings, band, piling
or stacking and butt swivels and swivel bands for guns, rifles or carbines … Silencers (sound moderators) … Removable recoil absorbers for sporting or target shooting guns’ (WCO,
2012).
iv
The exact wording of the WCO explanatory notes is: ‘(a) Parts of general use as defined in Note 2 to Section XV (e.g., screws, rivets and springs), of base metal (Section XV), and
similar goods of plastics (Chapter 39). (b) Gun cases (heading 42.02). (c) Gun cameras for aircraft (heading 90.07). (d) Telescopic sights and similar sights for arms (heading 90.13).
(e) Accessories more specifically covered by other headings of the Nomenclature, such as pull-throughs, cleaning rods and other cleaning tools for arms (headings 82.05, 96.03, etc.)’
(WCO, 2012).
Source: WCO (2012)

six-digit commodity codes known collectively as the Harmonized Commodity

Description and Coding System, or Harmonized System (HS). Most codes of rele-
vance to tracking arms flows begin with ‘93’, which is the HS chapter on ‘arms
and ammunition’. Table 8.4 lists the codes under which most data on transfers of
small arms, light weapons, parts, ammunition, and some accessories are reported;
the small arms and light weapons reported under each category; and any other
items (non small arms and light weapons) that may be included in the data. The
table includes the World Customs Organization’s terminology and categorization
for small arms, ammunition, and parts and accessories, which often differs from
the categories and usage of terms in the rest of this Handbook.
Data from UN Comtrade is particularly useful for identifying and measuring
trends in small arms transfers over time and across different regions, as illustrated
by the data on small arms imports by countries in the Americas in Figure 8.3. The
data reveals a sharp increase in arms transfers to this region, which jumped from
less than USD 1 billion in 2002 to nearly USD 3 billion in 2014. By 2014, the value
of transfers to the Americas was nearly twice as high as transfers to any other
region.
When disaggregated by sub-region, this data provides additional insights. Table
8.5 shows that the two largest importers of small arms, the United States and
Figure 8.3 Global trends in small arms imports by region, as reported to UN Comtrade
(USD million), 2001–14
Africa Americas Asia and the Pacific Europe
Value of imports (USD million)

3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year
Note: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars.

Sources: NISAT (n.d.) via Holtom and Pavesi (2017, p. 25)
301
Table 8.5 Value of small arms supplied to the Americas, by sub-region, as reported to
UN Comtrade (USD million), 2001–14
Sub-region Value of small arms imports

(USD million)
2001 2014 Average, Change from

2001–14 2001 to 2014
Caribbean 14 16 17 2
Central America 34 107 68 73
Northern America 759 2,580 1,538 1,821
South America 114 172 140 57
Note: All values are expressed in constant 2014 US dollars. Due to rounding, individual values may not add up.
Sources: NISAT (n.d.) via Holtom and Pavesi (2017, p. 29)
Canada, account for most—but not all—of this increase. Imports of small arms in
Central America rose by more than 300 per cent from 2001 to 2014. This increase
may be of interest to journalists and researchers covering security issues in Central
America, including the sharp rise in drug-related violence during this period.
Data from UN Comtrade is a good starting point for investigating possible links
Handbook
between drug-related insecurity and the procurement of small arms by state and
non-state actors in the region.
UN Comtrade is less useful for tracking individual transfers, and exports of
certain categories of items. The data is aggregated by year and, unless there was
only one transfer to a given country during the year under review, determining
the quantity or value of a particular transfer is not possible. Since the data contains
no information about the manufacturer, model, or calibre of transferred weap-
ons, UN Comtrade is also not particularly useful for corroborating claims in other
sources about transferred weapons.
Data aggregation also precludes meaningful analysis of most light weapons
transfers. Exports of light weapons and their parts, accessories, and ammunition
are reported with data on non small arms and light weapons items, such as artil-
lery guns, air-delivered weapons, and torpedo tubes. Similarly, data on weapon
sights is combined with data on telescopes and periscopes (WCO, 2017, p. 5),
rendering this data largely useless for tracking transfers of optics for small arms
and light weapons. Data on transfers of military firearms (HS code 930190) is also
mixed with unrelated items, and determining exactly which items is difficult
302
because 930190 is a catch-all code, meaning that, in addition to military firearms,

this code contains data on any transfers of items that do not clearly fit into one of
the other four sub-categories of ‘military weapons’.
More detailed customs data is available for certain countries. A good example
is data on exports of ‘military firearms’ published by the United States Census
Bureau. As noted above, data on military firearms available from UN Comtrade
also contains data on other items, which significantly reduces the usefulness of this
data for tracking small arms transfers. The data published by the Census Bureau,
which is from the same source as the data provided by the United States to UN
Comtrade, partially addresses this problem by disaggregating the data into four
sub-categories: military rifles, military shotguns, machine guns, and other ‘mil-
itary weapons’.
As shown in Table 8.6, machine guns account for most of the items reported
under HS code 930190, followed by military rifles. Military shotguns only comprise
a small percentage of these items. The disaggregated data also reveals that trans-
fers of military firearms comprise approximately 94 per cent of the all transfers
Table 8.6 Exports of military firearms and other items from the United States as
recorded under HS code 930190, 2006–15
Commodity Value Quantity

(HST code)*
Total (USD) Per cent Total Per cent
Military rifles 576,397,770 33 641,887 37

(HS code 9301903000)
Military shotguns 41,161,670 2 242,923 14

(HS code 9301906000)
Machine guns 633,144,241 37 734,060 43

(HS code 9301909030)
Military weapons, 477,987,227 28 102,451 6

exc Arms Of Heading
9307, Nesoi (no)
(HS code 9301909090)
Total (USD) 1,728,690,908 1,721,321
Note: * The code used here is the ten-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) of the United States. In accordance with
Article 3 of the HS Convention, individual governments can add sub-divisions to the HS code for statistical reasons. The first
six digits of any national tariff system will always be the relevant HS codes.
Source: US Census Bureau (n.d.)
303
Table 8.7 Data on weapon sights imported by Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, 2007–10
Importing Importer Country of Country Transport Quantity Brand Description
Country Purchase of Origin Method
Peru Armaq sociedad * China Aerea 3 Shilba Mira, shilba, 3-10x44 illuminator
anonima 152306 - para carabinas de aire
comprimido y deporte
Uruguay Pinor sociedad China China Vapor 16 Not specified *

anonima
Chile Immaval S.A Uruguay Uruguay Aereo 20 Shilba Con montura,para armas
Chile Immaval S.A Uruguay Uruguay Aereo 20 Shilba Pararifle, de uso en caza
Uruguay Pinor sociedad Montevideo China Vapor 10 Not specified *
304
anonima free zone
Peru Armaq sociedad * China Maritimo 6 Shilba/para carabinas Mira, shilba, iluminator 3-10 x 44 para
anonima de aire comprimido carabinas de aire comprimido - 152306
Uruguay Arcocity S.A United states Philippines Vapor 19 Not specified *
Chile Immaval S.A Uruguay Uruguay Aereo 20 Shilba Con montura,para armas
Chile Immaval S.A Uruguay Uruguay Aereo 10 Shilba Vision 6-24x50
Uruguay Arcocity S.A United states Philippines Avion 18 Not specified *
Peru Armaq sociedad * China Aerea 8 Shilba Mira shilba 10x50 152307 uso
anonima comecial bultos mira ``shilba``
2.5-10X50ir d30 il.Mag. S/cp
Peru Armaq sociedad * China Maritimo 18 Shilba Mira, shilba, 152306 para carabinas de
anonima aire y/o deporte 3-10 x 44a illuminator
Note: The information in this table is taken verbatim from the source to reflect the original data.
Source: Datamyne (n.d.)
reported by the United States under HS code 930190 in number, but only 72 per

cent of the value. The rest of the exports were reported under the ambiguous
sub-category of ‘Military weapons, Exc Arms Of Heading 9307, Nesoi (no).’
Whether US customs data is representative of the data submitted by other states is
unknown. Regardless, this case underscores the need to fully understand com-
modity categorization schemes, and to treat data in catch-all categories with an
abundance of caution.
Even more detailed customs data is available for a fee from companies that spe-
cialize in obtaining trade data directly from customs agencies. While less volumi-
nous than data reported to UN Comtrade, the records collected by these companies
often include key information generally not available elsewhere, such as the make
and model of the imported items, the importer, end user, and transport method. An
example of data from the US-based company Datamyne is provided in Table 8.7.
UN Comtrade and other publicly-available customs data is less useful for
tracking transfers between countries with less transparent governments, which
include several major arms exporting and importing states.194 These governments
often withhold data on transfers of key items, including military firearms, pistols,
and revolvers (Dreyfus, Marsh, and Schroeder, 2009, p. 10).
One strategy for tracking arms transfers from non-transparent countries is
analysis of mirror data, which, as noted above, is data published by an importing
or exporting country’s trade partner. Data on African imports of small arms from
China illustrates the utility of mirror data in filling gaps in export data. Figure 8.4
shows data submitted by China on exports of light weapons (930120), military
firearms (930190), smalll calibre ammunition (930630), and pistols and revolvers
(930200) to four African countries in conflict zones (Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria,
and Sudan). China does not report on transfers of these items to UN Comtrade
and thus the query yielded no data. However, mirror data on imports of weapons
from China submitted by these countries shows transfers worth more than USD
8 million from 2010 to 2014. By systematically searching mirror data in UN
Comtrade, it is often possible to piece together information on some transfers to
and from less transparent states. Rarely does this data provide a complete ac-
counting of transfers from large exporters, however.
194 Major small arms exporters are ranked by level of transparency in Small Arms Survey’s Transpar-
ency Barometer (Small Arms Survey, n.d.b). See also the Small Arms Survey’s Trade Update series.
305
Figure 8.4 Data on small arms exports reported by China (top) and by four trade
partners in Africa (bottom), 2010–14

Handbook
Source: UNSD (n.d.c)
306
Table 8.8 Strengths and limitations of UN Comtrade

Monitoring and Tracking individual Many commodity categories include
measuring trends in transfers. data on unrelated items (see Table
small arms transfers Researching: (1) most 8.4).
over time and across light weapons; (2) There is no central mechanism for
regions. accessories for small ensuring accuracy and
Identifying trade arms and light weap- completeness.
partners of less trans- ons; (3) light weapons Some governments do not report
parent countries ammunition; and (4) on transfers of certain items, such
Researching trans- parts for light weapons as military firearms (930190).
fers of: (1) pistols and light weapons Some types of transfers, such as
and revolvers; (2) ammunition. military-to-military arms exports,
sporting and hunting Confirming reports of are
rifles and shotguns; arms transfers in other not always captured in customs
(3) small calibre sources. data.
Some weapons are not clearly,
ammunition; and (4)
consistently, or explicitly
parts for small arms.
categorized.
Errors found by researchers
highlight the need to confirm and
corroborate data.*
Note: * See Dreyfus, Marsh, and Schroeder (2009, p. 27).
Even governments that submit data on all commodity categories do not nec-
essarily report on every arms transfer. Government-to-government transfers some-
times go unreported, including when exported weapons are shipped directly
from military installations and do not pass through ports of exit administered by
customs agencies. Also noteworthy is the absence of information on intermediary
recipients and end users of transferred arms, which is critical for tracking weapons
throughout the chain of custody.
Finally, since the UN Statistics Commission cannot verify the accuracy of the
data that it receives, the onus is on individual governments to ensure that their
data is accurate. ‘The WCO makes efforts to ensure uniform application of the
[Harmonized System],’ observed one WCO representative. ‘But it is up to [individ-
ual governments] to ensure correct classification and thus reporting of trade data.’195
Thus, the completeness and accuracy of the data varies, and errors discovered by
researchers highlight the need to verify and corroborate the data, when possible.196
Table 8.8 summarizes the primary uses for—and limitations of—UN Comtrade.
195 Email correspondence with WCO official, 19 September 2016.

196 See Dreyfus, Marsh, and Schroeder (2009, p. 27).
307
Analysing the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
The UN Register of Conventional Arms, or ‘UN Register’, is a UN-administered

reporting mechanism for international transfers of major conventional weapon
systems and, to a lesser extent, small arms and light weapons. All UN member
states are requested to submit data annually on exports and imports of seven
categories of weapon systems:
battle tanks (Category I);

armoured combat vehicles (Category II);
large-calibre artillery systems (Category III);
combat aircraft (Category IVa), including unmanned combat aerial vehicles
(Category IVb);
attack helicopters (Category V);
warships (Category VI); and
missiles or missile launchers (Category VII),197 including man-portable air
defence systems (MANPADS) (Category VIIb).
The lists of items reported under two of the seven main categories include
light weapons. Category III includes mortar systems with calibres of 75 mm or
larger, which are frequently encountered in seized arms caches and in the arsenals
Handbook
of armed groups.198 Category III also includes crew-portable and towed multiple-
barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs), some of which are also considered light weap-
ons. The Iranian defence industry, for example, produces a single tube rocket
launcher that weighs just 23 kg (DIO, n.d.). While most other multiple-launch rock-
et systems exceed size and weight limits for ‘light weapons’, armed groups often
fire their ammunition from improvised launchers that are man- or crew-portable.
Groups in Iraq and elsewhere have built a wide array of launchers for these rockets,
which vary significantly in terms of size and sophistication (Schroeder, 2014b).
The highest-profile light weapons reported in the seven main categories are
MANPADS, which many governments regard as particularly sensitive because of
the potential threat they pose to commercial aviation. This sensitivity is evident
197 With exception of MANPADS (which has its own sub-category), Category VII only includes mis-
siles, rockets, and launchers with a range of at least 25 km, which excludes most if not all
crew-portable anti-tank guided missiles. See UNODA (2007, p. 20).
198 Category III also includes mortar systems that are generally not considered light weapons, includ-
ing systems with calibres that are greater than 120 mm.
308
Figure 8.5 Excerpts from the Russian Federation’s submission to the UN Register

regarding conventional arms exported in 2009 (top) and 2012 (bottom)
Sources: Top: UNGA (2010, p. 24); bottom: UNGA (2013b, p. 28)
in the special status of MANPADS in the UN Register; it is one of only two groups
of weapons that have their own dedicated sub-categories. Since the sub-category
for MANPADS was first used in 2004, governments have reported on the transfer
of thousands of the missile systems, making the UN Register one of the best sourc-
es of data on the proliferation of MANPADS.
Among the most notable MANPADS transfers recorded in the UN Register
are exports of advanced Russian Igla-S systems to Venezuela in 2009 and 2012
(see Figure 8.5). Russian export data reveals that the Venezuelan military has
received at least 4,200 MANPADS missiles and launchers, making it the largest
documented importer of MANPADS in more than a decade.199 Journalists reporting
on the potential threat posed by these missiles frequently use data from the UN
Register.200 These articles highlight the UN Register’s value as a source for data
on potentially problematic accumulation of sensitive weapons in unstable regions.
199 See also SIPRI (n.d.); UNROCA (n.d.b).

200 See Forero (2010); Gupta (2017).
309
Figure 8.6 Excerpt from the Czech Republic’s submission to the UN Register regarding
small arms exported in 2010
Source: UNGA (2011, p. 88)
States are also invited (but not required) to submit information on: (1) transfers
of small arms and light weapons;201 (2) national holdings of weapons; and (3)
procurement of weapons through domestic production.202 The first data on small
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arms transfers received by the UN Register dates back to the 1990s, but few govern-
ments reported on small arms until 2006. Since then, the UN Register has received
records on tens of thousands of imports and exports of small arms, some of which
are quite detailed. As this archive grows, it is increasingly useful for researching
small arms flows.
Submissions to the UN Register vary significantly in terms of scope, detail, and
completeness. Some states only submit the bare minimum of data required to meet
UN reporting requirements while others provide detailed lists of all transfers of
small arms and light weapons, identifying the make, model, calibre, origin state,
and intermediate states for each transferred weapon.
201 In 2016, the UN adopted a ‘7+1 formula’ that elevated the status of reporting on small arms and
light weapons above its previous categorization as ‘background information’ but stopped short of
creating an eighth main reporting category. It is not clear what, if any, impact this change will
have on reporting on small arms and light weapons transfers. See Holtom and Pavesi (2017, p. 57);
UNGA (2016a, para. 61(a)–(h), para. 75; 2016b).
202 See UNGA (2006a, p. 1).
310
Figure 8.6 is an excerpt from the Czech Republic’s submission on exports of

small arms and light weapons in 2010, which includes a reference to 6,000 CZ 75
pistols transferred to Iraq in 2010. This type of data is extremely useful for stud-
ying arms flows to conflict zones and for narrowing down possible sources of
weapons recovered from unauthorized end users.
Like all of the data sources profiled in this chapter, the UN Register has limita-
tions, which affect the completeness, comparability, and verifiability of the data (see
Table 8.9 Strengths and limitations of the UN Register of Conventional Arms
Researching arms exports Tracking transfers from Some states report on arms
from certain countries, major non-European transfers to governments
including many European exporters to much of Asia, and civilians while others
countries. Africa, Latin America, and only report on transfers to
Tracking exports, re-exports,i the Middle East.ii other governments.vii
and imports. Tracking transfers of civil- Many states do not indicate
Researching transfers of: ian firearms.iii whether they are reporting
(1) military firearms; Researching: (1) small on authorizations (licences
(2) pistols and revolvers; arms ammunition; issued) or deliveries.
and (3) light weapons, (2) ammunition for most Some states report selec-
especially MANPADS. light weapons; (3) parts tively, excluding data on
for small arms and light certain transfers.viii
weapons, including kits Researchers have discov-
for assembling complete ered significant errors.viii
weapons;iv (4) accessories
for small arms and light
weapons; (5) missiles and
rockets with a range of
less than 25 kilometres;v
and (6) missiles for
MANPADS delivered sep-
arately from launchers.vi
Notes:
i UN reporting guidelines explicitly advise states to report on transfers, including transfers of ‘second-hand equipment’
(UNODA, 2007, para. 18).
ii See UNROCA (n.d.c) for reporting rates by region.
iii While some states report on transfers of civilian weapons, UN guidelines only recommend that states report on transfers
of weapons that are ‘made or modified to military specification and intended for military use’ (UNGA, 2003, para.
113(e)). Similarly, states are only expected to report on transfers involving ‘States Members of the United Nations’
(UNGA, 2006b, para. 126(a)).
iv UNODA (2007, para. 15).
v Few, if any, missiles or rockets categorized as ‘light weapons’ have a range of 25 km or more.
vi See UNODA (2007, para. 8).
vii See Holtom (2008, p.35).
viii See Wezeman and Wezeman (2015).
311
Table 8.9). Many countries, including major producers, exporters, and importers
in conflict zones, do not report on most small arms and light weapons transfers.
These countries include several identified by the Small Arms Survey as top small
arms exporters, including Belgium, Brazil, China, Israel, and Russia. Compound-
ing this problem is a precipitous decline in reporting more generally. In 2015, the
UN Register received 54 submissions as compared to 126 in 2001 (UNGA, 2016a,
para. 17; Holtom, Pavesi, and Rigual, 2014, p. 133). If reporting rates do not im-
prove, the UN Register will become increasingly irrelevant as a data source for
tracking arms flows.
Researchers should also be aware of divergent reporting practices by partici-
pating governments. Some submissions are based on licensing data while others
reflect actual deliveries.203 The submission of licensing data without indicating that
the data is based on licences and not actual transfers is problematic because not
all licences lead to transfers, or to the transfer of all of the items specified in the
licences. Similarly, some states report on exports to civilians while others only
include data on government-to-government transfers.204 Differences in how states
categorize transferred weapons also complicate analysis of UN data. This problem
is exacerbated by ambiguous categorization on the UN Register’s reporting form.
One state may categorize an automatic AK-pattern rifle as a ‘light machine gun’
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while another may report it under ‘rifles and carbines’, ‘sub-machine guns’, or
‘assault rifles’.205
These incongruities often preclude the use of mirror data to verify information
on specific transfers. Data submitted by exporting governments often does not
match data on the same transfer submitted by the importing government, and often
one of the governments does not report on the transfer at all. An analysis of 77
submissions on light weapons transfers from 2003–06 by the Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yielded only ten exact matches (Holtom, 2008,
203 The UN’s Guidelines for Reporting on International Transfers explicitly instructs participating gov-
ernments to report on ‘only those transfers which they consider to have been effected’ during the
previous calendar year (UNODA, 2007, para. 5). More than half of the governments surveyed by
SIPRI in 2008 indicated that their UN Register submissions on exports were based on licensing
data (Holtom, 2008, p. 26).
204 In its 2003 report, the Group of Government Experts on the continuing operation and further devel-
opment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms limited its recommendation regarding
submission of data on transfers of small arms and light weapons to ‘weapons made or modified
to military specification and intended for military use’ (UNGA, 2003, para. 113 (e)).
205 UNGA (2016a, p. 37).
312
pp. 31–32). Thus, researchers often have to use other sources to verify data found

in the UN Register.
Finally, the UN Register’s database has several significant functional limita-
tions. It has no keyword search function and is currently incapable of retrieving
data on specific transfers by year, weapon category, region, or report type (that
is, import or export). To gather data on transfers of a particular type of weapon,
researchers must download each country’s annual submission individually and
manually compile relevant data points from each submission. These shortcomings
significantly limit the database’s utility as a research tool. Fortunately, much of
the data in the UN Register is accessible via user-friendly databases maintained
by SIPRI and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) (SIPRI,
n.d.; NISAT, n.d.).
Analysing social media

Social media outlets, including YouTube, Facebook, Flickr, and Twitter, are increas-
ingly powerful tools for researching arms flows. These platforms are the largest
repositories of open-source data in the world. This data includes millions of photo-
graphs, videos, and documents, including numerous images of exported small
arms and light weapons. Unlike government reporting (most of which is annual),
images available on social media are often posted shortly after they are generated,
sometimes providing near real-time updates on transfers and holdings.
Images posted on social media also shed light on transfers to and from govern-
ments that do not publish data on their arms imports and exports. From footage of
military parades to selfies taken by soldiers holding imported rifles, social media
is awash with images of transferred weapons, the importance of which increases as
the number of governments who regularly provide data to the UN Register shrinks.
These images are also useful for determining—or confirming—the make and
model of specific weapons. It was a YouTube user, not a government report, that
revealed the model of Russian MANPADS exported to Venezuela in the 2000s
(Herron, Marsh, and Schroeder, 2011, p. 22; see Image 8.1).
Social media has also facilitated a notable expansion in the capacity to analyse
the steady stream of images of transferred weapons posted online. By pooling
their expertise via loosely organized networks on Facebook and Twitter, analysts
and hobbyists with different backgrounds are able to instantaneously share infor-
313
Image 8.1 Screenshots from video of Venezuelan military parade, 2009
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Source: Soto (2009)
314
Table 8.10 Strengths and limitations of social media

Identifying transferred Systematically tracking and Erroneous identification of

weapons, accessories, and measuring arms flows. weapons is common.
ammunition in combat Postings are ad hoc and
zones and in some coun- therefore coverage of
tries with non-transparent transferred weapons is
governments. incomplete.
Corroborating claims about Widely available search
the make and model of engines are currently
some transferred incapable of identifying all
weapons. images of a particular
weapon or from a particu-
lar country or region.
mation and, in some cases, accurately identify different models of arms and ammu-
nition, including new and obscure items.
Social media’s strengths are also its weaknesses, however (see Table 8.10). The
decentralized nature of social media means that anyone with a smartphone can
anonymously upload images and distribute them to millions of people around
the world. Unlike traditional media, there is no vetting and little accountabili-
ty, and dissemination (through retweets, for example) is instant and effortless.
Consequently, information—including erroneous information—spreads rapidly,
making social media an attractive tool for distributing propaganda and advancing
political agendas.
There are several tools for assessing the accuracy of claims about weapons in
social media posts, the authenticity of their contents, and the time and location
of the events depicted in the posts. Among the most important tools are the
weapons identification techniques included in this Handbook (see Chapters 3–7).
Other tools include digital forensic techniques, time-stamping, and geolocation.
None of these techniques are foolproof, however, and information from social
media posts should be corroborated with data from other sources and verified by
weapons specialists, whenever possible.
Decentralization also means that it is difficult to systematically search, collate,
and store data on arms transfers posted on social media. No single search engine
generates a complete set of hits from all social media posts, and most images of
weapons are not identified and tagged. Advances in image recognition technology
are yielding software capable of distinguishing weapons from other items, but these
315
technologies are not yet widely available. Until advanced image recognition tech-
nology becomes more available, many—perhaps most—images of imported weap-

ons posted on social media will go unnoticed.
A related problem is that most social media posts on imported and exported
weapons are ad hoc and, consequently, coverage of arms transfers is almost always
incomplete. While voluminous in number, these images only document a small
percentage of transferred weapons. Furthermore, the vast majority of photos and
videos of weapons shared on social media were taken for purposes other than doc-
umenting arms flows. As a result, many do not include the weapon’s markings or
distinctive physical characteristics, which reduces their analytical value. As described
in detail in previous chapters, markings can reveal much about illicit weapons,
including their make and model, country and date of manufacture, and even uniquely
identifying information such as serial or batch number. This information provides
important clues about the item’s history, including, in some cases, its chain of custody.
Analysing tenders and contract award notices

Documents on the procurement of weapons and ammunition by government en-
tities sometimes contain detailed information about exports and imports. These
documents take many forms, including budget documentation, contract award
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notices, and tender notifications. An example of a contract award notice is pro-

vided in Figure 8.7.
The notice concerns the planned procurement by the US military of 40 mm gre-
nade launchers on behalf of the government of Iraq. The contract for the launchers
was awarded through the US Foreign Military Sales programme, the primary
mechanism for authorizing and administering government-to-government arms
sales.206 The notice includes the value of the contract, the company to which the
contract was awarded, the location where the launchers will be manufactured, and
the scheduled completion date—significantly more information than is included
in most arms transfer reports. The notice also includes a reference number for
the contract, which can be used to request more information (US DoD, 2016), such
as the model and precise calibre of the launchers. Government agencies in some
other countries publish similar documents online.207
206 In addition, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA, n.d.) provides more information on
the US Foreign Military Sales programme.
207 See, for example, EU (n.d.); Philippine DND (2013); Indian National Informatics Centre (2013).
316
Contract award notices and other procurement documentation can be valuable

sources of data on weapons procured through government-to-government arms
export programmes. Contracts are sometimes cancelled or revised, however,
rendering data in award notices obsolete. Furthermore, such notices often do not
provide a full accounting of potential exports since they may not reflect contracts
issued by agencies or through programmes that are exempt from reporting require-
ments. Some agencies do not issue notices for contracts worth less than a certain
amount. For example, the US Department of Defense only issues award notices
for contracts valued at USD 7 million or more (US DoD, n.d.). Given the compar-
atively low unit cost of most small arms, contracts that fall below reporting thresh-
olds may account for a large quantity of these weapons in some countries.
Figure 8.7 US Defense Department contract award notice regarding the procurement
of 40 mm grenade launchers for Iraq, 2016
Source: US DoD (2016)
317
Box 8.1 Tips for researchers: analysing data on authorized arms flows
Determine which items are included in the data. Some sources only include data on government-
to-government transfers of fully-assembled weapons while other sources include data on transfers
of civilian firearms; parts, accessories, and ammunition; and/or technical information. Determin-
ing which items are included helps to identify any data gaps, and enables you to convey to your
readers which items are covered—and which are not covered—in the data.
Determine whether the data reflects potential exports or actual exports. Reports on ‘arms exports’
published by governments sometimes only consist of data on potential exports, such as export
licences issued. Since not all licences result in deliveries, or in deliveries in the quantities speci-
fied in the licence, you should attempt to determine whether the data reflects potential or actual
exports. If these attempts prove unsuccessful, you should explain to the reader that it is not clear
whether the weapons have been delivered to the end user.
Identify any commodity categories or column headings that are vague, misleading, or over-
aggregated. Of particular concern are the following data and categorization practices:
(1) Inclusion of components, technical data, accessories, and other items in commodity catego-
ries that appear to only include complete weapons (for example, ‘rifles’, ‘firearms’, etc.).
(2) Use of ‘catch-all’ commodity categories that combine data on transfers of clearly identified
items with transfers of items that do not clearly fit into other commodity categories. These
categories can become dumping grounds for data on unusual items and on shipments by ex-
porters who do not fully understand the categorization scheme.
(3) Use of misleading or unclear data on quantities. It is sometimes unclear whether data in the
‘quantity’ column refers only to complete (assembled) weapons or a combination of com-
plete weapons, components, and/or accessories. In these cases, assuming that the data re-
fers to complete weapons may result in significant overestimates.
Determine whether the data includes all arms transfers from a particular country or agency. Some
sources only include data on certain categories or types of arms transfers, such as government-
to-government arms sales. Transfers that are commonly omitted from national reports and other
Handbook
government data sources include: (1) exports and imports of firearms and ammunition to civilians;
(2) classified exports; (3) transfers that fall below reporting thresholds; (4) transfers of parts, compo-
nents, and technical data in furtherance of licensed production arrangements; and (5) weapons,
ammunition, and related items that are provided as part of foreign aid and training programmes.
Verify the data and interpretations of the data. As noted above, reports on arms transfers often
do not define key terms or column headings. These reports also sometimes include ambiguous
or poorly defined commodity categories, and occasionally contain errors. Providing the report-
ing agency with the opportunity to explain its methodology, clarify terms and definitions, and
confirm the accuracy of key data points helps to minimize errors and misinterpretations, and to
ensure that analysis of the data is sufficiently nuanced and includes the appropriate caveats. You
should cross-check data from the above-mentioned sources with other sources, and attempt to
resolve any discrepancies with the assistance of officials from reporting agencies. Any unresolved
discrepancies should be flagged for readers.
Conclusion
Tracking arms flows is a challenging but critically important endeavour that,
until recently, has been constrained by the centralization of data and ponderous
reporting practices. Recent advances in computing power, connectivity, and
smartphones have resulted in exponential increases in the quantity of information
that is publicly available, including information on weapons in (and from) some
318
of the least transparent countries in the world. The simultaneous expansion of

field research complements the voluminous but often unverifiable imagery avail-
able on social media. When combined with records from UN databases and oth-
er legacy sources, this rapidly growing pool of data has the potential to dramati-
cally improve our understanding of how, where, and to whom small arms are
acquired and used.
―― Author
Matt Schroeder
319
320
CHAPTER 9
Analysing Arms Flows:

Illicit weapons
Introduction
Tracking illicit arms flows is often significantly more difficult than tracking the
authorized trade (see Chapter 8). There are no datasets comparable to UN Comtrade
and the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) for illicit weapons, and
the data that is available on illicit arm flows is incomplete, often ambiguous, and
frequently limited to anecdotal accounts of individual illicit transfers. These ac-
counts are few and far between, and only rarely are they sufficient in quantity or
detail to draw any conclusions about trafficking in a particular region.
Nonetheless, careful analysis of available data can reveal much about the types,
origins, and recipients of illicit weapons and ammunition, and the methods and
routes used by traffickers to smuggle these items across borders. This chapter
looks at several prominent sources of data on illicit small arms, including data on
weapons seized at border crossings (border seizures) and local seizures (weapons
recovered at crime scenes and from arms caches). It also examines images and
information available on social media.
For the purposes of this chapter, ‘border seizures’ are shipments of weapons
and other items detained by authorities of the importing or exporting state at or
near international borders. ‘Local seizures’ are incidents other than border sei-
zures in which authorities take weapons into custody. It should be noted that the
Handbook
term ‘seizure’ can be a bit misleading in that some of these items are only tempo-
rarily detained or are voluntarily surrendered.
Analysing data on border seizures

Data on weapons and related items interdicted at or near border crossings is an
important source of information on illicit arms flows. Depending on the level of
detail and time frame, border seizure data can reveal the types of frequently
trafficked weapons, the countries from which these weapons are trafficked, and
the methods and routes used by traffickers. Data that covers seizures over several
years may also reveal changes in trafficking patterns.
Table 9.1 shows records of border seizures compiled by US Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) that were obtained under the US Freedom of Information
Act. The records identify:
The type and quantity of seized items and, in many cases, the make, model,
and/or calibre.
322
The date that the items were seized.
Analysing Arms Flows: Illicit weapons

The destination of the seized shipment.
The records also include information about the legal and physical status of the
seizure and the statutory authority under which the weapons were seized, which
is often as important as the information about the seized weapons themselves.
Arms shipments are detained by customs agents for various reasons, ranging from
minor paperwork issues to strong evidence of arms trafficking. Information about
statutory and regulatory violations linked to the seized items and their adminis-
trative status provides important clues regarding the nature of the seizure. For
example, CBP officials told the Small Arms Survey that weapons ‘transfer[red] to
UFPD’ were probably seized for substantive reasons (including trafficking) while
items that were ‘remitted’ were probably detained as a result of technical viola-
tions of applicable legislation rather than deliberate arms trafficking.208
These records highlight the importance of developing a clear working defini-
tion of ‘illicit’ that reflects the scope and purpose of the research. In some of the
cases documented in these records, the shipper may have violated export laws
with no nefarious intent. Examples include unlicensed shipments of firearms com-
ponents by a licensed company to a legitimate foreign manufacturer of firearms.
In the United States (and many other countries), shipments would be illegal since
they violate national licensing requirements. But the impact on peace and security
of such shipments is minimal compared to that of shipments of semi-automatic
pistols and rifles to Mexican drug cartels, for example. As such, some recorded
cases may not be relevant to a particular story or report. Whether it is possible to
exclude specific types of cases depends on the data. Regardless, it is important for
researchers to develop precise definitions for ‘illicit’ and other key terms, and to
clearly present these definitions to their readers.
Analysing data on local seizures

Local seizures are another rich source of data on illicit small arms. Data on local
seizures takes many forms and is generated by both non-governmental and gov-
ernmental sources. In some cases, the seizure is summarized in detailed narratives
that include photos of the seized weapons and maps of their location (see Image 9.1).
208 Phone interview with CBP official, July 2012.
323
Table 9.1 Small arms taken into custody by US CBP, 2009–11
Nvntry Prprty Typ Txt Prprty Dsc Txt Going To Lgl Stus Txt Phscl Stus Txt Sezr Dt Statu Titl 1 Statu Titl 2 Txt
Qty Amt Txt
1 PISTOL HI-POINT PISTOL CANADA EVIDENCE - SINGLE TURNED OVER TO 20 MAY 2010 19USC1497
WITH MAGAZINE STATUS ANOTHER AGENCY
(PRE-FORFEITURE)
1 RIFLE-SHOTGUN WINCHESTER PANAMA ADMINISTRATIVELY TRANSFER TO UFPD 24 FEBRUARY 2010 OTHERSEIZURE 18USC922
COMBINATION SHOTGUN (12 GA) FORFEITED
2 GRENADE MK2 TYPE MEXICO SEIZED TURNED OVER TO 30 MARCH 2011 OTHERSEIZURE 18USC922
GRENADES ANOTHER AGENCY
(PRE-FORFEITURE)
1 OTHER HARRIS A2 DOMINICAN EVIDENCE - SINGLE REMITTED 08 JANUARY 2009 OTHERSEIZURE 18USC922(E)
ULTRALIGHT REPUBLIC STATUS
BI-POD LEGS
1 OTHER NIKON SCOPE DOMINICAN EVIDENCE - SINGLE REMITTED 08 JANUARY 2009 OTHERSEIZURE 18USC922(E)
REPUBLIC STATUS
2 OTHER .45 CAL PISTOL DOMINICAN ADMINISTRATIVELY TRANSFER TO UFPD 08 JANUARY 2009 OTHERSEIZURE 18USC922(E)
MAGAZINE REPUBLIC FORFEITED
324
2 OTHER 9MM PISTOL DOMINICAN ADMINISTRATIVELY TRANSFER TO UFPD 08 JANUARY 2009 OTHERSEIZURE 18USC922(E)
MAGAZINES REPUBLIC FORFEITED
1 PISTOL AMT SEMI AUTO DOMINICAN ADMINISTRATIVELY TRANSFER TO UFPD 08 JANUARY 2009 OTHERSEIZURE 18USC922(E)
PISTOL .45CAL REPUBLIC FORFEITED
(RECEIVER)
1 OTHER MAGAZINE NEW ZEALAND SEIZED HELD BY CUSTOMS 10 JUNE 2011 19USC1436 19CFR123.91
1 RIFLE RIFLE NEW ZEALAND SEIZED HELD BY CUSTOMS 10 JUNE 2011 19USC1436 19CFR123.91
2 MAGAZINE 9 MM MAGAZINE DOMINICAN ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 30 NOVEMBER 2010 19USC1305 19USC1497
REPUBLIC FORFEITED
2 MAGAZINE MAGAZINE DOMINICAN ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 30 NOVEMBER 2010 19USC1305 19USC1497
REPUBLIC FORFEITED
1 PISTOL FN HERSTAL DOMINICAN ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 30 NOVEMBER 2010 19USC1305 19USC1497
REPUBLIC FORFEITED
1 PISTOL GLOCK 17 DOMINICAN ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 30 NOVEMBER 2010 19USC1305 19USC1497
REPUBLIC FORFEITED
Nvntry Prprty Typ Txt Prprty Dsc Txt Going To Lgl Stus Txt Phscl Stus Txt Sezr Dt Statu Titl 1 Statu Titl 2 Txt
Qty Amt Txt
1 PISTOL GLOCK 19 DOMINICAN ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 30 NOVEMBER 2010 19USC1305 19USC1497
REPUBLIC FORFEITED
12 AMMUNITION 40 CAL. VENEZUELA ADMINISTRATIVELY TRANSFER TO UFPD 07 JUNE 2009 OTHERSEIZURE 19USC1595A
AMMUNITION FORFEITED
1 OTHER SIG PRO VENEZUELA ADMINISTRATIVELY TRANSFER TO UFPD 07 JUNE 2009 OTHERSEIZURE 19USC1595A
MAGAZINE FORFEITED
1 RIFLE BUSHMASTER M4 MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 31 AUGUST 2010 19USC1595A(A) 19USC1595A(C)
RIFLE/SCOPE/ FORFEITED
FLASHLIGHT
6224 AMMUNITION AMMO .22 CAL MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 03 JULY 2010 19USC1497 19USC1595A(D)
FORFEITED
(20 ROUNDS) FORFEITED
40 AMMUNITION AMMO .243 MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 03 JULY 2010 19USC1497 19USC1595A(D)
WINCHESTER (40 FORFEITED
ROUNDS)
325
SUPER AUTO+P FORFEITED
100 AMMUNITION AMMO 9MM MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 03 JULY 2010 19USC1497 19USC1595A(D)
LUGER (100 FORFEITED
ROUNDS)
1 PISTOL LOADED S&W MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVELY HELD BY CUSTOMS 01 DECEMBER 2009 19USC1595A(A) 19USC1595A(D)
REVOLVER 38 CAL FORFEITED
1 RIFLE POLY MEXICO SEIZED HELD BY CUSTOMS 19 APRIL 2011 19USC1497 19USC1595A(D)
TECHNOLOGIES
7.62X39 ASSAULT
RIFLE
1 OTHER MAGAZINE UNITED STATES SEIZED REMITTED 09 SEPTEMBER 2009 19USC1497 19USC1595A(D)
Source: US CBP (2011)

Image 9.1 Weapons seized in an arms cache, Afghanistan, 2011
Source: Schroeder (2015d)
In other cases, the data consists of large spreadsheets with thousands of re-
cords on weapons seized over several years. An example is provided in Table 9.2,
which is a sample of records of more than 30,000 small arms and light weapons
taken into custody by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) (Schroeder,
2014b, p. 247). The data includes key details about each item, including the make,
model, and calibre of the seized weapons. The records also note the circumstanc-
es under which the LAPD took possession of the items, which is critical for disag-
gregating data on illicit weapons from data on legally-owned weapons turned in
Handbook
to—or temporarily held by—the LAPD.

Data on local seizures often includes items that are not typically considered
‘illicit’. Examples include firearms turned in at local police stations by lawful own-
ers who no longer want them. Thus, to be useful, data on seizures must provide
contextual information about the circumstances under which the items were taken
into custody. However, even if the contextual information links individual weap-
ons to specific crimes, not all of the weapons linked to a particular crime are the
‘crime gun’. For example, the pistol linked to the crime type ‘Murder-First Degree’
in Table 9.2 could be the weapon used to commit the murder, or it may have been:
(1) seized from a suspect at the time of his or her arrest; (2) found on the body of
the murder victim; or (3) taken from a bystander. Without more information about
this case, it is impossible to determine if the pistol identified in the record was
actually used in a murder. This does not mean that such data is of no analytic
value; it simply means that analysts must clearly define what they mean by ‘illic-
it’, exclude records that clearly do not fit this definition, and add caveats regard-
ing any ambiguities in the remaining data.
326
To illustrate this point, the records displayed in Table 9.2 are colour-coded

into groups of ‘crime types’ with similar categorization challenges:
Yellow: The firearms in these records are clearly linked to one or more crimes
but their role in the criminal activity is unclear. As noted above, a weapon
linked to a first degree murder may or may not be the murder weapon. Without
the case file, it is impossible to determine whether these weapons were illicitly
possessed or used.
Blue: These firearms are linked to gun crimes. If the weapon is the only one
that was seized, it is likely that it is the ‘crime gun’ and can safely be consid-
ered ‘illicit’. However, if multiple weapons are linked to the same case, some
may not be ‘illicit’; they may have been temporarily confiscated from the suspect
at the time of arrest, or from lawful owners who were with the suspect when
he or she was arrested.
Green and grey: These weapons were taken from illicit end users—individu-
als who, by US law, are prohibited from owning firearms. Of all the weapons
in the four subcategories identified here, these weapons are the most likely to
be ‘illicit’. However, even in these cases, it is possible that some of the fire-
arms were legally-owned weapons that were, for example, temporarily seized
from individuals who were with the suspect at the time of arrest.
Table 9.2 also highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of the scope
and completeness of the dataset. There are no light weapons (grenade launchers,
mortars, recoilless guns, etc.) listed in this excerpt, and the full data file includes
records on only 73 light weapons, or less than one per cent of all seized weapons.
At first glance, the data appears to indicate that light weapons are almost never
encountered by police officers in Los Angeles, but there are other possible explana-
tions. In some US cities, police departments do not take custody of light weapons
ammunition (or anything else that presents an explosive hazard). Such items are
removed by specialized explosive ordnance disposal units, sometimes referred
to as ‘bomb squads’. Because bomb squads are often not part of the agencies that
log most seized arms, light weapons ammunition may not be reflected in police
seizure data (Schroeder, 2014b, p. 250). Thus, before drawing conclusions about
the types of items taken into custody in a given region, researchers should confirm
that their data provides a full account of all seizures. Since most datasets do not
include explanatory information about the data and how it was compiled, inter-
327
Table 9.2 Firearms taken into custody by the LAPD, 2009
Type Description Manufacturer’s name Caliber Crime type Crime

date
SHOTGUN PUMP ACTION ITHACA/ITHACAGUN 12 GAUGE SPOUSAL BEATING 25/01/2009
PISTOL REVOLVER ROHM .32 CALIBER RECEIVING KNOWN 26/01/2009
STOLEN PROPERTY,<$400
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC HI-POINT(HIGH) .380 CALIBER ATTEMPT - MURDER 27/01/2009

ACTION FIREARMS
PISTOL AUTOMATIC GLOCK 9 MILLIMETER MURDER:FIRST DEGREE 27/01/2009
ACTION
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC STERLING .25 CALIBER RECEIVE/ETC KNOWN 27/01/2009

ACTION STOLEN PROPERTY
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC BRYCO ARMS 9 MILLIMETER BRING/POSSESS FIREARM 26/01/2009
ACTION ON SCHOOL GROUNDS
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC KIMBER .45 CALIBER CARRYING CONCEALED 26/01/2009
ACTION WEAPON WITHIN VEHICLE
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC RG (WITH NUMBERS) .25 CALIBER POSSESS LOADED 26/01/2009
ACTION WEAPON/PUBLC
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC SIG-SAUER .357 CALIBER CARRY LOADED FIREARM 27/01/2009
ACTION IN PUBLIC PLACE
PISTOL REVOLVER SMITH & WESSON .45 CALIBER POSSESSION OF 27/01/2009
UNREGISTERED FIREARM
RIFLE BOLT ACTION RUGER .223 CALIBER MFG/SELL/IMPORT 27/01/2009
ASSAULT RIFLE
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC SPRINGFIELD ARMS CO. .40 CALIBER POSSESSION MARIJUANA 27/01/2009
ACTION FOR SALE
Handbook
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC HI-POINT(HIGH) .40 CALIBER TRANSPORT/SELL/ETC 27/01/2009

ACTION FIREARMS CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC COBRA .380 CALIBER POSSESSION 28/01/2009
ACTION CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR SALE
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC COLT .38 CALIBER POSSESSION 28/01/2009
ACTION CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR SALE
PISTOL REVOLVER COLT .38 CALIBER POSSESSION 28/01/2009
CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR SALE
PISTOL REVOLVER COLT .45 CALIBER POSSESSION 28/01/2009
CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR SALE
ACTION CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR SALE
ACTION CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR SALE
PISTOL REVOLVER SMITH & WESSON .357 CALIBER FELON POSS WEAPON 27/01/2009
- MAND 6MO JAIL
PISTOL REVOLVER ARMINIUS .38 CALIBER POSSESSION OF FIREARM 27/01/2009
BY FELON/ADDICT/ETC
PISTOL SEMI-AUTOMATIC SMITH & WESSON 9 MILLIMETER FELON POSS WEAPON 28/01/2009
ACTION - MAND 6MO JAIL
Source: LAPD (2013)
328
views with officials from the source agency are often the best—and sometimes the

only—way to determine which, if any, seizures are not reflected in the data.
Other sources of government data

There are several additional sources of government data on illicit weapons, many
of which are not readily available in the public domain but can be acquired in some
countries via freedom of information requests. Declassified government intelli-
gence reports are a good example. Some government agencies compile detailed
reports on the conventional weapons acquired and used by armed groups, particu-
larly in countries where their troops are deployed. While these reports are often
classified, some governments release redacted copies in response to freedom of
information requests (see Image 9.2). In recent years, the Small Arms Survey has
used redacted intelligence reports acquired in this way to:
identify trends in illicit proliferation not documented elsewhere;

establish baseline inventories of illicit SALW in specific countries;
Image 9.2 Redacted intelligence reports obtained from the US government (left) and
UK government (right) via freedom of information requests
Sources: UK Defence Intelligence (2010); ATF (2010)
329
improve understanding of the physical characteristics and capabilities of spe-
cific weapons; and

assess the effectiveness of commonly-used control measures, such as weap-
ons collection programmes.209
While these documents are often valuable reference guides, one should not
assume that their content is completely accurate. Even reports from government
agencies that specialize in conventional weapons identification occasionally contain
errors. As with all sources, information in intelligence reports should be verified
and corroborated with information from other sources whenever possible.
Shipping and storage documents

Shipping documents are another rich source of information. Manifests, bills of lading,
customs declarations, and other shipping documents are useful for identifying the
shipper and other parties to the transfer; the date(s) and route of the shipment; and
the destination. Image 9.3 features excerpts from a manifest found on the FRAN-
COP, which was transporting thousands of Iranian weapons to Syria when it was
intercepted by the Israeli Navy in 2009.
Since smugglers often falsify cargo lists and other information on shipping
Handbook
documents, the data found on these documents should be corroborated with oth-
er sources.
Packing lists and other documents that accompany exported weapons also
provide important information. Image 9.4 shows a packing list found in a crate
of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) looted from a depot in Libya.
The list identifies the exporter, the export year, the model of exported missiles,
and size of the shipment—information that is extremely useful for generating (or
corroborating) baseline inventories of small arms and light weapons in conflict
zones, failed states, and other countries where weapons are vulnerable to theft,
loss, or diversion. Using packing lists and similar documents found in depots
after the revolution in Libya, journalists and government contractors were able
to piece together a fairly comprehensive overview of MANPADS imported by the
Libyan government over a 40-year period.210
209 See, for example, Schroeder and King (2012) and Schroeder (2015b; 2016).
210 See Schroeder (2015a, pp. 3–5).
330
Image 9.3 Ship manifest found on the There are several ways to obtain

FRANCOP, November 2009 shipping and storage documents. Jour-
nalists in the field sometimes encoun-
ter them in storage crates that were
seized from—or discarded by—armed
groups and other unauthorized end
users. Documents found with intercept-
ed arms shipments are also sometimes
made available by governments as part
of public displays of seized weaponry,
or in images of illicit weapons posted on
government websites.211 These docu-
ments are also sometimes obtainable via
freedom of information requests.
Note: Latakia, Syria, is identified as the ‘place of delivery’.
While much of their content is rela-
The IRISL is identified as the ‘shipper’. tively straightforward, accurately inter-
preting and analysing these documents
Image 9.4 Packing list found in a crate of
often requires significant technical or
looted MANPADS, Libya, 2011
contextual knowledge. Journalists and
researchers should consult weapons
specialists and regional security ex-
perts whenever possible.
Analysing social media

Social media is an increasingly impor-
tant source of data on illicit small arms
(see Chapter 8). Photos and video foot-
age posted on Facebook, Twitter, You-
Tube, and other social media platforms
are often the first publicly available evi-
dence of the illicit proliferation of par-
ticular models of small arms and light
Source: C.J. Chivers 211 See, for example, Israel MFA (2009).
331
Image 9.5 Social media images of MANPADS acquired by armed groups in Syria,
2012–13
a d
b e
c
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Notes: (a) Syrian rebel with Strela-2-pattern launch tube; (b) Rebel with complete SA-7-pattern MANPADS; (c) Rebel with
Igla-1-pattern launch tube; (d) Rebel with FN-6 MANPADS; (e) Rebel with an Igla-S MANPADS and (f) Rebels with four
generations of MANPADS.
Sources: Mhmad Mhmad (n.d.); Chivers (2012c); Higgins (2012); Rebels Deir al-Zour (n.d.); Hazzm Movement’s Troop
Nine (n.d.); Syri Anwa (n.d.)
332
weapons. In some cases, these images also provide essential details about the

provenance, age, condition, and recipients of illicit weapons. In regions where
social media coverage is extensive, these images often provide important clues
regarding the quantity of illicit weaponry and changes in proliferation patterns
over time.
The immense potential of social media to track illicit weapons proliferation is
illustrated by images of MANPADS acquired and used by armed groups during
the Syrian civil war. Image 9.5 chronicles the unprecedented proliferation of
MANPADS since 2012, when the first early-generation Strela-2 pattern launch
tubes were spotted in Syria (via videos posted on YouTube).212 Over the next year,
Box 9.1 MANPADS and social media

MANPADS receive a lot of attention on social media. New videos and photos featuring the missile
systems are widely circulated and discuwssed. The net effect of this attention is positive. Images of
recently imported and trafficked MANPADS are available more quickly and in greater numbers
than ever before, allowing analysts to track their proliferation in near-real time. The decentralized
and instantaneous flow of information on social media is dual-edged, however. The Internet does
not discriminate on the basis of accuracy; false and misleading information circulates just as quickly
and as widely as well-informed analysis.
The sources of misinformation on MANPADS are many and varied. Some erroneous postings are
disinformation—deliberately forged or doctored images used to advance a particular strategic or
political agenda. An example is the fake ‘Stinger missile’ purportedly discovered by anti-government
militia members in Ukraine. Video footage of the ‘discovery’ was posted online, where analysts
quickly identified physical anomalies and erroneous markings, the most obvious of which was the
misspelling of ‘Tracking Trainer’ as ‘Tracking Rainer’ on the launcher (see Image 9.6). Based on this
misspelling, analysts concluded that the designer of the fake missile had based it on an image of the
Stinger MANPADS from the video game Battlefield 3 (Mezzofiore, 2015).
While forgeries and other forms of disinformation are occasionally posted on social media, most
misinformation stems from inadvertent errors made by individuals who lack technical knowledge
about small arms and light weapons. A common example is the use of specific model designations
to refer to entire groups of weapons, including MANPADS. The FIM-92 Stinger is a US-designed
MANPADS made famous by the Afghan Mujahideen, who used them to great effect against Soviet
aircraft in the 1980s. Their high-profile role in Afghanistan garnered a lot of attention, and ‘Stinger’
became a synonym for ‘MANPADS’, including missile systems of Russian and Chinese origin. This
misuse of the term ‘Stinger’ created—and has perpetuated—the impression that US-made Stinger
missiles are commonly found on the black market, which is demonstrably false; FIM-92 Stinger
missiles are tightly controlled and are now rarely, if ever, acquired by unauthorized end users.
Nonetheless, some users of Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms continue to refer to
all MANPADS as ‘Stingers’.6
Referring to MANPADS missiles as complete systems is another common mistake. During the Libyan
civil war, a US military official estimated that ‘there were as many as 20,000 of these types of weapons 
212 See, for example, Mhmad Mhmad (n.d.).
333
 in Libya before the conflict began’ (US AFRICOM, 2011). The official was referring to MANPADS
components (individual missiles or launchers) but his statement was widely misinterpreted to
mean that the Qaddafi regime had imported 20,000 complete systems. As noted in
Chapter 5, a functional MANPADS consists of four main components: a missile, a launch tube,
a launcher (gripstock), and a battery unit. Typically, governments import several missiles for every
launcher and therefore the number of complete systems in Libya at the time of the uprising was
likely only a fraction of the 20,000 MANPADS often cited on social media (Schroeder, 2015a, p. 4).
The misidentification of specific models of MANPADS is another source of misinformation. The
physical differences between different models of MANPADS are often subtle. This is particularly
true for variants of the same model produced in different countries. These variants are often nearly
identical in appearance and are sometimes assembled from the same components as the original
model. Telling these systems apart requires a trained eye and access to up-to-date reference materials.
A final mistake that is often seen on social media is the assumption that all missiles with certain
model designations are shoulder-fired. Many missiles with the same model name are fired from both
Image 9.6 Fake ‘Stinger missile’ featured in a video reportedly taken in Ukraine
and posted on Youtube, 2015
Handbook
Source: Telekanal ICTV (2015)
334
vehicle-mounted and man-portable launchers. In some cases, the missiles are interchangeable; they
can be fired from launchers mounted on vehicles and from gripstocks. In other cases, however, indi-
vidual missiles with the same model name can only be fired from vehicle-mounted launchers. This
often leads to confusion and misreporting. During the civil war in Libya, some analysts prematurely
declared that advanced Russian Igla-S MANPADS had been looted from Libyan arsenals after find-
ing emptied crates for 9M342 missiles. The 9M342 missile is fired from man-portable launchers,
but also from other launchers.7 In fact, the missiles imported by the Libyan government were not
shoulder-fired; they were reportedly configured only for use with vehicle-mounted launchers (Schro-
eder, 2013b, p. 25). Despite the best efforts of many journalists and analysts to point this out, Libya’s
Igla-S missiles are still occasionally referred to as ‘MANPADS’ on social media and elsewhere.
Because of the acute threat to military and civilian aircraft posed by MANPADS, their proliferation
to and within conflict zones warrants continued coverage. Improving the accuracy of this coverage
would increase its utility to analysts and policy-makers, with potentially significant implications for
aviation security and counter-trafficking efforts.
Box 9.2 Tips for analysing data on illicit small arms and light weapons
Make sure that the data is generated or compiled by individuals with the expertise required to
accurately identify the weapons referenced in the data. Accurately identifying weapons is diffi-
cult and requires significant experience and training. Data generated by individuals without
adequate training or experience may contain large numbers of errors, some of which may not
be easily identifiable.
Corroborate data on the make, model, and provenance of weapons. Since even experts some-
times misidentify weapons, it is important to check the make and model of illicit weapons with
multiple, independent sources.
Identify biases in each data source and determine how these biases affect the data. All data is
affected by biases. Accounting and controlling for these biases and their effects on data collec-
tion and aggregation is an essential part of analysing data on illicit small arms.
Look for signs of sloppy or inconsistent data entry. Even the most meticulously assembled data will
have some errors, but excessive error rates may indicate serious, systemic problems. Obvious
errors include duplicate records, misspellings, weapon model designations that do not match
the make and/or calibre of the weapon, and inconsistent use of terminology.
Confirm that the data is representative of the broader population of illicit weapons. As noted
above, some datasets on seized weapons may not contain data on certain types of weapons, such
as explosive munitions. When possible, ask a representative of the institution that compiled the
data if the dataset provides a full accounting of all weapons taken into custody.
Conduct key informant interviews. Determining whether seized weapons are representative of
illicit weapons in a particular country or region is extremely difficult. Law enforcement officers
and other local experts with in-depth knowledge of arms trafficking patterns are often well placed
to answer this question. Many of these officials are willing to respond to questions about illicit
small arms if they can be answered without divulging classified information and if the questions
are provided in advance.
7 Representatives of the Russian defence industry have claimed that the 9M342 missiles exported to Libya are not
compatible with MANPADS gripstocks (Schroeder, 2013b, p. 25). The Small Arms Survey has not independently veri-
fied this claim. It is unclear whether other (individual) 9M342 missiles are compatible with both man-portable and
vehicle-mounted launchers.
335
analysts used social media to document the acquisition of increasingly sophisti-
cated MANPADS by various armed groups, culminating in the discovery of a video

featuring rebels armed with four generations of MANPADS, including systems
not previously seen outside of government control (Schroeder, 2014a, p. 9).
As explained in Chapter 8, social media also has significant limitations. It is
often extremely difficult to verify the authenticity, time, and location of events
depicted in social media (see Box 9.1). The decentralized and ad hoc nature of
social media means that postings on illicit small arms are erratic and that coverage
is incomplete. Furthermore, the sprawling digital architecture of social media
platforms and the functional limitations of available search engines preclude the
systematic and comprehensive identification and collection of relevant images. No
single search engine generates a complete set of hits from all relevant sources,
and most images of weapons are not identified and tagged in social media posts.
Conclusion
Tracking illicit arms flows is a difficult endeavour. Reliable reports on illicit arms
transfers are few and far between, and many of the reports that are published are
Handbook
vague or impossible to corroborate. Until recently, there was too little data from
alternate sources to systematically study and report on illicit small arms. This is
changing rapidly. Images of illicit weapons are routinely posted on social media,
creating new opportunities for creative research and analysis. This data is just the
tip of the iceberg: millions of records on seized weapons are sitting on the hard
drives of government computers. Recent, successful efforts by the Small Arms Sur-
vey to acquire some of this data reveal that governments are willing to release
redacted versions of these records if they are approached in the right way. Data
and images of millions of additional weapons are hidden in plain sight in more
obscure corners of the Internet. When combined with field research conducted by
the United Nations, journalists, and other researchers, this data has the potential
to revolutionize our understanding of illicit small arms and the role they play in
crime and conflict.
Journalists and other researchers have a key role to play in this revolution.
Their writing skills and large, diverse audiences make them well suited to bridge
the gap between technical analysts and the general public. Furthermore, many
336
foreign correspondents have the mandate, experience, and networks required to

access data on illicit weapons and trafficking networks in areas of the world not
covered by social media or UN investigators. With the proper training and resources,
researchers can fill these data gaps and, in doing so, significantly improve our
understanding of arms flows and their implications for peace and security.
―― Author: Matt Schroeder
337
338
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An Introductory Guide

A publication of the Small Arms Survey with support

Published in Switzerland by the Fact-checking: Lisa Bjork, Timothy Jolin, and

© Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of Copy-editing: Fiona O’Brien

First published in November 2018 Layout: Julian Knott (www.julianknott.com)

Small Arms Survey Communications coordination: Emilia Dungel

Graduate Institute of International and

The Small Arms Survey takes no position

About the Small Arms Survey

For more information, please visit: www.smallarmssurvey.org.

Small Arms Survey

p +41 22 908 5777

N.R. Jenzen-Jones is a military arms and munitions specialist and intelligence

About the authors

Wright (ARES). Whether by contributing images, information, or technical exper-

Using this handbook

The information in this Handbook is provided for informational purposes only.

Abbreviations and acronyms ................................................................ 18

Chapter 1: Small Arms Identification: An Introduction ........................ 25

Chapter 2: Understanding the Trade in Small Arms: Key Concepts ....... 45

Import and other markings 121

Chapter 4: Weapons Identification: Small-calibre Ammunition ......... 131

Chapter 5: Weapons Identification: Light Weapons and their

Weapons ............................................................................................ 231

Chapter 7: Gathering Arms and Ammunition Data in the Field: Advice

Small arms and light weapons 266

Chapter 9: Analysing Arms Flows: Illicit weapons ............................. 321

Bibliography ....................................................................................... 339

4.2 Myths and misconceptions: ‘poisoned bullets’ 162

List of boxes, figures, maps, and tables

goods, 2014 295

1.1 Common small arms groups and sub-groups 33

List of boxes, figures, maps, and tables

Arms-related abbreviations and acronyms

CZ Česká Zbrojovka Uherský Brod (‘Czech Arms Factory, Uher-

Abbreviations and acronyms

SPG Stankovyy Protivotankovyy Granatomyot (‘heavy anti-tank

Munitions-related abbreviations and acronyms

ASM Anti-structure munitions

Abbreviations and acronyms

ARES Armament Research Services

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Abbreviations and acronyms

Small Arms Identification:

Small Arms Identification: An Introduction

Terms and definitions

1 See GPO (n.d., para. 5845(b)).

Small Arms Identification: An Introduction

Accurate classification and identification of arms and ammunition is the cornerstone

1. Determine the class.

Source: ARES (forthcoming)

Figure 1.2 provides a sample description of a weapon following the ARCS

Class Small arms

Group Long guns (self-loading rifles)

Type Self-loading (automatic) [short-stroke gas-operated

Year of manufacture 2004

Serial number L014466

Country of manufacture Belgium

PID (positive identification by Belgian FN Herstal SCAR-L CQC 5.56 × 45 mm self-

CZ Česká Zbrojovka Uherský Brod (‘Czech Arms Factory, Uher-

SPG Stankovyy Protivotankovyy Granatomyot (‘heavy anti-tank