Pormento v.

Estrada (TOPIC: Presidential Term Limit) Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, represented
FACTS: Respondent was elected President of the Republic in himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition before the
2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed COMELEC to disqualify FPJ upon the thesis that FPJ made a
respondents’ candidacy and filed a petition for material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
disqualification. claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners.
His petition was denied by the COMELEC en banc. As
such, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May According to petitioner, FPJ’s mother, Bessie Kelley
7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
petition would not stay the execution of the judgment of the Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Hence, private respondent was able to participate as Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 of an alien mother.
elections where he garnered the second highest number of
votes. Private respondent was not elected President the The COMELEC dismissed the case hence the case at
second time he ran. bar.

ISSUE: WON respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by ISSUE: WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen - YES
the ban on the President from any reelection.
RULING: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
RULING: Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the expresses: No person may be elected President unless he is a
phrase “any reelection” will be premised on a person’s natural-born citizen of the Philippines xxx xxx
second (whether immediate or not) election as President,
there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
live conflict of legal rights exists. include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
As such, one of the essential requisites for the their Philippine citizenship."
exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an
actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. The The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which Constitution. Among the modes of acquiring citizenship, only
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
before it. "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, jus
to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected sanguinis or blood relationship became the primary basis of
in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true citizenship by birth.
today. Following the results of that elections, respondent was
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would
not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant
discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and
of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou. While the
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in
DISMISSED.
evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be
Walay principle gi-discuss. Ambot nganong gi-apil ni ni sir. a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954.
Fornier vs COMELEC (TOPIC: Definition of natural born
Filipino) Also, the birth certificate of FPJ would disclose that
he was born on 20 August 1939. (Daghan pa kayo tong mga
FACTS: On 31 December 2003, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed documentary evidence gi-submit pero wa na nako apila kay
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the taas na kayo and because these two are the most crucial)
 Being public documents, the death certificate of 2. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a
Lorenzo Pou and the birth certificate of FPJ constitute prima natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that
facie proof of their content. status when she became a naturalized American
citizen (after she married her husband and moved to
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo USA). According to Elamparo, natural-born
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having citizenship must be continuous from birth.
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born Issue on residency (omitted)
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Petitioner filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other xxx
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before (3) she did not make any material
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had citizenship and residency qualifications for:
effected in 1902. a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention
deliberations show that foundlings were
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would considered citizens;
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
b. foundlings are presumed under international
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
law to have been born of citizens of the
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons place where they are found;
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225;
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would American citizenship prior to the filing of
her COC for President in the May 9,
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
2016 Elections and that the same is in full
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his force and effect and has not been
certificate of candidacy in violation of he Omnibus Election withdrawn or recanted;
Code. DISMISSED.
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that
POE V COMELEC she did not possess natural-born status;
COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding
FACTS: (Facts not very important, you can skip directly to
that petitioner's COC
Ruling on foundlings)
contained material representations which are false.
A day after Grace Poe filed her COC for President, Estrella
Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or
cancel said COC. Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that
petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she ISSUE:
stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen 1. WON Poe is a Filipino citizen
and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten 2. WON Foundlings are considered Natural-born citizens.
(10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9
May 2016 Elections.
RULING:
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued:
1. YES
1. petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE. She has typical
foundling. Elamparo claimed that international law Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black
does not confer natural-born status and Filipino hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
citizenship on foundlings. Following this line of At the outset, it must be noted that
reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No.
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and
9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to
Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence
begin with.
 that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a Spaniards, because the
natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of presumption is that a child of
proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner unknown parentage is the son of
is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should a Spaniard. This may be applied
have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. in the Philippines in that a child
Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the of unknown parentage born in
burden to her because such status did not exclude the the Philippines is deemed to be
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in Filipino, and there is no need. . . .
this case where there is a high probability, if not
Sr. Rafols:
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
There is a need, because we are relating
2. Yes. Basis: Intent of the Framer; International
the conditions that are
law;
[required] to be Filipino.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent Sr. Montinola:
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would But that is the interpretation of the law,
definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and therefore, there is no [more]
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, need for amendment.
there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
Xxx
[Intent of the Framers]

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Sr. Busion:

Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Mr. President, don't you think it would be
Constitutional Convention show that the framers
better to leave this matter in the
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
hands of the Legislature?
The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Roxas:
Sr. Rafols:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that
For an amendment. I propose that after
these cases are few and far in
subsection 2, the following is
between, that the
inserted: "The natural children of
constitution need [not] refer to
a foreign father and a Filipino
them. By international law the
mother not recognized by the
principle that children or people
father.
born in a country of unknown
xxx xxx xxx parents are citizens in this nation
is recognized, and it is not
President:
necessary to include a
[We] would like to request a clarification provision on the subject
from the proponent of the exhaustively. 116
amendment. The gentleman
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried
refers to natural children or to
out, it was not because there was any objection to the
any kind of illegitimate children?
notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not
Sr. Rafols: citizens but only because their number was not enough
to merit specific mention. Such was the
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also
account, 117 cited by petitioner, of delegate
includes natural children of
and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown
parents.
During the debates on this
Sr. Montinola: provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
For clarification. The gentleman said "of amendment to include as Filipino
unknown parents." Current citizens the illegitimate children with a
codes consider them Filipino, foreign father of a mother who was a
that is, I refer to the Spanish citizen of the Philippines, and
Code wherein all children of also foundlings; but this amendment
unknown parentage born in was defeated primarily because the
Spanish territory are considered
 Convention believed that the cases, Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
being too few to warrant the inclusion providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
of a provision in the Constitution to RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
apply to them, should be governed by WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
believed that the rules of international ______ Years and seven Months.
law were already clear to the effect
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo,
that illegitimate children followed the
the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
citizenship of the mother, and that
and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
foundlings followed the nationality of
Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the place where they were found,
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not
thereby making unnecessary the
meet the constitutional requirement for residency of 1 year.
inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment. NOTE: Leyte has 1st district and 2nd district; When Marcos
showed his interest in ruling for election, Montejo told her
that she is not a resident of Tacloban (place where Marcos
[International Law] grew up) but of Tolosa (present place where she live) hence,
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Marcos registered as a voter in Tolosa. Montejo then filed a
Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can petition to Comelec to move the city of Tolosa to 2 nd district
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by such was not achieved, a very clear intention of Montejo to
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method remove Marcos from being his opponent.
requires that an international law be transformed into a Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" of
local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted the amended certificate. The Provincial Election Supervisor of
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation Leyte denied such as it is filed out of time. Consequently,
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations Marcos filed the Amended CoC to the COMELEC's Head Office
in Intramuros, Manila
The principles found in two conventions (1930 Hague
Convention and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
Statelessness), while yet unratified by the Philippines, are "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is of an "honest misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she
which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
country of birth," The second is the principle that a foundling residence." She averred that she thought that what was
is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found. asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and
not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague District, to which she could have responded "since
Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
childhood."
rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of COMELEC’s Ruling: against Marcos. It held:
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the In election cases, the term 'residence' has always been
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, considered as synonymous with 'domicile' which imports
that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
certainty. personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business
MARCOS v COMELEC or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
(Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil
FACTS:
294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendiis pointed
to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
 Except for the time that she studied and worked for to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she reasons, one intends to return.
continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband
[WHEN DOMICILE IS NOT LOST EVEN IF A PERSON IS IN
was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan,
OTHER PLACE]
Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965,
she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to
registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of voter other than in the place where one is elected does not
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of
Manila. She could not have served these positions if she domicile) in our election law that in these and other election
had not been a resident of the City of Manila. law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy individual from his permanent residence without the
for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of
a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. domicile.

[DOMICILE VS RESIDENCE]
When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in "There is a difference between domicile and
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay (animus residence. 'Residence' is used to indicate a place of
manendi) there by registering as a voter there and abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile'
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City (animus non when absent, one has the intention of returning. A
revertendi), where she spent her childhood and school man may have a residence in one place and a
days, as her place of domicile. domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
ISSUE: remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
1. WON the statement in a certificate of candidacy which one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an he may have numerous places of residence. His
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
qualification requirement. but it is not by any means necessarily so since no
length of residence without intention of remaining
2. WON Marcos has complied the 1 year residency will constitute domicile." (Uytengsu vs. Republic)
requirement in Leyte. (MAIN TOPIC)
[CONCLUSION]

Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have
RULING:
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
1. No. The said statement becomes material only when time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. (Own note: between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
Estoppel) It would be plainly ridiculous for a purposes.
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would
lead to his or her disqualification. Honest mistake Respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in
of residence in the First District if such fact were Tacloban. She pursued her college studies in Tacloban
established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when
2. Yes
he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered
In election cases, the term 'residence' has always been
there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of
considered as synonymous with 'domicile' which imports not
the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
such intention. (Basis: Intent of framer – Constitutional Philippines, she lived with him in Malacañang Palace and
Deliberation) Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. In February 1986
(she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and How to establish/change domicile
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came
home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Ilocos
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Sur and that he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon
Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and City. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has
established a new "domicile" of choice in Sarangani.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found A person's "domicile" is considered to continue and will not
by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully
various residences for different purposes during the past four effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
Leyte. establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose.
[Presumption of Continuity or Residence and Changing of
Domicile] DOM: In other words, there must be animus manendi (in
the new “domicile” - Sarangani) coupled with animus non
As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
revertendi (to the old “domicile” – Quezon City)
gained.

To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must

demonstrate: Domicile requires not only bodily presence but also an intent
1. An actual removal or an actual change of to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode
domicile; (Animus Manendi)
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former presence in Sarangani was sufficiently established by the
place of residence and establishing a lease of a house and lot in 1997 and by the affidavits and
new one; and (Animus non revertendi) certifications under oath of the residents of that place that
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their
locality.

While this may be so, actual and physical (presence) is not in

Domino vs. COMELEC itself sufficient to show that from said date he had
transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
the position of Representative in Sarangani indicating that he
coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While
had resided in the constituency for one (1) year and two (2)
"residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place,
months immediately preceding the 1991 election.
"domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that
Private respondents, however, filed with the Comelec a to place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s
cancel the certificate of candidacy because he is neither a fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
resident nor a registered voter of the province of Sarangani.
DOM: To establish domicile, actual/physical presence
The Comelec disqualified Domino as candidate for the
must be coupled with intention to acquire domicile; Also,
position and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
“domicile” is a term broader than “residence,” since the
candidacy.
latter only requires actual/physical presence.

Issue: WON DOMINO was a resident of Sarangani for at least

Lease Contract not indicative of abandonment of one’s
one year immediately preceding the 1991 election?
original domicile

The lease contract entered into in 1997, does not adequately

Ruling: No. support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it
Preamble: In Election Law, the term "residence," means the does not prove abandonment of one's original domicile.
same thing as "domicile.” Therefore, when respondents
questioned the residency requirement of Domino, they were
actually questioning his domicile requirement.
Being a voter of QC shows Domino’s lack of intention to purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of
abandon his residence in QC Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor thereof

While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to Thus, for all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the
a strong presumption of residence especially in this case law, private respondent is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City
where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. The fact and eligible to run for mayor because he was actually residing
that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a in Cagayan de Oro City while he was discharging his duties as
strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his Governor of Misamis Oriental.
domicile.

Torayno vs. COMELEC

Laws governing Election Contests are liberally construed to
Facts: During the 1995 elections, Emano ran for, was elected, favor Popular Mandate
and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It
There is no question that private respondent was the
was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In
overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro City.
his Certificate of Candidacy, his residence was declared to be
He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes. Thus, we find it
in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the
In 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest
executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to
(geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), give life and spirit to the popular mandate.
in which he claimed 20 years of residence. In 1998, he filed
In Frivaldo vs. Comelec:
his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City,
stating therein that he resided there for two years and five “To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
months. qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
Petitioners Torayno Sr., et al, sought the disqualification of
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will
allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement.
of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice
to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
Issue: WON respondent Emano's acquired a bona fide
promote.”
domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro
City prior to 1998 elections Election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not
Ruling: Yes. be defeated by mere technical objections.

Respondent Emano had been residing in CDO since 1973

Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Residency Rationale
Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more
qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in
importantly, it is itself the seat of the provincial government.
order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with
As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their
the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and
functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less,
all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies;
getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Emano,
likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the seekers'
having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms
qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for.
and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that
period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the
city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO (3 topics)
adopt it as his permanent place of residence. Private
respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de FACTS: From the beginning of his term, petitioner was
Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started
together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community on October 4, 2000. Governor Chavit Singson went on air and
tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving ISSUE: whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next
day, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority RULING:
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech
RESIGNATION of the PRESIDENT
accusing the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section
1998 to August 2000. 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:

The House Committee on Public Order and Security, decided "SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent
to investigate the exposé of Governor Singson. On the other disability, removal from office or
hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and resignation of the President, the Vice
Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the President shall become the President to
petitioner. serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal
On November 20, the Senate formally opened the from office, or resignation of both the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their President and Vice President, the
oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. President of the Senate or, in case of his
Davide, Jr., presiding. inability, the Speaker of the House of
Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice
11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
President shall have been elected and
second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing
qualified.
that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private xxx xxx xxx."
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust,
Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. The ruling The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President
made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is
full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
11 senators. must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
On January 19, the petitioner informed Executive Secretary governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly President.
transfer of power started at Malacañang's Mabini Hall, Office
of the Executive Secretary. The negotiations consumed all In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In
would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
at the EDSA Shrine. acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its
At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice Davide administered the legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
Palace. leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was
Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed for Quo going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution." challenge after occupying the office of the president which he
has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not FACTS: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in
give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr as Vice-President.
the past tense. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who
took his oath as Vice-President.
DISABILITY of the PRESIDENT
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a
President has no power to adjudge the inability of the vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC
petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May
ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to
whether the President is incapable of performing his be elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further
functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th
VII." This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends
is only an Acting President. on 30 June 2004.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected
the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the Senators. Respondents Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer ranked 12th and 13th, respectively.
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of
inability. On 20 June 2001, petitioners as voters and taxpayers, filed
the instant petition for prohibition. Petitioners contend that
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review COMELEC’s provisional proclamation is without jurisdiction
the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and because it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of filled in the special election as required under Section 2
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the of R.A. No. 6645 and it failed to specify in the Voters
Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the
Court cannot "exercise its judicial power for this is an issue special or regular senatorial elections.
"in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislative . . . branch of the government." ISSUE: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year
Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed RULING: YES!
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special
which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and
the principle of separation of powers. the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by
law”.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time
leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President indispensable to the election's validity. In a general election,
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is
reviewed by this Court. valid without any call by the body charged to administer the
election.
VACANCY in the OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, HOW
FILLED In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute
that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator
be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her VP. The next day, February 7, the special election is to be held and operates as the call for
the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus
nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr. The House of prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body
Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to
nomination in Resolution No. 178. Senator Guingona, Jr. took do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call for the
his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.
election by some authority and the law thus charges voters
with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides “SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both
that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National
fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in
succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of
Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 Health. Xxx
could not be held at any other time but must be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and
14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any public
this statutory notice and COMELEC's failure to give the office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
additional notice did not negate the calling of such special undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
election, much less invalidate it. enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate
herein required.”
Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's
failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic
of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004
election or led them to believe that there was no such special elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
election. under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486. He invoked the
Honasan. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted provisions of the Constitution:
for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's
omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of
suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural
means and methods to conduct the special election within - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and
Senate's proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
COMELEC's wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to election.
carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
elections subject only to the limitation that the means so
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that
discretion. both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
PIMENTEL VS COMELEC candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must
CAVEAT: (Three consolidated cases ni siya: SJS vs PDEA, first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
Laserna vs PDEA and Pimentel vs Comelec – Pimentel lang ta provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
focus kay didto ang about sa senatorial qualifications. Ang COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
two other cases were about if pwede i-drug test ang students candidates for senator.
and ang private ug public officials.)
ISSUE: Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
FACTS: On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 laid down by the Constitution?
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent
portions of the said resolution read as follows: RULING: The provisions are unconstitutional. Hence, SC said
that:
Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
“SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g)
xxxx of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.” rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic
Also, the COMELEC Resolution provides: law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS COMELEC (3 consolidated
defined functions, the three departments of government cases)
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be FACTS: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list
observed.9 representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. COMELEC then proclaimed 14 party-list
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, representatives from 13 parties.
are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in
Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA Party (People's Progressive Alliance
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise: for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of
Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a
“Someone has said that the powers of the legislative "Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the Representatives provided by the Constitution."
ocean, are unlimited. Xxx However, the Constitution is the
shore of legislative authority against which the waves of It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot membership of party-list representatives in the House of
leap.10” Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was
mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a House. Thereafter, other party list organizations also filed
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, their respective motions to intervene in the case.
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election COMELEC 2ND Division, via Resolution, granted PAG-ASA’s
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would
thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
of the Constitution. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 COMELEC En banc affirmed such ruling via another
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in resolution.
the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at
of little value if one cannot assume office for non - least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system,
compliance with the drug - testing requirement. objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and assailed
the two resolutions.
BONUS – NOT ABOUT SENATORIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
As to drug test sa students: justifiable ra because of the ISSUES:
safety and interest of the student population 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
As to drug test sa public and private officials: petitioners tried Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? NO.
to invoke the right to privacy, but failed to prove it sa court.
The drug test was considered justifiable for private officials 2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-
because there is “reduced expectation of privacy in the work seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
office”. It was considered justifiable pud for public officials constitutional? YES.
due to “high requirement of ethics in the public service”.
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should
As to the drug test sa criminals: it was declared the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
unconstitutional since the accused persons “are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves”. RULING:
1. No. The twenty per cent allocation in the house for party-
list lawmakers is a mere ceiling and not mandatory. We rule
that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number
Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of including those elected under the party list.
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the
percentage of the total membership in the House of Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. And, garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
in the exercise of this constitutional prerogative, Congress cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in
enacted RA 7941. the House of Representatives;

2. Yes to both. TWO PERCENT THRESHOLD: In imposing a two Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless
percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
number of constituents deserving of representation are additional seats.
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned
from the deliberations on the proposed bill. . . The two Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats
percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very proportion to their total number of votes."
essence of "representation”. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate
LIST OF FORMULAS (WARNING: SC REVISITED THIS
of a sufficient number of people.
FORMULA IN BANAT VS COMELEC):

THREE-SEAT LIMIT: An important consideration in adopting

the party-list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation ...Consistent with the
Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set
the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party,
organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled
the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the
entire House.

3. How the additional seats of a qualified party be

determined:

1. Rank all the parties according to the votes each

obtained
2. Compute the ratio for each party by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for the party-list
3. All those who garnered at least 2% shall have a
guaranteed seat. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats BAYAN MUNA V COMELEC (APRIL 21, 2009) EN BANC
4. The party having the highest number of votes is DECISION
referred to as the “first party”
5. Determine the number of seats the first party is FACTS:
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for BANAT (GR 179271) - filed a Petition to Proclaim the
the other parties. (4% - additional 1; -6% - additional Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
2) Constitution before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC).
6. The number of seats allotted to the other parties The reason for filing is the implementation of the Veterans
cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party Federation Party v Comelec ruling using the Panganiban
is entitled to. formula in allocating party-list seats.

SUMMARY OF THE FOUR PARAMETERS OF THE PARTY-LIST Comelec, as the NBC, proclaimed 13 parties as
SYSTEM ACCORDING TO SC: winners. Then in allocating the additional seats, it reiterated
its ruling in Veterans Federation Party v Comelec.
For those obtaining 2% above – Guaranteed 1 seat

Formula in Veterans for additional seats for the

“FIRST PARTY”: (BUHAY ang number 1 nga party-list)
Number of Votes Proportion of votes of RULING:
first
Of first party party relative to total PARTY-LIST SEATS (1ST TOPIC)
-------------- = votes for party-list
system 4 INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS OF THE PHILIPPINE PARTY-LIST
Total votes for ELECTION:
Party-list system 1) combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed 20% of the total membership of the
The resulting Proportion of Votes received by the House of Rep, including those elected under the
first party (w/o rounding off) shall entitle it to additional party list
seats:
2) only those garnering a minimum of 2% of the total
If Equal to or at least 6% = 2 additional seats valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% = 1 to have a seat
additional
Less than 4% = no additional 3) each qualified party is entitled to a maximum of 3
seats (one qualifying seat) ( 2 additional seats)
Formula for Additional seats for the OTHER
QUALIFIED PARTIES in the Veteran’s ruling:
4) additional seats shall be in proportion to the party-
No. of Votes of list’s total number of votes
Concerned Party No. of additional
Additional
------------- x seats allocated to = seats Sec. 5 Art V - Composition of House of Rep:
for a  250 members elected from
No. of Votes of first party o Legislative districts apportioned among the
concerned provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
First Party party area

NBC nevertheless declared said petition of BANAT as moot o Party-list system of registered national, regional,
and academic and it implemented the Veteran’s formula. and sectoral parties or orgs.

BAYAN MUNA, ABONO, and A TEACHER (GR  For the Party-list Representatives:
179295) – asked the Comelec acting as NBC should not use o Constitute 20% of the total number of
the Veteran’s formula as it violates the Constitution and RA representatives including those under the party
7941. This was nevertheless denied. list (This is also found in Sec 11 RA 7941)

ISSUES: o Term – 3 consecutive

1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives in Sec.
5(2) Art. VI of the Consti mandatory or merely a ceiling? FOR COMPUTING THE NUMBER OF SEATS AVAILABLE TO
MERELY A CEILING PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NUMBER OF
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS: (SC followed Veteran’s formula)
2) Is the 3-seat limit in Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
YES Number of seats available
To legislative districts Number of seats
3) is the 2 % threshold prescribed in Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 to - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x .20 = available to PLR
qualify for one seat constitutional? CONSTITUTIONAL FOR .80
GUARANTEED SEAT, UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ADDITIONAL
SEATS 14th Congress of the Phil has 220 district reps. So substitute
lang, and you get 55 available seats.
4) How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
TAKE NOTE: There is no disagreement on the Computation of
5) can major political parties be barred from participating in the available seats as well as the formula to determine the
the party-list elections? YES guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least
2% of the total PL votes.
 3. those qualified shall be entitled to additional seats in
The problem here is THE ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL SEATS proportion to their total number of votes until all the
USING THE VETERAN’S FORMULA. additional seats are allocated (2nd to 3rd ROUND DEPENDING
ON THE AVAILABLE SEATS LESS GUARANTEED SEATS)
INTERPRETATIONS OF BANAT:
Deviating from the Veteran’s formula, BANAT presents 2 4. not more than 3 seats
interpretations:
AND FOR COMPUTING THE ADDITIONAL SEATS:
1st (44 seats will be awarded) (2nd round)
1.a) composition of PL is 20% x x x
1.b) 1 seat for every 2% of the total PL votes; then not more Take Note: the GUARANTEED SEATS FOR 2% THRESHOLD is
than 3 seats NO LONGER included because they have already been
1.c) the remaining seats shall be proportionately allocated to allocated. So ang additional seats refer to the MAXIMUM
the PL candidates who have not secured the max 3 seats SEATS RESERVED LESS THE GUARANTEED SEATS
under the 2% threshold, after deducting the seats obtained
by the PL groups and after deducting from their total the  Percentage x Remaining Available seats (in this case, 38
votes corresponding to those seats coz there are 55 max seats then in the 1st round, 17 seats
were allocated – if ganahan mo mu.view sa table, aron
2nd (34 seats will be awarded) mas maka.visualize, refer lang sa case)
Take note: It is assumed in this interpretation that the 2%
threshold will be declared unconstitutional o The whole integer of the product corresponds
to a party’s share in the remaining available
2.a) tally all the votes on a nationwide basis seats.
2.b) rank them
2.c) allocate PL reps proportionately according to the  Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
percentage of votes obtained by each candidate as against rank until all available seats are completely distributed.
the total nationwide votes cast for the PL system

ARGUMENT OF BAYAN MUNA, ABONO, and A TEACHER: CAN MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATE? - YES
They criticize that the 2-4-6 formula and the
Veteran’s formula make it impossible to fill all the PL seats. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-
Both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats. party system that allowed all political parties to participate in
They reject the 3 seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. the party-list
elections. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating in the
SC SAYS: party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
There is no problem with the 2% threshold to be Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
guaranteed 1 seat. However, the Veteran’s formula participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
erroneously interprets the clause in Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 “in wings.
proportion to their total number of votes” to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This is contrary to QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEES (2ND TOPIC)
the language of RA 7941. 1) natural born citizen of the Phil
2) registered voter
Pursuant to this, the 2% threshold for allocating the 3) resident of the Phil for a period of not less than 1 year
ADDITIONAL SEATS is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL because immediately preceding the day of the elections
it would mathematically and physically prevent the filling up 4) able to read and write
of the available PL seats. (2% applies lang sa guaranteed 5) bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seats) seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of
the election
THE PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED NOW: 6) at least 25 years of age on the day of election

1. rank the PL candidates from the highest to the lowest  FOR A NOMIBEE OF THE YOUTH SECTOR
o Must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years
2. those receiving at least 2%, guaranteed 1 seat (1st ROUND of age on the day of the election
OF SEAT ALLOCATION) o It attains 30 years of age during his term,
continue until the expiration of his term
 Votes obtained / Total Votes Cast in PL = percentage
TAKE NOTE: not necessary that the party-list organization's 4) For the guidance of the House of Representatives,
nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" as clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in
there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-
that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition list representatives is not mandatory," has been abandoned.
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she CLARIFICATIONS MADE BY THE SC:
must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior
citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen. 1) It is provided under Sec 5 (1) Art VI of the 1987 Consti
that the max number of members of the House of Rep
PARTIALLY GRANTED. shall be at 250. Nevertheless, an increase in the number
of members is allowed which is clear from the phrase
Diba major political parties can participate, but by virtue of 8- “unless otherwise provided by law”.
7 vote, ruling in Veterans with respect to non-participation of
said parties is upheld.  Increase may be done by the legislature through
Piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law
2% threshold in distributing additional seats is authorizing a general increase.
unconstitutional
2) The formula to determine the number of seats available
Veteran’s formula for additional seats is not controlling. for party list allows a corresponding increase in the number
of seats available whenever a legislative district is created
by law.
BAYAN MUNA V COMELEC (JULY 8 2009) EN BANC
RESOLUTION  This means that there is no need for the legislature to
create an additional party-list seat whenever four
additional legislative districts (four is entitled to 1 rep)
The House of Rep filed a motion for clarification for the are created by law.
following issues:
 Moreover, the actual count of legislative districts in the
1) There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. 2007 election was not 220 but 219, following the
Accordingly, the allotted seats for party-list representation declaration that rendered void the creation of the
should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives Province of Sharif Kabunsuan, thus only 54 seats were
seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives available, not 55.
shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the
Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.  The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not
mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats
2) The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on depends on the number of participants in the party-list
whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named election
party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such
number of representatives that would complete the 250 3) The 2% threshold is constitutional with respect to the
member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the allocation of the guaranteed seats (1st round)
Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32,
will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional  In the second round allocation of additional seats, there
provision considering that the total members would now rise is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list
to 270. seat because the Court has struck down the application
of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats.
3) The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold
only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found  However, a party-list organization has to obtain a
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second
distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient
the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of
seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term each election
"additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all
remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of  In the second step of the second round of seat allocation,
Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no the preference in the distribution of seats should be in
more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank,
representative. without limiting the distribution to parties receiving two-
percent of the votes. 6 To limit the distribution of seats
 to the two-percenters would mathematically prevent the He ran again as Mayor during the 1998 elections, but this
filling up of all the available party-list seats time, petitioner Borja, who was also running for the position
of Mayor, questioned his eligibility arguing that respondent
4) In response to Roa-Borje’s (lain nga intervenor ni sya) has already served three consecutive terms thereby
position claiming the perceived need for ABSOLUTE disqualifying him for the position of mayor.
proportionality in the allocation of PL seats. . .
Eventually, respondent won in the elections and was
 the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT require absolute proclaimed as the Mayor but petitioner appealed COMELEC’S
proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats decision in upholding respondent’s eligibility to run.

Issue: WON respondent should be disqualified from running.

 Section 5 (1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts
shall be apportioned according to proportional Held: No, the court here delved into the debates and
representation. However, this principle of proportional deliberations in the constitutional commissions wherein it
representation applies only to legislative districts, not to was revealed that the three consecutive term limit rule
the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the contemplates of a term wherein a candidate was elected in
party-list system is governed by the last phrase of that position. It does not include a term of office wherein an
Section 5 (1), which states that the party-list official merely succeeded in the position of a higher official
representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law, due to permanent vacancy unless there is an election held for
shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the such vacancy like in the case the house of representatives. In
Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation other words, succession that occurs by operation of law is not
of party-list seats. included, while succession that occurs via special election is
included in the consecutive term.
5) Again, nag provide nasad ug FOUR PARAMETERS IN A PHIL
STYLE PL ELECTION SYSTEM: Hence, the term of office during which respondent succeeded
as Mayor should not be included in the count of the three
1. 20% of the total number of the House of Rep consecutive term rule because it took effect by operation of
membership is the maximum number of seats law. Therefore, in effect respondent is still eligible to run for
available to party-list organizations, such that one more term.
there is automatically one party-list seat for *mao ni ruling sa SC:
every four existing legislative districts.
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials
2. Garnering 2 % of the total votes means 1 must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
guaranteed seat in the 1st round of allocation the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
3. Additional seats, total seats less guaranteed three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
seats, shall be distributed even to those also have been elected to the same position for the same
receiving less than 2% for the 2nd round. number of times before the disqualification can apply”
Otherwise, it would be mathematically
impossible if the 2% threshold would still be
observed in allocating the additional seats. Montebon vs Comelec, GR No. 180444

4. 3 seat cap is constitutional. This is intended to Facts: Petitioners, who were candidates for municipal
prevent any party from dominating the party-list councilor sought the disqualification of respondent in the
system. election who was also running for a position in the municipal
council during the 2007 elections. Respondent has already
been elected as municipal councilor for three terms from
1988 to 2007. But during the term of 2001-2004, he
TOPIC: Succesion, Effect on term continuity succeeded as Vice Mayor upon the retirement of the
incumbent vice mayor.
Borja vs Comelec, GR No. 133495
Petitioners argued that respondent’s assumption as Vice
Facts: Respondent Capco was elected vice mayor for a term Mayor should not be considered as an interruption and that it
ending in 1992. He succeeded as Mayor in 1989 upon the amounts to a voluntary renunciation. Respondent counters
death of the Mayor. Thereafter, he ran and was elected as that his succession as Vice Mayor served as an interruption to
Mayor for the next two succeeding terms ending in 1995 and the three consecutive term rule and hence, he is not
1998 which in effect allowed him to serve 3 consecutive disqualified.
terms as Mayor.
Issue: WON there was interruption.
Held: Yes, there was an interruption because succession in Issue: WON respondent is disqualified from running for a 4th
the case of local government officials takes effect by consecutive term?
operation of law and hence, is NOT a voluntary renunciation.
What is considered under law as not interrupting the three Ruling: Succession in local government offices is by operation
consecutive term rule is only voluntary renunciation which is of law. Sec. 44 of the LGC provides that if a permanent
one where it takes effect through the conduct of the official vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest
and not by operation of law. Hence, respondent is still ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
qualified to run as municipal councilor. SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor,
* SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.
Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking
governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be.Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
may automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled their ranking as defined herein
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined herein. . . In this case respondent was the highest ranking sanggunian
member thus it is clear that there was no voluntary
* Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except renunciation of his office in his part since the interruption of
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be his service was made by operation of law.
three years and no such officials shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office Aldovino v. COMELEC
for any length of time shall not be considered as an Facts: Respondent Asilo was elected as city councilor of
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term Lucena for three consecutive terms (1998-2001, 2001-2004,
for which he was elected. & 2004-2007). During his second term, the Sandiganbayan
ordered for a 90 days preventive suspension by reason of a
Ruling SC: criminal case he was facing at that time. Subsequently, it was
“Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the lifted and thus he was able to resume his office. During the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; 2007 election, he filed for his certificate of candidacy for the
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length same position. This prompted the petitioners to file for a
of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an disqualification case against him for violation of the three
interruption of continuity of service. term limit.
Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office Issue: WON the preventive suspension issue against the
as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the respondent constituted as an interruption in view of the 3
service of his 2001-2004 term.” term limit?

Ruling: Temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the

Montebon v. COMELEC
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not
Facts: Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent be considered an effective interruption of a term because it
Potencioso Jr. were candidates for Municipal councilors in the does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
synchronized national and local elections. Petitioners filed a retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions
disqualification case against Potencioso alleging that he had of his office for a reason provided by law.
already served for three consecutive terms as municipal
What the law contemplates when it comes to
councilor 1998-2001, 2001-2004, & 2004-2007 thus he is
interruption of office is that there is a loss of title to
proscribed from running again for the same position.
the office. In this there was no actual loss of title to
Respondent contended that his second term (2001-2004) was
hold office but merely the person is prevented in
interrupted when he succeeded the vice mayor due to
exercising such function.
retirement thus he is not disqualified. Petitioners contended
that there was no interruption during the second term as
(Additional just in case)
such was a voluntary renunciation.
Preventive suspension an interim remedial measure
to address the situation of an official who have been
charged administratively or criminally, where the
evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or
potential for eventual guilt or liability.
It is given when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the
gravity of the offense charged. The purpose of which is to
prevent the public officer influence or pose a threat against
to the witness or to the integrity of the record or witness.

A public officer under such is prevented from exercising the

functions of his office as well as from receiving salary
nonetheless, he does not lose title to hold office.