Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v.

Bahrain)

Citation. I.C.J., 1994 I.C.J. 112

Brief Fact Summary. A claim to settle a dispute involving sovereignty over certain islands, sovereign rights over certain
shoals and delimitation of a maritime boundary was filed by Qatar (P) in the International Court of Justice against Bahrain
(D). The Court’s jurisdiction was however disputed by Bahrain (D).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted by the
signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged.

Facts. A dispute concerning sovereignty over certain islands and shoals, including the delimitation of a maritime boundary
were issues upon which Qatar (P) and Bahrain (D) sought to resolve for 20 years. During this period of time, letters were
exchanged and acknowledged by both parties heads of state. A Tripartite Committee “for the purpose of approaching the
International Court of Justice”�..”� was formed by representatives of Qatar (P), Bahrain (D) and Saudi Arabia. Though
the committee met several time, it failed to produce an agreement on the specific terms for submitting the dispute to the
Court. Eventually, the meetings culminated in “Minutes”�, which reaffirmed the process and stipulated that the parties
“may”� submit the dispute to the I.C.J. after giving the Saudi King six months to resolve the dispute. The Court’s
jurisdiction was disputed by Bahrain (D) when Qatar (P) filed a claim in the I.C.J.

Issue. Yes. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted by the signatories to the
minutes of meetings and letters exchanged. Though Bahrain (D) argued that the Minutes were only a record of negotiation
and could not serve as a basis for the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction, both parties agreed that the letters constituted an international
agreement with binding force.
International agreements do not take a single form under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Court
has enforced this rule in the past. In this case, the Minutes not only contain the record of the meetings between the
parties, it also contained the reaffirmation of obligations previously agreed to and agreement to allow the King of Saudi
Arabia to try to find a solution to the dispute during a six-month period, and indicated the possibility of the involvement of
the I.C.J. The Minutes stipulated commitments to which the parties agreed, thereby creating rights and obligations in
international law. This is the basis therefore of the existence of international agreement.
On the part of the Bahrain’s (D) Foreign Minister, he argued that no agreement existed because he never intended to
enter an agreement fails on the grounds that he signed documents creating rights and obligations for his country. Also,
Qatar’s (P) delay in applying to the United Nations Secretariat does not indicate that Qatar (P) never considered the
Minutes to be an international agreement as Bahrain (D) argued. However, the registration and non-registration with the
Secretariat does not have any effect on the validity of the agreement.

Held. Yes. An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted by the signatories to the minutes
of meetings and letters exchanged. Though Bahrain (D) argued that the Minutes were only a record of negotiation and
could not serve as a basis for the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction, both parties agreed that the letters constituted an international
agreement with binding force.

Discussion. There is no doubt that language plays a vital role in influencing a court’s decision as to whether an
agreement has been entered into and in this particular case, the language was the main focus of the I.C.J and it was the
contents of the Minutes that persuaded the I.C.J. to reject the Bahrain foreign minister’s (D) claim that he did not intend to
enter into an agreement. Where this is compared to general U.S. contract law, where a claim by one of the parties that no
contract existed because there was no meeting of the minds might be the ground upon which a U.S. court would consider
whether a contract did exist with more care and thought than the I.C.J. gave the foreign minister of Bahrain’s (D) claims.
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)

Syllabus

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention makes air carriers liable for injuries sustained by a passenger

"if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking."

Respondent, while a passenger on petitioner's jetliner as it descended to land in Los Angeles on a trip from Paris, felt
severe pressure and pain in her left ear, and the pain continued after the jetliner landed. Shortly thereafter, respondent
consulted a doctor, who concluded that she had become permanently deaf in her left ear. She then filed suit in a
California state court, alleging that her hearing loss was caused by negligent maintenance and operation of the jetliner's
pressurization system. After the case was removed to Federal District Court, petitioner moved for summary judgment on
the ground that respondent could not prove that her injury was caused by an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17,
the evidence indicating that the pressurization system had operated in a normal manner. Relying on precedent that
defines the term "accident" in Article 17 as an "unusual or unexpected" happening, the District Court granted summary
judgment to petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the language, history, and policy of the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Agreement (a private agreement among airlines that has been approved by the Federal
Government) impose absolute liability on airlines for injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air travel; and that
normal cabin pressure changes qualify as an "accident" within the definition contained in Annex 13 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation as meaning "an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft."

Held: Liability under Article 17 arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the passenger, and not where the injury results from the passenger's own internal reaction to
the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, in which case it has not been caused by an accident under
Article 17. Pp. 470 U. S. 396-408.

(a) The text of the Warsaw Convention suggests that the passenger's injury must be so caused. The difference in the
language of Article 17, imposing liability for injuries to passengers caused by an "accident" and

Page 470 U. S. 393

Article 18, imposing liability for destruction or loss of baggage by an "occurrence," implies that the drafters of the
Convention understood the word "accident" to mean something different than the word "occurrence." Moreover, Article 17
refers to an accident which caused the passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury. The text
thus implies that, however "accident" is defined, it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the definition, rather than the
occurrence of the injury alone. And, since the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists, further
guidance is furnished by the French legal meaning of "accident" -- when used to describe a cause of injury, rather than
the event of injury -- as being a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended event. Pp. 397-400.

(b) The above interpretation of Article 17 is consistent with the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention, the conduct
of the parties thereto, and the weight of precedent in foreign and American courts. Pp. 470 U. S. 400-405.

(c) While any standard requiring courts to distinguish causes that are "accidents" from causes that are "occurrences"
requires drawing a line that may be subject to differences as to where it should fall, an injured passenger is only required
to prove that some link in the chain of causes was an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger.
Enforcement of Article 17's "accident" requirement cannot be circumvented by reference to the Montreal Agreement. That
Agreement, while requiring airlines to waive "due care" defenses under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, did not
waive Article 17's "accident" requirement. Nor can enforcement of Article 17 be escaped by reference to the equation of
"accident" with "occurrence" in Annex 13, which, with its corresponding Convention, expressly applies to aircraft
accident investigations,and not to principles of liability to passengers under the Warsaw Convention. Pp. 470 U. S. 405-
408.

724 F.2d 1383, reversed and remanded.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except POWELL, J., who took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Page 470 U. S. 394

Citation. I.C.J., 1973 I.C.J. 3

Brief Fact Summary. Because some circumstances changed, Iceland (D) claimed that a fishing treaty it had with the
United Kingdom (P) was no longer applicable.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to the premise calling for the termination
of a treaty, it is necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be
performed.

Facts. Iceland’s (D) claim to a 12-mile fisheries limit was recognized by the United Kingdom (P) in 1961 in return for
Iceland’s (D) agreement that any dispute concerning Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit be referred to
the International Court of Justice. An application was filed before the I.C.J. when Iceland (D) proposed to extend its
exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles around its shores in 1972. By postulating that changes in circumstances
since the 12-mile limit was now generally recognized was the ground upon which Iceland (D) stood to argue that the
agreement was no longer valid. Iceland (D) also asserted that there would be a failure of consideration for the 1961
agreement.

Issue. In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to a ground for invoking the termination of a treaty, is it
necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligation still to be performed?

Held. Yes. In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to the premise calling for the termination of a treaty, it is
necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be performed.
The change of circumstances alleged by Iceland (D) cannot be said to have transformed radically the extent of the
jurisdictional obligation that was imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.

Discussion. Recourse to the I.C.J. in the event of a dispute was the original agreement between the parties. The
economy of Iceland (D) is dependent on fishing. The merit of Iceland (D) argument was not reached by the Court in this
case, however, but rather dealt with the jurisdictional issues.
Advisory Opinion on Namibia

Citation. I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 1971, I.C.J. Rep 16.

Brief Fact Summary. Under a claim of right to annex Namibia, South Africa occupied its territory in violation of a United
Nations (U.N.) Security Council Mandate which though later terminated due to South Africa’s breach, empowered the
Security Council to enforce its terms.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Member States of the United Nations are bounded by its mandates and violations or breaches
results in a legal obligation on the part of the violator to rectify the violation and upon the other Member States to
recognize the conduct as a violation and to refuse to aid in such violation.

Facts. Under a claim of right to annex the Namibian territory and under the claim that Namibia’s nationals desired South
Africa’s (D) rule, South Africa (D) began the occupation of Namibia. South Africa was subject to a U.N. Mandate
prohibiting Member States from taking physical control of other territories because it was a Member State of the United
Nations.
The Resolution 2145 (XXI) terminating the Mandate of South Africa (D) was adopted by the U.N and the Security Council
adopted Resolution 276 (1970) which declared the continuous presence of South Africa (D) in Namibia as illegal and
called upon other Member States to act accordingly. An advisory opinion was however demanded from the International
Court of Justice.

Issue. Issue: are mandates adopted by the United Nations binding upon all Member States so as to make breaches or
violations thereof result in a legal obligation on the part of the violator to rectify the violation and upon other Member
States to recognize the conduct as a violation and to refuse to aid in such violations?

Held. Yes. Member States of the United Nations are bounded by its mandates and violations or breaches results in a
legal obligation on the part of the violator to rectify the violation and upon the other Member States to recognize the
conduct as a violation and to refuse to aid in such violation. As Member States, the obligation to keep intact and preserve
the rights of other States and the people in them has been assumed.
So when a Member State does not toll this line, that State cannot be recognized as retaining the rights that it claims to
derive from the relationship. In this particular case, the General Assembly discovered that South Africa (D) contravened
the Mandate because of its deliberate actions and persistent violations of occupying Namibia.
Hence, it is within the power of the Assembly to terminate the Mandate with respect to a violating Member State, which
was accomplished by resolution 2145 (XXI) in this case. The resolutions and decisions of the Security Council in enforcing
termination of this nature are binding on the Member States, regardless of how they voted on the measure when adopted.
South Africa (D) is therefore bound to obey the dictates of the Mandate, the resolution terminating it as to South Africa
(D), and the enforcement procedures of the Security Council.
Once the Mandate has been adopted by the United Nations, it becomes binding upon all Member States and the
violations or breaches of this Mandate result in legal obligations on the part of the violator to rectify the violation, and upon
the other Member States to recognize the conduct as a violation and to refuse to aid in such violation.

Discussion. Despite agreeing to restore independence to Namibia with the United Nations, South Africa (D) did not. A
number of mandatory sanctions for enforcement were now adopted by the General Assembly and the action of South
Africa (D) was “strongly condemned”�.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)

Citation. 1997 I.C.J. 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998)

Brief Fact Summary. Hungary (P) claimed that Czechoslovakia (D) violated the provisions of a treaty when it
appropriated the waters of the Danube River to construct a dam.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Watercourse states shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.

Facts. In 1977, Hungary (P) and Czechoslovakia (D) signed a Treaty for the construction of dams and other projects
along the Danube River that bordered both nations. Czechoslovakia (D) began work on damming the river in its territory
when Hungary (P) stopped working on the project and negotiation could not resolve the matter which led Hungary (P) to
terminate the Treaty. Hungary (P) based its action on the fact that the damming of the river had been agreed to only on
the ground of a joint operation and sharing of benefits associated with the project, to which Czechoslovakia (D) had
unlawfully unilaterally assumed control of a shared resource.

Issue. Shall watercourse states participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an
equitable and reasonable manner?

Held. Yes. Watercourse states shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in
an equitable and reasonable manner. Hungary (P) was deprived of its rights to an equitable and reasonable share of the
natural resources of the Danube by Czechoslovakia (D) and also failed to respect the proportionality that is required by
international law. Cooperative administration must be reestablished by the parties of what remains of the project.

Discussion. The Court’s decision was that the joint regime must be restored. In order to achieve most of the Treaty’s
objectives, common utilization of shared water resources was necessary. Hence, the defendant was not authorized to
proceed without the plaintiff’s consent.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)

Syllabus

The act of Congress of August 8, 1882, "to regulate immigration," which imposes upon the owners of steam or sailing
vessels who shall bring passengers from a foreign port into a port of the United States, a duty of fifty

Page 112 U. S. 581

cents for every such passenger not a citizen of this country, is a valid exercise of the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations.

Though the previous cases in this court on that subject related to State statutes only, they held those statutes void on the
ground that authority to enact them was vested exclusively in Congress by the Constitution, and necessarily decided that,
when Congress did pass such a statute, which it has done in this case, it would be valid.

The contribution levied on the ship owner by this statue is designed to mitigate the evils incident to immigration from
abroad by raising a fund for that purpose, and it is not, in the sense of the Constitution, a tax subject to the limitations
imposed by that instrument on the general taxing power of Congress.

A tax is uniform, within the meaning of the constitutional provision on that subject, when it operates with the same effect in
all places where the subject of it is found, and is not wanting in such uniformity because the thing taxed is not equally
distributed in all parts of the United States.

A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations, and depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the
honor and the interest of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of
international reclamation and negotiation, which may lead to war to enforce them. With this, judicial courts have nothing to
do.

But a treaty may also confer private rights on citizens or subjects of the contracting powers which are of a nature to be
enforced in n court of justice, and which, in cases otherwise cognizable in such courts, furnish rules of decision. The
Constitution of the United States makes the treaty, while in force, a part of the supreme law of the land in all courts where
such rights are to be tried.

But in this respect, so far as the provisions of a treaty can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of the
country, they are subject to such acts as Congress may pass for their enforcement, modification, or repeal.

These suits were brought to recover back sums collected at various times as duties on immigrants arriving in the United
States, under the provision of the act of August 3, 1882, 23 Stat. 21,

"that there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of fifty cents for each and every passenger not a citizen of the United
States, who shall come by steam or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within the United States."

Protests were filed against each payment, and all other steps required as foundations for the actions were taken. In the
Edye Case, there was a trial, jury being waived, a finding of facts, a judgment, and exceptions. 18 Fed.Rep. 13. In the
Cunard Cases, judgment was entered in favor of the collector

Page 112 U. S. 582

on demurrer to the complaints. The causes were brought here on writs of error.

Page 112 U. S. 586

Citation. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386, 1888 U.S. LEXIS 1852 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1888)

Brief Fact Summary. The claim which Whitney (P) brought before the court was that a treaty between the U.S and the
Dominican Republic guaranteed that no higher duty would be assessed on goods from the Dominican Republic than was
assessed on goods from any other country and that duties had been wrongfully assessed on his sugar imports.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where a treaty and an act of legislation conflict, the one last in date will control.

Facts. The claim which Whitney (P) brought before the court was that a treaty between the U.S and the Dominican
Republic guaranteed that no higher duty would be assessed on goods from the Dominican Republic than was assessed
on goods from any other country and that duties had been wrongfully assessed on his sugar imports.

Issue. Where a treaty and an act of legislation conflict, will the one last in date control?

Held. (Field, J.). Yes. The one with a later date will control where a treaty and an act of legislation conflict. The act of
congress under which the duties were collected was passed after the treaty and therefore is controlling. Affirmed.

Discussion. A later inconsistent statute does not abrogate or repeal a treaty. The treaty still exists as an international
obligation although the terms of the treaty may not be enforceable.
Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica)

Citation. 1 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 369 (1923)

Brief Fact Summary. The Tinoco regime, which was the former government of Costa Rica, was alleged by Great Britain
to have granted oil concession to a British company that had to be honored by the present regime.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A government need not conform to a previous constitution if the government had established
itself and maintained a peaceful de facto administration and non-recognition of the government by other government does
not destroy the de facto status of the government.

Facts. The Tinoco regime that had seized power in Costa Rica by coup was not recognized by Great Britain and the
United States. When the regime was removed, the new government nullified all Tinoco’c contract including an oil
concession to a British company. The claim of Great Britain (P) was that the contract could not be repudiated because the
Tinoco government was the only government in existence at the time of the contract was signed. This view was not
shared by Costa Rica (D) who claimed that Great Britain (P) was estopped from enforcing the contract by its non-
recognition of the Tinoco regime. The matter was sent for arbitration.

Issue. Does a government need to conform to a previous constitution if the government had established itself and
maintained a peaceful de facto administration and does non-recognition of the government by other government destroy
the de facto status of the government?

Held. (Taft, C.J., Arb). No. A government need not conform to a previous constitution if the government had established
itself and maintained a peaceful de facto administration and non-recognition of the government by other government does
not destroy the de facto status of the government. The non-recognition of the Tinoco regime by Great Britain did not
dispute the de facto existence of that regime. There is no estoppel since the successor government had not been led by
British non-recognition to change its position.

Discussion. Estoppel was not found by the arbitrator. The evidence of the de facto status of the Tinoco’s regime was not
outweighed by the evidence of non-recognition. This implies that valid contracts may be formed by unrecognized
government.
WALTER UPRIGHT v. MERCURY BUSINESS MACHINES CO. (05/05/60)

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL TERM, NEW YORK COUNTY 1960.NY.43270
<http://www.versuslaw.com>; 203 N.Y.S.2d 288; 24 Misc. 2d 571 May 5, 1960 WALTER UPRIGHT,
PLAINTIFF,v.MERCURY BUSINESS MACHINES CO., INC., DEFENDANT David W. Kahn for plaintiff. Taylor, Scoll &
Simon (Kenneth Simon of counsel), for defendant. Thomas A. Aurelio, J. Author: Aurelio

Thomas A. Aurelio, J.

Author: Aurelio

This is an action brought by a plaintiff assignee on a trade acceptance drawn by its assignor on itself and accepted by
defendant, representing a balance due for machinery sold to defendant. The complaint alleges that the assignor was a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of West Germany, having its principal place of business in West Berlin,
Republic of West Germany. The motion at bar seeks an order under subdivisions 1 and 2 of rule 107 of the Rules of Civil
Practice dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action and/or plaintiff does not have legal capacity to sue.

The basis of the motion is a contention that the plaintiff's assignor is a State-controlled enterprise of the German
Democratic Republic. In support thereof, the defendant submits a copy of a communication from the Chief of the
Economic Affairs section of the United States Mission in Berlin to the Department of State. Plaintiff's affidavits in
opposition state that it has been advised by its assignor that it was founded by residents of the German Democratic
Republic under the Limited Liabilities Company Law of 1892 and its founding is permitted in the German Democratic
Republic; that it has no office in West Berlin but has concluded contracts with firms in that city and in West Germany; that
the negotiations with defendant were carried on in West Germany. The matter was sent to an Official Referee to hear and
report with his recommendation on this issue.

It has now been conceded that the said assignor was not a West German corporation but rather an East German
corporation. Upon such concession the court cannot recognize the existence of a juridical creature of a government we do
not recognize. The court will take judicial notice that the German Democratic Republic is not recognized by our
Government. However, even though plaintiff's assignor would have no right to sue in this court as a corporation since the
recognition of that legal entity is barred by the foreign policy of the United States Government, nevertheless it cannot be
denied that some organization or group of persons does exist and entered into a commercial transaction with the
defendant. If it were clear that this group of people consisted of private citizens unconnected with the unrecognized
government, the court is of the opinion that no further question would exist. The foreign policy of the United States
Government does not require us to deny that there are people residing in and doing business in a certain geographical
area. No prohibition or restriction seems to have been imposed on trading in the items which are the basis of this cause of
action. Where, as here, it has received the benefits of the commercial transaction, it would be inequitable to permit
defendant to retain the fruits thereof without compensation. The point made by defendant that it would not be able to
enforce a proposed counterclaim against plaintiff's assignor in an East German court is not well taken. It does have an
opportunity to press any claim it may deem advisable in connection with the subject transaction in this court.

However, overriding foreign policy considerations may make necessary a denial of access to our courts in the event it is
determined that the defendant dealt in some form with the unrecognized Government of the German Democratic
Republic.

If plaintiff's assignor is as a matter of fact wholly owned by the so-called German Democratic Republic, it would, by that
fact, have no capacity to sue in our court, regardless of its organization. Whether this be so still remains to be determined,
since the proof submitted on this issue is inconclusive.

Plaintiff's contention that a claim of incapacity to sue cannot be set up against him, despite the refusal of recognition, in
that he is an American citizen and a resident of the State of New York, is without merit. He can have no greater rights than
his assignor.

The subject matter of the contentions urged in support of dismissal under both subdivisions 1 and 2 of rule 107 of the
Rules of Civil Practice appears to be identical. It is not that the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, but
the question is whether the assignor has capacity to sue and the court will entertain the action.

It appears from defendant's letter of December 9, 1959, that the sole issue tendered to the Official Referee was the state
of organization of the assignor corporation. It is now agreed that it is an East German corporation. Accordingly, the motion
to dismiss is denied with leave to defendant to raise the matter by defense in its answer, unless the parties agree to a
prior trial of the issues as herein stated, in which event an order will be settled.

Disposition

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied with leave to defendant to raise the matter by defense in its answer, unless
the parties agree to a prior trial of the issues as herein stated, in which event an order will be settled.
Island of Palmas Case (United States v. The Netherlands)

Citation. Perm. Ct. of Arbitration, 2 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).

Brief Fact Summary. Both the United States (P) laid claim to the ownership of the Island of Palmas. While the U.S. (P)
maintained that it was part of the Philippines, the Netherlands (D) claimed it as their own.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A title that is inchoate cannot prevail over a definite title found on the continuous and peaceful
display of sovereignty.

Facts. Both the United States (P) laid claim to the ownership of the Island of Palmas. While the U.S. (P) maintained that it
was part of the Philippines, the Netherlands (D) claimed it as their own. The claim of the U.S. (P) was back up with the
fact that the islands had been ceded by Spain by the Treaty of Paris in 1898, and as successor to the rights of Spain over
the Philippines, it based its claim of title in the first place on discovery. On the part of the Netherlands (D), they claimed to
have possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty over the island from 1677 or earlier to the present.

Issue. Can a title which is inchoate prevail over a definite title found on the continuous and peaceful display of
sovereignty?

Held. (Huber, Arb.). No. A title that is inchoate cannot prevail over a definite title found on the continuous and peaceful
display of sovereignty. The peaceful and continuous display of territorial sovereignty is as good as title. However,
discovery alone without subsequent act cannot suffice to prove sovereignty over the island. The territorial sovereignty of
the Netherlands (D) was not contested by anyone from 1700 to 1906. The title of discovery at best an inchoate title does
not therefore prevail over the Netherlands (D) claims of sovereignty.

Discussion. Evidence of contracts made by the East India Company and the Netherlands (D) was examined by the
arbitrator. The claims made by the Netherlands (D) were also based on the premise of the convention it had with the
princes and native chieftains of the islands. Hence, at the time of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, Spain was found not to have
dominion over the island.
y 4,700 private U.S. claims, ordered payment by Iran (D) to U.S. nationals amounting to over $2.5 billion.