Hazards and Operability (Hazop) Review: Dps Document No.

HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY
(HAZOP) REVIEW
DPS DOCUMENT NO. : J12008-DPSB-000-S-RZ-0003
DOCUMENT TITLE : HAZOP REPORT FOR AMINE UNIT 1
GAS TREATMENT PLANT AT

PROJECT TITLE : KHURMALA DOME FIELD
CLIENT : KAR
BY CHECKED APPROVED REVISION DATE REVISED FOR

A.ALLAWI A. Yousif T.A B1 22/4/13 ISSUE TO CLIENT
CONFIDENTIAL: THE COPYRIGHT IN THIS WORK IS VESTED IN DPS (BRISTOL) LTD. IT MUST NOT BE REPRODUCED WHOLE OR IN PART OR USED FOR TENDERING OR MANUFACTURING PURPOSES EXCEPT UNDER
AGREEMENT OR WITH THE CONSENT IN WRITING OF DPS (BRISTOL) LTD AND THEN ONLY ON CONDITION THAT THIS NOTICE IS INCLUDED IN ANY SUCH REPRODUCTION
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD .........................................................................................................................................................3
1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................................4
2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................................................4
3. PROJECT OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................4
4. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT ................................................................................................................................4
5. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS .........................................................................................................4
5.1 DEFINITIONS .......................................................................................................................................4
5.2 ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................................5
6. HAZOP REVIEW SCOPE ...............................................................................................................................6
7. HAZOP APPROACH, PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISM ................................................................................6
7.1 DEFINITION .........................................................................................................................................6
7.2 HAZOP TOOLS (KEY-WORDS) ............................................................................................................7
7.3 SAFE-GUARDS (LINES-OF-DEFENSE) ................................................................................................8
8. HAZOP EVALUATION NODES .................................................................................................................. 11
9. HAZOP TEAM COMPOSITION .................................................................................................................. 12
10. CHAIRMAN’S REPORT ......................................................................................................................... 12
10.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 12
10.2 GENERAL.......................................................................................................................................... 12
10.3 REQUIRED SAFEGUARDS ............................................................................................................... 13
10.4 NODES SELECTED FOR THE ASSESSMENT ................................................................................... 14
10.5 OBSERVATIONS ............................................................................................................................... 14
10.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................... 14
10.7 FOLLOW-UP AND HAZOP CLOSE-OUT REPORT ............................................................................ 15
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................................................... 16
APPENDIX - 1: HAZOP REVIEW WORKSHEETS .......................................................................................... 17
APPENDIX - 2: HAZOP REVIEW ACTION SHEETS .......................................................................................... 71
APPENDIX - 3: HAZOP WORKSHOP ATTENDEES ....................................................................................... 134
APPENDIX - 4: HAZOP P&IDS ....................................................................................................................... 135
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J12008-DPSB-000-S-RZ-0003 B1 Amine Unit 1 HAZOP Report
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
FOREWORD
This report demonstrates the findings and conclusions drawn from a HAZOP Review exercise
conducted for KAR Construction and Engineering “Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field”
facilities upgrade Project.
To conduct the HAZOP Assessment for the Project, KAR entrusted the assignment with EXIDA.SP
who deployed an independent Third Party Consultant; initiator of this document, for the purpose.
The Scope of Work (SOW) was set to conduct the HAZOP review, as one vital “Risk Management”
exercise, and issue its associated HAZOP Report. HAZOP Close-Out-Report together with all
completed HAZOP Actions shall be produced by others.
The assessment was carried out in line with the conventionally structured approach that is normally
exercised for HAZOP Reviews as illustrated in Section (5) of this document: HAZOP Approach,
Principles and Mechanism.
The HAZOP Report (this document) demonstrates the findings from the HAZOP Assessment
exercise. The report addresses and includes elements of the following nature as normally practiced:
Project outline,
HAZOP Review Principles and Mechanisms,
HAZOP Chairman Report addressing Conclusions and Recommendations; and,
HAZOP Report Appendices including the HAZOP Sessions Worksheets, the HAZOP
recommended Action Sheets and any supporting documents used for the exercise.
By implementing the recommendations and actions concluded by the HAZOP Review, “Risk Levels”
of the identified “Hazards” for the Project’s Detailed Engineering Design and Operability are
enhanced to their “Acceptable Region”; if not otherwise “waived” in their entirety. Reliability of this
“Hazards Management” process could well be further supported by conducting SIL Analysis as
recommended in Chairman’s Report (Section – 8).
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1. INTRODUCTION
KAR Construction and Engineering has engaged EXIDA.SP to carry out the Hazards and
Operability (HAZOP) Review for the project by deployment of an independent HAZOP Facilitator;
author of this document.
2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES
The main objective of the project is to enhance the gas quality so as to be used as “fuel gas” rather
than flaring as per the current operation. For this purpose, an Amine Gas Sweetening has been
selected as a package that involves an amine treating plant with a selected combination of absorption
tower and amine regeneration package.
3. PROJECT OVERVIEW
An insight into the project’s scope and facilities overview is depicted in the “Process Design
Specification” Document No. CPE-12016-EC-3003. The same is to be reviewed with all associated
PFD’s and P&ID’s.
4. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT
The Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) Report (this document) demonstrates the findings from the
HAZOP Assessment exercise. Thus, the report addresses and includes the following main elements
as conventionally practiced:
Project overview, description and objectives,
HAZOP Review Principles and Mechanisms,
The Project Specific HAZOP Particulars,
HAZOP Chairman Report addressing Conclusions and Recommendations; and,
HAZOP Report Appendices including the HAZOP Sessions Worksheets, the HAZOP
recommended Action Sheets and any supporting documents used for the exercise.
5. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
5.1 Definitions
For the purpose of this document and if and where used during the HAZOP Review, the
words and expressions listed below bear the meanings assigned to them as follows:
COMPANY KAR Construction and Engineering
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CONTRACTOR Custom Process Equipment, LLC
PROJECT Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field
5.2 Abbreviations
Following abbreviations, or part thereof, may be used and/or encountered with, verbally or in
writing during workshop reviews as in the case of this particular HAZOP Review:
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ESD Emergency Shut Down
FEED Front End Engineering Design
HAZID Hazards Identification
HAZOP Hazards and Operability Study
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
HIPS High Integrity Protection System
MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet per Day
MSTBD Thousand Stock Tank Barrel Day
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PEAR Personnel, Environment, Assets and Reputation
PFD Process Flow Diagram
SDV Shutdown Valve
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SIS Safety Instrumented System
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6. HAZOP REVIEW SCOPE
The primary objective of the HAZOP is to identify all viable causes of failures / deviations from
design intents “Deviations from Intent’ as conventionally expressed in the HAZOP’s language) and
the consequential potential hazards to PEAR (Personnel, Environment, Assets and Reputation), as
well as, the possible impacts on the Operability and Maintainability of the facilities.
The secondary and complementary objective of the HAZOP is to confirm provision, in the
engineering design of the facilities, the adequate detection means of deviations, and safeguarding of
the process.
For all ‘detection’ and ‘safeguarding’ facilities, the HAZOP ensured provision of a minimum of two
‘safe-guards’ (two-lines-of-defence) to mitigate the situation, that is:
Occurrence of the hazard; and/or,
Its consequential impact.
Otherwise, in case of no or inadequate-safe-guards are provided, recommendations to this effect

were made as needed.
7. HAZOP APPROACH, PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISM
7.1 Definition
A HAZOP is a ‘structured’ approach that is normally used to serve a systematic means for the
assessment of a project’s Engineering Design for all viable scenarios where deviation from
the project’s engineering design intent could eventually lead to a hazardous situation that may
impact PEAR; viz.:
Personnel (P),
Harm, injury, etc. that may result from leaks, debris, emissions, etc.,
Environment (E),
Environmental pollution caused by effluents, gas dispersion, etc.,
Assets (A); and/or,
Damage to the facilities, ancillaries and/or amenities; and/or,
Reputation (R),
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Loss of Reputation, Concern, Panic, etc. locally, country-wise or internationally.

The Operability and/or Maintainability of the facilities are eventually and inherently covered
by the analysis.
7.2 HAZOP Tools (Key-Words)
To proceed with the above, HAZOPS make use of certain ‘TOOLS’ that render the means to
the assessment a systematic and structured approach.
HAZOP “tools”, conventionally used during a HAZOP” review exercise, are as follows:
Basic and main ‘Guide-Words’; and,
Supporting “Guide-Words”, termed as ‘DEVIATIONS’, to allow for an in-depth
analysis of the system as deemed required.
To satisfy an in-depth analysis of the system, several possible “deviations from intent”, not
covered by the conventional HAZOP Key-Words, are normally analyzed using a range of
“deviations” under the umbrella of the keyword “OTHERS”.
The basic ‘key-words’, their corresponding ‘deviations’ and most common Deviations of
Concern under the keyword “others” are as follows:
KEYWORD DEVIATION LINES-OF-DEFENSE
Pressure Pressure More High Pressure Alarm

High-High Pressure Trip or Operator’s
intervention
Pressure Less Low Pressure Alarm
Low-Low Pressure Trip or Operator’s
intervention
Temperature Temperature More High Temperature Alarm
High-High Temperature Trip or Operator’s
intervention
Temperature Less Low Temperature alarm
Low-Low temperature trip or Operator’s
intervention
Level Level High High Level Alarm
High-High Level Trip or Operator’s
intervention
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KEYWORD DEVIATION LINES-OF-DEFENSE
Level Low Low level Alarm

Low-Low Level trip or Operator’s intervention
Flow Flow No No Flow SIF (ESD) or Operator’s intervention
Flow More High Flow Alarm
High-High Flow Trip or Operator’s intervention
Flow Less Low-Flow Alarm
Low-Low Flow Trip or Operator’s intervention
Flow Reverse System modification (engineering design) to
Flow Misdirected avert the situation
Others Start-up, Shutdown, Engineering Design, Philosophies, etc.
Corrosion, Dead-Legs, etc.
7.3 Safe-Guards (Lines-of-Defense)

A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) exercise is to identify, in an operating system, the
scenario for a ‘Deviation from Intent’ of any particular parameter within the system (pressure,
temperature, level, etc.) and correspondingly conclude the necessary level of
‘SAFEGUARDS’ to mitigate the situation.
The safeguards are identified by ‘Lines-of-Defense’ that are available in (or to be provided
for) the engineering design to ensure achieving “ALARP” as the minimum acceptable
ultimate protection. The latter is usually achieved by the provision of “Two-Lines-of-
Defense“.
A HAZOP would thus focus on identifying such lines of defense or, otherwise, a
recommendation for a ‘Line-of-Defense is to be put in place, as an ‘ACTION ITEM’, by the
HAZOP Team. As a minimum “Two-Lines-of-Defense” are to be provided in the engineering
design of a project.
This philosophy of Two-Lines-of-Defense is to ensure provision of adequate protection to
either:
“WAIVE” or “MINIMIZE” the frequency of occurrence of the deviation-from-intent;
or to,
“MITIGATE” the severity of its consequence.
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As such, the philosophy of Two-Lines-of-Defense would eventually demand the engineering

design to demonstrate the following:
Confirmed Alarm to alert the Operator; and,
Means to ‘mitigate the situation’ by either ‘Operator’s Intervention’ or ‘Automatic
Actuation’.
The following ‘hierarchy’ demonstrates the above said ‘Two-Lines-of-Defense:
SAFEGUARDS
FIRST-LINE-OF-DEFENSE SECOND-LINE-OF-DEFENSE
ALARM- 1 “SIF” AUTO-

OPERATOR
POSITIVELY PROTECTION
SYSTEM
INFORMED
PROTECTED
ALARM - 2
OPERATOR’S
INTERVENTION
Within context of “Operator’s Intervention”, as a line-of-defense if and where applicable, a

reasonable ‘time-frame’ should be provided in the engineering design to allow for analyzing
the situation (after the Operator being alerted) so as to take the necessary measures.
Where an Auto-Protection/SIF is provided for the system as a second-line-of- defense,
“operator’s intervention” shall further support the situation as an ultimate protection by virtue
of having been provided with “confirmed alarms” to allow “confirmed alerting” of the
operator.
In case of an ‘Alarm’, the HAZOP Team is to ensure provision of ‘Confirmed’ alarm to alert
the operator. This is satisfied by identifying the following:
Primary Alarm which is the ‘main’ alarm initiated by the ‘deviating parameter’; and,
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Secondary Alarm which is a back-up to the Primary Alarm and could be:
Related to the same Deviating Parameter but is independent from the first
Alarm; or,
Initiated by another operating parameter that is affected by the Deviating
Parameter.
The Secondary Alarm could be initiated by the deviating operating parameter itself;
for example Pressure, however independent from the primary alarm; or, it could be
initiated by another operating parameter that is equally affected by the deviation of the
primary parameter; for example Flow. This second alarm is hence unrelated to the first
and is independent in as much as its reliability is concerned.
“Failure to serve” of both Alarms simultaneously is far from being realistic in terms of
Probability of Failure. Therefore, provision of these Alarms ensures provision of confirmed
alerting system to the Operator.
Along the above mentioned guidelines the two ‘lines-of- defense could therefore assume any
of the following combinations:
Lines-of-Defense Deviation Control Requirement
Alarm for the deviating ‘Operating Parameter’ to Alert the

Operator
First Line of Defense
Alarm for an affected and unrelated ‘Operating Parameter’ to
Alert to the Operator
Second Line of Defense Automatic Control (Actuation) to trouble-shoot the deviating

Operating Parameter.
Operator’s Intervention
The SIF Loop or Auto Protection is normally provided with an acceptable SIL Classification
or HIPS.
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With provision of SIL classification or HIPS the defined two-lines-of-defense would further
enhance the system to either a “lower” ALARP or perhaps to the Acceptable Risk Zone
(yellow and green zones on the conventional Risk Matrix respectively).
8. HAZOP EVALUATION NODES
Chairman, prior to the workshop exercise, identified the following “manageable NODES” for
the assessment:
NODE
P&ID(S) NODE Items
No.
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3D sheet 2 1 Amine Inlet Scrubber (646-S-0101)
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3D sheet 2 2 Amine Contactor (646-V-0101)
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3D sheet 3 3 Amine Flash Separator (646-S-0102)
Lean/Rich Amine Exchanger (646-E-
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3D sheet 3 4
0101)
Amine Still Column (646-V-0102) and
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3B sheet 4 5 Reboiler (646-E-0102) (includes TCV
on hot oil supply)
Amine Reflux Condenser (646-A-0101),
Amine Reflux Accumulator (646-S-
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3B sheet 5 6
0103) and Reflux Pumps(646-P-
0101A/B)
Amine Booster Pumps (646-P-102A/B)
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3B sheet 6 7 and Lean Amine Coolers (646-A-
102A/B)
Lean Amine Filter (646-S-0104), Lean
Amine Carbon Filter (646-S-0105),
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3B sheet 7 8 Lean Amine Polishing Filter (646-S-
0106) and Amine Recirculation
Pumps(646-P-0103A/B/C)
Combustion Air Blower (646-B-0101),
CPE-12016-DW-2001 sheets 8 Rev Maxon Burner (646-Z-0101), Heater
9
3A and 9 Rev 3A (646-H-0101), Circulation Pumps (646-
P-300A/B/C)
CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3A sheet 8 10 Lean Gas Cooler (646-A-0103)
All P&IDs (CPE-12016-DW-2001 Global
All
rev 3D sheets 2 to 9) (G)
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NOTE:
As indicated in the above table, an additional HAZOP NODE was also included in the
HAZOP Review Worksheets to address concerns that may apply to more or perhaps all
P&IDs that are being reviewed. This NODE is termed as “Global NODE”.
9. HAZOP TEAM COMPOSITION
The HAZOP Workshop was conducted in three separate sessions as follows from the 6th to
the 8th of April 2013 in KAR Field Offices; Erbil – Iraq.
HAZOP Team, Chairman and Scribe were as follows:
Chairman:
Ali Allawi – Independent Process Engineering (Oil & Gas) and HSE Professional,
Scribe:
Mrs Jane Watson – DPS Project Manager BEng (Hons) CEng MIChemE
The complete lists of the HAZOP Workshop attendees is included in Appendix – 3.
10. CHAIRMAN’S REPORT
Chairman’s summary report, observations, conclusions and recommendations on the HAZOP

Review are categorized as follows:
10.1 Introduction
Chairman, prior to starting with the HAZOP Review, summarized the “basic” HAZOP
objective that targets identification of ‘Deviations from Intent’ scenarios in an operating
system as stipulated in Section (7) of this document; HAZOP Approach, Principles and
Mechanism. A short Power Point Presentation was demonstrated to the team addressing the
vital elements of HAZOP Reviews. The following sub-sections reflect general issues
pertaining to the HAZOP Review Session:
10.2 General
10.2.1 Chairman advised that HAZOP Assessments conventionally demand identification of
“two-lines-of-defense” to safeguard any “deviation-from-intent” concluded from the
review. Chairman requested the team’s acceptance to using this criteria during the
review. Such a requirement is initially satisfied by provision of “two alarms” to
positively alert the operator. The team’s approval was obtained and work progress
proceeded on this basis unless where a deviation scenario was unanimously agreed
by the team not to warrant provision of two alarms; i.e. deviation scenarios that were
not considered to be critical
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10.2.2 Chairman also requested the team’s advice if Operator’s intervention is to be

considered as a safeguard. HAZOP Team confirmed the requirement.
10.2.3 Chairman advised the team on the following main and general HAZOP Review
criteria:
“Block / Manual Valves” are not conventionally subject to HAZOP
Assessments.
Deviation-from-Intent to be identified within the HAZOP NODE under
consideration; however, impacts and/or safeguards could be found anywhere
upstream or downstream the NODE that’s being assessed.
Facilities upstream and downstream the NODE under assessment considered
“healthy”.
Where HAZOP concerns related to Design Issues; addressed and included
either under the keyword “others” or in the “global” worksheet, no risk
ranking was conducted as well endorsed by the HAZOP Team.
Worksheet for NODE “Global” reflects the above argument.
10.2.4 Time-Frame given for the HAZOP Pre-Workshop Preparatory Works was ample
enough to allow for healthy preparations. Also, the duration of the workshop review
was good enough to complete a healthy exercise.
10.3 Required Safeguards
It was demonstrated that any particular operating parameter (pressure, temperature, level, etc.)
could deviate from the “norm”; thus resulting in a hazardous situation that needs
“management”. Under the circumstance, the necessary “safeguards” to manage such
situations have to be ensured in the design. Such mitigation elements were either identified in
the design or recommendations to this effect were put in place in case of their unavailability
or deficiency.
Chairman emphasized that a minimum of Two-Lines-of-Defense have to be identified in the

system. As stated earlier in this document, Chairman requested identification of two alarms
where the first would normally relate to the deviating parameter and the second relates to
another operating parameter that is affected by the deviation of the first parameter. The
straightest example given at this point in time was that of “NO Flow” because blocked-outlet
affects the Pressure Parameter by having “High Pressure”.
Chairman further advised that with any of the above two alarms serving-on-demand, the
operator is positively alerted. Final safeguarding would either be by a SIF Loop (Safety
Instrumented Function) or Operator’s Intervention. These have to be clearly identified during
the HAZOP Review.
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10.4 NODES Selected for the Assessment
Chairman further explained that a “HAZOP Manageable NODE” would allow identification
of a deviation from intent at any device (or devices) contained within the NODE and that is
(are) prone to fail-to-serve on demand; for example, shutdown valve not closing when needed
to close. Otherwise, malfunction of a device when not on demand as in the case of a pressure
control valve opening wider than what is required to maintain normal operation.
10.5 Observations
The general and overall features of the HAZOP exercise could be summarized as per the
following main highlights:
10.5.1 The HAZOP Team was multi-disciplinary, well qualified and well versed with the
project. The HAZOP Discussions were thus lively and wide-ranging. The objective
set forth for the HAZOP Review was fully achieved as various aspects of the
facilities design were quite thoroughly reviewed.
10.5.2 Sound Engineering attempts were made to ensure that all ‘loop-holes’, ‘uncertainties’
and ‘Design Review’ related concerns to be captured within the frame of the
conventionally used HAZOP Key-Words / Deviations.
10.5.3 Chairman observed that “no” excessive “side discussions” took place during the
review which allowed for smooth progress of the exercise.
10.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
10.6.1 HAZOP Workshop Review discussions are all included in the HAZOP Worksheets
in Appendix – 1.
10.6.2 Sixty-two (62) HAZOP Recommendations were concluded from the review. These
are duly reflected in the HAZOP Action/Recommendations Sheets included in
Appendix – 2. According to Chairman’s assessment, all recommendations are normal
as per such reviews and none of them is considered unique or peculiar so as to
represent an outstanding issue or cause further concerns.
10.6.3 Identification of the two-lines-of-defense as a “Layers of Protection Analysis”
[LOPA] exercise was the overall and main target and was duly satisfied, where
applicable, for the handled P&ID’s. Where a deficiency in this regard was concluded,
the team unanimously agreed on a recommended HAZOP Action to be put in place.
10.6.4 Engineering Design of the project, as included in the P&ID’s that have been
reviewed, is now confirmed to have satisfied the necessary safeguards. This is
interpreted as achieving an ‘ALARP’ (As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicable) Region
for the ‘Risks’ identified during the assessment.
10.6.5 The target objective for the HAZOP Study was fully achieved in terms of satisfying
the necessary safeguards of “two-lines-of-defence” as a minimum for all identified
“deviations-from-intent”.
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10.6.6 Upon implementation and close-out of all recommended HAZOP Actions, the
overall status of the works will attain a “Very Good” standard of Engineering
Design in terms of operability and managing all identified hazards on PEAR.
10.6.7 The HAZOP Review, for the complete set of P&ID’s handled, was accomplished
with a “High Level of Rigor” as supported by the team’s healthy and positive
contribution.
10.6.8 Project’s engineering design and facilities performance and reliability shall be further
enhanced if and when a SIL Review is conducted for the system’s SIF’s. Hence,
HAZOP Chairman strongly recommends conducting SIL Assessment for all the
SIF’s in the project’s design.
10.6.9 Chairman usually recommends enhancement of the Stakeholders’ List of “Lessons
Learned” from such reviews. These will support future projects to be handled.
Among others, Chairman suggests (1) HAZOP Workshop Review duration to be
decided by the Chairman; based on his/her expertise with such reviews (2) Vital
documents / procedures that help smooth progress to be achieved to be finalized well
in advance; e.g. Project Control Philosophy, Operating and Maintenance (O&M)
Manual, etc.
10.7 Follow-up and HAZOP Close-Out Report

For each HAZOP Recommendation that was concluded during the workshop review, the
Action-on Party was defined by the HAZOP Team. DPS Project Manager is to eventually
decide on the Response Date for the Action-on Parties to implement and complete the
recommendation.
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APPENDICES
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APPENDIX - 1: HAZOP Review Worksheets
pg 17 of 143
Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field
Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) Review
Project: Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field DPS Ref No :

Section Description: Amine Inlet Scrubber and Contactor
Drawing No: CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3D sheet 2
Node Elements: Amine Inlet Scrubber (646-S-0101)
S. No. Guide Word Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Number By
Link 646-PIT-1003/1007
to DCS in control room
Partial blockage of vane Eventual tripping of
1.1 Flow Less/No First alarm 646-PIT-1003. with alarm to provide 1.1.1 CPE
pack in 646-S-0101 compressors
differential pressure
alarm.
Second alarm 646-PIT-1007
(on contactor vessel).
Operators intervention
Inadvertent closure of
646-LV-1004 (when in Level rise in 646-S-0101
Level alarm high from 646-
service) or stuck in (scrubber) with potential
LIT-1004.
closed position when on for liquid carry over
demand
Consider
implementation of
Level alarm high high from
design review
646-LIT-1002 with action 1.1.2 DPS
recommendation to
unidentified yet.
provide new ESDV on
inlet to scrubber.
Malfunction (control
loop failure) of 646- Level rise in 646-S-0101
Level alarm high from 646-
ESDV-1001 to closed with potential for liquid
LIT-1004.
position when not on carry over
demand
pg 18 of 143

Level alarm high high from
646-LIT-1002 with action
unidentified yet.
See recommendation 1.1.2
Reconfigure 646-FIT-
No flow from inlet Upset in operation. Low pressure alarm on 646-
1001 to accommodate 1.1.3 CPE
source Loss of production. PIT-1003
high and low alarms
Level drop in 646-S-0101 Level alarm low low from
loop failure) of 646-LV- Add pre-alarm low level
1.2 Flow More with potential for gas 646-LIT-1002 which shuts 1.2.1 CPE
1004 to open position to 646-LIT-1002.
blow-by 646-ESDV-1001
when not on demand
Review upstream design

Upstream facilities control
From inlet source of flow sharing from 1.2.2 DPS
system and safeguards.
compressor outlet.
Inlet source tripped

whilst supply from
Review downstream
1.3 Flow Reverse additional source to Upset in operation Downstream system design 1.3.1 DPS
design
downstream system is
healthy
pg 19 of 143

Inherently covered by
1.4 Pressure High
more/less/no flow
1.5 Pressure Less
more/less/no flow
1.6 Level High
more/less/no flow
1.7 Level Less
more/less/no flow
Temperature
1.8 No scenario
High
Temperature
1.9 No scenario
Less
1.10 Others
pg 20 of 143

Produce design for
closed drain system on
PI&D separate P&ID and
1.10.1 Condensate drain Undefined 1.10.1 DPS
Presentation consider provision of
double block and bleed
(DBB) if required.
Revisit provision of
Amine drain Undefined amine drain and consider 1.10.2 CPE
if DBB required.
Engineering
1.10.2
Design
1.10.3 Vacuum
High
1.10.4
Temperature
Low
1.10.5
Temperature
Start Up /
1.10.6
Operability
pg 21 of 143

Shutdown /
1.10.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
1.10.8
Erosion
Composition/C
1.10.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
1.10.10
n – More
Consider removing 646-

PSV-1004 after
Instrumentatio
1.10.11 checking that 646-PSV- 1.10.12.1 DPS
n – Less
1001 has sufficient
capacity.
Consider providing
Short and long term bypass around 646-S-
maintenance 0101 and spectacle
1.10.12 Maintenance 1.10.13.1 KAR
requirements of 646-S- blinds with valves at gas
0101. inlet and outlet of 646-S-
0101.
pg 22 of 143

2" drain from very
bottom of vessel may get Consider moving outlet
blocked by sludge (low to side of vessel, keeping 1.10.13.2 CPE
temperature waxing of bottom nozzle for drain.
the condensate).
1.11 Others for Note

Node Elements: Amine Contactor (646-V-0101)
pg 23 of 143

Level rise in 646-V-0101
646-LV-1006
(contactor) with potential Level alarm HH on 646- Provide pre-alarm H/L
2.1 Flow Less/No malfunctions due to 2.1.1 CPE
for liquid carryover with LIT-1008 (to ESD). to 646-LIT-1008.
control loop failure
gas
Malfunction of 646-
ESDV-1002 (control Level rise in 646-V-0101
loop failure) when not on (contactor) with potential Valve position indicator
demand or jammed in for liquid carryover with alarm.
closed position when on gas
demand
Level alarm H on 646-LIT-
1002.
Relocate downstream
Blockage of mist
tapping for 646-PDIT-
eliminator in 646-V- 2.1.2 CPE
1006 to gas outlet line
0101 (contactor).
12"-3CA-PG-1010
Malfunction of 646-LV- Level drop in 646-V-0101

Provide pre-alarm H/L to
2.2 Flow More 1006 to open position with potential for gas As per safeguard 2.1.3 CPE
646-LIT-1008.
(control loop failure) blow-by
Level alarm LL on 646-LIT-
1008 to close 646-ESDV- 2.1.4 CPE
1002.
pg 24 of 143

Pumps 646-P-
0103A/B/C (P&ID sht 7) Gas backflow into pump
Non-return valve installed
2.3 Flow Reverse stopped whilst contactor casing and further
on line 8"-3CA-CH-1011
646-V-0101 still being upstream of pump
fed with gas
2.4 Pressure High
2.5 Pressure Less
2.6 Level High
2.7 Level Less
Partly addressed, will be

fully addressed by
Temperature
2.8 completing other P&IDs
High
where temperature
control is located
Temperature
2.9
Less
2.10 Others
pg 25 of 143

PI&D
2.10.1
Presentation
Consider best location

for instrument and
Gas chromatography on-line
Engineering then update the
2.10.2 Performance of V-0101 analyzer - not shown on 2.10.2.1 CPE
Design appropriate P&ID
Hazop P&ID
(might not be sht 2) to
show the instrument
Assurance of accuracy of Update P&ID to reflect
Gas sampling would be part
gas chromatography provision of instrument 2.10.2.2 CPE
of gas analyzer package
instrument and package details
TIT's are installed in

thermowell.
Enhance reliability,
Trended data collected
Reliability of 646-TIT- availability and
during normal operation 2.10.2.3 CPE
1004 maintainability of both
will allow determination of
TIT's.
false readings from either
646-TIT-1002/1004.
Operability/performance
of V-0101 in terms of
646-PDIT-1006
possibility of blockage
of valve trays
Amine drain See action 2.10.2
pg 26 of 143

2.10.3 Vacuum
High
2.10.4
Temperature
Low
2.10.5
Temperature
Start Up /
2.10.6
Operability
Shutdown /
2.10.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
2.10.8
Erosion
Composition/
2.10.9
Contamination
Instrumentatio
2.10.10
n – More
Instrumentatio
2.10.11
n – Less
pg 27 of 143

2.10.12 Maintenance

Section Description: Amine Flash Separator and Lean/Rich Amine Exchanger
Node Elements: Amine Flash Separator (646-S-0102)
Backpressure and upset in
Mechanical failure of
the system where by 646-
3.1 Flow Less/No 646-PCV-1012 to closed 646-PIT-1009 high alarm
PCV-1010 always in
position
closed position.
646-PIT-1009 high high
alarm tripping 646-ESDV-
1002 (P&ID sht 2) closed
pg 28 of 143

646-PSV-1008 opening in
view of facilities pressure
profile design
Mechanical failure of
646-PCV-1010 jammed
in closed position or not Consider removing
opening when required 646-PIT-1009 low alarm PALL from 646-PIT- 3.1.1 CPE
(valve mainly used 1009 as no useful action
during start-up i.e.
manned operation)
Consider isolation of
646-PCV-1010 and 646-
Operators intervention as ESDV-1003 after
manned operation during reaching steady state 3.1.2 CPE
start-up (646-PCV-1012 remains
controlling pressure of
system)
Accumulation of
Malfunction of 646-LV- hydrocarbon condensate
Consider adding high
1010 when in service to causing contamination of
level alarm to 646-LIT- 3.1.3 CPE
closed position (control amine, ultimately
1012.
loop failure) resulting in premature
blockage of carbon filters
pg 29 of 143

Ensure that operating
manual includes
Operator walk around
inspection to be 3.1.4 CPE
completed every shift to
include check of 646-
LG-1010.
Malfunction of 646-
ESDV-1003 to closed
646-PIT-1009 low alarm
position (control loop
failure)
Malfunction of 646-LV- Condensate bucket will be Consider adding pre-

3.2 Flow More 1010 to open position emptied with potential for 646-LIT-1012 LALL alarm low level to 646- 3.2.1 CPE
(control loop failure) gas blow-by. LIT-1012
Consider adding ESDV

to drain outlet line
downstream of 646-LV-
1010 on line 2"-1CA-
PC-1002 or replacing 3.2.2 CPE
646-LV-1010 with XV
with limit switches and
two solenoids to allow
shutdown trip.
pg 30 of 143

No scenario apart from

requirement of NRV
upstream of block valve
646BL1043 which has
3.3 Flow Reverse
been provided
(646GC1002 on blanket
gas line 1"-1CA-FG-
1018)
3.4 Pressure High Covered by flow
3.5 Pressure Less Covered by flow
3.6 Level High Covered by flow
3.7 Level Less Covered by flow
Temperature
3.8 No scenario
High
Temperature
3.9 No scenario
Less
3.10 Others
pg 31 of 143

Reverse direction of
PI&D
3.10.1 NRV on line 1"-1CA-
Presentation
FG-1018
Consider stroking of
646-ESDV-1003 or 646-
Availability and 646-ESDV-1003 valve
Engineering PCV-1010 might not
3.10.2 reliability of 646-ESDV- None identified on regular basis and 3.10.2.1 KAR
Design operate after long period
1003 and 646-PCV-1010 maintenance of 646-
of idleness
PCV-1010.
To meet requirement of
3.10.2.1 spectacle blind
to be provided 3.10.2.2 CPE
downstream of
646BL1043.
Check if supplied for
Insulating gaskets at
flange between 2"-1SA-
flanges between 3.10.2.3 CPE
VF-1019 and 2" vessel
dissimilar metals
nozzle on 646-S-0102
3.10.3 Vacuum
High
3.10.4
Temperature
Low
3.10.5
Temperature
pg 32 of 143

Start Up /
3.10.6
Operability
Shutdown /
3.10.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
3.10.8
Erosion
Composition/C
3.10.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
3.10.10
n – More
Instrumentatio
3.10.11
n – Less
3.10.12 Maintenance
pg 33 of 143

Node Elements: Lean/Rich Amine Exchanger (646-E-0101)
Malfunction of control Level rise in 646-S-0102
Add high level pre-alarm
4.1 Flow Less/No valve 646-LV-1016 with potential for No alarms 4.1.1 CPE
to 646-LIT-1014
control loop failure carryover
Reconfigure to add high

high level alarm to 646-
4.1.2 CPE
LIT-1014 to trip 646-
ESDV-1002 closed.
Ensure instrument added

Increase in rich loading of and tagged on
Plate failure in 646-E- On-line off-spec gas
lean amine and off spec appropriate P&ID (see
0101 analyzer
gas action for 2.10.2.1 &
2.10.2.2 for node 2)
pg 34 of 143

Manual sample connections

provided on line 8"-3CA-
CH-1011 (P&ID sht 2)
Scenario follows less

4.2 Flow More
flow for plate failure
4.3 Flow Reverse
Covered by more/less
4.4 Pressure High
flow
Covered by more/less
4.5 Pressure Less
flow
4.6 Level High No scenario
4.7 Level Less No scenario
pg 35 of 143

Eventually would increase
Fouling of plate loading on reboiler till Manual sample connections Provide details of lab
Temperature
4.8 exchanger (mainly on unable to meet heating provided on line 8"-3CA- equipment required to 4.8.1 CPE
High
rich amine side) demand producing off CH-1011 (P&ID sht 2) test amine samples
spec gas
Troubleshooting
procedure to be provided
Local temperature gauges 4.8.2 CPE
in operating and
maintenance manual.
Consider whether there

will be any benefit in 4.8.3 CPE
replacing TI's with TIT's.
Temperature Refer to temperature

4.9
Less more
4.10 Others
PI&D
4.10.1
Presentation
Engineering
4.10.2
Design
pg 36 of 143

4.10.3 Vacuum
High
4.10.4
Temperature
Low
4.10.5
Temperature
Start Up /
4.10.6
Operability
Shutdown /
4.10.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
4.10.8
Erosion
Composition/C
4.10.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
4.10.10
n – More
4.10.11 Instrumentatio
pg 37 of 143

n – Less
Consider holding extra

Failure/fouling of plate plates and gaskets in
4.10.12 Maintenance 4.10.12.1 CPE
heat exchanger stores due to long lead
time for titanium plates
Consider limited
depressurisation/gas
freeing/draining to
exchanger area only for
4.10.12.2 CPE
maintenance purposes by
providing adequate block
valves, spectacle binds,
drains and vents
pg 38 of 143

Section Description: Amine Still Column and Reboiler (includes TCV on hot oil supply)
Drawing No: CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3B sheet 4
Node Elements: Amine Still Column (646-V-0102) and Reboiler (646-E-0102) (includes TCV on hot oil supply)
Malfunction of control
valve 646-TCV-1014 to Low temperature in
5.5 Flow Less/No 646-TIT-1013 alarm low
closed position (control column
loop failure)
646-TIT-1011 alarm low on
lean amine outlet
Operator intervention
Blockage of demister in
646-V-0102 (still Process upset 646-PIT-1016 high alarm
column)
Malfunction of control
valve 646-TCV-1014 to
5.2 Flow More 646-TIT-1013 alarm high
open position (control
loop failure)
pg 39 of 143

646-TIT-1013 high high trip
that stops hot oil circulation
pumps
646-TIT-1011 alarm high
on lean amine outlet
5.3 Flow Reverse See keyword others
5.4 Pressure High See no/less flow
5.5 Pressure Less No scenario
5.6 Level High See no/less flow
5.7 Level Less See no/less flow
Temperature
5.8 See no/less flow
High
Temperature
5.9 See no/less flow
Less
5.10 Others
pg 40 of 143

PI&D
5.10.1
Presentation
Consider adding level

control valve to make-up
water supply on line 2"-
Engineering 1SA-WF-1040 with
5.10.2 5.10.2.1 CPE
Design control signal from new
level controller, sharing
vessel nozzles with 646-
LIT-1023.
Consider local level

gauge to provide visual
indication if oil present 5.10.2.2 CPE
in still column bottom
section
Backflow of amine into Consider adding NRV to
water make-up line water supply line as 5.10.2.3 DPS
(battery limit) source unknown
5.10.3 Vacuum
High
5.10.4
Temperature
pg 41 of 143

Low
5.10.5
Temperature
Start Up /
5.10.6
Operability
Shutdown /
5.10.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
5.10.8
Erosion
Contamination of amine
solution with hot oil,
upset in liquid level inside
still column (surge
646-LSLL-1029 low level
Composition/C Tube leak inside reboiler volume) as result of new Add pre-alarm low to
5.10.9 trip will stop the hot oil 5.10.9.1 CPE
ontamination 646-E-0102 oil interface leading to 646-LSLL-1029.
circulation pumps.
eventual shutdown of oil
system (due low level in
hot oil surge tank 646-T-
0101).
Instrumentatio
5.10.10
n – More
pg 42 of 143

Instrumentatio
5.10.11
n – Less
5.10.12 Maintenance
pg 43 of 143

Section Description: Amine Reflux Condenser, Accumulator and Reflux Pumps
Node Elements: Amine Reflux Condenser (646-A-0101), Amine Reflux Accumulator (646-S-0103) and Reflux Pumps(646-P-0101A/B)
Loss of containment / Fire and gas detection
6.1 Flow Less/No Tube leak in 646-A-0101
toxic gas release provided for the facility
Tripping of 1 fan
(mechanical failure) Higher temperature Fan status alarm
hence less air flow
646-TIT-1016 high alarm
Blockage of vane pack in Consider adding high
Upset in operation 646-PT-1021/1022 6.1.1 CPE
646-S-0103 alarm to 646-PT-1021
646-PCV-1022 control
loop failure (valve None 646-PT-1021
closed)
646-PIT-1017 high alarm
(P&ID sht 4)
Trip of amine reflux Level rise in 646-S-0103
Pump status alarm
pumps 646-P-101A/B (reflux accumulator)
646-LIT-1027 high level
646-LIT-1027 high high Reconfigure 646-PIT-
Malfunction of 646-LV-
level trips stopped hot oil 1020 to accommodate 6.1.2 CPE
1024 to closed position
circulation pumps high alarm
pg 44 of 143

Consider adding pre-
alarm high to 646-LIT- 6.1.3 CPE
1027
Restriction orifice 646-
No affect on pump Strainers upstream of pumps
RO-1005 blocked
646-PIT-1020 high alarm See 6.1.2
Consider adding check
Blockage of pump of pump strainers to
Upset in operation 646-PIT-1020 low alarm 6.1.4 CPE
strainers troubleshooting guide in
operating manual.
Fouling of 646-A-0101 Frequent maintenance of air
No serious consequence
inside the tubes coolers
Depressurization of 646-
Malfunction of 646- S-0103 (reflux
PCV-1022 to open accumulator) and eventual
6.2 Flow More 646-PIT-1021 low alarm
position (control loop drop in temperature in
failure) reflux condenser outlet
(646-A-0101)
646-TIT-1016 low alarm
pg 45 of 143

Drop in level in 646-S-
Malfunction of 646-LV- 0103 (reflux accumulator)
1024 to open position with potential gas blow by 646-FIT-1004 high alarm
(control loop failure). and pump cavitation /
pump damage
(although pressure drop may
be momentary)
6.3 Flow Reverse No scenario
6.6 Level High Covered by flow
6.7 Level Less Covered by flow
Temperature
6.8 Covered by flow
High
6.9 Temperature See flow more

pg 46 of 143

Less
1.10 Others
PI&D Correct pipe materials to
6.10.1 Correct P&ID 6.10.1.1 CPE
Presentation 1SA from 1CA.
Engineering
6.10.2 Vibration of fans Vibration switch
Design
6.10.3 Vacuum
High
6.10.4
Temperature
Low
6.10.5
Temperature
Start Up /
6.10.6 Louvers stuck in position Periodic stroking of louvers
Operability
pg 47 of 143

Shutdown of whole plant
Maintenance of 646-A- (coolers are self-draining to
Shutdown /
6.10.7 0101 requires shutdown reflux accumulator and
Maintenance
of whole plant drain connections available
on header box)
Corrosion /
6.10.8
Erosion
Composition/C
6.10.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
6.10.10
n – More
Instrumentatio
6.10.11
n – Less
6.10.12 Maintenance
pg 48 of 143

Section Description: Amine Booster Pumps and Lean Amine Coolers
Node Elements: Amine Booster Pumps (646-P-102A/B) and Lean Amine Coolers (646-A-102A/B)
No flow from pump 646-
7.1 Flow Less/No Upset to operation Pump status alarm
P-0102A/B
646-PT-1024 low alarm
Consider provision of
Upset in operation with
Blockage of strainer new PI's downstream of
potential for pump 7.1.1 CPE
646-FS-1002A/B strainers 646-FS-
damage
1002A/B.
Revisit the sizing of 646-

PSV-1025 from thermal
Malfunction of 646-
relief case to pump
PCV-1024 closed when Dead head pump with
None identified blocked outlet case and 7.1.2 CPE
in service (control loop potential for damage
review relieving
failure)
scenario's accordingly
(where relieving to)
pg 49 of 143

Tube leak in 646-A- Loss of containment
Walk around inspection
0102A/B causing operation upset
Tripping of 1 fan
(mechanical failure) Higher temperature Fan status alarm
hence less air flow
646-TIT-1017 high alarm
Fouling of 646-A- Frequent maintenance of air
0102A/B inside the tubes coolers
Malfunction of 646- No serious consequence, Frequent maintenance of

PCV-1024 to open just loss of energy with system unless revealed
7.2 Flow More
position when not on momentary drop in earlier to operator by daily
demand pressure walk around inspections
7.3 Flow Reverse No scenario
Covered under flow

7.4 Pressure High
scenarios
Covered under flow

7.5 Pressure Less
scenarios
7.6 Level High Not applicable
pg 50 of 143

7.7 Level Less Not applicable
Temperature
7.8 Covered by flow
High
Temperature
7.9 No scenario
Less
7.10 Others
PI&D
7.10.1
Presentation
Provide PI downstream
Engineering Reliability of reading of pumps P-0102A/B to
7.10.2 7.10.2.1 CPE
Design given by 646-PT-1024 allow for cross check of
reading of 646-PT-1024
Vibration of fans Vibration switch
7.10.3 Vacuum
High
7.10.4
Temperature
pg 51 of 143

Low
7.10.5
Temperature
Start Up /
Operability
Shutdown /
7.10.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
7.10.8
Erosion
Composition/C
1.10.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
7.10.10
n – More
Instrumentatio
7.10.11
n – Less
pg 52 of 143

Consider provision of
adequate block valves
Maintenance of 646-A- with spectacle blinds to
7.10.12 Maintenance None identified 7.10.12.1 CPE
0102A/B (2 x 50%) allow maintenance of
one exchanger whilst
other is on line.
Operating and
maintenance manual to
highlight that during
maintenance of 1 7.10.12.2 CPE
exchanger, production
capacity to be reduced
accordingly.
pg 53 of 143

Section Description: Amine Filtration and Circulation Pumps

Lean Amine Filter (646-S-0104), Lean Amine Carbon Filter (646-S-0105), Lean Amine Polishing Filter (646-S-0106) and Amine
Node Elements:
Recirculation Pumps(646-P-0103A/B/C)
Blockage of 646-S-0104
8.1 Flow Less/No Upset of operation 646-PIT-1027
(lean amine filter)
Upset of operation 646-PIT-1030
(carbon filter)
Upset of operation 646-PIT-1032
(polishing filter)
Blockage of strainers 646-PI-1033; 646-PI-
Upset of operation
646-FS-1003A/B/C 1036A/B/C
Trip of pump 646-P-
Upset of operation Pump status alarm
0103A/B/C
646-FE-1008 low alarm
pg 54 of 143


Node Elements:
Malfunction of 646-
FCV-1009 failing closed
Operations classified as
(control loop failure)
Process conditions upset manned as it is operators
when in service to
wish
provide process flow
control
Malfunction of 646-
FCV-1009 failing open Less flow to downstream Downstream equipment
8.2 Flow More
(control loop failure) system (Contactor) control system
when not on demand
Consider adding
Discharge pressure and
Malfunction of 646- isolation, bleed and
Pumps high discharge suction pressure of
FCV-1009 failing open bypass around 646-FCV-
8.3 Flow Reverse pressure will be seen at circulating fluid will be 8.3.1 CPE
(control loop failure) 1009 to allow removal
pump suction stabilized by virtue of line
when not on demand for maintenance without
pressure drop.
plant shutdown
Downstream equipment
control system
pg 55 of 143


Node Elements:
Temperature
8.8 No concern
High
Temperature
8.9 No concern
Less
8.10 Others
PI&D
8.10.1
Presentation
Engineering
8.10.2
Design
8.10.3 Vacuum
pg 56 of 143


Node Elements:
High
8.10.4
Temperature
Low
8.10.5
Temperature
Start Up /
8.10.6
Operability
Shutdown /
8.10.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
8.10.8
Erosion
Composition/C
8.10.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
8.10.10
n – More
Instrumentatio
8.10.11
n – Less
pg 57 of 143


Node Elements:
8.10.12 Maintenance

Section Description: Hot Oil System
Drawing No: CPE-12016-DW-2001 sheets 8 Rev 3A and 9 Rev 3A
Node Elements: Combustion Air Blower (646-B-0101), Maxon Burner (646-Z-0101), Heater (646-H-0101), Circulation Pumps (646-P-300A/B/C)
646-PSLL-1049 forms part
9.1 Flow Less/No Fan 646-B-0101 trips Upset in heating system of the Burner Management
System (BMS)
Flexible sleeve leaks on
Less air to burner and
combustion air blower Operator to monitor flue gas
reduced burner efficiency
outlet line (646-B-0101)
Potential for oil ignition
Leak in heater 646-H-
and environmental Operator to monitor flue gas
0101 oil tube
concern
pg 58 of 143

Loss of heating medium 646-LALL-1029 low level
Consider adding pre-
oil which will decrease trip on expansion tank
alarm low level to 646- 9.1.1 CPE
level in the expansion which shuts down whole
LALL-1029
tank unit
Operating manual should

address in clear manner
Pumps tripped by 646- the course of action
loop failure) of 646-
Upset in operation FSLL-1010 on pump incase of malfunction of 9.1.2 CPE
FCV-1011 to closed
discharge 646-FCV-1011 to its
position
fully closed or open
position.
One duty pump trips
Reduced flow round
646-P-0104A/B/C Pump running status alarm
system
leaving 1 pump running
Alarms available in the
process system
Add PIT to existing 646-

Low pump suction
Mechanical failure of PI-1041 with high and
pressure and possible 9.1.3 CPE
646-PCV-1040 low alarms to expansion
upset of operations
tank 646-T-0101.
pg 59 of 143

Confirm expansion tank

646-T-0101 is designed 9.1.4 CPE
for full vacuum.
Mechanical failure of Overpressurisation of

646-PCV-1039 in closed expansion tank 646-T- See recommendation 9.1.3
position 0101
Blockage of temporary See keyword other below
Upset in operation
strainer 646-FS-1004 (action 9.10.6.1)
9.2 Flow More BMS

Upset in operation,
loop failure) of 646- Alarms available in the
reduced flow to the
FCV-1011 to open process system
reboiler
position
More flow from 646-
PCV-1040 due to See recommendation 9.1.3
mechanical failure
More flow from 646-
PCV-1039 due to See recommendation 9.1.3
mechanical failure
9.3 Flow Reverse BMS

No scenario
pg 60 of 143

9.4 Pressure High BMS

Covered by flow
scenarios
9.5 Pressure Less BMS

Covered by flow
scenarios

Covered by flow
scenarios

Covered by flow
scenarios
Temperature
9.8 BMS
High
Temperature
9.9 BMS
Less
9.10 Others
pg 61 of 143

646-FCV-1012 is Update P&ID to show
explained by positioner clearly to show
PI&D
9.10.1 schematic XV-1001 on relationship between 9.10.1.1 CPE
Presentation
same P&ID and forms 646-FCV-1012 and XV-
part of the BMS. 1001.
646-PCV-1046, 646-
ESDV-1005, 646-
ESDV-1004, 646-
ESDV-1006, 646-PCV-
1053, 646-BDV-1001
Engineering
9.10.2 and 646-FCV-1013 on
Design
fuel gas supply to burner
are all designed
according to NFPA 85.
Hence no assessment
required.
Location of vent on fuel Safe location required as

gas line 3"-1CA-FG- will be using sour fuel 9.10.2.1 DPS
1072 gas at start-up of unit
Location of vent from Safe location required as

relief valve 646-PSV- will be using sour fuel 9.10.2.2 DPS
1042 gas at start-up of unit
pg 62 of 143

9.10.3 Vacuum
High
9.10.4
Temperature
Low
9.10.5
Temperature
Ensure start-up strainer

is used when circulating
the oil only, after which
Temporary strainer on
Start Up / it is to be removed
9.10.6 common suction line to 9.10.6.1 CPE
Operability before full
pumps
commissioning
commences. Include in
operating manual.
Provide replacement
spool for temporary
strainer as well as low
9.10.6.2 CPE
point drain upstream of
pump suction block
valves.
pg 63 of 143

Maintenance to be
Shutdown /
9.10.7 carried out during
Maintenance
planned plant shutdown
Corrosion /
9.10.8
Erosion
Composition/C
9.10.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
9.10.10
n – More
Instrumentatio
9.10.11
n – Less
9.10.12 Maintenance
pg 64 of 143

Section Description: Lean Gas Cooler
Drawing No: CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3A sheet 8
Node Elements: Lean Gas Cooler (646-A-0103)
Tripping of fan
10.1 Flow Less/No (mechanical failure) Loss of cooling Fan status alarm
hence no air flow
Control system and
associated alarms on P&ID
sheet 10 (glycol unit)
Loss of containment / gas Fire and gas detection
Tube leak in 646-A-0103
release provided for the facility
Fouling of 646-A-0103 Frequent maintenance of air
inside the tubes cooler
10.2 Flow More
10.3 Flow Reverse
10.4 Pressure High
pg 65 of 143

10.5 Pressure Less
10.6 Level High
10.7 Level Less
Temperature
10.8
High
Temperature
10.9
Less
10.10 Others
PI&D
10.10.1
Presentation
Engineering
10.10.2 Vibration of fans Vibration switch
Design
10.10.3 Vacuum
High
10.10.4
Temperature
10.10.5 Low
pg 66 of 143

Temperature
Start Up /
Operability
Shutdown /
10.10.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
10.10.8
Erosion
Composition/C
10.10.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
10.10.10
n – More
Instrumentatio
10.10.11
n – Less
10.10.12 Maintenance
pg 67 of 143

Section Description: Amine Gas Sweetening Unit
Drawing No: All P&IDs (CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3D sheets 2 to 9)
Node Elements:
G.1 Others
PI&D
G.1.1
Presentation
Engineering 3D Model review is part of

G1.2 Deadlegs / corrosion
Design project scope
Consider the need for
any heat tracing
requirements due to low G1.2.1 CPE
ambient temperature in
winter
Review requirement for
Auto start of pumps G1.2.2 DPS
auto starting pumps
Insulating gaskets at Check insulating gaskets
flanges between are provided where G1.2.3 CPE
dissimilar metals required.
G1.3 Vacuum
pg 68 of 143

Node Elements:
High
G1.4
Temperature
Low
G1.5
Temperature
Start Up /
G1.6
Operability
Shutdown /
G1.7
Maintenance
Corrosion /
G1.8
Erosion
Composition/C
G1.9
ontamination
Instrumentatio
G1.10
n – More
Instrumentatio
G1.11
n – Less
pg 69 of 143

Node Elements:
G1.12 Maintenance
Pool fire around 646-S- Ensure fire fighting

G1.13 External Fire 0101 where hydrocarbon Fire and gas detection system satisfies the G1.13.1 DPS
condensate is present project scope
Operator intervention to use
hydrants and contact fire
station
pg 70 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
APPENDIX - 2: HAZOP Review Action Sheets
pg 71 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
Project Name: Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP Review Date: 6 - 8 April 2013 (Inclusive)
P&ID No.: CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3D sheet 2
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
HAZOP Action Details
Link 646-PIT-1003/1007 to DCS in control room with alarm to provide differential pressure alarm.
HAZOP Action No.: 1.1.1

Action-on Party: CPE Due Date:
RESPONSE
Date Signature
COMMENT / APPROVAL BY PROJECT ENGINEER
Date Signature
COMMENT / APPROVAL BY KAR
Date Signature
pg 72 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Consider implementation of design review recommendation to provide new ESDV on inlet to scrubber.

Action-on Party: DPS Due Date:
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 73 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Reconfigure 646-FIT-1001 to accommodate high and low alarms.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 74 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Produce design for closed drain system on separate P&ID and consider provision of double block and bleed (DBB) if
required.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 75 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Consider removing 646-PSV-1004 after checking that 646-PSV-1001 has sufficient capacity.
HAZOP Action No.: 1.10.12.1

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 76 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Consider providing bypass around 646-S-0101 and spectacle blinds with valves at gas inlet and outlet of 646-S-0101.

Action-on Party: KAR Due Date:
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 77 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Consider moving outlet to side of vessel, keeping bottom nozzle for drain.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 78 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Revisit provision of amine drain and consider if DBB required.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 79 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Add pre-alarm low level to 646-LIT-1002.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 80 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Review upstream design of flow sharing from compressor outlet.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 81 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 1
Review downstream design.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 82 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 2
Provide pre-alarm H/L to 646-LIT-1008.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 83 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 2
Relocate downstream tapping for 646-PDIT-1006 to gas outlet line 12"-3CA-PG-1010

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 84 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 2
Provide pre-alarm H/L to 646-LIT-1008.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 85 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 2
Consider best location for instrument and then update the appropriate P&ID (might not be sht 2) to show the
instrument
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 86 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 2
Update P&ID to reflect provision of instrument and package details

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 87 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 2
Enhance reliability, availability and maintainability of both TIT's.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 88 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
Consider removing PALL from 646-PIT-1009 as no useful action.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 89 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
Consider isolation of 646-PCV-1010 and 646-ESDV-1003 after reaching steady state (646-PCV-1012 remains
controlling pressure of system)
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 90 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
Consider adding high level alarm to 646-LIT-1012.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 91 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
Ensure that operating manual includes Operator walk around inspection to be completed every shift to include check of
646-LG-1010.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 92 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
Consider stroking of 646-ESDV-1003 valve on regular basis and maintenance of 646-PCV-1010.

Action-on Party: KAR Due Date:
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 93 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
To meet requirement of 3.10.2.1 spectacle blind to be provided downstream of 646BL1043.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 94 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
Check if supplied for flange between 2"-1SA-VF-1019 and 2" vessel nozzle on 646-S-0102

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 95 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
Consider adding pre-alarm low level to 646-LIT-1012.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 96 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 3
Consider adding ESDV to drain outlet line downstream of 646-LV-1010 on line 2"-1CA-PC-1002 or replacing 646-LV-
1010 with XV with limit switches and two solenoids to allow shutdown trip.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 97 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 4
Add high level pre-alarm to 646-LIT-1014.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
COMMENT / APPROVAL BY NICO-NIOC
Date Signature
pg 98 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 4
Reconfigure to add high high level alarm to 646-LIT-1014 to trip 646-ESDV-1002 closed.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 99 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 4
Ensure instrument added and tagged on appropriate P&ID (see action for 2.10.2.1 & 2.10.2.2 for node 2)

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 100 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 4
Consider holding extra plates and gaskets in stores due to long lead time for titanium plates

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 101 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 4
Consider limited depressurisation/gas freeing/draining to exchanger area only for maintenance purposes by providing
adequate block valves, spectacle binds, drains and vents.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 102 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 4
Provide details of lab equipment required to test amine samples.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 103 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 4
Troubleshooting procedure to be provided in operating and maintenance manual.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 104 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 4
Consider whether there will be any benefit in replacing TI's with TIT's.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 105 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
P&ID No.: CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3B sheet 4
HAZOP NODE No.: 5
Consider adding level control valve to make-up water supply on line 2"-1SA-WF-1040 with control signal from new
level controller, sharing vessel nozzles with 646-LIT-1023.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 106 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 5
Consider local level gauge to provide visual indication if oil present in still column bottom section.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 107 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 5
Consider adding NRV to water supply line as source unknown.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 108 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 5
Add pre-alarm low to 646-LSLL-1029.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 109 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 6
Consider adding high alarm to 646-PT-1021.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 110 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 6
Reconfigure 646-PIT-1020 to accommodate high alarm.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 111 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 6
Consider adding pre-alarm high to 646-LIT-1027.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 112 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 6
Consider adding check of pump strainers to troubleshooting guide in operating manual.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 113 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 6
Correct pipe materials to 1SA from 1CA.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 114 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 7
Consider provision of new PI's downstream of strainers 646-FS-1002A/B.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 115 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 7
Revisit the sizing of 646-PSV-1025 from thermal relief case to pump blocked outlet case and review relieving
scenario's accordingly (where relieving to)
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 116 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 7
Consider provision of adequate block valves with spectacle blinds to allow maintenance of one exchanger whilst other
is on line.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 117 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 7
Operating and maintenance manual to highlight that during maintenance of 1 exchanger, production capacity to be
reduced accordingly.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 118 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 7
Provide PI downstream of pumps P-0102A/B to allow for cross check of reading of 646-PT-1024.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 119 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 8
Consider adding isolation, bleed and bypass around 646-FCV-1009 to allow removal for maintenance without plant
shutdown.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 120 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
P&ID No.: CPE-12016-DW-2001 sheets 8 Rev 3A and 9 Rev 3A
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Consider adding pre-alarm low level to 646-LALL-1029.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 121 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Operating manual should address in clear manner the course of action incase of malfunction of 646-FCV-1011 to its
fully closed or open position.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 122 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Add PIT to existing 646- PI-1041 with high and low alarms to expansion tank 646-T-0101.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 123 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Confirm expansion tank 646-T-0101 is designed for full vacuum.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 124 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Update P&ID to show clearly to show relationship between 646-FCV-1012 and XV-1001.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 125 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Safe location required as will be using sour fuel gas at start-up of unit.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 126 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Location of vent from relief valve 646-PSV-1042. Safe location required as will be using sour fuel gas at start-up of
unit.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 127 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Ensure start-up strainer is used when circulating the oil only, after which it is to be removed before full commissioning
commences. Include in operating manual.
RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 128 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: 9
Provide replacement spool for temporary strainer as well as low point drain upstream of pump suction block valves.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 129 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
P&ID No.: All P&IDs (CPE-12016-DW-2001 rev 3D sheets 2 to 9)
HAZOP NODE No.: G
Ensure fire fighting system satisfies the project scope.
HAZOP Action No.: G1.13.1

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 130 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: G
Consider the need for any heat tracing requirements due to low ambient temperature in winter.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 131 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: G
Review requirement for auto starting pumps.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 132 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW

Job No.: CPE-12016-01-241
HAZOP NODE No.: G
Check insulating gaskets are provided where required.

RESPONSE
Date Signature
Date Signature
Date Signature
pg 133 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
APPENDIX - 3: HAZOP Workshop Attendees
HAZOP WORKSHOP ATTENDEES

Week 1
6th 7th 8th
April April April
Present
Name Company Role Mon Tue Wed
Ali Allawi Exida SP Hazop Chairman x x x
Mo Elborno KAR Projects Director x x x
Subhi Sadiq KAR Area Operations Manager x x x
Mike Halphen CPE Engineering Manager x x x
Jeremy Leger CPE Principal Process Engineer x x
Mohamed Salahaddin KAR Operations Manager x x x
Abdulla Muhamed KAR Production Engineer x x
Heman Sattar KAR C&I Engineer x x PT
Hayas Kakaee KAR Senior C&I Engineer x x x
Paul McCormack DPS Senior C&I Engineer x x x
Jane Watson DPS Project Manager x x x
Tom Agbabi DPS Study Manager x x x
Geoff Foweraker DPS C&I Liaison Manager FT PT
Number Per Day 13 12 11
pg 134 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
APPENDIX - 4: HAZOP P&IDs
Note: P&IDs show original mark up of nodes. A number of nodes were combined during the
HAZOP. The node descriptions for the attached P&ID sheets are as follows
Nodes 1 & 2 Gas Inlet Separator Contactor CPE-12016-DW-2001 Sheet 2

Nodes 3 & 4 Amine Separator Exchanger CPE-12016-DW-2001 Sheet 3
Nodes 4 & 5 Amine Still Column Reboiler CPE-12016-DW-2001 Sheet 4
Nodes 5 6b & 7 Amine Condenser Accumulator CPE-12016-DW-2001 Sheet 5
Nodes 8 & 9 Amine Pump Cooler CPE-12016-DW-2001 Sheet 6
Nodes 9 & 10 Amine Filter Circulation Pump CPE-12016-DW-2001 Sheet 7
Node 11 DF Heater CPE-12016-DW-2001 Sheet 9
Nodes 11 & 12 Expansion Pump Gas Exchanger CPE-12016-DW-2001 Sheet 8
pg 135 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
pg 136 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
pg 137 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
pg 138 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
pg 139 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
pg 140 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
pg 141 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
pg 142 of 143
HAZARDS AND
OPERABILITY
HAZOP REVIEW
pg 143 of 143

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What is the purpose of conducting a HAZOP review?

What is the purpose of conducting a HAZOP review?

What are some of the key components included in the amine unit?

What are some of the key components included in the amine unit?

HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY

DPS DOCUMENT NO. : J12008-DPSB-000-S-RZ-0003

DOCUMENT TITLE : HAZOP REPORT FOR AMINE UNIT 1

GAS TREATMENT PLANT AT

BY CHECKED APPROVED REVISION DATE REVISED FOR

COMPANY KAR Construction and Engineering

CONTRACTOR Custom Process Equipment, LLC

PROJECT Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

ESD Emergency Shut Down

FEED Front End Engineering Design

HAZID Hazards Identification

HAZOP Hazards and Operability Study

HSE Health, Safety and Environment

HIPS High Integrity Protection System

MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet per Day

MSTBD Thousand Stock Tank Barrel Day

P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

PEAR Personnel, Environment, Assets and Reputation

PFD Process Flow Diagram

SDV Shutdown Valve

SIF Safety Instrumented Function

SIL Safety Integrity Level

SIS Safety Instrumented System

6. HAZOP REVIEW SCOPE

Occurrence of the hazard; and/or,

Its consequential impact.

Otherwise, in case of no or inadequate-safe-guards are provided, recommendations to this effect

7. HAZOP APPROACH, PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISM

Loss of Reputation, Concern, Panic, etc. locally, country-wise or internationally.

KEYWORD DEVIATION LINES-OF-DEFENSE

Pressure Pressure More High Pressure Alarm

KEYWORD DEVIATION LINES-OF-DEFENSE

Level Low Low level Alarm

7.3 Safe-Guards (Lines-of-Defense)

As such, the philosophy of Two-Lines-of-Defense would eventually demand the engineering

ALARM- 1 “SIF” AUTO-

Within context of “Operator’s Intervention”, as a line-of-defense if and where applicable, a

Lines-of-Defense Deviation Control Requirement

Alarm for the deviating ‘Operating Parameter’ to Alert the

Second Line of Defense Automatic Control (Actuation) to trouble-shoot the deviating

8. HAZOP EVALUATION NODES

9. HAZOP TEAM COMPOSITION

Chairman’s summary report, observations, conclusions and recommendations on the HAZOP

10.2.2 Chairman also requested the team’s advice if Operator’s intervention is to be

Chairman emphasized that a minimum of Two-Lines-of-Defense have to be identified in the

10.4 NODES Selected for the Assessment

10.7 Follow-up and HAZOP Close-Out Report

APPENDIX - 1: HAZOP Review Worksheets

Project: Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field DPS Ref No :

Project: Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field DPS Ref No :

Review upstream design

Inlet source tripped

Project: Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field DPS Ref No :

Project: Gas Treatment Plant at Khurmala Dome Field DPS Ref No :