EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018 ]

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

In this petition for certiorari filed before this Court, petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes
challenges the constitutionality of several provisions of the 2015 Revised Rules of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). In particular, petitioner questions (1) the
rule which requires the presence of at least one Justice of the Supreme Court to constitute
a quorum; (2) the rule on constitution of a quorum; and (3) the requisites to
be considered a member of the House of Representatives.

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner alleges that she has two pending quo warranto cases before the HRET. They
are (1) Case No. 13-036 (Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina
Ongsiako Reyes) and (2) Case No. 130037 (Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes).

On 1 November 2015, the HRET published the 2015 Revised Rules of the House
ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal (2015 HRET Rules).

Petitioner alleges that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules is unconstitutional as it gives the
Justices, collectively, denial or veto powers over the proceedings by simply absenting
themselves from any hearing. In addition, petitioner alleges that the 2015 HRET Rules
grant more powers to the Justices, individually, than the legislators by requiring the
presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a quorum. Petitioner alleges that
even when all six legislators are present, they cannot constitute themselves as a body
and cannot act as an Executive Committee without the presence of any of the Justices.
Petitioner further alleges that the rule violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution by conferring the privilege of being indispensable members upon the
Justices.

Petitioner alleges that the quorum requirement under the 2015 HRET Rules is
ambiguous because it requires only the presence of at least one Justice and four
Members of the Tribunal. According to petitioner, the four Members are not limited to
legislators and may include the other two Justices. In case of inhibition, petitioner
alleges that a mere majority of the remaining Members shall be sufficient to render a
decision, instead of the majority of all the Members.

Petitioner likewise alleges that Rule 15, in relation to Rules 17 and 18, of the 2015
HRET Rules unconstitutionally expanded the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Petitioner alleges that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
as well as the 2011 Rules of the HRET, a petition may be filed within 15 days from the
date of the proclamation of the winner, making such proclamation the operative fact for
the HRET to acquire jurisdiction. However, Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules requires
that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there should be (1) a
valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Further, Rule 17 of
the 2015 HRET Rules states that election protests should be filed within 15 days from
June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is
later, while Rule 18 provides that petitions for quo warranto shall be filed within 15
days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption of office,
whichever is later. Petitioner alleges that this would allow the COMELEC to determine
whether there was a valid proclamation or a proper oath, as well as give it opportunity
to entertain cases between the time of the election and June 30 of the election year or
actual assumption of office, whichever is later.

Petitioner alleges that the application of the 2015 HRET Rules to all pending cases could
prejudice her cases before the HRET.

The HRET, through the Secretary of the Tribunal, filed its own Comment.[1] Thus, in a
Manifestation and Motion[2] dated 13 January 2016, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) moved that it be excused from representing the HRET and filing a Comment on
the petition. The Court granted the OSG's Manifestation and Motion in its 2 February
2016 Resolution.[3]

The HRET maintains that it has the power to promulgate its own rules that would
govern the proceedings before it. The HRET points out that under Rule 6 of the 2015
HRET Rules, a quorum requires the presence of at least one Justice-member and four
members of the Tribunal. The HRET argues that the requirement rests on substantial
distinction because there are only three Justice-members of the Tribunal as against six
Legislator-members. The HRET further argues that the requirement of four members
assures the presence of at least two Legislator-members to constitute a quorum. The
HRET adds that the requirement of the presence of at least one Justice was
incorporated in the Rules to maintain judicial equilibrium in deciding election contests
and because the duty to decide election cases is a judicial function. The HRET states
that petitioner's allegation that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules gives the Justices virtual
veto power to stop the proceedings by simply absenting themselves is not only
speculative but also imputes bad faith on the part of the Justices.

The HRET states that it only has jurisdiction over a member of the House of
Representatives. In order to be considered a member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a
proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Hence, the requirement of concurrence of
these three requisites is within the power of the HRET to make.
 The Issue

The issue before this Court is the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
2015 HRET Rules:

(1) Rule 6(a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a
quorum;

(2) Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation to Rule 17; and

(3) Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

The pertinent provisions questioned before this Court are the following:

(I) Rule 6(a) and Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69

(1) Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides:

Rule 6. Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in

Between Regular Meetings. -

(a) The Tribunal shall meet on such days and hours as it may designate or at
the call of the Chairperson or of a majority of its Members. The presence of
at least one (1) Justice and four (4) Members of the Tribunal shall be
necessary to constitute a quorum. In the absence of the Chairperson, the
next Senior Justice shall preside, and in the absence of both, the Justice present
shall take the Chair.

(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in
attendance, the Members present, who shall not be less than three (3), may
constitute themselves as an Executive Committee to act on the agenda for
the meeting concerned, provided, however, that its action shall be subject to
confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is
present.

(c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any
three (3) of its Members, provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice, who
may sit as the Executive Committee, may act on the following matters
requiring immediate action by the Tribunal:

1. Any pleading or motion,

(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or

substantial damage or injury to the rights of a party or cause
delay in the proceedings or action concerned;
 (b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect
the rights of the adverse party, such as one for extension of time
to comply with an order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a
pleading which is not a prohibited pleading and is within the
discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and

(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder

or any other similar pleading from any of the parties or their
attorneys;

2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications

or allocations of the appropriations of the Tribunal; and

3. Such other matters as may be delegated by the Tribunal.

However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of

business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its
confirmation.

(2) Rule 69 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides:

Rule 69. Votes Required. - In resolving all questions submitted to the

Tribunal, all the Members present, inclusive of the Chairperson, shall vote.

Except as provided in Rule 5(b) of these Rules, the concurrence of at least

five (5) Members shall be necessary for the rendition of decisions and the
adoption of formal resolutions, provided that, in cases where a Member
inhibits or cannot take part in the deliberations, a majority vote of the
remaining Members shall be sufficient.

This is without prejudice to the authority of the Supreme Court or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, to designate Special Member or
Members who should act as temporary replacement or replacements in
cases where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibits from a case
or is disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a particular
election contest, provided that:

(1) The option herein provided should be resorted [to] only when the
required quorum in order for the Tribunal to proceed with the hearing of the
election contest, or in making the final determination of the case, or in
arriving at decisions or resolutions thereof, cannot be met; and

(2) Unless otherwise provided, the designation of the Special Member as

replacement shall only be temporary and limited only to the specific case
where the inhibition or disqualification was made.

(II) Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation to Rule 17

Rules 15 and 17 of the 2015 HRET Rules provide:

 Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.

To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be

a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a
proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.

Rule 17. Election Protest. - A verified election protest contesting the election
or returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by
any candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the
election year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later.

xxxx

We shall discuss issues (1) and (3) together.

Presence of at least one Justice-member to Constitute a Quorum

Petitioner alleges that the requirement under Rule 6 of the 2015

HRET Rules that at least one Justice should be present to constitute a quorum violates
the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution and gives undue power to the
Justices over the legislators.

The argument has no merit.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the composition of the
HRET. It states:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
all the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

In accordance with this organization, where the HRET is composed of three Justices of
the Supreme Court and six members of the House of Representatives, it is clear that
the HRET is a collegial body with members from two separate departments of the
government: the Judicial and the Legislative departments. The intention of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution is to make the tribunal an independent, constitutional body subject
to constitutional restrictions.[4] The origin of the tribunal can be traced back from the
electoral commissions under the 1935 Constitution whose functions were
quasi-judicial in nature.[5] The presence of the three Justices, as against six members
of the House of Representatives, was intended as an additional guarantee to ensure
impartiality in the judgment of cases before it.[6] The intentions of the framers of the
1935 Constitution were extensively discussed in Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenca,[7]
thus:

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of

Representatives, said:

x x x what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal

was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine
members: Three of them belonging to the party having the
largest number of votes, and three from the party having the
second largest number of votes so that these members may
represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit
before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to
a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that decisions
will be made along party lines. (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; italics supplied.)

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our

Constitution, expressed himself as follows:

Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the

election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the
legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a
time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the
legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted
to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the
election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was
some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or
not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that
provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system
obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of
the United States, and there was no reason why that power or
that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained.
But it was thought that that would make the determination of this
contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been
observed in the past. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol.
III, p. 376; italics supplied.)

It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested
the accuracy of the views thus expressed.

Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional

provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:

The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily

upon the hope and belief that the abolition of party lines because
of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the
minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of
some members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed
constitutional provision, would also be members of the same,
would insure greater political justice in the determination of
election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would
be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself.
Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of
the Electoral Commission in the following words:

I understand that from the time that this question is

placed in the hands of members not only of the
majority party but also of the minority party, there is
already a condition, a factor which would make
protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know
from experience that many times in the many protests
tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible
to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From
the moment that it is required that not only the
majority but also the minority should intervene in
these questions, we have already enough guarantee
that there would be no tyranny on the part of the
majority.

But there is another more detail which is the one

which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention
of three justices. So that with this intervention of
three justices if there would be any question as to the
justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there
would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there
would be nothing but questions purely of party in
which the members of the majority as well as those of
the minority should wish to take lightly a protest
because the protestant belongs to one of said parties,
we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties,
the actuations of the three justices. In the last
analysis, what is really applied in the determination of
electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice
or before the House of Representatives or the Senate?
Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine
of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be
greater skill in the application of the laws and in the
application of doctrines to electoral matters having as
we shall have three justices who will act impartially in
these electoral questions.

I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues

to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible
to set aside party interests. Hence, the
 best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of
justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not
be applied improperly or incorrectly as well as for the fact
that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied
rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I
repeat, is the intervention of the three justices.
And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I
say again, the protestants as well as the protestees
could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will
receive the justice that they really deserve. If we
eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party
of the minority and that of the three justices, then we
shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the
party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in
practice that has not given good results. Many have
criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of
the majority in electoral cases x x x. I repeat that the
best guarantee lies in the fact that these questions will
be judged not only by three members of the majority
but also by three members of the minority, with the
additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three
justices of the Supreme Court. (The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263;
italics supplied.)

The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court,
in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139), he asserted:

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our

fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the
history and political development of other countries of the world.
When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the
exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their
own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that
body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that,
upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom 'ultimate
justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address,
March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the
purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members,
to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the
long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to
the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and
minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court, (Pp. 174-
175.)

As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates

Conejero and Roxas said:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir

informacion del Subcomite de Siete.

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a
la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema,
no cree su Señoria que este equivale practicamente a dejar el
asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision

esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como
los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema
considedaran la cuestion sabre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que
el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese,

podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la
minoria prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les darla el

triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169;
italics supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our
Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress,
was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of
election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this
purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the
largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of
votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given
the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal,
so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the
adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater
impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same
number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the
influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or
Tribunal with judicial temper.

This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under
consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido - who had moved to grant to Senator
Tañada the "privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of the party
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate - agrees with it. As
Senator Sumulong inquired:

x x x. I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers

of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral
Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a
preponderant majority in the Tribunal. (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; italics supplied.)

Senator Sabido replied:

That is so, x x x. (Id., p. 330.)

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:

x x x the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of

its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties
and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling
power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of
power. That is the ideal situation. (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; italics supplied.)

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were:

x x x. The intention is that when the three from the majority and
the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is
hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not
to protect the protestants or the protestees. It is hoped that they
will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial
function. But the framers of the Constitution besides being
learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators
like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we
should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say
that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our
party, so that in case that hope that the three from the majority
and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should
result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but
 they go there and vote along party lines, still there is the
guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be
that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three
Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the
protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is
to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the
decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote
will be wielded not by the Congressmen or Senators who are
members of the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who,
by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to
serve, either protestants or protestees. That is my understanding
of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they
decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.

xxxx

My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in

creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartiality and
independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by
never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and
secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will
be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or
motive to favor either protestant or protestee. (Congressional
Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; italics
supplied.)

Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but
rather maintains the balance of power between the members from the Judicial and
Legislative departments as envisioned by the framers of the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices is meant to tone down the political
nature of the cases involved and do away with the impression that party interests play
a part in the decision-making process.

Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence of at least one Justice and four
members of the Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices
are present, at least two members of the House of Representatives need to be present to
constitute a quorum. Without this rule, it would be possible for five members of the House
of Representatives to convene and have a quorum even when no Justice is present. This
would render ineffective the rationale contemplated by the framers of the
1935 and 1987 Constitutions for placing the Justices as members of the HRET. Indeed,
petitioner is nitpicking in claiming that Rule 6(a) unduly favors the Justices because
under the same rule, it is possible for four members of the House of Representatives
and only one Justice to constitute a quorum. Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does
not make the Justices indispensable members to constitute a quorum but ensures that
representatives from both the Judicial and Legislative departments are present to constitute
a quorum. Members from both the Judicial and Legislative departments become
indispensable to constitute a quorum. The situation cited by petitioner, that it is possible
for all the Justice-members to exercise denial or veto power over the proceedings
simply by absenting themselves, is speculative. As pointed out by the
HRET, this allegation also ascribes bad faith, without any basis, on the part of the
Justices.

The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution also provides that "
[t]he senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." This means that
only a Justice can chair the Electoral Tribunal. As such, there should always be one member
of the Tribunal who is a Justice. If all three Justice-members inhibit themselves
in a case, the Supreme Court will designate another Justice to chair the Electoral Tribunal
in accordance with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Contrary to petitioner's allegation, Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The equal protection clause is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.

The Court has explained that the equal protection clause of the Constitution allows
classification. The Court stated:

x x x. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of

classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.[8]

In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the
Supreme Court and the members of the House of Representatives. There are only three
Justice-members while there are six Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence, there is a
valid classification. The classification is justified because it was placed to ensure the
presence of members from both the Judicial and Legislative branches of the
government to constitute a quorum. There is no violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.

Ambiguity of Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69

Petitioner likewise questions Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69 of the 2015 HRET Rules for
being ambiguous, questionable, and undemocratic. Petitioner alleges:

x x x while the general rule requires that the "concurrence of at least five
(5) Members shall be necessary for the rendition of decisions . . ." in cases
where a "member inhibits or cannot take part in the deliberations," a mere
"majority of those remaining Members shall be sufficient."
 Thus, in case where there are only 5 constituting a quorum whereby at least
1 of the Members present thereat inhibit, a majority of the remaining four
may validly render a decision. In an extreme case where the 4 of the 5
present inhibit, the Rule allows that the decision of the remaining 1 member
shall be the decision of the Tribunal.

Applied to Petitioner in the cases against her pending with the HRET
whereby 2 justices inhibited themselves, in the event the 2 inhibiting
justices are present together with another justice and 2 other legislator-
members, these may qualify as a valid quorum because under Rule 6, their
mere "presence" is the only requirement. Therefore, the majority of the
remaining 3 members may vote and their decision shall be considered the
decision of the Tribunal. In case 1 of the remaining 3 opposes the measure,
only 2 votes actually represent the decision of the Tribunal. This may happen
even if those absent four (4) members may actually be against the decision,
but due to their absence, they were not able to vote.[9]

The ambiguity referred to by petitioner is absurd and stems from an erroneous

understanding of the Rules. As pointed out by the HRET in its Comment, a member of
the Tribunal who inhibits or is disqualified from participating in the deliberations cannot
be considered present for the purpose of having a quorum. In addition, Rule 69 clearly
shows that the Supreme Court and the House of Representatives have the authority to
designate a Special Member or Members who could act as temporary replacement or
replacements in cases where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibit from a
case or are disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a particular election
contest when the required quorum cannot be met. There is no basis to petitioner's
claim that a member who inhibits or otherwise disqualified can sit in the deliberations
to achieve the required quorum.

Actions of the Executive Committee

Rule 6(b) and 6(c) of the 2015 HRET Rules provide for instances when the members of
the tribunal can constitute themselves as an Executive Committee, thus:

Rule 6. Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in

Between Regular Meetings. -

xxxx

(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in
attendance, the Members present, who shall not be less than three (3), may
constitute themselves as an Executive Committee to act on the agenda for
the meeting concerned, provided, however, that its action shall be subject to
confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is
present.

(c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any
three (3) of its Members, provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice, who
 may sit as the Executive Committee, may act on the following matters
requiring immediate action by the Tribunal:

1. Any pleading or motion,

(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or

substantial damage or injury to the rights of a party or cause
delay in the proceedings or action concerned;

(b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect

the rights of the adverse party, such as one for extension of time
to comply with an order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a
pleading which is not a prohibited pleading and is within the
discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and

(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder

or any other similar pleading from any of the parties or their
attorneys;

2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications

or allocations of the appropriations of the Tribunal; and

3. Such other matters as may be delegated by the Tribunal.

However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of

business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its
confirmation.

The Rules clearly state that any action or resolution of the Executive Committee "shall
be included in the order of business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the
Tribunal for its confirmation." Hence, even if only three members of the HRET acted as
an Executive Committee, and even if all these three members are Justices of the
Supreme Court, their actions are subject to the confirmation by the entire Tribunal or at
least five of its members who constitute a quorum. The confirmation required by the
Rules should bar any apprehension that the Executive Committee would commit any
action arbitrarily or in bad faith. In addition, the Rules enumerated the matters,
requiring immediate action, that may be acted upon by the Executive Committee. Any
other matter that may be delegated to the Executive Committee under Rule 6(c)(3) has
to be decided by the entire Tribunal.

Qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives and Date of Filing

of Election Protest

Petitioner alleges that the HRET unduly expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Petitioner states that Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. According to petitioner,
Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides for the requisites to be considered a member
of the House of Representatives, as follows: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper
oath; and (3) assumption of office. In addition to these requisites, Rule 17 fixed the
time for the filing of an election protest within 15 days from June 30 of the election
year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later. Petitioner alleges
that these Rules will allow the COMELEC to assume jurisdiction between the time of the
election and within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual
assumption of office, whichever is later. Further, the requirements of a valid
proclamation and a proper oath will allow the COMELEC to look into these matters until
there is an actual assumption of office.

Under the 2015 HRET Rules, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
This is clear under the first paragraph of Rule 15.

Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.

To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be

a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a
proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.

HRET's jurisdiction is provided under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that "[t]he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members." There is no room for the
COMELEC to assume jurisdiction because HRET's jurisdiction is constitutionally
mandated.

The reckoning event under Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules, being dependent on the
taking of oath and the assumption of office of the winning candidate, is indeterminable.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for the losing candidate who intends to file an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto to keep track when the winning candidate took
his oath of office or when he assumed office. The date, time, and place of the taking of
oath depend entirely upon the winning candidate. The winning candidate may or may
not publicize his taking of oath and thus any candidate intending to file a protest will be
in a dilemma when to file the protest. The taking of oath can happen any day and any
time after the proclamation. As to the assumption of office, it is possible that, for one
reason or another, the winning candidate will not assume office at the end of the term
of his predecessor but on a later date that is unknown to the losing candidate.

However, the Court takes judicial notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018,
dated 20 September 2018,[10] the HRET amended Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET
Rules. As amended, Rules 17 and 18 now read:

RULE 17. Election Protest. - A verified protest contesting the election or

returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted
for the same office within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election
year, if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date.
 However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the
election year, a verified election protest shall be filed within fifteen (15) days
from the date of proclamation.

xxxx

RULE 18. Quo Warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto on the ground
of ineligibility may be filed by any registered voter of the congressional
district concerned, or any registered voter in the case of party-list
representatives, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year, if
the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date. However, if
the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30 of the election year, a
verified petition for quo warranto shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
the date of proclamation. The party filing the petition shall be designated as
the petitioner, while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.

xxxx

The amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules were made "with respect
to the reckoning point within which to file an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto, respectively, in order to further promote a just and expeditious determination
and disposition of every election contest brought before the Tribunal[.]"[11] The recent
amendments, which were published in The Philippine Star on 26 September 2018 and
took effect on 11 October 2018, clarified and removed any doubt as to the reckoning
date for the filing of an election protest. The losing candidate can determine with
certainty when to file his election protest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin,* Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Tijam, A. Reyes, Jr., J.

Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.
Peralta,* J., No part due to prior participation in the HRET.
Jardeleza, J., on official business.
Gesmundo, J., on leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on October 16, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on October 26, 2018 at 10:04 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
 EDGAR O.
ARICHETA
Clerk of Court

* No part. Members of the HRET who approved the 2015 Revised Rules of the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

[1] Rollo, pp. 72-104.

[2] Id. at 111-113.

[3] Id. at 115-116.

[4] Record of the Constitutional Commission, No. 34, 19 July 1986, p. 111.

[5] Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. IV, p. 505.

[6] See Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1079-1080 (1957).

[7] Id. at 1078-1084. Italicization in the original.

[8] Garcia v. Judge Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 90-91 (2013).

[9] Rollo, p. 20.

[10] Signed by Associate Justices Diosdado M. Peralta (Chairperson), Mariano C. Del

Castillo, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Representatives Jorge T. Almonte, Rodel M.

Batocabe, Abigail Faye C. Ferriol-Pascual, and Joaquin M. Chipeco, Jr.

[11] Fourth WHEREAS clause of Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library

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