SYMPOSIUM SERIES No.

147 © IChemE

SAFETY PROVISIONS AND LPG

Marc Caumont and Sylvie Ponthieu
Institut National de l’Environnement Industriel et des Risques,
Parc Technologique ALATA, BP 2, 60550 Verneuil-en-Halatte, France

The safety of an industrial site depends in particular on the characteristics of the

safety devices employed and the equipment installed.
In France, the safety evaluation of an installation is carried out, in particular, through
hazard analysis. However, the absence of objective criteria for safety device
evaluation makes the task difficult. Different pieces of equipment that assure the,
same function don’t necessarily have the same safety level.
Consequently, INERIS undertook a study including:
- an outline of the various practices based on an inventory of French regulation and a
comparison with regulations applied in other European countries,
- an accidentology allowing one to focus on some important safety devices,
- a description of the various devices that can be encountered on a L.P.G site,
accompanied by a collection of descriptive boards of safety devices used with
L.P.G.,
- a presentation of the concept of devices that are “ Important For Safety ”, with
definitions of commonly-used terms,
- a presentation of some approaches for taking into account safety devices in the
evaluation of the risks or specific methods used for the evaluation of a L.P.G. site.

Keywords: L.P.G., safety device

INTRODUCTION
In 1997 there were 95 establishments in France storing at least 300 cubic metres (m³) of LPG
(exclusively butane and propane) not including the underground storage sites.
Some 90% of these 95 sites were created between 1956 and 1975.
These sites have over 300,000 m³ of storage capacity made up as follows :
• Mounded tanks : 23,600 m³ (10 sites),

• Above ground spherical tanks : 220,000 m³ (68 sites),

• Cylindrical tanks : 27,000 m³ (49 sites),

• Cryogenic tanks : 60,000 m³ (3 tanks on a single site).

Four operators account for 54 of these sites ; chemical firms and refineries operate 15 of them.
The remaining 26 sites are where LPG is used as a utility for heating plants, industrial
furnaces, and so on, for a variety of activities.
There are at least about 182 spheres (100 containing butane and 82 propane), 200 horizontal
tanks and 2 vertical cryogenic tanks (35,000 and 20,000 m³). The capacity of the spheres
varies from 300 to 5,000 m³. Mounded tanks include horizontal tanks some of which have
substantial capacity (3,000 m³) and spheres (from 1,000 to 3,500 m³). In France there are also
23 industrial sites (essentially in the chemical industry) storing products similar to LPG (for
example, butadiene) with tank capacities ranging from 80 to 9,000 m³.

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In the current situation of technological change INERIS is undertaking a study for the French
Ministry of Environment (MATE) in the following five areas :
• A description of the different types of industrial facilities in France using LPG,

specifying the different industrial practices involved,

• An inventory of the principal current regulatory requirements in different European

countries (notably the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy) and a comparison with
French requirements,
• The feedback of experience based upon an analysis of industrial accidents involving

LPG,
• Identifying systems which are important to safety,

• An evaluation of the consequences of various accident scenarios according to the safety

systems present on the installation.

This study is still in progress. Hereafter some extracts of the sections covering an overview of
French LPG sites, the comparison of regulations and the feedback of experience are briefly
presented.

OVERVIEW OF FRENCH INDUSTRIAL SITES UTILISING LPG

The French sites utilising LPG can be subdivided into 7 main categories :
• Refineries (producing and storing LPG and distributing it to “buffer” and/or operating

sites) ;
• “Buffer” sites (receiving and storing LPG and distributing it to operating sites) ;

• Operating sites (receiving and storing LPG and distributing to clients and to “local

depots”) consisting of :
™filling centres (distributing LPG in bulk, “packaging” and distributing cylinders) ;
™intermediate depots (distributing only bulk LPG) ;
• So-called “local depots” (receiving and storing LPG and distributing it in bulk to

clients), which are similar to the intermediate depots but store smaller quantities
(storage capacity < 120 m³).
• Industrial sites employing LPG as a utility for an industrial process (for example,

heating plants, industrial furnaces, and so on).

• Chemical sites employing LPG as a raw material.

• The cosmetic industry employing LPG as a propellant gas (aerosols).

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In the following we shall disregard industrial sites employing LPG as a raw material, utility or
propellant gas. Some characteristics of the different types of French industrial site where
activities are entirely or partly focused on LPG are given in the following table :

Type of Type of Type of tank LPG entry LPG Remarks Site

site location despatch workforce
Refinery Large Spheres (>10) - Pipe Despatches >100
industrial horizontal (Internal) Ships frequently (firemen on
complex tanks (>10) Wagons made by the site)
Trucks independent
sites
“Buffer” Large Spheres Pipe Wagons Entry by >20
site industrial Refrigerated Ship Trucks truck very
complex tanks rare.
Underground
cavities
Filling Industrial Spheres (<10) Pipe Trucks For About 20
centre zone or Horizontal Wagons packaged
suburban tanks (<10) Trucks LPG, the
zone cylinders
are
despatched
by truck.
Interme_ Industrial Spheres (1 or Wagons Trucks Of the
diate zone or 2) Trucks order of 2
depot suburban Horizontal
zone tanks (<4)
Local Suburban 1 horizontal Trucks Trucks -
depot zone tank (volume
< 120 m³)

Overview of French LPG sites

This table illustrates the general trends for the various industrial configurations that exist. Of
course, there are exceptions, notably concerning the number and type of storage tanks.

TANK EQUIPMENT
For the tanks themselves, French regulations require to mound them (for capacity greater then
500 m3). This makes it possible to reduce safety distances for major accident scenarios. Quite
a number of the existing spheres have been “mounded” by being covered with “TEXSOL”
(special blend of sand and synthetic fibres). Use of this technique has allowed continued use
of sites that were threatened by housing developments. More than a dozen industrial sites
have used this technique for protecting their spheres.

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Apart from the safety fundamentals – proper pressure vessel design, provision for hydraulic
and seismic loading, and so on – the strategies applied with respect to tank auxiliaries have
the following objectives :
• to limit any spread of product,

• to protect the tanks against any thermal effects,

• to a lesser degree, to protect the tanks from impact missiles.

The safe state for tanks is attained by remote controlled safety valves on each connections that
close automatically if gas or a flame is detected on site. In addition, the liquid outlet
connections are fitted with internal remote controlled safety valves (usually hydraulically
operated). Bunds are the rule around above ground tanks.
Thermal and mechanical protection is attained by adding one metre of earth or an equivalent
thickness of TEXSOL (60 centimetres). For above ground tanks, protection against thermal
effects is provided by a spray system (10 litres/m².min).
Regarding the protection against missile impact, mounded tanks (under earth or TEXSOL).
are inherently safe. Above ground tanks - most French LPG tanks are of this type - do not
meet this safety objective apart from a few rare exceptions (when tanks are protected by a
concrete wall or dome)

INVENTORY AND COMPARISON OF LPG REGULATIONS

GENERAL
The different regulations or “reference documents” specific to LPG facilities were
summarised for five countries : the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium and
France.
Of the five countries considered, only Belgium(1), Italy(2) and France(3) have specific
regulations for LPG facilities. The respective sources are given in chapter referneces.
In the Netherlands, the directive “LPG distribution depots”(4) serves as the basis for defining
the regulatory requirements governing the issue and renewal of licences for operating such
installations.
In the United Kingdom, two reference documents(5) may be used, one from the Health &
Safety Executive, and the other from the British Institute of Petroleum. However these two
documents provide guidance and do not have the force of law.
It may be noted that general or particular legislation not specific to LPG facilities may contain
requirements that also apply to such facilities. Such legislation is disregarded in this study.
Our inventory was drawn up using, first, the above documents and, secondly, information
obtained from industry and government representatives in the countries concerned.
Notwithstanding this, the inventory should not be regarded as exhaustive.
Apart from the classification of products, the main items dealt with in these regulations are :
• Rules for the location of tanks

™Distances from establishment boundaries

™Distances between tanks
• Protection of water

• Firefighting measures

• Gas detection

• Control valves

• Relief valves

• Level measurements

• Pressure measurements

• Temperature measurements

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As an example, the following table summarises the situation as to the regulatory requirements
for safety valves on liquid outlets from tanks.

1st valve 2nd valve Comments

France Motorised, Motorised Fail safe
inside the tank
Netherlands Manual, Motorised, Fail safe
(recommended) as close to tank as as close as possible
possible, to 1st valve
1st flange welded
United Kingdom Motorised, Motorised, Fire safe
(recommended) or excess flow if 1st valve manual
valve,
or non-return valve
Belgium Motorised - Fail safe
non-return valve
Italy Liquid outlet : Excess flow valve Fire safe
manual Non-return valve Valves designed
Liquid outlet: for
manual P > 40 bar

Summary of regulatory requirements for valves on liquid outlets

This comparison reveals appreciable differences in approach between the different countries
considered. In France for example, internal valves are required on liquid outlets while the
other countries considered have opted for safety devices outside the tank.

LPG ACCIDENTS
Accidents are unfortunately a prime consideration from the safety standpoint, whether in
terms of prevention, protection or control. The accident analysis performed is based mainly on
information available in the “ARIA” database(6). It was done for each zone of activity – for
example storage, transfer (loading/unloading), cylinder filling, etc., and also for each type of
phenomenon : BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion), explosion and fire.
The following summary refers only to the analysis of accidents occurring during LPG transfer
operations involving tanker trucks or wagons.

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REVIEW OF ACCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING LPG LOADING OR UNLOADING

Statistical analysis
The statistical analysis of LPG accidents occurring during loading or unloading covers a
sample of 33 events, most of the data being taken from the ARIA database. These events took
place in the period 1951 to 1998. Although the sample is on the small side, we shall try to
deduce the main trends. A breakdown of where the accidents took place is shown below.

Filling
center or
depot Private
31% premises
40%

Industrial Others
clients 16%
13%

Distribution of accidents by type of location

It will be seen that the processes of unloading LPG on private premises and industrial sites (in
bulk) alone account for over half (53%) of the events listed. In both these circumstances,
transfer is practically always done using equipment carried on the tanker trucks (pumps, hoses
on reels, etc.). It should be borne in mind that a truck serving private clients (capacity limited
to 6 or 9 tonnes) fills up at the filling centre or depot and then delivers supplies to an average
of 10 clients. The number of unloading operations by these trucks at private premises far
exceeds the number of their loading operations at LPG centres.
Ten accident events are listed in connection with operations at these LPG centres. The two
earliest events (Port Newmark in 1951 and Brinkley in 1957) shown in the “others” category
could probably be included with them.
No particular analysis of the geographical location of the accidents was done since those
reported by the different sources are strongly influenced by the availability of information. In
fact the proportion of the accidents taking place in Europe and North America is very high
compared with other parts of the world. Here it is interesting to note that countries, like
Russia, apparently had very few accidents. As a result the list is not exhaustive since a
number of accidents probably took place with no report being published either by the media
or the international organisations.
As to the time distribution of the events, the number of cases reported appears to rise steadily
as time passes : 50% of the accidents have been in the last 10 years. This observation is
probably related to the growth of safety policies and the enhanced media attention for
accidents and incidents that impose a wider circulation of information.

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Phenomena observed
These have been classified into five categories :

Phenomenon
1. Liquid spreading on the ground
2. Gas phase leak without ignition
3. Jet (or pool) fire
4. Gas or vapour explosion
5. BLEVE of a tank

Phenomena used as a basis for classifying accidents

It is worth noting that phenomena 1 and 2 can be precursors of 3 or 4, while the flare (or pool)
fire can be the precursor of 5 (a BLEVE). In other words, a leak of flammable product
(whether liquefied or not) may ignite well after it spreads. The following figure shows the
different phenomena involved. The phenomenon shown in the following classification is the
most significant one noted during the accident (for a leak followed by a fire, this type of
accident is placed in the fire category).

Spreading liquid
Gas leak 0%
without ignition Explosion
20% 24%

Jet or pool fire

20% BLEVE
36%

Distribution of events by observed phenomena

Thus it can be seen that the main phenomenon characterising accidents during LPG transfer
operations is a leak followed by ignition of the cloud formed, which in most cases (60%)
leads to the effect of overpressure (24%) or a fireball (BLEVE : 36%). However ignition
didn’t occurred in 20% of the cases reported.
The two phenomena of fire and explosion (including BLEVE), which of course regularly
occur together, account for more than two thirds of the accidents (80%).
For the cases listed it will be seen that a leak is usually accompanied by the formation of a
cloud that drifts with the prevailing wind. The ignition of this cloud at a distance (possibly at
a considerable distance) is followed by a “flame return” that can cause fire under the road or
rail tanker or tankers or its immediate vicinity.

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The known BLEVEs listed in the literature result, in all the cases listed above, from a fire
heating the tank, leading to an increase in pressure and mechanical failure. This phenomenon
therefore affects ordinary above ground tanks, i.e., those where the shell has little or no
protection from thermal effects. Among the accidents listed, inadequate means of protection
are regularly identified as decisive in the development of an accident sequence towards a
BLEVE.
Explosions of flammable gases are the result of a gas leak followed by ignition of the cloud if
this is wholly or partly enclosed in a confined space. A large number of experiments have
shown that the ignition of a gas cloud in free space, in the case of LPG, does not generate
significant overpressure that is harmful to the environment. This is confirmed by accident
reports. Indeed this condition of partial containment is probably the reason why most
explosions of combustible gas (with the appearance of overpressure effects) concern
production units, where there is usually a high density of equipment (with seals, valves, etc.)
in a small volume, or leaks on customer’s premises, for example when the cloud has entered a
dwelling. Of course in these cases the explosion of the cloud could cause damage and leaks to
the other tanks or mobile tankers (the domino effect).
Finally we may note that only one of the listed events mentions an incident that did not give
rise to a leak and that no report mentions the presence of LPG in the liquid phase on the
ground.

The severity of accidents

This was evaluated simply by dividing the accidents into two categories :
• Accidents not resulting in casualties.

• Accidents resulting in casualties.

Some 55% of the accidents did not result in casualties. In 15 of the listed cases there were
casualties (injury or death) and the phenomena responsible are shown in the figure below.

BLEVE
Others 13% Explosio
33% n
20%
Fire
34%

Causes of injury or death

Fire (excluding fireballs) is the main cause of casualties with 5 accidents. The victims were
people present in the gas cloud when it ignited. The “other” category (5 cases) mainly
contains accidents for which there is no information as to the cause of casualties (4 cases) and,
in the 5th case, the operator had a fall following a leakage of LPG.
These 15 accidents were responsible for a total of 236 victims with 26 deaths and 210 injured.
It is worth pointing out that two events resulting in a BLEVE alone accounted for 14 deaths
and 144 injured.

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However accidents occurring at LPG loading or unloading points do not always lead to loss of
life. Thus on 1 April 1990 an accident occurred in an LPG filling centre at SYDNEY
(Australia) during a process where the product was being transferred from a road tanker to a
storage tank. A fire started and led to a BLEVE in a cylindrical 50 tonne LPG tank and a
tanker truck. About 10,000 people were evacuated and the neighbouring airport temporarily
closed, but there were no victims.

The causes of accidents

As to the causes and circumstances of the 33 accidents listed, we identified the following
seven causes set out in the table :

1. Hose failure
2. Failure of mobile tanker component
3. Failure of connecting system
4. Failure in break away coupler
5. Truck departed while connected
6. Human error
7. Other causes

Types of causes-circumstances considered

Any accident, even if it affects a whole area, is usually caused by a particular action or
system. In the present case therefore, we looked into the nature of the causes and separated
the main groups of causes-circumstances occurring. Their distribution is shown in the
following figure.

Failure of
Hose failure tanker
9% component
18% Tanker
Others
43% departed while
connected
6%
Failure in
Human error Breakaway connecting
12% coupler failure
system
6%
6%

Breakdown by type of cause-circumstance

The classification is based upon the precursor event. Lots of causes are identified. However
the relatively large number of accidents (6 cases) involving the failure of systems on road or
rail tankers will be noted. Hose failures account for 6% of cases (2 events) as do the failures
of connecting systems or a breakaway coupler, or leaks resulting from the road tanker’s
leaving while still connected to the fixed installations. As regards failures of connecting
systems, it is worth noting that the two events reported concern the operations of filling
clients’ tanks for which the connecting systems are much smaller (1¼”) than those used on
LPG sites (2” and 3”).

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Human error, which could also have been identified as a major cause in the case of tankers
departing when still connected, covers two types of error in this classification:
• Opening the wrong line, allowing product to discharge to atmosphere (2 accidents in

Germany).
• Operator error leading to the bursting of a hose, for example the accident at Divonnes-

les-Bains or the discharge of product when liquid was being taken from a client’s tank
(the accident at Mouans-Sartoux).

Feedback of experience
In view of the small number of accidents listed, and taking into consideration the variety of
possible scenarios, we must point out that the preventive, protective or control measures
referred to in this paragraph are not the only ones taken at loading or unloading facilities on
French LPG sites.
The accidents listed are usually characterised :
• by a leak either from the road or rail tanker or from the fixed installation,

• by the ignition of the cloud, often outside the site,

• by the means of control, notably spray systems, frequently inoperative either through

their design or as a result of damage when the accident sequence began.

From these facts it is clear that the objectives as regards measures of prevention, protection
and control should be :
• to employ high quality and reliable systems,

• to minimise any accidental releases of product,

• to cool tanks to prevent their bursting in the event of ignition.

The measures described below are guided by these objectives.

For the fixed installation

Hoses
A few accidents have occurred on site during the transfer of liquefied gases. A good number
of these involved hoses, a technique no longer employed on French LPG sites except for one
or two where they are used for the gas phase. For both loading and unloading operations on
LPG sites, articulated metal arms are the rule both for road and rail tankers.
Each transfer arm is usually fitted with two automatic isolating devices and the transfer zones
are under continuous surveillance for gas leaks or heat sources. These aspects are described
below.
It will be noted that hoses are still used for the operations of loading and unloading liquefied
toxic gases such as ammonia, chlorine, and so on.

One-way valves
These are useful only when tanker trucks or wagons are being unloaded. In these
circumstances the one-way valve can substantially limit the quantities of product discharged
to the atmosphere from the fixed installations. This passive system has the advantage of a
short response time but serves no purpose in the case of fire or increased temperature. To be
effective, it should be fitted as close as possible to the base of the arm, just before or after the
motorised valve at that point.

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Breakaway coupler
The causes of accidents include the unexpected movement of the road or rail tanker during
loading or unloading. Whatever the cause of the movement of the tanker whose product is
being transferred, the presence of breakaway coupler ensures that the mechanically weak
point of the system consisting of the road or rail tanker, its pipework, the articulated arm and
the fixed installation, lies between two automatic isolating valves.
The breakaway coupler should have the following two characteristics :
• It should create a weak point in the transfer arm that will fail under abnormal stress.

• An automatically closing isolating valve is positioned at both sides of this weak point.

This arrangement can limit the amount of LPG discharged to the atmosphere, if the valve is
open, to a few hundred grammes.
It will be noted that two accidents arising from malfunctions of such breakaway coupler are
listed in this study. They occured before the system has been modified.

Gas and fire detectors

Product transfer systems should be located in areas where there is continuous detection of :
• gas

• flame

• heat

It is of course extremely difficult to determine the best detection positions particularly for
flames and gas.

Gas detection
Gases are usually detected using sensors with two alarm concentration levels : 20% and 50%
of the Lower Flammable Limit for the gases, and which generally lead to :
• 20% LFL : audible and visible alarm,

• 50% LFL : audible and visible alarm, with the site setup in safe condition by closing the

motorised safety valves at the base of the arms and all motorised safety valves of all
types on the site, and possibly automatic spraying of the installations.

Flame detection
This can involve flame detectors (of the infrared or other type). Detection of flames by a
sensor should, besides raising an alarm, at least put the site in a safe condition and possibly
initiate automatic spraying of the installations.

Detection of heat
Due consideration should be given to the potential ignition of a flammable gas cloud, as
indicated by the accidents listed in this study. To limit the consequences of such an event each
motorised valve at the base of the arm (and indeed all the motorised valves on the site) should
be placed in a safe position automatically in the event of any rise in temperature in their
immediate vicinity. If the valves are operated pneumatically, this objective can be achieved by
introducing a compressed air supply pipe which, over the last few metres before the actuator,
is made of a meltable material. Then any substantial rise in temperature (about 80°C) in the
vicinity of the valve will melt its supply pipe and lead to the automatic closure of the
motorised valve.

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For mobile tankers

Railway tankers
Rail tankers have two nozzles at the bottom of the tank, one for the liquid phase and one for
the gas phase (fitted with an extension tube opening into the gas phase). Each nozzle has :
• a stop valve, inside the tanker, which can only be opened and kept open by pulling on

the operating lever ; this is done by introducing a hook secured to the valve operating
lever (or to the extension cable) and to the rail track, in order to maintain a continuous
pull on the valve operating lever;
• a manual valve.

Removal of the hook, for any reason, leads to the automatic closure of the stop valve under
the effect of the closure springs it contains.
Three types of hook may be encountered :
• mechanical,

• pneumatic,

• electromagnetic.

The hooks, whether of mechanical or other design, are automatically released if the rail tanker
should be accidentally moved, causing the automatic closure of the valves at the bottom of the
rail tanker. However the motorised hooks (pneumatic or electromagnetic) have the advantage
that they can be operated by gas or fire detectors and by pressing an emergency stop button,
which means that the placing of the rail tankers being loaded or unloaded in a safe condition
can be incorporated in the general process of placing the site in a safe condition.
Mechanical hooks on the other hand, if a leak should occur without wagon movement, can
only be operated by a cable some 30 metres in length (usually) and on condition that the cable
is not in the gas cloud.
Finally, we should mention an original technique which, instead of fixing up the hook on the
rail, employs a pneumatic hook-retaining bar, a technique that has been systematically applied
to sites. The system consists of a bar parallel to the rail and near to it, held in this position by
being clamped axially by a pneumatic jack. The hook is then secured to this bar rather than to
the rail.
Any detection of gas, flames or heat (by the meltable pipe supplying compressed air to the
jack that retains the bar) or actuation of one of the emergency stop buttons on the site, releases
the hook retaining bar, thus causing the automatic and instantaneous closure of the valve or
valves at the bottom of the rail tanker or wagons.

Where the hooks are motorised or attached to a bar retained in position pneumatically, it is no
longer necessary to use a chain or cable to remotely operate the hook.
Some of the advantages of motorised hooks are the following :
• They have been proven on a number of sites.

• These systems are integrated into the site safety scheme, since they operate

automatically if gas or flame is detected or an emergency stop actuated.

• They are fail safe devices, since in the event of an anomaly they take up a safe position.

• These devices are easily tested.

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Tanker trucks
Every nozzle (liquid or gas) on road tankers (small and large bulk carriers) is fitted with an
internal safety valve usually operated hydraulically. These valves close automatically in case
of fire thanks to the presence of a fuse plug. However the closure of these safety devices
cannot be integrated into the automatic site safety scheme. This aspect deserves close
attention.

Cooling systems on mobile tankers

Faulty operation or weaknesses of cooling systems in installation are often blamed when
scenarios develop catastrophically (into a BLEVE). LPG loading and unloading units are not
usually fitted with fixed spray systems. Only those sites where fixed tanks have been
mounded are usually fitted with such systems, the embankment of fixed tanks (on existing
sites) releasing substantial amounts of firefighting water. Both rail and road tankers are very
frequently fitted with a sunscreen. Small tanker trucks (that fill up at LPG sites) are provided
with a rear locker containing the different components to be protected. Rail tankers are fitted
with skirts at the bottom where the tanker is secured to the chassis. The effectiveness of fixed
spray systems could therefore be significantly and adversely affected by these arrangements.
Accordingly spray systems should combine fixed installations (headers) and judiciously
located fire hydrants so as to be able to spray all the road or rail tankers involved as well as
local areas not cooled by the fixed installations.
In order to help the cooling of rail tankers, it is preferable not to place two trains side by side
because in that case effective spraying of the arms (between the two trains) and the wagon
nozzles is extremely difficult if not practically impossible.
The time taken to start up fixed systems (fixed headers) should be as short as possible.
Automatic spraying, initiated by the gas or flame detection systems (at the very least) would
probably ensure effectiveness.

LESSONS
Except in the two cases of accidents concerning failure of the breakaway coupler, one can
note that the installations blamed in the accident reports were not usually fitted with the safety
systems described above.
In concluding this chapter on the feedback of experience concerning LPG loading and
unloading operations, it may be noted that in the absence of satisfactory safety arrangements
on these installations, two main phenomena may occur :
• explosion or ignition of a gas cloud following the accidental release of LPG to the

atmosphere ,
• a BLEVE in a mobile tanker.

CONCLUSION

This study is intended to provide the French Ministry of Environment with a reference base
regarding regulatory trends in a few neighbouring countries concerning the best industrial
practice. It may also provide guidance for developing French regulations for LPG.

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REFERENCES
(1) - Belgium
“Arrêté royal concernant les dépôts, en réservoirs fixes non réfrigérés, de gaz propane et de
gaz butane liquéfiés commerciaux ou leurs mélanges“ - 21 October 1968

(2) - Italy
Approvazione della regola tecnica di prevenzione incendi per la progettazione, la costruzione,
l’installazione e l’esercizio dei depositi di G.P.L. in serbatoi fissi dicapacità complessiva
superiore a 5 m3 e/o in recipienti mobili di capacità complessiva superiore a 5,000 kg”
Ministerial Decree of 13 October 1994 (Ministry of the Interior) -

(3) - France
x “ Arrêté du 9 novembre 1972, règles d'aménagement et d'exploitation des dépôts
d'hydrocarbures liquéfiés“ - - Ministère de l’industrie
x “Arrêté du 09 novembre 1989, relatif aux conditions d’éloignement auxquelles est
subordonnée la délivrance de l’autorisation des nouveaux réservoirs de gaz combustibles
liquéfiés“ - Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement
x “Arrêté ministériel du 10 mai 1993 (Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de
l’Environnement), relatif au stockage de gaz inflammables liquéfiés sous pression“ -
Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement

(4) - The Netherlands

“LPG distribution depots (Butane, propane, and their mixtures thereof)” Directive issued by
the Committee on the Prevention of Disasters due to Hazardous Materials (CPR) – 1994

(5) - United Kingdom

x “The storage of LPG at fixed installations, brochure SHG 34 (1987)” - Health & Safety
Executive – UK
x “Liquefied Petroleum Gas – part 9 (February 1987)” - British Institute of Petroleum – UK

(6) - ARIA
database of the French Ministry of Environment – Direction de la Prévention des Pollutions et
des Risques – Service de l’Environnement Industriel – Bureau d’Analyse des Risques et
Pollutions Industrielles

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