Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice

Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 9

December 1989

Arguments against Joint Custody

Dianne Post

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Recommended Citation
Dianne Post, Arguments against Joint Custody, 4 Berkeley Women's L.J. 316 (1989).

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http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38CW13

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Arguments Against
Joint Custody
Dianne Postt

I. INTRODUCTION

In my practice, I have seen the sad results of a joint custody mania

which is sweeping the courts. Joint custody is popularly seen as the solu-
tion to the divided family: the parents may divorce, but the children
remain legally and emotionally "married" to both.
Unfortunately, joint custody is more often an arrangement designed
to protect the divorcing father's rights rather than the best interests of
the children. Fathers are often economically motivated, since they are
often successful in reducing their child support obligations by seeking
joint custody orders. Allegedly since they have joint custody, they are
providing half of the cost of caring for that child. However, the tendency
of the fathers in joint custody arrangements is to leave the children with
their mother during the father's physical custody time. Not only does
this cause psychological harm to the children and inconvenience to the
mother, it costs the mother money. She must feed and entertain the
child for the extra time that the father had agreed to spend with the
child. Thus, the fathers retain control and get rights with no
responsibility.
The following is a guide to resources about the negative effects of
joint custody for practitioners arguing against this arrangement.' It dis-
cusses the psychological effects on children of joint custody, situations in
which the award is inappropriate or dangerous, and the legal status of
joint custody. The sources listed below represent some of the strongest
arguments made against the casual awarding of joint custody.

t Attorney, Arizona Coalition against Domestic Violence. M.A. Psychology, 1973, San Jose
State University; J.D. 1979, University of Wisconsin, Madison. Post has represented battered
women for eleven years.
Because this article is essentially a research guide, the citations are in the body of the piece
instead of segregated to foottnotes.

BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

ARGUMENTS AGAINST JOINT CUSTODY

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES

In recent years, several psychological studies have been done which
identify specific family situations where joint custody has proven not to
be in the child's best interest. These studies indicate that where certain
factors are present in the family, the emotional health of children who
have been the subject of joint custody arrangements has deteriorated.
Influenced by the indications of these studies, numerous courts have held
that the presence of these circumstances alone means that joint custody is
inappropriate. These decisions are discussed in section IV, below.
In McKinnon and Wallerstein, Joint Custody and the Preschool
Child, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW, 169 (1986), the authors
report the findings of a study regarding joint custody arrangements in
twenty-five families with children aged fourteen months to five years.
The authors first point out that, although all of the families had opted for
joint custody voluntarily rather than through a court order, various rea-
sons existed for their choices. Even though courts assume that the par-
ents' desire to nurture the child by continuing contact is the primary
reason that divorcing couples seek joint custody, this is true in only one-
third of the cases. Parents had practical and economic reasons in addi-
tion to emotional ones. Sometimes the parents' practical considerations
were more compelling than their emotional ones. Parents selected joint
custody for the following reasons:
1. Each parent had only a partial commitment to the child;
2. Each parent's workplace demands rendered joint custody
practicable;
3. The parent who opposed the divorce, especially if feeling humil-
iated or rejected, saw joint custody as a means of holding onto the mari-
tal relationship or of denying the divorce;
4. The parent who was seeking the divorce was aware and con-
cerned about the suffering the other spouse was experiencing and thus
used joint custody as restitution to "soften the blow."
McKinnon and Wallerstein note the factors which they found
affected the emotional health of a child in a joint custody arrangement.
The most important factors in creating a positive situation for the child
were whether both parents could sustain a strong commitment to the
child and whether they could cooperate with each other on childrearing
decisions. Unfortunately, the authors found that such cooperation
between divorcing parents was rare. (McKinnon at 176-7) Another
important factor was the parent's remaining doubts over whether or not
joint custody was appropriate. Those parents in the sample who came to
joint custody as a result of mediation were resentful that the arrangement
was never really their idea and doubted it could work. When time did
not dispel their doubts, their children did poorly.
 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

Other important factors influencing the outcome of the joint custody

arrangement were whether or not parental disagreement and overt hostil-
ity existed; whether or not the couple's parenting style or values were
extremely different; whether or not one parent was using the child as a
replacement for the marital partner; and whether or not, and how soon,
the parents entered into new romantic relationships.
Finally, McKinnon and Wallerstein report on the adjustment and
experiences of the children of the twenty-five sample families. First, joint
custody did not protect any of the children from experiencing the grief
and anxiety common to young children when parents divorce: "Joint
custody did not sustain the illusion of an intact family." (McKinnon at
180) Second, of the seven very young children between the ages of one
and three years, three adjusted well to the divorce, while four did not.
For the four unhappy children, continuing parental conflict, inappropri-
ate nurturing and structure, and excessive drinking by one parent were
the reasons. Third, of the nineteen children between the ages of three
and five years, three coped well with the divorce and sixteen did not. For
those who did not, new parental relationships, "disorganized" parents,
disinterested parents, violent parents, and substance abusive parents were
the reasons. The authors also suggest that the greater difficulty the older
children had in adjusting to joint custody, may have been due to the
greater complexity of their pre-school lives. (McKinnon at 180)
A report by Steinman, Zemmelman and Knoblauch, A Study of Par-
ents Who Sought Joint Custody Following Divorce: Who Reaches Agree-
ment and Sustains Joint Custody and Who Returns to Court, 24 JOURNAL
OF AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY, 554-62 (1985), con-
tains findings similar to those reported in McKinnon and Wallerstein's
study. The Steinman study followed forty-eight joint custody families.
One year after joint custody was established, thirteen of the families were
placed in an outcome category labeled "Successful," twenty were placed
in a category labeled "Stressed," and fifteen were placed in a category
labeled "Failed." "Successful" parents who most easily mastered the
tasks demanded by the joint custody arrangement displayed the follow-
ing qualities:
1. Maintained respect and appreciation for the bond between their
children and former spouses, despite the anger and disappointment from
the failed marriages.
2. Maintained some objectivity through the divorcing process, at
least in relation to the children.
3. Empathized with the point of view of the children and of the
other parents.
4. Shifted emotional expectations of the spouses from the role of
mate to that of co-parent.
5. Established new role boundaries.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST JOINT CUSTODY

6. Generally had high self-esteem, flexibility, and openness to help.

7. Believed that their ex-spouses were good parents.
Additionally, these families resorted to litigation and lawyers far less fre-
quently than the families with less successful results. These families pre-
ferred to solve their own problems as a way of protecting their co-
parenting relationship from outside stress.
The parental characteristics that led to a failed outcome for the joint
custody arrangement included:
1. Intense, continuing hostility and conflict with the spouse that
spilled over onto the child.
2. Overwhelming anger and the continuing need to punish the
spouse.
3. A history of physical abuse.
4. A history of substance abuse.
5. A fixed belief that the spouse is a bad parent.
6. An inability to separate their own feelings and needs from those
of the child.
This study, like that of McKinnon and Wallerstein, concluded that
in certain instances, such as where physical, verbal, or substance abuse is
present, joint custody fails.
A third study by Irving, Benjamin, & Trocme, Shared Parenting:
An EmpiricalAnalysis Utilizing a Large Canadian Data Base, in JOINT
CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING (J. Fulberg ed. 1984) deals with 201
parents (75 couples and 51 individuals) who shared custody. In this
study, the vast majority of participants said they were satisfied or
extremely satisfied with the arrangement. The parents who were signifi-
cantly less satisfied with the custody arrangement:
1. Came to shared parenting through court action or involvement;
2. Reported a greater level of guilt over the marital break-up;
3. Had a higher level of pre-separation conflict;
4. Had spent a shorter length of time in the shared parenting
arrangement than the more satisfied parents.
Generally, the authors conclude that joint custody does not work
for the child where overt parental conflict exists. Although the data sup-
ports the viability of joint custody as an option, the authors' data sup-
ports the need to differentiate between those families for whom it is
appropriate and those for whom it is not.
A fourth study, Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint
Custody Arrangement." A Report of a Study, 51 AMER. J. ORTHOP-
SYCHIAT. 403 (1981), involved families who arranged joint custody extra-
judicially and who maintained it over a number of years. The author
found that, while the parents were generally satisfied, the children's expe-
rience was more mixed. In this group of highly motivated and satisfied
 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

parents, about one-third of the children were having significant adjust-

ment problems and appeared to feel "overburdened by the demands and
requirements" of the arrangement, even after a number of years. (Stein-
man at 414) The author concluded that:
1. Joint custody arrangements should be made with an emphasis
on the child's individual needs and capacities.
2. Further research is necessary to better understand which chil-
dren and parents will benefit from joint custody.
3. Factors which appeared to make joint parenting work were:
a. commitment to the arrangement;
b. parents' mutual support and respect for each other as
parents;
c. flexible and cooperative sharing of responsibility.
In summary, the studies on how children fare in joint custody
arrangements indicate that in some instances joint custody is totally inap-
propriate and will not foster a climate of growth and well being for the
child. The most obvious situations in which joint custody will not be in a
child's best interest are where domestic violence has occurred, where
overt continual conflict exists between the parents, where a parent has
substance abuse problems, where the* court, rather than the parties,
decide that joint custody is the answer, and where a parent is using joint
custody as a means of denying the divorce.

III. LEGAL PRECEDENT

A. California Legislation
In 1980, California became the first state to adopt a statute that was
interpreted by courts and practitioners as favoring joint custody.
Cal.Civ. § 4600 (West 1983). The statute's stated goal was "to assure
minor children of frequent and continuing contact" with both parents.
Toward this end, joint custody was listed as the first custody arrange-
ment to be considered by the court. Cal.Civ. § 4600(a). In 1988, after
an examination of the results of the joint custody legislation, California
became the first state to revoke this presumption. Cal.Civ. § 4600(d)
(West 1989). Revocation of the law was based on recent psychological
findings, including a study of 100 children from San Francisco Bay Area
families in which custody was bitterly contested. Janet R. Johnson, a
Stanford University sociologist, suggested that access to both parents
increased emotional distress for children. "Children who shared more
days each month with both disputing parents were significantly more
depressed, withdrawn and uncommunicative, had more somatic symp-
toms, and tended to be more aggressive, according to the perceptions of
their parents." Mathews, Bill Curbs Court Use of Joint Custody: Califor-
ARGUMENTS AGAINST JOINT CUSTODY

nia Vote Could Slow Trend of Dual-ParentingAfter Divorce, Washington

Post, Sept. 1, 1988, at A3, col. d.
The FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE IN FAMILY
EQUITY (June 1, 1987) commented on the unintended ill results of the
original joint custody statute. First, the Task Force noted that the stat-
ute was misinterpreted "to create a joint custody preference or presump-
tion." (Task Force at VII-2) Second, the Task Force was concerned
about the use of "a misperceived preference for joint custody to lower
child support obligations and as a means of extracting financial conces-
sions from a parent opposed to such an arrangement." (Task Force at
V11-2) Third, the Task Force recommended that the revised statute
require that courts consider the following specific factors before award-
ing joint custody:
a) The past and present abilities of the parents to cooperate and make
decisions jointly.
b) The ability of each parent to permit the sharing of love, affection, and
contact between the child and the other parent.
c) The geographic proximity of the parents as this relates to the practical
considerations of joint custody.
d) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spousal abuse, or paren-
tal kidnapping.
e) The age and developmental stage of the child. It shall be presumed
that joint physical custody is not in the best interest of infants aged three
years and under. In determining whether to award joint physical custody
of an infant aged three years or less, the court shall consider, in addition to
the other factors specified in this subdivision, all of the following:
(1) The ability of the parents to communicate frequently about the
child's daily routine and the willingness of the parents to develop and
maintain similar child rearing duties.
(2) The personality characteristics of the child including, but not
limited to, the child's flexibility, developmental capacity to adjust to
repeated separations from each parent, frequent moves from one house to
the other, and different patterns of parenting and caregiving, where those
differences exist.
(3) Each parent's child care arrangements and the ability of the par-
ents to communicate about these arrangements on a regular basis. (Task
Force at VII-8 - VII-9)
The Task Force's rationale for adding this section was that joint
custody is a complicated arrangement which requires special parents and
children to make it work. Courts' failure to appropriately evaluate par-
ents and children results in inappropriate awards or mediated agreements
of joint custody that are harmful to children. Although joint custody has
been understood to promote a child's continued relationship with both
parents, the Task Force noted that since a continuing relationship can
also occur in sole custody, joint custody should be reserved for the "spe-
cial cases." Moreover, joint custody should not be used by the court to
 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

avoid the appearance of labeling either parent inadequate. (Task Force at

VII-9 -VII- 11)

B. Massachusetts Legislation
Problems of misinterpreting an open ended joint custody statute
occurred in the state of Massachusetts. According to the REPORT OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DIVORCE AND CHILDREN, MASSACHUSETTS'
BAR ASSOCIATION GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE UNMET LEGAL
NEEDS OF CHILDREN (Winter, 1986), courts applied the statute inconsis-
tently and incorrectly. Despite the state supreme court's ruling that the
statute did not give a presumption in favor of joint custody, parents and
lawyers requested, and courts granted, joint legal and physical custody
even where the award was unwarranted. Courts granted joint custody
without considering the child's age and developmental stage and the par-
ents' ability to cooperate with each other.
The REPORT further found that a presumption for joint custody
gives parents who might be unsuitable custodians of their children a bar-
gaining advantage in settling the rest of the divorce issues. This advan-
tage causes the more suitable parent to make financial concessions, often
to the detriment of the child, in order to assure sole custody.

C. Other State Legislation

Several other states have embraced the position that joint custody is
only beneficial to children in certain cases. For instance, at least three
states only permit courts to award joint custody where both parties agree
to the arrangement. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-363(3) (1988); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3109.04 (Page 1989); Wis. Stat. § 767.24 (1981). In Indiana, the
parties' agreement to joint custody is not a prerequisite to such an award
but is a matter of primary importance. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5- 2 1(g)
(West 1979). In Iowa, this is a factor for the court to consider. Iowa
Code § 598.41 (1981). Even in states where joint custody is presumed to
be in a child's best interest, the presumption only exists where both par-
ents agree to the award. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125.490(1) (Michie
1986) or where the parents have shown a willingness or ability to com-
municate, cooperate, or agree on issues regarding the child's needs.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-9.1 (1989). Most importantly, Iowa's statute
implies that joint custody is inappropriate where physical violence has
occurred by requiring the court to consider whether the safety of the
other parent will be jeopardized by an award of joint custody. Iowa
Code § 598.41 (1981).
Colorado's legislature has passed amendments that will preclude the
use of joint custody in domestic violence cases based on findings that it is
ARGUMENTS AGAINST JOINT CUSTODY

not in the best interest of children to be exposed to violence at home.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-124 (Supp. 1988-9). The New Hampshire legis-
lature has passed an amendment requiring that the court presume that
abuse is harmful to the children. If the court grants joint custody despite
the evidence of abuse, then the court must supply written findings to
support the order. N.H. Rev. Stat. § 458.17 (Supp. 1988-9).
Arizona House Bill 2418 passed during the 1989 legislative session
and will be codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-332 (F-I). It states that
joint custody is not the preferred arrangement and will only be awarded
where both parents seek the arrangement and the court has found it is in
the best interest of the child. Subsections A and B.
The court must make specific inquiry into the motivations and influ-
ences on the parents, including whether the parents were subject to
"duress or coercion." Subsection F. Practical considerations and evi-
dence of the parents' commitment to the child are also taken into
account.
Joint custody agreements are reviewable by the court after a one
year trial period. Either parent can request review and will be granted
sole custody if the other parent has demonstrated insufficient involve-
ment with the child.
While both battered women's advocates and fathers' rights groups
lobbied against the Arizona bill, it attempts to embody all of the psycho-
logical teachings and legal precedent from other states. It does not grant
a preference but requires an agreement that is not the result of coercion.
Additionally, the parent seeking joint custody must have been able to
sustain an ongoing commitment to the child and must continue to do so
after the divorce, and the arrangement must be logistically reasonable.
Child support orders shall be determined strictly by the existing child
support statute and guidelines not dependent on the existence of a joint
custody order.

IV. CASE LAW

Generally, courts have broken down the analysis of joint custody
decisions into three categories: Agreement between the parties to joint
custody, ability of the parties to cooperate, and practical logistics.

A. Agreement
In In Re Marriageof Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157
(1979), the appeals court held it was an abuse of discretion to order joint
custody if the parties had not agreed to it. Without an agreement, the
court said that the children are subject to conflicting demands, and fre-
quent disputes would arise resulting in more court actions.
 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

In Arizona, in an unpublished but frequently used opinion, Pitts v.

Pitts, 2 CA-CV88-0125 (April 28, 1988), the court held that since there is
no statutory authority for joint custody, a trial court cannot order it over
one party's objection. This rationale has been used in Illinois, Re Mar-
riage of Hanson, 112 Ill. App. 3d 564, 445 N.E.2d 912 (1983), Iowa, Re
Marriage of Weidner, 338 N.W.2d 351 (1983), Connecticut, Faria v.
Faria, 38 Conn. Supp. 37, 456 A.2d 1205 (1982), Indiana, Lord v. Lord,
443 N.E.2d 847, (1982), Oregon, Re Marriage of Handy, 44 Or. App.
225, 605 P.2d 738 (1980), Kansas, Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan. App. 2d 284,
615 P.2d 806 (1980), and Vermont, Berlin v. Berlin, 139 Vt. 339, 428
A.2d 1113 (1981).

B. Cooperation
In Blake v. Blake, 106 A.D.2d 916, 917, 483 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880
(1984), the court stated that "[t]he parties have demonstrated great
antagonism toward each other. For that reason alone joint custody... is
inappropriate."
In Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978), the court noted that the ability of the natural par-
ents to behave in a civilized fashion is crucial before a court can award
the parents joint custody. Joint custody is "insupportable when the par-
ents are severely antagonistic and embattled." Id. at 584, 378 N.E.2d at
1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
In Creusere v. Creusere, 98 N.M. 788, 653 P.2d 164 (1982), the
appeals court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of
joint custody when the level of incompatibility between the husband and
wife indicated that joint custody was not in the child's best interest.
In Hardin v. Hardin, 711 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), the court
stated that, although both parents were proven fit, where the parents
were not mature enough to cooperate, joint custody was not in the child's
best interest.
In Salamone v. Salamone, 83 A.D.2d 778, 443 N.Y.S.2d 464,
(1981), the court reversed an award of joint custody, holding that joint
custody was inappropriate where the parents did not exhibit an ability to
cooperate in matters of childrearing. Because of the parents' "almost
total lack of communication" with each other, they used a psychologist
as a problem solver and a go-between for complaints. Id. at 780, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 466. Other states which have adopted this argument include
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon.
Several courts have ruled that joint custody is not proper where
there has been physical violence by one parent against the other parent.
Slaughter v. Slaughter, 466 So. 2d 1370 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Kline v.
Kline, 686 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Blake v. Blake, 106 A.D.2d
ARGUMENTS AGAINST JOINT CUSTODY

916, 483 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1984); and Re Matter ofHanson, 112 Ill. App. 3d
564, 445 N.E.2d 912 (1983).
Some courts have gone further by requiring, in addition to a finding
of no overt hostility between the parents, "a showing of involvement and
commitment to the child sufficient to provide at least the promise that
the parent seeking joint custody will follow through with the obligations
that it entails over the long haul." In the Matter of Cheryl v. Jeffrey, 133
Misc. 2d 663, 665, 507 N.Y.S.2d 593, 595 (Family Ct. 1986). The Jeffrey
court refused to grant joint custody to a father who had shown no inter-
est in the child prior to the judicial proceedings.

C. Practical Considerations
The New York court has held that both shifting the child's resi-
dence two times a week, Lyritzis v. Lyritzis, 55 A.D.2d 946, 391 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1977), and a six months with mother/six months with father
arrangement are not in the child's best interest. Belandres v. Belandres,
58 A.D.2d 63, 395 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1977). A Montana court found exces-
sive distance between the parents' households made joint custody
impractical. Quinn v. Quinn 622 P.2d 230 (Mont. 1981).
Another specific reason given for denying joint custody is the par-
ents' differing religious beliefs. In Fisher v. Fisher, 118 Mich. App. 227,
324 N.W.2d 582 (1982) the court stated that where the parties' religious
views conflicted and they could not agree on this basic child rearing
issue, joint custody was properly refused. See also Andros v. Andros, 396
N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).

V. CONCLUSION

The inequities in joint custody, like those in divorce, hurt women

and children. Parents in conflict will carry their conflicts into the cus-
tody arrangements. Parents who abuse their co-parent or child will con-
tinue this abuse in the joint custody situation. Joint custody demands
ideal circumstances and exceptional parents to succeed at all. Even with
highly committed and motivated parents, joint custody is not for all chil-
dren. Until these facts are common knowledge and acknowledged, fam-
ily law practitioners will have to take the arguments presented here into
the courts and convince the judicial system one family at a time.