TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA
GR No. L-63915,April 24, 1985
Escolin, J.:

FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved
for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to
bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:
WON publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear
object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis
nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The
publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

GR. No. L-63915,December 29, 1986
Cruz, J.:

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Specifically asking the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?

Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:
1. WON a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to

inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must
be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

CAROLINO VS. SENGA

GR. No. 189491, April 20, 2015
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
In Dec. 1, 1976, Jeremias Carolino, petitioner’s husband, retired from service in
the AFP ranked as colonel. He started receiving his monthly pension in Dec. 1979
pursuant to RA No. 340. In March 2005, his pension was withheld due to the fact that
he lost his Filipino citizenship thereby caused his deletion in the AFP pensioner’s
payroll. That he could only restore his retirement benefits when he comply the
requirements prescribed under RA 9225. The said termination of Carolino’s pension is
pursuant to the provisions of PD 1638 which was made effective in January 2005.
Carolino filed a petition for mandamus against Gen. Senga, AFP Chief of Staff, seeking
the reinstatement of his retirement benefits under RA 340 and reimbursements of all
his retirement pay accrued from March 2005 until his restatement. RTC ordered the
AFP Chief of Staff to immediately reinstate Carolino in the list of retired AFP officers
and resume his payment pursuant to RA 340. Respondent sought for reconsideration
but was denied. Jeremias died in Sept. 30, 2007 and was substituted by his wife.

ISSUE:
WON Carolino is entitled to his retirement benefits after he lost his Philippine
citizenship as provided in the new law PD 1639.

RULING:
Yes. PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September
10, 1979. Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the
future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given
that effect to some legal provisions;that all statutes are to be construed as having only
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect. These
principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application,
nor the same may be implied from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638
clearly provides that the decree shall take effect upon its approval. Since PD No. 1638, as
amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its
approval.Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired before its
effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act
continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such
amendment. Petition was granted.

FAMANILIA VS CA, Barbership Mgt. and NFD International Manning

Agency
G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
FACTS:

NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto
G. Famanila as Messman for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its principal
and co-respondent, Barbership Management Limited. While Hansa Riga was docked at
the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while petitioner was assisting in the loading
operations, the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner experienced dizziness and he
subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he had a sudden
attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral
aneurysm. Famaniliaunderwent a brain operation. Due to Famanilia’sphysical and
mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was examined at the
American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining physician, Dr. Patricia
Abesamis declared that he “cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for 120
days, he is being declared permanently, totally disabled.”

Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to settle

his claim amicably by accepting the amount of US$13,200 or Php
365,904.00. Famanilia accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the Receipt
and Release dated February 28, 1991. His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard
Famanila, acted as witnesses in the signing of the release.

In June 11, 1997, Famanilia file a complaint before the NLRC praying for an
award of disability benefits and he denied that he did not voluntarily signed the Receipt
and Release document. NLRC promulgated its decision finding the appeal to be without
merit and ordered its dismissal.CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Receipt and Release constitutes a valid waiver.

HELD:

YES. It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are
considered as ineffective in barring recovery for the full measure of the worker’s right
and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. The reason
is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not stand on the same footing. However,
not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only
where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will
step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and
the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, as in this case.
 To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that
legally pertains to them. We have reviewed the terms and conditions contained in the
Receipt and Release and we find the same to be clear and unambiguous. The signing was
even witnessed by petitioner’s wife, Gloria T. Famanila and one Richard T.
Famanila.Petition is denied.

Thornton vs Thornton
G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004
Ponente: Corona, J.

FACTS:
Richard Brian Thornton, petitioner, an American, and Adelfa Francisco Thornton,
respondent, a Filipino were married and had one daughter. After 3 years, Adelfa grew
restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as guest
relations officer in a nightclub. One day, Adelfa left the family home together with their
daughter, Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton, and told her servants that she
was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated
Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When
he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued a certification that
respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas
corpus in Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the
entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980.)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in
cases involving custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD:
Yes, the Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA
8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors. The reasoning of CA can’t be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous,
leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be
transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. A literal
interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and
contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the
custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with
RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
minors is at issue.

Benjamin Ting v. Carmen Velez-Ting

G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009
Nachura, J.:

Facts:

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being
married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two
years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter.Carmen’s allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary
to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order
to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to
give regular financial support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that

he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he
who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with
her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each
other’s claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this
case

Issues:

Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases,

Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological

incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized,

Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Held:

No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
lexprospicit, non respicit.

The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Rommel Jacinto Silverio v. Republic

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Corona, J.:
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery,
sought to have his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to
female. Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed by the Republic
of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court decision, holding that there is
no law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
Issue:
 Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex
reassignment.
Held:
No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first name
through theintervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the Civil Code as
amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412 of the same Code,
change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical
or typographical errors are involved.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy
consequences. To grant this petition filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major changes in statutes that
underscore the public policy in relation to women.
The SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.”

Norma Del Socorro vs. Ernst Van Wilsem

G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
Peralta, J.:
Facts:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their
marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to
Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since
the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines
particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien,
Issue:
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the
Philippine law?
Whether a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
Held:
Yes. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not
obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.
In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he
is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While
Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents
of the forum.
The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is
living here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

Grace Garcia-Recio vs. RederickRecio

G.R. No. 138322, October2, 2001
Panganiban, J.:
Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce,
dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized
at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the
couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter
of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s
marriage with Editha Samson.
Issue:
Whether the decree of divorce submitted by RederickRecio is admissible as
evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
Held:
The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree
issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized
Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal
capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said
decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily
because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be
used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
 (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s
legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI

G.R. No. 205487, November 12, 2014

Facts:
Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to
inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong
City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean national.

Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
(CCT) No. 18186] and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118] were for sale.
Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean.

After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and
commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the
properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s
Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver
the documents.

Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the
status of the properties. He learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the
Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under the name of
Cityland Pioneer. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the
properties remained in possession of Perez.

Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez, however, refused
to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.

Issue:
Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of
spouses Kang?

Ruling:
In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal principle that
real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state
where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property
are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the
mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost.

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.

Matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be
governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the
conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of
the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not
qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing
that it was properly authenticated.

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or

processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even
if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine
Law.

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his
name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to declare as
invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.

It is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of the Dacion en Pago on

February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact,
nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the
property even six (6) months after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en
Pago. Kang was even able to transfer possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki,
who then made immediate improvements thereon.

Tenchavez vs. Escaño

G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965

FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February
24, 1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local
civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as
of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950.
On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the
State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.”
A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by the said
tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had several children
with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena
Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s parents were sufficient in
form.

RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and
undissolved under the Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be
deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the
divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts
of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any
justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute
divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of
injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on
the basis of adultery.

2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not supported by credible
evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes
the court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own
letters written before the suit had begun. An action for alienation of affections against
the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy
motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages.

SPOUSES CUSTODIO VS CA
GR NO. 116100, February 9, 1996
DOCTRINE:
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action,
since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach
or wrong.

Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between damages and

injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle of abuse
of rights. For there to be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must concur: (1)
defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The
acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

FACTS:
Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way going into
their property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties which
thereby restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners claim that they built the
wall in order to protect their persons and their property from their intrusive neighbors.
The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that an easement be created.

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the
trial court by awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages (p30,000.00) and
exemplary damages (p10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages were based on the fact
of loss in the form of unrealized rentals on the property due to the adobe wall restricting
access.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The mere fact
of loss does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant and a damage to the plaintiff resulting
therefrom.Damages are merely a part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.

An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from
the injury is damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. In this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which
was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of their rights as the owner of their respective
properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right as provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil
Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in this
case.

The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where the
damage was not a result of an injury is calleddamnum absque injuria and the plaintiff is
not normally given an award for damages.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide,
Cagayan de Oro Water District and Gaspar Gonzales, Jr., Respondents
G.R. No. 161921
July 17, 2013
Principle of Abuse of Rights

Facts:
Spouses Ardiente owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold and
conveyed to Pastorfide, however, the connection of water supply as well as other utilities
remained in the name of Ardiente which was never questioned, until such time that
Pastorfide became delinquent in paying the water bill.

The water connection of Pastorfide was cut off without notice and that after
paying the delinquent bills have known that it was Ardiente who authorize the
disconnection. Pastorfide thereafter filed a complaint for damages. Both RTC and CA
rules in favor of Pastorfide, thus this case.

Issue:
Whether the lower courts erred when it disregarded the fact that the Spouses
Pastorfide are likewise bound to observe Article 19 of the New Civil Code

Decision:
No, the decision of the lower courts is correct.

Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.

In this case, it is true that it is within the Spouses Ardiente’s power to ask and
even require Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the Spouses Ardiente to their
name. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection in
excessive and harsh way.
 The disconnection was without warning, had the intention was to compel
Spouses Pastorfide, Spouses Ardiente should have advised the latter.

Therefore, as there was an abuse of rights on the part of the Spouses Ardiente and
that they are guilty of bad faith, Spouses Pastorfide was in violation of Article 19 of the
New Civil Code

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL

LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
G.R. No. 127358
March 31, 2005
Damages

Facts:
The petitioner in this case, Noel Buenaventura (Noel) was married to herein
respondent Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura (Isabel). The case started when Noel filed
a petition for nullity of marriage against his wife Isabel. The Trial Court declared the
marriage void abintitio due to the Psychological Incapacity of the petitioner.

The Trial Court also awarded damages in favor of Isabel in violation of Article 21
of the New Civil Code. The trial court’s reason was that it found out that the Noel
deceived the Isabel into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing his
true reason that he was under heavy parental pressure, his career was his priority, and
that he had no inclination to make their marriage work.

Issue:
Whether damages should be awarded by reason of performance or non-
performance of marital obligations

Decision:
No, damages should not be awarded.

Article 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code refers to acts contrary to law, morals,
good customs, or public policy and that it is committed willfully, or negligently.

In this case, the marriage was severed due to Psychological Incapacity of Noel.
This means that his inability to discharge his marital obligations are beyond his control
and not done willfully or neglegently.

Therefore, granting of moral damages due to psychological incapacity of the

spouse is untenable.

Albenson Enterprises vs CA
G.R. No. 88694
January 11, 1993
BIDIN, J.
Acts Contrary to Morals

Facts:
The petitioner in this case, Albenson Enterprises delivered goods to a company
located in the business office of the herein respondent, Eugenio Balatao. The check was
drawn against the corporation of Eugenio but it was dishonored by the bank.

A case was filed against Eugenio and he was convicted by the RTC for the
violation of BP 22, however, upon appeal, the CA lowered the damages. Dissatisfied with
the decision, Albenson filed the petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the principle of abuse of rights has been violated

Decision:
No, the principle of abuse of rights was not violated.

Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1)
There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.

Here, Albenson could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of
abuse of rights. What prompted Albenson to file the case against Eugenio was their
failure to collect the amount due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was
issued to them by Eugenio. Albenson had also conducted inquiries regarding the origin
of the check.

Therefore, as Albenson did not act in bad faith, thus the act wa not contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy and that intent to injure was absent,
the principle of abuse of rights was not violated.

Hulstvs PR Builders
GR No. 156364
September 03, 2007
Unjust Enrichment

Facts:
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van
Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc.
(respondent), for the purchase of residential unit. Spouses Hulst paid a total amount of
P3,187,500.00 for the properties.

When PR Builders failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the
project by June 1995, the spouses Hulst filed before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest,
damages and attorney's fees. The HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decisionin favor of
spouses Hulst,

Thereafter, a Notice of Sale the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied
properties.The properties were sold for P5,450,653.33. The sum of P5,313,040.00 was
turned over to spouses Hulst in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the
legal fees.

Issue:
Whether there was unjust enrichment on the part of the petitioner

Decision:
Yes, there was unjust enrichment in favor of Hulst.

Article 22 of the New Civil Code provides that, every person who through an act
of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him.

Here, the sheriff delivered to Hulst the amount of P5,313,040.00 representing

the net proceeds of the auction sale after deducting the legal fees. Hulst is only entitled
to P3,187,500.00, the amount of the purchase price of the real property paid by Hulst to
PR Builders under the Contract to Sell.

Therefore, the HLURB Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of Hulstat the
expense of PR Builders. Petitioner received more than what he is entitled to recover
under the circumstances.

RCPI vs VERCHEZ
G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006

Subject Matter: Art. 26 Protection of Human Dignity

FACTS:

Private respondent Grace Verchez-Infante contracted the services of Radio

Communications of the Philippines Inc., (RCPI) to send a telegram to her sister,
Zenaida. Grace specifically asked for money as their mother, Editha, was rushed to the
hospital on that same day. However, it took 25 days before RCPI delivered the message.

When Editha died, the Verchez daughters and their father, Alfonso, filed a complaint for
damages against RCPI, alleging that the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to
the early demise of Editha.

RCPI argued that except for Grace, the other plaintiffs had no privity of contract with it
and any delay in sending the telegram was due to force majeure. Though the RTC
observed that the delayed delivery was not the apparent proximate cause of death, the
court ruled against RCPI, citing that it partakes of the nature of contract of adhesion.

ISSUE:

Whether the award of moral damages is proper even if the trial court found that there
was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts.

RULING:

RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or
breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-
herein-co-respondents. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:

Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.

Furthermore, Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:

Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention,
and other relief:

xxxx

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.

RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the
peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the
appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each
other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or
omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under
Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts
may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order, as is

the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to protect
their rights.

JOSE B. LEDESMA vs CA, DELMO

G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988

FACTS:
Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of Student Leadership Club in West Visayas College.
Through a resolution passed by the members of the club's Executive Board, Violeta, as
treasurer, extended loans to some of its members.

Petitioner Jose Ledesma, then school president, said that the act was against the school
rules and regulations. Thus, he informed Delmo that she was being dropped from the
membership of the club and that she could not be a candidate for any award or citation
from the school. He also denied Delmo's request for reconsideration.

Upon appeal, the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools ordered Ledesma not to
deprive Delmo and other club members and officers of any award, citation or honor
from the school. However, this was blatantly disregarded by Ledesma, thus Delmo only
graduated as a plain student instead of being awarded as Magna Cum Laude.

With this, an action for damages was filed against Ledesma but during the pendency of
the case, Violeta passed away and an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed
by her parents as her sole and only heirs. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the student.

ISSUE:
Whether Ledesma is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.

RULING:

The SC found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial and appellate courts.

It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was
brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness.

Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard
to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by
defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant
is liable for damages in his personal capacity.

Thus, moral damages are but proper.

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION vs JESICHRIS

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014

FACTS:

Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation filed a complaint for damages for unfair

competition against Willaware Products Corporation. Jesichris has been manufacturing
and distributing plastic-made automotive parts. On the other hand, Willaware is
engaged in manufacturing and distributing kitchenware items made of plastic and
metal. Both offices are physically proximate to each other.

Jesichris alleged that Willaware deliberately copied their products which constitute
unfair competition and that through hiring its former employees, Willaware developed
familiarity with Jesichris' products. Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Jesichris.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether Willaware committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of

the Civil Code.

RULING:

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural,

commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give
rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it
must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which
are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities,"
or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public
injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private
wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.

Here, both characteristics are present. First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals,
both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the
acts of the petitioner [Willaware] were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as
petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s former employees, deliberately
copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these products to
respondent’s customers.

Furthermore, it is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition as shown by

his act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-
made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his
employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.

Wherefore, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, thereby affirming that
Willaware is guilty of unfair competition.

[G.R. No. 210148. December 8, 2014.]

ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, petitioner, vs. MARLA OLIVA, respondent.

Facts:
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Informationfor Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death 5 of Marina Oliva. Records reveal
that sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street
when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the
Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over.While Marina Oliva was rushed to
the hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter,
herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.
In an Order 11 dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya's demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of
evidence. It found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in
material details and that they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed
the crime imputed upon him.
RTC sustained the MeTC decision but reversed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva's
death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

Ruling:
No, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that
Daluraya's acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt. Records disclose that
Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently
establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his
civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.

“Civil Obligation not arising from a felony”

Bobie Rose V. Frias vs Flora San Diego-Sison
GR No. 155223, April 4, 2007

FACTS:
Bobie Rose Frias owns a house and lot acquired from Island Masters Reality and
Development Corporation (IMRDC) through a Deed of Sale and covered by transfer
certificate of title (TCT) in the name of IRMDC.

Frias, as the First Party, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison as the Second Party, entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) over the property with the following terms
and conditions:
xxx for and in consideration of the sum of P3,000,000.00 receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY, the parties have agreed
as follows:

That the SECOND PARTY has a period of 6 months from the date of the execution of
this contract xxx to notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase xxx at a price
of P6,400,000.00 xxx another six months within which to pay the remaining balance of
P3.4 million.

That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first six months from the
six months from the execution of this contract, no interest shall be charged by the
SECOND PARTY on the P3million however, in the event that on the sixth month the
SECOND PARTY would decide not to purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST
PARTY has a period of another six months within which to pay the sum of P3 million
pesos provided that the said amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last
six months only. Under this circumstance, the amount of P3 million given by the
SECOND PARTY shall be treated as a loan and the property shall be considered as the
security for the mortgage which can be enforced in accordance with law.”

San Diego-Sison decided not to purchase the property and informed Frias through a
letter reminding of the agreement that the amount of P2Million be considered as a loan
payable within 6 months. However, Frias failed to pay San Diego-Sison who later filed a
complaint for sum of money with preliminary attachment. Also, San Diego-Sison
averred that Frias tried to deprive her of the security for the loan when Frias made a
false report of the loss of her owner’s copy of the TCT and be issued a new owner’s
duplicate copy of said title.

The trial court ordered Frias to pay San Diego-Sison the sum of P2million plus interest
at the rate of 32% per annum beginning December 7, 1991 due to the compounded
interest stipulated in the MOA. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision
but modified the rate of interest from 32% to 25% effective June 7, 1991 when the
interest rate prevailing in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum and that the
P2Million was considered as a loan in June 1991.
Frias argued that the interest rate was contrary to the MOA because it provided that if
San Diego-Sison would decide not to purchase the property, Frias has the period of
another six months to pay the loan with compounded bank interest for the last six
months only.

ISSUE:

Whether the compounded bank interest should be limited to 6 months only as

stipulated in the contract.

RULING:
The Court found no error in awarding 25% interest per annum on the P2Million loan
even beyond the six months stipulated period. “The general rule is that if the terms of an
agreement are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail. Besides, Frias and San Diego-Sison
agreed and as stipulated in the contract that the loaned amount shall earn compounded
bank interests.

Dreamwork v. Janiola
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON.
ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, through its president and VP, filed a

complaint for violation of BP 22 against private respondent Janiola with the Office of
City Prosecutor. Janiola then instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. Notably, the checks that were subject of the criminal cases before the MTC
were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.

Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the criminal case, alleging that
the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such
that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. In other words, Janiola claimed that the civil case
posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

ISSUE:Is there a prejudicial question in this case?

HELD:

No, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before the final judgment can be rendered in the
criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must
be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there
is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case. It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the
offense charged is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was
issued is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. The clear intention of
the framers of BP 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check
malumprohibitum.

It is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question
(resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action
may proceed) is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the
rules on it are inapplicable in this case.

Catalan vs Basa
G.R. No.159567, July 31, 2007
Puno, C.J.:

Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military services as The
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found him that he was
unfit to render military service due to Schizophrenia.

On September 38, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano
allegedly executed an Absolute Deed of Donation to his sister, Mercedes, which involved
one-half of his real property. The People’s Bank and Trust Company filed on December
11,1953 a special proceeding to declare Feliciano incompetent, to which the trial court
issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency appointing The People’s Bank and
Trust Company (now BPI) as guardian for Feliciano’s Estate and Fixing Allowance.

On March 26,1979, Mercedes sold the property donated to her by Feliciano to her
children, Delia and Jesus Basa. Acting as Feliciano’s guardian, BPI filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as
damages. BPI contended that the Deed of Absolute Donation executed by Feliciano was
void ab initio as he never donated said property to Mercedes and even if he did, the
donation will still be void as he was not of sound mind and therefore incapable of giving
valid consent.

Issue: Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity the donation.

Held:

Yes, Feliciano was capable of executing such donation. A person suffering from
Schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his
property. By merely alleging the existence of Schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16,1951, Feliciano Catalan had
lost total control of his mental facilities. It is also interesting to note that Feliciano’s
mental competence was fit when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon
Cerezo and even executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. The
presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness,
is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from
undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or executed, are presumed
to continue until the contrary is shown.

Therefore, Feliciano was capable of executing the Deed of Donation.

Mercado vs Espiritu
G.R. No. L-11872, December 1, 1917
Torres, J.:
Facts:

Domingo and Josepha Mercado, the heirs of Margarita Mercado, entered into a contract
of sale of the land they inherited from their mother with Luis Espiritu, their uncle. That
at the time of the execution of the contract Domingo and Josepha Mercado pretended to
be of legal age. They later on, contested the said agreement averring that the agreement
was void because they were only minors, 19 and 18 years old, respectively, when the
contract was entered into.

Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Sale is valid despite the minority of
Domingo and Josepha.

Held:

Yes, the Deed of Sale was valid because it was executed by minors, who have passed the
ages of puberty and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors
pretended that they had already reached their majority.

Article 38 provides that Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from
his acts or from property relations, such as easements.

Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from

compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment.
QUIMIGUNG vs ICAO
G.R. No. 26795, July 31, 1970
Reyes, J.B.L,. J.:

Facts:

Carmen Quimigung and Felix Icao, a married man, were close neighbors in Dapitan
City. Felix Icao succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Carmen several times by
force and intimidation and without consent which eventually led to Carmen becoming
preganant. Consequently, Carmen had to stop studying. She now claims for support,
damages and attorney’s fees against Felix Icao. Felix moved to dismiss the case for lack
of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that a child had been born.

Issue: Whether or not a conceived child, though yet unborn, is entitled to

support as in this case.

Held:

Yes, a conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality
of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its
progenitors, even if the
Child is only “en ventre de sa mere”, just a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same code.

It is true that Article 40 prescribing that the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it adds further “provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article”. This proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first paragraph of Article
40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.

Therefore, the unborn child of Carmen is entitled to Felix Icao’s support.