● CASE DIGEST WEEK 11 &12

Name: Otadoy, Charmaine Regine

Case: Arellano v. Pascual, 638 SCRA 826 (2010)
Doctrine: Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal
shares.

Facts:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who
is represented by her daughter Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.

In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village,
Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which
donation respondents assailed, may be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner.

RTC:
- It was precluded from determining the validity of the donation
- Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate, the probate court found the
Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to
hold that it is subject to collation
- Property was divided equally between the silings

Issue:
Whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation; and
Whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.

Ruling:
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of
the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the
return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his
lifetime.

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and
to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs.
He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to
any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has
reserved it for compulsory heirs.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to
donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable
against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property
is not subject to collation.

On the second issue:

The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral
relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial
Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what
finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the
parties.

(b) Bravo-Guerrero v. Guerrero, 465 SCRA 244 (2005);

NAME: PACULBA, John Philip S.

CASE: LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERREROvs. EDWARD P. BRAVO [G.R. No. 152658. July 29,
2005]
DOCTRINE:

The law on legitime does not bar the disposition of property for valuable consideration to descendants or
compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of equivalent value replaces the property taken from the estate. There is
no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution in values. Donations and other dispositions by
gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included in the computation of legitimes.

FACTS:
Spouses Mauricio Bravo (Mauricio) and Simona[5] Andaya Bravo (Simona) owned two parcels of land.
The Properties contain a large residential dwelling, a smaller house and other improvements.
Mauricio and Simona had three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily, all surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without
issue. Lily Bravo married David Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. (David Jr.). Roland had six
children, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero (Elizabeth), Edward Bravo (Edward), Roland Bravo, Jr.
(Roland Jr.), Senia Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo (Ofelia).
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) on 17 June 1966 appointing Mauricio as her
attorney-in-fact. In the GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to mortgage or otherwise hypothecate, sell,
assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and
wheresoever situated, or any interest therein xxx.[6] Mauricio subsequently mortgaged the Properties to
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage (Deed of Sale) conveying
the Properties to Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and Elizabeth Bravo [8] (vendees). The Deed of Sale
was not annotated on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. Neither was it presented to PNB and DBP. The
mortage loans and the receipts for loan payments issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricios
name even after his death on 20 November 1973. Simona died in 1977.
Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an action for the judicial partition of the Properties.
Edward claimed that he and the other grandchildren of Mauricio and Simona are co-owners of the
Properties by succession. Despite this, petitioners refused to share with him the possession and rental
income of the Properties. Edward later amended his complaint to include a prayer to annul the Deed of
Sale, which he claimed was merely simulated to prejudice the other heirs.

ISSUES:
Petitioners seek a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, raising these issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEED OF SALE WITH ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION.[13]

RULING:

On the Requirement of the Wifes Consent

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the Deed of Sale void based on Article 166,
which states:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the
court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnerships before the effective date of
this Code.
Even under the present Civil Code, however, the Deed of Sale is not void. It is well-settled that contracts
alienating conjugal real property without the wifes consent are merely voidable under the Civil Code that
is, binding on the parties unless annulled by a competent court and not void ab initio.[19]
Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the Civil Code (Article 173). The latter
prescribes certain conditions before a sale of conjugal property can be annulled for lack of the wifes
consent, as follows:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes of conjugal real property
without her consent. The wife must file the action for annulment during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction. In such case, the wife or her heirs can only demand the value of the
property provided they prove that the husband fraudulently alienated the property. Respondents action to
annul the Deed of Sale based on Article 166 must fail for having been filed out of time. The marriage of
Mauricio and Simona was dissolved when Mauricio died in 1973. More than ten years have passed since
the execution of the Deed of Sale.
We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized Mauricio to dispose of the Properties when she
executed the GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special power of attorney for an agent to execute a
contract that transfers the ownership of an immovable. However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878
refers to the nature of the authorization, not to its form.[22] Even if a document is titled as a general power
of attorney, the requirement of a special power of attorney is met if there is a clear mandate from the
principal specifically authorizing the performance of the act.[23]
In this case, Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA to sell, assign and dispose of any and
all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any
interest therein xxx as well as to act as my general representative and agent, with full authority to buy,
sell, negotiate and contract for me and in my behalf. [25] Taken together, these provisions constitute a clear
and specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even if it is called a general power of attorney, the
specific provisions in the GPA are sufficient for the purposes of Article 1878. These provisions in the GPA
likewise indicate that Simona consented to the sale of the Properties.

Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated

or is Void for Gross Inadequacy of Price
We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the disposition of property for valuable consideration to
descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of equivalent value replaces the property taken from the
estate. There is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution in values. Donations and other
dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included in the computation of legitimes.
The subject Deed of Sale, however, was executed in 1970. The valuation of the Properties in 1979 or
1997 is of little relevance to the issue of whether P16,000 was a grossly inadequate price to pay for the
Properties in 1970. Certainly, there is nothing surprising in the sharp increase in the value of the
Properties nine or twenty-seven years after the sale, particularly when we consider that the Properties are
located in the City of Makati.

Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof

The Deed of Sale was notarized and, as certified by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, entered in the
notarial books submitted to that court. As a document acknowledged before a notary public, the Deed of
Sale enjoys the presumption of regularity[45] and due execution.[46] Absent evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld. [47]
As the parties challenging the regularity of the Deed of Sale and alleging its simulation, respondents had
the burden of proving these charges.[48] Respondents failed to discharge this burden. Consequentially, the
Deed of Sale stands.

On the Partition of the Property

Nevertheless, this Court finds it proper to grant the partition of the Properties, subject to modification.
Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the vendees who bought the Properties.
Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both testified that the Roland A. Bravo in the Deed of Sale is their father, [49]
although their brother, Roland Bravo, Jr., made some of the mortgage payments. Petitioners counsel,
Atty. Paggao, made the same clarification before the trial court.[50]
As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of
Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his brothers and sisters, in his fathers portion of the
Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners are co-owners of the Properties.
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership.[51] This
action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.[52]

1. We GRANT judicial partition of the subject Properties in the following manner:

a. Petitioner LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the
Properties;
b. Petitioner OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS is entitled to one-third (1/3) of the Properties; and
c. The remaining one-third (1/3) portion of the Properties should be divided equally
between the children of ROLAND BRAVO.
2. The other heirs of ROLAND BRAVO must reimburse ROLAND BRAVO, JR. for whatever expenses the
latter incurred in paying for and securing the release of the mortgage on the Properties.

(c) Buenaventura v. CA, 416 SCRA 263(2004);

NAME: OBANI, MIE C.

DOCTRINE: Under the law, compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent
since said right commences only from the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito, Defendants, are parents of Petitioner Consolacion,
Nora ,Emma and Natividad as well as defendendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita , Felicitias, Fe and
Gavino ,all surnamed Joaquin.

The petitioner sought to be declared null and void ab initio certain deeds of sale in favour of defendants
Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitias , and Gavino alleging that they were simulated and grossly
inadequate and that they were deprived of their legitime being a compulsory heir.

The defendants on the other hand hold that the plaintiffs have no valid cause of action since there is no
legitime to speak of while their parents live and also, the sale were made with sufficient considerations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the legitime of the petitioners as compulsory heirs were impaired by virtue of
the sale made by their parents to other compulsory heir while their parents live?

Held: No, petitioners failed to show that they are the real party-in-interest to assail the validity of the
sale and their legitime were not impaired by virtue of the sale.

Under the law, compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right
commences only from the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

And in actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are
parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights
with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result
to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it .

In this case, petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale.
Petitioners right to their parents properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents death.
While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their
overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the
lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents estate.While the sale of the lots reduced
the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from the estate.

(d) In re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia , 454 SCRA 541, (2005);

(e) Delgado Vda. dela Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian, 480 SCRA 334;

(f) Mendoza v. Delos Santos, 694 SCRA 74 (2013);

Name: Julie Tanya Lanzar

Case: Mendoza v. Delos Santos, 694 SCRA 74 (2013)

Doctrine: The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which said property came.

FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan are
presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand,
is also in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the
property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject
of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his
spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992,
Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is
Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and
Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their
behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and
Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. CA also
denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT
RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT
HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.

RULING:
No, CA is correct.
I. Reserva troncal is not applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article
891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s
as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining
the lineal character of the property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that
Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally
came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by
gratuitous title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what
was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant).
After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also
known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s
ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral relative.

II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third
degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property came
and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are
Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants
a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus,
who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of
the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.

(g) De Papa v. Camacho, 144 SCRA 281 (1986);

NAME: LACIDA, NIÑA VIOLA G.

CASE: De Papa v. Camacho, G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986

DOCTRINE: In determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of
representation of nephews are made to apply. The right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios
over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote.

FACTS:

During her lifetime, Romana gratuitously donated four parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco
(legitimate sister of appellees). When Toribia died, she was survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and
their two legitimate children Faustino and Trinidad (mother of Dalisay). The 4 parcels of land were left as
inheritance of Toribia‟s two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. They too inherited 3 parcels of land
which was supposed to be the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco from her father Balbino. However,
when Faustino died intestate, single and without issue, the ½ pro-indiviso share in the 7 parcels of land
was left to his father Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to
a reserve troncal. Subsequently, Trinidad died intestate and her rights and interests in the parcels of
land were inherited by her only legitimate childe, appellant Dalisay. Eustacio thereafter died intestated,
survived by his only legitimate defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho.

The lower Court declared that the appellees as well as appellant Dalisay were entitled as reservatarios
to ½ of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all relatives of the prepositus (Faustino) within the third degree in the appropriate line
succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.

RULING:

No. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property
originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant (reservista). The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property
has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no
further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of
the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective
share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession.

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over
the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to
him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when
the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from
whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios
inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the
rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.

(h) Santos v. Alana, 467 SCRA 176 (2005);

NAME: MARCHINI SANDRO C. KONG

TOPIC: Inofficious donations as it impairs legitime
CASE: SANTOS V. ALANA
FACTS:
Petitioner, and Respondent, are half-blood siblings both asserting their claim over a 39-square
meter lot located at 1339-B Andalucia St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was registered in the name of
their father, Gregorio Santos, who died intestate.
During his lifetime, Gregorio donated the lot to petitioner which the latter accepted. The deed of
donation ("Pagsasalin ng Karapatan at Pag-aari") was annotated on Gregorio’s title. Later on, it
was also alleged that Gregorio sold the lot to petitioner. Meanwhile, by virtue of the annotated
deed of donation, Gregorio’s name was cancelled and a new certificate of title issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Manila in petitioner’s name.
Respondent Constancia Santos filed a complaint for partition and reconveyance against
petitioner. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father Gregorio denied having sold the lot to
petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she
was deprived of her legitime.
In his answer, petitioner countered that respondent’s suit is barred by prescription considering
that she is aware that he has been in possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years;
and that the lot was sold to him by his father, hence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime.
The trial court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by the parties nor was it
registered in the Registry of Deeds. Thus, it is not a valid contract. What is valid is the deed of
donation as it was duly executed by the parties and registered.
The trial court then held that since Gregorio did not own any other property, the donation to
petitioner is inofficious because it impaired respondent’s legitime. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. Hence the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was inofficious.
RULING:
It bears reiterating that under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it
exceeds this limitation – no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may
give or receive by will. In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, we held that inofficiousness may arise
only upon the death of the donor as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net
value of the estate of the donor deceased.
At this point, we emphasize that as found by the trial court, Gregorio did not sell the lot to
petitioner. He donated it. The trial court also found that the donation is inofficious as it impairs
respondent’s legitime; that at the time of Gregorio’s death, he left no property other than the lot
now in controversy he donated to petitioner; and that the deceased made no reservation for the
legitime of respondent, his daughter and compulsory heir. These findings were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to Article 752 earlier cited, Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by will.
Clearly, by donating the entire lot to petitioner, we agree with both lower courts that Gregorio’s
donation is inofficious as it deprives respondent of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the
Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since
the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to
one-half (1/2) thereof.
(i) Imperial v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 393 (1999);

Name: Ruel R. Pungos

Case: Imperial v. Court of Appeals

Topic: Inofficious Donation;

Facts:

Leoncio Imperial (Leoncio) was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land. Leoncio
sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, Eloy Imperial (Eloy). Both parties admit that
despite the contract's designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a donation.

Two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale
on the ground that he was deceived by Eloy into signing the said document. A compromise judgment
was approved by the trial court whereby Leoncio recognized the rights of petitioner over the land while
petitioner agreed to sell a portion of the lot for the benefit of Leoncio. On January 8, 1962, and pending
execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died.

Leoncio, upon his death, was substituted by his adopted son, Atty. Victor Imperial (Victor), who moved
for the execution of the compromise judgment. Victor died single, and survived by his natural father,
Ricardo Villalon (Ricardo).. Five years after Ricardo's death, his 2 children, Cesar and Teresa, filed Civil a
case for annulment of the donation on the ground of fraud, deceit, and inofficiousness as Leoncio had
no other property at the time of his death. That the donation impaired the legitime of Victor.

Eloy argued that Victor already repudiated his right to the inheritance because when Leoncio died on
January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing
an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff and even moved for
execution of the compromise judgment therein.

Issue:

Was their a valid repudiation of inheritance?

Ruling:

No. Our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an
express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code, the repudiation of an
inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court
having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.

Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in the civil case upon the latter's death, his act of moving for
execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He
was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation,
under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so
is expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053 which provides that if the heir should
die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.

Additional Facts:

The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years under Article 1141 of the
Civil Code 7 , reckoned from March 15, 1962, when the writ of execution of the compromise judgment in
Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not
yet prescribed.

Issue:

Did the action prescribed?

Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies
to the obligation to reduce inoficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the
extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.

From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which
involved the reduction for inoficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of
action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent.

It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The action,
therefore, has long prescribed.

(j) Carlos v. Sandoval, 574 SCRA 116 (2008);

(k) Bagunu v. Piedad, 347 SCRA 571 (2000);

RODIN BUTCH B. CHUA

FACTS

Augusto H. Piedad died intestate without any direct descendants or ascendants. The trial court awarded
the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad. Pastora Piedad is the maternal aunt of Augusto.

Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu intervene in the intestate proceeding contending that she has a right
to succession given that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad.She contends that the
proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of
hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors,and irregularity in the disbursements of
allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate.

ISSUE
Whether Petitioner Ofelia Bagunu, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, can inherit alongside
Respondent Pastora Piedad, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?

RULING

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes
the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation canapply. Thus,
Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:

"In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving
the right of representation when it properly takes place.”

Right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending line. In the collateral line,
the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the
decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.

(l) Ining v. Vega, 703 SCRA 40 (m) 7 (2013);

ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED) vs. LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA,

RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA,
RESPONDENTS. (G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013)

CONTRIBUTOR: CABRIDO, LESLIE MAE

PRINCIPLE:

“Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude
relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood”

Facts:

Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of
land. They both died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan and
Gregoria Ining, who were now both deceased. Respondents are the heirs of Romana while the
Petitioners are the heirs of Gregoria.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and her grandson, herein
Respondent, Leonardo Vega. Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In
short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
(Tajonera), are the spouses of Gregoria’s grandchildren. Tresvalles and Tajonera are
transferees of the said property.

Acting on the claim that one-half of the property belongs to him as Romana’s surviving
heir, Leonardo filed a case for Partition, recovery of ownership and possession against
Gregoria’s heirs. Leonardo claims that he demanded the partition of the property several times
but Gregoria’s heirs refused.

Petitioner’s contention:

Gregoria’s heirs claims that they owned the entire property because it was sold to Tresvales and
Tajonera which portion must be collated and shall form part of Gregoria’s heirs. They further
aver that Leonardo had no cause of action against them because they have become the sole
owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr who acquired the same in good faith by sale
from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was
aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive
possession of the property with a just title.

Respondent’s contention:

Leonardo contends that Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner
Teodora (Granddaughter of Gregoria), illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and
transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr.
and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo) of the fruits of the property

Issue:

WON Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-ownership only on february 9, 1979.

Held:

1. No. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is.
Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never
part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to
seek a partition of the property has not been lost.

Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings
– that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943 – should be taken against him,
is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this
very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More
significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens system and covered by OCT
RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the
property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.

(n) Arado v. Alcoran, 762 SCRA 37 (2015);

Name: Apellido, Ana Hannesa S.

Title: Arado v. Alcoran

Doctrine:
Article 992 - An illegitimate child has no right to inherit from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother. In the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from such illegitimate
child.

Facts:
Raymundo Alarcon was married to Joaquina Arado, spouses has a son named, Nicolas Alarcon. Nicolas
was married to Florencia however they were not blessed with a child. Years passed, Nicolas had an
extra-marital affair with Francisca, their illicit relationship bore a child, Anacleto Alarcon (respondent in
this case).

Grandfather Raymundo Alarcon died leaving part of his inheritance to his wife Joaquina and to his son,
Nicolas. Thereafter, Nicolas died and his estate was divided between his wife Florencia, his mother
Joaquina and his illegitimate son Anacleto.

Few years passed, Grandmother Joaquina died, Anacleto then asked for his part from the inheritance of
the former since both had a close relationship with each other as it was Joaquina who raised Anacleto.
However, the collateral relatives of Joaquina opposed on such claim stating that Anacleto being an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit from the estate of his grandmother.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the collateral relatives is tenable

Ruling:
Yes, the claim is correct.

The law provides that in Article 992 of the Civil Code- An illegitimate child has no right to inherit from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. In the same manner, such children or
relatives shall not inherit from such illegitimate child.

Applying the provisions in the case at bar, Anacleto being an illegitimate has no right to inherit from his
grandmother since she is considered as a relative of his father in which the law disallows the right to
inherit. Thus, the collateral relatives shall have the right over the estate of Joaquina.

(o) Capitle v. Elbambuena, 509 SCRA 444 (2006);

Name: Andales, Divino Czar A.

Doctrine: “Mere estranged relation is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving
spouse as an heir of a deceased spouse”

Title: Capitle v. Elbambuena

Facts: The subject of controversy in this case is an agricultural land and to which a certificate of land
ownership award (CLOA) was issued in favor of Cristobal Olar (Olar).

Olar died, and thus respondent Fortunata Elbambuena (Fortunata) and Rosalinda Olar
(Rosalinda), the spouse and daughter-in-law, respectively, of the deceased claim that Olar relinquished
half of the land to Fortunata through a kasunduan and the remaining portion of which was surrendered
to Fortunata by an undated document.

Respondent alleges that the petitioners were allowed to occupy the lot for livelihood purposes.
However, petitioners failed to pay rentals since 1990 and they ignored demands to return possession of
the land. This prompted respondent to file a case for recovery of possession and payment of back
rentals with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

On the other hand, petitioners claim that they’ve been in possession of the land since 1960 by
virtue of a waiver of rights executed by Olar. The said document stated that Olar recognizes the fact that
Olar co-possessed the land with petitioner Capitle. In addition thereto, petitioners also claim that
Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she even remarried, thereby giving her no right to
inherit from Olar.

While the case filed by the respondents in DARAB was pending before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), petitioners filed before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) a
petition to cancel the CLOA issued in favor of Olar claiming that petitioners were now the new farmer-
beneficiaries as shown by the waiver of rights.

These issues were jointly settled by PARAD, ruling in favor of petitioner. However, respondent
appealed the decision to the DARAB, thus the decision was set aside thereby ousting the petitioners
from the subject land. This time, petitioners elevated the case to the CA, however the CA affirmed in
toto the decision of the DARAB finding that petitioners possession of the land was by mere tolerance.

Issue: (a) Does petitioner have the preferential right over the land considering they were the actual
tillers of the land?

(b) Does Fortunata have the right to inherit from Olar in this case?

Held: (a) No. Petitioners argument stating that it would be absurd for Olar to bequeath his property to
his estranged wife and not to a relative who helped him till the land and took care of his needs, is
actually a virtual admission that their possession was not in concept of an owner. The fact they helped in
tilling the land is tantamount to acknowledging Olar as the actual possessor and tiller.

(b) Yes. Mere estranged relation is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving
spouse as an heir of a deceased spouse. Thus Rosalinda remained to be his legal wife and, consequently,
his legal heir to the estate of the deceased.

(p) Guy v. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 151 (2006);

Name Richard C. Abangan, Jr.

Title: Guy v. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 151 (2006)

Doctrine:

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval.

When filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Facts:

Karen and Kamille, represented by their mother, Remedios, filed a petition for letters of
administration. They alleged that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Wei, who died
intestate. His known heirs are his surviving spouse and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George, and
Michael, all surnamed Guy. Karen and Kamille prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for
the orderly settlement of We’s estate. Michael, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.

In his comment, Michael opposed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his father
left no debt and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration. He further
argued that Karen and Kamille should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Wei.

Later on, Remedios executed a Release and Waiver Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received from Michael, Remedios and her children discharge the
estate of Wei from any and all liabilities.

Issue: 1) Does the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes Karen and Kamille from claiming their
successional rights? 2) Are Karen and Kamille barred by prescription from proving their filiation?

Ruling:

1.) No. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to
him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an
intent to abandon a right. Moreover, Art. 1044 states that any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. Parents and guardians may
not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because
repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim
in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the
deceased. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance
of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake
or misapprehension of fact.

In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be
inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not
have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
 2.) A ruling on the issue would be premature considering that Karen and Kamille have yet to
present evidence.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or
special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of
evidence yet.

(q) Vizconde v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 217;

Name: DEBORAH DIMARANAN

Title: Lauro Vizconde v. CA, G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998

DOCTRINE:

Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves
property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The
obligation to collate is lodged with the heirs, and not to a stranger who does not have any interest in the
estate.

FACTS:

Lauro Vizconde and his wife Estrellita has 2 daughters. On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from her
father a parcel of land (Valenzuela property). Later on, she sold the Valenzuela property to Lim.

On June 1990, she bought from Premier Homes a parcel of land with improvements (Paranaque
property) using the proceeds from the sale of the Valenzuela property. On June 1991, the Vizconde
massacre happened. Estrellita and her daughters were killed thereafter leaving Lauro as the sole heir of
their estate. Later on, Rafael (Estrellita’s father) died intestate. The heirs of Rafael averred that their
legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed by Nicolas to his children during
his lifetime, including the Paranaque property. The trial court in its decision did not include the
Paranaque property as part of the estate of Rafael. Ramon, one of the heirs of Rafael, filed his objection
against the order of the trial court.
ISSUE:

A. Whether or not the collation is proper.

B. Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding regarding
Rafael’s estate is proper.

RULING:
A. NO. The probate court made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Parañaque property. It was
the Valenzuela property that was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale. The Parañaque
property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not
become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque property has no
statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was
gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property
was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00, by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the
decedent, has no participation therein, and Lauro who inherited and is now the present owner of the
Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against
Lauro is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein
Lauro who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Parañaque
property is improper for collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his
lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque
property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heir" in the Parañaque property.

B. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is exclusive, which negates the
rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall be included in the proceeding as a compulsory heir for he is
only a son-in-law of decedent Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of
decedent is considered a third person or stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged into the proceeding
herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the
said proceeding.

(r) Imperial v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 393;

Contributor: PAGAL, Eva Cristine G.

Doctrine: Our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it
requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:

The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by

petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings.
FACTS:
In 1951, Leoncio sold his 32, 837m² parcel of land to his acknowledged natural son Eloy Imperial.
However, in 1953, Leoncio filed a copmplaint for annulment of the sale alleging that he was deceived by
his son. They entered into a compromise agreement that Leoncio will recognize the validity and legality
of the sale but Eloy has to sold the 1000m² to Leoncio. In 1962, Leoncio died and Victor, his adopted
child, substituted him in the execution of the compromise agreement. However, in 1977, Victor died
single and without issue. After 4 years, Ricardo, Victors’s natural father, died too. Cesar and Trasa,
children of Ricardo, filed a complaint for annulment of the donation. A motion to dismiss was filed on
the ground of res judicata. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of
the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Cesar and Teresa filed an Amended
Complaint alleging that the conveyance impaired the legitime of Victor. The RTC ruled that the donation
is inofficious imparing the legitime of Victor. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for inofficious donation has prescribed.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme court applied Article 1144 of the Civil Code which states that “actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right accrues. Here, the
right accrues from the moment Leoncio died, but it took the respondents 24 years to file the action.

Also, there is estoppel by laches on their part. First, Victor is a lawyer; he even substituted his father in
the execution of the compromise agreement regarding the contested conveyance of parcel of land.
Second, Richardo is the lessee of the contested land and it is expected that he was aware of the sale of
the land. And, the respondents only instituted the complaint five years after the death of Ricardo.

(s) Balus v. Balus, 610 SCRA 178 (2010);

Name: Stephanie L. Ambrosio

Title : Balus vs. Balus, 610 SCRA 178
Doctrine: Article 777: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent.

Facts:
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural
Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that
purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank.
The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. On January 25, 1984, the sheriff
executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank’s favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of
the Bank. Subsequently Rufo died on July 6, 1984. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and
respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-
third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement
also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest
possible time.

Issue:
Whether or not the questioned land is part of the Estate of Rufo.

Ruling:
No. The subject land is not part of the estate of Rufo.

ART 777 provides that the rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.
The inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at
the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim.
Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.

(t) Heirs of Policarpio M. Ureta v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, 657 SCRA 555 (2011);

Contributor: HANA REA O. TAMSE

Doctrine:

It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property
from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property
that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is
merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a
special power of attorney is not necessary.

Facts:

1. Alfonso has 14 children. He was financially well-off and owned several

properties.
2. In order to reduce the inheritance taxes, Alfonso made it appear that he had sold
some of his lands to his children and accordingly executed four (4) Deeds of Sale
covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and
his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on
October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land.
 3. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary
consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands
and their produce until his death.
4. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,
which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that
were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado,
Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
5. After their father’s death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his
name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of
the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
6. On July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the
July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid.

Ruling:

Yes, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid.

It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property
from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property
that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It
is merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a
special power of attorney is not necessary.

In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors
are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not
apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such
transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.

A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is
revoked by the other contracting party.

Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to
render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable
against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.
(u) Arrogante v. Deliarte, G.R. No. 152132, July 24, 2007;

Name: Sheryl Bautista

Case: LORDITO ARROGANTE, JOHNSTON ARROGANTE, ARME ARROGANTE, (children of Fe) and FE D.
ARROGANTE vs BEETHOVEN DELIARTE, and SPOUSE LEONORA DUENAS

Doctrine:

FACTS:

The lot situated in Daanbantayan, Cebu is the lot in controversy. It was originally a conjugal property of
the spouses Bernabe Deliarte, Sr. and Gregoria Placencia who had nine children, including respondent
Beethoven and petitioner Fe Deliarte Arrogante.

Because of misfortunes which struck the Diliarte family, Beethoven initially shouldered the expenses of
hospitalization and death of a brother of Beethoven and Fe; Gregoria, their mother and eventually,
Bernabe, the testator to be reimbursed by the family. In between the deaths of Gregoria and Bernabe,
Deliarte siblings agreed to waive and convey in favor of Beethoven all their rights, interests, and claims
to the subject lot in consideration of P15,000.00. Bernabe, who was already blind at that time, was
likewise present and knew of the sale that took place among his children.

Subsequently, Beethoven occupied and possessed the subject lot openly, peacefully, and in the concept
of owner; all of Beethovens siblings, except Fe, signed a deed of confirmation of sale in favor of
Beethoven to ratify the 1978 private deed of sale.

In 1993, petitioner Lordito Arrogante installed placards on the fence erected by respondents, claiming
that the subject lot was illegally acquired by the latter, who had taken the subject lot from Lordito, who
claimed that the lot is a devise from his grandfather. Allegedly, the bequeathal was made in Bernabe’s
last will and testament which was torn by Bethoven. The respondents herein filed an action for quieting
of title and damages against the petitioners.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision quieting title on the subject lot in favor of
Beethhoven.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private deed of sale is a valid conveyance of the entire lot to Bethhoven.

HELD:

No. Article 1347, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code characterizes a contract entered into upon future
inheritance as void. The private deed of sale is void for being a conveyance of future inheritance and the
deed of confirmation of sale which sought to ratify the previous sale is also void. The law applies when
the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the
contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

True, the prohibition on contracts respecting future inheritance admits of exceptions, as when a person
partitions his estate by an act inter vivos under Article 1080 of the Civil Code.

Absent a showing of an overt act by Bernabe indicative of an unequivocal intent to partition his estate
among his children, his knowledge and ostensible acquiescence to the private deed of sale does not
equate to an oral partition by an act inter vivos. Besides, partition of property representing future
inheritance cannot be made effective during the lifetime of its owner.

Considering the foregoing, it follows that the 1986 deed of confirmation of sale which sought to ratify
the 1978 sale likewise suffers from the same infirmity.In short, the 1986 deed is also void.

(v) Heirs of Joaquin Teves v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 632;

Contributor: Casanares, Arianna

Title: Heirs of Joaquin Teves vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 109963 October 13, 1999

DOCTRINE:
1. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any
other transaction. Such a partition, which was legally made, confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
2. The fact that a person predeceased the decedent does not mean that he or, more accurately, his
heirs, lose the right to share in the partition of the property for this is a proper case for representation,
wherein the representative is raised to the place and degree of the person represented and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living.

FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died intestate and without debts in 1943 and 1953,
respectively. During their lifetime, the spouses own two parcels of land designated as Lot 769-A
registered in the name of Marcelina and Lot 6409 registered in the name of Joaquin and his two sisters.
However, Joaquin’s sisters died without issue, causing the entire property to pass to him. After
Marcelina and Joaquin died, their nine (9) children executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to
adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over the two parcels of land and to alienate their shares
thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves for a consideration.

The division of Lot 769-A was embodied in two deeds executed on June 13, 1956 and April 21, 1959,
respectively. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale covering Lot 6409 was executed on
December 14, 1971. After the death of Asuncion Teves, her children, private respondents It-it herein,
extrajudicially settled her property, adjudicating unto themselves said lots.

On May 9, 1984, Ricardo and Arcadia Teves, the other heirs of Marcelina and Joaquin filed a complaint
with the RTC against private respondents for the partition and reconveyance of the aforesaid parcels of
land alleging that the extrajudicial settlements were spurious as the signatures of petitioners were all
forgeries. Moreover, petitioners alleged that without justifiable reasons private respondents refused to
partition the said parcels of land and to convey to petitioners their rightful shares. They likewise
contend that as regards the share of Ricardo Teves, son of Crescenciano Teves who predeceased
Joaquin and Marcelina, it was not at all affected in that extrajudicial settlement and sale since neither
Crescenciano nor his son Ricardo participated in its execution.

Private respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the assailed documents were executed with
the formalities required by law and are therefore binding and legally effective as bases for acquiring
ownership over the lots in question. Furthermore, it is contended that petitioners have slept on their
rights and should now be deemed to have abandoned such rights. Thereafter, the trial court ruled in
favor of private respondents and upheld the validity of the extrajudicial settlements. The Court of
Appeals ordered It-it to partition and convey to Ricardo Teves his one-eighth share over Lot 769-A.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Ricardo Teves has the right to demand partition despite the execution of extrajudicial
settlement covering Lot 6409?
2. Whether Ricardo Teves has the right to demand partition despite the execution of extrajudicial
settlement covering Lot 769-A?

HELD:
The extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca
are legally valid and binding.

1. It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to divide
Joaquin Teves’ estate among only six of his heirs. It does not mention nor bear the signatures of either
Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are both intestate heirs of Joaquin Teves and as such, are
entitled to a proportionate share of the decedents estate. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court,
the fact that Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean that he or, more accurately, his
heirs, lose the right to share in the partition of the property for this is a proper case for representation,
wherein the representative is raised to the place and degree of the person represented and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living.
However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the action which Pedro and
Cresenciano might have brought for the reconveyance of their shares in the property has already
prescribed. An action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil
Code prescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title. Asuncion
Teves acquired title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in
1984, which is more than 10 years from the issuance of title.
2. In contrast to the extrajudicial settlement covering Lot 6409, the two extrajudicial settlements
involving Lot 769-A do not purport to exclude Cresenciano from his participation in Lot 769-A or to cede
his share therein in favor of Asuncion. The settlement clearly adjudicated the property in equal shares in
favor of the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover, the deeds were intended to convey to
Asuncion Teves only the shares of those heirs who affixed their signatures in the two documents.
Here, Ricardo Teves is in possession of an undetermined portion of Lot 769-A and It-it do not claim
ownership over his share in the land. Thus, there is no basis for an action for reconveyance of Ricardo
Teves share since, in the first place, there has been no conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the
ownership and possession of one-eighth of Lot 769-A. Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to
demand partition of Lot 769-A because the two extrajudicial settlements have already effectively
partitioned such property. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. The extrajudicial settlements executed in 1956 and 1959
adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition,
which was legally made, confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him. Although Cresenciano, Ricardo’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial
settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in accordance with their intestate
shares under the law.

Furthermore, the Court held that an action questioning the extrajudicial settlements instituted after
more than 25 years constitutes laches, which is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a defensible cause of action,
they are barred from pursuing the same by reason of their long and inexcusable inaction.

(w) Cua v. Vargas, 506 SCRA 374;

Name: Joharey L. Sultan

Doctrine:
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had
no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule
74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or
had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.

FACTS:

A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters was left behind by the late Paulina
Vargas. A notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas'
heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza,
Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino,
Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida
and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes
Tribune for three consecutive weeks.
Subsequently, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and
among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester,
Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55
square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
When the offer to redeem was refused, Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial
Settlement and Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no legal and
binding effect on them.
ISSUE:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to
participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial
settlement and partition has been duly published.
RULING:
No. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement
and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed
of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as
what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present
case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is
invalid insofar as they are concerned.
(x) Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 620;

Name: Shannine C. Fortuna

Doctrines: – (1) Without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudical settlement
cannot be binding on said persons. (2) A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs,
who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.

Facts: Miguel Rodriguez died intestate survived by his wife Rosalina and their legally adopted daughter Maria
Pedrosa, the petitioner. Rosalina and Maria entered into an extra judicial settlement of his estate. The other Private
respondents, the Rodriguezes, however filed an action an action to annul Maria’s adoption which the CFI upheld. It
was also appealed to the Court of Appeals which also upheld the adoption as legal.
In the meantime, Pilar, the sister of Miguel also passed away with no other heirs but her brothers and sisters, the
private respondents. Who then entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of
the estate of Miguel and of his sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883
square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel,
represented solely by Rosalina. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents
Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to
the other respondents herein.
Petitioner Maria tried to claim their share of the properties and after being unable to do so, filed a complaint to annul
the partition. Her complaint was dismissed by the RTC and on appeal was also dismissed by the CA.

Issues: -– (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition” had
already prescribed;
(2) whether or not said deed is valid;

Ruling:

(1) No. The complaint for the annulment has not prescribed
Section 4, Rule 74] provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or
had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement
or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. So the two-year prescriptive period
is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De
Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of “extrajudicial settlement” upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from
the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because
it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, “no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.”
As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that
their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941

(2) No. The deed of partition is not valid.

No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.
Under Rule 74, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot
be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of
Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following
Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement
is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled
on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her
adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code

(y) Figuracion-Gerilla v. Vda. de Figuracion, 499 SCRA 484;

(z) Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 165 Phil. 118;

Name: Rodolfo B. Demonteverde III

Case: Roque vs. Intermediate Appellate Court GR.No. L-75886. August 30, 1988.
Doctrine: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership" and that "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned." It also provides that 'no prescription shall run in favor of a
co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership.

Facts:
The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel of land situated in San Juan, Malolos, Bulacan
and designated as Lot No. 1549 of the Cadastral Survey of Malolos. The property was registered
originally in the name of Januario Avendaño, a bachelor who died intestate and without issue on 22
October 1945.

Petitioner Concepcion Roque seeks for partition for a parcel of land sold unto her by her half brother
Ernesto and Victor Roque which is ¾ share of Lot 1549 evidenced by a “Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan”
dated November 27, 1961 but the said document is not notarize.

The remaining ¼ portion is being owned by Ernesto and Victor Roque from an extrajudicial partition.

Upon the subdivision plan conducted by a Geodetic Engineer, Respondents Ernesto Roque and heirs of
Victor Roque refused to acknowledge the petitioner’s claim of ownership and rejected the plan to divide
the land.

Petitioner Concepcion Roque filed a Complaint for Partition with Specific Performance at CFI Malolos
claiming the legal ownership of ¾ portion of Lot 1549 by virtue of Bilihang Lubos at Panuluyan. She
alleged that, as co-owner of Lot 1549, she had a right to seek partition of the property, that she could
not be compelled to remain in the co-ownership of the same.

Respondent impugned the genuineness of the documents and that the signatures do not appear
authentic of the supposed signatures. Respondents also refused to honor the Kasulatan which is not
notarize..

CFI - ruled in favor of Concepcion Roque.

IAC - reversed the judgment of the RTC and denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner is a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.

Held:
Yes, petitioner Concepcion Roque is a co-owner of Lot 1549 and therefore entitled to the ¾ portion of
the said land.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co- ownership"
and that "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned." It also provides that 'no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Petitioner Concepcion Roque, the co-owner seeking partition has been and is presently in open and
continuous possession of the ¾ portion of the property owned in common. Prior to filing of the parties
involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole Lot
1549 thus, co-ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the owners.

(aa) Pangan v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 375;

Name: Shireen M. Zanganeh

Case Title: ISAAC, SEVERINO, MARIA, TELESFORA, FELISA, SERAPIO, SIMEON and MACARIA all surnamed
PANGAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: It is a settled rule that possession by one co-owner will not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners
but in fact as beneficial to all of them. Hence, as long as his co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel partition
will not prescribe and may be filed at any time against the actual possessor by any of the other co-owners. However,
if the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion over it against the other co-owners, the
corollary of the rule is that he can acquire sole title to it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period. From that
moment, the question involved will be one of ownership and no longer mere partition.

Facts:
The property in question is a parcel of land with an area of 635 square meters and situated in San Pascual, Obando,
Bulacan. It was originally owned by Leon Hilario and is now being disputed between the herein petitioners, who are
his great grandchildren by his daughter Silvestra, and the private respondent, Teodora Garcia, who is his
granddaughter by his daughter Catalina.

In 1964, the petitioners filed an application for the registration of the land in their names by virtue of their continuous
and exclusive possession thereof since 1895, by themselves and their father and grandfather before them. On the
basis thereof, the application was approved on March 31, 1966. On June 8, 1966, the herein private respondent filed
a petition to set aside the said decision, which the trial Court granted,admitting at the same time her opposition to the
application and setting the case for reception of her evidence. This evidence sought to show that the land was
inherited by Leon Hilario's three children, but the son, Felicisimo, waived his right thereto and thereby made his two
sisters, Silvestra and Catalina, its exclusive co-owners. As Catalina's daughter, she was entitled to one-half of the
property, the other half going to Silvestra's heirs, the petitioners herein and the latter's grandchildren. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. However, on appeal, the CA reversed the decision in favor of the
private respondent.

Issue:
W/N private respondent, by her failure to assert her right, allowed the statutory period to lapse.

Ruling:
It is a settled rule that possession by one co-owner will not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact
as beneficial to all of them. Hence, as long as his co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel partition will not
prescribe and may be filed at any time against the actual possessor by any of the other co-owners. However, if the
co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of
the rule is that he can acquire sole title to it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period. From that moment,
the question involved will be one of ownership and no longer mere partition.

For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear showing that he has repudiated the
claims of the other co-owners and that they have been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making to
the property in question. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been given that the period of prescription will
begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of their own title if they do not seasonably defend
it.

Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:

a) That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust
b) That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust
c) That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive

On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, the Court is not convinced that the above requirements have
been satisfied. Although there are admittedly some precedents to the contrary, it would appear that the weight of
authority requires a categorical and final rejection of the co-owners' claim, usually manifested by a formal legal action,
to make the prescriptive period start to run against the claimant. The established evidence clearly shows that the
subject land was inherited by the petitioners and the private respondent as co-heirs of their common ancestor, Leon
Hilario, whose possession they continued to acquire prescriptive title over the property. That possession was
originally in the name of all the heirs, including Teodora Garcia, who in fact had been assured by Tomas Pangan, the
petitioners' father, that she would get the share to which she was entitled. The petitioners have not proved that their
possession excluded their co-owner and aunt or that they derived their title from a separate conveyance to them of
the property by Leon Hilario. Parenthetically, such a conveyance, if it existed, would be questionable as it might have
deprived Leon's other children of their legitime. In any case, the petitioners appear to have arrogated the entire
property to themselves upon their father's death sometime in 1942 or at the latest in 1965 when they sought to
register the land in their names to the exclusion of Teodora Garcia. Manifestly, the petitioners have acted in bad faith
in denying their aunt and co-heir her legal share to the property they had all inherited from Leon Hilario through their
respective parents.

Thus, The SC affirms the finding of the respondent court that there was no adequate notice by the petitioners to the
private respondent of the rejection of her claim to her share in the subject property. Noticeably absent here is a
categorical assertion by the petitioners of their exclusive right to the entire property that barred her own claim of
ownership of one-half thereof nor is there any explanation as to why they said she had no right to a share.

(bb) Acebedo v. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 186

Acebedo vs. Abesamis

Name: Rizyl Yapsangco

Title: Acebedo v. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 186

Doctrine:

Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with
respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided.

Facts:

Herodotus Acebedo and 7 others were left an estate consisting of real properties in Quezon City and
Caloocan City. Acebedo became the administrator pending partition. In the meantime, the property is
owned in common by the heirs.

The case pended for 16 years with the court. Miguel Acebedo et al (respondents) then filed a Motion for
Approval of Sale for them to sell their shares from the estate. The court approved the motion.
Respondents were able to find a buyer in the person of Yu Hwa Ping who agreed to buy the properties
for P12 Million. He paid P6 million as earnest money.

Acebedo assailed the approval of the sale claiming that the price is quite low. The court ordered Miguel
et al to find a higher bidder within a specified time frame which was later extended to 7 months but still
no other buyer could provide better terms.

Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents sell their share to the price already agreed upon
with Ping and that Acebedo can negotiate his price with Ping. But Acebedo still filed a Supplemental
Opposition against the approval of the conditional sale.

The court affirmed the approval of the sale and ordered Acebedo to sell his share at the same rate that
the other heirs sold their share to Ping.

Issue: Whether or not the other heirs can sell their shares of the estate prior to adjudication.

Held: Yes. An heir can sell his share without final adjudication. An heir is a co-owner of the property
(estate) before adjudication.

Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to
an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this
authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate
court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale.

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the same is under administration, is
based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case
the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.

(cc) Vda. de Gil v. Cancio, 14 SCRA 796;

Name: Jay L. Viagedor

Case: DOLORES C. VDA. DE GIL v. AGUSTIN CANCIO

Principle: Section 4, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when it appears that the sale of
the whole or a part of the real or personal estate; will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and
other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or administrator and on
written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be solid, authorize
the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay
debts, legacies, or expenses of administration

Facts: Carlos Gil, Sr. died testate in Manila on November 28, 1943 instituting as his exclusive heir his
widow Isabel Herreros subject to the condition that should the latter die the estate, if any, would be
inherited by Carlos Gil, Jr., the decedent's adopted son. In due time, the decedent's will was duly
admitted to probate, the widow Isabel having been appointed as the administratrix of the estate.

Among the properties constituting the estate were two parcels of residential lands and a house erected
thereon situated in Guagua, Pampanga. During the Japanese occupation, the widow Isabel and the
adopted son Carlos secured from one Agustin Cancio a loan of P89,000.00 and in payment thereof they
agreed on November 21, 1944 to transfer to Cancio the two lots after the same had been finally
adjudicated to both or either of the two heirs. Subsequently, Carlos died, and on June 25, 1954 Isabel H.
Vda. de Gil, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Carlos Gil, Sr., filed a motion in the
testate proceedings (No. 548) praying for an order to authorize her to execute the necessary deed of
transfer of the two lots including the house erected thereon to Agustin Cancio or his heirs. Copy of this
motion was served on Dolores C. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Jr. who expressed her conformity thereto in her
capacity as guardian of her minor children on October 21, 1954. This motion was approved by Judge
Ramon R. San Jose on condition that the original of the deed of transfer should be submitted to the
court for approval.

As Isabel H. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Sr. died sometime in July, 1956, before being able to execute the deed of
transfer in favor of Cancio, said deed was executed by. Dolores C. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Jr. on July 3, 1956 in
her capacity as co-administratrix and vendor of the properties, which deed was attached to a motion
she filed in the testate proceedings (No. 548) praying the court for its approval. Accordingly, on July 9,
1956, the probate court issued an order directing the co-administratrix to pay the estate and inheritance
taxes due on the properties covered by the sale before passing upon the motion filed for the approval of
the aforesaid deed of sale.

Apparently, nothing was done on the matter by the co-administratrix notwithstanding the lapse of
several years, and so on April 1, 1959, Agustin Cancio filed a motion in the probate proceedings
reiterating the former petition of the co-administratrix dated July 5, 1956 requesting for the approval of
the deed of sale stating that the Office of the Commission on Internal Revenue agreed to the
registration of said deed of sale notwithstanding the non-payment of the estate and inheritance taxes in
view of the fact that the value of the properties of the estate is more than sufficient to answer for
whatever estate and inheritance taxes that may be assessed against the estate. But, to the surprise of
petitioner Cancio, co-administratrix Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr. filed a strong opposition to the petition on
the ground that the late Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. entered into the agreement to sell
the properties without the authority of the court, that the properties subject of the sale had never been
finally adjudicated to both or either of the two vendors, and that the alleged deed of sale should only be
considered as an equitable mortgage

Issue: Whether Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. entered into the agreement to sell the
properties without the authority of the court, that the properties subject of the sale had never been
finally adjudicated to both or either of the two vendors, and that the alleged deed of sale should only be
considered as an equitable mortgage.
Ruling: No. Section 4, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when it appears that the sale of
the whole or a part of the real or personal estate; will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and
other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or administrator and on
written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be solid, authorize
the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay
debts, legacies, or expenses of administration.

It is true that the agreement between Isabel H. Vda. de GO, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr., on the one hand, and
Agustin Cancio, on the other, concerning the transfer of the two lots in question in payment of the loan
of P89,000.00 is conditioned upon the final adjudication of said properties to both or either of them, and
here such adjudication has not been made in view of the early death of the two heirs; but this
circumstance is now of no consequence considering that it is beyond dispute that the properties left by
the late Carlos Gil, Sr. were inherited, first, by Isabel and, later, by the children of Carlos Gil, Jr. who
inherited them through their father charged with the commitment in favor of Cancio. As a matter of
fact, Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr., co-administratrix of the estate, is now estopped from disputing the sale
because she herself in her capacity as co-administratrix filed the petition in court asking for the approval
of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons that do not appear in the record. And there is no
doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under
administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court. It is, therefore, error
for the court a quo to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.
(dd) Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Court of Appeals, 372 SCRA 359;

CONTRIBUTOR: Maryjoy P. Montero

PRINCIPLE: Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not
be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter
shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him.”

CASE TITLE: AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs COURT OF APPEALS

CASE CITATION: GR NO. 128102, March 7, 2000.

FACTS:

Petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co. (hereafter AZNAR), it appears that Lot No. 4399 containing an area of 34,325 square
meters located at Brgy. Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City, was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 March 1964. This deed was registered with the Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964 as shown on the face thereof. After the sale, petitioner AZNAR declared this
property under its name for taxation purposes and regularly paid the taxes thereon.

Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave
the land in the event that the company would use the property for its purposes. Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with
Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision
and beach resort. When its demands for the private respondents to vacate the land failed, AZNAR filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for unlawful detainer and damages,

On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the successors and descendants of the eight children of the late
Crisanta Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in the Original Certificate of Title.They had been residing
and occupying the subject portion of the land in the concept of owner since the time of their parents and grandparents,

Private respondents claimed that the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being
simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only when AZNAR entered into the land in the last quarter of 1991
and destroyed its vegetation. Private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on participated in the
extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta.

MTCC rendered a decision ordering the private respondents to (a) vacate the land in question.

RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition directing the sheriff to demolish private
respondents houses and other improvements which might be found on the subject premises.

the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC; declared the private respondents as the rightful possessors
de facto of the land in question; and permanently enjoined Sheriff Juan Gato or whoever was acting in his stead from effectuating
the demolition of the houses of the private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid where in not all the known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-
on participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs
of Crisanta?

HELD:
In arriving at its challenged decision, the Court of Appeals noted that at the time AZNAR entered the property, the private
respondents had already been in possession thereof peacefully, continuously, adversely and notoriously since time immemorial.
There was no evidence that petitioner was ever in possession of the property. Its claim of ownership was based only on an
Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale, which private respondents, however, claimed to be null and void for being
simulated and fraudulently obtained.

First, private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on participated in the extrajudicial partition, and
that two persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true, would not
warrant rescission of the deed.

Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter shall
be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him." In the present case, no evidence of
bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in
point; it provides: "A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to
such person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its entirety but only to the
extent corresponding to them.

(ee) Tuason v. Tuason, Jr., & Gregorio Araneta, Inc., 88 Phil. 428 (1951);