Issues/Held

MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS - WON the exercise of the powers granted by

the Constitution, the President may prohibit
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the the
presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and  Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified YES
his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President - WON the President acted arbitrarily or with
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
nation of his return at a time when the stability of government or excess of jurisdiction when she
is threatened from various directions and the economy is just determined that the return of the Marcoses
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. national interest and welfare and decided to
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible bar their return. NO.
threats & following supervening events:
o Failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders Ratio
o Channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
o Plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a - The court framed the question not so much as
chartered plane of a Lebanese arms WON the right at bar is the right to travel but that it is
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar the right to return to one’s country. This locates it
o Honasan’s failed coup outside the circle of specifically guaranteed rights in
o Communist insurgency movements the Bill of Rights and into the sphere of international
o Secessionist movements in Mindanao law which part of the law of the land
o Devastated economy because of - The court adopted a two – tiered approach,
o Accumulated foreign debt first, the issue of WON the president has the power to
o Plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies bar entry will be resolved, and second, WON the
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to president acted arbitrarily
order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of Executive Power:
President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in - At first, court struggles with the question of
the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar WON one should limit executive powers to those
his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the explicitly mentioned in the Constitution (Control, CIC,
President that the decision was made in the interest of faithfully execute laws, etc.). Petitioners claim that the
national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also President has enumerated powers, and what is not
claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. enumerated is impliedly denied to HER. If we apply the
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their principle of inclusio unius est exclusion alterius, then
right to life, liberty, property without due we would have a clear – cut picture of what powers the
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that President actually has.
it deprives them of their right to travel which according to - Court rules that the principle does not apply in
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired this case. The executive power can even go beyond
by a court order. merely executing laws. In a similar vein, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
According to the Marcoses, barring their return deprives Constitution. The court even goes to say that whatever
them of their right to: power inherent in the government ithat is neither
- life, liberty, property, without due process and equal legislative nor judicial has to be exclusive.
protection of the laws
- travel which may only be impaired by a court order The Power Involved:
- The court cites Article 2, Section 4 and 5
Respondents argue: - These principles are the ones that President
has sworn to presever and defend especially in the face
- that this case involves a political question which is of the question at bar. This provides the basis for the
non – justiciable President’s actions and the source of power
that is being exercised
- for the primacy of the right of the State to - Although the constitution outlines tasks of the
national security over individual rights President, this list is not definite and exclusive. She has
- Also, they assert that under international law, their residual and discretionary powers not states in the
right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under Constitution, which include the power to protect the
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, which the people, promote their welfare, and advance
had been ratified by the Philippines national interest
- that the decision to ban them for reasons of national - The problem is one balancing the general
security and public safety has international precedents welfare and the common good against the exercise of
rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
President’s residual powers, which according to
Theodore Roosevelt, is not only the power of the
President but also his duty to do anything which is not
forbidden in the constitution or laws that needs of the
nation demand.
- Also, this case calls for the exercise of the
President’s power as the protector of peace, which is
not limited to CIC powers or emergency powers, but
also includes the powers needed to attend the day
- to – day operation of the State
- The rights Marcoses are invoking are not
absolute. They are flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses cannot be
considered in the light solely of he constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one.
- It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President, which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramout duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determing whether it must be granted or
denied.

The Extent of Review

- It did not find the decision arbitrary since it was
the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that
could really prove to be proverbial final straw that
would break the camel’s back. With all the documented
history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their
followers to destabilize the country, their return would
only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed
against the State and instigate more chaos
- As for the questions of WON there exists
factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in
the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses
in the Philippines, it is proven the supervening events
that happened before her decision are factual
 - The president must take preemptive measures
for the self – preservation of the country and
protection of the people. She has sworn to preserve
and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful
execution of laws, and cannot shirk from that
responsibility.

Decision: Petition dismissed

GONZALES V. HECHANOVA
MONDANO V. SILVOSA
CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GONZALES III V. OFFICE OF PRES ISSUE/S:
 WoN OotP has jurisdiction to exercise
FACTS: administrative disciplinary power over a
 Both petitioners seeks to declare sec 8(2) of RA 6770 Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) which gives president the who belong to the constitutionally-created
power to dismiss a deputy ombudsman of the office Office of the Ombudsman - NO
of the ombudsman o The ombudsman’s administrative
o Gonzales case: assails jurisdictional grounds disciplinary power over a deputy
on the Office of the President decision that ombudsman and special prosecutor is
dismissed him as deputy ombudsman for the not exclusive
military and other law enforcement offices o Sec 21 of RA 6770: Officials Subject to
upon a finding of guilt on administrative Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. -
charges of gross neglect of duty and grave The Office of the Ombudsman shall
misconduct constituting a betrayal of public have disciplinary authority over all
trust. elective and appointive officials of the
o Barreras-Sulit: seeks to reverse order Government and its subdivisions,
requiring petitioner to submit a written instrumentalities and agencies,
explanation with respect to acts constituting including Members of the Cabinet,
serious offenses in relation to the plea local government, government-owned
bargaining agreement entered into with or controlled corporations and their
Major General Carlos F. Garcia issued by subsidiaries, except over officials who
Office of the President may be removed only by impeachment
 2008: Formal charge for grave misconduct (robbery, or over Members of Congress, and the
grave threats, robbery extortion, and physical Judiciary
injuries) was filed before the PNP-NCR against Manila o Sec 8(2) of RA 6770: (2) A Deputy or the
Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and Special Prosecutor, may be removed
4 others docketed/ from office by the President for any of
o Christian M. Kalaw, private complainant, filed the grounds provided for the removal
a similar charge before the Office of the City of the Ombudsman, and after due
Prosecutor of Manila docketed as I.S. No. process
08E-09512 o Petitioners contend that they cannot
 July 24, 2008: During the pendency of the cases, be removed by the president because
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police under RA 6770, the Office of the
Commission turned over, upon request of Gonzales, Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
all relevant documents and evidence of said case to them
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for o Statcon: in interpreting a statute, care
administrative adjudication should be taken that every part
o Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H for Grave thereof be given effect, on the theory
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. that it was enacted as an integrated
Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police measure and not as a hodge-podge of
officers conflicting provisions.
 Aug 26, 2008: I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed
 o October 17, 2008: Internal affairs of PNP  harmonious construction of
recommended dismissal without prejudice of these two apparently
the administrative case against same police conflicting provisions in R.A.
officers No. 6770 leads to the
 Feb 16, 2009 Emilio Gonzales III recommended inevitable conclusion that
dismissal of Rolando Mendoza and others guilty of Congress had intended the
Grave Misconduct in case OMB-P-A-08-0670-H Ombudsman and the
o May 6, 2010: Gonzales endorsed Order for President to exercise
final approval of Ombudsman Meceditas concurrent disciplinary
Gutierrez jurisdiction over petitioners as
 August 23, 2010: Rolando Mendoza hijacked Chinese Deputy Ombudsman and
tourist bus to have himself reinstated Special Prosecutor,
o 8 HK nationals died, 7 injured, and Mendoza respectively
died  Congressional deliberations
 Incident Investigation and Review Committee was show that the Chair expressed
created to determine accountability for the incident apprehension that the
o Petitioner and ombudsman refused to Ombudsman and Deputy
appear on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman may try to
Ombudsman is an independent protect one another. Senator
constitutional body Angara: outside official should
o IIRC found that petitioner is among those be vested with authority to
whom culpability must lie for letting discipline Ombudsman to
Mendoza’s MoR lie more than 9 months effect a check and balance
without justification violating Ombudsman  The Ombudsman is possessed
prescribed rules to resolve MoRs within 5 of jurisdiction to discipline his
days own people and mete out
o If they had acted on the MoR, the hostage administrative sanctions upon
taking would have been avoided as Mendoza them, including the extreme
expressed willingness to take full penalty of dismissal from the
responsibility of the incident if his demand service, but the President has
for the release of the final decision or concurrent authority with
reinstatement was met respect to removal from office
o Office of the President instituted a formal of the Deputy Ombudsman
charge against Gonzales and dismissed him and Special Prosecutor, albeit
 Barreras-Sulit Case: Petitioner sought under specified conditions.
Sandiganbayan’s approval of a Plea Bargaining o By granting express authority power to the
Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with General President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
Carlos F. Garcia and family who are charged with and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely
Plunder and Money Laundering filled an obvious gap in the law
o HoR Committee on Justice: recommended o Section 9, Article XI of the 1987
dismissal of Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit for Constitution confers upon the
allowing Garcia to get off the hook despite President the power to appoint the
strong evidence for serious public offenses Ombudsman and his Deputies
because of the PLEBARA o While the removal of the Ombudsman
himself is also expressly provided for in
the Constitution, which is by
impeachment under Section 244 of the
same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly
dealing with the removal from office of
a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor, for that matter.
 o By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770,
Congress simply filled a gap in the law
without running afoul of any provision
in the Constitution or existing statutes.
In fact, the Constitution itself, under
Section 2, authorizes Congress to
provide for the removal of all other
public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
who are not subject to impeachment.
o Power of the president to remove a deputy
ombudsman and a special prosecutor is
implied from his power to appoint
o Under the doctrine of implication, the
power to appoint carries with it the
power to remove.
o As a general rule, therefore, all officers
appointed by the President are also
removable by him.
o The exception to this is when the law
expressly provides otherwise - that is,
when the power to remove is expressly
vested in an office or authority other
than the appointing power
 Under Section 9, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, the
Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by
the President. However,
Members of the Supreme
Court may be removed after
impeachment proceedings
initiated by Congress (Section
2, Article XI), while judges of
lower courts may be removed
only by the Supreme Court by
virtue of its administrative
supervision over all its
personnel (Sections 6 and 11,
Article VIII). The Chairpersons
and Commissioners of the Civil
Service Commission Section
1(2), Article IX(B), the
Commission on Elections
Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and
the Commission on Audit
Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall
likewise be appointed by the
President, but they may be
removed only by
impeachment (Section 2,
Article XI). As priorly stated,
 the Ombudsman himself shall
be appointed by the President
(Section 9, Article XI) but may
also be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2,
Article XI).
o Granting the President the Power to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does
not diminish independence of the
office of the ombudsman
 What the Constitution secures
for the Office of the
Ombudsman is, essentially,
political independence. This
means nothing more than that
"the terms of office, the salary,
the appointments and
discipline of all persons under
the office" are "reasonably
insulated from the whims of
politicians."
 Being aware of the
constitutional imperative of
shielding the Office of the
Ombudsman from political
influences and the
discretionary acts of the
executive, Congress laid down
two restrictions on the
President's exercise of such
power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman, namely:
(1) that the removal of the
Deputy Ombudsman must be
for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of
the Ombudsman and (2) that
there must be observance of
due process.
o Gonzales may not be removed from
office where questioned acts do not
constitute betrayal of public trust
 The OP's pronouncement of
administrative accountability
against petitioner and the
imposition upon him of the
corresponding penalty of
removal from office was based
on the finding of gross neglect
of duty and grave misconduct
in office amounting to a
betrayal of public trust, which
is a constitutional ground for
 the removal by impeachment
of the Ombudsman (Section 2,
Article XI, 1987 Constitution),
and a statutory ground for the
President to remove from
office a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor
Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act.
 The OP held that petitioner's
want of care and wrongful
conduct consisted of his
unexplained action in directing
the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S
Insp. Mendoza's case records
to his office; his failure to
verify the basis for requesting
the Ombudsman to take over
the case; his pronouncement
of administrative liability and
imposition of the extreme
penalty of dismissal on P/S
Insp. Mendoza based upon an
unverified complaint-affidavit;
his inordinate haste in
implementing P/S Insp.
Mendoza's dismissal
notwithstanding the latter's
non-receipt of his copy of the
Decision and the subsequent
filing of a motion for
reconsideration; and his
apparent unconcern that the
pendency of the motion for
reconsideration for more than
five months had deprived P/S
Insp. Mendoza of available
remedies against the
immediate implementation of
the Decision dismissing him
from the service.
 Thus, taking into consideration
the factual determinations of
the IIRC, the allegations and
evidence of petitioner in his
Answer as well as other
documentary evidence, the OP
concluded that: (1) petitioner
failed to supervise his
subordinates to act with
dispatch on the draft
resolution of P/S Insp.
Mendoza's motion for
 reconsideration and thereby
caused undue prejudice to P/S
Insp. Mendoza by effectively
depriving the latter of the right
to challenge the dismissal
before the courts and prevent
its immediate execution, and
(2) petitioner showed undue
interest by having P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case endorsed to
the Office of the Ombudsman
and resolving the same against
P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis
of the unverified complaint-
affidavit of the alleged victim
Christian Kalaw.
 Would every negligent act or
misconduct in the
performance of a Deputy
Ombudsman's duties
constitute betrayal of public
trust warranting immediate
removal from office? The
question calls for a deeper,
circumspective look at the
nature of the grounds for the
removal of a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor vis-a-vis common
administrative offenses.
 Accordingly, the OP's
pronouncement of
administrative accountability
against petitioner and the
imposition upon him of the
corresponding penalty of
dismissal must be reversed
and set aside, as the findings of
neglect of duty or misconduct
in office do not amount to a
betrayal of public trust. Hence,
the President, while he may be
vested with authority, cannot
order the removal of
petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no
intentional wrongdoing of the
grave and serious kind
amounting to a betrayal of
public trust.
o Barrera-Sulit petition: Plea bargaining is
allowable when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
 accused of the crime charged. However, if the
basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this
case is the evidence on record, then it is
significant to state that in its earlier Resolution
promulgated on January 7, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies
of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and
declared that "the conglomeration of evidence
presented by the prosecution is viewed by the
Court to be of strong character that militates
against the grant of bail."

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the

Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension
effective immediately, even as the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
investigation in connection with the above case against
petitioner. InG.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the
continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against
Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged
acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of
the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in
accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of
1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of

the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.

ATTY SYLVIA BANDA V. EDUARDO ERMITA ISSUE:

EO 285 by P. Aquino Prodecural
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There (1) WON the case is a class action suit – NO! 34
is hereby created a National Printing Office out of the people is not counted as a class action suit –
merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant too little people
printing units of the Philippine Information Agency. The
Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the a. class suit are:
following:
1) the subject matter of controversy is
one of common or general interest to
a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard
many persons;
and accountable forms of national, provincial, city and
2) the parties affected are so
municipal governments, including government
numerous that it is impracticable to
corporations;
bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are
b. Printing of officials ballots;
sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can
c. Printing of public documents such as
fully protect the interests of all
the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine
concerned.
Reports, and development information materials of the
b. All of which the petitioners were not
Philippine Information Agency.
complied with
 The Office may also accept other government PETITION DISMISSED! (but court says to still look at the
printing jobs, including government publications, aside ‘merits’ of the case)
from those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis. Substantive
(2) WON President Arroyo cannot amend or
The details of the organization, powers, functions, repeal Executive Order No. 285 by the mere
authorities, and related management aspects of the Office issuance of another executive order (Executive
shall be provided in the implementing details which shall be Order No. 378). – NO! no merit
prepared and promulgated in accordance with Section II of
this Executive Order. a. It is a well-settled principle in
jurisprudence that the President has
The Office shall be attached to the Philippine the power to reorganize the offices
Information Agency. and agencies in the executive
department in line with the
Presidents constitutionally granted
EO 378 by PGMA power of control over executive
offices and by virtue of previous
SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide delegation of the legislative power to
printing services to government agencies and reorganize executive offices under
instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no existing statutes.
longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the printing
b. Chapter 10, Title III, Book III, Executive
services requirements of the government over standard
Order No. 292 or the Administrative
and accountable forms. It shall have to compete with the
Code of 1987 Section 31 gives the
private sector, except in the printing of election
power to President to re-organize.
paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the Commission i. Sec. 31. Continuing Authority
on Elections consistent with the provisions of the Election of the President to Reorganize
Code of 1987. his Office. The President,
subject to the policy in the
SECTION 2. Government Executive Office and in order
agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services to achieve simplicity, economy
outside NPO provided that: and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to
2.1 The printing services to be provided by the reorganize the administrative
private sector is superior in quality and at a lower cost than structure of the Office of the
what is offered by the NPO; and President. For this purpose, he
may take any of the following
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms actions:
of meeting the target completion time of the government
agency. ii. (1) Restructure the internal
organization of the Office of
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the the President Proper,
amount to be appropriated for the programs, projects and including the immediate
activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations Act Offices, the President Special
(GAA) shall be limited to its income without additional Assistants/Advisers System
financial support from the government. (Emphases and and the Common Staff Support
underscoring supplied.) System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to
 Petitoners see EO 378 as a threat to their security of another;
tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now
challenge its constitutionality, contending that: iii. (2) Transfer any function
under the Office of the
(1) it is beyond the executive powers of President President to any other
Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. Department or Agency as well
285 issued by former President Aquino when the as transfer functions to the
latter still exercised legislative powers; and Office of the President from
(2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners other Departments and
security of tenure, because it paves the way for the Agencies; and
gradual abolition of the NPO.
iv. (3) Transfer any agency under
the Office of the President to
any other department or
agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the
President from other
Departments or agencies.
(Emphases ours.)

c. Court held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB

v Zamora: The President may transfer
the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the
President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,
we ruled that reorganization involves
the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. It takes
place when there is an alteration of
the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the
lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB
is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under
the Office of the President. Hence, it is
subject to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize.

d. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an

agency that is part of the Office of the
Press Secretary (which in various times
has been an agency directly attached
to the Office of the Press Secretary or
as an agency under the Philippine
Information Agency), is part of the
Office of the President.  So in this
case, the president has powers to re-
organize the NPO.

e. In the case at bar, there was neither an

abolition of the NPO nor a removal of
any of its functions to be transferred to
another agency. Under the assailed
Executive Order No. 378, the NPO
remains the main printing arm of the
 government for all kinds of
government forms and publications
but in the interest of greater economy
and encouraging efficiency and
profitability, it must now compete with
the private sector for certain
government printing jobs, with the
exception of election paraphernalia
which remains the exclusive
responsibility of the NPO, together
with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as
the Commission on Elections may
determine. At most, there was a mere
alteration of the main function of the
NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its
printing responsibility to election
forms.

f. Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of

the same Code significantly provides:

i. Sec. 20. Residual Powers.

Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers
and functions vested in the
President which are provided
for under the laws and which
are not specifically
enumerated above, or which
are not delegated by the
President in accordance with
law. (Emphasis ours.)

g. President to reorganize the Executive

Branch under Section 31 includes such
powers and functions that may be
provided for under other laws. To be
sure, an inclusive and broad
interpretation of the Presidents power
to reorganize executive offices has
been consistently supported by
specific provisions in general
appropriations laws.

i. the 2003 General

Appropriations Act, which was
reenacted in 2004 (the year of
the issuance of Executive
Order No. 378), likewise gave
the President the authority to
effect a wide variety of
organizational changes in any
 department or agency in the
Executive Branch.

ii. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act

provides:

1. Section 77. Organized

Changes. Unless otherwise
provided by law or directed by
the President of
the Philippines, no changes in
key positions or organizational
units in any department or
agency shall be authorized in
their respective organizational
structures and funded from
appropriations provided by
this Act.

2. Section 78. Institutional

Strengthening and
Productivity Improvement in
Agency Organization and
Operations and
Implementation of
Organization/Reorganization
Mandated by Law. The
Government shall adopt
institutional strengthening
and productivity
improvement measures to
improve service delivery and
enhance productivity in the
government, as directed by
the President of
the Philippines. The heads of
departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies, and other entities
of the Executive Branch shall
accordingly conduct a
comprehensive review of their
respective mandates,
missions, objectives,
functions, programs, projects,
activities and systems and
procedures; identify areas
where improvements are
necessary; and implement
corresponding structural,
functional and operational
adjustments that will result in
streamlined organization and
operations and improved
performance and
 productivity: PROVIDED, That
actual streamlining and
productivity improvements in
agency organization and
operations, as authorized by
the President of the
Philippines for the purpose,
including the utilization of
savings generated from such
activities, shall be in
accordance with the rules and
regulations to be issued by the
DBM, upon consultation with
the Presidential Committee on
Effective Governance:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in
the implementation of
organizations/reorganization
s, or specific changes in
agency structure, functions
and operations as a result of
institutional strengthening or
as mandated by law, the
appropriation, including the
functions, projects, purposes
and activities of agencies
concerned may be realigned
as may be necessary:
PROVIDED, FINALLY, That any
unexpended balances or
savings in appropriations may
be made available for payment
of retirement gratuities and
separation benefits to affected
personnel, as authorized
under existing laws.
(Emphases and underscoring
ours.)
h. In the 2003 case of Bagaoisan v.
National Tobacco Administration, we
upheld the streamlining of the
National Tobacco Administration
through a reduction of its personnel
and deemed the same as included in
the power of the President to
reorganize executive offices granted
under the laws, notwithstanding that
such streamlining neither involved an
abolition nor a transfer of functions of
an office.

i. In the more recent case of Tondo

Medical Center Employees Association
 v. Court of Appeals, which involved a
structural and functional
reorganization of the Department of
Health under an executive order, we
reiterated the principle that the power
of the President to reorganize agencies
under the executive department by
executive or administrative order is
constitutionally and statutorily
recognized.

i. Section 17, Article VII

of the 1987
Constitution, clearly
states: [T]he
president shall
have control of all
executive
departments,
bureaus and offices.
ii. ^^^^ take note this is only
time consti is mentioned

iii. Section 31, Book III,

Chapter 10 of
Executive Order No.
292, also known as the
Administrative Code
of 1987 reads (already
mentioned above)
j. Anak Mindanao Party-List
Group v. Executive Secretary:
In establishing an executive
department, bureau or office,
the legislature necessarily
ordains an executive agencys
position in the scheme of
administrative structure. Such
determination is primary, but
subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative
structure. As far as bureaus,
agencies or offices in the
executive department are
concerned, the power of
control may justify the
President to deactivate the
functions of a particular
office. Or a law may expressly
grant the President the broad
authority to carry out
reorganization measures. The
 Administrative Code of 1987 is
one such law.

(3) WON Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative

enactment, as the same was issued while
President Aquino still had legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution thus, only
Congress through legislation can validly amend
Executive Order No. 285. – YES, but is is also
w/in power of P. GMA.

a. Executive Order No. 378, which

purports to institute necessary
reforms in government in order to
improve and upgrade efficiency in the
delivery of public services by
redefining the functions of the NPO
and limiting its funding to its own
income and to transform it into a self-
reliant agency able to compete with
the private sector, is well within the
prerogative of President Arroyo under
her continuing delegated legislative
power to reorganize her own office

b. in the separate concurring opinion of

our learned colleague, Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the
objective behind Executive Order No.
378 is wholly consistent with the state
policy contained in Republic Act No.
9184 or the Government Procurement
Reform Act to encourage
competitiveness by extending equal
opportunity to private contracting
parties who are eligible and qualified.

c. this delegated legislative power to

reorganize pertains only to the Office
of the President and the departments,
offices and agencies of the executive
branch and does not include the
Judiciary, the Legislature or the
constitutionally-created or mandated
bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed
that the exercise by the President of
the power to reorganize the executive
department must be in accordance
with the Constitution, relevant laws
and prevailing jurisprudence.

d. Dario v. Mison:
Reorganizations in this
jurisdiction have been
 regarded as valid provided
they are pursued in good
faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in
good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist.
And in that case, security of
tenure would not be a Chinese
wall. Be that as it may, if the
abolition, which is nothing else
but a separation or removal, is
done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of
tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid abolition
takes place and whatever
abolition is done, is void ab
initio. There is an invalid
abolition as where there is
merely a change of
nomenclature of positions, or
where claims of economy are
belied by the existence of
ample funds. (Emphasis ours.)
e.
(4) WON petitioners maintain that the issuance of
Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the
eventual abolition of the NPO and would
violate the security of tenure of NPO
employees. - NOPE SORRY 

a. A careful review of the records will

show that petitioners utterly failed to
substantiate their claim. They failed
to allege, much less prove, sufficient
facts to show that the limitation of the
NPOs budget to its own income would
indeed lead to the abolition of the
position, or removal from office, of
any employee. Neither did petitioners
present any shred of proof of their
assertion that the changes in the
functions of the NPO were for political
considerations that had nothing to do
with improving the efficiency of, or
encouraging operational economy in,
the said agency.
 JUDGEMENT: WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
Separate Opinions: Carpio  see above

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ISSUE/S:

 W/N EO 13 is Constitutional – YES
For Legal Affairs, Office of the President". SC ruled it o The President has Continuing
constitutional, petition was dimissed. Authority to Reorganize the Executive
FACTS: Department under EO 292 (Admin
 April 16, 2001 – PGMA issued EO 12 creating the Code of 1987)
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) w/ the
power to investigate/ hear admin cases for possible SEC. 31, ADMIN CODE (EO 292):
graft and corruption against presidential appointees
and submit its report and recommendations to the 1. Restructure the internal
President. organization of the Office of
 November 15, 2010 – PNOY issued EO 13 abolishing the President Proper,
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office including the immediate
of the Deputy Exec. Sec for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) Offices, the Presidential
with an Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD- Special Assistants/Advisers
ODESLA) System and the Common
o Purposes stated in EO 13 for abolition of Staff Support System, by
PAGC: abolishing, consolidating, or
 government adopting a policy of merging units thereof or
STREAMLINING the govt bureaucracy transferring functions from
for economy & efficiency one unit to another;
 to enable Office of the Pres (OP) to
directly investigate graft and corrupt
cases of Pres. appointees in exec
department 2. Transfer any function under
 April 6, 2011 – Respondent Purisima filed before the the Office of the President
IAD-ODESLA a complaint for grave abuse of to any other Department or
misconduct against petitioner Pichay, Chairman of Agency as well as transfer
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities functions to the Office of
Administration (LWUA), and other incumbent the President from other
members of said board. Departments and Agencies;
o Due to their purchase by LWUA of 445,377 and
shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
 April 14, 2011 – Respondent Exec. Sec. Ochoa
required Pichay and other board members to submit
written explanations. 3. Transfer any agency under
 Thus this Petition of Pichay praying EO 13 be ruled the Office of the President
unconstitutional by this court on the ff grounds: to any other Department or
o Usurping power of legislature to create public Agency as well as transfer
office and appropriate funds agencies to the Office of the
o Usurping power of congress to delegate President from other
quasi-judicial powers to administrative departments or agencies
agencies
o Encroaching upon powers of the ombudman
o Violating the guarantee of due process & the
equal protection clause  Need of Pres. to reorganize
office is to achieve simplicity,
 economy and efficiency
(Domingo v. Zamora)
 This is properly w/in the
President’s continuing
“delegated legislative
authority to organize”
o President is limited to transferring
functions/agencies from OP to
departments/agencies
 Except for restructuring the
internal organization of the OP
proper, inc. immediate offices,
the Pres. Special
Assistants/Advisers System
and Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing,
consolidating, merging units or
transferring functions from
one unit to another (Sec.
31(1), EO 292)
o EO 13 is directly adherent to Section
31(1) of E)292
 When PAGC was created, it
was placed directly under the
OP
 On the other hand, ODESLA is
an office within the OP Proper
 Since PAGC and ODESLA both
belong to OP Proper, the
reorganization by way of
abolishing PAGC and
transferring its functions to
ODESLA is allowable under
Section 31 (1) or EO 292
o Petitioner asserts that EO 13 not only
abolished an office, but created one as
well. He goes on to argue that legally
speaking, reorganization does not
include the act of creating an office.
 The reorganization did not
entail the creation of a new,
separate and distinct office as
the duties and functions in
PAGC were simply transferred
to the ODESLA. It was a mere
alteration of the
administrative structure of the
ODESLA through the
establishment of the 3rd
division – Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division
 Reorganization = takes
place when there is an
 alteration of the
existing structure of
government
offices/units. It
involves a reduction of
personnel,
consolidation of
offices, or abolition
thereof be reason of
economy or
redundancy of
functions.
 Valid reorganization
must be exercised
through legitimate
authority and must be
pursued in good faith
(i.e. purposes of
economy &
efficiency). This was
the purpose of
transferring PAGC
functions to IAD-
ODELSA
o (This is the issue adherent to the
syllabus) Petitioner asserts that taking
operational funds for IAD-ODELSA is
an illegal appropriation by the
President since Congress didn’t
indicate the manner by which the
appropriation of the OP was to be
distributed,.
 Court finds no legal basis for
this and rules that there is no
usurpation of legislative power
to appropriate public funds
 Economical effects of
reorganization – Congress
initially appropriated P22 M
for PAGC’s operation in the
2010 budget.
 As Chief Executive, Pres. has
power to recommend the
budget necessary for the
operation of the government
 Sec. 78 of RA 9970 (General Appropriations Act of
2010) expresses of the President’s authority to
“direct changes in the organizational units or key
positions in any department or agency” even to
the extent of modifying and realigning
appropriations for that purpose”
 President is also given consti authority to
augment any item in the General Appropriations
 Law using savings in other items of the
appropriation for his office.
 he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund
appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department which is included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment
o The IAD-ODELSA is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body not vested with
quasi-judicial powers.
 the IAD-ODESLA cannot try
and resolve cases, its authority
being limited to the conduct of
investigations, preparation of
reports and submission of
recommendations
 Fact finding is not adjudication
and not likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice
o IAD-ODELSA doesn’t encroach upon
the powers and duties of the
Ombudsman
 The primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute cases refers to
criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases.
 the investigative authority of
the IAD- ODESLA is limited to
that of a fact-finding
investigator whose
determinations and
recommendations remain so
until acted upon by the
President
o EO 13 doesn’t violate petitioner’s right
to due process and the equal
protection of the laws
 The power to
remove/discipline is lodged in
the same authority on which
the power to appoint is vested.
President has authority to
discipline presidential
appointees. This is part of their
public office.
 Pichay is a high level position
presidential appointee. Thus,
he comes directly under the
 disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President as opposed to
elective officials who are
“disciplined” by the sovereign
power of the people.
 On due process –
administrative proceedings
were duly followed. Petitioner
was given sufficient
opportunity to oppose formal
complaint filed by Purisima.

PETITION DISMISSED.

GANZON V. CA HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the

Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on impression because legally, “supervision” is not
the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon incompatible with disciplinary authority.
was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of
the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order
the power of supervision by the President over local
by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
government officials in contrast to the power of control
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to
given to him over executive officials of our government
suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control
Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the
and supervision, are two different things which differ
same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
one from the other in meaning and extent.
supervisory power.
“In administration law supervision means overseeing
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as
or the power or authority of an officer to see that
the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
officials.
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.”
But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably
inferred that the power of supervision of the President
over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of
the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of
the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a
valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a
600 day suspension.

DADOLE V COA ISSUE: Whether or not LBC 55 is void for infringing the
local autonomy of Mandaue City
FACTS:
Petitioners RTC Judges Dadole et al and MTC judges HELD: Yes. We recognize that, although our
Temistocles et al stationed in Mandaue City received a Constitution guarantees autonomy to local
monthly allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the yearly government units, the exercise of local autonomy
appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in 1991, it was increased remains subject to the power of control by Congress
to P1,500 for each judge. However, the Department of Budget and the power of supervision by the President.
and Management (DBM) then issued Local Budget Circular
No. 55 which provides that the additional monthly allowances Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
to be given by a local government unit should not exceed Constitution provides that: "Sec. 4. The President of the
P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. . . . "
Acting on the said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor
issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in excess Under Section 458, of RA 7160, the law that supposedly
of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus, petitioners filed serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of
with the Office of the City Auditor a protest. However, it was additional allowances to judges "when the finances of
treated as a motion for reconsideration and was endorsed to the city government allow."
the Commission on Audit Regional Office.
The said provision does not authorize setting a definite
In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the said motion to maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to
their Head Office with recommendation that the same should judges. Thus, this Court need not belabor the point that
be denied. Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, the finances of a city government may allow the grant
petitioners filed the instant petition. They argued, among of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the
others, that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy revenues of the said city government exceed its annual
of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local expenditures.
government unit can disburse as additional allowances to
judges stationed therein. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional
allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the
criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160.

The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over

local government units by imposing a prohibition that
did not correspond with the law it sought to
implement.

In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular

had no legal basis. The President can only interfere in
the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he
or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law.
This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers
over local government units.

Hence, the President or any of his or her alter

egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the
parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any
directive therefore by the President or any of his or
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-
conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates
the principle of local autonomy and separation of
powers of the executive and legislative departments in
governing municipal corporations.
VILLAFUERTE JR. V. ROBREDO RULING:
No, a reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It
reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully
intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC
stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development
the IRA for development projects. projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine
themselves if they have been complying with the law.
It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if
they have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued
in response to the report of the COA that a substantial
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs
examination and audit on the manner the local government was not actually utilized for development projects but
units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as
calendar years 1993-1994. MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.

The examination yielded an official report, showing that a Contrary to the Villafuerte, et al.’s posturing, however,
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some the enumeration was not meant to restrict the
LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds.
was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the LGUs remain at liberty to map out their respective
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark development plans solely on the basis of their own
violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for
development projects.
In 2010, Jesse Robredo, in his capacity as DILG Secretary,
issued the assailed Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, They may even spend their IRAs for some of the
entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs
Bids and Public Offerings,” which aims to promote good of undertaking development projects.
governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs. Villafuerte, et al. likewise misread the issuance by
claiming that the provision of sanctions therein is a
The MC requires the posting within 30 days from the end of clear indication of the President’s interference in the
each fiscal year in at least three (3) publicly accessible and fiscal autonomy of LGUs.
conspicuous places in the local government unit a summary
of all revenues collected and funds received including the Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for
appropriations and disbursements of such funds during the sanctions. It did not particularly establish a new set of
preceding fiscal year. acts or omissions which are deemed violations and
provide the corresponding penalties therefor.
The foregoing circular also states that noncompliance will be
meted sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that there are
regulations. On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued existing rules to consider in the disbursement of the
another MC, reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall 20% development fund and that non-compliance
be utilized for desirable social, economic and environmental therewith may render them liable to sanctions which
outcomes essential to the attainment of the constitutional are provided in the LGC and other applicable laws.
objective of a quality of life for all. It also enumerated a list for
which the fund must not be utilized. Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post
other documents in the mentioned issuances went
Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the beyond the letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC
Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant and R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known as the
petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed issuances Government Procurement Reform Act, by requiring
of the respondent for being unconstitutional for violating the that budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and
principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the procurement plans of LGUs be publicly posted as well.
Constitution and the LGC. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads that Local
ISSUE: treasurers, accountants, budget officers, and other
Did the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles accountable officers shall, within thirty (30) days from
of local and fiscal autonomy? the end of the fiscal year, post in at least three (3)
publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local
government unit.

R.A. No. 9184, on the other hand, requires the posting

of the invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to
proceed, and approved contract in the procuring
entity’s premises, in newspapers of general circulation,
and the website of the procuring entity.

In particular, the Constitution commands the strict

adherence to full disclosure of information on all
matters relating to official transactions and those
involving public interest. Pertinently, Section 28, Article
II and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.
GPI V. SPRINGER It may finally be inferred from the books that the
appointment of public officials is generally looked upon
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was as properly an executive function. The power of
created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. appointment can hardly be considered a legislative
2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested power. Appointments may be made by the Legislature
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor- or the courts, but when so made should be taken as an
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the incident to the discharge of functions properly within
House of Representatives.” their respective spheres (State vs. Brill [1907], 100
Minn., 499; Stockman vs. Leddy [1912], 55 Colo., 24;
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood)
Spartanburg County vs. Miller [1924], 132 S. E., 673;
issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the
Mechem on Public Officers, secs. 103-108; Mechem,
Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO
The Power to Appoint to Office; Its Location and Limits,
emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in
1 Mich. Law Rev. [1903], 531.)|||
the Governor-General who is the head of the government
(President at that time was considered the head of state but
does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO
Based on all the foregoing considerations, we deduce
was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
that the power of appointment in the Philippines
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the appertains, with minor exceptions, to the executive
Senate President as well as the House Speaker, department; that membership in the voting committee
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the in question is an office or executive function; that the
Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four National Coal Company and similar corporations are
others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo instrumentalities of the government; that the duty to
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed look after government agencies and government
against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election property belongs to the executive department; and
into the Board of NCC. that the placing of members of the Philippine
Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges
House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC. of the Executive Department. Under a system of
government of delegated powers, under which
HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the delegation legislative power vests in the Philippine
doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court Legislature and executive power vests in the Governor-
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but General, and under which delegation a general power
it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the of appointment resides in the Governor-General and a
office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially specified power of appointment resides in the
executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or
corporation. It was created by Congress. indirectly perform functions of an executive nature
 through the designation of its presiding officers as
majority members of a body which has executive
To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the
functions. That is the meaning we gather from the tri-
Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint
partite theory of the division of powers. That is the
members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive
purport of the provisions of the Organic Law. That has
powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there
been the decided trend of persuasive judicial
are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint
opinion.|||
persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in
the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices
The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen, is
within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable
authorized to create corporations and offices. The
because it does not weaken the executive branch.
Legislature has lawfully provided for a National Coal
Company and a committee to vote the government
stock in that company, but has unlawfully provided for
two of its members to sit in the committee. Would this
court be doing violence to the legislative will if the
voting power be continued solely in the hands of the
Governor-General until different action is taken by the
Legislature? We conclude that we would not, for the
reason that the primordial purpose of the Legislature
was "to promote the business of developing coal
deposits . . . and of mining . . . and selling the coal
contained in said deposits." (Act No. 2705, sec. 2; Act
No. 2822, sec. 1.) The incidental purpose of the
Legislature was to provide a method to vote the stock
owned by the Government in the National Coal
Company. In the words of the United States Supreme
Court, "The striking out is not necessarily by erasing
words, but it may be by disregarding the
unconstitutional provision and reading the statute as if
that provision was not there." (Railroad Companies vs.
Schutte [1880], 103 U. S., 118; State vs. Westerfield
[1897], 23 Nev., 468; State vs. Washburn, supra; State
vs. Wright [1913], 251 Mo., 325; State vs. Clausen
[1919], 107 Wash., 667; 1 Lewis Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Second ed. Ch. IX.)|||

We have no hesitancy in concluding that so much of

section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2
of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power
of the government-owned stock in the National Coal
Company in the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, is
unconstitutional and void. It results, therefore, in the
demurrer being overruled, and as it would be
impracticable for the defendants to answer, judgment
shall be rendered ousting and excluding them from the
offices of directors of the National Coal Company. So
ordered, without costs.||
RUFINO V. ENDRIGA The power to appoint is the prerogative of the
President, except in those instances when
FACTS: the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this
Two groups of appointed members of the fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and
Board of Trustees of CCP are contesting each Judicial branches violates the system of separation of
other’s appointment. The Endriga group, sitting powers that inheres in our democratic republican
as current members, was appointed by then- government. 22
President Ramos and is assailing the Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
appointment of the Rufino group, replacing all 7 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
members of the Endriga group, by then-President officers. The first group refers to the heads of the
Estrada. Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
Endriga group avers that the appointment ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
into the Board of the Rufino group transgressed the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
PD 15 – creation of Board of Trustees of CCP. As whose appointments are vested in the President by
stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6, the Constitution. The second group refers to those
appointment into the Board shall only be made by whom the President may be authorized by law to
a majority vote of the trustees; presidential appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not
appointments can only be made when the Board
otherwise provided by law.
is entirely vacant to uphold the CCP’s charter of
independence from pressure or politics. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth
Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
appointment since the provision on appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments,
stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case
16, Article 7 of the Constitution. The Board involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII
cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the
appointment of this fourth group of officers. 23
to appointment of its members.
The President appoints the first group of
ISSUE: officers with the consent of the Commission on
Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing Appointments. The President appoints the second and
appointments made by trustees of their fellow third groups of officers without the consent of the
members is constitutional Commission on Appointments. The President appoints
the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is
the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the
HELD:
head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section
appointments of members by the trustees 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
themselves is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board
because the trustees fall under the third group of
While it is stated that appointing powers officers.
may be delegated by the President, such power is
limited in scope to include only ranks lower than ||| it also meant that while, generally, appointing
authority belongs to the President, Congress could let
the appointing authority.
others share in such authority. And the word
In the case, an appointment of a member "inferior" was understood to mean not petty or
made by a fellow member transgresses Article 7, unimportant but lower in rank than those to whom
Section 16 (1) since both positions are equal in appointing authority could be given.
nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy prescribed
in its charter as an exemption from the limitation The premise was that the power to appoint belonged
of delegative appointing power because such to the President; but the Batasan could diffuse this
invocation puts CCP outside the control of the authority by allowing it to be shared by officers other
President. than the President. ADTCaI||| (Rufino v. Endriga, G.R.
Nos. 139554 & 139565, [July 21, 2006], 528 PHIL 473-
548)

Incidentally, the 1987 text, in order to eschew any

pejorative connotation, avoids the phrase "inferior
officers" and translates it instead into "officers lower in
rank," that is, lower in rank than the courts or the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.||| (Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 &
139565, [July 21, 2006], 528 PHIL 473-548)

Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards" the power to appoint lower-ranked officers.
Section 16 provides:
The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.(Emphasis
supplied)
In a department in the Executive branch, the
head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the
Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to
appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department.
1. In an agency, the power is vested in
the head of the agency for it would be
preposterous to vest it in the agency
itself.
2. In a commission, the head is the
chairperson of the commission.
3. In a board, the head is also the
chairperson of the board.
In the last three situations, the law may not
also authorize officers other than the heads of the
agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked
officers.
||| (Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565,
[July 21, 2006], 528 PHIL 473-548)

Since the President exercises control over "all the

executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the
President necessarily exercises control over the CCP
which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating
that the President "shall have control of all executive
...offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not exempt any executive office —
one performing executive functions outside of the
independent constitutional bodies — from the
President's power of control. There is no dispute that
the CCP performs executive, and not legislative,
judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.||| (Rufino v.
 Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565, [July 21, 2006],
528 PHIL 473-548)

The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a

government office in the Executive branch outside the
control of the President in the guise of insulating that
office from politics or making it independent. If the
office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain
subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the
Legislature can deprive the President of his
constitutional power of control over "all the executive
. . . offices." ||| (Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 &
139565, [July 21, 2006], 528 PHIL 473-548)

The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law

can cut off the President's control over the CCP in the
guise of insulating the CCP from the President's
influence. By stating that the "President shall have
control of all the executive . . . offices," the 1987
Constitution empowers the Presidentnot only to
influence but even to control all offices in the
Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far
greater than, and subsumes, influence.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in G.R.
No. 139554. We declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section
6(b) and (c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended,
insofar as it authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by
election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines.
||| (Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565,
[July 21, 2006], 528 PHIL 473-548)
SARMIENTO V. MISON ISSUE:
WoN the appointment of Salvador Mison as
 Petitioners, as taxpayers, lawyers, and professors of Commission of the Bureau of Customs is
Consti Law, seek to prohibit Mison from performing unconstitutional for violating Sec. 16, Article VII of the
the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the 1987 Constitution? NO!
Bureau of Customs and prevent Carague as Sec. of the  1935 Constitution: almost all presidential
Department of Budget from effecting disbursements appointments required consent of the
in payment of Mison’s salaries on the ground that Commission on Appointments vs 1973
Mison’s appointment is unconstitutional. Constitution: placed the ABSOLUTE power of
o Unconstitutional by reason of it not having appointment in the President w/out any check
been confirmed by the Commission on on the part of the legislature.
Appointments.  Framers of 1987 Constitution: struck a “middle
o Respondents maintain its constitutionality of ground” between the two previous
the appointment w/out the confirmation of Constitutions by requiring the consent of the
the Commission on Appointments. Commission on Appointments for (1) and
 Court resolved to give due process to the petition leaving to the President, w/out such
because of the demands of public interest, setting confirmation, the appointment of officers
aside procedural issues. under (2), (3), and (4).
 Provision in question: Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 o 1986 Constitutional Commission: a
Constitution feeling was manifestly expressed to
make the power of the Commission on
o The President shall nominate and, with the Appointments more limited than in the
consent of the Commission on 1935 Constitution.
Appointments, appoint the o Further debates: excluded
o (1) heads of the executive departments, appointments of heads of bureaus
ambassadors, other public ministers and from req’t of confirmation by the
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from Commission on Appointments.
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and o Clear and expressed intent of its
other officers whose appointments are framers was to exclude presidential
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall appointments from confirmation,
also appoint except those provided in the first
o (2) all other officers of the Government sentence of the provision in question.
whose appointments are not otherwise  Sen. Neptali Gonzales: “also” in the second
provided for by law, and sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII implies that the
o (3) those whom he may be authorized by law President shall “in like manner” appoint
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest officers mentioned in said second sentence by
the appointment of nomination and with confirmation of the
o (4) other officers lower in rank in the Commission on Appointments.
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads o OSG: “also” could mean “in addition;
of the departments, agencies, commissions as well; besides; too”
or boards. o Court: Difference in the construction of
o (2),(3), (4): Question arises. Should officers the first and second sentences implies
falling within these categories be appointed a difference in message conveyed ->
with or without the consent of the first sentence needs consent, second
Commission on Appointments? sentence doesn’t.
 Power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Limitations on such
power should be strictly construed against
them.
o Court: use of the word “alone” after
the word “President” in the third
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII is a slip or
lapse in draftsmanship.
 Bureau of Customs Commissioner is not of
those within the first group of appointments
that requires confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
o Sec. 601, RA 1937, as amended by PD
34: “The Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs shall be
appointed by the President of the
Philippines.”
o If read w.r.t. 1935 Constitution: needs
confirmation.
o If read w.r.t. 1987 Constitution: no
need for confirmation.

HELD: Petition DISMISSED

DISSENTS:

GUTIERREZ, JR.
  Constitution should never have any of its
provisions interpreted in a manner that results
in absurd or irrational consequences.
 The functions of the Commission on
Appointments can’t be made unreasonably
diminished to the confirmation of a limited
number of appointees, given its importance as
a constitutional body.
o It gives assurance that only those who
pass the scrutiny of the Executive and
the Legislative will help run the
country.
o If only those in the first sentence need
confirmation, second and third
sentences become meaningless.
 Agrees with Commission on Appointments that
all provisions of the Constitution on
appointments must be read together.

CRUZ
 The framers of the 1987 Constitution did not
intend discrepancies in the need for
confirmation of appointment, as they would
lead to absurd consequences.
o Colonel is lower in rank than the CHR
Chairman, but the latter is not subject
to confirmation while the former is
o Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs:
needs confirmation but the ordinary
consuls under him/her don’t?
 Majority opinion’s interpretation that the
second sentence is the exception to the first is
pregnant with mischievous results that were
not envisioned by the framers.
o First sentence would have been
sufficient by itself to convey that all
other appointees of the President
would not need confirmation -> why
include the second sentence?????
o If officers in the second sentence do
not need confirmation, why was it
necessary to provide in the third
sentence that the appointment of the
other officers of lower rank will also
not need confirmation as long as their
appointment is vested by law in the
President alone? -> third sentence is
superfluous too.
o Cruz’s reading: Second sentence is a
CONTINUATION of the idea expressed
in the first sentence and simply
mentions the other officers subject to
confirmation.
  Records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission are at best persuasive and not
necessarily conclusive.
 Power of appointment, though executive in
nature, is not absolute or unlimited.
o Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments acts as a restraint on
presidential excesses of the use of this
power.
 In his view, the only officers appointed by the
President who are not subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments:
o (1)Members of the judiciary, the
Ombudsman and his deputies, who are
nominated by the Judicial and Bar
Council
o (2) Vice President when he is
appointed to the Cabinet
o (3) “other officers lower in rank”, but
only when their appointment is vested
by law in the President alone.
o Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs is NOT in the enumeration.
o Given his interpretation of the second
sentence, there is a need for a
confirmation from the Commission on
Appointments for the appointment of
Mison as Bureau of Customs
Commissioner.

CONCEPTION-BAUTISTA V. SALONGA

the Court is again confronted with a similar question, this

time, whether or not the appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an
"independent office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is to
be made with or without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments (CA, for brevity). Once more, as
in Mison, the Court will resolve the issue irrespective of the
parties involved in the litigation, mindful that what really
matters are the principles that will guide this Administration
and others in the years come.
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is
to be made without the review or participation of the
Commission on Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not
specifically provided for in theConstitution itself, unlike the
Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit,
whose appointments are expressly vested by
the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointment. 2
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because
they are among the officers of government "whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section
2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights. It provides:
"(c) The Chairman and the Members of the
Commission on Human Rights shall be
appointed by the President for a term of
seven years without re-appointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor."
The above conclusions appear to be plainly evident and,
therefore, irresistible. However, the presence in this case of
certain elements — absent in the Mison case — makes
necessary a closer scrutiny. The facts are therefore essential.
||| (Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, [April 13, 1989], 254
PHIL 156-198)

On 27 August 1987, the President of the

Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion
Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human
Rights."||| (Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, [April 13,
1989], 254 PHIL 156-198)

Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and

members of the Commission on Human Rights, befitting an
independent office, as mandated by the Constitution, 4 the
President of the Philippines on 17 December 1988 extended
to petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman
of the Commission.||| (Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439,
[April 13, 1989], 254 PHIL 156-198)

n 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from

the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments requesting
her to submit to the Commission certain information and
documents as required by its rules in connection with the
confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights.||| (Bautista v. Salonga, G.R.
No. 86439, [April 13, 1989], 254 PHIL 156-198)
QUINTOS-DELES V. COA These four (4) groups, to which we
will hereafter refer from time to
time, are:
First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the
Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by
law;
Third, those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly
appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints.
||| (Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Constitutional
Commissions, G.R. No. 83216, [September 4, 1989], 258
PHIL 54-67)

Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in

paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House
of Representatives are among the "other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of
Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
(Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the
President in the Constitution which, by express
mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation
such as appointments of members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and
the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No
such exemption from confirmation had been extended
to appointments of sectoral representatives in
the Constitution.
||| (Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Constitutional
Commissions, G.R. No. 83216, [September 4, 1989], 258
PHIL 54-67)

he invocation of Art. XVIII, Section 7 of

the Constitution as authority for the appointment of
petitioner places said appointment within the ambit of
the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII; hence, subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
under the Mison doctrine. Petitioner's appointment
was furthermore made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 which provides:
"SEC 16. . . .
The President shall have the power
to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress."
The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII
as additional authority for the appointment of
petitioner is of vital significance to the case at bar. The
records show that petitioner's appointment was made
on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March
26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the
said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the
appointment extended to her.
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16,
Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner
is, the recognition by the President as appointing
authority that petitioner's appointment requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII, appointments
made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral
representatives need no confirmation, the President
need not make any reference to the constitutional
provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner.
As a matter of fact, the President in a letter dated April
11, 1989 had expressly submitted petitioner's
appointment for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Considering that Congress had
adjourned without respondent Commission on
Appointments having acted on petitioner's
 appointment, said appointment/nomination had
become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of
the Rules of respondent Commission and "unless
resubmitted shall not again be considered by the
Commission."
Petitioners further contend that nowhere in
the Constitution nor in Executive Order No. 198 is
mention made of the need for petitioner's
appointment to be submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. Executive Order No.
198 promulgated on June 18, 1987 before the
convening of Congress, is denominated: "Providing for
the Manner of Nomination and Appointment of
Sectoral Representatives to the House of
Representatives." We agree with the submission of
respondent Commission that the provisions
of Executive Order No. 198 do not deal with the
manner of appointment of sectoral
representatives. Executive Order No. 198 confines
itself to specifying the sectors to be represented, their
number, and the nomination of such sectoral
representatives. LLjur
The power of the President to appoint sectoral
representatives remains directly derived from Section
7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in
the second "Whereas" clause of Executive Order No.
198. Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral
representatives require the consent of the Commission
on Appointments in accordance with the first sentence
of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the
point, petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by
virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art.
VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of
the Constitution which require submission to the
confirmation process.
||| (Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Constitutional
Commissions, G.R. No. 83216, [September 4, 1989], 258
PHIL 54-67)
CALDERON V. CARALE ISSUE:
 WoN Congress may, by law, require the CA’s
SUMMARY: The Congress may not, by law, require the CA’s confirmation of appointments extended by the
confirmation of appointments extended by the President to President to government officers additional to
government officers in addition to those expressly mentioned those expressly mentioned in the first sentence
in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, Constitution. of Section 16, Article VII, Constitution
FACTS: o NO. Section 13 of RA 6715 amends the
 RA 6715, amending the Labor Code, provides that the Constitution by adding appointments
Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and requiring CA’s confirmation and by
other Commissioners of the National Labor Relations imposing the CA’s confirmation on
Commission (NLRC) shall all be appointed by the appointments which are otherwise
President, subject to confirmation by the Commission entrusted only with the President.
on Appointments (CA).
  Pursuant to the law, President Corazon Aquino o Sec 16, Art VII of the Constitution was
assigned respondent Carale as the Chairman and deliberately intended by the framers
other respondents as the Commissioners of the NLRC. of the 1987 Constitution to be a
 Petitioner questions the constitutionality of and departure from the system embodied
legality of their permanent appointments, without in the 1935 Constitution where the CA
submitting them to the CA for confirmation. exercised the power of confirmation
over almost all presidential
appointments, leading to many cases
of abuse of such power of
confirmation.
o Section 16: “The President shall
nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards.
The President shall have the
power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only
until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”

NOTES:
 Cruz, dissenting: “on the basis of my dissent in
Sarmiento v. Mison, which I believe should be
reexamined”
 Gutierrez, dissenting: time to finally accept
majority ruling in Sarmiento

GENERAL V. URRO ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power
of judicial review
FACTS:
HELD:
When Roces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in
September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21, When questions of constitutional significance are
2008 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta review only if the following requisites are present: (1)
(Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the
him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman. existence of personal and substantial interest on the
part of the party raising the constitutional question;
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of the (3)recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest
petitioner, Constancia P.de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the
and Escuetaas permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. In a lis mota of the case.
letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action.
Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued In the present case, the constitutionality of the
separate congratulatory letters to the respondents, for being respondent’s appointments is not the lis mota of the
appointed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is
The petitioner then filed the present quo warranto petition the determination of whether the petitioner has a
questioning the validity of the respondents appointments cause of action to institute and maintain this present
mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional petition: a quo warranto against respondent Urro.
prohibition against midnight appointments. On July 30, 2010,
Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. The Court already held that for a petition for quo
No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments warranto to be successful, the suing private individual
Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the must show a clear right to the contested office. Since
Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments." the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment,
(and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a
The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was cause of action to maintain the present petition.
really a "regular" appointment, and as such, he cannot be The essence of an acting appointment is its
removed from office except for cause. temporariness and its consequent revocability at any
Since the appointment paper of respondent Urro, while time by the appointing authority.
bearing a date prior to the effectivity of the constitutional ban
on appointments, was officially released (as per the Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President
congratulatory letter dated March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) includes the power to make temporary (acting)
when the appointment ban was already in effect, then the appointments,unless he is otherwise specifically
petitioners appointment, though temporary in nature, should prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where
remain effective as no new and valid appointment was an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of
effectively made. the office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration
The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that
respondents De Guzman and Escueta on the same grounds. would be subverted or defeated by the President's
appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner
pending the selection and qualification of a permanent
appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of
pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that
the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under
or within the Executive Department.Clearly, there is
nothing repugnant between the petitioners acting
appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the
functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the
NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.

Estoppel also clearly militates against the petitioner.

From the time he was appointed until apprised of the
appointment of Urro, the petitioner discharged the
functions of his office without expressing any
misgivings on his appointment. He cannot later on be
heard to say that the appointment was really a
permanent one so that he could not be removed except
for cause.
FUNA V. CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
ISSUE/S:

Summary: Petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of EO  Procedural: WoN petitioner has standing – YES
364 and Sec. 14, Chap. 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292. The Court o Court upheld his standing in previous
partially grants the petition; it upheld the constitutionality of suits of similar nature (Funa v Agra;
Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but proclaimed Funa v Villar; Funa v Ermita)
EO 264 as unconstitutional for violating Sec. 1 and 2, Article o “non-traditional suitors” may be
IX-A of the Constitution granted standing in issues of
transcendental importance
FACTS:  Procedural: WoN the case is moot and
academic – YES
 Jan. 11, 2010: PGMA appointed respondent Duque as o Duques designation could have
chairman of the CSC terminated or been rendered invalid
o Feb. 3, 2010: appointment confirmed by the by the enactment of RA 10149 (GOCC
Commission on Appointments Governance Act of 2011) on June 6,
 Feb. 22, 2010: PGMA issued EO 864 2011
o EO 864 basically included the chairman of the o BUT, the Court still decided to exercise
CSC as a member of the Board of its power of judicial review for
Trustees/Directors in an ex official capacity of guidance of and as a restraint upon the
the 1) Government Service Insurance System future
(GSIS), 2) Philippine Health Insurance  Substantive: WoN the designation of Duque as
Corporation (PHILHEALTH), 3) the Employees a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees
Compensation Commission (ECC), and 4) the of the said GOCCS, in an ex officio capacity in
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) unconstitutional – YES
o Pursuant to this, Duque was designated as a o To safeguard the independence of the
member of the Board of Directors or Trustees Constitutional Commissions, the
of the said GOCCs Constitution (among others) imposes
 April 8, 2010: petitioner as a taxpayer, concerned under Sec. 2, Article IX-A of the
citizen, and lawyer filed the instant petition Constitution certain inhibitions and
challenging the constitutionality of EO 864 as well as disqualifications upon the Chairmen
Sec. 14, Chap. 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 and members to strengthen their
(Administrative Code of 1987), and the designation of integrity
Duque for allegedly violating Sec. 1 and 2, Art. IX-A of  The issue herein involves one
the Constitution of the disqualifications given in
the provision: the
disqualification from holding
any other office or
employment, in this case,
during Duque’s tenure as
Chairman of the CSC
o BUT, Sec. 1 and Sec. 2, Art. IX-A of the
Constitution must be read in relation
to Sec. 7, par. 2, Art. IX-B of the same
and the Court’s holding in Civil Liberties
Union v Executive Secretary
 Being an appointive public
official who does not occupy a
Cabinet position (i.e.,
President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants),
 Duque was covered by the
general rule enunciated under
Sec. 7, par. (2), Art. IX-B. He
can hold any other office or
employment in the
Government during his tenure
if such holding is allowed by
law or by the primary
functions of his position i.e. ex
officio positions (from office or
by virtue of office)
o Sec. 14, Chap. 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
292 is clear that the CSC Chairman’s
membership in a governing body is
dependent on the condition that the
functions of the government entity
where he will sit as its Board member
must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges,
and welfare of government officials
and employees
 The Court upholds the
constitutionality of this
provision because matters
affecting the career
development, rights and
welfare of government
employees are among the
primary functions of the CSC as
the central personnel agency
of the government (pursuant
to Sec. 3, Art. IX-B of the
Constitution) and are
consequently exercised
through its Chairman, and
thus, the CSC Chairman’s
membership therein must,
therefore, be considered to be
derived from his position as
such
o However, whether Duque’s
designation as Board member of the
said GOCCs is in accordance with the
Constitution and the condition laid
down in Sec. 14, Chap. 3, Title I-A, Book
V of EO 292 is dependent on the
functions of these government entities
under their respective charters (the
GSIS Charter or RA 8291; the
PHILHEALTH Charter or RA 7875; the
HDMF Charter or RA 9679; and the ECC
Charter, PD 626)
  While powers and functions
associated with appointments,
compensation and benefits
affect the career
development, employment
status, rights, privileges, and
welfare of government
officials and employees, the
said GOCCs are also tasked to
perform other corporate
powers and functions that are
not personnel-related.
 All of these powers and
functions, whether personnel-
related or not, are carried out
and exercised by the
respective Boards of these
GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of
the governing Boards of these
GOCCs, he may exercise these
powers and functions, which
are not anymore derived from
his position as CSC Chairman
 Duque’s designation as
member of the governing
Boards of these GOCCs entitles
him to receive per diem, a
form of additional
compensation that is
disallowed by the concept of
an ex officio position
 THUS, this situation goes
against the principle behind an
ex officio position, and must,
therefore, be held
unconstitutional
o Apart from violating the prohibition
against holding multiple offices,
Duque’s designation also impairs the
independence of the CSC
 Under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President
exercises control over all
government offices in the
Executive Branch.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
and the members of their
respective governing Boards
are under the control of the
President
  As such, the CSC Chairman
cannot be a member of a
government entity that is
under the control of the
President without impairing
the constitutionally-vested
independence of the CSC

NOTES:

 In view of the application of the prohibition

under Sec. 2, Art. IX-A of the Constitution,
Duque did not validly hold office as Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC
Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be
considered as a de jure officer while he served
his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs.
That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto
officer during his tenure as a Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF.
 In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds
that all official actions of Duque as a Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and
HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and
effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office
o This clarification is necessary in order
to protect the sanctity and integrity of
the dealings by the public with persons
whose ostensible authority emanates
from the State

AYTONA V. CASTILLO
Under the circumstances above described,
what with the separation of powers, this Court
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. resolves that it must decline to disregard the
Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling
interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.
the latter took the corresponding oath.
Of course, the Court is aware of many
On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect precedents to the effect that once an appointment
Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on December has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered,
31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, specially where the appointee has qualified. But
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments none of them refer to mass ad
made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961 (date interim appointments (three hundred and fifty),
when he, Macapagal, had been proclaimed elected by the issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief
Congress). On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined
appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of
the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately. exceptional circumstances justify revocation 3 and
if any circumstances justify revocation, those
On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the
described herein should fit the exception.
powers of their office, although Castillo informed Aytona
of his title thereto; and some unpleasantness developed
 in the premises of the Central Bank. However, the next Incidentally, it should be stated that the
day and thereafter, Aytona was definitely prevented from underlying reason for denying the power to revoke
holding office in Central Bank. after the appointee has qualified is the latter's
equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity
So, he instituted this proceeding which is
might be successfully set up in the present
practically, a quo warranto, challenging Castillo's right to
situation, considering the rush conditional
exercise the powers of Governor of the Central Bank.
appointments, hurried maneuvers and other
Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had qualified for
happenings detracting from that degree of good
the post, and therefore, the subsequent appointment and
faith, morality and propriety which form the basic
qualification of Castillo was void, because the position
foundation of claims to equitable relief. The
was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the
appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or
appointment of Aytona had been revoked by
unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to beat
Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal; and so, the real
the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences
issue is whether the new President had power to issue the
to the dignity and efficiency of the public service.
order of cancellation of thead interim appointments
Needless to say, there are instances of the public
made by the past President, even after the appointees
service. Needless to say, there are instances
had already qualified.
wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness,
||| (Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313 (Resolution), justice and righteousness should be taken into
[January 19, 1962]) account.
WHEREFORE, the Court exercising its
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing
judgment and discretion in the matter, hereby
president Carlos Garcia during the last day of his term. Aytona
dismiss the action, without costs.
was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank.
When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, ||| (Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313 (Resolution),
he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at [January 19, 1962])
the same time he appointed Andres Castillo as the new
governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his
warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain post.
as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly
HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done
appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that
in good faith then he would have the right to continue
the ex-president’s appointments were scandalous, irregular,
office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain
hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it
in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment
was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or
can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcia’s
administration.
appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the
upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the
policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a
person is qualified his appointment should not be
revoked but in here it may be since his appointment
was grounded on bad faith, immorality and
impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that
is considered but also justice, fairness and
righteousness.

JORGE V. MAYOR ISSUE:

FACTS: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President
Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Macapagal operated as valid revocation of Jorge's ad
Bureau of Lands through regular and successive promotions. interim appointment.
He was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim
Director of Lands in December 13, 1961, he took his oath of RULING:
office on the 23rd, his appointment was transmitted to the No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December
CoA in 26th. In May 1962, CoA confirmed the said ad interim 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record that it was
appointment. made and released after the joint session of Congress
President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 that ended on the same day. It is a matter of
revoking ad interim appointments extended and released by contemporary history, of which this Court may take
former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of Congress that judicial cognizance, that the session ended late in the
ended on December 13 1961. night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of regular office hours. In the absence of competent
Macapagal administration, informed Jorge that pursuant to a evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the
letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge that his appointment of Jorge was made before the close of
appointment was among those revoked by Admin Order No. office hours, that being the regular course of business.
2, and that his position of Director of Lands was considered The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor
vacant. Jovencio Mayor had been designated by the President intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2,
to be Acting Director of Lands. Jorge instituted a petition for and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was
mandamus and quo warranto, claiming that he is the legally validly confirmed by the CoA and thereafter, the office
appointed Director of Lands. never became vacant.

YKALINA V. ORICIO Issue:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary can validly

Facts: appoint on behalf of the President a vice-mayor in a
municipality.
The 1951 polls of the municipality of Valladolid, Occidental,
Negros, resulted in the election of Manuel Z. Ykalina as mayor, Held:
and of Antipas Junio as vice-mayor. Among the councilors-
elect, Pedro Z. Ykalina who obtained the highest place, and Yes, the Executive Secretary, as the alter ego of the
Ananias Oricio the fourth. All assumed office at the proper President, can appoint a municipality’s vice-mayor.
time. On July 18, 1953, Antipas Junio wrote the Provincial
Board a letter of resignation, which was duly accepted by that Undoubtedly, under section 21 (b) of the Revised
body on July 24, 1953. Then on August 8, 1953, the Acting Election Code, when the office of the vice-mayor
Executive Secretary suspended Mayor Ykalina by reason of became vacant the President could appoint thereto a
certain administrative charges. Consequently, Mayor Ykalina suitable person, etc. While the appointment of an
yielded the office to Ananias Oricio. officer is usually evidenced by a Commission, as a
general rule, it is not essential to the validity of an
A few days later, Pedro Z. Ykalina asserted his right to appointment that a commission issue, and an
substitute the mayor in view of the resignation of the vice- appointment may be made by an oral announcement
mayor Junio, and started a quo warranto proceeding to of his determination by the appointing power.
contest respondent Oricio's possession of the office. He
alleged that under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative The Chief Executive is vested by law with the power to
Code, when the mayor of a town is suspended his duties are appoint many officials. Probably in the appointment of
discharged by the vice-mayor, but if there be no vice-mayor, those of lesser category the Executive has found it
by the councilor who at the last general election received the more expedient to follow the practice herein disclosed.
highest number of votes. He alleged further in this petition For that matter, the document appointing Oricio as
that the Provincial Governor, without consultation with, nor vice-mayor did not materially differ from another in the
consent of the Provincial Boards had invalidly designated said same words of appointment, but with a rubber stamp
respondent to act as mayor of Valladolid. of His Excellency's autograph, as signature, affixed
thereto by the Executive Secretary upon orders of the
In his defense, the respondent answered that the Governor's President
letter merely informed Mayor Ykalina of his suspension by
superior decree, and of his obligation to cease in the exercise
of his powers which shall be assumed by Oricio, who had,
before that time, qualified for the office of vice-mayor in
pursuance of an appointment issued by the President of the
Philippines on July 25, 1953. The respondent went on to
explain there was no need of any designation by the provincial
governor, inasmuch as under section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code he ipso facto succeeded to the
mayorship upon the incumbent's suspension.

By way of replication, the petitioner assailed the validity of

Oricio's appointment as vice-mayor, contending that it was
made by Executive Secretary Marciano Roque, and not by
President Quirino himself.

SM LAND V. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVT. AUTHORITY ISSUES:

1) W/N there was a perfected contract between the
SM Land v BCDA (G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015) parties;
2) W/N BCDA may terminate the same by reason of
NATURE OF THE CASE: MR from SC decision granting SMLIs public interest.
petition for certiorari and directing BCDA to subject the
formers unsolicited proposal for the development of HELD: 1) Yes; 2) No.
Bonifacio South Property to a competitive challenge.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
FACTS: SM Land, Inc. submitted an unsolicited proposal to
develop Bonifacio South Property. Respondent BCDA, under (1) There was a valid agreement between the parties.
the current presidency of Casanova, however, terminated the The elements of a valid contract were all present:
competitive challenge on the following grounds: a) SMLI’s a) Consent. In the case at bar, when SMLI
offer was incompatible with public interest and, therefore, submitted the first Unsolicited Proposal to
void; b) the whole process that lead to the issuance of a BCDA on December 14, 2009, the
Certificate of Successful Negotiation was highly irregular, submission constituted an offer to
citing a dubious process that lead to the naming of SMLI as undertake the development of the subject
the original proponent given the fact that another developer property. BCDA then entered into
has submitted a proposal to develop the land in question two negotiations with SMLI until the BCDA
months before SMLI. BCDA also submitted that the Joint finally accepted the terms of the final
Venture Selection Committee’s recommendation and BCDA’s unsolicited proposal. Their agreement was
Boards approval using competitive challenge, instead of the thereafter reduced into writing through
usual public bidding process, are themselves questionable. the issuance of the Certification of
BCDA also submitted that the government stands to lose P13 Successful Negotiations where the
B in the agreement. meeting of the parties’ minds was
reflected.
In this MR, respondent argued that BCDA and SMLI do not b) Cause. The cause of the agreement in the
have a contract that would bestow upon the latter the right case at hand is their interest in the sale or
to demand that its unsolicited proposal be subjected to a acquisition and development of the
competitive challenge. Assuming arguendo the existence of property and their undertaking to perform
such an agreement between the parties, respondents their respective obligations, among others,
contend that the same may be terminated by reason of public as reflected in the Certificate of Successful
interest. Negotiations and in the Terms of
Reference (TOR) issued by BCDA.
c) Object. Here, when the BCDA Board issued
the Certification of Successful
Negotiations, it only accepted SMLI’s
Unsolicited Proposal and declared SMLI
eligible to enter into the proposed JV
activity. It also “agreed to subject [SMLI]’s
Original Proposal to Competitive
Challenge.”
(2) This agreement is the law between the contracting
parties with which they are required to comply in good
faith. Verily, it is BCDA’s subsequent unilateral
cancellation of this perfected contract which this Court
deemed to have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. BCDA could not validly renege on its
obligation to subject the unsolicited proposal to a
competitive challenge in view of this perfected
contract, and especially so after BCDA gave its
assurance that it would respect the rights that accrued
in SMLI’s favor arising from the same.

Collateral Issues:
a) On Public Bidding v Competitive Challenge. Public
bidding may generally be more preferred than a
competitive challenge for reasons explained in the
dissent. However, there must be a careful balance
between what is best for the government and what is
fair to the persons it deals with. Otherwise, any and all
unsolicited proposal can be cancellable, despite its
acceptance, by the mere allegation that straight
bidding is what public interest so requires. Worse, the
government can very well ignore, at will, its contractual
obligations by invoking that familiar mantra––public
interest.

b) On the argument on perceived government losses

and alleged dubious proceeding. The alleged adverse
economic impact on the government, in finding for
SMLI, does not constitute, under the premises, a valid
cause for the reversal of the assailed Decision. The
ruling did not award the project in petitioner’s favor
but merely ordered that SMLI’s proposal be subjected
to a competitive challenge. Consequently, any alleged
disadvantage the government would suffer is
speculative at most as there is no final award for the
project as of yet.
Respondents harp on the alleged dubiousness of the
proceeding that led to the perfection of the agreement,
but to rule now that irregularities marred the actions of
BCDA’s board and officers, as respondents would have
us believe, would be tantamount to prematurely
exposing its former officers to potential administrative
liability without due process of law. If respondent
would insist on such argument, it could have at least
shown that the proper disciplinary cases have been
initiated as evidence that BCDA reasonably believed
that its previous officers indeed deviated from lawful
procedure.
c) On W/N estoppel can be invoked against the state.
Respondents cannot also find solace in the general rule
that the State is not barred by estoppel by the mistakes
or errors of its officials or agents. As jurisprudence
 elucidates, the doctrine is subject to exceptions, viz:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They
should not be invoked except [in rare] and unusual
circumstances, and may not be invoked where they
would operate to defeat the effective operation of a
policy adopted to protect the public. They must be
applied with circumspection and should be applied only
in those special cases where the interests of justice
clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must
not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously
with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or
do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals.

DISPOSITIVE: Decision affirmed; MR denied with

finality.

QUIMSING V. TAJANLANGIT ISSUE

WON Quimsing’s appointment was not lawfully
FACTS: confirmed, because of the motion for reconsideration
May 16, 1962- Quimsing’s, as well as other people’s of his confirmation, which has, to the present,
appointments were confirmed- May 17, 1962- at the session remained unacted upon.
of the Commission on Appointments, a motion for
reconsideration of all the confirmed appointments was RULING:
approved, and the Commission was adjourned with no future The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of
date fixed for its next meeting- June 11, 1962- President Chief of Police of Iloilo City was null and void, because
Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of said position was not vacant. The Revised Rules of the
Police of Iloilo. Hence this petition for prohibition to restrain Commission on Appointments provide:“SEC. 21: …Any
Eduardo Tajanglangit from occupying the position of Chief of motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may
Police to which petitioner Quimsing had previously been be laid on the table, and this shall be final disposition
appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which he on such a motion." “SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or
was actually discharging. disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the
President of the Philippines before the expiration of the
period for its reconsideration, or while a motion for
reconsideration is pending."

The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsing’s

appointment, it was merely under reconsideration. It
has been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsing’s
appointment was delivered to Malacañang. This, as
well as the provisions above, supports the conclusion
that the laying of a motion for reconsideration on the
table does not have the effect of withholding the
effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous
with disapproval of the appointment. In fact, it is
recognition that the appointment was confirmed.

ARTURO DE CASTRO V. JBC ISSUE/S:

 WoN pets have locus standi YES
FACTS:
 CJ Puno is retiring on May 17, 2010, the main o De Castro and Peralta = YES petition on
question of this case is WON the incubent President behalf of the public
can appoint his successor o PHILCONSA = YES wanted to preserve the
 A. GR 191002 (De Cstro) + B. GR 1911149 (Peralta) => constitution
pet for certiorari and mandamus asking that JBC give o Mendoza = YES, as a concerned citizen
3 nominees for the next CJ o IBP = Yes, sought the obedience of the
 C. GR 191032 (Soriano) => pet to prevent JBC from constitution
conducting its search for the next CJ  WoN pets are justiciable YES
 D. GR 191057 (PHILCONSA) => Wants JBC to submit o Intervenors NUPL and Tan say no because
its list because Presidential appointments in Judiciary there's no final list of nominees yet, no
are not covered by A7 S15 of consti imminent controversey
 E. Admin Matter 10-2-5-SC (Estelito Mendoza) => o Reipe for adjucation because (JBC already
seeks a ruling WON A 7 S15 Consti applies to Judiciary commenced proceedings for selection of
appointments nominees, ripe because next steps are
 F. GR 191342 (Tolentino +IBP) => wants to stop JBC public interview aka list of candidates are
from submitting list of nominees during ban period in already needed)
A7 S15 Consti o Resistance to JBC's actions by pets need
 Valenzuela doctrine was usually used in cases like this resolution (waiting for vacancy of CJ is not
=> said that A7 S 15 Consti prohibited the President needed because issue is of
from appointing Judiciary positions during the ban constitutionality)
 A. president cant appoint during ban period v. 2  WoN A7 S15 extends to the Judiciary NO
month ban for exec positions during last two months o A7S15 CONSTI = ban against midnight
of incubent President (paramount national interest appointements for executive dep V
has made JBC question whether to send list of A8S4(1) CONSTI = vacancy in SC will be
nominees to Incubent President or Next President) => filled in 90 days
Answering this question would give JBC a judicial  CONCOM = organization of the
function (Grave Abuse of Discretion), only judiciary constiution was not an accident
can choose who JBC should give its list to  A6 = LEG, A7 = EXEC, A8 = JUDICIARY
 C. JBC comitted a GAOD when they opened search for (True recognition of SOP)
the next CJ (Only the SC has the power to appoint CJ's,  President's power of appointment = A7
President only appoints members of SC) S14 15 16
 D. Discordant interpretations pf the Consti has led to  A8S4(1) S9 = Judiciary (SC Justices shall
legal debates of JBC actions be appointed by President within 90
 B. Pet. wants same JBC to submit list to she can meet days pf vacancy) (A7S15 =does not
the 90 day deadline extend to Judiciary, framers would
have explicitly said so)
 F. There is a controversey because JBC has initiated
 Valenzuela doctrine = wrong, did not
finding next CJ and coming up with a list for President
follow intent of framers (A8S4(1) = use
within midnight appointments ban
of the word shall makes it imperative
 CJ Puno about to retire so Congressman Matia
for President to appoint members of
Defensor requested JBC to conduct process of
SC) VALENZUELA DECISION WAS
nominations for the next CJ (consisted of 5 most
REVERSED
senior associate justices and other parties + JBC
o A7S15 does to apply to all other judicial
proceeded to the next step and asked public to file
appointments
their complaints)
 A7S15 = was done to eliminate
 Most of the pets used Valenzuela doctrine to contend
midnight appointments (allowed if
JBC's actions (Valenzuela = 2 RTC judges were not
 allowed to be appointed by President because of A8 done with deliberate action and
S15 Consti) careful consideration for Excecutive
 OSG: said President can appoint successor of CJ Puno positions, only members of exec dep
when he retires (prohibition of A7 S15 Consti= does are allowed to hold temp
not apply to SC, Valenzuela doctrine = does not apply appointments)
(case was about RTC Judges) this case involves next  Establishment of JBC = CHECKER,
CJ, Doctrine even recognizes appointments are process through JBC avoids hasty
needed during ban period appointments, has to go through
 Compelling reasons for President to appoint new CJ scrutiny
(Lots of new cases, need for PET, CJ appointment is o Senior Associate Justice Regalado told JBC
done immediately, if CJ comes from Associate that A7S15 does not apply to Judiciary
justices, vacancy must be filled)  Valenzuela doctrine has no weight
 A7 S15 = Midnight appointments ban anymore, did not rely on the
 A8 S4(1) = SC vacancy shall be filled within 90 days deliberations of CONCOM
o A7S14, 15, 16 = appointing powers of the
President
 only for executive department, no
application to judiciary because
temporary appointments in this
branch undermines judicial
independence => because of this S15
refers only to executive department
(interpret consti with reference to
context)
o To hold Valenzuela doctrine = undermines
intent of consti because it violates the
independence of departments
 Making new President appoint judiciary
members does not ensure judicial
independence (still possible for there to
be sketchy appointments done in favor
of new admin)
 Less possibility of this happening with
incubent President because he is
leaving the office
o Wrong to say old President does not need
to appoint CJ within 90 day period because
once New Presidnet is elected, hell still have
45/90 days left to appoint CJ
 flawed arguement, focused only on
upcoming vacancy, not general vacancy
of CJ
 A7S4(3) CONSTI = elections are to
happen during 2nd Monday of May
(May8/14) so period of prohibition =
109 or 115 days
  Result = 19 occasion where President
would be in no position to comply with
Consti duty to fill vacancy in SC
 framers never intended A7S15 to apply
to any vacancy in SC
o JBC is not even necesarry for President
appointments (A8S9 CONSTI)
 A8S9 = refers to appointees coming
from SC, they need to come from SC
 brings about the question WoN
Presidnet can appoint any incumbent
Justices in Court
 WoN Judiciary Act of 1948 applies NO
o JA 1948 = Associate Justice first in
presedence will take over when CH cannot
until new CJ is appointed
o Acting Chief Justice = Court does not want
this, temporary
o A8S4(1) CONSTI = framers intended CJ
appointment to be permanent
o appointment of new CJ by President >
temporary appointment
o lack of appointed occupant harms
independece of Judiciary
o CJ = functions are the life of the nation
 WoN writ of mandamus lies against JBC NO
o Mandamus = when officer unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act of law
 petitoner must have a legal right to act
 defendant must have the duty to
perform the act
 defendant unlawfully neglects
performance
 act performed is ministerial
 no other speedy remedy
o A8S8(5) S9 CONSTI = JBC submits list of at
least 3 nominees to the President
o S4(1) S9 = Vacancy must be filled within 90
days
o 90 day period is for JBC, mandatory for JBC
to submit to President a list of nominees
within the period = > gives the President
time to reflect on qualifications of
nominees, Ministerial duty of JBC
(Discharge of the same requires neither
 the excercise of official discretion or
judgement = Ministerial)
o no sufficient ground to issue writ of
Mandamus to JBC, they still have until
May10,2010 to give a list
 WoN writ of prohibition lies against JBC NO
o only the President can appoint the CJ
o GR 191032 and GR 191342 = prevents the
JBC from interveneing + challenges the
constitutionality of JBC, both Lack merit

NOTES:
 Dissent Carpio-Morales
 ponencia relies on trivialities on draftsmanship
style in arriving at consti construction =>
organization of consti (S14,15,16) does not
suffice to signify functional structuring
 Establishment of JBC does not stop midnight
appointments => power of Judicial
appointment = President, limits the power of
the Judicary
 Insults the CONCOM to say that it excluded
judiciary from A7S15 but only for executive,
makes ban on midnight appointments
pointless
 EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS =
when one or more things of a class are
expressly mentioned others of the same class
are excluded => no clear circumstance to
indicate enumeration was not intended to be
exclusive
 Valenzuela Doctrine was hastily reversed = was
done on the sole basis of Regalado's opinion =>
proper interpretation of consti = how people
adopting it understood it v. framers
understanding, safer to consture consti on its
face
 bec A7S15 limits presidential power of
appointment, 90 day period should also be
suspended during this time
 JBC has until May 17 to submit list = absurd,
takes application process and nomination
stages in isolation of whole application process
 Absurd to say President needs 90 days to
reflect but say an acting CJ is worse
 Court can function without a CJ => Judiciary =
power is in one SC, NOT 1 PERSON

VELICARIA-GARAFIL V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ISSUES:

 1. W/N the petitioners’ appointments
Summary: The case discusses the petitioners’ appointments violate S15A7 of the 1987 Constitution
by PGMA. The Court held that the appointments were void – YES
because they were not able to complete the process of a. All petitioners’ appointments
appointment before the ban. are midnight appointments
Facts: and are void for violating the
 The case involves 4 petitions all questioning the constitution
constitutionality of EO2 for being inconsistent with b. The ponencia and the dissent
Section 15, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. (J. Brion) both agree that the
 Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, PGMA facts of the cases show that
issued more than 800 appointments to various none of the petitioners were
positions in several government offices. (Midnight able to show that their
ban started 11 March) appointment papers have
o The ban on midnight appointments in S15A7 been issued before the ban.
of the Constitution reads: The date of receipt (the only
 Two months immediately before the reliable evidence) showed that
next presidential elections and up to the actual transmittal showed
the end of his term, a President or that the dates fall on the
Acting President shall not make appointment ban.
appointments except temporary c. Petitioners have failed to show
appointments to executive positions compliance with all four
when continued vacancies therein elements of the valid
will prejudice public service or appointment (see letter (a) of
endanger public safety. second issue). Petitioners
 Appointments admit that they took their oath
Appointee Paper Date Date of Oath (fourth step) during the
Evidence of Received by and Start of appointment ban – making the
Appointmen Malacanan Term appointment void.
t g 2. W/N EO2 is constitutional – YES
Atty. 5 March 13 May 22 March a. Process of appointment to a
Velicaria- 2010 2010 2010 government post
Garafil i. President must sign
Atty. 23 Feb 2010 12 March 15 March appointment paper to
Venturanza 2010 2010 vacant office
1. He has the
Villanueva 3 March None 13 April 2010 discretion to
2010 choose who to
Rosquita 5 March None 18 March appoint in the
2010 2010 office
2. The
Atty. 1 March 25 March 25 March appointment
Tamondon 2010 2010 2010 and 6 can only be
g July 2010 (as made to a
an extra vacant office
caution ii. Official transmittal of
because of the paper through MRO
issues on 1. The release of
midnight the paper is an
appointments act that
) signifies the
president’s
intent of its
issuance
 30 July 2010: President Aquino revoked iii. Receipt of
appointments by PGMA because it violated the appointment paper by
constitutional ban on midnight appointments. appointee
 Effect of the Issuance: The appointees of PGMA was iv. Oath of appointee and
removed from office, and filed petitions questioning assumption to office
the validity of EO2. 1. The
 Jan 31, 2012: SC issued a resolution referring the acceptance of
petitions to the CA with the following issues to be the appointee
addressed: prevents the
o W/N the appointments of the petitions and abuse of the
intervenors were midnight appointments Presidential
within the coverage of EO2 power to
o W/N all midnight appointments were invalid appoint by
o W/N the appointments of the petitioners allowing the
were made with undue haste, hurried appointee to
maneuvers, for partisan reasons, and not in decide w/n to
accordance with good faith, and accept the
o W/N EO2 violated the Civil Service Rules on position being
Appointment given to him
 Ruling of the CA by the
o In the cases of Atty. Velicaria and Venturanza, President. It
the CA stated that the Office of the President cannot be
should consider the circumstances of their assumed that
appointments. the appointee
o In the other cases, the CA explicitly stated will accept the
that the revocation of their appointments position and
was proper because they were midnight thus, the
appointees. process will
only be
completed
upon
acceptance of
the
appointee.
b. During the deliberations of the
1987 Constitution, retired CJ
Davide, referred to Court’s
ruling in Aytona (midnight
appointments of Pres. Garcia)
and stated that his proposal
seeks to prevent a president
whose term is about to end,
from preempting his successor
by appointing his own people
to sensitive positions.
i. J. Brion’s dissent
states that: the
prohibited period in
the Constitution
should be viewed in
the “narrow sense”
where the act of
appointment by the
 president is valid if the
appointment is made
before the ban even
though the appointee
received and accepted
the appointment after
the ban.
1. He “sliced”
the process
and gave
exceptions to
it (that it is
already valid
by the time
the
appointment
was made)
but the
majority said
that the
process
should be
completed.
ii. The majority replied
that it would lead to
an absurdity if the
appointee did not
accept the position
and will leave the
office vacant, resulting
in chaos in public
service.
c. The president exercises only
one kind of appointing power
and there is no need to
differentiate the exercise of
the President’s appointing
power outside, just before,
and during the appointment
ban.
d. The acceptance of the
appointee is necessary in
order to validly assume his
post and discharge the
functions of his new office.
e. Petitioners failed to raise a
valid ground for the court to
declare EO2 unconstitutional,
so it remains valid and
constitutional.
Dissent of J. Brion included in the discussion of ratio.
GUEVARA V. INOCENTES ISSUE:
Whether the ad interim appointment of Onofre P.
FACTS: Guevara is valid.
On November 25, 1965, Onofre Guevara took his oath as an
Undersecretary of Labor after his appointment was extended RULING:
ad interim on November 22, 1965. The appointment was Art. VII, Sec. 10, Subsection 4 of the 1935 Constitution:
questioned by Rauol Inocentes on the ground that Guevara’s "the President shall have the power to make
appointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress. appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
At around midnight of January 22, 1966, the Senate such appointment shall be effective only until
adjourned its session. The House of Representatives disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
continued its session and adjourned upon learning the until the next adjournment of Congress"
Senate’s adjournment. In the case of Guevara’s appointment, The validity of an ad interim appointment shall be
Congress, through the Commission on appointments has not allowed when (a) until disapproval of the Commission
acted on it while the special session is being conducted. on Appointments and (b) adjournment of Congress,
whether special or regular session. In this case, the
second mode of termination took effect when the
Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of
January 22, 1966 which made the appointment of
petitioner Guevara ineffective. The contention that the
Commission on Appointments should be first organized
before the second mode can be made effective is
untenable because they are two different and separate
modes of termination.
Since the termination of ad interim appointment
cannot be separated, the well-known maxim in
statutory construction applies. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguire debemus.
DE RAMA V. CA ISSUES:
1 of 2: WON the appointments were valid?
SUMMARY: Upon assumption to his office, Mayor of Pagbilao, Held: Yes.
Quezon, Conrado L. de Rama sought to recall the The prohibition provided in Art 7, Sec 15 of the 1987
appointments of 14 municipal employees on the ground that Constitution applies only to presidential appointments
the said employees were midnight appointments of the (be it by President or by an Acting President). There is
former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja. A clear violation of Art 7, no law that prohibits local elective officials from
Sec 15 of the Constitution. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) making appointments during the last days of his or her
denied the request. CA likewise upheld the validity of the tenure.
appointments. SC, in affirming the decision of the CA, ruled 2 of 2: WON CSC and CA erred in refusing to give
that the prohibition provided in Art 7, Sec 15 of the 1987 credence to the supplemental pleading.
Constitution applies only to presidential appointments. There HELD: No.
is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making Supplemental pleadings must be with reasonable
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. notice, and it is discretionary upon the court or tribunal
Additional Facts: to allow the same or not. Thus, the CSC was under no
The appointments were made between June 1 to June 27, obligation to admit the supplemental pleading, or even
1995. to consider the averments therein.
While CSC has not yet ruled on the request of the mayor, Elsa The CSC, as well as the CA, found that the allegations in
Marino, Morell Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the his supplemental pleading did not constitute new
CSC a claim for payment of their salaries, alleging that the evidence that can be the proper subject of a
petitioner de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and supplemental pleading. These were old facts and issues
benefits. The CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division ruled that which he failed to raise earlier.
the said employees cannot be deprived of their salaries and It is well-settled that issues or questions of fact cannot
benefits by the unilateral act of the newly-assumed mayor. be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the
After the CSC upheld the validity of the appointments, de alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly in the
Rama moved for the reconsideration of the CSC's Resolution, supplemental pleading to the appeal at this very late
as well as the Order of the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial stage in the proceedings would amount to trampling on
Division, averring that the CSC was without jurisdiction: (1) to the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.
refuse to revoke the subject appointments; and (2) to uphold Mendoza J. DISSENT
the validity of said appointments. He also posited for the first Art. VII, 15 is simply an application of a broader
time in his supplement to the appeal that the appointments principle that after the appointing authority has lost
were fraught with irregularities for failing to comply with CSC the elections, his is the duty of a prudent caretaker of
rules and regulations. the office, and, therefore, he should not fill positions in
CSC denied the motion for reconsideration, ruling that: the government unless required by the imperatives of
In the absence of any showing that these alleged midnight public service. This rule binds all, including mayors, who
appointments were defective in form and in substance, nor is are vested with the power of appointment, and it flows
there evidence presented to show that subject appointments from the principle that a public office is a public trust.
were issued in contravention of law or rules, these CSC failed to appreciate the fact that Midnight
appointments are deemed valid and in effect. appointments were made hurriedly, without due
CA affirmed CSC's decision and subsequently denied deliberation and careful consideration. The fact that in
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition. this case the appointments were subsequently attested
Petitioner's Arguments: by the Civil Service Commission Field Office in Lucena
(1) The appointments of the said employees were midnight City does not make them any less odious.
appointments of the former mayor done in violation of Article • Former Mayor Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja made several
VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. appointments within the space of 27 days. Even when
(2) The appointments made failed to comply with the ff rules there was no urgent need to do so, she went ahead and
and laws on appointments: filled the vacancies in the municipal
I. No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the government a few days before the new mayor took
Personnel Selection Board in nominating the respondents; office on June 30, 1995.
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice • Appointments were made at two meetings of the
of vacancy as required by the rules and the law; Personnel Selection Board, held on May 31, 1995 and
III. Merit and fitness requirements were not observed by the June 16, 1995, each meeting lasting no more than an
selection board and by the appointing authority hour. At both meetings of the board, Mayor Abeja
as required by the Civil Service rules; presided as chairperson. There was just a perfunctory
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the appointments of compliance with legal requirements.
respondents. The hurried appointments of respondents detract from
(3)These said irregularities are issues raised as grounds for the that degree of good faith, morality, and propriety
request of the revocation of the appointments required for appointments made by a faithful and
and hence, should not be treated as new issues by the CA. CSC prudent caretaker in order to be considered valid.
and CA erred in refusing to give credence to
the supplemental pleading.
MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO ISSUE/S:
 WoN the petition satisfies all the requisites of
SUMMARY: Matibag assailed the ad interim appointments of judicial review
petitioners for violating the constitutional ban on temporary o YES. The issue in this case is not, as the
appointments and reappointment. However, SC ruled that ad respondents argue, the legality of
interim appointments are permanent and not temporary, and petitioner’s reassignment. Matibag
that as long as an ad interim appointment is not confirmed by has a personal and material stake
COA, renewal of said appointment is not reappointment. (locus standi) in the resolution of the
FACTS: constitutionality of Benipayo’s
 Matibag was appointed by COMELEC en banc in 1999 appointment because her
as Acting Director IV of the EID. The appointment was reassignment is without legal basis if
renewed in a temporary capacity in 2000 and again in Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC
2001. Chairman.
 On March 22, 2001, PGMA appointed, ad interim, o Respondents also argue that the
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and constitutional issue was not raised at
Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, all with terms of the earliest opportunity because the
7 years which would expire on February 2, 2008. petition was filed after the third time
These appointments were not acted upon by the that the respondents were issued ad
 Commission on Appointments, so PGMA renewed interim appointments. However,
them after Congress adjourned. The expiry date of earliest opportunity pertains not to
the terms remained the same. Again, the renewed the filing date but the fact that
appointments were not acted upon before Congress petitioner questioned the
adjourned, so PGMA renewed them with the same constitutionality in the pleadings.
expiry date of February 2, 2008. o Unless the constitutionality of
 Benipayo, as COMELEC Chairman, designated Cinco Benipayo’s appointment is resolved,
as Officer-in-Charge of EID and reassigned Matibag to the legality of Matibag’s reassignment
the Law Department. can’t be determined. Clearly, the lis
 Matibag filed the instant petition assailing: mota of this case is the very
o The appointments of Benipayo, Borra, and constitutional issue raised by
Tuason as unconstitutional for violating the Matibag.
provisions on the independence of COMELEC o In any case, the issue is of paramount
as well as on the prohibitions on temporary importance because the legality of
appointments and reappointments of its COMELEC’s decisions may be put in
members doubt if the issue is left unresolved.
o Her reassignment to the Law Department and  WoN the ad interim appointments issued by
the designation of Cinco as Officer-in-Charge PGMA amount to temporary appointmnets
of the EID which are prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art. 9-C of
o The legality of the disbursements of the Constitution
salaries/emoluments of Benipayo, Borra and o NO. Petitioner contends that an ad
Tuason interim appointment is temporary
since it can be revoked by the
President at her pleasure, or bypassed
by the COA. Based on this theory, there
can be no ad interim appointments
and the appointee cannot assume
office until his appointment is
confirmed by the COA.
o Petitioner is wrong. An ad interim
appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect
immediately and cannot be withdrawn
by the President after the appointee
assumes office. It remains effective
until disapproval of COA or next
adjournment of Congress (Sec. 16,
Art. 7 of the Consti).
o Petitioner contends that ad interim,
defined as “in the meantime”, means
that it’s temporary, but ad interim
actually refers to the manner of the
appointment and not the term: an ad
interim appointment is made in the
meantime that Congress is in recess.
o An ad interim appointee enjoys the
constitutional protection of Sec. 2(3),
Art. 9-B that no officer or employee in
the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided
by law. In contrast, a temporary/acting
appointment doesn’t enjoy any
security of tenure.
 o The original draft of Sec. 16, Art. 7 in
the Constitution did not provide for ad
interim appointments because the
plan was for Congress to remain in
session throughout the year except for
a brief 30-day compulsory recess. It
was, however, reinstated for the
purpose of avoiding interruption in
vital government services that
otherwise would result from
prolonged vacancies.
o If respondents were not extended ad
interim appointments, there would
have been only 1 division functioning
in the COMELEC instead of 2 in the May
2001 elections. The remaining division
would not only be swamped with
cases, but the disposal of motions for
reconsideration would be hampered
because the mere absence of one of
the 4 other COMELEC members would
prevent a quorum.
 WoN the renewal of the ad interim
appointments violate the prohibition on
reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. 9-C of the
Constitution
o NO. Petitioner argues that once an ad
interim appointment is bypassed, it
cannot be renewed without violating
the constitutional prohibition on
reappointments.
o Petitioner is wrong. A bypassed ad
interim appointment is different from
one that is disapproved. Disapproval is
final and binding, but in bypass, there
is no final decision on the merits for
Congress to withhold or give its
consent. This is recognized in Sec. 17 of
the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments, which provides that
unacted nominations are returned to
the President, and unless new
nominations are made, shall not again
be considered by the Commission.
Hence, a bypassed nomination can be
considered again if renewed.
o There are 4 situations where the
prohibition on reappointments in Sec.
1(2), Art. 9-C will apply, in order to
prevent a) a person serving for more
than 7 years, and b) reappointment of
any kind:
 1. The ad interim appointee is
confirmed by COA and serves
the full 7-year term
2. The ad interim appointee is
confirmed by COA and serves
part of the 7-year term and
resigns before it ends
3. The ad interim appointee is
confirmed to serve the
unexpired term of someone
who died/resigned, and
completes the unexpired term
4. The ad interim appointee
previously served for less than
7 years, and is again appointed
to a vacancy arising from
death or resignation
o A reappointment presupposes a
previous confirmed appointment. The
respondents’ appointments also don’t
breach the 7 year term limit because
all the appointments and their
renewals are for a fixed term expiring
on Feb. 2, 2008.
o An ad interim appointment that has
lapsed by inaction doesn’t consititute a
term of office; otherwise, the
President could unilaterally start and
complete a term of office in COMELEC
without COA’s consent. If these
bypassed appointments can’t be
renewed, the President would hesitate
to make them, and this would nullify
the constitutional power of the
President to make ad interim
appointments.
 WoN the reassignment of Matibag is illegal and
without authority since it was done without
the approval of COMELEC as a collegial body
o NO. Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC
Chairman. Being Chairman, he is
vested with the power to make
temporary assignments, rotate and
transfer personnel, pursuant to the
Revised Administrative Code.
o Moreover, Matibag doesn’t possess
the qualifications to hold the position
of Director IV and thus can claim no
security of tenure because her
appointment cannot be considered
permanent.
o Although the Omnibus Election Code
prohibits the transfer of officers and
 employees within the elective period
except upon prior approval of the
Commission, COMELEC already issued
Res. 3300 which allowed the said
transfer in view of the urgent need to
do so. It only mandated due notice and
hearing for the transfer of field
personnel, not head office personnel
like Matibag.
 WoN the Officer-in-Charge of COMELEC’s
Finance Services Department is acting in excess
of jurisdiction in continuing to make
disbursements in favor of respondents
o NO. Based on the foregoing discussion,
he did not act in excess of jurisdiction.

FETALINO V. COMELEC ISSUES:

EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, A. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies
Petitioners, MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner- as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full
Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. five-year lump sum gratuity;

FACTS: B. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted

the five-year lump sum gratuity is already final and
President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to executory;
petitioners Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and Amado Calderon
(Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of C. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a
seven (7) years. Congress, however, adjourned before the vested right over the full retirement benefits provided
Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their by RA No. 1568.
appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential
appointments later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon HELD: The petition lacks merit.
were no longer re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino and Calderon
merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Term of Office
months.
First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not
Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of
retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, R.A. No. 1568, as amended.
pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the
claims pursuant to its resolution. However, in its subsequent The Court emphasized that the right to retirement
resolution, the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments benefits accrues only when two conditions are met:
study, completely disapproved the Fetalino and Calderons first, when the conditions imposed by the applicable
claim, stating that one whose ad interim appointment expires law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and second,
cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to when an actual retirement takes place. The Court has
fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would repeatedly emphasized that retirement entails
entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five years salary. compliance with certain age and service requirements
Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) specified by law and jurisprudence, and takes effect by
later joined the petitioners in questioning the assailed operation of law.
subsequent resolution.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of
retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of
the Comelec who has retired from the service after
having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon
and Barcelona obviously did not retire under R.A. No.
1568, as amended, since they never completed the full
seven-year term of office. While the Court
characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v.
Benipayo as a permanent appointment that takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
President once the appointee has qualified into office,
the Court have also positively ruled in that case that an
ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of
the Commission on Appointments does not constitute
a term of office.

Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on

finality of judgments.

Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure

reads: In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or
resolution of the Commission en banc shall become
final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.

A simple reading of this provision shows that it only

applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs. Thus, it is clear
that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of
the assailed resolution do not fall within the coverage
of the actions and proceedings under Section 13, Rule
18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the
Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of
judgments.

Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.

Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and

Barcelona under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely
gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right
over these benefits. Retirement benefits as provided
under R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a
pension which is a form of deferred compensation for
services performed; in a pension, employee
participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire
contractual or vested rights over the pension as part of
their compensation.

DENIED