ROGEL ORTIZ, Petitioner vsDHL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, ET AL.

,
Respondents
G.R. No. 183399,March 20, 2017

Doctrine:Procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and

hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the
termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second
informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a
hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not
necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. [New Puerto Commercial, et
al. v. Lopez, et al.,639 Phil. 437 (2010).]

Facts:The petitioner was hired by DHL Philippines Corporation (DHL) as

Courier/Driver at the Mactan Business Center in Cebu. He was later promoted to the
position of Customs Representative and occupied the said position until 1995 when he
was assigned at the Ramos Business Center (RBC). Thereafter, he held the position of
a Manifest Clerk up to the time of his termination. As a Manifest Clerk, the petitioner
was specifically tasked to prepare manifest documents of the cargo before the same is
forwarded to its destination. He was made to work from 11:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m.,
with one-hour meal break and a 15-minute coffee break. On ordinary days, he and the
other manifest clerks took charge of the office business from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.
since their Branch Supervisor, MarivicJubay (Jubay) leaves by 6:00 p.m.
At some time, a little past 7pm, his branch supervisor Jubay made a visit in their
workplace and discovered that petitioner was not there and nobody knew where he
was. She waited until 8:55 to punch out petitioner’s time card and later reprimanded
him and told him to exercise more diligence at work. On the following day, however,
the petitioner did not report for work.On another time, around 6pm, RBC Branch
Manager Tamondong looked for the petitioner but found out that he was not in the
workplace and his co-employees do not know his whereabouts. Tamondong then
asked the security guard to find out that petitioner went home to watch a PBA game.
This prompted Tamondong to order Jubay to investigate on the matter. On the next
day, Jubay found out that the petitioner punched out his time card at 8:46pm on the
previous day.
The petitioner received a memorandumfrom Jubay, directing him to explain why he
had left his post during office hours. Instead of showing repentance and admitting his
faults, he arrogantly hurled invectives at his supervisor in front of his co-
employees.On the following day, he submitted his written explanation, wherein he
claimed that he only took his 15-minute break since he has yet to avail of the same
that day.
During the investigation, however, his officemates revealed that he had been regularly
leaving the office before his shift ends, just right after their supervisor leaves the office,
especially on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and whenever his brother-in-law, who plays
for a PBA team, has a scheduled game. In those days, he would call from his residence
and ask the security guard or his co-employee, Hubert Enad to punch out his time
card. Due to these allegations, Jubay elevated the matter for further investigation to
the Human Resources Manager for Visayas and Mindanao. The investigation
conducted only confirmed the fact that the petitioner had been leaving the office early
two to three times a week to practice basketball or watch PBA games. The security
guards likewise disclosed that this practice had been going on for almost two years
already. Upon learning that the security guards testified against him, he threatened to
retaliate by making them lose their employment and revoke their agency's license.
The petitioner was issued a notice of formal investigation to be conducted. The
petitioner apologized for his ill behavior in front of his supervisor and admitted to all
the charges against him. When he was informed that his infractions may warrant his
dismissal, he pleaded that he be imposed with suspension instead. He was, thus,
advised to write a letter to the management to appeal for a lesser penalty for his
infractions, which he submitted.
The management of DHL denied the petitioner's plea for a lesser penalty for his
infractions. The memorandum pointed out that the gravity of the infractions and the
fact that the same had been continuously committed for a period of two years amount
to grave dishonesty and serious misconduct which deserved no less than dismissal.
On June 4, 1999, the petitioner received a Notice of Dismissal.
Sometime thereafter, he filed a case for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, with
claims for the payment of indemnity, damages and costs of suit against DHL and its
responsible officers. LA dismissed his complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed LA’s decision and awarded petitioner separation pay in
view of his long service to DHL. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
He then filed a petition for certiorari to the CA and affirmed the NLRC’s decision that
the dismissal was with just cause but no separation pay is to be awarded. Instead,
DHL was ordered to pay nominal damages amounting to P30,000.

Issue/s: Whether or not the dismissal was valid and in accordance with the
procedural due process.

Held:Yes. The dismissal is was based on valid causes but the petitioner was not
accorded procedural due process.

Ratio:It is well settled that a valid dismissal necessitates compliance with substantive
and procedural requirements. Specifically, in Mantle Trading Services, Inc. and/or Del
Rosario v. NLRC, et al., the Court emphasized that (a) there should be just and valid
cause as provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (b) the employee be
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
After a careful examination of the facts and the records of this case, the Court finds
that the petitioner's dismissal was founded on acts constituting serious misconduct
and grave dishonesty which are grounds for a valid dismissal. In particular, he
repeatedly committed the following serious violations of company policies, to wit:
1) Grave dishonesty and fraud by allowing/asking someone to punch out your
timecard for a period of two years[;]
2) Deliberate disregard/disobedience of company rule by frequently leaving work area
prior to scheduled dismissal time without permission[;]
3) Disrespect to immediate superior by uttering offensive and lewd remarks and[/]or
misbehavior during confrontation last March 25, 1999[; and]
4) Threatening the two security guards on duty last April 9, 1999 and warning them
against testifying about violations incurred which constitute an offense against
persons
The Court also agrees with the CA that the petitioner was not afforded procedural due
process in the process of his termination.
In King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, the twin requirements of notice and hearing
were further clarified, thus:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific
causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees
are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable
period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of
assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare
adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5)
calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study
the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and
evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover,
in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and
defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and
circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention
which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art.
282 is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing
or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and
clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of
their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.
During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend
themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their
choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an
opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall
serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and
(2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.
None of the three notices satisfied the requirements of the law. In the first notice, the
allegations against the petitioner were vague and did not make any reference to the
company policy violated by the latter nor to any of the grounds for termination in
Article 282 of the Labor Code. Apart from this, the notice did not give the petitioner a
reasonable opportunity to prepare his explanation as he was only given practically a
day or 24 hours to respond to the same.
In the same way, the second notice lacked the particularity required by the law. It
does not contain a detailed narration of the incidents being alluded to, leaving the
petitioner guessing on the particulars of the charges against him. The general
description of the charges is not a sufficient compliance with the law.
The same can be said of the third notice as it is completely wanting of the essential
details required of a proper notice. There were no details of the charges against the
accused, the notice merely stating that the formal investigation concerns the "offenses
for which the petitioner is currently being investigated." What these offenses are,
however, can hardly be gathered with particularity from the two earlier notices given to
the petitioner. It is even doubtful whether this notice was ever given to the petitioner
at all since the copy of the same submitted in evidence by DHL contained a notation,
"REFUSED TO SIGN (6/30/99)", thereby giving the impression that the petitioner was
supposedly served a copy of the notice but refused to sign on June 30, 1999, while the
formal investigation was held on May 4, 1999.
Undoubtedly, there was a considerable lapse by DHL in observing the procedural due
process requirements of the law in terminating employment. In such a case, the ruling
in Agabon v. NLRC is instructive. It was held that in cases involving dismissals for
cause but without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the
validity of the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer shall be ordered to pay
nominal damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00.
LOURDES C. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner vsPARK N RIDE INC.NICEST (PHILS)
INC./GRAND LEISURE CORP./SPS. VICENTE & ESTELITA B. JAVIER,
Respondents
G.R. No. 222980,March 20, 2017

Doctrine:There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear

discrimination, insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the
employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such
employment. [Gan v. Galderma Philippines, Inc., 701 Phil. 612, 638-639 (2013)]
In light of the service incentive leave, we can conclude that the three (3)-year
prescriptive period commences, not at the end of the year when the employee
becomes entitled to the commutation of his service incentive leave, but from the time
when the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of
commutation or upon termination of the employee's services, as the case may be.
[Article 291 of the Labor Code]

Facts: Petitioner Rodriguez alleged that she was employed on January 30, 1984 as
Restaurant Supervisor at VicestPhils. Four (4) years later, the restaurant business
closed. Rodriguez was transferred to office work and became an Administrative and
Finance Assistant to Estelita Javier (Estelita).Rodriguez was also required to handle
the personnel and administrative matters of the other companies owned by the
spouses without additional compensation. Rodriguez handled the administrative,
finance, and warehousing departments of Park N Ride.
At some point, the Javier Spouses' treatment of Rodriguez became unbearable; thus,
prompting herto file her resignation letter effective April 25, 2009. The Javier Spouses
allegedly did not accept her resignation and convinced her to reconsider and stay
on. However, her experience became worse. Rodriguez claimed that toward the end of
her employment, Estelita was always unreasonable and hot-headed, and would belittle
and embarrass her in the presence of co-workers.
Later on, Estelita was mad at her and berating her for opening the office late. She
allegedly told her that if she did not want to continue with her work, the company
could manage without her.Thus, Rodriguez did not report for work the next day, and
wrote the Javier Spouses a letter expressing her gripes at them. She intimated that
they were always finding fault with her to push her to resign. On October 6, 2009, the
Javier Spouses replied to her letter, allegedly accepting her resignation. Rodriguez
prayed for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement; full back wages; service incentive
leave pay; proportional 13th month pay; moral damages of ₱l00,000.00; exemplary
damages of ₱l00,000.00; and attorney's fees.
In their defense, the respondent spouses alleged that Rodriguez did not report for
work. When she still has not reported for work after three days, a letter was sent to
her citing her continued and unauthorized absence. "She was told that her resignation
could not be processed because she had not completed her employment clearance and
she was unable to properly turnover her tasks to her assistant." She was asked to
report on September 30, 2009 or, at the very least, to reply in writing on or before
October 7, 2009. However, Rodriguez failed to do so.
Rodriguez allegedly continued to ignore the requests for her to complete the turnover
of her tasks and responsibilities and refused to cooperate in tracing the documents in
her custody. Corollary to this, it was discovered that the company check books were
missing; that Rodriguez had unliquidated cash advances of not less than ₱500,000.00;
and that two (2) checks were deposited in her personal account amounting to
₱936,000.00.
The Javier Spouses claimed that Rodriguez was not entitled to service incentive leave
pay, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and director's fee.They averred
that they were willing to pay Rodriguez the 13th month pay differentials, as soon as
Rodriguez completed her clearance.
Labor Arbiter dismissed Rodriguez claim for lack of merit on the ground that she has
voluntarily resigned. Rodriguez appealed to the NLRC and ruled that she was illegally
dismissed and awarded her the money claims.
However, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which reinstated the previous
decision of the LA. Petitioner also filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner later on filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA and held
that there was no constructive dismissal but ordered the respondent spouses to pay
petitioner service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay for the years 2006-2009.

Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioner was constructively dismissed/illegally

dismissed.
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to full service incentive leave pay and
damages.

Held:No. There wasvoluntary resignation. Yes. CA misapplied the 3-year prescriptive

period as elucidated on Article 291 of the Labor Code.

Ratio:Constructive dismissal exists where there is involuntary resignation because of

the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. We have held that
the standard for constructive dismissal is "whether a reasonable person in the
employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his employment under the
circumstances.
The unreasonably harsh conditions that compel resignation on the part of an
employee must be way beyond the occasional discomforts brought about by the
misunderstandings between the employer and employee. Strong words may sometimes
be exchanged as the employer describes her expectations or as the employee narrates
the conditions of her work environment and the obstacles she encounters as she
accomplishes her assigned tasks. As in every human relationship, there are bound to
be disagreements.
However, when these strong words from the employer happen without palpable reason
or are expressed only for the purpose of degrading the dignity of the employee, then a
hostile work environment will be created. In a sense, the doctrine of constructive
dismissal has been a consistent vehicle by this Court to assert the dignity of labor.
Nonetheless, this is not the situation in this case.Petitioner's unequivocal intent to
relinquish her position was manifest when she submitted her letters of resignation.
The resignation letters dated May 1, 2008 and March 25, 2009 contained words of
gratitude, which could hardly come from an employee forced to resign. These letters
were reinforced by petitioner's very own act of not reporting for work despite
respondents' directive.
From the representation of petitioner, what triggered her resignation was the incident
on September 22, 2009 when Estelita told her "Kung ayawmonangginagawamo, we
can manage!" These words, however, are not sufficient to make the continued
employment of petitioner impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely.
The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the utterance of Estelita was more a
consequence of her spontaneous outburst of feelings resulting from petitioner's failure
to perform a task that was long overdue, rather than an act to force petitioner to
resign from work. It appears that petitioner was asked to finish assigned tasks and
liquidate cash advances but failed to do so.
Petitioner was neither terminated on September 22, 2009 nor was she constructively
dismissed. There was no showing of bad faith or malicious design by the respondents
that would make her work conditions unbearable. On the other hand, it is a fact that
petitioner enjoyed the privilege of working closely with the Javier Spouses and having
their full trust and confidence. Spontaneous expressions of an employer do not
automatically render a hostile work atmosphere. The circumstances in this case
negate its presence.
On the monetary claims, petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary
damages considering that she was not illegally dismissed. On the other hand, with
respect to service incentive leave pay, the Court of Appeals is correct in awarding such
claim but erred in limiting the award thereof to three (3) years (2006 to 2009).
Article 95 of the Labor provides Code that every employee who has rendered at least
one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave pay of five days
with pay, subject to exceptions (i.e.: when the employee is already enjoying vacation
leave with pay of at least five days; and when the employee is employed in an
establishment regularly employing less than ten employees).
It was not shown here that petitioner Rodriguez was enjoying vacation leave with pay
of at least five days while being employed by private respondents Spouses Javier; it
was not shown that private respondents Spouses Javier were merely employing less
than 10 employees (on the contrary, private respondent spouses Javier stated that
they were employing less than 15 employees). Hence, the award of service incentive
leave pay to petitioner Rodriguez was proper.
The cause of action of an entitled employee to claim his service incentive leave pay
accrues from the moment the employer refuses to remunerate its monetary equivalent
if the employee did not make use of said leave credits but instead chose to avail of its
commutation.1âwphi1 Accordingly, if the employee wishes to accumulate his leave
credits and opts for its commutation upon his resignation or separation from
employment, his cause of action to claim the whole amount of his accumulated service
incentive leave shall arise when the employer fails to pay such amount at the time of
his resignation or separation from employment.
Thus, the prescriptive period with respect to petitioner's claim for her entire service
incentive leave pay commenced only from the time of her resignation or separation
from employment. Since petitioner had filed her complaint on October 7, 2009, or a
few days after her resignation in September 2009, her claim for service incentive leave
pay has not prescribed. Accordingly, petitioner must be awarded service incentive
leave pay for her entire 25 years of service-from 1984 to 2009.
SUMIFRU (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION (surviving entity in a merger with Davao
Fruits Corporation and other Companies), Petitioners vs. BERNABE
BAYA, Respondents
G.R. No. 188269, April 17, 2017

Doctrine: Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because

'continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer
involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits. Aptly called a
dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were
not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the
employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment. [D Verdadero v. Barney Autolines Group of Companies Transport, Inc., 693
Phil. 646, 656 (2012), citingMorales v. Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc., 680 Phil.
112, 120-121 (2012)]

Facts: Respondent Baya filed an illegal/constructive dismissal case against AMS

Farming Corporation (AMSFC) and Davao Fruits Corporation (DFC), before the NLRC.
Baya was employed as a supervisor and joined the union of supervisors, and
eventually, formed AMS Kapalong Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multipurpose
Cooperative (AMSKARBEMCO), the basic agrarian reform organization of the regular
employees of AMSFC.
Baya was reassigned to a series of supervisory positions in AMSFC’s sister company
also joined the supervisory positions and became a member of the latter’s supervisory
union.
Later on and upon AMSKARBEMCO’s petition before the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), some 220 hectares of AMSFC’s 513-hectare banana plantation were
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Eventually, said portion was
transferred to AMSFC’s regular employees as Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs),
including Baya.
ARBs held a referendum in order to choose as to which group between
AMSKARBEMCO or SAFFPAI, an association of pro-company beneficiaries, they
wanted to belong. 280 went to AMSKARBEMCO while 85 joined SAFFPAI.
When AMSFC learned that AMSKARBEMCO entered into an export agreement with
another company, it summoned AMSKARBEMCO officers, including Baya, to lash out
at them and even threatened them that the ARBs’ takeover of the lands would not
push through. Thereafter, Baya was again summoned, this time by a DFC manager,
who told the former that he would be putting himself in a “difficult situation” if he will
not shift his loyalty to SAFFPAI; this notwithstanding, Baya politely refused to betray
his cooperative. A few days later, Baya received a letter stating that his secondment
with DFC has ended, thus, ordering his return to AMSFC. However, upon Baya’s
return to AMSFC on August 30, 2002, he was informed that there were no
supervisory positions available; thus, he was assigned to different rank-and-file
positions instead.
Baya filed a Complaint. LA ruled in Baya’s favor.
NLRC found that the termination of Baya’s employment was not caused by illegal/
constructive dismissal, but by the cessation of AMSFC’s business operation or
undertaking in large portions of its banana plantation due to the implementation of
the agrarian reform program. Thus, the NLRC opined that Baya is not entitled to
separation pay as such cessation was not voluntary, but rather involuntary, on the
part of AMSFC as it was an act of the State, i.e., the agrarian reform program, that
caused the same.

Issue/s: Whether or not the Baya was constructively dismissed/illegally dismissed.

Whether or not AMSFC and DFC are liable to Baya for separation pay, moral
damages, and attorney’s fees.
Whether or not Sumifru should be held solidarily liable with AMSFC’s for Baya’s
monetary awards.

Held: Yes, Baya was constructively dismissed. Yes, he is entitled to such under the
doctrine of strained relations. Yes, Sumifru’s contention that it should only be held
liable for the period when Baya stayed with DFC as it only merged with the latter and
not with AMSFC is untenable.

Ratio: In Peckson v. Robinsons Supermarket Corp., the Court held that the burden is
on the employer to prove that the transfer or demotion of an employee was a valid
exercise of management prerogative and was not a mere subterfuge to get rid of an
employee; failing in which, the employer will be found liable for constructive
dismissal, viz.:
In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer and demotion of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as
genuine business necessity. Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a
constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a
demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Failure
of the employer to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's demotion shall no
doubt be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that the top management of both
AMSFC and DFC, which were sister companies at the time, were well-aware of the lack
of supervisory positions in AMSFC. This notwithstanding, they still proceeded to order
Baya's return therein, thus, forcing him to accept rank-and-file positions. Notably,
AMSFC and DFC failed to refute the allegation that Baya's "end of secondment with
DFC" only occurred after: (a) he and the rest of AMSKARBEMCO officials and members
were subjected to harassment and cooperative busting tactics employed by AMSFC
and DFC; and (b) he refused to switch loyalties from AMSKARBEMCO to SAFFP AI, the
pro-company cooperative. In this relation, the Court cannot lend credence to the
contention that Baya's termination was due to the ARBs' takeover of the banana
plantation, because the said takeover only occurred on September 20, 2002, while the
acts constitutive of constructive dismissal were performed as early as August 30,
2002, when Baya returned to AMSFC. Thus, AMSFC and DFC are guilty of
constructively dismissing Baya.
However, in light of the underlying circumstances which led to Baya's
constructive dismissal, it is clear that an atmosphere of animosity and antagonism
now exists between Baya on the one hand, and AMSFC and DFC on the other, which
therefore calls for the application of the doctrine of strained relations. "Under
the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an
acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or
viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a
highly oppressive work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from
the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no
longer trust." Thus, it is more prudent that Baya be awarded separation pay, instead
of being reinstated, as computed by the CA.
Further, and as aptly pointed out by both the LA and the CA, the acts constitutive of
Baya's constructive dismissal are clearly tainted with bad faith as they were done to
punish him for the actions of his cooperative, AMSKARBEMCO, and for not switching
his loyalty to the pro-company cooperative, SAFFP AI. This prompted Baya to litigate
in order to protect his interest and to recover what is properly due him. Hence, the
award of moral damages and attorney's fees are warranted.
Finally, Sumifru's contention that it should only be held liable for the period
when Baya stayed with DFC as it only merged with the latter and not with AMSFC 37 is
untenable. Section 80 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines clearly states that
one of the effects of a merger is that the surviving company shall inherit not only the
assets, but also the liabilities of the corporation it merged with, to wit:
Section 80. Effects of merger or consolidation. - The merger or consolidation shall have
the following effects:
1. The constituent corporations shall become a single corporation which, in case of
merger, shall be the surviving corporation designated in the plan of merger; and, in
case of consolidation, shall be the consolidated corporation designated in the plan of
consolidation;
2. The separate existence of the constituent corporations shall cease, except that of
the surviving or the consolidated corporation;
3. The surviving or the consolidated corporation shall possess all the rights, privileges,
immunities and powers and shall be subject to all the duties and liabilities of a
corporation organized under this Code;
4. The surviving or the consolidated corporation shall thereupon and thereafter
possess all the rights, privileges, immunities and franchises of each of the constituent
corporations; and all property, real or personal, and all receivables due on whatever
account, including subscriptions to shares and other choses in action, and all and
every other interest of, or belonging to, or due to each constituent corporation, shall be
deemed transferred to and vested in such surviving or consolidated corporation
without further act or deed; and
5. The surviving or consolidated corporation shall be responsible and liable for all the
liabilities and obligations of each of the constituent corporations in the same manner
as if such surviving or consolidated corporation had itself incurred such liabilities or
obligations; and any pending claim, action or proceeding brought by or against any of
such constituent corporations may be prosecuted by or against the surviving or
consolidated corporation. The rights of creditors or liens upon the property of any of
such constituent corporations shall not be impaired by such merger or consolidation.
In this case, it is worthy to stress that both AMSFC and DFC are guilty of acts
constitutive of constructive dismissal performed against Baya. As such, they should be
deemed as solidarily liable for the monetary awards in favor of Baya. Meanwhile,
Sumifru, as the surviving entity in its merger with DFC, must be held answerable for
the latter's liabilities, including its solidary liability with AMSFC arising herein. Verily,
jurisprudence states that "in the merger of two existing corporations, one of the
corporations survives and continues the business, while the other is dissolved and all
its rights, properties and liabilities are acquired by the surviving corporation," as in
this case.
RAMON MANUEL T. JAVINES, Petitioner vs. XLIBRIS a.k.a. AUTHOR
SOLUTIONS, INC., JOSEPH STEINBACH, and STELLA MARS OUANO,,
Respondents
G.R. No. 214301, June 1, 2017

Doctrine: Failure to file the requisite petition before the CA, the NLRC decision had
attained finality and had been placed beyond the appellate court's power of review.
Facts: Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as Operations Manager on September
1, 2011. Approximately 10 months after, or on July 27, 2012, Javines was terminated
for falsifying/tampering three meal receipts.
The falsification was discovered on July 5, 2012 when Javines submitted the meal
receipts for reimbursement to the finance department. Prompted by said discovery, the
company's Finance Officer prepared an incident report on the same day.
Consequently, a Notice to Explain was issued on July 6, 2012 to Javines for alleged
violation of the Employee's Code of Conduct and charging him with acts constituting
dishonesty. Xlibris obtained certified copies of the meal receipts from the fast food
chains concerned and Javines was notified that the following receipts were tampered.
On July 10, 2012, Javines submitted his written explanation, denying having
tampered the receipts. He explained that as Operations Manager, he is responsible for
securing reimbursement for expenses incurred by the supervisors under him. He
further explained that it is the supervisors who subinit the receipts to him and for
which, he prepares a reimbursement request. Once the reimbursement is made,
Javines distributes the cash to the supervisor concerned. J a vines argued that while
he prepares the request for reimbursement, he has no knowledge or part in the
tampered receipts.
On July 13, 2012, an administrative hearing was held. Javines failed to explain why
and how the incident transpired. Instead, Javines requested for further investigation
since, at that time, he allegedly could not recall who submitted the receipts to him. 7
Consequently, on the same day, notices to explain were sent to the supervisors under
Javines. In their written accounts, the supervisors· denied participation in the
tampered receipts.
On July 27, 2012, Xlibris terminated Javines' employment through an "end of
employment notice."
Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The complaint was, however,
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter who found that Javines' dismissal was for just cause
and with due process.
The NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter, finding that, while Javines was
dismissed for just cause, he was not afforded procedural due process.
The CA partially granted the petition. it observed that while Javines was given a
chance to explain his side and adduce evidence in his defense through his written
explanation and through the administrative hearing, he was nevertheless not given the
opportunity to rebut the additional pieces of evidence secured by Xlibris thereafter and
considered by Xlibris in arriving at the decision to terminate him.

Issue/s: Whether or not Javines was dismissed for just cause.

Held: Yes, he was dismissed for just cause.

Ratio: The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC uniformly held that Javines' employment was
terminated for just cause under Article 297 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor
Code.1âwphi1 It is undisputed that from this unanimous finding, Javines failed to
move for reconsideration nor challenged said.ruling before the CA. Consequently, the
NLRC decision finding Javines to have been dismissed for just cause. became final.
For failure to file the requisite petition before the CA, the NLRC decision had attained
finality and had been placed beyond the appellate court's power of review. Although
appeal is an essential part of judicial process, the right thereto is not a natural right or
a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Settled are the rules that a
decision becomes final as against a party who does not appeal the same and an
appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the court below. Hence,
the finding that Javines was dismissed for just cause must be upheld.
LUIS S. DOBLE, JR., Petitioner vs. ABB, INC./NITIN DESAI, Respondents
G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017

Doctrine: In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer
interposes the defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed
voluntarily resigned necessarily rests upon the employer. [San Miguel Properties Phi
ls., Inc. v. Gucaban, 669 Phil. 288, 297 (2011 ).]
Facts: Petitioner Luis S. Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent
ABB, Inc. as Junior Design Engineer on March 29, 1993. During almost nineteen (19)
years of his employment with the respondent ABB, Inc. prior to his disputed
termination, Doble rose through the ranks and was promoted.
As a matter of policy, ABB, Inc. conducts the yearly Performance and Development
Appraisal of all its employees. In all years prior to 2008, Doble was rated with grades
three (3) or four (4), which are equivalent to Strong Performance or Superior Results.
In the years 2008, 2009, and 2010, he received a performance rating of 4 for superior
results. At some time, Doble was called by respondent ABB, Inc. Country Manager and
President Nitin Desai, and was informed that his performance rating for 2011 is one
(1) which is equivalent to unsatisfactory performance.
During the meeting, ABB, Inc. President Desai explained to Doble that the Global and
Regional Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of
losses and level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised
the option for Doble to resign as Local Division Manager of the PS Division. Thereafter,
HR Manager Miranda told Doble that he would be paid separation pay equivalent to
75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided he would submit a letter
of resignation, and gave him until 12:45 p.m. within which to decide.
Shocked by the abrupt decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be
the one made to resign. Miranda said that it was the decision of the management, and
left him alone in the conference room to decide whether or not to resign. At this
juncture, the parties gave contrasting accounts on the ensuing events which led to the
termination of Doble's employment. Doble filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, other monetary claims and
damages.
Labor Arbiter held that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was
involuntary, and ordered ABB, Inc. and Desai to pay his backwages and separation
pay, since reinstatement is no longer feasible.
NLRC on the other hand found that the resignation of Doble being voluntary, there
can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of other monetary claims,
damages and attorney's fees. CA dismissed the petition.

Issue/s: Whether or not Doble was illegally dismissed and is entitled to monetary
claims.
Held: No, his resignation was voluntary.

Ratio: To begin with, constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work

because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely;
when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if
an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him
except to forego his continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the
harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of
constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position
would have felt compelled to give up his employment/position under the
circumstances.
On the other hand, "[r]esignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a
situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the
intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the
intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the
employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment."
Guided by these principles, the Court agrees with the NLRC that ABB, Inc. and Desai
were able to prove by substantial evidence that Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown
by the following documents (1) the affidavit of ABB, Inc. 's HR Manager Miranda; (2)
the resignation letter; the letter of intent to purchase service vehicle; and ABB, Inc. 's
acceptance letter, all dated March 13, 2012, (3) the Employee Clearance Sheet; (4) the
Certificate of Employment dated March 23, 2012; (5) photocopy of Bank of the
Philippine Islands manager's check in the amount of ₱2,009,822.72, representing the
separation benefit; (6) Employee Final Pay Computation, showing payment of leave
credits, rice subsidy and bonuses, amounting to ₱805,399.35; and (7) the Receipt,
Release and Quitclaim for a consideration of the total sum of ₱2,815,222.07.
Apart from his bare and self-serving allegations, however, Doble failed to present
substantial documentary or testimonial evidence to corroborate the same. It is well
settled that bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the
evidence on record, cannot be given credence. Neither can it be held that Doble was
constructively dismissed because there is no evidence on record of any act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain towards him which rendered his continued
employment unbearable or forced him to terminate his employment from ABB, Inc.,
much less a claim of demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits.
Since Doble claims to have been forced to submit a resignation letter, it is incumbent
upon him to prove with clear and convincing evidence that his resignation was not
voluntary, but was actually a case of constructive dismissal,i.e., a product of coercion
or intimidation. Coercion exists when there is a reasonable or well-grounded fear of an
imminent evil upon a person or his property or upon the person or property of his
spouse, descendants or ascendants.
Anent his monetary claims for 13th month pay, yearly bonus of about ₱750,000.00,
15 days vacation leave, 3 days long service leave, recreational allowance of
₱l80,000.00 per year, and rice subsidy of ₱20,400.00, Doble argued that he is entitled
thereto in light of the rule that where there is a finding of illegal dismissal, an
employee who is unjustly dismissed shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights, benefits and other privileges or its monetary equivalent computed
from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Suffice it to stress that there being no illegal dismissal in this case, Doble's monetary
claims must be denied for lack of legal basis.
Finally, since the Decision of the NLRC finding Doble to have voluntarily resigned is
supported by substantial evidence and in accord with law and prevailing
jurisprudence, no grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction may be imputed against the NLRC for having dismissed his complaint for
illegal dismissal against ABB, Inc. and Desai.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC, Petitioner vs ARJAN T. HASSARAM, Respondent
G.R. No. 217730, June 5, 2017

Doctrine: Retirement benefits contemplated in Article 287 of the Labor Code is

applicable only to a situation where (l) there is no CBA or other applicable employment
contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee, or (2) there is a CBA or
other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits for an
employee, but it is below the requirement set by law. [Elegir v PAL (691 Phil. 58
(2012).]

Facts: The case stemmed from a Complaint filed by Hassaram against PAL for illegal
dismissal and the payment of retirement benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. He
claimed that he had applied for retirement from PAL in August 2000 after rendering 24
years of service as a pilot, but that his application was denied. Instead, PAL informed
him that he had lost his employment in the company as of 9 June 1998, in view of his
failure to comply with the Return to Work Order issued by the Secretary of Labor
against members of the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) on 7 June
1998.
Before the Labor Arbiter (LA), Hassaram argued that he was not covered by the
Secretary's Return to Work Order; hence, PAL had no valid ground for his dismissal.
He asserted that on 9 June 1998, he was already on his way to Taipei to report for
work at Eva Air, pursuant to a four-year contract approved by PAL itself. Petitioner
further claimed that his arrangement with PAL allowed him to go on leave without pay
while working for Eva Air, with the right to accrue seniority and retire from PAL during
the period of his leave.
In its Position Paper, PAL contended that (a) the LA had no jurisdiction over the case,
which was a mere off-shoot of ALPAP's strike, a matter over which the Secretary of
Labor had already assumed jurisdiction; (b) the Complaint should be considered
barred by res judicata, forum shopping, and prescription; (c) the case should be
suspended while PAL was under receivership; and (d) if at all, Hassaram was entitled
only to retirement benefits of ₱5,000 for every year of service pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and ALPAP.
LA awarded retirement benefits and attorney's fees to Hassaram. Hassaram did not
defy the Return to Work Order, as he was in fact already on leave when the order was
implemented. As to the computation of benefits, the LA ruled that Article 287 of the
Labor Code should be applied, since the statute provided better benefits than the PAL-
ALPAP CBA. Hassaram's other claims, on the other hand, were dismissed.
The NLRC granted PAL's Motion for Reconsideration. Reversing its earlier Decision, it
set aside the ruling of the LA on account of Hassaram's receipt of retirement benefits
under the Plan. This payment, according to the NLRC, was sufficient to discharge his
claim for retirement pay.
The CA issued the assailed Decision reversing the NLRC and reinstating the ruling of
the LA. The appellate court declared that the funds received under the Plan were not
the retirement benefits contemplated by law. Hence, it ruled that Hassaram was still
entitled to receive retirement benefits in the amount of ₱2, 111,984.60 pursuant to
Article 287 of the Labor Code.

Issue/s: Whether the amount received by Hassaram under the Plan should be deemed
part of his retirement pay.
Whether Hassaram is entitled to receive retirement benefits under Article 287 of
the Labor Code.

Held: Yes, it is deemed part of his retirement pay. No, retirement pay should be
computed on the basis of the retirement plans provided by PAL.

Ratio: t is clear from the provisions of the Plan that it is the company that contributes
to a "retirement fund" for the account of the pilots. These contributions comprise the
benefits received by the latter upon retirement, separation from service, or
disability. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the Phils. the Court
utilized these provisions to explain the nature of the Plan:
The PAL Pilots' Retirement Benefit Plan is a retirement fund raised from contributions
exclusively from [PALI of amounts equivalent to 20% of each pilot's gross monthly pay.
Upon retirement, each pilot stands to receive the full amount of the contribution. In
sum, therefore, the pilot gets an amount equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly
income for every year of service he rendered to petitioner. This is in addition to the
amount of not less than ₱100,000.00 that he shall receive under the 1967 Retirement
Plan.47 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
Based on the foregoing characterization, the Court included the amount received from
the Plan in the computation of the retirement pay of the pilot involved in that case.
The same rule was later applied to Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.:
Consistent with the purpose of the law, the CA correctly ruled for the computation of
the petitioner's retirement benefits based on the two (2) PAL retirement plans because
it is under the same that he will reap the most benefits. Under the PAL-ALPAP
Retirement Plan, the petitioner, who qualified for late retirement after rendering more
than twenty (20) years of service as a pilot, is entitled to a lump sum payment of
₱125,000.00 for his twenty-five (25) years of service to PAL. xxx.
x x xx
Apart from the abovementioned benefit, the petitioner is also entitled to the equity of
the retirement fund under PAL Pilots' Retirement Benefit Plan, which pertains to the
retirement fund raised from contributions exclusively from PAL of amounts equivalent
to 20% of each pilot's gross monthly pay. Each pilot stands to receive the full amount
of the contribution upon his retirement which is equivalent to 240% of his gross
monthly income for every year of service he rendered to PAL. This is in addition to the
amount of not less than ₱l 00,000.00 that he shall receive under the PAL-ALP AP
Retirement Plan. (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
Considering that the very same retirement plan is involved in this petition, we adopt
the pronouncements in the above cases. We therefore rule that the amount of
₱4,456,8l7.75 received by Hassaram from the PAL Plan formed part of his retirement
pay.
We first examine Article 287 of the Labor Code, which provides in relevant part:
Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age
established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment
contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits
as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement
and other agreements:Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits
under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those
provided therein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years
or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory
retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may
retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1 /2)
month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year.
Interpreting the language of this provision, we declared in Elegir as follows:
It can be clearly inferred from the language of the foregoing provision that it is
applicable only to a situation where (l) there is no CBA or other applicable employment
contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee, or (2) there is a CBA or
other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits for an
employee, but it is below the requirement set by law. The rationale for the first
situation is to prevent the absurd situation where an employee, deserving to receive
retirement benefits, is denied them through the nefarious scheme of employers to
deprive employees of the benefits due them under existing labor laws. On the other
hand, the second situation aims to prevent private contracts from derogating from the
public law.
xxxx
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that the purpose of the amendment is not merely
to establish precedence in application or accord blanket priority to existing CBAs in
computing retirement benefits. The determining factor in choosing which retirement
scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits provided. Thus, even if there is
an existing CBA but the same does not provide for retirement benefits equal or
superior to that which is provided under Article 287 of the Labor Code, the latter will
apply. In this manner, the employee can be assured of a reasonable amount of
retirement pay for his sustenance. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the above pronouncement, we therefore declare that Hassaram's retirement
benefits must be computed based on the retirement plans of PAL, and not on Article
287 of the Labor Code. In view of the undisputed fact that Hassaram has received his
benefits under the Plan, he is now entitled to claim only his remaining benefits under
the CBA, i.e. the amount of ₱l20,000 (24 years x ₱5,000) for his 24 years of service to
the company.
SPECTRUM SECURITY SERVICES, INC., Petitioner vs. DAVID GRAVE, ARIEL V.
AROA, TOMASINO R. DE CHAVEZ, JR., LUCITO P. SAMARITA, SAIDOMAR M.
MAROHOM, LITO V. MAHILOM and OLIVER N. MARTIN, Respondents
G.R. No. 196650, June 7, 2017

Doctrine: A security guard placed on reserved or off-detail status is deemed

constructively dismissed only if the status should last more than six months. Any
claim of constructive dismissal must be established by clear and positive evidence.
[Salvaloza v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 182086, November 24,
2010, 636 SCRA 184, 197-198; Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v.
Lactao, G.R. No. 160940, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 110, 116-117.]
Facts: The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing
security services - employed and posted the respondents at the premises of Ibiden
Philippines, Inc. (Ibiden) located in the First Philippine Industrial Park in Sto. Tomas,
Batangas. The controversy started when the petitioner implemented an action plan as
part of its operational and manpower supervision enhancement program geared
towards the gradual replacement of security guards at Ibiden. Pursuant to the action
plan, it issued separate "Notice(s) to Return to Unit" to the respondents in July and
August 2008 directing them to report to its head office and to update their documents
for re-assignment.
On August 14, 2008, the respondents filed their complaint against the petitioner for
constructive dismissal in Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV of the NLRC, claiming
that the implementation of the action plan was a retaliatory measure against them for
bringing several complaints5 along with other employees of the petitioner to recover
unpaid holiday pay and 13th month pay. The complaints were consolidated, and a
decision was later on rendered ordering the petitioner to pay to the respondents and
their co-employees their unpaid entitlements corresponding to the period from October
16, 2007 to June 30, 2008.
LA dismissed the complaint for constructive dismissal upon finding that "there is no
evidence adduced by complainants in the form of a termination letter and the like to
substantiate their claim that they were indeed unceremoniously terminated by
[petitioner] Spectrum.
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's dismissal, and ordered the petitioner to reinstate
the respondents with backwages. It noted that had the petitioner really intended to re-
assign the respondents to new posts, the petitioner should have indicated in the
notices the new postings or re-assignments.
CA affirmed NLRC’s decision.

Issue/s: Whether or not there was illegal dismissal.

Held: None.
Ratio: Security guards, like other employees in the private sector, are entitled to
security of tenure. However, their situation should be differentiated from that of other
employees or workers. The employment of security guards generally depends on their
employers' contracts with clients who are third parties to the employment relationship,
and the requirements of the latter for security services and what will be beneficial to
them dictate the posting of the security guards. It is also relevant to mention that their
employers retain the management prerogative to change their assignments and
postings, and to decide to temporarily relieve them of their assignments. In other
words, their security of tenure, though it shields them from demotions in rank or
diminutions of salaries, benefits and other privileges, does not vest them with the right
to their positions or assignments that will prevent their transfers or re-assignments
(unless the transfers or re-assignments are motivated by discrimination or bad faith,
or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause). Such
peculiar conditions of their employment render inevitable that some of them just have
to undergo periods of reserved or off-detail status that should not by any means
equate to their dismissal. Only when the period of their reserved or off-detail status
exceeds the reasonable period of six months without re-assignment should the
affected security guards be regarded as dismissed.
Indeed, there should be no indefinite lay-offs. After the period of six months, the
employers should either recall the affected security guards to work or consider them
permanently retrenched pursuant to the requirements of the law; otherwise, the
employers would be held to have dismissed them, and would be liable for such
dismissals.
The petitioner sufficiently established, too, that it did not ignore the respondents,
contrary to their claims. As the records bear out, one of the respondents reported to
the head office but only to claim his salary and to avail himself of a loan from the
Social Security System (SSS); and that another respondent, Oliver Martin, albeit
notified of his endorsement to a new posting with a different client company, did not
report to the new posting.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that when respondents reported to the human
resource office and the company did not provide them with new assignments at that
time, the six-month period had not yet lapsed. Note that the position paper submitted
by the respondents to the NLRC was only received by the NLRC on December 11,
2008. The reckoning of the end of the six-month period from the supposed
termination (i.e., July and August 2008, the period when they were each given the
"Notice to Return to Unit") would only be in January or February 2009.
Lastly, the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was guilty of providing the
respondents with new assignments during the pendency of the proceedings.1âwphi1 It
appears, indeed, that by the time the respondents appealed their case in the NLRC,
some of them had already gained regular employment as security guards elsewhere
during their reserved status with the petitioner and prior to the lapse of the six-month
period.
The act of some of the respondents of gaining employment as security guards
elsewhere constituted abandonment of their employment with the petitioner.
Abandonment requires the concurrence of two elements, namely: one, the employee
must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and, two, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the
employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act.
Although mere absence or failure to report for work, even after notice to return, does
not necessarily amount to abandonment, the law requires that there be clear proof of
deliberate and unjustified intent on the part of the employee to sever the employer-
employee relationship. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly
presumed from certain equivocal acts. In other words, the operative act is still the
employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his employment.
YOLANDO T. BRAVO, Petitioner vs. URIOS COLLEGE (NOW FATHER SATURNINO
URIOS UNIVERSITY) and/or FR. JOHN CHRISTIAN U. YOUNG,, Respondents
G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017

Doctrine: The employer must adduce proof of actual involvement in the alleged
misconduct for loss of trust and confidence to warrant the dismissal of fiduciary rank-
and-file employees. However, "mere existence of a basis for believing that [the]
employee has breached the trust [and confidence] of [the] employer" is sufficient for
managerial employees. (Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, 359 Phil 399,
406 (1998) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].)
Facts: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College, now
called Father Satumino Urios lJniversity. 7 In addition to his duties as a part-time
teacher, Bravo was designated as the school's comptroller from June 1, 2002 to May
31, 2002.
Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non-
academic employees for school year 2001-2002." "[U]nder [the proposed ranking]
system, the position of Comptroller was classified as an office [h]ead while the position
of VicePresident for Finance was classified as [m]iddle [m]anagement."
The proposed ranking system for school year 2001-2002 was presented to Bravo for
comments. Bravo recommended that "the position of Comptroller should be classified
as a middle management position [because it was] ... informally merged with . . . the
position of [V]ice[ P]resident for [F]inance." In addition, the Comptroller and the
VicePresident for Finance performed similar functions, which included follow up of
payroll preparation, verification of daily cash vouchers, and certification of checks
issued by the school. Moreover, they were responsible for the control of checkbooks
issuance to the Cashier, preparation of departmental budget guidelines, supervision of
reports and payments to various government agencies, and analysis and interpretation
of financial statements. Bravo further suggested that since he assumed the duties of
Comptroller and Vice-President for Finance, his salary scale should be upgraded.
The committee allegedly agreed with Bravo and accepted his recommendations. Bravo
was then directed to arrange a salary adjustment schedule for the new ranking
system.
Meanwhile, Urios College decided to undertake a structural reorganization. During
this period, Bravo occupied the Comptroller position in a "hold-over" capacity until
May 31, 2003. He was reappointed to the same position, which expired on May 31,
2004. Bravo was then designated as a full-time teacher in the college department for
school year 2004-2005.
In October 2004, Urios College organized a committee to review the ranking system
implemented during school year 2001-2002. In its report, the committee found that
the ranking system for school year 2001-2002 caused salary distortions among several
employees. There were also discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo and of
two (2) other employees, namely, Nena A. Turgo and Cherry I. Tabada. The committee
discovered that "the Comptroller's Office solely prepared and implemented the [s]alary
[a]djustment [s]chedule" without prior approval from the Human Resources
Department.
The committee recommended, among others, that Bravo be administratively charged
for serious misconduct or willful breach of trust under Article 282 of the Labor
Code. Bravo allegedly misclassified several positions and miscomputed his and other
employees' salaries.
On March 16, 2005, Bravo received a show cause memo requiring him to explain in
writing why his services should not be terminated for his alleged acts of serious
misconduct.
A committee was organized to investigate the matter. Hearings were conducted on
April 5, 2005, April 9, 2005, and once in May 2005, after which the parties submitted
their respective position papers. In his Position Paper, Bravo alleged that he did not
prepare the ranking system for school year 2001-2002. It was the ranking committee
which categorized the position of Comptroller as middle management.
Bravo was found guilty of serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the
sum of ₱ 179,319.16, representing overpayment of his monthly salary. He received a
copy of the investigation committee's decision on July 15, 2005.
On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his services
for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon receipt of the
termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E.
Pelaez (Executive Labor Arbiter Pelaez) a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer
for the payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees.
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Bravo's act of"assigning to himself an
excessive and unauthorized salary rate while working as a [C]omptroller" constituted
serious misconduct and willful breach of trust and confidence for which he may be
dismissed.
NLRC found that Bravo's dismissal from service was illegal. There was no clear
showing that Bravo violated any school policy. Moreover, Bravo received the increased
salary in good faith. It also found that Urios College "failed to afford [Bravo] the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel.
The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision and reinstated the decision of LA.

Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioner’s service was terminated for just cause.

Held: Yes, it was for a just cause under Article 297 of the Labor Code.

Ratio: There is no evidence that the position of Comptroller was officially reclassified
as middle management by respondent. Petitioner's employment ranking slip, if at all,
only constituted proof of petitioner's evaluation score. It hardly represented the formal
act of respondent in reclassifying the position of Comptroller. Hence, petitioner could
not summarily assign to himself a higher salary rate without rendering himself unfit to
continue working for respondent.
However, it appears that petitioner was neither induced nor motivated by any wrongful
intent. He believed in good faith that respondent had accepted and approved his
recommendations on the proposed ranking scale for school year 2001-2002.
Nevertheless, due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's employment may be
terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article 297(a), of the
Labor Code.
A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under
Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions.
First, the employee whose services are to be terminated must occupy a position of
trust and confidence.
There are two (2) types of positions in which trust and confidence are reposed by the
employer, namely, managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file
employees. Managerial employees are considered to occupy positions of trust and
confidence because they are "entrusted with confidential and delicate matters." On
the other hand, fiduciary rank-and-file employees refer to those employees, who, "in
the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant
amounts of [the employer's] money or property." Examples of fiduciary rank-and-file
employees are "cashiers, auditors, property custodians," selling tellers, and sales
managers. It must be emphasized, however, that the nature and scope of work and not
the job title or designation determine whether an employee holds a position of trust
and confidence.
The second condition that must be satisfied is the presence of some basis for the loss
of trust and confidence. This means that "the employer must establish the existence of
an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence."Otherwise, employees will be left at
the mercy of their employers.
Set against these parameters, this Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed
based on loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file
employee. His position of responsibility on delicate financial matters entailed a
substantial amount of trust from respondent. The entire payroll account depended on
the accuracy of the classifications made by the Comptroller. It was reasonable for the
employer to trust that he had basis for his computations especially with respect to his
own compensation. The preparation of the payroll is a sensitive matter requiring
attention to detail. Not only does the payroll involve the company's finances, it also
affects the welfare of all other employees who rely on their monthly salaries.
In termination based on just causes, the employer must comply with procedural due
process by furnishing the employee a written notice containing the specific grounds or
causes for dismissal.116 The notice must also direct the employee to submit his or her
written explanation within a reasonable period from the receipt of the notice.
Afterwards, the employer must give the employee ample opportunity to be heard and
defend himself or herself. A hearing, however, is not a condition sine qua non.
A formal hearing only becomes mandatory in termination cases when so required
under company rules or when the employee requests for it.
Any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence and address the
charges against him or her satisfies the requirement of ample opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the employer must serve a notice informing the employee of his or her
dismissal from employment.
In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural due process
in terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished petitioner a show cause
memo stating the specific grounds for dismissal. The show cause memo also required
petitioner to answer the charges by submitting a written explanation. Respondent even
informed petitioner that he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then
conducted a thorough investigation. Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate
occasions. The findings of the investigation committee were then sent to petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination containing respondent’s final
decision.
SUMIFRU (PHILIPPINES) CORP. (surviving entity of a merger with Fresh Banana
Agricultural Corporation and other corporations), Petitioner vs. NAGKAHIUSANG
MAMUMUO SA SUYAPA FARM (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU), Respondent
G.R. No. 202091, June 7, 2017

Doctrine: The "four-fold test" is used to determine the existence of an employer-

employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his
wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the
most crucial is the element of control.
Facts: Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its
merger with Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in 2008. FBAC was
engaged in the buying, marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas.
Respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUF ANAFLU-KMU)
(NAMASUFA) is a labor organization affiliated with the National Federation of Labor
Unions and Kilusang Mayo Uno.
On July 28, 2008, the DOLE Med-Arbiter issued an Order granting the Petition for
Certification Election of NAMASUF A and declared that Sumifru was the employer of
the workers concerned.
In ruling that an employer-employee relationship existed, the MedArbiter stated:
The "four-fold test" will show that respondent FBAC is the employer of petitioner's
members. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct.
The most important element is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not
only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to
accomplish it.
On the first factor, (selection and engagement of the employer), it is apparent that the
staff of respondent FBAC advised those who are interested to be hired in the Packing
Plant to become members first of CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it.
On the second factor (payment of wages), while the respondent tried to impress upon
us that workers are paid by A2Y Contracting Services, this at best is but an
administrative arrangement. We agree with petitioner that the payroll summary
submitted does not contain the relevant information such as the employee's rate of
pay, deductions made and the amount actually paid to the employee.
On the third factor, (the power of dismissal), it is very clear that respondent FBAC is
the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against erring workers. This alone
proves that it wields disciplinary authority over them.
Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent
FBAC gives instructions to the workers on how to go about their work is sufficient
indication that it exercises control over their movements. The workers are instructed
as to what time they are supposed to report and what time they are supposed to
return. They were required to fill up monitoring sheets as they go about their jobs and
even the materials which they used in the packing plant were supplied by FBAC.
Viewed from the above circumstances, it is clear that respondent FBAC is the real
employer of the workers of Packing Plant 90. They are in truth and in fact the
employees of the respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on A2Y Contracting
Services as the ostensible employer was nothing but an elaborate scheme to deprive
them their right to self-organization.
Sumifru appealed to the DOLE Secretary and in a Resolution dated February 8, 2010,
the DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal.
Sumifru then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA raising the issue of whether the
DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring it as the employer of
the workers at PP 90 but the CA dismissed the petition.

Issue/s: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship.

Held: Yes, there is Er-Ee relationship by applying the four-fold test.

Ratio: SUMIFRU raises the same issue of non-existence of employeremployee

relationship, which had been squarely resolved in the negative by the Med-Arbiter and
the DOLE Secretary. We find no traces of abuse in discretion in the ruling of the DOLE
Secretary anchored as it is on substantial evidence.
The Court has consistently applied the "four-fold test" to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b)
pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of
these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the
employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee
as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same.
In this case, the records are replete with evidence which would show that SUMIFRU
has control over the concerned workers, to wit:
1. FBAC memorandum on "Standardized Packing Plant Breaktime";
2. Material Requisition for PP 90;
3. Memorandum dated February 9, 2008 on "no helmet, no entry" policy posted at the
packing plant;
4. Memorandum dated October 15, 2007 on "no ID, no entry policy";
5. Attendance Sheet for General Assembly Meeting called by FBAC on February 18[,]
2004;
6. Attendance Sheet for Packers ISO awareness seminar on February 11, 2004 called
by FBAC;
7. FBAC Traypan Fruit Inspection Packer's Checklist issued by FBAC for the use of
workers in the Packing Plant;
8. FBAC KD Gluing Pattern Survey.
The above orders issued by SUMIFRU/FBAC would show that not only does it have
control over the results of the workers in PP 90 but also in the manners and methods
of its accomplishment.
As stated beforehand, there is no cogent reason to set aside the ruling of the DOLE
Secretary which affirmed the findings of the Med-Arbiter.1âwphi1 By reason of their
special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are
in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard
are generally accorded respect and even finality by the courts when supported by
substantial evidence, as in this case.
RAVENGAR G. IBON, Petitioner vs. GENGHIS KHAN SECURITY SERVICES
and/or MARIETTA VALLESPIN, Respondents
G.R. No. 221085, June 19, 2017

Doctrine: Temporary off-detail of a security guard is generally allowed, but is

tantamount to constructive dismissal if the floating status extends beyond six (6)
months. [Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency 708 Phil. 598 (2013)]
Facts: Ravengar G. Ibon (petitioner) was employed as a security guard by Genghis
Khan Security Services (respondent) sometime in June 2008. He was initially assigned
to a certain Mr. Solis in New Manila, Quezon City. In July 2008, he was transferred to
the 5th Avenue Condominium in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, in September 2008 and
was posted there until May 2009.
In June 2009, petitioner was transferred to the Aspen Tower Condominium until his
last duty on October 4, 2010. Thereafter, respondent promised to provide him a new
assignment, which, however, did not happen.
On May 10, 2011, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal,
with claims for underpayment of wages, holiday and rest day premiums, service
incentive leave pay, non-payment of separation pay, and reimbursement of illegal
deductions. He alleged that he was no longer assigned to a new post after his last duty
on October 4, 2010; that he was merely receiving a daily salary of ₱384.00; and that in
the course of his employment, respondent would deduct ₱200.00 per month as cash
bond from September 2008 until September 2010.
For his part, respondent denied that petitioner was placed on a floating status for
more than six (6) months. It claimed that he was suspended on October 4, 2010 for
sleeping on the job. Respondent added that petitioner was endorsed to another client
for re-assignment, which the latter refused because his license was due for renewal.
Since then, petitioner failed to report for work.
Sometime in November 2010, petitioner went to respondent's office to claim his 13th
month pay, but the same was not given to him because it was not yet due. Respondent
then received a call from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) regarding
petitioner's claim for 13th month pay, which was later on settled during the
proceedings before the DOLE. It then sent letters to petitioner requiring him to report
for work, but he did not show up. Hence, respondent was surprised to receive
summons regarding the complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared petitioner to have been constructively dismissed
because of respondent's failure to put him on duty for more than six (6) months. It
ordered respondent to pay petitioner backwages from May 5, 2011, the effective date of
the constructive dismissal. The LA also granted petitioner's prayer for separation pay
in view of the parties' strained relationship, as well as his claims for wage differential,
service incentive leave pay and reimbursement of his cash bond.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the LA. It opined that there was no
constructive dismissal because respondent did not intend to indefinitely place
petitioner on a floating status. The NLRC noted that respondent sent letters to
petitioner requiring him to report back to work within the six-month period. It added
that respondent offered to reinstate petitioner during the proceedings before the LA,
but the said offer was rejected by the latter.
The CA affirmed the NLRC finding that petitioner was not constructively dismissed. It
wrote that the evidence on record showed that petitioner was required to report back
to work and that on October 21, 2010, he was offered a new assignment, which he
refused. The CA concluded that there was no dismissal to speak of as it was petitioner
who manifested his lack of interest in going back to work.

Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed.

Held: Yes, Ibon was constructive dismissed by the respondent .

Ratio: Temporary displacement or temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally,

allowed in a situation where a security agency's client decided not to renew their
service contract with the agency and no post is available for the relieved security
guard. Such situation does not normally result in a constructive dismissal.
Nonetheless, when the floating status lasts for more than six (6) months, the employee
may be considered to have been constructively dismissed. No less than the
Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure, thus, employees
can only be dismissed for just or authorized causes and after they have been afforded
the due process of law.
Relative thereto, constructive dismissal may exist if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the
employee that it can foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment or when there is cessation of work because continued employment is
rendered impossible, or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a
diminution in pay.
In the case at bench, petitioner was last deployed on October 4, 2010. Thus, it was
incumbent upon respondent to show that he was redeployed within six (6) months
from the said date. Otherwise, petitioner would be deemed to have been constructively
dismissed.
A perusal of the records, however, reveals that aside from respondent's bare assertions
that petitioner was suspended, which the latter had denied, there was no evidence of
the imposition of said penalty. Respondent could have easily produced documents to
support its contention that petitioner had been suspended, considering that employers
are required to observe due process in the discipline of employees.
Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, respondent should have deployed
petitioner to a specific client within six (6) months from his last assignment. The
correspondences allegedly sent to petitioner merely required him to explain why he did
not report to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if
petitioner actually received the letters of respondent, he was still constructively
dismissed because none of these letters indicated his reassignment to another client.
Respondent is guilty of constructive dismissal because it never attempted to redeploy
petitioner to a definite assignment or security detail.
Further, petitioner's refusal to accept the offer of reinstatement could not have the
effect of validating an otherwise constructive dismissal considering the that same was
made only after petitioner had filed a case for illegal dismissal. Further, at the time the
offer for reinstatement was made, petitioner's constructive dismissal had long been
consummated. Such belated gesture does not absolve respondent from the
consequences of petitioner's dismissal.
NORMAN PANALIGAN, IRENEO VILLAJIN, and GABRIEL PENILLA, Petitioners vs.
PHYVITA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, Respondent
G.R. No. 202086, June 21, 2017

Doctrine: An employer may terminate an employment for any of the causes

under Article 297 of the Labor Code. For an employer to validly dismiss an employee
on the ground of loss of trust and confidence under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code,
the employer must observe the following guidelines: 1) loss of confidence should not be
simulated; 2) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper,
illegal or unjustified; 3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary; and 4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify
earlier action taken in bad faith. More importantly, it must be based on a wilful breach
of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
Facts: Petitioners were employee of herein respondent. Sometime in 25 January 2005,
it was discovered that sales from 22nd-24 th of the same month was missing. Though
reported to the Finance head, there was no avail in finding it and been reported to
Henry Ting, Vice-President for Operations.
Respondent’s Legal Officer, Joy Ting, reported an alleged theft but the police officers
likewise failed to determine the suspect. While the investigation is pending, petitioners
together with their other co-employees filed a complaint before the DOLE claiming to
be underpaid and nonpayment of other benefits.
Meanwhile, a show cause memo was released by the respondent’s Assistant
Operation’s Manager Jerry Rafols for the alleged theft incident against the petitioner
and directed to file an answer for the claim. On the scheduled hearings, petitioners
failed to appear, thus caused the respondent to terminate the petitioners. Respondent
filed a complaint before the Office of the Prosecutor but was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint before the NLRC alleging illegal dismissal
by the respondent which ruled in their favor. However, CA reversed the decision.

Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Held: Yes, they were illegally dismissed by the respondent.

Ratio: There is no question that PANALIGAN, et al., occupied positions that are
reposed with trust and confidence. Jurisprudence states that the job of a roomboy or
chambermaid in a hotel is clearly of such a nature as to require a substantial amount
of trust and confidence on the part of the employer. There is merit as well in
PHYVITA's assertion that the dismissal of its criminal complaint does not necessarily
exonerate PANALIGAN, et al., from a charge of loss of trust and confidence. However,
even with the lower burden of proof in labor cases, there is a dearth of substantial
evidence to support a finding that PANALIGAN, et al., were indeed guilty of a willful
breach of their employer's trust. We are constrained to conclude that there is no just
and valid cause to terminate the employment of PANALIGAN, et al., for loss of trust
and confidence or even for serious misconduct.
Therefore, we uphold the NLRC in finding that PANALIGAN, et al., were illegally
dismissed from employment by PHYVIT A and, thus, are entitled to separation pay, in
lieu of reinstatement, and full backwages. Given the obviously strained relations
between the parties and the length of time that PANALIGAN, et al., have been
separated from their employment in PHYVIT A, we agree with the NLRC that the
doctrine of strained relations must apply wherein the payment of separation pay is
considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no
longer desirable or viable.
Finally, we find no reason to disturb the NLRC's ruling regarding the award of salary
differentials and unpaid salaries for April 2005 to PANALIGAN, et al. The Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC both found that PANALIGAN, et al.'s,wages were underpaid based on
the documents on record; they only differed in the period or the number of months.
We agree with the NLRC that PHYVITA should be liable for PANALIGAN, et al.'s, claims
for underpaid salaries that had not yet prescribed at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Moreover, it is settled even in labor cases that "one who pleads payment
has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege nonpayment, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than
on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment. "In another case, we upheld the NLRC' s ruling
that the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that it has not committed any
violation of labor standard laws, in particular the full payment of the legally mandated
wages. If PHYVITA had truly paid PANALIGAN, et al., their correct wages, it had every
opportunity to produce all relevant payrolls and documents in the proceedings below
instead of merely submitting incomplete documents relating to February 2005
salaries, 13th month pay and service incentive leave.
Respondent failed to attribute the loss of confidence nor the willful breach of trust
towards the petitioners. There was no substantial evidence adduced to support the
claim of violation or theft nor link the cause of action to effect theft as against the
employees.
The question of possession of the alleged stolen documents were explained by
respondent’s employee who admitted to be the source of the same.
Thus, though reposed with trust and confidence by virtue of their job, there was no
sufficient cause to support the findings leading to termination.